The Complete Works of
THUCYDIDES



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The Complete Works of
THUCYDIDES

(c. 460–395 BC)



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





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The Translations

Athens — Thucydides' birthplace

THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

Thucydides' famous history recounts the events of the Peloponnesian War, which was fought between the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta, and the Delian League, led by Athens. The author himself was an Athenian that happened to serve as a general during the war and the book has been widely celebrated for its objective and scientific approach to history. Thucydides is one of the first historians to employ a strict standard of chronology, recording events by year, with each year consisting of the summer campaign season and a less active winter season. This method contrasts sharply with Herodotus' earlier work *The Histories*, which is chronologically mixed at times and makes frequent digressions into unrelated areas.

Thucydides work is famous for its extensive use of first-person speeches in order to elaborate on the events it portrays. These include addresses given to troops by their generals before battles and numerous political speeches, both by Athenian and Spartan leaders, as well as debates between various parties. Of the speeches, the most famous is the funeral oration of Pericles, which is found in Book Two. Thucydides undoubtedly heard some of these speeches himself, whilst for others he relied on eyewitness accounts and, of course, many others must be products of his imagination.

The gods play no active role in Thucydides' History, which is different from Herodotus' History. Instead, Thucydides regards history as being caused by the choices and actions of human beings. Nevertheless, religion and piety play critical roles in the actions of the Spartans, and to a lesser

degree, the Athenians and Thucydides is clearly concerned with natural occurrences, such as earthquakes and eclipses, which to modern readers would be viewed as superstitious occurrences.

The History of the Peloponnesian War was divided into eight books by editors of later antiquity. The first book, after a brief review of early Greek history and some programmatic historiographical commentary, seeks to explain why the Peloponnesian War broke out when it did and what its causes were. Except for a few short excursuses (notably 6.54-58 on the Tyrant Slayers), the remainder of the History (Books II through to VIII) rigidly maintains its focus on the Peloponnesian War to the exclusion of almost all other topics.

Thucydides explains that the primary cause of the Peloponnesian War was the growth in power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta. The historian traces the development of Athenian power through the growth of their Empire in the years 479 BC to 432 BC in first Book of the History (1.89-118). The legitimacy of the Empire is explored in several passages, notably in the speech at 1.73-78, where an anonymous Athenian legation defends the empire on the grounds that it was freely given to the Athenians and not taken by force. The subsequent expansion of the Empire is defended by these Athenians, “...the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honour and interest came afterward.” (1.75.3)

The Athenians also argue that, “We have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human nature in accepting an empire when it was offered to us and then in refusing to give it up.” (1.76) They claim that anyone in their position would act in the same fashion. The Spartans represent a more traditional, circumspect, and less expansive power. Indeed, the Athenians are nearly destroyed by their greatest act of imperial overreach, the

Sicilian expedition, described in books six and seven of the History.

It is commonly thought that Thucydides died while still working on his History, since it ends in mid-sentence and only goes up to 410 BC, leaving six years of the war uncovered. Furthermore, there is a great deal of uncertainty whether he intended to revise the sections he had already written. Since there appear to be some contradictions between certain passages in the text, it has been proposed that the conflicting passages were written at different times and that Thucydides' opinion on the conflicting matter had changed over time.

Thucydides' great work has been extremely influential in both ancient and modern historiography. It was embraced by the author's contemporaries and immediate successors with enthusiasm, with many authors seeking to complete the unfinished history. Xenophon wrote his *Hellenica* as a continuation of Thucydides' History, beginning at the exact moment that Thucydides' work leaves off. However, Xenophon's continuation is generally considered inferior in style and accuracy compared with Thucydides' text, though it is generally regarded as the most accurate and accomplished continuation of Thucydides' great work. To complement Thucydides' unfinished text, Xenophon's continuation *Hellenica,* translated by H. G. Dakyns, is also provided in this collection.



Head of Thucydides. The portrait is a copy, probably late Hellenistic, of a lost Greek work of the early fourth century BC.



An early papyrus fragment of the famous History

Vase painting of a Hoplite soldier

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One of the principal events narrated in Thucydides' great work — Pericles' Funeral Oration by Philipp von Foltz

Sphacteria island, one of the principal scenes of the History, where the Athenians enjoyed a famous victory in 425 BC: for the first time forcing the Spartans to surrender to them.

Alcibiades (c. 450 – 404 BC) was a charismatic Athenian statesman, orator, and general, who played a major role in the second half of that conflict as a strategic advisor, military commander and politician.



A Victorian engraving of the Battle of Syracuse — a key later event of the History

BOOK I

[1] THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war in which the Peloponnesians and the Athenians fought against one another. He began to write when they first took up arms, believing that it would be great and memorable above any previous war. For he argued that both states were then at the full height of their military power, and he saw the rest of the Hellenes either siding or intending to side with one or other of them. No movement ever stirred Hellas more deeply than this; it was shared by many of the Barbarians, and might be said even to affect the world at large. The character of the events which preceded, whether immediately or in more remote antiquity, owing to the lapse of time cannot be made out with certainty. But, judging from the evidence which I am able to trust after most careful enquiry, I should imagine that former ages were not great either in their wars or in anything else.

[2] The country which is now called Hellas was not regularly settled in ancient times. The people were migratory, and readily left their homes whenever they were overpowered by numbers. There was no commerce, and they could not safely hold intercourse with one another either by land or sea. The several tribes cultivated their own soil just enough to obtain a maintenance from it. But they had no accumulations of wealth and did not plant the ground; for, being without walls, they were never sure that an invader might not come and despoil them. Living in this manner and knowing that they could anywhere obtain a bare subsistence, they were always ready to migrate; so that they had neither great cities nor any considerable resources. The richest districts were most constantly changing their inhabitants; for example, the countries which are now called Thessaly and Boeotia, the greater part of the Peloponnesus with the exception of Arcadia, and all the best parts of Hellas. For the

productiveness of the land increased the power of individuals; this in turn was a source of quarrels by which communities were ruined, while at the same time they were more exposed to attacks from without. Certainly Attica, of which the soil was poor and thin, enjoyed a long freedom from civil strife, and therefore retained its original inhabitants. And a striking confirmation of my argument is afforded by the fact that Attica through immigration increased in population more than any other region. For the leading men of Hellas, when driven out of their own country by war or revolution, sought an asylum at Athens; and from the very earliest times, being admitted to rights of citizenship, so greatly increased the number of inhabitants that Attica became incapable of containing them, and was at last obliged to send out colonies to Ionia.

[3] The feebleness of antiquity is further proved to me by the circumstance that there appears to have been no common action in Hellas before the Trojan War. And I am inclined to think that the very name was not as yet given to the whole country, and in fact did not exist at all before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion; the different tribes, of which the Pelasgian was the most widely spread, gave their own names to different districts. But when Hellen and his sons became powerful in Phthiotis, their aid was invoked by other cities, and those who associated with them gradually began to be called Hellenes, though a long time elapsed before the name prevailed over the whole country. Of this Homer affords the best evidence; for he, although he lived long after the Trojan War, nowhere uses this name collectively, but confines it to the followers of Achilles from Phthiotis, who were the original Hellenes; when speaking of the entire host he calls them Danaäns, or Argives, or Achaeans. Neither is there any mention of Barbarians in his poems, clearly because there were as yet no Hellenes opposed to them by a common distinctive name. Thus the several Hellenic tribes (and I mean by the term Hellenes

those who, while forming separate communities, had a common language, and were afterwards called by a common name), owing to their weakness and isolation, were never united in any great enterprise before the Trojan War. And they only made the expedition against Troy after they had gained considerable experience of the sea.

[4] Minos is the first to whom tradition ascribes the possession of a navy. He made himself master of a great part of what is now termed the Hellenic sea; he conquered the Cyclades, and was the first coloniser of most of them, expelling the Carians and appointing his own sons to govern in them. Lastly, it was he who, from a natural desire to protect his growing revenues, sought, as far as he was able, to clear the sea of pirates.

[5] For in ancient times both the Hellenes, and those Barbarians, whose homes were on the coast of the mainland or in islands, when they began to find their way to one another by sea had recourse to piracy. They were commanded by powerful chiefs, who took this means of increasing their wealth and providing for their poorer followers. They would fall upon the unwalled and straggling towns, or rather villages, which they plundered, and maintained themselves chiefly by the plunder of them; for, as yet, such an occupation was held to be honourable and not disgraceful. This is proved by the practice of certain tribes on the mainland who, to the present day, glory in piratical exploits, and by the witness of the ancient poets, in whose verses the question is invariably asked of newly-arrived voyagers, whether they are pirates; which implies that neither those who are questioned disclaim, nor those who are interested in knowing censure the occupation. On land also neighbouring communities plundered each other; and there are many parts of Hellas in which the old practices still continue, as for example among the Ozolian Locrians, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and the adjacent regions of the continent. The fashion of wearing arms among these

continental tribes is a relic of their old predatory habits. For in ancient times all Hellenes carried weapons because their homes were undefended and intercourse was unsafe; like the Barbarians they went armed in their every-day life. And the continuance of the custom in certain parts of the country indicates that it once prevailed everywhere.

[6] The Athenians were the first who laid aside arms and adopted an easier and more luxurious way of life. Quite recently the old-fashioned refinement of dress still lingered among the elder men of their richer class, who wore under-garments of linen, and bound back their hair in a knot with golden clasps in the form of grasshoppers; and the same customs long survived among the elders of Ionia, having been derived from their Athenian ancestors. On the other hand, the simple dress which is now common was first worn at Sparta; and there, more than anywhere else, the life of the rich was assimilated to that of the people. The Lacedaemonians too were the first who in their athletic exercises stripped naked and rubbed themselves over with oil. But this was not the ancient custom; athletes formerly, even when they were contending at Olympia, wore girdles about their loins, a practice which lasted until quite lately, and still prevails among Barbarians, especially those of Asia, where the combatants in boxing and wrestling matches wear girdles. And many other customs which are now confined to the Barbarians might be shown to have existed formerly in Hellas.

[7] In later times, when navigation had become general and wealth was beginning to accumulate, cities were built upon the sea-shore and fortified; peninsulas too were occupied and walled-off with a view to commerce and defence against the neighbouring tribes. But the older towns both in the islands and on the continent, in order to protect themselves against the piracy which so long prevailed, were built inland; and there they remain to this day. For the piratical

tribes plundered, not only one another, but all those who, without being seamen, lived on the sea-coast.

[8] The islanders were even more addicted to piracy than the inhabitants of the mainland. They were mostly Carian or Phoenician settlers. This is proved by the fact that when the Athenians purified Delos during the Peloponnesian War and the tombs of the dead were opened, more than half of them were found to be Carians. They were known by the fashion of their arms which were buried with them, and by their mode of burial, the same which is still practised among them.

After Minos had established his navy, communication by sea became more general. For, he having expelled the marauders when he colonised the greater part of the islands, the dwellers on the sea-coast began to grow richer and to live in a more settled manner; and some of them, finding their wealth increase beyond their expectations, surrounded their towns with walls. The love of gain made the weaker willing to serve the stronger, and the command of wealth enabled the more powerful to subjugate the lesser cities. This was the state of society which was beginning to prevail at the time of the Trojan War.

[9] I am inclined to think that Agamemnon succeeded in collecting the expedition, not because the suitors of Helen had bound themselves by oath to Tyndareus, but because he was the most powerful king of his time. Those Peloponnesians who possess the most accurate traditions say that originally Pelops gained his power by the great wealth which he brought with him from Asia into a poor country, whereby he was enabled, although a stranger, to give his name to the Peloponnesus; and that still greater fortune attended his descendants after the death of Eurystheus, king of Mycenae, who was slain in Attica by the Heraclidae. For Atreus the son of Pelops was the maternal uncle of Eurystheus, who, when he went on the expedition, naturally committed to his charge the kingdom of Mycenae. Now Atreus had been banished by his father on account of

the murder of Chrysippus. But Eurystheus never returned; and the Mycenaeans, dreading the Heraclidae, were ready to welcome Atreus, who was considered a powerful man and had ingratiated himself with the multitude. So he succeeded to the throne of Mycenae and the other dominions of Eurystheus. Thus the house of Pelops prevailed over that of Perseus.

And it was, as I believe, because Agamemnon inherited this power and also because he was the greatest naval potentate of his time that he was able to assemble the expedition; and the other princes followed him, not from good-will, but from fear. Of the chiefs who came to Troy, he, if the witness of Homer be accepted, brought the greatest number of ships himself, besides supplying the Arcadians with them. In the 'Handing down of the Sceptre' he is described as 'The king of many islands, and of all Argos.' But, living on the mainland, he could not have ruled over any except the adjacent islands (which would not be 'many') unless he had possessed a considerable navy. From this expedition we must form our conjectures about the character of still earlier times.

[10] When it is said that Mycenae was but a small place, or that any other city which existed in those days is inconsiderable in our own, this argument will hardly prove that the expedition was not as great as the poets relate and as is commonly imagined. Suppose the city of Sparta to be deserted, and nothing left but the temples and the ground-plan, distant ages would be very unwilling to believe that the power of the Lacedaemonians was at all equal to their fame. And yet they own two-fifths of the Peloponnesus, and are acknowledged leaders of the whole, as well as of numerous allies in the rest of Hellas. But their city is not built continuously, and has no splendid temples or other edifices; it rather resembles a group of villages like the ancient towns of Hellas, and would therefore make a poor show. Whereas, if the same fate befell the Athenians, the

ruins of Athens would strike the eye, and we should infer their power to have been twice as great as it really is. We ought not then to be unduly sceptical. The greatness of cities should be estimated by their real power and not by appearances. And we may fairly suppose the Trojan expedition to have been greater than any which preceded it, although according to Homer, if we may once more appeal to his testimony, not equal to those of our own day. He was a poet, and may therefore be expected to exaggerate; yet, even upon his showing, the expedition was comparatively small. For it numbered, as he tells us, twelve hundred ships, those of the Boeotians carrying one hundred and twenty men each, those of Philoctetes fifty; and by these numbers he may be presumed to indicate the largest and the smallest ships; else why in the catalogue is nothing said about the size of any others? That the crews were all fighting men as well as rowers he clearly implies when speaking of the ships of Philoctetes; for he tells us that all the oarsmen were likewise archers. And it is not to be supposed that many who were not sailors would accompany the expedition, except the kings and principal officers; for the troops had to cross the sea, bringing with them the materials of war, in vessels without decks, built after the old piratical fashion. Now if we take a mean between the crews, the invading forces will appear not to have been very numerous when we remember that they were drawn from the whole of Hellas.

[11] The cause of the inferiority was not so much the want of men as the want of money; the invading army was limited, by the difficulty of obtaining supplies, to such a number as might be expected to live on the country in which they were to fight. After their arrival at Troy, when they had won a battle (as they clearly did, for otherwise they could not have fortified their camp), even then they appear not to have used the whole of their force, but to have been driven by want of provisions to the cultivation of the Chersonese and to pillage. And in consequence of this dispersion of their

forces, the Trojans were enabled to hold out against them during the whole ten years, being always a match for those who remained on the spot. Whereas if the besieging army had brought abundant supplies, and, instead of betaking themselves to agriculture or pillage, had carried on the war persistently with all their forces, they would easily have been masters of the field and have taken the city; since, even divided as they were, and with only a part of their army available at any one time, they held their ground. Or, again, they might have regularly invested Troy, and the place would have been captured in less time and with less trouble. Poverty was the real reason why the achievements of former ages were insignificant, and why the Trojan War, the most celebrated of them all, when brought to the test of facts, falls short of its fame and of the prevailing traditions to which the poets have given authority.

[12] Even in the age which followed the Trojan War, Hellas was still in process of ferment and settlement, and had no time for peaceful growth. The return of the Hellenes from Troy after their long absence led to many changes: quarrels too arose in nearly every city, and those who were expelled by them went and founded other cities. Thus in the the sixtieth year after the fall of Troy, the Boeotian people, having been expelled from Arnè by the Thessalians, settled in the country formerly called Cadmeis, but now Boeotia: a portion of the tribe already dwelt there, and some of these had joined in the Trojan expedition. In the eightieth year after the war, the Dorians led by the Heraclidae conquered the Peloponnesus. A considerable time elapsed before Hellas became finally settled; after a while, however, she recovered tranquillity and began to send out colonies. The Athenians colonised Ionia and most of the islands; the Peloponnesians the greater part of Italy and Sicily, and various places in Hellas. These colonies were all founded after the Trojan War.

[13] As Hellas grew more powerful and the acquisition of wealth became more and more rapid, the revenues of her

cities increased, and in most of them tyrannies were established; they had hitherto been ruled by hereditary kings, having fixed prerogatives. The Hellenes likewise began to build navies and to make the sea their element. The Corinthians are said to have first adopted something like the modern style of marine, and the oldest Hellenic triremes to have been constructed at Corinth. A Corinthian ship-builder, Ameinocles, appears to have built four ships for the Samians; he went to Samos about three hundred years before the end of the Peloponnesian War. And the earliest naval engagement on record is that between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans which occurred about forty years later. Corinth, being seated on an isthmus, was naturally from the first a centre of commerce; for the Hellenes within and without the Peloponnese in the old days, when they communicated chiefly by land, had to pass through her territory in order to reach one another. Her wealth too was a source of power, as the ancient poets testify, who speak of ‘Corinth the rich.’ When navigation grew more common, the Corinthians, having already acquired a fleet, were able to put down piracy; they offered a market both by sea and land, and with the increase of riches the power of their city increased yet more. Later, in the time of Cyrus, the first Persian king, and of Cambyses his son, the Ionians had a large navy; they fought with Cyrus, and were for a time masters of the sea around their own coasts. Polycrates, too, who was a tyrant of Samos in the reign of Cambyses, had a powerful navy and subdued several of the islands, among them Rhenea, which he dedicated to the Delian Apollo. And the Phocaeans, when they were colonising Massalia, defeated the Carthaginians on the sea.

[14] These were the most powerful navies, and even these, which came into existence many generations after the Trojan Warr, appear to have consisted chiefly of fifty-oared vessels and galleys of war, as in the days of Troy; as yet triremes were not common. But a little before the Persian War and the

death of Darius, who succeeded Cambyses, the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans had them in considerable numbers. No other maritime powers of any consequence arose in Hellas before the expedition of Xerxes. The Aeginetans, Athenians, and a few more had small fleets, and these mostly consisted of fifty-oared vessels. Even the ships which the Athenians built quite recently at the instigation of Themistocles, when they were at war with the Aeginetans and in expectation of the Barbarian, even these ships with which they fought at Salamis were not completely decked.

[15] So inconsiderable were the Hellenic navies in recent as well as in more ancient times. And yet those who applied their energies to the sea obtained a great accession of strength by the increase of their revenues and the extension of their dominion. For they attacked and subjugated the islands, especially when the pressure of population was felt by them. Whereas by land, no conflict of any kind which brought increase of power ever occurred; what wars they had were mere border feuds. Foreign and distant expeditions of conquest the Hellenes never undertook; for they were not as yet ranged under the command of the great states, nor did they form voluntary leagues or make expeditions on an equal footing. Their wars were only the wars of the several neighbouring tribes with one another. The conflict in which the rest of Hellas was most divided, allying itself with one side or the other, was the ancient war between the Chalcidians and Eretrians.

[16] There were different impediments to the progress of the different states. The Ionians had attained great prosperity when Cyrus and the Persians, having overthrown Croesus and subdued the countries between the river Halys and the sea, made war against them and enslaved the cities on the mainland. Some time afterwards, Darius, strong in the possession of the Phoenician fleet, conquered the islands also.

[17] Nor again did the tyrants of the Hellenic cities extend their thoughts beyond their own interest, that is, the security of their persons, and the aggrandisement of themselves and their families. They were extremely cautious in the administration of their government, and nothing considerable was ever effected by them; except in wars with their neighbours, as in Sicily, where their power attained its greatest height. Thus for a long time everything conspired to prevent Hellas from uniting in any great action and to paralyse enterprise in the individual states.

[18] At length the tyrants both at Athens and in the rest of Hellas (which had been under their dominion long before Athens), at least the greater number of them, and with the exception of the Sicilian the last who ever ruled, were put down by the Lacedaemonians. For although Lacedaemon, after the conquest of the country by the Dorians who now inhabit it, remained long unsettled, and indeed longer than any country which we know, nevertheless she obtained good laws at an earlier period than any other, and has never been subject to tyrants; she has preserved the same form of government for rather more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the Peloponnesian War. It was the excellence of her constitution which gave her power, and thus enabled her to regulate the affairs of other states. Not long after the overthrow of the tyrants by the Lacedaemonians, the battle of Marathon was fought between the Athenians and the Persians; ten years later, the Barbarian returned with the vast armament which was to enslave Hellas. In the greatness of the impending danger, the Lacedaemonians, who were the most powerful state in Hellas, assumed the lead of the confederates, while the Athenians, as the Persian host advanced, resolved to forsake their city, broke up their homes, and, taking to their ships, became seamen. The Barbarian was repelled by a common effort; but soon the Hellenes, as well those who had revolted from the King as those who formed the original confederacy,

took different sides and became the allies either of the Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians; for these were now the two leading powers, the one strong by land and the other by sea. The league between them was of short duration; they speedily quarrelled and, with their respective allies, went to war. Any of the other Hellenes who had differences of their own now resorted to one or other of them. So that from the Persian to the Peloponnesian War, the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians were perpetually fighting or making peace, either with one another or with their own revolted allies; thus they attained military efficiency, and learned experience in the school of danger.

[19] The Lacedaemonians did not make tributaries of those who acknowledged their leadership, but took care that they should be governed by oligarchies in the exclusive interest of Sparta. The Athenians, on the other hand, after a time deprived the subject cities of their ships and made all of them pay a fixed tribute, except Chios and Lesbos. And the single power of Athens at the beginning of this war was greater than that of Athens and Sparta together at their greatest, while the confederacy remained intact.

[20] Such are the results of my enquiries, though the early history of Hellas is of a kind which forbids implicit reliance on every particular of the evidence. Men do not discriminate, and are too ready to receive ancient traditions about their own as well as about other countries. For example, most Athenians think that Hipparchus was actually tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton; they are not aware that Hippias was the eldest of the sons of Peisistratus, and succeeded him, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were only his brothers. At the last moment, Harmodius and Aristogeiton suddenly suspected that Hippias had been forewarned by some of their accomplices. They therefore abstained from attacking him, but, wishing to do something before they were seized, and not to risk their lives in vain, they slew Hipparchus, with whom they fell in

near the temple called Leocorium as he was marshalling the Panathenaic procession. There are many other matters, not obscured by time, but contemporary, about which the other Hellenes are equally mistaken. For example, they imagine that the kings of Lacedaemon in their council have not one but two votes each, and that in the army of the Lacedaemonians there is a division called the Pitanate division; whereas they never had anything of the sort. So little trouble do men take in the search after truth; so readily do they accept whatever comes first to hand.

[21] Yet any one who upon the grounds which I have given arrives at some such conclusion as my own about those ancient times, would not be far wrong. He must not be misled by the exaggerated fancies of the poets, or by the tales of chroniclers who seek to please the ear rather than to speak the truth. Their accounts cannot be tested by him; and most of the facts in the lapse of ages have passed into the region of romance. At such a distance of time he must make up his mind to be satisfied with conclusions resting upon the clearest evidence which can be had. And, though men will always judge any war in which they are actually fighting to be the greatest at the time, but, after it is over, revert to their admiration of some other which has preceded, still the Peloponnesian, if estimated by the actual facts, will certainly prove to have been the greatest ever known.

[22] As to the speeches which were made either before or during the war, it was hard for me, and for others who reported them to me, to recollect the exact words. I have therefore put into the mouth of each speaker the sentiments proper to the occasion, expressed as I thought he would be likely to express them, while at the same time I endeavoured, as nearly as I could, to give the general purport of what was actually said. Of the events of the war I have not ventured to speak from any chance information, nor according to any notion of my own; I have described nothing but what I either saw myself, or learned from others

of whom I made the most careful and particular enquiry. The task was a laborious one, because eye-witnesses of the same occurrences gave different accounts of them, as they remembered or were interested in the actions of one side or the other. And very likely the strictly historical character of my narrative may be disappointing to the ear. But if he who desires to have before his eyes a true picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen hereafter in the order of human things, shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied. My history is an everlasting possession, not a prize composition which is heard and forgotten.

[23] The greatest achievement of former times was the Persian War; yet even this was speedily decided in two battles by sea and two by land. But the Peloponnesian War was a protracted struggle, and attended by calamities such as Hellas had never known within a like period of time. Never were so many cities captured and depopulated — some by Barbarians, others by Hellenes themselves fighting against one another; and several of them after their capture were repeopled by strangers. Never were exile and slaughter more frequent, whether in the war or brought about by civil strife. And traditions which had often been current before, but rarely verified by fact, were now no longer doubted. For there were earthquakes unparalleled in their extent and fury, and eclipses of the sun more numerous than are recorded to have happened in any former age; there were also in some places great droughts causing famines, and lastly the plague which did immense harm and destroyed numbers of the people. All these calamities fell upon Hellas simultaneously with the war, which began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians violated the thirty years' truce concluded by them after the recapture of Euboea. Why they broke it and what were the grounds of quarrel I will first set forth, that in time to come no man may be at a loss to know what was the origin of this great war. The real though

unavowed cause I believe to have been the growth of the Athenian power, which terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war; but the reasons publicly alleged on either side were as follows.

[24] The city of Epidamnus is situated on the right hand as you sail up the Ionian Gulf. The neighbouring inhabitants are the Taulantians, a barbarian tribe of the Illyrian race. The place was colonised by Corcyraeans, but under the leadership of a Corinthian, Phalius, son of Eratocleides, who was of the lineage of Heracles; he was invited, according to ancient custom, from the mother city, and Corinthians and other Dorians joined in the colony. In process of time Epidamnus became great and populous, but there followed a long period of civil commotion, and the city is said to have been brought low in a war against the neighbouring barbarians, and to have lost her ancient power. At last, shortly before the Peloponnesian War, the notables were overthrown and driven out by the people; the exiles went over to the barbarians, and, uniting with them, plundered the remaining inhabitants both by sea and land. These, finding themselves hard pressed, sent an embassy to the mother-city Corcyra, begging the Corcyraeans not to leave them to their fate, but to reconcile them to the exiles and settle the war with the barbarians. The ambassadors came, and sitting as suppliants in the temple of Herè preferred their request; but the Corcyraeans would not listen to them, and they returned without success.

[25] The Epidamnians, finding that they had no hope of assistance from Corcyra, knew not what to do, and sending to Delphi enquired of the God whether they should deliver up the city to their original founders, the Corinthians, and endeavour to obtain aid from them. The God replied that they should, and bade them place themselves under the leadership of the Corinthians. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth, and informing the Corinthians of the answer which the oracle had given, delivered up the city to them. They

reminded them that the original leader of the colony was a citizen of Corinth; and implored the Corinthians to come and help them, and not leave them to their fate. The Corinthians took up their cause, partly in vindication of their own rights (for they considered that Epidamnus belonged to them quite as much as to the Corcyraeans), partly too because they hated the Corcyraeans, who were their own colony but slighted them. In their common festivals they would not allow them the customary privileges of founders, and at their sacrifices denied to a Corinthian the right of receiving first the lock of hair cut from the head of the victim, an honour usually granted by colonies to a representative of the mother-country. In fact they despised the Corinthians, for they were more than a match for them in military strength, and as rich as any state then existing in Hellas. They would often boast that on the sea they were very far superior to them, and would appropriate to themselves the naval renown of the Phaeacians, who were the ancient inhabitants of the island. Such feelings led them more and more to strengthen their navy, which was by no means despicable; for they had a hundred and twenty triremes when the war broke out.

[26] Irritated by these causes of offence, the Corinthians were too happy to assist Epidamnus; accordingly they invited any one who was willing to settle there, and for the protection of the colonists despatched with them Ambracian and Leucadian troops and a force of their own. All these they sent by land as far as Apollonia, which is a colony of theirs, fearing that if they went by sea the Corcyraeans might oppose their passage. Great was the rage of the Corcyraeans when they discovered that the settlers and the troops had entered Epidamnus and that the colony had been given up to the Corinthians. They immediately set sail with five and twenty ships, followed by a second fleet, and in insulting terms bade the Epidamnians receive the exiled oligarchs, who had gone to Corcyra and implored the Corcyraeans to

restore them, appealing to the tie of kindred and pointing to the sepulchres of their common ancestors. They also bade them send away the troops and the new settlers. But the Epidamnians would not listen to their demands. Whereupon the Corcyraeans attacked them with forty ships. They were accompanied by the exiles whom they were to restore, and had the assistance of the native Illyrian troops. They sat down before the city, and made proclamation that any Epidamnian who chose, and the foreigners, might depart in safety, but that all who remained would be treated as enemies. This had no effect, and the Corcyraeans proceeded to invest the city, which is built upon an isthmus.

[27] When the news reached the Corinthians that Epidamnus was besieged, they equipped an army and proclaimed that a colony was to be sent thither; all who wished might go and enjoy equal rights of citizenship; but any one who was unwilling to sail at once might remain at Corinth, and, if he made a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmae, might still have a share in the colony.

Many sailed, and many deposited the money. The Corinthians also sent and requested the Megarians to assist them with a convoy in case the Corcyraeans should intercept the colonists on their voyage. The Megarians accordingly provided eight ships, and the Cephallenians of Palè four; the Epidaurians, of whom they made a similar request, five; the Hermionians one; the Troezenians two; the Leucadians ten; and the Ambraciots eight. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they begged money, and of the Eleans money, and ships without crews. On their own account they equipped thirty ships and three thousand hoplites.

[28] When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to Corinth, taking with them Lacdaemonian and Sicyonian envoys, and summoned the Corinthians to withdraw the troops and the colonists, telling them that they had nothing to do with Epidamnus. If they made any claim to it, the Corcyraeans expressed themselves willing to refer

the cause for arbitration to such Peloponnesian states as both parties should agree upon, and their decision was to be final; or, they were willing to leave the matter in the hands of the Delphian oracle. But they deprecated war, and declared that, if war there must be, they would be compelled by the Corinthians in self-defence to discard their present friends and seek others whom they would rather not, for help they must have. The Corinthians replied that if the Corcyraeans would withdraw the ships and the barbarian troops they would consider the matter, but that it would not do for them to be litigating while Epidamnus and the colonists were in a state of siege. The Corcyraeans rejoined that they would consent to this proposal if the Corinthians on their part would withdraw their forces from Epidamnus: or again, they were willing that both parties should remain on the spot, and that a truce should be made until the decision was given.

[29] The Corinthians turned a deaf ear to all these overtures, and, when their vessels were manned and their allies had arrived, they sent a herald before them to declare war, and set sail for Epidamnus with seventy-five ships and two thousand hoplites, intending to give battle to the Corcyraeans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellichus, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes; the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. When they arrived at Actium in the territory of Anactorium, at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, where the temple of Apollo stands, the Corcyraeans sent a herald to meet them in a small boat forbidding them to come on. Meanwhile their crews got on board; they had previously put their fleet in repair, and strengthened the old ships with cross-timbers, so as to make them serviceable. The herald brought back no message of peace from the Corinthians. The Corcyraean ships, numbering eighty (for forty out of the hundred and twenty were engaged in the blockade of Epidamnus), were

now fully manned; these sailed out against the Corinthians and, forming line, fought and won a complete victory over them, and destroyed fifteen of their ships. On the very same day the forces besieging Epidamnus succeeded in compelling the city to capitulate, the terms being that the Corinthians until their fate was determined should be imprisoned and the strangers sold.

[30] After the sea-fight the Corcyraeans raised a trophy on Leucimnè, a promontory of Corcyra, and put to death all their prisoners with the exception of the Corinthians, whom they kept in chains. The defeated Corinthians and their allies then returned home, and the Corcyraeans (who were now masters of the Ionian sea), sailing to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, devastated the country. They also burnt Cyllenè, where the Eleans had their docks, because they had supplied the Corinthians with money and ships. And, during the greater part of the summer after the battle, they retained the command of the sea and sailed about plundering the allies of the Corinthians. But, before the season was over, the Corinthians, perceiving that their allies were suffering, sent out a fleet and took up a position at Actium and near the promontory of Cheimerium in Thesprotia, that they might protect Leucas and other friendly places. The Corcyraeans with their fleet and army stationed themselves on the opposite coast at Leucimnè. Neither party attacked the other, but during the remainder of the summer they maintained their respective stations, and at the approach of winter returned home.

[31] For the whole year after the battle and for a year after that, the Corinthians, exasperated by the war with Corcyra, were busy in building ships. They took the utmost pains to create a great navy: rowers were collected from the Peloponnesus and from the rest of Hellas by the attraction of pay. The Corcyraeans were alarmed at the report of their preparations. They reflected that they had not enrolled themselves in the league either of the Athenians or of the

Lacedaemonians, and that allies in Hellas they had none. They determined to go to Athens, join the Athenian alliance, and get what help they could from them. The Corinthians, hearing of their intentions, also sent ambassadors to Athens, fearing lest the combination of the Athenian and Corcyraean navies might prevent them from bringing the war to a satisfactory termination. Accordingly an assembly was held at which both parties came forward to plead their respective causes; and first the Corcyraeans spoke as follows:

[32] ‘Men of Athens, those who, like ourselves, come to others who are not their allies and to whom they have never rendered any considerable service and ask help of them, are bound to show, in the first place, that the granting of their request is expedient, or at any rate not inexpedient, and, secondly, that their gratitude will be lasting. If they fulfil neither requirement they have no right to complain of a refusal. Now the Corcyraeans, when they sent us hither to ask for an alliance, were confident that they could establish to your satisfaction both these points. But, unfortunately, we have had a practice alike inconsistent with the request which we are about to make and contrary to our own interest at the present moment: — Inconsistent; for hitherto we have never, if we could avoid it, been the allies of others, and now we come and ask you to enter into an alliance with us; — Contrary to our interest; for through this practice we find ourselves isolated in our war with the Corinthians. The policy of not making alliances lest they should endanger us at another’s bidding, instead of being wisdom, as we once fancied, has now unmistakably proved to be weakness and folly. True, in the last naval engagement we repelled the Corinthians single-handed. But now they are on the point of attacking us with a much greater force which they have drawn together from the Peloponnesus and from all Hellas. We know that we are too weak to resist them unaided, and may expect the worst if we fall into their hands. We are therefore compelled to ask assistance of you and of all the

world; and you must not be hard upon us if now, renouncing our indolent neutrality which was an error but not a crime, we dare to be inconsistent.

[33] ‘To you at this moment the request which we are making offers a glorious opportunity. In the first place, you will assist the oppressed and not the oppressors; secondly, you will admit us to your alliance at a time when our dearest interests are at stake, and will lay up a treasure of gratitude in our memories which will have the most abiding of all records. Lastly, we have a navy greater than any but your own. Reflect; what good fortune can be more extraordinary, what more annoying to your enemies than the voluntary accession of a power for whose alliance you would have given any amount of money and could never have been too thankful? This power now places herself at your disposal; you are to incur no danger and no expense, and she brings you a good name in the world, gratitude from those who seek your aid, and an increase of your own strength. Few have ever had all these advantages offered them at once; equally few when they come asking an alliance are able to give in the way of security and honour as much as they hope to receive.

‘And if any one thinks that the war in which our services may be needed will never arrive, he is mistaken. He does not see that the Lacedaemonians, fearing the growth of your empire, are eager to take up arms, and that the Corinthians, who are your enemies, are all-powerful with them. They begin with us, but they will go on to you, that we may not stand united against them in the bond of a common enmity; they will not miss the chance of weakening us or strengthening themselves. And it is our business to strike first, we offering and you accepting our alliance, and to forestall their designs instead of waiting to counteract them.

[34] ‘If they say that we are their colony and that therefore you have no right to receive us, they should be made to understand that all colonies honour their mother-city when

she treats them well, but are estranged from her by injustice. For colonists are not meant to be the servants but the equals of those who remain at home. And the injustice of their conduct to us is manifest: for we proposed an arbitration in the matter of Epidamnus, but they insisted on prosecuting their quarrel by arms and would not hear of a legal trial.. When you see how they treat us who are their own kinsmen, take warning: if they try deception, do not be misled by them; and if they make a direct request of you, refuse. For he passes through life most securely who has least reason to reproach himself with complaisance to his enemies.

[35] ‘But again, you will not break the treaty with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us: for we are not allies either of you or of them. What says the treaty?— “Any Hellenic city which is the ally of no one may join whichever league it pleases.” And how monstrous, that they should man their ships, not only from their own confederacy, but from Hellas in general, nay, even from your subjects, while they would debar us from the alliance which naturally offers and from every other, and will denounce it as a crime if you accede to our request. With far better reason shall we complain of you if you refuse. For you will be thrusting away us who are not your enemies and are in peril; and, far from restraining the enemy and the aggressor, you will be allowing him to gather fresh forces out of your own dominions. How unjust is this! Surely if you would be impartial you should either prevent the Corinthians from hiring soldiers in your dominions, or send to us also such help as you can be induced to send; but it would be best of all if you would openly receive and assist us. Many, as we have already intimated, are the advantages which we offer. Above all, our enemies are your enemies, which is the best guarantee of fidelity in an ally; and they are not weak but well able to injure those who secede from them. Again, when the proffered alliance is that of a maritime and not of an inland power, it is a far more serious

matter to refuse. You should, if possible, allow no one to have a fleet but yourselves; or, if this is impossible, whoever is strongest at sea; make him your friend.

[36] ‘Some one may think that the course which we recommend is expedient, but he may be afraid that if he is convinced by our arguments he will break the treaty. To him we reply, that as long as he is strong he may make a present of his fears to the enemy, but that if he reject the alliance he will be weak, and then his confidence, however reassuring to himself, will be anything but terrifying to enemies who are strong. It is Athens about which he is advising, and not Corcyra: will he be providing for her best interests if, when war is imminent and almost at the door, he is so anxious about the chances of the hour that he hesitates to attach to him a state which cannot be made a friend or enemy without momentous consequences? Corcyra, besides offering many other advantages, is conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily; it stands in the way of any fleet coming from thence to the Peloponnesus, and can also protect a fleet on its way to Sicily. One word more, which is the sum of all and everything we have to say, and should convince you that you must not abandon us. Hellas has only three considerable navies: — there is ours, and there is yours, and there is the Corinthian. Now, if the Corinthians get hold of ours, and you allow the two to become one, you will have to fight against the united navies of Corcyra and the Peloponnesus. But, if you make us your allies, you will have our navy in addition to your own ranged at your side in the impending conflict.’

Thus spoke the Corcyraeans: the Corinthians replied as follows:

[37] ‘Since these Corcyraeans have chosen to speak, not only of their reception into your alliance, but of our misdoings and of the unjust war which has been forced upon them by us, we too must touch on these two points before we proceed to our main argument, that you may be better

prepared to appreciate our claim upon you, and may have a good reason for rejecting their petition. They pretend that they have hitherto refused to make alliances from a wise moderation, but they really adopted this policy from a mean and not from a high motive. They did not want to have an ally who might go and tell of their crimes, and who would put them to the blush whenever they called him in. Their insular position makes them judges of their own offences against others, and they can therefore afford to dispense with judges appointed under treaties; for they hardly ever visit their neighbours, but foreign ships are constantly driven to their shores by stress of weather. And all the time they screen themselves under the specious name of neutrality, making believe that they are unwilling to be the accomplices of other men's crimes. But the truth is that they wish to keep their own criminal courses to themselves: where they are strong, to oppress; where they cannot be found out, to defraud; and whatever they may contrive to appropriate, never to be ashamed. If they were really upright men, as they profess to be, the greater their immunity from attack the more clearly they might have made their honesty appear by a willingness to submit differences to arbitration.

[38] 'But such they have not shown themselves either towards us or towards others. Although they are our colony they have always stood aloof from us, and now they are fighting against us on the plea that they were not sent out to be ill used. To which we rejoin that we did not send them out to be insulted by them, but that we might be recognised as their leaders and receive proper respect. Our other colonies at any rate honour us; no city is more beloved by her colonies than Corinth. That we are popular with the majority proves that the Corcyraeans have no reason to dislike us; and, if it seems extraordinary that we should go to war with them, our defence is that the injury which they are doing us is unexampled. Even if we had been misled by passion, it would have been honourable in them to make

allowance for us, and dishonourable in us to use violence when they showed moderation. But they have wronged us over and over again in their insolence and pride of wealth; and now there is our colony of Epidamnus which they would not acknowledge in her distress, but, when we came to her rescue, they seized and are now holding by force.

[39] ‘They pretend that they first offered to have the matter decided by arbitration. The appeal to justice might have some meaning in the mouth of one who before he had recourse to arms acted honourably, as he now talks fairly, but not when it is made from a position of security and advantage. Whereas these men began by laying siege to Epidamnus, and not until they feared our vengeance did they put forward their specious offer of arbitration. And as if the wrong which they have themselves done at Epidamnus were not enough, they now come hither and ask you to be, not their allies, but their accomplices in crime, and would have you receive them when they are at enmity with us. But they ought to have come when they were out of all danger, not at a time when we are smarting under an injury and they have good reason to be afraid. You have never derived any benefit from their power, but they will now be benefited by yours, and, although innocent of their crimes, you will equally be held responsible by us. If you were to have shared the consequences with them, they ought long ago to have shared the power with you.

[40] ‘We have proved that our complaints are justified and that our adversaries are tyrannical and dishonest; we will now show you that you have no right to receive them. Admitting that the treaty allows any unenrolled cities to join either league, this provision does not apply to those who have in view the injury of others, but only to him who is in need of protection, — certainly not to one who forsakes his allegiance and who will bring war instead of peace to those who receive him, or rather, if they are wise, will not receive him on such terms. And war the Corcyraeans will bring to

you if you listen to them and not to us. For if you become the allies of the Corcyraeans you will be no longer at peace with us, but will be converted into enemies; and we must, if you take their part, in defending ourselves against them, defend ourselves against you. But you ought in common justice to stand aloof from both; or, if you must join either, you should join us and go to war with them; to Corinth you are at all events bound by treaty, but with Corcyra you never even entered into a temporary negotiation. And do not set the precedent of receiving the rebellious subjects of others. At the revolt of Samos, when the other Peloponnesians were divided upon the question of giving aid to the rebels, we voted in your favour and expressly maintained “that every one should be allowed to chastise his own allies.” If you mean to receive and assist evil-doers, we shall assuredly gain as many allies of yours as you will of ours; and you will establish a principle which will tell against yourselves more than against us.

[41] ‘Such are the grounds of right which we urge; and they are sufficient according to Hellenic law. And may we venture to recall to your minds an obligation of which we claim the repayment in our present need, we and you being not enemies who seek one another’s hurt, nor yet friends who freely give and take? There was a time before the Persian invasion when you were in want of ships for the Aeginetan war, and we Corinthians lent you twenty: the service which we then rendered to you gave you the victory over the Aeginetans, as the other, which prevented the Peloponnesians from aiding the Samians, enabled you to punish Samos. Both benefits were conferred on one of those critical occasions when men in the act of attacking their enemies are utterly regardless of everything but victory, and deem him who assists them a friend though he may have previously been a foe, him who opposes them a foe, even though he may happen to be a friend; nay, they will often neglect their own interests in the excitement of the struggle.

[42] ‘Think of these things; let the younger be informed of them by their elders, and resolve all of you to render like for like. Do not say to yourselves that this is just, but that in the event of war something else is expedient; for the true path of expediency is the path of right. The war with which the Corcyraeans would frighten you into doing wrong is distant, and may never come; is it worth while to be so carried away by the prospect of it, that you bring upon yourselves the hatred of the Corinthians which is both near and certain? Would you not be wiser in seeking to mitigate the ill-feeling which your treatment of the Megarians has already inspired? The later kindness done in season, though small in comparison, may cancel a greater previous offence. And do not be attracted by their offer of a great naval alliance; for to do no wrong to a neighbour is a surer source of strength than to gain a perilous advantage under the influence of a momentary illusion.

[43] ‘We are now ourselves in the same situation in which you were, when we declared at Sparta that every one so placed should be allowed to chastise his own allies; and we claim to receive the same measure at your hands. You were profited by our vote, and we ought not to be injured by yours. Pay what you owe, knowing that this is our time of need, in which a man’s best friend is he who does him a service, he who opposes him, his worst enemy. Do not receive these Corcyraeans into alliance in despite of us, and do not support them in injustice. In acting thus you will act rightly, and will consult your own true interests.’

Such were the words of the Corinthians.

[44] The Athenians heard both sides, and they held two assemblies; in the first of them they were more influenced by the words of the Corinthians, but in the second they changed their minds and inclined towards the Corcyraeans. They would not go so far as to make an alliance both offensive and defensive with them; for then, if the Corcyraeans had required them to join in an expedition

against Corinth, the treaty with the Peloponnesians would have been broken. But they concluded a defensive league, by which the two states promised to aid each other if an attack were made on the territory or on the allies of either. For they knew that in any case the war with Peloponnesus was inevitable, and they had no mind to let Corcyra and her navy fall into the hands of the Corinthians. Their plan was to embroil them more and more with one another, and then, when the war came, the Corinthians and the other naval powers would be weaker. They also considered that Corcyra was conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily.

[45] Under the influence of these feelings, they received the Corcyraeans into alliance; the Corinthians departed; and the Athenians now despatched to Corcyra ten ships commanded by Lacedaemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles. The commanders received orders not to engage with the Corinthians unless they sailed against Corcyra or to any place belonging to the Corcyraeans, and attempted to land there, in which case they were to resist them to the utmost. These orders were intended to prevent a breach of the treaty.

[46] The Corinthians, when their preparations were completed, sailed against Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships, — ten Elean, twelve Megarian, ten Leucadian, twenty-seven Ambraciot, one from Anactorium, and ninety of their own. The contingents of the several cities were commanded by their own generals. The Corinthian commander was Xenocleides the son of Euthycles, with four others. The fleet sailed from Leucas, and, arriving at the mainland opposite Corcyra, came to anchor at Cheimerium in the country of Thesprotia. Cheimerium is only a harbour; above it, at some distance from the sea, in that part of Thesprotia called Eleatis, lies the city of Ephyrè, near which the Acherusian lake finds a way out to the sea; the river Acheron, whence

the name is derived, flows through Thesprotia and falls into the lake. Another river, the Thyamis, forms the boundary of Thesprotia and Cestrinè, and the promontory of Cheimerium runs out between these two rivers. Here the Corinthians anchored and formed a camp.

[47] The Corcyraeans, observing their approach, manned a hundred and ten ships. These, which were placed under the command of Meiciades, Aesimides, and Eurybatus, took up a position off one of the islands called Sybota; the ten Athenian ships accompanied them. The land forces occupied the promontory of Leucimnè, whither a thousand Zacynthians had come to the aid of Corcyra. The Corinthians on their part were supported by a large force of barbarians, which collected on the mainland; for the inhabitants of this region have always been well disposed towards them.

[48] The Corinthians had now made their preparations, and, taking with them three days' provisions, put off by night from Cheimerium, intending to give battle: at break of day they descried the Corcyraean fleet, which had also put out to sea and was sailing to meet them. As soon as they saw one another, they ranged themselves in order of battle. On the right Corcyraean wing were the Athenian ships. The Corcyraeans themselves occupied the centre and the left wing, and were drawn up in three divisions, each under the command of one of the generals. On the right wing of the Corinthians were the Megarian and Ambraciot ships, in the centre the contingents of their other allies; they themselves with their swiftest vessels formed the left wing, which was opposed to the Athenians and to the right division of the Corcyraeans.

[49] The standards were now raised on both sides, and the two fleets met and fought. The decks of both were crowded with heavy infantry, with archers and with javelin-men; for their naval arrangements were still of the old clumsy sort. The engagement was obstinate, but more courage than skill was displayed, and it had almost the appearance of a battle

by land. When two ships once charged one another it was hardly possible to part company, for the throng of vessels was dense, and the hopes of victory lay chiefly in the heavy-armed, who maintained a steady fight upon the decks, the ships meanwhile remaining motionless. There were no attempts to break the enemy’s line. Brute force and rage made up for the want of tactics. Everywhere the battle was a scene of tumult and confusion. At any point where they saw the Corcyraeans distressed, the Athenians appeared and kept the enemy in check; but the generals, who were afraid of disobeying their instructions, would not begin the attack themselves. The Corinthians suffered most on their right wing. For the Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them, drove them in disorder to the shore, and sailed right up to their encampment; there landing, they plundered and burnt the deserted tents. So in this part of the battle the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans prevailed. But the left wing of the Corinthians, where their own ships were stationed, had greatly the advantage, because the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were originally inferior, had now twenty vessels detached in the pursuit. When the Athenians saw the distress of the Corcyraeans, they began to assist them more openly. At first they had abstained from actual collision, but when the Corcyraeans fled outright and the Corinthians pressed them hard, then every man fell to work; all distinctions were forgotten;-the time had arrived when Corinthian and Athenian were driven to attack one another.

[50] The Corinthians, having put to flight their enemies, never stopped to take in tow the hulls of the vessels which they had disabled, but fell upon the men; they rowed up and down and slew them, giving no quarter, and unintentionally killing their own friends; for they were not aware that their right wing had been defeated. There were so many ships on one side and on the other, and they covered so great an extent of water, that, when the engagement had once

begun, it was hard among conquerors and conquered to distinguish friend from foe. For never before had two Hellenic navies so numerous met in battle.

When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore, they turned their attention to their own wrecks and the bodies of their dead. Most of these were recovered by them and conveyed to Sybota, a desert harbour of Thesprotia, whither their barbarian allies had come to support them. They then formed afresh and once more made a movement towards the Corcyraeans, who, taking such vessels as had not been disabled, and any others which they had in their docks, together with the Athenian ships, put out to meet them, dreading a descent upon Corcyra. It was now late in the day and the Paean had been already sounded for the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly began to row astern. They had descried sailing towards them twenty vessels which the Athenians had sent to reinforce the former ten, fearing what had actually happened, that the Corcyraeans would he defeated, and that the original squadron would be insufficient to protect them.

[51] The Corinthians, who had the first view of these vessels, suspecting that they were Athenian and that there were more of them than they saw, were beginning to retreat. The Corcyraeans, owing to their position, could not see them, and they wondered why the Corinthians rowed astern. At length some of them who spied the advancing fleet exclaimed, ‘Yonder are ships coming up;’ and then the Corcyraeans, as it was getting dark, likewise retired, and the Corinthians turned about and sailed away. Thus the two fleets separated after a battle which lasted until nightfall. The twenty ships which came from Athens under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus, and Andocides the son of Leogoras, made their way through the wrecks and corpses and sailed into the Corcyraean station at Leucimnè almost as soon as they were sighted. At first in the darkness the Corcyraeans feared that they were enemies, but they

soon recognised them and the Athenian vessels came to anchor.

[52] On the next day the thirty Athenian and all the Corcyraean ships which were fit for service, wanting to ascertain whether the Corinthians would fight, sailed to the harbour at Sybota where their fleet lay. The Corinthians, putting out into deep water, drew up their ships in line and so remained, but they did not intend to begin the battle. For they saw that fresh ships, which had received no damage in the action, had arrived from Athens, and their own position was one of great difficulty. They had to guard the prisoners in their vessels, and there were no means of refitting in such a desert place. They were more disposed to consider how they should get home than to fight. For they feared that the Athenians, deeming the peace, now that blows had been exchanged, to be already broken, would intercept their return.

[53] They therefore determined to send a few men in a boat without a flag of truce to the Athenians, and so test their intentions. The men were to deliver the following message: ‘You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war and violate the treaty. We were only chastising our enemies, and you come with a hostile force and place yourselves between us and them. If it is your intention to hinder us from sailing to Corcyra, or whithersoever we choose, and you are going to break the treaty, take us first and deal with us as enemies.’ Whereupon all the Corcyraeans who were within hearing cried out ‘Take and kill them.’ But the Athenians replied ‘Men of Peloponnesus, we are not beginning war, and we are not violating the treaty; we are only aiding the Corcyraeans here, who are our allies. If you mean to sail against Corcyra or any place belonging to the Corcyraeans, we will do our utmost to prevent you, but, if you want to go anywhere else, you may.’

[54] Reassured by this reply, the Corinthians prepared to sail home, first setting up a trophy at the Sybota which is on the

mainland. The Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead bodies which were carried towards them, the current and the wind which had risen during the night having scattered them in all directions. They then set up a rival trophy on the island of Sybota. Both parties claimed the victory, but on different grounds. The Corinthians had retained the advantage in the seafight until nightfall, and had thus secured a greater number of wrecks and dead bodies; they had taken not less than a thousand prisoners and had disabled about seventy ships. The Corcyraeans, on the other hand, had destroyed some thirty sail, and when reinforced by the Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead bodies which had drifted in their direction; whereas the enemy on the evening of the battle had rowed astern at sight of the Athenian ships, and after their arrival had not come out against them from Sybota. Upon these grounds both sides raised trophies and claimed the victory.

[55] On their homeward voyage the Corinthians took by stratagem Anactorium, a town situated at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, which they and the Corcyraeans held in common; there they settled colonists of their own, and returned to Corinth. Of their Corcyraean captives eight hundred who were slaves they sold, but two hundred and fifty they detained in prison, treating them with much consideration, in the hope that, when they returned, they would win over Corcyra to the Corinthian interest: it so happened that the majority of them were among the most influential men of the state. Thus the war ended to the advantage of Corcyra, and the Athenian fleet returned home. This was the first among the causes of the Peloponnesian War, the Corinthians alleging that the Athenian fleet had taken part with the Corcyraeans and had fought against them in a time of truce.

[56] There soon arose another cause of quarrel between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. Potidaea, which is situated on the isthmus of Pallenè, was originally a Corinthian colony,

although at this time the tributary and ally of Athens. Now the Corinthians were forming plans of vengeance, and the Athenians, who suspected their intentions, commanded the Potidaeans to raze their walls on the side of Pallenè and give hostages; also to send away and not to receive for the future the magistrates whom the Corinthians annually sent to them. For they were afraid lest the Potidaeans might be persuaded by the Corinthians and Perdiccas to revolt, and might induce the rest of Chalcidicè to follow their example.

[57] These measures of precaution were taken by the Athenians immediately after the sea-fight off Corcyra. The hostility of the Corinthians was no longer doubtful, and Perdiccas, king of Macedon, the son of Alexander, hitherto the friend and ally of Athens, had now become an enemy. He had quarrelled with the Athenians because they had made an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, who were leagued against him. Alarmed by their attitude, he sent envoys to Sparta and did all he could to stir up a war between Athens and the Peloponnese. He also sought the alliance of Corinth, for he had an eye to the revolt of Potidaea; and he proposed to the Chalcidians and to the Bottiaeans that they should join in the revolt, thinking, that if he had the assistance of the neighbouring peoples, the difficulties of the war would be diminished. The Athenians became aware of his designs and resolved to forestall the revolt of the cities. They were already intending to send against Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under the command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes, and ten others, and they told their admirals to take hostages from the Potidaeans and to demolish their wall. They were also to keep a watch over the towns in the neighbourhood and prevent any attempt at rebellion.

[58] Meanwhile the Potidaeans sent envoys to the Athenians in the hope of persuading them to take no strong measures; but at the same time other envoys of theirs accompanied a Corinthian embassy to Lacedaemon and exerted themselves

to procure assistance in case of need. A long negotiation was carried on at Athens which came to no satisfactory result; the ships destined for Macedonia were also sent against Potidaea. But at Lacedaemon they were promised by the magistrates that if the Athenians attacked Potidaea they would invade Attica. So they seized the opportunity and revolted: the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans swore alliance with them and joined in the revolt. Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull down their towns on the sea-coast, and settling at Olynthus inland, there to form one strong city. On their removal he gave them part of his own territory of Mygdonia about the lake Bolbè to cultivate while the contest lasted. So, dismantling their cities, they settled up the country and made preparation for war.

[59] The Athenians, when the thirty ships arrived in Chalcidicè, found that Potidaea and the other cities had already revolted. Whereupon the generals, thinking that they were not able without a stronger force to act against all the rebels as well as against Perdiccas, directed their attention to Macedonia, which was their original destination, and there carried on a regular campaign in concert with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the country from the interior.

[60] Now that Potidaea had revolted and the Athenian ships were on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians grew anxious about the town; they felt that the danger came home to them, and despatched thither volunteers of their own and other troops whom they attracted by pay from various parts of the Peloponnese, numbering in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed. Their commander was Aristeus the son of Adeimantus, who had always been a great friend of the Potidaeans; it was mainly out of regard for him that most of the Corinthian soldiers volunteered on the expedition. They arrived in Chalcidicè forty days after the revolt of Potidaea.

[61] The news of the revolt in Chalcidicè quickly reached Athens, and the Athenians, when they heard that Aristeus had come with reinforcements, sent against the revolted towns forty ships and two thousand of their own hoplites under the command of Callias the son of Calliades, and four others. The expedition, sailing first of all to Macedonia, found that the former thousand had just taken Thermè and were blockading Pydna; they joined in the siege themselves; but before long the Athenian army were constrained to come to an understanding and make an alliance with Perdiccas. For Potidaea, now that Aristeus had arrived, urgently demanded their presence; so they prepared to quit Macedonia. They first marched out of their way to Beroea, which they attempted to take without success. Returning to their route, they moved on by land towards Potidaea with three thousand hoplites of their own and a large force of allies; they had also six hundred Macedonian horse, who fought under Philip and Pausanias; meanwhile their ships, in number seventy, sailed along the coast. Proceeding by slow marches, they arrived on the third day at Gigonus and there encamped.

[62] The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesian force under Aristeus had now taken up a position at the isthmus on the side towards Olynthus, where they awaited the coming of the Athenians; they held their market outside the walls of Potidaea. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry, and of the cavalry Perdiccas, for he had no sooner joined than he again deserted the Athenians and was now fighting on the side of the Potidaeans, having appointed Iolaus to be his lieutenant at home. The plan of Aristeus was as follows: — His own army was to remain on the isthmus and watch for the approach of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians, their allies from beyond the isthmus, and the two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas were stationed at Olynthus; and as soon as the Athenians attacked Aristeus himself and his army, they were to fall upon them in the

rear; thus the enemy would be assailed on both sides. But Callias the Athenian general and his colleagues sent the Macedonian horse and a few of the allied troops towards Olynthus that they might check any movement in that quarter, while they themselves, quitting their position, marched against Potidaea. When they had reached the isthmus and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they did the same. The two armies soon closed. The wing led by Aristeus, which was composed of his Corinthian followers and other picked troops, routed their opponents and chased them far away; but the rest of the army, both Potidaeans and Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenians and fled into the city.

[63] Aristeus, when he returned from the pursuit and perceived that the other wing of his army was defeated, hesitated whether he should make for Olynthus or return to Potidaea. Both courses were hazardous; but at last he determined to contract his troops into the smallest compass and force his way at full speed into Potidaea. Harassed by the missiles of the enemy he pushed forward through the water along the bank in front of the sea-wall, not without loss; but he contrived to save the greater part of his men. When the battle began, the allies of the Potidaeans in Olynthus, which is only about seven miles distant, and is visible from Potidaea, seeing the signals raised, came out a little way to support their friends; and the Macedonian horse drew up in order of battle to oppose them. But victory quickly declared for the Athenians; and when the signals were torn down the Olynthian auxiliaries retired within the walls, and the Macedonians rejoined the Athenians: thus on neither side did the cavalry take any part in the action. The Athenians raised a trophy and granted the Potidaeans a truce for the burial of their dead. Of the Potidaeans and their allies, there fell somewhat less than three hundred; of the Athenians, a hundred and fifty, and their general Callias.

[64] The Athenians instantly blockaded the town on the side towards the isthmus, raising a wall, which they guarded; but the side towards Pallenè was left open. They were conscious that they were too weak both to guard the isthmus and, crossing over to Pallenè, there to build another wall; they feared that their forces if divided would be attacked by the Potidaeans and their allies. Afterwards, when the Athenians at home heard that on the side towards Pallenè Potidaea was not invested, they sent out sixteen hundred hoplites of their own under the command of Phormio the son of Asopius. On his arrival in Pallenè he made Aphytis his head-quarters, and brought his army by slow marches up to Potidaea, wasting the country as he went along. No one came out to meet him, and so he built a wall towards Pallenè. Potidaea was now closely invested on both sides, while the Athenian ships, lying off the city, cut off all communication from the sea.

[65] Aristeus despaired of saving the place unless aid came from Peloponnesus or he was relieved in some unforeseen manner. Being anxious to husband provisions, he proposed to the garrison that they should avail themselves of the first favourable wind and sail away, leaving behind five hundred men, of whom he offered to be one. But they would not listen to him; so, wanting to do the best he could, and to further the Peloponnesian interests beyond the walls, he sailed out undiscovered by the Athenian guard-ships. He did not leave the country, but assisted the Chalcidians in carrying on the war. He succeeded in cutting off a large force of Sermylians by an ambuscade which he laid near their city; he also exerted himself to obtain aid from Peloponnesus. Phormio with his sixteen hundred hoplites, now that Potidaea was invested, ravaged Chalcidicè and Botticè, and captured several places.

[66] Such were the causes of ill-feeling which at this time existed between the Athenians and Peloponnesians: the Corinthians complaining that the Athenians were blockading their colony of Potidaea, and a Corinthian and Peloponnesian

garrison in it; the Athenians rejoining that a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy had excited to revolt a state which was an ally and tributary of theirs, and that they had now openly joined the Potidaeans, and were fighting on their side. The Peloponnesian war, however, had not yet broken out; the peace still continued; for thus far the Corinthians had acted alone.

[67] But now, seeing Potidaea besieged, they bestirred themselves in earnest. Corinthian troops were shut up within the walls, and they were afraid of losing the town; so without delay they invited the allies to meet at Sparta. There they inveighed against the Athenians, whom they affirmed to have broken the treaty and to be wronging the Peloponnese. The Aeginetans did not venture to send envoys openly, but secretly they acted with the Corinthians, and were among the chief instigators of the war, declaring that they had been robbed of the independence which the treaty guaranteed them. The Lacedaemonians themselves then proceeded to summon any of the allies who had similar charges to bring against the Athenians, and calling their own ordinary assembly told them to speak. Several of them came forward and stated their wrongs: The Megarians alleged, among other grounds of complaint, that they were excluded from all harbours within the Athenian dominion and from the Athenian market, contrary to the treaty. The Corinthians waited until the other allies had stirred up the Lacedaemonians; at length they came forward, and, last of all, spoke as follows:

[68] ‘The spirit of trust, Lacedaemonians, which animates your own political and social life, makes you distrust others who, like ourselves, have something unpleasant to say, and this temper of mind, though favourable to moderation, too often leaves you in ignorance of what is going on outside your own country. Time after time we have warned you of the mischief which the Athenians would do to us, but instead of taking our words to heart, you chose to suspect

that we only spoke from interested motives. And this is the reason why you have brought the allies to Sparta too late, not before but after the injury has been inflicted, and when they are smarting under the sense of it. Which of them all has a better right to speak than ourselves, who have the heaviest accusations to make, outraged as we are by the Athenians, and neglected by you? If the crimes which they are committing against Hellas were being done in a corner, then you might be ignorant, and we should have to inform you of them: but now, what need of many words? Some of us, as you see, have been already enslaved; they are at this moment intriguing against others, notably against allies of ours; and long ago they had made all their preparations in the prospect of war. Else why did they seduce from her allegiance Corcyra, which they still hold in defiance of us, and why are they blockading Potidaea, the latter a most advantageous post for the command of the Thracian peninsula, the former a great naval power which might have assisted the Peloponnesians?

[69] ‘And the blame of all this rests on you; for you who originally allowed them to fortify their city after the Persian War, and afterwards to build their Long Walls; and to this hour you have gone on defrauding of liberty their unfortunate subjects, and are now beginning to take it away from your own allies. For the true enslaver of a people is he who can put an end to their slavery but has no care about it; and all the more, if he be reputed the champion of liberty in Hellas. — And so we have met at last, but with what difficulty! and even now we have no definite object. By this time we ought to have been considering, not whether we are wronged, but how we are to be revenged. The aggressor is not now threatening, but advancing; he has made up his mind, while we are resolved about nothing. And we know too well how by slow degrees and with stealthy steps the Athenians encroach upon their neighbours. While they think that you are too dull to observe them, they are more careful,

but, when they know that you wilfully overlook their aggressions, they will strike and not spare. Of all Hellenes, Lacedaemonians, you are the only people who never do anything: on the approach of an enemy you are content to defend yourselves against him, not by acts, but by intentions, and seek to overthrow him, not in the infancy but in the fulness of his strength. How came you to be considered safe? That reputation of yours was never justified by facts. We all know that the Persian made his way from the ends of the earth against Peloponnesus before you encountered him in a worthy manner; and now you are blind to the doings of the Athenians, who are not at a distance as he was, but close at hand. Instead of attacking your enemy, you wait to be attacked, and take the chances of a struggle which has been deferred until his power is doubled. And you know that the Barbarian miscarried chiefly through his own errors; and that we have oftener been delivered from these very Athenians by blunders of their own, than by any aid from you. Some have already been ruined by the hopes which you inspired in them; for so entirely did they trust you that they took no precautions themselves. These things we say in no accusing or hostile spirit — let that be understood — but by way of expostulation. For men expostulate with erring friends, they bring accusation against enemies who have done them a wrong.

[70] ‘And surely we have a right to find fault with our neighbours, if any one ever had. There are important interests at stake to which, as far as we can see, you are insensible. And you have never considered what manner of men are these Athenians with whom you will have to fight, and how utterly unlike yourselves. They are revolutionary, equally quick in the conception and in the execution of every new plan; while you are conservative — careful only to keep what you have, originating nothing, and not acting even when action is most urgent. They are bold beyond their strength; they run risks which prudence would condemn;

and in the midst of misfortune they are full of hope. Whereas it is your nature, though strong, to act feebly; when your plans are most prudent, to distrust them; and when calamities come upon you, to think that you will never be delivered from them. They are impetuous, and you are dilatory; they are always abroad, and you are always at home. For they hope to gain something by leaving their homes; but you are afraid that any new enterprise may imperil what you have already. When conquerors, they pursue their victory to the utmost; when defeated, they fall back the least. Their bodies they devote to their country as though they belonged to other men; their true self is their mind, which is most truly their own when employed in her service. When they do not carry out an intention which they have formed, they seem to themselves to have sustained a personal bereavement; when an enterprise succeeds, they have gained a mere instalment of what is to come; but if they fail, they at once conceive new hopes and so fill up the void. With them alone to hope is to have, for they lose not a moment in the execution of an idea. This is the lifelong task, full of danger and toil, which they are always imposing upon themselves. None enjoy their good things less, because they are always seeking for more. To do their duty is their only holiday, and they deem the quiet of inaction to be as disagreeable as the most tiresome business. If a man should say of them, in a word, that they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to allow peace to other men, he would simply speak the truth.

[71] ‘In the face of such an enemy, Lacedaemonians, you persist in doing nothing. You do not see that peace is best secured by those who use their strength justly, but whose attitude shows that they have no intention of submitting to wrong. Justice with you seems to consist in giving no annoyance to others and in defending yourselves only against positive injury. But this policy would hardly be successful, even if your neighbours were like yourselves;

and in the present case, as we pointed out just now, your ways compared with theirs are old-fashioned. And, as in the arts, so also in politics, the new must always prevail over the old. In settled times the traditions of government should be observed: but when circumstances are changing and men are compelled to meet them, much originality is required. The Athenians have had a wider experience, and therefore the administration of their state unlike yours has been greatly reformed. But here let your procrastination end; send an army at once into Attica and assist your allies, especially the Potidaeans, to whom your word is pledged. Do not betray friends and kindred into the hands of their worst enemies; or drive us in despair to seek the alliance of others; in taking such a course we should be doing nothing wrong either before the Gods who are the witnesses of our oaths, or before men whose eyes are upon us. For the true breakers of treaties are not those who, when forsaken, turn to others, but those who forsake allies whom they have sworn to defend. We will remain your friends if you choose to bestir yourselves; for we should be guilty of an impiety if we deserted you without cause; and we shall not easily find allies equally congenial to us. Take heed then: you have inherited from your fathers the leadership of Peloponnesus; see that her greatness suffers no diminution at your hands.’

[72] Thus spoke the Corinthians. Now there happened to be staying at Lacedaemon an Athenian embassy which had come on other business, and when the envoys heard what the Corinthians had said, they felt bound to go before the Lacedaemonian assembly, not with the view of answering the accusations brought against them by the cities, but they wanted to put the whole question before the Lacedaemonians, and make them understand that they should take time to deliberate and not be rash. They also desired to set forth the greatness of their city, reminding the elder men of what they knew, and informing the younger of what lay beyond their experience. They thought that their

words would sway the Lacedaemonians in the direction of peace. So they came and said that, if they might be allowed, they too would like to address the people. The Lacedaemonians invited them to come forward, and they spoke as follows:

[73] ‘We were not sent here to argue with your allies, but on a special mission; observing, however, that no small outcry has arisen against us, we have come forward, not to answer the accusations which they bring (for you are not judges before whom either we or they have to plead), but to prevent you from lending too ready an ear to their bad advice and so deciding wrongly about a very serious question. We propose also, in reply to the wider charges which are raised against us, to show that what we have acquired we hold rightfully and that our city is not to be despised.

‘Of the ancient deeds handed down by tradition and which no eye of any one who hears us ever saw, why should we speak? But of the Persian War, and other events which you yourselves remember, speak we must, although we have brought them forward so often that the repetition of them is disagreeable to us. When we faced those perils we did so for the common benefit: in the solid good you shared, and of the glory, whatever good there may be in that, we would not be wholly deprived. Our words are not designed to deprecate hostility, but to set forth in evidence the character of the city with which, unless you are very careful, you will soon be involved in war. We tell you that we, first and alone, dared to engage with the Barbarian at Marathon, and that when he came again, being too weak to defend ourselves by land, we and our whole people embarked on shipboard and shared with the other Hellenes in the victory of Salamis. Thereby he was prevented from sailing to the Peloponnesus and ravaging city after city; for against so mighty a fleet how could you have helped one another? He himself is the best witness of our words; for when he was

once defeated at sea, he felt that his power was gone and quickly retreated with the greater part of his army.

[74] ‘The event proved undeniably that the fate of Hellas depended on her navy. And the three chief elements of success were contributed by us; namely, the greatest number of ships, the ablest general, the most devoted patriotism. The ships in all numbered four hundred, and of these, our own contingent amounted to nearly two-thirds. To the influence of Themistocles our general it was chiefly due that we fought in the strait, which was confessedly our salvation; and for this service you yourselves honoured him above any stranger who ever visited you. Thirdly, we displayed the most extraordinary courage and devotion; there was no one to help us by land; for up to our frontier those who lay in the enemy’s path were already slaves; so we determined to leave our city and sacrifice our homes. Even in that extremity we did not choose to desert the cause of the allies who still resisted, or by dispersing ourselves to become useless to them; but we embarked and fought, taking no offence at your failure to assist us sooner. We maintain then that we rendered you a service at least as great as you rendered us. The cities from which you came to help us were still inhabited and you might hope to return to them; your concern was for yourselves and not for us; at any rate you remained at a distance while we had anything to lose. But we went forth from a city which was no more, and fought for one of which there was small hope; and yet we saved ourselves, and bore our part in saving you. If, in order to preserve our land, like other states, we had gone over to the Persians at first, or afterwards had not ventured to embark because our ruin was already complete, it would have been useless for you with your weak navy to fight at sea, but everything would have gone quietly just as the Persian desired.

[75] ‘Considering, Lacedaemonians, the energy and sagacity which we then displayed, do we deserve to be so bitterly

hated by the other Hellenes merely because we have an empire? That empire was not acquired by force; but you would not stay and make an end of the Barbarian, and the allies came of their own accord and asked us to be their leaders. The subsequent development of our power was originally forced upon us by circumstances; fear was our first motive; afterwards honour, and then interest stepped in. And when we had incurred the hatred of most of our allies; when some of them had already revolted and been subjugated, and you were no longer the friends to us which you once had been, but suspicious and ill-disposed, how could we without great risk relax our hold? For the cities as fast as they fell away from us would have gone over to you. And no man is to be reproached who seizes every possible advantage when the danger is so great.

[76] ‘At all events, Lacedaemonians, we may retort that you, in the exercise of your supremacy, manage the cities of Peloponnesus to suit your own views; and that if you, and not we, had persevered in the command of the allies long enough to be hated, you would have been quite as intolerable to them as we are, and would have been compelled, for the sake of your own safety, to rule with a strong hand. An empire was offered to us: can you wonder that, acting as human nature always will, we accepted it and refused to give it up again, constrained by three all-powerful motives, honour, fear, interest? We are not the first who have aspired to rule; the world has ever held that the weaker must be kept down by the stronger. And we think that we are worthy of power; and there was a time when you thought so too; but now, when you mean expediency you talk about justice. Did justice ever deter any one from taking by force whatever he could? Men who indulge the natural ambition of empire deserve credit if they are in any degree more careful of justice than they need be. How moderate we are would speedily appear if others took our place; indeed

our very moderation, which should be our glory, has been unjustly converted into a reproach.

[77] ‘For because in our suits with our allies, regulated by treaty, we do not even stand upon our rights, but have instituted the practice of deciding them at Athens and by Athenian law, we are supposed to be litigious. None of our opponents observe why others, who exercise dominion elsewhere and are less moderate than we are in their dealings with their subjects, escape this reproach. Why is it? Because men who practise violence have no longer any need of law. But we are in the habit of meeting our allies on terms of equality, and, therefore, if through some legal decision of ours, or exercise of our imperial power, contrary to their own ideas of right, they suffer ever so little, they are not grateful for our moderation in leaving them so much, but are far more offended at their trifling loss than if we had from the first plundered them in the face of day, laying aside all thought of law. For then they would themselves have admitted that the weaker must give way to the stronger. Mankind resent injustice more than violence, because the one seems to be an unfair advantage taken by an equal, the other is the irresistible force of a superior. They were patient under the yoke of the Persian, who inflicted on them far more grievous wrongs; but now our dominion is odious in their eyes. And no wonder: the ruler of the day is always detested by his subjects. And should your empire supplant ours, may not you lose the good-will which you owe to the fear of us? Lose it you certainly will, if you mean again to exhibit the temper of which you gave a specimen when, for a short time, you led the confederacy against the Persian. For the institutions under which you live are incompatible with those of foreign states; and further, when any of you goes abroad, he respects neither these nor any other Hellenic customs.

[78] ‘Do not then be hasty in deciding a question which is serious; and do not, by listening to representations and

complaints which concern others, bring trouble upon yourselves. Realise, while there is time, the inscrutable nature of war; and how when protracted it generally ends in becoming a mere matter of chance, over which neither of us can have any control, the event being equally unknown and equally hazardous to both. The misfortune is that in their hurry to go to war, men begin with blows, and when a reverse comes upon them, then have recourse to words. But neither you, nor we, have as yet committed this mistake; and therefore while both of us can still choose the prudent part, we tell you not to break the peace or violate your oaths. Let our differences be determined by arbitration, according to the treaty. If you refuse we call to witness the Gods, by whom your oaths were sworn, that you are the authors of the war; and we will do our best to strike in return.'

[79] When the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges brought by the allies against the Athenians, and their rejoinder, they ordered everybody but themselves to withdraw, and deliberated alone. The majority were agreed that there was now a clear case against the Athenians, and that they must fight at once. But Archidamus their king, who was held to be both an able and a prudent man, came forward and spoke as follows:

[80] 'At my age, Lacedaemonians, I have had experience of many wars, and I see several of you who are as old as I am, and who will not, as men too often do, desire war because they have never known it, or in the belief that it is either a good or a safe thing. Any one who calmly reflects will find that the war about which you are now deliberating is likely to be a very great one. When we encounter our neighbours in the Peloponnese, their mode of fighting is like ours, and they are all within a short march. But when we have to do with men whose country is a long way off, and who are most skilful seamen and thoroughly provided with the means of war, — having wealth, private and public, ships, horses,

infantry, and a population larger than is to be found in any single Hellenic territory, not to speak of the numerous allies who pay them tribute, — is this a people against whom we can lightly take up arms or plunge into a contest unprepared? To what do we trust? To our navy? There we are inferior; and to exercise and train ourselves until we are a match for them, will take time. To our money? Nay, but in that we are weaker still; we have none in a common treasury, and we are never willing to contribute out of our private means.

[81] ‘Perhaps some one may be encouraged by the superior equipment and numbers of our infantry, which will enable us regularly to invade and ravage their lands. But their empire extends to distant countries, and they will be able to introduce supplies by sea. Or, again, we may try to stir up revolts among their allies. But these are mostly islanders, and we shall have to employ a fleet in their defence, as well as in our own. How then shall we carry on the war? For if we can neither defeat them at sea, nor deprive them of the revenues by which their navy is maintained, we shall get the worst of it. And having gone so far, we shall no longer be able even to make peace with honour, especially if we are believed to have begun the quarrel. We must not for one moment flatter ourselves that if we do but ravage their country the war will be at an end. Nay, I fear that we shall bequeath it to our children; for the Athenians with their high spirit will never barter their liberty to save their land, or be terrified like novices at the sight of war.

[82] ‘Not that I would have you shut your eyes to their designs and abstain from unmasking them, or tamely suffer them to injure our allies. But do not take up arms yet. Let us first send and remonstrate with them: we need not let them know positively whether we intend to go to war or not. In the meantime our own preparations may be going forward; we may seek for allies wherever we can find them, whether in Hellas or among the Barbarians, who will supply our

deficiencies in ships and money. Those who, like ourselves, are exposed to Athenian intrigue cannot be blamed if in self-defence they seek the aid not of Hellenes only, but of Barbarians. And we must develop our own resources to the utmost. If they listen to our ambassadors, well and good; but, if not, in two or three years' time we shall be in a stronger position, should we then determine to attack them. Perhaps too when they begin to see that we are getting ready, and that our words are to be interpreted by our actions, they may be more likely to yield; for their fields will be still untouched and their goods undespoiled, and it will be in their power to save them by their decision. Think of their land simply in the light of a hostage, all the more valuable in proportion as it is better cultivated; you should spare it as long as you can, and not by reducing them to despair make their resistance more obstinate. For if we allow ourselves to be stung into premature action by the reproaches of our allies, and waste their country before we are ready, we shall only involve Peloponnesus in more and more difficulty and disgrace. Charges brought by cities or persons against one another can be satisfactorily arranged; but when a great confederacy, in order to satisfy private grudges, undertakes a war of which no man can foresee the issue, it is not easy to terminate it with honour.

[83] 'And let no one think that there is any want of courage in cities so numerous hesitating to attack a single one. The allies of the Athenians are not less numerous; they pay them tribute too; and war is not an affair of arms, but of money which gives to arms their use, and which is needed above all things when a continental is fighting against a maritime power: let us find money first, and then we may safely allow our minds to be excited by the speeches of our allies. We, on whom the future responsibility, whether for good or evil, will chiefly fall, should calmly reflect on the consequences which may follow.

[84] ‘Do not be ashamed of the slowness and procrastination with which they are so fond of charging you; if you begin the war in haste, you will end it at your leisure, because you took up arms without sufficient preparation. Remember that we have always been citizens of a free and most illustrious state, and that for us the policy which they condemn may well be the truest good sense and discretion. It is a policy which has saved us from growing insolent in prosperity or giving way under adversity, like other men. We are not stimulated by the allurements of flattery into dangerous courses of which we disapprove; nor are we goaded by offensive charges into compliance with any man’s wishes. Our habits of discipline make us both brave and wise; brave, because the spirit of loyalty quickens the sense of honour, and the sense of honour inspires courage; wise, because we are not so highly educated that we have learned to despise the laws, and are too severely trained and of too loyal a spirit to disobey them. We have not acquired that useless over-intelligence which makes a man an excellent critic of an enemy’s plans, but paralyses him in the moment of action. We think that the wits of our enemies are as good as our own, and that the element of fortune cannot be forecast in words. Let us assume that they have common prudence, and let our preparations be, not words, but deeds. Our hopes ought not to rest on the probability of their making mistakes, but on our own caution and foresight. We should remember that one man is much the same as another, and that he is best who is trained in the severest school.

[85] ‘These are principles which our fathers have handed down to us, and we maintain to our lasting benefit; we must not lose sight of them, and when many lives and much wealth, many cities and a great name are at stake, we must not be hasty, or make up our minds in a few short hours; we must take time. We can afford to wait, when others cannot, because we are strong. And now, send to the Athenians and remonstrate with them about Potidaea first, and also about

the other wrongs of which your allies complain. They say that they are willing to have the matter tried; and against one who offers to submit to justice you must not proceed as against a criminal until his cause has been heard. In the meantime prepare for war. This decision will be the best for yourselves and the most formidable to your enemies.’

Thus spoke Archidamus. Last of all, Sthenelaidas, at that time one of the Ephors, came forward and addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows:

[86] ‘I do not know what the long speeches of the Athenians mean. They have been loud in their own praise, but they do not pretend to say that they are dealing honestly with our allies and with the Peloponnesus. If they behaved well in the Persian War and are now behaving badly to us they ought to be punished twice over, because they were once good men and have become bad. But we are the same now as we were then, and we shall not do our duty if we allow our allies to be ill-used, and put off helping them, for they cannot put off their troubles. Others may have money and ships and horses, but we have brave allies and we must not betray them to the Athenians. If they were suffering in word only, by words and legal processes their wrongs might be redressed; but now there is not a moment to be lost, and we must help them with all our might. Let no one tell us that we should take time to think when we are suffering injustice. Nay, we reply, those who mean to do injustice should take a long time to think. Wherefore, Lacedaemonians, prepare for war as the honour of Sparta demands. Withstand the advancing power of Athens. Do not let us betray our allies, but, with the Gods on our side, let us attack the evil-doer.’

[87] When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken he, being Ephor, himself put the question to the Lacedaemonian assembly. Their custom is to signify their decision by cries and not by voting. But he professed himself unable to tell on which side was the louder cry, and wishing to call forth a demonstration which might encourage the warlike spirit, he said, ‘Whoever

of you, Lacedaemonians, thinks that the treaty has been broken and that the Athenians are in the wrong, let him rise and go yonder' (pointing to a particular spot), 'and those who think otherwise to the other side.' So the assembly rose and divided, and it was determined by a large majority that the treaty had been broken. The Lacedaemonians then recalled the allies and told them that in their judgment the Athenians were guilty, but that they wished to hold a general assembly of the allies and take a vote from them all; then the war, if they approved of it, might be undertaken by common consent. Having accomplished their purpose, the allies returned home; and the Athenian envoys, when their errand was done, returned likewise. Thirteen years of the thirty years' peace which was concluded after the recovery of Euboea had elapsed and the fourteenth year had begun when the Lacedaemonian assembly decided that the treaty had been broken.

[88] In arriving at this decision and resolving to go to war, the Lacedaemonians were influenced, not so much by the speeches of their allies, as by the fear of the Athenians and of their increasing power. For they saw the greater part of Hellas already subject to them.

[89] How the Athenians attained the position in which they rose to greatness I will now proceed to describe. When the Persians, defeated by the Hellenes on sea and land, had retreated from Europe, and the remnant of the fleet, which had taken refuge at Mycalè, had there perished, Leotychides, the Lacedaemonian king, who had commanded the Hellenes in the battle, returned home with the allies from Peloponnesus. But the Athenians and their allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, who had now revolted from the king, persevered and besieged Sestos, at that time still in the hands of the Persians. Remaining there through the winter they took the place, which the Barbarians deserted. The allies then sailed back from the Hellespont to their respective homes. Meanwhile the Athenian people, now quit

of the Barbarians, fetched their wives, their children, and the remains of their property from the places in which they had been deposited, and set to work, rebuilding the city and the walls. Of the old line of wall but a small part was left standing. Most of the houses were in ruins, a few only remaining in which the chief men of the Persians had lodged.

[90] The Lacedaemonians knew what would happen and sent an embassy to Athens. They would rather themselves have seen neither the Athenians nor any one else protected by a wall; but their main motive was the importunity of their allies, who dreaded not only the Athenian navy, which had until lately been quite small, but also the spirit which had animated them in the Persian War. So the Lacedaemonians requested them not to restore their walls, but on the contrary to join with them in razing the fortifications of other towns outside the Peloponnesus which had them standing. They did not reveal their real wishes or the suspicion which they entertained of the Athenians, but argued that the Barbarian, if he again attacked them, would then have no strong place which he could make his head-quarters as he had lately made Thebes. Peloponnesus would be a sufficient retreat for all Hellas and a good base of operations. To this the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, replied, that they would send an embassy of their own to discuss the matter, and so got rid of the Spartan envoys. He then proposed that he should himself start at once for Sparta, and that they should give him colleagues who were not to go immediately, but were to wait until the wall reached the lowest height which could possibly be defended. The whole people, who were in the city, men, women, and children, should join in the work, and they must spare no building, private or public, which could be of use, but demolish them all. Having given these instructions and intimated that he would manage affairs at Sparta, he departed. On his arrival he did not at once present himself officially to the

magistrates, but delayed and made excuses; and when any of them asked him ‘why he did not appear before the assembly,’ he said ‘that he was waiting for his colleagues, who had been detained by some engagement; he was daily expecting them, and wondered that they had not appeared.’

[91] The friendship of the Lacedaemonian magistrates for Themistocles induced them to believe him; but when everybody who came from Athens declared positively that the wall was building and had already reached a considerable height, they knew not what to think. He, aware of their suspicions, desired them not to be misled by reports, but to send to Athens men whom they could trust out of their own number who would see for themselves and bring back word. They agreed; and he at the same time privately instructed the Athenians to detain the envoys as quietly as they could, and not let them go until he and his colleagues had got safely home. For by this time Habronichus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, who were joined with him in the embassy, had arrived, bringing the news that the wall was of sufficient height; and he was afraid that the Lacedaemonians, when they heard the truth, might not allow them to return. So the Athenians detained the envoys, and Themistocles, coming before the Lacedaemonians, at length declared in so many words that Athens was now provided with walls and could protect her citizens; henceforward, if the Lacedaemonians or their allies wished at any time to negotiate, they must deal with the Athenians as with men who knew quite well what was for their own and the common good. When they boldly resolved to leave their city and go on board ship, they did not first ask the advice of the Lacedaemonians, and, when the two states met in council, their own judgment had been as good as that of any one. And now they had arrived at an independent opinion that it was better far, and would be more advantageous both for themselves and for the whole body of the allies, that their city should have a wall; when

any member of a confederacy had not equal military advantages, his counsel could not be of equal weight or worth. Either all the allies should pull down their walls, or they should acknowledge that the Athenians were in the right.

[92] On hearing these words the Lacedaemonians did not openly quarrel with the Athenians; for they professed that the embassy had been designed, not to interfere with them, but to offer a suggestion for the public good; besides at that time the patriotism which the Athenians had displayed in the Persian War had created a warm feeling of friendliness between the two cities. They were annoyed at the failure of their purpose, but they did not show it. And the envoys on either side returned home without any formal complaint.

[93] In such hurried fashion did the Athenians build the walls of their city. To this day the structure shows evidence of haste. The foundations are made up of all sorts of stones, in some places unwrought, and laid just as each worker brought them; there were many columns too, taken from sepulchres, and many old stones already cut, inserted in the work. The circuit of the city was extended in every direction, and the citizens, in their ardour to complete the design, spared nothing.

Themistocles also persuaded the Athenians to finish the Piraeus, of which he had made a beginning in his year of office as Archon. The situation of the place, which had three natural havens, was excellent; and now that the Athenians had become seamen, he thought that they had great advantage for the attainment of empire. For he first dared to say that ‘they must make the sea their domain,’ and he lost no time in laying the foundations of their empire. By his advice, they built the wall of such a width that two waggons carrying the stones could meet and pass on the top; this width may still be traced at the Piraeus; inside there was no rubble or mortar, but the whole wall was made up of large stones hewn square, which were clamped on the outer face

with iron and lead. The height was not more than half what he had originally intended; he had hoped by the very dimensions of the wall to paralyse the designs of an enemy, and he thought that a handful of the least efficient citizens would suffice for its defence, while the rest might man the fleet. His mind was turned in this direction, as I conceive, from observing that the King’s armament had met with fewer obstacles by sea than by land. The Piraeus appeared to him to be of more real consequence than the upper city. He was fond of telling the Athenians that if ever they were hard pressed on land they should go down to the Piraeus and fight the world at sea.

Thus the Athenians built their walls and restored their city immediately after the retreat of the Persians.

[94] Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus was now sent from Peloponnesus with twenty ships in command of the Hellenic forces; thirty Athenian ships and a number of the allies sailed with him. They first made an expedition against Cyprus, of which they subdued the greater part; and afterwards against Byzantium, which was in the hands of the Persians, and was taken while he was still in command.

[95] He had already begun to be oppressive, and the allies were offended with him, especially the Ionians and others who had been recently emancipated from the King. So they had recourse to their kinsmen the Athenians and begged them to be their leaders, and to protect them against Pausanias, if he attempted to oppress them. The Athenians took the matter up and prepared to interfere, being fully resolved to manage the confederacy in their own way. In the meantime the Lacedaemonians summoned Pausanias to Sparta, intending to investigate certain reports which had reached them; for he was accused of numerous crimes by Hellenes returning from the Hellespont, and appeared to exercise his command more after the fashion of a tyrant than of a general. His recall occurred at the very time when the hatred which he inspired had induced the allies, with the

exception of the Peloponnesians, to transfer themselves to the Athenians. On arriving at Lacedaemon he was punished for the wrongs which he had done to particular persons, but he had been also accused of conspiring with the Persians, and of this, which was the principal charge and was generally believed to be proven, he was acquitted. The government however did not continue him in his command, but sent in his place Dorcis and certain others with a small force. To these the allies refused allegiance, and Dorcis, seeing the state of affairs, returned home. Henceforth the Lacedaemonians sent out no more commanders, for they were afraid that those whom they appointed would be corrupted, as they had found to be the case with Pausanias; they had had enough of the Persian War; and they thought that the Athenians were fully able to lead, and at that time believed them to be their friends.

[96] Thus the Athenians by the good-will of the allies, who detested Pausanias, obtained the leadership. They immediately fixed which of the cities should supply money and which of them ships for the war against the Barbarians, the avowed object being to compensate themselves and the allies for their losses by devastating the King’s country. Then was first instituted at Athens the office of Hellenic treasurers (Hellenotamiae), who received the tribute, for so the contributions were termed. The amount was originally fixed at 460 talents. The island of Delos was the treasury, and the meetings of the allies were held in the temple.

[97] At first the allies were independent and deliberated in a common assembly under the leadership of Athens. But in the interval between the Persian and the Peloponnesian Wars, by their military success and by policy in dealing with the Barbarian, with their own rebellious allies and with the Peloponnesians who came across their path from time to time, the Athenians made immense strides in power. I have gone out of my way to speak of this period because the writers who have preceded me treat either of Hellenic affairs previous to the Persian invasion or of that invasion itself; the intervening portion of history has been omitted by all of them, with the exception of Hellanicus; and he, where he has touched upon it in his Attic history, is very brief, and inaccurate in his chronology. The narrative will also serve to explain how the Athenian empire grew up.

[98] First of all under the leadership of Cimon, the son of Miltiades, the Athenians besieged and took Eion upon the Strymon, then in the hands of the Persians, and sold the inhabitants into slavery. The same fate befell Scyros, an island in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopes; this they colonised themselves. They also made war on the Carystians of Euboea, who, after a time, capitulated; the other Euboeans took no part in the war. Then the Naxians revolted, and the Athenians made war against them and reduced them by blockade. This was the first of the allied cities which was enslaved contrary to Hellenic right; the turn of the others came later.

[99] The causes which led to the defections of the allies were of different kinds, the principal being their neglect to pay the tribute or to furnish ships, and, in some cases, failure of military service. For the Athenians were exacting and oppressive, using coercive measures towards men who were neither willing nor accustomed to work hard. And for various reasons they soon began to prove less agreeable leaders than at first. They no longer fought upon an equality with the rest of the confederates, and they had no difficulty in

reducing them when they revolted. Now the allies brought all this upon themselves; for the majority of them disliked military service and absence from home, and so they agreed to contribute their share of the expense instead of ships. Whereby the Athenian navy was proportionally increased, while they themselves were always untrained and unprepared for war when they revolted.

[100] A little later the Athenians and their allies fought two battles, one by land and the other by sea, against the Persians, at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia. The Athenians, under the command of Cimon the son of Miltiades, on the same day conquered in both, and took and destroyed all the Phoenician triremes numbering two hundred. After a while the Thasians revolted; a quarrel had arisen between them and the Athenians about the Thracian markets and the mine on the Thracian coast opposite, of which the Thasians received the profits. The Athenians sailed to Thasos and, gaining a victory at sea, landed upon the island. About the same time they sent ten thousand of their own people and of their allies to the Strymon, intending to colonise the place then called the Nine Ways and now Amphipolis. They gained possession of the Nine Ways, which were inhabited by the Edoni, but, advancing into the interior of Thrace, they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the united Thracians, whose country was threatened by the new settlement.

[101] The Thasians, now blockaded after several defeats, had recourse to the Lacedaemonians and entreated them to invade Attica. Unknown to the Athenians they agreed, and were on the point of setting out when the great earthquake occurred and was immediately followed by the revolt of the Helots and with them the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea, who seized Ithomè. These Helots were mostly the descendants of the Messenians who had been enslaved in ancient times, and hence all the insurgents were called Messenians.

While the Lacedaemonians were thus engaged, the Thasians, who had now been blockaded for more than two years, came to terms with the Athenians; they pulled down their walls and surrendered their ships; they also agreed to pay what was required of them whether in the shape of immediate indemnity or of tribute for the future; and they gave up their claim to the mainland and to the mine.

[102] The siege of Ithomè proved tedious, and the Lacedaemonians called in, among other allies, the Athenians, who sent to their aid a considerable force under Cimon. The Athenians were specially invited because they were reputed to be skilful in siege operations, and the length of the blockade proved to the Lacedaemonians their own deficiency in that sort of warfare; else why had they not taken the place by assault? This expedition of the Athenians led to the first open quarrel between them and the Lacedaemonians. For the Lacedaemonians, not succeeding in storming the place, took alarm at the bold and original spirit of the Athenians. They reflected that they were aliens in race, and fearing that, if they were allowed to remain, they might be tempted by the Helots in Ithomè to change sides, they dismissed them, while they retained the other allies. But they concealed their mistrust, and merely said that they no longer needed their services. Now the Athenians saw that their dismissal was due to some suspicion which had arisen and not to the less offensive reason which was openly avowed; they felt keenly that such a slight ought not to have been offered them by the Lacedaemonians; and so, on their return home, they forthwith abandoned the alliance which they had made with them against the Persians and went over to their Argive enemies. At the same time both Argos and Athens bound themselves to Thessaly by a common oath of alliance.

[103] In the tenth year of the siege the defenders of Ithomè were unable to hold out any longer, and capitulated to the Lacedaemonians. The terms were as follows: They were to

leave Peloponnesus under a safe-conduct, and were never again to return; if any of them were taken on Peloponnesian soil, he was to be the slave of his captor. Now an ancient oracle of Delphi was current among the Lacedaemonians, bidding them let the suppliant of Ithomaean Zeus go free. So the Messenians left Ithomè with their wives and children; and the Athenians, who were now the avowed enemies of Sparta, gave them a home at Naupactus, a place which they had lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians.

The Athenians obtained the alliance of the Megarians, who revolted from the Lacedaemonians because the Corinthians were pressing them hard in a war arising out of a question of frontiers. Thus they gained both Megara and Pegae; and they built for the Megarians the long walls, extending from the city to the port of Nisaea, which they garrisoned themselves. This was the original and the main cause of the intense hatred which the Corinthians entertained towards the Athenians.

[104] Meanwhile Inaros the son of Psammetichus, king of the Libyans who border on Egypt, had induced the greater part of Egypt to revolt from King Artaxerxes. He began the rebellion at Mareia, a city opposite the island of Pharos, and, having made himself ruler of the country, called in the Athenians. They were just then engaged in an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies; and, quitting the island, they went to his aid. They sailed from the sea into the Nile, and, making themselves masters of the river and of two-thirds of Memphis, proceeded to attack the remaining part called the White Castle, in which some of the Persians and Medes had taken refuge, and with them such Egyptians as had not joined in the revolt.

[105] An Athenian fleet made a descent upon Halieis, where a battle took place against some Corinthian and Epidaurian troops; the Athenians gained the victory. Soon afterwards the Athenians fought at sea off Cecryphaleia with a

Peloponnesian fleet, which they defeated. A war next broke out between the Aeginetans and the Athenians, and a great battle was fought off the coast of Aegina, in which the allies of both parties joined; the Athenians were victorious, and captured seventy of the enemy's ships; they then landed on Aegina and, under the command of Leocrates the son of Stroebus, besieged the town. Thereupon the Peloponnesians sent over to the assistance of the Aeginetans three hundred hoplites who had previously been assisting the Corinthians and Epidaurians. The Corinthians seized on the heights of Geraneia, and thence made a descent with their allies into the Megarian territory, thinking that the Athenians, who had so large a force absent in Aegina and in Egypt, would be unable to assist the Megarians; or, if they did; would be obliged to raise the siege of Aegina. But the Athenians, without moving their army from Aegina, sent to Megara under the command of Myronides a force consisting of their oldest and youngest men, who had remained at home. A battle was fought, which hung equally in the balance; and when the two armies separated, they both thought that they had gained the victory. The Athenians, who did however get rather the better, on the departure of the Corinthians erected a trophy. And then the Corinthians, irritated by the reproaches of the aged men in the city, after about twelve days' preparation came out again, and, claiming the victory, raised another trophy. Hereupon the Athenians sallied out of Megara, killed those who were erecting the trophy, and charged and defeated the rest of the army.

[106] The Corinthians now retreated, but a considerable number of them were hard pressed, and missing their way got into an enclosure belonging to a private person, which was surrounded by a great ditch and had no exit. The Athenians, perceiving their situation, closed the entrance in front with heavy-armed troops, and, placing their light troops in a circle round, stoned all who had entered the

enclosure. This was a great blow to the Corinthians. The main body of their army returned home.

[107] About this time the Athenians began to build their Long Walls extending to the sea, one to the harbour of Phalerum, and the other to the Piraeus. The Phocians made an expedition against the Dorians, who inhabit Boeum, Cytinium, and Erineum, and are the mother people of the Lacedaemonians; one of these towns they took. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians under the command of Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus, who was general in the place of the king Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias (he being at that time a minor), came to the assistance of the Dorians with fifteen hundred hoplites of their own, and, of their allies, ten thousand, and compelled the Phocians to make terms and to restore the town. They then thought of returning; but there were difficulties. Either they might go by sea across the Crisaean Gulf, in which case the Athenian fleet would be sure to sail round and intercept them, or they might march over Mount Geraneia; but this seemed dangerous when the Athenians were holding Megara and Pegae. The pass was not easy, and was always guarded by the Athenians, who were obviously intending to stop them by that route also. So they determined to remain in Boeotia and consider how they could best get home. They had another motive : — Certain Athenians were privately making overtures to them, in the hope that they would put an end to the democracy and the building of the Long Walls. But the Athenians were aware of their embarrassment, and they also suspected their design against the democracy. So they went out to meet them with their whole force, together with a thousand Argives and contingents from the other allies; they numbered in all fourteen thousand men. Among them were some Thessalian cavalry, who came to their aid in accordance with the treaty, but these deserted to the Lacedaemonians during the engagement.

[108] The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, after great slaughter on both sides, gained the victory. They then marched into the Megarian territory, and, cutting down the fruit-trees; returned home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the Athenians made another expedition into Boeotia under the command of Myronides, and there was a battle at Oenophyta, in which they defeated the Boeotians and became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They pulled down the walls of Tanagra and took as hostages from the Opuntian Locrians a hundred of their richest citizens. They then completed their own Long Walls. Soon afterwards the Aeginetans came to terms with the Athenians, dismantling their walls, surrendering their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute for the future. The Athenians, under the command of Tolmides, the son of Tolmaeus, sailed round Peloponnesus and burnt the Lacedaemonian dockyard. They also took the Corinthian town of Chalcis, and, making a descent upon Sicyon, defeated a Sicyonian force.

[109] The Athenians and their allies were still in Egypt, where they carried on the war with varying fortune. At first they were masters of the country. The King sent to Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian, who was well supplied with money, in the hope that he might persuade the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and so draw off the Athenians from Egypt. He had no success; the money was being spent and nothing done; so, with what remained of it, he found his way back to Asia. The King then sent into Egypt Megabyzus the son of Zopyrus, a Persian, who marched overland with a large army and defeated the Egyptians and their allies. He drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and finally shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he blockaded them for eighteen months. At length he drained the canal and diverted the water, thus leaving their ships high and dry and joining

nearly the whole island to the mainland. He then crossed over with a land force, and took the island.

[110] Thus, after six years' fighting, the cause of the Hellenes in Egypt was lost. A few survivors of their great army found their way through Libya to Cyrenè; by far the larger number perished. Egypt again became subject to the Persians, although Amyrtaeus, the king in the fens, still held out. He escaped capture owing to the extent of the fens and the bravery of their inhabitants, who are the most warlike of all the Egyptians. Inaros, the king of Libya, the chief author of the revolt, was betrayed and impaled. Fifty additional triremes, which had been sent by the Athenians and their allies to relieve their other forces, in ignorance of what had happened, sailed into the Mendesian mouth of the Nile. But they were at once attacked both from the land and from the sea, and the greater part of them destroyed by the Phoenician fleet, a few ships only escaping. Thus ended the great Egyptian expedition of the Athenians and their allies.

[111] About this time Orestes, the exiled son of the Thessalian king Echecratides, persuaded the Athenians to restore him: Taking with them a force of the Boeotians and Phocians, who were now their allies, they marched against Pharsalus in Thessaly. They made themselves masters of the country in the neighbourhood of their camp, but the Thessalian cavalry stopped any further advance. They could not take the place, and none of their plans prospered; so they returned unsuccessful and brought back Orestes.

A short time afterwards a thousand Athenians, under the command of Pericles the son of Xanthippus, embarking on board the fleet which they had at Pegae, now in their possession, coasted along to Sicyon, and there landing, defeated the Sicyonians who came out to meet them. With the least possible delay taking on board Achaean troops and sailing to the opposite coast, they attacked and besieged Oeniadae, a town of Acarnania; but failing to reduce it, they returned home.

[112] After an interval of three years a five years' truce was concluded between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. The Athenians now abstained from war in Hellas itself, but made an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty ships were detached from the armament and sailed to Egypt, at the request of Amyrtaeus the king in the fens; the remainder proceeded to blockade Citium. Here Cimon died, and a famine arose in the country; so the fleet quitted Citium. Arriving off Salamis in Cyprus they fought at sea and also on land with Phoenician and Cilician forces. Gaining a victory in both engagements, they returned home, accompanied by the ships which had gone out with them and had now come back from Egypt. After this the Lacedaemonians engaged in the so-called Sacred War and gained possession of the temple of Delphi, which they handed over to the Delphians. But no sooner had they retired than the Athenians sent an expedition and recovered the temple, which they handed over to the Phocians.

[113] Some time afterwards the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides the son of Tolmaeus, with a thousand hoplites of their own and contingents of their allies, made an expedition against Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and certain other places in Boeotia which were in the hands of oligarchical exiles from different Boeotian towns, and so were hostile to them. They took Chaeronea, and leaving a garrison there, departed. But while they were on their march, the exiles who had occupied Orchomenus, some Locrians, some Euboean exiles and others of the same party, set upon them at Coronea and defeated them, killing many and taking many prisoners. The Athenians then agreed to evacuate the whole of Boeotia upon condition that the prisoners should be restored. And so the Boeotian exiles returned to their homes, and all the Boeotians regained their independence.

[114] Not long afterwards Euboea revolted from Athens. Pericles had just arrived in the island with an Athenian army when the news came that Megara had likewise revolted, that the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica, and that the Megarians had slaughtered the Athenian garrison, of whom a few only had escaped to Nisaea. The Megarians had introduced a force of Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the city, and by their help had effected the revolt. Pericles in haste withdrew his army from Euboea. The Peloponnesians then invaded Attica under the command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, the Lacedaemonian king. They advanced as far as Eleusis and Thria but no further, and after ravaging the country, returned home. Thereupon the Athenians under the command of Pericles again crossed over to Euboea and reduced the whole country; the Hestiaeans they ejected from their homes and appropriated their territory; the rest of the island they settled by agreement.

[115] Soon after their return from Euboea they made a truce for thirty years with the Laeedaemonians and their allies, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen and Achaia, which were the places held by them in Peloponnesus. Six years later the Samians and Milesians went to war about the possession of Prienè, and the Milesians, who were getting worsted, came to Athens and complained loudly of the Samians. Some private citizens of Samos, who wanted to overthrow the government, supported their complaint. Whereupon the Athenians, sailing to Samos with forty ships, established a democracy, and taking as hostages fifty boys and fifty men whom they deposited at Lemnos, they returned leaving a garrison. But certain of the Samians who had quitted the island and fled to the mainland entered into an alliance with the principal oligarchs who remained in the city, and with Pissuthnes the son of Hystaspes, then governor of Sardis, and collecting troops to the number of seven hundred they crossed over by night to Samos. First of all they attacked the victorious populace and got most of them into their power;

then they stole away their hostages from Lemnos, and finally revolted from Athens. The garrison of the Athenians and the officials who were in their power were delivered by them into the hands of Pissuthnes. They at once prepared to make an expedition against Miletus. The Byzantians joined in their revolt.

[116] When the Athenians heard of the insurrection they sailed for Samos with sixty ships. But of this number they sent away sixteen, some towards Caria to keep a look out for the Phoenician fleet, others to summon aid from Chios and Lesbos. With the remaining forty-four ships they fought at sea under the command of Pericles and nine others, near the island of Tragia, against seventy Samian vessels, all sailing from Miletus, of which twenty were transports; the Athenians gained the victory. After receiving a reinforcement of forty ships from Athens and of twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos they disembarked, and their infantry proving superior, invested the city with three walls; they also blockaded it by sea. At the same time Pericles took sixty ships of the blockading force and sailed hastily towards Caunus in Caria, news having arrived that a Phoenician fleet was approaching; Stesagoras and others had already gone with five ships from Samos to fetch it.

[117] Meanwhile the Samians made a sudden sally, and attacking the naval station of the Athenians which was unprotected, destroyed the guard-ships and engaged and defeated the other vessels which put out to meet them. During some fourteen days they were masters of the sea about their own coasts, and carried in and out whatever they pleased. But when Pericles returned, they were again closely blockaded; and there soon arrived from Athens forty additional ships under Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio, twenty more under Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. The Samians made a feeble attempt at a sea-fight, but soon they were unable to resist, and after nine months were forced to surrender. The terms of capitulation

were as follows: — They were to raze their walls, give hostages, surrender their ships, and pay a full indemnity by regular instalments. The Byzantians too made terms and became subjects as before.

[118] Not long afterwards occurred the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, which have been already narrated, and the various other circumstances which led to the Peloponnesian War. Fifty years elapsed between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of the war; during these years took place all those operations of the Hellenes against one another and against the Barbarian which I have been describing. The Athenians acquired a firmer hold over their empire and the city itself became a great power. The Lacedaemonians saw what was going on, but during most of the time they remained inactive and hardly attempted to interfere. They had never been of a temper prompt to take the field unless they were compelled; and they were in some degree embarrassed by wars near home. But the Athenians were growing too great to be ignored and were laying hands on their allies. They could now bear it no longer: they made up their minds that they must put out all their strength and overthrow the Athenian power by force of arms. And therefore they commenced the Peloponnesian War. They had already voted in their own assembly that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were guilty; they now sent to Delphi and asked the God if it would be for their advantage to make war. He is reported to have answered that, if they did their best, they would be conquerors, and that he himself, invited or uninvited, would take their part.

[119] So they again summoned the allies, intending to put to them the question of war or peace. When their representatives arrived, an assembly was held; and the allies said what they had to say, most of them complaining of the Athenians and demanding that the war should proceed. The Corinthians had already gone the round of the cities and entreated them privately to vote for war; they

were afraid that they would be too late to save Potidaea. At the assembly they came forward last of all and spoke as follows:

[120] ‘Fellow allies, we can no longer find fault with the Lacedaemonians; they have themselves resolved upon war and have brought us hither to confirm their decision. And they have done well; for the leaders of a confederacy, while they do not neglect the interests of their own state, should look to the general weal: as they are first in honour, they should be first in the fulfilment of their duties. Now those among us who have ever had dealings with the Athenians, do not require to be warned against them; but such as live inland and not on any maritime highway should clearly understand that, if they do not protect the sea-board, they will find it more difficult to carry their produce to the sea, or to receive in return the goods which the sea gives to the land. They should not lend a careless ear to our words, for they nearly concern them; they should remember that, if they desert the cities on the sea-shore, the danger may some day reach them, and that they are consulting for their own interests quite as much as for ours. And therefore let no one hesitate to accept war in exchange for peace. Wise men refuse to move until they are wronged, but brave men as soon as they are wronged go to war, and when there is a good opportunity make peace again. They are not intoxicated by military success; but neither will they tolerate injustice from a love of peace and ease. For he whom pleasure makes a coward will quickly lose, if he continues inactive, the delights of ease which he is so unwilling to renounce; and he whose arrogance is stimulated by victory does not see how hollow is the confidence which elates him. Many schemes which were ill-advised have succeeded through the still greater folly which possessed the enemy, and yet more, which seemed to be wisely contrived, have ended in foul disaster. The execution of an enterprise is never equal to the conception of it in the confident mind of

its promoter; for men are safe while they are forming plans, but, when the time of action comes, then they lose their presence of mind and fail.

[121] ‘We, however, do not make war upon the Athenians in a spirit of vain-glory, but from a sense of wrong; there is ample justification, and when we obtain redress, we will put up the sword. For every reason we are likely to succeed. First, because we are superior in numbers and in military skill; secondly, because we all obey as one man the orders given to us. They are doubtless strong at sea, but we too will provide a navy, for which the means can be supplied partly by contributions from each state, partly out of the funds at Delphi and Olympia. A loan will be granted to us, and by the offer of higher pay we can draw away their foreign sailors. The Athenian power consists of mercenaries, and not of their own citizens; but our soldiers are not mercenaries, and therefore cannot so be bought, for we are strong in men if poor in money. Let them be beaten in a single naval engagement and they are probably conquered at once; but suppose they hold out, we shall then have more time in which to practise at sea. As soon as we have brought our skill up to the level of theirs our courage will surely give us the victory. For that is a natural gift which they cannot learn, but their superior skill is a thing acquired, which we must attain by practice.

And the money which is required for the war, we will provide by a contribution. What! shall their allies never fail in paying the tribute which is to enslave them, and shall we refuse to give freely in order to save ourselves and be avenged on our enemies, or rather to prevent the money which we refused to give from being taken from us by them and used to our destruction?

[122] ‘These are some of the means by which the war may be carried on; but there are others. We may induce their allies to revolt, — a sure mode of cutting off the revenues in which the strength of Athens consists; or we may plant a fort in

their country; and there are many expedients which will hereafter suggest themselves. For war, least of all things, conforms to prescribed rules; it strikes out a path for itself when the moment comes. And therefore he who has his temper under control in warfare is safer far, but he who gets into a passion is, through his own fault, liable to the greater fall.

'If this were merely a quarrel between one of us and our neighbours about a boundary line it would not matter; but reflect: the truth is that the Athenians are a match for us all, and much more than a match for any single city. And if we allow ourselves to be divided or are not united against them heart and soul — the whole confederacy and every nation and city in it — they will easily overpower us. It may seem a hard saying, but you may be sure that defeat means nothing but downright slavery, and the bare mention of such a possibility is a disgrace to the Peloponnese: — shall so many states suffer at the hands of one? Men will say, some that we deserve our fate, others that we are too cowardly to resist: and we shall seem a degenerate race. For our fathers were the liberators of Hellas, but we cannot secure even our own liberty; and while we make a point of overthrowing the rule of a single man in this or that city, we allow a city which is a tyrant to be set up in the midst of us. Are we not open to one of three most serious charges — folly, cowardice, or carelessness? For you certainly do not escape such imputations by wrapping yourselves in that contemptuous wisdom which has so often brought men to ruin, as in the end to be pronounced contemptible folly.

[123] 'But why should we dwell reproachfully upon the past, except in the interest of the present? We should rather, looking to the future, devote our energies to the task which we have immediately in hand. By labour to win virtue, — that is the lesson which we have learnt from our fathers, and which you ought not to unlearn, because you chance to have some trifling advantage over them in wealth and

power; for men should not lose in the time of their wealth what was gained by them in their time of want. There are many reasons why you may advance with confidence. The God has spoken and has promised to take our part himself. All Hellas will fight at our side, from motives either of fear or of interest. And you will not break the treaty, — the God in bidding you go to war pronounces it to have been already broken, — but you will avenge the violation of it. For those who attack others, not those who defend themselves, are the real violators of treaties.

[124] ‘On every ground you will be right in going to war: it is our united advice; and if you believe community of interests to be the surest ground of strength both to states and individuals, send speedy aid to the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and now besieged by Ionians (for times have changed), and recover the liberties which the rest of the allies have lost. We cannot go on as we are: for some of us are already suffering, and if it is known that we have met, but do not dare to defend ourselves, others will soon share their fate. Acknowledging then, allies, that there is no alternative, and that we are advising you for the best, vote for war; and be not afraid of the immediate danger, but fix your thoughts on the durable peace which will follow. For by war peace is assured, but to remain at peace when you should be going to war may be often very dangerous. The tyrant city which has been set up in Hellas is a standing menace to all alike; she rules over some of us already, and would fain rule over others. Let us attack and subdue her, that we may ourselves live safely for the future and deliver the Hellenes whom she has enslaved.’

Such were the words of the Corinthians.

[125] The Lacedaemonians, having heard the opinions of all the allies, put the question to them all, one after the other, great and small alike, and the majority voted for war. But, although they had come to this decision, they were not ready, and could not take up arms at once; so they

determined to make the necessary preparations, each for themselves, with the least possible delay. Still nearly a whole year was passed in preparation before they invaded Attica and commenced open hostilities.

[126] During this interval they sent embassies to Athens and made various complaints that their grounds for going to war might be all the stronger in case the Athenians refused to listen. The first ambassadors desired the Athenians to drive out ‘the curse of the Goddess.’ The curse to which they referred was as follows: — In the days of old there was an Athenian named Cylon, who had been an Olympic victor; he was powerful and of noble birth; and he had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian who was at that time tyrant of Megara. In answer to an enquiry which Cylon made at Delphi, the God told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens at the greatest festival of Zeus. Thereupon he obtained forces from Theagenes, and, persuading his friends to join him, when the time of the Olympic festival in Peloponnesus came round, he took possession of the Acropolis, intending to make himself tyrant. He thought that this was the greatest festival of Zeus, and, having been an Olympic victor, he seemed to have a special interest in it. But whether the greatest festival spoken of was in Attica or in some other part of Hellas was a question which never entered into his mind, and the oracle said nothing about it. (For the Athenians also have a greatest festival of Zeus — the festival of Zeus the Gracious, or Diasia, as it is called — this is held outside the city and the whole people sacrifice at it, some, ordinary victims, others, a kind of offering peculiar to the country.) However, Cylon thought that his interpretation was right, and made the attempt at the Olympic festival. The Athenians, when they saw what had happened, came in a body from the fields and invested the Acropolis. After a time they grew tired of the siege and most of them went away, committing the guard to the nine Archons, and giving them full powers to do what they

thought best in the whole matter; for in those days public affairs were chiefly administered by the nine Archons.. Cylon and his companions were in great distress from want of food and water. So he and his brother made their escape; the rest, being hard pressed, and some of them ready to die of hunger, sat as suppliants at the altar which is in the Acropolis. When the Athenians, to whose charge the guard had been committed, saw them dying in the temple, they bade them rise, promising to do them no harm, and then led them away and put them to death. They even slew some of them in the very presence of the awful Goddesses at whose altars, in passing by, they had sought refuge. The murderers and their descendants are held to be accursed, and offenders against the Goddess. These accursed persons were banished by the Athenians; and Cleomenes, the Lacedaemonian king, again banished them from Athens in a time of civil strife by the help of the opposite faction, expelling the living and disinterring and casting forth the bones of the dead. Nevertheless they afterwards returned, and to this day their race still survives in the city.

[127] The Lacedaemonians desired the Athenians to drive away this curse, as if the honour of the Gods were their first object, but in reality because they knew that the curse attached to Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, by his mother’s side, and they thought that if he were banished they would find the Athenians more manageable. They did not really expect that he would be driven into exile, but they hoped to discredit him with the citizens and make them believe that his misfortune was to a certain extent the cause of the war. For he was the leader of the state and the most powerful man of his day, and his policy was utterly opposed to the Lacedaemonians. He would not suffer the Athenians to give way, but was always urging upon them the necessity of war.

[128] The Athenians retaliated by demanding that the Lacedaemomans should drive away the curse of Taenarus. They referred to the murder of certain Helots who had taken

refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus; these the Lacedaemonians, having first raised by the hand, had then led away and slain. The Lacedaemonians themselves believe this act of theirs to have been the cause of the great earthquake which visited Sparta. The Athenians also bade them drive out the curse of Athenè of the Brazen House. The story is as follows: — When Pausanias the Lacedaemonian was originally summoned by the Spartans to give an account of his command at the Hellespont, and had been tried and acquitted, he was no longer sent out in a public capacity, but he hired a trireme of Hermionè on his own account and sailed to the Hellespont, pretending that he had gone thither to fight in the cause of the Hellenes. In reality he wanted to prosecute an intrigue with the King, by which he hoped to obtain the empire of Hellas. He had already taken the first steps after the return from Cyprus, when he captured Byzantium The city was at that time held by the Persians and by certain relatives and kinsmen of the King, who were taken prisoners. These he restored to the King without the knowledge of the allies, to whom he declared that they had made their escape. This act was the beginning of the whole affair, and thereby he originally placed the King under an obligation to him. His accomplice was Gongylus the Eretrian, to whose care he had entrusted Byzantium and the captives. To this same Gongylus he also gave a letter addressed to the King, of which, as was afterwards discovered, the terms were as follows:

‘Pausanias, the Spartan commander, desiring to do you a service, sends you back these captives of his spear. And I propose, if you have no objection, to marry your daughter, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Hellas under your sway. I think that I can accomplish this if you and I take counsel together. Should you approve of my proposal, send a trusty person to the sea and through him we will negotiate.’ Thus far the letter.

[129] Xerxes was pleased, and sent Artabazus the son of Pharnaces to the sea, commanding him to assume the government of the satrapy of Dascylium in the room of Megabates. An answer was entrusted to him, which he was to send as quickly as possible to Pausanias at Byzantium; he was to show him at the same time the royal seal. If Pausanias gave him any order about his own affairs, he was to execute it with all diligence and fidelity. Artabazus came down to the sea, as he was desired, and transmitted the letter. The answer of the King was as follows:

'Thus saith Xerxes, the King, to Pausanias. The benefit which thou hast done me in saving the captives who were taken at Byzantium beyond the sea is recorded in my house for ever, and thy words please me. Let neither day nor night hinder thee from fulfilling diligently the promise which thou hast made to me; spare not gold or silver, and take as large an army as thou wilt, wheresoever of it may be required. I have sent to thee Artabazus, a good man; act with him for my honour and welfare, and for thine own, and be of good courage.'

[130] Pausanias received the letter. He had already acquired a high reputation among the Hellenes when in command at Plataea, and now he was so great that he could no longer contain himself or live like other men. Whenever he marched out of Byzantium he wore Persian apparel. On his way through Thrace he was always attended by a body-guard of Medes and Egyptians, and he had his table served after the Persian fashion. He could not conceal his ambition, but indicated by little things the greater designs which he was meditating. He made himself difficult of access, and displayed such a violent temper towards everybody that no one could come near him; and this was one of the chief reasons why the confederacy transferred themselves to the Athenians.

[131] The news of his behaviour soon reached the Lacedaemonians; who had recalled him in the first instance

on this ground. And now, when he had sailed away in the ship of Hermionè without leave, and was evidently carrying on the same practices; when he had been forced out of Byzantium and the gates had been shut against him by the Athenians; and when, instead of returning to Sparta, he settled at Colonae in Troas, and was reported to the Ephors to be negotiating with the Barbarians, and to be staying there for no good purpose, then at last they made up their minds to act. They sent a herald to him with a despatch rolled on a scytalè, commanding him to follow the officer home, and saying that, if he refused, Sparta would declare war against him. He, being desirous as far as he could to avoid suspicion and believing that he could dispose of the accusations by bribery, returned for the second time to Sparta. On his return he was at once thrown into prison by the Ephors, who have the power to imprison the king himself. But after a time he contrived to come out, and challenged any one who asserted his guilt to bring him to trial.

[132] As yet however neither his enemies among the citizens nor the Spartan government had any trustworthy evidence such as would have justified them in inflicting punishment upon a member of the royal family holding royal office at the time. For he was the guardian as well as cousin of the king, Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, who was still a minor. But his disregard of propriety and affectation of Barbarian fashions made them strongly suspect that he was dissatisfied with his position in the state. They examined into any violation of established usage which they could find in his previous life; and they remembered among other things how in past times he had presumed on his own authority to inscribe on the tripod at Delphi, which the Hellenes dedicated as the first fruits of their victory over the Persians, this elegiac couplet:

‘Pausanias, captain of the Hellenes, having destroyed the Persian host,

Made this offering to Phoebus for a memorial.’

The Lacedaemonians had at once effaced the lines and inscribed on the tripod the names of the cities which took part in the overthrow of the Barbarian and in the dedication of the offering. But still this act of Pausanias gave offence at the time, and, now that he had again fallen under suspicion, seemed to receive a new light from his present designs. They were also informed that he was intriguing with the Helots; and this was true, for he had promised them emancipation and citizenship if they would join him in an insurrection and help to carry out his whole design. Still the magistrates would not take decided measures; they even refused to believe the distinct testimony which certain Helots brought against him; their habit having always been to be slow in taking an irrevocable decision against a Spartan without incontestable proof. At last a certain man of Argilus, who had been a favourite and was still a confidential servant of Pausanias, turned informer. He had been commissioned by him to carry to Artabazus the last letters for the King, but the thought struck him that no previous messenger had ever returned; he took alarm, and so, having counterfeited the seal of Pausanias in order to avoid discovery if he were mistaken, or if Pausanias, wanting to make some alteration, should ask him for the letter, he opened it, and among the directions given in it found written, as he had partly suspected, an order for his own death.

[133] He showed the letter to the Ephors, who were now more inclined to believe, but still they wanted to hear something from Pausanias’ own mouth, and so, according to a plan preconcerted with them, the man went to Taenarus as a suppliant and there put up a hut divided by a partition. In the inner part of the hut he placed some of the Ephors, and when Pausanias came to him and asked him why he was a suppliant, the whole truth was at once revealed to them.

There was the man reproaching Pausanias with the directions which he had found in the letter, and going into minute details about the whole affair; he protested that never on any occasion had he brought him into any trouble when sent on his service in this matter to the King: why then should he share the fate of the other messengers, and be rewarded with death? And there was Pausanias, admitting the truth of his words, and telling him not to be angry at what had happened, offering to raise him by the hand that he might safely leave the temple, and bidding him start at once and not make difficulties.

[134] The Ephors, who had heard every word, went away for the present, intending, now that they had certain knowledge, to take Pausanias in the city. It is said that he was on the point of being arrested in the street, when the face of one of them as they approached revealed to him their purpose, and another who was friendly warned him by a hardly perceptible nod. Whereupon he ran and fled to the temple of Athenè of the Brazen House and arrived before them, for the precinct was not far off. There, entering into a small chamber which belonged to the temple, that he might not suffer from exposure to the weather, he remained. His pursuers, failing to overtake him, afterwards unroofed the building, and watching when he was within, and preventing him from getting out, they built up the doors, and, investing the place, starved him to death. He was on the point of expiring in the chamber where he lay, when they; observing his condition, brought him out; he was still breathing, but as soon as he was brought out he died. The Spartans were going to cast his body into the Caeadas, a chasm into which they throw malefactors, but they changed their minds and buried him somewhere in the neighbourhood. The God of Delphi afterwards commanded them to transfer him to the place where he died, and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, as the inscription on the column testifies. The oracle also told them that they had brought a curse upon

themselves, and must offer two bodies for one to Athenè of the Brazen House. Whereupon they made two brazen statues, which they dedicated, intending them to be an expiation for Pausanias.

[135] To this judgment of the God himself the Athenians referred when they retorted on the Lacedaemonians, telling them to banish the curse.

Now the evidence which proved that Pausanias was in league with Persia implicated Themistocles; and the Lacedaemonians sent ambassadors to the Athenians charging him likewise with treason, and demanding that he should receive the same punishment. The Athenians agreed, but having been ostracised he was living at the time in Argos, whence he used to visit other parts of the Peloponnese. The Lacedaemonians were very ready to join in the pursuit; so they and the Athenians sent officers, who were told to arrest him wherever they should find him.

[136] Themistocles received information of their purpose, and fled from the Peloponnesus to the Corcyraeans, who were under an obligation to him. The Corcyraeans said that they were afraid to keep him, lest they should incur the enmity of Athens and Lacedaemon; so they conveyed him to the neighbouring continent, whither he was followed by the officers, who constantly enquired in which direction he had gone and pursued him everywhere. Owing to an accident he was compelled to stop at the house of Admetus, king of the Molossians, who was not his friend.

He chanced to be absent from home, but Themistocles presented himself as a suppliant to his wife, and was instructed by her to take their child and sit at the hearth. Admetus soon returned, and then Themistocles told him who he was, adding that if in past times he had opposed any request which Admetus had made to the Athenians, he ought not to retaliate on an exile. He was now in such extremity that a far weaker adversary than he could do him a mischief; but a noble nature should not be revenged by

taking at a disadvantage one as good as himself. Themistocles further argued that he had opposed Admetus in some matter of business, and not when life was at stake; but that, if Admetus delivered him up, he would be consigning him to death. At the same time he told him who his pursuers were and what was the charge against him.

[137] Admetus, hearing his words, raised him up, together with his own son, from the place where he sat holding the child in his arms, which was the most solemn form of supplication. Not long afterwards the Athenians and Lacedaemonians came and pressed him to give up the fugitive, but he refused; and as Themistocles wanted to go to the King, sent him on foot across the country to the sea at Pydna (which was in the kingdom of Alexander). There he found a merchant vessel sailing to Ionia, in which he embarked; it was driven, however, by a storm to the station of the Athenian fleet which was blockading Naxos. He was unknown to his fellow passengers, but, fearing what might happen, he told the captain who he was and why he fled, threatening if he did not save his life to say that he had been bribed to take him on board. The only hope was that no one should be allowed to leave the ship while they had to remain off Naxos; if he complied with his request, the obligation should be abundantly repaid. The captain agreed, and after anchoring in a rough sea for a day and a night off the Athenian station, he at length arrived at Ephesus. Themistocles rewarded him with a liberal present; for he received soon afterwards from his friends the property which they had in their keeping at Athens, and which he had deposited at Argos. He then went up the country in the company of one of the Persians who dwelt on the coast, and sent a letter to Artaxerxes the son Xerxes, who had just succeeded to the throne. The letter was in the following words:— ‘I, Themistocles, have come to you, I who of all Hellenes did your house the greatest injuries so long as I was compelled to defend myself against your father; but still

greater benefits when I was in safety and he in danger during his retreat. And there is a debt of gratitude due to me’ (here he noted how he had forewarned Xerxes at Salamis of the resolution of the Hellenes to withdraw, and how through his influence, as he pretended, they had refrained from breaking down the bridges). ‘Now I am here, able to do you many other services, and persecuted by the Hellenes for your sake. Let me wait a year, and then I will myself explain why I have come.’

[138] The King is said to have been astonished at the boldness of his character, and told him to wait a year as he proposed. In the interval he made himself acquainted, as far as he could, with the Persian language and the manners of the country. When the year was over, he arrived at the court and became a greater man there than any Hellene had ever been before. This was due partly to his previous reputation, and partly to the hope which he inspired in the King’s mind that he would enslave Hellas to him; above all, his ability had been tried and not found wanting. For Themistocles was a man whose natural force was unmistakeable; this was the quality for which he was distinguished above all other men; from his own native acuteness, and without any study either before or at the time, he was the ablest judge of the course to be pursued in a sudden emergency, and could best divine what was likely to happen in the remotest future. Whatever he had in hand he had the power of explaining to others, and even where he had no experience he was quite competent to form a sufficient judgment; no one could foresee with equal clearness the good or evil event which was hidden in the future. In a word, Themistocles, by natural power of mind and with the least preparation, was of all men the best able to extemporise the right thing to be done. A sickness put an end to his life, although some say that he poisoned himself because he felt that he could not accomplish what he had promised to the King. There is a monument of him in the agora of the Asiatic Magnesia,

where he was governor — the King assigning to him, for bread, Magnesia, which produced a revenue of fifty talents in the year; for wine, Lampsacus, which was considered to be the richest in wine of any district then known; and Myus for meat. His family say that his remains were carried home at his own request and buried in Attica, but secretly; for he had been accused of treason and had fled from his country, and he could not lawfully be interred there. Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, the two most famous Hellenes of their day.

[139] Thus the demand for the banishment of the accursed made by the Lacedaemonians on the occasion of their first embassy was met by a counter demand on the part of Athens. They came again and again, and told the Athenians that they must raise the siege of Potidaea and restore Aegina to independence. Above all, and in the plainest terms, they insisted that if they wanted to avert war, they must rescind the decree which excluded the Megarians from the market of Athens and the harbours in the Athenian dominions. But the Athenians would not listen to them, nor rescind the decree; alleging in reply that the Megarians had tilled the holy ground and the neutral borderland, and had received their runaway slaves. Finally, there came from Sparta an embassy, consisting of Rhamphias, Melesippus, and Hegesander, who said nothing of all this, but only, ‘The Lacedaemonians desire to maintain peace; and peace there may be, if you will restore independence to the Hellenes.’ Whereupon the Athenians called an assembly and held a discussion; it seemed best to them to make up their minds and to give a complete and final answer. Many came forward to speak, and much was said on both sides, some affirming that they ought to go to war, and others that this decree about the Megarians should be rescinded and not stand in the way of peace. At last Pericles the son of Xanthippus, who was the first man of his day at Athens, and the greatest orator and statesman, came forward and advised as follows:

[140] ‘Athenians, I say, as I always have said, that we must never yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are persuaded to go to war in one temper of mind, and act when the time comes in another, and that their resolutions change with the changes of fortune. But I see that I must give you the same or nearly the same advice which I gave before, and I call upon those whom my words may convince to maintain our united determination, even if we should not escape disaster; or else, if our sagacity be justified by success, to claim no share of the credit. The movement of events is often as wayward and incomprehensible as the course of human thought; and this is why we ascribe to chance whatever belies our calculation.

‘For some time past the designs of the Lacedaemonians have been clear enough, and they are still clearer now. Our agreement says that when differences arise, the two parties shall refer them to arbitration, and in the mean time both are to retain what they have. But for arbitration they never ask; and when it is offered by us, they refuse it. They want to redress their grievances by arms and not by argument; and now they come to us, using the language, no longer of expostulation, but of command. They tell us to quit Potidaea, to leave Aegina independent, and to rescind the decree respecting the Megarians. These last ambassadors go further still, and announce that we must give the Hellenes independence. I would have none of you imagine that he will be fighting for a small matter if we refuse to annul the Megarian decree, of which they make so much, telling us that its revocation would prevent the war. You should have no lingering uneasiness about this; you are not really going to war for a trifle. For in the seeming trifle is involved the trial and confirmation of your whole purpose. If you yield to them in a small matter, they will think that you are afraid, and will immediately dictate some more oppressive condition; but if you are firm, you will prove to them that they must treat you as their equals.

[141] ‘Wherefore make up your minds once for all, either to give way while you are still unharmed, or, if we are going to war, as in my judgment is best, then on no plea small or great to give way at all; we will not condescend to possess our own in fear. Any claim, the smallest as well as the greatest, imposed on a neighbour and an equal when there has been no legal award can mean nothing but slavery.

‘That our resources are equal to theirs, and that we shall be as strong in the war, I will now prove to you in detail. The Peloponnesians cultivate their own lands, and they have no wealth either public or private. Nor have they any experience of long wars in countries beyond the sea; their poverty prevents them from fighting, except in person against each other, and that for a short time only. Such men cannot be often manning fleets or sending out armies. They would be at a distance from their own properties, upon which they must nevertheless draw, and they will be kept off the sea by us. Now wars are supported out of accumulated wealth, and not out of forced contributions. And men who cultivate their own lands are more ready to serve with their persons than with their property; they do not despair of their lives, but they soon grow anxious lest their money should all be spent, especially if the war in which they are engaged is protracted beyond their calculation, as may well be the case. In a single pitched battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are a match for all Hellas, but they are not able to maintain a war against a power different in kind from their own; they have no regular general assembly, and therefore cannot execute their plans with speed and decision. The confederacy is made up of many races; all the representatives have equal votes, and press their several interests. There follows the usual result, that nothing is ever done properly. For some are all anxiety to be revenged on an enemy, while others only want to get off with as little loss as possible. The members of such a confederacy are slow to meet, and when they do meet, they give little time to the

consideration of any common interest, and a great deal to schemes which further the interest of their particular state. Every one fancies that his own neglect will do no harm, but that it is somebody else’s business to keep a look-out for him, and this idea, cherished alike by each, is the secret ruin of all.

[142] ‘Their greatest difficulty will be want of money, which they can only provide slowly; delay will thus occur, and war waits for no man. Further, no fortified place which they can raise against us is to be feared any more than their navy. As to the first, even in time of peace it would be hard for them to build a city able to compete with Athens; and how much more so when they are in an enemy’s country, and our walls will be a menace to them quite as much as theirs to us! Or, again, if they simply raise a fort in our territory, they may do mischief to some part of our lands by sallies, and the slaves may desert to them; but that will not prevent us from sailing to the Peloponnese and there raising forts against them, and defending ourselves there by the help of our navy, which is our strong arm. For we have gained more experience of fighting on land from warfare at sea than they of naval affairs from warfare on land. And they will not easily acquire the art of seamanship; even you yourselves, who have been practising ever since the Persian War, are not yet perfect. How can they, who are not sailors, but tillers of the soil, do much? They will not even be permitted to practise, because a large fleet will constantly be lying in wait for them. If they were watched by a few ships only, they might run the risk, trusting to their numbers and forgetting their inexperience; but if they are kept off the sea by our superior strength, their want of practice will make them unskilful, and their want of skill timid. Maritime skill is like skill of other kinds, not a thing to be cultivated by the way or at chance times; it is jealous of any other pursuit which distracts the mind for an instant from itself.

[143] ‘Suppose, again, that they lay hands on the treasures at Olympia and Delphi, and tempt our mercenary sailors with the offer of higher pay, there might be serious danger, if we and our metics embarking alone were not still a match for them. But we are a match for them: and, best of all, our pilots are taken from our own citizens, while no sailors are to be found so good or so numerous as ours in all the rest of Hellas. None of our mercenaries will choose to fight on their side for the sake of a few days’ high pay, when he will not only be an exile, but will incur greater danger, and will have less hope of victory.

‘Such I conceive to be the prospects of the Peloponnesians. But we ourselves are free from the defects which I have noted in them; and we have great advantages. If they attack our country by land, we shall attack theirs by sea; and the devastation, even of part of Peloponnesus, will be a very different thing from that of all Attica. For they, if they want fresh territory, must take it by arms, whereas we have abundance of land both in the islands and on the continent; such is the power which the empire of the sea gives. Reflect, if we were islanders, who would be more invulnerable? Let us imagine that we are, and acting in that spirit let us give up land and houses, but keep a watch over the city and the sea. We should not under any irritation at the loss of our property give battle to the Peloponnesians, who far outnumber us. If we conquer, we shall have to fight over again with as many more; and if we fail, besides the defeat, our confederacy, which is our strength, will be lost to us; for our allies will rise in revolt when we are no longer capable of making war upon them. Mourn not for houses and lands, but for men; men may gain these, but these will not gain men. If I thought that you would listen to me, I would say to you, “Go yourselves and destroy them, and thereby prove to the Peloponnesians that none of these things will move you.”

[144] ‘I have many other reasons for believing that you will conquer, but you must not be extending your empire while you are at war, or run into unnecessary dangers. I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemies’ designs. But of all this I will speak again when the time of action comes; for the present, let us send the ambassadors away, giving them this answer: “That we will not exclude the Megarians from our markets and harbours, if the Lacedaemonians will cease to expel foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies, from Sparta; for the treaty no more forbids the one than the other. That we will concede independence to the cities, if they were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon as the Lacedaemonians allow their allied states a true independence, not for the interest of Lacedaemon, but everywhere for their own. Also that we are willing to offer arbitration according to the treaty. And that we do not want to begin a war, but intend to defend ourselves if attacked.” This answer will be just, and befits the dignity of the city. We must be aware however that war will come; and the more willing we are to accept the situation, the less ready will our enemies be to lay hands upon us. Remember that where dangers are greatest, there the greatest honours are to be won by men and states. Our fathers, when they withstood the Persian, had no such power as we have; what little they had they forsook: not by good fortune but by wisdom, and not by power but by courage, they drove the Barbarian away and raised us to our present height of greatness. We must be worthy of them, and resist our enemies to the utmost, that we may hand down our empire unimpaired to posterity.’

[145] Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, approving, voted as he told them, and on his motion answered the Laeedaemonians in detail as he had suggested, and on the whole question to the effect ‘that they would do nothing upon compulsion, but were ready to settle their differences by arbitration upon fair terms

according to the treaty.’ So the ambassadors went home and came no more.

[146] These were the causes of offence alleged on either side before the war began. The quarrel arose immediately out of the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra. But, although the contest was imminent, the contending parties still kept up intercourse and visited each other, without a herald, but not with entire confidence. For the situation was really an abrogation of the treaty, and might at any time lead to war.

BOOK II

[1] And now the war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies of both actually began. Henceforward the struggle was uninterrupted, and they communicated with one another only by heralds. The narrative is arranged according to summers and winters and follows the order of events.

[2] For fourteen years the thirty years' peace which was concluded after the recovery of Euboea remained unbroken. But in the fifteenth year, when Chrysis the high-priestess of Argos was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood, Aenesias being Ephor at Sparta, and at Athens Pythodorus having two months of his archonship to run, in the sixth month after the engagement at Potidaea and at the beginning of spring, about the first watch of the night an armed force of somewhat more than three hundred Thebans entered Plataea, a city of Boeotia, which was an ally of Athens, under the command of two Boeotarchs, Pythangelus the son of Phyleides, and Diemporus the son of Onetorides. They were invited by Naucleides, a Plataean, and his partisans, who opened the gates to them. These men wanted to kill certain citizens of the opposite faction and to make over the city to the Thebans, in the hope of getting the power into their own hands. The intrigue had been conducted by Eurymachus the son of Leontiades, one of the chief citizens of Thebes. There was an old quarrel between the two cities, and the Thebans, seeing that war was inevitable, were anxious to surprise the place while the peace lasted and before hostilities had actually broken out. No watch had been set; and so they were enabled to enter the city unperceived. They grounded their arms in the Agora, but instead of going to work at once and making their way into the houses of their enemies, as those who invited them suggested, they resolved to issue a conciliatory

proclamation and try to make friends with the citizens. The herald announced that if any one wished to become their ally and return to the ancient constitution of Boeotia, he should join their ranks. In this way they thought that the inhabitants would easily be induced to come over to them.

[3] The Plataeans, when they found that the city had been surprised and taken and that the Thebans were within their walls, were panic-stricken. In the darkness they were unable to see them and greatly over-estimated their numbers. So they came to terms, and accepting the proposals which were made to them, remained quiet, the more readily since the Thebans offered violence to no one. But in the course of the negotiations they somehow discovered that their enemies were not so numerous as they had supposed, and concluded that they could easily attack and master them. They determined to make the attempt, for the commons at Plataea were strongly attached to the Athenian alliance. They began to collect inside the houses, breaking through the party-walls that they might not be seen going along the streets; they likewise raised barricades of waggons (without the beasts which drew them), and took other measures suitable to the emergency. When they had done all which could be done under the circumstances, they sallied forth from their houses, choosing the time of night just before daybreak, lest, if they put off the attack until dawn, the enemy might be more confident and more a match for them. While darkness lasted they would be timid, and at a disadvantage, not knowing the streets so well as themselves. So they fell upon them at once hand to hand.

[4] When the Thebans found that they had been deceived they closed their ranks and resisted their assailants on every side. Two or three times they drove them back. But when at last the Plataeans charged them, and the women and slaves on the housetops screamed and yelled and pelted them with stones and tiles, the confusion, which was aggravated by the rain which had been falling heavily during the night,

became too much for them, and they turned and fled in terror through the city. Hardly any of them knew the way out, and the streets were dark as well as muddy, for the affair happened at the end of the month when there was no moon; whereas their pursuers knew well enough how to prevent their escape; and thus many of them perished. The gates by which they entered were the only ones open, and these a Plataean fastened with the spike of a javelin, which he thrust into the bar instead of the pin. So this exit too was closed and they were chased up and down the city. Some of them mounted upon the wall and cast themselves down into the open. Most of these were killed. Others got out by a deserted gate, cutting through the bar unperceived with an axe which a woman gave them; but only a few, for they were soon found out. Others lost themselves in different parts of the city, and were put to death. But the greater number kept together and took refuge in a large building abutting upon the wall, of which the doors on the near side chanced to be open, they thinking them to be the gates of the city, and expecting to find a way through them into the country. The Plataeans, seeing that they were in a trap, began to consider whether they should not set the building on fire, and burn them where they were. At last they and the other Thebans who were still alive, and were wandering about the city, agreed to surrender themselves and their arms unconditionally. Thus fared the Thebans in Plataea.

[5] The main body of the Theban army, which should have come during the night to the support of the party entering the city in case of a reverse, having on their march heard of the disaster, were now hastening to the rescue. Plataea is about eight miles distant from Thebes, and the heavy rain which had fallen in the night delayed their arrival; for the river Asopus had swollen, and was not easily fordable. Marching in the rain, and with difficulty crossing the river, they came up too late, some of their friends being already slain and others captives. When the Thebans became aware

of the state of affairs, they resolved to lay hands on what was outside the walls; for there were men and property left in the fields, as would naturally happen when a sudden blow was struck in time of peace. They meant to keep any one whom they caught as a hostage and exchange him for one of their own men, if any of them were still alive. But before they had executed their plan, the Plataeans, suspecting their intentions, and fearing for their friends outside, sent a herald to the Thebans protesting against the crime of which they had been guilty in trying to seize their city during peace, and warning them not to touch anything which was outside the walls. If they persisted they threatened in return to kill the prisoners; but if they retired, they would give them up. This is the Theban account, and they add that the Plataeans took an oath. The Plataeans do not admit that they ever promised to restore the captives at once, but only if they could agree after negotiations; and they deny that they took an oath. However this may have been, the Thebans withdrew, leaving the Plataean territory unhurt; but the Plataeans had no sooner got in their property from the country than they put the prisoners to death. Those who were taken were a hundred and eighty in number, and Eurymachus, with whom the betrayers of the city had negotiated, was one of them.

[6] When they had killed their prisoners, they sent a messenger to Athens and gave back the dead to the Thebans under a flag of truce; they then took the necessary measures for the security of the city. The news had already reached Athens, and the Athenians had instantly seized any Boeotians who were in Attica, and sent a herald to Plataea bidding them do no violence to the Theban prisoners, but wait for instructions from Athens. The news of their death had not arrived. For the first messenger had gone out when the Thebans entered, and the second when they were just defeated and captured; but of what followed the Athenians knew nothing; they sent the message in ignorance, and the

herald, when he arrived, found the prisoners dead. The Athenians next despatched an army to Plataea, and brought in supplies. Then leaving a small force in the place they conveyed away the least serviceable of the citizens, together with the women and children.

[7] The affair of Plataea was a glaring violation of the thirty years' truce, and the Athenians now made preparations for war. The Lacedaemonians and their allies made similar preparations. Both they and the Athenians meditated sending embassies to the King, and to the other Barbarian potentates from whom either party might hope to obtain aid; they likewise sought the alliance of independent cities outside their own dominion. The Lacedaemonians ordered their friends in Italy and Sicily to build others in number proportioned to the size of their cities, in addition to the ships which they had on the spot; for they intended to raise the Peloponnesian navy to a total of five hundred. The cities were also required to furnish a fixed sum of money; they were not to receive more than one ship of the Athenians at a time, but were to take no further measures until these preparations had been completed. The Athenians reviewed their confederacy, and sent ambassadors to the places immediately adjacent to Peloponnesus — Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus. They perceived that if they could only rely upon the friendship of these states, they might completely encircle Peloponnesus with war.

[8] On neither side were there any mean thoughts; they were both full of enthusiasm: and no wonder, for all men are energetic when they are making a beginning. At that time the youth of Peloponnesus and the youth of Athens were numerous; they had never seen war, and were therefore very willing to take up arms. All Hellas was excited by the coming conflict between her two chief cities. Many were the prophecies circulated and many the oracles chanted by diviners, not only in the cities about to engage in the struggle, but throughout Hellas. Quite recently the island of

Delos had been shaken by an earthquake for the first time within the memory of the Hellenes; this was interpreted and generally believed to be a sign of coming events. And everything of the sort which occurred was curiously noted.

[9] The feeling of mankind was strongly on the side of the Lacedaemonians; for they professed to be the liberators of Hellas. Cities and individuals were eager to assist them to the utmost, both by word and deed; and where a man could not hope to be present, there it seemed to him that all things were at a stand. For the general indignation against the Athenians was intense; some were longing to be delivered from them, others fearful of falling under their sway.

Such was the temper which animated the Hellenes, and such were the preparations made by the two powers for the war. Their respective allies were as follows: — The Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the Peloponnesians with the exception of the Argives and the Achaeans — they were both neutral; only the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the Lacedaemonians at first; afterwards all the Achaeans joined them. Beyond the borders of the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Phocians, Locrians, Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians were their allies. Of these the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians provided a navy, the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry, the other states only infantry. The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania, Corcyra, Zacynthus, and cities in many other countries which were their tributaries. There was the maritime region of Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, the islands that lie to the east within the line of Peloponnesus and Crete, including all the Cyclades with the exception of Melos and Thera. Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra furnished a navy; the rest,

land forces and money. Thus much concerning the two confederacies, and the character of their respective forces.

[10] Immediately after the affair at Plataea the Lacedaemonians sent round word to their Peloponnesian and other allies, bidding them equip troops and provide all things necessary for a foreign expedition, with the object of invading Attica. The various states made their preparations as fast as they could, and at the appointed time, with contingents numbering two-thirds of the forces of each, met at the Isthmus. When the whole army was assembled, Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, and the leader of the expedition, called together the generals of the different states and their chief officers and most distinguished men, and spoke as follows:

[11] ‘Men of Peloponnesus, and you, allies, many are the expeditions which our fathers made both within and without the Peloponnese, and the veterans among ourselves are experienced in war; and yet we never went forth with a greater army than this. But then we should remember that, whatever may be our numbers or our valour, we are going against a most powerful city. And we are bound to show ourselves worthy of our fathers, and not wanting to our own reputation. For all Hellas is stirred by our enterprise, and her eyes are fixed upon us: she is friendly and would have us succeed because she hates the Athenians. Now although some among you, surveying this great host, may think that there is very little risk of the enemy meeting us in the field, we ought not on that account to advance heedlessly; but the general and the soldier of every state should be always expecting that his own division of the army will be the one first in danger. War is carried on in the dark; attacks are generally sudden and furious, and often the smaller army, animated by a proper fear, has been more than a match for a larger force which, disdaining their opponent, were taken unprepared by him. When invading an enemy’s country, men should always be confident in spirit, but they should

fear too, and take measures of precaution; and thus they will be at once most valorous in attack and impregnable in defence.

‘And the city which we are attacking is not so utterly powerless against an invader, but is in the best possible state of preparation, and for this reason our enemies may be quite expected to meet us in the field. Even if they have no such intention beforehand, yet as soon as they see us in Attica, wasting and destroying their property, they will certainly change their mind. For all men are angry when they not only suffer but see, and some strange form of calamity strikes full upon the eye; the less they reflect the more ready they are to fight; above all men the Athenians, who claim imperial power, and are more disposed to invade and waste their neighbour’s land than to look on while their own is being wasted. Remembering how great this city is which you are attacking, and what a fame you will bring on your ancestors and yourselves for good or evil according to the result, follow whithersoever you are led; maintain discipline and caution above all things, and be on the alert to obey the word of command. It is both the noblest and the safest thing for a great army to be visibly animated by one spirit.’

[12] Having thus spoken, Archidamus dismissed the assembly. His first step was to send Melesippus, the son of Diaeritus, a Spartan, to Athens in the hope that the Athenians might after all give way, when they saw their enemies actually on the march. But they would not admit him to the assembly, nor even into the city. For Pericles had already carried a motion to the effect that they would have nothing to do with herald or embassy while the Lacedaemonians were in the field. So Melesippus was sent away without a hearing and told that he must cross the frontier before sunset; if the Lacedaemonians wanted to hold any parley with the Athenians, they must go home first. He was attended by an escort in order to prevent his

communicating with any one. When he arrived at the Athenian frontier, and was about to leave them, he uttered these words: ‘This day will be to the Hellenes the beginning of great sorrows.’ On the return of the herald to the camp Archidamus learned that the Athenians were not as yet at all in the mood to yield; so at last he moved forward his army and prepared to enter Attica. The Boeotians who had sent their contingent of two-thirds, including their cavalry, to the Peloponnesian army, marched to Plataea with the remainder of their forces and wasted the country.

[13] While the Peloponnesians were gathering at the Isthmus, and were still on their way, but before they entered Attica, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, who was one of the ten Athenian generals, knowing that the invasion was inevitable, and suspecting that Archidamus in wasting the country might very likely spare his lands, either out of courtesy and because he happened to be his friend, or by the order of the Lacedaemonian authorities (who had already attempted to raise a prejudice against him when they demanded the expulsion of the polluted family, and might take this further means of injuring him in the eyes of the Athenians), openly declared in the assembly that Archidamus was his friend; but was not so to the injury of the state, and that supposing the enemy did not destroy his lands and buildings like the rest, he would make a present of them to the public; and he desired that the Athenians would have no suspicion of him on that account. As to the general situation, he repeated his previous advice; they must prepare for war and bring their property from the country into the city; they must defend their walls but not go out to battle; they should also equip for service the fleet in which lay their strength. Their allies should be kept well in hand, for their power depended on the revenues which they derived from them; military successes were generally gained by a wise policy and command of money. The state of their finances was encouraging; they had on an average six

hundred talents of tribute coming in annually from their allies, to say nothing of their other revenue; and there were still remaining in the Acropolis six thousand talents of coined silver. (The whole amount had once been as much as nine thousand seven hundred talents, but from this had to be deducted a sum of three thousand seven hundred expended on various buildings, such as the Propylaea of the Acropolis, and also on the siege of Potidaea.) Moreover there was uncoined gold and silver in the form of private and public offerings, sacred vessels used in processions and games, the Persian spoil and other things of the like nature, worth at least five hundred talents more. There were also at their disposal, besides what they had in the Acropolis, considerable treasures in various temples. If they were reduced to the last extremity they could even take off the plates of gold with which the image of the goddess was overlaid; these, as he pointed out, weighed forty talents, and were of refined gold, which was all removeable. They might use this treasure in self-defence, but they were bound to replace all that they had taken. By this estimate of their wealth he strove to encourage them. He added that they had thirteen thousand hoplites, besides the sixteen thousand who occupied the fortresses or who manned the walls of the city. For this was the number engaged on garrison duty at the beginning of the war, whenever the enemy invaded Attica; they were made up of the elder and younger men, and of such metics as bore heavy arms. The Phaleric wall extended four miles from Phalerum to the city walls: the portion of the city wall which was guarded was somewhat less than five miles; that between the Long Wall and the Phaleric requiring no guard. The Long Walls running down to the Piraeus were rather more than four and a half miles in length; the outer only was guarded. The whole circuit of the Piraeus and of Munychia was not quite seven miles, of which half required a guard. The Athenian cavalry, so Pericles pointed out, numbered twelve hundred, including

mounted archers; the foot-archers, sixteen hundred; of triremes fit for service the city had three hundred. — The forces of various kinds which Athens possessed at the commencement of the war, when the first Peloponnesian invasion was impending, cannot be estimated at less. — To these Pericles added other arguments, such as he was fond of using, which were intended to prove to the Athenians that victory was certain.

[14] The citizens were persuaded, and brought into the city their children and wives, their household goods, and even the wood-work of their houses, which they took down. Their flocks and beasts of burden they conveyed to Euboea and the adjacent islands.

The removal of the inhabitants was painful; for the Athenians had always been accustomed to reside in the country.

[15] Such a life had been characteristic of them, more than of any other Hellenic people, from very early times. In the days of Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign of' Theseus, Attica was divided into communes, having their own town halls and magistrates. Except in case of alarm the whole people did not assemble in council under the king, but administered their own affairs, and advised together in their several townships. Some of them at times even went to war with him, as the Eleusinians under Eumolpus with Erectheus. But when Theseus came to the throne, he, being a powerful as well as a wise ruler, among other improvements in the administration of the country, dissolved the councils and separate governments, and united all the inhabitants of Attica in the present city, establishing one council and town hall. They continued to live on their own lands, but he compelled them to resort to Athens as their metropolis, and henceforward they were all inscribed in the roll of her citizens. A great city thus arose which was handed down by Theseus to his descendants, and from his day to this the Athenians have regularly celebrated

the national festival of the Synoecia, or ‘union of the communes’ in honour of the Goddess Athene.

Before his time, what is now the Acropolis and the ground lying under it to the south was the city. Many reasons may be urged in proof of this statement: The temples of Athenè and of other divinities are situated in the Acropolis itself, and those which are not lie chiefly thereabouts; the temples of Olympian Zeus, for example, and of the Pythian Apollo, and the temple of Earth and of Dionysus in the Marshes, in honour of whom the more ancient Dionysia are celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Anthesterion, a festival which also continues to be observed by the Ionian descendants of the Athenians. In the same quarter are other ancient temples, and not far off is the fountain now called Enneacrounos, or the Nine Conduits, from the form given to it by the tyrants, but originally, before the springs were covered in, Callirrhoè, or the Fair Stream. The water of this fountain was used by the ancient Athenians on great occasions, it being near the original city; and at marriage rites and other ceremonies the custom is still retained. To this day the Acropolis or Citadel is called by the Athenians *Polis*, or City, because that neighbourhood was first inhabited.

[16] Thus for a long time the ancient Athenians enjoyed a country life in self-governing communities; and although they were now united in a single city, they and their descendants, down to the time of this war, from old habit generally resided with their households in the country where they had been born. For this reason, and also because they had recently restored their country-houses and estates after the Persian War, they had a disinclination to move. They were depressed at the thought of forsaking their homes and the temples which had come down to them from their fathers and were the abiding memorials of their early constitution. They were going to change their manner of life,

and in leaving their villages were in fact each of them going into exile.

[17] When they came to Athens, only a few of them had houses or could find homes among friends or kindred. The majority took up their abode in the vacant spaces of the city, and in the temples and shrines of heroes, with the exception of those on the Acropolis, the Eleusinium, and any other precinct which could be securely closed. The Pelasgian ground, as it was called, which lay at the foot of the citadel, was under a curse forbidding its occupation. There was also a half-line of a Pythian oracle to the same effect:

‘Better the Pelasgian ground left waste.’

Yet even this was filled under the sudden pressure of necessity. And to my mind the oracle came true in a sense exactly contrary to the popular expectation; for the unlawful occupation to which men were driven was not the cause of the calamities which befell the city, but the war was the cause of the occupation; and the oracle without mentioning the war foresaw that the place would be inhabited some day for no good. Many also established themselves in the turrets of the walls, or in any other place which they could find; for the city could not contain them when they first came in. But afterwards they divided among them the Long Walls and the greater part of the Piraeus. At the same time the Athenians applied themselves vigorously to the war, summoning their allies, and preparing an expedition of a hundred ships against the Peloponnese.

[18] While they were thus engaged, the Peloponnesian army was advancing: it arrived first of all at Oenoè, a fortress on the confines of Attica and Boeotia, which was garrisoned by the Athenians whenever war broke out, and was the point at which the Peloponnesians intended to enter the enemy’s country. There they encamped and prepared to assault the walls by means of engines and siege works. But these and other measures took up time and detained them in the neighbourhood. Archidamus was severely blamed for the

delay; he was also thought not to have been energetic enough in levying war, and to have done the Athenians good service by discouraging vigorous action. After the muster of the forces he had been accused of delay at the isthmus, and of loitering on the march. But his reputation was most affected by his halt at Oenoè. For the Athenians employed the interval in getting away their property; and the Peloponnesians fancied that, if they had advanced quickly and he had not lingered, they could have seized everything before it was conveyed within the walls. Such were the feelings entertained towards Archidamus by his troops during the halt. He is said to have held back in the belief that the Athenians, while their lands were still unravaged, would yield, and that the thought of allowing them to be devastated would be too much for them.

[19] But when they had assaulted Oenoè, and after leaving no means untried were unable to take it, and no herald came from the Athenians, at last they marched on, and about the eightieth day after the entry of the Thebans into Plataea, in the middle of the summer, when the corn was in full ear, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus the Lacedaemonian king. They encamped and ravaged, first of all, Eleusis and the plain of Thria, where they put to flight some Athenian horse near the streams called Rheiti; they then advanced, keeping Mount Aegaleos on the right hand, through the district of Kropeia until they reached Acharnae, which is the largest of the Athenian townships or demes, as they are called; and at Acharnae they encamped, and remained there a considerable time ravaging the country.

[20] In this first invasion Archidamus is said to have lingered about Acharnae with his army ready for battle, instead of descending into the plain, in the hope that the Athenians, who were now flourishing in youth and numbers and provided for war as they had never been before, would perhaps meet them in the field rather than allow their lands

to be ravaged. When therefore they did not appear at Eleusis or in the plain of Thria, he tried once more whether by encamping in the neighbourhood of Acharnae he could induce them to come out. The situation appeared to be convenient, and the Acharnians, being a considerable section of the city and furnishing three thousand hoplites, were likely to be impatient at the destruction of their property, and would communicate to the whole people a desire to fight. Or if the Athenians did not come out to meet him during this invasion, he could henceforward ravage the plain with more confidence, and march right up to the walls of the city. The Acharnians, having lost their own possessions, would be less willing to hazard their lives on behalf of their neighbours, and so there would be a division in the Athenian counsels. Such was the motive of Archidamus in remaining at Acharnae.

[21] The Athenians, so long as the Lacedaemonians were in the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the plain of Thria, entertained a hope that they would come no further. They remembered how, fourteen years before, the Lacedaemonian king, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army, and how after advancing as far as Eleusis and Thria he came no further, but retreated. And indeed this retreat was the cause of his exile; for he was thought to have been bribed. But when they saw the army in the neighbourhood of Acharnae, and barely seven miles from the city, they felt the presence of the invader to be intolerable. The devastation of their country before their eyes, which the younger men had never seen at all, nor the elder except in the Persian invasion, naturally appeared to them a horrible thing, and the whole people, the young men especially, were anxious to go forth and put a stop to it. Knots were formed in the streets, and there were loud disputes, some eager to go out, a minority resisting. Soothsayers were repeating oracles of the most different kinds, which all found in some one or other enthusiastic

listeners. The Acharnians, who in their own estimation were no small part of the Athenian state, seeing their land ravaged, strongly insisted that they should go out and fight. The excitement in the city was universal; the people were furious with Pericles, and, forgetting all his previous warnings, they abused him for not leading them to battle, as their general should, and laid all their miseries to his charge.

[22] But he, seeing that they were overcome by the irritation of the moment and inclined to evil counsels, and confident that he was right in refusing to go out, would not summon an assembly or meeting of any kind, lest, coming together more in anger than in prudence, they might take some false step. He maintained a strict watch over the city, and sought to calm the irritation as far as he could. Meanwhile he sent out horsemen from time to time to prevent flying parties finding their way into the fields near the city and doing mischief. A skirmish took place at Phrygia between one of the divisions of the Athenian horse assisted by their Thessalian allies on the one hand, and the Boeotian cavalry on the other, in which the Athenians and Thessalians were at least a match for their opponents, until, the Boeotian infantry coming up to support the horse, they were compelled to fly. The Athenians and Thessalians lost a few men, but recovered their bodies on the same day without asking for a truce. On the morrow the Peloponnesians raised a trophy. The forces which the Thessalians brought to the aid of the Athenians, according to the terms of their old alliance, consisted of Larissaeans, Pharsalians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. The leaders of the Larissaeans were Polymedes and Aristonous, one from each of the two leading factions of their city; the Pharsalians were commanded by Meno. The forces of the other cities had likewise generals of their own.

[23] When the Peloponnesians found that the Athenians did not come out to meet them, they moved their army from Acharnae, and ravaged some of the townships which lie

between Mount Parnes and Mount Brilessus. While they were still in the country, the Athenians sent the fleet of a hundred ships which they had been equipping on an expedition round the Peloponnese. These ships carried on board a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers; they were under the command of Carcinus the son of Xenotimus, Proteas the son of Epicles, and Socrates the son of Antigenes. After the departure of the fleet the Peloponnesians remained in Attica as long as their provisions lasted, and then, taking a new route, retired through Boeotia. In passing by Oropus they wasted the country called Peiraïkè, inhabited by the Oropians, who are subjects of the Athenians. On their return to Peloponnesus the troops dispersed to their several cities.

[24] When they had retreated, the Athenians posted guards to keep watch both by land and sea, a precaution which they maintained throughout the war. They then passed a decree reserving of the treasure in the Acropolis a thousand talents: this sum was set apart and was not to be expended unless the enemy attacked the city with a fleet and they had to defend it. In any other case, he who brought forward or put to the vote a proposal to touch the money was to be punished with death. They also resolved to set apart yearly a hundred triremes, the finest of the year, and to appoint trierarchs for them; these they were only to use at the same time with the money, and in the same emergency.

[25] The Athenian forces, which had lately been dispatched to Peloponnesus in the hundred vessels, and were assisted by the Corcyraeans with fifty ships and by some of the allies from the same region, did considerable damage on the Peloponnesian coast. They also disembarked and attacked Methonè, a fortress in Laconia, which was weak and had no regular garrison. Now Brasidas the son of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in those parts in command of a force, and, seeing the danger, he came to the aid of the inhabitants with a hundred hoplites. He dashed through the scattered

parties of Athenian troops, whose attention was occupied with the fortress, and threw himself into Methonè, suffering a slight loss; he thus saved the place. The exploit was publicly acknowledged at Sparta, Brasidas being the first Spartan who obtained this distinction in the war. The Athenians, proceeding on their voyage, ravaged the territory of Pheia in Elis for two days, and defeated three hundred chosen men from the vale of Elis, as well as some Elean perioeci from the neighbourhood of Pheia who came to the rescue. But a violent storm arose, and there was no harbour in which the fleet could find shelter; so the greater part of the army re-embarked and sailed round the promontory called Ichthys towards the harbour of Pheia. Meanwhile the Messenians and others who were unable to get on board marched by land and captured Pheia. The fleet soon sailed into the harbour and took them up; they then evacuated Pheia and put to sea. By this time the main army of the Eleans had arrived; whereupon the Athenians proceeded on their way to other places, which they ravaged.

[26] About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise off Locris, having an eye also to the safety of Euboea. Cleopompus the son of Cleinias was their commander. He made descents on the Locrian coast and ravaged various places. He also captured Thronium, taking hostages of the inhabitants, and at Alopè defeated the Locrians who came to defend the place.

[27] In the same summer the Athenians expelled the Aeginetans and their families from Aegina, alleging that they had been the main cause of the war. The island lies close to Peloponnesus, and they thought it safer to send thither settlers of their own, an intention which they shortly afterwards carried out. The Lacedaemonians gave the Aeginetan exiles the town of Thyrea to occupy and the adjoining country to cultivate, partly in order to annoy the Athenians, partly out of gratitude to the Aeginetans, who had done them good service at the time of the earthquake

and the revolt of the Helots. The Thyrean territory is a strip of land coming down to the sea on the borders of Argolis and Laconia. There some of them found a home; others dispersed over Hellas.

[28] During the same summer, at the beginning of the lunar month (apparently the only time when such an event is possible), and in the afternoon, there was an eclipse of the sun, which took the form of a crescent, and then became full again; during the eclipse a few stars were visible.

[29] In the same summer, Nymphodorus the son of Pythes, a native of Abdera and a man of great influence with Sitalces who had married his sister, was made by the Athenians their proxenus at that place and invited by them to Athens. He had formerly been considered their enemy, but now they hoped that he would gain over to their alliance Sitalces, who was the son of Teres and king of Thrace.

This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first founder of the great Odrysian empire, which he extended over a large part of Thrace, although many of the Thracian tribes are still independent. He has no connexion with Tereus who took to wife from Athens Procnè, the daughter of Pandion; they do not even belong to the same Thrace. For Tereus dwelt in Daulia, a part of the region which is now called Phocis but in those days was inhabited by Thracians, and in that country Itys suffered at the hands of the women Procnè and Philomela. Many of the poets when they make mention of the nightingale (Philomela) apply to the bird the epithet Daulian. Further, Pandion would surely have formed a marriage connexion for his daughter among his neighbours with a view to mutual protection, and not at a distance of so many days' journey, among the Odrysian Thracians. And the Teres of whom I am speaking, and who was the first powerful king of the Odrysae, has not even the same name.

Now Sitalces, whom the Athenians made their ally, was the son of this Teres; they wanted him to assist them in the conquest of Chalcidicè and of Perdiccas. So Nymphodorus

came to Athens, negotiated the alliance with Sitalces, and got his son Sadocus enrolled an Athenian citizen. He also undertook to terminate the war in Chalcidicè, promising that he would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians an army of Thracian horsemen and targeteers. He further reconciled Perdiccas with the Athenians, and persuaded them to restore Thermè to him. Whereupon Perdiccas joined the Athenian army under Phormio, and with him fought against the Chalcidians. Thus Sitalces the son of Teres king of Thrace, and Perdiccas son of Alexander king of Macedonia, entered into the Athenian alliance.

[30] The Athenians, in the hundred ships which were still cruising about Peloponnesus, took Sollium, a town belonging to the Corinthians, which they handed over to the Palaereans of Acarnania, giving to them alone of the Acarnanians the right of occupying the city and country. They also stormed the town of Astacus, and driving out Evarchus who was tyrant there, added it to the Athenian confederacy. They next sailed to the island of Cephallenia, which they gained over without fighting. The island lies over against Acarnania and Leucas, and contains four cities inhabited by the Paleans, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronnaeans. Soon afterwards the fleet proceeded on its voyage homewards.

[31] About the end of the summer the entire Athenian force, including the metics, invaded the territory of Megara, under the command of Pericles the son of Xanthippus. The Athenian fleet had reached Aegina on its way home, and when the commanders heard that the whole armed force of the city was in Megara, they sailed thither and joined them. This was the largest army which the Athenians ever had in one place; for the city was still in her full strength, and had not as yet suffered from the plague. The Athenians themselves numbered not less than ten thousand hoplites, exclusive of the remaining three thousand who were engaged at Potidaea. A force of metic hoplites amounting to

at least three thousand took part in the invasion, and also a large number of light-armed troops. After ravaging the greater part of the country they retired. They repeated the invasion, sometimes with cavalry, sometimes with the whole Athenian army, every year during the war until Nisaea was taken.

[32] At the end of this summer the island of Atalantè, which lies off the coast of the Opuntian Locrians and had hitherto been uninhabited, was fortified and made a guard-station by the Athenians. They wanted to prevent pirates sailing from Opus and other places in Locris and plundering Euboea. Such were the events which occurred during the remainder of the summer after the Peloponnesians had retired from Attica.

[33] During the following winter, Evarchus the Acarnanian, desiring to be restored to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen hundred hoplites and reinstate him, he himself hiring some mercenaries. Of this expedition Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus the son of Timocrates, and Eumachus the son of Chrysis, were the commanders. They sailed to Astacus, and restored Evarchus; they then tried to gain over certain other towns on the coast of Acarnania; but, failing in their attempt, they proceeded homewards. Touching at Cephallenia on their voyage, they made a descent on the country of the Cranians, but being entrapped by means of a pretended agreement, and then unexpectedly attacked, they lost a part of their forces; at length, not without a severe struggle, they put to sea again and returned home.

[34] During the same winter, in accordance with an old national custom, the funeral of those who first fell in this war was celebrated by the Athenians at the public charge. The ceremony is as follows: Three days before the celebration they erect a tent in which the bones of the dead are laid out, and every one brings to his own dead any offering which he

pleases. At the time of the funeral the bones are placed in chests of cypress wood, which are conveyed on hearses; there is one chest for each tribe. They also carry a single empty litter decked with a pall for all whose bodies are missing, and cannot be recovered after the battle. The procession is accompanied by any one who chooses, whether citizen or stranger, and the female relatives of the deceased are present at the place of interment and make lamentation. The public sepulchre is situated in the most beautiful spot outside the walls; there they always bury those who fall in war; only after the battle of Marathon the dead, in recognition of their pre-eminent valour, were interred on the field. When the remains have been laid in the earth, some man of known ability and high reputation, chosen by the city, delivers a suitable oration over them; after which the people depart. Such is the manner of interment; and the ceremony was repeated from time to time throughout the war. Over those who were the first buried Pericles was chosen to speak. At the fitting moment he advanced from the sepulchre to a lofty stage, which had been erected in order that he might be heard as far as possible by the multitude, and spoke as follows:

[35] FUNERAL SPEECH. ‘Most of those who have spoken here before me have commended the lawgiver who added this oration to our other funeral customs; it seemed to them a worthy thing that such an honour should be given at their burial to the dead who have fallen on the field of battle. But I should have preferred that, when men’s deeds have been brave, they should be honoured in deed only, and with such an honour as this public funeral, which you are now witnessing. Then the reputation of many would not have been imperilled on the eloquence or want of eloquence of one, and their virtues believed or not as he spoke well or ill. For it is difficult to say neither too little nor too much; and even moderation is apt not to give the impression of truthfulness. The friend of the dead who knows the facts is

likely to think that the words of the speaker fall short of his knowledge and of his wishes; another who is not so well informed, when he hears of anything which surpasses his own powers, will be envious and will suspect exaggeration. Mankind are tolerant of the praises of others so long as each hearer thinks that he can do as well or nearly as well himself, but, when the speaker rises above him, jealousy is aroused and he begins to be incredulous. However, since our ancestors have set the seal of their approval upon the practice, I must obey, and to the utmost of my power shall endeavour to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of all who hear me.

[36] I will speak first of our ancestors, for it is right and seemly that now, when we are lamenting the dead, a tribute should be paid to their memory. There has never been a time when they did not inhabit this land, which by their valour they have handed down from generation to generation, and we have received from them a free state. But if they were worthy of praise, still more were our fathers, who added to their inheritance, and after many a struggle transmitted to us their sons this great empire. And we ourselves assembled here to-day, who are still most of us in the vigour of life, have carried the work of improvement further, and have richly endowed our city with all things, so that she is sufficient for herself both in peace and war. Of the military exploits by which our various possessions were acquired, or of the energy with which we or our fathers drove back the tide of war, Hellenic or Barbarian, I will not speak; for the tale would be long and is familiar to you. But before I praise the dead, I should like to point out by what principles of action we rose to power, and under what institutions and through what manner of life our empire became great. For I conceive that such thoughts are not unsuited to the occasion, and that this numerous assembly of citizens and strangers may profitably listen to them.

[37] ‘Our form of government does not enter into rivalry with the institutions of others. We do not copy our neighbours, but are an example to them. It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few. But while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognised; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as the reward of merit. Neither is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country whatever be the obscurity of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbour if he does what he likes; we do not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, are not pleasant. While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented from doing wrong by respect for the authorities and for the laws, having an especial regard to those which are ordained for the protection of the injured as well as to those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor of them the reprobation of the general sentiment.

[38] ‘And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from toil; we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year; our homes are beautiful and elegant; and the delight which we daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy. Because of the greatness of our city the fruits of the whole earth flow in upon us; so that we enjoy the goods of other countries as freely as of our own.

[39] ‘Then, again, our military training is in many respects superior to that of our adversaries. Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him. We rely not upon

management or trickery, but upon our own hearts and hands. And in the matter of education, whereas they from early youth are always undergoing laborious exercises which are to make them brave, we live at ease, and yet are equally ready to face the perils which they face. And here is the proof. The Lacedaemonians come into Attica not by themselves, but with their whole confederacy following; we go alone into a neighbour's country; and although our opponents are fighting for their homes and we on a foreign soil, we have seldom any difficulty in overcoming them. Our enemies have never yet felt our united strength; the care of a navy divides our attention, and on land we are obliged to send our own citizens everywhere. But they, if they meet and defeat a part of our army, are as proud as if they had routed us all, and when defeated they pretend to have been vanquished by us all.

'If then we prefer to meet danger with a light heart but without laborious training, and with a courage which is gained by habit and not enforced by law, are we not greatly the gainers? Since we do not anticipate the pain, although, when the hour comes, we can be as brave as those who never allow themselves to rest; and thus too our city is equally admirable in peace and in war.

[40] For we are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avow poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household; and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless; but as a useless character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by

discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act and of acting too, whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection. And they are surely to be esteemed the bravest spirits who, having the clearest sense both of the pains and pleasures of life, do not on that account shrink from danger. In doing good, again, we are unlike others; we make our friends by conferring, not by receiving favours. Now he who confers a favour is the firmer friend, because he would fain by kindness keep alive the memory of an obligation; but the recipient is colder in his feelings, because he knows that in requiting another's generosity he will not be winning gratitude but only paying a debt. We alone do good to our neighbours not upon a calculation of interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank and fearless spirit. [41] To sum up: I say that Athens is the school of Hellas, and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems to have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace. This is no passing and idle word, but truth and fact; and the assertion is verified by the position to which these qualities have raised the state. For in the hour of trial Athens alone among her contemporaries is superior to the report of her. No enemy who comes against her is indignant at the reverses which he sustains at the hands of such a city; no subject complains that his masters are unworthy of him. And we shall assuredly not be without witnesses; there are mighty monuments of our power which will make us the wonder of this and of succeeding ages; we shall not need the praises of Homer or of any other panegyrist whose poetry may please for the moment, although his representation of the facts will not bear the light of day. For we have compelled every land and every sea to open a path for our valour, and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our friendship and of our enmity. Such is the city for whose sake these men nobly fought and died; they could not bear the thought that

she might be taken from them; and every one of us who survive should gladly toil on her behalf.

[42] ‘I have dwelt upon the greatness of Athens because I want to show you that we are contending for a higher prize than those who enjoy none of these privileges, and to establish by manifest proof the merit of these men whom I am now commemorating. Their loftiest praise has been already spoken. For in magnifying the city I have magnified them, and men like them whose virtues made her glorious. And of how few Hellenes can it be said as of them, that their deeds when weighed in the balance have been found equal to their fame! Methinks that a death such as theirs has been gives the true measure of a man’s worth; it may be the first revelation of his virtues, but is at any rate their final seal. For even those who come short in other ways may justly plead the valour with which they have fought for their country; they have blotted out the evil with the good, and have benefited the state more by their public services than they have injured her by their private actions. None of these men were enervated by wealth or hesitated to resign the pleasures of life; none of them put off the evil day in the hope, natural to poverty, that a man, though poor, may one day become rich. But, deeming that the punishment of their enemies was sweeter than any of these things, and that they could fall in no nobler cause, they determined at the hazard of their lives to be honourably avenged, and to leave the rest. They resigned to hope their unknown chance of happiness; but in the face of death they resolved to rely upon themselves alone. And when the moment came they were minded to resist and suffer, rather than to fly and save their lives; they ran away from the word of dishonour, but on the battle-field their feet stood fast, and in an instant, at the height of their fortune, they passed away from the scene, not of their fear, but of their glory.

[43] ‘Such was the end of these men; they were worthy of Athens, and the living need not desire to have a more heroic

spirit, although they may pray for a less fatal issue. The value of such a spirit is not to be expressed in words. Any one can discourse to you for ever about the advantages of a brave defence, which you know already. But instead of listening to him I would have you day by day fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love of her; and when you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of conflict had the fear of dishonour always present to them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow their virtues to be lost to their country, but freely gave their lives to her as the fairest offering which they could present at her feast. The sacrifice which they collectively made was individually repaid to them; for they received again each one for himself a praise which grows not old, and the noblest of all sepulchres — I speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but of that in which their glory survives, and is proclaimed always and on every fitting occasion both in word and deed. For the whole earth is the sepulchre of famous men; not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of men. Make them your examples, and, esteeming courage to be freedom and freedom to be happiness, do not weigh too nicely the perils of war. The unfortunate who has no hope of a change for the better has less reason to throw away his life than the prosperous who, if he survive, is always liable to a change for the worse, and to whom any accidental fall makes the most serious difference. To a man of spirit, cowardice and disaster coming together are far more bitter than death striking him unperceived at a time when he is full of courage and animated by the general hope.

[44] Wherefore I do not now commiserate the parents of the dead who stand here; I would rather comfort them. You know that your life has been passed amid manifold vicissitudes; and that they may be deemed fortunate who have gained most honour, whether an honourable death like theirs, or an honourable sorrow like yours, and whose days have been so ordered that the term of their happiness is likewise the term of their life. I know how hard it is to make you feel this, when the good fortune of others will too often remind you of the gladness which once lightened your hearts. And sorrow is felt at the want of those blessings, not which a man never knew, but which were a part of his life before they were taken from him. Some of you are of an age at which they may hope to have other children, and they ought to bear their sorrow better; not only will the children who may hereafter be born make them forget their own lost ones, but the city will be doubly a gainer. She will not be left desolate, and she will be safer. For a man's counsel cannot have equal weight or worth, when he alone has no children to risk in the general danger. To those of you who have passed their prime, I say: "Congratulate yourselves that you have been happy during the greater part of your days; remember that your life of sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the glory of those who are gone. For the love of honour alone is ever young, and not riches, as some say, but honour is the delight of men when they are old and useless."

[45] 'To you who are the sons and brothers of the departed, I see that the struggle to emulate them will be an arduous one. For all men praise the dead, and, however preeminent your virtue may be, hardly will you be thought, I do not say to equal, but even to approach them. The living have their rivals and detractors, but when a man is out of the way, the honour and good-will which he receives is unalloyed. And, if I am to speak of womanly virtues to those of you who will henceforth be widows, let me sum them up in one short admonition: To a woman not to show more weakness than is

natural to her sex is a great glory, and not to be talked about for good or for evil among men.

[46] ‘I have paid the required tribute, in obedience to the law, making use of such fitting words as I had. The tribute of deeds has been paid in part; for the dead have been honourably interred, and it remains only that their children should be maintained at the public charge until they are grown up: this is the solid prize with which, as with a garland, Athens crowns her sons living and dead, after a struggle like theirs. For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there the noblest citizens are enlisted in the service of the state. And now, when you have duly lamented, every one his own dead, you may depart.’

[47] Such was the order of the funeral celebrated in this winter, with the end of which ended the first year of the PeloponnesianWar. As soon as summer returned, the Peloponnesian army, comprising as before two-thirds of the force of each confederate state, under the command of the Lacedaemonian king Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, invaded Attica, where they established themselves and ravaged the country. They had not been there many days when the plague broke out at Athens for the first time. A similar disorder is said to have previously smitten many places, particularly Lemnos, but there is no record of such a pestilence occurring elsewhere, or of so great a destruction of human life. For a while physicians, in ignorance of the nature of the disease, sought to apply remedies; but it was in vain, and they themselves were among the first victims, because they oftenest came into contact with it. No human art was of any avail, and as to supplications in temples, enquiries of oracles, and the like, they were utterly useless, and at last men were overpowered by the calamity and gave them all up.

[48] The disease is said to have begun south of Egypt in Aethiopia; thence it descended into Egypt and Libya, and after spreading over the greater part of the Persian empire,

suddenly fell upon Athens. It first attacked the inhabitants of the Piraeus, and it was supposed that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns, no conduits having as yet been made there. It afterwards reached the upper city, and then the mortality became far greater. As to its probable origin or the causes which might or could have produced such a disturbance of nature, every man, whether a physician or not, will give his own opinion. But I shall describe its actual course, and the symptoms by which any one who knows them beforehand may recognise the disorder should it ever reappear. For I was myself attacked, and witnessed the sufferings of others.

[49] The season was admitted to have been remarkably free from ordinary sickness; and if anybody was already ill of any other disease, it was absorbed in this. Many who were in perfect health, all in a moment, and without any apparent reason, were seized with violent heats in the head and with redness and inflammation of the eyes. Internally the throat and the tongue were quickly suffused with blood, and the breath became unnatural and fetid. There followed sneezing and hoarseness; in a short time the disorder, accompanied by a violent cough, reached the chest; then fastening lower down, it would move the stomach and bring on all the vomits of bile to which physicians have ever given names; and they were very distressing. An ineffectual retching producing violent convulsions attacked most of the sufferers; some as soon as the previous symptoms had abated, others not until long afterwards. The body externally was not so very hot to the touch, nor yet pale; it was of a livid colour inclining to red, and breaking out in pustules and ulcers. But the internal fever was intense; the sufferers could not bear to have on them even the finest linen garment; they insisted on being naked, and there was nothing which they longed for more eagerly than to throw themselves into cold water. And many of those who had no one to look after them actually plunged into the cisterns, for

they were tormented by unceasing thirst, which was not in the least assuaged whether they drank little or much. They could not sleep; a restlessness which was intolerable never left them. While the disease was at its height the body, instead of wasting away, held out amid these sufferings in a marvellous manner, and either they died on the seventh or ninth day, not of weakness, for their strength was not exhausted, but of internal fever, which was the end of most; or, if they survived, then the disease descended into the bowels and there produced violent ulceration; severe diarrhoea at the same time set in, and at a later stage caused exhaustion, which finally with few exceptions carried them off. For the disorder which had originally settled in the head passed gradually through the whole body, and, if a person got over the worst, would often seize the extremities and leave its mark, attacking the privy parts and the fingers and the toes; and some escaped with the loss of these, some with the loss of their eyes. Some again had no sooner recovered than they were seized with a forgetfulness of all things and knew neither themselves nor their friends.

[50] The general character of the malady no words can describe, and the fury with which it fastened upon each sufferer was too much for human nature to endure. There was one circumstance in particular which distinguished it from ordinary diseases. The birds and animals which feed on human flesh, although so many bodies were lying unburied, either never came near them, or died if they touched them. This was proved by a remarkable disappearance of the birds of prey, which were not to be seen either about the bodies or anywhere else; while in the case of the dogs the result was even more obvious, because they live with man.

[51] Such was the general nature of the disease: I omit many strange peculiarities which characterised individual cases. None of the ordinary sicknesses attacked any one while it lasted, or, if they did, they ended in the plague. Some of the sufferers died from want of care, others equally who were

receiving the greatest attention. No single remedy could be deemed a specific; for that which did good to one did harm to another. No constitution was of itself strong enough to resist or weak enough to escape the attacks; the disease carried off all alike and defied every mode of treatment. Most appalling was the despondency which seized upon any one who felt himself sickening; for he instantly abandoned his mind to despair and, instead of holding out, absolutely threw away his chance of life. Appalling too was the rapidity with which men caught the infection; dying like sheep if they attended on one another; and this was the principal cause of mortality. When they were afraid to visit one another, the sufferers died in their solitude, so that many houses were empty because there had been no one left to take care of the sick; or if they ventured they perished, especially those who aspired to heroism. For they went to see their friends without thought of themselves and were ashamed to leave them, at a time when the very relations of the dying were at last growing weary and ceased even to make lamentations, overwhelmed by the vastness of the calamity. But whatever instances there may have been of such devotion, more often the sick and the dying were tended by the pitying care of those who had recovered, because they knew the course of the disease and were themselves free from apprehension. For no one was ever attacked a second time, or not with a fatal result. All men congratulated them, and they themselves, in the excess of their joy at the moment, had an innocent fancy that they could not die of any other sickness.

[52] The crowding of the people out of the country into the city aggravated the misery; and the newly-arrived suffered most. For, having no houses of their own, but inhabiting in the height of summer stifling huts, the mortality among them was dreadful, and they perished in wild disorder. The dead lay as they had died, one upon another, while others hardly alive wallowed in the streets and crawled about every

fountain craving for water. The temples in which they lodged were full of the corpses of those who died in them; for the violence of the calamity was such that men, not knowing where to turn, grew reckless of all law, human and divine. The customs which had hitherto been observed at funerals were universally violated, and they buried their dead each one as best he could. Many, having no proper appliances, because the deaths in their household had been so numerous already, lost all shame in the burial of the dead. When one man had raised a funeral pile, others would come, and throwing on their dead first, set fire to it; or when some other corpse was already burning, before they could be stopped, would throw their own dead upon it and depart.

[53] There were other and worse forms of lawlessness which the plague introduced at Athens. Men who had hitherto concealed what they took pleasure in, now grew bolder. For, seeing the sudden change, — how the rich died in a moment, and those who had nothing immediately inherited their property, — they reflected that life and riches were alike transitory, and they resolved to enjoy themselves while they could, and to think only of pleasure. Who would be willing to sacrifice himself to the law of honour when he knew not whether he would ever live to be held in honour? The pleasure of the moment and any sort of thing which conduced to it took the place both of honour and of expediency. No fear of Gods or law of man deterred a criminal. Those who saw all perishing alike, thought that the worship or neglect of the Gods made no difference. For offences against human law no punishment was to be feared; no one would live long enough to be called to account. Already a far heavier sentence had been passed and was hanging over a man’s head; before that fell, why should he not take a little pleasure?

[54] Such was the grievous calamity which now afflicted the Athenians; within the walls their people were dying, and without, their country was being ravaged. In their troubles

they naturally called to mind a verse which the elder men among them declared to have been current long ago:

A Dorian war will come and a plague with it.’

There was a dispute about the precise expression; some saying that *limos*, a famine, and not *loimos*, a plague, was the original word. Nevertheless, as might have been expected, for men’s memories reflected their sufferings, the argument in favour of *loimos* prevailed at the time. But if ever in future years another Dorian war arises which happens to be accompanied by a famine, they will probably repeat the verse in the other form. The answer of the oracle to the Lacedaemonians when the God was asked ‘whether they should go to war or not,’ and he replied ‘that if they fought with all their might, they would conquer, and that he himself would take their part,’ was not forgotten by those who had heard of it, and they quite imagined that they were witnessing the fulfilment of his words. The disease certainly did set in immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians, and did not spread into Peloponnesus in any degree worth speaking of, while Athens felt its ravages most severely, and next to Athens the places which were most populous. Such was the history of the plague.

[55] After the Peloponnesians had wasted the plain they entered what are called the coast lands (Paralus) and penetrated as far as Laurium, where are the silver mines belonging to the Athenians. First they ravaged that part of the coast which looks towards Peloponnesus, and afterwards that situated towards Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, who was still general, continued to insist, as in the former invasion, that the Athenians should remain within their walls.

[56] Before, however, the Peloponnesians had left the plain and moved forward into the coast lands he had begun to equip an expedition of a hundred ships against Peloponnesus. When all was ready he put to sea, having on board four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred

cavalry conveyed in horse transports which the Athenians then constructed for the first time out of their old ships. The Chians and Lesbians joined them with fifty vessels. The expedition did not actually put to sea until the Peloponnesians had reached the coast lands. Arriving at Epidaurus in Peloponnesus the Athenians devastated most of the country and attacked the city, which at one time they were in hopes of taking, but did not quite succeed. Setting sail again they ravaged the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermionè, which are all places on the coast of Peloponnesus. Again putting off they came to Prasiae, a small town on the coast of Laconia, ravaged the country, and took and plundered the place. They then returned home and found that the Peloponnesians had also returned and were no longer in Attica.

[57] All the time during which the Peloponnesians remained in the country and the armament of the Athenians continued at sea the plague was raging both among the troops and in the city. The fear which it inspired was said to have induced the enemy to leave Attica sooner than they intended; for they heard from deserters that the disease was in the city, and likewise saw the burning of the dead. Still in this invasion the whole country was ravaged by them, and they remained about forty days, which was the longest stay they ever made.

[58] In the same summer, Hagnon the son of Nicias, and Cleopompus the son of Cleinias, who were colleagues of Pericles in his military command, took the fleet which he had employed and sailed forthwith against the Thracian Chalcidians and against Potidaea, which still held out. On their arrival they brought engines up to the walls, and tried every means of taking the town. But they did not succeed; nor did the result by any means correspond to the magnitude of their armament; for thither too the plague came and made dreadful havoc among the Athenian troops. Even the soldiers who were previously there and had been in

good health caught the infection from the forces under Hagnon. But the army of Phormio escaped; for he and his sixteen hundred troops had left Chalcidicè. And so Hagnon returned with his fleet to Athens, having lost by the plague out of four thousand hoplites a thousand and fifty men in about forty days. But the original armament remained and prosecuted the siege.

[59] After the second Peloponnesian invasion, now that Attica had been once more ravaged, and the war and the plague together lay heavy upon the Athenians, a change came over their spirit. They blamed Pericles because he had persuaded them to go to war, declaring that he was the author of their troubles; and they were anxious to come to terms with the Lacedaemonians. Accordingly envoys were despatched to Sparta, but they met with no success. And now, being completely at their wits' end, they turned upon Pericles. He saw that they were exasperated by their misery and were behaving just as he had always anticipated that they would. And so, being still general, he called an assembly, wanting to encourage them and to convert their angry feelings into a gentler and more hopeful mood. At this assembly he came forward and spoke as follows:

[60] 'I was expecting this outburst of indignation; the causes of it are not unknown to me. And I have summoned an assembly that I may remind you of your resolutions and reprove you for your inconsiderate anger against me, and want of fortitude in misfortune. In my judgment it would be better for individuals themselves that the citizens should suffer and the state flourish than that the citizens should flourish and the state suffer. A private man, however successful in his own dealings, if his country perish is involved in her destruction; but if he be an unprosperous citizen of a prosperous city he is much more likely to recover. Seeing then that states can bear the misfortunes of individuals, but individuals cannot bear the misfortunes of the state, let us all stand by our country and not do what

you are doing now, who because you are stunned by your private calamities are letting go the hope of saving the state, and condemning not only me who advised, but yourselves who consented to, the war. Yet I with whom you are so angry venture to say of myself, that I am as capable as any one of devising and explaining a sound policy; and that I am a lover of my country, and incorruptible. Now a man may have a policy which he cannot clearly expound, and then he might as well have none at all; or he may possess both ability and eloquence, but if he is disloyal to his country he cannot, like a true man, speak in her interest; or again he may be unable to resist a bribe, and then all his other good qualities will be sold for money. If, when you determined to go to war, you believed me to have somewhat more of the statesman in me than others, it is not fair that I should now be charged with anything like crime.

[61] ‘I allow that for men who are in prosperity and free to choose it is great folly to make war. But when they must either submit and at once surrender independence, or strike and be free, then he who shuns and not he who meets the danger is deserving of blame. For my own part, I am the same man and stand where I did. But you are changed; for you have been driven by misfortune to recall the consent which you gave when you were yet unhurt, and to think that my advice was wrong because your own characters are weak. The pain is present and comes home to each of you, but the good is as yet unrealised by any one; and your minds have not the strength to persevere in your resolution, now that a great reverse has overtaken you unawares. Anything which is sudden and unexpected and utterly beyond calculation, such a disaster for instance as this plague coming upon other misfortunes, enthralls the spirit of a man. Nevertheless, being the citizens of a great city and educated in a temper of greatness, you should not succumb to calamities however overwhelming, or darken the lustre of your fame. For if men hate the presumption of those who

claim a reputation to which they have no right, they equally condemn the faint-heartedness of those who fall below the glory which is their own. You should lose the sense of your private sorrows and cling to the deliverance of the state.

[62] ‘As to your sufferings in the war, if you fear that they may be very great and after all fruitless, I have shown you already over and over again that such a fear is groundless. If you are still unsatisfied I will indicate one element of your superiority which appears to have escaped you, although it nearly touches your imperial greatness. I too have never mentioned it before, nor would I now, because the claim may seem too arrogant, if I did not see that you are unreasonably depressed. You think that your empire is confined to your allies, but I say that of the two divisions of the world accessible to man, the land and the sea, there is one of which you are absolute masters, and have or may have, the dominion to any extent which you please. Neither the great King nor any nation on earth can hinder a navy like yours from penetrating whithersoever you choose to sail. When we reflect on this great power, houses and lands, of which the loss seems so dreadful to you, are as nothing. We ought not to be troubled about them or to think much of them in comparison; they are only the garden of the house, the superfluous ornament of wealth; and you may be sure that if we cling to our freedom and preserve that, we shall soon enough recover all the rest. But, if we are the servants of others, we shall be sure to lose not only freedom, but all that freedom gives. And where your ancestors doubly succeeded, you will doubly fail. For their empire was not inherited by them from others but won by the labour of their hands, and by them preserved and bequeathed to us. And to be robbed of what you have is a greater disgrace than to attempt a conquest and fail. Meet your enemies therefore not only with spirit but with disdain. A coward or a fortunate fool may brag and vaunt, but he only is capable of disdain whose conviction that he is stronger than his enemy rests, like our

own, on grounds of reason. Courage fighting in a fair field is fortified by the intelligence which looks down upon an enemy; an intelligence relying, not on hope, which is the strength of helplessness, but on that surer foresight which is given by reason and observation of facts.

[63] ‘Once more, you are bound to maintain the imperial dignity of your city in which you all take pride; for you should not covet the glory unless you will endure the toil. And do not imagine that you are fighting about a simple issue, freedom or slavery; you have an empire to lose, and there is the danger to which the hatred of your imperial rule has exposed you. Neither can you resign your power, if, at this crisis, any timorous or inactive spirit is for thus playing the honest man. For by this time your empire has become a tyranny which in the opinion of mankind may have been unjustly gained, but which cannot be safely surrendered. The men of whom I was speaking, if they could find followers, would soon ruin a city, and if they were to go and found a state of their own, would equally ruin that. For inaction is secure only when arrayed by the side of activity; nor is it expedient or safe for a sovereign, but only for a subject state, to be a servant.

[64] ‘You must not be led away by the advice of such citizens as these, nor be angry with me; for the resolution in favour of war was your own as much as mine. What if the enemy has come and done what he was certain to do when you refused to yield? What too if the plague followed? That was an unexpected blow, but we might have foreseen all the rest. I am well aware that your hatred of me is aggravated by it. But how unjustly, unless to me you also ascribe the credit of any extraordinary success which may befall you! The visitations of heaven should be borne with resignation, the sufferings inflicted by an enemy with manliness. This has always been the spirit of Athens, and should not die out in you. Know that our city has the greatest name in all the world because she has never yielded to misfortunes, but has

sacrificed more lives and endured severer hardships in war than any other; wherefore also she has the greatest power of any state up to this day; and the memory of her glory will always survive. Even if we should be compelled at last to abate somewhat of our greatness (for all things have their times of growth and decay), yet will the recollection live, that, of all Hellenes, we ruled over the greatest number of Hellenic subjects; that we withstood our enemies, whether single or united, in the most terrible wars, and that we were the inhabitants of a city endowed with every sort of wealth and greatness. The indolent may indeed find fault, but the man of action will seek to rival us, and he who is less fortunate will envy us. To be hateful and offensive has ever been at the time the fate of those who have aspired to empire. But he judges well who accepts unpopularity in a great cause. Hatred does not last long, and, besides the immediate splendour of great actions, the renown of them endures for ever in men's memories. Looking forward to such future glory and present avoidance of dishonour, make an effort now and secure both. Let no herald be sent to the Lacedaemonians, and do not let them know that you are depressed by your sufferings. For those are the greatest states and the greatest men, who, when misfortunes come, are the least depressed in spirit and the most resolute in action.'

[65] By these and similar words Pericles endeavoured to appease the anger of the Athenians against himself, and to divert their minds from their terrible situation. In the conduct of public affairs they took his advice, and sent no more embassies to Sparta; they were again eager to prosecute the war. Yet in private they felt their sufferings keenly; the common people had been deprived even of the little which they possessed, while the upper class had lost fair estates in the country with all their houses and rich furniture. Worst of all, instead of enjoying peace, they were now at war. The popular indignation was not pacified until

they had fined Pericles; but, soon, afterwards, with the usual fickleness of a multitude, they elected him general and committed all their affairs to his charge. Their private sorrows were beginning to be less acutely felt, and for a time of public need they thought that there was no man like him. During the peace while he was at the head of affairs he ruled with prudence; under his guidance Athens was safe, and reached the height of her greatness in his time. When the war began he showed that here too he had formed a true estimate of the Athenian power. He survived the commencement of hostilities two years and six months; and, after his death, his foresight was even better appreciated than during his life. For he had told the Athenians that if they would be patient and would attend to their navy, and not seek to enlarge their dominion while the war was going on, nor imperil the existence of the city, they would be victorious; but they did all that he told them not to do, and in matters which seemingly had nothing to do with the war, from motives of private ambition and private interest they adopted a policy which had disastrous effects in respect both of themselves and of their allies; their measures, had they been successful, would only have brought honour and profit to individuals, and, when unsuccessful, crippled the city in the conduct of the war. The reason of the difference was that he, deriving authority from his capacity and acknowledged worth, being also a man of transparent integrity, was able to control the multitude in a free spirit; he led them rather than was led by them; for, not seeking power by dishonest arts, he had no need to say pleasant things, but, on the strength of his own high character, could venture to oppose and even to anger them. When he saw them unseasonably elated and arrogant, his words humbled and awed them; and, when they were depressed by groundless fears, he sought to reanimate their confidence. Thus Athens, though still in name a democracy, was in fact ruled by her greatest citizen, But his successors were more

on an equality with one another, and, each one struggling to be first himself, they were ready to sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the people. Such weakness in a great and imperial city led to many errors, of which the greatest was the Sicilian expedition; not that the Athenians miscalculated their enemy's power, but they themselves, instead of consulting for the interests of the expedition which they had sent out, were occupied in intriguing against one another for the leadership of the democracy, and not only hampered the operations of the army, but became embroiled, for the first time, at home. And yet after they had lost in the Sicilian expedition the greater part of their fleet and army, and were now distracted by revolution, still they held out three years not only against their former enemies, but against the Sicilians who had combined with them, and against most of their own allies who had risen in revolt. Even when Cyrus the son of the King joined in the war and supplied the Peloponnesian fleet with money, they continued to resist, and were at last overthrown, not by their enemies, but by themselves and their own internal dissensions. So that at the time Pericles was more than justified in the conviction at which his foresight had arrived, that the Athenians would win an easy victory over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians.

[66] During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies sent a fleet of a hundred ships against the island of Zacynthus, which lies opposite Elis. The Zacynthians are colonists of the Peloponnesian Achaeans, and were allies of the Athenians. There were on board the fleet a thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites, under the command of Cnemus the Spartan admiral. They disembarked and ravaged the greater part of the country; but as the inhabitants would not come to terms, they sailed away home.

[67] At the end of the same summer, Aristeus the Corinthian, the Lacedaemonian ambassadors Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, Timagoras of Tegea, and Pollis of Argos who

had no public mission, were on their way to Asia in the hope of persuading the King to give them money and join in the war. They went first of all to Sitalces son of Teres, in Thrace, wishing if possible to detach him from the Athenians, and induce him to lead an army to the relief of Potidaea, which was still blockaded by Athenian forces; they also wanted him to convey them across the Hellespont on their intended journey to Pharnaces, the son of Pharnabazus, who was to send them on to the King. At the time of their arrival two Athenian envoys, Learchus the son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, chanced to be at the court of Sitalces; and they entreated his son Sadocus, who had been made an Athenian citizen, to deliver the envoys into their hands, that they might not find their way to the King and so injure a city which was in some degree his own. He consented, and, sending a body of men with Learchus and Ameiniades, before they embarked, as they were on their way through Thrace to the vessel in which they were going to cross the Hellespont, seized them; they were then, in accordance with the orders of Sadocus, handed over to the Athenian envoys, who conveyed them to Athens. On the very day of their arrival the Athenians, fearing that Aristeus, whom they considered to be the cause of all their troubles at Potidaea and in Chalcidicè, would do them still further mischief if he escaped, put them all to death without trial and without hearing what they wanted to say; they then threw their bodies down precipices. They considered that they had a right to retaliate on the Lacedaemonians, who had begun by treating in the same way the traders of the Athenians and their allies when they caught their vessels off the coast of Peloponnesus. For at the commencement of the war, all whom the Lacedaemonians captured at sea were treated by them as enemies and indiscriminately slaughtered, whether they were allies of the Athenians or neutrals.

[68] About the end of the same summer the Ambraciots, with a large Barbarian force which they had called out, made war upon the Amphilochian Argos and upon Amphilochia. The original cause of their enmity against the Argives was as follows: — The Amphilochian territory had been occupied and the city founded by Amphilochus the son of Amphiaraus, who on returning home after the Trojan War was dissatisfied at the state of Argos. He fixed the site on the shore of the Ambracian Gulf, and called the new city by the name of his native place; it was the greatest city in that region, and its inhabitants were the most powerful community. Many generations afterwards, these Amphilochians in a time of distress invited their neighbours the Ambraciots to join in the settlement, and from them they first learned the Hellenic language which they now speak; the other Amphilochians are Barbarians. After a while the Ambraciots drove out the Amphilochian Argives and themselves took possession of the city. The expelled Amphilochians placed themselves under the protection of the Acarnanians, and both together called in the Athenians, who sent them a fleet of thirty ships under the command of Phormio. When Phormio arrived, they stormed Argos, and sold the Ambraciots into slavery; and the Amphilochians and Acarnanians dwelt together in the place. The alliance between the Acarnanians and Athenians then first began. The hatred of the Ambraciots towards the Amphilochian Argives commenced with the enslavement of their countrymen; and now when the war offered an opportunity they invaded their territory, accompanied by the Chaonians and some others of the neighbouring Barbarians. They came as far as Argos and made themselves masters of the country; but not being able to take the city by assault they returned, and the several tribes dispersed to their own homes. Such were the events of the summer.

[69] In the following winter the Athenians sent twenty ships on an expedition round Peloponnesus. These were placed

under the command of Phormio, who, stationing himself at Naupactus, guarded the straits and prevented any one from sailing either out of or into Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf. Six other vessels were sent to collect tribute in Lycia and Caria; they were under the command of Melesander, who was to see that Peloponnesian privateers did not establish themselves in those parts, and damage merchant vessels coming from Phaselis and Phoenicia and all that region. But he, going up the country into Lycia with an army composed of Athenians taken from the crews and of allied troops, was defeated, and himself and a part of his forces slain.

[70] In the same winter the Potidaeans, who were still blockaded, found themselves unable to hold out; for the Peloponnesian invasions of Attica did not make the Athenians withdraw; and they had no more food. When they had been reduced to such straits as actually in some cases to feed on human flesh, they entered into communications with the Athenian generals, Xenophon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus the son of Callimachus, to whom the siege had been entrusted. They, seeing that the army was suffering from the exposed situation, and considering that the city had already spent two thousand talents on the siege, accepted the terms proposed. The Potidaeans, with their wives and their children, and likewise the foreign troops, were to come out of the city, the men with one garment, the women with two, and they were allowed a certain fixed sum of money for their journey. So they came out under a safe-conduct, and went into Chalcidicè, or wherever they could find a home. But the Athenians blamed the generals for coming to terms without their authority, thinking that they could have made the city surrender at discretion. Soon afterwards they sent thither colonists of their own. Such were the events of the winter. And so ended the second year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

[71] In the following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies under the command of Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, instead of invading Attica, made an expedition against Plataea. There he encamped and was about to ravage the country, when the Plataeans sent envoys to him bearing the following message:

‘Archidamus, and you Lacedaemonians, in making war upon Plataea you are acting unjustly, and in a manner unworthy of yourselves and of your ancestors. Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedaemonian, when he and such Hellenes as were willing to share the danger with him fought a battle in our land and liberated Hellas from the Persian, offered up sacrifice in the Agora of Plataea to Zeus the God of Freedom, and in the presence of all the confederates then and there restored to the Plataeans their country and city to be henceforth independent; no man was to make unjust war upon them at any time or to seek to enslave them; and if they were attacked, the allies who were present promised that they would defend them to the utmost of their power. These privileges your fathers granted to us as a reward for the courage and devotion which we displayed in that time of danger. But you are acting in an opposite spirit; for you have joined the Thebans, our worst enemies, and have come hither to enslave us. Wherefore, calling to witness the Gods to whom we all then swore, and also the Gods of your race and the Gods who dwell in our country, we bid you do no harm to the land of Plataea. Do not violate your oaths, but allow the Plataeans to be independent, and to enjoy the rights which Pausanias granted to them.’

[72] To this appeal Archidamus rejoined:

‘What you say, Plataeans, is just, but your acts should correspond to your words. Enjoy the independence which Pausanias granted to you, but also assist us in freeing the other Hellenes who were your sworn confederates in that time of danger and are now in subjection to the Athenians.

With a view to the emancipation of them and of the other subject states, this great war has been undertaken and all these preparations made. It would be best for you to join with us, and observe the oaths yourselves which you would have us observe. But if you prefer to be neutral, a course which we have already once proposed to you, retain possession of your lands, and receive both sides in peace, but neither for the purposes of war; and we shall be satisfied.'

The Plataean ambassadors then returned to the city and reported these words of Archidamus to the people, who made answer that they that they could not do what they were asked without the sanction of the Athenians, in whose power they had left their wives and children, and that they also feared for the very existence of their state. When the Lacedaemonians were gone the Athenians might come and not allow them to carry out the treaty; or the Thebans, who would be included in the clause requiring them 'to receive both sides,' might again attempt to seize their town. To this Archidamus, wanting to reassure them, made the following answer:

'Then deliver over your city and houses to the Lacedaemonians; mark the boundaries of your land, and number your fruit-trees and anything else which can be counted. Go yourselves whithersoever you please, while the war lasts, and on the return of peace we will give back to you all that we have received. Until then we will hold your property in trust, and will cultivate your ground, paying you such a rent as will content you.'

[73] Upon hearing these words the envoys again returned into the city, and, after holding a consultation with the people, told Archidamus that they wished first to communicate his proposals to the Athenians, and if they could get their consent they would do as he advised; in the meantime they desired him to make a truce with them, and not to ravage their land. So he made a truce which allowed

sufficient time for their ambassadors to return from Athens; and meanwhile he spared their land. The Plataean envoys came to Athens, and after advising with the Athenians they brought back the following message to their fellow-citizens:

‘Plataeans, the Athenians say that never at any time since you first became their allies have they suffered any one to do you wrong, and that they will not forsake you now, but will assist you to the utmost of their power; and they adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to forsake the Athenian alliance.’

[74] When the answer came, the Plataeans resolved not to desert the Athenians, but patiently to look on, if they must, while the Lacedaemonians wasted their country, and to endure the worst. No one was henceforward to leave the town, but answer was to be made from the walls that they could not possibly consent to the Lacedaemonian proposal. King Archidamus, as soon as he received the reply, before proceeding to action, fell to calling upon the Gods and heroes of the country in the following words:

‘O ye Gods and heroes who possess the land of Plataea, be our witnesses that our invasion of this land in which our fathers prayed to you when they conquered the Persians, and which you made a propitious battle-field to the Hellenes, has thus far been justified, for the Plataeans first deserted the alliance; and that if we go further we shall be guilty of no crime, for we have again and again made them fair proposals and they have not listened to us. Be gracious to us and grant that the real authors of the iniquity may be punished, and that they may obtain revenge who lawfully seek it.’

[75] After this appeal to the Gods he began military operations. In the first place, the soldiers felled the fruit-trees and surrounded the city with a stockade, that henceforth no one might get out. They then began to raise a mound against it, thinking that with so large an army at work this would be the speediest way of taking the place. So

they cut timber from Cithaeron and built on either side of the intended mound a frame of logs placed cross-wise in order that the material might not scatter. Thither they carried wood, stones, earth, and anything which would fill up the vacant space. They continued raising the mound seventy days and seventy nights without intermission; the army was divided into relays, and one party worked while the other slept and ate. The Lacedaemonian officers who commanded the contingents of the allies stood over them and kept them at work. The Plataeans, seeing the mound rising, constructed a wooden frame, which they set upon the top of their own wall opposite the mound; in this they inserted bricks, which they took from the neighbouring houses; the wood served to strengthen and bind the structure together as it increased in height; they also hung curtains of skins and hides in front; these were designed to protect the wood-work and the workers, and shield them against blazing arrows. The wooden wall rose high, but the mound rose quickly too. Then the Plataeans had a new device; — they made a hole in that part of the wall against which the mound pressed and drew in the earth.

[76] The Peloponnesians discovered what they were doing, and threw into the gap clay packed in wattles of reed, which could not scatter and like the loose earth be carried away. Whereupon the Plataeans, baffled in one plan, resorted to another. Calculating the direction, they dug a mine from the city to the mound and again drew the earth inward. For a long time their assailants did not find them out, and so what the Peloponnesians threw on was of little use, since the mound was always being drawn off below and settling into the vacant space. But in spite of all their efforts, the Plataeans were afraid that their numbers would never hold out against so great an army; and they devised yet another expedient. They left off working at the great building opposite the mound, and beginning at both ends, where the city wall returned to its original lower height, they built an

inner wall projecting inwards in the shape of a crescent, that if the first wall were taken the other might still be defensible. The enemy would be obliged to begin again and carry the mound right up to it, and as they advanced inwards would have their trouble all over again, and be exposed to missiles on both flanks. While the mound was rising the Peloponnesians brought battering engines up to the wall; one which was moved forward on the mound itself shook a great part of the raised building, to the terror of the Plataeans. They brought up others too at other points of the wall. But the Plataeans dropped nooses over the ends of these engines and drew them up; they also let down huge beams suspended at each end by long iron chains from two poles leaning on the wall and projecting over it. These beams they drew up at right angles to the advancing battering-ram, and whenever at any point it was about to attack them they slackened their hold of the chains and let go the beam, which fell with great force and snapped off the head of the ram.

[77] At length the Peloponnesians, finding that their engines were useless, and that the new wall was rising opposite to the mound, and perceiving that they could not without more formidable means of attack hope to take the city, made preparations for a blockade. But first of all they resolved to try whether, the wind favouring, the place, which was but small, could not be set on fire; they were anxious not to incur the expense of a regular siege, and devised all sorts of plans in order to avoid it. So they brought faggots and threw them down from the mound along the space between it and the wall, which was soon filled up when so many hands were at work; then they threw more faggots one upon another into the city as far as they could reach from the top of the mound, and casting in lighted brands with brimstone and pitch, set them all on fire. A flame arose of which the like had never before been made by the hand of man; I am not speaking of fires in the mountains, when the forest has

spontaneously blazed up from the action of the wind and mutual attrition. There was a great conflagration, and the Plataeans, who had thus far escaped, were all but destroyed; a considerable part of the town was unapproachable, and if a wind had come on and carried the flame that way, as the enemy hoped, they could not have been saved. It is said that there was also a violent storm of thunder and rain, which quenched the flames and put an end to the danger.

[78] The Peloponnesians, having failed in this, as in their former attempts, sent away a part of their army but retained the rest, and dividing the task among the contingents of the several cities, surrounded Plataea with a wall. Trenches, out of which they took clay for the bricks, were formed both on the inner and the outer side of the wall. About the rising of Arcturus all was completed. They then drew off their army, leaving a guard on one half of the wall, while the other half was guarded by the Boeotians; the disbanded troops returned to their homes. The Plataeans had already conveyed to Athens their wives, children, and old men, with the rest of their unserviceable population. Those who remained during the siege were four hundred Plataeans, eighty Athenians, and a hundred and ten women to make bread. These were their exact numbers when the siege began. There was no one else, slave or freeman, within the walls. In such sort was the blockade of Plataea completed.

[79] During the same summer, when the corn was in full ear, and about the time of the attack on Plataea, the Athenians sent an expedition against the Chalcidians of Thrace and against the Bottiaeans, consisting of two thousand heavy-armed troops of their own and two hundred horsemen under the command of Xenophon the son of Euripides, and two others. They came close up to the Bottian Spartolus and destroyed the crops. They expected that the place would be induced to yield to them by a party within the walls. But the opposite party sent to Olynthus and obtained from thence a garrison, partly composed of hoplites, which sallied out of

Spartolus and engaged with the Athenians under the walls of the town. The Chalcidian hoplites and with them certain auxiliaries were defeated and retreated into Spartolus, but their cavalry and light-armed troops had the advantage over those of the Athenians. They were assisted by a few targeteers, who came from the district called Crusis. The engagement was scarcely over when another body of targeteers from Olynthus came up to their aid. Encouraged by the reinforcement and their previous success, and supported by the Chalcidian horse and the newly-arrived troops, the light-armed again attacked the Athenians, who began to fall back upon the two companies which they had left with their baggage: as often as the Athenians charged, the enemy retired; but when the Athenians continued their retreat, they pressed upon them and hurled darts at them. The Chalcidian cavalry too rode up, and wherever they pleased charged the Athenians, who now fled utterly disconcerted and were pursued to a considerable distance. At length they escaped to Potidaea, and having recovered their dead under a flag of truce, returned to Athens with the survivors of their army, out of which they had lost four hundred and thirty men and all their generals. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, having set up a trophy and carried off their dead, disbanded and dispersed to their several cities.

[80] In the same summer, not long afterwards, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, designing to subjugate the whole of Acarnania and detach it from the Athenian alliance, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to equip a fleet out of the confederate forces, and to send into that region a thousand hoplites. They said that if the Lacedaemonians would join with them and attack the enemy both by sea and land, the Acarnanians on the sea-coast would be unable to assist the inland tribes, and they might easily conquer Acarnania. Zacynthus and Cephallenia would then fall into their hands, and the Athenian fleet would not so easily sail round

Peloponnesus. They might even hope to take Naupactus. The Lacedaemonians agreed, and at once despatched Cnemus, who was still admiral, with the thousand hoplites in a few ships; they ordered the rest of the allied navy to get ready and at once sail to Leucas. The interests of the Ambraciots were zealously supported by Corinth, their mother city. The fleet which was to come from Corinth, Sicyon, and the adjacent places was long in preparation; but the contingent from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia was soon equipped, and waited at Leucas. Undiscovered by Phormio, the commander of the twenty Athenian ships which were keeping guard at Naupactus, Cnemus and his thousand hoplites crossed the sea and began to make preparations for the land expedition. Of Hellenes he had in his army Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians whom he brought with him, — of Barbarians a thousand Chaonians, who, having no king, were led by Photyus and Nicanor, both of the governing family and holding the presidency for a year. With the Chaonians came the Thesprotians, who, like them, have no king. A Molossian and Atintanian force was led by Sabylinthus, the guardian of Tharypas the king, who was still a minor; the Paravaeans were led by their king Oroedus, and were accompanied by a thousand Orestians placed at the disposal of Oroedus by their king Antiochus. Perdiccas also, unknown to the Athenians, sent a thousand Macedonians, who arrived too late. With this army Cnemus, not waiting for the ships from Corinth, began his march. They passed through the Argive territory and plundered Limnaea, an unwalled village. At length they approached Stratus, which is the largest city in Acarnania, thinking that, if they could take it, the other places would soon come over to them.

[81] The Acarnanians, seeing that a great army had invaded their territory, and that the enemy was threatening them by sea as well as by land, did not attempt any united action, but guarded their several districts, and sent to Phormio for

aid. He replied that a fleet of the enemy was about to sail from Corinth, and that he could not leave Naupactus unguarded. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians and their allies marched in three divisions towards Stratus, intending to encamp near and try negotiations; if these failed, they would take stronger measures and assault the wall. The Chaonians and the other Barbarians advanced in the centre; on the right wing were the Leucadians, Anactorians, and their auxiliaries; on the left was Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots. The three divisions were a long way apart, and at times not even in sight of one another. The Hellenic troops maintained order on the march and kept a look out, until at length they found a suitable place in which to encamp; the Chaonians, confident in themselves, and having a great military reputation in that part of the country, would not stop to encamp, but they and the other Barbarians rushed on at full speed, hoping to take the place by storm and appropriate to themselves the glory of the action. The Stratians perceiving their approach in time, and thinking that, if they could overcome them before the others arrived, the Hellenic forces would not be so ready to attack them, set ambuscades near the city. When they were quite close, the troops came out of the city and from the ambuscades and fell upon them hand to hand. Whereupon the Chaonians were seized with a panic and many of them perished; the other Barbarians, seeing them give way, no longer stood their ground, but took to flight. Neither of the Hellenic divisions knew of the battle; the Chaonians were far in advance of them, and were thought to have hurried on because they wanted to choose a place for their camp. At length the Barbarians in their flight broke in upon their lines; they received them, and the two divisions uniting during that day remained where they were, the men of Stratus not coming to close quarters with them, because the other Acarnanians had not as yet arrived, but slinging at them from a distance and distressing them greatly. For they

could not move a step without their armour. Now the Acarnanians are famous for their skill in slinging.

[82] When night came on, Cnemus withdrew his army in haste to the river Anapus, which is rather more than nine miles from Stratus, and on the following day carried off his dead under a flag of truce. The people of Oeniadae were friendly and had joined him; to their city therefore he retreated before the Acarnanians had collected their forces. From Oeniadae all the Peloponnesian troops returned home. The Stratians erected a trophy of the battle in which they had defeated the Barbarians.

[83] The fleet from Corinth and the other allied cities on the Crisaean Gulf, which was intended to support Cnemus and to prevent the Acarnanians on the sea-coast from assisting their friends in the interior of the country, never arrived, but was compelled, almost on the day of the battle of Stratus, to fight with Phormio and the twenty Athenian ships which were stationed at Naupactus. As they sailed by into the open sea, Phormio was watching them, preferring to make his attack outside the gulf. Now the Corinthians and their allies were not equipped for a naval engagement, but for the conveyance of troops into Acarnania, and they never imagined that the Athenians with twenty ships would venture to engage their own forty-seven. But, as they were coasting along the southern shore, they saw the Athenian fleet following their movements on the northern; they then attempted to cross the sea from Patrae in Achaea to the opposite continent in the direction of Acarnania, when they again observed the enemy bearing down upon them from Chalcis and the mouth of the river Evenus. They had previously endeavoured to anchor under cover of night, but had been detected. So at last they were compelled to fight in the middle of the channel. The ships were commanded by generals of the cities which had furnished them; the Corinthian squadron by Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians arranged their ships in

such a manner as to make the largest possible circle without leaving space to break through, turning their prows outwards and their sterns inwards; within the circle they placed the smaller craft which accompanied them, and five of their swiftest ships that they might be close at hand and row out at whatever point the enemy charged them.

[84] The Athenians ranged their ships in a single line and sailed round and round the Peloponnesian fleet, which they drove into a narrower and narrower space, almost touching as they passed, and leading the crews to suppose that they were on the point of charging. But they had been warned by Phormio not to begin until he gave the signal, for he was hoping that the enemy's ships, not having the steadiness of an army on land, would soon fall into disorder and run foul of one another; they would be embarrassed by the small craft, and if the usual morning breeze, for which he continued waiting as he sailed round them, came down from the gulf, they would not be able to keep still for a moment. He could attack whenever he pleased, because his ships were better sailers; and he knew that this would be the right time. When the breeze began to blow, the ships, which were by this time crowded into a narrow space and were distressed at once by the force of the wind and by the small craft which were knocking up against them, fell into confusion; ship dashed against ship, and they kept pushing one another away with long poles; there were cries of `keep off' and noisy abuse, so that nothing could be heard either of the word of command or of the coxswains' giving the time; and the difficulty which unpractised rowers had in clearing the water in a heavy sea made the vessels disobedient to the helm. At that moment Phormio gave the signal; the Athenians, falling upon the enemy, began by sinking one of the admirals' vessels, and then wherever they went made havoc of them; at last such was the disorder that no one any longer thought of resisting, but the whole fleet fled away to Patrae and Dymè in Achaea. The Athenians pursued them, captured twelve ships, and

taking on board most of their crews, sailed away to Molycrium. They set up a trophy on Rhium, and having there dedicated a ship to Poseidon, retired to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians likewise, with the remainder of their fleet, proceeded quickly along the coast from Dymè and Patrae to Cyllenè, where the Eleans have their docks. Cnemus with the ships from Leucas, which should have been joined by these, arrived after the battle of Stratus at Cyllenè.

[85] The Lacedaemonians at home now sent to the fleet three commissioners, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, to advise Cnemus. He was told that he must contrive to fight again and be more successful; he should not allow a few ships to keep him off the sea. The recent sea-fight had been the first attempt of the Lacedaemonians, and they were quite amazed and could not imagine that their own fleet was so inferior to that of the enemy. They suspected that there had been cowardice, not considering that the Athenians were old sailors and that they were only beginners. So they despatched the commissioners in a rage. On their arrival they and Cnemus sent round to the allied cities for ships, and equipped for action those which were on the spot. Phormio likewise sent home messengers to announce the victory, and at the same time to inform the Athenians of the preparations which the enemy were making. He told them to send him immediately as large a reinforcement as possible, for he might have to fight any day. They sent him twenty ships, but ordered the commander of them to go to Crete first; for Nicias of Gortys in Crete, who was the proxenus of the Athenians, had induced them to send a fleet against Cydonia, a hostile town which he promised to reduce. But he really invited them to please the Polichnitae, who are neighbours of the Cydoniatae. So the Athenian commander took the ships, went to Crete, and joined the Polichnitae in ravaging the lands of the Cydoniatae; there, owing to contrary winds and bad weather, a considerable time was wasted.

[86] While the Athenians were detained in Crete the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, equipped for a naval engagement, coasted along to Panormus in Achaia, whither the Peloponnesian army had gone to co-operate with them. Phormio also coasted along to the Molycrian Rhium and anchored outside the gulf with the twenty ships which had fought in the previous engagement. This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians; there is another Rhium on the opposite coast in Peloponnesus; the space between them, which is rather less than a mile, forms the mouth of the Crisaean Gulf. When the Peloponnesians saw that the Athenians had come to anchor, they likewise anchored with seventy-seven ships at the Rhium which is in Achaia, not far from Panormus where their land forces were stationed. For six or seven days the two fleets lay opposite one another, and were busy in practising and getting ready for the engagement — the one resolved not to sail into the open sea, fearing a recurrence of their disaster, the other not to sail into the strait, because the confined space was favourable to their enemies. At length Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian generals determined to bring on an engagement at once, and not wait until the Athenians too received their reinforcements. So they assembled their soldiers and, seeing that they were generally dispirited at their former defeat and reluctant to fight, encouraged them in the following words:

[87] ‘The late sea-fight, Peloponnesians, may have made some of you anxious about the one which is impending, but it really affords no just ground for alarm. In that battle we were, as you know, ill-prepared, and our whole expedition had a military and not a naval object. Fortune was in many ways unpropitious to us, and this being our first sea-fight we may possibly have suffered a little from inexperience. The defeat which ensued was not the result of cowardice; nor should the unconquerable quality which is inherent in our minds, and refuses to acknowledge the victory of mere force,

be depressed by the accident of the event. For though fortune may sometimes bring disaster, yet the spirit of a brave man is always the same, and while he retains his courage he will never allow inexperience to be an excuse for misbehaviour. And whatever be your own inexperience, it is more than compensated by your superiority in valour. The skill of your enemies which you so greatly dread, if united with courage, may be able in the moment of danger to remember and execute the lesson which it has learned, but without courage no skill can do anything at such a time. For fear makes men forget, and skill which cannot fight is useless. And therefore against their greater skill set your own greater valour, and against the defeat which so alarms you set the fact that you were unprepared. But now you have a larger fleet; this turns the balance in your favour; and you will fight close to a friendly shore under the protection of heavy-armed troops. Victory is generally on the side of those who are more numerous and better equipped. So that we have absolutely no reason for anticipating failure. Even our mistakes will be an additional advantage, because they will be a lesson to us. Be of good courage, then, and let every one of you, pilot or sailor, do his own duty and maintain the post assigned to him. We will order the attack rather better than your old commanders, and so give nobody an excuse for cowardice. But, if any one should be inclined to waver, he shall be punished as he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with the due rewards of their valour.’

[88] Such were the words of encouragement addressed to the Peloponnesians by their commanders. Phormio too, fearing that his sailors might be frightened, and observing that they were gathering in knots and were evidently apprehensive of the enemy’s numbers, resolved to call them together and inspirit them by a suitable admonition. He had always been in the habit of telling them and training their minds to believe that no superiority of hostile forces could

justify them in retreating. And it had long been a received opinion among the sailors that, as Athenians, they were bound to face any quantity of Peloponnesian ships. When, however, he found them dispirited by the sight which met their eyes, he determined to revive their drooping courage, and, having assembled them together, he spoke as follows:

[89] ‘Soldiers, I have summoned you because I see that you are alarmed at the numbers of the enemy, and I would not have you dismayed when there is nothing to fear. In the first place, the reason why they have provided a fleet so disproportionate is because we have defeated them already, and they can see themselves that they are no match for us; next, as to the courage which they suppose to be native to them and which is the ground of their confidence when they attack us, that reliance is merely inspired by the success which their experience on land usually gives them, and will, as they fancy, equally ensure them by sea. But the superiority which we allow to them on land we may justly claim for ourselves at sea; for in courage at least we are their equals, and the superior confidence of either of us is really based upon greater experience. The Lacedaemonians lead the allies for their own honour and glory; the majority of them are dragged into battle against their will; if they were not compelled they would never have ventured after so great a defeat to fight again at sea. So that you need not fear their valour; they are far more afraid of you and with better reason, not only because you have already defeated them, but because they cannot believe that you would oppose them at all if you did not mean to do something worthy of that great victory. For most men when, like these Peloponnesians, they are a match for their enemies rely more upon their strength than upon their courage; but those who go into battle against far superior numbers and under no constraint must be inspired by some extraordinary force of resolution. Our enemies are well aware of this, and are more afraid of our surprising boldness than they would be if

our forces were less out of proportion to their own. Many an army before now has been overthrown by smaller numbers owing to want of experience; some too through cowardice; and from both these faults we are certainly free. If I can help I shall not give battle in the gulf, or even sail into it. For I know that where a few vessels which are skilfully handled and are better sailers engage with a larger number which are badly managed the confined space is a disadvantage. Unless the captain of a ship see his enemy a good way off he cannot come on or strike properly; nor can he retreat when he is pressed hard. The manoeuvres suited to fast-sailing vessels, such as breaking of the line or returning to the charge, cannot be practised in a narrow space. The sea-fight must of necessity be reduced to a land-fight in which numbers tell. For all this I shall do my best to provide. Do you meanwhile keep order and remain close to your ships. Be prompt in taking your instructions, for the enemy is near at hand and watching us. In the moment of action remember the value of silence and order, which are always important in war, especially at sea. Repel the enemy in a spirit worthy of your former exploits. There is much at stake; for you will either destroy the rising hope of the Peloponnesian navy, or bring home to Athens the fear of losing the sea. Once more I remind you that you have beaten most of the enemy’s fleet already; and, once defeated, men do not meet the same dangers with their old spirit.’ Thus did Phormio encourage his sailors.

[90] The Peloponnesians, when they found that the Athenians would not enter the straits or the gulf, determined to draw them in against their will. So they weighed anchor early in the morning, and, ranging their ships four deep, stood in towards the gulf along their own coast, keeping the order in which they were anchored. The right wing, consisting of twenty of their fastest vessels, took the lead. These were intended to close upon the Athenians and prevent them from eluding their attack and getting beyond

the wing in case Phormio, apprehending an attack upon Naupactus, should sail along shore to its aid. He, when he saw them weighing anchor, was alarmed, as they anticipated, for the safety of the town, which was undefended. Against his will and in great haste he embarked and sailed along the shore; the land forces of the Messenians followed. The Peloponnesians, seeing that the enemy were in single file and were already within the gulf and close to land, which was exactly what they wanted, at a given signal suddenly brought their ships round, and the whole line faced the Athenians and bore down upon them, every ship rowing at the utmost speed, for they hoped to cut off all the Athenian fleet. Eleven vessels which were in advance evaded the sudden turn of the Peloponnesians, and rowed past their right wing into the open water; but they caught the rest, forced them aground, and disabled them. All the sailors who did not swim out of them were slain. Some of the empty ships they fastened to their own and began to tow away; one they had already taken with the crew, but others were saved by the Messenians, who came to the rescue, dashed armed as they were into the sea, boarded them, and, fighting from their decks when they were being already towed away, finally recovered them.

[91] While in this part of the engagement the Lacedaemonians had the victory and routed the Athenian ships, their twenty vessels on the right wing were pursuing the eleven of the Athenians which had escaped from their attack into the open water of the gulf. These fled and, with the exception of one, arrived at Naupactus before their pursuers. They stopped off the temple of Apollo, and, turning their beaks outward, prepared to defend themselves in case the enemy followed them to the land. The Peloponnesians soon came up; they were singing a paean of victory as they rowed, and one Leucadian ship far in advance of the rest was chasing the single Athenian ship which had been left behind. There chanced to be anchored

in the deep water a merchant vessel, round which the Athenian ship rowed just in time, struck the Leucadian amidships, and sank her. At this sudden and unexpected feat the Peloponnesians were dismayed; they had been carrying on the pursuit in disorder because of their success. And some of them, dropping the blades of their oars, halted, intending to await the rest, which was a foolish thing to do when the enemy were so near and ready to attack them. Others, not knowing the coast, ran aground.

[92] When the Athenians saw what was going on their hopes revived, and at a given signal they charged their enemies with a shout. The Lacedaemonians did not long resist, for they had made mistakes and were all in confusion, but fled to Panormus, whence they had put to sea. The Athenians pursued them, took six of their ships which were nearest to them, and recovered their own ships which the Peloponnesians had originally disabled and taken in tow near the shore. The crews of the captured vessels were either slain or made prisoners. Timocrates the Lacedaemonian was on board the Leucadian ship which went down near the merchant vessel; when he saw the ship sinking he killed himself; the body was carried into the harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians then retired and raised a trophy on the place from which they had just sailed out to their victory. They took up the bodies and wrecks which were floating near their own shore, and gave back to the enemy, under a flag of truce, those which belonged to them. The Lacedaemonians also set up a trophy of the victory which they had gained over the ships destroyed by them near the shore; the single ship which they took they dedicated on the Achaean Rhium, close to the trophy. Then, fearing the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements, they sailed away at nightfall to the Crisaean Gulf and to Corinth, all with the exception of the Leucadians. And not long after their retreat the twenty Athenian ships from Crete, which ought to have come to the

assistance of Phormio before the battle, arrived at Naupactus. So the summer ended.

[93] Before breaking up the fleet which had returned to Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, it being now the beginning of winter, wished to make an attempt, suggested by some Megarians, on Piraeus, the harbour of Athens. The entrance was unclosed and unguarded; as was natural, since the Athenians were complete masters of the sea. Each sailor was to carry his cushion and his oar with its thong, and cross on foot with all haste from Corinth to the Athenian side of the Isthmus; they were to go to Megara and from Nisaea, the harbour of Megara, to launch forty ships which happened to be lying in the docks; thence they were to sail straight for the Piraeus. No guard ships were stationed there, for no one ever expected that the enemy would attempt a surprise of this kind. As to an open and deliberate attack, how was he likely to venture on that? and if he even entertained such a design, would he not have been found out in time?

The plan was immediately carried out. Arriving at night, they launched the ships from Nisaea and sailed away, but not to the Piraeus; the danger seemed too great, and also the wind is said to have been unfavourable. So they gave up their original idea and made for the projecting point of Salamis which looks towards Megara; here there was a fort, and three ships were stationed in order to prevent anything being conveyed by sea into or out of Megara. This fort they assailed, towed away the ships without their crews, and ravaged the rest of Salamis which was unprepared for their attack.

[94] By this time fire-signals had carried the alarm to Athens. Nothing which happened in the war caused a greater panic. The inhabitants of the city thought that the enemy had already sailed into the Piraeus; the belief in the Piraeus was that Salamis had been taken and that the enemy were on the point of sailing into the harbour, which, if they had been

bolder, they might easily have done, and no wind would have prevented them. But as soon as day dawned, the Athenians, coming down with the whole strength of the city to the Piraeus, launched their ships and, embarking in tumultuous haste, sailed to Salamis, while their land-forces remained and guarded the Piraeus. When the Peloponnesians saw the fleet coming they sailed quickly back to Nisaea, but not until they had ravaged the greater part of Salamis and taken many prisoners and much spoil, as well as the three ships which lay off the fort of Budorum. There was some apprehension about their own ships; for they had long been lain up and were not sea-worthy. Arriving at Megara they marched back again to Corinth, and the Athenians, having failed to overtake them in Salamis, sailed back likewise. Henceforth they kept more careful watch over the Piraeus, among other precautions closing the entrance to the harbour.

[95] About the same time, at the beginning of winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, the son of Teres, king of Thrace, made war upon Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, king of Macedon, and upon the Thracian Chalcidians. There were two promises, of which he wished to perform one, and exact fulfilment of the other. The promise of which he claimed fulfilment had been made to him by Perdiccas, when, being hard pressed at the beginning of the war, he wanted Sitalces to reconcile him to the Athenians, and not to restore and place on the throne his brother Philip, who was his enemy; but Perdiccas did not keep his word. The other was a promise which Sitalces had himself made to the Athenians when he entered into alliance with them, that he would put an end to their war with the Chalcidians. For these two reasons he invaded the country, taking with him Amyntas the son of Philip, whom he intended to make king of Macedon, and also certain Athenian envoys who had just come to remind him of his engagement, and an Athenian commander Hagnon. For the Athenians on their part were bound to assist him against

the Chalcidians with ships and with as large an army as they could provide.

[96] Accordingly Sitalces, beginning with the Odrysae, made a levy of all his Thracian subjects dwelling between Mount Haemus and Mount Rhodopè as far as the shores of the Euxine and of the Hellespont. Beyond the Haemus he made a levy of the Getae and of all the tribes lying more towards the Euxine on this side of the Ister. Now the Getae and their neighbours border on the Scythians, and are equipped like them, for they are all horse-archers. He also summoned to his standard many of the highland Thracians, who are independent and carry dirks; they are called Dii, and most of them inhabit Mount Rhodope; of these some were attracted by pay, while others came as volunteers. He further called out the Agrianians, the Laeaeans, and the other Paeonian nations who were his subjects. These tribes were the last within his empire; they extended as far as the Graaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which rises in Mount Scombrus and flows through the country of the Graaeans and Laeaeans; there his dominion ended and the independent Paeonians began. In the direction of the Triballi, who are likewise independent, the Treres and the Tilataeans formed his boundary. These tribes dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and reach westward as far as the Oscius. This river rises in the same mountains as the Nestus and the Hebrus, an uninhabited and extensive range which adjoins Rhodopè.

[97] The empire of the Odrysae measured by the coast-line reaches from the city of Abdera to the mouth of the Ister in the Euxine. The voyage round can be made by a merchant vessel, if the wind is favourable the whole way, at the quickest in four days and as many nights. Or an expeditious traveller going by land from Abdera to the mouth of the Ister, if he takes the shortest route, will accomplish the journey in eleven days. Such was the extent of the Odrysian empire towards the sea: up the country the land journey

from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and to the Strymon, this being the longest line which can be drawn from the sea into the interior, may be accomplished by an expeditious traveller in thirteen days. The tribute which was collected from the Hellenic cities and from all the barbarous nations in the reign of Seuthes, the successor of Sitalces, under whom the amount was greatest, was valued at about four hundred talents of coined money, reckoning only gold and silver. Presents of gold and silver equal in value to the tribute, besides stuffs embroidered or plain and other articles, were also brought, not only to the king himself, but to the inferior chiefs and nobles of the Odrysae. For their custom was the opposite of that which prevailed in the Persian kingdom; they were more ready to receive than to give; and he who asked and was refused was not so much discredited as he who refused when he was asked. The same custom prevailed among the other Thracians in a less degree, but among the Odrysae, who were richer, more extensively; nothing could be done without presents. By these means the kingdom became very powerful, and in revenue and general prosperity exceeded all the nations of Europe which lie between the Ionian Sea and the Euxine; in the size and strength of their army being second only, though far inferior, to the Scythians. For if the Scythians were united, there is no nation which could compare with them, or would be capable of resisting them; I do not say in Europe, but even in Asia — not that they are at all on a level with other nations in sense, or in that intelligence which uses to advantage the ordinary means of life.

[98] Such was the great country over which Sitalces ruled. When he had collected his army and his preparations were complete he marched into Macedonia, passing first of all through his own territory, and then through Cercinè, a desert mountain which lies between the Sinti and the Paeonians. He went by the road which he had himself constructed when he made his expedition against the

Paeonians and cut down the forest. As he left the Odrysian territory in going through the mountain he had on the right hand the Paeonians and on the left hand the Sinti and Maedi; on quitting the mountain he arrived at Doberus in Paeonia. He lost no part of his army on the march, except by sickness, but rather increased it; for many of the independent Thracian tribes followed him of their own accord in hopes of plunder. The whole number of his forces was estimated at a hundred and fifty thousand, of which about two-thirds were infantry and the rest cavalry. The largest part of the cavalry was furnished by the Odrysae themselves, and the next largest by the Getae. Of the infantry, those armed with dirks who came from the independent tribes of Mount Rhodopè were the most warlike. The remainder of the army was a mixed multitude, chiefly formidable from its numbers.

[99] Having mustered at Doberus, they made ready to descend over the heights into the plains of Macedonia, which were the territory of Perdiccas. There is an upper Macedonia, which is inhabited by Lyncestians, Elimiots, and other tribes; these are the allies and tributaries of the lower Macedonians, but have kings of their own. The maritime country which we now call Macedonia was conquered and formed into a kingdom by Alexander the father of Perdiccas and his ancestors the Temenidae, who originally came from Argos. They defeated and drove out of Pieria the Pierians, who afterwards settled in Phagres and other places at the foot of Mount Pangaeus, beyond the Strymon; the land which lies under Mount Pangaeus towards the sea is still called the Pierian vale. They also drove out of Bottia, as it is called, the Bottiaeans, who are now the neighbours of the Chalcidians, and they acquired a narrow strip of Paeonia by the river Axius, reaching down to Pella and the sea. Beyond the Axius they possess the country called Mygdonia reaching to the Strymon, out of which they have driven the Edonians. They expelled from the country still called Eordia

the Eordians, of whom the greater part perished, but a small remnant of them settled in the neighbourhood of Physca; and from Almopia the Almopians. They and their subjects further subdued and still hold various places belonging to other tribes, Anthemus, Grestonia, Bisaltia, and a great part of the original Macedonia. But the whole of this country is now called Macedonia, and was under the rule of Perdiccas the son of Alexander at the time of the invasion of Sitalces.

[100] The Macedonians were unable to defend themselves against the onset of so vast a host; they therefore retired into their strongholds and forts, which at that time were few. For those which now exist were built by Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, who, when he became king, made straight roads and in various ways improved the country. In his force of cavalry and infantry and in his military resources generally he surpassed all the eight kings who preceded him.

The Thracian army, leaving Doberus, invaded first of all the country which had formerly been the principality of Philip, and took Eidomenè by storm. Gortynia, Atalantè, and some other towns came to terms out of regard for Amyntas the son of Philip, who accompanied the expedition. They also besieged but failed to take Europus; they next advanced into that part of Macedonia which lay on the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. Farther south into Bottiaea and Pieria they did not penetrate, but were content to ravage the territory of Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians had no idea of facing them with infantry, but sent for additional cavalry from their allies in the upper part of the country, and, although a handful of men, dashed in amongst the great Thracian host wherever they pleased. No one withstood their onset; for they were excellent horsemen and well protected with coats of mail. But hemmed in as they continually were by a multitude many times their own number, they ran into great danger. At last, feeling that they were not strong enough to encounter such superiority of force, they desisted.

[101] Sitalces now held a conference with Perdiccas touching the matters which gave occasion to the war. The fleet which the Athenians had promised never arrived; for not believing that Sitalces would come, they only sent gifts and envoys to him. After waiting for them in vain he despatched a part of his army against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and, driving them within their walls, devastated the country. While he was encamped in these parts, the Thessalians, who lie towards the south, the Magnesians and other dependants of the Thessalians, and all the Hellenes as far as Thermopylae were afraid that his army would move on them, and took measures of precaution. Those independent Thracian tribes to the north beyond the Strymon who dwelt in the plains, namely the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and Dersaeans, were also in great alarm. A belief arose, which spread far and wide among the enemies of Athens, that the Athenians meant to lead their Odrysian allies against the rest of Hellas. Meanwhile Sitalces overran and ravaged Chalcidicè, Botticè, and Macedonia, but could not effect his objects; and, his army being without food and suffering from the winter, he was persuaded by his nephew, who next to himself had the greatest authority, Seuthes the son of Spardacus, to return home at once. Now Perdiccas had secretly gained over Seuthes, promising to give him his sister in marriage, with a portion. And so Sitalces and his army, having remained thirty days in all, of which eight were passed among the Chalcidians, returned home in haste. Perdiccas in fulfilment of his promise gave his sister Stratonicè in marriage to Seuthes. Thus ended the expedition of Sitalces.

[102] During the same winter the Athenian forces at Naupactus, after the Peloponnesian fleet had dispersed, made an expedition under the command of Phormio into the centre of Acarnania with four hundred hoplites of their own taken from the fleet and four hundred Messenian hoplites. They first coasted along towards Astacus and disembarked.

From Stratus, Coronta, and other places they expelled those of the inhabitants whom they distrusted, and restoring Cynes the son of Theolytus to Coronta, they returned to their ships. Oeniadae, of which the inhabitants, unlike the rest of the Acarnanians, were their persistent enemies, was unapproachable in winter. For the town is in the midst of a marsh formed by the river Achelous, which, rising in Mount Pindus and passing first through the territory of the Dolopians, Agraeans, and Amphilochians, and then through the Acarnanian plain, at some distance from its mouth flows by the city of Stratus and finds an exit into the sea near Oeniadae: an expedition in winter is thus rendered impossible by the water. Most of the islands called Echinades are situated opposite to Oeniadae and close to the mouth of the Achelous. The consequence is that the river, which is large, is always silting up: some of the islands have been already joined to the mainland, and very likely, at no distant period, they may all be joined to it. The stream is wide and strong and full of mud; and the islands are close together and serve to connect the deposits made by the river, not allowing them to dissolve in the water. For, lying irregularly and not one behind the other, they prevent the river from finding a straight channel into the sea. These islands are small and uninhabited. The story is that when Alcmaeon the son of Amphiaraus was wandering over the earth after the murder of his mother, he was told by Apollo that here he should find a home, the oracle intimating that he would never obtain deliverance from his terrors until he discovered some country which was not yet in existence and not seen by the sun at the time when he slew his mother; there he might settle, but the rest of the earth was accursed to him. He knew not what to do, until at last, according to the story, he spied the deposit of earth made by the Achelous, and he thought that a place sufficient to support life must have accumulated in the long time during which he had been wandering since his mother’s death. There,

near Oeniadae, he settled, and, becoming ruler, left to the country the name of his son Acarnan. Such is the tradition which has come down to us concerning Alcmaeon.

[103] The Athenians under Phormio sailed back from Acarnania to Naupactus, and later at the beginning of spring returned to Athens, bringing with them the ships which they had captured, besides the prisoners of free birth whom they had taken in the naval engagements. These were exchanged man for man. And so the winter ended, and with it the third year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

BOOK III

[1] IN the following summer, when the corn was in full ear, the Peloponnesians and their allies, under the command of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, invaded Attica, and encamping wasted the country. The Athenian cavalry as usual attacked them whenever an opportunity offered, and prevented the great body of the light-armed troops from going beyond their lines and injuring the lands near the city. The invaders remained until their supplies were exhausted; they were then disbanded, and returned to their several homes.

[2] No sooner had the Peloponnesians quitted Attica than the whole people of Lesbos, with the exception of the Methymnaeans, revolted from Athens. They had entertained the design before the war began, but the Lacedaemonians gave them no encouragement. And now they were not ready, and were compelled to revolt sooner than they had intended. For they were waiting until they had completed the work of closing their harbours, raising walls, and building ships, and they had not as yet received from Pontus the force of archers, the corn and the other supplies for which they had sent. But the inhabitants of Tenedos, who were not on good terms with them, and the Methymnaeans, and individual citizens who were of the opposite faction and were proxeni of Athens, turned informers and told the Athenians that the Mytilenaeans were forcibly making Mytilenè the centre of government for the whole island; that the preparations which they were pressing forward had been throughout undertaken by them in concert with the Lacedaemonians and with their Boeotian kinsmen, and meant revolt; and that if something were not immediately done, Lesbos would be lost to Athens.

[3] The Athenians, who were suffering severely from the plague and from the war, of which they had begun to feel

the full effects, reflected that it was a serious matter to bring upon themselves a second war with a naval power like Lesbos, whose resources were unimpaired; and so, mainly because they wished that the charges might not be true, they at first refused to listen to them. But, when they had sent envoys to Mytilenè and found that the Mytilenaeans, in spite of remonstrances, continued their preparations and persisted in the attempt to concentrate the government in Mytilenè, they took alarm and determined to be beforehand with them. Without losing a moment, they sent to Lesbos, under the command of Cleïppides the son of Deinias, and two others, forty ships which had been intended to cruise about Peloponnesus. They had heard that there was a festival of Apollo Maloeis held outside the walls in which the whole population took part, and that if they made haste they might hope to surprise them. The attempt would very likely succeed; but, if not, they might bid the Mytilenaeans give up their fleet and dismantle their walls, and in case they refused they might go to war with them. So the ships sailed; and as there happened to be at Athens ten Mytilenaean triremes, serving in accordance with the terms of the alliance, the Athenians seized them and threw their crews into prison. But the Mytilenaeans were warned by a messenger from Athens, who crossed to Euboea and went on foot to Geraestus; there he found a merchant vessel just about to sail; he took ship, and arriving at Mytilenè on the third day after he left Athens, announced the coming of the Athenian fleet. Whereupon the Mytilenaeans abstained from going out to the temple of Apollo Maloeis. They also kept good watch about their walls and harbours, and barricaded the unfinished works.

[4] Soon afterwards the Athenians arrived. The commanders of the fleet, seeing that they were foiled, delivered the message entrusted to them; the city refused to yield and they commenced hostilities. Taken by surprise, and unprepared for the war which was forced upon them, the

Mytilenaeans came out once and made a show of fighting a little in front of the harbour; but they were soon driven back by the Athenian ships, and then they began to parley with the generals, in the hope of obtaining tolerable terms of some kind, and getting rid of the fleet for the time. The Athenian generals accepted their proposals, they too fearing that they were not strong enough to make war against the whole island. Having got the armistice, the Mytilenaeans sent envoys to Athens; one of them was a person who had given information against his fellow-citizens, but was now repentant. They had a faint hope that the Athenians would be induced to withdraw their ships and believe in their good intentions. But as they did not really expect to succeed in their Athenian mission, they also sent an embassy to Lacedaemon, unperceived by the Athenian fleet, which was stationed at Malea to the north of the city. After a troublesome voyage through the open sea, the envoys arrived at Lacedaemon and solicited aid for their countrymen.

[5] The other envoys who had been sent to Athens met with no success. When they returned, the Mytilenaeans and the rest of Lesbos, with the exception of Methymna, commenced hostilities; the Methymnaeans, with the Imbrians, Lemnians, and a few of the allies, had come to the support of the Athenians. The Mytilenaeans with their whole force sallied out against the Athenian camp, and a battle took place, in which they got the better; but they had no confidence in themselves, and, instead of encamping on the field, retired. They then remained quiet, being unwilling to risk an engagement without the additional help which they were expecting from Peloponnesus and elsewhere. For Meleas a Lacedaemonian, and Hermaeondas a Theban, had now arrived at Mytilenè; they had been sent before the revolt, but the Athenian fleet anticipated them, and they sailed in by stealth after the battle in a single trireme. The envoys recommended the Mytilenaeans to send an embassy of their

own in another trireme to accompany them on their return to Sparta; which they accordingly did.

[6] The Athenians, greatly encouraged by the inactivity of their adversaries, summoned their allies, who came all the more readily because they saw that the Lesbians displayed no energy. They then anchored the fleet round the south of the city, and having fortified two camps, one on either side of it, they established a blockade of both the harbours. Thus they excluded the Mytilenaeans from the sea. They likewise held the country in the immediate neighbourhood of their two camps; but the Mytilenaeans and the other Lesbians, who had now taken up arms, were masters of the rest of the island. At Malea the Athenians had, not a camp, but a station for their ships and for their market.

[7] Such was the course of the war in Lesbos. In the same summer, and about the same time, the Athenians sent thirty ships to Peloponnesus; they were placed under the command of Asopius, the son of Phormio; for the Acarnanians had desired them to send out a son or relation of Phormio to be their leader. The ships in passing ravaged the coast of Laconia, and then Asopius sent most of them home, but kept twelve, with which he sailed to Naupactus. Next he made a general levy of the Acarnanians and led his forces against Oeniadae, his ships sailing up the river Achelous, while his army ravaged the country by land. As the inhabitants refused to yield, he disbanded his land-forces, but himself sailed to Leucas and made a descent upon Nericus, where he and part of his army in returning to their ships were slain by the inhabitants, assisted by a few Peloponnesian guards. The Athenians then put to sea, and received their dead from the Leucadians under a flag of truce.

[8] The envoys whom the Mytilenaeans had sent out in their first vessel were told by the Lacedaemonians to come to the Olympic festival, in order that the allies, as well as themselves, might hear them and determine what should be

done. So they went to Olympia. The Olympiad was that in which the Rhodian Dorieus won his second victory. When the festival was over, the allies met in council, and the ambassadors spoke as follows:

[9] ‘We know, Lacedaemonians and allies, that all Hellenes entertain a fixed sentiment against those who in time of war revolt and desert an old alliance. Their new allies are delighted with them in as far as they profit by their aid; but they do not respect them, for they deem them traitors to their former friends. And this opinion is reasonable enough; but only when the rebels, and those from whom they sever themselves, are naturally united by the same interests and feelings and equally matched in power and resources, and when there is no reasonable excuse for a revolt. But our relation to the Athenians was of another sort, and no one should be severe upon us for deserting them in the hour of danger although we were honoured by them in time of peace.

[10] ‘Since an alliance is our object, we will first address ourselves to the question of justice and honour. We know that no friendship between man and man, no league between city and city, can ever be permanent unless the friends or allies have a good opinion of each other’s honesty, and are similar in general character. For the diversity in men’s minds makes the difference in their actions.

‘Now our alliance with the Athenians first began when you ceased to take part in the Persian War, and they remained to complete the work. But we were never the allies of the Athenians in their design of subjugating Hellas; we were really the allies of the Hellenes, whom we sought to liberate from the Persians. And while in the exercise of their command they claimed no supremacy, we were very ready to follow them, But our fears began to be aroused when we saw them relaxing their efforts against the Persians and imposing the yoke of their dominion upon the allies, who could not unite and defend themselves, for their interests

were too various. And so they were all enslaved, except ourselves and the Chians. We forsooth were independent allies, free men — that was the word — who fought at their side. But, judging from previous examples, how could we any longer have confidence in our leaders? For they had subjugated others to whom, equally with ourselves, their faith was pledged; and how could we who survived expect to be spared if ever they had the power to destroy us?

[11] ‘Had all the allies retained their independence,we should have had better assurance that they would leave us as we were; but when the majority had been subjugated by them, they might naturally be expected to take offence at our footing of equality; they would contrast us who alone maintained this equality with the majority who had submitted to them; they would also observe that in proportion as their strength was increasing, our isolation was increasing too. Mutual fear is the only solid basis of alliance; for he who would break faith is deterred from aggression by the consciousness of inferiority. And why were we left independent? Only because they thought that to gain an empire they must use fair words and win their way by policy and not by violence. On the one hand, our position was a witness to their character. For, having an equal vote with them, we could not be supposed to have fought in their wars against our will, but those whom they attacked must have been in the wrong. On the other hand, they were thus enabled to use the powerful against the weak; they thought that they would leave us to the last; when the lesser states were removed, the stronger would fall an easier prey. But if they had begun with us while the power of the allies was still intact, and we might have afforded a rallying-point, they would not so easily have mastered them. Besides, our navy caused them some apprehension; they were afraid that we might join you, or some other great power, and that the union would be dangerous to them. For a time, too, we saved ourselves by paying court to the people and to the

popular leaders of the day. But we were not likely to have survived long, judging by the conduct of the Athenians towards others, if this war had not arisen.

[12] ‘What trust then could we repose in such a friendship or such a freedom as this? The civility which we showed to one another was at variance with our real feelings. They courted us in time of war because they were afraid of us, and we in time of peace paid a like attention to them. And the faith which is generally assured by mutual good-will had with us no other bond but mutual fear; from fear, and not from love, we were constrained to maintain the alliance, and whichever of us first thought that he could safely venture would assuredly have been the first to break it. And therefore if any one imagines that we do wrong in striking first, because they delay the blow which we dread, and thinks that we should wait and make quite sure of their intentions, he is mistaken. If we were really on an equality with them and in a position to counteract their designs and imitate their threatening attitude, how was it consistent with this equality that we had still to be at their mercy? The power of attack is always in their hands, and the power of anticipating attack should always be in ours.

[13] ‘These were the reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, and the grievances which led us to revolt. They were clear enough to prove to all hearers the justice of our cause, and strong enough to alarm us and drive us to seek some deliverance. We have acted from no sudden impulse; long ago, before the war began, we sent envoys to you, and proposed to revolt. But we could not, because you refused our request. Now, however, when the Boeotians have invited us, we have at once obeyed the call. We were intending to make a double severance of ourselves, from the Hellenes and from the Athenians; from the guilt, that is, of oppressing the Hellenes, in concert with the Athenians, instead of aiding in their liberation, and from the ruin which the Athenians were sooner or later sure to bring upon us, unless

we anticipated them. But the step has been taken hastily and without due preparation; hence you are the more bound to receive us into alliance and to send us speedy help, thereby showing that you are ready to protect those who have claims upon you and to strike a blow at your enemies. Never was there such an opportunity before. The Athenians are exhausted by pestilence and by a costly war; some of their ships are cruising about your shores; the remainder are threatening us; so that they are not likely to have many to spare if you, in the course of this summer, make a second attack upon them by land and by sea. They will not be able to meet you at sea; or, if they do, they will have to withdraw their forces both from Lesbos and from Peloponnesus. And let no one say to himself that he is going to incur a danger which will be his own on behalf of a country which is not his own. He may think that Lesbos is a long way off; but he will find that the help which we bring will be very near him. For the war will not be fought in Attica, as might be imagined; but in those countries by which Attica is supported. The revenues of the Athenians are derived from their allies, and, if they subdue us, will be greater than ever; no one will revolt again, and our resources will be added to theirs; and we shall suffer worse things than those who have been enslaved already. But, if you assist us heartily, you will gain the alliance of a great naval power, and a navy is your chief want; you will draw away the allies of the Athenians, who will fearlessly come over to you; thus you will more easily overthrow the power of Athens. And you will no longer incur, as in times past, the reproach of deserting those who revolt. If you come forward as their liberators your final triumph will be assured.

[14] ‘Do not then for very shame frustrate the hopes which the Hellenes rest on you, or dishonour the name of Olympian Zeus in whose temple we are in a manner suppliants, but be our allies and helpers. Do not betray us; we, the people of Mytilenè, risk our lives alone in the common cause of Hellas:

universal will be the benefit which we confer if we succeed, and still more universal the ruin if you are inflexible and we fall. Wherefore prove yourselves worthy of your reputation in Hellas, and be such as we in our fear would have you.’

These were the words of the Mytilenaeans.

[15] The Lacedaemonians and the allies immediately accepted their proposals and took the Lesbians into alliance. The confederates, who were present at Olympia, were told to make ready quickly for another expedition into Attica, and to assemble at the isthmus, bringing the usual contingent of two-thirds. The Lacedaemonians arrived first, and at once set to work making machines for hauling ships over the isthmus, from Corinth to the Saronic Gulf. For they intended to attack the Athenians both by sea and land. But although they were energetic themselves, the other allies assembled slowly; they were gathering in their fruits and in no mood for war.

[16] The Athenians, perceiving that the activity of the Lacedaemonians was due to a conviction of their weakness, determined to show them their mistake, and to prove that, without moving the fleet from Lesbos, they were fully able to repel this new force which threatened them. They manned a hundred ships, in which they embarked, both metics and citizens, all but the highest class and the Knights; they then set sail, and, after displaying their strength along the shores of the isthmus, made descents upon the Peloponnesian coast wherever they pleased. The Lacedaemonians were astounded, and thought that the Lesbians had told them what was not true. Their allies too had not yet arrived, and they heard that the Athenians in the thirty ships which had been sent to cruise around Peloponnesus were wasting their country districts; and so, not knowing what else to do, they returned home. However, they afterwards prepared a fleet to go to Lesbos, and ordered the allies to equip forty ships: these they placed under the command of Alcidas, who was to take them out. When the Athenians saw that the

Peloponnesians had gone home, they and their fleet of a hundred ships did the same.

[17] At the time when the fleet was at sea, the Athenians had the largest number of ships which they ever had all together, effective and in good trim, although the mere number was as large or even larger at the commencement of the war. For then there were a hundred which guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis, and another hundred which were cruising off Peloponnesus, not including the ships employed in blockading Potidaea and at other places; so that in one and the same summer their fleet in all numbered two hundred and fifty. This and the money spent in the war against Potidaea was the chief call upon their treasury. Every one of the hoplites engaged in the siege received two drachmae a day, one for himself, and one for his servant; the original force amounted to three thousand, and this number was maintained as long as the siege lasted. Sixteen hundred more came with Phormio, but went away before the end. The sailors in the fleet all received the same pay as the soldiers. So great was the drain on the resources of the Athenians in the early part of the war, and such was the largest number of ships which they ever manned.

[18] While the Lacedaemonians were at the isthmus, the Mytilenaeans and their auxiliaries marched against Methymna, which they expected to be betrayed to them, but, making an assault, and finding that they were mistaken, they went off to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus; and, having strengthened the walls of these places and established their interest in them, they hastily returned. As soon as they had retired, the Methymnaeans retaliated by making an expedition against Antissa; but the people of Antissa and their auxiliaries sallied out and defeated them with heavy loss; the survivors made a hasty retreat. The Athenians heard that the Mytilenaeans were masters of the country, and that their own troops in Lesbos were not sufficient to confine them within the walls. So about the

beginning of autumn they sent to Mytilenè, under the command of Paches the son of Epicurus, a thousand Athenian hoplites who handled the oars themselves. On arriving, they surrounded the town with a single line of wall; and in some strong places forts were erected which formed part of the wall. Thus Mytilenè was effectually blockaded both by sea and by land. The winter now began to set in.

[19] The Athenians, being in want of money to carry on the siege, raised among themselves for the first time a property-tax of two hundred talents, and sent out twelve ships to collect tribute among the allies, under the command of Lysicles and four others. He sailed to various places and exacted tribute; but as he was going up from Myus in Caria, through the plain of the Maeander, he was attacked at the hill of Sandius by the Carians and the Samians of Anaea, and, with a great part of his army, perished.

[20] During the same winter the Plataeans, who were still besieged by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, began to suffer from the failure of provisions. They had no hope of assistance from Athens and no other chance of deliverance. So they and the Athenians who were shut up with them contrived a plan of forcing their way over the enemy’s walls. The idea was suggested by Theaenetus the son of Tolmides, a diviner, and Eupompidas, the son of Daïmachus, one of their generals. At first they were all desirous of joining, but afterwards half of them somehow lost heart, thinking the danger too great, and only two hundred and twenty agreed to persevere. They first made ladders equal in length to the height of the enemy’s wall, which they calculated by the help of the layers of bricks on the side facing the town, at a place where the wall had accidentally not been plastered. A great many counted at once, and, although some might make mistakes, the calculation would be oftener right than wrong; for they repeated the process again and again, and, the distance not being great, they could see the wall distinctly enough for their purpose. In this manner they

ascertained the proper length of the ladders, taking as a measure the thickness of the bricks.

[21] The Peloponnesian wall was double, and consisted of an inner circle looking towards Plataea, and an outer intended to guard against an attack from Athens; they were at a distance of about sixteen feet from one another. This interval of sixteen feet was partitioned off into lodgings for the soldiers, by which the two walls were joined together, so that they appeared to form one thick wall with battlements on both sides. At every tenth battlement there were large towers, filling up the space between the walls, and extending both to the inner and outer face; there was no way at the side of the towers, but only through the middle of them. During the night, whenever there was storm and rain, the soldiers left the battlements and kept guard from the towers, which were not far from each other and were covered overhead. Such was the plan of the wall with which Plataea was invested.

[22] When the Plataeans had completed their preparations they took advantage of a night on which there was a storm of wind and rain and no moon, and sallied forth. They were led by the authors of the attempt. First of all they crossed the ditch which surrounded the town; then they came right up to the wall of the enemy. The guard did not discover them, for the night was so dark that they could not be seen, while the clatter of the storm drowned the noise of their approach. They marched a good way apart from each other, that the clashing of their arms might not betray them; and they were lightly equipped, having the right foot bare that they might be less liable to slip in the mud. They now set about scaling the battlements, which they knew to be deserted, choosing a space between two of the towers. Those who carried the ladders went first and placed them against the wall; they were followed by twelve others, armed only with sword and breastplate, under the command of Ammeas the son of Coroebus: he was the first to mount;

after him came the twelve, ascending the wall and proceeding to the towers on the right and left, six to each. To these succeeded more men lightly armed with short spears, others following who bore their shields, that they might have less difficulty in mounting the wall; the shields were to be handed to them as soon as they were near the enemy. A considerable number had ascended, when they were discovered by the guards in the towers. One of the Plataeans, taking hold of the battlements, threw down a tile which made a noise in falling: immediately a shout was raised and the army rushed out upon the wall; for in the dark and stormy night they did not know what the alarm meant. At the same time, in order to distract their attention, the Plataeans who were left in the city made a sally against the Peloponnesian wall on the side opposite to the place at which their friends were getting over. The besiegers were in great excitement, but every one remained at his own post, and dared not stir to give assistance, being at a loss to imagine what was happening. The three hundred who were appointed to act in any sudden emergency marched along outside the walls towards the spot from which the cry proceeded; and fire-signals indicating danger were raised towards Thebes. But the Plataeans in the city had numerous counter signals ready on the wall, which they now lighted and held up, thereby hoping to render the signals of the enemy unintelligible, that so the Thebans, misunderstanding the true state of affairs, might not arrive until the men had escaped and were in safety.

[23] Meanwhile the Plataeans were scaling the walls. The first party had mounted, and, killing the sentinels, had gained possession of the towers on either side. Their followers now began to occupy the passages, lest the enemy should come through and fall upon them. Some of them placed ladders upon the wall against the towers, and got up more men. A shower of missiles proceeding both from the upper and lower parts of the towers kept off all assailants. Meanwhile

the main body of the Plataeans, who were still below, applied to the wall many ladders at once, and, pushing down the battlements, made their way over through the space between the towers. As each man got to the other side he halted upon the edge of the ditch, whence they shot darts and arrows at any one who came along under the wall and attempted to impede their passage. When they had all passed over, those who had occupied the towers came down, the last of them not without great difficulty, and proceeded towards the ditch. By this time the three hundred were upon them; they had lights, and the Plataeans, standing on the edge of the ditch, saw them all the better out of the darkness, and shot arrows and threw darts at them where their bodies were exposed; they themselves were concealed by the darkness, while the enemy were dazed by their own lights. And so the Plataeans, down to the last man of them all, got safely over the ditch, though with great exertion and only after a hard struggle; for the ice in it was not frozen hard enough to bear, but was half water, as is commonly the case when the wind is from the east and not from the north. And the snow which the east wind brought in the night had greatly swollen the water, so that they could scarcely accomplish the passage. It was the violence of the storm, however, which enabled them to escape at all.

[24] From the ditch the Plataeans, leaving on the right hand the shrine of Androcrates, ran all together along the road to Thebes. They made sure that no one would ever suspect them of having fled in the direction of their enemies. On their way they saw the Peloponnesians pursuing them with torches on the road which leads to Athens by Cithaeron and Dryoscephalae. For nearly a mile the Plataeans continued on the Theban road; they then turned off and went by the way up the mountain leading to Erythrae and Hysiae, and so, getting to the hills, they escaped to Athens. Their number was two hundred and twelve, though they had been originally more, for some of them went back to the city and

never got over the wall; one who was an archer was taken at the outer ditch. The Peloponnesians at length gave up the pursuit and returned to their lines. But the Plataeans in the city, knowing nothing of what had happened, for those who had turned back had informed them that not one was left alive, sent out a herald at daybreak, wanting to make a truce for the burial of the dead ; they then discovered the truth and returned. Thus the Plataeans scaled the wall and escaped.

[25] At the end of the same winter Salaethus the Lacedaemonian was despatched in a trireme from Lacedaemon to Mytilenè. He sailed to Pyrrha, and thence, proceeding on foot, made his way, by the channel of a torrent at a place where the line of the Athenian wall could be crossed, undiscovered into Mytilenè. He told the government that there was to be an invasion of Attica, and that simultaneously the forty ships which were coming to their assistance would arrive at Lesbos; he himself had been sent in advance to bring the news and take charge of affairs. Whereupon the Mytilenaeans recovered their spirits, and were less disposed to make terms with the Athenians. So the winter ended, and with it the fourth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

[26] With the return of summer the Peloponnesians despatched the two and forty ships which they intended for Mytilenè in charge of Alcidas, the Lacedaemonian admiral. They and their allies then invaded Attica, in order that the Athenians, embarrassed both by sea and land, might have their attention distracted from the ships sailing to Mytilenè. Cleomenes led the invasion. He was acting in the place of his nephew, the king Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, who was still a minor. All the country which they had previously overrun, wherever anything had grown up again, they ravaged afresh, and devastated even those districts which they had hitherto spared. This invasion caused greater distress to the Athenians than any, except the second. For

the Peloponnesians, who were daily expecting to hear from Lesbos of some action on the part of the fleet, which they supposed by this time to have crossed the sea, pursued their ravages far and wide. But when none of their expectations were realised, and their food was exhausted, they retired and dispersed to their several cities.

[27] Meanwhile the Mytilenaeans, finding as time went on that the ships from Peloponnesus never came, and that their provisions had run short, were obliged to make terms with the Athenians. The immediate cause was as follows: Salaethus himself began to despair of the arrival of the ships, and therefore he put into the hands of the common people (who had hitherto been light-armed) shields and spears, intending to lead them out against the Athenians. But, having once received arms, they would no longer obey their leaders; they gathered into knots and insisted that the nobles should bring out the corn and let all share alike; if not, they would themselves negotiate with the Athenians and surrender the city.

[28] The magistrates, knowing that they were helpless, and that they would be in peril of their lives if they were left out of the convention, concluded a general agreement with Paches and his army, stipulating that the fate of the Mytilenaeans should be left in the hands of the Athenians at home. They were to receive him and his forces into the city; but might send an embassy to Athens on their own behalf. Until the envoys returned, Paches was not to bind, enslave, or put to death any Mytilenaean. These were the terms of the capitulation. Nevertheless, when the army entered, those Mytilenaeans who had been principally concerned with the Lacedaemonians were in an agony of fear, and could not be satisfied until they had taken refuge at the altars. Paches raised them up, and promising not to hurt them, deposited them at Tenedos until the Athenians should come to a decision. He also sent triremes to Antissa, of which

he gained possession, and took such other military measures as he deemed best.

[29] The forty ships of the Peloponnesians, which should have gone at once to Mytilenè, lost time about the Peloponnese, and proceeded very leisurely on their voyage. They arrived safely at Delos, before they were heard of at Athens; but on touching at Icarus and Myconus they found, too late, that Mytilenè was taken. Wanting to obtain certain information, they sailed to Embatum near Erythrae, which they reached, but not until seven days after the fall of Mytilenè. Having now made sure of the fact, they consulted as to what measures should next be taken, and Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows:

[30] 'My opinion, Alcidas, and you, my fellow-commanders of the Peloponnesian forces, is that we should attack Mytilenè at once, just as we are, before our arrival is known. In all probability we shall find that men who have recently gained possession of a city will be much off their guard, and entirely so at sea, on which element they do not fear the attack of an enemy, and where at this moment we can strike with effect. Probably too their land forces, in the carelessness of victory, will be scattered up and down among the houses of the city. If we were to fall upon them suddenly by night, with the help of our friends inside, should there be any left, I have no doubt that Mytilenè would be ours. The danger should not deter us; for we should consider that the execution of a military surprise is always dangerous, and that the general who is never taken off his guard himself, and never loses an opportunity of striking at an unguarded foe, will be most likely to succeed in war.'

[31] His words failed to convince Alcidas; whereupon some Ionian exiles and the Lesbians who were on board the fleet recommended that, if this enterprise appeared too hazardous, he should occupy one of the Ionian towns or the Aeolian Cymè: having thus established their head-quarters in a city, the Peloponnesians might raise the standard of

revolt in Ionia. There was a good chance of success, for every one was glad of his arrival; they might cut off a main source of Athenian revenue; and although they themselves would incur expense, for the Athenians would blockade them, the attempt was worth making. Pissuthnes might very likely be persuaded to co-operate. But Alcidas objected to this proposal equally with the last; his only idea was, now that he had failed in saving Mytilenè, to get back as fast as he could to Peloponnesus.

[32] Accordingly he sailed from Embatum along the coast, touching at Myonnesus in the territory of Teos; he there slew most of the captives whom he had taken on his voyage. He then put into harbour at Ephesus, where a deputation from the Samians of Anaea came to him. They told him that it was an ill-manner of liberating Hellas, to have put to death men who were not his enemies and were not lifting a hand against him, but were allies of Athens from necessity: if he went on in this way he would convert few of his enemies into friends, and many of his friends into enemies. He was convinced by them, and allowed such of the Chian prisoners as he had not yet put to death and some others to go free. They had been easily taken, because, when people saw the ships, instead of flying, they came close up to them under the idea that they were Athenian; the thought never entered into their minds that while the Athenians were masters of the sea, Peloponnesian ships would find their way across the Aegean to the coast of Ionia.

[33] From Ephesus Alcidas sailed away in haste, or rather fled; for while he was at anchor near Clarus he had been sighted by the Athenian sacred vessels, Paralus and Salaminia, which happened to be on a voyage from Athens. In fear of pursuit he hurried through the open sea, determined to stop nowhere, if he could help it, until he reached Peloponnesus. News of him and his fleet was brought to Paches from the country of Erythrae, and indeed kept coming in from all sides. For Ionia not being fortified,

there was great apprehension lest the Peloponnesians, as they sailed along the coast, might fall upon the cities and plunder them, even though they had no intention of remaining. And the Paralus and Salaminia reported that they had themselves seen him at Clarus. Paches eagerly gave chase and pursued him as far as the island of Patmos, but, seeing that he was no longer within reach, he returned. Not having come up with the fleet of the Peloponnesians upon the open sea, he congratulated himself that they had not been overtaken somewhere near land, where they would have been forced to put in and fortify themselves on shore, and the Athenians would have had the trouble of watching and blockading them.

[34] As he was sailing along the coast on his return he touched at Notium, the port of Colophon. Here some inhabitants of the upper town had taken up their abode; for it had been captured by Itamenes and the Barbarians, who had been invited into the city by a certain local faction. The capture took place about the time of the second invasion of Attica. The refugees who settled in Notium again quarrelled among themselves. The one party, having introduced Arcadian and Barbarian auxiliaries whom they had obtained, from Pissuthnes, stationed them in a fortified quarter of the town; the Persian faction from the upper city of Colophon joined them and were living with them. The other party had retired from the city, and being now in exile, called in Paches. He proposed to Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the fortress, that they should hold a conference, undertaking, if they could not agree, to put him back in the fort, safe and sound. So he came out, and Paches kept him in custody without fetters. In the meantime he made an attack upon the unsuspecting garrison, took the fortress, and slaughtered all the Arcadians and Barbarians whom he found within. He then conducted Hippias into the fort, according to the agreement, and when he was inside seized him and shot him to death with arrows. He next handed over

Notium to the Colophonians, excluding the Persian party. The Athenians afterwards gathered together all the Colophonians who could be found in the neighbouring cities and colonised the place, to which they gave laws like their own, under new founders whom they sent out from Athens.

[35] On returning to Lesbos, Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus, and finding Salaethus, the Lacedaemonian governor, concealed in Mytilenè, sent him to Athens. He also sent thither the Mytilenaeans whom he had deposited in Tenedos, and any others who seemed to have been implicated in the revolt. He then dismissed the greater part of his army, and, by the aid of the remainder, settled as seemed best to him the affairs of Mytilenè and Lesbos.

[36] When the captives arrived at Athens the Athenians instantly put Salaethus to death, although he made various offers, and among other things promised to procure the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Plataea which was still blockaded. Concerning the other captives a discussion was held, and in their indignation the Athenians determined to put to death not only the men then at Athens, but all the grown-up citizens of Mytilenè, and to enslave the women and children; the act of the Mytilenaeans appeared inexcusable, because they were not subjects like the other states which had revolted, but free. That Peloponnesian ships should have had the audacity to find their way to Ionia and assist the rebels contributed to increase their fury; and the action showed that the revolt was a long premeditated affair. So they sent a trireme to Paches announcing their determination, and bidding him put the Mytilenaeans to death at once. But on the following day a kind of remorse seized them; they began to reflect that a decree which doomed to destruction not only the guilty, but a whole city, was cruel and monstrous. The Mytilenaean envoys who were at Athens perceived the change of feeling, and they and the Athenians who were in their interest prevailed on the magistrates to bring the question again before the people;

this they were the more willing to do, because they saw themselves that the majority of the citizens were anxious to have an opportunity given them of reconsidering their decision. An assembly was again summoned, and different opinions were expressed by different speakers. In the former assembly, Cleon the son of Cleaenetus had carried the decree condemning the Mytilenaeans to death. He was the most violent of the citizens, and at that time exercised by far the greatest influence over the people. And now he came forward a second time and spoke as follows: —

[37] ‘I have remarked again and again that a democracy cannot manage an empire, but never more than now, when I see you regretting your condemnation of the Mytilenaeans. Having no fear or suspicion of one another in daily life, you deal with your allies upon the same principle, and you do not consider that whenever you yield to them out of pity or are misled by their specious tales, you are guilty of a weakness dangerous to yourselves, and receive no thanks from them. You should remember that your empire is a despotism exercised over unwilling subjects, who are always conspiring against you; they do not obey in return for any kindness which you do them to your own injury, but in so far as you are their masters; they have no love of you, but they are held down by force. Besides, what can be more detestable than to be perpetually changing our minds? We forget that a state in which the laws, though imperfect, are inviolable, is better off than one in which the laws are good but ineffective. Dullness and modesty are a more useful combination than cleverness and licence; and the more simple sort generally make better citizens than the more astute. For the latter desire to be thought wiser than the laws; they want to be always getting their own way in public discussions; they think that they can nowhere have a finer opportunity of displaying their intelligence, and their folly generally ends in the ruin of their country; whereas the others, mistrusting their own capacity, admit that the laws

are wiser than themselves: they do not pretend to criticise the arguments of a great speaker; and being impartial judges, not ambitious rivals, they hit the mark. That is the spirit in which we should act; not suffering ourselves to be so excited by our own cleverness in a war of wits as to advise the Athenian people contrary to our own better judgment.

[38] ‘I myself think as I did before, and I wonder at those who have brought forward the case of the Mytilenaeans again, thus interposing a delay which is in the interest of the evil-doer. For after a time the anger of the sufferer waxes dull, and he pursues the offender with less keenness; but the vengeance which follows closest upon the wrong is most adequate to it and exacts the fullest retribution. And again I wonder who will answer me, and whether he will attempt to show that the crimes of the Mytilenaeans are a benefit to us, or that when we suffer, our allies suffer with us. Clearly he must be some one who has such confidence in his powers of speech as to contend that you never adopted what was most certainly your resolution; or else he must be some one who, under the inspiration of a bribe, elaborates a sophistical speech in the hope of diverting you from the point. In such rhetorical contests the city gives away the prizes to others, while she takes the risk upon herself. And you are to blame, for you order these contests amiss. When speeches are to be heard, you are too fond of using your eyes, but, where actions are concerned, you trust your ears; you estimate the possibility of future enterprises from the eloquence of an orator, but as to accomplished facts, instead of accepting ocular demonstration, you believe only what ingenious critics tell you. No men are better dupes, sooner deceived by novel notions, or slower to follow approved advice. You despise what is familiar, while you are worshippers of every new extravagance. Not a man of you but would be an orator if he could; when he cannot, he will not yield the palm to a more successful rival: he would fain show that he does not

let his wits come limping after, but that he can praise a sharp remark before it is well out of another's mouth; he would like to be as quick in anticipating what is said, as he is slow in foreseeing its consequences. You are always hankering after an ideal state, but you do not give your minds even to what is straight before you. In a word, you are at the mercy of your own ears, and sit like spectators attending a performance of sophists, but very unlike counsellors of a state.

[39] 'I want you to put aside this trifling, and therefore I say to you that no single city has ever injured us so deeply as Mytilenè. I can excuse those who find our rule too heavy to bear, or who have revolted because the enemy has compelled them. But islanders who had walls, and were unassailable by our enemies, except at sea, and on that element were sufficiently protected by a fleet of their own, who were independent and treated by us with the highest regard, when they act thus, they have not revolted (that word would imply that they were oppressed), but they have rebelled; and entering the ranks of our bitterest enemies have conspired with them to seek our ruin. And surely this is far more atrocious than if they had been led by motives of ambition to take up arms against us on their own account. They learned nothing from the misfortunes of their neighbours who had already revolted and been subdued by us, nor did the happiness of which they were in the enjoyment make them hesitate to court destruction. They trusted recklessly to the future, and cherishing hopes which, if less than their wishes, were greater than their powers, they went to war, preferring might to right. No sooner did they seem likely to win than they set upon us, although we were doing them no wrong. Too swift and sudden a rise is apt to make cities insolent and, in general, ordinary good-fortune is safer than extraordinary. Mankind apparently find it easier to drive away adversity than to retain prosperity. We should from the first have made no difference between the

Mytilenaeans and the rest of our allies, and then their insolence would never have risen to such a height; for men naturally despise those who court them, but respect those who do not give way to them. Yet it is not too late to punish them as their crimes deserve. And do not absolve the people while you throw the blame upon the nobles. For they were all of one mind when we were to be attacked. Had the people deserted the nobles and come over to us, they might at this moment have been reinstated in their city; but they considered that their safety lay in sharing the dangers of the oligarchy, and therefore they joined in the revolt. Reflect: if you impose the same penalty upon those of your allies who wilfully rebel and upon those who are constrained by the enemy, which of them will not revolt upon any pretext however trivial, seeing that, if he succeed, he will be free, and, if he fail, no irreparable evil will follow? We in the meantime shall have to risk our lives and our fortunes against every one in turn. When conquerors we shall recover only a ruined city, and, for the future, the revenues which are our strength will be lost to us. But if we fail, the number of our adversaries will be increased. And when we ought to be employed in repelling the enemies with whom we have to do, we shall be wasting time in fighting against our own allies.

[40] ‘Do not then hold out a hope, which eloquence can secure or money buy, that they are to be excused and that their error is to be deemed human and venial. Their attack was not unpremeditated; that might have been an excuse for them; but they knew what they were doing. This was my original contention, and I still maintain that you should abide by your former decision, and not be misled either by pity, or by the charm of words, or by a too forgiving temper. There are no three things more prejudicial to your power. Mercy should be reserved for the merciful, and not thrown away upon those who will have no compassion on us, and who must by the force of circumstances always be our

enemies. And our charming orators will still have an arena, but one in which the questions at stake will not be so grave, and the city will not pay so dearly for her brief pleasure in listening to them, while they for a good speech get a good fee. Lastly, forgiveness is naturally shown to those who, being reconciled, will continue friends, and not to those who will always remain what they were, and will abate nothing of their enmity. In one word, if you do as I say, you will do what is just to the Mytilenaeans, and also what is expedient for yourselves; but, if you take the opposite course, they will not be grateful to you, and you will be self-condemned. For, if they were right in revolting, you must be wrong in maintaining your empire. But if, right or wrong, you are resolved to rule, then rightly or wrongly they must be chastised for your good. Otherwise you must give up your empire, and, when virtue is no longer dangerous, you may be as virtuous as you please. Punish them as they would have punished you; let not those who have escaped appear to have less feeling than those who conspired against them. Consider: what might not they have been expected to do if they had conquered? — especially since they were the aggressors. For those who wantonly attack others always rush into extremes, and sometimes, like these Mytilenaeans, to their own destruction. They know the fate which is reserved for them by an enemy who is spared: when a man is injured wantonly he is more dangerous if he escape than the enemy who has only suffered what he has inflicted. Be true then to yourselves, and recall as vividly as you can what you felt at the time; think how you would have given the world to crush your enemies, and now take your revenge. Do not be soft-hearted at the sight of their distress, but remember the danger which was once hanging over your heads. Chastise them as they deserve, and prove by an example to your other allies that rebellion will be punished with death. If this is made quite clear to them, your

attention will no longer be diverted from your enemies by wars against your own allies.’

[41] Such were the words of Cleon; and after him Diodotus the son of Eucrates, who in the previous assembly had been the chief opponent of the decree which condemned the Mytilenaeans, came forward again and spoke as follows:

[42] ‘I am far from blaming those who invite us to reconsider our sentence upon the Mytilenaeans, nor do I approve of the censure which has been cast on the practice of deliberating more than once about matters so critical. In my opinion the two things most adverse to good counsel are haste and passion; the former is generally a mark of folly, the latter of vulgarity and narrowness of mind. When a man insists that words ought not to be our guides in action, he is either wanting in sense or wanting in honesty: he is wanting in sense if he does not see that there is no other way in which we can throw light on the unknown future; and he is not honest if, seeking to carry a discreditable measure, and knowing that he cannot speak well in a bad cause, he reflects that he can slander well and terrify his opponents and his audience by the audacity of his calumnies. Worst of all are those who, besides other topics of abuse, declare that their opponent is hired to make an eloquent speech. If they accused him of stupidity only, when he failed in producing an impression he might go his way having lost his reputation for sense but not for honesty; whereas he who is accused of dishonesty, even if he succeed, is viewed with suspicion, and, if he fail, is thought to be both fool and rogue. And so the city suffers; for she is robbed of her counsellors by fear. Happy would she be if such citizens could not speak at all, for then the people would not be misled. The good citizen should prove his superiority as a speaker, not by trying to intimidate those who are to follow him in debate, but by fair argument; and the wise city ought not to give increased honour to her best counsellor, any more than she will deprive him of that which he has; while he whose proposal is

rejected not only ought to receive no punishment, but should be free from all reproach. Then he who succeeds will not say pleasant things contrary to his better judgment in order to gain a still higher place in popular favour, and he who fails will not be striving to attract the multitude to himself by like compliances.

[43] ‘But we take an opposite course; and still worse. Even when we know a man to be giving the wisest counsel, a suspicion of corruption is set on foot; and from a jealousy which is perhaps groundless we allow the state to lose an undeniable advantage. It has come to this, that the best advice when offered in plain terms is as much distrusted as the worst; and not only he who wishes to lead the multitude into the most dangerous courses must deceive them, but he who speaks in the cause of right must make himself believed by lying. In this city, and in this city only, to do good openly and without deception is impossible, because you are too clever; and, when a man confers an unmistakeable benefit on you, he is rewarded by a suspicion that, in some underhand manner, he gets more than he gives. But, whatever you may suspect, when great interests are at stake, we who advise ought to look further and weigh our words more carefully than you whose vision is limited. And you should remember that we are accountable for our advice to you, but you who listen are accountable to nobody. If he who gave and he who followed evil counsel suffered equally, you would be more reasonable in your ideas; but now, whenever you meet with a reverse, led away by the passion of the moment you punish the individual who is your adviser for his error of judgment, and your own error you condone, if the judgments of many concurred in it.

[44] ‘I do not come forward either as an advocate of the Mytilenaeans or as their accuser; the question for us rightly considered is not, what are their crimes? but, what is for our interest? If I prove them ever so guilty, I will not on that account bid you put them to death, unless it is expedient.

Neither, if perchance there be some degree of excuse for them, would I have you spare them, unless it be clearly for the good of the state. For I conceive that we are now concerned, not with the present, but with the future. When Cleon insists that the infliction of death will be expedient and will secure you against revolt in time to come, I, like him taking the ground of future expediency, stoutly maintain the contrary position; and I would not have you be misled by the apparent fairness of his proposal, and reject the solid advantages of mine. You are angry with the Mytilenaeans, and the superior justice of his argument may for the moment attract you; but we are not at law with them, and do not want to be told what is just; we are considering a question of policy, and desire to know how we can turn them to account.

[45] ‘To many offences less than theirs states have affixed the punishment of death; nevertheless, excited by hope, men still risk their lives. No one when venturing on a perilous enterprise ever yet passed a sentence of failure on himself. And what city when entering on a revolt ever imagined that the power which she had, whether her own or obtained from her allies, did not justify the attempt? All are by nature prone to err both in public and in private life, and no law will prevent them. Men have gone through the whole catalogue of penalties in the hope that, by increasing their severity, they may suffer less at the hands of evil-doers. In early ages the punishments, even of the worst offences, would naturally be milder; but as time went on and mankind continued to transgress, they seldom stopped short of death. And still there are transgressors. Some greater terror then has yet to be discovered; certainly death is no deterrent. For poverty inspires necessity with daring; and wealth engenders avarice in pride and insolence; and the various conditions of human life, as they severally fall under the sway of some mighty and fatal power, lure men through their passions to destruction. Desire and hope are never wanting, the one leading, the other following, the one

devising the enterprise, the other suggesting that fortune will be kind; and they are the most ruinous, for, being unseen, they far outweigh the dangers which are seen. Fortune too assists the illusion, for she often presents herself unexpectedly, and induces states as well as individuals to run into peril, however inadequate their means; and states even more than individuals, because they are throwing for a higher stake, freedom or empire, and because when a man has a whole people acting with him, he magnifies himself out of all reason. In a word then, it is impossible and simply absurd to suppose that human nature when bent upon some favourite project can be restrained either by the strength of law or by any other terror.

[46] ‘We ought not therefore to act hastily out of a mistaken reliance on the security which the penalty of death affords. Nor should we drive our rebellious subjects to despair; they must not think that there is no place for repentance, or that they may not at any moment give up their mistaken policy. Consider: at present, although a city may actually have revolted, when she becomes conscious of her weakness she will capitulate while still able to defray the cost of the war and to pay tribute for the future; but if we are too severe, will not the citizens make better preparations, and, when besieged, resist to the last, knowing that it is all the same whether they come to terms early or late? Shall not we ourselves suffer? For we shall waste our money by sitting down before a city which refuses to surrender; when the place is taken it will be a mere wreck, and we shall in future lose the revenues derived from it; and in these revenues lies our military strength. Do not then weigh offences with the severity of a judge, when you will only be injuring yourselves, but have an eye to the future; let the penalties which you impose on rebellious cities be moderate, and then their wealth will be undiminished and at your service. Do not hope to find a safeguard in the severity of your laws, but only in the vigilance of your administration. At present we

do just the opposite; a free people under a strong government will always revolt in the hope of independence; and when we have put them down we think that they cannot be punished too severely. But instead of inflicting extreme penalties on free men who revolt, we should practise extreme vigilance before they revolt, and never allow such a thought to enter their minds. When however they have been once put down we ought to extenuate their crimes as much as possible.

[47] ‘Think of another great error into which you would fall if you listened to Cleon. At present the popular party are everywhere our friends; either they do not join with the oligarchs, or, if compelled to do so, they are always ready to turn against the authors of the revolt; and so in going to war with a rebellious state you have the multitude on your side. But, if you destroy the people of Mytilenè who took no part in the revolt, and who voluntarily surrendered the city as soon as they got arms into their hands; in the first place they were your benefactors, and to slay them would be a crime; in the second place you will play into the hands of the oligarchic parties, who henceforward, in fomenting a revolt, will at once have the people on their side; for you will have proclaimed to all that the innocent and the guilty will share the same fate. Even if they were guilty you should wink at their conduct, and not allow the only friends whom you have left to be converted into enemies. Far more conducive to the maintenance of our empire would it be to suffer wrong willingly, than for the sake of justice to put to death those whom we had better spare. Cleon may speak of a punishment which is just and also expedient, but you will find that, in any proposal like his, the two cannot be combined.

[48] ‘Assured then that what I advise is for the best, and yielding neither to pity nor to lenity, for I am as unwilling as Cleon can be that you should be influenced by any such motives, but simply weighing the arguments which I have

urged, accede to my proposal: Pass sentence at your leisure on the Mytilenaeans whom Paches, deeming them guilty, has sent hither; but leave the rest of the inhabitants where they are. This will be good policy for the future, and will strike present terror into your enemies. For wise counsel is really more formidable to an enemy than the severity of unreasoning violence.’

[49] Thus spoke Diodotus, and such were the proposals on either side which most nearly represented the opposing parties. In spite of the reaction there was a struggle between the two opinions; the show of hands was very near, but the motion of Diodotus prevailed. The Athenians instantly despatched another trireme, hoping that, if the second could overtake the first, which had a start of about twenty-four hours, it might be in time to save the city. The Mytilenaean envoys provided wine and barley for the crew, and promised them great rewards if they arrived first. And such was their energy that they continued rowing whilst they ate their barley, kneaded with wine and oil, and slept and rowed by turns. Fortunately no adverse wind sprang up, and, the first of the two ships sailing in no great hurry on her untoward errand, and the second hastening as I have described, the one did indeed arrive sooner than the other, but not much sooner. Paches had read the decree and was about to put it into execution, when the second appeared and arrested the fate of the city.

So near was Mytilenè to destruction.

[50] The captives whom Paches had sent to Athens as being the most guilty numbered about a thousand, or rather more; these the Athenians, upon the motion of Cleon, put to death. They razed the walls of the Mytilenaeans and took away their fleet. Then, instead of imposing tribute on them, they divided the whole island, exclusive of the territory of Methymna, into three thousand portions, of which they dedicated three hundred to the Gods; the remainder they let out to cleruchi taken from their own citizens, whom they

chose by lot and sent to Lesbos. The Lesbians undertook to pay them a yearly rent of two minae for each portion and cultivated the land themselves. The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the continent which the Mytilenaeans held, and these henceforward were subject to Athens.

Thus ended the revolt of Lesbos.

[51] During the same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos, the Athenians, under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the island of Minoa, which lies in front of Megara; the Megarians had built a fort there and used the island as a military station. But Nicias wanted the Athenians to keep a watch over Megara, not as hitherto from Budorum in Salamis, but from this spot, which was nearer, the Peloponnesians would then be no longer able to send out triremes, as they had already done on one occasion, or privateers from the harbour unobserved, and nothing could be brought in by sea to Megara. First of all he took two projecting towers on the side of the island towards Nisaea by the help of engines from the sea, and, having thus freed a way into the channel dividing Minoa from the coast of Megara, he fortified the point nearest the mainland, where, by a bridge through a lagoon, aid could be brought by the enemy to the island, lying as it did at that point close to the shore. The work was completed in a few days. Nicias then proceeded to build a fort on the island, and, leaving a garrison, returned with the rest of his army.

[52] In this summer and about the same time the Plataeans, who had exhausted their food and could no longer hold out, capitulated to the Peloponnesians. The enemy had assaulted their wall and they were unable to defend themselves. But the Lacedaemonian commander knew their weakness, and was desirous that the place should be surrendered and not stormed; he had instructions from home to this effect, the intention being that if some day a treaty of peace were concluded, and both parties agreed to give up all the places

which they had taken by force of arms, Plataea might be excepted on the ground that the inhabitants had come to terms of their own accord. So he sent a herald to enquire whether they would surrender the place to the Lacedaemonians and submit to their decision; the guilty were to be punished, but no one without a just cause. The Plataeans, now in the last stage of weakness, surrendered the city; and for a few days, until the five men who were appointed judges came from Lacedaemon, the Peloponnesians supplied them with food. On the arrival of the judges no accusation was brought against them; they were simply asked one by one, Whether they had done any kind of service to the Lacedaemonians or to their allies in the present war. Before making their reply they requested leave to speak at length, and appointed two of their number, Astymachus the son of Asopolaus, and Lacon the son of Aeimnestus, who was the Lacedaemonian proxenus, to be their advocates. They came forward and spoke as follows: —

[53] ‘Men of Lacedaemon, we surrendered our city because we had confidence in you; we were under the impression that the trial to which we submitted would be legal, and of a very different kind from this; and when we accepted you and you alone to be our judges, which indeed you are, we thought that at your hands we had the best hope of obtaining justice. But we fear that we are doubly mistaken, having too much reason to suspect that in this trial our lives are at stake, and that you will turn out to be partial judges. So we must infer, because no accusation has been preferred against us calling for a defence, but we speak at our own request; and because your question is a short one, to which the answer, if true, condemns us, and, if false, is exposed at once. In the extremity of our helplessness, our only and our safest course is to say something, whatever may be our fate; for men in our condition are sure to reproach themselves with their silence, and to fancy that the unuttered word, if spoken, would have saved them.

‘But by what arguments can we ever convince you? If we were unacquainted with one another we might with advantage adduce in evidence matters of which you were ignorant, but now you know all that we can say; and we are afraid, not that we are criminals in your eyes because you have decided that we fall short of your own standard of virtue, but that we are being sacrificed to please others, and that the cause which we plead is already prejudged.

[54] ‘Still we may urge our claims of justice against our Theban enemies, and our claims of gratitude upon you and the other Hellenes; the recollection of our good deeds may perhaps move you. To your short question, “Whether in this war we have done any service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies,” we reply that “if we are enemies you are not wronged, because you have received no good from us; and if you deem us friends, you who have made war upon us, and not we, are to blame.” During the late peace and in the Persian War our conduct was irreproachable; we were not the first to violate the peace, and we were the only Boeotians who took part in repelling the Persian invader and in the liberation of Hellas. Although we are an inland city, we joined in the sea-fight off Artemisium; we were at your side when you fought in our land under Pausanias, and, whatever dangers the Hellenes underwent in those days, we took a share beyond our strength in all of them. And you, Lacedaemonians, more especially should remember how at the time when Sparta was panic-stricken by the rebellion of the Helots, who seized Ithomè after the earthquake, we sent a third part of our own citizens to your aid; these are things not to be forgotten.

[55] ‘Such was the spirit which animated us in the great days of old; not until later did we become your enemies, and that was originally your own fault. For when we sought your help against the violence of the Thebans, you had rejected us and had bade us turn to the Athenians, who were near, whereas you were at a distance. Yet even in this war you

have neither suffered nor were ever likely to suffer anything very atrocious at our hands. If we refused to revolt from the Athenians at your bidding, we were quite right; for they assisted us against the Thebans when you shrank from the task; and after this it would have been dishonourable to betray them. They had been our benefactors; we had been at our own request admitted to their alliance, and we shared the rights of citizenship with them. How could we refuse to respond loyally to their call? When you or they in the exercise of your supremacy have acted, it may be, wrongly and led your allies into evil courses, the leaders and not the followers are to be blamed.

[56] ‘The Thebans have inflicted many injuries upon us, and their latest crime, as you are well aware, is the cause of our present misfortunes. They came not only in time of peace, but at a holy season and attempted to seize our city; we righteously and in accordance with univeral law defended ourselves and punished the aggressor; and there is no reason why we should now suffer for their satisfaction. If you take your own present advantage and their present hatred to be the measure of justice, you will prove yourselves, not upright and impartial judges, but the slaves of expediency. The Thebans may appear serviceable now, but of far greater service to you were we and the other Hellenes when you were in far greater danger. For now you invade and menace others, but in those days the Barbarian was threatening to enslave us all, and they were on his side. May we not fairly set our former patriotism against our present offence, if indeed we have offended? You will find that the one more than outweighs the other; for our service to you was performed at a time when very few Hellenes opposed their courage to the power of Xerxes; they were then held in honour, not who, looking to their own advantage, made terms with the invader and were safe, but who, in the face of danger, dared the better part. Of that number were we, and there was a time when we received the highest honour at

your hands, but now we fear that these same principles, which have led us to prefer a just alliance with the Athenians to an interested alliance with you, will be our destruction. Yet when men have been consistent in their conduct, others should show themselves consistent in their judgment of it. For true expediency is only this — to have an enduring sense of gratitude towards good allies for their services, while we do not neglect our own immediate interest.

[57] ‘Consider, before you act, that hitherto you have been generally esteemed among Hellenes to be a pattern of nobility; if you decide unjustly (and this judgment cannot be hidden, for you, the judges, are famous, and we, who are judged by you, are of good repute), mankind will be indignant at the strange and disgraceful sentence which will have been passed against good men by men still better. They will not endure to see spoils taken from us, the benefactors of Hellas, dedicated by our enemies in the common temples. Will it not be deemed a monstrous thing that the Lacedaemonians should desolate Plataea; that they, whose fathers inscribed the name of the city on the tripod at Delphi in token of her valour, should for the sake of the Thebans blot out the whole people from the Hellenic world? For to this we have come at last. When the Persians conquered our land, we were all but ruined; and now, when we plead before you, who were once our dearest friends, the Thebans have prevailed against us. We have had to meet two terrible trials, the danger first of starvation, if we had not given up the city; and secondly, of condemnation to death. The Plataeans, who were zealous in the cause of Hellas even beyond their strength, are now friendless, spurned and rejected by all. None of our old allies will help us, and we fear that you, O Lacedaemonians, our only hope, are not to be depended upon.

[58] ‘Yet once more for the sake of those Gods in whose name we made a league of old, and for our services to the cause of

Hellas, relent and change your minds, if the Thebans have at all influenced you: in return for the wicked request which they make of you, ask of them the righteous boon that you should not slay us to your own dishonour. Do not bring upon yourselves an evil name merely to gratify others. For, although you may quickly take our lives, you will not so easily obliterate the infamy of the deed. We are not enemies whom you might justly punish, but friends who were compelled to go to war with you; and therefore piety demands that you should spare our lives. Before you pass judgment, consider that we surrendered ourselves, and stretched out our hands to you; the custom of Hellas does not allow the suppliant to be put to death. Remember too that we have ever been your benefactors: Cast your eyes upon the sepulchres of your fathers slain by the Persians and buried in our land, whom we have honoured by a yearly public offering of garments, and other customary gifts. We were their friends, and we gave them the first fruits in their season of that friendly land in which they rest; we were their allies too, who in times past had fought at their side; and if you now pass an unjust sentence, will not your conduct strangely contrast with ours? Reflect: when Pausanias buried them here, he thought that he was laying them among friends and in friendly earth. But if you put us to death, and make Plataea one with Thebes, are you not robbing your fathers and kindred of the honour which they enjoy, and leaving them in a hostile land inhabited by their murderers? Nay more, you will enslave the land in which the Hellenes won their liberty; you bring desolation upon the temples in which they prayed when they conquered the Persians; and you will take away the sacrifices which our fathers instituted from the city which ordained and established them.

[59] ‘These things, O Lacedaemonians, would not be for your honour. They would be an offence against the common feeling of Hellas and against your ancestors. You should be ashamed to put us to death, who are your benefactors and

have never done you any wrong, in order that you may gratify the enmity of another. Spare us, and let your heart be softened towards us; be wise, and have mercy upon us, considering not only how terrible will be our fate, but who the sufferers are; think too of the uncertainty of fortune, which may strike any one how ever innocent. We implore you, as is becoming and natural in our hour of need, by the Gods whom the Hellenes worship at common altars, to listen to our prayers. We appeal to the oaths which your fathers swore, and entreat you not to forget them. We kneel at your fathers' tombs, and we call upon the dead not to let us be betrayed into the hands of the Thebans, their dearest friends to their bitterest enemies. We remind you of the day on which we shared in their glorious deeds — we who on this day are in danger of meeting a fearful doom. And now we say no more; to men in our case, though we must, there is nothing harder than to make an end; for with the end comes the decisive hour. Our last word is that we did not surrender Plataea to the Thebans, — far rather would we have perished from hunger, the most miserable of deaths, — but to you, in whom we trusted, and, if you will not listen to us, you ought at least to replace us in the same position, and allow us to choose our destiny, whatever it may be. We adjure you not to deliver us, the Plataeans, who were so loyal to the cause of Hellas, and who are now suppliants to you, O Lacedaemonians, out of your own hands and your own good faith, into the hands of the Thebans, our worst enemies. Be our saviours. You are liberating the other Hellenes; do not destroy us.'

[60] Such were the words of the Plataeans; whereupon the Thebans, fearing that the Lacedaemonians might give way, came forward and said that since, against their judgment, the Plataeans had been allowed, instead of answering the question, to make a long defence, they too wished to speak. Permission was granted, and they spoke as follows:

[61] ‘We should never have asked to speak, if the Plataeans had briefly answered the question which was put to them, and had not turned upon us and arraigned us while they made a long and irrelevant defence of their own doings, excusing themselves from charges which nobody brought against them, and praising what nobody blamed. We must answer their accusations of us, and look a little closely into their glorification of themselves, that neither our baseness nor their superior reputation may benefit them, and that, before you judge, you may hear the truth both about us and them. Our quarrel with them arose thus: — Some time after our first occupation of Boeotia we settled Plataea and other places, out of which we drove a mixed multitude. But the Plataeans refused to acknowledge our leadership according to the original agreement, and, separating themselves from the other Boeotians, deserted the traditions of their ancestors. When force was applied to them they went over to the Athenians, and, assisted by them, did us a great deal of mischief; and we retaliated.

[62] ‘They say that when the Barbarian invaded Hellas they were the only Boeotians who did not join the Persian; and this is their great glory, and our great reproach. But we say that if they did not side with Persians, it was only because the Athenians did not; and on the same principle, they alone of all the Boeotians afterwards sided with the Athenians when the liberties of Hellas were attacked by them. But, consider how different were the circumstances in which we and they acted. In those days our state was not governed by an oligarchy which granted equal justice to all, nor yet by a democracy; the power was in the hands of a small cabal, than which nothing is more opposed to law or to true political order, or more nearly resembles a tyranny. The rulers of the state, hoping to strengthen their private interest if the Persian won, kept the people down and brought him in. The city at large, when she acted thus, was not her own mistress; and she cannot be fairly blamed for an

error which she committed when she had no constitution. After the Persian departed and she obtained a constitution, you may see how we fought against the Athenians when they became aggressive and endeavoured to subjugate us as well as the rest of Hellas. Owing to our divisions they actually conquered the greater part of the country; but we defeated them at Coronea, and liberated Boeotia; and at this moment we are zealously co-operating in the liberation of Hellas, providing cavalry and munitions of war more largely than any of the allies. Thus much in answer to the charge respecting our Persian tendencies.

[63] ‘And now we will proceed to show that you, and not we, have done the greater wrong to Hellas, and are deserving of every sort of punishment. You say that you became allies and citizens of Athens in order that you might be protected against us. If so, you ought to have invited their aid only against us, and not to have assisted them in their attacks upon others; such a course was certainly open to you: even if you had been in some degree constrained against your will by the Athenians, you had previously made the alliance with the Lacedaemonians against the Persians, to which you are so fond of appealing. That alliance would at any rate have restrained our hands, and above all would have secured to you freedom of deliberation. But you acted willingly, and were no longer under compulsion when you made common cause with the Athenians. Your allegation is that they were your benefactors and that you could not honourably betray them; but how far more dishonourable and wicked to betray all the Hellenes with whom you had sworn alliance, than the Athenians only, the one the liberators, the other the enslavers of Hellas! The return which you made to them is unequal, nay, infamous; you say that you invited them to assist you because you were wronged, and then you became their accomplices in wronging others. Surely ingratitude is shown in refusing to return an honourable kindness, when it

can be done honourably, not in refusing to return a kindness which, however justly due, cannot be repaid without a crime.

[64] ‘You have thus made it plain that, when you alone among the Boeotians refused to join the Persian cause, this was not out of any love for Hellas, but because the Athenians did not; and that you wanted to act with them and not with us; and now you claim the benefit of the virtue which others inspired in you. But this is not reasonable; having once chosen the Athenians, fight on their side, and do not at the last moment be saying that the old alliance ought to save you. For you have abandoned it, and by the violation of it, instead of striving to prevent, have aided in the enslavement of the Aeginetans and of other members of the alliance. And you were not, like us, under compulsion, but free, living under your ancient laws. Moreover, you persisted in refusing that last offer of peace and neutrality which we made to you before the siege began. Who more thoroughly than you deserve the hatred of the Hellenes? than you who have only displayed your virtues to their injury? You have given proof that the merit which you claim for your former actions does not properly belong to you! Your true nature and constant desire are now revealed in the light of day; for you have followed the Athenians in the path of injustice. Thus much we have to say as to our involuntary dealings with the Persians, and your voluntary dealings with the Athenians.

[65] ‘The last offence which you lay to our charge is that we unlawfully assailed your city in time of peace, and at a holy season; even in that affair we do not think ourselves more in fault than you. We do not deny that we were wrong if of our own mere motion we went to your city, fought with you, and ravaged your land. But when certain of the noblest and richest of your citizens, who wished to withdraw you from a foreign alliance and to bring you back to the national institutions of Boeotia, came and invited us, wherein are we to blame? As you say yourselves, the leaders rather than the

followers are the transgressors. But in our opinion, neither we nor they were really guilty. Like yourselves they were citizens, and they had a greater stake in the country than you have; they opened their own gates and received us into their native city, not as her enemies but as her friends. They desired that the bad among you should not grow worse, and that the good should have their reward. They wanted to reform the principles of your citizens, and not to banish their persons; they would have brought them back into a natural union with their kindred, that Plataea might be at peace with all and the enemy of none.

[66] ‘And the proof that we acted in no hostile spirit is that we did no harm to any one, but made a proclamation that whoever wished to live under the national institutions of Boeotia should join us. You came to us gladly, and, entering into an agreement, for a time offered no opposition; but afterwards, when you discovered that we were few, you turned upon us. Even allowing that we did act somewhat inconsiderately in entering your town without the consent of your whole people, still how different was your conduct and ours! For if you had followed our example you would have used no violence, but thought only of getting us out by persuasion, whereas you broke the agreement and attacked us. Now we do not so much complain of the fate of those whom you slew in battle — for they indeed suffered by a kind of law — but there were others who stretched out their hands to you; and although you gave them quarter, and then promised to us that you would spare them, in utter defiance of law you took their lives — was not that a cruel act? Here are three crimes which you committed within a few hours; the breach of the agreement, the slaughter of the prisoners which followed, and the lying promise which you made to us that you would not slay them if we did no injury to your property in the fields; and yet you insist that we are the criminals, and that you ought to be acquitted. Not so; if

the Lacedaemonians give just judgment: but for all these offences you shall suffer.

[67] ‘We have entered into particulars, Lacedaemonians, both for your sakes and for our own, that you may know the sentence which you are going to pass on them to be just, and still more righteous the vengeance which we have taken. Do not let your hearts be softened by tales about their ancient virtues, if they had any; such virtues might plead for the injured, but should bring a double penalty on the authors of a base deed, because they are false to their own character. Let them gain nothing by their pitiful lamentations, or by appealing to your fathers’ tombs and their own desolate condition. We tell you that a far sadder fate was inflicted by them on our murdered youth, of whose fathers some fell at Coronea in the act of bringing Boeotia to join you, while others are left in their old age by their solitary hearths, and entreat you, with far better reason, to punish the Plataeans. Men who suffer an unworthy fate are indeed to be pitied, but there should be joy over those who suffer justly, as these do. For their present desolation they may thank themselves; they might have chosen the worthier alliance, but they wilfully renounced it. They sinned against us though we had never injured them; the spirit of hatred and not of justice possessed them, and even now they are not punished half enough. For they are going to suffer by a lawful sentence, not, as they pretend, stretching out their suppliant hands on the field of battle, but delivering themselves up to justice under the terms of a capitulation. Maintain then, Lacedaemonians, the common Hellenic law which they have outraged, and give to us, who have suffered contrary to law, the just recompense of our zeal in your cause. Do not be moved by their words to spurn and reject us, but show Hellas by example that, when a cause is tried at your tribunal, deeds and not words will prevail. If the deeds be good, a brief statement of them is enough; if they be evil, speeches full of fine sentiments do but veil them. If

all persons in authority were like you, and would sum up a case in a short question, and pass sentence upon all the offenders at once, men would be less tempted to seek out fair words in order to excuse foul deeds.’

[68] Thus spoke the Thebans. The Lacedaemonian judges thought that no objection could be made to their question, whether the Plataeans had done them any service in the war. For they pretended to have expected neutrality from them in the times before the war, on the strength of the original treaty concluded with Pausanias after the defeat of the Persians. And just before the siege they had made to them a proposal of neutrality in accordance with the terms of the same treaty; but the Plataeans had refused. Considering that they had been wronged by them, after their own fair proposals had released them from the obligations of the treaty, they again brought up the Plataeans one after another, and asked each of them separately, Whether he had done any service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the war? When he said No, they took him away and slew him; no one was spared. They put to death not less than two hundred Plataeans, as well as twenty-five Athenians who had shared with them in the siege; and made slaves of the women. For about a year the Thebans gave possession of the city to certain Megarians, who had been driven out by a revolution, and to any surviving Plataeans who were of their own party; but they afterwards razed the whole place to the very foundations, and built near the precinct of Herè an inn forming a square of two hundred feet; it had two stories, and chambers all round. They used the roofs and the doors of the Plataeans; and of the brass and iron articles of furniture found within the walls they made couches, which they dedicated to Herè; they also built in her honour a stone temple a hundred feet long. The Plataean territory they converted into public land, and let it out for terms of ten years; some of their own citizens occupied it. Throughout

the whole affair the severity shown by the Lacedaemonians to the Plataeans was mainly promoted by a desire to gratify the Thebans, who seemed likely to be useful allies to them in the war then just beginning. Such was the fate of Plataea, which was overthrown in the ninety-third year after the Plataeans entered into alliance with Athens.

[69] The forty Peloponnesian ships which had been sent to the aid of Lesbos, as they fled through the open sea pursued bythe Athenians, were caught in a storm near Crete, and, making their way in a straggling condition from Crete to the Peloponnesus, found at Cyllene thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot triremes, and Brasidas the son of Tellis, who had been sent out as a commissioner to advise Alcidas. The Lacedaemonians at home, after the failure of their attempt on Lesbos, had determined to increase their navy and sail to Corcyra, which was in a state of revolution. The Athenian squadron at Naupactus consisted of twelve ships only, and the Lacedaemonians wanted to reach the island before any more vessels could arrive from Athens. Brasidas and Alcidas made their preparations accordingly.

[70] Now Corcyra had been in an unsettled state ever since the return of the prisoners who were taken at sea in the Epidamnian war, and afterwards released by the Corinthians. They were nominally let out on bail for a sum of eight hundred talents on the security of their proxeni, but in reality they had been induced to try and gain over Corcyra to the Corinthian interest. They went from one citizen to another, and did their best with them to bring about a revolt from Athens. On the arrival of an Athenian and also of a Corinthian vessel conveying ambassadors, there was a discussion in the assembly, and the Corcyraeans voted that they would continue allies of Athens according to their agreement, but would renew their former friendship with the Peloponnesians. A certain Peithias, who voluntarily acted as the proxenus of the Athenians and was the popular leader, was summoned by the partisans of the Peloponnesians to

take his trial, they affirming that he wanted to bring Corcyra under the yoke of Athens. He was acquitted, and then he in turn summoned their five richest men, declaring that they were in the habit of cutting poles for vines in the sacred precinct of Zeus and Alcinous; now for each pole the penalty was fixed at a stater. They were condemned; but the fine was so excessive that they went and sat as suppliants in the temple of Zeus and Alcinous, begging that they might pay the money by instalments. Peithias, who happened to be a member of the senate as well as the popular leader, persuaded the senators to put the law in execution. The culprits, knowing that the law was against them, and perceiving that Peithias as long as he remained in the senate would try to induce the people to make an alliance offensive and defensive with Athens, conspired together, and, rushing into the council chamber with daggers in their hands, slew him and others to the number of sixty, as well private persons as senators. A few who were of the same party with him took refuge in the Athenian trireme, which had not yet left.

[71] The next step taken by the conspirators was to assemble the people and tell them that they had acted for the best, and in order to secure them against the tyranny of Athens. For the future they should receive neither Athenians nor Peloponnesians, unless they came peaceably with one ship; to bring more should be deemed the act of an enemy; and this proposal they compelled the people to ratify. They also sent envoys to Athens, who were to put the most favourable colour on the affair, and to dissuade the refugees who had fled thither from taking any inconvenient step which might lead to a counter-revolution.

[72] When the envoys arrived, the Athenians arrested them as disturbers of the peace, and deposited them in Aegina, together with any of the refugees whom they had gained over. In the meantime, the Corcyraean oligarchs who were now in power, on the arrival of a Corinthian trireme and

Lacedaemonian envoys, attacked and defeated the people, who at nightfall took refuge in the Acropolis and the higher parts of the city, and there concentrated their forces. They also held the Hyllaic harbour; the other party seized the Agora, where most of them lived, and the adjacent harbour which looked towards the continent.

[73] On the following day they skirmished a little, and both parties sent messengers round the country inviting the slaves to join them, and promising them liberty; the greater number came to the aid of the people, while the other faction was reinforced by eight hundred auxiliaries from the mainland.

[74] After resting a day they fought again, and the people, who had the advantage in numbers and in the strength of their positions, gained the victory. Their women joined vigorously in the fray, hurling tiles from the housetops, and showing amid the uproar a fortitude beyond their sex. The conflict was decided towards evening; the oligarchy, fearing lest the people should take the arsenal with a sudden rush and so make an end of them, set fire to the private houses which surrounded the Agora, as well as to the larger blocks of buildings, sparing neither their own property nor that of any one else in their determination to stop them. Much merchandise was burnt, and the whole city would have been destroyed if the wind had carried the flame in that direction. Both parties now left off fighting, and kept watch in their own positions during the night. When the popular cause triumphed, the Corinthian vessel stole away and most of the auxiliaries crossed over unobserved to the continent.

[75] On the following day, Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes, an Athenian general, arrived from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian hoplites. He tried to effect a reconciliation between the two parties, and on his suggestion they agreed to bring to trial ten of the most guilty persons, who immediately fled. The rest were to live together, and to make peace with one another, and with

Athens an alliance offensive and defensive. Having accomplished his purpose he was about to sail away, when the leaders of the people induced him to leave five of his own vessels, that the enemy might be less inclined to stir, promising to man five ships of their own and send them with him. He agreed, and they selected the crews of the ships out of the opposite faction. But the men were afraid of being sent to Athens, and sat as suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri. Nicostratus sought to raise them up and reassure them, but they would not trust him; whereupon the people armed themselves, arguing that their mistrust and unwillingness to sail was a proof of their evil designs. They took their enemies' arms out of their houses, and some of them whom they chanced to meet would have been slain if Nicostratus had not interfered. The rest, to the number of about four hundred, when they saw what was going on, took refuge afresh in the temple of Herè. But the people, fearing that they would resort to violence, persuaded them to rise and conveyed them at once to the island that lies in front of the temple of Herè, whither provisions were regularly sent to them.

[76] At this stage of the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after the suppliants had been conveyed to the island, the Peloponnesian ships from Cyllene, which since the expedition to Ionia had been in harbour there, arrived on the scene, fifty-three in number, still under the command of Alcidas. Brasidas his adviser was on board. They anchored for the night at Sybota, a harbour on the mainland, and when the morning broke they sailed upon Corcyra.

[77] The whole place was in an uproar; the people dreaded their enemies within the city no less than the Peloponnesian fleet. They hastened to equip sixty ships, and as fast as they were manned sent them out against the Peloponnesians, although the Athenians entreated to be allowed to sail out first, leaving them to follow as soon as they had got their fleet together. But when in this straggling fashion their ships

approached the enemy, two of them at once deserted; in others the crews were fighting with one another, and everything was in disorder. The Peloponnesians, seeing the confusion, employed twenty ships only against the Corcyraeans, and opposed the remainder of their fleet to the twelve Athenian ships, of which two were the Salaminia and Paralus.

[78] The Corcyraeans, coming up few at a time and in this disorderly fashion, had trouble enough among themselves. The Athenians, afraid of being surrounded by superior numbers, did not attack the main body nor the centre of those opposed to them, but fell upon the wings and sank a single ship; then, the enemy forming in a circle, they sailed round them and endeavoured to throw them into confusion. But those who were opposed to the Corcyraeans, seeing this movement and fearing a repetition of what happened at Naupactus, came to the rescue, and the united fleet charged the Athenians. Thereupon they rowed astern, hoping that by retreating very leisurely they might give the Corcyraeans time to escape, especially as the attack of the enemy was now directed against themselves. The naval engagement ended at sunset.

[79] The Corcyraeans, who were afraid that the victorious enemy would sail to the city and have recourse to some decisive measure, such as taking on board the prisoners in the island, conveyed them back to the temple of Herè and guarded the city. But the Peloponnesians, although they had won the battle, did not venture to attack the city, but returned to their station on the mainland with thirteen Corcyraean ships which they had taken. On the next day they still hesitated, although there was great panic and confusion among the inhabitants. It is said that Brasidas advised Alcidas to make the attempt, but he had not an equal vote with him. So they only disembarked at the promontory of Leucimnè and ravaged the country.

[80] Meanwhile the people of Corcyra, dreading that the fleet of the Peloponnesians would attack them, held a parley with the other faction, especially with the suppliants, in the hope of saving the city; they even persuaded some of them to go on board the fleet; for the Corcyraeans still contrived to man thirty ships. But the Peloponnesians, after devastating the land till about midday, retired. And at nightfall the approach of sixty Athenian vessels was signalled to them from Leucas. These had been sent by the Athenians under the command of Eurymedon the son of Thucles, when they heard of the revolution and of the intended expedition of Alcidas to Corcyra.

[81] The Peloponnesians set out that very night on their way home, keeping close to the land, and transporting the ships over the Leucadian isthmus, that they might not be seen sailing round. When the Corcyraeans perceived that the Athenian fleet was appoaching, while that of the enemy had disappeared, they took the Messenian troops, who had hitherto been outside the walls, into the city, and ordered the ships which they had manned to sail round into the Hyllaic harbour. These proceeded on their way. Meanwhile they killed any of their enemies whom they caught in the city. On the arrival of the ships they disembarked those whom they had induced to go on board, and despatched them; they also went to the temple of Herè, and persuading about fifty of the suppliants to stand their trial condemned them all to death. The majority would not come out, and, when they saw what was going on, destroyed one another in the enclosure of the temple where they were, except a few who hung themselves on trees, or put an end to their own lives in any other way which they could. And, during the seven days which Eurymedon after his arrival remained with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans continued slaughtering those of their fellow-citizens whom they deemed their enemies; they professed to punish them for their designs against the democracy, but in fact some were killed from

motives of personal enmity, and some because money was owing to them, by the hands of their debtors. Every form of death was to be seen; and everything, and more than everything, that commonly happens in revolutions, happened then. The father slew the son, and the suppliants were torn from the temples and slain near them; some of them were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus, and there perished. To such extremes of cruelty did revolution go; and this seemed to be the worst of revolutions, because it was the first.

[82] For not long afterwards nearly the whole Hellenic world was in commotion; in every city the chiefs of the democracy and of the oligarchy were struggling, the one to bring in the Athenians, the other the Lacedaemonians. Now in time of peace, men would have had no excuse for introducing either, and no desire to do so; but, when they were at war, the introduction of a foreign alliance on one side or the other to the hurt of their enemies and the advantage of themselves was easily effected by the dissatisfied party. And revolution brought upon the cities of Hellas many terrible calamities, such as have been and always will be while human nature remains the same, but which are more or less aggravated and differ in character with every new combination of circumstances. In peace and prosperity both states and individuals are actuated by higher motives, because they do not fall under the dominion of imperious necessities; but war, which takes away the comfortable provision of daily life, is a hard master and tends to assimilate men’s characters to their conditions.

When troubles had once begun in the cities, those who followed carried the revolutionary spirit further and further, and determined to outdo the report of all who had preceded them by the ingenuity of their enterprises and the atrocity of their revenges. The meaning of words had no longer the same relation to things, but was changed by them as they thought proper. Reckless daring was held to be loyal

courage; prudent delay was the excuse of a coward; moderation was the disguise of unmanly weakness; to know everything was to do nothing. Frantic energy was the true quality of a man. A conspirator who wanted to be safe was a recreant in disguise. The lover of violence was always trusted, and his opponent suspected. He who succeeded in a plot was deemed knowing, but a still greater master in craft was he who detected one. On the other hand, he who plotted from the first to have nothing to do with plots was a breaker up of parties and a poltroon who was afraid of the enemy. In a word, he who could outstrip another in a bad action was applauded, and so was he who encouraged to evil one who had no idea of it. The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood, because a partisan was more ready to dare without asking why. (For party associations are not based upon any established law, nor do they seek the public good; they are formed in defiance of the laws and from self-interest.) The seal of good faith was not divine law, but fellowship in crime. If an enemy when he was in the ascendant offered fair words, the opposite party received them not in a generous spirit, but by a jealous watchfulness of his actions. Revenge was dearer than self-preservation. Any agreements sworn to by either party, when they could do nothing else, were binding as long as both were powerless. But he who on a favourable opportunity first took courage, and struck at his enemy when he saw him off his guard, had greater pleasure in a perfidious than he would have had in an open act of revenge; he congratulated himself that he had taken the safer course, and also that he had overreached his enemy and gained the prize of superior ability. In general the dishonest more easily gain credit for cleverness than the simple for goodness; men take a pride in the one, but are ashamed of the other.

The cause of all these evils was the love of power, originating in avarice and ambition, and the party-spirit which is engendered by them when men are fairly embarked

in a contest. For the leaders on either side used specious names, the one party professing to uphold the constitutional equality of the many, the other the wisdom of an aristocracy, while they made the public interests, to which in name they were devoted, in reality their prize. Striving in every way to overcome each other, they committed the most monstrous crimes; yet even these were surpassed by the magnitude of their revenges which they pursued to the very utmost, neither party observing any definite limits either of justice or public expediency, but both alike making the caprice of the moment their law. Either by the help of an unrighteous sentence, or grasping power with the strong hand, they were eager to satiate the impatience of party-spirit. Neither faction cared for religion; but any fair pretence which succeeded in effecting some odious purpose was greatly lauded. And the citizens who were of neither party fell a prey to both; either they were disliked because they held aloof, or men were jealous of their surviving.

[83] Thus revolution gave birth to every form of wickedness in Hellas. The simplicity which is so large an element in a noble nature was laughed to scorn and disappeared. An attitude of perfidious antagonism everywhere prevailed; for there was no word binding enough, nor oath terrible enough to reconcile enemies. Each man was strong only in the conviction that nothing was secure; he must look to his own safety, and could not afford to trust others. Inferior intellects generally succeeded best. For, aware of their own deficiencies, and fearing the capacity of their opponents, for whom they were no match in powers of speech, and whose subtle wits were likely to anticipate them in contriving evil, they struck boldly and at once. But the cleverer sort, presuming in their arrogance that they would be aware in time, and disdaining to act when they could think, were taken off their guard and easily destroyed.

[84] Now in Corcyra most of these deeds were perpetrated, and for the first time. There was every crime which men

could commit in revenge who had been governed not wisely, but tyrannically, and now had the oppressor at their mercy. There were the dishonest designs of others who were longing to be relieved from their habitual poverty, and were naturally animated by a passionate desire for their neighbour’s goods; and there were crimes of another class which men commit, not from covetousness, but from the enmity which equals foster towards one another until they are carried away by their blind rage into the extremes of pitiless cruelty. At such a time the life of the city was all in disorder, and human nature, which is always ready to transgress the laws, having now trampled them underfoot, delighted to show that her passions were ungovernable, that she was stronger than justice, and the enemy of everything above her. If malignity had not exercised a fatal power, how could any one have preferred revenge to piety, and gain to innocence? But, when men are retaliating upon others, they are reckless of the future, and do not hesitate to annul those common laws of humanity to which every individual trusts for his own hope of deliverance should he ever be overtaken by calamity; they forget that in their own hour of need they will look for them in vain.

[85] Such were the passions which the citizens of Corcyra first of all Hellenes displayed towards one another. After the departure of Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet the surviving oligarchs, who to the number of five hundred had escaped, seized certain forts on the mainland, and thus became masters of the territory on the opposite coast which belonged to Corcyra. Thence issuing forth, they plundered the Corcyraeans in the island, and did much harm, so that there was a great famine in the city. They also sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon and Corinth, begging that they might be restored, but, failing of their object, they procured boats and auxiliaries, and passed over to Corcyra about six hundred in all; then, burning their boats, that they might have no hope but in the conquest of the island, they went

into Mount Istonè, and building a fort there, became masters of the country to the ruin of the inhabitants of the city.

[86] At the end of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships to Sicily under the command of Laches the son of Melanopus, and Charoeades the son of Euphiletus. Syracuse and Leontini were now at war with one another. All the Dorian cities, except Camarina, were in alliance with Syracuse; they were the same which at the beginning of the war were reckoned in the Lacedaemonian confederacy, but they had taken no active part. The allies of the Leontines were the Chalcidian cities and Camarina. In Italy the Locrians sided with the Syracusans, and the Rhegians with the Leontines, who were their kinsmen. The Leontines and their allies sent to Athens, and on the ground, partly of an old alliance, partly of their Ionian descent, begged the Athenians to send them ships, for they were driven off both sea and land by their Syracusan enemies. The Athenians sent the ships, professedly on the ground of relationship, but in reality because they did not wish the Peloponnesians to obtain corn from Sicily. Moreover they meant to try what prospect they had of getting the affairs of Sicily into their hands. So the commanders of the fleet came to Rhegium in Italy, where they established themselves, and carried on the war in concert with their allies. Thus the summer ended.

[87] In the following winter the plague, which had never entirely disappeared, although abating for a time, again attacked the Athenians. It continued on this second occasion not less than a year, having previously lasted for two years. To the power of Athens certainly nothing was more ruinous; not less than four thousand four hundred Athenian hoplites who were on the roll died, and also three hundred horsemen; how many of the common people could never be ascertained. This too was the time when the frequent earthquakes occurred at Athens, in Euboea, and in Boeotia, especially at Orchomenos.

[88] During the same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty ships against the islands of Aeolus, as they are called, which in summer time cannot be attacked owing to the want of water. These islands belong to the Liparaeans, who are colonists of the Cnidians: they inhabit one of them, which is not large, and is called Lipara; from this they go and cultivate the rest, Didymè, Strongylè, and Hiera. The inhabitants believe that the forge of Hephaestus is in Hiera, because the island sends up a blaze of fire in the night-time and clouds of smoke by day. The Aeolian islands lie off the territory of the Sicels and Messenians; they were in alliance with Syracuse. The Athenians wasted the country, but finding that the inhabitants would not yield, sailed back to Rhegium. And so ended the winter, and with it the fifth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

[89] In the ensuing summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, came as far as the isthmus. They intended to invade Attica, but were deterred from proceeding by numerous earthquakes, and no invasion took place in this year. About the time when these earthquakes prevailed, the sea at Orobiae in Euboea, retiring from what was then the line of coast and rising in a great wave, overflowed a part of the city; and although it subsided in some places, yet in others the inundation was permanent, and that which was formerly land is now sea. All the people who could not escape to the high ground perished. A similar inundation occurred in the neighbourhood of Atalantè, an island on the coast of the Opuntian Locri, which carried away a part of the Athenian fort, and dashed in pieces one of two ships which were drawn up on the beach. At Peparethus also the sea retired, but no inundation followed; an earthquake, however, overthrew a part of the wall, the Prytaneum, and a few houses. I conceive that, where the force of the earthquake was greatest, the sea was driven

back, and the suddenness of the recoil made the inundation more violent; and I am of opinion that this was the cause of the phenomenon, which would never have taken place if there had been no earthquake.

[90] During the same summer war was going on in various parts of Sicily, the Hellenes in Sicily fighting against one another, the Athenians helping their own allies. I will mention the chief actions in which the Athenians took part, whether by the help of their allies attacking, or attacked by their enemies. Charoeades, the Athenian general, had been killed in battle by the Syracusans, and, Laches having taken the entire command of the fleet, he and the allies made an expedition against Mylae, a town belonging to Messenè. Two tribes of the Messenians were keeping guard there, and they had set an ambuscade for the force which they were expecting to land; but the Athenians and their allies put to flight with heavy loss the troops which came out of the ambush. Then, attacking the fortress, they compelled its defenders to come to terms, surrender the citadel, and march with them against Messenè. Finally, upon the approach of the Athenians and their allies, the Messenians themselves came to terms, giving hostages and the other pledges which were required of them.

[91] In the same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round the Peloponnese under the command of Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, and Procles the son of Theodorus. They also sent sixty ships and two thousand hoplites to Melos, under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus, wishing to subdue the Melians, who, although they were islanders, resisted them and would not join their alliance. So they ravaged their country, but finding that the Melians would not yield, they sailed away to Oropus, opposite Euboea. There they put in at nightfall, and the hoplites disembarking went at once by land to Tanagra in Boeotia. Meanwhile the entire Athenian force, under the command of Hipponicus the son of Callias, and Eurymedon the son of

Thucles, upon a signal given marched to meet them at the same spot. There they encamped, and all together devastated the country, remaining at Tanagra during that day and the following night. On the morrow they defeated the Tanagraeans who sallied out upon them, and also some Thebans who had come to their aid; they then took up the arms of the slain, raised a trophy, and returned, the one part of the forces back again to the city, the other to their ships. Nicias with his sixty ships then sailed to the coast of Locris; after ravaging the country he returned home.

[92] About the same time the Lacedaemonians founded Heraclea, their colony in Trachinia. The intention was as follows: The Trachinians are one of the three Melian tribes; the other two being the Paralians and the Hiereans. These Trachinians, having suffered greatly in war from their neighbours the Oetaeans, at first thought of attaching themselves to the Athenians, but, fearing that they could not trust them, sent Tisamenus, whom they appointed their envoy, to Lacedaemon. The Dorians, who were the mother state of Lacedaemon, joined in the embassy and also requested help, for they too were suffering from the Oetaeans. The Lacedaemonians heard their appeal, and, being desirous of assisting both the Trachinians and Dorians, made up their minds to send out a colony. They also thought that the situation of the new city would be convenient for carrying on the war against the Athenians. There a navy could be equipped if they wanted to attack Euboea, which was quite near, and the station would be handy for the conveyance of troops to Chalcidicè. For every reason they were eager to colonise the place. First they enquired of the God at Delphi; he bade them go, and they sent out settlers taken from their own citizens and the Perioeci, announcing that any Hellenes who desired, not being of the Ionian, Achaean, or certain other races, might accompany them. The leaders of the colony were three Lacedaemonians, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. They set to work and built afresh the walls of the city, which received the name of Heraclea, and is situated about four miles and a half from Thermopylae and a little more than two from the sea. They also constructed docks, beginning the works near Thermopylae, at the pass, that the city might be perfectly defended.

[93] While the new colonists were collecting at Heraclea, the Athenians grew alarmed; the scheme appeared to be aimed at Euboea, for Cape Cenaeum on the opposite coast is within a short sail. But their fears were not realised; no harm whatever ensued. The reasons were these: In the first place

the Thessalians are strong in that part of the country, and fearing that Heraclea, which was built to control them, would be a powerful and dangerous neighbour, they carried on uninterrupted war against the young colony until they completely wore the settlers out, although originally they had been very numerous. For every one joined without hesitation, encouraged by the promise of security which a Lacedaemonian colony seemed to offer. But another great cause of the ruin and depopulation of the place was the conduct of the governors sent out from Lacedaemon, who frightened the people away by their severe and often unjust administration. Thus the Heracleans fell an easy prey to their neighbours.

[94] During the same summer, and just about the same time when the Athenians were engaged at Melos, the troops which were cruising in the thirty Athenian ships about Peloponnesus set an ambuscade at Ellomenus in Leucadia and killed a few of the guards of the country. They next attacked Leucas itself with a larger armament, consisting of the Acarnanians, who followed them with their whole forces, all but the inhabitants of Oeniadae, and some Zacynthians and Cephallenians, together with fifteen ships from Corcyra. The Leucadians saw their territory both on the mainland and within the isthmus, where the town of Leucas and the temple of Apollo are situated, ravaged by the enemy; but being powerless against a superior force, they remained inactive. The Acarnanians begged Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to cut Leucas off by a wall, thinking that they could easily take the city and so rid themselves of an old enemy. But just then he was persuaded by the Messenians that, having such an army in the field, it would be a great thing to attack the Aetolians: they were the enemies of Naupactus, and if he defeated them he would easily subjugate the adjoining part of the mainland to the Athenians. The Aetolians, they said, though a large and warlike people, dwelt in unwalled villages, which were

widely scattered, and as they had only light-armed soldiers, they would be subdued without difficulty before they could combine. They told him that he should first attack the Apodotians, then the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytanians, The last are the largest tribe of the Aetolians; they speak a dialect more unintelligible than any of their neighbours, and are believed to eat raw flesh. They said that, if he conquered these, the rest would readily come over to him.

[95] He was influenced by his regard for the Messenians, and still more by the consideration that without reinforcements from Athens, and with no other help than that of the allies on the mainland, to whom he hoped to add the Aetolians, he could make his way by land to attack Boeotia. He might proceed through the Ozolian Locri to the Dorian Cytinium, keeping Mount Parnassus on the right, until he came down upon the Phocians. They would probably be eager to join in the expedition because they had always been friendly to Athens, or, if unwilling, they might be coerced; and once in Phocis he would be on the borders of Boeotia. So he left Leucas with all his army, much against the will of the Acarnanians, and sailed to Sollium. He there communicated his design to them, but they would not accompany him because he had refused to blockade Leucas; so with the remainder of his army, which consisted of Cephallenians, Messenians, Zacynthians, and three hundred marines belonging to the Athenian fleet, the fifteen Corcyraean vessels having left, he marched against the Aetolians, starting from Oeneon in Locris. The Ozolian Locrians were allies of the Athenians, and they were to meet him with their whole force in the interior of the country. They dwelt on the border of the Aetolians, and as they were armed in a similar manner and knew their country and ways of fighting, their help in the expedition seemed likely to be very valuable.

[96] He encamped the first night at the temple of Nemean Zeus, where the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by

the inhabitants in fulfilment of an oracle which foretold that he should die at Nemea. Early the next morning he proceeded on his march into Aetolia. On the first day he took Potidania, on the second Crocyleium, on the third Teichium. There he stayed and sent back the spoils to Eupalium in Locris. For he did not intend to attack the Ophioneans yet; when he had subjugated the rest of the country he would return to Naupactus and make a second expedition against them if they continued to resist. The Aetolians were aware of his designs from the very first; and no sooner did he enter their territory than they all collected in great force; even the most distant of the Ophioneans, the Bomieans and Callieans who reach down towards the Malian Gulf, came to the aid of their countrymen.

[97] The Messenians repeated the advice which they had originally given to Demosthenes. They assured him that there would be no difficulty in conquering the Aetolians, and told him to march as quickly as he could against the villages. He should not wait until they could combine and meet him with an army, but should endeavour to take any place which was nearest. He, trusting to their advice, and confident in his good fortune since everything was going favourably, did not wait for the Locrians, who should have supplied his deficiency in javelin-men, but at once marched towards Aegitium, which he attacked, and forced his way in. The inhabitants had stolen away and taken up a position on the top of the hills overhanging the town, which was itself built upon heights at a distance of about nine miles from the sea. The other Aetolians, who had by this time come to the rescue of Aegitium, attacked the Athenians and their allies. Some ran down from one hill and some from another and hurled darts at them; when the Athenian army advanced they retired, and when the Athenians retreated they pressed upon them. The battle, which lasted long, was nothing but a series of pursuits and retreats, and in both the Athenians were at a disadvantage.

[98] While their archers had arrows and were able to use them, the Athenians maintained their ground, for the Aetolians, being light-armed, were driven back by the arrows. But at length the captain of the archers was slain, and the forces under his command no longer kept together. The Athenians themselves grew weary of the long and tedious struggle. The Aetolians came closer and closer, and never ceased hurling darts at them. At last they turned and fled, and falling into ravines, out of which there was no way, or losing themselves in a strange country, they perished. Their guide, Chromon the Messenian, had been killed. The Aetolians, who were light-armed and swift of foot, followed at their heels, hurling darts, and caught and slew many of them in the actual rout. The greater number missed their way and got into the woods, out of which no path led; and their enemies brought fire and burnt the wood about them. So the Athenian army tried every means of escape and perished in all manner of ways. The survivors with difficulty made their way to the sea at Oeneon in Locris, whence they had set out. Many of the allies fell, and of the Athenian heavy-armed about a hundred and twenty, all in the flower of their youth; they were the very finest men whom the city of Athens lost during the war. Procles, one of the two generals, was also killed. When they had received the bodies of their dead under a flag of truce from the Aetolians, they retreated to Naupactus, and returned in their ships to Athens. Demosthenes remained behind in Naupactus and the neighbourhood; for, after what had happened, he feared the anger of the Athenians.

[99] About the same time the Athenian forces engaged in Sicily, sailing to the territory of Locri and there disembarking, defeated the Locrians who came out to meet them, and took a small garrison fort, which was situated upon the river Halex.

[100] During the same summer the Aetolians, who had some time before despatched Tolophus the Ophionean, Boriades

the Eurytanian, and Tisander the Apodotian on an embassy to Corinth and Lacedaemon, induced the Lacedaemonians to aid them by sending an army against Naupactus, in order to punish the inhabitants for inviting the Athenian invasion. So in the autumn they sent out three thousand hoplites of their allies, including five hundred from Heraclea, the newly-founded city in Trachis. Eurylochus, a Spartan, was general, and with him were associated in the command Macarius and Menedaeus, also Spartans.

[101] When the army was collected at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Ozolian Locrians, for he had to pass through their country on the way to Naupactus; and he also wished to detach them from the Athenian alliance. Of the Locrians, the inhabitants of Amphissa were most willing to co-operate with him, being anxious for protection against their enemies the Phocians; they were the first who gave hostages, and by them the other Locrians, who were alarmed at the impending invasion, were persuaded to do the like: — first their neighbours the Myoneans, who commanded the most difficult pass into Locris; then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritaeeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeantheans; all these tribes also joined the expedition. The Olpaeans gave hostages but did not join; the Hyaeans would not give hostages until the Lacedaemonians had taken one of their villages, called Polis.

[102] When everything was ready, and Eurylochus had deposited the hostages at Cytinium of the Dorians, he marched with his army against Naupactus, through the territory of the Locrians. On his march he took Oeneon and Eupalium, two Locrian towns which refused to come to terms. When they had arrived in the territory of Naupactus and the Aetolians had at length joined them, they devastated the country, and after taking the unwalled suburbs of the town marched against Molycrium, a colony of the Corinthians subject to Athens, which they captured. But Demosthenes the Athenian, who after his misfortune in

Aetolia was still in the neighbourhood of Naupactus, having previous intelligence, and fearing for the town, went and persuaded the Acarnanians, much against their will — for they had not forgotten his withdrawal from Leucas — to assist Naupactus. So they sent with him on board the Athenian ships a thousand hoplites; these got in and saved the place, which was in danger of having to capitulate, owing to the extent of the wall and the paucity of its defenders. Eurylochus and his soldiers, when they saw that the garrison had been reinforced, and that there was no possibility of taking the city by storm, instead of going back to Peloponnesus, retired into the country of Aeolis, which is now called by the names of the towns Calydon and Pleuron, and to other places in the neighbourhood; also to Proschium in Aetolia. For the Ambraciots sent and persuaded them to take part in an attack on the Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia and Acarnania, declaring that, if they gained possession of these places, all the tribes of the mainland would at once come over to the Lacedaemonians. Eurylochus assented and, dismissing the Aetolians, waited with his army in that region until the time for the Ambraciots to make their expedition and for him to join them in the neighbourhood of Argos. Thus the summer ended.

[103] In the following winter the Athenians in Sicily and their Hellenic allies made an attack upon the Sicel fort of Inessa, a Sicel town of which the citadel was held by the Syracusans. They were joined by many of the Sicels, who had formerly been allies to the Syracusans, and, having been held down by them, had now revolted to the Athenians. The attempt failed, and they retreated. But during their retreat the Syracusans sallied out and fell upon the allies who were in the rear of the Athenians, routed them, and put to flight a part of their forces with great loss. Soon afterwards, Laches and the Athenians in the fleet made several descents upon Locris. At the river Caecinus they defeated about three hundred Locrians who came out to meet them under

Proxenus the son of Capaton, took arms from the slain, and returned.

[104] In the same winter the Athenians, by command of an oracle, purified the island of Delos. Pisistratus the tyrant had already purified it, but imperfectly, for the purification only extended to that part which was within sight of the temple. The whole island was now purified in the following manner: — The Athenians took away all the coffins of the dead which were in Delos, and passed a decree that henceforward no one should die or give birth to a child there, but that the inhabitants when they were near the time of either should be carried across to Rhenea. Now Rhenea is near to Delos, so near indeed that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who for a time had a powerful navy, attached this island, which he conquered with the rest of the islands and dedicated to the Delian Apollo, by a chain to Delos. After the purification, the Athenians for the first time celebrated the Delian games, which were held every four years. There had been in ancient days a great gathering of the Ionians and the neighbouring islanders at Delos; whither they brought their wives and children to be present at the Delian games, as the Ionians now frequent the games at Ephesus. Musical and gymnastic contests were held there, and the cities celebrated choral dances. The character of the festival is attested by Homer in the following verses, which are taken from the hymn to Apollo:

‘At other times, Phoebus, Delos is dearest to thy heart,
Where are gathered together the Ionians in flowing robes,
With their wives and children in thy street:
There do they delight thee with boxing and dancing and song,
Making mention of thy name when they gather at the assembly.’

And that there were musical contests which attracted competitors is implied in the following words of the same hymn. After commemorating the Delian dance of women, Homer ends their praises with these lines, in which he alludes to himself:

‘And now may Apollo and Artemis be gracious,
And to all of you, maidens, I say farewell.
Yet remember me when I am gone;
And if some other toiling pilgrim among the sons of men
Comes and asks: O maidens,
Who is the sweetest minstrel of all who wander hither,
And in whom do you delight most?
Make answer with one voice, in gentle words,
The blind old man of Chios’ rocky isle.’

Thus far Homer, who clearly indicates that even in days of old there was a great gathering and festival at Delos. In after ages the islanders and the Athenians led choruses in procession, and sacrificed. But the games and the greater part of the ceremonies naturally fell into disuse, owing to the misfortunes of Ionia. The Athenians now restored the games and for the first time introduced horse-races.

[105] During the same winter the Ambraciots, in fulfilment of the promise by which they had induced Eurylochus and his army to remain, made an expedition against the Amphilochian Argos with three thousand hoplites. They invaded the Argive territory and seized Olpae, a strong fort on a hill by the sea-side, which in former days the Acarnanians had fortified and used as a common hall of justice. The place is about three miles from Argos, which is also on the sea-shore. One division of the Acarnanians came to the aid of Argos, while another encamped at a spot called the Wells, where they could lie in wait for Eurylochus and the Peloponnesians, and prevent them from joining the Ambraciots unobserved. They also despatched a messenger

to Demosthenes, who had led the Athenian expedition into Aetolia, asking him to be their commander, and sent for twenty Athenian ships which were just then cruising about the Peloponnese under the command of Aristoteles the son of Timocrates, and Hierophon the son of Antimnestus. The Ambraciots sent a messenger from Olpae to their own citizens, bidding them come and help them with their entire force; for they were afraid that Eurylochus and his followers might not be able to make their way through the Acarnanians, and then they would have either to fight alone, or to attempt a hazardous retreat.

[106] Eurylochus and the Peloponnesians, when they heard that the Ambraciots had arrived at Olpae, left Proschium and went with all speed to help, them. Passing over the river Achelous they marched through Acarnania, leaving the city and garrison of Stratus on the right hand, and the rest of Acarnania on their left. The land was deserted, for the inhabitants had gone to the assistance of Argos. Crossing the territory of Stratus they proceeded through Phytia and by the extreme border of Medeon, and so through Limnaea; at last they left Acarnania, and reached the friendly territory of the Agraeans. Then taking to Mount Thyamus, which is open country, they marched on and descended into the plain of Argos after dark. Making their way unobserved between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian force stationed at the Wells, they at length reached the Ambraciots at Olpae.

[107] The two armies having effected this junction moved at break of day to a place called Metropolis, and there encamped. Soon afterwards the Argives received the expected reinforcement of twenty Athenian ships, which arrived in the Ambracian Gulf. With them came Demosthenes, who brought two hundred Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian archers. The ships anchored about the hill of Olpae, while the Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians (the greater part of them were prevented

from stirring by the Ambraciots), having mustered at Argos, were now preparing to give battle. They associated Demosthenes with their own generals in the command of the allied forces. He led them to the neighbourhood of Olpae, and there encamped at a place where they were divided from the enemy by a great ravine. During five days they remained inactive; on the sixth day both armies drew up in battle array. Demosthenes, fearing that he would be surrounded by the Peloponnesians who were more numerous and extended beyond his own line, placed hoplites and light-armed troops, numbering altogether four hundred, in a deep lane overgrown with brushwood, intending them to lie in wait until the moment of conflict, when they were to rush out from the rear on the line of the enemy where it overlapped. The preparations of both armies were now complete and they engaged. Demosthenes led his own right wing, on which were the Messenians and a few Athenians, while the other was held by the Acarnanians, who were disposed according to their cities, and by the Amphilochian javelin-men who were in the battle. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were intermingled, with the exception of the Mantineans, who were all collected on the left wing; but the extremity of the wing was occupied by Eurylochus and his division, who were opposed to the Messenians under Demosthenes.

[108] When the two armies were at close quarters, the left wing of the Peloponnesians out-flanked the right wing of their opponents and threatened to surround them; whereupon the Acarnanians, coming upon them from behind out of the ambuscade, charged and turned them. They fled without striking a blow, and their panic caused the greater part of the army to run with them. For, when they saw Eurylochus and their best troops routed, they lost whatever courage they had. The Messenians, who were in this part of the field under the command of Demosthenes, were foremost in the action. The right wing of the enemy,

however, and the Ambraciots, who are the most warlike nation in those parts, vanquished their opponents and drove them back to Argos. But, returning, they saw the greater part of the army defeated, and were hard pressed by the victorious division of the Acarnanians, whereupon, escaping with difficulty, they made their way to Olpae. Numbers of the defeated were killed, for they dashed into the fort wildly and in confusion, except the Mantineans, who kept together and retreated in better order than any other part of the army. The battle, which had lasted until evening, now ended.

[109] On the next day Menedaeus took the command, for Eurylochus and Macarius, the two other generals, had been slain. He knew not what to do after so serious a defeat. He could not hope, if he remained, to stand a siege, hemmed in as he was by land, and at sea blockaded by the Athenian ships; neither could he safely retire; so entering into a parley with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals about the burial of the dead, he tried to negotiate with them at the same time for a retreat. The Athenians gave back to the enemy their dead, erected a trophy, and took up their own dead, in number about three hundred. They would not openly agree to the proposal for a general retreat, but Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues made a secret treaty with the Mantineans, and Menedaeus, and the other Peloponnesian generals and chief persons, allowing their army to depart. He wanted partly to isolate the Ambraciots and their foreign mercenary troops, but much more to take away the character of the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians among the Hellenes in those parts and convict them of selfishness and treachery. Accordingly the Peloponnesians took up their dead, and burying them quickly as well as they could, consulted secretly how those who had permission could best depart.

[110] Meanwhile news was brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the whole remaining force of the

Ambraciots, who some time previously had been summoned from the city to join the troops in Olpae, were now on their way through the territory of the Amphilochians and were in entire ignorance of what had occurred. Whereupon he at once sent forward a part of his army to lie in ambush in the roads and to occupy the strong places, himself at the same time preparing to support them with the rest of his forces.

[111] In the meantime the Mantineans and the others who were included in the truce went out on pretence of gathering herbs and sticks, and stole away one by one, picking up as they went along what they pretended to be looking for. But, as they got farther away from Olpae, they quickened their steps, and then the Ambraciots and others who happened to collect on the instant, when they saw that they were leaving, ran after them at full speed, wanting to get up with them. The Acarnanians at first thought that none of those who were going away were protected by a truce, and pursued the Peloponnesians. Some of the generals tried to keep them back and explained how matters stood; whereupon a soldier, suspecting that there was treachery, hurled a javelin at them. At length the soldiers understood, and let the Mantineans and other Peloponnesians go, but began to kill the Ambraciots. There was great dispute and uncertainty as to who was an Ambraciot and who a Peloponnesian. Of the former they killed about two hundred; the Peloponnesians escaped into the neighbouring country of Agraea, and were received by king Salynthius who was their friend.

[112] Meanwhile the reinforcement from the city of Ambracia had reached Idomenè, which is the name of two lofty peaks. The higher of the two had been already occupied unobserved at nightfall by the troops which Demosthenes had sent forward; of the lower the Ambraciots first obtained possession and encamped there. As soon as it was dark, after supper, Demosthenes advanced with the rest of his army, himself leading half of them towards the pass between

the mountains, while the rest made their way through the Amphilochian hills. At the first dawn of day he fell upon the Ambraciots, who were still half-asleep, and so far from knowing anything of what had happened that they imagined his troops to be their own comrades. For Demosthenes had taken care to place the Messenians in the first rank and desired them to speak to the enemy in their own Doric dialect, thereby putting the sentinels off their guard; and as it was still dark, their appearance could not be distinguished. So they fell upon the Ambraciots and routed them. Most of them were slain on the spot; the remainder fled over the mountains. But the paths were beset; the Amphilochians were lightly-armed, and in their own country which they knew, while their enemies were heavy-armed and the country was strange to them. And so, not knowing which way to turn, they fell into ravines and into ambuscades which had been set for them, and perished. Every means of escape was tried. Some even fled to the sea which was not far distant, and seeing the Athenian ships which were sailing by while the action was taking place, swam out to them, thinking in the terror of the moment that they had better be killed, if die they must, by the Athenians in the ships than by their barbarous and detested enemies the Amphilochians. So the Ambraciots were cut to pieces, and but few out of many returned home to their city. The Acarnanians, having despoiled the dead and raised trophies, returned to Argos.

[113] On the following day there arrived a herald from the Ambraciots who had escaped out of Olpae to the Agraeans. He came to recover the bodies of the dead who had been slain subsequently to the first engagement, when, unprotected by the treaty, they tried to get out of Olpae in company with the Mantineans and others protected by it. The herald saw the arms of the Ambraciot troops from the city and wondered at the number of them; he knew nothing of the later disaster, and he imagined that they belonged to

his own division of the army. Some one present thought that the herald had come from the army defeated at Idomenè, and asked why he looked so astonished, and how many of their men had fallen; he replied, ‘about two hundred’; whereupon the other rejoined, ‘These which you see are not the arms of two hundred men, but of more than a thousand.’ The herald replied, ‘Then they cannot be the arms of our men.’ The other answered, ‘They must be, if you were fighting yesterday at Idomenè’ ‘But yesterday we did not fight at all; it was the day before, in the retreat.’ ‘All I know is that we fought yesterday with these men, who were marching to your aid from Ambracia.’ When the herald heard these words, and knew that the army coming from the city had perished, he uttered a cry of anguish, and, overwhelmed by the greatness of the blow, went away at once without doing his errand, no longer caring to demand the dead. And indeed in the whole war no such calamity happened within so few days to any Hellenic state. I have not ventured to set down the number of those who fell, for the loss would appear incredible when compared with the size of the city. Of this I am certain, that if the Acarnanians had been willing to destroy Ambracia as Demosthenes and the Athenians desired, they might have taken it at the first onset. But they were afraid that the Athenians, if they once got possession of the place, would be more troublesome neighbours than the Ambraciots.

[114] After assigning a third part of the spoils to the Athenians, the Acarnanians divided the remainder among their cities. The spoils of the Athenians were captured on the voyage. But three hundred panoplies which were allotted to Demosthenes he brought home with him, and they are still preserved in the Athenian temples. This good service of his enabled him to return to Athens with less apprehension after his misfortune in Aetolia. The twenty Athenian ships sailed away to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, after the Athenians and Demosthenes had left them, granted

a truce to the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had fled to Salynthius and the Agraeans; they were thus enabled to return home from Oeniadae, whither they had removed from the country of Salynthius. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians now made a treaty of alliance for one hundred years with the Ambraciots, of which the terms were as follows:— ‘The Ambraciots shall not be required to join the Acarnanians in making war on the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians to join the Ambraciots in making war on the Athenians. But they shall aid in the defence of one another’s territory. The Ambraciots shall give up such places or hostages of the Amphilochians as they possess, and they shall not assist Anactorium’ (which was hostile to the Acarnanians). Upon these terms they put an end to the war. Soon afterwards the Corinthians sent a force of their own, consisting of three hundred hoplites under the command of Xenocleidas the son of Euthycles, to guard Ambracia, whither they made their way with some difficulty by land. Such was the end of the Ambracian war.

[115] During the same winter the Athenian fleet in Sicily, sailing to Himera, made a descent upon the country in concert with the Sicels, who had invaded the extreme border of the Himeraeans from the interior; they also attacked the Aeolian Isles. Returning to Rhegium, they found that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, one of the Athenian generals, had superseded Laches in the command of the fleet. The allies of the Athenians in Sicily had sailed to Athens, and persuaded the Athenians to send a larger fleet to their aid; for their territory was in the power of the Syracusans, and they were kept off the sea by a few ships only; so they were preparing to resist, and had begun to collect a navy. The Athenians manned forty ships for their relief, partly hoping to finish the war in Sicily the sooner, partly because they wanted to exercise their fleet. They despatched one of the commanders, Pythodorus, with a few ships, intending to send Sophocles the son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon the

son of Thucles, with the larger division of the fleet afterwards. Pythodorus, having now succeeded Laches in the command, sailed at the end of the winter against the Locrian fort which Laches had previously taken,* but he was defeated by the Locrians and retired.

[116] In the early spring the burning lava, not for the first time, issued from Mount Aetna, which is the highest mountain in Sicily, and devastated a portion of the territory of the Catanaeans who dwell on the skirts of Aetna. The last eruption is said to have taken place fifty years before; and altogether three eruptions are recorded since the Hellenes first settled in Sicily. Such were the events of the winter; and so ended the sixth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

BOOK IV

[1] IN the following summer, about the time when the corn comes into ear, ten Syracusan and ten Locrian ships took possession of Messenè in Sicily, whither they had gone by the invitation of the inhabitants. And so Messenè revolted from the Athenians. The Syracusans took part in this affair chiefly because they saw that Messenè was the key to Sicily. They were afraid that the Athenians would one day establish themselves there and come and attack them with a larger force. The Locrians took part because the Rhegians were their enemies, and they wanted to crush them by sea as well as by land. They had already invaded the territory of Rhegium with their whole army, in order to hinder the Rhegians from assisting the Messenians; they were also partly instigated by certain Rhegian exiles who had taken refuge with them. For the Rhegians had been for a long time torn by revolution, and in their present condition could not resist the Locrians, who for this very reason were the more disposed to attack them. After wasting the country, the Locrians withdrew their land forces; but the ships remained to protect Messenè. Another fleet which the allies were manning was intended to lie in the harbour of Messenè, and to carry on the war from thence.

[2] During the spring and about the same time, before the corn was in full ear, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king. They encamped and ravaged the country.

The Athenians sent to Sicily the forty ships, which were now ready, under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, the third general, Pythodorus, having gone thither beforehand. Orders were given to them, as they passed Corcyra, to assist the Corcyraeans in the city, who were harassed by the exiles in the mountain. The

Peloponnesians had already sent sixty ships to the assistance of the exiles, expecting to make themselves masters of the situation with little difficulty; for there was a great famine in the city. Demosthenes, since his return from Acarnania, had been in no command, but now at his own request the Athenians allowed him to make use of the fleet about the Peloponnese according to his judgment.

[3] When they arrived off the coast of Laconia and heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles wanted to hasten thither, but Demosthenes desired them first to put in at Pylos and not to proceed on their voyage until they had done what he wanted. They objected, but it so happened that a storm came on and drove them into Pylos. Instantly Demosthenes urged them to fortify the place; this being the project which he had in view when he accompanied the fleet. He pointed out to them that there was abundance of timber and stone ready to their hand, and that the position was naturally strong, while both the place itself and the country for a long way round was uninhabited. Pylos is distant about forty-six miles from Sparta, and is situated in the territory which once belonged to the Messenians; by the Lacedaemonians it is called Coryphasium. The other generals argued that there were plenty of desolate promontories on the coast of Peloponnesus which he might occupy if he wanted to waste the public money. But Demosthenes thought that this particular spot had exceptional advantages. There was a harbour ready at hand; the Messenians, who were the ancient inhabitants of the country and spoke the same language with the Lacedaemonians, would make descents from the fort and do the greatest mischief: and they would be a trusty garrison.

[4] As neither generals nor soldiers would listen to him, he at last communicated his idea to the officers of divisions; who would not listen to him either. The weather was still unfit for sailing; he was therefore compelled to remain doing

nothing; until at length the soldiers, who had nothing to do, were themselves seized with a desire to come round and fortify the place forthwith. So they put their hands to the work; and, being unprovided with iron tools, brought stones which they picked out and put them together as they happened to fit; if they required to use mortar, having no hods, they carried it on their backs, which they bent so as to form a resting-place for it, clasping their hands behind them that it might not fall off. By every means in their power they hurried on the weaker points, wanting to finish them before the Lacedaemonians arrived. The position was in most places so strongly fortified by nature as to have no need of a wall.

[5] The Lacedaemonians, who were just then celebrating a festival, made light of the news, being under the impression that they could easily storm the fort whenever they chose to attack it, even if the Athenians did not run away of themselves at their approach. They were also delayed by the absence of their army in Attica. In six days the Athenians finished the wall on the land side, and in places towards the sea where it was most required; they then left Demosthenes with five ships to defend it, and with the rest hastened on their way to Corcyra and Sicily.

[6] The Peloponnesian army in Attica, when they heard that Pylos had been occupied, quickly returned home, Agis and the Lacedaemonians thinking that this matter touched them very nearly. The invasion had been made quite early in the year while the corn was yet green, and they were in want of food for their soldiers; moreover the wet and unseasonable weather had distressed them, so that on many grounds they were inclined to return sooner than they had intended. This was the shortest of all the Peloponnesian invasions; they only remained fifteen days in Attica.

[7] About the same time Simonides, an Athenian general, collecting a few troops from the Athenian garrisons, and a larger force from their allies in that neighbourhood, took

Eion in Chalcidicè, a colony of Mendè, which had been hostile to Athens; the place was betrayed to him. But the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans quickly came to the rescue and he was driven out with considerable loss.

[8] On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans and the Perioeci in the neighbourhood of the city went at once to attack Pylos, but the other Lacedaemonians, having only just returned from an expedition, were slower in arriving. A message was sent round the Peloponnesus bidding the allies come without a moment's delay and meet at Pylos; another message summoned the sixty Peloponnesian ships from Corcyra. These were carried over the Leucadian isthmus, and, undiscovered by the Athenian ships, which were by this time at Zacynthus, reached Pylos, where their land forces had already assembled. While the Peloponnesian fleet was still on its way, Demosthenes succeeded in despatching unobserved two vessels to let Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet know of his danger, and to bid them come at once.

While the Athenian ships were hastening to the assistance of Demosthenes in accordance with his request, the Lacedaemonians prepared to attack the fort both by sea and by land; they thought that there would be little difficulty in taking a work hastily constructed and defended by a handful of men. But as they expected the speedy arrival of the Athenian fleet they meant to close the entrances to the harbour, and prevent the Athenians from anchoring there should they fail in taking the fort before their arrival.

The island which is called Sphacteria stretches along the land and is quite close to it, making the harbour safe and the entrances narrow; there is only a passage for two ships at the one end, which was opposite Pylos and the Athenian fort, while at the other the strait between the island and the mainland is wide enough to admit eight or nine. The length of the island is about a mile and three-quarters; it was wooded, and being uninhabited had no roads. The

Lacedaemonians were intending to block up the mouths of the harbour by ships placed close together with their prows outwards; meanwhile, fearing lest the Athenians should use the island for military operations, they conveyed thither some hoplites, and posted others along the shore of the mainland. Thus both the island and the mainland would be hostile to the Athenians; and nowhere on the mainland would there be a possibility of landing. For on the shore of Pylos itself, outside the entrance of the strait, and where the land faced the open sea, there were no harbours, and the Athenians would find no position from which they could assist their countrymen. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, avoiding the risk of an engagement at sea, might take the fort, which had been occupied in a hurry and was not provisioned. Acting on this impression they conveyed their hoplites over to the island, selecting them by lot out of each division of the army. One detachment relieved another; those who went over last and were taken in the island were four hundred and twenty men, besides the Helots who attended them; they were under the command of Epitadas the son of Molobrus.

[9] Demosthenes, seeing that the Lacedaemonians were about to attack him both by sea and by land, made his own preparations. He drew up on shore under the fort the three triremes remaining to him out of the five which had not gone on to Corcyra, and protected them by a stockade; their crews he armed with shields, but of a poor sort, most of them made of wicker-work. In an uninhabited country there was no possibility of procuring arms, and these were only obtained from a thirty-oared privateer and a light boat belonging to some Messenians who had just arrived. Of these Messenians about forty were hoplites, whom Demosthenes used with the others. He placed the greater part of his forces, armed and unarmed, upon the side of the place which looks towards the mainland and was stronger and better fortified; these he ordered, if they should be

attacked, to repel the land forces, while he himself selected out of the whole body of his troops sixty hoplites and a few archers, and marched out of the fort to the sea-shore at the point where the Lacedaemonians seemed most likely to attempt a landing. The spot which he chose lay towards the open sea, and was rocky and dangerous; but he thought that the enemy would be attracted thither and would be sure to make a dash at that point because the fortifications were weaker. For the Athenians, not expecting to be defeated at sea, had left the wall just there less strong, while if the enemy could once force a landing, the place would easily be taken. Accordingly, marching down to the very edge of the sea, he there posted his hoplites; he was determined to keep the enemy off if he could, and in this spirit he addressed his men:

[10] ‘My companions in danger, let none of you now on the eve of battle desire to display his wits by reckoning up the sum of the perils which surround us; let him rather resolve to meet the enemy without much thought, but with a lively hope that he will survive them all. In cases like these, when there is no choice, reflection is useless, and the sooner danger comes the better. I am sure that our chances are more than equal if we will only stand firm, and, having so many advantages, do not take fright at the numbers of the enemy and throw them all away. The inaccessibility of the place is one of them; this, however, will only aid us if we maintain our position; when we have once retreated, the ground, though difficult in itself, will be easy enough to the enemy, for there will be no one to oppose him. And if we turn and press upon him he will be more obstinate than ever; for his retreat will be next to impossible. On ship-board the Peloponnesians are easily repelled, but once landed they are as good as we are. Of their numbers again we need not be so much afraid; for, numerous as they are, few only can fight at a time, owing to the difficulty of bringing their ships to shore. We are contending against an army superior

indeed in numbers, but they are not our equals in other respects; for they are not on land but on water, and ships require many favourable accidents before they can act with advantage. So that I consider their embarrassments to counterbalance our want of numbers. You are Athenians, who know by experience the difficulty of disembarking in the presence of an enemy, and that if a man is not frightened out of his wits at the splashing of oars and the threatening look of a ship bearing down upon him, but is determined to hold his ground, no force can move him. It is now your turn to be attacked, and I call on you to stand fast and not to let the enemy touch the beach at all. Thus you will save yourselves and the place.’

[11] The Athenians, inspirited by the words of Demosthenes, went down to the shore and formed a line along the water’s edge. The Lacedaernonians now began to move, and assaulted the fort with their army by land, and with their fleet, consisting of forty-three ships, by sea. The admiral in command was Thrasymelidas, son of Cratesicles, a Spartan; he made his attack just where Demosthenes expected. The Athenians defended themselves both by sea and land. The Peloponnesians had divided their fleet into relays of a few ships — the space would not allow of more — and so resting and fighting by turns they made their attack with great spirit, loudly exhorting one another to force back the enemy and take the fort. Brasidas distinguished himself above all other men in the engagement; he was captain of a ship, and seeing his fellow-captains and the pilots, even if they could touch anywhere, hesitating and afraid of running their ships on the rocks, he called out to them: ‘Not to be sparing of timber when the enemy had built a fort in their country; let them wreck their ships to force a landing’: this he said to his own countrymen, and to the allies that ‘they should not hesitate at such a moment to make a present of their ships to the Lacedaemonians, who had done so much for them;

they must run aground, and somehow or other get to land and take the fort and the men in it.’

[12] While thus upbraiding the others he compelled his own pilot to run his ship aground, and made for the gangway. But in attempting to disembark he was struck by the Athenians, and, after receiving many wounds, he swooned away and fell into the fore part of the ship; his shield slipped off his arm into the sea, and, being washed ashore, was taken up by the Athenians and used for the trophy which they raised in commemoration of this attack. The Peloponnesians in the other ships made great efforts to disembark, but were unable on account of the roughness of the ground and the tenacity with which the Athenians held their position. It was a singular turn of fortune which drove the Athenians to repel the Lacedaemonians, who were attacking them by sea, from the Lacedaemonian coast, and the Lacedaemonians to fight for a landing on their own soil, now hostile to them, in the face of the Athenians. For in those days it was the great glory of the Lacedaemonians to be a land power distinguished for their military prowess, and of the Athenians to be a nation of sailors and the first sea power in Hellas.

[13] The Peloponnesians, having continued their efforts during this day and a part of the next, at length desisted; on the third day they sent some of their ships to Asinè for timber with which to make engines, hoping by their help to take the part of the fort looking towards the harbour where the landing was easier, although it was built higher. Meanwhile the Athenian ships arrived from Zacynthus; they had been increased in number to fifty by the arrival of some guard-ships from Naupactus and of four Chian vessels. Their commanders saw that both the mainland and the island were full of hoplites, and that the ships were in the harbour and were not coming out: so, not knowing where to find anchorage, they sailed away for the present to the island of Protè, which is close at hand and uninhabited, and there

passed the night. Next day, having made ready for action, they put off to sea, intending, if, as they hoped, the Peloponnesians were willing to come out against them, to give battle in the open; if not, to sail into the harbour. The Peloponnesians did not come out, and had somehow neglected to close the mouths as they had intended. They showed no sign of moving, but were on shore, manning their ships and preparing to fight, if any one entered the harbour, which was of considerable size.

[14] The Athenians, seeing how matters stood, rushed in upon them at both mouths of the harbour. Most of the enemies' ships had by this time got into deep water and were facing them. These they put to flight and pursued them as well as they could in such a narrow space; damaging many and taking five, one of them with the crew. They charged the remaining vessels even after they had reached the land, and there were some which they disabled while the crews were getting into them and before they put out at all. Others they succeeded in tying to their own ships and began to drag them away empty, the sailors having taken flight. At this sight the Lacedaemonians were in an agony, for their friends were being cut off in the island; they hurried to the rescue, and dashing armed as they were into the sea, took hold of the ships and pulled them back; that was a time when every one thought that the action was at a stand where he himself was not engaged. The confusion was tremendous; the two combatants in this battle for the ships interchanging their usual manner of fighting; for the Lacedaemonians in their excitement and desperation did, as one may say, carry on a sea-fight from the land, and the Athenians, who were victorious and eager to push their good fortune to the utmost, waged a land-fight from their ships. At length, after giving each other much trouble and inflicting great damage, they parted. The Lacedaemonians saved their empty ships, with the exception of those which were first taken. Both sides retired to their encampments; the

Athenians then raised a trophy, gave up the dead, and took possession of the wrecks. They lost no time in sailing round the island and establishing a guard over the men who were cut off there. The Peloponnesians on the mainland, who had now been joined by all their contingents, remained in their position before Pylos.

[15] At Sparta, when the news arrived, there was great consternation; it was resolved that the magistrates should go down to the camp and see for themselves; they could then take on the spot any measures which they thought necessary. Finding on their arrival that nothing could be done for their soldiers in the island, and not liking to run the risk of their being starved to death or overcome by force of numbers, they decided that with the consent of the Athenian generals they would suspend hostilities at Pylos, and sending ambassadors to ask for peace at Athens, would endeavour to recover their men as soon as possible.

[16] The Athenian commanders accepted their proposals, and a truce was made on the following conditions:

‘The Lacedaemonians shall deliver into the hands of the Athenians at Pylos the ships in which they fought, and shall also bring thither and deliver over any other ships of war which are in Laconia; and they shall make no assault upon the fort either by sea or land. The Athenians shall permit the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send to those on the island a fixed quantity of kneaded flour, viz. two Attic quarts of barley-meal for each man, and a pint of wine, and also a piece of meat; for an attendant, half these quantities; they shall send them into the island under the inspection of the Athenians, and no vessel shall sail in by stealth. The Athenians shall guard the island as before, but not land, and shall not attack the Peloponnesian forces by land or by sea. If either party violate this agreement in any particular, however slight, the truce is to be at an end. The agreement is to last until the Lacedaemonian ambassadors return from Athens, and the Athenians are to convey them thither and

bring them back in a trireme. When they return the truce is to be at an end, and the Athenians are to restore the ships in the same condition in which they received them.’ Such were the terms of the truce. The ships, which were about sixty in number, were given up to the Athenians. The ambassadors went on their way, and arriving at Athens spoke as follows:

[17] ‘Men of Athens, the Lacedaemonians have sent us to negotiate for the recovery of our countrymen in the island, in the hope that you may be induced to grant us terms such as will be at once advantageous to you and not inglorious to us in our present misfortune. If we speak at length, this will be no departure from the custom of our country. On the contrary, it is our manner not to say much where few words will suffice, but to be more liberal of speech when something important has to be said and words are the ministers of action. Do not receive what we say in a hostile spirit, or imagine that we deem you ignorant and are instructing you, but regard us simply as putting you in mind of what you already know to be good policy. For you may turn your present advantage to excellent account, not only keeping what you have won, but gaining honour and glory as well. You will then escape the reverse which is apt to be experienced by men who attain any unusual good fortune; for, having already succeeded beyond all expectation, they see no reason why they should set any limit to their hopes and desires. Whereas they who have oftenest known the extremes of either kind of fortune ought to be most suspicious of prosperity; and this may naturally be expected to be the lesson which experience has taught both us and you.

[18] ‘Look only at the calamity which has just overtaken us, who formerly enjoyed the greatest prestige of any Hellenic state, but are now come hither to ask of you the boon which at one time we should have thought ourselves better able to confer. You cannot attribute our mishap to any want of power; nor to the pride which an increase of power fosters.

We were neither stronger nor weaker than before, but we erred in judgment, and to such errors all men are liable. Therefore you should not suppose that, because your city and your empire are powerful at this moment, you will always have fortune on your side. The wise ensure their own safety by not making too sure of their gains, and when disasters come they can meet them more intelligently; they know that war will go on its way whithersoever chance may lead, and will not restrict itself to the limits which he who begins to meddle with it would fain prescribe. They of all men will be least likely to meet with reverses, because they are not puffed up with military success, and they will be most inclined to end the struggle in the hour of victory. It will be for your honour, Athenians, to act thus towards us. And then the victories which you have gained already cannot be attributed to mere luck; as they certainly will be if, rejecting our prayer, you should hereafter encounter disasters, a thing which is not unlikely to happen. Whereas you may if you will leave to posterity a reputation for power and wisdom which no danger can affect.

[19] ‘The Lacedaemonians invite you to make terms with them and to finish the war. They offer peace and alliance and a general friendly and happy relation, and they ask in return their countrymen who are cut off in the island. They think it better that neither city should run any further risk, you of the escape of the besieged, who may find some means of forcing their way out, we of their being compelled to surrender and passing absolutely into your hands. We think that great enmities are most effectually reconciled, not when one party seeks revenge and, getting a decided superiority, binds his adversary by enforced oaths and makes a treaty with him on unequal terms, but when, having it in his power to do all this, he from a generous and equitable feeling overcomes his resentment, and by the moderation of his terms surprises his adversary, who, having sufered no violence at his hands, is bound to recompense his

generosity not with evil but with good, and who therefore, from a sense of honour, is more likely to keep his word. And mankind are more ready to make such a concession to their greater enemies than to those with whom they have only a slight difference. Again, they joyfully give way to those who first give way themselves, although against overbearing power they will risk a conflict even contrary to their own better judgment.

[20] ‘Now, if ever, is the time of reconciliation for us both, before either has suffered any irremediable calamity, which must cause, besides the ordinary antagonism of contending states, a personal and inveterate hatred, and will deprive you of the advantages which we now offer. While the contest is still undecided, while you may acquire reputation and our friendship, and while our disaster can be repaired on tolerable terms, and disgrace averted, let us be reconciled, and choosing peace instead of war ourselves, let us give relief and rest to all the Hellenes. The chief credit of the peace will be yours. Whether we or you drove them into war is uncertain; but to give them peace lies with you, and to you they will be grateful. If you decide for peace, you may assure to yourselves the lasting friendship of the Lacedaemonians freely offered by them, you on your part employing no force but kindness only. Consider the great advantages which such a friendship will yield. If you and we are at one, you may be certain that the rest of Hellas, which is less powerful than we, will pay to both of us the greatest deference.’

[21] Thus spoke the Lacedaemonians, thinking that the Athenians, who had formerly been desirous of making terms with them, and had only been prevented by their refusal, would now, when peace was offered to them, joyfully agree and would restore their men. But the Athenians reflected that, since they had the Lacedaemonians shut up in the island, it was at any time in their power to make peace, and they wanted more. These feelings were chiefly encouraged

by Cleon the son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader of the day who had the greatest influence over the multitude. He persuaded them to reply that the men in the island must first of all give up themselves and their arms and be sent to Athens; the Lacedaemonians were then to restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia — places which had not been taken in war, but had been surrendered under a former treaty in a time of reverse, when the Athenians were more anxious to obtain peace than they now were. On these conditions they might recover the men and make a treaty of such duration as both parties should approve.

[22] To this reply the Lacedaemonians said nothing, but only requested that the Athenians would appoint commissioners to discuss with them the details of the agreement and quietly arrive at an understanding about them if they could. This proposal was assailed by Cleon in unmeasured language: he had always known, he said, that they meant no good, and now their designs were unveiled; for they were unwilling to speak a word before the people, but wanted to be closeted with a select few;if they had any honesty in them, let them say what they wanted to the whole city. But the Lacedaemonians knew that, although they might be willing to make concessions under the pressure of their calamities, they could not speak openly before the assembly (for if they spoke and did not succeed, the terms which they offered might injure them in the opinion of their allies); they saw too that the Athenians would not grant what was asked of them on any tolerable conditions. So, after a fruitless negotiation, they returned home.

[23] Upon their return the truce at Pylos instantly came to an end, and the Lacedaemonians demanded back their ships according to the agreement. But the Athenians accused them of making an assault upon the fort, and of some other petty infractions of the treaty which seemed hardly worth mentioning. Accordingly they refused to restore them, insisting upon the clause which said that if ‘in any

particular, however slight,’ the agreement were violated, the treaty was to be at an end. The Lacedaemonians remonstrated, and went away protesting against the injustice of detaining their ships. Both parties then renewed the war at Pylos with the utmost vigour. The Athenians had two triremes sailing round Sphacteria in opposite directions throughout the day, and at night their whole fleet was moored about the island, except on the side towards the sea when the wind was high. Twenty additional ships had come from Athens to assist in the blockade, so that the entire number was seventy. The Peloponnesians lay encamped on the mainland and made assaults upon the fort, watching for any opportunity which might present itself of rescuing their men.

[24] Meanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans and the allies brought up the fleet which they had been equipping to Messenè, and joining the other fleet which was keeping guard there, carried on the war from thence. They were instigated chiefly by the Locrians, who hated the Rhegians, and had already invaded their territory with their whole force. They were eager to try their fortune in a naval engagement, for they saw that the Athenians had only a few ships actually on the spot; the larger portion of the fleet which had been despatched to Sicily being, as they heard, engaged in the siege of Sphacteria. If they conquered at sea they hoped to blockade Rhegium both by sea and land; they would easily master the place, and their affairs would then be really gaining strength. Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy, and Messenè, of Sicily, are close to one another; and if Rhegium were taken the Athenians would not be able to lie there and command the strait. Now the strait is that portion of sea between Rhegium and Messenè where Sicily is nearest to the continent; it is the so-called Charybdis by which Odysseus is said to have passed. The channel was naturally considered dangerous; for the strait is narrow; and

the sea flowing into it from two great oceans, the Tyrrhenian and Sicilian, is full of currents.

[25] In this strait the Syracusans and their allies, who had somewhat more than thirty ships, were compelled to fight late in the day for a vessel which was sailing through. They put out against sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian ships; but, being defeated by the Athenians, they made a hasty retreat, each ship as it best could, to their stations at Messenè and near Rhegium; one ship was lost. Night closed the engagement. After this the Locrians quitted the Rhegian territory, and the Syracusans and their confederates united their fleet and anchored at the promontory of Pelorus near Messenè, where their land-forces were also stationed. The Athenians and Rhegians, sailing up to them, and seeing that the crews were not there, fell upon the empty vessels, but an iron grapnel was thrown out at them, and they in their turn lost a ship, from which the crew escaped by swimming. Then the Syracusans embarked, and, as they were being towed along the shore towards Messenè, the Athenians again attacked them. Making a sudden twist outwards they struck the first blow at the Athenians, who lost another ship. Thus both in the movement along the coast and in the naval engagement which ensued, the Syracusans proved themselves quite a match for the Athenians, and at length made their way into the harbour at Messenè.

The Athenians, hearing that Camarina was to be betrayed to the Syracusans by a certain Archias and his confederates, sailed thither. Meanwhile the Messenians, with their whole power by land and with the allied fleet, made war upon Naxos, a Chalcidian city which was their neighbour. On the first day they forced the Naxians to retire within their walls and ravaged the country; on the morrow they sailed round to the mouth of the river Acesines, again ravaged the country, and with their land-forces made incursions right up to the city. But in the meantime a large body of Sicels came down over the heights to assist the Naxians against the

Messenians. Perceiving this the besieged took heart, and shouting to one another that the Leontines and their other Hellenic allies were coming to succour them, they sallied out of the city, charged the Messenians, and put them to flight with a loss of more than a thousand men; the rest with difficulty escaped, for the barbarians fell upon them in the roads and destroyed most of them. The allied fleet, putting into Messenè, broke up and returned home. Whereupon the Leontines and their allies, in concert with the Athenians, marched against the now enfeebled Messenè. The Athenian fleet attempted an assault of the harbour while the army attacked the city. But the Messenians and a Locrian garrison under Demoteles, which after their disaster at Naxos had been left to protect the place, suddenly falling upon them put to flight the main body of the Leontines with great loss; whereupon the Athenians disembarked, came to their aid, and, falling on the Messenians while they were still in confusion, chased them back to the city. They then erected a trophy and retired to Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in Sicily went on fighting against one another by land; but the Athenians took no part in their operations.

[26] At Pylos meanwhile the Athenians continued to blockade the Lacedaemonians in the island, and the Peloponnesian forces on the mainland remained in their old position. The watch was harassing to the Athenians, for they were in want both of food and water; there was only one small well, which was in the acropolis, and the soldiers were commonly in the habit of scraping away the shingle on the sea-shore, and drinking such water as they could get. The Athenian garrison was crowded into a narrow space, and, their ships having no regular anchorage, the crews took their meats on land by turns; one half of the army eating while the other lay at anchor in the open sea. The unexpected length of the siege was a great discouragement to them; they had hoped to starve their enemies out in a few days, for they were on a desert island, and had only brackish

water to drink. The secret of this protracted resistance was a proclamation issued by the Lacedaemonians offering large fixed prices, and freedom if he were a Helot, to any one who would convey into the island meal, wine, cheese or any other provision suitable for a besieged place. Many braved the danger, especially the Helots; they started from all points of Peloponnesus, and before daybreak bore down upon the shore of the island looking towards the open sea. They took especial care to have a strong wind in their favour, since they were less likely to be discovered by the triremes when it blew hard from the sea. The blockade was then impracticable, and the crews of the boats were perfectly reckless in running them aground; for a value had been set upon them, and Lacedaemonian hoplites were waiting to receive them about the landing-places of the island. All however who ventured when the sea was calm were captured. Some too dived and swam by way of the harbour, drawing after them by a cord skins containing pounded linseed and poppy-seeds mixed with honey. At first they were not found out, but afterwards watches were posted. The two parties had all sorts of devices, the one determined to send in food, the other to detect them.

[27] When the Athenians heard that their own army was suffering and that supplies were introduced into the island, they began to be anxious and were apprehensive that the blockade might extend into the winter. They reflected that the conveyance of necessaries round the Peloponnese would then be impracticable. Their troops were in a desert place, to which, even in summer, they were not able to send a sufficient supply. The coast was without harbours; and therefore it would be impossible to maintain the blockade. Either the watch would be relaxed and the men would escape; or, taking advantage of a storm, they might sail away in the ships which brought them food. Above all they feared that the Lacedaemonians, who no longer made overtures to them, must now be reassured of the strength of

their own position, and they regretted having rejected their advances. Cleon, knowing that he was an object of general mistrust because he had stood in the way of peace, challenged the reports of the messengers from Pylos; who rejoined that, if their words were not believed, the Athenians should send commissioners of their own. And so Theogenes and Cleon himself were chosen commissioners. As he knew that he could only confirm the report of the messengers whom he was calumniating, or would be convicted of falsehood if he contradicted them, observing too that the Athenians were now more disposed to take active measures, he advised them not to send commissioners, which would only be a loss of valuable time, but, if they were themselves satisfied with the report, to send a fleet against the island. Pointedly alluding to Nicias the son of Niceratus, who was one of the generals and an enemy of his, he declared sarcastically that, if the generals were men, they might easily sail with an expedition to the island and take the garrison, and that this was what he would certainly have done, had he been general.

[28] Nicias perceived that the multitude were murmuring at Cleon, and asking ‘why he did not sail in any case — now was his time if he thought the capture of Sphacteria to be such an easy matter’; and hearing him find fault, he told him that, as far as they, the generals, were concerned, he might take any force which he required and try. Cleon at first imagined that the offer of Nicias was only a pretence, and was willing to go; but finding that he was in earnest, he tried to back out; and said that not he but Nicias was general. He was now alarmed, for he never imagined that Nicias would go so far as to give up his place to him Again Nicias bade him take the command of the expedition against Pylos, which he formally gave up to him in the presence of the assembly. And the more Cleon declined the proffered command and tried to retract what he had said, so much the more the multitude, as their manner is, urged Nicias to

resign and shouted to Cleon that he should sail. At length, not knowing how to escape from his own words, he undertook the expedition, and, coming forward, said that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians, and that he would sail without taking a single man from the city if he were allowed to have the Lemnian and Imbrian forces now at Athens, the auxiliaries from Aenus, who were targeteers, and four hundred archers from other places. With these and with the troops already at Pylos he gave his word that within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedaemonians alive or kill them on the spot. His vain words moved the Athenians to laughter; nevertheless; the wiser sort of men were pleased when they reflected that of two good things they could not fail to obtain one — either there would be no more trouble with Cleon, which they would have greatly preferred, or, if they were disappointed, he would put the Lacedaemonians into their hands.

[29] When he had concluded the affair in the assembly, and the Athenians had passed the necessary vote for his expedition, he made choice of Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, to be his colleague, and proceeded to sail with all speed. He selected Demosthenes because he heard that he was already intending to make an attack upon the island; for the soldiers, who were suffering much from the discomfort of the place, in which they were rather besieged than besiegers, were eager to strike a decisive blow. He had been much encouraged by a fire which had taken place in the island. It had previously been nearly covered with wood and was pathless, having never been inhabited; and he had feared that the nature of the country would give the enemy an advantage. For, however large the force with which he landed, the Lacedaemonians might attack him from some place of ambush and do him much injury. Their mistakes and the character of their forces would be concealed by the wood; whereas all the errors made by his own army would be palpable, and so the enemy, with whom the power of attack

would rest, might come upon them suddenly wherever they liked. And if they were compelled to go into the wood and there engage, a smaller force which knew the ground would be more than a match for the larger number who were unacquainted with it. Their own army, however numerous, would be destroyed without knowing it, for they would not be able to see where they needed one another’s assistance.

[30] Demosthenes was led to make these reflections from his experience in Aetolia, where his defeat had been in a great measure owing to the forest. However, while the Athenian soldiers were taking their midday meal, with a guard posted in advance, at the extremity of the island, compelled as they were by want of room to land on the edge of the shore at meal-times, some one unintentionally set fire to a portion of the wood; a wind came on; and from this accident, before they knew what was happening, the greater part of it was burnt. Demosthenes, who had previously suspected that the Lacedaemonians when they sent in provisions to the besieged had exaggerated their number, saw that the men were more numerous than he had imagined. He saw too the increased zeal of the Athenians, who were now convinced that the attempt was worth making; and the island seemed to him more accessible. So he prepared for the descent, despatching messengers to the allies in the neighbourhood for additional forces and putting all in readiness. Cleon sent and announced to Demosthenes his approach, and soon afterwards, bringing with him the army which he had requested, himself arrived at Pylos. On the meeting of the two generals they first of all sent a herald to the Lacedaemonian force on the mainland, proposing that they should avoid any further risk by ordering the men in the island to surrender with their arms; they were to be placed under surveillance but well treated until a general peace was concluded.

[31] Finding that their proposal was rejected, the Athenians waited for a day, and on the night of the day following put

off, taking with them all their heavy-armed troops, whom they had embarked in a few ships. A little before dawn they landed on both sides of the island, towards the sea and towards the harbour, a force amounting in all to about eight hundred men. They then ran as fast as they could to the first station on the island. Now the disposition of the enemy was as follows: This first station was garrisoned by about thirty hoplites, while the main body under the command of Epitadas was posted near the spring in the centre of the island, where the ground was most level. A small force guarded the furthest extremity of the island opposite Pylos, which was precipitous towards the sea, and on the land side the strongest point of all, being protected to some extent by an ancient wall made of rough stones, which the Spartans thought would be of use to them if they were overpowered and compelled to retreat. Such was the disposition of the Lacedaemonian troops.

[32] The Athenians rushed upon the first garrison and cut them down, half asleep as they were and just snatching up their arms. Their landing had been unobserved, the enemy supposing that the ships were only gone to keep the customary watch for the night. When the dawn appeared, the rest of the army began to disembark. They were the crews of rather more than seventy ships, including all but the lowest rank of rowers, variously equipped. There were also archers to the number of eight hundred, and as many targeteers, besides the Messenian auxiliaries and all who were on duty about Pylos, except the guards who could not be spared from the walls of the fortress. Demosthenes divided them into parties of two hundred more or less, who seized the highest points of the island in order that the enemy, being completely surrounded and distracted by the number of their opponents, might not know whom they should face first, but might be exposed to missiles on every side. For if they attacked those who were in front, they would be assailed by those behind; and if those on one flank, by

those posted on the other; and whichever way they moved, the light-armed troops of the enemy were sure to be in their rear. These were their most embarrassing opponents, because they were armed with bows and javelins and slings and stones, which could be used with effect at a distance. Even to approach them was impossible, for they conquered in their very flight, and when an enemy retreated, pressed close at his heels. Such was the plan of the descent which Demosthenes had in his mind, and which he now carried into execution.

[33] The main body of the Lacedaemonians on the island under Epitadas, when they saw the first garrison cut to pieces and an army approaching them, drew up in battle array. The Athenian hoplites were right in front, and the Lacedaemonians advanced against them, wanting to come to close quarters; but having light-armed adversaries both on their flank and rear, they could not get at them or profit by their own military skill, for they were impeded by a shower of missiles from both sides. Meanwhile the Athenians instead of going to meet them remained in position, while the light-armed again and again ran up and attacked the Lacedaemonians, who drove them back where they pressed closest. But though compelled to retreat they still continued fighting, being lightly equipped and easily getting the start of their enemies. The ground was difficult and rough, the island having been uninhabited; and the Lacedaemonians, who were incumbered by their arms, could not pursue them in such a place.

[34] For some little time these skirmishes continued. But soon the Lacedaemonians became too weary to rush out upon their assailants, who began to be sensible that their resistance grew feebler. The sight of their own number, which was many times that of the enemy, encouraged them more than anything; they soon found that their losses were trifling compared with what they had expected; and familiarity made them think their opponents much less

formidable than when they first landed cowed by the fear of facing Lacedaemonians. They now despised them and with a loud cry rushed upon them in a body, hurling at them stones, arrows, javelins, whichever came first to hand. The shout with which they accompanied the attack dismayed the Lacedaemonians, who were unaccustomed to this kind of warfare. Clouds of dust arose from the newly-burnt wood, and there was no possibility of a man’s seeing what was before him, owing to the showers of arrows and stones hurled by their assailants which were flying amid the dust. And now the Lacedaemonians began to be sorely distressed, for their felt cuirasses did not protect them against the arrows, and the points of the javelins broke off where they struck them. They were at their wits’ end, not being able to see out of their eyes or to hear the word of command, which was drowned by the cries of the enemy. Destruction was staring them in the face, and they had no means or hope of deliverance.

[35] At length, finding that so long as they fought in the same narrow spot more and more of their men were wounded, they closed their ranks and fell back on the last fortification of the island, which was not far off, and where their other garrison was stationed. Instantly the light-armed troops of the Athenians pressed upon them with fresh confidence, redoubling their cries. Those of the Lacedaemonians who were caught by them on the way were killed, but the greater number escaped to the fort and ranged themselves with the garrison, resolved to defend the heights wherever they were assailable. The Athenians followed, but the strength of the position made it impossible to surround and cut them off, and so they attacked them in face and tried to force them back. For a long time, and indeed during the greater part of the day, both armies, although suffering from the battle and thirst and the heat of the sun, held their own; the one endeavouring to thrust their opponents from the high ground, the other determined not

to give way. But the Lacedaemonians now defended themselves with greater ease, because they were not liable to be taken in flank.

[36] There was no sign of the end. At length the general of the Messenian contingent came to Cleon and Demosthenes and told them that the army was throwing away its pains, but if they would give him some archers and light-armed troops and let him find a path by which he might get round in the rear of the Lacedaemonians, he thought that he could force the approach. Having obtained his request he started from a point out of sight of the enemy, and making his way wherever the broken ground afforded a footing and where the cliff was so steep that no guards had been set, he and his men with great difficulty got round unseen and suddenly appeared on the summit in their rear, striking panic into the astonished enemy and redoubling the courage of his own friends who were watching for his reappearance. The Lacedaemonians were now assailed on both sides, and to compare a smaller thing to a greater, were in the same case with their own countrymen at Thermopylae. For as they perished when the Persians found a way round by the path, so now the besieged garrison were attacked on both sides, and no longer resisted. The disparity of numbers, and the failure of bodily strength arising from want of food, compelled them to fall back; and the Athenians were at length masters of the approaches.

[37] Cleon and Demosthenes saw that if the Lacedaemonians gave way one step more they would be destroyed by the Athenians; so they stopped the engagement and held back their own army, for they wanted, if possible, to bring them alive to Athens. They were in hopes that when they heard the offer of terms their courage might be broken, and that they might be induced by their desperate situation to yield up their arms. Accordingly they proclaimed to them that they might, if they would, surrender at discretion to the Athenians themselves and their arms.

[38] Upon hearing the proclamation most of them lowered their shields and waved their hands in token of their willingness to yield. A truce was made, and then Cleon and Demosthenes on the part of the Athenians, and Styphon the son of Pharax on the part of the Lacedaemonians, held a parley. Epitadas, who was the first in command, had been already slain; Hippagretas, who was next in succession, lay among the slain for dead; and Styphon had taken the place of the two others, having been appointed, as the law prescribed, in case anything should happen to them. He and his companions expressed their wish to communicate with the Lacedaemonians on the mainland as to the course which they should pursue. The Athenians allowed none of them to stir, but themselves invited heralds from the shore; and after two or three communications, the herald who came over last from the body of the army brought back word, ‘The Lacedaemonians bid you act as you think best, but you are not to dishonour yourselves.’ Whereupon they consulted together, and then gave up themselves and their arms. During that day and the following night the Athenians kept guard over them; on the next day they set up a trophy on the island and made preparations to sail, distributing the prisoners among the trierarchs. The Lacedaemonians sent a herald and conveyed away their own dead. The number of the dead and the prisoners was as follows: — Four hundred and twenty hoplites in all passed over into the island; of these, two hundred and ninety-two were brought to Athens alive, the remainder had perished. Of the survivors the Spartans numbered about a hundred and twenty. But few Athenians fell, for there was no regular engagement.

[39] Reckoned from the sea-fight to the final battle in the island, the time during which the blockade lasted was ten weeks and two days. For about three weeks the Lacedaemonians were supplied with food while the Spartan ambassadors were gone to solicit peace, but during the rest of this time they lived on what was brought in by stealth. A

store of corn and other provisions was found in the island at the time of the capture; for the commander Epitadas had not served out full rations. The Athenians and Peloponnesians now withdrew their armies from Pylos and returned home. And the mad promise of Cleon was fulfilled; for he did bring back the prisoners within twenty days, as he had said.

[40] Nothing which happened during the war caused greater amazement in Hellas; for it was universally imagined that the Lacedaemonians would never give up their arms, either under the pressure of famine or in any other extremity, but would fight to the last and die sword in hand. No one would believe that those who surrendered were men of the same quality with those who perished. There is a story of a reply made by a captive taken in the island to one of the Athenian allies who had sneeringly asked ‘Where were their brave men all killed?’ He answered that ‘The spindle’ (meaning the arrow) `would be indeed a valuable weapon if it picked out the brave.’ He meant to say that the destruction caused by the arrows and stones was indiscriminate.

[41] On the arrival of the captives the Athenians resolved to put them in chains until peace was concluded, but if in the meantime the Lacedaemonians invaded Attica, to bring them out and put them to death. They placed a garrison in Pylos; and the Messenians of Naupactus, regarding the place as their native land (for Pylos is situated in the territory which was once Messenia), sent thither some of themselves, being such troops as were best suited for the service, who ravaged Laconia and did great harm, because they spoke the same language with the inhabitants. The Lacedaemonians had never before experienced this irregular and predatory warfare; and finding the Helots desert, and dreading some serious domestic calamity, they were in great trouble. Although reluctant to expose their condition before the Athenians, they sent envoys to them and endeavoured to recover Pylos and the prisoners. But the Athenians only raised their terms, and at last, after they had made many

fruitless journeys, dismissed them. Thus ended the affair of Pylos.

[42] During the same summer and immediately afterwards the Athenians attacked the Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand heavy-armed, and cavalry to the number of two hundred conveyed in horse transports. They were accompanied by allies from Miletus, Andros, and Carystus. Nicias the son of Niceratus, and two others, were in command. Very early in the morning they put in between the promontory Chersonesus and the stream Rhetus, to that part of the coast which is overhung by the Solygean ridge; there in ancient times Dorian invaders had taken up their position and fought against their Aeolian enemies in Corinth, and to this day there is a village, called Solygea, on the hill which they occupied. From the beach where the crews landed this village is distant nearly a mile and a half, the city of Corinth about seven miles, and the isthmus about two miles and a quarter. The Corinthians, having had early intimation from Argos of the intended invasion, came in good time to the isthmus. The whole population, with the exception of those who dwelt to the north of the isthmus and five hundred troops who were employed in protecting Ambracia and Leucadia, was on the watch to see where the Athenians would land. But, having sailed in before daylight, they were not discovered; the Corinthians however were soon informed by signals of their landing; and so, leaving half their troops at Cenchreae in case the Athenians should attack Crommyon, they came to the rescue with all speed.

[43] Battus, one of the two generals who were present in the engagement, taking a single division of the force, went to Solygea, intending to protect the village, which was not fortified; Lycophron with the remainder of the army attacked the enemy. The Corinthians first of all assailed the right wing of the Athenians, which had only just landed in front of the Chersonesus, and then engaged with the rest. The conflict was stubborn, and all hand to hand. The Athenians, who

were on the right wing, and the Carystians, who were on the extreme right, received the Corinthians, and with some difficulty drove them back. They retired behind a loose stone wall, and the whole place being a steep hill-side, threw the stones down from above; but soon they raised the paean and again came on. Again the Athenians received them, and another hand-to-hand fight ensued, when a division of the Corinthians coming to the aid of their left wing, forced back the right wing of the Athenians and pursued them to the sea; but the Athenians and Carystians in their turn again drove them back from the ships. Meanwhile the rest of the two armies had been fighting steadily. On the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron was opposed to the Athenian left, the defence was most energetic; for he and his troops were apprehensive that the Athenians would move on the village of Solygea.

[44] For a long time neither would give way, but at length the Athenians, having an advantage in cavalry, with which the Corinthians were unprovided, drove them back, and they retired to the summit of the ridge; where they grounded their arms and remained inactive, refusing to come down. In this defeat of their right wing the Corinthians incurred the heaviest loss, and Lycophron their general was slain. The whole army was now forced back upon the high ground, where they remained in position; they were not pursued far, and made a leisurely retreat. The Athenians seeing that they did not return to the attack, at once erected a trophy and began to spoil the enemies' dead and take up their own. The other half of the Corinthians who were keeping guard at Cenchreae, lest the Athenians should sail against Crommyon, had their view of the battle intercepted by Mount Oneum. But when they saw the dust and knew what was going on, they instantly came to the rescue. The elder men of Corinth hearing of the defeat likewise hastened to the spot. The united army then advanced against the Athenians, who fancying that a reinforcement had come

from the neighbouring states of Peloponnesus, quickly retreated to their ships, taking their spoils and their own dead, with the exception of two whom they could not find; they then embarked and sailed to the neighbouring islands. Thence they sent a herald asking for a truce, and recovered the two dead bodies which were missing. The Corinthians lost two hundred and twelve men; the Athenians hardly so many as fifty.

[45] On the same day the Athenians sailed from the islands to Crommyon, which is in the territory of Corinth, nearly fourteen miles from the city, and, there anchoring, they ravaged the country and encamped for the night. On the following day they sailed along the coast to Epidaurus, where they made a descent, and then passed onward and came to Methonè, which is situated between Epidaurus and Troezen. They built a wall across the isthmus, and so cut off the peninsula on which Methonè stands. There they established a garrison, which continued for some time to ravage the country of Troezen, Halieis, and Epidaurus. The fleet, when the fortification was completed, returned home.

[46] Just about this time Eurymedon and Sophocles, who had started from Pylos on their voyage to Sicily with the Athenian fleet, arrived at Corcyra, and in concert with the popular party attacked the Corcyraean oligarchs, who after the revolution had crossed over into the island and settled in Mount Istonè. Here they had become masters of the country again, and were doing great mischief. The Athenians assaulted and took their fortress; the garrison, who had fled in a body to a peak of the hill, came to terms, agreeing to give up their auxiliaries and surrender their arms, but stipulating that their own fate should be decided by the Athenian people. The garrison themselves were conveyed by the generals to the island of Ptychia and kept there under a promise of safety until they could be sent to Athens; on condition however that if any of them were caught attempting to escape, they should all lose the benefit of the

agreement. Now the leaders of the Corcyraean democracy feared that when the captives arrived at Athens they would not be put to death; so they devised the following trick: — They sent to the island friends of the captives, whom with seeming good-will they instructed to tell them that they had better escape as fast as they could, for the fact was that the Athenian generals were about to hand them over to the Corcyraean democracy; they would themselves provide a vessel.

[47] The friends of the captives persuaded a few of them, and the vessel was provided. The prisoners were taken sailing out; the truce was at an end, and they were all instantly delivered up to the Corcyraeans. The feeling which the Athenian generals displayed greatly contributed to the result; for, being compelled to proceed to Sicily themselves, they were well known to wish that no one else should gain the credit of bringing the prisoners to Athens; and therefore the agreement was interpreted to the letter, and the contrivers of the trick thought that they could execute it with impunity. The Corcyraeans took the prisoners and shut them up in a large building; then, leading them out in bands of twenty at a time, they made them pass between two files of armed men; they were bound to one another and struck and pierced by the men on each side, whenever any one saw among them an enemy of his own; and there were men with whips, who accompanied them to the place of execution and quickened the steps of those who lingered.

[48] In this manner they brought the prisoners out of the building, and slew them to the number of sixty undiscovered by the rest, who thought that they were taking them away to some other place. But soon they found out what was happening, for some one told them, and then they called upon the Athenians, if they wanted them to die, to take their lives themselves. Out of the building they refused to stir, and threatened that into it, if they could help, no one should enter. The Corcyraean populace had not the least intention

of forcing a way in by the door, but they got upon the roof and, making an opening, threw tiles and shot arrows down from above. The prisoners sought to shelter themselves as they best could. Most of them at the same time put an end to their own lives; some thrust into their throats arrows which were shot at them, others strangled themselves with cords taken from beds which they found in the place, or with strips which they tore from their own garments. This went on during the greater part of the night, which had closed upon their sufferings, until in one way or another, either by their own hand or by missiles hurled from above, they all perished. At daybreak the Corcyraeans flung the dead bodies cross-wise on waggons and carried them out of the city. The women who were taken in the fortress on Mount Istonè were reduced to slavery. Thus the Corcyraeans in the mountain were destroyed by the people, and, at least while the Peloponnesian war lasted, there was an end of the great sedition; for there was nothing left of the other party worth mentioning. The Athenians then sailed for Sicily, their original destination, and there fought in concert with their allies.

[49] At the end of the summer the Athenian forces in Naupactus and some Acarnanians made an expedition against Anactorium, a Corinthian town at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, which was betrayed to them. The Acarnanians expelled the Corinthians, and sent a colony of their own, taken from the whole nation, to occupy the place. So the summer ended.

[50] During the ensuing winter Aristides the son of Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian vessels which collected tribute from the allies, captured, at Eion upon the Strymon, Artaphernes a Persian, who was on his way from the King to Sparta. He was brought to Athens, and the Athenians had the despatches which he was carrying and which were written in the Assyrian character translated, and read them; there were many matters contained in them,

but the chief point was a remonstrance addressed to the Lacedaemonians by the King, who said that he could not understand what they wanted; for, although many envoys had come to him, no two of them agreed. If they meant to make themselves intelligible, he desired them to send to him another embassy with the Persian envoy. Shortly afterwards the Athenians sent Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and with him an embassy of their own, but they found that Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes had recently died; for the embassy arrived just at that time. Whereupon they returned home.

[51] During the same winter the Chians dismantled their new walls by order of the Athenians, who suspected that they meant to rebel, not however without obtaining from the Athenians such pledges and assurances as they could, that no violent change should be made in their condition. So the winter came to an end; and with it the seventh year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

[52] Early in the ensuing summer there was a partial eclipse of the sun at the time of the new moon, and within the first ten days of the same month an earthquake.

The main body of the refugees who had escaped from Mitylenè and the rest of Lesbos had established themselves on the continent. They hired mercenaries from Peloponnesus or collected them on the spot, and took Rhoeteum, but on receiving a payment of two thousand Phocaean staters, they restored the town uninjured. They then made an expedition against Antandrus and took the city, which was betrayed into their hands. They hoped to liberate the other so-called ‘cities of the coast,’ which had been formerly in the possession of the Mytilenaeans and were now held by the Athenians, but their principal object was Antandrus itself, which they intended to strengthen and make their head-quarters. Mount Ida was near and would furnish timber for shipbuilding, and by the help of a fleet and by other means they could easily harass Lesbos which was close at hand,

and reduce the Aeolian towns on the continent. Such were their designs.

[53] During the same summer the Athenians with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, and a few cavalry, taking also certain Milesian and other allied forces, made an expedition against Cythera, under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus the son of Diotrephes, and Autocles the son of Tolmaeus. Cythera is an island which lies close to Laconia off Cape Malea; it is inhabited by Lacedaemonian Perioeci, and a Spartan officer called the judge of Cythera was sent thither every year. The Lacedaemonians kept there a garrison of hoplites, which was continually relieved, and took great care of the place. There the merchant vessels coming from Egypt and Libya commonly put in; the island was a great protection to the Lacedaemonians against depredation by sea, on which element, though secure by land, they were exposed to attack, for the whole of Laconia runs out towards the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

[54] The Athenian fleet appeared off Cythera, and with a detachment of ten ships and two thousand Milesian hoplites took Scandea, one of the cities on the sea-shore. The rest of their army disembarked on the side of the island looking towards Malea, and moved on to the lower city of the Cytherians, which is also on the sea-coast; there they found all the inhabitants encamped in force. A battle was fought in which the Cytherians held their ground for some little time, and then, betaking themselves to flight, retired to the upper city. They at length surrendered to Nicias and his colleagues, placing themselves at the disposal of the Athenians, but stipulating that their lives should be spared. Nicias had already contrived to enter into communication with some of them, and in consequence the negotiations were speedier, and lighter terms were imposed upon them both at the time and afterwards. Else the Athenians would have expelled them, because they were Lacedaemonians and their island was close to Laconia. After the capitulation they took into

their own hands Scandea, the city near the harbour, and secured the island by a garrison. They then sailed away, made descents upon Asinè, Helos, and most of the other maritime towns of Laconia, and, encamping wherever they found convenient, ravaged the country for about seven days.

[55] The Lacedaemonians seeing that the Athenians had got possession of Cythera, and anticipating similar descents on their own shores, nowhere opposed them with their united forces, but distributed a body of hoplites in garrisons through the country where their presence seemed to be needed. They kept strict watch, fearing lest some domestic revolution should break out. Already a great and unexpected blow had fallen upon them at Sphacteria; Pylos and Cythera were in the hands of the Athenians, and they were beset on every side by an enemy against whose swift attacks precaution was vain. Contrary to their usual custom they raised a force of four hundred cavalry and archers. Never in their history had they shown so much hesitation in their military movements. They were involved in a war at sea, an element to which they were strange, against a power like the Athenians, in whose eyes to miss an opportunity was to lose a victory. Fortune too was against them, and they were panic-stricken by the many startling reverses which had befallen them within so short a time. They feared lest some new calamity like that of the island might overtake them; and therefore they dared not venture on an engagement, but expected all their undertakings to fail; they had never hitherto known misfortune, and now they lost all confidence in their own powers.

[56] While the Athenians were ravaging their coasts they hardly ever stirred; for each garrison at the places where they happened to land considered in their depressed state of mind that they were too few to act. One of them however, which was in the neighbourhood of Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, did offer some resistance, and by a sudden rush put to flight

the multitude of light-armed troops who had been scattered, but, being encountered by the hoplites, they again retired with the loss of some few men and arms. The Athenians, raising a trophy, sailed back to Cythera. Thence they coasted round to Epidaurus Limera and, after devastating some part of its territory, to Thyrea, which is situated in the country called Cynuria, on the border of Argolis and Laconia. The Lacedaemonians, who at that time held the town, had settled there the Aeginetan exiles, whom they wished to requite for services rendered to them at the time of the earthquake and the Helot revolt, and also because they had always been partisans of theirs, although subjects of the Athenians.

[57] Before the Athenian ships had actually touched, the Aeginetans quitted a fort on the sea-shore which they were just building and retired to the upper city, where they lived, a distance of rather more than a mile. One of the country garrisons of the Lacedaemonians which was helping to build the fort was entreated by the Aeginetans to enter the walls, but refused, thinking that to be shut up inside them would be too dangerous. So they ascended to the high ground, and then, considering the enemy to be more than a match for them, would not come down. Meanwhile the Athenians landed, marched straight upon Thyrea with their whole army, and took it. They burnt and plundered the city, and carried away with them to Athens all the Aeginetans who had not fallen in the battle, and the Lacedaemonian governor of the place, Tantalus the son of Patrocles, who had been wounded and taken prisoner. They also had on board a few of the inhabitants of Cythera, whose removal seemed to be required as a measure of precaution. These the Athenians determined to deposit in some of the islands; at the same time they allowed the other Cytherians to live in their own country, paying a tribute of four talents. They resolved to kill all the Aeginetans whom they had taken in satisfaction of

their long-standing hatred, and to put Tantalus in chains along with the captives from Sphacteria.

[58] During the same summer the people of Camarina and Gela in Sicily made a truce, in the first instance with one another only. But after a while all the other Sicilian states sent envoys to Gela, where they held a conference in the hope of effecting a reconciliation. Many opinions were expressed on both sides; and the representatives of the different cities wrangled and put in claims for the redress of their several grievances. At length Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a Syracusan, whose words chiefly influenced their decision, addressed the conference in the following speech:

[59] ‘Sicilians, the city to which I belong is not the least in Sicily, nor am I about to speak because Syracuse suffers more than other cities in the war, but because I want to lay before you the policy which seems to me best fitted to promote the common good of the whole country. You well know, and therefore I shall not rehearse to you at length, all the misery of war. Nobody is driven into war by ignorance, and no one who thinks that he will gain anything from it is deterred by fear. The truth is that the aggressor deems the advantage to be greater than the suffering; and the side which is attacked would sooner run any risk than suffer the smallest immediate loss. But when such feelings on the part of either operate unseasonably, the time for offering counsels of peace has arrived, and such counsels, if we will only listen to them, will be at this moment invaluable to us. Why did we go to war? Simply from a consideration of our own individual interests, and with a view to our interests we are now trying by means of discussion to obtain peace; and if, after all, we do not before we separate succeed in getting our respective rights, we shall go to war again.

[60] ‘But at the same time we should have the sense to see that this conference is not solely concerned with our private interests, but with those of the whole country. Sicily is in my opinion at this moment imperilled by the designs of the

Athenians, and we must try, if not too late, to save her. The Athenians are a much more convincing argument of peace than any words of mine can be. They are the greatest power in Hellas; they come hither with a few ships to spy out our mistakes; though we are their natural enemies, they assume the honourable name of allies, and under this flimsy pretence turn our enmity to good account. For when we go to war and invite their assistance (and they are fond of coming whether they are invited or not) we are taxing ourselves for our own destruction, and at the same time paving the way for the advance of their empire. And at some future day, when they see that we are exhausted, they are sure to come again with a larger armament, and attempt to bring all Sicily under their yoke.

[61] ‘And yet if we must call in allies and involve ourselves in dangers, as men of sense, looking to the interest of our several states, we should set before us the prospect of gaining an increase of dominion, not of losing what we already have. We should consider that internal quarrels more than anything else are the ruin of Sicily and her cities; we Sicilians are fighting against one another at the very time when we are threatened by a common enemy. Knowing this, we should be reconciled man to man, city to city, and make an united effort for the preservation of all Sicily. Let no one say to himself, “The Dorians among us may be enemies to the Athenians, but the Chalcidians, being Ionians, are safe because they are their kinsmen.” For the Athenians do not attack us because we are divided into two races, of which one is their enemy and the other their friend, but because they covet the good things of Sicily which we all share alike. Is not their reception of the Chalcidian appeal a proof of this? They have actually gone out of their way to grant the full privileges of their old treaty to those who up to this hour have never aided them as required by the terms of that treaty. The ambition and craft of the Athenians are pardonable enough. I blame not those who wish to rule, but

those who are willing to serve. The same human nature which is always ready to domineer over the subservient, bids us defend ourselves against the aggressor. And if, knowing all these things, we continue to take no thought for the future, and have not, every one of us, made up our minds already that first and foremost we must all deal wisely with the danger which threatens all, we are grievously in error.

'Now a mutual reconciliation would be the speediest way of deliverance from this danger; for the Athenians do not come direct from their own country, but first plant themselves in that of the Sicilians who have invited them. Instead of finishing one war only to begin another, we should then quietly end our differences by peace. And those who came at our call and had so good a reason for doing wrong will have a still better reason for going away and doing nothing.

[62] 'Such is the great advantage which we obtain by sound policy as against the Athenians. And why, if peace is acknowledged by all to be the greatest of blessings, should we not make peace among ourselves? Whatever good or evil is the portion of any of us, is not peace more likely than war to preserve the one and to alleviate the other? And has not peace honours and glories of her own unattended by the dangers of war? (But it is unnecessary to dilate on the blessings of peace any more than on the miseries of war.) Consider what I am saying, and instead of despising my words, may every man seek his own safety in them! And should there be some one here present who was hoping to gain a permanent advantage either by right or by force, let him not take his disappointment to heart. For he knows that many a man before now who has sought a righteous revenge, far from obtaining it, has not even escaped himself; and many an one who in the consciousness of power has grasped at what was another's, has ended by losing what was his own. The revenge of a wrong is not always successful merely because it is just; nor is strength most

assured of victory when it is most full of hope. The inscrutable future is the controller of events, and, being the most treacherous of all things, is also the most beneficent; for when there is mutual fear, men think twice before they make aggressions upon one another.

[63] ‘And now, because we know not what this hidden future may bring forth, and because the Athenians, who are dangerous enemies, are already at our gates, — having these two valid reasons for alarm, let us acquiesce in our disappointment, deeming that the obstacles to the fulfilment of our individual hopes are really insuperable. Let us send out of the country the enemies who threaten us, and make peace among ourselves, if possible for ever; but if not, for as long as we can, and let our private enmities bide their time. If you take my advice, rest assured that you will maintain the freedom of your several cities; from which you will go forth your own masters, and recompense, like true men, the good or evil which is done to you. But if you will not believe me, and we are enslaved by others, the punishment of our enemies will be out of the question. Even supposing we succeed in obtaining vengeance to our hearts’ content, we may perhaps become the friends of our greatest enemies, we certainly become the enemies of our real friends.

[64] ‘As I said at first, I am the representative of a great city which is more likely to act on the aggressive than on the defensive; and yet with the prospect of these dangers before me I am willing to come to terms, and not to injure my enemies in such a way that I shall doubly injure myself. Nor am I so obstinate and foolish as to imagine that, because I am master of my own will, I can control fortune, of whom I am not master; but I am disposed to make reasonable concessions. And I would ask the other Sicilians to do the same of their own accord, and not to wait until the enemy compels them. There is no disgrace in kinsmen yielding to kinsmen, whether Dorians to Dorians, or Chalcidians to the

other Ionians. Let us remember too that we are all neighbours, inhabitants of one island home, and called by the common name of Sicilians. When we see occasion we will fight among ourselves, and will negotiate and come to terms among ourselves. But we shall always, if we are wise, unite as one man against the invader; for when a single state suffers, all are imperilled. We will never again introduce allies from abroad, no, nor pretended mediators. This policy will immediately secure to Sicily two great blessings; she will get rid of the Athenians, and of civil war. And for the future we shall keep the island free and our own, and none will be tempted to attack us.'

[65] Such were the words of Hermocrates. The Sicilians took his advice and agreed among themselves to make peace, on the understanding that they should all retain what they had; only Morgantinè was handed over to the Camarinaeans, who were to pay in return a fixed sum to the Syracusans. The cities in alliance with Athens sent for the Athenian generals and told them that a treaty was about to be made in which they might join if they pleased. They assented; the treaty was concluded; and so the Athenian ships sailed away from Sicily. When the generals returned the Athenians punished two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, with exile, and imposed a fine on the third, Eurymedon, believing that they might have conquered Sicily but had been bribed to go away. For in their present prosperity they were indignant at the idea of a reverse; they expected to accomplish everything, possible or impossible, with any force, great or small. The truth was that they were elated by the unexpected success of most of their enterprises, which inspired them with the liveliest hope.

[66] During the same summer the citizens of Megara were hard pressed by the Athenians, who twice every year invaded the country with their whole army, as well as by their own exiles in Pegae, who had been driven out by the people in a revolution, and were continually harassing and

plundering them. So they conferred together upon the advisability of recalling the exiles, lest they should expose the city to destruction from the attacks of two enemies at once. The friends of the exiles became aware of the agitation and ventured to urge the measure more openly than hitherto. But the popular leaders, knowing that their partisans were in great extremity and could not be trusted to hold out in support of them much longer, took alarm and entered into negotiation with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates the son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes. They thought that they would incur less danger by surrendering the city to them than by the restoration of the exiles whom they had themselves expelled. So they agreed that the Athenians should in the first place seize their Long Walls, which were a little less than a mile in length and extended from the city to their harbour Nisaea. They wanted to prevent the Peloponnesians intefering from Nisaea, of which they formed the sole garrison, being stationed there to secure Megara. The conspirators were then to try and place in the hands of the Athenians the upper city, which would be more ready to come over when they once had possession of the Long Walls.

[67] Both parties had now made all necessary preparations, both in word and act. The Athenians sailed at nightfall to Minoa, the island in front of Megara, with six hundred hoplites under the command of Hippocrates. They then took up their position not far from the Long Walls, in a pit out of which the bricks for the walls had been dug. A second division of the Athenian army, consisting of light-armed Plataeans and of a part of the force employed in guarding the frontier, under the command of Demosthenes the other general, lay in ambush at the temple of Ares, which is nearer still. During the night no one knew what they were about, except the men who were immediately concerned. Just before daybreak the conspirators executed their plan. They had long ago provided that the gates should be open when

required; for by the permission of the commander, who supposed them to be privateering, they had been in the habit of conveying a sculling-boat out of the town by night. This they placed upon a waggon, and carried it down to the sea through the trench; they then sailed out, and just before day broke the boat was brought back by them on the waggon and taken in at the gates; their object being, as they pretended, to baffle the Athenian watch at Minoa, as no vessel would be seen in the harbour at all. The waggon had just arrived at the gates, which were opened for the boat to enter, when the Athenians, with whom the whole affair had been preconcerted, seeing this movement, rushed out of the ambuscade, wanting to get in before the gates were shut again and while the waggon was still in them, and prevented them from being closed. At the same instant their Megarian confederates cut down the guards stationed at the gates. First of all the Plataeans and the frontier-guard under Demosthenes rushed in where the trophy now stands. No sooner were they within the gates than the Peloponnesians who were nearest and saw what was going on hastened to the rescue; but they were overpowered by the Plataeans, who secured the gates for the entrance of the Athenian hoplites as they came running up.

[68] Then the Athenians entered, and one after another proceeded to mount the wall. A few Peloponnesian guards at first resisted and some of them were killed; but the greater part took to flight; they were terrified at the night attack of the enemy, and fancied, when they saw the Megarians who were in the conspiracy fighting against them, that all the Megarians had betrayed them. It had occurred at the same time to the Athenian herald, without orders, to make proclamation that any Megarian who pleased might join the ranks of the Athenians. When the Lacedaemonians heard the proclamation none of them remained any longer, but thinking that the Megarians were really fighting on the Athenian side they fled, into Nisaea.

When the morning dawned and the Long Walls were already captured, Megara was in a tumult, and those who had negotiated with the Athenians and a large number of others who were in the plot insisted upon opening the gates and going out to battle. Now they had agreed that the Athenians should immediately rush in; and they were themselves to be anointed with oil; this was the mark by which they were to be distinguished, that they might be spared in the attack. There was the less danger in opening the gates, since there had now arrived four thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred horse, who by a previous arrangement had come from Eleusis during the night. When they were anointed and had collected about the gates some one in the secret acquainted the other party, who instantly came upon them in a compact body and declared that there should be no going out; even when they were stronger than at present they had not ventured to take the field; the danger to the city was too palpable; if any one opposed them the battle would have to be fought first within the walls. They did not betray their knowledge of the plot, but assumed the confident tone of men who were recommending the best course. At the same time they kept watch about the gates; and thus the conspiracy was foiled.

[69] The Athenian generals became aware that some difficulty had arisen, and that they could not carry the city by storm. So they immediately set about the circumvallation of Nisaea, thinking that, if they could take it before any assistance arrived, Megara itself would be more likely to capitulate. Iron and other things needful, as well as masons, were quickly procured from Athens. Beginning from the wall which they already held they intercepted the approach from Megara by a cross wall, and from that drew another on either side of Nisaea down to the sea. The army divided among them the execution of the trench and walls, obtaining stones and bricks from the suburbs of the town. They also cut down timber and fruit-trees and made palisades where they were

needed. The houses in the suburbs were of themselves a sufficient fortification, and only required battlements. All that day they continued working; on the following day, towards evening, the wall was nearly finished, and the terrified inhabitants of Nisaea having no food (for they depended for their daily supplies on the upper city), and imagining that Megara had gone over to the enemy, despairing too of any aid soon arriving from Peloponnesus, capitulated to the Athenians. The conditions were as follows: They were to go free, every man paying a fixed ransom and giving up his arms; but the Athenians might deal as they pleased with the Lacedaemonian commander and any Lacedaemonian who was in the place. Upon these terms they came out, and the Athenians, having broken down the Long Walls between Megara and Nisaea, took possession of Nisaea and prepared for further action.

[70] But it so happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, the Lacedaemonian, who was equipping an expedition intended for Chalcidicè, was in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth at the time. Hearing of the capture of the Long Walls, and fearing for the safety of the Peloponnesians in Nisaea, and of Megara itself, he sent to the Boeotians, desiring them to bring an army and meet him with all speed at Tripodiscus. The place so called is a village of Megara situated under Mount Geranea. Thither he also came himself, bringing two thousand seven hundred Corinthian, four hundred Phliasian, and six hundred Sicyonian hoplites, as well as the followers whom he had previously collected. He had hoped to find Nisaea still untaken; but the news of the capture reached him on his exit from the hills at Tripodiscus, where he did not arrive until night. He immediately took with him a body of three hundred chosen men, and before his arrival in the country was reported reached Megara, undiscovered by the Athenians, who were near the sea. He professed that he wanted, and he really meant if he could, to attempt the recovery of Nisaea; but the

great point was to get into Megara and make that safe. So he demanded admission, saying that he had hopes of regaining Nisaea.

[71] The two factions in Megara were both equally afraid to receive him — the one lest he should introduce the exiles and drive them out, the other lest the people, fearing this very thing, should set upon them and ruin the city, which would then be distracted by civil war and at the same time beset by the Athenians. And so both parties determined to wait and see what would happen. For they both expected a battle to ensue between the Athenians and the army which had come to the relief of the city, and when the victory was won the party whose friends had conquered could more safely join them. Brasidas, thus failing in his purpose, returned to the main body of his troops.

[72] At dawn of day the Boeotians appeared. Even before they were summoned by Brasidas they had intended to relieve Megara; for the danger came home to them; and their whole force was already collected at Plataea. When his messenger arrived they were more resolved than ever, and sent forward two thousand two hundred heavy-armed and six hundred horse, allowing the greater number to return. The entire army of Brasidas now amounted to six thousand hoplites. The Athenian hoplites were drawn up near Nisaea and the sea, and their light-armed troops were scattered over the plain, when the Boeotian cavalry came riding up, fell upon the light-armed, and drove them to the shore. The attack was unexpected, for in no former invasion had aid come to the Megarians from any quarter. The Athenian cavalry now rode forward and there was a long engagement, in which both parties claimed to have won a victory. The Athenians drove the general of the Boeotian cavalry and a few other horsemen up to the walls of Nisaea, and there slew them and took their arms. As they retained possession of the dead bodies, and only restored them under a flag of truce, they raised a trophy. Still in respect of the whole

engagement neither side when they parted had a decided advantage. The Boeotians retired to their main body, and the Athenians to Nisaea.

[73] Brasidas and his army then moved nearer to the sea and to the town of Megara, and there, taking up a convenient position and marshalling their forces, they remained without moving. They were expecting the Athenians to attack them, and knew that the Megarians were waiting to see who would be the conquerors. They were very well satisfied, for two reasons. In the first place they were not the assailants, and had not gone out of their way to risk a battle, although they had clearly shown that they were ready to engage; and so they might fairly claim a victory without fighting. Again, the result in regard to Megara was good: for if they had not put in an appearance they would have had no chance at all, but would have been as good as beaten, and beyond a doubt would immediately have lost the city. Whereas now the Athenians themselves might be unwilling to fight; and, if so, they would gain their object without striking a blow. And this turned out to be the fact; for the Megarians did in the end receive Brasidas. At first the Athenians came out and drew up near the Long Walls, but not being attacked they likewise remained inactive. The generals on their side were restrained by similar reflections. They had gained the greater part of what they wanted; they would be offering battle against a superior force; and their own danger would be out of proportion to that of the enemy. They might be victorious and take Megara, but if they failed the loss would fall on the flower of their infantry. Whereas the Peloponnesians were naturally more willing to encounter a risk which would be divided among the several contingents making up the army now in the field; and each of these was but a part of their whole force, present and absent. Both armies waited for a time, and, when neither saw the other moving, the Athenians first of the two retired into Nisaea and the Peloponnesians returned to their previous position.

Whereupon the party in Megara friendly to the exiles took courage, opened the gates, and received Brasidas and the generals of the other cities, considering that the Athenians had finally made up their minds not to fight, and that he was the conqueror. They then entered into negotiations with him; for the other faction which had conspired with the Athenians was now paralysed.

[74] After this the allies dispersed to their several cities and Brasidas returned to Corinth, where he made preparations for his expedition into Chalcidicè, his original destination. When the Athenians had also gone home, such of the Megarians as had been chiefly concerned with them, knowing that they were discovered, at once slipped away. The rest of the citizens, after conferring with the friends of the exiles, recalled them from Pegae, first binding them by the most solemn oaths to consider the interests of the state and to forget old quarrels. But no sooner had they come into office than, taking the opportunity of a review and drawing up the divisions apart from one another, they selected about a hundred of their enemies, and of those who seemed to have been most deeply implicated with the Athenians, and compelled the people to give sentence upon them by an open vote; having obtained their condemnation, they put them to death. They then established in the city an extreme oligarchy. And no government based on a counter revolution effected by so few ever lasted so long a time.

[75] During the same summer Demodocus and Aristides, two commanders of the Athenian fleet which collected tribute from the allies, happened to be in the neighbourhood of the Hellespont; there were only two of them, the third, Lamachus, having sailed with ten ships into the Pontus. They saw that the Lesbian exiles were going to strengthen Antandrus as they had intended, and they feared that it would prove as troublesome an enemy to Lesbos as Anaea had been to Samos; for the Samian refugees, who had settled there, aided the Peloponnesian navy by sending

them pilots; they likewise took in fugitives from Samos and kept the island in a state of perpetual alarm. So the Athenian generals collected troops from their allies, sailed to Antandrus, and, defeating a force which came out against them, recovered the place. Not long afterwards Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus and had anchored in the territory of Heraclea at the mouth of the river Calex, lost his ships by a sudden flood which a fall of rain in the upper country had brought down. He and his army returned by land through the country of the Bithynian Thracians who dwell on the Asiatic coast across the water, and arrived at Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

[76] In the same summer, and immediately after the withdrawal of the Athenians from Megara, the Athenian general Demosthenes arrived at Naupactus with forty ships. A party in the cities of Boeotia, who wanted to overthrow their constitution and set up a democracy like that of Athens, had entered into communications with him and with Hippocrates, and a plan of operations had been concerted, chiefly under the direction of Ptoeodorus, a Theban exile. Some of the democratical party undertook to betray Siphae, which is a seaport on the Crisaean Gulf in the Thespian territory, and certain Orchomenians were to deliver up to the Athenians Chaeronea, which is a dependency of the Boeotian, or as it was formerly called the Minyan, Orchomenus. A body of Orchomenian exiles had a principal hand in this design and were seeking to hire a Peloponnesian force. The town of Chaeronea is at the extremity of Boeotia near the territory of Phanoteus in Phocis, and some Phocians took part in the plot. The Athenians meanwhile were to seize Delium, a temple of Apollo which is in the district of Tanagra and looks towards Euboea. In order to keep the Boeotians occupied with disturbances at home, and prevent them from marching in a body to Delium, the whole movement was to be made on a single day, which was fixed beforehand. If the attempt

succeeded and Delium was fortified, even though no revolution should at once break out in the states of Boeotia, they might hold the places which they had taken and plunder the country. The partisans of democracy in the several cities would have a refuge near at hand to which in case of failure they might retreat. Matters could not long remain as they were; and in time, the Athenians acting with the rebels, and the Boeotian forces being divided, they would easily settle Boeotia in their interest. Such was the nature of the proposed attempt.

[77] Hippocrates himself with a force from the city was ready to march into Boeotia when the moment came. He had sent Demosthenes beforehand with the forty ships to Naupactus, intending him to collect an army of Acarnanians and other allies of the Athenians in that region and sail against Siphae, which was to be betrayed to them. These operations were to be carried out simultaneously on the day appointed.

Demosthenes on his arrival found that the confederate Acarnanians had already compelled Oeniadae to enter the Athenian alliance. He then himself raised all the forces of the allies in those parts and proceeded first to make war upon Salynthius and the Agraeans. Having subdued them, he took the necessary steps for keeping his appointment at Siphae.

[78] During this summer, and about the same time, Brasidas set out on his way to Chalcidicè with seventeen hundred hoplites. When he arrived at Heraclea in Trachis he despatched a messenger to Pharsalus, where he had friends, with a request that they would conduct him and his army through the country. Accordingly there came to meet him at Melitia, in Achaea Phthiotis, Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus who was the proxenus of the Chalcidians. Under their guidance he started. Other Thessalians also conducted him; in particular, Niconidas a friend of Perdiccas from Larissa. Under any circumstances it would not have been easy to cross Thessaly without an escort, and certainly for an armed force to go through a

neighbour’s country without his consent was a proceeding which excited jealousy among all Hellenes. Besides, the common people of Thessaly were always well disposed towards the Athenians. And if the traditions of the country had not been in favour of a close oligarchy, Brasidas could never have gone on; even as it was, some of the opposite party met him on his march at the river Enipeus and would have stopped him, saying that he had no business to proceed without the consent of the whole nation. His escort replied that they would not conduct him if the others objected, but that he had suddenly presented himself and they were doing the duty of hosts in accompanying him. Brasidas himself added that he came as a friend to the Thessalian land and people, and that he was making war upon his enemies the Athenians, and not upon them. He had never heard that there was any ill-feeling between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians which prevented either of them from passing through the territory of the other; however, if they refused their consent, he would not and indeed could not go on; but such was not the treatment which he had a right to expect from them. Upon this they departed, and he by the advice of his escort, fearing that a large force might collect and stop him, marched on at full speed and without a halt. On the same day on which he started from Melitia he arrived at Pharsalus, and encamped by the river Apidanus. Thence he went on to Phacium, and thence to Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian escort returned; and the Perrhaebians, who are subjects of the Thessalians, brought him safe to Dium in the territory of Perdiccas, a city of Macedonia which is situated under Mount Olympus on the Thessalian side.

[79] Thus Brasidas succeeded in running through Thessaly before any measures were taken to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidicè. He and the revolted tributaries of the Athenians, alarmed at their recent successes, had invited the Peloponnesians. The Chalcidians were expecting

that the first efforts of the Athenians would be directed against them: their cities in the neighbourhood also which had not revolted secretly joined in the invitation. Perdiccas was not a declared enemy of Athens, but was afraid that the old differences between himself and the Athenians might revive, and he was especially anxious to subdue Arrhibaeus, king of the Lyncestians.

[80] The Lacedaemonians were the more willing to let the Chalcidians have an army from Peloponnesus owing to the unfortunate state of their affairs. For now that the Athenians were infesting Peloponnesus, and especially Laconia, they thought that a diversion would be best effected if they could retaliate on them by sending troops to help their dissatisfied allies, who moreover were offering to maintain them, and had asked for assistance from Sparta with the intention of revolting. They were also glad of a pretext for sending out of the way some of the Helots, fearing that they would take the opportunity of rising afforded by the occupation of Pylos. Most of the Lacedaemonian institutions were specially intended to secure them against this source of danger. Once, when they were afraid of the number and vigour of the Helot youth, this was what they did: They proclaimed that a selection would be made of those Helots who claimed to have rendered the best service to the Lacedaemonians in war, and promised them liberty. The announcement was intended to test them; it was thought that those among them who were foremost in asserting their freedom would be most high-spirited, and most likely to rise against their masters. So they selected about two thousand, who were crowned with garlands and went in procession round the temples; they were supposed to have received their liberty; but not long afterwards the Spartans put them all out of the way, and no man knew how any one of them came by his end. And so they were only too glad to send with Brasidas seven hundred Helots as hoplites. The rest of his army he

hired from Peloponnesus. He himself was even more willing to go than they were to send him.

[81] The Chalcidians too desired to have him, for at Sparta he had always been considered a man of energy. And on this expedition he proved invaluable to the Lacedaemonians. At the time he gave an impression of justice and moderation in his behaviour to the cities, which induced most of them to revolt, while others were betrayed into his hands. Thus the Lacedaemonians were able to lighten the pressure of war upon Peloponnesus; and when shortly afterwards they desired to negotiate, they had places to give in return for what they sought to recover. And at a later period of the war, after the Sicilian expedition, the honesty and ability of Brasidas which some had experienced, and of which others had heard the fame, mainly attracted the Athenian allies to the Lacedaemonians. For he was the first Spartan who had gone out to them, and he proved himself to be in every way a good man. Thus he left in their minds a firm conviction that the others would be like him.

[82] The Athenians, hearing of the arrival of Brasidas in Chalcidicè, and believing that Perdiccas was the instigator of the expedition, declared war against the latter and kept a closer watch over their allies in that region.

[83] Perdiccas, at once uniting the soldiers of Brasidas with his own forces, made war upon Arrhibaeus the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestians, a neighbouring people of Macedonia; for he had a quarrel with him and wanted to subdue him. But when he and Brasidas and the army arrived at the pass leading into Lyncus, Brasidas said that before appealing to arms he should like to try in person the effect of negotiations, and see if he could not make Arrhibaeus an ally of the Lacedaemonians. He was partly influenced by messages which came from Arrhibaeus expressing his willingness to submit any matter in dispute to the arbitration of Brasidas: and the Chalcidian ambassadors who accompanied the expedition recommended him not to

remove from Perdiccas' path all his difficulties, lest, when they were wanting him for their own affairs, his ardour should cool. Besides, the envoys of Perdiccas when at Sparta had said something to the Lacedaemonians about his making many of the neighbouring tribes their allies, and on this ground Brasidas claimed to act jointly with Perdiccas in the matter of Arrhibaeus. But Perdiccas answered that he had not brought Brasidas there to arbitrate in the quarrels of Macedonia; he had meant him to destroy his enemies when he pointed them out. While he, Perdiccas, was maintaining half the Lacedaemonian army, Brasidas had no business to be holding parley with Arrhibaeus. But in spite of the opposition and resentment of Perdiccas, Brasidas communicated with Arrhibaeus, and was induced by his words to withdraw his army without invading the country. From that time Perdiccas thought himself ill-used, and paid only a third instead of half the expenses of the army.

[84] During the same summer, immediately on his return from Lyncus, and a little before the vintage, Brasidas, reinforced by Chalcidian troops, marched against Acanthus, a colony of Andros. The inhabitants of the city were not agreed about admitting him; those who in concert with the Chalcidians had invited him being opposed to the mass of the people. So he asked them to receive him alone, and hear what he had to say before they decided; and to this request the multitude, partly out of fear for their still ungathered vintage, were induced to consent. Whereupon, coming forward to the people (and for a Lacedaemonian he was not a bad speaker), he addressed them as follows:

[85] 'Men of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me out at the head of this army to justify the declaration which we made at the beginning of the war — that we were going to fight against the Athenians for the liberties of Hellas. If we have been long in coming, the reason is that we were disappointed in the result of the war nearer home; for we had hoped that, without involving you in danger, we might

ourselves have made a speedy end of the Athenians. And therefore let no one blame us; we have come as soon as we could, and with your help will do our best to overthrow them. But how is it that you close your gates against me, and do not greet my arrival? We Lacedaemonians thought that we were coming to those who even before we came in act were our allies in spirit, and would joyfully receive us; having this hope we have braved the greatest dangers, marching for many days through a foreign country, and have shown the utmost zeal in your cause. And now, for you to be of another mind and to set yourselves against the liberties of your own city and of all Hellas would be monstrous! The evil is not only that you resist me yourselves, but wherever I go people will be less likely to join me; they will take it amiss when they hear that you to whom I first came, representing a powerful city and reputed to be men of sense, did not receive me, and I shall not be able to give a satisfactory explanation, but shall have to confess either that I offer a spurious liberty, or that I am weak and incapable of protecting you against the threatened attack of the Athenians. And yet when I brought assistance to Nisaea in command of the army which I have led hither, the Athenians, though more numerous, refused to engage with me; and they are not likely now, when their forces must be conveyed by sea, to send an army against you equal to that which they had at Nisaea.

[86] And I myself, why am I here? I come, not to injure, but to emancipate the Hellenes. And I have bound the government of Lacedaemon by the most solemn oaths to respect the independence of any states which I may bring over to their side. I do not want to gain your alliance by force or fraud, but to give you ours, that we may free you from the Athenian yoke. I think that you ought not to doubt my word when I offer you the most solemn pledges, nor should I be regarded as an inefficient champion; but you should confidently join me.

‘If any one among you hangs back because he has a personal fear of anybody else, and is under the impression that I shall hand over the city to a party, him above all I would reassure. For I am not come hither to be the tool of a faction; nor do I conceive that the liberty which I bring you is of an ambiguous character; I should forget the spirit of my country were I to enslave the many to the few, or the minority to the whole people. Such a tyranny would be worse than the dominion of the foreigner, and we Lacedaemonians should receive no thanks in return for our trouble, but, instead of honour and reputation, only reproach. We should lay ourselves open to the charges which are our best weapons against the Athenians, and in a far more detestable form, for they have never been great examples of virtue. For to men of character there is more disgrace in seeking aggrandisement by specious deceit than by open violence; the violent have the justification of strength which fortune gives them, but a policy of intrigue is insidious and wicked.

[87] ‘So careful are we where our highest interests are at stake. And not to speak of our oaths, you cannot have better assurance than they give whose actions, when compared with their professions, afford a convincing proof that it is their interest to keep their word.

‘But if you plead that you cannot accept the proposals which I offer, and insist that you ought not to suffer for the rejection of them because you are our friend; if you are of opinion that liberty is perilous and should not in justice be forced upon any one, but gently brought to those who are able to receive it, — I shall first call the Gods and heroes of the country to witness that I have come hither for your good, and that you would not be persuaded by me: I shall then use force and ravage your country without any more scruple. I shall deem myself justified by two overpowering arguments. In the first place, I must not permit the Lacedaemonians to suffer by your friendship, and suffer they will through the

revenues which the Athenians will continue to derive from you if you do not join me; and in the second place, the Hellenes must not lose their hope of liberation by your fault. On any other ground we should certainly be wrong in taking such a step; it is only for the sake of the general weal that we Lacedaemonians have any right to be forcing liberty upon those who would rather not have it. For ourselves, we are far from desiring empire, but we want to overthrow the empire of others. And having this end in view, we should do injustice to the majority if, while bringing independence to all, we tolerated opposition in you. Wherefore be well advised. Strive to take the lead in liberating Hellas, and lay up a treasure of undying fame. You will save your own property, and you will crown your city with glory.’

[88] Thus spoke Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been said on both sides, partly under the attraction of his words, and partly because they were afraid of losing their vintage, determined by a majority, voting secretly, to revolt from Athens. They pledged Brasidas to stand by the engagement to which the government of Sparta had sworn before they sent him out, to respect the independence of all whom he brought over to the Lacedaemonian alliance. They then admitted his army; and shortly afterwards Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, revolted also. Such were the events of the summer.

[89] Meanwhile the betrayal of Boeotia into the hands of Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, was on the eve of accomplishment. At the beginning of the ensuing winter Demosthenes and his fleet were to appear at Siphae, and Hippocrates simultaneously to march upon Delium. But there was a mistake about the day, and Demosthenes, with his Acarnanian and numerous other allies drawn from that neighbourhood, sailed to Siphae too soon. His attempt failed; for the plot was betrayed by Nicomachus a Phocian, of the town of Phanoteus, who told

the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians. Whereupon there was a general levy of the Boeotians, for Hippocrates, who was to have been in the country and to have distracted their attention, had not yet arrived; and so they forestalled the Athenians by the occupation of Siphae and Chaeronea. When the conspirators in the Boeotian cities saw that there had been a mistake they made no movement from within.

[90] Hippocrates had called out the whole force of Athens, metics as well as citizens, and all the strangers who were then in the city. But he did not arrive at Delium until after the Boeotians had quitted Siphae. He encamped and fortified Delium, which is a temple of Apollo. His army dug a trench around the temple and the sacred precinct, the earth which they threw up out of the trench forming a rampart; along this rampart they drove in a double palisade, and cutting down the vines in the neighbourhood of the temple threw them in between. They made a like use of the stones and bricks of the houses near, which they pulled down, and by every means in their power strove to increase the height of the rampart. Where the temple buildings did not extend they erected wooden towers at convenient places; the cloister which had once existed had fallen down. They began their work on the third day after their departure from Athens, and continued all this day and the next and the following day until the midday meal. When it was nearly finished the army retired from Delium to a distance of a little more than a mile, intending to go home. The greater part of the light-armed troops proceeded on their march, but the hoplites piled their arms and rested. Hippocrates, who had remained behind, was occupied in placing the guards at their posts, and in superintending the completion of that part of the outworks which was still unfinished.

[91] Meanwhile the Boeotians were gathering at Tanagra. All the forces from the different cities had now arrived. They saw that the Athenians were already marching homewards, and most of the Boeotarchs (who are in number eleven) disapproved of giving battle, because the enemy had left the Boeotian territory. For when the Athenians rested in their march they were just on the borders of Oropia. But Pagondas the son of Aeoladas, one of the two Boeotarchs from Thebes, who was in command at the time (the other being Arianthidas the son of Lysimachidas), wanted to fight, believing that the risk was worth encountering. So calling the soldiers to him in successive divisions, that they might not all leave their arms at once, he exhorted the Boeotians to march against the Athenians and to hazard battle, in the following words:

[92] ‘Men of Boeotia, no one among us generals should ever have allowed the thought to enter his mind that we ought not to fight with the Athenians, even although we may not overtake them on Boeotian soil. They have crossed our frontier; it is Boeotia in which they have built a fort, and Boeotia which they intend to lay waste. Our enemies they clearly are wherever we find them, and therefore in that country out of which they came and did us mischief. But perhaps not to fight may appear to some one to be the safer course. Well then, let him who thinks so think again. When a man being in full possession of his own goes out of his way to attack others because he covets more, he cannot reflect too much; but when a man is attacked by another and has to fight for his own, prudence does not allow of reflection. In you the temper has been hereditary which would repel the foreign invader, whether he be in another’s country or in your own; the Athenian invader above all others should be thus repelled, because he is your next neighbour. For among neighbours antagonism is ever a condition of independence, and against men like these, who are seeking to enslave not only near but distant countries, shall we not fight to the

last? Look at their treatment of Euboea just over the strait, and of the greater part of Hellas. I would have you know, that whereas other men fight with their neighbours about the lines of a frontier, for us, if we are conquered, there will be no more disputing about frontiers, but one fixed boundary, including our whole country, for the Athenians will come in and take by force all that we have. So much more dangerous are they than ordinary neighbours. And men who, like them, wantonly assail others, will not hesitate to attack him who remains quietly at home and only defends himself; but they are not so ready to overbear the adversary who goes out of his own country to meet them, and when there is an opportunity strikes first. We have proved this in our own dealings with the Athenians. Once, owing to our internal dissensions, they took possession of our land, but we overcame them at Coronea, and gave Boeotia that complete security which has lasted to this day. Remember the past: let the elder men among us emulate their own earlier deeds, and the younger who are the sons of those valiant fathers do their best not to tarnish the virtues of their race. Confident that the God whose temple they have impiously fortified and now occupy will be our champion, and relying on the sacrifices, which are favourable to us, let us advance to meet them. They may satisfy their greed by attacking those who do not defend themselves; but we will show them that from men whose generous spirit ever impels them to fight for the liberties of their country, and who will not see that of others unjustly enslaved, — from such men they will not part without a battle.’

[93] With this exhortation Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to march against the Athenians, and quickly moved his army forward (for the day was far advanced). As soon as he approached the enemy he took up a position where a hill intercepted the view, and there drew up his army and prepared for action. Hippocrates, who was still at Delium, heard that the Boeotians were advancing, and sent

a message to the army bidding them get into position. He himself came up shortly afterwards, having left three hundred cavalry at Delium, in order that they might protect the place if assailed, and also might watch their opportunity and attack the Boeotians while the battle was going on. To these the Boeotians opposed a separate force. When everything was ready they appeared over the crest of the hill, and halted in the order which they proposed to maintain in the engagement; they numbered about seven thousand hoplites, more than ten thousand light-armed troops, a thousand cavalry, and five hundred targeteers. The Thebans and the Boeotians who served in their ranks occupied the right wing. In the centre were the men of Haliartus, Coronea, and Copae, and the other dwellers about the Lake Copais. On the left wing were the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians; the cavalry and light-armed troops were placed on both wings. The Thebans were formed in ranks of five and twenty deep; the formation of the others varied. Such was the character and array of the Boeotian forces.

[94] All the hoplites of the Athenian army were arranged in ranks eight deep; in numbers they equalled the hoplites of the enemy; the cavalry were stationed on either wing. No regular light-armed troops accompanied them, for Athens had no organised force of this kind. Those who originally joined the expedition were many times over the number of their opponents; but they were to a great extent without proper arms, for the whole force, strangers as well as citizens, had been called out. Having once started homewards, there were but few of them forthcoming in the engagement. When the Athenians were ranged in order of battle and, on the point of advancing, Hippocrates the general, proceeding along the lines, exhorted them as follows:

[95] ‘Men of Athens, there is not much time for exhortation, but to the brave a few words are as good as many; I am only going to remind, not to admonish you. Let no man think that

because we are on foreign soil we are running into great danger without cause. Although in Boeotian territory we shall be fighting for our own. If we are victors, the Peloponnesians, deprived of the Boeotian cavalry, will never invade our land again, so that in one battle you win Boeotia and win at the same time for Attica a more complete freedom. Meet them in a spirit worthy of the first city in Hellas-of that Athens which we are all proud to call our country; in a spirit too worthy of our fathers, who in times past under Myronides at Oenophyta overcame these very Boeotians and conquered their land.’

[96] Thus spoke Hippocrates, and had gone over half the army, not having had time for more, when the Boeotians (to whom Pagondas just before engaging had been making a second short exhortation) raised the paean, and came down upon them from the hill. The Athenians hastened forward, and the two armies met at a run. The extreme right and left of either army never engaged, for the same reason; they were both prevented by water-courses. But the rest closed, and there was a fierce struggle and pushing of shield against shield. The left wing of the Boeotians as far as their centre was worsted by the Athenians, who pressed hard upon this part of the army, especially upon the Thespians. For the troops ranged at their side having given way they were surrounded and hemmed in; and so the Thespians who perished were cut down fighting hand to hand. Some of the Athenians themselves in surrounding the enemy were thrown into confusion and unwittingly slew one another. On this side then the Boeotians were overcome, and fled to that part of the army which was still fighting; but the right wing, where the Thebans were stationed, overcame the Athenians, and forcing them back, at first step by step, were following hard upon them, when Pagondas, seeing that his left wing was in distress, sent two squadrons of horse unperceived round the hill. They suddenly appeared over the ridge; the victorious wing of the Athenians, fancying that another army

was attacking them, was struck with panic; and so at both points, partly owing to this diversion, and partly to the pressure of the advancing Thebans who broke their line, the rout of the Athenian army became general. Some fled to the sea at Delium, others towards Oropus, others to Mount Parnes, or in any direction which gave hope of safety. The Boeotians, especially their cavalry and that of the Locrians which arrived when the rout had begun, pursued and slaughtered them. Night closed upon the pursuit, and aided the mass of the fugitives in their escape. On the next day those of them who had reached Oropus and Delium, which, though defeated, they still held, were conveyed home by sea. A garrison was left in the place.

[97] The Boeotians, after raising a trophy, took up their own dead, and despoiled those of the enemy. They then left them under the care of a guard, and retiring to Tanagra concerted an attack upon Delium. The herald of the Athenians, as he was on his way to ask for their dead, met a Boeotian herald, who turned him back, declaring that he would get no answer until he had returned himself. He then came before the Athenians and delivered to them the message of the Boeotians, by whom they were accused of transgressing the universally recognised customs of Hellas. Those who invaded the territory of others ever abstained from touching the temples, whereas the Athenians had fortified Delium and were now dwelling there, and doing all that men usually do in an unconsecrated place. They were even drawing, for common use, the water which the Boeotians themselves were forbidden to use except as holy water for the sacrifices. They therefore on behalf both of the God and of themselves, invoking Apollo and all the divinities who had a share in the temple, bade the Athenians depart and carry off what belonged to them.

[98] Upon the delivery of this message the Athenians sent to the Boeotians a herald of their own, who on their behalf declared ‘that they had done no wilful injury to the temple,

and would not damage it if they could help it; they had not originally entered it with any injurious intent, but in order that from it they might defend themselves against those who were really injuring them. According to Hellenic practice, they who were masters of the land, whether much or little, invariably had possession of the temples, to which they were bound to a show the customary reverence, but in such ways only as were possible.

There was a time when the Boeotians themselves and most other nations, including all who had driven out the earlier inhabitants of the land which they now occupied, attacked the temples of others, and these had in time become their own. So the Boeotian temples would have become theirs if they had succeeded in conquering more of Boeotia. So much of the country as they did occupy was their own, and they did not mean to leave it until compelled. As to meddling with the water, they could not help themselves; the use of it was a necessity which they had not incurred wantonly; they were resisting the Boeotians who had begun by attacking their territory. When men were constrained by war, or by some other great calamity, there was every reason to think that their offence was forgiven by the God himself. He who has committed an involuntary misdeed finds a refuge at the altar, and men are said to transgress, not when they presume a little in their distress, but when they do evil of their own free will. The Boeotians, who demanded a sacred place as a ransom for the bodies of the dead, were guilty of a far greater impiety than the Athenians who refused to make such an unseemly exchange. They desired the Boeotians to let them take away their dead, not adding the condition “if they would quit Boeotia,” for in fact they were in a spot which they had fairly won by arms and not in Boeotia, but simply saying, “if they would make a truce according to ancestral custom.”’

[99] The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia they might take what belonged to them, but must depart out of

it; if they were in their own land they could do as they pleased. They knew that the territory of Oropus, in which the dead lay (for the battle took place on the border), was actually in the possession of Athens, but that the Athenians could not take them away without their leave, and they were unwilling as they pretended to make a truce respecting a piece of ground which did not belong to them. And to say in their reply ‘that if they would quit Boeotian ground they might take what they asked for,’ sounded plausible. Thereupon the Athenian herald departed, leaving his purpose unaccomplished.

[100] The Boeotians immediately sent for javelin-men and slingers from the Malian Gulf. They had been joined after the battle by the Corinthians with two thousand hoplites, and by the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisaea, as well as by some Megarians. They now marched against Delium and attacked the rampart, employing among other military devices an engine, with which they succeeded in taking the place; it was of the following description. They sawed in two and hollowed out a great beam, which they joined together again very exactly, like a flute, and suspended a vessel by chains at the end of the beam; the iron mouth of a bellows directed downwards into the vessel was attached to the beam, of which a great part was itself overlaid with iron. This machine they brought up from a distance on carts to various points of the rampart where vine stems and wood had been most extensively used, and when it was quite near the wall they applied a large bellows to their own end of the beam, and blew through it. The blast, prevented from escaping, passed into the vessel which contained burning coals and sulphur and pitch; these made a huge flame, and set fire to the rampart, so that no one could remain upon it. The garrison took flight, and the fort was taken. Some were slain; two hundred were captured; but the greater number got on board their ships and so reached home.

[101] Delium was captured seventeen days after the battle. The Athenian herald came shortly afterwards in ignorance of its fate to ask again for the dead, and now the Boeotians, instead of repeating their former answer, gave them up. In the battle the Boeotians lost somewhat less than five hundred; the Athenians not quite a thousand, and Hippocrates their general; also a great number of light-armed troops and baggage-bearers.

Shortly after the battle of Delium, Demosthenes, on the failure of the attempt to betray Siphae, against which he had sailed with forty ships, employed the Agraean and Acarnanian troops together with four hundred Athenian hoplites whom he had on board in a descent on the Sicyonian coast. Before all the fleet had reached the shore the Sicyonians came out against the invaders, put to flight those who had landed, and pursued them to their ships, killing some, and making prisoners of others. They then erected a trophy, and gave back the dead under a flag of truce.

While the affair of Delium was going on, Sitalces the Odrysian king died; he had been engaged in an expedition against the Triballi, by whom he was defeated in battle. Seuthes the son of Sparadocus, his nephew, succeeded him in the kingdom of the Odrysians and the rest of his Thracian dominions.

[102] During the same winter, Brasidas and his Chalcidian allies made an expedition against Amphipolis upon the river Strymon, the Athenian colony. The place where the city now stands is the same which Aristagoras of Miletus in days of old, when he was fleeing from King Darius, attempted to colonise; he was driven out by the Edonians. Two and thirty years afterwards the Athenians made another attempt; they sent a colony of ten thousand, made up partly of their own citizens, partly of any others who liked to join; but these also were attacked by the Thracians at Drabescus, and perished. Twenty-nine years later the Athenians came again, under the

leadership of Hagnon the son of Nicias, drove out the Edonians, and built a town on the same spot, which was formerly called `The Nine Ways.' Their base of operations was Eion, a market and seaport which they already possessed, at the mouth of the river, about three miles from the site of the present town. Wanting to enclose the newly-founded city, which on two sides is surrounded by the river Strymon, Hagnon cut it off by a long wall reaching from the upper part of the river to the lower, and called the place Amphipolis, because it strikes the eye both by sea and land.

[103] Against Amphipolis Brasidas now led his army. Starting from Arnae in Chalcidicè, towards evening he reached Aulon and Bromiscus at the point where the lake Bolbè flows into the sea; having there supped, he marched on during the night. The weather was wintry and somewhat snowy; and so he pushed on all the quicker; he was hoping that his approach might be known at Amphipolis only to those who were in the secret. There dwelt in the place settlers from Argilus, a town which was originally colonised from Andros; these and others aided in the attempt, instigated some by Perdiccas, others by the Chalcidians. The town of Argilus is not far off, and the inhabitants were always suspected by the Athenians, and were always conspiring against Amphipolis. For some time past, ever since the arrival of Brasidas had given them an opportunity, they had been concerting measures with their countrymen inside the walls for the surrender of the city. They now revolted from the Athenians on that very night, and received him into their town, and before dawn they conducted the army to the bridge over the river, which is at some distance from the town. At that time no walls had been built down to the river, as they have since been; a small guard was posted there. Brasidas easily overcame the guard, owing partly to the plot within the walls, partly to the severity of the weather and the suddenness of his attack; he then crossed the bridge, and at once was master of all the possessions of the

Amphipolitans outside the walls. For they lived scattered about in the country.

[104] The passage of the river was a complete surprise to the citizens within the walls. Many who happened to be outside were taken. Others fled into the town. The Amphipolitans were in great consternation, for they suspected one another. It is even said that Brasidas, if, instead of allowing his army to plunder, he had marched direct to the place, would probably have captured it. But he merely occupied a position, and overran the country outside the walls; and then, finding that his confederates within failed in accomplishing their part, he took no further step. Meanwhile the opponents of the conspirators, being superior in number, prevented the immediate opening of the gates, and acting with Eucles, the general to whose care the place had been committed by the Athenians, sent for help to the other general in Chalcidicè, Thucydides the son of Olorus, who wrote this history; he was then at Thasos, an island colonised from Paros, and distant from Amphipolis about half a day’s sail. As soon as he heard the tidings he sailed quickly to Amphipolis with seven ships which happened to be on the spot; he wanted to get into Amphipolis if possible before it could capitulate, or at any rate to occupy Eion.

[105] Meanwhile Brasidas, fearing the arrival of the ships from Thasos, and hearing that Thucydides had the right of working gold mines in the neighbouring district of Thrace, and was consequently one of the leading men of the country, did his utmost to get possession of the city before his arrival. He was afraid that, if Thucydides once came, the people of Amphipolis would no longer be disposed to surrender. For their hope would be that he would bring in allies from the islands or maritime towns or from the interior of Thrace, and relieve them. He therefore offered moderate terms, proclaiming that any Amphipolitan or Athenian might either remain in the city and have the enjoyment of his

property on terms of equality; or, if he preferred, might depart, taking his goods with him, within five days.

[106] When the people heard the proclamation they began to waver; for very few of the citizens were Athenians, the greater number being a mixed multitude. Many within the walls were relatives of those who had been captured outside. In their alarm they thought the terms reasonable; the Athenian population because they were too glad to withdraw, reflecting how much greater their share of the danger was, and not expecting speedy relief; the rest of the people because they retained all their existing rights, and were delivered from a fate which seemed inevitable. The partisans of Brasidas now proceeded to justify his proposals without disguise, for they saw that the mind of the whole people had changed, and that they no longer paid any regard to the Athenian general who was on the spot. So his terms were accepted, and the city was surrendered and delivered up to him. On the evening of the same day Thucydides and his ships sailed into Eion, but not until Brasidas had taken possession of Amphipolis, missing Eion only by a night. For if the ships had not come to the rescue with all speed, the place would have been in his hands on the next morning.

[107] Thucydides now put Eion in a state of defence, desiring to provide not only against any immediate attempt of Brasidas, but also against future danger. He received the fugitives who had chosen to quit Amphipolis according to the agreement and wished to come into Eion. Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of small craft down the river to Eion, hoping that he might take the point which runs out from the wall, and thereby command the entrance to the harbour; at the same time he made an attack by land. But in both these attempts he was foiled. Whereupon he returned, and took measures for the settlement of Amphipolis. Myrcinus a city in the Edonian country joined him, Pittacus the king of the Edonians having been assassinated by the

children of Goaxis and Brauro his wife. Soon afterwards Galepsus and Oesymè (both colonies from Thasos) came over to him. Perdiccas likewise arrived shortly after the taking of Amphipolis, and assisted him in settling the newly-acquired towns.

[108] The Athenians were seriously alarmed at the loss of Amphipolis; the place was very useful to them, and supplied them with a revenue, and with timber which they imported for shipbuilding. As far as the Strymon the Lacedaemonians could always have found a way to the allies of Athens, if the Thessalians allowed them to pass; but until they gained possession of the bridge they could proceed no further, because, for a long way above, the river forms a large lake, and below, towards Eion, there were triremes on guard. All difficulty seemed now to be removed, and the Athenians feared that more of their allies would revolt. For Brasidas in all his actions showed himself reasonable, and whenever he made a speech lost no opportunity of declaring that he was sent to emancipate Hellas. The cities which were subject to Athens, when they heard of the taking of Amphipolis and of his promises and of his gentleness, were more impatient than ever to rise, and privately sent embassies to him, asking him to come and help them, every one of them wanting to be first. They thought that there was no danger, for they had under-estimated the Athenian power, which afterwards proved its greatness and the magnitude of their mistake; they judged rather by their own illusive wishes than by the safe rule of prudence. For such is the manner of men; what they like is always seen by them in the light of unreflecting hope, what they dislike they peremptorily set aside by an arbitrary conclusion. Moreover, the Athenians had lately received a blow in Boeotia, and Brasidas told the allies what was likely to attract them, but untrue, that at Nisaea the Athenians had refused to fight with his unassisted forces. And so they grew bold, and were quite confident that no army would ever reach them. Above all,

they were influenced by the pleasurable excitement of the moment; they were now for the first time going to find out of what the Lacedaemonians were capable when in real earnest, and therefore they were willing to risk anything. The Athenians were aware of their disaffection, and as far as they could, at short notice and in winter time, sent garrisons to the different cities. Brasidas also despatched a message to the Lacedaemonians requesting them to let him have additional forces, and he himself began to build triremes on the Strymon. But they would not second his efforts because their leading men were jealous of him, and also because they preferred to recover the prisoners taken in the island and bring the war to an end.

[109] In the same winter the Megarians recovered their Long Walls which had been in the hands of the Athenians, and razed them to the ground.

After the taking of Amphipolis, Brasidas and his allies marched to the so-called Actè, or coastland, which runs out from the canal made by the Persian King and extends into the peninsula; it ends in Athos, a high mountain projecting into the Aegean sea. There are cities in the peninsula, of which one is Sanè, an Andrian colony on the edge of the canal looking towards the sea in the direction of Euboea; the others are Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium; their inhabitants are a mixed multitude of barbarians, speaking Greek as well as their native tongue. A few indeed are Chalcidian; but the greater part are Pelasgians (sprung from the Tyrrhenians who once inhabited Lemnos and Athens), or Bisaltians, Crestonians, Edonians. They all dwell in small cities. Most of them joined Brasidas, but Sanè and Dium held out; whereupon he remained there for a time and wasted their territory.

[110] Finding that they would not yield, he promptly made an expedition against Toronè in Chalcidicè, which was held by the Athenians. He was invited by a few of the inhabitants, who were ready to deliver the city into his hands. Arriving at

night, or about daybreak, he took up a position at the temple of the Dioscuri, which is distant about three furlongs from the city. The great body of the inhabitants and the Athenian garrison never discovered him; but those Toronaeans who were in his interest, and knew that he was coming, were awaiting his approach; some few of them had privately gone to meet him. When his confederates found that he had arrived, they introduced into the city, under the command of Lysistratus an Olynthian, seven light-armed soldiers carrying daggers (for of twenty who had been originally appointed to that service, only seven had the courage to enter). These men slipped in undiscovered by way of the wall where it looks towards the sea. They ascended the side of the hill on the slope of which the city is built, and slew the sentinels posted on the summit; they then began to break down the postern-gate towards the promontory of Canastraeum.

[111] Meanwhile Brasidas advanced a little with the rest of his army, and then halting, sent forward a hundred targeteers, that as soon as any of the gates were opened, and the signal agreed upon displayed, they might rush in first. There was a delay, and they, wondering what had happened, drew by degrees nearer and nearer to the city. Their partisans in Toronè, acting with the soldiers who had already got inside, had now broken through the postern-gate, and proceeded to cut the bar which fastened the gates near the market-place. They then brought round some of the targeteers by way of the postern-gate, and introduced them into the city, hoping to strike panic into the unconscious citizens by the sudden appearance of an armed force in their rear and on both sides of them at once. Their next step was to raise the fire-signal according to agreement; they then received the rest of the targeteers through the gates by the market-place.

[112] Brasidas, when he saw the signal, gave his army the word to advance, and ran forward. Raising with one voice a shout which struck great terror into the inhabitants, they

followed him. Some of them dashed in by the gates; others found a way in at a place where the wall had fallen down and was being repaired, getting up by some planks which were placed against it, intended for drawing up stones. He himself with the main body of his army ascended to the upper part of the city, wanting to make the capture thorough and secure; the rest of his soldiers overran the town.

[113] While the capture was proceeding the Toronaeans generally, who knew nothing about the plot, were in confusion. The conspirators and their party at once joined the assailants. Of the Athenian hoplites, who to the number of fifty chanced to be sleeping in the Agora, a few were cut down at once, but the greater number, when they saw what had happened, fled, some by land, others to the Athenian guard-ships, of which two were on the spot, and reached safely the fort of Lecythus, a high point of the city which the Athenians had occupied and retained in their own hands; it runs out into the sea, and is only joined to the mainland by a narrow isthmus; thither fled also such Toronaeans as were friendly to the Athenians.

[114] It was now daylight, and the city being completely in his power, Brasidas made proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the Athenians, that if they liked they might come out and return to their homes; they would suffer no harm in the city. He also sent a herald to the Athenians, bidding them take what was their own and depart under a flag of truce out of Lecythus. The place, he said, belonged to the Chalcidians, and not to them. They refused to go, but asked him to make a truce with them for a day, that they might take up their dead, and he granted them two days. During these two days he fortified the buildings which were near Lecythus, and the Athenians strengthened the fort itself. He then called a meeting of the Toronaeans, and addressed them much in the same terms which he had used at Acanthus. He told them that they

ought not to think badly of those citizens who had aided him, much less to deem them traitors; for they were not bribed and had not acted with any view of enslaving the city, but in the interest of her freedom and welfare. Those of the inhabitants who had not joined in the plot were not to suppose that they would fare worse than the rest; for he had not come thither to destroy either the city or any of her citizens. In this spirit he had made the proclamation to those who had taken refuge with the Athenians, and he thought none the worse of them for being their friends; when they had a similar experience of the Lacedaemonians their attachment to them would be still greater, for they would recognise their superior honesty; they were only afraid of them now because they did not know them. They must all make up their minds to be faithful allies, and expect henceforward to be held responsible if they offended; but in the past the Lacedaemonians had not been wronged by them; on the contrary, it was they who had been wronged by a power too great for them, and were to be excused if they had opposed him.

[115] With these words he encouraged the citizens. On the expiration of the truce he made his intended attack upon Lecythus. The Athenians defended themselves from the fortress, which was weak, and from some houses which had battlements. For a whole day they repulsed the assault; but on the morrow an engine was brought against them, from which the Lacedaemonians proposed to throw fire upon the wooden breastwork. Just as the army was drawing near the wall, the Athenians raised a wooden tower upon the top of a building at a point where the approach was easiest and where they thought that the enemy would be most likely to apply the engine. To this tower they carried up numerous jars and,casks of water and great stones; and many men mounted upon it. Suddenly the building, being too heavily weighted, fell in with a loud crash. This only annoyed and did not much alarm the Athenians who were near and saw

what had happened, but the rest were terrified, and their fright was the greater in proportion as they were further off. They thought that the place had been taken at that spot, and fled as fast as they could to the sea where their ships lay.

[116] Brasidas witnessed the accident and observed that they were abandoning the battlements. He at once rushed forward with his army, captured the fort, and put to death all whom he found in it. Thus the Athenians were driven out; and in their ships of war and other vessels crossed over to Pallenè. There happened to be in Lecythus a temple of Athenè; and when Brasidas was about to storm the place he had made a proclamation that he who first mounted the wall should receive thirty minae; but now, believing that the capture had been effected by some more than human power, he gave the thirty minae to the Goddess for the service of the temple, and then pulling down Lecythus and clearing the ground, he consecrated the whole place. The rest of this winter he spent in settling the administration of the towns which he already held, and in concerting measures against the rest. At the end of the winter ended the eighth year of the war.

[117] Early in the following spring the Lacedaemonians and Athenians made a truce for a year. The Athenians hoped to prevent Brasidas from gaining over any more of their allies for the present; the interval would give them leisure for preparation; and hereafter, if it was for their interest, they might come to a general understanding. The Lacedaemonians had truly divined the fears of the Athenians, and thought that, having enjoyed an intermission of trouble and hardship, they would be more anxious to make terms, restore the captives taken in the island, and conclude a durable peace. Their main object was to recover their men while the good fortune of Brasidas lasted; when, owing to his successful career and the balance which he had established between the contending powers, they did not

feel the loss of them, and yet by retaliating on equal terms with the remainder of their forces might have a fair prospect of victory. So they made a truce for themselves and their allies in the following terms:

[118] ‘I. Concerning the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, it seems good to us that any one who will shall ask counsel thereat without fraud and without fear, according to his ancestral customs. To this we, the Lacedaemonians and their allies here present, agree, and we will send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians, and do our best to gain their assent likewise.

‘II. Concerning the treasures of the God, we will take measures for the detection of evil-doers, both you and we, according to our ancestral customs, and any one else who will, according to his ancestral customs, proceeding always with right and equity. Thus it seems good to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in respect of these matters.

‘III. It further seems good to the Lacedaemonians and their allies that, if the Athenians consent to a truce, either party shall remain within his own territory, retaining what he has. The Athenians at Coryphasium shall keep between Buphras and Tomeus. They shall remain at Cythera, but shall not communicate with the Lacedaemonian confederacy, neither we with them nor they with us. The Athenians who are in Nisaea and Minoa shall not cross the road which leads from the gates of the shrine of Nisus to the temple of Poseidon, and from the temple of Poseidon goes direct to the bridge leading to Minoa; neither shall the Megarians and their allies cross this road; the Athenians shall hold the island which they have taken, neither party communicating with the other. They shall also hold what they now hold near Troezen, according to the agreement concluded between the Athenians and Troezenians.

‘IV. At sea the Lacedaemonians and their allies may sail along their own coasts and the coasts of the confederacy,

not in ships of war, but in any other rowing vessel whose burden does not exceed five hundred talents.

‘V. There shall be a safe-conduct both by sea and land for a herald, with envoys and any number of attendants which may be agreed upon, passing to and fro between Peloponnesus and Athens, to make arrangements about the termination of the war and about the arbitration of disputed points.

‘ VI. While the truce lasts, neither party, neither we nor you, shall receive deserters, either bond or free.

‘VII. And we will give satisfaction to you and you shall give satisfaction to us according to our ancestral customs, and determine disputed points by arbitration and not by arms.

‘These things seem good to us, the Lacedaemonians, and to our allies. But if you deem any other condition more just or honourable, go to Lacedaemon and explain your views; neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies will reject any just claim which you may prefer.

‘And we desire you, as you desire us, to send envoys invested with full powers.

‘ This truce shall be for a year.’

‘The Athenian people passed the following decree. The prytanes were of the tribe Acamantis, Phaenippus was the registrar, Niciades was the president. Laches moved that a truce be concluded on the terms to which the Lacedaemonians and their allies had consented; and might it be for the best interests of the Athenian people! Accordingly the assembly agreed that the truce shall last for a year, beginning from this day, being the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion. During the year of truce ambassadors and heralds are to go from one state to another and discuss proposals for the termination of the war. The generals and prytanes shall proceed to hold another assembly, at which the people shall discuss, first of all, the question of peace, whatever proposal the Lacedaemonian embassy may offer about the termination of the war. The

embassies now present shall bind themselves on the spot, in the presence of the assembly, to abide for a year by the truce just made.’

[119] To these terms the Lacedaemonians assented, and they and their allies took oath to the Athenians and their allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius. Those who formally ratified the truce were, on behalf of Lacedaemon, Taurus the son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus the son of Periclidas, Philocharidas the son of Eryxidaidas; of Corinth, Aeneas the son of Ocytus, Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus; of Sicyon, Damotimus the son of Naucrates, Onasimus the son of Megacles; of Megara, Nicasus the son of Cecalus, Menecrates the son of Amphidorus; of Epidaurus, Amphias the son of Eupaidas; and on behalf of Athens, Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Autocles the son of Tolmaeus. Such were the terms of the armistice; during its continuance fresh negotiations for a final peace were constantly carried on.

[120] About the time when the envoys engaged in the negotiations were passing to and fro, Scionè, a town of Pallenè, revolted from the Athenians and joined Brasidas. The Scionaeans, according to their own account, sprang originally from Pellenè in Peloponnesus, but their ancestors returning from Troy were carried by the storm which the Achaean fleet encountered to Scionè, where they took up their abode. Brasidas, when he heard of the revolt, sailed thither by night, sending before him a friendly trireme, while he himself followed at some distance in a small boat, thinking that if he met any vessel, not a trireme, larger than the boat, the trireme would protect him, while if another trireme of equal strength came up, it would fall, not upon the boat, but upon the larger vessel, and in the meantime he would be able to save himself. He succeeded in crossing, and having summoned a meeting of the Scionaeans, he repeated what he had said at Acanthus and Toronè, adding that their conduct was deserving of the highest praise; for at

a time when the Athenians were holding Potidaea and the isthmus of Pallenè, and they, being cut off from the mainland, were as defenceless as if they had been islanders, they had taken the side of liberty unbidden. They were not such cowards as to wait until they were compelled to do what was obviously for their own interest; and this was a sufficient proof that they would endure like men any hardships, however great, if only their aspirations could be realised. He should reckon them the truest and most loyal friends of the Lacedaemonians, and pay them the highest honour.

[121] The Scionaeans were inspirited by his words; and one and all, even those who had previously been against the movement, took courage and determined to bear cheerfully the burdens of the war. They received Brasidas with honour, and in the name of the city crowned him with a golden crown as the liberator of Hellas; many too, in token of their personal admiration, placed garlands on his head, and congratulated him, as if he had been a victor in the games. For the present he left a small garrison with them and returned, but soon afterwards again crossed the sea with a larger army, being desirous, now that he had the help of the Scionaeans, to attempt Mendè and Potidaea; he made sure that the Athenians would follow him with their ships to Pallenè, which they would consider an island; and he wished to anticipate them. Moreover he had entered into negotiations with these cities, and had some hope of their being betrayed to him.

[122] But before he had executed his intentions, a trireme arrived conveying the ambassadors who went round to proclaim the truce, Aristonymus from Athens, and Athenaeus from Lacedaemon. His army then returned to Toronè, and the truce was formally announced to him. All the allies of the Lacedaemonians in Chalcidicè agreed to the terms. Aristonymus the Athenian assented generally, but finding on a calculation of the days that the Scionaeans had revolted

after the conclusion of the truce, refused to admit them. Brasidas insisted that they were in time, and would not surrender the city. Whereupon Aristonymus despatched a message to Athens. The Athenians were ready at once to make an expedition against Scionè. The Lacedaemonians, however, sent an embassy to them and protested that such a step would be a breach of the truce. They laid claim to the place, relying on the testimony of Brasidas, and proposed to have the matter decided by arbitration. But the Athenians, instead of risking an arbitration, wanted to send an expedition instantly; for they were exasperated at discovering that even the islanders were now daring to revolt from them, in a futile reliance on the Lacedaemonian power by land. The greater right was on their side; for the truth was that the Scionaeans had revolted two days after the truce was made. They instantly carried a resolution, moved by Cleon, to destroy Scionè and put the citizens to the sword; and, while abstaining from hostilities elsewhere, they prepared to carry out their intentions.

[123] In the meantime Mendè, a city of Pallenè and an Eretrian colony, revolted from them. Brasidas felt justified in receiving the Mendaeans, although, when they came to him, the peace had unmistakably been declared, because there were certain points in which he too charged the Athenians with violating the treaty. His attitude encouraged them to take this bold step; they saw his zeal in the cause, which they likewise inferred from his unwillingness to hand over Scionè to the Athenians. Moreover the persons who negotiated with him were few in number, and having once begun, would not give up their purpose. For they feared the consequences of detection, and therefore compelled the multitude to act contrary to their own wishes. When the Athenians heard of the revolt they were more angry than ever, and made preparations against both cities. Brasidas, in expectation of their attack, conveyed away the wives and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans to Olynthus in

Chalcidice, and sent over five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, under the sole command of Polydamidas, to their aid. The two cities concerted measures for their defence against the Athenians, who were expected shortly to arrive.

[124] Brasidas and Perdiccas now joined their forces, and made a second expedition to Lyncus against Arrhibaeus. Perdiccas led his own Macedonian army and a force of hoplites supplied by the Hellenic inhabitants of the country. Brasidas, beside the Peloponnesians who remained with him, had under his command a body of Chalcidians from Acanthus and other cities which supplied as many troops as they severally could. The entire heavy-armed Hellenic forces numbered about three thousand; the Chalcidian and Macedonian cavalry nearly a thousand, and there was also a great multitude of barbarians. They entered the territory of Arrhibaeus, and there finding the Lyncestians ready for battle, they took up a position in face of them. The infantry of the two armies was stationed upon two opposite hills, and between them was a plain, into which the cavalry of both first descended and fought. Then the Lyncestian heavy-armed troops began to advance from the hill, and forming a junction with their cavalry, offered battle. Brasidas and Perdiccas now drew out their army and charged; the Lyncestians were put to flight and many slain; the rest escaped to the high ground, and there remained inactive. The conquerors raised a trophy, and waited for two or three days expecting the arrival of some Illyrians whom Perdiccas had hired. Then Perdiccas wanted, instead of sitting idle, to push on against the villages of Arrhibaeus, but Brasidas was anxious about Mendè, and apprehensive that the Athenians might sail thither and do some mischief before he returned. The Illyrians had not appeared; and for both reasons he was more disposed to retreat than to advance.

[125] But while they were disputing, the news arrived that the Illyrians had just betrayed Perdiccas and joined

Arrhibaeus, whereupon they both resolved to retreat; for they were afraid of the Illyrians, who are a nation of warriors. Owing to the dispute nothing had been determined respecting the time of their departure. Night came on, and the Macedonians and the mass of the barbarians were instantly seized with one of those unaccountable panics to which great armies are liable. They fancied that the Illyrians were many times their real number, and that they were close at their heels; so, suddenly betaking themselves to flight, they hastened homewards. And they compelled Perdiccas, when he understood the state of affairs, which at first he did not, to go away without seeing Brasidas, for the two armies were encamped at a considerable distance from one another. At dawn Brasidas, finding that Arrhibaeus and the Illyrians were coming on and that the Macedonians had already decamped, resolved to follow them. So he formed his hoplites into a compact square, and placed his light-armed troops in the centre. He selected the youngest of his soldiers to run out upon the enemy at whatever point the attack might be made. He himself proposed during the retreat to take his post in the rear with three hundred chosen men, meaning to stop the foremost of his assailants and beat them off. Before the Illyrians came up he exhorted his soldiers, as far as the shortness of the time permitted, in the following words:

[126] ‘Did I not suspect, men of Peloponnesus, that you may be terrified because you have been deserted by your companions and are assailed by a host of barbarians, I should think only of encouraging and not of instructing you. But now that we are left alone in the face of numerous enemies, I shall endeavour in a few words to impress upon you the main points which it concerns you to be informed of and to remember. For you ought to fight like men not merely when you happen to have allies present, but because courage is native to you; nor should you fear any number of foreign troops. Remember that in the cities from which you

come, not the many govern the few, but the few govern the many, and have acquired their supremacy simply by successful fighting. Your enemies are barbarians, and you in your inexperience fear them. But you ought to know, from your late conflicts with the Macedonian portion of them — and any estimate which I can form, or account of them which I receive from others, would lead me to infer — that they will not prove so very formidable. An enemy often has weak points which wear the appearance of strength; and these; when their nature is explained, encourage rather than frighten their opponents. As, on the other hand, where an army has a real advantage, the adversary who is the most ignorant is also the most foolhardy. The Illyrians, to those who have no experience of them, do indeed at first sight present a threatening aspect. The spectacle of their numbers is terrible, their cries are intolerable, and the brandishing of their spears in the air has a menacing effect. But in action they are not the men they look, if their opponents will only stand their ground; for they have no regular order, and therefore are not ashamed of leaving any post in which they are hard pressed; to fly and to advance being alike honourable, no imputation can be thrown on their courage. When every man is his own master in battle he will readily find a decent excuse for saving himself. They clearly think that to frighten us at a safe distance is a better plan than to meet us hand to hand; else why do they shout instead of fighting? You may easily see that all the terrors with which you have invested them are in reality nothing; they do but startle the sense of sight and hearing. If you repel their tumultuous onset, and, when opportunity offers, withdraw again in good order, keeping your ranks, you will sooner arrive at a place of safety, and will also learn the lesson that mobs like these, if an adversary withstand their first attack, do but threaten at a distance and make a flourish of valour, although if he yields to them they are

quick enough to show their courage in following at his heels when there is no danger.’

[127] Brasidas, having addressed his army, began to retreat. Whereupon the barbarians with loud noise and in great disorder pressed hard upon him, supposing that he was flying, and that they could overtake and destroy his troops. But, wherever they attacked, the soldiers appointed for the purpose ran out and met them, and Brasidas himself with his chosen men received their charge. Thus the first onset of the barbarians met with a resistance which surprised them, and whenever they renewed the attack the Lacedaemonians received and repelled them again, and when they ceased, proceeded with their march. Thereupon the greater part of the barbarians abstained from attacking Brasidas and his Hellenes in the open country; but leaving a certain number to follow and harass them, they ran on after the fugitive Macedonians and killed any with whom they fell in. They then secured beforehand the narrow pass between two hills which led into the country of Arrhibaeus, knowing that this was the only path by which Brasidas could retreat. And as he was approaching the most dangerous point of the defile they began to surround him in the hope of cutting him off.

[128] Perceiving their intention, he told his three hundred to leave their ranks and run every man as fast as he could to the top of one of the hills, being the one which he thought the barbarians would be most likely to occupy; and before a larger number of them could come up and surround them, to dislodge those who were already there. They accordingly attacked and defeated them; and so the main body of his army more easily reached the summit; for the barbarians, seeing their comrades defeated and driven from the high ground, took alarm; they considered too that the enemy were already on the borders of the country, and had got away from them, and therefore followed no further. Brasidas had now gained the high ground and could march unmolested; on the same day he arrived at Arnissa, which is

in the dominion of Perdiccas. The soldiers were enraged at the hasty retreat of the Macedonians, and when they came upon carts of theirs drawn by oxen, or any baggage which had been dropped in the flight, as was natural in a retreat made in a panic and by night, they of themselves loosed the oxen and slaughtered them, and appropriated the baggage. From that time forward Perdiccas regarded Brasidas in the light of a foe, and conceived a new hatred of the Peloponnesians, which was not a natural feeling in an enemy of the Athenians. Nevertheless, disregarding his own nearest interests, he took steps to make terms with the one and get rid of the other.

[129] Brasidas returned from Macedonia to Toronè, and when he arrived there found the Athenians already in possession of Mendè. Thinking it now too late to cross over to Pallenè and assist Mendè and Scionè, he remained quiet and guarded Toronè. While he was engaged with the Lyncestians, the Athenians, having completed their preparations, had sailed against Mendè and Scionè with fifty ships, of which ten were Chian, conveying a thousand hoplites of their own, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and targeteers furnished by their allies in the neighbourhood. They were under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes. Sailing from Potidaea and putting in near the temple of Poseidon they marched against the Mendaeans. Now they and three hundred Scionaeans who had come to their aid, and their Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred hoplites in all, with Polydamidas their commander, had just encamped outside the city on a steep hill. Nicias, taking with him for the assault a hundred and twenty Methonaean light-armed troops, sixty select Athenian hoplites and all the archers, made an attempt to ascend the hill by a certain pathway, but he was wounded and failed to carry the position. Nicostratus with the remainder of his troops approaching the hill, which was hard of access, by another and more

circuitous route was thrown into utter confusion, and the whole army of the Athenians were nearly defeated. So on this day the Athenians, finding that the Mendaeans and their allies refused to give way, retreated and encamped; and when night came on, the Mendaeans likewise returned to the city.

[130] On the following day the Athenians sailed round to the side of Mendè looking towards Scionè; they took the suburb, and during the whole of that day devastated the country. No one came out to meet them; for a division had arisen in the city, and on the following night the three hundred Scionaeans returned home. On the next day Nicias with half his army went as far as the Scionaean frontier and devastated the country on his march, while Nicostratus with the other half sat down before the upper gates of Mendè, out of which the road leads to Potidaea. In this part of the city within the walls the Mendaeans and their allies chanced to have their arms deposited, and Polydamidas, arraying his forces in order of battle, was just exhorting the Mendaeans to go forth. Some one of the popular faction answered in the heat of party that he would not go out, and that he did not care to fight, but no sooner had he uttered the words than he was seized by the Peloponnesian commander and roughly handled. Whereupon the people lost patience, caught up their arms, and made a furious rush upon the Peloponnesians and the opposite party who were in league with them. They soon put them to flight, partly because the onslaught was sudden, and also because the gates were thrown open to the Athenians, which greatly terrified them. For they thought that the attack upon them was premeditated. All the Peloponnesians who were not killed on the spot fled to the citadel, which they had previously kept in their own hands. Nicias had now returned and was close to the city, and the Athenians rushed into Mendè with their whole force. As the gates had been opened without any previous capitulation they plundered the town as if it had

been stormed; and even the lives of the citizens were with difficulty saved by the efforts of the generals. The Mendaeans were then told that they were to retain their former constitution, and bring to trial among themselves any whom they thought guilty of the revolt. At the same time the Athenians blockaded the garrison in the Acropolis by a wall extending to the sea on either side and established a guard. Having thus secured Mendè, they proceeded against Scionè.

[131] The inhabitants of Scionè and the Peloponnesian garrison had come out to meet them and occupied a steep hill in front of the city. The hill had to be taken by the Athenians before they could effect the circumvallation of the place. So they made a furious attack and dislodged those who were stationed there; they then encamped, and after raising a trophy, prepared to invest the city. Soon afterwards, while they were engaged in the work, the Peloponnesian auxiliaries who were besieged in the Acropolis of Mendè, forcing their way out by the sea-shore, broke through the watch and came to Scionè by night. Most of them eluded the Athenians who were encamped outside, and got into the town.

[132] While the circumvallation of Scionè was proceeding, Perdiccas, who, after what had occurred in the retreat from Lyncus, hated Brasidas, sent heralds to the Athenian generals, and came to an understanding with them, which without loss of time he took measures to carry out. It so happened that Ischagoras the Lacedaemonian was then on the eve of marching with an army to reinforce Brasidas. Perdiccas was told by Nicias that, having now made friends with the Athenians, he should give them some evidence of his sincerity. He himself too no longer wished the Peloponnesians to find their way into his country. And so by his influence over the Thessalian chiefs, with whom he was always on good terms, he put a stop to the whole expedition; indeed, the Lacedaemonians did not even attempt to obtain the consent of the Thessalians.

Nevertheless, Ischagoras, Ameinias, and Aristeus, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonian government to report on the state of affairs, found their way to Brasidas. They brought with them, though contrary to law, certain young Spartans, intending to make them governors of the cities, instead of leaving the care of them to chance persons. Accordingly Brasidas appointed Clearidas the son of Cleonymus governor of Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas the son of Hegesander governor of Toronè.

[133] During the same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians, charging them with Athenian tendencies. This was an object which they always had in view, and now they had their opportunity, because the flower of the Thespian army had fallen in the battle of Delium. During the same summer the temple of Herè near Argos was burnt down; Chrysis the priestess had put a light too near the sacred garlands, and had then gone to sleep, so that the whole place took fire and was consumed. In her fear of the people she fled that very night to Phlius; and the Argives, as the law provided, appointed another priestess named Phaeinis. Chrysis had been priestess during eight years of the war and half of the ninth when she became an exile. Towards the close of the summer Scionè was completely invested, and the Athenians, leaving a guard, retired with the rest of their army.

[134] In the following winter the Athenians and Lacedaemonians remained inactive, in consequence of the armistice; but the Mantineans and the Tegeans with their respective allies fought a battle at Laodicium in the territory of Orestheum; the victory was disputed. For the troops of both cities defeated the allies on the wing opposed to them, and both erected trophies, and sent spoils to Delphi. The truth is that, although there was considerable slaughter on both sides, and the issue was still undecided when night put an end to the conflict, the Tegeans encamped on the field and at once erected a trophy, while the Mantineans

retreated to Bucolion and raised a rival trophy, but afterwards.

[135] At the close of the same winter, towards the beginning of spring, Brasidas made an attempt on Potidaea. He approached the place by night and planted a ladder against the walls. Thus far he proceeded undiscovered; for the ladder was fixed at a point which the sentinel who was passing on the bell had just quitted, and before he had returned to his post. But Brasidas had not yet mounted the ladder when he was detected by the garrison: whereupon he withdrew his army in haste without waiting for the dawn. So the winter ended, and with it the ninth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

BOOK V

[1] WITH the return of summer the year of the truce expired, but hostilities were not resumed until after the Pythian games. During the armistice the Athenians removed the Delians from Delos; they considered them impure and unworthy of their sacred character by reason of a certain ancient offence. The island had been purified before, when they took up the coffns of the dead as I have already narrated; but this purification, which seemed sufficient at the time, was now thought unsatisfactory because the inhabitants had been suffered to remain. Pharnaces gave to the Delians an asylum at Adramyttium in Asia, and whoever chose went and settled there.

[2] When the armistice was over, Cleon, having obtained the consent of the people, sailed on an expedition to the Chalcidian cities with thirty ships conveying twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, three hundred Athenian horsemen, and numerous allies. Touching first at Scionè (which was still blockaded, and taking from thence some hoplites of the besieging force, he sailed into the so-called Colophonian port, which was near the city of Toronè; there learning from deserters that Brasidas was not in Toronè, and that the garrison was too weak to resist, he marched with his army against the town, and sent ten ships to sail round into the harbour. First he came to the new line of wall which Brasidas had raised when, wanting to take in the suburbs, he broke down a part of the old wall and made the whole city one.

[3] But Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian governor, and the garrison under his command came to the defence of this quarter of the town, and fought against their assailants, who pressed them hard. Meanwhile the Athenian fleet was sailing round into the harbour, and Pasitelidas feared that the ships would take the city before he could return and defend it, and that the new fortifications would be captured and himself in

them. So he left the suburb and ran back into the city. But the enemy were too quick; the Athenians from the ships having taken Toronè before he arrived; while their infantry followed close upon him, and in a moment dashed in along with him at the breach in the old wall. Some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans were slain upon the spot, others were captured, and among them Pasitelidas the governor. Brasidas was on his way to the relief of Toronè at the time, but, hearing that the place was taken, he stopped and returned; he was within four miles and a half at the time of the capture. Cleon and the Athenians erected two trophies, one at the harbour and the other near the new wall. The women and children were made slaves; the men of Toronè and any other Chalcidians, together with the Peloponnesians, numbering in all seven hundred, were sent to Athens. The Peloponnesian captives were liberated at the peace which was concluded shortly afterwards; the rest were recovered by the Olynthians in exchange for a like number of the captives held by them. About the same time Panactum, a fortress on the Athenian frontier, was betrayed to the Boeotians. Cleon, putting a garrison into Toronè, sailed round Mount Athos, intending to attack Amphipolis.

[4] About the same time three envoys, of whom one was Phaeax the son of Erasistratus, were sent by the Athenians with two ships to Italy and Sicily. After the general peace and the withdrawal of the Athenians from Sicily, the Leontines had enrolled many new citizens, and the people contemplated a redistribution of the land. The oligarchy, perceiving their intention, called in the Syracusans and drove out the people, who separated and wandered up and down the island. The oligarchy then made an agreement with the Syracusans; and, leaving their own city deserted, settled in Syracuse, and received the privileges of citizenship. Not long afterwards some of them grew discontented, and, quitting Syracuse, seized a place called Phocaeae, which was a part of the town of Leontini, and

Bricinniae, a fortress in the Leontine territory. Here they were joined by most of the common people who had been previously driven out, and from their strongholds they carried on a continual warfare against Syracuse. It was the report of these events which induced the Athenians to send Phaeax to Sicily. He was to warn the Sicilians that the Syracusans were aiming at supremacy, and to unite the allies of Athens, and if possible the other cities, in a war against Syracuse. The Athenians hoped that they might thus save the Leontine people. Phaeax succeeded in his mission to the Camarinaeans and Agrigentines, but in Gela he failed, and, convinced that he could not persuade the other states, went no further. Returning by land through the country of the Sicels, and by the way going to Bricinniae and encouraging the exiles, he arrived at Catana, where he embarked for Athens.

[5] On his voyage, both to and from Sicily, he made proposals of friendship to several of the Italian cities. He also fell in with some Locrian settlers who had been driven out of Messenè. After the agreement between the Sicilian towns, a feud had broken out at Messenè, and one of the two parties called in the Locrians, who sent some of their citizens to settle there; thus Messenè was held for a time by the Locrians. They were returning home after their expulsion when Phaeax fell in with them, but he did them no harm; for the Locrians had already agreed with him to enter into a treaty with the Athenians. At the general reconciliation of the Sicilians, they alone of the allies had not made peace with Athens. And they would have continued to hold out had they not been constrained by a war with the Itoneans and Melaeans, who were their neighbours and colonists from their city. Phaeax then returned to Athens.

[6] Cleon had now sailed round from Toronè against Amphipolis, and making Eion his headquarters, attacked Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, which he failed to take. He succeeded, however, in storming Galepsus, a Thasian

colony. He sent an embassy to Perdiccas, desiring him to come with an army, according to the terms of the alliance, and another to Polles, the king of the Odomantian Thracians, who was to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as he could; he then remained quietly at Eion waiting for these reinforcements. Brasidas, hearing of his movements, took up a counter-position on Cerdylium. This is a high ground on the right bank of the river, not far from Amphipolis, belonging to the Argilians. From this spot he commanded a view of the country round, so that Cleon was sure to be seen by him if, — as Brasidas fully expected, — despising the numbers of his opponents, he should go up against Amphipolis without waiting for his reinforcements. At the same time he prepared for a battle, summoning to his side fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries and the entire forces of the Edonians, who were targeteers and horsemen; he had already one thousand Myrcinian and Chalcidian targeteers, in addition to the troops in Amphipolis. His heavy-armed, when all mustered, amounted to nearly two thousand, and he had three hundred Hellenic cavalry. Of these forces about fifteen hundred were stationed with Brasidas on Cerdylium, and the remainder were drawn up in order of battle under Clearidas in Amphipolis.

[7] Cleon did nothing for a time, but he was soon compelled to make the movement which Brasidas expected. For the soldiers were disgusted at their inaction, and drew comparisons between the generals; what skill and enterprise might be expected on the one side, and what ignorance and cowardice on the other. And they remembered how unwilling they had been to follow Cleon when they left Athens. He, observing their murmurs, and not wanting them to be depressed by too long a stay in one place, led his army forward. He went to work in the same confident spirit which had already been successful at Pylos, and of which the success had given him a high opinion of his own wisdom. That any one would come out to fight with him he never

even imagined; he said that he was only going to look at the place. If he waited for a larger force, this was not because he thought that there was any risk of his being defeated should he be compelled to fight, but that he might completely surround and storm the city. So he stationed his army upon a steep hill above Amphipolis, whence he surveyed with his own eyes the lake formed by the river Strymon, and the lie of the country on the side towards Thrace. He thought that he could go away without fighting whenever he pleased. For indeed there was no one to be seen on the walls, nor passing through the gates, which were all closed. He even imagined that he had made a mistake in coming up against the city without siege-engines; had he brought them he would have taken Amphipolis, for there was no one to prevent him.

[8] No sooner did Brasidas see the Athenians in motion, than he himself descended from Cerdylium, and went into Amphipolis. He did not go out and draw up his forces in order of battle; he feared too much the inferiority of his own troops, not in their numbers (which were about equal to those of the enemy) but in quality; for the Athenian forces were the flower of their army, and they were supported by the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians. So he determined to employ a manoeuvre, thinking that, if he showed them the real number and meagre equipment of his soldiers, he would be less likely to succeed than if he came upon them before there had been time to observe him, and when as yet they had no real grounds for their contempt of him. Selecting a hundred and fifty hoplites, and handing over the rest to Clearidas, he resolved to make a sudden attack before the Athenians retired, considering that, if their reinforcements should arrive, he might never again have an opportunity of fighting them by themselves. So he called together all his troops, and wishing to encourage them, and explain his plan, spoke as follows:

[9] ‘Men of Peloponnesus, I need not waste words in telling you that we come from a land which has always been brave,

and therefore free, and that you are Dorians, and are about to fight with Ionians whom you have beaten again and again. But I must explain to you my plan of attack; lest you should be disheartened at the seeming disproportion of numbers, because we go into battle not with our whole force but with a handful of men. Our enemies, if I am not mistaken, despise us; they believe that no one will come out against them, and so they have ascended the hill, where they are busy looking about them in disorder, and making but small account of us. Now, he is the most successful general who discerns most clearly such mistakes when made by his enemies, and adapts his attack to the character of his own forces, not always assailing them openly and in regular array, but acting according to the circumstances of the case. And the greatest reputation is gained by those stratagems in which a man deceives his enemies most completely, and does his friends most service. Therefore while they are still confident and unprepared, and, if I read their intentions aright, are thinking of withdrawing rather than of maintaining their ground, while they are off their guard and before they have recovered their presence of mind, I and my men will do our best to anticipate their retreat, and will make a rush at the centre of the army. Then, Clearidas, when you see me engaged, and I hope striking panic into them, bring up your troops, the Amphipolitans and the other allies, open the gates suddenly, run out, and lose no time in closing with them. This is the way to terrify them; for reinforcements are always more formidable to an enemy than the troops with which he is already engaged. Show yourself a brave man and a true Spartan, and do you, allies, follow manfully, remembering that readiness, obedience, and a sense of honour are the virtues of a soldier. To-day you have to choose between freedom and slavery; between the name of Lacedaemonian allies, which you will deserve if you are brave, and of servants of Athens. For even if you should be so fortunate as to escape bonds or death, servitude will

be your lot, a servitude more cruel than hitherto; and what is more, you will be an impediment to the liberation of the other Hellenes. Do not lose heart; think of all that is at stake; and I will show you that I can not only advise others, but fight myself.’

[10] When Brasidas had thus spoken, he prepared to sally forth with his own division, and stationed the rest of his army with Clearidas at the so-called Thracian gate, that they might come out and support him, in accordance with his instructions. He had been seen descending from Cerdylium into Amphipolis, and then offering up sacrifice at the temple of Athenè within the walls; for the interior of the city was visible from the surrounding country. While he was thus employed, a report was brought to Cleon, who had just gone forward to reconnoitre, that the whole army of the enemy could plainly be seen collected inside the town, and that the feet of numerous men and horses ready to come forth were visible under the gate. He went to the spot and saw for himself; but, not wishing to hazard a regular engagement until his allies arrived, and thinking he could get away soon enough, he gave a general signal for retreat, at the same time ordering his forces to retire slowly on the left wing, which was the only direction possible, towards Eion. They appeared to linger; whereupon he caused his own right wing to face round, and so with his unshielded side exposed to the enemy began to lead off his army. Meanwhile Brasidas, seeing that the Athenians were on the move and that his opportunity was come, said to his companions and to the troops: ‘These men do not mean to face us; see how their spears and their heads are shaking; such behaviour always shows that an army is going to run away. Open me the gates there as I ordered, and let us boldly attack them at once.’ Thereupon he went out himself by the gate leading to the palisade and by the first gate of the long wall which was then standing, and ran at full speed straight up the road, where, on the steepest part of the hill, a trophy now stands:

he then attacked the centre of the Athenians, who were terrified at his audacity and their own disorder, and put them to flight. Then Clearidas, as he was bidden, sallied forth by the Thracian gate with his division, and charged the Athenians. The sudden attack at both points created a panic among them. Their left wing, which had proceeded some little way along the road towards Eion, broke off and instantly fled. They were already in full retreat, and Brasidas was going on to the right wing when he was wounded; the Athenians did not observe his fall, and those about him carried him off the field. The right wing of the Athenians was more disposed to stand. Cleon indeed, who had never intended to remain, fled at once, and was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer. But his soldiers rallied where they were on the top of the hill, and repulsed Clearidas two or three times. They did not yield until the Chalcidian and Myrcinian cavalry and the targeteers hemmed them in and put them to flight with a shower of darts. And so the rout became general, and those of the Athenians who were not slain at once in close combat or destroyed by the Chalcidian horse and the targeteers, hard-pressed and wandering by many paths over the hills, made their way back to Eion. Brasidas was carried safely by his followers out of the battle into the city. He was still alive, and knew that his army had conquered, but soon afterwards he died. The rest of the army, returning with Clearidas from the pursuit, spoiled the dead, and erected a trophy.

[11] Brasidas was buried in the city with public honours in front of what is now the Agora. The whole body of the allies in military array followed him to the grave. The Amphipolitans enclosed his sepulchre, and to this day they sacrifice to him as to a hero, and have also instituted games and yearly offerings in his honour. They likewise made him their founder, and dedicated their colony to him, pulling down the buildings which Hagnon had erected, and obliterating any memorials which might have remained to

future time of his foundation. For they considered Brasidas to have been their deliverer, and under the present circumstances the fear of Athens induced them to pay court to their Lacedaemonian allies. That Hagnon should retain the honours of a founder, now that they were enemies of the Athenians, seemed to them no longer in accordance with their interests, and likely to be displeasing to him.

They gave back to the Athenians their dead, who numbered about six hundred, while only seven were slain on the other side. For there was no regular engagement, but an unforeseen circumstance led to the battle; and the Athenians were panic-stricken before it had well begun. After the recovery of the dead the Athenians went home by sea. Clearidas and his companions remained and administered the affairs of Amphipolis.

[12] At the end of the summer, a little before this time, a reinforcement of nine hundred heavy-armed, under the command of the Lacedaemonian generals Rhamphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, set out for Chalcidicè. Coming first to Heraclea in Trachis, they regulated whatever appeared to them to be amiss. They were staying there when the battle of Amphipolis occurred. And so the summer came to an end.

[13] The following winter Rhamphias and his army went as far as Pierium in Thessaly, but as the Thessalians would not let them proceed, and Brasidas, for whom these reinforcements were intended, was dead, they returned home, thinking that the time for action had gone by. They felt that they were not competent to carry out the great designs of Brasidas, and the Athenians had now left the country defeated. But their chief reason for not proceeding was that the Lacedaemonians, at the time when they left Sparta, were inclined towards peace.

[14] After the battle of Amphipolis and the return of Rhamphias from Thessaly, neither side undertook any military operations. Both alike were inclined to peace. The

Athenians had been beaten at Delium, and shortly afterwards at Amphipolis; and so they had lost that confidence in their own strength which had indisposed them to treat at a time when temporary success seemed to make their final triumph certain. They were afraid too that their allies would be elated at their disasters, and that more of them would revolt; they repented that after the affair at Pylos, when they might honourably have done so, they had not come to terms. The Lacedaemonians on the other hand inclined to peace because the course of the war had disappointed their expectations. There was a time when they fancied that, if they only devastated Attica, they would crush the power of Athens within a few years; and yet they had received a blow at Sphacteria such as Sparta had never experienced until then; their country was continually ravaged from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting, and they were always fearing lest those who had not deserted, relying on the help of those who had, should seize their opportunity and revolt, as they had done once before. Moreover, the truce for thirty years which they had made with Argos was on the point of expiring; the Argives were unwilling to renew it unless Cynuria were restored to them, and the Lacedaemonians deemed it impossible to fight against the Argives and Athenians combined. They suspected also that some of the Peloponnesian cities would secede and join the Argives, which proved to be the case.

[15] Upon these grounds both governments thought it desirable to make peace. The Lacedaemonians were the more eager of the two, because they wanted to recover the prisoners taken at Sphacteria; for the Spartans among them were of high rank, and all alike related to themselves. They had negotiated for their recovery immediately after they were taken, but the Athenians, in the hour of their prosperity, would not as yet agree to fair terms. After their defeat at Delium, the Lacedaemonians were well aware that they would now be more compliant, and therefore they had

at once made a truce for a year, during which the envoys of the two states were to meet and advise about a lasting peace.

[16] When Athens had received a second blow at Amphipolis, and Brasidas and Cleon, who had been the two greatest enemies of peace, the one because the war brought him success and reputation, and the other because he fancied that in quiet times his rogueries would be more transparent and his slanders less credible, had fallen in the battle, the two chief aspirants for political power end to the war at Athens and Sparta, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias the son of Niceratus the Athenian, who had been the most fortunate general of his day, became more eager than ever to make an end of the war. Nicias desired, whilst he was still successful and held in repute, to preserve his good fortune; he would have liked to rest from toil, and to give the people rest; and he hoped to leave behind him to other ages the name of a man who in all his life had never brought disaster on the city. He thought that the way to gain his wish was to trust as little as possible to fortune, and to keep out of danger; and that danger would be best avoided by peace. Pleistoanax wanted peace, because his enemies were always stirring up the scruples of the Lacedaemonians against him, and insisting whenever misfortunes came that they were to be attributed to his illegal return from exile. For they accused him and Aristocles his brother of having induced the priestess at Delphi, whenever Lacedaemonian envoys came to enquire of the oracle, constantly to repeat the same answer: ‘Bring back the seed of the hero son of Zeus from a strange country to your own; else you will plough with a silver ploughshare’: until, after a banishment of nineteen years, he persuaded the Lacedaemonians to bring him home again with dances and sacrifices and such ceremonies as they observed when they first enthroned their kings at the foundation of Lacedaemon. He had been banished on account of his

retreat from Attica, when he was supposed to have been bribed. While in exile at Mount Lycaeum he had occupied a house half within the sacred precinct of Zeus, through fear of the Lacedaemonians.

[17] He was vexed by these accusations, and thinking that in peace, when there would be no mishaps, and when the Lacedaemonians would have recovered the captives, he would himself be less open to attack, whereas in war leading men must always have the misfortunes of the state laid at their door, he was very anxious to come to terms. Negotiations were commenced during the winter. Towards spring the Lacedaemonians sounded a note of preparation by announcing to the allies that their services would be required in the erection of a fort; they thought that the Athenians would thereby be induced to listen to them. At the same time, after many conferences and many demands urged on both sides, an understanding was at last arrived at that both parties should give up what they had gained by arms. The Athenians, however, were to retain Nisaea, for when they demanded the restoration of Plataea the Thebans protested that they had obtained possession of the place not by force or treachery, but by agreement; to which the Athenians rejoined that they had obtained Nisaea in the same manner. The Lacedaemonians then summoned their allies; and although the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians were dissatisfied, the majority voted for peace. And so the peace was finally concluded and ratified by oaths and libations, the Lacedaemonians binding themselves to the Athenians and the Athenians to the Lacedaemonians in the following terms:

[18] ‘The Athenians and Lacedaemonians and their respective allies make peace upon the following terms, to which they swear, each city separately:

‘I. Touching the common temples, any one who pleases may go and sacrifice in them and enquire at them, on behalf

either of himself or of the state, according to the custom of his country, both by land and sea, without fear.

II. The precinct and the temple of Apollo at Delphi and the Delphian people shall be independent, and shall retain their own revenues and their own courts of justice, both for themselves and for their territory, according to their ancestral customs.

‘III. The peace between the Athenians and their confederates and the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall endure fifty years, both by sea and land, without fraud or hurt.

‘IV. They shall not be allowed to bear arms to the hurt of one another in any way or manner; neither the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies, nor the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedaemonians and their allies; and they shall determine any controversy which may arise between them by oaths and other legal means in such sort as they shall agree.

‘V. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians.

‘VI. The inhabitants of any cities which the Lacedaemonians deliver over to the Athenians may depart whithersoever they please, and take their property with them. The said cities shall be independent, but shall pay the tribute which was fixed in the time of Aristides. After the conclusion of the treaty the Athenians and their allies shall not be allowed to make war upon them to their hurt, so long as they pay the tribute. The cities are these — Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus: these shall be allies neither of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians, but if the Athenians succeed in persuading them, having their consent, they may make them allies.

‘VII. The Mecybernaeans, Sanaeans, and Singaeans shall dwell in their own cities on the same terms as the Olynthians and Acanthians.

‘VII. The Lacedaemonians and the allies shall restore Panaetum to the Athenians. The Athenians shall restore to the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methonè, Pteleum, and Atalantè.

IX. The Athenians shall surrender the Lacedaemonian captives whom they have in their public prison, or who are in the public prison of any place within the Athenian dominions, and they shall let go the Peloponnesians who are besieged in Scionè, and any other allies of the Lacedaemonians who are in Scionè, and all whom Brasidas introduced into the place, and any of the allies of the Lacedaemonians who are in the public prison at Athens, or in the public prison of any place within the Athenian dominions. The Lacedaemonians and their allies in like manner shall restore those of the Athenians and their allies who are their prisoners.

‘X. Respecting Scionè, Toronè, and Sermylè, or any cities which are held by the Athenians, the Athenians shall do with the inhabitants of the said cities, or of any cities which are held by them, as they think fit.

‘XI. The Athenians shall bind themselves by oath to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, city by city, and the oath shall be that which in the several cities of the two contracting parties is deemed the most binding. The oath shall be in the following form:— ‘I will abide by this treaty and by this peace truly and sincerely.’ The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall bind themselves by a similar oath to the Athenians. This oath shall be renewed by both parties every year; and they shall erect pillars at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, at Athens in the Acropolis, at Lacedaemon in the temple of Apollo at Amyclae.

‘XII. If anything whatsoever be forgotten on one side or the other, either party may, without violation of their oaths, take honest counsel and alter the treaty in such manner as shall seem good to the two parties, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.’

[19] The treaty begins, at Lacedaemon in the Ephorate of Pleistolas, and on the twenty-seventh day of the month Artemisium, and at Athens in the Archonship of Alcaeus, on the twenty-fifth day of the month Elaphebolion. The following persons took the oaths and ratified the treaty: — On behalf of the Lacedaemonians, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daïthus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus; on behalf of the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.

[20] This treaty was concluded at the end of winter, just at the beginning of spring, immediately after the city Dionysia. Ten years, with a difference of a few days, had passed since the invasion of Attica and the commencement of the war. I would have a person reckon the actual periods of time, and not rely upon catalogues of the archons or other official personages whose names may be used in different cities to mark the dates of past events. For whether an event occurred in the beginning, or in the middle, or whatever might be the exact point, of a magistrate’s term of office is left uncertain by such a mode of reckoning. But if he measure by summers and winters as they are here set down, and count each summer and winter as a half year, he will find that ten summers and ten winters passed in the first part of the war.

[21] The Lacedaemonians — for the lot having fallen upon them they had to make restitution first — immediately released their prisoners, and sending three envoys, Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas, to Chalcidicè, commanded Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and the other cities to accept the articles of the treaty which severally concerned them. But they did not approve of the terms, and refused. Clearidas, who acted in

the interest of the Chalcidians, would not give up the place, and said that it was not in his power to do so against their will. Accompanied by envoys from the Chalcidian cities, he himself went direct to Lacedaemon, intending to defend himself in case Ischagoras and his colleagues should accuse him of insubordination; he also wanted to know whether the treaty could still be reconsidered. On his arrival he found that it was positively concluded, and he himself was sent back to Thrace by the Lacedaemonians, who commanded him to give up Amphipolis, or, if he could not, at any rate to withdraw all the Peloponnesian forces from the place. So he returned in haste.

[22] The representatives of the other allies were present at Lacedaemon, and the Lacedaemonians urged the reluctant states to accept the treaty. But they refused for the same reasons as before, and insisted that they must have more equitable conditions. Finding that they would not come in, the Lacedaemonians dismissed them, and proceeded on their own account to make an alliance with the Athenians. They thought that the Argives, whose hostile intentions had been manifested by their refusal to renew the peace at the request of Ampelidas and Lichas, the Lacedaemonian envoys who had gone thither, being now unsupported by the Athenians, would thus be least dangerous and that the rest of Peloponnesus would be least likely to stir. For the Athenian alliance, to which they would otherwise have had recourse, would now be closed to them. There were present at the time Athenian envoys, and after a negotiation the two parties took oaths, and made an alliance, of which the terms were as follows:

[23] ‘The Lacedaemonians shall be allies of the Athenians for fifty years, on the following conditions:

‘I. If any enemy invade the Lacedaemonian territory and harm the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians shall assist the Lacedaemonians in any way which they can, and to the utmost of their power; and if the enemy ravage their

territory and depart, the offending city shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, and shall suffer at the hands of both of them, and neither city shall cease from war before the other. These things shall be performed honestly, and zealously, and sincerely.

‘II. If any enemy invade the Athenian territory and harm the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians shall assist them in any way which they can, and to the utmost of their power; and if the enemy ravage their territory and depart, the offending city shall be the enemy of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, and shall suffer at the hands of both of them, and neither city shall cease from war before the other. These things shall be performed honestly, and zealously, and sincerely.

‘III. If the slaves rebel, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedaemonians with all their might and to the utmost of their power.

‘IV. These provisions shall be sworn to on both sides by the same persons who swore to the former treaty. Every year the Lacedaemonians shall go to Athens at the Dionysia and renew the oath, and the Athenians shall go to Lacedaemon at the Hyacinthia and renew the oath. Both parties shall erect pillars, one in Lacedaemon at the temple of Apollo in Amyclae, another at Athens in the Acropolis at the temple of Athenè.

‘V. If the Lacedaemonians and Athenians agree that anything shall be added to or taken away from the treaty of alliance, whatever it be, this may be done without violation of their oaths.’

[24] On behalf of the Lacedaemonians there took the oaths, Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daïthus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. On behalf of the Athenians there took the oaths, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes,

Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.

This alliance was made shortly after the treaty; at the same time the Athenians restored to the Lacedaemonians the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. The summer of the eleventh year then began. During the previous ten years the first war, of which the history has now been written, went on without intermission.

[25] The treaty and the alliance which terminated the ten years' war were made in the Ephorate of Pleistolas at Lacedaemon, and the Archonship of Alcaeus at Athens. Those who accepted the treaty were now at peace; but the Corinthians and several of the Peloponnesian cities did what they could to disturb the arrangement. And so before long a new cause of quarrel set the allies against the Lacedaemonians; who also, as time went on, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians, because in certain particulars they would not execute the provisions of the treaty. For six years and ten months the two powers abstained from invading each other's territories, but abroad the cessation of arms was intermittent, and they did each other all the harm which they could. At last they were absolutely compelled to break the treaty made at the end of the first ten years, and engaged once more in open war.

[26] The same Thucydides of Athens continued the history, following the order of events, which he reckoned by summers and winters, up to the destruction of the Athenian empire and the taking of Piraeus and the Long Walls by the Lacedaemonians and their allies. Altogether the war lasted twenty-seven years, for if any one argue that the interval during which the truce continued should be excluded, he is mistaken. If he have regard to the facts of the case, he will see that the term 'peace' can hardly be applied to a state of things in which neither party gave back or received all the places stipulated; moreover in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and in other matters there were violations

of the treaty on both sides; the Chalcidian allies maintained their attitude of hostility towards Athens, and the Boeotians merely observed an armistice terminable at ten days' notice. So that, including the first ten years' war, the doubtful truce which followed, and the war which followed that, he who reckons up the actual periods of time will find that I have rightly given the exact number of years with the difference only of a few days. He will also find that this was the solitary instance in which those who put their faith in oracles were justified by the event. For I well remember how, from the beginning to the end of the war, there was a common and often repeated saying that it was to last thrice nine years. I lived through the whole of it, being of mature years and judgment, and I took great pains to make out the exact truth. For twenty years I was banished from my country after I held the command at Amphipolis, and associating with both sides, with the Peloponnesians quite as much as with the Athenians, because of my exile, I was thus enabled to watch quietly the course of events. I will now proceed to narrate the quarrels which after the first ten years broke up the treaty, and the events of the war which followed.

[27] After the conclusion of the fifty years' peace and of the subsequent alliance, the ambassadors who had been invited to the conference from the other states of Peloponnesus left Lacedaemon. They all went home except the Corinthians, who turned aside to Argos and opened communications with certain of the Argive magistrates, saying that the Lacedaemonians had made peace and alliance with the Athenians, hitherto their mortal enemies, to no good end, but for the enslavement of Peloponnesus, and that the Argives were bound to take measures for its deliverance. They ought to pass a vote that any independent Hellenic city which would allow a settlement of disputes on equal terms might enter into a defensive alliance with them. The negotiation should not be carried on with the assembly, but the Argives should appoint a few commissioners having full

powers, lest, if any states appealed to the people and were rejected, their failure should become public. They added that hatred of the Lacedaemonians would induce many to join them. Having offered this recommendation, the Corinthians returned home.

[28] The Argive magistrates, after hearing these proposals, referred them to their colleagues and the people. The Argives passed a vote accordingly, and elected twelve commissioners; through these any of the Hellenes who pleased might make an alliance with them, except the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, who could only be admitted to the league with the sanction of the Argive people. The Argives were the more inclined to take this course because, their truce with the Lacedaemonians being about to expire, they saw that war was imminent. Moreover they were encouraged by the hope of becoming the leaders of Peloponnesus. For at this time the reputation of Lacedaemon had fallen very low; her misfortunes had brought her into contempt, while the resources of Argos were unimpaired. For the Argives had not taken part in the war with Athens, and, being at peace with both parties, had reaped a harvest from them.

[29] The first to enter the alliance offered by the Argives to any Hellenes who were willing to accept it were the Mantineans and their allies, who joined through fear of the Lacedaemonians. For, during the war with Athens, they had subjected a part of Arcadia, which they thought that the Lacedaemonians, now that their hands were free, would no longer allow them to retain. So they gladly joined Argos, reflecting that it was a great city, the constant enemy of Sparta, and, like their own, governed by a democracy. When Mantinea seceded, a murmur ran through the other states of Peloponnesus that they must secede too; they imagined that the Mantineans had gone over to the Argives because they had better information than themselves, and also they were angry with the Lacedaemonians, chiefly on account of that

clause in the treaty with Athens which provided that the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, if agreed, might add to or take away from it whatever they pleased. This clause aroused great uneasiness among the Peloponnesians, and made them suspect that the Lacedaemonians meant to unite with the Athenians in order to enslave them; they argued that the power of altering the treaty ought to have been given only to the whole confederacy. Entertaining these fears they generally inclined towards Argos, and every state was eager to follow the example of Mantinea and form an alliance with her.

[30] The Lacedaemonians perceived that great excitement prevailed in Peloponnesus, and that the Corinthians had inspired it and were themselves on the point of making a treaty with Argos. So they sent envoys to Corinth, desiring to anticipate what might happen. They laid the blame of having instigated the whole movement on the Corinthians, and protested that, if they deserted them and joined the Argives, they would be forsworn; indeed they were already much to blame for not accepting the peace made with Athens, although there was an article in their league which said that what the majority of the allies voted should be binding unless there was some impediment on the part of Gods or heroes. Now the Corinthians had previously summoned those of the allies who, like themselves, had rejected the treaty: and, replying in their presence, they were unwilling to speak out and state their grievances, of which the chief was that the Lacedaemonians had not recovered for them Sollium or Anactorium. But they pretended that they could not betray their allies in Thrace, to whom, when they originally joined in the revolt of Potidaea, they had sworn a separate oath, and had afterwards renewed it. They denied therefore that they were violating the terms of the league by refusing to join in the peace with the Athenians, for, having sworn in the name of the Gods to their allies, they would be violating their oaths if

they betrayed them: the treaty said ‘unless there was some impediment on the part of Gods or heroes,’ and this did appear to them to be an impediment of that nature. Thus far they pleaded their former oaths; as to the Argive alliance they would take counsel with their friends, and do whatever was right. So the Lacedaemonians returned home. Now there happened to be at that time Argive envoys present at Corinth who urged the Corinthians to join the alliance without more delay, and the Corinthians told them to come to their next assembly.

[31] Soon afterwards envoys from Elis likewise arrived at Corinth, who, first of all making an alliance with the Corinthians, went on to Argos, and became allies of the Argives in the manner prescribed. Now the Eleans had a quarrel with the Lacedaemonians about the town of Lepreum. A war had arisen between the Lepreans and certain Arcadian tribes, and the Eleans having been called in by the Lepreans came to assist them, on condition of receiving half their territory. When they had brought the war to a successful end the Eleans allowed the inhabitants of Lepreum to cultivate the land themselves, paying a rent of a talent to Olympian Zeus. Until the Peloponnesian war they had paid the talent, but taking advantage of the war they ceased to pay, and the Eleans tried to compel them. The Lepreans then had recourse to the Lacedaemonians, who undertook to arbitrate. The Eleans suspected that they would not have fair play at their hands; they therefore disregarded the arbitration and ravaged the Leprean territory. Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians went on with the case and decided that Lepreum was an independent state, and that the Eleans were in the wrong. As their award was rejected by the Eleans, they sent a garrison of hoplites to Lepreum. The Eleans, considering that the Lacedaemonians had taken into alliance a city which had seceded from them, appealed to the clause of the agreement which provided that whatever places any of the confederates had held

previous to the war with Athens should be retained by them at its conclusion, and acting under a sense of injustice they now seceded to the Argives and, like the rest, entered into the alliance with them in the manner prescribed. Immediately afterwards the Corinthians and the Chalcidians of Thrace joined; but the Boeotians and the Megarians agreed to refuse, and, jealously watched by the Lacedaemonians, stood aloof; for they were well aware that the Lacedaemonian constitution was far more congenial to their own oligarchical form of government than the Argive democracy.

[32] During the same summer, and about this time, the Athenians took Scionè which they were blockading, put to death all the grown-up men, and enslaved the women and children; they then gave possession of the land to the Plataeans. They also replaced the Delians in Delos, moved partly by the defeats which they had sustained, partly by an oracle of the Delphic God. About this time too the Phocians and Locrians went to war. The Corinthians and Argives (who were now allies) came to Tegea, which they hoped to withdraw from the Lacedaemonian alliance, thinking that if they could secure so important a part of Peloponnesus they would soon have the whole of it. The Tegeans however said that they could have no quarrel with the Lacedaemonians; and the Corinthians, who had hitherto been zealous in the cause, now began to cool, and were seriously afraid that no other Peloponnesian state would join them. Nevertheless they applied to the Boeotians and begged them to become allies of themselves and of the Argives, and generally to act with them; they further requested that they would accompany them to Athens and procure an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, similar to that which the Athenians and Boeotians had made with one another shortly after the conclusion of the fifty years' peace. If the Athenians did not agree, then the Corinthians demanded of the Boeotians that they should renounce the armistice and

for the future make no truce without them. The Boeotians on receiving this request desired the Corinthians to say no more about alliance with the Argives. But they went together to Athens, where the Boeotians failed to obtain the armistice for the Corinthians, the Athenians replying that the original truce extended to them, if they were allies of the Lacedaemonians. The Boeotians however did not renounce their own armistice, although the Corinthians expostulated, and argued that such had been the agreement. Thus the Corinthians had only a suspension of hostilities with Athens, but no regular truce.

[33] During the same summer the Lacedaemonians with their whole force, commanded by their king Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, made war upon the Parrhasians of Arcadia, who were subjects of the Mantineans. They had been invited by a faction among the Parrhasians; and moreover they wanted to demolish a fortress in the Parrhasian town of Cypsela, threatening the Laconian district of Sciritis, which the Mantineans had built and garrisoned. The Lacedaemonians devastated the country of the Parrhasians; and the Mantineans, leaving the custody of their own city to a force of Argives, themselves garrisoned the territory of their allies. But being unable to save either the fort of Cypsela or the cities of Parrhasia, they went home again; whereupon the Lacedaemonians, having demolished the fort and restored the independence of the Parrhasians, returned home likewise.

[34] In the course of the same summer the troops serving in Thrace, which had gone out under Brasidas and were brought home by Clearidas after the conclusion of peace, arrived at Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemonians passed a vote that the Helots who had fought under Brasidas should be free and might dwell wherever they pleased. Not long afterwards, they settled them, together with the Neodamodes, at Lepreum, which is on the borders of Laconia and Elis, being now enemies of the Eleans. Fearing lest their

own citizens who had been taken in the island and had delivered up their arms might expect to be slighted in consequence of their misfortune, and, if they retained the privileges of citizens, would attempt revolution, they took away the right of citizenship from them, although some of them were holding office at the time. By this disqualification they were deprived of their eligibility to offices, and of the legal right to buy and sell. In time, however, their privileges were restored to them.

[35] During this summer the Dictidians took Thyssus, a town of Mount Athos, which was in alliance with the Athenians. During the whole summer intercourse continued between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. But almost as soon as the peace was concluded both Athenians and Lacedaemonians began to mistrust one another, because the places mentioned in the treaty were not given up. For the Lacedaemonians, who were to make restitution first, according to the lot, had not surrendered Amphipolis and the other less important places which they held, and had not made their allies in Chalcidicè, nor the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians accept the treaty, but only kept declaring that they would join the Athenians in coercing them if they continued to refuse. They even fixed a time, though they did not commit themselves in writing, within which those who would not come into the treaty were to be declared the enemies of both parties. The Athenians, seeing that nothing was being really done, suspected the Lacedaemonians of dishonesty, and therefore they would not give up Pylos when the Lacedaemonians required it; they even repented that they had restored the prisoners taken at Sphacteria, and resolved to keep the other places until the Lacedaemonians had fulfilled their part of the contract. The Lacedaemonians replied that they had done what they could. They had delivered up the Athenian prisoners who were in their hands, and had withdrawn their soldiers from Chalcidicè; they had neglected nothing which lay within

their power. But they could not give up Amphipolis, of which they were not entirely masters; they would however try to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians into the treaty, to get back Panactum, and recover all the Athenian captives who were in the hands of the Boeotians. They still continued to insist on the restoration of Pylos, or at any rate on the withdrawal of the Messenians and Helots, now that the Lacedaemonians had withdrawn their troops from Chalcidicè; the Athenians might, if they liked, garrison the place themselves. After many long conferences held during the summer, they persuaded the Athenians to withdraw the Messenians, Helots, and Lacedaemonian deserters: these the Athenians settled at Cranii in Cephallenia. So during this summer there was peace and intercourse between Athens and Sparta.

[36] Before the following winter the Ephors under whom the peace was concluded were succeeded by others, of whom some were actually opposed to it. During the winter, embassies from the allied states arrived at Sparta, including representatives of Athens, Boeotia, and Corinth. Much was said with no result. As the ambassadors were departing, Cleobulus and Xenares, the Ephors who were most desirous of renewing the war, entered into a private negotiation with the Boeotians and Corinthians, recommending them to unite as closely as possible, and suggesting that the Boeotians should first enter the Argive alliance and then try and make the Argives, as well as themselves, allies of the Lacedaemonians. The Boeotians would thus escape the necessity of accepting the peace with Athens; for the Lacedaemonians would prefer the friendship and alliance of Argos to anything which they might lose by the enmity of Athens and the dissolution of the treaty. The two Ephors knew that a satisfactory alliance with Argos was an object which the Lacedaemonians always had at heart, perceiving as they did that it would enable them to carry on the war beyond the Peloponnesus with greater freedom. At the same

time they entreated the Boeotians to give up Panactum to the Lacedaemonians, in order that they might exchange it for Pylos, and so be in a better position for renewing the war with Athens.

[37] The Boeotians and Corinthians, having received from Xenares and Cleobulus and their other Lacedaemonian friends the instructions which they were to convey to their own governments, returned to their respective cities. On their way home two Argives high in office, who had been waiting for them on the road, entered into communications with them, in the hope that the Boeotians, like the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans, might join their alliance; if this could only be accomplished, and they could act together, they might easily, they said, go to war or make peace, either with Lacedaemon or with any other power. The Boeotian envoys were pleased at the proposal, for it so happened that the request of the Argives coincided with the instructions of their Lacedaemonian friends. Whereupon the Argives, finding that their proposals were acceptable to the Boeotians, promised to send an embassy to them, and so departed. When the Boeotians returned home they told the Boeotarchs what they had heard, both at Lacedaemon and from the Argives who had met them on their way. The Boeotarchs were glad, and their zeal was quickened when they discovered that the request made to them by their friends in Lacedaemon fell in with the projects of the Argives. Soon afterwards the envoys from Argos appeared, inviting the Boeotians to fulfil their engagement. The Boeotarchs encouraged their proposals, and dismissed them; promising that they would send envoys of their own to negotiate the intended alliance.

[38] In the meantime the Boeotarchs and the envoys from Corinth, Megara, and Chalcidicè determined that they would take an oath to one another, pledging themselves to assist whichever of them was at any time in need, and not go to war or make peace without the consent of all. When they

had got thus far, the Megarians and Boeotians, who acted together in the matter, were to enter into an agreement with the Argives. But before the oath was sworn, the Boeotarchs communicated their intentions to the Four Councils of the Boeotians, whose sanction is always necessary, and urged that oaths of alliance should be offered to any cities which were willing to join with them for mutual protection. But the Boeotian Councils, fearing that they might offend the Lacedaemonians if they swore alliance to the Corinthians who had seceded from them, rejected their proposals. For the Boeotarchs did not tell them what had passed at Lacedaemon, and how two of the Ephors, Cleobulus and Xenares, and their friends had advised them first to become allies of Argos and Corinth, and then to make a further alliance with the Lacedaemonians. They thought that the Councils, whether informed of this or not, would be sure to ratify their foregone decision when it was communicated to them. So the plan broke down, and the Corinthian and the Chalcidian envoys went away without effecting their purpose. The Boeotarchs, who had originally intended, if they succeeded, to do their best to effect an alliance with the Argives, gave up the idea of bringing this latter measure before the Councils, and did not fulfil their promise of sending envoys to Argos; but the whole business was neglected and deferred.

[39] During the same winter the Olynthians made a sudden attack upon Mecyberna, which was held by an Athenian garrison, and took it. The Athenians and Lacedaemonians still continued to negotiate about the places which had not been restored, the Lacedaemonians hoping that, if the Athenians got back Panactum from the Boeotians, they might themselves recover Pylos. So they sent an embassy to the Boeotians, and begged of them to give up Panactum and the Athenian prisoners to themselves, that they might obtain Pylos in return for them. But the Boeotians refused to give them up unless the Lacedaemonians made a separate

alliance with them as they had done with the Athenians. Now the Lacedaemonians knew that, if they acceded to this request, they would be dealing unfairly with Athens, because there was a stipulation which forbade either state to make war or peace without the consent of the other; but they were eager to obtain Panactum and thereby, as they hoped, recover Pylos. At the same time the party who wished to break the peace with Athens were zealous on behalf of the Boeotians. So they made the alliance about the end of winter and the beginning of spring. The Boeotians at once commenced the demolition of Panactum; and the eleventh year of the war ended.

[40] Immediately on the commencement of spring, the Argives, observing that the envoys whom the Beeotians promised to send had not arrived, that Panactum was being demolished, and that a private alliance had been made between the Lacedaemonians and the Boeotians, began to fear that they would be isolated, and that the whole confederacy would go over to the Lacedaemonians. For they thought that the Boeotians were demolishing Panactum by the desire of the Lacedaemonians, and had likewise been induced by them to come into the Athenian treaty; and that the Athenians were cognisant of the whole affair. But, if so, they could no longer form an alliance even with Athens, although they had hitherto imagined that the enmity of the two powers would secure them an alliance with one or the other, and that if they lost the peace with Lacedaemon, they might at any rate become allies of the Athenians. So in their perplexity, fearing that they might have to fight Lacedaemon, Tegea, Boeotia, and Athens, all at once, the Argives, who at the time when they were proudly hoping to be the leaders of Peloponnesus had refused to make a treaty with Lacedaemon, now sent thither two envoys, Eustrophus and Aeson, who were likely to be well regarded by the Spartans. For under present circumstances it seemed to them that nothing better could be done than to make a

treaty with the Lacedaemonians on any terms whatever, and keep out of war.

[41] The envoys arrived, and began to confer with the Lacedaemonians respecting the conditions on which the peace should be made. The Argives at first demanded that the old quarrel about the border-land of Cynuria, a district which contains the cities of Thyrea and Anthenè and is occupied by the Lacedaemonians, should be referred to the arbitration of some state or person. Of this the Lacedaemonians would not allow a word to be said, but they professed their readiness to renew the treaty on the old terms. The Argives at length induced them to make a fifty years' peace, on the understanding however that either Lacedaemon or Argos, provided that neither city were suffering at the time from war or plague, might challenge the other to fight for the disputed territory, as they had done once before when both sides claimed the victory; but the conquered party was not to be pursued over their own border. The Lacedaemonians at first thought that this proposal was nonsense; however, as they were desirous of having the friendship of Argos on any terms, they assented, and drew up a written treaty. But they desired the envoys, before any of the provisions took effect, to return and lay the matter before the people of Argos; if they agreed, they were to come again at the Hyacinthia and take the oaths. So they departed.

[42] While the Argives were thus engaged, the envoys ofthe Lacedaemonians — Andromedes, Phaedimus, and Antimenidas — who were appointed to receive Panactum and the prisoners from the Boeotians, and give them up to the Athenians, found Panactum already demolished by the Boeotians. They alleged that the Athenians and Boeotians in days of old had quarrelled about the place, and had sworn that neither of them should inhabit it, but both enjoy the use of it. However, Andromedes and his colleagues conveyed the Athenian prisoners who were in the hands of

the Boeotians to Athens, and restored them; they further announced the destruction of Panactum, maintaining that they were restoring that too, inasmuch as no enemy of the Athenians could any longer dwell there. Their words raised a violent outcry among the Athenians; they felt that the Lacedaemonians were dealing unfairly with them in two respects: first, there was the demolition of Panactum, which should have been delivered standing; secondly, they were informed of the separate alliance which the Lacedaemonians had made with the Boeotians, notwithstanding their promise that they would join in coercing those who did not accept the peace. They called to mind all their other shortcomings in the fulfilment of the treaty, and conscious that they had been deceived, they answered the envoys roughly, and sent them away.

[43] When the difference between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians had gone thus far, the war party at Athens in their turn lost no time in pressing their views. Foremost among them was Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, a man who would have been thought young in any other city, but was influential by reason of his high descent: he sincerely preferred the Argive alliance, but at the same time he took part against the Lacedaemonians from temper, and because his pride was touched. For they had not consulted him, but had negotiated the peace through Nicias and Laches, despising his youth, and disregarding an ancient connexion with his family, who had been their proxeni; a connexion which his grandfather had renounced, and he, by the attention which he had paid to the captives from Sphacteria, had hoped to have renewed. Piqued at the small respect which was shown to all his claims, he had originally opposed the negotiations; declaring that the Lacedaemonians were not to be trusted, and that their only object in making terms was that they might by Athenian help crush the Argives, and afterwards attack the Athenians themselves when they had no friends. As soon as the rupture occurred he promptly

despatched a private message to the Argives, bidding them send an embassy as quickly as they could, together with representatives of Mantinea and Elis, and invite the Athenians to enter the alliance; now was the time, and he would do his utmost to assist them.

[44] The Argives received his message, and thus became aware that the alliance with the Boeotians had been made without the consent of the Athenians, and that a violent quarrel had broken out between Athens and Lacedaemon. So they thought no more about their ambassadors who were at that very moment negotiating the peace with Lacedaemon, but turned their thoughts towards Athens. They reflected that Athens was a city which had been their friend of old; like their own it was governed by a democracy, and would be a powerful ally to them at sea, if they were involved in war. They at once sent envoys to negotiate an alliance with the Athenians; the Eleans and Mantineans joined in the embassy. Thither also came in haste three envoys from Lacedaemon, who were thought likely to be acceptable at Athens — Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius. They were sent because the Lacedaemonians were afraid that the Athenians in their anger would join the Argive alliance. The envoys while they demanded the restoration of Pylos in return for Panactum, were to apologise for the alliance with the Boeotians, and to explain that it was not made with any view to the injury of Athens.

[45] They delivered their message to the council, adding that they came with full power to treat about all differences. Alcibiades took alarm; he feared that if the envoys made a similar statement to the people they would win them over to their side, and that the Argive alliance would be rejected. Whereupon he devised the following trick: he solemnly assured the Lacedaemonians that if they would not communicate to the people the extent of their powers, he would restore Pylos to them, for he would use his influence in their favour instead of against them, and would arrange

their other differences. But his real aim all the time was to alienate them from Nicias, and to bring about an alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, which he hoped to effect, if he could only discredit them in the assembly, and create the impression that their intentions were not honest, and that they never told the same tale twice. And he succeeded; for when the envoys appeared before the assembly, and in answer to the question whether they had full powers replied ‘No,’ in direct contradiction to what they had said in the council, the patience of the Athenians was exhausted, and Alcibiades declaimed against the Lacedaemonians more violently than ever. The people were carried away and were ready to have in the Argives, and make an alliance with them and their confederates on the spot. But an earthquake occurred before the final vote was taken, and the assembly was adjourned.

[46] The trick which had deceived the Lacedaemonians themselves completely deceived Nicias, who could not understand the disavowal of their powers. Nevertheless in the assembly which met on the following day he still continued to maintain that the Athenians ought to prefer the friendship of Sparta, and not to conclude the Argive alliance until they had sent to the Lacedaemonians and ascertained their intentions. He urged them not to renew the war now, when it could be put off with honour to themselves and discredit to the Lacedaemonians; they were successful and should seek to preserve their good fortune as long as they could, but the Lacedaemonians were in a bad way, and would be only too glad to fight as soon as possible at all hazards. And he prevailed on them to send envoys, of whom he was himself one, requiring the Lacedaemonians, if they were sincere in their intentions, to rebuild and restore Panactum, to restore Amphipolis, and to renounce their alliance with the Boeotians unless they came into the treaty, according to the stipulation which forbade the contracting parties to make a new alliance except by mutual consent. If

we, they added, had wanted to deal unfairly, we should already have accepted an alliance with the Argives, whose ambassadors have come hither to offer it. They entrusted the representation of these and their other grievances to Nicias and his colleagues, and sent them away to Sparta. These, on their arrival, delivered their message, which they concluded by declaring that, unless the Lacedaemonians renounced their alliance with the Boeotians in case the latter still refused to accept the peace, the Athenians on their part would enter into an alliance with the Argives and their confederates. The Lacedaemonians refused to give up their Boeotian alliance, Xenares the Ephor, with his friends and partisans, carrying this point. However they consented to ratify their former oaths at the request of Nicias, who was afraid that he would return without having settled anything, and would incur the blame of failure, as indeed he did, because he was held to be responsible for the original treaty with the Lacedaemonians. When the Athenians learned on his return that the negotiations with Sparta had miscarried, they were furious; and acting under a sense of injustice, entered into an alliance with the Argives and their allies, whose ambassadors were present at the time, for Alcibiades had introduced them on purpose. The terms were as follows:

[47] ‘I. The Athenians and the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, on their own behalf and that of the allies over whom they severally rule, make a peace to continue for a hundred years both by sea and land, without fraud or hurt. The Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies shall not make war against the Athenians and the allies over whom they rule, and the Athenians and their allies shall not make war against the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies, in any sort or manner.

‘II. Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea shall be allied for a hundred years on the following conditions: — If enemies invade the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to Athens and render the Athenians

any assistance which they may demand of them, in the most effectual manner, and to the utmost of their power. And if the enemy spoil their territory and depart, the offending city shall be an enemy to Argos, Mantinea, Elis, and Athens, and suffer at the hands of all these cities; and it shall not be lawful for any of them to make peace with the offending city, unless they have the consent of all the rest. And if enemies shall invade the territory of the Eleans or Argives or Mantineans, the Athenians shall go to Argos, Mantinea, or Elis, and render these cities any assistance which they may demand of them, in the most effectual manner, and to the utmost of their power. If an enemy spoil their territory and depart, the offending city shall be an enemy to Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, and shall suffer at the hands of all these cities; and it shall not be lawful for any of them to make peace with the offending city, unless they have the consent of all the rest.

‘III. The confederates shall not allow armed men to pass through their own territory, or that of the allies over whom they severally rule or may rule, or to pass by sea, with hostile intent, unless all the cities have formally consented to their passage — that is to say, Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis.

‘IV. The city which sends troops to help another shall supply them with provisions for thirty days, counting from the time of their arrival at the city which summons them; it shall also provide for them at their departure. But if the city which summons the troops wishes to employ them for a longer time, it shall give them provisions at the rate of three Aeginetan obols a day for heavy-armed and light-armed troops and for archers, and an Aeginetan drachma for cavalry.

‘V. The city which sent for the troops shall have the command when the war is carried on in her territory. Or, if the allied cities agree to send out a joint expedition, then the command shall be equally shared among all the cities.

‘VI. The Athenians shall swear to the peace on their own behalf and on that of their allies; the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and their allies shall swear city by city. The oath shall be taken over full-grown victims, and shall be that oath which in the countries of the several contracting parties is deemed the most binding. The form of oath shall be as follows:

“I will be true to the alliance, and will observe the agreement in all honesty and without fraud or hurt; I will not transgress it in any way or manner.”’

At Athens the senate and the home magistrates shall swear, and the prytanes shall administer the oath; at Argos the senate and the council of eighty and the artynae shall swear, and the eighty shall administer the oath; at Mantinea the demiurgi and the senate and the other magistrates shall swear, and the theori and the polemarchs shall administer the oath. At Elis the demiurgi and the supreme magistrates and the six hundred shall swear, and the demiurgi and the guardians of the law shall administer the oath. Thirty days before the Olympian games the Athenians shall go to Elis, to Mantinea, and to Argos, and renew the oath. Ten days before the Great Panathenaea the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to Athens and renew the oath. The agreement concerning the treaty and the oaths and the alliance shall be inscribed on a stone column in the Acropolis by the Athenians, by the Argives on a similar column in the temple of Apollo in the Agora, and by the Mantineans in the temple of Zeus in the Agora. They shall together erect at Olympia a brazen column at the coming Olympic games. And if these cities think it desirable to make any improvement in the treaty, they shall add it to the provisions of it. Whatever the cities agree upon in common shall hold good.

[48] Thus the peace and the alliance were concluded. Nevertheless the previous treaty between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians was not on that account renounced by either party. The Corinthians, although allies

of the Argives, took no part in the new alliance; they had already refused to swear to an offensive and defensive alliance which the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans had previously made with one another. They said that they were satisfied with the original defensive alliance which bound them only to assist one another when attacked, but not to join in offensive movements. Thus the Corinthians severed themselves from the allies, and were again beginning to turn their thoughts to the Lacedaemonians.

[49] During the summer the Olympic games were celebrated, the Olympiad being that in which Androsthenes, an Arcadian, won his first victory in the pancratium. The Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple by the Eleans, and so could neither sacrifice nor contend in the games. For they had refused to pay the fine which, according to Olympic law, the Eleans had imposed upon them, alleging that they had brought an armed force against the fortress of Phyrcus, and had introduced some hoplites of their own into Lepreum during the Olympic truce. The fine amounted to two thousand minae, being two minae for each hoplite, which is the penalty imposed by the law. The Lacedaemonians sent envoys who argued that the sentence was unjust, for at the time when their troops entered Lepreum the truce had not been announced at Lacedaemon. The Eleans replied that the truce (which they always proclaim first to themselves) had already begun with them, and that while they were quietly observing the truce, and expecting nothing less, the Lacedaemonians had treacherously attacked them. The Lacedaemonians rejoined by asking why the Eleans proclaimed the truce at all at Lacedaemon if they considered them to have broken it already — they could not really have thought so when they made the proclamation; and from the moment when the announcement reached Lacedaemon all hostilities had ceased. The Eleans were still positive that the Lacedaemonians were in the wrong, and said that they

would never be persuaded of the contrary. But if the Lacedaemonians were willing to restore Lepreum to them, they offered to remit their own share of the penalty, and pay on their behalf that part which was due to the God.

[50] As this proposal was rejected, the Eleans made another: the Lacedaemonians need not give up Lepreum if they did not like, but since they wanted to have access to the temple of Olympian Zeus, they might go up to his altar and swear before all the Hellenes that they would hereafter pay the fine. But neither to this offer would the Lacedaemonians agree; they were therefore excluded from the temple and from the sacrifices and games, and sacrificed at home. The other Hellenes, with the exception of the people of Lepreum, sent representatives to Olympia. The Eleans however, fearing that the Lacedaemonians would force their way into the temple and offer sacrifice, had a guard of young men under arms; there came to their aid likewise a thousand Argives, and a thousand Mantineans, and certain Athenian horsemen, who had been awaiting the celebration of the festival at Argos. The whole assembly were in terror lest the Lacedaemonians should come upon them in arms, and their fears were redoubled when Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus, was struck by the officers. As a Lacedaemonian he had been excluded from the lists, but his chariot had been entered in the name of the Boeotian state, and was declared victorious. He had then come forward into the arena and placed a garland on the head of his charioteer, wishing to show that the chariot was his own. When the blows were given the anxiety became intense, and every one thought that something serious would happen. But the Lacedaemonians did not stir, and the festival passed off quietly.

The Olympic games being over, the Argives and their allies went to Corinth, and requested the Corinthians to join them. An embassy from Lacedaemon was also present. After much discussion nothing was concluded, for an earthquake

broke up the assembly, and the envoys from the several states returned home. So the summer ended.

[51] In the following winter there was a battle between the Heracleans of Trachis and the Oenianians, Dolopes, Malians, and certain Thessalians. These were neighbouring tribes hostile to the place, for it was in order to control them that it was originally fortified; they had been enemies to it from the first, and had done it all the damage in their power. In this battle they gained a victory over the Heracleans. Xenares, son of Cnidis, the Lacedaemonian governor, and many of the Heracleans were killed. Thus ended the winter, and with it the twelfth year of the war.

[52] At the beginning of the following summer the Boeotians took possession of Heraclea, which after the battle was in a miserable plight. They dismissed Hegesippidas, the Lacedaemonian governor, for his misconduct, and occupied the place themselves. They were afraid that now, when the Lacedaemonians were embroiled in Peloponnesus, the Athenians would take it if they did not. But, for all that, the Lacedaemonians were offended.

During the same summer, Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, now one of the Athenian generals, acting in concert with the Argives and their allies, led into Peloponnesus a small Athenian force of hoplites and archers. He collected other troops from the Athenian allies in the Peloponnese, and, marching with his army through the country, organised the affairs of the confederacy. Coming to Patrae, he persuaded the citizens to build walls reaching down to the sea. He was intending also to erect a fort himself on the promontory of Rhium in Achaia. But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and others to whose interests the fort would have been injurious, came and prevented him.

[53] In the same summer there broke out a war between the Epidaurians and the Argives. The occasion of the war was as follows: The Epidaurians were bound to send a victim as a tribute for the meadows to the temple of Apollo Pythaeus

over which the Argives had chief authority, and they had not done so. But this charge was a mere pretext; for in any case Alcibiades and the Argives had determined, if possible, to attach Epidaurus to their league, that they might keep the Corinthians quiet, and enable the Athenians to bring forces to Argos direct from Aegina instead of sailing round the promontory of Scyllaeum. So the Argives prepared to invade Epidauria, as if they wished on their own account to exact payment of the sacrifice.

[54] About the same time the Lacedaemonians with their whole force, under the command of king Agis the son of Archidamus, likewise made an expedition. They marched as far as Leuctra, a place on their own frontier in the direction of Mount Lycaeum. No one, not even the cities whence the troops came, knew whither the expedition was going. But at the frontier the sacrifices proved unfavourable; so they returned, and sent word to their allies that, when the coming month was over, which was Carneus, a month held sacred by the Dorians, they should prepare for an expedition. When they had retreated, the Argives, setting out on the twenty-seventh day of the month before Carneus, and continuing the observance of this day during the whole time of the expedition, invaded and devastated the territory of Epidaurus. The Epidaurians summoned their allies, but some of them refused to come, pleading the sanctity of the month; others came as far as the frontier of Epidauria and there stopped.

[55] While the Argives were in Epidauria, envoys from the different cities met at Mantinea, on the invitation of the Athenians. A conference was held, at which Euphamidas the Corinthian remarked that their words and their actions were at variance; for they were conferring about peace while the Argives and the Epidaurians with their allies were in the field against each other; first let envoys from both parties go and induce the armies to disband, and then they might come back and discuss the peace. His advice was approved; so

they went straight to the Argives and compelled them to withdraw from Epidauria. But, when they reassembled, they were still unable to agree, and the Argives again invaded and began to ravage the Epidaurian territory. Whereupon the Lacedaemonians likewise made an expedition as far as Caryae; but again the sacrifices at the frontier proved unfavourable, and they returned home. The Argives, after devastating about one-third of Epidauria, also returned home. One thousand Athenian hoplites, under the command of Alcibiades, had come to their aid. But hearing that the Lacedaemonian expedition was over, and seeing that there was no longer any need of them, they departed. And so passed the summer.

[56] In the following winter the Lacedaemonians, unknown to the Athenians, sent by sea to Epidaurus a garrison of three hundred under the command of Agesippidas. The Argives came to the Athenians and complained that, notwithstanding the clause in the treaty which forbade the passage of enemies through the territory of any of the contracting parties, they had allowed the Lacedaemonians to pass by sea along the Argive coast. If they did not retaliate by replacing the Messenians and Helots in Pylos, and letting them ravage Laconia, they, the Argives, would consider themselves wronged. The Athenians, by the advice of Alcibiades, inscribed at the foot of the column on which the treaty was recorded words to the effect that the Lacedaemonians had not abided by their oaths, and thereupon conveyed the Helots recently settled at Cranii to Pylos that they might plunder the country, but they took no further steps. During the winter the war between the Argives and Epidaurians continued; there was no regular engagement, but there were ambuscades and incursions in which losses were inflicted, now on one side, now on the other. At the end of winter, when the spring was approaching, the Argives came with scaling-ladders against Epidaurus, expecting to find that the place was stripped of

its defenders by the war, and could be taken by storm. But the attempt failed, and they returned. So the winter came to an end, and with it the thirteenth year of the war.

[57] In the middle of the following summer, the Lacedaemonians, seeing that their Epidaurian allies were in great distress, and that several cities of Peloponnesus had seceded from them, while others were disaffected, and knowing that if they did not quickly take measures of precaution the evil would spread, made war on Argos with their whole forces, including the Helots, under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king. The Tegeans and the other Arcadian allies of the Lacedaemonians took part in the expedition. The rest of their allies, both from within and without the Peloponnesus, mustered at Phlius. Among the other contingents there came from Boeotia five thousand heavy-armed, and as many light-armed, five hundred cavalry, and attached to each horseman a foot-soldier; and from Corinth two thousand heavy-armed, while the Phliasians joined with their whole force, because the army was to assemble in their country.

[58] The Argives, having had previous notice of the Lacedaemonian preparations, and seeing that they were actually on their march to join the rest of the army at Phlius, now took the field themselves. The Mantineans and their allies and three thousand Elean hoplites came to their aid. They advanced to the territory of Methydrium in Arcadia, where they fell in with the Lacedaemonians. The two armies each occupied a hill, and the Argives, thinking that they now had the Lacedaemonians alone, prepared for action. But in the night Agis removed his forces unknown to them and went to join the allies at Phlius. At dawn the Argives became aware of his departure, and moved first towards Argos, then to the Nemean road, by which they expected the Lacedaemonians and their allies to descend into the plain. But Agis, instead of taking the road by which he was expected, led the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and

Epidaurians by a more difficult path, and so made his way down; the Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians went by another steep pass; the Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians he commanded to descend by the Nemean road, where the Argives had taken up their position, in order that, if the Argives should return and attack his own division of the army in the plain, they might be pursued and harassed by their cavalry. Having made these dispositions, and having come down into the plain, he began to devastate Saminthus and the neighbourhood.

[59] It was now daylight, and the Argives, who had become aware of his movements, quitted Nemea and went in search of the enemy. Encountering the Phliasian and Corinthian forces, they killed a few of the Phliasians, and had rather more of their own troops killed by the Corinthians. The Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians marched as they were ordered towards Nemea, but found the Argives no longer there, for by this time they had descended from the high ground, and seeing their lands ravaged were drawing up their troops in order of battle. The Lacedaemonians prepared to meet them. The Argives were now surrounded by their enemies; for on the side of the plain the Lacedaemonians and their division of the army cut them off from the city; from the hills above they were hemmed in by the Corinthians, Phliasians and Pellenians, towards Nemea by the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megarians, and in the absence of the Athenians, who alone of their allies had not arrived, they had no cavalry. The main body of the Argives and their allies had no conception of their danger. They thought that their position was a favourable one, and that they had cut off the Lacedaemonians in their own country and close to the city of Argos. But two of the Argives, Thrasyllus one of the five generals, and Alciphron the proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, came to Agis when the armies were on the point of engaging and urged him privately not to fight; the Argives were ready to offer and

accept a fair arbitration, if the Lacedaemonians had any complaint to make of them; they would gladly conclude a treaty, and be at peace for the future.

[60] These Argives spoke of their own motion; they had no authority from the people; and Agis, likewise on his own authority, accepted their proposals, not conferring with his countrymen at large, but only with one of the Lacedaemonian magistrates who accompanied the expedition. He made a treaty with the Argives for four months, within which they were to execute their agreement, and then, without saying a word to any of the allies, he at once withdrew his army. The Lacedaemonians and their allies followed Agis out of respect for the law, but they blamed him severely among themselves. For they believed that they had lost a glorious opportunity; their enemies had been surrounded on every side both by horse and foot; and yet they were returning home having done nothing worthy of their great effort. — No finer Hellenic army had ever up to that day been collected; its appearance was most striking at Nemea while the host was still one; the Lacedaemonians were there in their full strength; arrayed by their side were Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megarians, from each state chosen men — they might have been thought a match not only for the Argive confederacy, but for another as large. — So the army returned and dispersed to their homes, much out of humour with Agis.

The Argives on their part found still greater fault with those who had made the peace, unauthorised by the people; they too thought that such an opportunity would never recur, and that it was the Lacedaemonians who had escaped, for the combat would have taken place close to their own city, and they had numerous and brave allies. And so, as they were retreating and had reached the bed of the Charadrus, where they hold military trials before they enter

the city, they began to stone Thrasyllus. He saved his life by flying to the altar, but they confiscated his property.

[61] Soon afterwards there arrived an Athenian reinforcement of a thousand hoplites and three hundred horse, under the command of Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives, although dissatisfied with the truce, were reluctant to break it, so they bade them depart; and, when they desired to treat, they would not present them to the assembly until they were compelled by the importunity of their Mantinean and Elean allies, who had not yet left Argos. The Athenians then, speaking by the mouth of their ambassador Alcibiades, told the Argives in the presence of the rest that they had no right to make the truce at all independently of their allies, and that, the Athenians having arrived at the opportune moment, they should fight at once. The allies were convinced, and they all, with the exception of the Argives, immediately marched against Orchomenus in Arcadia; the Argives, though consenting, did not join them at first, but they came afterwards. The united forces then sat down before Orchomenus, which they assailed repeatedly; they were especially anxious to get the place into their hands, because certain Arcadian hostages had been deposited there by the Lacedaemonians. The Orchomenians, considering the weakness of their fortifications and the numbers of the enemy, and beginning to fear that they might perish before any one came to their assistance, agreed to join the alliance: they were to give hostages of their own to the Mantineans, and to deliver up those whom the Lacedaemonians had deposited with them.

[62] The allied force, now in possession of Orchomenus, considered against what town they should next proceed; the Eleans wanted them to attack Lepreum, the Mantineans Tegea. The Argives and Athenians sided with the Mantineans; whereupon the Eleans, indignant that they had not voted for the expedition against Lepreum, returned home, but the remainder of the allies made preparations at

Mantinea to attack Tegea. They were assisted by a party within the walls who were ready to betray the place to them.

[63] The Lacedaemonians, when after making the four months' truce they had returned home, severely blamed Agis because he had not conquered Argos, and had lost an opportunity of which, in their own judgment, they had never before had the like. For it was no easy matter to bring together a body of allies so numerous and brave. But when the news came that Orchomenus had fallen they were furious, and in a fit of passion, which was unlike their usual character, they had almost made up their minds to raze his house and fine him in the sum of a hundred thousand drachmae. But he besought them not to punish him, promising that he would atone for his error by some brave action in the field; if he did not keep his word they might do as they pleased with him. So they did not inflict the fine or demolish his house, but on this occasion they passed a law which had no precedent in their history, providing that ten Spartans should be appointed his counsellors, who were to give their consent before he could lead the army out of the city.

[64] Meanwhile word was brought from their friends in Tegea that they must come at once, since Tegea was about to secede and had almost seceded already to the Argives and their allies. Whereupon the Lacedaemonians led out their whole force, including the Helots, with an alacrity which they had never before displayed, and marched to Orestheum in Maenalia. They told their Arcadian allies to assemble and follow them at once to Tegea. When the army had proceeded as far as Orestheum they dismissed the sixth part, including the elder and the younger men, who were to keep guard at home, and arrived at Tegea with the rest of their troops. Not long afterwards the Arcadian allies appeared. They had also sent to the Corinthians, and to the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, whom they summoned to meet them with all speed at Mantinea. But the notice given to the allies was short, and

their passage was barred by the enemies' country, which they could not easily traverse unless they waited for one another and came all together. However, they did their best. The Lacedaemonians, accompanied by their Arcadian allies, invaded the territory of Mantinea, and pitching their camp near the temple of Heracles, wasted the country.

[65] When the Argives and their allies saw the enemy they took up a steep and hardly assailable position, and arranged themselves in order of battle. The Lacedaemonians instantly charged them, and had proceeded within a javelin or stone's throw when one of the elder Spartans, seeing the strength of the ground which they were attacking, called out to Agis that he was trying to mend one error by another; he meant to say that his present mistaken forwardness was intended to repair the discredit of his former retreat. And, either in consequence of this exclamation or because some new thought suddenly struck him, he withdrew his army in haste without actually engaging. He marched back into the district of Tegea, and proceeded to turn the water into the Mantinean territory. This water is a constant source of war between the Mantineans and Tegeans, on account of the great harm which is done to one or other of them according to the direction which the stream takes. Agis hoped that the Argives and their allies when they heard of this movement would come down from the hill and try to prevent it; he could then fight them on level ground. Accordingly he stayed about the water during the whole day, diverting the stream. Now the Argives and their confederates were at first amazed at the sudden retreat of their enemies when they were so near, and did not know what to think. But when the Lacedaemonians had retired and disappeared from view, and they found themselves standing still and not pursuing, they once more began to blame their own generals. Their cry was that they had already let the Lacedaemonians slip when they had them at a disadvantage close to Argos; and now they were running away and no one pursued them; the

enemy were just allowed to escape, while their own army was quietly betrayed. The commanders were at first bewildered by the outcry; but soon they quitted the hill, and advancing into the plain took up a position with the intention of attacking.

[66] On the following day the Argives and their allies drew themselves up in the order in which they intended to fight should they meet with the enemy. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians returned from the water to their old encampment near the temple of Heracles. There they saw quite close to them the Argive army, which had moved on from the hill, and was already in order of battle. Never within their recorded history were the Lacedaemonians more dismayed than at that instant; not a moment was to be lost: immediately they hurried every man to his own place, the king Agis, according to the law, directing their several movements. For when the king is in the field nothing is done without him; he in person gives general orders to the polemarchs, which they convey to the commanders of divisions; these again to the commanders of fifties, the commanders of fifties to the commanders of enomoties, and these to the enomoty. In like manner any more precise instructions are passed down through the army, and quickly reach their destination. For almost the whole Lacedaemonian army are officers who have officers under them, and the responsibility of executing an order devolves upon many.

[67] On this occasion the Sciritae formed the left wing, a position to which in the Lacedaemonian army they have a peculiar and exclusive right. Next to the Sciritae were placed the troops who had served in Chalcidicè under Brasidas, and with them the Neodamodes. Next in order were ranged the several divisions of the Lacedaemonian army, and near them the Heraeans of Arcadia; next the Maenalians, and on the right wing the Tegeans, and a few Lacedaemonians at the extreme point of the line; the cavalry were placed on both

wings. This was the order of the Lacedaemonians. On the right wing of the enemy were placed the Mantineans, because the action was to be fought in their country, and next to them such of the Arcadians as were their allies. Then came the select force of a thousand Argives, whom the city had long trained at the public expense in military exercises; next the other Argives, and after them their allies, the Cleonaeans and Orneatae. Last of all the Athenians occupied the left wing, supported by their own cavalry.

[68] Such was the order and composition of the two armies: that of the Lacedaemonians appeared to be the larger, but what the number was, either of the several contingents, or of the total on either side, I cannot pretend exactly to say, for the secrecy of the government did not allow the strength of the Lacedaemonian army to be known, and the numbers on the other side were thought to be exaggerated by the vanity natural to men when speaking of their own forces. However, the following calculation may give some idea of the Lacedaemonian numbers. There were seven divisions in the field, besides the Sciritae who numbered six hundred; in each division there were four pentecosties, in every pentecosty four enomoties, and of each enomoty there fought in the front rank four. The depth of the line was not everywhere equal, but was left to the discretion of the generals commanding divisions; on an average it was eight deep. The front line consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, exclusive of the Sciritae.

[69] The two armies were now on the point of engaging, but first the several commanders addressed exhortations to their own contingents. The Mantineans were told that they were not only about to fight for their country, but would have to choose between dominion or slavery; having tried both, did they want to be deprived of the one, or to have any more acquaintance with the other? The Argives were reminded that in old times they had been sovereign, and more recently the equals of Sparta, in Peloponnesus; would they

acquiesce for ever in the loss of their supremacy, and lose at the same time the chance of revenging themselves upon their hateful neighbours, who had wronged them again and again? The Athenians were told that it was glorious to be fighting side by side with a host of brave allies and to be found equal to the bravest. If they could conquer a Lacedaemonian army in Peloponnesus, they would both extend and secure their dominion, and need never fear an invader again. Such were the exhortations addressed to the Argives and to their allies. But the Lacedaemonians, both in their war-songs and in the words which a man spoke to his comrade, did but remind one another of what their brave spirits knew already. For they had learned that true safety was to be found in long previous training, and not in eloquent exhortations uttered when they were going into action.

[70] At length the two armies went forward. The Argives and their allies advanced to the charge with great fury and determination. The Lacedaemonians moved slowly and to the music of many flute-players, who were stationed in their ranks, and played, not as an act of religion, but in order that the army might march evenly and in true measure, and that the line might not break, as often happens in great armies when they go into battle.

[71] Before they had actually closed a thought occurred to Agis. All armies, when engaging, are apt to thrust outwards their right wing; and either of the opposing forces tends to outflank his enemy’s left with his own right, because every soldier individually fears for his exposed side, which he tries to cover with the shield of his comrade on the right, conceiving that the closer he draws in the better he will be protected. The first man in the front rank of the right wing is originally responsible for the deflection, for he always wants to withdraw from the enemy his own exposed side, and the rest of the army, from a like fear, follow his example. In this battle the line of the Mantineans, who were on the Argive

right wing, extended far beyond the Sciritae: and still further, in proportion as the army to which they belonged was the larger, did the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans on the Lacedaemonian right wing extend beyond the Athenian left. Agis was afraid that the Lacedaemonian left wing would be surrounded, and, thinking that the Mantineans outflanked them too far, he signalled to the Sciritae and the old soldiers of Brasidas to make a lateral movement away from his own division of the army, and so cover the line of the Mantineans: to fill up the space thus left vacant he ordered Hipponoidas and Aristocles, two of the polemarchs, to bring up their two divisions from the right wing, thinking that he would still have more troops than he wanted there, and that he would thus strengthen that part of his line which was opposed to the Mantineans.

[72] He had given the order at the last moment, when the charge had already begun, and Aristocles and Hipponoidas refused to make the movement. (For the cowardice which they were supposed to have shown on this occasion they were afterwards banished from Sparta.) The enemy were upon him before he was ready, and as the two divisions would not advance into the place left by the Sciritae, Agis ordered the Sciritae themselves to close up, but he found that it was too late, and that they also were now unable to fill the vacant space. Then the Lacedaemonians showed in a remarkable manner that, although utterly failing in their tactics, they could win by their courage alone. When they were at close quarters with the enemy, the Mantinean right put to flight the Sciritae and the soldiers of Brasidas. The Mantineans and their allies and the thousand chosen Argives dashed in through the gap in the Lacedaemonian ranks and completed their defeat; they surrounded and routed them, and so drove them to their waggons, where they killed some of the elder men who were appointed to guard them. In this part of the field the Lacedaemonians were beaten, but elsewhere, and especially in the centre of

the army, where the king Agis and the three hundred Knights, as they are called, who attend him, were posted, they charged the elder Argives, the Five Divisions as they are termed, the Cleonaeans, Orneatae, and those of the Athenians who were ranged with them, and put them to flight. Most of them never even struck a blow, but gave way at once on the approach of the Lacedaemonians; some were actually trodden under foot, being overtaken by the advancing host.

[73] When the allies and the Argives had yielded in this quarter, they became severed from their comrades to the left as well as to the right of the line; meanwhile the extended right wing of the Lacedaemonians and the Tegeans threatened to surround the Athenians. They were in great danger; their men were being hemmed in at one point and were already defeated at another; and but for their cavalry, which did them good service, they would have suffered more than any other part of the army. Just then Agis, observing the distress of the Lacedaemonian left wing, which was opposed to the Mantineans and the thousand select Argives, commanded his whole forces to go and assist their own defeated troops. Whereupon the Athenians, when their opponents turned aside and began to move away from them, quietly made their escape, and along with them the defeated Argives. The Mantineans and their allies and the chosen force of Argives, seeing their army conquered and the Lacedaemonians bearing down upon them, gave up all thoughts of following up their advantage and fled. The loss incurred by the chosen Argives was small, that of the Mantineans more serious. The pursuit was not fierce nor the flight protracted, for the Lacedaemonians fight long and refuse to move until they have put an enemy to flight, but, having once defeated him, they do not follow him far or long.

[74] Thus, or nearly thus, went the battle, by far the greatest of Hellenic battles which had taken place for a long time,

and fought by the most famous cities. The Lacedaemonians exposed the arms of the enemies' dead, and made a trophy of them; they then plundered the bodies, and taking up their own dead carried them away to Tegea, where they were buried; the enemies' dead they gave back under a flag of truce. Of the Argives, Orneatae, and Cleonaeans there fell seven hundred, of the Mantineans two hundred, and of the Athenians, including their settlers in Aegina, two hundred, and both their generals. As to the Lacedaemonians, their allies were not hard pressed and did not incur any considerable loss; how many of themselves fell it was hard to ascertain precisely, but their dead are reported to have numbered about three hundred.

[75] Just before the battle, Pleistoanax, the other king, led out of Sparta a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; he had proceeded as far as Tegea when he heard of the victory, and returned. The Lacedaemonians sent and countermanded the reinforcements from Corinth and beyond the Isthmus; they then went home themselves and, dismissing the allies, celebrated the festival of the Carnea, for which this happened to be the season. Thus, by a single action, they wiped out the charge of cowardice, which was due to their misfortune at Sphacteria, and of general stupidity and sluggishness, then current against them in Hellas. They were now thought to have been hardly used by fortune; but in character to be the same as ever.

The very day before the battle, the Epidaurians with their whole force invaded the territory of Argos, expecting to find it deserted; they killed many of the men who had been left to protect the country when the main army took the field. After the battle three thousand Elean hoplites came to the aid of the Mantineans, and a second detachment of a thousand from Athens. While the Lacedaemonians were still celebrating the Carnea they marched all together against Epidaurus, and began to surround the city with a wall, dividing the task among them. The other allies did not

persevere, but the Athenians soon completed their own portion, the fortification of the promontory on which the temple of Herè stood. In this part of the works a garrison was left, to which all furnished a contingent; they then returned to their several cities. So the summer ended.

[76] At the very beginning of the following winter, after the celebration of the Carnea, the Lacedaemonians led out an army as far as Tegea, whence they sent proposals of peace to the Argives. There had always been some partisans of Lacedaemon in the city, who had wanted to put down the democracy. After the battle it was far easier for this party to draw the people into an alliance with Sparta. Their intention was to make first of all a peace, and then an alliance, with the Lacedaemonians, and, having done so, to set upon the people. And now there arrived in Argos, Lichas the son of Arcesilaus, the proxenus of the Argives, offering them one of two alternatives: There were terms of peace, but they might also have war if they pleased. A warm discussion ensued, for Alcibiades happened to be in the place. The party which had been intriguing for the Lacedaemonians, and had at last ventured to come forward openly, persuaded the Argives to accept the terms of peace, which were as follows:

[77] ‘It seems good to the Lacedaemonian assembly to make an agreement with the Argives on the following terms:

‘I. The Argives shall restore to the Orchomenians the youths, and to the Maenalians the men whom they hold as hostages, and to the Lacedaemonians the men who were deposited in Mantinea.

‘II. They shall also evacuate Epidauria, and demolish the fortifications which they have erected there. If the Athenians refuse to evacuate Epidauria, they shall be enemies to the Argives and Lacedaemonians, and to the allies of the Lacedaemonians, and to the allies of the Argives.

‘III. If the Lacedaemonians have any youths belonging to any of the allies in their country, they shall restore them to their several cities.

‘IV. Concerning the sacrifice to the God, the Epidaurians shall be permitted to take an oath which the Argives shall formally tender to them.

‘V. The cities in Peloponnesus, both small and great, shall be all independent, according to their ancestral laws.

‘VI. If anyone from without Peloponnesus comes against Peloponnesus with evil intent, the Peloponnesians shall take council together and shall repel the enemy; and the several states shall bear such a share in the war as may seem equitable to the Peloponnesians.

‘VII. The allies of the Lacedaemonians without Peloponnesus shall be in the same position as the other allies of the Lacedaemonians and the allies of the Argives, and they shall retain their present territory.

‘VIII. The Argives may if they think fit show this agreement to their allies and make terms with them, but if the allies raise any objection, they shall dismiss them to their homes.’

[78] When the Argives had accepted these propositions in the first instance, the Lacedaemonian army returned home from Tegea. The two states now began to hold intercourse with one another, and not long afterwards the same party which had negotiated the treaty contrived that the Argives should renounce their alliance with Mantinea, Athens, and Elis, and make a new treaty of alliance with Lacedaemon on the following terms:

[79] ‘It seems good to the Lacedaemonians and to the Argives to make peace and alliance for fifty years on the following conditions:

‘I. They shall submit to arbitration on fair and equal terms, according to their ancestral customs.

‘II. The other cities of Peloponnesus shall participate in the peace and alliance, and shall be independent and their own masters, retaining their own territory and submitting to arbitration on fair and equal terms, according to their ancestral customs.

‘III. All the allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnesus shall share in the same terms as the Lacedaemonians, and the allies of the Argives shall be in the same position as the Argives, and shall retain their present territory.

`IV. If it shall be necessary to make an expedition in common against any place, the Lacedaemonians and the Argives shall consult together and fix the share in the war which may be equitably borne by the allies.

‘V. If any of the states, either within or without Peloponnesus, have a dispute about a frontier, or any other matter, the difference shall be duly settled. But should a quarrel break out between two of the allied cities, they shall appeal to some state which both the cities deem to be impartial.

‘VI. Justice shall be administered to the individual citizens of each state according to their ancestral customs.’

[80] Thus the peace and the alliance were concluded, and the Lacedaemonians and Argives settled with each other any difference which they had about captures made in the war, or about any other matter. They now acted together, and passed a vote that no herald or embassy should be received from the Athenians, unless they evacuated the fortifications which they held in Peloponnesus and left the country; they agreed also that they would not enter into alliance or make war except in concert. They were very energetic in all their doings, and jointly sent ambassadors to the Chalcidian cities in Thrace, and to Perdiccas whom they persuaded to join their confederacy. He did not, however, immediately desert the Athenians, but he was thinking of deserting, being influenced by the example of the Argives; for he was himself of Argive descent. The Argives and Lacedaemonians renewed the oaths formerly taken by the Lacedaemonians to the Chalcidians and swore new ones. The Argives also sent envoys to the Athenians bidding them evacuate the fortifications which they had raised at

Epidaurus. They, seeing that their troops formed but a small part of the garrison, sent Demosthenes to bring them away with him. When he came he proposed to hold a gymnastic contest outside the fort; upon this pretext he induced the rest of the garrison to go out, and then shut the gates upon them. Soon afterwards the Athenians renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians, and themselves restored the fort to them.

[81] When the Argives deserted the alliance the Mantineans held out for a time, but without the Argives they were helpless, and so they too came to terms with the Lacedaemonians, and gave up their claim to supremacy over the cities in Arcadia which had been subject to them. Next the Lacedaemonians and the Argives, each providing a thousand men, made a joint expedition: first the Lacedaemonians went alone and set up a more oligarchical government at Sicyon; then they and the Argives uniting their forces put down the democracy at Argos, and established an oligarchy which was in the interest of the Lacedaemonians. These changes were effected at the close of winter towards the approach of spring, and so ended the fourteenth year of the war.

[82] In the ensuing summer the Dictidians in Mount Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidians; and the Lacedaemonians resettled the affairs of Achaia upon a footing more favourable to their interests than hitherto. The popular party at Argos, reconstituting themselves by degrees, plucked up courage, and, taking advantage of the festival of the Gymnopaediae at Lacedaemon, attacked the oligarchy. A battle took place in the city: the popular party won, and either killed or expelled their enemies. The oligarchy had sought help from their friends the Lacedaemonians, but they did not come for some time; at last they put off the festival and went to their aid. When they arrived at Tegea they heard that the oligarchs had been defeated. They would proceed no further, but in spite of the

entreaties of the fugitives returned home and resumed the celebration of the festival. Not long afterwards envoys came to them both from the party now established in Argos and from those who had been driven out, and in the presence of their allies, after hearing many pleas from both sides, they passed a vote condemning the victorious faction; they then resolved to send an expedition to Argos, but delays occurred and time was lost. Meanwhile the democracy at Argos, fearing the Lacedaemonians, and again courting the Athenian alliance in which their hopes were centred, began building Long Walls to the sea, in order that if they were blockaded by land they might have the advantage, with Athenian help, of introducing provisions by water. Certain other states in Peloponnesus were privy to this project. The whole Argive people, the citizens themselves, their wives, and their slaves, set to work upon the wall, and the Athenians sent them carpenters and masons from Athens. So the summer ended.

[83] In the ensuing winter the Lacedaemonians, hearing of the progress of the work, made an expedition to Argos with their allies, all but the Corinthians; there was also a party at Argos itself acting in their interest. Agis the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, led the army. The support which they expected to find at Argos was not forthcoming; the walls however, which were not yet finished, were captured by them and razed to the ground; they also seized Hysiae, a place in the Argive territory, and put to death all the free men whom they caught; they then withdrew, and returned to their several cities. Next the Argives in their turn made an expedition into the territory of Phlius, which they ravaged because the Phliasians had received the Argive refugees, most of whom had settled there; they then returned home.

During the same winter the Athenians blockaded Perdiccas in Macedonia, complaining of the league which he had made with the Argives and Lacedaemonians; and also that he had

been false to their alliance when they had prepared to send an army against the Chalcidians and against Amphipolis under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus. The army was in fact disbanded chiefly owing to his withdrawal. So he became their enemy. Thus the winter ended, and with it the fifteenth year of the war.

[84] In the ensuing summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships, and seized any of the Argives who were still suspected to be of the Lacedaemonian faction, to the number of three hundred; and the Athenians deposited them in the subject islands near at hand. The Athenians next made an expedition against the island of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian, twelve hundred hoplites and three hundred archers besides twenty mounted archers of their own, and about fifteen hundred hoplites furnished by their allies in the islands. The Melians are colonists of the Lacedaemonians who would not submit to Athens like the other islanders. At first they were neutral and took no part. But when the Athenians tried to coerce them by ravaging their lands, they were driven into open hostilities. The generals, Cleomedes the son of Lycomedes and Tisias the son of Tisimachus, encamped with the Athenian forces on the island. But before they did the country any harm they sent envoys to negotiate with the Melians. Instead of bringing these envoys before the people, the Melians desired them to explain their errand to the magistrates and to the dominant class. They spoke as follows:

[85] ‘Since we are not allowed to speak to the people, lest, forsooth, a multitude should be deceived by seductive and unanswerable arguments which they would hear set forth in a single uninterrupted oration (for we are perfectly aware that this is what you mean in bringing us before a select few), you who are sitting here may as well make assurance yet surer. Let us have no set speeches at all, but do you reply to each several statement of which you disapprove,

and criticise it at once. Say first of all how you like this mode of proceeding.’

[86] The Melian representatives answered: ‘The quiet interchange of explanations is a reasonable thing, and we do not object to that. But your warlike movements, which are present not only to our fears but to our eyes, seem to belie your words. We see that, although you may reason with us, you mean to be our judges; and that at the end of the discussion, if the justice of our cause prevail and we therefore refuse to yield, we may expect war; if we are convinced by you, slavery.’

[87] Athenians. ‘Nay, but if you are only going to argue from fancies about the future, or if you meet us with any other purpose than that of looking your circumstances in the face and saving your city, we have done; but if this is your intention we will proceed.’

[88] Mel. ‘It is an excusable and natural thing that men in our position should neglect no argument and no view which may avail. But we admit that this conference has met to consider the question of our preservation; and therefore let the argument proceed in the manner which you propose.’

[89] Ath. `Well, then, we Athenians will use no fine words; we will not go out of our way to prove at length that we have a right to rule, because we overthrew the Persians; or that we attack you now because we are suffering any injury at your hands. We should not convince you if we did; nor must you expect to convince us by arguing that, although a colony of the Lacedaemonians, you have taken no part in their expeditions, or that you have never done us any wrong. But you and we should say what we really think, and aim only at what is possible, for we both alike know that into the discussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where there is equal power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.’

[90] Mel. `Well, then, since you set aside justice and invite us to speak of expediency, in our judgment it is certainly expedient that you should respect a principle which is for

the common good; that to every man when in peril a reasonable claim should be accounted a claim of right, and that any plea which he is disposed to urge, even if failing of the point a little, should help his cause. Your interest in this principle is quite as great as ours, inasmuch as you, if you fall, will incur the heaviest vengeance, and will be the most terrible example to mankind.'

[91] Ath. 'The fall of our empire, if it should fall, is not an event to which we look forward with dismay; for ruling states such as Lacedaemon are not cruel to their vanquished enemies. With the Lacedaemonians, however, we are not now contending; the real danger is from our many subject states, who may of their own motion rise up and overcome their masters. But this is a danger which you may leave to us. And we will now endeavour to show that we have come in the interests of our empire, and that in what we are about to say we are only seeking the preservation of your city. For we want to make you ours with the least trouble to ourselves, and it is for the interests of us both that you should not be destroyed.'

[92] Mel. 'It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours to be your slaves?'

[93] Ath. 'To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation.'

[94] Mel. 'But must we be your enemies? Will you not receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you?'

[95] Ath. `No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our weakness.'

[96] Mel. 'But are your subjects really unable to distinguish between states in which you have no concern, and those which are chiefly your own colonies, and in some cases have revolted and been subdued by you ?'

[97] Ath. ‘Why, they do not doubt that both of them have a good deal to say for themselves on the score of justice, but they think states like yours are left free because they are able to defend themselves, and that we do not attack them because we dare not. So that your subjection will give us an increase of security, as well as an extension of empire. For we are masters of the sea, and you who are islanders, and insignificant islanders too, must not be allowed to escape us.’

[98] Mel. ‘But do you not recognise another danger? For, once more, since you drive us from the plea of justice and press upon us your doctrine of expediency, we must show you what is for our interest, and, if it be for yours also, may hope to convince you: — Will you not be making enemies of all who are now neutrals? When they see how you are treating us they will expect you some day to turn against them; and if so, are you not strengthening the enemies whom you already have, and bringing upon you others who, if they could help, would never dream of being your enemies at all?’

[99] Ath. ‘We do not consider our really dangerous enemies to be any of the peoples inhabiting the mainland who, secure in their freedom, may defer indefinitely any measures of precaution which they take against us, but islanders who, like you, happen to be under no control, and all may be already irritated by the necessity of submission to our empire — these are our real enemies, for they are the most reckless and most likely to bring themselves as well as us into a danger which they cannot but foresee.’

[100] Mel. `Surely then, if you and your subjects will brave all this risk, you to preserve your empire and they to be quit of it, how base and cowardly would it be in us, who retain our freedom, not to do and suffer anything rather than be your slaves.’

[101] Ath. ‘Not so, if you calmly reflect: for you are not fighting against equals to whom you cannot yield without

disgrace, but you are taking counsel whether or no you shall resist an overwhelming force. The question is not one of honour but of prudence.’

[102] Mel. ‘But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes impartial, and not always on the side of numbers. If we yield now, all is over; but if we fight, there is yet a hope that we may stand upright.’

[103] Ath. ‘Hope is a good comforter in the hour of danger, and when men have something else to depend upon, although hurtful, she is not ruinous. But when her spendthrift nature has induced them to stake their all, they see her as she is in the moment of their fall, and not till then. While the knowledge of her might enable them to be ware of her, she never fails.

You are weak and a single turn of the scale might be your ruin. Do not you be thus deluded; avoid the error of which so many are guilty, who, although they might still be saved if they would take the natural means, when visible grounds of confidence forsake them, have recourse to the invisible, to prophecies and oracles and the like, which ruin men by the hopes which they inspire in them.’

[104] Mel. `We know only too well how hard the struggle must be against your power, and against fortune, if she does not mean to be impartial. Nevertheless we do not despair of fortune; for we hope to stand as high as you in the favour of heaven, because we are righteous, and you against whom we contend are unrighteous; and we are satisfied that our deficiency in power will be compensated by the aid of our allies the Lacedaemonians; they cannot refuse to help us, if only because we are their kinsmen, and for the sake of their own honour. And therefore our confidence is not so utterly blind as you suppose.’

[105] Ath. ‘As for the Gods, we expect to have quite as much of their favour as you: for we are not doing or claiming anything which goes beyond common opinion about divine or men’s desires about human things. For of the Gods we

believe, and of men we know, that by a law of their nature wherever they can rule they will. This law was not made by us, and we are not the first who have acted upon it; we did but inherit it, and shall bequeath it to all time, and, we know that you and all mankind, if you were as strong as we are, would do as we do. So much for the Gods; we have told you why we expect to stand as high in their good opinion as you. And then as to the Lacedaemonians — when you imagine that out of very shame they will assist you, we admire the innocence of your idea, but we do not envy you the folly of it. The Lacedaemonians are exceedingly virtuous among themselves, and according to their national standard of morality. But, in respect of their dealings with others, although many things might be said, they can be described in few words — of all men whom we know they are the most notorious for identifying what is pleasant with what is honourable, and what is expedient with what is just. But how inconsistent is such a character with your present blind hope of deliverance!’

[106] Mel. `That is the very reason why we trust them; they will look to their interest, and therefore will not be willing to betray the Melians, who are their own colonists, lest they should be distrusted by their friends in Hellas and play into the hands of their enemies.’

[107] Ath. ‘ But do you not see that the path of expediency is safe, whereas justice and honour involve danger in practice, and such dangers the Lacedaemonians seldom care to face?’

[108] Mel. ‘On the other hand, we think that whatever perils there may be, they will be ready to face them for our sakes, and will consider danger less dangerous where we are concerned. For if they need our aid we are close at hand, and they can better trust our loyal feeling because we are their kinsmen.’

[109] Ath. `Yes, but what encourages men who are invited to join in a conflict is clearly not the good-will of those who summon them to their side, but a decided superiority in real

power. To this no men look more keenly than the Lacedaemonians; so little confidence have they in their own resources, that they only attack their neighbours when they have numerous allies, and therefore they are not likely to find their way by themselves to an island, when we are masters of the sea.'

[110] Mel. `But they may send their allies: the Cretan sea is a large place; and the masters of the sea will have more difficulty in overtaking vessels which want to escape than the pursued in escaping. If the attempt should fail they may invade Attica itself, and find their way to allies of yours whom Brasidas did not reach: and then you will have to fight, not for the conquest of a land in which you have no concern, but nearer home, for the preservation of your confederacy and of your own territory.'

[111] Ath. `Help may come from Lacedaemon to you as it has come to others, and should you ever have actual experience of it, then you will know that never once have the Athenians retired from a siege through fear of a foe elsewhere. You told us that the safety of your city would be your first care, but we remark that, in this long discussion, not a word has been uttered by you which would give a reasonable man expectation of deliverance. Your strongest grounds are hopes deferred, and what power you have is not to be compared with that which is already arrayed against you. Unless after we have withdrawn you mean to come, as even now you may, to a wiser conclusion, you are showing a great want of sense. For surely you cannot dream of flying to that false sense of honour which has been the ruin of so many when danger and dishonour were staring them in the face. Many men with their eyes still open to the consequences have found the word "honour" too much for them, and have suffered a mere name to lure them on, until it has drawn down upon them real and irretrievable calamities; through their own folly they have incurred a worse dishonour than fortune would have inflicted upon them. If you are wise you

will not run this risk; you ought to see that there can be no disgrace in yielding to a great city which invites you to become her ally on reasonable terms, keeping your own land, and merely paying tribute; and that you will certainly gain no honour if, having to choose between two alternatives, safety and war, you obstinately prefer the worse. To maintain our rights against equals, to be politic with superiors, and to be moderate towards inferiors is the path of safety. Reflect once more when we have withdrawn, and say to yourselves over and over again that you are deliberating about your one and only country, which may be saved or may be destroyed by a single decision.’

[112] The Athenians left the conference: the Melians, after consulting among themselves, resolved to persevere in their refusal, and made answer as follows:— ‘Men of Athens, our resolution is unchanged; and we will not in a moment surrender that liberty which our city, founded seven hundred years ago, still enjoys; we will trust to the good fortune which, by the favour of the Gods, has hitherto preserved us, and for human help to the Lacedaemonians, and endeavour to save ourselves. We are ready however to be your friends, and the enemies neither of you nor of the Lacedaemonians, and we ask you to leave our country when you have made such a peace as may appear to be in the interest of both parties.’

[113] Such was the answer of the Melians; the Athenians, as they quitted the conference, spoke as follows:— ‘Well, we must say, judging from the decision at which you have arrived, that you are the only men who deem the future to be more certain than the present, and regard things unseen as already realised in your fond anticipation, and that the more you cast yourselves upon the Lacedaemonians and fortune and hope, and trust them, the more complete will be your ruin.’

[114] The Athenian envoys returned to the army; and the generals, when they found that the Melians would not yield,

immediately commenced hostilities. They surrounded the town of Melos with a wall, dividing the work among the several contingents. They then left troops of their own and of their allies to keep guard both by land and by sea, and retired with the greater part of their army; the remainder carried on the blockade.

[115] About the same time the Argives made an inroad into Phliasia, and lost nearly eighty men, who were caught in an ambuscade by the Phliasians and the Argive exiles. The Athenian garrison in Pylos took much spoil from the Lacedaemonians; nevertheless the latter did not renounce the peace and go to war, but only notified by a proclamation that if any one of their own people had a mind to make reprisals on the Athenians he might. The Corinthians next declared war upon the Athenians on some private grounds, but the rest of the Peloponnesians did not join them. The Melians took that part of the Athenian wall which looked towards the agora by a night assault, killed a few men, and brought in as much corn and other necessaries as they could; they then retreated and remained inactive. After this the Athenians set a better watch. So the summer ended.

[116] In the following winter the Lacedaemonians had intended to make an expedition into the Argive territory, but finding that the sacrifices which they offered at the frontier were unfavourable they returned home. The Argives, suspecting that the threatened invasion was instigated by citizens of their own, apprehended some of them; others however escaped.

About the same time the Melians took another part of the Athenian wall; for the fortifications were insufficiently guarded. Whereupon the Athenians sent fresh troops, under the command of Philocrates the son of Demeas. The place was now closely invested, and there was treachery among the citizens themselves. So the Melians were induced to surrender at discretion. The Athenians thereupon put to death all who were of military age, and made slaves of the

women and children. They then colonised the island, sending thither five hundred settlers of their own.

BOOK VI

[1] DURING the same winter the Athenians conceived a desire of sending another expedition to Sicily, larger than those commanded by Laches and Eurymedon. They hoped to conquer the island. Of its great size and numerous population, barbarian as well as Hellenic, most of them knew nothing, and they never reflected that they were entering on a struggle almost as arduous as the Peloponnesian War. The voyage in a merchant-vessel round Sicily takes up nearly eight days, and this great island is all but a part of the mainland, being divided from it by a sea not much more than two miles in width.

[2] I will now describe the original settlement of Sicily, and enumerate the nations which it contained. Oldest of all were [1] the Cyclopes and Laestrygones, who are said to have dwelt in a district of the island; but who they were, whence they came, or whither they went, I cannot tell. We must be content with the legends of the poets, and every one must be left to form his own opinion. [2] The Sicanians appear to have succeeded these early races, although according to their own account they were still older; for they profess to have been children of the soil. But the fact proves to be that they were Iberians, and were driven from the river Sicanus in Iberia by the Ligurians. Sicily, which was originally called Trinacria, received from them the name Sicania. To this day the Sicanians inhabit the western parts of the island. [3] After the capture of Troy, some Trojans who had escaped from the Achaeans came in ships to Sicily; they settled near the Sicanians, and took the common name of Elymi but had two separate cities, Eryx and Egesta. [4] These were joined by certain Phocians, who had also fought at Troy, and were driven by a storm first to Libya and thence to Sicily. [5] The Sicels were originally inhabitants of Italy, whence they were driven by the Opici, and passed over into Sicily; according to

a probable tradition they crossed upon rafts, taking advantage of the wind blowing from the land, but they may have found other ways of effecting a passage; there are Sicels still in Italy, and the country itself was so called from Italus a Sicel king. They entered Sicily with a large army, and defeating the Sicanians in battle, drove them back to the southern and western parts of the country; from them the island, formerly Sicania, took the name of Sicily. For nearly three hundred years after their arrival until the time when the Hellenes came to Sicily they occupied the most fertile districts, and they still inhabit the central and northern regions. [6] The Phoenicians at one time had settlements all round the island. They fortified headlands on the sea-coast, and settled in the small islands adjacent, for the sake of trading with the Sicels; but when the Hellenes began to find their way by sea to Sicily in greater numbers they withdrew from the larger part of the island, and forming a union established themselves in Motyè, Soloeis, and Panormus, in the neighbourhood of the Elymi, partly trusting to their alliance with them, and partly because this is the point at which the passage from Carthage to Sicily is shortest. Such were the Barbarian nations who inhabited Sicily, and these were their settlements.

[3] The first Hellenic colonists sailed from Chalcis in Euboea under the leadership of Thucles, and founded Naxos; there they erected an altar in honour of Apollo the Founder, which is still standing without the city, and on this altar religious embassies sacrifice before they sail from Sicily. [8] In the following year Archias, one of the Heraclidae, came from Corinth and founded Syracuse, first driving the Sicels out of the island of Ortygia; in which, though it is no longer surrounded by the sea, the inner city now stands; in process of time the outer city was included within the walls and became populous. [9] In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse Thucles and the Chalcidians went forth from Naxos, and driving out the Sicels by force of arms, founded

first Leontini, then Catana. The Catanaeans however chose a founder of their own, named Evarchus.

[4] About the same time Lamis came from Megara bringing a colony to Sicily, where he occupied a place called Trotilus, upon the river Pantacyas; but he soon afterwards joined the settlement of the Chalcidians at Leontini; with them he dwelt a short time; until he was driven out; he then founded Thapsus, where he died. His followers quitted Thapsus and founded the city which is called the Hyblaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, had betrayed the place to them and guided them thither. There they remained two hundred and forty-five years, and were then driven out of their town and land by Gelo the tyrant of Syracuse; but before they were driven out, and a hundred years after their own foundation, they sent out Pamillus and founded Selinus; he had come from Megara, their own mother state, to take part in the new colony. [11] In the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, Antiphemus of Rhodes and Entimus of Crete came with their followers and together built Gela. The city was named from the river Gela, but the spot which is now the Acropolis and was first fortified is called Lindii. The institutions of the new settlement were Dorian. Exactly a hundred and eight years after their own foundation the inhabitants of Gela founded Agrigentum (Acragas), which they named from the river Acragas; they appointed Aristonous and Pystilus founders of the place, and gave to it their own institutions. [12] Zanclè was originally colonised by pirates who came from Cymè, the Chalcidian city in Opicia; these were followed by a large body of colonists from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, who shared in the allotment of the soil. The first settlement was led by Perieres of Cymè, the second by Crataemenes of Chalcis. Zanclè was the original name of the place, a name given by the Sicels because the site was in shape like a sickle, for which the Sicel word is *zanclon*. These earlier settlers were afterwards driven out by the Samians and other Ionians, who when they fled from the

Persians found their way to Sicil. Not long afterwards Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium, drove out these Samians. He then repeopled their city with a mixed multitude, and called the place Messenè after his native country.

[5] Himera was colonised from Zanclè by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon. Most of the settlers were Chalcidian, but the so-called Myletidae, Syracusan exiles who had been defeated in a civil war, took part in the colony. Their language was a mixture of the Chalcidian and Doric dialects, but their institutions were mainly Chalcidian. [13] Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans, Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenae nearly twenty years after Acrae. Camarina was originally founded by the Syracusans exactly a hundred and thirty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse; the founders were Dascon and Menecolus. But the Camarinaeans revolted, and as a punishment for their revolt were violently expelled by the Syracusans. After a time Hippocrates the tyrant of Gela, receiving the territory of Camarina as the ransom of certain Syracusan prisoners, became the second founder of the place, which he colonised anew. The inhabitants were once more driven out by Gelo, who himself colonised the city for the third time.

[6] These were the nations, Hellenic or Barbarian, who inhabited Sicily, and such was the great island on which the Athenians were determined to make war. They virtuously professed that they were going to assist their own kinsmen and their newly-acquired allies, but the simple truth was that they aspired to the empire of Sicily. They were principally instigated by an embassy which had come from Egesta and was urgent in requesting aid. The Egestaeans had gone to war with the neighbouring city of Selinus about certain questions of marriage and about a disputed piece of land. The Selinuntians summoned the Syracusans to their assistance, and their united forces reduced the Egestaeans to great straits both by sea and land. The Egestaean envoys reminded the Athenians of the alliance which they had

made with the Leontines under Laches in the former war, and begged them to send ships to their relief. Their chief argument was that, if the Syracusans were not punished for the expulsion of the Leontines, but were allowed to destroy the remaining allies of the Athenians, and to get the whole of Sicily into their own hands, they would one day come with a great army, Dorians assisting Dorians, who were their kinsmen, and colonists assisting their Peloponnesian founders, and would unite in overthrowing Athens herself. Such being the danger, the Athenians would be wise in combining with the allies who were still left to them in Sicily against the Syracusans, especially since the Egestaeans would themselves provide money sufficient for the war. These arguments were constantly repeated in the ears of the Athenian assembly by the Egestaeans and their partisans; at length the people passed a vote that they would at all events send envoys to ascertain on the spot whether the Egestaeans really had the money which they professed to have in their treasury and in their temples, and to report on the state of the war with Selinus. So the Athenian envoys were despatched to Sicily.

[7] During the same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, all but the Corinthians, made an expedition into the Argive territory, of which they devastated a small part, and, having brought with them waggons, carried away a few loads of corn. They settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, where they left a small garrison, and having made an agreement that the inhabitants of Orneae and the Argives should not injure one another’s land for a given time, returned home with the rest of their army. Soon afterwards the Athenians arrived with thirty ships and six hundred hoplites. They and the people of Argos with their whole power went out and blockaded Orneae for a day, but at night the Argive exiles within the walls got away unobserved by the besiegers, who were encamped at some distance. On the following day the Argives, perceiving what had

happened, razed Orneae to the ground and returned. Soon afterwards the Athenian fleet returned likewise.

The Athenians also conveyed by sea cavalry of their own, and some Macedonian exiles who had taken refuge with them, to Methonè on the borders of Macedonia, and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. Whereupon the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who were maintaining an armistice terminable at ten days' notice with the Athenians, and commanded them to assist Perdiccas, but they refused. So the winter ended, and with it the sixteenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

[8] Early in the next spring the Athenian envoys returned from Sicily. They were accompanied by Egestaeans who brought sixty talents of uncoined silver, being a month's pay for sixty vessels which they hoped to obtain from Athens. The Athenians called an assembly, and when they heard both from their own and from the Egestaean envoys, amongst other inviting but untrue statements, that there was abundance of money lying ready in the temples and in the treasury of Egesta, they passed a vote that sixty ships should be sent to Sicily; Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus the son of Xenophanes were appointed commanders with full powers. They were to assist Egesta against Selinus; if this did not demand all their military strength they were empowered to restore the Leontines, and generally to further in such manner as they deemed best the Athenian interests in Sicily. Five days afterwards another assembly was called to consider what steps should be taken for the immediate equipment of the expedition, and to vote any additional supplies which the generals might require. Nicias, who had been appointed general against his will, thought that the people had come to a wrong conclusion, and that upon slight if specious grounds they were aspiring to the conquest of Sicily, which was no easy task. So, being desirous of

diverting the Athenians from their purpose, he came forward and admonished them in the following terms:

[9] ‘I know that we are assembled here to discuss the preparations which are required for our expedition to Sicily, but in my judgment it is still a question whether we ought to go thither at all; we should not be hasty in determining a matter of so much importance, or allow ourselves to enter into an impolitic war at the instigation of foreigners. Yet to me personally war brings honour; and I am as careless as any man about my own life: not that I think the worse of a citizen who takes a little thought about his life or his property, for I believe that the sense of a man’s own interest will quicken his interest in the prosperity of the state. But I have never in my life been induced by the love of reputation to say a single word contrary to what I thought; neither will I now: I will say simply what I believe to be best. If I told you to take care of what you have and not to throw away present advantages in order to gain an uncertain and distant good, my words would be powerless against a temper like yours. I would rather argue that this is not the time for vigorous action, and that your great aims will not be easily realised.

[10] ‘I tell you that in going to Sicily you are leaving many enemies behind you, and seem to be bent on bringing new ones hither. You are perhaps relying upon the treaty recently made, which if you remain quiet may retain the name of a treaty; for to a mere name the intrigues of certain persons both here and at Lacedaemon have nearly succeeded in reducing it. But if you meet with any serious reverse, your enemies will be upon you in a moment, for the agreement was originally extracted from them by the pressure of misfortune, and the discredit of it was on their side not on ours. In the treaty itself there are many disputed points; and, unsatisfactory as it is, to this hour several cities, and very powerful cities too, persist in rejecting it. Some of these are at open war with us already; others may declare war at ten days’ notice; and they only remain at peace because the

Lacedaernonians are indisposed to move. And in all probability, if they find our power divided (and such a division is precisely what we are striving to create), they will eagerly join the Sicilians, whose alliance in the war they would long ago have given anything to obtain. These considerations should weigh with us. The state is far from the desired haven, and we should not run into danger and seek to gain a new empire before we have fully secured the old. The Chalcidians in Thrace have been rebels all these years and remain unsubdued, and there are other subjects of ours in various parts of the mainland who are uncertain in their allegiance. And we forsooth cannot lose a moment in avenging the wrongs of our allies the Egestaeans, while we still defer the punishment of our revolted subjects, whose offences are of long standing.

[11] ‘And yet if we subdue the Chalcidian rebels we may retain our hold on them; but Sicily is a populous and distant country; over which, even if we are victorious, we shall hardly be able to maintain our dominion. And how foolish it is to select for attack a land which no conquest can secure, while he who fails to conquer will not be where he was before!

‘I should say that the Sicilian cities are not dangerous to you, certainly not in their present condition, and they would be even so if they were to fall under the sway of the Syracusans (and this is the prospect with which the Egestaeans would fain scare you). At present individuals might cross the sea out of friendship for the Lacedaemonians; but if the states of Sicily were all united in one empire they would not be likely to make war upon another empire. For whatever chance they may have of overthrowing us if they unite with the Peloponnesians, there will be the same chance of their being overthrown themselves if the Peloponnesians and Athenians are ever united against them. The Hellenes in Sicily will dread us most if we never come; in a less degree if we display our

strength and speedily depart; but if any disaster occur, they will despise us and be ready enough to join the enemies who are attacking us here. We all know that men have the greatest respect for that which is farthest off, and for that of which the reputation has been least tested; and this, Athenians, you may verify by your own experience. There was a time when you feared the Lacedaemonians and their allies, but now you have got the better of them, and because your first fears have not been realised you despise them, and even hope to conquer Sicily. But you ought not to be elated at the chance mishaps of your enemies; before you can be confident you should have gained the mastery over their minds. Remember that the Lacedaemonians are sensitive to their disgrace, and that their sole thought is how they may even yet find a way of inflicting a blow upon us which will retrieve their own character; the rather because they have laboured so earnestly and so long to win a name for valour. If we are wise we shall not trouble ourselves about the barbarous Egestaeans in Sicily; the real question is how we can make ourselves secure against the designs of an insidious oligarchy.

[12] ‘We must remember also that we have only just recovered in some measure from a great plague and a great war, and are beginning to make up our losses in men and money. It is our duty to expend our new resources upon ourselves at home, and not upon begging exiles who have an interest in successful lies; who find it expedient only to contribute words, and let others fight their battles; and who, if saved, prove ungrateful; if they fail, as they very likely may, only involve their friends in a common ruin.

‘I dare say there may be some young man here who is delighted at holding a command, and the more so because he is too young for his post; and he, regarding only his own interest, may recommend you to sail; he may be one who is much admired for his stud of horses, and wants to make something out of his command which will maintain him in

his extravagance. But do not you give him the opportunity of indulging his own magnificent tastes at the expense of the state. Remember that men of this stamp impoverish themselves and defraud the public. An expedition to Sicily is a serious business, and not one which a mere youth can plan and carry into execution off-hand.

[13] The youth of whom I am speaking has summoned to his side young men like himself, whom, not without alarm, I see sitting by him in this assembly, and I appeal against them to you elder citizens. If any of you should be placed next one of his supporters, I would not have him ashamed, or afraid, of being thought a coward if he does not vote for war. Do not, like them, entertain a desperate craving for things out of your reach; you know that by prevision many successes are gained, but few or none by mere greed. On behalf of our country, now on the brink of the greatest danger which she has ever known, I entreat you to hold up your hands against them. Do not interfere with the boundaries which divide us from Sicily; I mean the Ionian gulf which parts us if we sail along the coast, the Sicilian sea if we sail through the open water; these are quite satisfactory. The Sicilians have their own country; let them manage their own concerns. And let the Egestaeans in particular be informed that, having originally gone to war with the Selinuntians on their own account, they must make peace on their own account. Let us have no more allies such as ours have too often been, whom we are expected to assist when they are in misfortune, but to whom we ourselves when in need may look in vain.

[14] ‘And you, Prytanis, as you wish to be a good citizen, and believe that the welfare of the state is entrusted to you, put my proposal to the vote, and lay the question once more before the Athenians. If you hesitate, remember that in the presence of so many witnesses there can be no question of breaking the law, and that you will be the physician of the state at the critical moment. The first duty of the good

magistrate is to do the very best which he can for his country, or, at least, to do her no harm which he can avoid.’

[15] Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians who came forward to speak were in favour of war, and reluctant to rescind the vote which had been already passed, although a few took the other side. The most enthusiastic supporter of the expedition was Alcibiades the son of Cleinias; he was determined to oppose Nicias, who was always his political enemy and had just now spoken of him in disparaging terms; but the desire to command was even a stronger motive with him. He was hoping that he might be the conqueror of Sicily and Carthage; and that success would repair his private fortunes, and gain him money as well as glory. He had a great position among the citizens and was devoted to horse-racing and other pleasures which outran his means. And in the end his wild courses went far to ruin the Athenian state. For the people feared the extremes to which he carried the lawlessness of his personal habits, and the far-reaching purposes which invariably animated him in all his actions. They thought that he was aiming at a tyranny and set themselves against him. And therefore, although his talents as a military commander were unrivalled, they entrusted the administration of the war to others, because they personally objected to his private habits; and so they speedily shipwrecked the state. He now came forward and spoke as follows:

[16] ‘I have a better right to command, men of Athens, than another; for as Nicias has attacked me, I must begin by praising myself; and I consider that I am worthy. Those doings of mine for which I am so much cried out against are an honour to myself and to my ancestors, and a solid advantage to my country. In consequence of the distinguished manner in which I represented the state at Olympia, the other Hellenes formed an idea of our power which even exceeded the reality, although they had previously imagined that we were exhausted by war. I sent

into the lists seven chariots, — no other private man ever did the like; I was victor, and also won the second and fourth prize; and I ordered everything in a style worthy of my victory. Apart from the conventional honour paid to such successes, the energy which is shown by them creates an impression of power. At home, again, whenever I gain distinction by providing choruses or by the performance of some other public duty, although the citizens are naturally jealous of me, to strangers these acts of munificence are a new argument of our strength. There is some use in the folly of a man who at his own cost benefits not only himself, but the state. And where is the injustice, if I or any one who feels his own superiority to another refuses to be on a level with him? The unfortunate keep their misfortunes to themselves. We do not expect to be recognised by our acquaintance when we are down in the world; and on the same principle why should any one complain when treated with disdain by the more fortunate? He who would have proper respect shown to him should himself show it towards others. I know that men of this lofty spirit, and all who have been in any way illustrious, are hated while they are alive, by their equals especially, and in a lesser degree by others who have to do with them; but that they leave behind them to after-ages a reputation which leads even those who are not of their family to claim kindred with them, and that they are the glory of their country, which regards them, not as aliens or as evil-doers, but as her own children, of whose character she is proud. These are my own aspirations, and this is the reason why my private life is assailed; but let me ask you, whether in the management of public affairs any man surpasses me. Did I not, without involving you in any great danger or expense, combine the most powerful states of Peloponnesus against the Lacedaemonians, whom I compelled to stake at Mantinea all that they had upon the fortune of one day? And even to this hour, although they

were victorious in the battle, they have hardly recovered courage.

[17] ‘These were the achievements of my youth, and of what is supposed to be my monstrous folly; thus did I by winning words conciliate the Peloponnesian powers, and my heartiness made them believe in me and follow me. And now do not be afraid of me because I am young, but while I am in the flower of my days and Nicias enjoys the reputation of success, use the services of us both.

Having determined to sail, do not change your minds under the impression that Sicily is a great power. For although the Sicilian cities are populous, their inhabitants are a mixed multitude, and they readily give up old forms of government and receive new ones from without. No one really feels that he has a city of his own; and so the individual is ill provided with arms, and the country has no regular means of defence. A man looks only to what he can win from the common stock by arts of speech or by party violence; hoping, if he is overthrown, at any rate to carry off his prize and enjoy it elsewhere. They are a motley crew, who are never of one mind in counsel, and are incapable of any concert in action. Every man is for himself, and will readily come over to anyone who makes an attractive offer; the more readily if, as report says, they are in a state of internal discord. They boast of their hoplites, but, as has proved to be the case in all Hellenic states, the number of them is grossly exaggerated. Hellas has been singularly mistaken about her heavy infantry; and even in this war it was as much as she could do to collect enough of them. The obstacles then which will meet us in Sicily, judging of them from the information which I have received, are not great; indeed, I have overrated them, for there will be many barbarians who, through fear of the Syracusans, will join us in attacking them. And at home there is nothing which, viewed rightly, need interfere with the expedition. Our forefathers had the same enemies whom we are now told

that we are leaving behind us, and the Persian besides; but their strength lay in the greatness of their navy, and by that and that alone they gained their empire. Never were the Peloponnesians more hopeless of success than at the present moment; and let them be ever so confident, they will only invade us by land, which they can equally do whether we go to Sicily or not. But on the sea they cannot hurt us, for we shall leave behind us a navy equal to theirs.

[18] ‘What reason can we give to ourselves for hesitation? What excuse can we make to our allies for denying them aid? We have sworn to them, and have no right to argue that they never assisted us. In seeking their alliance we did not intend that they should come and help us here, but that the should harass our enemies in Sicily, and prevent them from coming hither. Like all other imperial powers, we have acquired our dominion by our readiness to assist any one, whether Barbarian or Hellene, who may have invoked our aid. If we are all to sit and do nothing, or to draw distinctions of race when our help is requested, we shall add little to our empire, and run a great risk of losing it altogether. For mankind do not await the attack of a superior power, they anticipate it. We cannot cut down an empire as we might a household; but having once gained our present position, we must, while keeping a firm hold upon some, contrive occasion against others; for if we are not rulers we shall be subjects. You cannot afford to regard inaction in the same light as others might, unless you impose a corresponding restriction on your practice. Convinced then that we shall be most likely to increase our power here if we attack our enemies there, let us sail. We shall humble the pride of the Peloponnesians when they see that, scorning the delights of repose, we have attacked Sicily. By the help of our acquisitions there, we shall probably become masters of all Hellas; at any rate we shall injure the Syracusans, and at the same time benefit ourselves and our allies. Whether we succeed and remain, or depart, in either case our navy will

ensure our safety; for at sea we shall be more than a match for all Sicily. Nicias must not divert you from your purpose by preaching indolence, and by trying to set the young against the old; rather in your accustomed order, old and young taking counsel together, after the manner of your fathers who raised Athens to this height of greatness, strive to rise yet higher. Consider that youth and age have no power unless united; but that the shallower and the more exact and the middle sort of judgment, when duly attempered, are likely to be most efficient. The state, if at rest, like everything else will wear herself out by internal friction. Every pursuit which requires skill will tend to decay, whereas by conflict the city will always be gaining fresh experience and learning to defend herself, not in theory, but in practice. My opinion in short is, that a state used to activity will quickly be ruined by the change to inaction; and that they of all men enjoy the greatest security who are truest to themselves and their institutions even when they are not the best.'

[19] Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the Egestaeans and certain Leontine exiles who came forward and earnestly entreated assistance, reminding the Athenians of the oaths which they had sworn, the people were more than ever resolved upon war. Nicias, seeing that his old argument would no longer deter them, but that he might possibly change their minds if he insisted on the magnitude of the force which would be required, came forward again and spoke as follows:

[20] 'Men of Athens, as I see that you are thoroughly determined to go to war, I accept the decision, and will advise you according1y, trusting that the event will be such as we all wish. The cities which we are about to attack are, I am informed, powerful, and independent of one another; they are not inhabited by slaves, who would gladly pass out of a harder into an easier condition of life; and they are very unlikely to accept our rule in exchange for their present

liberty. As regards numbers, although Sicily is but one island, it contains a great many Hellenic states. Not including Naxos and Catana (of which the inhabitants, as I hope, will be our allies because they are the kinsmen of the Leontines), there are seven other cities fully provided with means of warfare similar to our own, above all Selinus and Syracuse, the cities against which our expedition is particularly directed. For they have numerous hoplites, archers, and javelin-men, and they have many triremes which their large population will enable them to man; besides their private wealth, they have the treasures of the Selinuntian temples; and the Syracusans receive a tribute which has been paid them from time immemorial by certain barbarian tribes. Moreover, they have a numerous cavalry, and grow their own corn instead of importing it: in the two last respects they have a great advantage over us.

[21] ‘Against such a power more is needed than an insignificant force of marines; if we mean to do justice to our design, and not to be kept within our lines by the numbers of their cavalry, we must embark a multitude of infantry. For what if the Sicilians in terror combine against us, and we make no friends except the Egestaeans who can furnish us with horsemen capable of opposing theirs? To be driven from the island or to send for reinforcements, because we were wanting in forethought at first, would be disgraceful. We must take a powerful armament with us from home, in the full knowledge that we are going to a distant land, and that the expedition will be of a kind very different from any which you have hitherto made among your subjects against some enemy in this part of the world, yourselves the allies of others. Here a friendly country is always near, and you can easily obtain supplies. There you will be dependent on a country which is entirely strange to you, and whence during the four winter months hardly even a message can be sent hither.

[22] ‘I say, therefore, that we must take with us a large heavy-armed force both of Athenians and of allies, whether our own subjects or any Peloponnesians whom we can persuade or attract by pay to our service; also plenty of archers and javelin-men to act against the enemy’s cavalry. Our naval superiority must be overwhelming, that we may not only be able to fight, but may have no difficulty in bringing in supplies. And there is the food carried from home, such as wheat and parched barley, which will have to be conveyed in merchant-vessels; we must also have bakers, drafted in a certain proportion from each mill, who will receive pay, but will be forced to serve, in order that, if we should be detained by a calm, the army may not want food; for it is not every city that will be able to receive so large a force as ours. We must make our preparations as complete as possible, and not be at the mercy of others; above all, we must take out with us as much money as we can; for as to the supplies of the Egestaeans which are said to be awaiting us, we had better assume that they are imaginary.

[23] ‘Even supposing we leave Athens with a force of our own, not merely equal to that of the enemy, but in every way superior, except indeed as regards the number of hoplites which they can put into the field, for in that respect equality is impossible, still it will be no easy task to conquer Sicily, or indeed to preserve ourselves. You ought to consider that we are like men going to found a city in a land of strangers and enemies, who on the very day of their disembarkation must have command of the country; for if they meet with a disaster they will have no friends. And this is what I fear. We shall have much need of prudence; still more of good fortune (and who can guarantee this to mortals?). Wherefore I would trust myself and the expedition, as little as possible to accident, and would not sail until I had taken such precautions as will be likely to ensure our safety. This I conceive to be the course which is the most prudent for the whole state, and, for us who are

sent upon the expedition, a condition of safety. If any one thinks otherwise, to him I resign the command.’

[24] These were the words of Nicias. He meant either to deter the Athenians by bringing home to them the vastness of the undertaking, or to provide as far as he could for the security of the expedition if he were compelled to proceed. The result disappointed him. Far from losing their enthusiasm at the disagreeable prospect, they were more determined than ever; they approved of his advice, and were confident that every chance of danger was now removed. All alike were seized with a passionate desire to sail, the elder among them convinced that they would achieve the conquest of Sicily, — at any rate such an armament could suffer no disaster; the youth were longing to see with their own eyes the marvels of a distant land, and were confident of a safe return; the main body of the troops expected to receive present pay, and to conquer a country which would be an inexhaustible mine of pay for the future. The enthusiasm of the majority was so overwhelming that, although some disapproved, they were afraid of being thought unpatriotic if they voted on the other side, and therefore held their peace.

[25] At last an Athenian came forward and, calling upon Nicias, said that they would have no more excuses and delays; he must speak out and say what forces the people were to vote him. He replied, with some unwillingness, that he would prefer to consider the matter at leisure with his colleagues, but that, as far as he could see at present, they ought to have at least a hundred triremes of their own; of these a certain number might be used as transports, and they must order more triremes from their allies. Of heavy-armed troops they would require in all, including Athenians and allies, not less than five thousand, and more if they could possibly have them; the rest of the armament must be in proportion, and should comprise archers to be procured both at home and from Crete, and slingers. These forces, and

whatever else seemed to be required, the generals would make ready before they started.

[26] Upon this the Athenians at once decreed that the generals should be empowered to act as they thought best in the interest of the state respecting the numbers of the army and the whole management of the expedition. Then the preparations began. Lists for service were made up at home and orders given to the allies. The city had newly recovered from the plague and from the constant pressure of war; a new population had grown up; there had been time for the accumulation of money during the peace; so that there was abundance of everything at command.

[27] While they were in the midst of their preparations, the Hermae or square stone figures carved after the ancient Athenian fashion, and standing everywhere at the doorways both of temples and private houses, in one night had nearly all of them throughout the city their faces mutilated. The offenders were not known, but great rewards were publicly offered for their detection, and a decree was passed that any one, whether citizen, stranger, or slave, might without fear of punishment disclose this or any other profanation of which he was cognisant. The Athenians took the matter greatly to heart — it seemed to them ominous of the fate of the expedition; and they ascribed it to conspirators who wanted to effect a revolution and to overthrow the democracy.

[28] Certain metics and servants gave information, not indeed about the Hermae, but about the mutilation of other statues which had shortly before been perpetrated by some young men in a drunken frolic: they also said that the mysteries were repeatedly profaned by the celebration of them in private houses, and of this impiety they accused, among others, Alcibiades. A party who were jealous of his influence over the people, which interfered with the permanent establishment of their own, thinking that if they could get rid of him they would be supreme, took up and

exaggerated the charges against him, clamorously insisting that both the mutilation of the Hermae and the profanation of the mysteries were part of a conspiracy against the democracy, and that he was at the bottom of the whole affair. In proof they alleged the excesses of his ordinary life, which were unbecoming in the citizen of a free state.

[29] He strove then and there to clear himself of the charges, and also offered to be tried before he sailed (for all was now ready), in order that, if he were guilty, he might be punished, and if acquitted, might retain his command. He adjured his countrymen to listen to no calumnies which might be propagated against him in his absence; and he protested that they would be wiser in not sending a man who had so serious an imputation hanging over him on a command so important. But his enemies feared that if the trial took place at once he would have the support of the army; and that the people would be lenient, and would not forget that he had induced the Argives and some Mantineans to join in the expedition. They therefore exerted themselves to postpone the trial. To this end they suborned fresh speakers, who proposed that he should sail now and not delay the expedition, but should return and stand his trial within a certain number of days. Their intention was that he should be recalled and tried when they had stirred up a stronger feeling against him, which they could better do in his absence. So it was decided that Alcibiades should sail.

[30] About the middle of summer the expedition started for Sicily. Orders had been previously given to most of the allies, to the cornships, the smaller craft, and generally to the vessels in attendance on the armament, that they should muster at Corcyra, whence the whole fleet was to strike across the Ionian gulf to the promontory of Iapygia. Early in the morning of the day appointed for their departure, the Athenian forces and such of their allies as had already joined them went down to the Piraeus and began to man the ships.

Almost the entire population of Athens accompanied them, citizens and strangers alike. The citizens came to take farewell, one of an acquaintance, another of a kinsman, another of a son, and as they passed along were full of hope and full of tears; hope of conquering Sicily, tears because they doubted whether they would ever see their friends again, when they thought of the long voyage on which they were going away. At the last moment of parting the danger was nearer; and terrors which had never occurred to them when they were voting the expedition now entered into their souls. Nevertheless their spirits revived at the sight of the armament in all its strength and of the abundant provision which they had made. The strangers and the rest of the multitude came out of curiosity, desiring to witness an enterprise of which the greatness exceeded belief.

[31] No armament so magnificent or costly had ever been sent out by any single Hellenic power, though in mere number of ships and hoplites that which sailed to Epidaurus under Pericles and afterwards under Hagnon to Potidaea was not inferior. For that expedition consisted of a hundred Athenian and fifty Chian and Lesbian triremes, conveying four thousand hoplites all Athenian citizens, three hundred cavalry, and a multitude of allied troops. Still the voyage was short and the equipments were poor, whereas this expedition was intended to be long absent, and was thoroughly provided both for sea and, land service, wherever its presence might be required. On the fleet the greatest pains and expense had been lavished by the trierarchs and the state. The public treasury gave a drachma a day to each sailor, and furnished empty hulls for sixty swift-sailing vessels, and for forty transports carrying hoplites. All these were manned with the best crews which could be obtained. The trierarchs, besides the pay given by the state, added somewhat more out of their own means to the wages of the upper ranks of rowers and of the petty officers. The figure-heads and other fittings provided by them were of the most

costly description. Every one strove to the utmost that his own ship might excel both in beauty and swiftness. The infantry had been well selected and the lists carefully made up. There was the keenest rivalry among the soldiers in the matter of arms and personal equipment. And while at home the Athenians were thus competing with one another in the performance of their several duties, to the rest of Hellas the expedition seemed to be a grand display of their power and greatness, rather than a preparation for war. If any one had reckoned up the whole expenditure, both of the state and of individual soldiers and others, including in the first not only what the city had already laid out, but what was entrusted to the generals, and in the second what either at the time or afterwards private persons spent upon their outfit, or the trierarchs upon their ships, the provision for the long voyage which every one may be supposed to have carried with him over and above his public pay, and what soldiers or traders may have taken for purposes of exchange, he would have found that altogether an immense sum amounting to many talents was withdrawn from the city. Men were quite amazed at the boldness of the scheme and the magnificence of the spectacle, which were everywhere spoken of, no less than at the great disproportion of the force when compared with that of the enemy against whom it was intended. Never had a greater expedition been sent to a foreign land; never was there an enterprise in which the hope of future success seemed to be better justified by actual power.

[32] When the ships were manned and everything required for the voyage had been placed on board, silence was proclaimed by the sound of the trumpet, and all with one voice before setting sail offered up the customary prayers; these were recited, not in each ship separately, but by a single herald, the whole fleet accompanying him. On every deck both the officers and the marines, mingling wine in bowls, made libations from vessels of gold and silver. The multitude of citizens and other well-wishers who were

looking on from the land joined in the prayer. The crews raised the paean and, when the libations were completed, put to sea. After sailing out for some distance in single file, the ships raced with one another as far as Aegina; thence they hastened onwards to Corcyra, where the allies who formed the rest of the army were assembling.

Meanwhile reports of the expedition were coming in to Syracuse from many quarters, but for a long time nobody gave credit to them. At length an assembly was held. Even then different opinions were expressed, some affirming and others denying that the expedition was coming. At last Hermocrates the son of Hermon, believing that he had certain information, came forward, and warned the Syracusans in the following words:

[33] 'I dare say that, like others, I shall not be believed when I tell you that the expedition is really coming; and I am well aware that those who are either the authors or reporters of tidings which seem incredible not only fail to convince others, but are thought fools for their pains. Yet, when the city is in danger, fear shall not stop my mouth; for I am convinced in my own mind that I have better information than anybody. The Athenians, wonder as you may, are coming against us with a great fleet and army; they profess to be assisting their Egestaean allies and to be restoring the Leontines. But the truth is that they covet Sicily, and especially our city. They think that, if they can conquer us, they will easily conquer the rest. They will soon be here, and you must consider how with your present resources you can make the most successful defence. You should not let them take you by surprise because you despise them, or neglect the whole matter because you will not believe that they are coming at all. But to him who is not of this unbelieving temper I say- And do not you be dismayed at their audacity and power. They cannot do more harm to us than we can do to them; the very greatness of their armament may be an advantage to us; it will have a good effect on the other

Sicilian cities, who will be alarmed, and in their terror will be the more ready to assist us. Then, again, if in the end we overpower them, or at any rate drive them away baffled, for I have not the slightest fear of their accomplishing their purpose, we shall have achieved a noble triumph. And of this I have a good hope. Rarely have great expeditions, whether Hellenic or Barbarian, when sent far from home, met with success. They are not more numerous than the inhabitants and their neighbours, who all combine through fear; and if owing to scarcity of supplies in a foreign land they miscarry, although their ruin may be chiefly due to themselves, they confer glory on those whom they meant to overthrow. The greatness of these very Athenians was based on the utter and unexpected ruin of the Persians, who were always supposed to have directed their expedition against Athens. And I think that such a destiny may very likely be reserved for us.

[34] ‘Let us take courage then, and put ourselves into a state of defence; let us also send envoys to the Sicels, and, while we make sure of our old allies, endeavour to gain new ones. We will despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily, and point out that the danger is common to all; we will also send to the Italian cities in the hope that they may either join us, or at any rate refuse to receive the Athenians. And I think that we should send to the Carthaginians; the idea of an Athenian attack is no novelty to them; they are always living in apprehension of it. They will probably feel that if they leave us to our fate, the trouble may reach themselves, and therefore they may be inclined in some way or other, secretly, if not openly, to assist us. If willing to help, of all existing states they are the best able; for they have abundance of gold and silver, and these make war, like other things, go smoothly. Let us also send to the Lacedaemonians and Corinthians and entreat them to come to our aid speedily, and at the same time to revive the war in Hellas. I have a plan which in my judgment is the best suited to the

present emergency, although it is the last which you in your habitual indolence will readily embrace. Let me tell you what it is. If all the Sicilian Greeks, or at least if we and as many as will join us, taking two months' provisions, would put out to sea with all our available ships and prepare to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of Iapygia, thereby proving to them that before they fight for Sicily they must fight for the passage of the Ionian Sea, we should strike a panic into them. They would then reflect that at Tarentum (which receives us), we, the advanced guard of Sicily, are among friends, and go forth from a friendly country, and that the sea is a large place not easy to traverse with so great an armament as theirs. They would know that after a long voyage their ships will be unable to keep in line, and coming up slowly and few at a time will be at our mercy. On the other hand, if they lighten their vessels and meet us in a compact body with the swifter part of their fleet, they may have to use oars, and then we shall attack them when they are exhausted. Or if we prefer not to fight, we can retire again to Tarentum. Having come over with slender supplies and prepared for a naval engagement, they will not know what to do on these desolate coasts. If they remain they will find themselves blockaded; if they attempt to sail onwards they will cut themselves off from the rest of their armament, and will be discouraged; for they will be far from certain whether the cities of Italy and Sicily will receive them. In my opinion the anticipation of these difficulties will hamper them to such a degree, that they will never leave Corcyra. While they are holding consultations, and sending out spies to discover our number and exact position, they will find themselves driven into winter; or in dismay at the unexpected opposition, they may very likely break up the expedition; especially if, as I am informed, the most experienced of their generals has taken the command against his will, and would gladly make any considerable demonstration on our part an excuse for retreating. I am

quite sure that rumour will exaggerate our strength. The minds of men are apt to be swayed by what they hear; and they are most afraid of those who commence an attack, or who at any rate show to the aggressor betimes that he will meet with resistance; for then they reflect that the risk is equally divided. And so it will be with the Athenians. They are now attacking us because they do not believe that we shall defend ourselves, and in this opinion they are justified by our neglect to join with the Lacedaemonians in putting them down. But, if they see that they were mistaken, and that we boldly venture, they will be more dismayed at our unexpected resistance than at our real power. Take my advice; if possible, resolve on this bold step, but if not, adopt other measures of defence as quickly as possible. Remember each and all of you that the true contempt of an invader is shown by deeds of valour in the field, and that meanwhile the greatest service which you can render to the state is to act as if you were in the presence of danger, considering that safety depends on anxious preparation. The Athenians are coming; I am certain that they are already on the sea and will soon be here.’

[35] Thus spoke Hermocrates. Great was the contention which his words aroused among the Syracusan people, some asserting that the Athenians would never come, and that he was not speaking truth, others asking, ‘And if they should come, what harm could they do to us nearly so great as we could do to them?’ while others were quite contemptuous, and made a jest of the whole matter. A few only believed Hermocrates and realised the danger. At last Athenagoras, the popular leader, who had at that time the greatest influence with the multitude, came forward and spoke as follows:

[36] ‘He is either a coward or a traitor who would not rejoice to hear that the Athenians are so mad as to come hither and deliver themselves into our hands. The audacity of the people who are spreading these alarms does not surprise

me, but I do wonder at their folly if they cannot see that their motives are transparent. Having private reasons for being afraid, they want to strike terror into the whole city that they may hide themselves under the shadow of the common fear. And now, what is the meaning of these rumours? They do not grow of themselves; they have been got up by persons who are the troublers of our state. And you, if you are wise, will not measure probabilities by their reports, but by what we may assume to be the intentions of shrewd and experienced men such as I conceive the Athenians to be. They are not likely to leave behind them a power such as Peloponnesus. The war which they have already on their hands is far from settled, and will they go out of their way to bring upon themselves another as great? In my opinion they are only too glad that we are not attacking them, considering the number and power of our states.

[37] ‘Even if the rumour of their coming should turn out to be true, I am sure that Sicily is more fit than Peloponnesus to maintain a great war. The whole island is better supplied in every way, and our own city is herself far more than a match for the army which is said to be threatening us; aye, and for another as great. I know that they will not bring cavalry with them, and will find none here, except the few horsemen which they may procure from Egesta. They cannot provide a force of hoplites equal to ours, for they have to cross the sea; and to come all this distance, if only with ships and with no troops or lading, would be work enough. I know too that an armament which is directed against so great a city as ours will require immense supplies. Nay, I venture to assert that if they came hither, having at their command another city close upon our border as large as Syracuse, and could there settle and carry on war against us from thence, they would still be destroyed to a man; how much more when the whole country will be their enemy (for Sicily will unite), and when they must pitch their camp the moment they are out

of their ships, and will have nothing but their wretched huts and meagre supplies, being prevented by our cavalry from advancing far beyond their lines? Indeed I hardly think that they will effect a landing at all. So far superior, in my judgment, are our forces to theirs.

[38] ‘The Athenians, I repeat, know all that I am telling you, and do not mean to throw away what they have got: I am pretty sure of that. But some of our people are fabricating reports which neither are, nor are ever likely to be, true. I know, and have always known, that by words like these, and yet more mischievous, if not by acts, they want to intimidate you, the Syracusan people, and make themselves chiefs of the state. And I am afraid that if they persevere they will succeed at last, and that we shall be delivered into their hands before we have had the sense to take precautions or to detect and punish them. This is the reason why our city is always in a state of unrest and disorganisation, fighting against herself quite as much as against foreign enemies, and from time to time subjected to tyrants and to narrow and wicked oligarchies. If the people will only support me I shall endeavour to prevent any such misfortunes happening in our day. With you I shall use persuasion, but to these conspirators I shall apply force; and I shall not wait until they are detected in the act (for who can catch them?), but I shall punish their intentions and the mischief which they would do if they could. For the thoughts of our enemies must be punished before they have ripened into deeds. If a man does not strike first, he will be the first struck. As to the rest of the oligarchical party, I must expose them and have an eye on their designs; I must also instruct them; that, I think, will be the way by which I can best deter them from their evil courses. Come now, young men, and answer me a question which I have often asked myself. “What can you want?” To hold office already? But the law forbids. And the law was not intended to slight you had you been capable; it was passed because you were incapable. And so you would

rather not be on an equality with the many? But when there is no real difference between men, why should there be a privileged class?

[39] ‘I shall be told that democracy is neither a wise nor a just thing, and that those who have the money are most likely to govern well. To which I answer, first of all, that the people is the name of the whole, the oligarchy of a part; secondly, that the rich are the best guardians of the public purse, the wise the best counsellors, and the many, when they have heard a matter discussed, the best judges; and that each and all of these classes have in a democracy equal privileges. Whereas an oligarchy, while giving the people the full share of danger, not merely takes too much of the good things, but absolutely monopolises them. And this is what the powerful among you and the young would like to have, and what in a great city they will never obtain.

[40] ‘O most senseless of men, for such you are indeed if you do not see the mischief of your own schemes; never in all my experience have I known such blindness among Hellenes, or such wickedness if you have your eyes open to what you are doing. Yet even now learn if you are stupid, repent if you are guilty; and let your aim be the welfare of the whole country. Remember that the good among you will have an equal or larger share in the government of it than the people; while if you want more you will most likely lose all. Away with these reports; we know all about them, and are determined to suppress them. Let the Athenians come, and Syracuse will repel her enemies in a manner worthy of herself; we have generals who will look to the matter. But if, as I believe, none of your tales are true, the state is not going to be deceived, and will not in a moment of panic admit you to power, or impose upon her own neck the yoke of slavery. She will take the matter into her own hands, and when she gives judgment will reckon words to be equally criminal with actions. She will not be talked out of her liberty

by you, but will do her utmost to preserve it; she will be on her guard, and will put you down with a strong hand.’

[41] Thus spoke Athenagoras. Whereupon one of the generals rose, and suffering no one else to come forward, closed the discussion himself in the following words:

‘There is little wisdom in exchanging abuse or in sitting by and listening to it; let us rather, in view of the reported danger, see how the whole city and every man in it may take measures for resisting the invaders worthily. Why should not the city be richly furnished with arms, horses, and all the pride and pomp of war; where is the harm even if they should not be wanted? We, who are generals, will take in hand all these matters and examine into them ourselves; and we will send messengers to the neighbouring cities in order to obtain information, and for any other purpose which may be necessary. Some precautions we have taken already, and whatever comes to our notice we will communicate to you.’ When the general had thus spoken, the assembly dispersed.

[42] The Athenians and their allies were by this time gathered at Corcyra. There the generals began by holding a final review of the ships, and disposed them in the order in which they were to anchor at their stations. The fleet was divided into three squadrons, and one of them assigned by lot to each of the three generals, in order to avoid any difficulties which might occur, if they sailed together, in finding water, anchorage, and provisions where they touched; they also thought that the presence of a general with each division would promote good order and discipline throughout the fleet. They then sent before them to Italy and Sicily three ships, which had orders to find out what cities in those regions would receive them, and to meet them again on their way, that they might know before they put in.

[43] At length the great armament proceeded to cross from Corcyra to Sicily. It consisted of a hundred and thirty-four

triremes in all, besides two Rhodian vessels of fifty oars. Of these a hundred were Athenian; sixty being swift vessels, and the remaining forty transports: the rest of the fleet was furnished by the Chians and other allies. The hoplites numbered in all five thousand one hundred, of whom fifteen hundred were Athenians taken from the roll, and seven hundred who served as marines were of the fourth and lowest class of Athenian citizens. The remainder of the hoplites were furnished by the allies, mostly by the subject states; but five hundred came from Argos, besides two hundred and fifty Mantinean and other mercenaries. The archers were in all four hundred and eighty, of whom eighty were Cretans. There were seven hundred Rhodian slingers, a hundred and twenty light-armed Megarians who were exiles; and one horse transport which conveyed thirty horsemen and horses.

[44] Such were the forces with which the first expedition crossed the sea. For the transport of provisions thirty merchant-ships, which also conveyed bakers, masons, carpenters, and tools such as are required in sieges, were included in the armament. It was likewise attended by a hundred small vessels; these, as well as the merchant-vessels, were pressed into the service. Other merchant-vessels and lesser craft in great numbers followed of their own accord for purposes of trade. The whole fleet now struck across the Ionian sea from Corcyra. They arrived at the promontory of Iapygia and at Tarentum, each ship taking its own course, and passed along the coast of Italy. The Italian cities did not admit them within their walls, or open a market to them, but allowed them water and anchorage; Tarentum and Locri refused even these. At length they reached Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy, where the fleet reunited. As they were not received within the walls they encamped outside the city at the temple of Artemis; there they were provided by the inhabitants with a market, and drawing up their ships on shore they took a rest. They held a

conference with the Rhegians, and pressed them, being Chalcidians themselves, to aid their Chalcidian kinsmen the Leontines. But the Rhegians replied that they would be neutral, and would only act in accordance with the decision of all the Italian Greeks. The Athenian commanders now began to consider how they could best commence operations in Sicily. Meanwhile they were expecting the ships which had gone on and were to meet them from Egesta; for they wanted to know whether the Egestaeans really had the money of which the messengers had brought information to Athens.

[45] From many quarters the news began to reach the Syracusans that the Athenian fleet was at Rhegium, and the report was confirmed by their spies. They now no longer doubted, but fell to work heart and soul. To some of the Sicel towns they sent troops, to others envoys; they also garrisoned the forts in the territory of Syracuse, and within the city itself inspected the horses and arms, and saw that they were in good condition. In short, they made every preparation, as for a war which was rapidly approaching, and almost at their gates.

[46] The three ships which had gone forward to Egesta now returned to the Athenians at Rhegium; they reported that of the money which had been promised thirty talents only were forthcoming and no more. The spirits of the generals fell at once on receiving this their first discouragement. They were also disappointed at the unfavourable answer of the Rhegians, whom they had asked first, and who might naturally have been expected to join them because they were kinsmen of the Leontines, and had always hitherto been in the Athenian interest. Nicias had expected that the Egestaeans would fail them; to the two others their behaviour appeared even more incomprehensible than the defection of the Rhegians. The fact was that when the original envoys came from Athens to inspect the treasure, the Egestaeans had practised a trick upon them. They

brought them to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx, and showed them the offerings deposited there, consisting of bowls, flagons, censers, and a good deal of other plate. Most of the vessels were only of silver, and therefore they made a show quite out of proportion to their value. They also gave private entertainments to the crews of the triremes: on each of these occasions they produced, as their own, drinking-vessels of gold and silver not only collected in Egesta itself, but borrowed from the neighbouring towns, Phoenician as well as Hellenic. All of them exhibiting much the same vessels and making everywhere a great display, the sailors were amazed, and on their arrival at Athens told every one what heaps of wealth they had seen. When the news spread that the Egestaeans had not got the money, great was the unpopularity incurred throughout the army by these men, who having been first imposed upon themselves had been instrumental in imposing upon others.

[47] The generals now held a council of war. Nicias was of opinion that they should sail with the whole fleet against Selinus, which was their main errand: if the Egestaeans provided pay for all their forces, they would shape their course accordingly; if not, they would demand maintenance for sixty ships, the number which the Egestaeans had requested, and remain on the spot until they had brought the Selinuntians to terms either by force or by negotiation. They would then pass along the coast before the eyes of the other cities and display the visible power of Athens, while they proved at the same time her zeal in the cause of her friends and allies; after this they would return home, unless a speedy way of relieving the Leontines or obtaining support from some of the other cities should unexpectedly present itself. But they should not throw away their own resources and imperil the safety of Athens.

[48] Alcibiades urged that it would be a disgrace to have gone forth with so great an armament and to return without achieving anything. They should send envoys to every city

of Sicily, with the exception of Selinus and Syracuse; they should also negotiate with the Sicels, making friends of the independent tribes, and persuading the rest to revolt from the Syracusans. They would thus obtain supplies and reinforcements. They should first appeal to the Messenians, whose city being on the highway of traffic was the key of Sicily, and possessed a harbour from which the Athenian forces could most conveniently watch the enemy. Finally, when they had brought the cities over to them and knew who would be on their side in the war, they should attack Selinus and Syracuse, unless the Selinuntians would come to terms with the Egestaeans, and the Syracusans would permit the restoration of the Leontines.

[49] Lamachus was of opinion that they ought to sail direct to Syracuse, and fight as soon as possible under the walls of the city, while the inhabitants were unprepared and the consternation was at its height. He argued that all armies are most terrible at first; if the appearance of them is long delayed the spirits of men revive, and, when they actually come, the sight of them only awakens contempt. If the Athenians could strike suddenly, while their opponents were still in fear and suspense, that would be the best chance of victory. Not only the sight of the armament which would never seem so numerous again, but the near approach of suffering, and above all the immediate peril of battle, would create a panic among the enemy. Many of the Syracusans would probably be cut off in the country, not believing in the approach of an invader; and while the villagers were trying to convey their property into the city, their own army, which would be encamped close under the walls, would be masters of the field and could have no lack of provisions. In the end, the other Sicilian Greeks, instead of joining the Syracusan alliance, would come over to them, and would no longer hesitate and look about them to see which side would conquer. He was also of opinion that they should make Megara their naval station, the fleet returning thither from

Syracuse and anchoring in the harbour. The place was deserted, and was not far distant from Syracuse either by land or by sea.

[50] Lamachus having thus spoken nevertheless gave his own voice for the proposal of Alcibiades. Whereupon Alcibiades sailed across in his admiral’s ship to Messenè and proposed an alliance to the inhabitants. He failed to convince them, for they refused to receive the Athenians into the city, although they offered to open a market for them outside the walls. So he sailed back to Rhegium. The generals at once manned sixty ships, selecting the crews indifferently out of the entire fleet, and taking the necessary provisions coasted along to Naxos; they left the rest of the armament and one of themselves at Rhegium. The Naxians received them into their city, and they sailed on to Catana; but the Catanaeans, having a Syracusan party within their walls, denied admission to them; so they moved to the river Terias and there encamped. On the following day they went on to Syracuse in long file with all their ships, except ten, which they had sent forward to sail into the Great Harbour and see whether there was any fleet launched. On their approaching the city a herald was to proclaim from the decks that the Athenians had come to restore their allies and kinsmen the Leontines to their homes, and that therefore any Leontines who were in Syracuse should regard the Athenians as their friends and benefactors, and join them without fear. When the proclamation had been made, and the fleet had taken a survey of the city, and harbours, and of the ground which was to be the scene of operations, they sailed back to Catana.

[51] The Catanaeans now held an assembly and, although they still refused to receive the army, they told the generals to come in and say what they had to say. While Alcibiades was speaking and the people of the city had their attention occupied with the assembly, the soldiers broke down unobserved a postern gate which had been badly walled up,

and finding their way into the town began to walk about in the market-place. Those of the Catanaeans who were in the Syracusan interest, when they saw that the enemy had entered, took alarm and stole away. They were not numerous, and the other Catanaeans voted the alliance with the Athenians, and told them to bring up the rest of their armament from Rhegium. The Athenians then sailed back to Rhegium, and with their entire force moved to Catana, where on their arrival they began to establish their camp.

[52] But meanwhile news came from Camarina that if they would go thither the Camarinaeans would join them. They also heard that the Syracusans were manning a navy. So they sailed with their whole force first to Syracuse, but they found that there was no fleet in preparation; they then passed on to Camarina, and putting in to the open beach they sent a herald to the city. The citizens would not receive them, declaring that their oath bound them not to receive the Athenians if they came with more than one ship, unless they themselves sent for a greater number. So they sailed away without effecting their purpose. They then disembarked on a part of the Syracusan territory, which they ravaged. But a few Syracusan horse coming up killed some of their light-armed troops who were straggling. They then returned to Catana.

[53] There they found that the vessel Salaminia had come from Athens to fetch Alcibiades, who had been put upon his trial by the state and was ordered home to defend himself. With him were summoned certain of the soldiers, who were accused at the same time, some of profaning the mysteries, others of mutilation of the Hermae. For after the departure of the expedition the Athenians prosecuted both enquiries as keenly as ever. They did not investigate the character of the informers, but in their suspicious mood listened to all manner of statements, and seized and imprisoned some of the most respectable citizens on the evidence of wretches; they thought it better to sift the matter and discover the

truth; and they would not allow even a man of good character, against whom an accusation was brought, to escape without a thorough investigation, merely because the informer was a rogue. For the people, who had heard by tradition that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons ended in great oppression, and knew moreover that their power was overthrown, not by Harmodius or any efforts of their own, but by the Lacedaemonians, were in a state of incessant fear and suspicion.

[54] Now the attempt of Aristogiton and Harmodius arose out of a love affair, which I will narrate at length; and the narrative will show that the Athenians themselves give quite an inaccurate account of their own tyrants, and of the incident in question, and know no more than other Hellenes. Pisistratus died at an advanced age in possession of the tyranny, and then, not, as is the common opinion, Hipparchus, but Hippias (who was the eldest of his sons) succeeded to his power. Harmodius was in the flower of youth, and Aristogiton, a citizen of the middle class, became his lover. Hipparchus made an attempt to gain the affections of Harmodius, but he would not listen to him, and told Aristogiton. The latter was naturally tormented at the idea, and fearing that Hipparchus who was powerful would resort to violence, at once formed such a plot as a man in his station might for the overthrow of the tyranny. Meanwhile Hipparchus made another attempt; he had no better success, and thereupon he determined, not indeed to take any violent step, but to insult Harmodius in some secret place, so that his motive could not be suspected. To use violence would have been at variance with the general character of his rule, which was not unpopular or oppressive to the many; in fact no tyrants ever displayed greater merit or capacity than these. Although the tax on the produce of the soil which they exacted amounted only to five per cent, they improved and adorned the city, and carried on successful wars; they were also in the habit of sacrificing in

the temples. The city meanwhile was permitted to retain her ancient laws; but the family of Pisistratus took care that one of their own number should always be in office. Among others who thus held the annual archonship at Athens was Pisistratus, a son of the tyrant Hippias. He was named after his grandfather Pisistratus, and during his term of office he dedicated the altar of the Twelve Gods in the Agora, and another altar in the temple of the Pythian Apollo. The Athenian people afterwards added to one side of the altar in the Agora and so concealed the inscription upon it; but the other inscription on the altar of the Pythian Apollo may still be seen, although the letters are nearly effaced. It runs as follows:

'Pisistratus the son of Hippias dedicated this memorial of his archonship in the sacred precinct of the Pythian Apollo.'

[55] That Hippias was the eldest son of Pisistratus and succeeded to his power I can positively affirm from special information which has been transmitted to me. But there is other evidence. Of the legitimate sons of Pisistratus he alone had children; this is indicated by the altar just mentioned, and by the column which the Athenians set up in the Acropolis to commemorate the oppression of the tyrants. For on that column no son of Thessalus or of Hipparchus is named, but five of Hippias who were born to him of Myrrhinè the daughter of Callias the son of Hyperechides; now there is a presumption that the son who married first would be the eldest. Moreover, his name is inscribed on the same column immediately after his father's; this again is a presumption that he was his eldest son and succeeded him. I think too that Hippias would have found a difficulty in seizing the tyranny if Hipparchus had been tyrant at the time of his death and he had tried to step into his place. As it was, owing to the habitual dread which he had inspired in the citizens, and the strict discipline which he maintained among his body-guard, he held the government with the most perfect security and without the least difficulty. Nor did

he behave at all like a younger brother, who would not have known what to do because he had not been regularly used to command. Yet Hipparchus by reason of his violent end became famous, and obtained in after ages the reputation of having been the tyrant.

[56] When Hipparchus found his advances repelled by Harmodius he carried out his intention of insulting him. There was a young sister of his whom Hipparchus and his friends first invited to come and carry a sacred basket in a procession, and then rejected her, declaring that she had never been invited by them at all because she was unworthy. At this Harmodius was very angry, and Aristogiton, for his sake, more angry still. They and the other conspirators had already laid their preparations, but were waiting for the festival of the great Panathenaea, when the citizens who took part in the procession assembled in arms; for to do so on any other day would have aroused suspicion. Harmodius and Aristogiton were to begin the attack, and the rest were immediately to join in, and engage with the guards. The plot had been communicated to a few only, the better to avoid detection; but they hoped that, however few struck the blow, the crowd who would be armed, although not in the secret, would at once rise and assist in the recovery of their own liberties.

[57] The day of the festival arrived, and Hippias went out of the city to the place called the Ceramicus, where he was occupied with his guards in marshalling the procession. Harmodius and Aristogiton, who were ready with their daggers, stepped forward to do the deed. But seeing one of the conspirators in familiar conversation with Hippias, who was readily accessible to all, they took alarm, and imagined that they had been betrayed and were on the point of being seized. Whereupon they determined to take their revenge first on the man who had outraged them and was the cause of their desperate attempt. So they rushed, just as they were, within the gates. They found Hipparchus near the

Leocorium, as it was called, and then and there falling upon him with all the blind fury, one of an injured lover, the other of a man smarting under an insult, they smote and slew him. The crowd ran together, and so Aristogiton for the present escaped the guards; but he was afterwards taken and not very gently handled. Harmodius perished on the spot.

[58] The news was carried to Hippias at the Ceramicus; he went at once, not to the place, but to the armed men who were to march in the procession and, being at a distance, were as yet ignorant of what had happened. Betraying nothing in his looks of the calamity which had befallen him, he bade them leave their arms and go to a certain spot which he pointed out. They, supposing that he had something to say to them, obeyed, and then bidding his guards seize the arms, he at once selected those whom he thought guilty, and all who were found carrying daggers; for the custom was to march in the procession with spear and shield only.

[59] Such was the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogiton, which began in the resentment of a lover; the reckless attempt which followed arose out of a sudden fright. To the people at large the tyranny simply became more oppressive, and Hippias, after his brother’s death living in great fear, slew many of the citizens; he also began to look abroad in hope of securing an asylum should a revolution occur. Himself an Athenian, he married his daughter Archedicè to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of Hippoclus the tyrant of Lampsacus; for he observed that the family of Hippoclus had great influence with King Darius. Her tomb is at Lampsacus, and bears this inscription:

‘This earth covers Archedicè the daughter of Hippias,
A man who was great among the Hellenes of his day.
Her father, her husband, her brothers, and her sons were tyrants,
Yet was not her mind lifted up to vanity.’

Hippias ruled three years longer over the Athenians. In the fourth year he was deposed by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled Alcmaeonidae. He retired under an agreement, first to Sigeum, and then to Aeantides at Lampsacus. From him he went to the court of Darius, whence returning twenty years later with the Persian army he took part in the expedition to Marathon, being then an old man.

[60] The Athenian people, recalling these and other traditions of the tyrants which had sunk deep into their minds, were suspicious and savage against the supposed profaners of the mysteries; the whole affair seemed to them to indicate some conspiracy aiming at oligarchy or tyranny. Inflamed by these suspicions they had already imprisoned many men of high character. There was no sign of returning quiet, but day by day the movement became more furious and the number of arrests increased. At last one of the prisoners, who was believed to be deeply implicated, was induced by a fellow-prisoner to make a confession — whether true or false I cannot say; opinions are divided, and no one knew at the time, or to this day knows, who the offenders were. His companion argued that even if he were not guilty he ought to confess and claim a pardon; he would thus save his own life, and at the same time deliver Athens from the prevailing state of suspicion. His chance of escaping would be better if he confessed his guilt in the hope of a pardon, than if he denied it and stood his trial. So he gave evidence both against himself and others in the matter of the Hermae. The Athenians were delighted at finding out what they supposed to be the truth; they had been in despair at the thought that the conspirators against the democracy would never be known, and they immediately liberated the informer and all whom he had not denounced. The accused they brought to trial, and executed such of them as could be found. Those who had fled they condemned to death, and promised a reward to any one who would kill them. No one could say whether the sufferers were

justly punished; but the beneficial effect on the city at the time was undeniable.

[61] The enemies of Alcibiades, who had attacked him before he sailed, continued their machinations, and popular feeling was deeply stirred against him. The Athenians now thought that they knew the truth about the Hermae, and they were more than ever convinced that the violation of the mysteries which had been laid to his charge was done by him with the same purpose, and was a part of the conspiracy. It so happened that while the city was in this state of excitement a small Lacedaemonian force proceeded as far as the Isthmus, having something to do in Boeotia. They were supposed to have come, not in the interest of the Boeotians, but by a secret understanding with Alcibiades; and the Athenians really believed that but for their own alacrity in arresting the accused persons the city would have been betrayed. For one whole night the people lay in arms in the temple of Theseus which is within the walls. About this time too the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were suspected of conspiring against the Argive democracy, and accordingly the Argive hostages who had been deposited in the islands were at once given up by the Athenians to the vengeance of the Argive people. From every quarter suspicion had gathered around Alcibiades, and the Athenian people were determined to have him tried and executed; so they sent the ship Salaminia to Sicily bearing a summons to him and to others against whom information had been given. He was ordered to follow the officers home and defend himself, but they were told not to arrest him; the Athenians, having regard to their interests in Sicily, were anxious not to cause excitement in their own camp or to attract the attention of the enemy, and above all not to lose the Mantineans and Argives, whom they knew to have been induced by his influence to join in the expedition. He in his own ship, and those who were accused with him, left Sicily in company with the Salaminia, and sailed for Athens. When they arrived

at Thurii they followed no further, but left the ship and disappeared, fearing to return and stand their trial when the prejudice against them was so violent. The crew of the Salaminia searched for them, but after a time, being unable to find them, gave up the search and went home. Alcibiades, now an exile, crossed not long afterwards in a small vessel from Thurii to Peloponnesus, and the Athenians on his non-appearance sentenced him and his companions to death.

[62] The two Athenian generals who remained in Sicily now divided the fleet between them by lot, and sailed towards Selinus and Egesta; they wanted to know whether the Egestaeans would give them the promised money, and also to ascertain the condition of the Selinuntians and the nature of their quarrel with the Egestaeans. Sailing along the north coast of Sicily, which looks towards the Tyrrhenian Gulf, they touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city in this part of the island. But they were not received, and passed on. On their voyage they took Hyccara, a city on the sea-shore which, although of Sicanian origin, was hostile to the Egestaeans. They reduced the inhabitants to slavery, and handed the place over to the Egestaeans, whose cavalry had now joined them. The Athenian troops then marched back through the country of the Sicels until they arrived at Catana; the ships which conveyed the prisoners going round the coast to meet them. Nicias had sailed straight from Hyccara to Egesta, where he did his business, and having obtained thirty talents of silver, rejoined the army at Catana. The Athenians on their return disposed of their slaves; the sum realised by the sale was about a hundred and twenty talents. They next sailed round to their Sicel allies and bade them send reinforcements. Then with half of their army they marched against Hybla Geleatis, a hostile town, which they failed to take. And so ended the summer.

[63] Early in the ensuing winter the Athenians made preparations for an attack upon Syracuse; the Syracusans likewise prepared to take the offensive. For when they found

that their enemies did not assail them at once, as in their first panic they had expected, day by day their spirits rose. And now the Athenians, after cruising about at the other end of Sicily, where they seemed to be a long way off, had gone to Hybla, and their attack upon it had failed. So the Syracusans despised them more than ever. After the manner of the populace when elated, they insisted that since the Athenians would not come to them, their generals should lead them against Catana. Syracusan horsemen, who were always riding up to the Athenian army and watching their movements, would ask insultingly whether, instead of resettling the Leontines in their old home, they were not themselves going to settle down with their good friends the Syracusans in a new one.

[64] The generals were aware of the state of affairs. They determined to draw the whole Syracusan army as far as possible out of the city, and then in their absence sail thither by night and take up a convenient position unmolested. They knew that they would fail of their purpose if they tried to disembark their men in the face of an enemy who was prepared to meet them, or if they marched openly by land and were discovered, for they had no cavalry of their own, and the Syracusan horse which were numerous would do great harm to their light-armed troops and the mass of attendants. Whereas if they sailed thither by night they would be enabled to take up a position in which the cavalry could do them no serious mischief. The exact spot near the temple of Olympian Zeus which they afterwards occupied was indicated by Syracusan exiles who accompanied them. Accordingly the generals devised the following plan; they sent to Syracuse a man of whose fidelity they were assured, but whom the Syracusan leaders believed to be a friend of theirs. He was a Catanaean, and professed to come from adherents of their party whose names were familiar to them, and whom they knew to be still remaining in Catana. He told them that the Athenians lay within the city every night away

from the camp in which their arms were deposited, and if at dawn on a set day the Syracusans with their whole force would come and attack the troops left in the camp, their partisans in Catana would themselves shut the Athenians up in the town and fire their ships; meanwhile the Syracusans might assault the palisade, and easily take the camp — preparations had been made, and many of the Catanaeans were in the plot; from them he came.

[65] The Syracusan generals were already in high spirits, and before this proposal reached them had made up their minds to have all things in readiness for a march to Catana. So they trusted the man the more recklessly, and at once fixed the day on which they would arrive. They then sent him back, and issued orders for an expedition to their whole army, including the Selinuntians and the rest of the allies, who had now joined them. When they were ready and the appointed day drew near they marched towards Catana, and encamped by the river Symaethus in the Leontine territory. The Athenians, aware of the approach of the Syracusans, took all their own army and Sicel or other allies on board their ships and smaller craft, and sailed away at nightfall to Syracuse. At dawn they disembarked opposite the temple of Olympian Zeus, intending to seize a place for their camp; almost at the same moment the Syracusan horse who had advanced before the rest to Catana discovered that the whole Athenian army had put out to sea, whereupon they returned and told the infantry: and then all together hurried back to protect the city.

[66] The march from Catana to Syracuse was long, and in the meantime the Athenians had quietly established themselves in an advantageous position, where they could give battle whenever they pleased, and the Syracusan horse were least likely to harass them either before or during the engagement. On one side they were protected by walls, and houses, and trees, and a marsh; on another by a line of cliffs. They felled the trees near, and bringing them down to the

sea made a palisade to protect their ships; on the shore of Dascon too they hurriedly raised a fortification of rough stones and logs at a point where the ground was most accessible to the enemy, and broke down the bridge over the river Anapus. No one came out from the walls to hinder them in their work. The first to appear at all were the returning cavalry; after a while the whole body of infantry came up and re-formed. They at once marched right up to the Athenian position, but the Athenians did not come out to meet them; so they retired and encamped on the other side of the Helorine road.

[67] On the next day the Athenians and their allies prepared to give battle. Their order was as follows: The Argives and Mantineans formed the right wing, the Athenians held the centre; on the left wing were the remaining allies. Half of their army which formed the van was ranged eight deep. The other half was drawn up likewise eight deep close to their sleeping-places, in a hollow oblong. The latter were told to watch the engagement, and to move up to the support of any part of the line which might be distressed. In the midst of the reserve thus disposed were placed the baggage-bearers. The Syracusans drew up their heavy-armed sixteen deep; the army consisted of the whole Syracusan people and their allies, chiefly the Selinuntians, who were in the city; they had also two hundred horsemen from Gela, and twenty, with about fifty archers, from Camarina. The cavalry, numbering in all twelve hundred, were placed upon the right wing, and beside them the javelin-men. The Athenians determined to begin the attack. Just before the battle Nicias went up and down, and addressed the following words to all and each of the various peoples who composed the army:

[68] ‘What need, soldiers, is there of a long exhortation when we are all here united in the same cause? The mere sight of this great army is more likely to put courage into you than an eloquent speech and an inferior force. We are Argives and

Mantineans, and Athenians and the chief of the islanders; and must not the presence of so many brave allies inspire every one of us with a good hope of victory, especially when we reflect that our opponents are not like ourselves picked soldiers, but a whole city which has turned out to meet us? They are Sicilians too, who, although they may despise us, will not stand their ground against us; for their skill is not equal to their courage. Consider again that we are far from home, and that there is no friendly land near but what you can win with your swords. The generals of the enemy, as I know well, are appealing to very different motives. They say to them, “you are fighting for your own country,” but I say to you that you are fighting in a country which is not your own, and from which, if you do not conquer, retreat will be impossible, for swarms of cavalry will follow at your heels. Remember your own reputation, and charge valiantly, deeming the difficulties and necessities of your position to be more formidable than the enemy.’

[69] Nicias having thus exhorted his men led them at once to the charge. The Syracusans did not expect that they would have to fight just at that moment, and some of them had even gone away into the city, which was close at hand; others came running up as fast as they could, and, although late, joined the main body one by one at the nearest point. For they showed no want of spirit or daring in this or any other engagement; in courage they were not a whit inferior to their enemies, had their skill only been adequate, but when it failed, they could no longer do justice to their good intentions. On this occasion they were compelled to make a hasty defence, for they felt sure that the Athenians would not begin the attack. Nevertheless they took up their arms and immediately went forward to meet them. For a while the throwers of stones, and slingers, and archers skirmished in front of the two armies, driving one another before them after the manner of light-armed troops. Then the soothsayers brought out the customary victims, and the

trumpets sounded and called the infantry to the charge. The two armies advanced; the Syracusans to fight for their country, and every man for life now, and liberty hereafter; on the opposite side the Athenians to gain a new country, and to save the old from the disaster of defeat; the Argives and the independent allies eager to share the good things of Sicily, and, if they returned victorious, to see their own homes once more. The courage of the subject allies was chiefly inspired by a lively consciousness that their only chance of life was in victory; they had also a distant hope that, if they assisted the Athenians in overthrowing others, their own yoke might be lightened.

[70] The armies met, and for a long time the issue was doubtful. During the battle there came on thunder and lightning, and a deluge of rain; these added to the terror of the inexperienced who were fighting for the first time, but experienced soldiers ascribed the storm to the time of year, and were much more alarmed at the stubborn resistance of the enemy, First the Argives drove back the left wing of the Syracusans; next the Athenians the right wing which was opposed to them. Whereupon the rest of the army began to give way and were soon put to flight. Their opponents did not pursue them far, for the Syracusan horsemen, who were numerous and had not shared in the defeat, interposed, and wherever they saw hoplites advancing from the ranks attacked and drove them back. The Athenians pursued in a body as far as they safely could, and then returned and raised a trophy. The Syracusans rallied on the Helorine road, and did their best to reform after their defeat. They did not neglect to send some of their forces as a guard to the Olympieum, fearing lest the Athenians should plunder the treasures of the temple. The rest of the army returned to the city.

[71] The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple at all, but collecting their dead, and laying them on a pyre, they passed the night where they were. On the following day they

gave back the Syracusan dead under a flag of truce, and gathered from the pyre the bones of their own dead. There had fallen of the Syracusans and of their allies about two hundred and sixty; of the Athenians and their allies not more than fifty. The Athenians then taking with them the spoils of their enemies, sailed back to Catana. Winter had now set in, and they thought that before they could do anything more at Syracuse they must send for horsemen from Athens, and collect others from their Sicilian allies; without them they would be at the mercy of the Syracusan cavalry. They also wanted to obtain both in Sicily and from Athens a supply of money, and to gain over some of the Sicilian cities. These would be more willing to listen to them after their victory. They had likewise to provide supplies, and to make the other requisite preparations for attacking Syracuse in the spring.

[72] Accordingly they sailed away to Naxos and Catana, intending to winter.

The Syracusans, after burying their dead; called an assembly. Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a man of first-rate ability, of distinguished bravery, and also of great military experience, came forward and encouraged them. He told them not to be disheartened at the result of the battle; for their resolution had not been defeated; but they had suffered from want of discipline. Yet they had proved less unequal than might have been expected; and they should remember that they had been contending against the most experienced soldiers of Hellas; they were unskilled workmen, and the Athenians masters in their craft. Another great source of weakness had been the number of generals (there were fifteen of them); the division of authority had produced disorganisation and disorder among the troops. If they had a few experienced generals, and during the winter got their hoplites into order, providing arms for those who had none, and so raising the number of their forces to the utmost, while at the same time they insisted on strict drill

and discipline, they would have a good chance of victory; for they had courage already, and only wanted steadiness in action. Both qualities would improve together; they would learn steadiness in the school of danger, and their natural courage would be reinforced by the confidence which skill inspires. The generals whom they elected should be few in number and should be entrusted with full power, the people taking a solemn oath to them that they would be allowed to command according to their own judgment. The secrets of the army would then be better kept, and everything would be done in a more orderly and straightforward manner.

[73] The Syracusans listened to him, and voted all that he desired. They chose three generals and no more; Hermocrates himself, Heraclides the son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus the son of Execestus. They also sent ambassadors to Corinth and to Lacedaemon requesting aid as allies, and urged the Lacedaemonians to make war openly and decidedly against the Athenians on their behalf; thus they would either draw them off from Sicily, or at any rate prevent them from sending reinforcements to the army which was there already.

[74] No sooner had the Athenians returned in the fleet to Catana than they sailed to Messenè, expecting that the city would be betrayed to them. But they were disappointed. For Alcibiades, when he was recalled and gave up his command, foreseeing that he would be an exile, communicated to the Syracusan party at Messenè the plot of which he was cognisant. They at once put to death the persons whom he indicated; and on the appearance of the Athenians the same party, rising and arming, prevented their admission. The Athenians remained there about thirteen days, but the weather was bad, their provisions failed, and they had no success. So they went to Naxos, and having surrounded their camp with a palisade, proposed to pass the winter there. They also despatched a trireme to Athens for money and cavalry, which were to arrive at the beginning of spring.

[75] The Syracusans employed the winter in various defensive works. Close to the city they built a wall, which took in the shrine of Apollo Temenites and extended all along that side of Syracuse which looks towards Epipolae; they thus enlarged the area of the city, and increased the difficulty of investing it in case of defeat. They fortified and garrisoned Megara, and also raised a fort at the Olympieum, besides fixing stockades at all the landing-places along the shore. They knew that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, and so, marching out with their whole army to Catana, they ravaged the country and burnt the huts and the camp of the Athenians; they then returned home. They heard that the Athenians were sending an embassy to gain over the Camarinaeans on the strength of their former alliance, which had been made under Laches, and they despatched a counter embassy of their own. They suspected that the Camarinaeans had not been over-zealous in sending their contingent to the first battle, and would not be willing to assist them any longer now that the Athenians had gained a victory; old feelings of friendship would revive, and they would be induced to join them. Accordingly Hermocrates came with an embassy to Camarina, and Euphemus with another embassy from the Athenians. An assembly of the Camarinaeans was held, at which Hermocrates, hoping to raise a prejudice against the Athenians, spoke as follows:

[76] ‘We are not here, Camarinaeans, because we suppose that the presence of the Athenian army will dismay you; we are more afraid of their as yet unuttered words, to which you may too readily lend an ear if you hear them without first hearing us. You know the pretext on which they have come to Sicily, but we can all guess their real intentions. If I am not mistaken they want, not to restore the Leontines to their city, but to drive us out of ours. Who can believe that they who desolate the cities of Hellas mean to restore those of Sicily, or that the enslavers and oppressors of the

Chalcidians in Euboea have any feeling of kindred towards the colonists of these Chalcidians in Leontini? In their conquests at home, and in their attempt to conquer Sicily, is not the principle upon which they act one and the same? The Ionians and other colonists of theirs who were their allies, wanting to be revenged on the Persian, freely invited them to be their leaders; and they accepted the invitation. But soon they charged them, some with desertion, and some with making war upon each other; any plausible accusation which they could bring against any of them became an excuse for their overthrow. It was not for the liberties of Hellas that Athens, or for her own liberty that Hellas, fought against the Persian; they fought, the Athenians that they might enslave Hellas to themselves instead of him, the rest of the Hellenes that they might get a new master, who may be cleverer, but certainly makes a more dishonest use of his wits.

[77] ‘However, the character of the Athenians is known to you already, and we do not come here to set forth their enormities, which would be an easy task, but rather to accuse ourselves. We have had a warning in the fate of the Hellenes elsewhere; we know that they were reduced to slavery because they would not stand by one another. And when the same tricks are practised upon us, and we hear the old tale once more about the restoration of “our kinsmen the Leontines,” and the succour of “our allies the Egestaeans,” why do we not all rise as one man and show them that here they will find, not Ionians, nor yet Hellespontians, nor islanders, who must always be the slaves, if not of the Persian, of some other master; but Dorians and free inhabitants of Sicily, sprung from the independent soil of Peloponnesus? Are we waiting till our cities are taken one by one, when we know that this is the only way in which we can be conquered? We see what their policy is: how in some cases their cunning words sow ill-feeling; in others they stir up war by the offer of alliance; or again, by some well-

invented phrase specially agreeable to an individual state they do it all the mischief which they can. And does any one suppose that, if his countryman at a distance perishes, the danger will not reach him, or that he who suffers first will have no companions in ruin?

[78] ‘If any one fancies that not he, but the Syracusan, is the enemy of the Athenian, and asks indignantly “Why should I risk myself for you?” let him consider that in fighting for my country he will be at the same time fighting in mine for his own. And he will fight with less danger, because I shall still be in existence; he will not carry on the struggle alone, for he will have me for an ally. Let him consider that the Athenian is not really seeking to chastise the enmity of the Syracusan, but under pretence of attacking me may be quite as desirous of drawing hard and fast the bonds of friendship with him. And if any one from envy, or possibly from fear (for greatness is exposed to both), would have Syracuse suffer that we may receive a lesson, but survive for his own security, he is asking to have a thing which human power cannot compass. For a man may regulate his own desires, but he is not the dispenser of fortune; the time may come when he will find himself mistaken, and while mourning over his own ruin he may possibly wish that he could still have my prosperity to envy. But he cannot bring me back again when he has once abandoned me and has refused to take his share in the common danger, which, far from being imaginary, is only too real. For though in name you may be saving me, in reality you will be saving yourselves. And you especially, Camarinaeans, who are our next neighbours, and on whom the danger will fall next, should have anticipated all this, and not be so slack in your alliance. Instead of our coming to you, you should have come to us. Suppose the Athenians had gone to Camarina first, would you not at this moment be begging and praying for assistance? Then why did not you present yourselves at Syracuse, and say to us in our time of danger, “Never yield to the enemy”? But,

hitherto, neither you nor any of the Sicilians have shown a spirit like this.

[79] ‘You may perhaps disguise your cowardice under the pretence of impartiality; you may balance between us and the invaders, and plead that you have an alliance with the Athenians. But that alliance was made on the supposition that you were invaded by an enemy, not against a friend; and you promised to assist the Athenians if they were wronged by others, not when, as now, they are doing wrong themselves. Are the Rhegians who are Chalcidians so very anxious to join in the restoration of their Leontine kinsmen? And yet how monstrous that they, suspecting the real meaning of this plausible claim, should display a prudence for which they can give no reason; and that you, who have every reason for a like prudence, should be eager to assist your natural enemies, and to conspire with them for the destruction of those who by a higher law are your still more natural kinsmen. This should not be. You must make a stand against them. And do not be afraid of their armament. There is no danger if we hold together; the danger is in disunion, and they want to disunite us. Even when they engaged with our unaided forces, and defeated us in battle, they failed in their main purpose, and quickly retired.

[80] ‘If then we can once unite, there is no reason for discouragement. But there is every reason why you, who are our allies, should meet us more cordially. We may be sure that help will come to us from Peloponnesus, and the Peloponnesians are far better soldiers than the Athenians. Let no one think that the caution which professes to be in league with both, and therefore gives aid to neither, is just to us or safe for you. Such a policy, though it may pretend to impartiality, is really unjust. For if through your absence the victor overcomes and the vanquished falls, have you not abandoned the one to his fate, and allowed the other to commit a crime? How much nobler would it be to join your injured kinsmen, and thereby maintain the common interest

of Sicily and save the Athenians, whom you call your friends, from doing wrong!

‘To sum up: We Syracusans are quite aware that there is no use in our dilating to you or to any one else on matters which you know as well as ourselves. But we prefer a prayer to you; and solemnly adjure you to consider, that, if you reject us, we, who are Dorians like yourselves, are betrayed by you to Ionians, our inveterate enemies, who are seeking our ruin. If the Athenians subdue us, your decision will have gained them the day; but the honour will be all their own, and the authors of their victory will be the prize of their victory. If on the other hand we conquer, you who have brought the peril upon us will have to suffer the penalty. Reflect then, and take your choice: will you have present safety and slavery, or the hope of delivering yourselves and us, and thereby escaping the dishonour of submitting to the Athenian yoke, and the danger of our enmity, which will not be short-lived?’

[81] Thus spoke Hermocrates. Euphemus, the Athenian envoy, replied as follows:

[82] ‘We had come to renew our former alliance, but the attack made upon us by the Syracusan envoy renders it necessary for us to vindicate our title to empire. He himself bore the strongest witness in our favour when he said that Dorians and Ionians are inveterate enemies. And so they are. We Ionians dwelling in the neighbourhood of the Peloponnesians (who are Dorians and more numerous than ourselves) have had to consider the best way of securing our independence. After the Persian War we were delivered by the help of our newly-acquired navy from the rule and supremacy of Lacedaemon; they had no more right to domineer over us than we over them, except the right of the stronger, which at the time they possessed. We then assumed the leadership of the King’s former subjects, which we still retain; if we were not to be the slaves of the Peloponnesians we thought that we must have the means of

self-defence. And what if we did subjugate those kinsmen of ours whom the Syracusans say that we have enslaved, the Ionians and the islanders? On the strictest principles, where was the injustice? For we were their mother-city, and they joined in the Persian invasion. They had not the courage to revolt from him and to destroy their homes, as we did when we left our city. But they chose slavery for their own portion, and would have imposed it upon us.

[83] 'We rule then, in the first place, because we deserve to rule; for we provided the largest navy and showed the most patriotic alacrity in the cause of Hellas; while those who became our subjects were willing slaves to the Persian, and were doing us mischief. And secondly, we were anxious to gain additional strength against the Peloponnesians. We use no fine words: we do not tell you that we have a right to rule on the ground that we alone overthrew the Barbarians, nor do we pretend that we fought for the liberty of our allies, and not equally for the general liberty and for our own. Can any man be blamed because he makes the natural provision for his own safety? The same care of our safety has brought us hither, and we can see that our presence here is for your benefit as well as for ours. This we will prove to you; and our proofs shall be drawn from the calumnies of our enemies, and from the suspicions and fears which most sway your minds. For we know that those who are timorous and mistrustful may be won for the moment by alluring words, but that when the time of action comes they follow their own interests.

'We have told you already that fear makes us maintain our empire at home; and that a like fear brings us to your shores. For we desire by the help of our friends to secure our position in Sicily. And we have not come to enslave you, but to save you from being enslaved.

[84] Let no one imagine that your welfare is no business of ours, for if you are preserved, and are strong enough to hold out against the Syracusans, they will be less likely to aid the

Peloponnesians, and so to injure us. Thus you become at once our first concern. And we are quite consistent in restoring the Leontines, not to be subjects, like their kinsmen in Euboea, but to be as strong as ever we can make them, that from their position on the border they may harass the Syracusans and do our work. In Hellas we are a match for our enemies single-handed; and as to our subjection of the Chalcidians at home, which Hermocrates finds so inconsistent with our emancipation of the Chalcidians here, it is for our advantage, on the one hand, that the cities of Euboea should have no armed force and contribute money only, and, on the other hand, that the Leontines and our friends in Sicily should be as independent as possible.

[85] ‘Now to a tyrant or to an imperial city nothing is inconsistent which is expedient, and no man is a kinsman who cannot be trusted. In each case we must make friends or enemies according to circumstances, and here our interest requires, not that we should weaken our friends, but that our friends should be too strong for our enemies. Do not mistrust us. In Hellas we act upon the same principle, managing our allies as our interest requires in their several cases. The Chians and Methymnaeans furnish us with ships, and are their own masters; the majority are less independent, and pay a tribute; others, although they are islanders and might be easily conquered, enjoy complete freedom, because they are situated conveniently for operations about Peloponnesus. So that in Sicily too our policy is likely to be determined by our interest, and, as I was saying, by our fear of the Syracusans. For they desire to be your masters, but first they must unite you in a common suspicion of us, and then either by force, or through your isolation, when we have failed and retired, they will dominate Sicily. This is inevitable if you now join them. Your united power will be more than we can manage, and the Syracusans, when we are gone, will be too much for you.

[86] He who thinks otherwise is convicted out of his own mouth. For when you originally invited us, the danger which we should incur if we allowed you to fall into the hands of the Syracusans was precisely what you held before our eyes, and now you ought not to distrust the argument which you thought good enough for us. Nor should you suspect us because we bring hither a force larger than before; for we have to contend against the power of Syracuse. Much more to be mistrusted are they. Without your aid we cannot even remain where we are, and if we were so dishonourable as to make conquests we should be unable to retain them, for the voyage is long, and it would be a hopeless task to garrison great cities which, though situated on an island, have the resources of a continent. Whereas these men are your nearest neighbours. And they dwell, not in a camp, but in a city far more powerful than the forces which we have brought to Sicily; they are always scheming against you, and never miss a chance, as they have often shown, especially in their conduct towards the Leontines. And now they have the impudence to stir you up against those who resist them, and have thus far saved Sicily from passing under their yoke. As if you had no eyes! Far more real than the security offered by them is that to which we invite you, a security which we and you gain from one another, and we beseech you not to throw it away. Reflect: the Syracusans are so numerous that with or without allies they can always find their way to you, but you will not often have the chance of defending yourself with the aid of an army like ours. And if from any suspicion you allow us to depart unsuccessful, or perhaps defeated, the time may come when you will desire to see but a fraction of that army, although, if it came, it would be too late to save you.

[87] ‘But we would not have either you, Camarinaeans, or others moved by their calumnies. We have told you the whole truth about the suspicions which are entertained of us; we will now sum up our arguments, and we think that they ought to convince you. We rule over the cities of Hellas in order to maintain our independence, and we emancipate the cities of Sicily that they may not be used against us. And we are compelled to adopt a policy of interference because we have many interests to guard. Lastly, we come now, as we came before, not uninvited, but upon your own invitation to assist those of you who are suffering wrong. Do not sit in judgment upon our actions, or seek to school us into moderation and so divert us from our purpose, (the time for good advice has gone by), but in as far as our busy, meddlesome spirit can be of service to you as well as to ourselves, take and use us, remembering that these qualities, so far from being injurious to all alike, actually benefit great numbers of the Hellenes. For in all places — however remote from our sphere — both he who fears and he who intends injustice, the one because he has a lively hope that from us he will obtain redress, and the other because he may well be alarmed for the consequences if we answer to the call, must both alike submit, the one to learn moderation against his will, the other to receive at our hands a deliverance which costs him nothing. Do not reject the common salvation which is offered to you at this moment, as well as to all who seek it, but following the example of your countrymen join with us and, instead of having always to watch the Syracusans, assert your equality and threaten them as they have long been threatening you.’

[88] Thus spoke Euphemus. Now the Camarinaeans were swayed by opposite feelings; they had a good will to the Athenians, tempered by a suspicion that they might be intending to enslave Sicily, whereas the Syracusans, from their proximity, were always at feud with them. But they were not so much afraid of the Athenians as of their

Syracusan neighbours, who, as they thought, might win without their assistance. This was the reason why they sent them the small body of horse which took part in the first battle; and in a like spirit they now determined that for the future they would give real assistance only to the Syracusans, but to a very moderate extent. For the present however, that they might seem to deal equal justice to the Athenians, especially after their recent victory, they resolved to return the same answer to both. Such were the considerations which led them to reply that, as two of their allies were at war with one another, they thought that under the circumstances the best way of observing their oaths would be to assist neither. So the two embassies departed.

The Syracusans proceeded with their own preparations for the war, and the Athenians who were encamped at Naxos tried by negotiation to gain over as many of the Sicels as they could. The dwellers in the plain who were subjects of the Syracusans mostly stood aloof, but the Sicel settlements in the interior (which had always been independent) at once, with a few exceptions, joined the Athenians, and brought down food to the army; in some cases money also. Against those who were recalcitrant troops were despatched by the Athenians; and some of them were forced into submission, but others were protected by the garrisons which the Syracusans sent to their aid. They then transferred their station from Naxos to Catana and, reconstructing the camp which had been burnt by the Syracusans, passed the winter there. In the hope of obtaining assistance they sent a trireme to Carthage with a proposal of friendship; likewise to Tyrrhenia, since some of the cities there were offering of themselves to join them in the war: to the various Sicel tribes and to the Egestaeans they issued orders that they were to send as many horse as possible. They further prepared bricks, tools, and whatever else was requisite for siege operations, intending, when the spring arrived, to prosecute the war with vigour.

The envoys whom the Syracusans had sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon endeavoured on the voyage to persuade the Italian Greeks that they were equally threatened by the Athenian designs, and should take an interest in the war. When they arrived at Corinth they appealed to the Corinthians for aid on the ground of relationship. The Corinthians, taking the lead of all the Hellenic states, voted that they would assist Syracuse with all possible energy. They sent with the Syracusan envoys ambassadors of their own to the Lacedaemonians, bearing a joint request that they would resume open hostilities at home, and unite with them in sending help to Sicily. At Lacedaemon the Corinthian ambassadors met Alcibiades and his fellow exiles. He had sailed at once from Thurii in a trading vessel to Cyllenè in Elis, and thence proceeded to Lacedaemon on the invitation of the Lacedaemonians themselves, first obtaining a safe-conduct; for he was afraid of them after his proceedings in the matter of the Mantinean league. And so it came to pass that the Corinthians, the Syracusans, and Alcibiades appeared simultaneously in the Lacedaemonian assembly, and concurred in urging the same request. The ephors and the magistrates were already intending to send envoys to the Syracusans bidding them make no terms with the Athenians, although they were not disposed to assist them actively. But now Alcibiades came forward and stimulated the energies of the Lacedaemonians in the following words:

[89] ‘I must endeavour first of all to remove a prejudice against myself, lest through suspicion of me you should turn a deaf ear to considerations of public interest. My ancestors in consequence of some misunderstanding renounced the office of Lacedaemonian proxenus; I myself resumed it, and did you many good offices, especially after your misfortune at Pylos. My anxiety to serve you never ceased, but when you were making peace with Athens you negotiated through my enemies, thereby conferring power on them, and

bringing dishonour upon me. And if I then turned to the Mantineans and Argives and opposed you in that or in any other way, you were rightly served, and any one who while the wound was recent may have been unduly exasperated against me should now take another and a truer view. Or, again, if any one thought the worse of me because I was inclined to the people, let him acknowledge that here too there is no real ground of offence. Any power adverse to despotism is called democracy, and my family have always retained the leadership of the people in their hands because we have been the persistent enemies of tyrants. Living too under a popular government, how could we avoid in a great degree conforming to circumstances? However, we did our best to observe political moderation amid the prevailing licence. But there were demagogues, as there always have been, who led the people into evil ways, and it was they who drove me out. Whereas we were the leaders of the state as a whole, and not of a part only; it was our view that all ought to combine in maintaining that form of government which had been inherited by us, and under which the city enjoyed the greatest freedom and glory. Of course, like all sensible men, we knew only too well what democracy is, and I better than any one, who have so good a reason for abusing it. The follies of democracy are universally admitted, and there is nothing new to be said about them. But we could not venture to change our form of government when an enemy like yourselves was so near to us.

[90] ‘Such is the truth about the calumnies under which I labour. And now I will speak to you of the matter which you have in hand, and about which I, in so far as I have better information, am bound to instruct you. We sailed to Sicily hoping in the first place to conquer the Sicilian cities; then to proceed against the Hellenes of Italy; and lastly, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian dominions, and on Carthage itself. If all or most of these enterprises succeeded, we meant finally to attack Peloponnesus, bringing with us the whole

Hellenic power which we had gained abroad, besides many barbarians whom we intended to hire — Iberians and the neighbouring tribes, esteemed to be the most warlike barbarians that now are. Of the timber which Italy supplies in such abundance we meant to build numerous additional triremes, and with them to blockade Peloponnesus. At the same time making inroads by land with our infantry, we should have stormed some of your cities and invested others. Thus we hoped to crush you easily, and to rule over the Hellenic world. For the better accomplishment of our various aims our newly-acquired territory would supply money and provisions enough, apart from the revenue which we receive in Hellas.

[91] ‘You have heard the objects of our expedition from him who knows them best; the generals who remain will persevere and carry them out if they can. And now let me prove to you that if you do not come to the rescue Sicily will be lost. If the Greeks would all unite they might even now, notwithstanding their want of military skill, resist with success; but the Syracusans alone, whose whole forces have been already defeated, and who cannot move freely at sea, will be unable to withstand the power which the Athenians already have on the spot. And Syracuse once taken, the whole of Sicily is in their hands; the subjugation of Italy will follow; and the danger which, as I was saying, threatens you from that quarter, will speedily overwhelm you. And therefore remember every one of you that the safety, not of Sicily alone, but of Peloponnesus, is at stake. No time should be lost. You must send to Sicily a force of hoplites who will themselves handle the oars and will take the field immediately on landing. A Spartan commander I conceive to be even more indispensable than an army; his duty will be to organise the troops which are already enlisted, and to press the unwilling into the service. Thus you will inspire confidence in your friends and overcome the fears of the wavering. Here too in Hellas you should make open war. The

Syracusans, seeing that you have not forgotten them, will then persevere in their resistance, while the Athenians will have greater difficulty in reinforcing their army. You ought also to fortify Decelea in Attica; the Athenians are always in particular dread of this; to them it seems to be the only peril of which they have not faced the worst in the course of the war. And the way to hurt an enemy most surely is to inform yourself exactly about the weak points of which you see that he is conscious, and strike at them. For every man is likely to know best himself the dangers which he has most to fear. I will sum up briefly the chief though by no means all the advantages which you will gain, and the disadvantages which you will inflict, by the fortification of Decelea. The whole stock of the country will fall into your hands. The slaves will come over to you of their own accord; what there is besides will be seized by you. The Athenians will at once be deprived of the revenues which they obtain from the silver mines of Laurium, and of all the profits which they make by the land or by the law courts: above all, the customary tribute will cease to flow in; for their allies, when they see that you are now carrying on the war in earnest, will not mind them.

[92] How far these plans are executed, and with how much speed and energy, Lacedaemonians, depends on you; for I am confident that they are practicable, and I am not likely to be mistaken.

‘You ought not in fairness to think the worse of me because, having been once distinguished as a lover of my country, I now cast in my lot with her worst foes and attack her with all my might; or suspect that I speak only with the eagerness of an exile. An exile I am indeed; I have lost an ungrateful country, but I have not lost the power of doing you service, if you will listen to me. The true enemies of my country are not those who, like you, have injured her in open war, but those who have compelled her friends to become her enemies. I love Athens, not in so far as I am wronged by

her, but in so far as I once enjoyed the privileges of a citizen. The country which I am attacking is no longer mine, but a lost country which I am seeking to regain. He is the true patriot, not who, when unjustly exiled, abstains from attacking his country, but who in the warmth of his affection seeks to recover her without regard to the means. I desire therefore that you, Lacedaemonians, will use me without scruple in any service however difficult or dangerous, remembering that, according to the familiar saying, “the more harm I did you as an enemy, the more good can I do you as a friend.” For I know the secrets of the Athenians, while I could only guess at yours. Remember the immense importance of your present decision, and do not hesitate to send an expedition to Sicily and Attica. By despatching a fraction of your forces to co-operate in Sicily you may save great interests, and may overthrow the Athenian power once and for ever. And so henceforward you may dwell safely yourselves and be leaders of all Hellas, which will follow you, not upon compulsion, but from affection.’

[93] Thus spoke Alcibiades: the Lacedaemonians, who had been intending to send an army against Athens, but were still hesitating and looking about them, were greatly strengthened in their resolution when they heard all these points urged by him who, as they thought, knew best. Accordingly they now turned their thoughts to the fortification of Decelea, and determined to send immediate assistance to the Syracusans. They appointed Gylippus the son of Cleandridas commander of the Syracusan forces, and desired him to co-operate with the Syracusan and Corinthian representatives, and send aid to Sicily in the speediest and most effective manner which the circumstances admitted. Whereupon he told the Corinthians to despatch immediately two ships to him at Asine, and to fit out as many more as they meant to send; the latter were to be ready for sea when the season arrived. Coming to this understanding the envoys departed from Lacedaemon.

About this time the trireme which the Athenian generals had despatched from Sicily for money and cavalry arrived at Athens. The Athenians, hearing their request, voted money and a force of cavalry for the army. So the winter ended, and with it the seventeenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

[94] At the very beginning of the following spring the Athenians quitted Catana, and sailed along the coast towards the Sicilian Megara; this place, as I have already mentioned, in the days of Gelo the tyrant was depopulated by the Syracusans, who still retain possession of the country. They disembarked, and after ravaging the fields proceeded to attack a small Syracusan fortress, but without success; they then moved on some by land and some by sea to the river Terias, and going up the country wasted the plain and burned the corn. They encountered a few Syracusans, some of whom they killed, and setting up a trophy returned to their ships. They then sailed back to Catana, and having taken in provisions marched with their whole force against Centoripa, a Sicel town, which capitulated. Thence they returned, and on their way burned the corn of the Inessians and the Hyblaeans. Arriving at Catana they found that the horsemen, for whom they had sent, to the number of two hundred and fifty had come from Athens, with their equipments, but without horses, which they were expected to procure on the spot. Thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents of silver had arrived also.

[95] During the same spring the Lacedaemonians led an army against Argos, and advanced as far as Cleonae, but retired in consequence of an earthquake. The Argives in their turn invaded the neighbouring district of Thyrea, and took a great deal of spoil from the Lacedaemonians, which was sold for no less than twenty-five talents. Somewhat later the populace of Thespiae made an attack upon the government, but the attempt did not succeed; for the

Thebans came to the rescue. Some of the insurgents were apprehended, others fled to Athens.

[96] The Syracusans heard that the Athenians had received their cavalry, and that they would soon be upon them. They considered that, unless the Athenians gained possession of Epipolae (which was a steep place looking down upon Syracuse), the city could not easily be invested, even if they were defeated in battle; they therefore determined to guard the paths leading to the summit that the enemy might not get up by stealth. At all other points the place was secure, as it lies high and slopes right down to the city, from the interior of which it can all be seen; the Syracusans call it Epipolae (or the plateau, because it is above the level of the adjacent country. Hermocrates and his colleagues had now entered upon their command. The whole people went out at break of day to the meadow skirting the river Anapus, and proceeded to hold a review of their forces. A selection was at once made of six hundred hoplites, who were appointed to guard Epipolae, and to run in a body to any point at which they were needed. They were commanded by Diomilus, an Andrian exile.

[97] On the very same morning the Athenians were likewise holding a muster of their army. They had come from Catana with their whole force, and had put in unobserved near a place called Leon, which is distant from Epipolae not quite a mile; there they disembarked their troops. Their ships cast anchor at Thapsus, which is a peninsula with a narrow isthmus, running out into the sea, and not far from Syracuse either by land or water. The Athenian sailors made a stockade across the isthmus and remained at Thapsus, while the troops ran to Epipolae, and gained the summit by the way of the Euryelus before the Syracusans saw them or could come up to them from the meadow where the review was going on. Nevertheless Diomilus with his six hundred hurried to the spot, accompanied by the rest of the army, each man running as fast he could; but the distance from

the meadow which they had to traverse before they could engage was not less than three miles; consequently they were in disorder when they closed with the Athenians. They were defeated in the engagement which ensued on Epipolae, and retired into the city. Diomilus and about three hundred others were slain. The Athenians erected a trophy, and gave up to the Syracusans the bodies of the dead under a flag of truce. On the following day they went down to the city itself, but as the Syracusans did not come out against them, they retired and built a fort upon Labdalum, at the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae looking towards Megara, in order that when they advanced either to fight or to construct lines, the place might serve as a depository for their baggage and their property.

[98] Not long afterwards the Athenians were joined by three hundred Egestaean horsemen, and about a hundred more furnished by the Sicels, Naxians, and others. They had two hundred and fifty of their own, for some of whom they received horses from the Egestaeans and Catanaeans; other horses they bought. The whole number of their cavalry was now raised to six hundred and fifty. They placed a garrison in Labdalum and went down to Sycè, where they took up a position and immediately commenced building a wall round the city. The Syracusans were amazed at the celerity of the work. They saw that they must interfere, and made up their minds to go out and fight. The two armies were already preparing to engage when the Syracusan generals, seeing that their forces were in disorder and were forming with difficulty, led them back into the city, all but a detachment of the cavalry, who, remaining on the spot, prevented their opponents from gathering stones for the wall, and compelled them to keep together. At length, advancing with one division of their hoplites and all their cavalry, the Athenians attacked the Syracusan horse, whom they put to flight, and killed some of them; they then erected a trophy.

[99] On the following day some of the Athenians proceeded with the construction of that part of the circle which lay towards the north; others began to collect wood and stones and lay them along the intended course of the wall towards Trogilus, where the distance was shortest from the Great Harbour to the outer sea. The Syracusans by the advice of their commanders, chiefly of Hermocrates, determined to risk no more general engagements. They thought it better to raise a counter-wall across the line along which the Athenian wall was building. If they were first they would intercept them. They might indeed be attacked by the Athenians while thus engaged, but then they could oppose them with a part of their army; and there would be time to run a stockade across, if not a wall, before any attack took place. The Athenians on the other hand would have to leave their work, and employ their whole army against them. So they came out and drew a cross-wall, beginning at their own city, from a point below the circle of the Athenian wall, cutting down the olive-trees in the precinct of Apollo and erecting wooden towers. As yet the Athenian ships had not sailed round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour; the Syracusans were still masters of their own coast, and the Athenians brought their necessaries from Thapsus by land.

[100] The Athenians did not interfere with their work, for they were afraid of dividing and weakening their forces; and they were pressing forward that part of the line on which they were employed. So the Syracusans when they had sufficiently completed a part of their stockade and cross-wall, leaving one division to guard the work, retreated into the city with the rest of their army. The Athenians now destroyed their conduits, which were laid underground to bring drinking-water into the city. Then, choosing their time at noon when the Syracusan guard remained within their tents (some of them had even retired into the city) and when the vigilance of their sentinels at the stockade was relaxed, they took a body of three hundred chosen hoplites

of their own and some light-armed troops, picked soldiers, to whom they had given heavy arms, and bade them run quickly to the cross-wall. The rest of the army proceeded in two divisions under the two generals, one towards the city in case the enemy should come to save the wall, the other to that part of the stockade which adjoined the postern-gate of the city. The three hundred attacked and captured the further end of the stockade, from which the guards retired and fled inside the new outer wall which enclosed the shrine of Apollo Temenites. The pursuers pressed forward and made their way in after them; but they were forced out again by the Syracusans; and some Argives and a few of the Athenians fell there. Then the whole army, turning back, destroyed the cross-wall, tore up the stockades, carried the stakes to their camp, and raised a trophy.

[101] On the following day the Athenians, beginning at one end of the unfinished circle, began to bring the wall down over the cliff which on this side of Epipolae looks across the marsh towards the Great Harbour, intending to carry on the line by the shortest way to the harbour right through the level of the marsh. Meanwhile the Syracusans also came out, and beginning from the city, proceeded to carry another stockade through the middle of the marsh, with a ditch at the side, in order to prevent the Athenians from completing their line to the sea. The latter, having finished their work as far as the cliff, attacked the new Syracusan stockade and ditch. They ordered the ships to sail round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour of the Syracusans; with the first break of day they descended themselves from Epipolae to the level ground; and passing through the marsh where the soil was clay and firmer than the rest, over planks and gates which they laid down, they succeeded at sunrise in taking nearly the whole of the stockade and the ditch, and the remainder not long afterwards. A battle took place in which the Athenians were victorious, and the Syracusans on the right wing fled to the city, those on the left along the river. The

three hundred chosen Athenian troops pressed on at full speed towards the bridge, intending to stop their passage, but the Syracusans, fearing that they would be cut off, and having most of their horsemen on the spot, turned upon the three hundred, and putting them to flight, charged the right wing of the Athenians. The panic now extended to the whole division at the extremity of the wing. Lamachus saw what had happened, and hastened to the rescue from his own place on the left wing, taking with him a few archers and the Argive troops; but pressing forward across a certain ditch he and a few who had followed him were cut off from the rest, and he fell with five or six others. The Syracusans hastily snatched up their bodies, and carried them across the river out of the reach of the enemy. But when they saw the rest of the Athenian army advancing towards them they retreated.

[102] Meanwhile the Syracusans who fled first into the city, observing the resistance made by the left wing, took courage, and coming out drew up against that part of the Athenian line which was opposed to them. They also sent a detachment against the wall of circumvallation on Epipolae, supposing that it was undefended, and might be taken. They did indeed take and demolish the outwork, which was about a thousand feet in length; but Nicias, who happened to have been left there because he was ill, saved the lines themselves. He commanded the attendants of the camp to set fire to the engines and to the timber which had been left lying in front of the wall, for being without troops he knew that there was no other way of escape. The expedient succeeded; and in consequence of the fire the Syracusans gave up the attack. The Athenian army too was now hastening from the plain to the surrounding wall, with the intention of beating off the enemy; while the ships, as they had been ordered, were sailing from Thapsus into the Great Harbour. The Syracusans on the heights, seeing this combined movement, quickly retreated, together with the rest of the army, into the city, thinking that with their

present force they were no longer able to prevent the completion of the line of wall towards the sea.

[103] The Athenians then erected a trophy and restored the Syracusan dead under a flag of truce. The Syracusans delivered to them the bodies of Lamachus and his companions. The whole Athenian forces, both naval and military, were now on the spot, and they proceeded to cut off the Syracusans by a double wall, beginning at the southern cliff of Epipolae and extending to the sea. Provisions came to their army in abundance from various parts of Italy. Many of the Sicel tribes who had hitherto been hesitating now joined the Athenians, and three penteconters came from the Tyrrhenians. Everything began to answer to their hopes. The Syracusans despaired of saving the city by arms, for no help reached them even from Peloponnesus. Within the walls they were talking of peace, and they began to enter into communications with Nicias, who, now that Lamachus was dead, had the sole command. But no definite result was attained; although, as might be expected when men began to feel the pressure of the siege and their own helplessness, many proposals were made to him, and many more were discussed in the city. Their calamities even made them suspicious of one another; accordingly they deposed their generals, attributing the misfortunes which had befallen the city since they were appointed either to their ill-luck or to their treachery. In their room they chose Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias.

[104] Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the ships from Corinth were already at Leucas hastening to their relief. They were alarmed at the reports which were continually pouring in, all false, but all agreeing that the Athenian lines round Syracuse were now complete. Gylippus had no longer any hope of Sicily, but thought that he might save Italy; so he and Pythen the Corinthian sailed across the Ionian Gulf to Tarentum as fast as they could, taking two Laconian and two Corinthian ships. The Corinthians were to man ten ships of

their own, two Leucadian, and three Ambracian, and to follow. Gylippus on his arrival at Tarentum went on a mission to Thurii, of which his father had formerly been a citizen; he had hoped to gain over the Thurians, but failed; he then continued his voyage from Tarentum along the coast of Italy. He was caught in the Terinaean gulf by a wind which in this region blows violently and steadily from the north, and was carried into the open sea. After experiencing a most violent storm he returned to Tarentum, where he drew up those of his ships which had suffered in the gale and refitted them. Nicias heard of his approach, but despised the small number of his ships; in this respect he was like the Thurians. He thought that he had come on a mere privateering expedition, and for some time set no watch.

[105] During the same summer, about the same time, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Argolis and wasted most of the Argive territory. The Athenians assisted the Argives with thirty ships. The use which they made of them was a glaring violation of the treaty with the Lacedaemonians. Hitherto they had only gone out on marauding expeditions from Pylos; when they landed, it was not upon the shores of Laconia, but upon other parts of the Peloponnese; and they had merely fought as the allies of the Argives and Mantineans. The Argives had often urged them just to land soldiers on Lacedaemonian ground, and to waste some part of Laconia, however small, without remaining, and they had refused. But now, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodias, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and wasted the country. Thereby the Athenians at last gave the Lacedaemonians a right to complain of them and completely justified measures of retaliation. After the Athenian fleet had departed from Argos, and the Lacedaemonians had likewise retired, the Argives invaded Phliasia, and having ravaged the country and killed a few of the Phliasians, returned home.

BOOK VII

[1] GYLIPPUS and Pythen, after refitting their ships at Tarentum, coasted along to the Epizephyrian Locri. They now learned the truth, that Syracuse was not as yet completely invested, but that an army might still enter by way of Epipolae. So they considered whether they should steer their course to the left or to the right of Sicily. They might attempt to throw themselves into Syracuse by sea, but the risk would be great; or they might go first to Himera, and gathering a force of the Himeraeans, and of any others whom they could induce to join them, make their way by land. They determined to sail to Himera, especially as the straits were unguarded. Nicias, when he heard that they were at Locri, although he had despised them at first, now sent out four Athenian ships to intercept them; but these had not as yet arrived at Rhegium, and came too late. So they sailed through the strait and, touching by the way at Rhegium and Messenè, reached Himera. They persuaded the Himeraeans to make common cause with them, and not only to join in the expedition themselves, but to supply arms to all their unarmed sailors, for they had beached their ships at Himera. They then sent to the Selinuntians and told them to come and meet them with their whole army at an appointed place. The Geloans and certain of the Sicels also promised to send them a small force; the latter with the more alacrity because Archonides, a Sicel king in these parts who was a powerful man and friendly to the Athenians, had recently died, and because Gylippus seemed to have come from Lacedaemon with hearty good-will. And so, taking with him about seven hundred of his own sailors and marines for whom he had obtained arms, about a thousand Himeraean infantry, heavy and light-armed included, and a hundred Himeraean horsemen, some light-armed troops and cavalry

from Selinus, a few more from Gela, and of the Sicels about a thousand in all, Gylippus marched towards Syracuse.

[2] In the meantime the Corinthian ships had put to sea from Leucas and were coming with all speed to the relief of the besieged. Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who started last in a single ship, arrived at Syracuse before the rest of the fleet, and a little before Gylippus. He found the citizens on the point of holding an assembly at which the question of peace was to be discussed; from this intention he dissuaded them by the encouraging announcement that more ships, and Gylippus the son of Cleandridas, whom the Lacedaemonians had sent to take the command, were on their way. Whereupon the Syracusans were reassured, and at once went forth with their whole army to meet Gylippus, who, as they were informed, was now close at hand. He had shortly before captured the Sicel fort Geta on his march, and drawing up his men in readiness to fight, came to Epipolae, which he ascended by the Euryelus; where the Athenians had found a way before him. Having formed a junction with the Syracusans, he marched against the Athenian lines. He arrived just at the time when the Athenians had all but finished their double wall, nearly a mile long, reaching to the Great Harbour; there remained only a small portion toward the sea, upon which they were still at work. Along the remainder of the line of wall, which extended towards Trogilus and the northern sea, the stones were mostly lying ready; a part was half-finished, a part had been completed and left. So near was Syracuse to destruction.

[3] The Athenians, though at first disconcerted by the sudden advance of Gylippus and the Syracusans, drew up their forces in order of battle. He halted as he approached, and sent a herald to them offering a truce if they were willing to quit Sicily within five days taking what belonged to them. But they despised his offer, and sent away the herald without an answer. Whereupon both armies set

themselves in order of battle. Gylippus, seeing that the Syracusans were in confusion, and could with difficulty form, led back his troops to the more open ground. Nicias did not follow, but lay still, close to his own wall. When Gylippus observed that the Athenians remained where they were, he led away his army to the height called Temenites; there they passed the night. On the following day he stationed the greater part of his troops in front of the Athenian wall that the enemy might not despatch a force to any other point, and then sent a detachment against the fort of Labdalum, which was out of sight of the Athenian lines. He took the place, and killed every one whom he found in it. On the same day an Athenian trireme which was keeping watch over the mouth of the harbour was taken by the Syracusans.

[4] The Syracusans and their allies now began to build a single line of wall starting from the city and running upwards across Epipolae at an angle with the Athenian wall; this was a work which, unless it could be stopped by the Athenians, would make the investment of the city impossible. Towards the sea the Athenian wall was now completed, and their forces had come up to the high ground. Gylippus, knowing that a part of the wall was weak, instantly went by night with his army to attack it. But the Athenians, who happened to be passing the night outside the walls, perceived this movement and marched to oppose him; whereupon he at once withdrew. They then raised the weak portion of their wall higher; and guarded it themselves, while they posted the allies on the other parts of the fortification in the places severally assigned to them.

Nicias now determined to fortify Plemmyrium, a promontory which runs out opposite the city and narrows the entrance to the Great Harbour. He thought that this measure would facilitate the introduction of supplies. His forces would then be able to watch the harbour of the Syracusans from a nearer point, whereas they had hitherto been obliged to put out from the further corner of the Great

Harbour whenever a Syracusan ship threatened to move. He was inclined to pay more attention than hitherto to naval operations; for since the arrival of Gylippus the Athenian prospects by land were not so encouraging. Having therefore transferred his ships and a portion of his army to Plemmyrium, he built three forts in which the greater part of the Athenian stores were deposited; and the large boats as well as the ships of war were now anchored at this spot. The removal was a first and main cause of the deterioration of the crews. For when the sailors went out to procure forage and water, of which there was little, and that only to be obtained from a distance, they were constantly cut off by the Syracusan cavalry, who were masters of the country, a third part of their force having been posted in a village at the Olympieum expressly in order to prevent the enemy at Plemmyrium from coming out and doing mischief. About this time Nicias was informed that the rest of the Corinthian fleet was on the point of arriving, and he sent twenty ships, which were ordered to lie in wait for them about Locri and Rhegium and the approach to Sicily.

[5] While Gylippus was building the wall across Epipolae, employing the stones which the Athenians had previously laid there for their own use, he at the same time constantly led out and drew up in front of the wall the Syracusans and their allies, and the Athenians on their part drew up in face of them. When he thought that the moment had arrived he offered battle; the two armies met and fought hand to hand between the walls. But there the Syracusan cavalry was useless; the Syracusans and their allies were defeated, and received their dead under a flag of truce, while the Athenians raised a trophy. Gylippus then assembled his army and confessed that the fault was his own and not theirs; for by confining their ranks too much between the walls he had rendered useless both their cavalry and their javelin-men. So he would lead them out again. And he reminded them that in material force they were equal to

their enemies, while as for resolution they ought to be far superior. That they, who were Peloponnesians and Dorians, should allow a mixed rabble of Ionians and islanders to remain in the country and not determine to master them and drive them out, was a thing not to be thought of.

[6] On the first opportunity he led them out again. Nicias and the Athenians had determined that, whether the Syracusans would offer battle or not, they must not allow them to carry on their counter-work. For already it had almost passed the end of the Athenian wall, and if the work advanced any further it would make no difference to the Athenians whether they fought and conquered in every battle, or never fought at all. So they went out to meet the Syracusans. Gylippus before engaging led his heavy-armed further outside the walls than on the former occasion; his cavalry and javelin-men he placed on the flanks of the Athenians in the open space between the points at which their respective lines of walls stopped. In the course of the battle the cavalry attacked the left wing of the Athenians which was opposed to them, and put them to flight; the defeat became general, and the whole Athenian army was driven back by main force within their lines. On the following night the Syracusans succeeded in carrying their wall past the works of the enemy. Their operations were now no longer molested by them, and the Athenians, whatever success they might gain in the field, were utterly deprived of all hope of investing the city.

[7] Not long afterwards the remaining Corinthian with the Ambraciot and Leucadian ships sailed in, under the command of Erasinides the Corinthian, having eluded the Athenian guardships. They assisted the Syracusans in completing what remained of the Syracusan wall up to the Athenian wall which it crossed. Gylippus meanwhile had gone off into Sicily to collect both naval and land forces, and also to bring over any cities which either were slack in the Syracusan cause or had stood aloof from the war. More

ambassadors, Syracusan and Corinthian, were despatched to Lacedaemon and Corinth, requesting that reinforcements might be sent across the sea in merchantships or small craft, or by any other available means, since the Athenians were sending for assistance. The Syracusans, who were in high spirits, also manned a fleet, and began to practise, intending to try their hand at this new sort of warfare.

[8] Nicias observing how they were employed, and seeing that the strength of the enemy and the helplessness of the Athenians was daily increasing, sent to Athens a full report of his circumstances, as he had often done before, but never in such detail. He now thought the situation so critical that, if the Athenians did not at once recall them or send another considerable army to their help, the expedition was lost. Fearing lest his messengers, either from inability to speak or from want of intelligence, or because they desired to please the people, might not tell the whole truth, he wrote a letter, that the Athenians might receive his own opinion of their affairs unimpaired in the transmission, and so be better able to judge of the real facts of the case. The messengers departed carrying his letter and taking verbal instructions. He was now careful to keep his army on the defensive, and to run no risks which he could avoid.

[9] At the end of the same summer, Euetion, an Athenian general, in concert with Perdiccas and assisted by a large force of Thracians, made an attack upon Amphipolis, which he failed to take. He then brought round triremes into the Strymon and besieged the place from the river, making Himeraeum his head-quarters. So the summer ended.

[10] In the following winter the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens. They delivered their verbal instructions, and answered any questions which were put to them. They also presented his letter, which the registrar of the city, coming forward, read to the Athenian people. It ran as follows:

[11] ‘Athenians, in many previous despatches I have reported to you the course of events up to this time, but now there is greater need than ever that you should inform yourselves of our situation, and come to some decision. After we had engaged the Syracusans, against whom you sent us, in several battles, and conquered in most of them, and had raised the lines within which we are now stationed, Gylippus, a Lacedaemonian arrived, bringing an army from Peloponnesus and from certain of the cities of Sicily. In the first engagement he was defeated by us, but on the following day we were overcome by numerous horsemen and javelin-men, and retired within our lines. We have therefore desisted from our siege-works and remain idle, since we are overpowered by the superior numbers of the enemy, and indeed cannot bring our whole army into the field, for the defence of our wall absorbs a large part of our heavy-armed. The enemy meanwhile have built a single wall which crosses ours, and we cannot now invest them, unless a large army comes up and takes this cross-wall. So that we, who are supposed to be the besiegers, are really the besieged, at least by land; and the more so because we cannot go far even into the country, for we are prevented by their horsemen.

[12] ‘Moreover they have sent ambassadors to Peloponnesus asking for reinforcements, and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily intending to solicit those who are at present neutral to join him, and to obtain from his allies fresh naval and land forces. For they purpose, as I hear, to attack our walls by land, and at the same time to make an effort at sea. And let no one be startled when I say “at sea.” Our fleet was originally in first-rate condition: the ships were sound and the crews were in good order, but now, as the enemy are well aware, the timbers of the ships, having been so long exposed to the sea, are soaked, and the efficiency of the crews is destroyed. We have no means of drawing up our vessels and airing them, because the enemy’s fleet is equal

or even superior in numbers to our own, and we are always expecting an attack from them. They are clearly trying their strength; they can attack us when they please, and they have far greater facilities for drying their ships, since they are not, like us, engaged in a blockade.

[13] ‘Even if we had a great superiority in the number of our ships, and were not compelled as we are to employ them all in keeping guard, we could hardly have the like advantage. For our supplies have to pass so near the enemy’s city that they are with difficulty conveyed to us now, and if we relax our vigilance ever so little we shall lose them altogether.

‘It has been, and continues to be the ruin of our crews, that the sailors, having to forage and fetch water and wood from a distance, are cut off by the Syracusan horse, while our servants, since we have been reduced to an equality with the enemy, desert us. Of the foreign sailors, some who were pressed into the service run off at once to the Sicilian cities; others, having been originally attracted by high pay, and fancying that they were going to trade and not to fight, astonished at the resistance which they encounter, and especially at the naval strength of the enemy, either find an excuse for deserting to the Syracusans, or they effect their escape into the country; and Sicily is a large place. Others, again, have persuaded the trierarchs to take Hyccarian slaves in their room while they themselves are busy trading; and thus the precision of the service is lost.

[14] ‘You to whom I am writing know that the crew of a vessel does not long remain at its prime, and that the sailors who really start the ship and keep the rowing together are but a fraction of the whole number. The most hopeless thing of all is that, although I am general, I am not able to put a stop to these disorders, for tempers like yours are not easily controlled, and that we cannot even fill up the crews, whereas the enemy can obtain recruits from many sources. Our daily waste in men and stores can only be replaced out of the supplies which we brought with us; and these we have

no means of increasing, for the cities which are now our confederates, Naxos and Catana, are unable to maintain us. There is only one advantage more which the Syracusans can gain over us: if the towns of Italy from which our provisions are derived, seeing in what a plight we are and that you do not come to our help, go over to the enemy, we shall be starved out, and they will have made an end of the war without striking a blow. I could have written you tidings more cheering than these, but none more profitable; for you should be well-informed of our circumstances if you are to take the right steps. Moreover I know your dispositions; you like to hear pleasant things, but afterwards lay the fault on those who tell you them if they are falsified by the event; therefore I think it safer to speak the truth.

[15] ‘And now, do not imagine that your soldiers and their generals have failed in the fulfilment of the duty which you originally imposed upon them. But when all Sicily is uniting against us, and the Syracusans are expecting another army from Peloponnesus, it is time that you should make up your minds. For the troops which we have here certainly cannot hold out even against our present enemies, and therefore you ought either to recall us or to send another army and fleet as large as this, and plenty of money. You should also send a general to succeed me, for I have a disease in the kidneys and cannot remain here. I claim your indulgence; while I retained my health I often did you good service when in command. But do whatever you mean to do at the very beginning of spring, and let there be no delay. The enemy will obtain reinforcements in Sicily without going far, and although the troops from Peloponnesus will not arrive so soon, yet if you do not take care they will elude you; their movements will either be too secret for you, as they were before, or too quick.’

[16] Such was the condition of affairs described in the letter of Nicias. The Athenians, after hearing it read, did not release Nicias from his command, but they joined with him

two officers who were already in Sicily, Menander and Euthydemus, until regular colleagues could be elected and sent out, for they did not wish him to bear the burden in his sickness alone. They also resolved to send a second fleet and an army of Athenians taken from the muster-roll and of allies. As colleagues to Nicias they elected Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. Eurymedon was despatched immediately to Sicily about the winter solstice; he took with him ten ships conveying a hundred and twenty talents of silver, and was to tell the army in Sicily that they should receive assistance and should not be neglected.

[17] Demosthenes remained behind, and busied himself in getting ready the expedition which he was to bring out in the spring. He announced to the allies that troops would be required, collected money, and mustered ships, and hoplites at Athens. The Athenians also sent twenty ships to cruise off the Peloponnesian coast and intercept any vessels trying to pass to Sicily from the Peloponnesus or Corinth. The Sicilian envoys had now arrived at Corinth, and the Corinthians had heard from them that affairs were looking better in Sicily. Seeing how opportune had been the arrival of the ships which they had already despatched they were more zealous than ever. They prepared to convey hoplites to Sicily in merchant-vessels; the Lacedaemonians were to do the like from Peloponnesus. The Corinthians also proceeded to man twenty-five ships of war, intending to hazard a naval engagement against the Athenian squadron stationed at Naupactus. They hoped that, if the attention of the Athenians was diverted by an opposing force, they would be unable to prevent their merchant-vessels from sailing.

[18] The Lacedaemonians also prepared for their already projected invasion of Attica. They were kept to their purpose by the Syracusans and Corinthians, who, having heard of the reinforcements which the Athenians were sending to Sicily, hoped they might be stopped by the invasion. Alcibiades

was always at hand insisting upon the importance of fortifying Decelea and of carrying on the war with vigour. Above all, the Lacedaemonians were inspirited by the thought that the Athenians would be more easily overthrown now that they had two wars on hand, one against themselves, and another against the Sicilians. They considered also that this time they had been the first offenders against the treaty, whereas in the former war the transgression had rather been on their own side. For the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of peace, and they themselves had refused arbitration when offered by the Athenians, although the former treaty forbade war in case an adversary was willing to submit to arbitration. They felt that their ill success was deserved, and they took seriously to heart the disasters which had befallen them at Pylos and elsewhere. But now the Athenians with a fleet of thirty ships had gone forth from Argive territory and ravaged part of the lands of Epidaurus and Prasiae, besides other places; marauding expeditions from Pylos were always going on; and whenever quarrels arose about disputed points in the treaty and the Lacedaemonians proposed arbitration, the Athenians refused it. Reflecting upon all this, the Lacedaemonians concluded that the guilt of their former transgression was now shifted to the Athenians, and they were full of warlike zeal. During the winter they bade their allies provide iron, and themselves got tools in readiness for the fortification of Decelea. They also prepared, and continually urged the other Peloponnesians to prepare, the succours which they intended to send in merchant-vessels to the Syracusans. And so the winter ended, and with it the eighteenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

[19] At the very beginning of the next spring, and earlier than ever before, the Lacedaemonians and their allies entered Attica under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus the Lacedaemonian king. They first devastated

the plain and its neighbourhood. They then began to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the cities of the confederacy. Decelea is distant about fourteen miles from Athens, and not much further from Boeotia. The fort was designed for the devastation of the plain and the richest parts of the country, and was erected on a spot within sight of Athens.

While the Peloponnesians and their allies in Attica were thus engaged, the Peloponnesians at home were despatching the hoplites in the merchant-vessels to Sicily. The Lacedaemonians selected the best of the Helots and Neodamodes, numbering in all six hundred, and placed them under the command of Eccritus, a Spartan. The Boeotians furnished three hundred hoplites, who were commanded by two Thebans, Xenon and Nicon, and by Hegesander, a Thespian. These started first and put out into the open sea from Taenarus in Laconia. Not long afterwards the Corinthians sent five hundred heavy-armed, some of them from Corinth itself, others who were Arcadian mercenaries; they were all placed under the command of Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicyonians also sent with the Corinthians two hundred hoplites under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Meanwhile the twenty-five ships which the Corinthians had manned in the winter lay opposite to the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus until the merchant-vessels conveying the heavy-armed troops had got safely off. So the design succeeded, and the attention of the Athenians was diverted from the merchant-ships to the triremes.

[20] At the beginning of spring, whilst the Lacedaemonians were fortifying Decelea, the Athenians sent thirty ships under the command of Charicles the son of Apollodorus to cruise about Peloponnesus. He was told to touch at Argos, and there to summon and take on board a force of heavy-armed which the Argives, being allies of the Athenians, were bound to furnish. Meanwhile they despatched under

Demosthenes their intended expedition to Sicily: it consisted of sixty Athenian ships and five Chian, twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians taken from the roll, and as many others as could possibly be obtained from the different islanders; they had also collected from their subject-allies supplies of all sorts for the war. Demosthenes was told first of all to co-operate with Charicles on the coast of Laconia. So he sailed to Aegina, and there waited until the whole of his armament was assembled and until Charicles had taken on board the Argives.

[21] In the same spring and about the same time Gylippus returned to Syracuse, bringing from each of the cities which he had persuaded to join him as many troops as he could obtain. He assembled the Syracusans and told them that they should man as large a fleet as possible and try their fortune at sea; he hoped to obtain a decisive result which would justify the risk. Hermocrates took the same view, and urged them strongly not to be faint-hearted at the prospect of attacking with their ships. He said that the Athenians had not inherited their maritime skill, and would not retain it for ever; there was a time when they were less of a naval people than the Syracusans themselves, but they had been made sailors from necessity by the Persian invasion. To daring men like the Athenians those who emulated their daring were the most formidable foes. The same reckless courage which had often enabled the Athenians, although inferior in power, to strike terror into their adversaries might now be turned against them by the Syracusans. He was quite sure that if they faced the Athenian navy suddenly and unexpectedly, they would gain more than they would lose; the consternation which they would inspire would more than counterbalance their own inexperience and the superior skill of the Athenians. He told them therefore to try what they could do at sea, and not to be timid. Thus under the influence of Gylippus, Hermocrates, and others, the

Syracusans, now eager for the conflict, began to man their ships.

[22] When the fleet was ready, Gylippus, under cover of night, led forth the whole land-army, intending to attack in person the forts on Plemmyrium. Meanwhile the triremes of the Syracusans, at a concerted signal, sailed forth, thirty-five from the greater harbour and forty-five from the lesser, where they had their arsenal. These latter sailed round into the Great Harbour, intending to form a junction with the other ships inside and make a combined attack on Plemmyrium, that the Athenians, assailed both by sea and land, might be disconcerted. The Athenians however quickly manned sixty ships; and with twenty-five of them engaged the thirty-five of the Syracusans which were in the Great Harbour: with the remainder they encountered those which were sailing round from the arsenal. These two squadrons met at once before the mouth of the Great Harbour: the struggle was long and obstinate, the Syracusans striving to force an entrance, the Athenians to prevent them.

[23] Meanwhile Gylippus, quite early in the morning, while the Athenians in Plemmyrium who had gone down to the water-side had their minds occupied by the sea-fight, made a sudden attack upon their forts. He captured the largest of them first, then the two lesser, their garrisons forsaking them when they saw the largest so easily taken. Those who escaped from the fortress first captured, getting into a merchant-vessel and some boats which were moored at Plemmyrium, found their way to the main station of the Athenians, but with difficulty; for they were chased by a swift trireme, the Syracusans at that time having the advantage in the Great Harbour. But when the two lesser fortresses were taken, the Syracusans were already losing the day, and the fugitives got past them with greater ease. For the Syracusan ships which were fighting before the mouth of the harbour, having forced their way through the enemy, entered in disorder, and falling foul of one another

gave away the victory to the Athenians, who routed not only these, but also the others by whom they were at first worsted inside the harbour. Eleven Syracusan ships were disabled; the crews in most of them were slain, in three, made prisoners. The Athenians themselves lost three ships. They now drew to land the wrecks of the Syracusan ships, and erecting a trophy on the little island in front of Plemmyrium returned to their own station.

[24] But although the Syracusans were unsuccessful in the sea-fight, still they had taken the fortresses of Plemmyrium. They erected three trophies, one for each fort. Two out of the three forts they repaired and garrisoned, but one of the two which were captured last they demolished. Many perished and many prisoners were made at the capture of the forts, and abundant spoil of different kinds was taken, for the Athenians had used them as a store, and much corn and goods of traders were deposited in them; also much property belonging to the trierarchs, including the sails and other fittings of forty triremes which fell into the enemy’s hands, and three triremes which had been drawn up on the beach. The loss of Plemmyrium was one of the greatest and severest blows which befell the Athenians. For now they could no longer even introduce provisions with safety, but the Syracusan ships lay watching to prevent them; and they had to fight for the passage. General discouragement and dismay prevailed throughout the army.

[25] The Syracusans next sent out twelve ships under the command of Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these hastened to Peloponnesus conveying envoys who were to report their improved prospects, and to urge more strongly than ever the prosecution of the war in Hellas. The remaining eleven sailed to Italy, hearing that ships laden with supplies were on their way to the Athenians. They fell in with and destroyed most of these ships, and burnt a quantity of ship-timber which was lying ready for the Athenians in the territory of Caulonia. Then they came to

Locri, and while they were at anchor there, one of the merchant-vessels from Peloponnesus sailed in, bringing some Thespian hoplites. These the Syracusans took on board, and sailed homewards. The Athenians watched for them near Megara with twenty ships and took one ship with the crew, but the rest made their escape to Syracuse.

There was some skirmishing in the harbour about the palisades which the Syracusans had fixed in the sea in front of their old dock-houses, that their ships might ride at anchor in the enclosed space, where they could not be struck by the enemy, and would be out of harm's way. The Athenians brought up a ship of ten thousand talents burden, which had wooden towers and bulwarks; and from their boats they tied cords to the stakes and wrenched and tore them up; or dived and sawed them through underneath the water. Meanwhile the Syracusans kept up a shower of missiles from the dock-houses, which the men in the ship returned. At length the Athenians succeeded in pulling up most of the palisade. The stakes which were out of sight were the most dangerous of all, there being some which were so fixed that they did not appear above the water; and no vessel could safely come near. They were like a sunken reef, and a pilot, not seeing them, might easily catch his ship upon them. Even these were sawn off by men who dived for hire; but the Syracusans drove them in again. Many were the contrivances employed on both sides, as was very natural, when two armies confronted each other at so short a distance. There were continual skirmishes, and they practised all kinds of stratagems.

The Syracusans also sent to the Siciliot cities Corinthian, Ambraciot, and Lacedaemonian ambassadors announcing the taking of Plemmyrium, and explaining that in the sea-fight they had been defeated not so much by the superior strength of the enemy as through their own disorder. They were also to report their great hopes of success, and to ask for assistance both by land and sea. They were to add that

the Athenians were expecting reinforcements; if they could succeed in destroying the army then in Sicily before these arrived, there would be an end of the war. Such was the course of events in Sicily.

[26] Demosthenes, when the reinforcements which he was to take to Sicily had all been collected, sailed from Aegina to Peloponnesus and joined Charicles and his thirty ships. He embarked the Argive hoplites, and, proceeding to Laconia, first devastated some part of the lands of Epidaurus Limera. Next the Athenians landed in the district of Laconia opposite Cythera, where there is a temple of Apollo. They ravaged various parts of the country, and fortified a sort of isthmus in the neighbourhood, that the Helots of the Lacedaemonians might desert and find a refuge there, and that privateers might make the place, as they did Pylos, their head-quarters for marauding expeditions. Demosthenes assisted in the occupation, and then sailed for Corcyra, intending to collect additional forces from the allies in that region, and to make his way with all speed to Sicily. Charicles waited until he had completed the fort, and then leaving a garrison he sailed home with his thirty ships, accompanied by the Argives.

[27] During the same summer there arrived at Athens thirteen hundred Thracian targeteers of the Dian race, who carried dirks; they were to have sailed with Demosthenes to Sicily, but came too late, and the Athenians determined to send them back to their native country. Each soldier was receiving a drachma per day; and to use them against Decelea would have been too expensive.

For during this summer Decelea had been fortified by the whole Peloponnesian army, and was henceforward regularly occupied for the annoyance of the country by a succession of garrisons sent from the allied cities, whose incursions did immense harm to the Athenians: the destruction of property and life which ensued did as much as anything to ruin the city. Hitherto the invasions had been brief and did not prevent them from getting something from the soil in the

interval; but now the Peloponnesians were continually on the spot; and sometimes they were reinforced by additional troops, but always the regular garrison, who were compelled to find their own supplies, overran and despoiled the country. The Lacedaemonian king, Agis, was present in person, and devoted his whole energies to the war. The sufferings of the Athenians were terrible. For they were dispossessed of their entire territory; more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, most of them workmen; all their sheep and cattle had perished, and now that the cavalry had to go out every day and make descents upon Decelea or keep guard all over the country, their horses were either wounded by the enemy, or lamed by the roughness of the ground and the incessant fatigue.

[28] Provisions, which had been formerly conveyed by the shorter route from Euboea to Oropus and thence overland through Decelea, were now carried by sea round the promontory of Sunium at great cost. Athens was obliged to import everything from abroad, and resembled a fort rather than a city. In the daytime the citizens guarded the battlements by relays; during the night every man was on service except the cavalry; some at their places of arms, others on the wall , summer and winter alike, until they were quite worn out. But worse than all was the cruel necessity of maintaining two wars at once; and they carried on both with a determination which no one would have believed unless he had actually seen it. That, blockaded as they were by the Peloponnesians, who had raised a fort in their country, they should refuse to let go Sicily, and, themselves besieged, persevere in the siege of Syracuse, which as a mere city might rank with Athens, and whereas the Hellenes generally were expecting at the beginning of the war, some that they would survive a year, others two or perhaps three years, certainly not more, if the Peloponnesians invaded Attica — that in the seventeenth year from the first invasion, after so exhausting a struggle, the Athenians should have been

strong enough and bold enough to go to Sicily at all, and to plunge into a fresh war as great as that in which they were already engaged — how contrary was all this to the expectation of mankind! Through the vast expense thus incurred, above all through the mischief done by Decelea, they were now greatly impoverished. It was at this time that they imposed upon their allies, instead of the tribute, a duty of five percent on all things imported and exported by sea, thinking that this would be more productive.

[29] For their expenses became heavier and heavier as the war grew in extent, and at the same time their sources of revenue were drying up.

And so, being in extreme want of money, and desirous to economise, they at once sent away the Thracians who came too late for Demosthenes, ordering Diitrephes to convey them home, but, as they must needs sail through the Euripus, to employ them in any way which he could against the enemy. He landed them at Tanagra and there made a hasty raid; in the evening he sailed from Chalcis in Euboea across the Euripus, and disembarking his troops in Boeotia led them against the town of Mycalessus. He passed the night unperceived at the temple of Hermes, which is distant from Mycalessus about two miles, and at the dawn of day he assaulted and captured the city, which is not large. The inhabitants were taken off their guard; for they never imagined that an enemy would come and attack them at so great a distance from the sea. The walls were weak, and in some places had fallen down; in others they were built low; while the citizens, in their sense of security, had left their gates open. The Thracians dashed into the town, sacked the houses and temples, and slaughtered the inhabitants. They spared neither old nor young, but cut down, one after another, all whom they met, the women and children, the very beasts of burden, and every living thing which they saw. For the Thracians, when they dare, can be as bloody as the worst barbarians. There in Mycalessus the wildest panic

ensued, and destruction in every form was rife. They even fell upon a boys' school, the largest in the place, which the children had just entered, and massacred them every one. No calamity could be worse than this, touching as it did the whole city, none was ever so sudden or so terrible.

[30] When the news reached the Thebans they hastened to the rescue. Coming upon the Thracians before they had gone far, they took away the spoil and, putting them to flight, pursued them to the Euripus, where the ships which had brought them were moored. Of those who fell, the greater number were slain in the attempt to embark; for they did not know how to swim, and the men on board, seeing what was happening, had anchored their vessels out of bow-shot. In the retreat itself the Thracians made a very fair defence against the Theban cavalry which first attacked them, running out and closing in again, after the manner of their country; and their loss was trifling. But a good many who remained for the sake of plunder were cut off within the city and slain. The whole number who fell was two hundred and fifty, out of thirteen hundred. They killed, however, some of the Thebans and others who came to the rescue, in all about twenty, both horsemen and hoplites. Scirphondas, one of the Theban Boeotarchs, was slain. A large proportion of the Mycalessians perished. Such was the fate of Mycalessus; considering the size of the city, no calamity more deplorable occurred during the war.

[31] Demosthenes, who after helping to build the fort on the Laconian coast, had sailed away to Corcyra, on his way thither destroyed a merchant-vessel anchored at Phea in Elis, which was intended to convey some of the Corinthian hoplites to Sicily. But the crew escaped, and sailed in another vessel. He went on to Zacynthus and Cephallenia, where he took on board some hoplites, and sent to the Messenians of Naupactus for others; he then passed over to the mainland of Acarnania, and touched at Alyzia and Anactorium, which were at that time occupied by the

Athenians. While he was in those regions he met Eurymedon returning from Sicily, whither he had been sent during the winter in charge of the money which had been voted to the army; he reported, among other things, the capture of Plemmyrium by the Syracusans, of which he had heard on his voyage home. Conon too, the governor of Naupactus, brought word that the twenty-five Corinthian ships which were stationed on the opposite coast were still showing a hostile front, and clearly meant to fight. He requested the generals to send him reinforcements, since his own ships — eighteen in number — were not able to give battle against the twenty-five of the enemy. Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent ten ships, the swiftest which they had, to the fleet at Naupactus, while they themselves completed the muster of the expedition. Eurymedon, sailing to Corcyra, ordered the Corcyraeans to man fifteen ships, and himself levied a number of hoplites. He had turned back from his homeward voyage, and was now holding the command, to which, in conjunction with Demosthenes, he had been appointed. Demosthenes meanwhile had been collecting slingers and javelin-men in the neighbourhood of Acarnania.

[32] The ambassadors from Syracuse who had gone to the cities of Sicily after the taking of Plemmyrium, and had persuaded them to join in the war, were now about to bring back the army which they had collected. Nicias, having previous information, sent word to the Sicel allies of Athens who commanded the road, such as the Centoripes and Alicyaei, and told them not to let the forces of the enemy pass, but to unite and stop them; there was no likelihood, he said, that they would even think of taking another road, since they were not allowed to go through the country of the Agrigentines. So when the forces of the Sicilian towns were on their way, the Sicels, complying with the request of the Athenians, set an ambush in three divisions, and falling upon them suddenly when they were off their guard, destroyed about eight hundred of them, and all the envoys

except the Corinthian; he brought the survivors, numbering fifteen hundred, to Syracuse.

[33] About the same time arrived a reinforcement from Camarina of five hundred hoplites, three hundred javelin-men, and three hundred archers. The Geloans also sent five ships with four hundred javelin-men and two hundred horsemen. Hitherto the Sicilian cities had only watched the course of events, but now the whole island, with the exception of Agrigentum, which was neutral, united with the Syracusans against the Athenians.

After their misfortune in the Sicel country, the Syracusans deferred their intended attack for a time. The forces which Demosthenes and Eurymedon had collected from Corcyra and the mainland were now ready, and they passed over the Ionian Sea to the promontory of Iapygia. Proceeding onwards, they touched at the Iapygian islands called Choerades, and took on board a hundred and fifty Iapygian javelin-men of the Messapian tribe. After renewing an ancient friendship with Artas, a native prince who had furnished the javelin-men, they went on to Metapontium in Italy. They persuaded the Metapontians, who were their allies, to let them have two triremes and three hundred javelin-men; these they took with them and sailed to Thurii. At Thurii they found that the party opposed to the Athenians had just been driven out by a revolution. Wishing to hold another muster and inspection of their whole army, and to be sure that no one was missing, they remained there for some time. They also did their best to gain the hearty co-operation of the Thurians, and to effect an offensive and defensive alliance with them, now that they had succeeded in expelling the anti-Athenian party.

[34] About the same time the Peloponnesians in their fleet of twenty-five ships, which was stationed opposite the Athenian fleet at Naupactus to protect the passage of the merchant-vessels going to Sicily, made ready for action. They manned some additional ships, which raised their

number nearly to that of the Athenians, and anchored at Erineus off Achaia, which is in the territory of Rhypae. The bay, off the shore of which they were stationed, has the form of a crescent, and the infantry of the Corinthians and of the allies, which had come from the country on both sides to co-operate with the fleet, was disposed on the projecting promontories. The ships, which were under the command of Polyanthes the Corinthian, formed a close line between the two points. The Athenians sailed out against them from Naupactus with thirty-three ships, under the command of Diphilus. For a while the Corinthians remained motionless; in due time the signal was raised and they rushed upon the Athenians and engaged with them. The battle was long and obstinate. Three Corinthian ships were destroyed. The Athenians had no ships absolutely sunk, but about seven of them were rendered useless; for they were struck full in front by the beaks of the Corinthian vessels, which had the projecting beams of their prows designedly built thicker, and their bows were stoven in. The engagement was undecided and both sides claimed the victory; but the Athenians gained possession of the wrecks because the wind blew them towards the open sea and the Corinthians did not put out again. So the two fleets parted. There was no pursuit, nor were any prisoners taken on either side. For the Corinthians and Peloponnesians were fighting close to the land and thus their crews escaped, while on the Athenian side no ship was sunk. As soon as the Athenians had returned to Naupactus the Corinthians set up a trophy, insisting that they were the victors, because they had disabled more of the enemy’s ships than the enemy of theirs. They refused to acknowledge defeat on the same ground which made the Athenians unwilling to claim the victory. For the Corinthians considered themselves conquerors, if they were not severely defeated; but the Athenians thought that they were defeated because they had not gained a signal victory. When however the

Peloponnesians had sailed away and the land-army was dispersed, the Athenians raised another trophy in Achaia, at a distance of about two miles and a quarter from the Corinthian station at Erineus. Such was the result of the engagement.

[35] Demosthenes and Eurymedon, when the Thurians had been prevailed upon to help them, and had furnished seven hundred hoplites and three hundred javelin-men, commanded the ships to sail towards the territory of Crotona, and themselves, after holding a review of all their infantry at the river Sybaris, led them through the territory of Thurii. On their arrival at the river Hylias the people of Crotona sent to them, and said that they could not allow the army to march through their country. So they directed their march down to the sea and passed the night at the mouth of the river, where they were met by their ships. On the following day they re-embarked the army and coasted along, touching at the cities which they passed, with the exception of Locri, until they came to the promontory of Petra near Rhegium.

[36] The Syracusans, hearing of their approach, desired to have another trial of the fleet, and to use the army which they had collected with the express purpose of bringing on an engagement before Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived in Sicily. Profiting by the experience which they had acquired in the last sea-fight, they devised several improvements in the construction of their vessels. They cut down and strengthened the prows, and also made the beams which projected from them thicker; these latter they supported underneath with stays of timber extending from the beams to and through the sides of the ship a length of nine feet within and nine without, after the fashion in which the Corinthians had refitted their prows before they fought with the squadron from Naupactus. For the Syracusans hoped thus to gain an advantage over the Athenian ships, which were not constructed to resist such improvements, but

had their prows slender, because they were in the habit of rowing round an enemy and striking the side of his vessel instead of meeting him prow to prow. The plan would be the more effectual, because they were going to fight in the Great Harbour, where many ships would be crowded in a narrow space. They would charge full in face, and presenting their own massive and solid beaks would stave in the hollow and weak forepart of their enemies' ships; while the Athenians, confined as they were, would not be able to wheel round them or break their line before striking, to which manoeuvres they mainly trusted — the want of room would make the one impossible, and the Syracusans themselves would do their best to prevent the other. What had hitherto been considered a defect of skill on the part of their pilots, the practice of striking beak to beak, would now be a great advantage, to which they would have constant recourse; for the Athenians, when forced to back water, could only retire towards the land, which was too near, and of which but a small part, that is to say, their own encampment, was open to them. The Syracusans would be masters of the rest of the harbour, and, if the Athenians were hard pressed at any point, they would all be driven together into one small spot, where they would run foul of one another and fall into confusion. (Which proved to be the case; for nothing was more disastrous to the Athenians in all these sea-fights than the impossibility of retreating, as the Syracusans could, to any part of the harbour.) Again, while they themselves had command of the outer sea and could charge from it and back water into it whenever they pleased, the Athenians would be unable to sail into the open and turn before striking; besides, Plemmyrium was hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbour was narrow.

[37] Having thus adapted their plans to the degree of naval skill and strength which they possessed, the Syracusans, greatly encouraged by the result of the previous engagement, attacked the Athenians both by sea and land.

A little before the fleet sailed forth, Gylippus led the land-forces out of the city against that part of the Athenian wall which faced Syracuse, while some of the heavy-armed troops, which together with the cavalry and light infantry were stationed at the Olympieum, approached the lines of the enemy from the opposite side. Nearly at the same instant the ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailed out. The Athenians at first thought that they were going to make an attempt by land only, but when they saw the ships suddenly bearing down upon them they were disconcerted. Some mounted the walls or prepared to meet their assailants in front of them; others went out against the numerous cavalry and javelin-men, who were hastening from the Olympieum and the outer side of the wall; others manned the ships or prepared to fight on the beach. When the crews had got on board they sailed out with seventy-five ships; the number of Syracusan ships being about eighty.

[38] During a great part of the day the two fleets continued advancing and retreating and skirmishing with one another. Neither was able to gain any considerable advantage, only the Syracusans sank one or two ships of the Athenians; so they parted, and at the same time the infantry retired from the walls. On the following day the Syracusans remained quiet and gave no sign of what they meant to do next. Seeing how close the conflict had been, Nicias expected another attack; he therefore compelled the trierarchs to repair their ships wherever they were injured, and anchored merchant-vessels in front of the palisades which the Athenians had driven into the sea so as to form a kind of dock for the protection of their own ships; these he placed at a distance of about two hundred feet from one another, in order that any ship which was hard pressed might have a safe retreat and an opportunity of going out again at leisure. These preparations occupied the Athenians for a whole day from morning to night.

[39] On the next day, in the same manner as before but at an earlier hour, the Syracusans attacked the Athenians both by sea and land. Again the ships faced one another, and again a great part of the day was passed in skirmishing. At length Ariston the son of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian, who was the ablest pilot in the Syracusan fleet, persuaded the commanders to send a message to the proper authorities in the city desiring them to have the market transferred as quickly as possible to the shore, and to compel any one who had food for sale to bring his whole stock thither. The sailors would thus be enabled to disembark and take their midday meal close to the ships; and so after a short interval they might, without waiting until the next day, renew the attack upon the Athenians when least expected.

[40] The generals, agreeing to the proposal, sent the message, and the market was brought down to the shore. Suddenly the Syracusans backed water and rowed towards the city; then disembarking they at once took their meal on the spot. The Athenians, regarding their retreat as a confession of defeat, disembarked at leisure, and among other matters set about preparing their own meal, taking for granted that there would be no more fighting that day. Suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships and again bore down upon them; the Athenians, in great disorder and most of them fasting, hurried on board, and with considerable difficulty got under weigh. For some time the two fleets looked at one another, and did not engage; after a while the Athenians thought they had better not delay until they had fairly tired themselves out, but attack at once. So, cheering on one another, they charged and fought. The Syracusans remained firm, and meeting the enemy prow to prow, as they had resolved, stove in by the strength of their beaks a great part of the bows of the Athenian ships. Their javelin-men on the decks greatly injured the enemy. Still more mischief was done by Syracusans who rowed about in light

boats and dashed in upon the blades of the enemy’s oars, or ran up alongside and threw darts at the sailors.

[41] By such expedients as these the Syracusans, who made a great effort, gained the victory; and the Athenians, retreating between the merchant-vessels, took refuge at their own moorings. The ships of the enemy pursued them as far as the entrance, but they were prevented from following further by leaden dolphins, which were suspended aloft from beams placed in the merchant-vessels. Two Syracusan ships, in the exultation of victory, approached too near and were disabled; one of them was taken with its whole crew. The Syracusans damaged many of the Athenian ships and sank seven; the crews were either killed or taken prisoners. They then retired and raised trophies of the two sea-fights. They were now quite confident that they were not only equal but far superior to the Athenians at sea, and they hoped to gain the victory on land as well. So they prepared to renew the attack on both elements.

[42] But in the midst of their preparations Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian reinforcements. They brought a fleet, including foreign ships, of about seventy-three sail, carrying five thousand heavy infantry of their own and of their allies, numerous javelin-men, slingers, and archers, both Hellenic and Barbarian, and abundant supplies of every kind. The Syracusans and their allies were in consternation. It seemed to them as if their perils would never have an end when they saw, notwithstanding the fortification of Decelea, another army arriving nearly equal to the former, and Athens displaying such varied and exuberant strength; while the first Athenian army regained a certain degree of confidence after their disasters. Demosthenes at once saw how matters stood; he knew that there was no time to be lost, and resolved that it should not be with him as it had been with Nicias. For Nicias was dreaded at his first arrival; but when, instead of at once laying siege to Syracuse, he passed the winter at Catana, he

fell into contempt, and his delay gave Gylippus time to come with an army from Peloponnesus. Whereas if he had struck, hard at first, the Syracusans would never even have thought of getting fresh troops; strong in their own self-sufficiency, they would have discovered their inferiority only when the city had been actually invested, and then, if they had been sent for reinforcements, they would have found them useless. Demosthenes, reflecting on all this, and aware that he too would never again be in a position to inspire such terror as on the day of his arrival, desired to take the speediest advantage of the panic caused by the appearance of his army. Accordingly, seeing that the cross-wall of the Syracusans which had prevented the Athenians from investing them was but a single line, and that if he could gain the command of the way up to Epipolae and take the camp which was on the high ground the wall would be easily captured, for no one would so much as stand his ground against them, he resolved to make the attempt at once. This would be the shortest way of putting an end to the war. If he succeeded, Syracuse would fall into his hands; if he failed, he meant to bring away the expedition; he would no longer wear out the Athenian army, and weaken the state to no purpose.

The Athenians began by ravaging the fields of the Syracusans about the Anapus, and regained their former superiority both by sea and land. At sea the Syracusans no longer opposed them; and on land they merely sent out parties of cavalry and javelin-men from the Olympieum.

[43] Before he attacked Epipolae, Demosthenes wished to try what could be done with engines against the counter-wall. But the engines which he brought up were burnt by the enemy, who fought from the wall, and, after making assaults at several points, the Athenian forces were repulsed. He now determined to delay no longer, and persuaded Nicias and his colleagues to carry out the plan of attacking Epipolae. To approach during the daytime and ascend the heights

undetected appeared to be impossible; so he resolved to attack by night. He ordered provisions for five days, and took with him all the masons and carpenters in the army; also a supply of arrows and of the various implements which would be required for siege-works if he were victorious. About the first watch he, Eurymedon, and Menander led out the whole army and marched towards Epipolae. Nicias was left in the Athenian fortifications. Reaching Epipolae at the Euryelus, where their first army had originally ascended, and advancing undiscovered by the garrison to the fort which the Syracusans had there erected, they took it and killed some of the guards. But the greater number made good their escape and carried the news to the three fortified camps, one of the Syracusans, one of the other Sicilian Greeks, and one of the allies, which had been formed on Epipolae; they also gave the alarm to the six hundred who were an advanced guard stationed on this part of Epipolae. They hastened to meet the enemy, but Demosthenes and the Athenians came upon them and, in spite of a vigorous resistance, drove them back. The Athenians immediately pressed forward; they were determined not to lose a moment or to slacken their onset until they had accomplished their purpose. Others captured the first part of the Syracusan counter-wall and, the guards taking to flight, began to drag off the battlements. Meanwhile the Syracusans, the allies, and Gylippus with his own troops, were hurrying from the outworks. The boldness of this night attack quite amazed them. They had not recovered from their terror when they met the Athenians, who were at first too strong for them and drove them back. But now the conquerors, in the confidence of victory, began to fall into disorder as they advanced; they wanted to force their way as quickly as they could through all that part of the enemy which had not yet fought, and they were afraid that if they relaxed their efforts the Syracusans might rally. The Boeotians were the first to make

a stand: they attacked the Athenians, turned, and put them to flight.

[44] The whole army was soon in utter confusion, and the perplexity was so great that from neither side could the particulars of the conflict be exactly ascertained. In the daytime the combatants see more clearly; though even then only what is going on immediately around them, and that imperfectly — nothing of the battle as a whole. But in a night engagement, like this in which two great armies fought — the only one of the kind which occurred during the war — who could be certain of anything? The moon was bright, and they saw before them, as men naturally would in the moonlight, the figures of one another, but were unable to distinguish with certainty who was friend or foe. Large bodies of heavy-armed troops, both Athenian and Syracusan, were moving about in a narrow space; of the Athenians some were already worsted, while others, still unconquered, were carrying on the original movement. A great part of their army had not yet engaged, but either had just mounted the heights, or were making the ascent; and no one knew which way to go. For in front they were defeated already; there was nothing but confusion, and all distinction between the two armies was lost by reason of the noise. The victorious Syracusans and their allies, who had no other means of communication in the darkness, cheered on their comrades with loud cries as they received the onset of their assailants. The Athenians were looking about for each other; and every one who met them, though he might be a friend who had turned and fled, they imagined to be an enemy. They kept constantly asking the watchword (for there was no other mode of knowing one another), and thus they not only caused great confusion among themselves by all asking at once, but revealed the word to the enemy. The watchword of the Syracusans was not so liable to be discovered, because being victorious they kept together and were more easily recognised. So that when they were

encountered by a superior number of the enemy they, knowing the Athenian watchword, escaped; but the Athenians in a like case, failing to answer the challenge, were killed. Most disastrous of all were the mistakes caused by the sound of the Paean, which, the same being heard in both armies, was a great source of perplexity. For there were in the battle Argives, Corcyraeans, and other Dorian allies of the Athenians, and when they raised the Paean they inspired as much alarm as the enemy themselves; so that in many parts of the army, when the confusion had once begun, not only did friends terrify friends and citizens their fellow-citizens whom they had encountered, but they attacked one another, and were with difficulty disentangled. The greater number of those who were pursued and killed perished by throwing themselves from the cliffs; for the descent from Epipolae is by a narrow path. The fugitives who reached the level ground, especially those who had served in the former army and knew the neighbourhood, mostly escaped to the camp. But of the newly-arrived many missed their way, and, wandering about until daybreak, were then cut off by the Syracusan cavalry who were scouring the country.

[45] On the following day the Syracusans erected two trophies, one on Epipolae at the summit of the ascent, the other at the spot where the Boeotians made the first stand. The Athenians received their dead under a flag of truce. A considerable number of them and of their allies had fallen; there were however more arms taken than there were bodies of the slain; for those who were compelled to leap from the heights, whether they perished or not, had thrown away their shields.

[46] The confidence of the Syracusans was restored by their unexpected success, and they sent Sicanus with fifteen ships to Agrigentum, then in a state of revolution, that he might win over the place if he could. Gylippus had gone off again by land to collect a new army in the other parts of

Sicily, hoping after the victory of Epipolae to carry the Athenian fortifications by storm.

[47] Meanwhile the Athenian generals, troubled by their recent defeat and the utter discouragement which prevailed in the army, held a council of war. They saw that their attempts all failed, and that the soldiers were weary of remaining. For they were distressed by sickness, proceeding from two causes: the season of the year was that in which men are most liable to disease; and the place in which they were encamped was damp and unhealthy. And they felt that the situation was in every way hopeless. Demosthenes gave his voice against remaining; he said that the decisive attack upon Epipolae had failed, and, in accordance with his original intention, he should vote for immediate departure while the voyage was possible, and while, with the help of the ships which had recently joined them, they had the upper hand at any rate by sea. It was more expedient for the city that they should make war upon the Peloponnesians, who were raising a fort in Attica, than against the Syracusans, whom they could now scarcely hope to conquer; and there was no sense in carrying on the siege at a vast expense and with no result. This was the opinion of Demosthenes.

[48] Nicias in his own mind took the same gloomy view of their affairs; but he did not wish openly to confess their weakness, or by a public vote given in a numerous assembly to let their intention reach the enemy’s ears, and so lose the advantage of departing secretly whenever they might choose to go. He had moreover still some reason to suppose that the Syracusans, of whose condition he was better informed than the other generals, were likely to be worse off than themselves if they would only persevere in the siege; they would be worn out by the exhaustion of their resources; and now the Athenians with their additional ships had much greater command of the sea. — There was a party in Syracuse itself which wanted to surrender the city to the

Athenians, and they kept sending messages to Nicias and advising him not to depart. Having this information he was still wavering and considering, and had not made up his mind. But in addressing the council he positively refused to withdraw the army; he knew, he said, that the Athenian people would not forgive their departure if they left without an order from home. The men upon whose votes their fate would depend would not, like themselves, have seen with their own eyes the state of affairs; they would only have heard the criticisms of others, and would be convinced by any accusations which a clever speaker might bring forward. Indeed many or most of the very soldiers who were now crying out that their case was desperate would raise the opposite cry when they reached home, and would say that the generals were traitors, and had been bribed to depart; and therefore he, knowing the tempers of the Athenians, would for his own part rather take his chance and fall, if he must, alone by the hands of the enemy, than die unjustly on a dishonourable charge at the hands of the Athenians. And, after all, the Syracusans were in a condition worse than their own; for they had to maintain mercenary troops; they were spending money on garrisons, and had now kept up a large navy for a whole year; already in great difficulties, they would soon be in greater; they had expended two thousand talents, and were heavily in arrear; and if by a failure in the pay they suffer any diminution of their present forces their affairs would be ruined. For they depended on mercenaries, who, unlike the Athenian allies, were under no compulsion to serve. Therefore, he said, they ought to persevere in the siege, and not go away disheartened by the greatness of the expense, for they were far richer than the enemy.

[49] Nicias spoke thus decidedly because he knew exactly how matters stood in Syracuse; he was aware of their want of money, and of the secret existence of that party within the walls which wished well to the Athenians, and was continually sending word to him not to depart; and the

confidence in his navy, if not in his army, which now possessed him was greater than ever. But Demosthenes would not hear for an instant of persisting in the siege; if, he said, the army must remain and ought not to be removed without a vote of the assembly, then they should retire to Thapsus or Catana, whence they might overrun the whole country with their land-forces, maintaining themselves at the expense of the enemy and doing him great damage. They would thus fight their battles, not cooped up in the harbour, which gave an advantage to the enemy, but in the open sea, where their skill would be available and their charges and retreats would not be circumscribed by the narrow space which now hampered their movements whenever they had to put in or out. In a word, he wholly disapproved of the Athenians continuing in their present position; they should with all speed break up the siege and be gone. Eurymedon took the same side. Still Nicias resisted; there was delay and hesitation, and a suspicion that he might have some ground which they did not know for his unwillingness to yield. And so the Athenians stayed on where they were.

[50] Meanwhile Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse. Sicanus had not succeeded in his design upon Agrigentum; for while he was at Gela on his way the party inclined to friendship with the Syracusans had been driven out. But Gylippus brought back a large army, together with the hoplites who had been sent in merchant-vessels from Peloponnesus in the spring, and had come by way of Libya to Selinus. They had been driven to Libya by stress of weather, and the Cyrenaeans had given them two triremes and pilots. On their voyage they had made common cause with the Evesperitae, who were besieged by the Libyans. After defeating the Libyans they sailed on to Neapolis, a Carthaginian factory which is the nearest point to Sicily, the passage taking two days and a night only; thence they crossed and came to Selinus. On their arrival, the

Syracusans immediately prepared to renew their attack upon the Athenians, both by land and sea. And the Athenian generals, seeing that their enemy had been reinforced by a new army, and that their own affairs, instead of improving, were daily growing worse in every respect, and being especially troubled by the sickness of their troops, repented that they had not gone before. Even Nicias now no longer objected, but only made the condition that there should be no open voting. So, maintaining such secrecy as they could, they gave orders for the departure of the expedition; the men were to prepare themselves against a given signal. The preparations were made and they were on the point of sailing, when the moon, being just then at the full, was eclipsed. The mass of the army was greatly moved, and called upon the generals to remain. Nicias himself, who was too much under the influence of divination and such like, refused even to discuss the question of their removal until they had remained thrice nine days, as the soothsayers prescribed. This was the reason why the departure of the Athenians was finally delayed.

[51] And now the Syracusans, having heard what had happened, were more eager than ever to prosecute the war to the end; they saw in the intention of the Athenians to depart a confession that they were no longer superior to themselves, either by sea or land; and they did not want them to settle down in some other part of Sicily where they would be more difficult to manage, but sought to compel them forthwith to fight at sea under the disadvantages of their present position. So they manned their ships and exercised for as many days as they thought sufficient. When the time came they began by attacking the Athenian lines. A small number both of the hoplites and of the cavalry came out of some of the gates to meet them; they cut off however a portion of the hoplites, and, putting the main body to flight, drove them within their walls. The entrance was

narrow, and the Athenians lost seventy horses and a few infantry.

[52] The Syracusan army then retired. On the morrow their ships, in number seventy-six, sailed forth, and at the same time their landforces marched against the walls. The Athenians on their side put out with eighty-six ships; and the two fleets met and fought. Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, hoping to surround the enemy, extended his line too far towards the land, and was defeated by the Syracusans, who, after overcoming the Athenian centre, cooped him up in the inner bay of the harbour. There he was slain, and the vessels which were under his command and had followed him were destroyed. The Syracusans now pursued and began to drive ashore the rest of the Athenian fleet.

[53] Gylippus, observing the discomfiture of the enemy, who were being defeated and driven to land beyond their own palisade and the lines of their camp, hastened with a part of his army to the causeway which ran along the harbour, intending to kill all who landed, and to assist the Syracusans in capturing the ships, which could be more easily towed away if the shore was in the hands of their friends. The Tyrrhenians, who guarded this part of the Athenian lines, seeing Gylippus and his forces advance in disorder, rushed out, and attacking the foremost put them to flight, and drove them into the marsh called Lysimelea. But soon the Syracusans and their allies came up in greater numbers. The Athenians in fear for their ships advanced to the support of the Tyrrhenians, and joined in the engagement; the Syracusans were overcome and pursued, and a few of their heavy-armed slain. Most of the Athenian ships were saved and brought back to the Athenian station. Still the Syracusans and their allies took eighteen, and killed the whole of their crews. Then, hoping to burn the remainder of the fleet, they procured an old merchant-vessel, which they filled with faggots and brands; these they lighted, and as

the wind blew right upon the enemy they let the ship go. The Athenians, alarmed for the safety of their fleet, contrived means by which they extinguished their flames, and succeeded in keeping the fireship at a distance. Thus the danger was averted.

[54] The Syracusans now raised a trophy of their naval victory, and another marking their interception of the hoplites on the higher ground close to the wall at the place where they took the horses. The Athenians raised a trophy of the victory over the land-forces whom the Tyrrhenians drove into the marsh, and another of that which they had themselves gained with the rest of the army.

[55] The Syracusans, who up to this time had been afraid of the reinforcements of Demosthenes, had now gained a brilliant success by sea as well as by land; the Athenians were in utter despair. Great was their surprise at the result, and still greater their regret that they had ever come. The Sicilian were the only cities which they had ever encountered similar in character to their own, having the same democratic institutions and strong in ships, cavalry, and population. They were not able by holding out the prospect of a change of government to introduce an element of discord among them which might have gained them over, nor could they master them by a decided superiority of force. They had failed at almost every point, and were already in great straits, when the defeat at sea, which they could not have thought possible, reduced their fortunes to a still lower ebb.

[56] The Syracusans at once sailed round the shore of the harbour without fear, and determined to close the mouth, that the Athenians might not be able, even if they wanted, to sail out by stealth. For they were now striving, no longer to achieve their own deliverance, but to cut off the escape of the Athenians; they considered their position already far superior, as indeed it was, and they hoped that if they could conquer the Athenians and their allies by sea and land, their

success would be glorious in the eyes of all the Hellenes, who would at once be set free, some from slavery, others from fear. For the Athenians, having lost so much of their power, would never be able to face the enemies who would rise up against them. And the glory of the deliverance would be ascribed to the Syracusans, who would be honoured by all living men and all future ages. The conflict was still further ennobled by the thought that they were now conquering, not only the Athenians, but a host of their allies. And they themselves were not alone, but many had come to their support; they were taking the command in a war by the side of Corinth and Lacedaemon; they had offered their own city to bear the brunt of the encounter, and they had made an immense advance in naval power. More nations met at Syracuse than ever gathered around any single city, although not so many as the whole number of nations enrolled in this war under the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.

[57] I will now enumerate the various peoples who came to Sicily as friends or enemies, to share either in the conquest or in the defence of the country, and who fought before Syracuse, choosing their side, not so much from a sense of right, or from obligations of kinship, as from the accident of compulsion or of their own interest.

The Athenians themselves, who were Ionians, went of their own free will against the Syracusans, who were Dorians; they were followed by the Lemnians and Imbrians and the then inhabitants of Aegina, and by the Hestiaeans dwelling at Hestiaea in Euboea: all these were their own colonists, speaking the same language with them, and retaining the same institutions.

Of the rest who joined in the expedition, some were subjects, others independent allies, some again mercenaries. Of the subjects and tributaries, the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styreans, and Carystians came from Euboea; the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians from the islands; the

Milesians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia. Of these however the Chians were independent, and instead of paying tribute, provided ships. All or nearly all were Ionians and descendants of the Athenians, with the exception of the Carystians, who are Dryopes. They were subjects and constrained to follow, but still they were Ionians fighting against Dorians. There were also Aeolians, namely, the Methymnaeans, who furnished ships but were not tributaries, and the Tenedians and Aenians, who paid tribute. These Aeolians were compelled to fight against their Aeolian founders, the Boeotians, who formed part of the Syracusan army. The Plataeans were the only Boeotians opposed to Boeotians, a natural result of mutual hatred. The Rhodians and Cytherians were both Dorians; the Cytherians, although Lacedaemonian colonists, bore arms in the Athenian cause against the Lacedaemonians who came with Gylippus; and the Rhodians, though by descent Argive, were compelled to fight against the Syracusans, who were Dorians, and against the Geloans, who were actually their own colony, and were taking part with Syracuse. Of the islanders around Peloponnesus, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians were independent; still, being islanders, they followed under a certain degree of constraint; for the Athenians were masters of the sea. The Corcyraeans, who were not only Dorians but actually Corinthians, were serving against Corinthians and Syracusans, although they were the colonists of the one and the kinsmen of the other; they followed under a decent appearance of compulsion, but quite readily, because they hated the Corinthians. The Messenians too, as the inhabitants of Naupactus were now called, including the garrison of Pylos, which was at that time held by the Athenians, were taken by them to the war. A few Megarians, having the misfortune to be exiles, were thus induced to fight against the Selinuntians, who were Megarians like themselves.

The service of the remaining allies was voluntary. The Argives, not so much because they were allies of Athens, as owing to their hatred of the Lacedaemonians, and the desire of each man among them to better himself at the time, followed the Athenians, who were Ionians, being themselves Dorians, to fight against Dorians. The Mantineans and other Arcadians were mercenaries accustomed to attack any enemy who from time to time might be pointed out to them, and were now ready, if they were paid, to regard the Arcadians, who were in the service of the Corinthians, as their enemies. The Cretans and Aetolians also served for hire; the Cretans, who had once joined with the Rhodians in the foundation of Gela, came with reluctance; nevertheless for pay they consented to fight against their own colonists. Some of the Acarnanians came to aid their Athenian allies, partly from motives of gain, but much more out of regard for Demosthenes and good-will to Athens. All these dwelt on the eastern side of the Ionian Gulf.

Of the Hellenes in Italy, the Thurians and Metapontians, constrained by the necessities of a revolutionary period, joined in the enterprise; of the Hellenes in Sicily, the Naxians and Catanaeans. Of Barbarians, there were the Egestaeans, who invited the expedition, and the greater part of the Sicels, and, besides native Sicilians, certain Tyrrhenians who had a quarrel with the Syracusans; also Iapygians, who served for hire. These were the nations who followed the Athenians.

[58] The Syracusans, on the other hand, were assisted by the Camarinaeans, who were their nearest neighbours, and by the Geloans, who dwelt next beyond them; and then (for the Agrigentines, who came next, were neutral) by the still more distant Selinuntians. All these inhabited the region of Sicily which lies towards Libya. On the side looking towards the Tyrrhenian Gulf the Himeraeans, the only Hellenic people in those parts, were also their only allies. These were the Hellenic peoples in Sicily who fought on the side of the

Syracusans; they were Dorians and independent. As for Barbarians, they had only such of the Sicels as had not gone over to the Athenians.

Of Hellenes who were not inhabitants of Sicily, the Lacedaemonians provided a Spartan general; the Lacedaemonian forces were all Neodamodes and Helots. (The meaning of the word Neodamode is freedman.) The Corinthians were the only power which furnished both sea and land forces. Their Leucadian and Ambraciot kinsmen accompanied them; from Arcadia came mercenaries sent by Corinth; there were also Sicyonians who served under compulsion; and of the peoples beyond the Peloponnese, some Boeotians. — This external aid however was small compared with the numerous troops of all kinds which the Sicilian Greeks themselves supplied; for they dwelt in great cities, and had mustered many ships and horses and hoplites, besides a vast multitude of other troops. And again, the proportion furnished by the Syracusans themselves was greater than that of all the rest put together; their city was the largest, and they were in the greatest danger.

[59] Such were the allies who were assembled on both sides. At that time they were all on the spot, and nothing whatever came afterwards to either army.

The Syracusans and the allies naturally thought that the struggle would be brought to a glorious end if, after having defeated the Athenian fleet, they took captive the whole of their great armament, and did not allow them to escape either by sea or land. So they at once began to close the mouth of the Great Harbour, which was about a mile wide, by means of triremes, merchant-vessels, and small boats, placed broadside, which they moored there. They also made every preparation for a naval engagement, should the Athenians be willing to hazard another; and all their thoughts were on a grand scale.

[60] The Athenians, seeing the closing of the harbour and inferring the intentions of the enemy, proceeded to hold a

council. The generals and officers met and considered the difficulties of their position. The most pressing of all was the want of food. For they had already sent to Catana, when they intended to depart, and stopped the supplies for the present; and they could get no more in the future unless they recovered the command of the sea. They resolved therefore to quit their lines on the higher ground and to cut off by a cross-wall a space close to their ships, no greater than was absolutely required for their baggage and for their sick; after leaving a guard there they meant to put on board every other man, and to launch all their ships, whether fit for service or not; they would then fight a decisive battle, and, if they conquered, go to Catana; but if not, they would burn their ships, and retreat by land in good order, taking the nearest way to some friendly country, Barbarian or Hellenic. This design they proceeded to execute, and withdrawing quietly from the upper walls manned their whole fleet, compelling every man of any age at all suitable for service to embark. The entire number of the ships which they manned was about a hundred and ten. They put on board numerous archers and javelin-men, Acarnanians, and other foreigners, and made such preparations for action as their difficult situation and the nature of their plan allowed. When all was nearly ready, Nicias, perceiving that his men were depressed by their severe defeat at sea, which was so new an experience to them, while at the same time the want of provisions made them impatient to risk a battle with the least possible delay, called the whole army together, and before they engaged exhorted them as follows:

[61] ‘Soldiers of Athens and of our allies, we have all the same interest in the coming struggle; every one of us as well as of our enemies will now have to fight for his life and for his country, and if only we can win in the impending sea-fight, every one may see his native city and his own home once more. But we must not be faint-hearted, nor behave as if we were mere novices in the art of war, who when

defeated in their first battle are full of cowardly apprehensions and continually retain the impress of their disaster. You, Athenians, have had great military experience; and you, allies, are always fighting at our side. Remember the sudden turns of war; let your hope be that fortune herself may yet come over to us; and prepare to retrieve your defeat in a manner worthy of the greatness of your own army which you see before you.

[62] ‘We have consulted the pilots about any improvements which seemed likely to avail against the crowding of ships in the narrow harbour, as well as against the force on the enemy’s decks, which in previous engagements did us so much harm, and we have adopted them as far as we had the means. Many archers and javelin-men will embark, and a great number of other troops, whom if we were going to fight in the open sea we should not employ because they increase the weight of the ships, and therefore impede our skill; but here, where we are obliged to fight a land-battle on ship-board, they will be useful. We have thought of all the changes which are necessary in the construction of our ships, and in order to counteract the thickness of the beams on the enemy’s prows, for this did us more mischief than anything else, we have provided iron grapnels, which will prevent any ship striking us from getting off if the marines are quick and do their duty. For, as I tell you, we are positively driven to fight a land-battle on ship-board, and our best plan is neither to back water ourselves nor to allow the enemy to back water after we have once closed with him. Recollect that the shore, except so far as our land-forces extend, is in their hands.

[63] ‘Knowing all this, you must fight to the last with all your strength, and not be driven ashore. When ship strikes ship, refuse to separate until you have swept the enemy’s heavy-armed from their decks. I am speaking to the hoplites rather than to the sailors; for this is the special duty of the men on deck. We may still reckon on the superiority of our infantry.

The sailors I would exhort, nay I would implore them, not to be paralysed by their disasters; for they will find the arrangements on deck improved, and the numbers of the fleet increased. Some among you have long been deemed Athenians, though they are not; and to them I say, Consider how precious is that privilege, and how worthy to be defended. You were admired in Hellas because you spoke our language and adopted our manners, and you shared equally with ourselves in the substantial advantages of our empire, while you gained even more than we by the dread which you inspired in subject-states and in your security against wrong. You alone have been free partners in that empire; you ought not to betray it now. And so, despising the Corinthians whom you have beaten again and again, and the Sicilians who never dared to withstand us when our fleet was in its prime, repel your enemies, and show that your skill even amid weakness and disaster is superior to the strength of another in the hour of his success.

[64] ‘Let me appeal once more to you who are Athenians, and remind you that there are no more ships like these in the dockyards of the Piraeus, and that you have no more young men fit for service. In any event but victory your enemies here will instantly sail against Athens, while our countrymen at home, who are but a remnant, will be unable to defend themselves against the attacks of their former foes reinforced by the new invaders. You who are in Sicily will instantly fall into the hands of the Syracusans (and you know how you meant to deal with them), and your friends at Athens into the hands of the Lacedaemonians. In this one struggle you have to fight for yourselves and them. Stand firm therefore now, if ever, and remember one and all of you who are embarking that you are both the fleet and army of your country, and that on you hangs the whole state and the great name of Athens: for her sake if any man exceed another in skill or courage let him display them now; he will

never have a better opportunity of doing good to himself and saving his country.’

[65] Nicias, as soon as he had done speaking, gave orders to man the ships. Gylippus and the Syracusans could see clearly enough from the preparations which the Athenians were making that they were going to fight. But they had also previous notice, and had been told of the iron grapnels; and they took precautions against this as against all the other devices of the Athenians. They covered the prows of their vessels with hides, extending a good way along the upper part of their sides, so that the grapnels might slip and find no hold. When all was ready, Gylippus and the other generals exhorted their men in the following words:

[66] ‘That our actions so far have been glorious, and that in the coming conflict we shall be fighting for a glorious prize, most of you, Syracusans and allies, seem to be aware: what else would have inspired you with so much energy? But if any one has failed to understand our position, we will enlighten him. The Athenians came hither intending to enslave first of all Sicily, and then, if they succeeded, Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas, they having already the largest dominion of any Hellenic power, past or present. But you set mankind the example of withstanding that invincible navy; which you have now defeated in several engagements at sea, and which you will probably defeat in this. For when men are crippled in what they assume to be their strength, any vestige of self-respect is more completely lost than if they had never believed in themselves at all. When once their pride has had a fall they throw away the power of resistance which they might still exert. And this we may assume to be the condition of the Athenians.

[67] ‘Far otherwise is it with us. The natural courage, which even in the days of our inexperience dared to risk all, is now better assured, and when we have the further conviction that he is the strongest who has overcome the strongest, the hopes of every one are redoubled. And in all enterprises the

highest hopes infuse the greatest courage. Their imitation of our modes of fighting will be useless to them. To us they come naturally, and we shall readily adapt ourselves to any arrangements of ours which they have borrowed. But to them the employment of troops on deck is a novelty; they will be encumbered with crowds of hoplites and crowds of javelin-men, Acarnanians and others, who are mere awkward landsmen put into a ship, and will not even know how to discharge their darts when they are required to keep their places. Will they not make the ships unsteady? And their own movements will be so unnatural to them that they will all fall into utter confusion. The greater number of the enemy's ships will be the reverse of an advantage to him, should any of you fear your inequality in that respect; for a large fleet confined in a small space will be hampered in action and far more likely to suffer from our devices. And I would have you know what I believe on the best authority to be the simple truth. Their misfortunes paralyse them, and they are driven to despair at finding themselves helpless. They have grown reckless, and have no confidence in their own plans. They will take their chance as best they can, and either force a way out to sea, or in the last resort retreat by land; for they know that they cannot in any case be worse off than they are.

[68] 'Against such disorder, and against hateful enemies whose good fortune has run away from them to us, let us advance with fury. We should remember in the first place that men are doing a most lawful act when they take vengeance upon an enemy and an aggressor, and that they have a right to satiate their heart's animosity; secondly, that this vengeance, which is proverbially the sweetest of all things, will soon be within our grasp. I need not tell you that they are our enemies, and our worst enemies. They came against our land that they might enslave us, and if they had succeeded they would have inflicted the greatest sufferings on our men, and the worst indignities upon our wives and

children; and would have stamped a name of dishonour upon our whole city. Wherefore let no one’s heart be softened towards them. Do not congratulate yourselves at the mere prospect of getting safely rid of them. Even if they conquer they can only depart. But supposing that we obtain, as we most likely shall, the fulness of our desires, in the punishment of the Athenians and in the confirmation to Sicily of the liberties which she now enjoys, how glorious will be our prize! Seldom are men exposed to hazards in which they lose little if they fail, and win all if they succeed.’

[69] When Gylippus and the other Syracusan generals had, like Nicias, encouraged their troops, perceiving the Athenians to be manning their ships, they presently did the same. Nicias, overwhelmed by the situation, and seeing how great and how near the peril was (for the ships were on the very point of rowing out), feeling too, as men do on the eve of a great struggle, that all which he had done was nothing, and that he had not said half enough, again addressed the trierarchs, and calling each of them by his father’s name, and his own name, and the name of his tribe, he entreated those who had made any reputation for themselves not to be false to it, and those whose ancestors were eminent not to tarnish their hereditary fame. He reminded them that they were the inhabitants of the freest country in the world, and how in Athens there was no interference with the daily life of any man. He spoke to them of their wives and children and their fathers’ Gods, as men will at such a time; for then they do not care whether their common-place phrases seem to be out of date or not, but loudly reiterate the old appeals, believing that they may be of some service at the awful moment. When he thought that he had exhorted them, not enough, but as much as the scanty time allowed, he retired, and led the land-forces to the shore, extending the line as far as he could, so that they might be of the greatest use in encouraging the combatants on board ship. Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who had gone on board the

Athenian fleet to take the command, now quitted their own station, and proceeded straight to the closed mouth of the harbour, intending to force their way to the open sea where a passage was still left.

[70] The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with nearly the same number of ships as before. A detachment of them guarded the entrance of the harbour; the remainder were disposed all round it in such a manner that they might fall on the Athenians from every side at once, and that their land-forces might at the same time be able to co-operate wherever the ships retreated to the shore. Sicanus and Agatharchus commanded the Syracusan fleet, each of them a wing; Python and the Corinthians occupied the centre. When the Athenians approached the closed mouth of the harbour the violence of their onset overpowered the ships which were stationed there; they then attempted to loosen the fastenings. Whereupon from all sides the Syracusans and their allies came bearing down upon them, and the conflict was no longer confined to the entrance, but extended throughout the harbour. No previous engagement had been so fierce and obstinate. Great was the eagerness with which the rowers on both sides rushed upon their enemies whenever the word of command was given; and keen was the contest between the pilots as they manoeuvred one against another. The marines too were full of anxiety that, when ship struck ship, the service on deck should not fall short of the rest; every one in the place assigned to him was eager to be foremost among his fellows. Many vessels meeting — and never did so many fight in so small a space, for the two fleets together amounted to nearly two hundred — they were seldom able to strike in the regular manner, because they had no opportunity of first retiring or breaking the line; they generally fouled one another as ship dashed against ship in the hurry of flight or pursuit. All the time that another vessel was bearing down, the men on deck poured showers of javelins and arrows and

stones upon the enemy; and when the two closed, the marines fought hand to hand, and endeavoured to board. In many places, owing to the want of room, they who had struck another found that they were struck themselves; often two or even more vessels were unavoidably entangled about one, and the pilots had to make plans of attack and defence, not against one adversary only, but against several coming from different sides. The crash of so many ships dashing against one another took away the wits of the crews, and made it impossible to hear the boatswains, whose voices in both fleets rose high, as they gave directions to the rowers, or cheered them on in the excitement of the struggle. On the Athenian side they were shouting to their men that they must force a passage and seize the opportunity now or never of returning in safety to their native land. To the Syracusans and their allies was represented the glory of preventing the escape of their enemies, and of a victory by which every man would exalt the honour of his own city. The commanders too, when they saw any ship backing without necessity, would call the captain by his name, and ask, of the Athenians, whether they were retreating because they expected to be more at home upon the land of their bitterest foes than upon that sea which had been their own so long; on the Syracusan side, whether, when they knew perfectly well that the Athenians were only eager to find some means of flight, they would themselves fly from the fugitives.

[71] While the naval engagement hung in the balance the two armies on shore had great trial and conflict of soul. The Sicilian soldier was animated by the hope of increasing the glory which he had already won, while the invader was tormented by the fear that his fortunes might sink lower still. The last chance of the Athenians lay in their ships, and their anxiety was dreadful. The fortune of the battle varied; and it was not possible that the spectators on the shore should all receive the same impression of it. Being quite close and

having different points of view, they would some of them see their own ships victorious; their courage would then revive, and they would earnestly call upon the Gods not to take from them their hope of deliverance. But others, who saw their ships worsted, cried and shrieked aloud, and were by the sight alone more utterly unnerved than the defeated combatants themselves. Others again, who had fixed their gaze on some part of the struggle which was undecided, were in a state of excitement still more terrible; they kept swaying their bodies to and fro in an agony of hope and fear as the stubborn conflict went on and on; for at every instant they were all but saved or all but lost. And while the strife hung in the balance you might hear in the Athenian army at once lamentation, shouting, cries of victory or defeat, and all the various sounds which are wrung from a great host in extremity of danger. Not less agonising were the feelings of those on board. At length the Syracusans and their allies, after a protracted struggle, put the Athenians to flight, and triumphantly bearing down upon them, and encouraging one another with loud cries and exhortations, drove them to land. Then that part of the navy which had not been taken in the deep water fell back in confusion to the shore, and the crews rushed out of the ships into the camp. And the land-forces, no longer now divided in feeling, but uttering one universal groan of intolerable anguish, ran, some of them to save the ships, others to defend what remained of the wall; but the greater number began to look to themselves and to their own safety. Never had there been a greater panic in an Athenian army than at that moment. They now suffered what they had done to others at Pylos. For at Pylos the Lacedaemonians, when they saw their ships destroyed, knew that their friends who had crossed over into the island of Sphacteria were lost with them. And so now the Athenians, after the rout of their fleet, knew that they had no hope of saving themselves by land unless events took some extraordinary turn.

[72] Thus, after a fierce battle and a great destruction of ships and men on both sides, the Syracusans and their allies gained the victory. They gathered up the wrecks and bodies of the dead, and sailing back to the city, erected a trophy. The Athenians, overwhelmed by their misery, never so much as thought of recovering their wrecks or of asking leave to collect their dead. Their intention was to retreat that very night. Demosthenes came to Nicias and proposed that they should once more man their remaining vessels and endeavour to force the passage at daybreak, saying that they had more ships fit for service than the enemy. For the Athenian fleet still numbered sixty, but the enemy had less than fifty. Nicias approved of his proposal, and they would have manned the ships, but the sailors refused to embark; for they were paralysed by their defeat, and had no longer any hope of succeeding. So the Athenians all made up their minds to escape by land.

[73] Hermocrates the Syracusan suspected their intention, and dreading what might happen if their vast army, retreating by land and settling somewhere in Sicily, should choose to renew the war, he went to the authorities, and represented to them that they ought not to allow the Athenians to withdraw by night (mentioning his own suspicion of their intentions), but that all the Syracusans and their allies should go out in advance, wall up the roads, and occupy the passes with a guard. They thought very much as he did, and wanted to carry out his plan, but doubted whether their men, who were too glad to repose after a great battle, and in time of festival — for there happened on that very day to be a sacrifice to Heracles — could be induced to obey. Most of them, in the exultation of victory, were drinking and keeping holiday, and at such a time how could they ever be expected to take up arms and go forth at the order of the generals? On these grounds the authorities decided that the thing was impossible. Whereupon Hermocrates himself, fearing lest the Athenians

should gain a start and quietly pass the most difficult places in the night, contrived the following plan: when it was growing dark he sent certain of his own acquaintance, accompanied by a few horsemen, to the Athenian camp. They rode up within earshot, and pretending to be friends (there were known to be men in the city who gave information to Nicias of what went on) called to some of the soldiers, and bade them tell him not to withdraw his army during the night, for the Syracusans were guarding the roads; he should make preparation at leisure and retire by day. Having delivered their message they departed, and those who had heard them informed the Athenian generals.

[74] On receiving this message, which they supposed to be genuine, they remained during the night. And having once given up the intention of starting immediately, they decided to remain during the next day, that the soldiers might, as well as they could, put together their baggage in the most convenient form, and depart, taking with them the bare necessaries of life, but nothing else.

Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus, going forth before them with their land-forces, blocked the roads in the country by which the Athenians were likely to pass, guarded the fords of the rivers and streams, and posted themselves at the best points for receiving and stopping them. Their sailors rowed up to the beach and dragged away the Athenian ships. The Athenians themselves had burnt a few of them, as they had intended, but the rest the Syracusans towed away, unmolested and at their leisure, from the places where they had severally run aground, and conveyed them to the city.

[75] On the third day after the sea-fight, when Nicias and Demosthenes thought that their preparations were complete, the army began to move. They were in a dreadful condition; not only was there the great fact that they had lost their whole fleet, and instead of their expected triumph had brought the utmost peril upon Athens as well as upon

themselves, but also the sights which presented themselves as they quitted the camp were painful to every eye and mind. The dead were unburied, and when any one saw the body of a friend lying on the ground he was smitten with sorrow and dread, while the sick or wounded who still survived but had to be left were even a greater trial to the living, and more to be pitied than those who were gone. Their prayers and lamentations drove their companions to distraction; they would beg that they might be taken with them, and call by name any friend or relation whom they saw passing; they would hang upon their departing comrades and follow as far as they could, and, when their limbs and strength failed them, and they dropped behind, many were the imprecations and cries which they uttered. So that the whole army was in tears, and such was their despair that they could hardly make up their minds to stir, although they were leaving an enemy’s country, having suffered calamities too great for tears already, and dreading miseries yet greater, in the unknown future. There was also a general feeling of shame and self-reproach, — indeed they seemed, not like an army, but like the fugitive population of a city captured after a siege; and of a great city too. For the whole multitude who were marching together numbered not less than forty thousand. Each of them took with him anything he could carry which was likely to be of use. Even the heavy-armed and cavalry, contrary to their practice when under arms, conveyed about their persons their own food, some because they had no attendants, others because they could not trust them; for they had long been deserting, and most of them had gone off all at once. Nor was the food which they carried sufficient; for the supplies of the camp had failed. Their disgrace and the universality of the misery, although there might be some consolation in the very community of suffering, were nevertheless at that moment hard to bear, especially when they remembered from what pride and splendour they had fallen into their present low

estate. Never had an Hellenic army experienced such a reverse. They had come intending to enslave others, and they were going away in fear that they would be themselves enslaved. Instead of the prayers and hymns with which they had put to sea, they were now departing amid appeals to heaven of another sort. They were no longer sailors but landsmen, depending, not upon their fleet, but upon their infantry. Yet in face of the great danger which still threatened them all these things appeared endurable.

[76] Nicias, seeing the army disheartened at their terrible fall, went along the ranks and encouraged and consoled them as well as he could. In his fervour he raised his voice as he passed from one to another and spoke louder and louder, desiring that the benefit of his words might reach as far as possible.

[77] ‘Even now, Athenians and allies, we must hope: men have been delivered out of worse straits than these, and I would not have you judge yourselves too severely on account either of the reverses which you have sustained or of your present undeserved miseries. I too am as weak as any of you; for I am quite prostrated by my disease, as you see. And although there was a time when I might have been thought equal to the best of you in the happiness of my private and public life, I am now in as great danger, and as much at the mercy of fortune, as the meanest. Yet my days have been passed in the performance of many a religious duty, and of many a just and blameless action. Therefore my hope of the future is still courageous, and our calamities do not appal me as they might. Who knows that they may not be lightened? For our enemies have had their full share of success, and if we were under the jealousy of any God when our fleet started, by this time we have been punished enough. Others ere now have attacked their neighbours; they have done as men will do, and suffered what men can bear. We may therefore begin to hope that the Gods will be more merciful to us; for we now invite their pity rather than

their jealousy. And look at your own well-armed ranks; see how many brave soldiers you are, marching in solid array, and do not be dismayed; bear in mind that wherever you plant yourselves you are a city already, and that no city in Sicily will find it easy to resist your attack, or can dislodge you if you choose to settle. Provide for the safety and good order of your own march, and remember every one of you that on whatever spot a man is compelled to fight, there if he conquer he may find a native land and a fortress. We must press forward day and night, for our supplies are but scanty. The Sicels through fear of the Syracusans still adhere to us, and if we can only reach any part of their territory we shall be among friends, and you may consider yourselves secure. We have sent to them, and they have been told to meet us and bring food. In a word, soldiers, let me tell you that you must be brave; there is no place near to which a coward can fly. And if you now escape your enemies, those of you who are not Athenians will see once more the home for which they long, while you Athenians will again rear aloft the fallen greatness of Athens. For men, and not walls or ships in which are no men, constitute a state.’

[78] Thus exhorting his troops Nicias passed through the army, and wherever he saw gaps in the ranks or the men dropping out of line, he brought them back to their proper place. Demosthenes did the same for the troops under his command, and gave them similar exhortations. The army marched disposed in a hollow oblong: the division of Nicias leading, and that of Demosthenes following; the hoplites enclosed within their ranks the baggage-bearers and the rest of the host. When they arrived at the ford of the river Anapus they found a force of the Syracusans and of their allies drawn up to meet them; these they put to flight, and getting command of the ford, proceeded on their march. The Syracusans continually harassed them, the cavalry riding alongside, and the light-armed troops hurling darts at them. On this day the Athenians proceeded about four and a half

miles and encamped at a hill. On the next day they started early, and, having advanced more than two miles, descended into a level plain, and encamped. The country was inhabited, and they were desirous of obtaining food from the houses, and also water which they might carry with them, as there was little to be had for many miles in the country which lay before them. Meanwhile the Syracusans had gone forward, and at a point where the road ascends a steep hill called the Acraean height, and there is a precipitous ravine on either side, were blocking up the pass by a wall. On the next day the Athenians advanced, although again impeded by the numbers of the enemy's cavalry who rode alongside, and of their javelin-men who threw darts at them. For a long time the Athenians maintained the struggle, but at last retired to their own encampment. Their supplies were now cut off, because the horsemen circumscribed their movements.

[79] In the morning they started early and resumed their march. They pressed onwards to the hill where the way was barred, and found in front of them the Syracusan infantry drawn up to defend the wall, in deep array, for the pass was narrow. Whereupon the Athenians advanced and assaulted the barrier, but the enemy, who were numerous and had the advantage of position, threw missiles upon them from the hill, which was steep, and so, not being able to force their way, they again retired and rested. During the conflict, as is often the case in the fall of the year, there came on a storm of rain and thunder, whereby the Athenians were yet more disheartened, for they thought that everything was conspiring to their destruction. While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans despatched a division of their army to raise a wall behind them across the road by which they had come; but the Athenians sent some of their own troops and frustrated their intention. They then retired with their whole army in the direction of the plain and passed the night. On the following day they again advanced. The

Syracusans now surrounded and attacked them on every side, and wounded many of them. If the Athenians advanced they retreated, but charged them when they retired, falling especially upon the hindermost of them, in the hope that, if they could put to flight a few at a time, they might strike a panic into the whole army. In this fashion the Athenians struggled on for a long time, and having advanced about three-quarters of a mile rested in the plain. The Syracusans then left them and returned to their own encampment.

[80] The army was now in a miserable plight, being in want of every necessary; and by the continual assaults of the enemy great numbers of the soldiers had been wounded. Nicias and Demosthenes, perceiving their condition, resolved during the night to light as many watch-fires as possible and to lead off their forces. They intended to take another route and march towards the sea in the direction opposite to that from which the Syracusans were watching them. Now their whole line of march lay, not towards Catana, but towards the other side of Sicily, in the direction of Camarina and Gela, and the cities, Hellenic or Barbarian, of that region. So they lighted numerous fires and departed in the night. And then, as constantly happens in armies, especially in very great ones, and as might be expected when they were marching by night in an enemy’s country, and with the enemy from whom they were flying not far off; there arose a panic among them, and they fell into confusion. The army of Nicias, which was leading the way, kept together, and got on considerably in advance, but that of Demosthenes; which was the larger half, was severed from the other division, and marched in worse order. At daybreak, however, they succeeded in reaching the sea, and striking into the Helorine road marched along it, intending as soon as they arrived at the Cacyparis to follow up the course of the river through the interior of the island. They were expecting that the Sicels for whom they had sent would meet them on this road. When they had reached the

river they found there also a guard of the Syracusans cutting off the passage by a wall and palisade. They forced their way through and, crossing the river, passed on towards another river which is called the Erineus, this being the direction in which their guides led them.

[81] When daylight broke and the Syracusans and their allies saw that the Athenians had departed, most of them thought that Gylippus had let them go on purpose, and were very angry with him. They easily found the line of their retreat, and quickly following, came up with them about the time of the midday meal. The troops of Demosthenes were last; they were marching slowly and in disorder, not having recovered from the panic of the previous night, when they were overtaken by the Syracusans, who immediately fell upon them and fought. Separated as they were from the others, they were easily hemmed in by the Syracusan cavalry and driven into a narrow space. The division of Nicias was now as much as six miles in advance, for he marched faster, thinking that their safety depended at such a time, not in remaining and fighting, if they could avoid it, but in retreating as quickly as they could, and resisting only when they were positively compelled. Demosthenes, on the other hand, who had been more incessantly harassed throughout the retreat, because marching last he was first attacked by the enemy, now, when he saw the Syracusans pursuing him, instead of pressing onward, ranged his army in order of battle. Thus lingering he was surrounded, and he and the Athenians under his command were in the greatest confusion. For they were crushed into a walled enclosure, having a road on both sides and planted thickly with olive-trees, and missiles were hurled at them from all points. The Syracusans naturally preferred this mode of attack to a regular engagement. For to risk themselves against desperate men would have been only playing into the hands of the Athenians. Moreover, every one was sparing of his life; their good fortune was already assured; and they did not want to fall in the hour of victory. Even by this irregular mode of fighting they thought that they could overpower and capture the Athenians.

[82] And so when they had gone on all day assailing them with missiles from every quarter, and saw that they were

quite worn out with their wounds and all their other sufferings, Gylippus and the Syracusans made a proclamation, first of all to the islanders; that any of them who pleased might come over to them and have their freedom. But only a few cities accepted the offer. At length an agreement was made for the entire force under Demosthenes. Their arms were to be surrendered, but no one was to suffer death, either from violence or from imprisonment, or from want of the bare means of life. So they all surrendered, being in number six thousand, and gave up what money they had. This they threw into the hollows of shields and filled four. The captives were at once taken to the city. On the same day Nicias and his division reached the river Erineus, which he crossed, and halted his army on a rising ground.

[83] On the following day he was overtaken by the Syracusans, who told him that Demosthenes had surrendered, and bade him do the same. He, not believing them, procured a truce while he sent a horseman to go and see. Upon the return of the horseman bringing assurance of the fact, he sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans, saying that he would agree, on behalf of the Athenian state, to pay the expenses which the Syracusans had incurred in the war, on condition that they should let his army go; until the money was paid he would give Athenian citizens as hostages, a man for a talent. Gylippus and the Syracusans would not accept these proposals, but attacked and surrounded this division of the army as they had the other, and hurled missiles at them from every side until the evening. They too were grievously in want of food and necessaries. Nevertheless they meant to wait for the dead of the night and then to proceed. They were just resuming their arms, when the Syracusans discovered them and raised the Paean. The Athenians, perceiving that they were detected, laid down their arms again, with the exception of about

three hundred men who broke through the enemy’s guard, and made their escape in the darkness as best they could.

[84] When the day dawned Nicias led forward his army, and the Syracusans and the allies again assailed them on every side, hurling javelins and other missiles at them. The Athenians hurried on to the river Assinarus. They hoped to gain a little relief if they forded the river, for the mass of horsemen and other troops overwhelmed and crushed them; and they were worn out by fatigue and thirst. But no sooner did they reach the water than they lost all order and rushed in; every man was trying to cross first, and, the enemy pressing upon them at the same time, the passage of the river became hopeless. Being compelled to keep close together they fell one upon another, and trampled each other under foot: some at once perished, pierced by their own spears; others got entangled in the baggage and were carried down the stream. The Syracusans stood upon the further bank of the river, which was steep, and hurled missiles from above on the Athenians, who were huddled together in the deep bed of the stream and for the most part were drinking greedily. The Peloponnesians came down the bank and slaughtered them, falling chiefly upon those who were in the river. Whereupon the water at once became foul, but was drunk all the same, although muddy and dyed with blood, and the crowd fought for it.

[85] At last, when the dead bodies were lying in heaps upon one another in the water and the army was utterly undone, some perishing in the river, and any who escaped being cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered to Gylippus, in whom he had more confidence than in the Syracusans. He entreated him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they pleased with himself, but not to go on killing the men. So Gylippus gave the word to make prisoners. Thereupon the survivors, not including however a large number whom the soldiers concealed, were brought in alive. As for the three hundred who had broken through the guard in the night, the

Syracusans sent in pursuit and seized them. The total of the public prisoners when collected was not great; for many were appropriated by the soldiers, and the whole of Sicily was full of them, they not having capitulated like the troops under Demosthenes. A large number also perished; the slaughter at the river being very great, quite as great as any which took place in the Sicilian war; and not a few had fallen in the frequent attacks which were made upon the Athenians during their march. Still many escaped, some at the time, others ran away after an interval of slavery, and all these found refuge at Catana.

[86] The Syracusans and their allies collected their forces and returned with the spoil, and as many prisoners as they could take with them, into the city. The captive Athenians and allies they deposited in the quarries, which they thought would be the safest place of confinement. Nicias and Demosthenes they put to the sword, although against the will of Gylippus. For Gylippus thought that to carry home with him to Lacedaemon the generals of the enemy, over and above all his other successes, would be a brilliant triumph. One of them, Demosthenes, happened to be the greatest foe, and the other the greatest friend of the Lacedaemonians, both in the same matter of Pylos and Sphacteria. For Nicias had taken up their cause, and had persuaded the Athenians to make the peace which set at liberty the prisoners taken in the island. The Lacedaemonians were grateful to him for the service, and this was the main reason why he trusted Gylippus and surrendered himself to him. But certain Syracusans, who had been in communication with him, were afraid (such was the report) that on some suspicion of their guilt he might be put to the torture and bring trouble on them in the hour of their prosperity. Others, and especially the Corinthians, feared that, being rich, he might by bribery escape and do them further mischief. So the Syracusans gained the consent of the allies and had him executed. For these or the like

reasons he suffered death. No one of the Hellenes in my time was less deserving of so miserable an end; for he lived in the practice of every virtue.

[87] Those who were imprisoned in the quarries were at the beginning of their captivity harshly treated by the Syracusans. There were great numbers of them, and they were crowded in a deep and narrow place. At first the sun by day was still scorching and suffocating, for they had no roof over their heads, while the autumn nights were cold, and the extremes of temperature engendered violent disorders. Being cramped for room they had to do everything on the same spot. The corpses of those who died from their wounds, exposure to heat and cold, and the like, lay heaped one upon another. The smells were intolerable; and they were at the same time afflicted by hunger and thirst. During eight months they were allowed only about half a pint of water and a pint of food a day. Every kind of misery which could befall man in such a place befell them. This was the condition of all the captives for about ten weeks. At length the Syracusans sold them, with the exception of the Athenians and of any Sicilian or Italian Greeks who had sided with them in the war. The whole number of the public prisoners is not accurately known, but they were not less than seven thousand.

Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this war, or indeed, as I think, of all Hellenic actions which are on record, this was the greatest — the most glorious to the victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished ; for they were utterly and at all points defeated, and their sufferings were prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth; nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home.

Thus ended the Sicilian expedition.

BOOK VIII

[1] THE news was brought to Athens, but the Athenians could not believe that the armament had been so completely annihilated, although they had the positive assurances of the very soldiers who had escaped from the scene of action. At last they knew the truth; and then they were furious with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition — as if they had not voted it themselves — and with the soothsayers, and prophets, and all who by the influence of religion had at the time inspired them with the belief that they would conquer Sicily. Whichever way they looked there was trouble; they were overwhelmed by their calamity, and were in fear and consternation unutterable. The citizens and the city were alike distressed; they had lost a host of cavalry and hoplites and the flower of their youth, and there were none to replace them. And when they saw an insufficient number of ships in their docks, and no crews to man them, nor money in the treasury, they despaired of deliverance. They had no doubt that their enemies in Sicily, after the great victory which they had already gained, would at once sail against the Piraeus. Their enemies in Hellas, whose resources were now doubled, would likewise set upon them with all their might both by sea and land, and would be assisted by their own revolted allies. Still they determined, so far as their situation allowed, not to give way. They would procure timber and money by whatever means they might, and build a navy. They would make sure of their allies, and above all of Euboea. Expenses in the city were to be economised, and they were to choose a council of the elder men, who should advise together, and lay before the people the measures which from time to time might be required. After the manner of a democracy, they were very amenable to discipline while their fright lasted. They

proceeded to carry out these resolutions. And so the summer ended.

[2] During the following winter all Hellas was stirred by the great overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily. The states which had been neutral determined that the time had come when, invited or not, they could no longer stand aloof from the war; they must of their own accord attack the Athenians. They considered, one and all, that if the Sicilian expedition had succeeded, they would sooner or later have been attacked by them. The war would not last long, and they might as well share in the glory of it. The Lacedaemonian allies, animated by a common feeling, were more eager than ever to make a speedy end of their great hardships. But none showed greater alacrity than the subjects of the Athenians, who were everywhere willing even beyond their power to revolt; for they judged by their excited feelings, and would not admit a possibility that the Athenians could survive another summer. To the Lacedaemonians themselves all this was most encouraging; and they had in addition the prospect that their allies from Sicily would join them at the beginning of spring with a large force of ships as well as men; necessity having at last compelled them to become a naval power. Everything looked hopeful, and they determined to strike promptly and vigorously. They considered that by the successful termination of the war they would be finally delivered from dangers such as would have surrounded them if the Athenians had become masters of Sicily. Athens once overthrown, they might assure to themselves the undisputed leadership of all Hellas.

[3] At the beginning therefore of this winter, Agis the Lacedaemonian king led out a body of troops from Decelea, and collected from the allies contributions towards the expenses of a navy. Then passing to the Malian Gulf he carried off from the Oetaeans, who were old enemies, the greater part of their cattle, and exacted money of them; from the Achaeans of Phthia, and from the other tribes in

that region, without the leave and in spite of the remonstrance of the Thessalians, to whom they were subject, he likewise extorted money and took some hostages, whom he deposited at Corinth, and tried to force upon them the Lacedaemonian alliance. The whole number of ships which the allies were to build was fixed by the Lacedaemonians at a hundred: twenty-five were to be built by themselves and twenty-five by the Boeotians, fifteen by the Phocians and Locrians, fifteen by the Corinthians, ten by the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians, ten by the Megarians, Troezenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians. Every sort of preparation was made, for the Lacedaemonians were determined to prosecute the war at the first appearance of spring.

[4] The Athenians also carried out their intended preparations during this winter. They collected timber and built ships; they fortified Sunium for the protection of their corn-ships on the voyage round to Athens; also they abandoned the fort in Laconia which they had erected while sailing to Sicily, and cut down any expenses which seemed unnecessary. Above all, they kept strict watch over their allies, apprehending revolt.

[5] During the same winter, while both parties were as intent upon their preparations as if the war were only just beginning, first among the Athenian subjects the Euboeans sent envoys to negotiate with Agis. Agis accepted their proposals, and summoned from Lacedaemon Alcamenes the son of Sthenelaidas, and Melanthus, that they might take the command in Euboea. They came, accompanied by three hundred of the Neodamodes. But while he was making ready to convey them across the strait, there arrived envoys from Lesbos, which was likewise anxious to revolt; and as the Boeotians were in their interest, Agis was persuaded to defer the expedition to Euboea while he prepared to assist the Lesbians. He appointed Alcamenes, who had been designed for Euboea, their governor; and he further promised them

ten ships, the Boeotians promising ten more. All this was done without the authority of the Lacedaemonian government; for Agis, while he was with his army at Decelea, had the right to send troops whithersoever he pleased, to raise levies, and to exact money. And at that particular time he might be said to have far more influence over the allies than the Lacedaemonians at home, for he had an army at his disposal, and might appear in formidable strength anywhere at any time.

While he was supporting the Lesbians, certain Chians and Erythraeans (who were also ready to revolt) had recourse, not to Agis, but to Lacedaemon; they were accompanied by an envoy from Tissaphernes, whom King Darius the son of Artaxerxes had appointed to be military governor of the provinces on the coast of Asia. Tissaphernes too was inviting the assistance of the Lacedaemonians, and promised to maintain their troops; for the King had quite lately been demanding of him the revenues due from the Hellenic cities in his province, which he had been prevented by the Athenians from collecting, and therefore still owed. He thought that if he could weaken the Athenians he would be more likely to get his tribute; he hoped also to make the Lacedaemonians allies of the King, and by their help either to slay or take alive, in accordance with the King’s orders, Amorges the natural son of Pissuthnes, who had revolted in Caria.

[6] While the Chians and Tissaphernes were pursuing their common object, Calligitus the son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both exiles from their own country, who were residing at the court of Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, came to Lacedaemon. They had been commissioned by Pharnabazus to bring up a fleet to the Hellespont; like Tissaphernes he was anxious, if possible, to induce the cities in his province to revolt from the Athenians, that he might obtain the tribute from them; and he wanted the alliance between the Lacedaemonians

and the King to come from himself. The two parties — that is to say, the envoys of Pharnabazus and those of Tissaphernes — were acting independently; and a vehement contest arose at Lacedaemon, the one party urging the Lacedaemonians to send a fleet and army to Ionia and Chios, the other to begin with the Hellespont. They were themselves far more favourable to the proposals of the Chians and Tissaphernes; for Alcibiades was in their interest, and he was a great hereditary friend of Endius, one of the Ephors of that year. — Through this friendship the Lacedaemonian name of Alcibiades had come into his family; for Alcibiades was the name of Endius' father, — Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians, before giving an answer, sent a commissioner, Phrynis, one of their Perioeci, to see whether the Chians had as many ships as they said, and whether the power of the city was equal to her reputation. He reported that what they had heard was true. Whereupon they at once made alliance with the Chians and Erythraeans and voted them forty ships — there being at Chios already, as the Chians informed them, no less than sixty. Of the forty ships they at first intended to send out ten themselves under the command of Melancridas their admiral; but an earthquake occurred; so instead of Melancridas they appointed Chalcideus, and instead of the ten ships they prepared to send five only, which they equipped in Laconia. So the winter ended, and with it the nineteenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

[7] At the beginning of the next summer the Chians were eager to get the fleet sent off at once. For their proposals, like those of the other allies, had been made secretly, and they were afraid that the Athenians would detect them. Thereupon the Lacedaemomans sent to Corinth three Spartans, who were to give orders that the ships then lying at the Isthmus should be as quickly as possible dragged over from the Corinthian gulf to the coast on the other side. They were all to be despatched to Chios, including the ships

which Agis had been equipping for Lesbos. The allied fleet then at the Isthmus numbered in all thirty-nine.

[8] Calligitus and Timagoras, who represented Pharnabazus, took no part in the expedition to Chios, nor did they offer to contribute towards the expenses of it the money which they had brought with them, amounting to twenty-five talents; they thought of sailing later with another expedition. Agis, when he saw that the Lacedaemonians were bent on going to Chios first, offered no opposition; so the allies held a conference at Corinth, and after some deliberation determined to sail, first of all to Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who was equipping the five ships in Laconia, then to proceed to Lesbos, under the command of Alcamenes, whom Agis had previously designed to appoint to that island, and finally to the Hellespont; for this last command they had selected Clearchus the son of Rhamphias. They resolved to carry over the Isthmus half the ships first; these were to sail at once, that the attention of the Athenians might be distracted between those which were starting and those which were to follow. They meant to sail quite openly, taking it for granted that the Athenians were powerless, since no navy of theirs worth speaking of had as yet appeared. In pursuance of their plans they conveyed twenty-one ships over the Isthmus.

[9] They were in a hurry to be off, but the Corinthians were unwilling to join them until the conclusion of the Isthmian games, which were then going on. Agis was prepared to respect their scruples and to take the responsibility of the expedition on himself. But the Corinthians would not agree to this proposal, and there was delay. In the meantime the Athenians began to discover the proceedings of the Chians, and despatched one of their generals, Aristocrates, to accuse them of treason. They denied the charge; whereupon he desired them to send back with him a few ships as a pledge of their fidelity to the alliance; and they sent seven. They could not refuse his request, for the Chian people were

ignorant of the whole matter, while the oligarchs, who were in the plot, did not want to break with the multitude until they had secured their ground. And the Peloponnesian ships had delayed so long that they had ceased to expect them.

[10] Meanwhile the Isthmian games were celebrated. The Athenians, to whom they had been formally notified, sent representatives to them; and now their eyes began to be opened to the designs of the Chians. On their return home they took immediate measures to prevent the enemy’s ships getting away from Cenchreae unperceived. When the games were over, the Peloponnesians, under the command of Alcamenes, with their twenty-one ships set sail for Chios; the Athenians, with an equal number, first sailed up to them and tried to draw them into the open sea. The Peloponnesians did not follow them far, but soon turned back to Cenchreae; the Athenians likewise retired, because they could not depend on the fidelity of the seven Chian ships which formed a part of their fleet. So they manned some more ships, making the whole number thirty-seven, and when the Peloponnesians resumed their voyage along the coast they pursued them into Piraeum, a lonely harbour, the last in the Corinthian territory before you reach Epidauria. One ship was lost by the Peloponnesians at sea, but they got the rest together and came to anchor in the harbour. Again the Athenians attacked them, not only on the water, but also after they had landed; there was a fierce struggle, but no regular engagement; most of the enemy’s ships were damaged by the Athenians on the beach, and their commander, Alcamenes, was slain. Some Athenians also fell.

[11] When the conflict was over, the conquerors left a sufficient number of ships to watch the enemy, and with the remainder they lay to under a little island not far off, where they encamped, and sent to Athens, requesting reinforcements. For on the day after the battle the Corinthians had come to assist the Peloponnesian ships, and the other inhabitants of the country quickly followed them.

Foreseeing how great would be the labour of keeping guard on so desolate a spot, the Peloponnesians knew not what to do; they even entertained the idea of burning their ships, but on second thoughts they determined to draw them high up on shore, and to keep guard over them with their land-forces stationed near, until some good opportunity of escape should occur. Agis was informed of their condition, and sent Thermon, a Spartan, to them. The first tidings which had reached Sparta were to the effect that the ships had left the Isthmus (the Ephors having told Alcamenes to send a horseman announcing the fact), and immediately they determined to send out the five ships of their own which they had ready, under the command of Chalcideus, who was to be accompanied by Alcibiades. But when they were on the point of departure, a second messenger reported that the other squadron had been chased into Piraeum; and then, disheartened by finding that they had begun the Ionian war with a failure, they determined to give up sending the ships from Laconia, and even to recall some others which had already sailed.

[12] Alcibiades, seeing the state of affairs, advised Endius and the Ephors to persevere in the expedition. They would arrive, he said, before the Chians had heard of the misadventure of the ships. He would himself, as soon as he reached Ionia, represent to the cities the weakness of the Athenians and the alacrity of the Lacedaemonians, and they would revolt at once; for they would believe him sooner than any one. To Endius he argued in private ‘that he would win honour if he were the instrument of effecting a revolt in Ionia, and of gaining the alliance of the King; he should not allow such a prize to fall into the hands of Agis’; — now Agis was a personal enemy of Alcibiades. His opinion prevailed with Endius and the other Ephors. So he put to sea with the five ships, accompanied by Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian, and hastened on his way.

[13] About this time sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had remained with Gylippus to the end of the Sicilian war were returning home. They were caught in the neighbourhood of Leucadia and roughly handled by twenty-seven Athenian vessels, under the command of Hippocles the son of Menippus, which were on the watch for ships coming from Sicily; but all except one of them escaped the Athenians and sailed into Corinth.

[14] Chalcideus and Alcibiades on their voyage seized every one whom they met in order that their coming might not be reported. They touched first at the promontory of Corycus on the mainland, and there releasing their prisoners they held a preliminary conference with certain of the Chians, who were in the plot, and who advised them to give no notice of their intention, but to sail at once to the city. So they appeared suddenly at Chios, to the great wonder and alarm of the people. The oligarchs had contrived that the council should be sitting at the time. Chalcideus and Alcibiades made speeches and announced that many more ships were on their way, but said nothing about the blockade of Piraeum. So Chios first, and afterwards Erythrae, revolted from Athens. They then sailed with three vessels to Clazomenae, which they induced to revolt. The Clazomenians at once crossed over to the mainland and fortified Polichnè, intending in case of need to retreat thither from the little island on which Clazomenae stands. All the revolted cities were occupied in raising fortifications and preparing for war.

[15] The news of the revolt of Chios soon reached Athens; and the Athenians realised at once the magnitude of the danger which now surrounded them. The greatest city of all had gone over to the enemy, and the rest of their allies were certain to rise. In the extremity of their alarm they abrogated the penalties denounced against any one who should propose or put to the vote the employment of the thousand talents which throughout the war they had hitherto jealously reserved. They now passed a decree permitting their use,

and resolved to man a large number of ships; also to send at once to Chios eight ships which had been keeping guard at Piraeum, and had gone away under the command of Strombichides the son of Diotimus in pursuit of Chalcideus, but not overtaking him had returned. Twelve other ships, under the command of Thrasycles, were to follow immediately; these too were to be taken from the blockading force. They also withdrew the seven Chian ships which were assisting them in the blockade of Piraeum; and setting free the slaves in them, put the freemen in chains. Other ships were then quickly manned by them and sent to take the place of all those which had been subtracted from the blockading squadron, and they proposed to equip thirty more. They were full of energy, and spared no effort for the recovery of Chios.

[16] Meanwhile Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos, and thence, taking with him an additional Saurian vessel, sailed to Teos and warned the inhabitants against revolt. But Chalcideus with twenty-three ships was on his way from Chios to Teos, intending to attack it; he was assisted by the land-forces of Clazomenae and Erythrae, which followed his movements on the shore. Strombichides saw him in time, and put out to sea before he arrived.

When fairly away from land he observed the superior numbers of the fleet coming from Chios, and fled towards Samos, pursued by the enemy. The land-forces were not at first received by the Teians, but after the flight of the Athenians they admitted them. The troops waited a little for the return of Chalcideus from the pursuit, but as he did not come they proceeded without him to demolish the fort which the Athenians had built for the protection of Teos on the land side. A few barbarians under the command of Stages, a lieutenant of Tissaphernes, came and joined in the work of demolition.

[17] Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides to Samos, gave heavy arms to the crews of

the ships which they had brought from Peloponnesus, and left them in Chios. Then, having manned their own vessels and twenty others with Chians, they sailed to Miletus, intending to raise a revolt. — For Alcibiades, who was on friendly terms with the principal Milesians, wanted to gain over the place before any more ships from Peloponnesus arrived, and, using the Chian troops and those of Chalcideus only, to spread revolt far and wide among the cities of Ionia. Thus he would gain the chief glory of the war for the Chians, for himself, for Chalcideus; and, in fulfilment of his promise, for Endius, who had sent him out. — They were not observed during the greater part of their voyage, and, although narrowly escaping from Strombichides, and from Thrasycles who had just arrived with twelve ships from Athens and had joined Strombichides in the pursuit, they succeeded in raising a revolt in Miletus. The Athenians followed close behind them with nineteen ships, but the Milesians would not receive them, and they came to anchor at Ladè, the island opposite the town. Immediately after the revolt of Miletus the Lacedaemonians made their first alliance with the King of Persia, which was negotiated by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus. It ran as follows:

[18] ‘The Lacedaemonians and their allies make an alliance with the King and Tissaphernes on the following terms:

‘I. All the territory and all the cities which are in possession of the King, or were in possession of his forefathers, shall be the King’s, and whatever revenue or other advantages the Athenians derived from these cities, the King, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, shall combine to prevent them from receiving such revenue or advantage.

‘II. The King, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, shall carry on the war against the Athenians in common, and they shall not make peace with the Athenians unless both parties — the King on the one hand and the Lacedaemonians and their allies on the other — agree.

‘III. Whosoever revolts from the King shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and whosoever revolts from the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall be the enemy of the King in like manner.’

Such were the terms of the alliance.

[19] Shortly afterwards the Chians manned ten more ships and sailed to Anaea, wanting to hear whether the attempt on Miletus had succeeded, and to draw fresh cities into the revolt. A message however was brought from Chalcideus, bidding them return, and warning them that Amorges was coming thither by land at the head of an army. So they sailed to the Temple of Zeus, where they caught sight of sixteen Athenian ships which Diomedon, following Thrasycles, was bringing from Athens. They instantly fled; one ship to Ephesus, the remainder towards Teos. Four of them the Athenians took empty, the crews having got safe to land; the rest escaped to Teos. The Athenians then sailed away to Samos. The Chians with their remaining ships put to sea again, and, assisted by the land-forces of their allies, caused first Lebedus, and afterwards Erae, to revolt. Both the army and the fleet then returned home.

[20] About the same time the twenty Peloponnesian ships which had been chased into Piraeum, and were now blockaded by a like number of Athenian ships, made a sally, defeated the Athenians, and took four ships; they then got away to Cenchreae, and once more prepared to sail to Chios and Ionia. At Cenchreae they were met by Astyochus, the admiral from Lacedaemon, to whom the whole of the Peloponnesian navy was about to be entrusted.

By this time the land-forces of Clazomenae and Erythrae, had retired from Teos, and Tissaphernes, who had led a second army thither in person and overthrown what was left of the Athenian fort, had retired also. Not long after his departure, Diomedon arrived with ten ships, and made an agreement with the Teians, who promised to receive the

Athenians as well as the Peloponnesians. He then sailed to Erae, which he attacked without success, and departed.

[21] About the same time a great revolution occurred in Samos. The people, aided by the crews of three Athenian vessels which happened to be on the spot, rose against the nobles, slew in all about two hundred of them, and banished four hundred more; they then distributed their land and houses among themselves. The Athenian people, now assured of their fidelity, granted them independence; and henceforward the city was in the hands of the democracy. They denied to the former landed proprietors all the privileges of citizenship, not even allowing them to contract marriage with any family belonging to the people, nor any of the people with them.

[22] The zeal of the Chians did not abate. They had already begun to go out with armies and raise revolts independently of the Peloponnesians, and they wished to draw as many cities as they could into their own danger. During the same summer they sent out a Chian fleet numbering thirteen ships. The expedition was directed first against Lesbos, the Lacedaemonians having originally instructed their officers to proceed from Chios to Lesbos, and thence to the Hellespont. It was placed under the command of Deiniadas, one of the Perioeci. Meanwhile the infantry of the Peloponnesians and of the neighbouring allies, under Evalas, a Spartan, moved along the shore towards Clazomenae and Cymè. The fleet sailed to Lesbos, and first induced Methymna to rebel; there leaving four of their ships, with the remainder they raised a revolt in Mytilenè.

[23] Meanwhile Astyochus the Lacedaemonian admiral, with four ships, set forth, as he intended, from Cenchreae, and arrived at Chios. On the third day after his arrival a division of the Athenian fleet, numbering twenty-five ships, sailed to Lesbos under the command of Leon and Diomedon; Leon had arrived from Athens later than Diomedon with a reinforcement of ten ships. On the same day, towards

evening, Astyochus put to sea, and taking with him one Chian ship, sailed to Lesbos, that he might render any assistance which he could to the Chian fleet. He came to Pyrrha, and on the following day to Eresus, where he heard that Mytilenè had been taken by the Athenians at the first blow. The Athenian ships had sailed right into the harbour when they were least expected, and captured the Chian vessels; the men on board had then landed, and defeating in a battle a Mytilenean force which came out to meet them, had taken possession of the city. Astyochus heard the news from the Eresians, and from the Chian ships which had been left with Eubulus at Methymna. They had fled when Mytilenè was taken, and had now fallen in with him; but only three out of the four, for one of them had been captured by the Athenians. Upon this, instead of going on to Mytilenè, he raised a revolt in Eresus, and armed the inhabitants: he then disembarked the heavy-armed from his ships and sent them by land to Antissa and Methymna under the command of Eteonicus; and with his own and the three Chian ships coasted thither himself, hoping that the Methymnaeans would take courage at the sight of them and persevere in their revolt. But everything went against him in Lesbos; so he re-embarked his troops and sailed back to Chios. The land-forces from the ships which were intended to go to the Hellespont also returned to their several homes. Not long afterwards six ships came to Chios from the allied forces of the Peloponnesians now collected at Cenchreae. The Athenians, when they had re-established their influence in Lesbos, sailed away, and having taken Polichnè on the mainland, which the Clazomenians were fortifying, brought them all back to their city on the island, except the authors of the revolt, who had escaped to Daphnus. So Clazomenae returned to the Athenian alliance.

[24] During the same summer the Athenians, who were stationed with twenty of their ships at the island of Ladè and were watching the enemy in Miletus, made a descent upon

Panormus in the Milesian territory. Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian general with a few followers came out to meet them, but was killed. Three days later they again sailed across and set up a trophy, which the Milesians pulled down, because the Athenians were not really masters of the ground at the time when they erected it. Leon and Diomedon, who were at Lesbos with the rest of the Athenian fleet, stationed their ships at the islands called Oenussae which lie in front of Chios, at Sidussa and Pteleum, which were forts held by them in the Erythraean territory, and at Lesbos itself, and carried on the war by sea against the Chians. The marines whom they had on board were hoplites taken from the roll and compelled to serve. They made descents upon Cardamylè and Bolissus, and having defeated with heavy loss the Chians who came out to meet them, they devastated all that region. In another battle at Phanae they defeated them again, and in a third at Leuconium. Henceforward the Chians remained within their walls. The Athenians ravaged their country, which was well stocked, and from the Persian War until that time had never been touched by an invader. No people as far as I know, except the Chians and Lacedaemonians (but the Chians not equally with the Lacedaemonians), have preserved moderation in prosperity, and in proportion as their city has gained in power have gained also in the stability of their administration. In this revolt they may seem to have shown a want of prudence, yet they did not venture upon it until many brave allies were ready to share the peril with them, and until the Athenians themselves seemed to confess that after their calamity in Sicily the state of their affairs was hopelessly bad. And, if they were deceived through the uncertainty of human things, this error of judgment was common to many who, like them, believed that the Athenian power would speedily be overthrown. But now that they were driven off the sea and saw their lands ravaged, some of their citizens undertook to bring back the city to the

Athenians. The magistrates perceived their design, but instead of acting themselves, they sent to Erythrae for Astyochus the admiral. He came with four ships which he had on the spot, and they considered together by what means the conspiracy might be suppressed with the least violence, whether by taking hostages or in some other way.

[25] The Lacedaemonians were thus engaged in Chios when towards the end of the summer there came from Athens a thousand Athenian hoplites and fifteen hundred Argives, of whom five hundred were originally light-armed, but the Athenians gave them heavy arms; also a thousand of the allies. They were conveyed in forty-eight ships, of which some were transports, under the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides. Sailing first to Samos they crossed over to Miletus, and there took up a position. The Milesians with a force of eight hundred heavy-armed of their own, the Peloponnesians who came with Chalcideus, and certain foreign mercenaries of Tissaphernes, who was there in person with his cavalry, went out and engaged the Athenians and their allies. The Argives on their own wing dashed forward, and made a disorderly attack upon the troops opposed to them, whom they despised; they thought that, being Ionians, they would be sure to run away. But they were defeated by the Milesians, and nearly three hundred of them perished. The Athenians first overcame the Peloponnesians, and then forced back the barbarians and the inferior troops. But they never engaged the Milesians, who, after routing the Argives, when they saw their other wing defeated, returned to the city. The Athenians, having won the day, took up a position close under the walls of Miletus. In this engagement the Ionians on both sides had the advantage of the Dorians; for the Athenians vanquished the Peloponnesians who were opposed to them, and the Milesians vanquished the Argives. The Athenians now raised a trophy, and prepared to build a wall across the isthmus which separates the city from the mainland, thinking that, if

they could reduce Miletus, the other cities would quickly return to their allegiance.

[26] But meanwhile, late in the afternoon, news was brought to them that a fleet of fifty-five ships from Peloponnesus and Sicily was close at hand. Hermocrates the Syracusan had urged the Sicilians to assist in completing the overthrow of Athens. Twenty ships came from Syracuse, two from Selinus, and with them the Peloponnesian ships which had been in preparation. The two squadrons were entrusted to Theramenes, who was to conduct them to Astyochus the admiral. They sailed first to Leros, an island lying off Miletus. Thence, finding that the Athenians were at Miletus, they sailed away to the Iasian Gulf, wanting to ascertain the fate of the town. Alcibiades came on horseback to Teichiussa in the Milesian territory, the point of the gulf at which the fleet had passed the night, and from him they received news of the battle. For he had been present, and had fought on the side of the Milesians and Tissaphernes. And he recommended them, if they did not mean to ruin their cause in Ionia and everywhere else, to assist Miletus at once, and break up the blockade.

[27] They determined to go at daybreak and relieve the place. But Phrynichus the Athenian general had certain information from Leros of their approach, and, although his colleagues wanted to remain and risk a battle, he refused and declared that he would neither himself fight, nor allow them or any one else to fight if he could help it. For when they might discover the exact number of the enemy’s ships and the proportion which their own bore to them, and, before engaging, make adequate preparations at their leisure, he would not be so foolish as to risk all through fear of disgrace. There was no dishonour in Athenians retreating before an enemy’s fleet when circumstances required. But there would be the deepest dishonour under any circumstances in a defeat; and the city would then not only incur disgrace, but would be in the utmost danger. Even if

their preparations were complete and satisfactory, Athens after her recent disasters ought not to take the offensive, or in any case not without absolute necessity; and now when they were not compelled, why should they go out of their way to court danger? He urged them to put on board their wounded, and their infantry, and all the stores which they had brought with them, but to leave behind the plunder obtained from the enemy’s country, that their ships might be lighter; they should sail back to Samos, and there uniting all their forces, they might go on making attacks upon Miletus when opportunity offered. His advice was followed.And not on this occasion only, but quite as much afterwards, whenever Phrynichus had to act, he showed himself to be a man of great sagacity. So the Athenians departed that very evening from Miletus without completing their victory, and the Argives, hurrying away from Samos in a rage after their disaster, went home.

[28] At dawn the Peloponnesians sailed from Teichiussa, and on their arrival at Miletus found that the Athenians had left: after remaining one day, on the morrow they took the Chian ships which under the command of Chalcideus had previously been chased into Miletus, and resolved to go back to Teichiussa and fetch that part of the tackle of which they had lightened the ships. There they found Tissaphernes, who had come with his infantry; he persuaded them to sail against Iasus, in which his enemy Amorges lay. So they attacked Iasus, which they took by a sudden assault; for it never occurred to the inhabitants that their ships were not Athenian. The Syracusans distinguished themselves greatly in the action. The Peloponnesians took captive Amorges the natural son of Pissuthnes, who had rebelled, and gave him to Tissaphernes, that, if he liked, he might convey him to the King in obedience to the royal command. They then plundered Iasus, and the army obtained a great deal of treasure; for the city had been rich from early times. They did no harm to the mercenaries of

Amorges, but received them into their own ranks; for most of them came from Peloponnesus. The town, and all their prisoners, whether bond or free, were delivered by them into the hands of Tissaphernes, who engaged to give them a Daric stater for each man; they then returned to Miletus. Thence they despatched by land as far as Erythrae Pedaritus the son of Leon, whom the Lacedaemonians had sent out to be governor of Chios; he was escorted by the mercenaries who had been in the service of Amorges. To remain on the spot, and take charge of Miletus, they appointed Philip. So the summer ended.

[29] During the following winter, Tissaphernes, after he had provided for the security of Iasus, came to Miletus. There he distributed one month's pay among all the ships, at the rate of an Attic drachma a day per man, as his envoy had promised at Lacedaemon; in future he proposed to give half a drachma only until he had asked the King's leave, promising that if he obtained it he would pay the entire drachma. On the remonstrance, however, of Hermocrates the Syracusan general (Theramenes, not being himself admiral, but only taking charge of the ships which he was to hand over to Astyochus, took no interest in the matter of the pay), he promised to each man a payment of somewhat more than three obols, reckoning the total sum paid to every five ships. For he offered to every five ships, up to the number of fifty-five, three talents a month, and to any ships in excess of this number he agreed to give at a like rate.

[30] During the same winter there arrived at Samos from Athens thirty-five ships, under the command of Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon. Whereupon the generals assembled their whole fleet, including the ships engaged at Chios, their purpose being to make a distribution of their forces by lot. The principal division was to continue watching Miletus, while a second force of ships and soldiers was to be sent to Chios. Accordingly Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty ships, besides

transports in which they conveyed a portion of the thousand heavy-armed who had joined the army at Miletus, sailed away to Chios, the duty which the lot assigned to them. The other generals remaining at Samos with seventy-four ships, and having the mastery of the sea, prepared to make a descent upon Miletus.

[31] Astyochus was at Chios selecting hostages as a precaution against the betrayal of the island to Athens, but when he heard of the reinforcements which Theramenes had brought, and of the improved prospects of the allies, he desisted, and taking with him his own Peloponnesian ships, ten in number, and ten Chian, he put to sea. Failing in an attack upon Pteleum he sailed on to Clazomenae, and demanded that the Athenian party should settle at Daphnus on the mainland, and come over to the Peloponnesians: Tamos, one of the Persian lieutenants of Ionia, joined in the demand. But the Clazomenians would not listen to him; whereupon he assaulted the city (which was unwalled), but being unable to take it, sailed away with a strong wind. He was himself carried to Phocaea and Cymè, and the remainder of the fleet put into the islands, Marathussa, Pelè, and Drymussa, which lie off Clazomenae. There, being detained eight days by the weather, they spoiled and destroyed part of the property of the Clazomenians which had been deposited in the islands, and, taking part on board, they sailed away to Phocaea and Cymè, where they rejoined Astyochus.

[32] While Astyochus was there, envoys came to him from Lesbos; the Lesbians were once more eager to revolt, and he was willing to assist them; but the Corinthians and the other allies were disheartened by the previous failure. So he put to sea and sailed back to Chios. His ships were scattered by a storm, and reached Chios from various places. Soon afterwards Pedaritus and his army having come by land from Miletus to Erythrae, where he crossed the channel, arrived in Chios. On his arrival he found at his disposal the sailors

whom Chalcideus had taken from his five ships and left in Chios fully armed, to the number of five hundred. Some of the Lesbians renewing their proposal to revolt, Astyochus suggested to Pedaritus and the Chians that they should go with the fleet to Lesbos and raise the country; they would thus increase the number of their allies, and, even if the attempt did not wholly succeed, they would injure the Athenians. But they would not listen, and Pedaritus refused to let him have the Chian ships.

[33] So Astyochus took five Corinthian ships and a sixth from Megara, one from Hermionè, and the Lacedaemonian ships which he had brought with him, and set sail for Miletus in order to assume his command. He threatened the Chians, again and again, that he would certainly not help them when their time of need came. Touching at Corycus in Erythraea he passed the night there. The Athenian ships from Samos were now on their way to Chios; they had put in at a place where they were only divided from the Peloponnesians by a hill, and neither fleet knew that the other was so near. But that night there came a despatch from Pedaritus informing Astyochus that certain Erythraean prisoners had been released by the Athenians from Samos on condition of betraying Erythrae, and had gone thither with that intention. Whereupon Astyochus sailed back to Erythrae. So narrowly did he escape falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pedaritus sailed over to meet him. They then enquired about the supposed traitors, and found that the whole matter was a trick which the men had devised in order to get away from Samos; so they acquitted them of the charge, and Pedaritus returned to Chios, while Astyochus resumed his voyage to Miletus.

[34] In the meantime the Athenian fleet, sailing round the promontory of Corycus towards Arginus, lighted upon three Chian ships of war, to which they gave chase. A great storm came on, and the Chian ships with difficulty escaped into their harbour, but of the Athenian ships the three which

were most zealous in the pursuit were disabled and driven ashore near the city of Chios; the crews were either lost or taken captive. The remainder of the fleet found shelter in the harbour called Phoenicus, lying under Mount Mimas, whence again setting sail they put in at Lesbos, and made preparations for building the fort which they meant to establish in Chios.

[35] During the same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedaemonian sailed from the Peloponnese with one Laconian, one Syracusan, and ten Thurian ships; of these last Dorieus the son of Diagoras and two others were the commanders. They put in at Cnidus, which under the influence of Tissaphernes had already revolted from Athens. The Peloponnesian authorities at Miletus, when they heard of their arrival, ordered one half of these ships to protect Cnidus, and the other half to cruise off Triopium and seize the merchant-vessels which put in there from Egypt. This Triopium is a promontory in the district of Cnidus on which there is a temple of Apollo. The Athenians, hearing of their intentions, sailed from Samos and captured the six ships which were keeping guard at Triopium; the crews escaped. They then sailed to Cnidus, and attacking the town, which was unwalled, all but took it. On the following day they made a second attack, but during the night the inhabitants had improved their hasty defences, and some of the men who had escaped from the ships captured at Triopium had come into the city. So the Athenian assault was less destructive than on the first day; and after retiring from the city and devastating the country belonging to it they sailed back to Samos.

[36] About the same time Astyochus arrived at Miletus and took the command of the fleet. He found the Peloponnesians still abundantly provided with all requisites. They had sufficient pay; the great spoils taken at Iasus were in the hands of the army, and the Milesians carried on the war with a will. The Peloponnesians however considered the former

treaty made between Tissaphernes and Chalcideus defective and disadvantageous to them; so before the departure of Theramenes they made new terms of alliance, which were as follows:

[37] ‘The Lacedaemonians and their allies make agreement with King Darius and the sons of the King, and with Tissaphernes, that there shall be alliance and friendship between them on the following conditions:

“I. Whatever territory and cities belong to King Darius, or formerly belonged to his father, or to his ancestors, against these neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies shall make war, or do them any hurt, nor shall the Lacedaemonians or their allies exact tribute of them. Neither Darius the King nor the subjects of the King shall make war upon the Lacedaemonians or their allies, or do them any hurt.

“II. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies have need of anything from the King, or the King have need of anything from the Lacedaemonians and their allies, whatever they do by mutual agreement shall hold good.

“III. They shall carry on the war against the Athenians and their allies in common, and if they make peace, shall make peace in common.

“IV. The King shall defray the expense of any number of troops for which the King has sent, so long as they remain in the King’s country.

“V. If any of the cities who are parties to this treaty go against the King’s country, the rest shall interfere and aid the King to the utmost of their power. And if any of the inhabitants of the King’s country or any country under the dominion of the King shall go against the country of the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall interfere and aid them to the utmost of his power”.’

[38] After the conclusion of the treaty, Theramenes, having delivered over the fleet to Astyochus, sailed away in a small boat and was no more heard of. The Athenians, who had now crossed over with their troops from Lesbos to Chios, and had

the upper hand both by land and sea, began to fortify Delphinium, a place not far distant from the town of Chios, which had the double advantage of being strong by land and of possessing harbours. The Chians meanwhile remained inactive; they had been already badly beaten in several battles, and their internal condition was far from satisfactory; for Tydeus the son of Ion and his accomplices had been executed by Pedaritus on a charge of complicity with Athens, and the city was reduced by the strong hand to a mere oligarchy. Hence they were in a state of mutual distrust, and could not be persuaded that either they or the mercenaries brought by Pedaritus were a match for the enemy. They sent however to Miletus and requested the aid of Astyochus, but he refused. Whereupon Pedaritus sent a despatch to Lacedaemon, complaining of his misconduct. So favourable to the Athenians was the course of affairs in Chios. The main fleet, which they had left at Samos, from time to time made threatening movements against the enemy at Miletus, but as they would never come out, the Athenians at length retired to Samos and there remained.

[39] During the same winter, about the solstice, twenty-seven ships which Calligitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus, the agents of Pharnabazus, had persuaded the Lacedaemonians to fit out in his interest, sailed for Ionia: they were placed under the command of Antisthenes, a Spartan. The Lacedaemonians sent at the same time eleven Spartans to act as advisers to Astyochus, one of whom was Lichas the son of Arcesilaus. Besides receiving a general commission to assist in the direction of affairs to the best of their judgment, they were empowered on their arrival at Miletus to send on, if they saw fit, these ships, or a larger or smaller number, to Pharnabazus at the Hellespont under the command of Clearchus the son of Rhamphias, who sailed with them. The eleven might also, if they thought good, deprive Astyochus of his command and appoint Antisthenes in his place, for the despatch of Pedaritus had excited

suspicion against him. So the ships sailed from Malea over the open sea until they came to Melos. There they lighted on ten Athenian ships; of these they took three without their crews and burned them. But then, fearing that the remainder which had escaped would, as in fact they did, give information of their approach to the fleet at Samos, they took the precaution of going by a longer route. And sailing round by Crete they put in at Caunus in Asia. They thought that they were now safe, and sent a messenger to the fleet at Miletus requesting a convoy.

[40] Meanwhile the Chians and Pedaritus continued to send messengers to Astyochus, who continued to delay. They implored him to come to their help with his whole fleet, saying that they were blockaded, and that he should not allow the chief ally of Sparta in Ionia to be cut off from the sea and overrun and devastated by land. Now the Chians had more domestic slaves than any other state with the exception of Lacedaemon, and their offences were always more severely punished because of their number; so that, when the Athenian army appeared to be firmly settled in their fortifications, most of them at once deserted to the enemy. And they did the greatest damage, because they knew the country. The Chians pressed upon the Lacedaemonians the necessity of coming to their assistance while there was still hope of interfering to some purpose; the fortification of Delphinium, though not yet completed, was in progress, and the Athenians were beginning to extend the lines of defence which protected their army and ships. Astyochus, seeing that the allies were zealous in the cause, although he had fully meant to carry out his threat, now determined to relieve the Chians.

[41] But in the meantime he received a message from Caunus, informing him that the twenty-seven ships and his Lacedaemonian advisers had arrived. He thought that everything should give way to the importance of convoying so large a reinforcement which would secure to the

Lacedaemonians greater command of the sea, and that he must first of all provide for the safe passage of the commissioners who were to report on his conduct. So he at once gave up his intended expedition to Chios and sailed for Caunus. As he coasted along he made a descent on the island of Cos Meropis. The city was unfortified and had been overthrown by an earthquake, the greatest which has ever happened within our memory. The citizens had fled into the mountains; so he sacked the town and overran and despoiled the country, but let go the free inhabitants whom he found. From Cos he came by night to Cnidus, and was prevailed upon by the importunity of the Cnidians, instead of disembarking his men, to sail at once, just as he was, against twenty Athenian ships with which Charminus (one of the generals at Samos) was watching for the twenty-seven ships expected from Peloponnesus, being those which Astyochus was going to escort. The Athenians at Samos had heard from Melos of their coming, and Charminus was cruising off the islands of Symè, Chalcè, and Rhodes, and on the coast of Lycia; he had by this time discovered that they were at Caunus.

[42] So Astyochus sailed at once to Symè before his arrival was reported, in the hope that he might come upon the Athenian squadron in the open sea. The rain and cloudy state of the atmosphere caused confusion among his ships, which lost their way in the dark. When dawn broke, the fleet was dispersed and the left wing alone was visible to the Athenians, while the other ships were still straggling off the shore of the island. Charminus and the Athenians put out to sea with part of their twenty ships, supposing that these were only the squadron from Caunus for which they were watching. They at once attacked them, sank three of them, disabled others, and were gaining the victory, when to their surprise there appeared the larger part of the Lacedaemonian fleet threatening to surround them. Whereupon they fled, and in their flight lost six ships, but

with the rest gained the island of Teutlussa, and thence Halicarnassus. The Peloponnesians touched at Cnidus, and there uniting with the twenty-seven ships from Caunus, they all sailed to Symè and raised a trophy; they then returned and put into port again at Cnidus.

[43] As soon as the Athenians heard the result of the sea-fight they sailed from Samos to Symè with their whole fleet. They did not attack the Peloponnesians at Cnidus, nor the Peloponnesians them; but they carried away the heavy tackle of their own ships which had been left at Symè, and touching at Loryma, a place on the mainland, returned to Samos. The Peloponnesians were now all together at Cnidus, and were making the repairs necessary after the battle, while the Lacedaemonian commissioners conferred with Tissaphernes (who was himself on the spot) as to any matters in his past dealings with them at which they were displeased, and as to the best manner of securing their common interests in the future conduct of the war. Lichas entered into the enquiry with great energy; he took exception to both the treaties; that of Chalcideus and that of Theramenes were equally objectionable. For the King at that time of day to claim power over all the countries which his ancestors had formerly held was monstrous. If either treaty were carried out, the inhabitants of all the islands, of Thessaly, of Locris, and of all Hellas, as far as Boeotia, would again be reduced to slavery; instead of giving the Hellenes freedom, the Lacedaemonians would be imposing upon them the yoke of Persia. So he desired them to conclude some more satisfactory treaty, for he would have nothing to say to these; he did not want to have the fleet maintained upon any such terms. Tissaphernes was indignant, and without settling anything went away in a rage.

[44] Meanwhile the Peloponnesians had been receiving communications from the chief men of Rhodes, and resolved to sail thither. They hoped to gain over an island which was strong alike in sailors and in infantry; if successful, they

might henceforward maintain their navy by the help of their own allies without asking Tissaphernes for money. So in the same winter they sailed from Cnidus against Rhodes, and first attacked Camirus with ninety-four ships. The inhabitants, who were in ignorance of the plot and dwelt in an unfortified city, were alarmed and began to fly. The Lacedaemonians re-assured them, and assembling the people not only of Camirus, but of Lindus and Ialysus, the two other cities of Rhodes, persuaded all of them to revolt from the Athenians. Thus Rhodes went over to the Peloponnesians. Nearly at the same time the Athenians, who had heard of their intentions, brought up the fleet from Samos, hoping to forestall them; they appeared in the offing, but finding that they were just too late, sailed to Chalcè for the present, and thence back to Samos. They then fought against Rhodes, making descents upon it from Chalcè, Cos, and Samos, while the Peloponnesians, having collected thirty-two talents from the Rhodians, drew up their ships, and did nothing for eleven weeks.

[45] Before the Peloponnesians had removed to Rhodes affairs took a new turn. After the death of Chalcideus and the engagement at Miletus, Alcibiades fell under suspicion at Sparta, and orders came from home to Astyochus that he should be put to death. Agis hated him, and he was generally distrusted. In fear he retired to Tissaphernes, and soon, by working upon him, did all he could to injure the Peloponnesian cause. He was his constant adviser, and induced him to cut down the pay of the sailors from an Attic drachma to half a drachma, and this was only to be given at irregular intervals. Tissaphernes was instructed by him to tell the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, with their long experience of naval affairs, gave half a drachma only, not from poverty, but lest their sailors should be demoralised by high pay, and spend their money on pleasures which injured their health, and thereby impaired their efficiency; the payment too was made irregularly, that the arrears, which

they would forfeit by desertion, might be a pledge of their continuance in the service. He also recommended him to bribe the trierarchs and the generals of the allied cities into consenting. They all yielded with the exception of the Syracusans: Hermocrates alone stood firm on behalf of the whole alliance. When the allies who had revolted came asking for money, Alcibiades drove them away himself, saying on behalf of Tissaphernes that the Chians must have lost all sense of shame; they were the richest people in Hellas, and now, when they were being saved by foreign aid, they wanted other men, not only to risk life, but to expend money in their cause. To the other cities he replied that, having paid such large sums to the Athenians before they revolted, they would be inexcusable if they were not willing to contribute as much and even more for their own benefit. He represented further that Tissaphernes was now carrying on the war at his own expense, and must be expected to be careful. But if supplies should come from the King he would restore the full pay, and do whatever was reasonable for the cities.

[46] Alcibiades also advised Tissaphernes not to be in a hurry about putting an end to the war, and neither to bring up the Phoenician fleet which he was preparing, nor to give pay to more Hellenic sailors; he should not be so anxious to put the whole power both by sea and land into the same hands. Let the dominion only remain divided, and then, whichever of the two rivals was troublesome, the King might always use the other against him. But if one defeated the other and became supreme on both elements, who would help Tissaphernes to overthrow the conqueror? He would have to take the field in person and fight, which he might not like, at great risk and expense. The danger would be easily averted at a fraction of the cost, and at no risk to himself, if he wore out the Hellenes in internal strife. Alcibiades also said that the Athenians would be more suitable partners of empire, because they were less likely to encroach by land, and both

their principles and their practice in carrying on the war accorded better with the King’s interest. For if he helped them to subject the element of the sea to themselves, they would gladly help him in the subjugation of the Hellenes who were in his country, whereas the Lacedaemonians came to be their liberators. But a power which was at that very moment emancipating the Hellenes from the dominion of another Hellenic power like themselves would not be satisfied to leave them under the yoke of the Barbarian if they once succeeded in crushing the Athenians. So he advised him first to wear them both out, and when he had clipped the Athenians as close as he could, then to get the Peloponnesians out of his country. To this course Tissaphernes was strongly inclined, if we may judge from his acts. For he gave his full confidence to Alcibiades, whose advice he approved; and kept the Peloponnesians ill-provided, at the same time refusing to let them fight at sea, and insisting that they must wait until the Phoenician ships arrived; they would then fight at an advantage. In this manner he ruined their affairs and impaired the efficiency of their navy, which had once been in first-rate condition. There were many other ways in which he showed openly and unmistakeably that he was not in earnest in the cause of his allies.

[47] In giving this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, now that he had passed under their protection, Alcibiades said what he really thought to be most for their interests. But he had another motive; he was preparing the way for his own return from exile. He knew that, if he did not destroy his country altogether, the time would come when he would persuade his countrymen to recall him; and he thought that his arguments would be most effectual if he were seen to be on intimate terms with Tissaphernes. And the result proved that he was right. The Athenian soldiers at Samos soon perceived that he had great influence with him, and he sent messages to the chief persons among them, whom he

begged to remember him to all good men and true, and to let them know that he would be glad to return to his country and cast in his lot with them. He would at the same time make Tissaphernes their friend; but they must establish an oligarchy, and abolish the villainous democracy which had driven him out. Partly moved by these messages, but still more of their own inclination, the trierarchs and leading Athenians at Samos were now eager to overthrow the democracy.

[48] The matter was stirred in the camp first of all, and introduced into the city afterwards. A few persons went over from Samos to Alcibiades, and conferred with him: to them he held out the hope that he would make, first of all Tissaphernes, and secondly the King himself, their friend, if they would put down democracy; the King would then be better able to trust them. And so the aristocracy, on whom the heaviest burdens are apt to fall, conceived great hopes of getting the government into their own hands, and overcoming their enemies. Returning to Samos, the envoys drew all such as seemed desirable accomplices into a conspiracy, while the language held in public to the main body of the army was that the King would be their friend and would supply them with money if Alcibiades was restored and democracy given up. Now the multitude were at first dissatisfied with the scheme, but the prospect of the King’s pay was so grateful to them that they offered no opposition; and the authors of the movement, after they had broached the idea to the people, once more considered the proposals of Alcibiades among themselves and the members of their clubs. Most of them thought the matter safe and straightforward enough. Phrynichus, who was still general, was of another mind. He maintained, and rightly, that Alcibiades cared no more for oligarchy than he did for democracy, and in seeking to change the existing form of government was only considering how he might be recalled and restored to his country at the invitation of the clubs;

whereas their one care should be to avoid disunion. Why should the King go out of his way to join the Athenians whom he did not trust, when he would only get into trouble with the Peloponnesians, who were now as great a naval power, and held some of the most important cities in his dominion? — it would be much easier for him to make friends with them, who had never done him any harm. As to the allies, to whom they had promised the blessings of oligarchy which they were now about to enjoy themselves, he would be bound that the revolted cities would not return to them, and that their old allies would be not a whit more loyal in consequence. The form of government was indifferent to them if they could only be free, but they did not want to be in subjection either to an oligarchy or to a democracy. And as for the so-called nobility, the allies thought that they would be quite as troublesome as the people; they were the persons who suggested crimes to the popular mind; who provided the means for their execution; and who reaped the fruits themselves. As far as it rested with the oligarchy the punishment of death would be inflicted unscrupulously, and without trial, whereas the people brought the oligarchs to their senses, and were a refuge to which the oppressed might always have recourse. Experience had taught the cities this lesson, and he was well aware of their feelings. He was therefore himself utterly dissatisfied with the proposals of Alcibiades, and disapproved of the whole affair.

[49] But the conspirators who were present were not at all shaken in their opinion. They accepted the plan and prepared to send Peisander and other envoys to Athens, that they might manage the recall of Alcibiades and the overthrow of the democracy, and finally make Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians.

[50] Phrynichus now knew that a proposal would be made for the restoration of Alcibiades, which the Athenians would certainly accept; and having opposed his return he feared

that Alcibiades, if he were recalled, would do him a mischief, because he had stood in his way. So he had recourse to the following device. He secretly sent a letter to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, who was still at Miletus, informing him that Alcibiades was gaining over Tissaphernes to the Athenians and ruining the Peloponnesian interests. He gave full particulars, adding that Astyochus must excuse him if he sought to harm an enemy even at some cost to his country." Now Astyochus had no idea of punishing Alcibiades, who moreover no longer came within his reach. On the contrary, he went to him and to Tissaphernes at Magnesia, and, turning informer, told them of the letter which he had received from Samos. (He was believed to have sold himself to Tissaphernes, to whom he now betrayed everything; and this was the reason why he was so unwilling to bestir himself about the reduction of the pay.) Alcibiades immediately sent a despatch denouncing to the leaders of the army at Samos the treason of Phrynichus, and demanding that he should be put to death. Phrynichus was confounded, and in fact the revelation placed him in the greatest danger. However he sent again to Astyochus, blaming him for having violated his former confidence. He then proceeded to say that he was ready to give the Peloponnesians the opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian army, and he explained in detail how Samos, which was unfortified, might best be attacked; adding that he was in danger of his life for their sakes, and that he need no longer apologise if by this or any other means he could save himself from destruction at the hands of his worst enemies. Again the message was communicated by Astyochus to Alcibiades.

[51] Now Phrynichus was well aware of his treachery, and he knew that another letter from Alcibiades giving further information was on the point of arriving. Before its arrival he himself warned the army that, Samos being unwalled and some of the ships not anchoring within the harbour, the enemy were going to attack the fleet; of this he had certain

knowledge. They ought therefore to fortify the place as quickly as they could, and to take every precaution. As he was a general he could execute his proposals by his own authority. So they set to work, and in consequence Samos, which would have been fortified in any case, was fortified all the sooner. Not long afterwards the expected letter came from Alcibiades warning the Athenians that the army was being betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy were going to make an attack. But Alcibiades was not trusted; he was thought to have attributed to Phrynichus out of personal animosity complicity in the enemy's designs, with which he was himself acquainted. Thus he did him no harm, but rather strengthened his position by telling the same tale.

[52] Alcibiades still continued his practices with Tissaphernes, whom he now sought to draw over to the Athenian interest. But Tissaphernes was afraid of the Peloponnesians, who had more ships on the spot than the Athenians. And yet he would have liked, if he could, to have been persuaded; especially when he saw the opposition which the Peloponnesians raised at Cnidus to the treaty of Theramenes. For his quarrel with them had broken out before the Peloponnesians went to Rhodes, where they were at present stationed; and the words of Alcibiades, who had previously warned Tissaphernes that the Lacedaemonians were the liberators of all the cities of Hellas, were verified by the protest of Lichas, who declared that 'for the King to hold all the cities which he or his ancestors had held was a stipulation not to be endured.' So Alcibiades, who was playing for a great stake, was very assiduous in paying his court to Tissaphernes.

[53] Meanwhile Peisander and the other envoys who had been sent from Samos arrived at Athens and made their proposals to the people. They said much in few words, insisting above all that if the Athenians restored Alcibiades and modified their democracy they might secure the

alliance of the King and gain the victory over the Peloponnesians. There was great opposition to any change in the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades were loud in protesting that it would be a dreadful thing if he were permitted to return in defiance of the law. The Eumolpidae and Ceryces called heaven and earth to witness that the city must never restore a man who had been banished for profaning the mysteries. Amid violent expressions of indignation Peisander came forward, and having up the objectors one by one he pointed out to them that the Peloponnesians had a fleet ready for action as large as their own, that they numbered more cities among their allies, and that they were furnished with money by Tissaphernes and the King; whereas the Athenians had spent everything: he then asked them whether there was the least hope of saving the country unless the King could be won over. They all acknowledged that there was none. He then said to them plainly:

‘But this alliance is impossible unless we are governed in a wiser manner, and office is confined to a smaller number: then the King will trust us. Do not let us be dwelling on the form of the constitution, which we may hereafter change as we please, when the very existence of Athens is at stake. And we must restore Alcibiades, who is the only man living capable of saving us.’

[54] The people were very angry at the first suggestion of an oligarchy; but when Peisander proved to them that they had no other resource, partly in fear, and partly in hope that it might be hereafter changed, they gave way. So a decree was passed that Peisander himself and ten others should go out and negotiate to the best of their judgment with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. Peisander also denounced Phrynichus, and therefore the people dismissed him and his colleague Scironides from their commands, and appointed Diomedon and Leon to be admirals in their room. Peisander thought that Phrynichus would stand in the way of the

negotiations with Alcibiades, and for this reason he calumniated him, alleging that he had betrayed Iasus and Amorges. Then he went, one after another, to all the clubs which already existed in Athens for the management of trials and elections, and exhorted them to unite, and by concerted action put down the democracy. When he had completed all the necessary preparations and the plot was ripe, he and his colleagues proceeded on their voyage to Tissaphernes.

[55] During the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had now entered upon their command, made a descent upon Rhodes. They found the Peloponnesian fleet drawn up out of their reach, but they landed, and defeated the Rhodians who came out to meet them. From Rhodes they retired to Chalcè, which henceforth they made their base of operations rather than Cos, because they could there better command any movement which might be made by the Peloponnesian fleet. About this time Xenophantidas, a Lacedaemonian, brought word to Rhodes from Pedaritus, the governor of Chios, that the Athenian fortification was now completed, and that if the Peloponnesians with their whole fleet did not at once come to the rescue Chios would be lost. So they began to think of sending help. Meanwhile Pedaritus in person with his mercenaries and the whole Chian army attacked the lines which protected the Athenian fleet; he took a part of the wall and obtained possession of certain ships which were drawn up on shore. But the Athenians rushed out upon them, and first putting to flight the Chians, soon defeated the rest of his forces. Pedaritus himself was slain, together with many of the Chians, and a great quantity of arms was taken.

[56] The Chians were now blockaded more closely than ever both by sea and land, and there was a great famine in the place. Meanwhile Peisander and his colleagues came to Tissaphernes and proposed an agreement. But Alcibiades was not as yet quite sure of Tissaphernes, who was more

afraid of the Peloponnesians than of the Athenians, and was still desirous, in accordance with the lesson which he had been taught by Alcibiades himself, to wear them both out. So he had recourse to the device of making Tissaphernes ask too much, that the negotiations might be broken off. And I imagine that Tissaphernes himself equally wanted them to fail; he was moved by his fears; while Alcibiades, seeing that his reluctance was insuperable, did not wish the Athenians to think that he was unable to persuade him — he wanted them to believe that Tissaphernes was already persuaded and anxious to make terms but could not, because they themselves would not grant enough. And so, speaking on behalf of Tissaphernes who was himself present, he made such exorbitant demands that, although for a time the Athenians were willing to grant anything which he asked, at length the responsibility of breaking off the conference was thrown upon them. He and Tissaphernes demanded, first the cession of all Ionia to the King, then that of the neighbouring islands; and there were some other conditions. Thus far the Athenians offered no opposition. But at last, fearing that his utter inability to fulfil his promise would be exposed, at the third interview he demanded permission for the King to build ships, and sail along his own coast wherever and with as many vessels as he pleased. This was too much; the Athenians now perceived that matters were hopeless, and that they had been duped by Alcibiades. So they departed in anger to Samos.

[57] Immediately afterwards, and during the same winter, Tissaphernes came down to Caunus wishing to bring back the Peloponnesians to Miletus, and once more to make a treaty with them on such terms as he could get; he was willing to maintain them, for he did not want to become wholly their enemy, and was afraid that if their large fleet were at a loss for supplies they might be compelled to fight and be defeated, or their crews might desert; in either case the Athenians would gain their ends without his assistance.

Above all he feared lest they should ravage the adjoining mainland in search of food. Taking into account all these possibilities, and true to his policy, which was to hold the balance evenly between the two contending powers, he sent for the Lacedaemonians, furnished them with supplies, and made a third treaty with them, which ran as follows:

[58] ‘In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius the King, when Alexippidas was Ephor at Lacedaemon, a treaty was made in the plain of the Maeander between the Lacedaemonians and their allies on the one hand, and Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces on the other, touching the interests of the King, and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies.

‘I. All the King’s country which is in Asia shall continue to be the King’s, and the King shall act as he pleases in respect of his own country.

‘II. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not go against the King’s country to do hurt, and the King shall not go against the country of the Lacedaemonians and their allies to do hurt. If any of the Lacedaemonians or their allies go against the King’s country and do hurt, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall interfere: and if any of the dwellers in the King’s country shall go against the country of the Lacedaemonians and their allies and do hurt, the King shall interfere.

‘III. Tissaphernes shall provide maintenance for the number of ships which the Lacedaemonians have at present, according to the agreement, until the King’s ships arrive. When they have arrived, the Lacedaemonians and their allies may either maintain their own ships, or they may receive the maintenance of their ships from Tissaphernes. But in this case the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall at the end of the war repay to Tissaphernes the money which they have received.

‘IV. When the King’s ships have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and of their allies and of the King shall

carry on the war in common, as may seem best to Tissaphernes and to the Lacedaemonians and their allies: and if they wish to make peace with the Athenians both parties shall make peace on the same terms.’

[59] Such was the treaty. Tissaphernes now prepared to bring up the Phoenician ships, as he had promised, and to fulfil his other pledges. He was anxious at all events to be seen making a beginning.

[60] Towards the end of the winter, Oropus, which was occupied by an Athenian garrison, was betrayed to the Boeotians. Certain of the Eretrians and of the Oropians themselves, both having an eye to the revolt of Euboea, were concerned in the enterprise. For Oropos, facing Eretria, while held by the Athenians could not be other than a serious annoyance, both to Eretria and to the whole of Euboea. Having now possession of Oropus the Eretrians came to Rhodes, and invited the Peloponnesians to Euboea. They were however more disposed to relieve the distress of Chios, and thither they sailed from Rhodes with their whole fleet. Near Triopium they descried the Athenian ships in the open sea sailing from Chalcè: neither fleet attacked the other, but both arrived safely, the one at Samos, and the other at Miletus. The Lacedaemonians now saw that they could no longer relieve Chios without a battle at sea. So the winter ended, and with it the twentieth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

[61] At the beginning of the following spring, Dercyllidas, a Spartan, was sent at the head of a small army along the coast to the Hellespont. He was to effect the revolt of Abydos, a Milesian colony. The Chians, while Astyochus was doubting whether he could assist them, were compelled by the pressure of the blockade to fight at sea. While he was still at Rhodes they had obtained from Miletus, after the death of Pedaritus, a new governor, Leon, a Spartan, who had come out as a marine with Antisthenes; he brought with him twelve ships, five Thurian, four Syracusan, one from

Anaea, one Milesian, and one which was Leon’s own; they had been employed in guarding Miletus. The Chians made a sally with their whole force, and seized a strong position; their ships at the same time, to the number of thirty-six, sailed out and fought with the thirty-two of the Athenians. The engagement was severe; the Chians and their allies had rather the advantage, but evening had come on; so they retired to the city.

[62] Soon afterwards Dercyllidas arrived at the Hellespont from Miletus; Abydos, and two days later Lampsacus, revolted to him and Pharnabazus. Strombichides, having intelligence, hastened thither from Chios with twenty-four Athenian ships, of which some were transports conveying hoplites. Defeating the Lampsacenes who came out against him, he took Lampsacus, which was unfortified, at the first onset. He made plunder of the slaves and property which he found there, and, reinstating the free inhabitants, went on to Abydos. But the people of Abydos would not yield, and though he attempted to take the place by assault, he failed; so he crossed over to Sestos, a city of the Chersonese opposite Abydos, which the Persians had formerly held. There he placed a garrison to keep watch over the entire Hellespont.

[63] Meanwhile the Chians gained more command of the sea, and Astyochus and the Peloponnesians at Miletus, hearing of the naval engagement and of the withdrawal of Strombichides and his ships, took courage. Sailing to Chios with two ships, Astyochus fetched away the fleet which was there, and with his united forces made a demonstration against Samos. But the Athenian crews, who were in a state of mutual distrust, did not go out to meet him; so he sailed back to Miletus.

For about this time, or rather sooner, the democracy at Athens had been subverted. Peisander and his fellow envoys, on their return to Samos after their visit to Tissaphernes, had strengthened their interest in the army,

and had even persuaded the chief men of Samos to join them in setting up an oligarchy, although they had lately risen against their own countrymen

in order to put down oligarchy. At the same time conferring among themselves, the Athenian leaders at Samos came to the conclusion that since Alcibiades would not join they had better leave him alone; for indeed he was not the sort of person who was suited to an oligarchy. But they determined, as they were already compromised, to proceed by themselves, and to take measures for carrying the movement through; they meant also to persevere in the war, and were willing enough to contribute money or anything else which might be wanted out of their own houses, since they would now be toiling, not for others, but for themselves.

[64] Having thus encouraged one another in their purpose they sent Peisander and one half of the envoys back to Athens. They were to carry out the scheme at home, and had directions to set up an oligarchy in the subject-cities at which they touched on their voyage. The other half were despatched different ways to other subject-cities. Diotrephes, who was then at Chios, was sent to assume the command in Chalcidicè and on the coast of Thrace, to which he had been previously appointed. On arriving at Thasos he put down the democracy. But within about two months of his departure the Thasians began to fortify their city; they did not want to have an aristocracy dependent on Athens when they were daily expecting to obtain their liberty from Lacedaemon. For there were Thasian exiles who had been driven out by the Athenians dwelling in Peloponnesus, and they, with the assistance of their friends at home, were exerting themselves vigorously to obtain ships and effect the revolt of Thasos. The recent change was exactly what they desired; for the government had been reformed without danger to themselves, and the democracy, who would have opposed them, had been overthrown. Thus the result in the

case of Thasos, and also, as I imagine, of many other states, was the opposite of what the oligarchical conspirators had intended. For the subject-cities, having secured a moderate form of government, and having no fear of being called to account for their proceedings, aimed at absolute freedom; they scorned the sham independence proffered to them by the Athenians.

[65] Peisander and his colleagues pursued their voyage and, as they had agreed, put down the democracies in the different states. From some places they obtained the assistance of heavy-armed troops, which they took with them to Athens. There they found the revolution more than half accomplished by the oligarchical clubs. Some of the younger citizens had conspired and secretly assassinated one Androcles, one of the chief leaders of the people, who had been foremost in procuring the banishment of Alcibiades. Their motives were two-fold: they killed him because he was a demagogue; but more because they hoped to gratify Alcibiades, whom they were still expecting to return, and to make Tissaphernes their friend. A few others who were inconvenient to them they made away with in a like secret manner. Meanwhile they declared in their public programme that no one ought to receive pay who was not on military service; and that not more than five thousand should have a share in the government; those, namely, who were best able to serve the state in person and with their money.

[66] These were only pretences intended to look well in the eyes of the people; for the authors of the revolution fully meant to retain the new government in their own hands. The popular assembly and the council of five hundred were still convoked; but nothing was brought before them of which the conspirators had not approved; the speakers were of their party and the things to be said had been all arranged by them beforehand. No one any longer raised his voice against them; for the citizens were afraid when they saw the

strength of the conspiracy, and if any one did utter a word, he was put out of the way in some convenient manner. No search was made for the assassins; and though there might be suspicion, no one was brought to trial; the people were so depressed and afraid to move that he who escaped violence thought himself fortunate, even though he had never said a word. Their minds were cowed by the supposed number of the conspirators, which they greatly exaggerated, having no means of discovering the truth, since the size of the city prevented them from knowing one another. For the same reason a man could not conspire and retaliate, because he was unable to express his sorrow or indignation to another; he could not make a confidant of a stranger, and he would not trust his acquaintance. The members of the popular party all approached one another with suspicion; every one was supposed to have a hand in what was going on. Some were concerned whom no one would ever have thought likely to turn oligarchs; their adhesion created the worst mistrust among the multitude, and by making it impossible for them to rely upon one another, greatly contributed to the security of the few.

[67] Such was the state of affairs when Peisander and his colleagues arrived at Athens. They immediately set to work and prepared to strike the final blow. First, they called an assembly and proposed the election of ten commissioners, who should be empowered to frame for the city the best constitution which they could devise; this was to be laid before the people on a fixed day. When the day arrived they summoned an assembly to meet in the temple of Poseidon at Colonus without the walls, and distant rather more than a mile. But the commissioners only moved that any Athenian should be allowed to propose whatever resolution he pleased — nothing more; threatening at the same time with severe penalties anybody who indicted the proposer for unconstitutional action, or otherwise offered injury to him. The whole scheme now came to light. A motion was made to

abolish all the existing magistracies and the payment of magistrates, and to choose a presiding board of five; these five were to choose a hundred, and each of the hundred was to co-opt three others. The Four Hundred thus selected were to meet in the council-chamber; they were to have absolute authority, and might govern as they deemed best; the Five Thousand were to be summoned by them whenever they chose.

[68] The mover of this proposal, and to outward appearance the most active partisan of the revolution, was Peisander, but the real author and maturer of the whole scheme, who had been longest interested in it, was Antiphon, a man inferior in virtue to none of his contemporaries, and possessed of remarkable powers of thought and gifts of speech. He did not like to come forward in the assembly, or in any other public arena. To the multitude, who were suspicious of his great abilities, he was an object of dislike; but there was no man who could do more for any who consulted him, whether their business lay in the courts of justice or in the assembly. And when the government of the Four Hundred was overthrown and became exposed to the vengeance of the people, and he being accused of taking part in the plot had to speak in his own case, his defence was undoubtedly the best ever made by any man tried on a capital charge down to my time. Phrynichus also showed extraordinary zeal in the interests of the oligarchy. He was afraid of Alcibiades, whom he knew to be cognisant of the intrigue which when at Samos he had carried on with Astyochus, and he thought that no oligarchy would ever be likely to restore him. Having once set his hand to the work he was deemed by the others to be the man upon whom they could best depend in the hour of danger. Another chief leader of the revolutionary party was Theramenes the son of Hagnon, a good speaker and a sagacious man. No wonder then that, in the hands of all these able men, the attempt, however arduous, succeeded. For an easy thing it certainly

was not, about one hundred years after the fall of the tyrants, to destroy the liberties of the Athenians, who not only were a free, but during more than one half of this time had been an imperial people.

[69] The assembly passed all these measures without a dissentient voice, and was then dissolved. And now the Four Hundred were introduced into the council-chamber. The manner was as follows: — The whole population were always on service, either manning the walls or drawn up at their places of arms, for the enemy were at Decelea. On the day of the assembly those who were not in the conspiracy were allowed to go home as usual, while the conspirators were quietly told to remain, not actually by their arms, but at a short distance; if anybody opposed what was doing they were to arm and interfere. There were also on the spot some Andrians and Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and some of the Athenian colonists from Aegina, who received similar instructions; they had all been told to bring with them from their homes their own arms for this especial purpose. Having disposed their forces the Four Hundred arrived, every one with a dagger concealed about his person, and with them a bodyguard of a hundred and twenty Hellenic youths whose services they used for any act of violence which they had in hand. They broke in upon the council of five hundred as they sat in the council-chamber, and told them to take their pay and begone. They had brought with them the pay of the senators for the remainder of their yearly term of office, which they handed to them as they went out.

[70] In this manner the council retired without offering any remonstrance; and the rest of the citizens kept perfectly quiet and made no counter-movement. The Four Hundred then installed themselves in the council-chamber; for the present they elected by lot Prytanes of their own number, and did all that was customary in the way of prayers and sacrifices to the Gods at their entrance into office. Soon however they wholly changed the democratic system; and

although they did not recall the exiles, because Alcibiades was one of them, they governed the city with a high hand. Some few whom they thought would be better out of the way were put to death by them, others imprisoned, others again exiled. They also sent heralds to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, who was at Decelea, saying that they desired to conclude a peace with him; and that they expected him to be more ready to treat with them than with the perfidious democracy.

[71] But he, thinking that the city must be in an unsettled state and that the people would not so quickly yield up their ancient liberty, thinking too that the appearance of a great Lacedaemonian army would increase their excitement, and far from convinced that civil strife was not at that very moment raging among them, gave unfavourable answers to the envoys of the Four Hundred. He sent to Peloponnesus for large reinforcements, and then, with the garrison at Decelea and the newly arrived troops, came down in person to the very walls of Athens. He expected that the Athenians, distracted by civil strife, would be quite at his mercy; there would be such a panic created by the presence of enemies both within and without the walls, that he might even succeed in taking the city at the first onset; for the Long Walls would be deserted, and he could not fail of capturing them. But when he drew near there was no sign of the slightest disorder within; the Athenians, sending out their cavalry and a force of heavy and light-armed troops and archers, struck down a few of his soldiers who had ventured too far, and retained possession of some arms and dead bodies; whereupon, having found out his mistake, he withdrew to Decelea. There he and the garrison remained at their posts; but he ordered the newly arrived troops, after they had continued a few days in Attica, to return home. The Four Hundred resumed negotiations, and Agis was now more ready to listen to them. At his suggestion they sent envoys to Lacedaemon in the hope of coming to terms.

[72] They also sent ten commissioners to Samos, who were to pacify the army, and to explain that the oligarchy was not established with any design of injuring Athens or her citizens, but for the preservation of the whole state. The promoters of the change, they said, were five thousand, not four hundred; but never hitherto, owing to the pressure of war and of business abroad, had so many as five thousand assembled to deliberate even on the most important questions. They instructed them to say anything else which would have a good effect, and sent them on their mission as soon as they themselves were installed in the government. For they were afraid, and not without reason as the event showed, that the Athenian sailors would be impatient of the oligarchical system, and that disaffection would begin at Samos and end in their own overthrow.

[73] At the very time when the Four Hundred were establishing themselves at Athens, a reaction had set in against the oligarchical movement at Samos. Some Samians of the popular party, which had originally risen up against the nobles, had changed sides again when Peisander came to the island and, persuaded by him and his Athenian accomplices at Samos, had formed a body of three hundred conspirators and prepared to attack the rest of the popular party who had previously been their comrades. There was a certain Hyperbolus, an Athenian of no character, who, not for any fear of his power and influence, but for his villany, and because the city was ashamed of him, had been ostracised. This man was assassinated by them, and they were abetted in the act by Charminus, one of the generals, and by certain of the Athenians at Samos, to whom they pledged their faith. They also joined these Athenians in other deeds of violence, and were eager to fall upon the popular party. But the people, discovering their intention, gave information to the generals Leon and Diomedon, who were impatient of the attempted oligarchy because they were respected by the multitude, to Thrasybulus and

Thrasyllus, one of whom was a trierarch and the other a private soldier, and to others who were thought to be the steadiest opponents of the oligarchical movement. They entreated them not to allow the Samian people to be destroyed, and the island of Samos, without which the Athenian empire would never have lasted until then, to be estranged. Thereupon the generals went to the soldiers one by one, and begged them to interfere, addressing themselves especially to the Parali, or crew of the ship Paralus, all freeborn Athenians, who were at any time ready to attack oligarchy, real or imaginary. Leon and Diomedon, whenever they sailed to any other place, left some ships for the protection of the Samians. And so, when the three hundred began the attack, all the crews, especially the Parali, hastened to the rescue, and the popular party gained the victory. Of the three hundred they slew about thirty, and the three most guilty were banished; the rest they forgave, and henceforward all lived together under a democracy.

[74] Chaereas the son of Archestratus, an Athenian, who had been active in the movement, was quickly despatched in the ship Paralus by the Samians and the army to Athens, there to report the defeat of the Samian oligarchy, for as yet they did not know that the government was in the hands of the Four Hundred. No sooner had he arrived than the Four Hundred imprisoned two or three of the Parali, and taking away their ship transferred the rest of the crew to a troop-ship which was ordered to keep guard about Euboea. Chaereas, seeing promptly how matters stood, had contrived to steal away and get back to Samos, where he told the soldiers with much aggravation the news from Athens, how they were punishing everybody with stripes, and how no one might speak a word against the government; he declared that their wives and children were being outraged, and that the oligarchy were going to take the relations of all the men serving at Samos who were not of their faction and shut

them up, intending, if the fleet did not submit, to put them to death. And he added a great many other falsehoods.

[75] When the army heard his report they instantly rushed upon the chief authors of the recent oligarchy who were present, and their confederates, and tried to stone them. But they were deterred by the warnings of the moderate party, who begged them not to ruin everything by violence while the enemy were lying close to them, prow threatening prow. Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, who were the chief leaders of the reaction, now thought that the time had come for the open proclamation of democracy among the Athenians at Samos, and they bound the soldiers, more especially those of the oligarchical party, by the most solemn oaths to maintain a democracy and be of one mind, to prosecute vigorously the war with Peloponnesus, to be enemies to the Four hundred, and to hold no parley with them by heralds. All the Samians who were of full age took the same oath, and the Athenian soldiers determined to make common cause with the Samians in their troubles and dangers, and invited them to share their fortunes. They considered that neither the Samians nor themselves had any place of refuge to which they could turn, but that, whether the Four Hundred or their enemies at Miletus gained the day, they were doomed.

[76] There was now an obstinate struggle; the one party determined to force democracy upon the city, the other to force oligarchy upon the fleet. The soldiers proceeded to summon an assembly, at which they deposed their former generals, and any trierarchs whom they suspected, and chose others. Among the new generals Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus naturally found a place. One after another the men rose and encouraged their comrades by various arguments. ‘We ought not to despond,’ they said, ‘because the city has revolted from us, for they are few and we are many; they have lost us and not we them, and our resources are far greater. Having the whole navy with us we can

compel the subject-states to pay us tribute as well as if we sailed forth from the Piraeus; Samos is our own — no weak city, but one which in the Samian war all but wrested from Athens the dominion of the sea; and the position which we hold against our Peloponnesian enemies is as strong as heretofore. And again, with the help of the fleet we are better able to obtain supplies than the Athenians at home. Indeed the only reason why the citizens have so long retained the command of the Piraeus is that we who are stationed at Samos are the advanced guard of the Piraeus itself. And now if they will not agree to give us back the constitution, it will come to this — that we shall be better able to drive them off the sea than they us. The help which the city gives us against our enemies is poor and worthless; and we have lost nothing in losing them. They have no longer any money to send' (the soldiers were supplying themselves). 'They cannot aid us by good counsel; and yet for what other reason do states exercise authority over armies? But in this respect too they are useless. They have gone altogether astray, and overthrown the constitution of their country, which we maintain and will endeavour to make the oligarchy maintain likewise. Our advisers in the camp then are at least as good as theirs in the city. Alcibiades, if we procure his recall and pardon, will be delighted to obtain for us the alliance of the King. And above all, if these hopes fail entirely, yet, while we have our great navy, there are many places of refuge open to us in which we shall find city and lands.'

[77] Having met and encouraged one another by these and similar appeals, they displayed a corresponding energy in their preparations for war. And the ten commissioners whom the Four Hundred had sent out to Samos, hearing when they reached Delos how matters stood, went no further.

[78] Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Miletus had likewise troubles among themselves. The sailors complained loudly to one another that their cause was

ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes. ‘Astyochus,’ they said, `refused to fight before, while we were strong and the Athenian navy weak, and will not fight now when they are reported to be in a state of anarchy, and their fleet is not as yet united. We are kept waiting for Tissaphernes and the Phoenician ships, which are a mere pretence and nothing more, and we shall soon be utterly exhausted. Tissaphernes never brings up the promised reinforcement, and he destroys our navy by his scanty and irregular payments: the time has come when we must fight.’ The Syracusans were especially vehement in the matter.

[79] Astyochus and the allies became aware of the outcry, and had resolved in council to fight a decisive battle. This resolution was confirmed when they heard of the confusion at Samos. So they put to sea with all their ships, in number a hundred and twelve, and ordering the Milesians to march along the coast towards Mycalè, sailed thither themselves. But the Athenians with their fleet of eighty-two ships, which had come out of Samos and were just then moored at Glaucè on the promontory of Mycalè, a point of the mainland not far off, saw the Peloponnesians bearing down upon them, and returned, thinking that with their inferior numbers they were not justified in risking their all. Besides, having previous information from Miletus that the Peloponnesians were anxious to fight, they had sent a messenger to Strombichides at the Hellespont, and were waiting for him to come to their aid with the ships from Chios which had gone to Abydos. So they retreated to Samos, and the Peloponnesians sailed for Mycalè and there established themselves, together with the land-forces of Miletus and of the neighbouring cities. On the following day they were on the point of attacking Samos, when news came that Strombichides had arrived with the fleet from the Hellespont; whereupon the Peloponnesians immediately retired towards Miletus, and the Athenians themselves, thus reinforced, sailed against Miletus with a hundred and eight

ships. They had hoped to fight a decisive battle, but no one came out to meet them, and they returned to Samos.

[80] The Peloponnesians had not gone out because they thought that even with their united force they could not risk a battle. But not knowing how to maintain so large a fleet, especially since Tissaphernes never paid them properly, they at once while the summer lasted sent Clearchus the son of Rhamphias with forty ships to Pharnabazus, this being the commission which he had originally received from Peloponnesus. Pharnabazus had been inviting them to come, and promised to maintain them; the Byzantians likewise had been sending envoys to them proposing to revolt. The Peloponnesian squadron put out into the open sea that they might not be seen on their voyage by the Athenians. They were caught in a storm; Clearchus and most of his ships found refuge at Delos, and thence returned to Miletus. He himself proceeded later by land to the Hellespont and assumed his command. But ten ships under Helixus of Megara arrived safely, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Samos, receiving information of these movements, sent a naval force to guard the Hellespont; and off Byzantium a small engagement was fought by eight ships against eight.

[81] Ever since Thrasybulus restored the democracy at Samos he had strongly insisted that Alcibiades should be recalled; the other Athenian leaders were of the same mind, and at last the consent of the army was obtained at an assembly which voted his return and full pardon. Thrasybulus then sailed to Tissaphernes, and brought Alcibiades to Samos, convinced that there was no help for the Athenians unless by his means Tissaphernes could be drawn away from the Peloponnesians. An assembly was called, at which Alcibiades lamented the cruel and unjust fate which had banished him; he then spoke at length of their political prospects; and bright indeed were the hopes of future victory with which he inspired them, while he

magnified to excess his present influence over Tissaphernes. He meant thereby first to frighten the oligarchy at home, and effect the dissolution of their clubs; and secondly, to exalt himself in the eyes of the army at Samos and fortify their resolution; thirdly, to widen the breach between Tissaphernes and the enemy, and blast the hopes of the Lacedaemonians. Having these objects in view, Alcibiades carried his fulsome assurances to the utmost. Tissaphernes, he said, had promised him that if he could only trust the Athenians they should not want for food while he had anything to give, no not if he were driven at last to turn his own bed into money; that he would bring up the Phoenician ships (which were already at Aspendus) to assist the Athenians instead of the Peloponnesians; but that he could not trust the Athenians unless Alcibiades were restored and became surety for them.

[82] Hearing all this, and a great deal more, the Athenians immediately appointed him a colleague of their other generals, and placed everything in his hands; no man among them would have given up for all the world the hope of deliverance and of vengeance on the Four Hundred which was now aroused in them; so excited were they that under the influence of his words they despised the Peloponnesians, and were ready to sail at once for the Piraeus. But in spite of the eagerness of the multitude he absolutely forbade them to go thither and leave behind them enemies nearer at hand. Having been elected general, he said, he would make the conduct of the war his first care, and go at once to Tissaphernes. And he went straight from the assembly, in order that he might be thought to do nothing without Tissaphernes; at the same time he wished to be honoured in the eyes of Tissaphernes himself, and to show him that he had now been chosen general, and that a time had come when he could do him a good or a bad turn. Thus Alcibiades frightened the Athenians with Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.

[83] The Peloponnesians at Miletus, who had already conceived a mistrust of Tissaphernes, when they heard of the restoration of Alcibiades were still more exasperated against him. About the time of the advance in force of the Athenians on Miletus, Tissaphernes, observing that the Peloponnesians would not put out to sea and fight with them, had become much more remiss in paying the fleet; and previously to this a dislike of him, arising out of his connexion with Alcibiades, had gained ground. He was now more hated than ever. As before, the soldiers began to gather in knots and to express discontent; and not only the soldiers, but some men of position complained that they had never yet received their full pay, and that the sum given was too small, while even this was irregularly paid; if nobody would fight, or go where food could be got, the men would desert. All these grievances they laid to the charge of Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for his own gain.

[84] While these thoughts were passing in their minds the behaviour of Astyochus gave occasion to an outbreak. The Syracusan and Thurian sailors were for the most part free men, and therefore bolder than the rest in assailing him with demands for pay. Astyochus answered them roughly and threatened them; he even raised his stick against Dorieus of Thurii who was pleading the cause of his own sailors. When the men saw the action they, sailor-like, lost all control of themselves, and rushed upon him, intending to stone him; but he, perceiving what was coming, ran to an altar, where taking refuge he escaped unhurt, and they were parted. The Milesians, who were likewise discontented, captured by a sudden assault a fort which had been built in Miletus by Tissaphernes, and drove out the garrison which he had placed there. Of this proceeding the allies approved, especially the Syracusans; Lichas, however, was displeased, and said that the Milesians and the inhabitants of the King’s country should submit to the necessary humiliation, and manage to keep on good terms with Tissaphernes until the

war was well over. His conduct on this and on other occasions excited a strong feeling against him among the Milesians; and afterwards, when he fell sick and died, they would not let him be buried where his Lacedaemonian comrades would have laid him.

[85] While the Lacedaemonians were quarrelling in this manner with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon; he had been appointed to succeed Astyochus, who surrendered to him the command of the fleet and sailed home. Tissaphernes sent with him an envoy, one of his own attendants, a Carian named Gaulites, who spoke both Greek and Persian. He was instructed to complain of the destruction of the fort by the Milesians, and also to defend Tissaphernes against their charges. For he knew that Milesian envoys were going to Sparta chiefly to accuse him, and Hermocrates with them, who would explain how he, aided by Alcibiades, was playing a double game and ruining the Peloponnesian cause. Now Tissaphernes owed Hermocrates a grudge ever since they quarrelled about the payment of the sailors. And when afterwards he had been exiled from Syracuse, and other generals, Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus, came to take the command of the Syracusan ships at Miletus, Tissaphernes attacked him with still greater violence in his exile, declaring among other things that Hermocrates had asked him for money and had been refused, and that this was the reason of the enmity which he conceived against him. And so Astyochus, the Milesians, and Hermocrates sailed away to Lacedaemon. Alcibiades had by this time returned from Tissaphernes to Samos.

[86] The envoys whom the Four Hundred had sent to pacify the army and give explanations left Delos and came to Samos after the return of Alcibiades, and an assembly was held at which they endeavoured to speak. At first the soldiers would not listen to them, but shouted ‘Death to the subverters of the democracy.’ When quiet had been with

difficulty restored, the envoys told them that the change was not meant for the destruction but for the preservation of the state, and that there was no intention of betraying Athens to the enemy, which might have been effected by the new government already if they had pleased during the recent invasion. They declared that all the Five Thousand were in turn to have a share in the administration; and that the families of the sailors were not being outraged, as Chaereas slanderously reported, or in any way molested; they were living quietly in their several homes. They defended themselves at length, but the more they said, the more furious and unwilling to listen grew the multitude. Various proposals were made; above all they wanted to sail to the Piraeus. Then Alcibiades appears to have done as eminent a service to the state as any man ever did. For if the Athenians at Samos in their excitement had been allowed to sail against their fellow-citizens, the enemy would instantly have obtained possession of Ionia and the Hellespont. This he prevented, and at that moment no one else could have restrained the multitude: but he did restrain them, and with sharp words protected the envoys against the fury of individuals in the crowd. He then dismissed them himself with the reply that he had nothing to say against the rule of the Five Thousand, but that the Four Hundred must be got rid of, and the old council of Five Hundred restored. If they had reduced the expenditure in order that the soldiers on service might be better off for supplies, he highly approved. For the rest he entreated them to stand firm, and not give way to the enemy; if the city was preserved, there was good hope that they might be reconciled amongst themselves, but if once anything happened either to the army at Samos or to their fellow-citizens at home, there would be no one left to be reconciled with.

There were also present envoys from Argos, who proffered their aid ‘to the Athenian people at Samos.’ Alcibiades complimented them, and requested them to come with their

forces when they were summoned; he then dismissed them. These Argives came with the Parali who had been ordered by the Four Hundred to cruise off Euboea in a troop-ship; they were afterwards employed in conveying to Lacedaemon certain envoys sent by the Four Hundred, Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias. But when they were near Argos on their voyage the crews seized the envoys, and, as they were among the chief authors of the revolution, delivered them over to the Argives; while they, instead of returning to Athens, went from Argos to Samos, and brought with them in their trireme the Argive ambassadors.

[87] During the same summer, and just at the time when the Peloponnesians were most offended with Tissaphernes on various grounds, and above all on account of the restoration of Alcibiades, which finally proved him to be a partisan of the Athenians, he, as if he were wanting to clear himself of these suspicions, prepared to go to Aspendus and fetch the Phoenician ships; and he desired Lichas to go with him. He also said that he would assign the charge of the army to his lieutenant Tamos, who would provide for them during his absence. Why he went to Aspendus, and having gone there never brought the ships, is a question not easy to answer, and which has been answered in various ways. For the Phoenician fleet of a hundred and forty-seven ships came as far as Aspendus — there is no doubt about this; but why they never came further is matter of conjecture. Some think that, in going to Aspendus, Tissaphernes was still pursuing his policy of wearing out the Peloponnesians; at any rate Tamos, who was in charge, supplied them no better, but rather worse. Others are of opinion that he brought up the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus in order to make money by selling the crews their discharge; for he certainly had no idea of using them in actual service. Others think that he was influenced by the outcry against him which had reached Lacedaemon; and that he wanted to create an impression of his honesty: ‘Now at any rate he has gone to fetch the ships,

and they are really manned.’ I believe beyond all question that he wanted to wear out and to neutralise the Hellenic forces; his object was to damage them both while he was losing time in going to Aspendus, and to paralyse their action, and not strengthen either of them by his alliance. For if he had chosen to finish the war, finished it might have been once for all, as any one may see: he would have brought up the ships, and would in all probability have given the victory to the Lacedaemonians, who lay opposite to the Athenians and were fully a match for them already. The excuse which he gave for not bringing them is the most conclusive evidence against him; he said that there was not as many collected as the King had commanded. But if so, the King would have been all the better pleased, for his money would have been saved and Tissaphernes would have accomplished the same result at less expense. Whatever may have been his intention, Tissaphernes came to Aspendus and conferred with the Phoenicians, and the Peloponnescans at his request sent Philip, a Lacedaemonian, with two triremes to fetch the ships:

[88] Alcibiades, when he learned that Tissaphernes was going to Aspendus, sailed thitherward himself with thirteen ships, promising the army at Samos that he would not fail to do them a great service. He would either bring the Phoenician ships to the Athenians, or, at any rate, make sure that they did not join the Peloponnesians. He had probably known all along the real mind of Tissaphernes, and that he never meant to bring them at all. He wanted further to injure him as much as possible in the opinion of the Peloponnesians when they observed how friendly Tissaphernes was towards himself and the Athenians; their distrust would compel him to change sides. So he set sail and went on his voyage eastward, making directly for Phaselis and Caunus.

[89] The commissioners sent by the Four Hundred returned from Samos to Athens and reported the words of Alcibiades — how he bade them stand firm and not give way to the enemy, and what great hopes he entertained of reconciling the army to the city, and of overcoming the Peloponnesians. The greater number of the oligarchs, who were already dissatisfied, and would have gladly got out of the whole affair if they safely could, were now much encouraged. They began to come together and to criticise the conduct of affairs. Their leaders were some of the oligarchical generals and actually in office at the time, for example, Theramenes the son of Hagnon and Aristocrates the son of Scellius. They had been among the chief authors of the revolution, but now, fearing, as they urged, the army at Samos, and being in good earnest afraid of Alcibiades, fearing also lest their colleagues, who were sending envoys to Lacedaemon, might, unauthorised by the majority, betray the city, they did not indeed openly profess that they meant to get rid of extreme oligarchy, but they maintained that the Five Thousand should be established in reality and not in name, and the constitution made more equal. This was the political phrase of which they availed themselves, but the truth was that most of them were given up to private ambition of that sort which is more fatal than anything to an oligarchy succeeding a democracy. For the instant an oligarchy is established the promoters of it disdain mere equality, and everybody thinks that he ought to be far above everybody else. Whereas in a democracy, when an election is made, a man is less disappointed at a failure because he has not been competing with his equals. The influence which most sensibly affected them were the great power of Alcibiades at Samos, and an impression that the oligarchy was not likely to be permanent. Accordingly every one was struggling hard to be the first champion of the people himself.

[90] The leading men among the Four Hundred most violently opposed to the restoration of democracy were

Phrynichus, who had been general at Samos, and had there come into antagonism with Alcibiades, Aristarchus, a man who had always been the most thorough-going enemy of the people, Peisander, and Antiphon. These and the other leaders, both at the first establishment of the oligarchy, and again later when the army at Samos declared for the democracy, sent envoys of their own number to Lacedaemon, and were always anxious to make peace; meanwhile they continued the fortification which they had begun to build at Eetionea. They were confirmed in their purposes after the return of their own ambassadors from Samos; for they saw that not only the people, but even those who had appeared steadfast adherents of their own party, were now changing their minds. So, fearing what might happen both at Athens and Samos, they sent Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten others, in great haste, authorising them to make peace with Lacedaemon upon anything like tolerable terms; at the same time they proceeded more diligently than ever with the fortification of Eetionea. The design was (so Theramenes and his party averred) not to bar the Piraeus against the fleet at Samos should they sail thither with hostile intentions, but rather to admit the enemy with his sea and land forces whenever they pleased. This Eetionea is the mole of the Piraeus and forms one side of the entrance; the new fortification was to be so connected with the previously existing wall, which looked towards the land, that a handful of men stationed between the two walls might command the approach from the sea. For the old wall looking towards the land, and the new inner wall in process of construction facing the water, ended at the same point in one of the two forts which protected the narrow mouth of the harbour: A cross-wall was added, taking in the largest storehouse in the Piraeus and the nearest to the new fortification, which it joined; this the authorities held themselves, and commanded every one to deposit their corn there, not only what came in by sea but what they had

on the spot, and to take from thence all that they wanted to sell.

[91] For some time Theramenes had been circulating whispers of their designs, and when the envoys returned from Lacedaemon without having effected anything in the nature of a treaty for the Athenian people, he declared that this fort was likely to prove the ruin of Athens. Now the Euboeans had requested the Peloponnesians to send them a fleet, and just at this time two and forty ships, including Italian vessels from Tarentum and Locri and a few from Sicily, were stationed at Las in Laconia, and were making ready to sail to Euboea under the command of Agesandridas the son of Agesander, a Spartan. Theramenes insisted that these ships were intended, not for Euboea, but for the party who were fortifying Eetionea, and that, if the people were not on the alert, they would be undone before they knew where they were. The charge was not a mere calumny, but had some foundation in the disposition of the ruling party. For what would have best pleased them would have been, retaining the oligarchy in any case, to have preserved the Athenian empire over the allies; failing this, to keep merely their ships and walls, and to be independent; if this too proved impracticable, at any rate they would not see democracy restored, and themselves fall the first victims, but would rather bring in the enemy and come to terms with them, not caring if thereby the city lost walls and ships and everything else, provided that they could save their own lives.

[92] So they worked diligently at the fort, which had entrances and postern-gates and every facility for introducing the enemy, and did their best to finish the building in time. As yet the murmurs of discontent had been secret and confined to a few; when suddenly Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to Lacedaemon, in a full market-place, having just quitted the council-chamber, was struck by an assassin, one of the force employed in guarding

the frontier, and fell dead. The man who dealt the blow escaped; his accomplice, an Argive, was seized and put to the torture by order of the Four Hundred, but did not disclose any name or say who had instigated the deed. All he would confess was that a number of persons used to assemble at the house of the commander of the frontier guard, and in other houses. No further measures followed; and so Theramenes and Aristocrates, and the other citizens, whether members of the Four Hundred or not, who were of the same mind, were emboldened to take decided steps. For the Peloponnesians had already sailed round from Las, and having overrun Aegina had cast anchor at Epidaurus; and Theramenes insisted that if they had been on their way to Euboea they would never have gone up the Saronic gulf to Aegina and then returned and anchored at Epidaurus, but that some one had invited them for the purposes which he had always alleged; it was impossible therefore to be any longer indifferent. After many insinuations and inflammatory harangues, the people began to take active measures. The hoplites who were at work on the fortification of Eetionea in the Piraeus, among whom was Aristocrates with his own tribe, which, as taxiarch, he commanded, seized Alexicles, an oligarchical general who had been most concerned with the clubs, and shut him up in a house. Others joined in the act, including one Hermon, who commanded the Peripoli stationed at Munychia; above all, the rank and file of the hoplites heartily approved. The Four Hundred, who were assembled in the council-house when the news was brought to them, were ready in a moment to take up arms, except Theramenes and his associates, who disapproved of their proceedings; to these they began to use threats. Theramenes protested, and offered to go with them at once and rescue Alexicles. So, taking one of the generals who was of his own faction, he went down to the Piraeus. Aristarchus and certain young knights came also to the scene of action. Great and bewildering was the tumult, for in the city the

people fancied that the Piraeus was in the hands of the insurgents, and that their prisoner had been killed, and the inhabitants of the Piraeus that they were on the point of being attacked from the city. The elder men with difficulty restrained the citizens, who were running up and down and flying to arms. Thucydides of Pharsalus, the proxenus of Athens in that city, happening to be on the spot, kept throwing himself in every man’s way and loudly entreating the people, when the enemy was lying in wait so near, not to destroy their country. At length they were pacified, and refrained from laying hands on one another. Theramenes, who was himself a general, came to the Piraeus, and in an angry voice pretended to rate the soldiers, while Aristarchus and the party opposed to the people were furious. No effect was produced on the mass of the hoplites, who were for going to work at once. They began asking Theramenes if he thought that the fort was being built to any good end, and whether it would not be better demolished. He answered that, if they thought so, he thought so too. And immediately the hoplites and a crowd of men from the Piraeus got on the walls and began to pull them down. The cry addressed to the people was, ‘Whoever wishes the Five Thousand to rule and not the Four Hundred, let him come and help us.’ For they still veiled their real minds under the name of the Five Thousand, and did not venture to say outright ‘Whoever wishes the people to rule’: they feared that the Five Thousand might actually exist, and that a man speaking in ignorance to his neighbour might get into trouble. The Four Hundred therefore did not wish the Five Thousand either to exist or to be known not to exist, thinking that to give so many a share in the government would be downright democracy, while at the same time the mystery tended to make the people afraid of one another.

[93] The next day the Four Hundred, although much disturbed, met in the council-chamber. Meanwhile the hoplites in the Piraeus let go Alexicles whom they had

seized, and having demolished the fort went to the theatre of Dionysus near Munychia; there piling arms they held an assembly, and resolved to march at once to the city, which they accordingly did, and again piled arms in the temple of the Dioscuri. Presently deputies appeared sent by the Four Hundred. These conversed with them singly, and tried to persuade the more reasonable part of them to keep quiet and restrain their comrades, promising that they would publish the names of the Five Thousand, and that out of these the Four Hundred should be in turn elected in such a manner as the Five Thousand might think fit. In the meantime they begged them not to ruin everything; or to drive the city upon the enemy. The discussion became general on both sides, and at length the whole body of soldiers grew calmer, and turned their thoughts to the danger which threatened the commonwealth. They finally agreed that an assembly should be held on a fixed day in the theatre of Dionysus to deliberate on the restoration of harmony.

[94] When the day arrived and the assembly was on the point of meeting in the theatre of Dionysus, news came that Agesandridas and his forty-two ships had crossed over from Megara, and were sailing along the coast of Salamis. Every man of the popular party thought that this was what they had been so often told by Theramenes and his friends, and that the ships were sailing to the fort, happily now demolished. Nor is it impossible that Agesandridas may have been hovering about Epidaurus and the neighbourhood by agreement; but it is equally likely that he lingered there of his own accord, with an eye to the agitation which prevailed at Athens, hoping to be on the spot at the critical moment. Instantly upon the arrival of the news the whole city rushed down to the Piraeus, thinking that a conflict with their enemies more serious than their domestic strife was now awaiting them, not at a distance, but at the very mouth of the harbour. Some embarked in the ships

which were lying ready; others launched fresh ships; others manned the walls and prepared to defend the entrance of the Piraeus.

[95] The Peloponnesian squadron, however, sailed onward, doubled the promontory of Sunium, and then, after putting in between Thoricus and Prasiae, finally proceeded to Oropus. The Athenians in their haste were compelled to employ crews not yet trained to work together, for the city was in a state of revolution, and the matter was vital and urgent; Euboea was all in all to them now that they were shut out from Attica. They despatched a fleet under the command of Thymochares to Eretria; these ships, added to those which were at Euboea before, made up thirty-six. No sooner had they arrived than they were constrained to fight; for Agesandridas, after his men had taken their midday meal, brought out his own ships from Oropus, which is distant by sea about seven miles from the city of Eretria, and bore down upon them. The Athenians at once began to man their ships, fancying that their crews were close at hand; but it had been so contrived that they were getting their provisions from houses at the end of the town, and not in the market, for the Eretrians intentionally sold nothing there that the men might lose time in embarking; the enemy would then come upon them before they were ready, and they would be compelled to put out as best they could. A signal was also raised at Eretria telling the fleet at Oropus when to attack. The Athenians putting out in this hurried manner, and fighting off the harbour of Eretria, nevertheless resisted for a little while, but before long they fled and were pursued to the shore. Those of them who took refuge in the city of Eretria, relying on the friendship of the inhabitants, fared worst, for they were butchered by them; but such as gained the fortified position which the Athenians held in the Eretrian territory escaped, and also the crews of the vessels which reached Chalcis. The Peloponnesians, who had taken twenty-two Athenian ships and had killed or made prisoners

of the men, erected a trophy. Not long afterwards they induced all Euboea to revolt, except Oreus of which the Athenians still maintained possession. They then set in order the affairs of the island.

[96] When the news of the battle and of the defection of Euboea was brought to Athens, the Athenians were panic-stricken. Nothing which had happened before, not even the ruin of the Sicilian expedition, however overwhelming at the time, had so terrified them. The army at Samos was in insurrection; they had no ships in reserve or crews to man them; there was revolution at home — civil war might break out at any moment; and by this new and terrible misfortune they had lost, not only their ships, but what was worse, Euboea, on which they were more dependent for supplies than on Attica itself. Had they not reason to despair? But what touched them nearest, and most agitated their minds, was the fear lest their enemies, emboldened by victory, should at once attack the Piraeus, in which no ships were left; indeed they fancied that they were all but there. And had the Peloponnesians been a little more enterprising they could easily have executed such a plan. Either they might have cruised near, and would then have aggravated the divisions in the city; or by remaining and carrying on a blockade they might have compelled the fleet in Ionia, although hostile to the oligarchy, to come and assist their kindred and their native city; and then the Hellespont, Ionia, all the islands between Ionia and Euboea, in a word, the whole Athenian empire, would have fallen into their hands. But on this as on so many other occasions the Lacedaemonians proved themselves to be the most convenient enemies whom the Athenians could possibly have had. For the two peoples were of very different tempers; the one quick, the other slow; the one adventurous, the other timorous; and the Lacedaemonian character was of great service to the Athenians, the more so because the empire for which they were fighting was

maritime. And this view is confirmed by the defeat of the Athenians at Syracuse; for the Syracusans, who were most like them, fought best against them.

[97] When the news came the Athenians in their extremity still contrived to man twenty ships, and immediately summoned an assembly (the first of many) in the place called the Pnyx, where they had always been in the habit of meeting; at which assembly they deposed the Four Hundred, and voted that the government should be in the hands of the Five Thousand; this number was to include all who could furnish themselves with arms. No one was to receive pay for holding any office, on pain of falling under a curse. In the numerous other assemblies which were afterwards held they appointed Nomothetae, and by a series of decrees established a constitution. This government during its early days was the best which the Athenians ever enjoyed within my memory. Oligarchy and Democracy were duly attempered. And thus after the miserable state into which she had fallen, the city was again able to raise her head. The people also passed a vote recalling Alcibiades and others from exile, and sending to him and to the army in Samos exhorted them to act vigorously.

[98] When this new revolution began, Peisander, Alexicles, and the other leaders of the oligarchy stole away to Decelea; all except Aristarchus, who, being one of the generals at the time, gathered round him hastily a few archers of the most barbarous sort and made his way to Oenoè. This was an Athenian fort on the borders of Boeotia which the Corinthians, having called the Boeotians to their aid, were now besieging on their own account, in order to revenge an overthrow inflicted by the garrison of Oenoè upon a party of them who were going home from Decelea. Aristarchus entered into communication with the besiegers, and deceived the garrison by telling them that the Athenian government had come to terms with the Lacedaemonians, and that by one of the conditions of the peace they were

required to give up the place to the Boeotians. They, trusting him, whom they knew to be a general, and being in entire ignorance of what had happened because they were closely invested, capitulated and came out. Thus Oenoè was taken and occupied by the Boeotians; and the oligarchical revolution at Athens came to an end.

[99] During this summer and about the same time Mindarus transferred the fleet of the Peloponnesians to the Hellespont. They had been waiting at Miletus. But none of the commissioners whom Tissaphernes on going to Aspendus appointed to supply the fleet gave them anything; and neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes himself had as yet made their appearance; Philip, who had been sent with Tissaphernes, and Hippocrates, a Spartan then in Phaselis, had informed the admiral Mindarus that the ships would never come, and that Tissaphernes was thoroughly dishonest in his dealings with them. All this time Pharnabazus was inviting them and was eager to secure the assistance of the fleet; he wanted, like Tissaphernes, to raise a revolt, whereby he hoped to profit, among the cities in his own dominion which still remained faithful to Athens. So at length Mindarus, in good order and giving the signal suddenly, lest he should be discovered by the Athenians at Samos, put to sea from Miletus with seventy-three ships, and set sail for the Hellespont, whither in this same summer a Peloponnesian force had already gone in sixteen ships, and had overrun a portion of the Chersonese. But meeting with a storm Mindarus was driven into Icarus, and being detained there five or six days by stress of weather, he put in at Chios.

[100] When Thrasyllus at Samos heard that he had started from Miletus he sailed away in all haste with fifty-five ships, fearing that the enemy might get into the Hellespont before him. Observing that Mindarus was at Chios, and thinking that he could keep him there, he placed scouts at Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, that he might be informed if the ships made any attempt to sail away. He himself coasted

along the island to Methymna and ordered a supply of barley-meal and other provisions, intending, if he were long detained, to make Lesbos his head-quarters while attacking Chios. He wanted also to sail against the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had revolted, and, if possible, to destroy the place. Now certain of the chief citizens of Methymna who had been driven into exile had conveyed to the island about fifty hoplites, partisans of theirs, from Cymè, besides others whom they hired on the mainland, to the number of three hundred in all. They were commanded by Anaxander, a Theban, who was chosen leader because the Lesbians were of Theban descent. They first of all attacked Methymna. In this attempt they were foiled by the timely arrival of the Athenian garrison from Mytilenè, and being a second time repulsed outside the walls, had marched over the mountains and induced Eresus to revolt. Thither Thrasyllus sailed, having determined to attack them with all his ships. He found that Thrasybulus had already reached the place, having started from Samos with five ships as soon as he heard that the exiles had landed. But he had come too late to prevent the revolt, and was lying off Eresus. There Thrasyllus was also joined by two ships which were on their way home from the Hellespont, and by a squadron from Methymna. The whole fleet now consisted of sixty-seven ships, from the crews of which the generals formed an army, and prepared by the help of engines and by every possible means to take Eresus.

[101] Meanwhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, having spent two days in provisioning, and having received from the Chians three Chian tesseracosts for each man, on the third day sailed hastily from Chios, not going through the open sea, lest they should fall in with the ships blockading Eresus, but making directly for the mainland and keeping Lesbos on the left. They touched at the harbour of the island Carteria, which belongs to Phocaea, and there taking their midday meal, sailed past the Cymaean territory,

and supped at Argennusae on the mainland over against Mytilenè. They sailed away some time before dawn, and at Harmatus, which is opposite Methymna on the mainland, they again took their midday meal; they quickly passed by the promontory of Lectum, Larissa, Hamaxitus, and the neighbouring towns, and finally arrived at Rhoeteum in the Hellespont before midnight. Some of the ships also put into Sigeum and other places in the neighbourhood.

[102] The Athenians, who lay with eighteen ships at Sestos, knew from the beacons which their scouts kindled, and from the sudden blaze of many watch-fires which appeared in the enemy's country, that the Peloponnesians were on the point of sailing into the strait. That very night, getting close under the Chersonese, they moved towards Elaeus, in the hope of reaching the open sea before the enemy's ships arrived. They passed unseen the sixteen Peloponnesian ships which were at Abydos, and had been told by their now approaching friends to keep a sharp look-out if the Athenians tried to get away. At dawn of day they sighted the fleet of Mindarus, which immediately gave chase; most of them escaped in the direction of Imbros, and Lemnos, but the four which were hindermost were caught off Elaeus. One which ran ashore near the temple of Protesilaus the Peloponnesians took, together with the crew; two others without the crews; a fourth they burnt on the shore of Imbros; the crew escaped.

[103] For the rest of that day they blockaded Elaeus with the ships from Abydos which had now joined them; the united fleet numbering eighty-six; but as the town would not yield they sailed away to Abydos.

The Athenians, whose scouts had failed them, and who had never imagined that the enemy's fleet could pass them undetected, were quietly besieging Eresus; but on finding out their mistake they instantly set sail and followed the enemy to the Hellespont. They fell in with and took two Peloponnesian ships, which during the pursuit had ventured

too far into the open sea. On the following day they came to Elaeus, where they remained at anchor, and the ships which had taken refuge at Imbros joined them; the next five days were spent in making preparations for the impending engagement.

[104] After this they fought, and the manner of the battle was as follows. The Athenians began to sail in column close along the shore towards Sestos, when the Peloponnesians, observing them, likewise put to sea from Abydos. Perceiving that a battle was imminent, the Athenians, numbering seventy-six ships, extended their line along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani, and the Peloponnesians, numbering eighty-eight ships, from Abydos to Dardanus. The Syracusans held the right wing of the Peloponnesians; the other wing, on which were the swiftest ships, was led by Mindarus himself. Thrasyllus commanded the left wing of the Athenians, and Thrasybulus the right; the other generals had their several posts. The Peloponnesians were eager to begin the engagement, intending, as their left wing extended beyond the right of the Athenians, to prevent them, if possible, from sailing out of the straits again, and also to thrust their centre back on the land which was near. The Athenians, seeing their intention, advanced from the land the wing on which the enemy wanted to cut them off, and succeeded in getting beyond them. But their left wing by this time had passed the promontory of Cynossema, and the result was that the centre of their line was thinned and weakened — all the more since their numbers were inferior and the sharp projection of the shore about Cynossema hindered those who were on one side from seeing what was taking place on the other.

[105] So the Peloponnesians, falling upon the centre of the Athenian fleet, forced their enemies’ ships back on the beach, and having gained a decisive advantage, disembarked to follow up their victory. Neither Thrasybulus on the right wing, who was pressed hard by superior

numbers, nor Thrasyllus on the left, was able to assist them. The promontory of Cynossema hindered the left wing from seeing the action, and the ships of the Syracusans and others, equal in number to their own, kept them fully engaged. But at last, while the victorious Peloponnesians were incautiously pursuing, some one ship, some another; a part of their line began to fall into disorder. Thrasybulus remarked their confusion, and at once left off extending his wing; then turning upon the ships which were opposed to him, he repulsed and put them to flight; he next faced the conquering and now scattered ships of the Peloponnesian centre, struck at them, and threw them into such a panic that hardly any of them resisted. The Syracusans too had by this time given way to Thrasyllus, and were still more inclined to fly when they saw the others flying.

[106] After the rout the Peloponnesians effected their escape, most of them to the river Midius first, and then to Abydos. Not many ships were taken by the Athenians; for the Hellespont, being narrow, afforded a retreat to the enemy within a short distance. Nevertheless nothing could have been more opportune for them than this victory at sea; for some time past they had feared the Peloponnesian navy on account of their disaster in Sicily, as well as of the various smaller defeats which they had sustained. But now they ceased to depreciate themselves or to think much of their enemies’ seamanship. They had taken eight Chian vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and of the Leucadians, Lacedaemonians, Syracusans, and Pellenians one each. Their own loss amounted to fifteen ships. They raised a trophy on the promontory of Cynossema, and then collecting the wrecks, and giving up to the enemy his dead under a flag of truce, sent a trireme carrying intelligence of the victory to Athens. On the arrival of the ship and the news of a success so incredible after the calamities which had befallen them in Euboea and during the revolution, the Athenians were greatly encouraged. They thought that their

affairs were no longer hopeless, and that if they were energetic they might still win.

[107] The Athenians at Sestos promptly repaired their ships, and on the fourth day were proceeding against Cyzicus, which had revolted, when, seeing the eight Peloponnesian ships from Byzantium anchored at Harpagium and Priapus, they bore down upon them, and defeating the land-forces which were acting with them, took the ships. They then went and recovered Cyzicus, which was unwalled, and exacted a contribution from the inhabitants. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus, and recovered as many of their own captured vessels as were still seaworthy; the rest had been burnt by the Elaeusians. They then sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to bring up the ships which were there.

[108] About the same time Alcibiades sailed back with his thirteen ships from Caunus and Phaselis to Samos, announcing that he had prevented the Phoenician fleet from coming to the assistance of the enemy, and that he had made Tissaphernes a greater friend of the Athenians than ever. He then manned nine additional ships, and exacted large sums of money from the Halicarnassians. He also fortified Cos, where he left a governor, and towards the autumn returned to Samos.

When Tissaphernes heard that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he broke up his camp at Aspendus and marched away towards Ionia. Now after the arrival of the Peloponnesians at the Hellespont, the Antandrians, who are Aeolians, had procured from them at Abydos a force of infantry, which they led through Mount Ida and introduced into their city. They were oppressed by Arsaces the Persian, a lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This Arsaces, when the Athenians, wishing to purify Delos, expelled the inhabitants and they settled in Adramyttium, professing to have a quarrel which he did not wish to declare openly, asked their best soldiers to form an army for him. He

then led them out of the town as friends and allies, and, taking advantage of their midday meal, surrounded them with his own troops, and shot them down. This deed alarmed the Antandrians, who thought that they might meet with some similar violence at his hands; and as he was imposing upon them burdens which were too heavy for them, they expelled his garrison from their citadel.

[109] Tissaphernes, who was already offended at the expulsion of his garrison from Miletus, and from Cnidus, where the same thing had happened, perceived that this new injury was the work of the Peloponnesians. He felt that they were now his determined enemies, and was apprehensive of some further injury. He was also disgusted at discovering that Pharnabazus had induced the Peloponnesians to join him, and was likely in less time and at less expense to be more successful in the war with the Athenians than himself. He therefore determined to go to the Hellespont, and complain of their conduct in the affair of Antandrus, offering at the same time the most plausible defence which he could concerning the non-arrival of the Phoenician fleet and their other grievances. He first went to Ephesus, and there offered sacrifice to Artemis ....

[With the end of the winter which follows this summer the twenty-first year of the Peloponnesian War is completed.]

XENOPHON'S HELLENICA

Translated by H. G. Dakyns

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

Xenophon (c. 430 – 354 BC) was a Greek historian, mercenary, philosopher and an admirer of Socrates. He is known for his writings on the history of his own times and preserving the sayings of Socrates. His 'Hellenica' is a major primary source for events in Greece from 411 to 362 BC, and is considered to be the principal continuation of the History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides.

BOOK I

I

B.C. 411. To follow the order of events (1). A few days later Thymochares arrived from Athens with a few ships, when another sea fight between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians at once took place, in which the former, under the command of Agesandridas, gained the victory.

(1) Lit. “after these events”; but is hard to conjecture to what events the author refers. For the order of events and the connection between the closing chapter of Thuc. viii. 109, and the opening words of the “Hellenica,” see introductory remarks above. The scene of this sea-fight is, I think, the Hellespont.

Another short interval brings us to a morning in early winter, when Dorieus, the son of Diagoras, was entering the Hellespont with fourteen ships from Rhodes at break of day. The Athenian day-watch descrying him, signalled to the generals, and they, with twenty sail, put out to sea to attack him. Dorieus made good his escape, and, as he shook himself free of the narrows, (2) ran his triremes aground off Rhoeteum. When the Athenians had come to close quarters, the fighting commenced, and was sustained at once from ships and shore, until at length the Athenians retired to their main camp at Madytus, having achieved nothing.

(2) Lit. “as he opened” {os enoige}. This is still a mariner’s phrase in modern Greek, if I am rightly informed.

Meanwhile Mindarus, while sacrificing to Athena at Ilium, had observed the battle. He at once hastened to the sea, and getting his own triremes afloat, sailed out to pick up the ships with Dorieus. The Athenians on their side put out to meet him, and engaged him off Abydos. From early morning till the afternoon the fight was kept up close to the shore. (3) Victory and defeat hung still in even balance, when Alcibiades came sailing up with eighteen ships. Thereupon the Peloponnesians fled towards Abydos, where, however, Pharnabazus brought them timely assistance. (4) Mounted on horseback, he pushed forward into the sea as far as his horse would let him, doing battle himself, and encouraging

his troopers and the infantry alike to play their parts. Then the Peloponnesians, ranging their ships in close-packed order, and drawing up their battle line in proximity to the land, kept up the fight. At length the Athenians, having captured thirty of the enemy’s vessels without their crews, and having recovered those of their own which they had previously lost, set sail for Sestos. Here the fleet, with the exception of forty vessels, dispersed in different directions outside the Hellespont, to collect money; while Thrasylus, one of the generals, sailed to Athens to report what had happened, and to beg for a reinforcement of troops and ships. After the above incidents, Tissaphernes arrived in the Hellespont, and received a visit from Alcibiades, who presented him with a single ship, bringing with him tokens of friendship and gifts, whereupon Tissaphernes seized him and shut him up in Sardis, giving out that the king’s orders were to go to war with the Athenians. Thirty days later Alcibiades, accompanied by Mantitheus, who had been captured in Caria, managed to procure horses and escaped by night to Clazomenae.

(3) The original has a somewhat more poetical ring. The author uses the old Attic or Ionic word {eona}. This is a mark of style, of which we shall have many instances. One might perhaps produce something of the effect here by translating: “the battle hugged the strand.”

(4) Or, “came to their aid along the shore.”

B.C. 410. And now the Athenians at Sestos, hearing that Mindarus was meditating an attack upon them with a squadron of sixty sail, gave him the slip, and under cover of night escaped to Cardia. Hither also Alcibiades repaired from Clazomenae, having with him five triremes and a light skiff; but on learning that the Peloponnesian fleet had left Abydos and was in full sail for Cyzicus, he set off himself by land to Sestos, giving orders to the fleet to sail round and join him there. Presently the vessels arrived, and he was on the point of putting out to sea with everything ready for action, when Theramenes, with a fleet of twenty ships from Macedonia, entered the port, and at the same instant Thrasybulus, with a second fleet of twenty sail from Thasos, both squadrons having been engaged in collecting money. Bidding these

officers also follow him with all speed, as soon as they had taken out their large sails and cleared for action, Alcibiades set sail himself for Parium. During the following night the united squadron, consisting now of eighty-six vessels, stood out to sea from Parium, and reached Proconnesus next morning, about the hour of breakfast. Here they learnt that Mindarus was in Cyzicus, and that Pharnabazus, with a body of infantry, was with him. Accordingly they waited the whole of this day at Proconnesus. On the following day Alcibiades summoned an assembly, and addressing the men in terms of encouragement, warned them that a threefold service was expected of them; that they must be ready for a sea fight, a land fight, and a wall fight all at once, “for look you,” said he, “we have no money, but the enemy has unlimited supplies from the king.”

Now, on the previous day, as soon as they were come to moorings, he had collected all the sea-going craft of the island, big and little alike, under his own control, that no one might report the number of his squadron to the enemy, and he had further caused a proclamation to be made, that any one caught sailing across to the opposite coast would be punished with death. When the meeting was over, he got his ships ready for action, and stood out to sea towards Cyzicus in torrents of rain. Off Cyzicus the sky cleared, and the sun shone out and revealed to him the spectacle of Mindarus’s vessels, sixty in number, exercising at some distance from the harbour, and, in fact, intercepted by himself. The Peloponnesians, perceiving at a glance the greatly increased number of the Athenian galleys, and noting their proximity to the port, made haste to reach the land, where they brought their vessels to anchor in a body, and prepared to engage the enemy as he sailed to the attack. But Alcibiades, sailing round with twenty of his vessels, came to land and disembarked. Seeing this, Mindarus also landed, and in the engagement which ensued he fell fighting, whilst those who

were with him took to flight. As for the enemy's ships, the Athenians succeeded in capturing the whole of them (with the exception of the Syracusan vessels, which were burnt by their crews), and made off with their prizes to Proconnesus. From thence on the following day they sailed to attack Cyzicus. The men of that place, seeing that the Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus had evacuated the town, admitted the Athenians. Here Alcibiades remained twenty days, obtaining large sums of money from the Cyzicenes, but otherwise inflicting no sort of mischief on the community. He then sailed back to Proconnesus, and from there to Perinthus and Selybria. The inhabitants of the former place welcomed his troops into their city, but the Selybrians preferred to give money, and so escape the admission of the troops. Continuing the voyage the squadron reached Chrysopolis in Chalcedonia, (5) where they built a fort, and established a custom-house to collect the tithe dues which they levied on all merchantmen passing through the Straights from the Black Sea. Besides this, a detachment of thirty ships was left there under the two generals, Theramenes and Eubulus, with instructions not only to keep a look-out on the port itself and on all traders passing through the channel, but generally to injure the enemy in any way which might present itself. This done, the rest of the generals hastened back to the Hellespont.

(5) This is the common spelling, but the coins of Calchedon have the letters {KALKH}, and so the name is written in the best MSS. of Herodotus, Xenophon, and other writers, by whom the place is named. See "Dict. of Greek and Roman Geog." "Chalcedon."

Now a despatch from Hippocrates, Mindarus's vice-admiral, (6) had been intercepted on its way to Lacedaemon, and taken to Athens. It ran as follows (in broad Doric): (7) "Ships gone; Mindarus dead; the men starving; at our wits' end what to do."

(6) "Epistoleus," i.e. secretary or despatch writer, is the Spartan title of the officer second in command to the admiral.

(7) Reading {'Errei ta kala} (Bergk's conjecture for {kala}) = "timbers," i.e. "ships" (a Doric word). Cf. Aristoph., "Lys." 1253, {potta kala}. The despatch continues: {Mindaros apessoua} (al. {apessua}), which is much more racy than the simple word "dead." "M. is gone off." I cannot find the right English or "broad Scotch" equivalent. See Thirlwall, "Hist. Gr." IV. xxix. 88 note.

Pharnabazus, however, was ready to meet with encouragement the despondency which afflicted the whole

Peloponnesian army and their allies. “As long as their own bodies were safe and sound, why need they take to heart the loss of a few wooden hulls? Was there not timber enough and to spare in the king’s territory?” And so he presented each man with a cloak and maintenance for a couple of months, after which he armed the sailors and formed them into a coastguard for the security of his own seaboard.

He next called a meeting of the generals and trierarchs of the different States, and instructed them to build just as many new ships in the dockyards of Antandrus as they had respectively lost. He himself was to furnish the funds, and he gave them to understand that they might bring down timber from Mount Ida. While the ships were building, the Syracusans helped the men of Antandrus to finish a section of their walls, and were particularly pleasant on garrison duty; and that is why the Syracusans to this day enjoy the privilege of citizenship, with the title of “benefactors,” at Antandrus. Having so arranged these matters, Pharnabazus proceeded at once to the rescue of Chalcedon.

It was at this date that the Syracusan generals received news from home of their banishment by the democratic party. Accordingly they called a meeting of their separate divisions, and putting forward Hermocrates (8) as their spokesman, proceeded to deplore their misfortune, insisting upon the injustice and the illegality of their banishment. “And now let us admonish you,” they added, “to be eager and willing in the future, even as in the past: whatever the word of command may be, show yourselves good men and true: let not the memory of those glorious sea fights fade. Think of those victories you have won, those ships you have captured by your own unaided efforts; forget not that long list of achievements shared by yourselves with others, in all which you proved yourselves invincible under our generalship. It was to a happy combination of our merit and

your enthusiasm, displayed alike on land and sea, that you owe the strength and perfection of your discipline.”

(8) Hermocrates, the son of Hermon. We first hear of him in Thuc. iv. 58 foll. as the chief agent in bringing the Sicilian States together in conference at Gela B.C. 424, with a view to healing their differences and combining to frustrate the dangerous designs of Athens. In 415 B.C., when the attack came, he was again the master spirit in rendering it abortive (Thuc. vi. 72 foll.) In 412 B.C. it was he who urged the Sicilians to assist in completing the overthrow of Athens, by sending a squadron to co-operate with the Peloponnesian navy — for the relief of Miletus, etc. (Thuc. viii. 26, 27 foll.) At a later date, in 411 B.C., when the Peloponnesian sailors were ready to mutiny, and “laid all their grievances to the charge of Astyochus (the Spartan admiral), who humoured Tissaphernes for his own gain” (Thuc. viii. 83), Hermocrates took the men’s part, and so incurred the hatred of Tissaphernes.

With these words they called upon the men to choose other commanders, who should undertake the duties of their office, until the arrival of their successors. Thereupon the whole assembly, and more particularly the captains and masters of vessels and marines, insisted with loud cries on their continuance in command. The generals replied, “It was not for them to indulge in faction against the State, but rather it was their duty, in case any charges were forthcoming against themselves, at once to render an account.” When, however, no one had any kind of accusation to prefer, they yielded to the general demand, and were content to await the arrival of their successors. The names of these were — Demarchus, the son of Epidocus; Myscon, the son of Mencrates; and Potamis, the son of Gnosis.

The captains, for their part, swore to restore the exiled generals as soon as they themselves should return to Syracuse. At present with a general vote of thanks they despatched them to their several destinations. It particular those who had enjoyed the society of Hermocrates recalled his virtues with regret, his thoroughness and enthusiasm, his frankness and affability, the care with which every morning and evening he was wont to gather in his quarters a group of naval captains and mariners whose ability he recognised. These were his confidants, to whom he communicated what he intended to say or do: they were his pupils, to whom he gave lessons in oratory, now calling upon them to speak extempore, and now again after deliberation. By these means Hermocrates had gained a wide reputation at the council board, where his mastery of language was no less

felt than the wisdom of his advice. Appearing at Lacedaemon as the accuser of Tissaphernes, (9) he had carried his case, not only by the testimony of Astyochus, but by the obvious sincerity of his statements, and on the strength of this reputation he now betook himself to Pharnabazus. The latter did not wait to be asked, but at once gave him money, which enabled him to collect friends and triremes, with a view to his ultimate recall to Syracuse. Meanwhile the successors of the Syracusans had arrived at Miletus, where they took charge of the ships and the army.

(9) The matter referred to is fully explained Thuc. viii. 85.

It was at this same season that a revolution occurred in Thasos, involving the expulsion of the philo-Laconian party, with the Laconian governor Eteonicus. The Laconian Pasippidas was charged with having brought the business about in conjunction with Tissaphernes, and was banished from Sparta in consequence. The naval force which he had been collecting from the allies was handed over to Cratesippidas, who was sent out to take his place in Chios.

About the same period, while Thrasylus was still in Athens, Agis (10) made a foraging expedition up to the very walls of the city. But Thrasylus led out the Athenians with the rest of the inhabitants of the city, and drew them up by the side of the Lyceum Gymnasium, ready to engage the enemy if they approached; seeing which, Agis beat a hasty retreat, not however without the loss of some of his supports, a few of whom were cut down by the Athenian light troops. This success disposed the citizens to take a still more favourable view of the objects for which Thrasylus had come; and they passed a decree empowering him to call out a thousand hoplites, one hundred cavalry, and fifty triremes.

(10) The reader will recollect that we are giving in “the Deceleian” period of the war, 413-404 B.C. The Spartan king was in command of the fortress of Deceleia, only fourteen miles distant from Athens, and erected on a spot within sight of the city. See Thuc. vii. 19, 27, 28.

Meanwhile Agis, as he looked out from Deceleia, and saw vessel after vessel laden with corn running down to Piraeus, declared that it was useless for his troops to go on week

after week excluding the Athenians from their own land, while no one stopped the source of their corn supply by sea: the best plan would be to send Clearchus, (11) the son of Rhamphius, who was proxenos (12) of the Byzantines, to Chalcedon and Byzantium. The suggestion was approved, and with fifteen vessels duly manned from Megara, or furnished by other allies, Clearchus set out. These were troop-ships rather than swift-sailing men-of-war. Three of them, on reaching the Hellespont, were destroyed by the Athenian ships employed to keep a sharp look-out on all merchant craft in those waters. The other twelve escaped to Sestos, and thence finally reached Byzantium in safety.

(11) Of Clearchus we shall hear more in the sequel, and in the "Anabasis."

(12) The Proxenus answered pretty nearly to our "Consul," "Agent," "Resident"; but he differed in this respect, that he was always a member of the foreign State. An Athenian represented Sparta at Athens; a Laconian represented Athens at Sparta, and so forth. See Liddell and Scott.

So closed the year — a year notable also for the expedition against Sicily of the Carthaginians under Hannibal with one hundred thousand men, and the capture, within three months, of the two Hellenic cities of Selinus and Himera.

II

B.C. 409. Next year (1)... the Athenians fortified Thoricus; and Thrasylus, taking the vessels lately voted him and five thousand of his seamen armed to serve as peltasts, (2) set sail for Samos at the beginning of summer. At Samos he stayed three days, and then continued his voyage to Pygela, where he proceeded to ravage the territory and attack the fortress. Presently a detachment from Miletus came to the rescue of the men of Pygela, and attacking the scattered bands of the Athenian light troops, put them to flight. But to the aid of the light troops came the naval brigade of peltasts, with two companies of heavy infantry, and all but annihilated the whole detachment from Miletus. They captured about two hundred shields, and set up a trophy. Next day they sailed to Notium, and from Notium, after due preparation, marched upon Colophon. The Colophonians

capitulated without a blow. The following night they made an incursion into Lydia, where the corn crops were ripe, and burnt several villages, and captured money, slaves, and other booty in large quantity. But Stages, the Persian, who was employed in this neighbourhood, fell in with a reinforcement of cavalry sent to protect the scattered pillaging parties from the Athenian camp, whilst occupied with their individual plunder, and took one trooper prisoner, killing seven others. After this Thrasylus led his troops back to the sea, intending to sail to Ephesus. Meanwhile Tissaphernes, who had wind of this intention, began collecting a large army and despatching cavalry with a summons to the inhabitants one and all to rally to the defence of the goddess Artemis at Ephesus.

(1) The MSS. here give a suspected passage, which may be rendered thus: “The first of Olympiad 93, celebrated as the year in which the newly-added two-horse race was won by Evagorias the Eleian, and the stadion (200 yards foot-race) by the Cyrenaean Eubotas, when Evarchippus was ephor at Sparta and Euctemon archon at Athens.” But Ol. 93, to which these officers,and the addition of the new race at Olympia belong, is the year 408. We must therefore suppose either that this passage has been accidentally inserted in the wrong place by some editor or copyist, or that the author was confused in his dates. The “stadium” is the famous foot-race at Olympia, 606 3/4 English feet in length, run on a course also called the “Stadion,” which was exactly a stade long.

(2) Peltasts, i.e. light infantry armed with the “pelta” or light shield, instead of the heavy {aspis} of the hoplite or heavy infantry soldiers.

On the seventeenth day after the incursion above mentioned Thrasylus sailed to Ephesus. He disembarked his troops in two divisions, his heavy infantry in the neighbourhood of Mount Coressus; his cavalry, peltasts, and marines, with the remainder of his force, near the marsh on the other side of the city. At daybreak he pushed forward both divisions. The citizens of Ephesus, on their side, were not slow to protect themselves. They had to aid them the troops brought up by Tissaphernes, as well as two detachments of Syracusans, consisting of the crews of their former twenty vessels and those of five new vessels which had opportunely arrived quite recently under Eucles, the son of Hippon, and Heracleides, the son of Aristogenes, together with two Selinuntian vessels. All these several forces first attacked the heavy infantry near Coressus; these they routed, killing about one hundred of them, and driving the remainder down into the sea. They then turned to deal with the second division on the marsh. Here, too, the Athenians

were put to flight, and as many as three hundred of them perished. On this spot the Ephesians erected a trophy, and another at Coressus. The valour of the Syracusans and Selinuntians had been so conspicuous that the citizens presented many of them, both publicly and privately, with prizes for distinction in the field, besides offering the right of residence in their city with certain immunities to all who at any time might wish to live there. To the Selinuntians, indeed, as their own city had lately been destroyed, they offered full citizenship.

The Athenians, after picking up their dead under a truce, set sail for Notium, and having there buried the slain, continued their voyage towards Lesbos and the Hellespont. Whilst lying at anchor in the harbour of Methymna, in that island, they caught sight of the Syracusan vessels, five-and-twenty in number, coasting along from Ephesus. They put out to sea to attack them, and captured four ships with their crews, and chased the remainder back to Ephesus. The prisoners were sent by Thrasylus to Athens, with one exception. This was an Athenian, Alcibiades, who was a cousin and fellow-exile of Alcibiades. Him Thrasylus released. (3) From Methymna Thrasylus set sail to Sestos to join the main body of the army, after which the united forces crossed to Lampsacus. And now winter was approaching. It was the winter in which the Syracusan prisoners who had been immured in the stone quarries of Piraeus dug through the rock and escaped one night, some to Decelia and others to Megara. At Lampsacus Alcibiades was anxious to marshal the whole military force there collected in one body, but the old troops refused to be incorporated with those of Thrasylus. “They, who had never yet been beaten, with these newcomers who had just suffered a defeat.” So they devoted the winter to fortifying Lampsacus. They also made an expedition against Abydos, where Pharnabazus, coming to the rescue of the place, encountered them with numerous

cavalry, but was defeated and forced to flee, Alcibiades pursuing hard with his cavalry and one hundred and twenty infantry under the command of Menander, till darkness intervened. After this battle the soldiers came together of their own accord, and freely fraternised with the troops of Thrasylus. This expedition was followed by other incursions during the winter into the interior, where they found plenty to do ravaging the king's territory.

(3) Reading {apelusen}. Wolf's conjecture for the MSS. {katelousen} = stoned. See Thirlwall, "Hist. Gr." IV. xxix. 93 note.

It was at this period also that the Lacedaemonians allowed their revolted helots from Malea, who had found an asylum at Coryphasium, to depart under a flag of truce. It was also about the same period that the Achaeans betrayed the colonists of Heracleia Trachinia, when they were all drawn up in battle to meet the hostile Oetaeans, whereby as many as seven hundred of them were lost, together with the governor (4) from Lacedaemon, Labotas. Thus the year came to its close — a year marked further by a revolt of the Medes from Darius, the king of Persia, followed by renewed submission to his authority.

(4) Technically {armostes} (harmost), i.e. administrator.

III

B.C. 408. The year following is the year in which the temple of Athena, in Phocaea, was struck by lightning and set on fire. (1) With the cessation of winter, in early spring, the Athenians set sail with the whole of their force to Proconnesus, and thence advanced upon Chalcedon and Byzantium, encamping near the former town. The men of Chalcedon, aware of their approach, had taken the precaution to deposit all their pillageable property with their neighbours, the Bithynian Thracians; whereupon Alcibiades put himself at the head of a small body of heavy infantry with the cavalry, and giving orders to the fleet to follow along the coast, marched against the Bithynians and

demanded back the property of the Chalcedonians, threatening them with war in case of refusal. The Bithynians delivered up the property. Returning to camp, not only thus enriched, but with the further satisfaction of having secured pledges of good behaviour from the Bithynians, Alcibiades set to work with the whole of his troops to draw lines of circumvallation round Chalcedon from sea to sea, so as to include as much of the river as possible within his wall, which was made of timber. Thereupon the Lacedaemonian governor, Hippocrates, let his troops out of the city and offered battle, and the Athenians, on their side, drew up their forces opposite to receive him; while Pharnabazus, from without the lines of circumvallation, was still advancing with his army and large bodies of horse. Hippocrates and Thrasylus engaged each other with their heavy infantry for a long while, until Alcibiades, with a detachment of infantry and the cavalry, intervened. Presently Hippocrates fell, and the troops under him fled into the city; at the same instant Pharnabazus, unable to effect a junction with the Lacedaemonian leader, owing to the circumscribed nature of the ground and the close proximity of the river to the enemy’s lines, retired to the Heracleium, (2) belonging to the Chalcedonians, where his camp lay. After this success Alcibiades set off to the Hellespont and the Chersonese to raise money, and the remaining generals came to terms with Pharnabazus in respect of Chalcedon; according to these, the Persian satrap agreed to pay the Athenians twenty talents (3) in behalf of the town, and to grant their ambassadors a safe conduct up country to the king. It was further stipulated by mutual consent and under oaths provided, that the Chalcedonians should continue the payment of their customary tribute to Athens, being also bound to discharge all outstanding debts. The Athenians, on their side, were bound to desist from all hostilities until the return of their ambassadors from the king. These oaths were not witnessed by Alcibiades, who was now in the

neighbourhood of Selybria. Having taken that place, he presently appeared before the walls of Byzantium at the head of the men of Chersonese, who came out with their whole force; he was aided further by troops from Thrace and more than three hundred horse. Accordingly Pharnabazus, insisting that he too must take the oath, decided to remain in Chalcedon, and to await his arrival from Byzantium. Alcibiades came, but was not prepared to bind himself by any oaths, unless Pharnabazus would, on his side, take oaths to himself. After this, oaths were exchanged between them by proxy. Alcibiades took them at Chrysopolis in the presence of two representatives sent by Pharnabazus — namely, Mitrobates and Arnapes. Pharnabazus took them at Chalcedon in the presence of Euryptolemus and Diotimus, who represented Alcibiades. Both parties bound themselves not only by the general oath, but also interchanged personal pledges of good faith.

(1) The MSS. here give the words, "in the ephorate of Pantacles and the archonship of Antigenes, two-and-twenty years from the beginning of the war," but the twenty-second year of the war = B.C. 410; Antigenes archon, B.C. 407 = Ol. 93, 2; the passage must be regarded as a note mis-inserted by some editor or copyist (vide supra, I. 11.)

(2) I.e. sacred place or temple of Heracles.

(3) Twenty talents = 4800 pounds; or, more exactly, 4875 pounds.

This done, Pharnabazus left Chalcedon at once, with injunctions that those who were going up to the king as ambassadors should meet him at Cyzicus. The representatives of Athens were Dorotheus, Philodices, Theogenes, Euryptolemus, and Mantitheus; with them were two Argives, Cleostratus and Pyrrholochus. An embassy of the Lacedaemonians was also about to make the journey. This consisted of Pasippidas and his fellows, with whom were Hermocrates, now an exile from Syracuse, and his brother Proxenus. So Pharnabazus put himself at their head. Meanwhile the Athenians prosecuted the siege of Byzantium; lines of circumvallation were drawn; and they diversified the blockade by sharpshooting at long range and occasional assaults upon the walls. Inside the city lay Clearchus, the Lacedaemonian governor, and a body of

Perioci with a small detachment of Neodamodes. (4) There was also a body of Megarians under their general Helixus, a Megarian, and another body of Boeotians, with their general Coeratadas. The Athenians, finding presently that they could effect nothing by force, worked upon some of the inhabitants to betray the place. Clearchus, meanwhile, never dreaming that any one would be capable of such an act, had crossed over to the opposite coast to visit Pharnabazus; he had left everything in perfect order, entrusting the government of the city to Coeratadas and Helixus. His mission was to obtain pay for the soldiers from the Persian satrap, and to collect vessels from various quarters. Some were already in the Hellespont, where they had been left as guardships by Pasippidas, or else at Antandrus. Others formed the fleet which Agesandridas, who had formerly served as a marine (5) under Mindarus, now commanded on the Thracian coast. Others Clearchus purposed to have built, and with the whole united squadron to so injure the allies of the Athenians as to draw off the besieging army from Byzantium. But no sooner was he fairly gone than those who were minded to betray the city set to work. Their names were Cydon, Ariston, Anaxicrates, Lycurgus, and Anaxilaus. The last-named was afterwards impeached for treachery in Lacedaemon on the capital charge, and acquitted on the plea that, to begin with, he was not a Lacedaemonian, but a Byzantine, and, so far from having betrayed the city, he had saved it, when he saw women and children perishing of starvation; for Clearchus had given away all the corn in the city to the Lacedaemonian soldiers. It was for these reasons, as Anaxilaus himself admitted, he had introduced the enemy, and not for the sake of money, nor out of hatred to Lacedaemon.

(4) According to the constitution of Lacedaemon the whole government was in Dorian hands. The subject population was divided into (1) Helots, who were State serfs. The children of Helots were at times brought up by Spartans and called “Mothakes”; Helots who had received their liberty were called “Neodamodes” ({neodamodeis}). After the conquest of Messenia this class was very numerous. (2) Perioeci. These were the ancient Achaean inhabitants, living in towns and villages, and managing their own affairs, paying tribute, and serving in the army as heavy-armed soldiers. In 458 B.C. they were said to number thirty thousand. The Spartans themselves were divided, like all Dorians, into three tribes, Hylleis, Dymanes, and Pamphyli, each of which tribes was divided into ten “obes,” which were again divided into {oikoi} or families possessed of landed properties. In 458 B.C. there were said to be nine thousand such families; but in course of time, through alienation of lands, deaths in war, and other causes, their numbers were much diminished; and in many cases there was a loss of status, so that in the time of Agis III., B.C. 244, we hear of two orders of Spartans, the

{omoioi} and the {upomeiones} (inferiors); seven hundred Spartans (families) proper and one hundred landed proprietors. See Mullers “Dorians,” vol. ii. bk. iii. ch. x. S. 3 (Eng. trans.); Arist. “Pol.” ii. 9, 15; Plut. (“Agis”).

(5) The greek word is {epibates}, which some think was the title of an inferior naval officer in the Spartan service, but there is no proof of this. Cf. Thuc. viii. 61, and Prof. Jowett’s note; also Grote, “Hist. of Greece,” viii. 27 (2d ed.)

As soon as everything was ready, these people opened the gates leading to the Thracian Square, as it is called, and admitted the Athenian troops with Alcibiades at their head. Helixus and Coeratadas, in complete ignorance of the plot, hastened to the Agora with the whole of the garrison, ready to confront the danger; but finding the enemy in occupation, they had nothing for it but to give themselves up. They were sent off as prisoners to Athens, where Coeratadas, in the midst of the crowd and confusion of debarkation at Piraeus, gave his guards the slip, and made his way in safety to Decelia.

IV

B.C. 407. Pharnabazus and the ambassadors were passing the winter at Gordium in Phrygia, when they heard of the occurrences at Byzantium. Continuing their journey to the king’s court in the commencement of spring, they were met by a former embassy, which was now on its return journey. These were the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, Boeotius and his party, with the other envoys; who told them that the Lacedaemonians had obtained from the king all they wanted. One of the company was Cyrus, the new governor of all the seaboard districts, who was prepared to co-operate with the Lacedaemonians in war. He was the bearer, moreover, of a letter with the royal seal attached. It was addressed to all the populations of Lower Asia, and contained the following words: “I send down Cyrus as ‘Karanos’” (1) — that is to say, supreme lord— “over all those who muster at Castolus.” The ambassadors of the Athenians, even while listening to this announcement, and indeed after they had seen Cyrus, were still desirous, if possible, to continue their journey to the king, or, failing that, to return home. Cyrus, however, urged upon Pharnabazus either to

deliver them up to himself, or to defer sending them home at present; his object being to prevent the Athenians learning what was going on. Pharnabazus, wishing to escape all blame, for the time being detained them, telling them, at one time, that he would presently escort them up country to the king, and at another time that he would send them safe home. But when three years had elapsed, he prayed Cyrus to let them go, declaring that he had taken an oath to bring them back to the sea, in default of escorting them up to the king. Then at last they received safe conduct to Ariobarzanes, with orders for their further transportation. The latter conducted them a stage further, to Cius in Mysia; and from Cius they set sail to join their main armament.

(1) {Karanos.} Is this a Greek word, a Doric form, {karanos}, akin to {kara} (cf. {karenon}) = chief? or is it not more likely a Persian or native word, Karanos? and might not the title be akin conceivably to the word {korano}, which occurs on many Indo- Bactrian coins (see A. von Sallet, "Die Nachfolger Alexanders des Grossen," p. 57, etc.)? or is {koiranos} the connecting link? The words translated "that is to say, supreme lord," {to de karanon esti kurion}, look very like a commentator's gloss.

Alcibiades, whose chief desire was to return home to Athens with the troops, immediately set sail for Samos; and from that island, taking twenty of the ships, he sailed to the Ceramic Gulf of Caria, where he collected a hundred talents, and so returned to Samos.

Thrasybulus had gone Thrace-wards with thirty ships. In this quarter he reduced various places which had revolted to Lacedaemon, including the island of Thasos, which was in a bad plight, the result of wars, revolutions, and famine.

Thrasylus, with the rest of the army, sailed back straight to Athens. On his arrival he found that the Athenians had already chosen as their general Alcibiades, who was still in exile, and Thrasybulus, who was also absent, and as a third, from among those at home, Conon.

Meanwhile Alcibiades, with the moneys lately collected and his fleet of twenty ships, left Samos and visited Paros. From Paros he stood out to sea across to Gytheum, (2) to keep an eye on the thirty ships of war which, as he was informed, the Lacedaemonians were equipping in that arsenal. Gytheum would also be a favourable point of

observation from which to gauge the disposition of his fellow-countrymen and the prospects of his recall. When at length their good disposition seemed to him established, not only by his election as general, but by the messages of invitation which he received in private from his friends, he sailed home, and entered Piraeus on the very day of the festival of the Plunteria, (3) when the statue of Athena is veiled and screened from public gaze. This was a coincidence, as some thought, of evil omen, and unpropitious alike to himself and the State, for no Athenian would transact serious business on such a day.

(2) Gytheum, the port and arsenal of Sparta, situated near the head of the Laconian Gulf (now Marathonisi).

(3) {ta Plunteria}, or feast of washings, held on the 25th of the month Thargelion, when the image of the goddess Athena was stripped in order that her clothes might be washed by the Praxiergidae; neither assembly nor court was held on that day, and the Temple was closed.

As he sailed into the harbour, two great crowds — one from the Piraeus, the other from the city (4) — flocked to meet the vessels. Wonderment, mixed with a desire to see Alcibiades, was the prevailing sentiment of the multitude. Of him they spoke: some asserting that he was the best of citizens, and that in his sole instance banishment had been ill-deserved. He had been the victim of plots, hatched in the brains of people less able than himself, however much they might excel in pestilent speech; men whose one principle of statecraft was to look to their private gains; whereas this man’s policy had ever been to uphold the common weal, as much by his private means as by all the power of the State. His own choice, eight years ago, when the charge of impiety in the matter of the mysteries was still fresh, would have been to submit to trial at once. It was his personal foes, who had succeeded in postponing that undeniably just procedure; who waited till his back was turned, and then robbed him of his fatherland. Then it was that, being made the very slave of circumstance, he was driven to court the men he hated most; and at a time when his own life was in daily peril, he must see his dearest friends and fellow-citizens, nay, the very State itself, bent on a suicidal course,

and yet, in the exclusion of exile, be unable to lend a helping hand. “It is not men of this stamp,” they averred, “who desire changes in affairs and revolution: had he not already guaranteed to him by the Democracy a position higher than that of his equals in age, and scarcely if at all inferior to his seniors? How different was the position of his enemies. It had been the fortune of these, though they were known to be the same men they had always been, to use their lately acquired power for the destruction in the first instance of the better classes; and then, being alone left surviving, to be accepted by their fellow-citizens in the absence of better men.”

(4) Or, “collected to meet the vessels from curiosity and a desire to see Alcibiades.”

Others, however, insisted that for all their past miseries and misfortunes Alcibiades alone was responsible: “If more trials were still in store for the State, here was the master mischief-maker ready at his post to precipitate them.”

When the vessels came to their moorings, close to the land, Alcibiades, from fear of his enemies, was unwilling to disembark at once. Mounting on the quarterdeck, he scanned the multitude, (5) anxious to make certain of the presence of his friends. Presently his eyes lit upon Euryptolemus, the son of Peisianax, who was his cousin, and then on the rest of his relations and other friends. Upon this he landed, and so, in the midst of an escort ready to put down any attempt upon his person, made his way to the city.

(5) Or, “he looked to see if his friends were there.”

In the Senate and Public Assembly (6) he made speeches, defending himself against the charge of impiety, and asserting that he had been the victim of injustice, with other like topics, which in the present temper of the assembly no one ventured to gainsay.

(6) Technically the “Boule” ({Boule}) or Senate, and “Ecclesia” or Popular Assembly.

He was then formally declared leader and chief of the State, with irresponsible powers, as being the sole individual

capable of recovering the ancient power and prestige of Athens. Armed with this authority, his first act was to institute anew the processional march to Eleusis; for of late years, owing to the war, the Athenians had been forced to conduct the mysteries by sea. Now, at the head of the troops, he caused them to be conducted once again by land. This done, his next step was to muster an armament of one thousand five hundred heavy infantry, one hundred and fifty cavalry, and one hundred ships; and lastly, within three months of his return, he set sail for Andros, which had revolted from Athens.

The generals chosen to co-operate with him on land were Aristocrates and Adeimantus, the son of Leucophilides. He disembarked his troops on the island of Andros at Gaurium, and routed the Andrian citizens who sallied out from the town to resist the invader; forcing them to return and keep close within their walls, though the number who fell was not large. This defeat was shared by some Lacedaemonians who were in the place. Alcibiades erected a trophy, and after a few days set sail himself for Samos, which became his base of operations in the future conduct of the war.

V

At a date not much earlier than that of the incidents just described, the Lacedaemonians had sent out Lysander as their admiral, in the place of Cratesippidas, whose period of office had expired. The new admiral first visited Rhodes, where he got some ships, and sailed to Cos and Miletus, and from the latter place to Ephesus. At Ephesus he waited with seventy sail, expecting the advent of Cyrus in Sardis, when he at once went up to pay the prince a visit with the ambassadors from Lacedaemon. And now an opportunity was given to denounce the proceedings of Tissaphernes, and at the same time to beg Cyrus himself to show as much zeal as possible in the prosecution of the war. Cyrus replied that

not only had he received express injunction from his father to the same effect, but that his own views coincided with their wishes, which he was determined to carry out to the letter. He had, he informed them, brought with him five hundred talents; (1) and if that sum failed, he had still the private revenue, which his father allowed him, to fall back upon, and when this resource was in its turn exhausted, he would coin the gold and silver throne on which he sat, into money for their benefit. (2)

(1) About 120,000 pounds. One Euboic or Attic talent = sixty minae = six thousand drachmae = 243 pounds 15 shillings of our money.

(2) Cf. the language of Tissaphernes, Thuc. viii. 81.

His audience thanked him for what he said, and further begged him to fix the rate of payment for the seamen at one Attic drachma per man, (3) explaining that should this rate of payment be adopted, the sailors of the Athenians would desert, and in the end there would be a saving of expenditure. Cyrus complimented them on the soundness of their arguments, but said that it was not in his power to exceed the injunctions of the king. The terms of agreement were precise, thirty minae (4) a month per vessel to be given, whatever number of vessels the Lacedaemonians might choose to maintain.

(3) About 9 3/4 pence; a drachma (= six obols) would be very high pay for a sailor — indeed, just double the usual amount. See Thuc. vi. 8 and viii. 29, and Prof. Jowett ad loc. Tissaphernes had, in the winter of 412 B.C., distributed one month's pay among the Peloponnesian ships at this high rate of a drachma a day, "as his envoy had promised at Lacedaemon;" but this he proposed to reduce to half a drachma, "until he had asked the king's leave, promising that if he obtained it, he would pay the entire drachma. On the remonstrance, however, of Hermocrates, the Syracusan general, he promised to each man a payment of somewhat more than three obols."

(4) Nearly 122 pounds; and thirty minae a month to each ship (the crew of each ship being taken at two hundred) = three obols a day to each man. The terms of agreement to which Cyrus refers may have been specified in the convention mentioned above in chap. iv, which Boeotius and the rest were so proud to have obtained. But see Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. p. 192 note (2d ed.)

To this rejoinder Lysander at the moment said nothing. But after dinner, when Cyrus drank to his health, asking him "What he could do to gratify him most?" Lysander replied, "Add an obol (5) to the sailors' pay." After this the pay was raised to four instead of three obols, as it hitherto had been. Nor did the liberality of Cyrus end here; he not only paid up all arrears, but further gave a month's pay in advance, so that, if the enthusiasm of the army had been great before, it was greater than ever now. The Athenians when they heard

the news were proportionately depressed, and by help of Tissaphernes despatched ambassadors to Cyrus. That prince, however, refused to receive them, nor were the prayers of Tissaphernes of any avail, however much he insisted that Cyrus should adopt the policy which he himself, on the advice of Alcibiades, had persistently acted on. This was simply not to suffer any single Hellenic state to grow strong at the expense of the rest, but to keep them all weak alike, distracted by internecine strife.

(5) An obol = one-sixth of a drachma; the Attic obol = rather more than 1 1/2 pence.

Lysander, now that the organisation of his navy was arranged to his satisfaction, beached his squadron of ninety vessels at Ephesus, and sat with hands folded, whilst the vessels dried and underwent repairs. Alcibiades, being informed that Thrasybulus had come south of the Hellespont and was fortifying Phocaea, sailed across to join him, leaving his own pilot Antiochus in command of the fleet, with orders not to attack Lysander’s fleet. Antiochus, however, was tempted to leave Notium and sail into the harbour of Ephesus with a couple of ships, his own and another, past the prows of Lysander’s squadron. The Spartan at first contented himself with launching a few of his ships, and started in pursuit of the intruder; but when the Athenians came out with other vessels to assist Antiochus, he formed his whole squadron into line of battle, and bore down upon them, whereupon the Athenians followed suit, and getting their remaining triremes under weigh at Notium, stood out to sea as fast as each vessel could clear the point. (6) Thus it befell in the engagement which ensued, that while the enemy was in due order, the Athenians came up in scattered detachments and without concert, and in the end were put to flight with the loss of fifteen ships of war. Of the crews, indeed, the majority escaped, though a certain number fell into the hands of the enemy. Then Lysander collected his

vessels, and having erected a trophy on Cape Notium, sailed across to Ephesus, whilst the Athenians retired to Samos.

(6) {os ekastos enoixen}, for this nautical term see above.

On his return to Samos a little later, Alcibiades put out to sea with the whole squadron in the direction of the harbour of Ephesus. At the mouth of the harbour he marshalled his fleet in battle order, and tried to tempt the enemy to an engagement; but as Lysander, conscious of his inferiority in numbers, refused to accept the challenge, he sailed back again to Samos. Shortly after this the Lacedaemonians captured Delphinium and Eion. (7)

(7) This should probably be Teos, in Ionia, in spite of the MSS. {'Eiona}. The place referred to cannot at any rate be the well- known Eion at the mouth of the Strymon in Thrace.

But now the news of the late disaster at Notium had reached the Athenians at home, and in their indignation they turned upon Alcibiades, to whose negligence and lack of self-command they attributed the destruction of the ships. Accordingly they chose ten new generals — namely Conon, Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasylus, and Aristogenes. Alcibiades, who was moreover in bad odour in the camp, sailed away with a single trireme to his private fortress in the Chersonese.

After this Conon, in obedience to a decree of the Athenian people, set sail from Andros with the twenty vessels under his command in that island to Samos, and took command of the whole squadron. To fill the place thus vacated by Conon, Phanosthenes was sent to Andros with four ships. That captain was fortunate enough to intercept and capture two Thurian ships of war, crews and all, and these captives were all imprisoned by the Athenians, with the exception of their leader Dorieus. He was the Rhodian, who some while back had been banished from Athens and from his native city by the Athenians, when sentence of death was passed upon him and his family. This man, who had once enjoyed the

right of citizenship among them, they now took pity on and released him without ransom.

When Conon had reached Samos he found the armament in a state of great despondency. Accordingly his first measure was to man seventy ships with their full complement, instead of the former hundred and odd vessels. With this squadron he put to sea accompanied by the other generals, and confined himself to making descents first at one point and then at another of the enemy’s territory, and to collecting plunder.

And so the year drew to its close: a year signalled further by an invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians, with one hundred and twenty ships of war and a land force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, which resulted in the capture of Agrigentum. The town was finally reduced to famine after a siege of seven months, the invaders having previously been worsted in battle and forced to sit down before its walls for so long a time.

VI

B.C. 406. In the following year — the year of the evening eclipse of the moon, and the burning of the old temple of Athena (1) at Athens (2) — the Lacedaemonians sent out Callicratidas to replace Lysander, whose period of office had now expired. (3) Lysander, when surrendering the squadron to his successor, spoke of himself as the winner of a sea fight, which had left him in undisputed mastery of the sea, and with this boast he handed over the ships to Callicratidas, who retorted, “If you will convey the fleet from Ephesus, keeping Samos (4) on your right” (that is, past where the Athenian navy lay), “and hand it over to me at Miletus, I will admit that you are master of the sea.” But Lysander had no mind to interfere in the province of another officer. Thus Callicratidas assumed responsibility. He first manned, in addition to the squadron which he received from

Lysander, fifty new vessels furnished by the allies from Chios and Rhodes and elsewhere. When all these contingents were assembled, they formed a total of one hundred and forty sail, and with these he began making preparations for engagement with the enemy. But it was impossible for him not to note the strong current of opposition which he encountered from the friends of Lysander. Not only was there lack of zeal in their service, but they openly disseminated an opinion in the States, that it was the greatest possible blunder on the part of the Lacedaemonians so to change their admirals. Of course, they must from time to time get officers altogether unfit for the post — men whose nautical knowledge dated from yesterday, and who, moreover, had no notion of dealing with human beings. It would be very odd if this practice of sending out people ignorant of the sea and unknown to the folk of the country did not lead to some catastrophe. Callicratidas at once summoned the Lacedaemonians there present, and addressed them in the following terms: —

(1) I.e. as some think, the Erechtheion, which was built partly on the site of the old temple of Athena Polias, destroyed by the Persians. According to Dr. Dorpfeld, a quite separate building of the Doric order, the site of which (S. of the Erechtheion) has lately been discovered.

(2) The MSS. here add “in the ephorate of Pityas and the archonship of Callias at Athens;” but though the date is probably correct (cf. Leake, “Topography of Athens,” vol. i. p. 576 foll.), the words are almost certainly a gloss.

(3) Here the MSS. add “with the twenty-fourth year of the war,” probably an annotator’s gloss; the correct date should be twenty- fifth. Pel. war 26 = B.C. 406. Pel. war 25 ended B.C. 407.

(4) Lit. on the left (or east) of Samos, looking south from Ephesus.

“For my part,” he said, “I am content to stay at home: and if Lysander or any one else claim greater experience in nautical affairs than I possess, I have no desire to block his path. Only, being sent out by the State to take command of this fleet, I do not know what is left to me, save to carry out my instructions to the best of my ability. For yourselves, all I beg of you, in reference to my personal ambitions and the kind of charges brought against our common city, and of which you are as well aware as I am, is to state what you consider to be the best course: am I to stay where I am, or shall I sail back home, and explain the position of affairs out here?”

No one ventured to suggest any other course than that he should obey the authorities, and do what he was sent to do. Callicratidas then went up to the court of Cyrus to ask for further pay for the sailors, but the answer he got from Cyrus was that he should wait for two days. Callicratidas was annoyed at the rebuff: to dance attendance at the palace gates was little to his taste. In a fit of anger he cried out at the sorry condition of the Hellenes, thus forced to flatter the barbarian for the sake of money. “If ever I get back home,” he added, “I will do what in me lies to reconcile the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians.” And so he turned and sailed back to Miletus. From Miletus he sent some triremes to Lacedaemon to get money, and convoking the public assembly of the Milesians, addressed them thus: —

“Men of Miletus, necessity is laid upon me to obey the rulers at home; but for yourselves, whose neighbourhood to the barbarians has exposed you to many evils at their hands, I only ask you to let your zeal in the war bear some proportion to your former sufferings. You should set an example to the rest of the allies, and show us how to inflict the sharpest and swiftest injury on our enemy, whilst we await the return from Lacedaemon of my envoys with the necessary funds. Since one of the last acts of Lysander, before he left us, was to hand back to Cyrus the funds already on the spot, as though we could well dispense with them. I was thus forced to turn to Cyrus, but all I got from him was a series of rebuffs; he refused me an audience, and, for my part, I could not induce myself to hang about his gates like a mendicant. But I give you my word, men of Miletus, that in return for any assistance which you can render us while waiting for these aids, I will requite you richly. Only by God’s help let us show these barbarians that we do not need to worship them, in order to punish our foes.”

The speech was effective; many members of the assembly arose, and not the least eagerly those who were accused of opposing him. These, in some terror, proposed a vote of money, backed by offers of further private contributions. Furnished with these sums, and having procured from Chios a further remittance of five drachmas (5) a piece as outfit for each seaman, he set sail to Methyma in Lesbos, which was in the hands of the enemy. But as the Methymnaeans were not disposed to come over to him (since there was an Athenian garrison in the place, and the men at the head of affairs were partisans of Athens), he assaulted and took the place by storm. All the property within accordingly became the spoil of the soldiers. The prisoners were collected for sale by Callicratidas in the market-place, where, in answer to the demand of the allies, who called upon him to sell the Methymnaeans also, he made answer, that as long as he was in command, not a single Hellene should be enslaved if he could help it. The next day he set at liberty the free-born captives; the Athenian garrison with the captured slaves he sold. (6) To Conon he sent word: — He would put a stop to his strumpeting the sea. (7) And catching sight of him, as he put out to sea, at break of day, he gave chase, hoping to cut him off from his passage to Samos, and prevent his taking refuge there.

(5) About 4d.

(6) Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. p. 224 (2d ed.), thinks that Callicratidas did not even sell the Athenian garrison, as if the sense of the passage were: "The next day he set at liberty the free-born captives with the Athenian garrison, contenting himself with selling the captive slaves." But I am afraid that no ingenuity of stopping will extract that meaning from the Greek words, which are, {te d' usteraia tous men eleutherous apheke tous de ton 'Athenaion phrourous kai ta andrapoda ta doula panta apedoto}. To spare the Athenian garrison would have been too extraordinary a proceeding even for Callicratidas. The idea probably never entered his head. It was sufficiently noble for him to refuse to sell the Methymnaeans. See the remarks of Mr. W. L. Newman, "The Pol. of Aristotle," vol. i. p. 142.

(7) I.e. the sea was Sparta's bride.

But Conon, aided by the sailing qualities of his fleet, the rowers of which were the pick of several ships' companies, concentrated in a few vessels, made good his escape, seeking shelter within the harbour of Mitylene in Lesbos, and with him two of the ten generals, Leon and Erasinides. Callicratidas, pursuing him with one hundred and seventy sail, entered the harbour simultaneously; and Conon thus

hindered from further or final escape by the too rapid movements of the enemy, was forced to engage inside the harbour, and lost thirty of his ships, though the crews escaped to land. The remaining, forty in number, he hauled up under the walls of the town. Callicratidas, on his side, came to moorings in the harbour; and, having command of the exit, blocked the Athenian within. His next step was to send for the Methymnaeans in force by land, and to transport his army across from Chios. Money also came to him from Cyrus.

Conon, finding himself besieged by land and sea, without means of providing himself with corn from any quarter, the city crowded with inhabitants, and aid from Athens, whither no news of the late events could be conveyed, impossible, launched two of the fastest sailing vessels of his squadron. These he manned, before daybreak, with the best rowers whom he could pick out of the fleet, stowing away the marines at the same time in the hold of the ships and closing the port shutters. Every day for four days they held out in this fashion, but at evening as soon as it was dark he disembarked his men, so that the enemy might not suspect what they were after. On the fifth day, having got in a small stock of provisions, when it was already mid-day and the blockaders were paying little or no attention, and some of them even were taking their siesta, the two ships sailed out of the harbour: the one directing her course towards the Hellespont, whilst her companion made for the open sea. Then, on the part of the blockaders, there was a rush to the scene of action, as fast as the several crews could get clear of land, in bustle and confusion, cutting away the anchors, and rousing themselves from sleep, for, as chance would have it, they had been breakfasting on shore. Once on board, however, they were soon in hot pursuit of the ship which had started for the open sea, and ere the sun dipped they overhauled her, and after a successful engagement

attached her by cables and towed her back into harbour, crew and all. Her comrade, making for the Hellespont, escaped, and eventually reached Athens with news of the blockade. The first relief was brought to the blockaded fleet by Diomedon, who anchored with twelve vessels in the Mitylenaean Narrows. (8) But a sudden attack of Callicratidas, who bore down upon him without warning, cost him ten of his vessels, Diomedon himself escaping with his own ship and one other.

(8) Or, “Euripus.”

Now that the position of affairs, including the blockade, was fully known at Athens, a vote was passed to send out a reinforcement of one hundred and ten ships. Every man of ripe age, (9) whether slave or free, was impressed for this service, so that within thirty days the whole one hundred and ten vessels were fully manned and weighed anchor. Amongst those who served in this fleet were also many of the knights. (10) The fleet at once stood out across to Samos, and picked up the Samian vessels in that island. The muster-roll was swelled by the addition of more than thirty others from the rest of the allies, to whom the same principle of conscription applied, as also it did to the ships already engaged on foreign service. The actual total, therefore, when all the contingents were collected, was over one hundred and fifty vessels.

(9) I.e. from eighteen to sixty years.

(10) See Boeckh. “P. E. A.” Bk. II. chap. xxi. p. 263 (Eng. trans.)

Callicratidas, hearing that the relief squadron had already reached Samos, left fifty ships, under command of Eteonicus, in the harbour of Mitylene, and setting sail with the other one hundred and twenty, hove to for the evening meal off Cape Malea in Lesbos, opposite Mitylene. It so happened that the Athenians on this day were supping on the islands of Arginusae, which lie opposite Lesbos. In the night the Spartan not only saw their watch-fires, but received positive information that “these were the

Athenians;” and about midnight he got under weigh, intending to fall upon them suddenly. But a violent downpour of rain with thunder and lightning prevented him putting out to sea. By daybreak it had cleared, and he sailed towards Arginusae. On their side, the Athenian squadron stood out to meet him, with their left wing facing towards the open sea, and drawn up in the following order: — Aristocrates, in command of the left wing, with fifteen ships, led the van; next came Diomedon with fifteen others, and immediately in rear of Aristocrates and Diomedon respectively, as their supports, came Pericles and Erasinides. Parallel with Diomedon were the Samians, with their ten ships drawn up in single line, under the command of a Samian officer named Hippeus. Next to these came the ten vessels of the taxiarchs, also in single line, and supporting them, the three ships of the navarchs, with any other allied vessels in the squadron. The right wing was entrusted to Protomachus with fifteen ships, and next to him (on the extreme right) was Thrasylus with another division of fifteen. Protomachus was supported by Lysias with an equal number of ships, and Thrasylus by Aristogenes. The object of this formation was to prevent the enemy from manouvring so as to break their line by striking them amidships, (11) since they were inferior in sailing power.

(11) Lit. “by the diekplous.” Cf. Thuc. i. 49, and Arnold’s note, who says: “The ‘diecplus’ was a breaking through the enemy’s line in order by a rapid turning of the vessel to strike the enemy’s ship on the side or stern, where it was most defenceless, and so to sink it.” So, it seems, “the superiority of nautical skill has passed,” as Grote (viii. p. 234) says, “to the Peloponnesians and their allies.” Well may the historian add, “How astonished would the Athenian Admiral Phormion have been, if he could have witnessed the fleets and the order of battle at Arginusae!” See Thuc. iv. 11.

The Lacedaemonians, on the contrary, trusting to their superior seamanship, were formed opposite with their ships all in single line, with the special object of manouvring so as either to break the enemy’s line or to wheel round them. Callicratidas commanded the right wing in person. Before the battle the officer who acted as his pilot, the Megarian Hermon, suggested that it might be well to withdraw the fleet as the Athenian ships were far more numerous. But Callicratidas replied that Sparta would be no worse off even

if he personally should perish, but to flee would be disgraceful. (12) And now the fleets approached, and for a long space the battle endured. At first the vessels were engaged in crowded masses, and later on in scattered groups. At length Callicratidas, as his vessel dashed her beak into her antagonist, was hurled off into the sea and disappeared. At the same instant Protomachus, with his division on the right, had defeated the enemy's left, and then the flight of the Peloponnesians began towards Chios, though a very considerable body of them made for Phocaea, whilst the Athenians sailed back again to Arginusae. The losses on the side of the Athenians were twenty-five ships, crews and all, with the exception of the few who contrived to reach dry land. On the Peloponnesian side, nine out of the ten Lacedaemonian ships, and more than sixty belonging to the rest of the allied squadron, were lost.

(12) For the common reading, {oikeitai}, which is ungrammatical, various conjectures have been made, e.g. {oikieitai} = "would be none the worse off for citizens," {oikesetai} = "would be just as well administered without him,"

but as the readings and their renderings are alike doubtful, I have preferred to leave the matter vague. Cf. Cicero, "De Offic." i. 24; Plutarch, "Lac. Apophth." p. 832.

After consultation the Athenian generals agreed that two captains of triremes, Theramenes and Thrasybulus, accompanied by some of the taxiarchs, should take forty-seven ships and sail to the assistance of the disabled fleet and of the men on board, whilst the rest of the squadron proceeded to attack the enemy's blockading squadron under Eteonicus at Mitylene. In spite of their desire to carry out this resolution, the wind and a violent storm which arose prevented them. So they set up a trophy, and took up their quarters for the night. As to Etenoicus, the details of the engagement ware faithfully reported to him by the express despatch-boat in attendance. On receipt of the news, however, he sent the despatch-boat out again the way she came, with an injunction to those on board of her to sail off quickly without exchanging a word with any one. Then on a

sudden they were to return garlanded with wreaths of victory and shouting “Callicratidas has won a great sea fight, and the whole Athenian squadron is destroyed.” This they did, and Eteonicus, on his side, as soon as the despatch-boat came sailing in, proceeded to offer sacrifice of thanksgiving in honour of the good news. Meanwhile he gave orders that the troops were to take their evening meal, and that the masters of the trading ships were silently to stow away their goods on board the merchant ships and make sail as fast as the favourable breeze could speed them to Chios. The ships of war were to follow suit with what speed they might. This done, he set fire to his camp, and led off the land forces to Methymna. Conon, finding the enemy had made off, and the wind had grown comparatively mild, (13) got his ships afloat, and so fell in with the Athenian squadron, which had by this time set out from Arginusae. To these he explained the proceedings of Eteonicus. The squadron put into Mitylene, and from Mitylene stood across to Chios, and thence, without effecting anything further, sailed back to Samos.

(13) Or, “had changed to a finer quarter.”

VII

All the above-named generals, with the exception of Conon, were presently deposed by the home authorities. In addition to Conon two new generals were chosen, Adeimantus and Philocles. Of those concerned in the late victory two never returned to Athens: these were Protomachus and Aristogenes. The other six sailed home. Their names were Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasylus, and Erasinides. On their arrival Archidemus, the leader of the democracy at that date, who had charge of the two obol fund, (1) inflicted a fine on Erasinides, and accused him before the Dicastery (2) of having appropriated money derived from the Hellespont, which belonged to the people.

He brought a further charge against him of misconduct while acting as general, and the court sentenced him to imprisonment.

(1) Reading {tes diobelais}, a happy conjecture for the MSS. {tes diokelias}, which is inexplicable. See Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. p. 244 note (2d ed.)

(2) I.e. a legal tribunal or court of law. At Athens the free citizens constitutionally sworn and impannelled sat as "dicasts" ("jurymen," or rather as a bench of judges) to hear cases ({dikai}). Any particular board of dicasts formed a "dicastery."

These proceedings in the law court were followed by the statement of the generals before the senate (3) touching the late victory and the magnitude of the storm. Timocrates then proposed that the other five generals should be put in custody and handed over to the public assembly. (4) Whereupon the senate committed them all to prison. Then came the meeting of the public assembly, in which others, and more particularly Theramenes, formally accused the generals. He insisted that they ought to show cause why they had not picked up the shipwrecked crews. To prove that there had been no attempt on their part to attach blame to others, he might point, as conclusive testimony, to the despatch sent by the generals themselves to the senate and the people, in which they attributed the whole disaster to the storm, and nothing else. After this the generals each in turn made a defence, which was necessarily limited to a few words, since no right of addressing the assembly at length was allowed by law. Their explanation of the occurrences was that, in order to be free to sail against the enemy themselves, they had devolved the duty of picking up the shipwrecked crews upon certain competent captains of men-of-war, who had themselves been generals in their time, to wit Theramenes and Tharysbulus, and others of like stamp. If blame could attach to any one at all with regard to the duty in question, those to whom their orders had been given were the sole persons they could hold responsible. "But," they went on to say, "we will not, because these very persons have denounced us, invent a lie, and say that Theramenes and Thrasybulus are to blame, when the truth of the matter is that the magnitude of the storm alone prevented the

burial of the dead and the rescue of the living.” In proof of their contention, they produced the pilots and numerous other witnesses from among those present at the engagement. By these arguments they were in a fair way to persuade the people of their innocence. Indeed many private citizens rose wishing to become bail for the accused, but it was resolved to defer decision till another meeting of the assembly. It was indeed already so late that it would have been impossible to see to count the show of hands. It was further resolved that the senate meanwhile should prepare a measure, to be introduced at the next assembly, as to the mode in which the accused should take their trial.

(3) This is the Senate or Council of Five Hundred. One of its chief duties was to prepare measures for discussion in the assembly. It had also a certain amount of judicial power, hearing complaints and inflicting fines up to fifty drachmas. It sat daily, a “prytany” of fifty members of each of the ten tribes in rotation holding office for a month in turn.

(4) This is the great Public Assembly (the Ecclesia), consisting of all genuine Athenian citizens of more than twenty years of age.

Then came the festival of the Aparturia, (5) with its family gatherings of fathers and kinsfolk. Accordingly the party of Theramenes procured numbers of people clad in black apparel, and close-shaven, (6) who were to go in and present themselves before the public assembly in the middle of the festival, as relatives, presumably, of the men who had perished; and they persuaded Callixenus to accuse the generals in the senate. The next step was to convoke the assembly, when the senate laid before it the proposal just passed by their body, at the instance of Callixenus, which ran as follows: “Seeing that both the parties to this case, to wit, the prosecutors of the generals on the one hand, and the accused themselves in their defence on the other, have been heard in the late meeting of the assembly; we propose that the people of Athens now record their votes, one and all, by their tribes; that a couple of voting urns be placed for the convenience of each several tribe; and the public crier in the hearing of each several tribe proclaim the mode of voting as follows: ‘Let every one who finds the generals guilty of not rescuing the heroes of the late sea fight deposit his vote in urn No. 1. Let him who is of the contrary opinion

deposit his vote in urn No. 2. Further, in the event of the aforesaid generals being found guilty, let death be the penalty. Let the guilty persons be delivered over to the eleven. Let their property be confiscated to the State, with the exception of one tithe, which falls to the goddess.’”

(5) An important festival held in October at Athens, and in nearly all Ionic cities. Its objects were (1) the recognition of a common descent from Ion, the son of Apollo Patrous; and (2) the maintenance of the ties of clanship. See Grote, “Hist. of Greece,” vol. viii. p. 260 foll. (2d ed.); Jebb, “Theophr.” xviii. 5.

(6) I.e. in sign of mourning.

Now there came forward in the assembly a man, who said that he had escaped drowning by clinging to a meal tub. The poor fellows perishing around him had commissioned him, if he succeeded in saving himself, to tell the people of Athens how bravely they had fought for their fatherland, and how the generals had left them there to drown.

Presently Euryptolemus, the son of Peisianax, and others served a notice of indictment on Callixenus, insisting that his proposal was unconstitutional, and this view of the case was applauded by some members of the assembly. But the majority kept crying out that it was monstrous if the people were to be hindered by any stray individual from doing what seemed to them right. And when Lysicus, embodying the spirit of those cries, formally proposed that if these persons would not abandon their action, they should be tried by the same vote along with the generals: a proposition to which the mob gave vociferous assent; and so these were compelled to abandon their summonses. Again, when some of the Prytanes (7) objected to put a resolution to the vote which was in itself unconstitutional, Callixenus again got up and accused them in the same terms, and the shouting began again. “Yes, summons all who refuse,” until the Prytanes, in alarm, all agreed with one exception to permit the voting. This obstinate dissentient was Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who insisted that he would do nothing except in accordance with the law. (8) After this Euryptolemus rose and spoke in behalf of the generals. He said: —

(7) Prytanes — the technical term for the senators of the presiding tribe, who acted as presidents of the assembly. Their chairman for the day was called Epistates.

(8) For the part played by Socrates see further Xenophon's "Memorabilia," I. i. 18; IV. iv. 2.

"I stand here, men of Athens, partly to accuse Pericles, though he is a close and intimate connection of my own, and Diomedon, who is my friend, and partly to urge certain considerations on their behalf, but chiefly to press upon you what seems to me the best course for the State collectively. I hold them to blame in that they dissuaded their colleagues from their intention to send a despatch to the senate and this assembly, which should have informed you of the orders given to Theramenes and Thrasybulus to take forty-seven ships of war and pick up the shipwrecked crews, and of the neglect of the two officers to carry out those orders. And it follows that though the offence was committed by one or two, the responsibility must be shared by all; and in return for kindness in the past, they are in danger at present of sacrificing their lives to the machinations of these very men, and others whom I could mention. In danger, do I say, of losing their lives? No, not so, if you will suffer me to persuade you to do what is just and right; if you will only adopt such a course as shall enable you best to discover the truth and shall save you from too late repentance, when you find you have transgressed irremediably against heaven and your own selves. In what I urge there is no trap nor plot whereby you can be deceived by me or any other man; it is a straightforward course which will enable you to discover and punish the offender by whatever process you like, collectively or individually. Let them have, if not more, at any rate one whole day to make what defence they can for themselves; and trust to your own unbiased judgment to guide you to the right conclusion.

"You know, men of Athens, the exceeding stringency of the decree of Cannonus, (9) which orders that man, whosoever he be, who is guilty of treason against the people of Athens, to be put in irons, and so to meet the charge against him before the people. If he be convicted, he is to be thrown into

the Barathron and perish, and the property of such an one is to be confiscated, with the exception of the tithe which falls to the goddess. I call upon you to try these generals in accordance with this decree. Yes, and so help me God — if it please you, begin with my own kinsman Pericles for base would it be on my part to make him of more account than the whole of the State. Or, if you prefer, try them by that other law, which is directed against robbers of temples and betrayers of their country, which says: if a man betray his city or rob a sacred temple of the gods, he shall be tried before a law court, and if he be convicted, his body shall not be buried in Attica, and his goods shall be confiscated to the State. Take your choice as between these two laws, men of Athens, and let the prisoners be tried by one or other. Let three portions of a day be assigned to each respectively, one portion wherein they shall listen to their accusation, a second wherein they shall make their defence, and a third wherein you shall meet and give your votes in due order on the question of their guilt or innocence. By this procedure the malefactors will receive the desert of their misdeeds in full, and those who are innocent will owe you, men of Athens, the recovery of their liberty, in place of unmerited destruction. (10)

(9) "There was a rule in Attic judicial procedure, called the psephism of Kannonus (originally adopted, we do not know when, on the proposition of a citizen of that name, as a psephism or decree for some particular case, but since generalised into common practice, and grown into great prescriptive reverence), which peremptorily forbade any such collective trial or sentence, and directed that a separate judicial vote should in all cases be taken for or against each accused party." Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. p. 266 (2d ed.)

(10) Reading {adikos apolountai}.

"On your side, in trying the accused by recognised legal procedure, you will show that you obey the dictates of pious feeling, and can regard the sanctity of an oath, instead of joining hands with our enemies the Lacedaemonians and fighting their battles. For is it not to fight their battles, if you take their conquerors, the men who deprived them of seventy vessels, and at the moment of victory sent them to perdition untried and in the teeth of the law? What are you afraid of, that you press forward with such hot haste? Do you

imagine that you may be robbed of the power of life and death over whom you please, should you condescend to a legal trial? but that you are safe if you take shelter behind an illegality, like the illegality of Callixenus, when he worked upon the senate to propose to this assembly to deal with the accused by a single vote? But consider, you may actually put to death an innocent man, and then repentance will one day visit you too late. Bethink you how painful and unavailing remorse will then be, and more particularly if your error has cost a fellow-creature his life. What a travesty of justice it would be if in the case of a man like Aristarchus, (11) who first tried to destroy the democracy and then betrayed Oenoe to our enemy the Thebans, you granted him a day for his defence, consulting his wishes, and conceded to him all the other benefits of the law; whereas now you are proposing to deprive of these same privileges your own generals, who in every way conformed to your views and defeated your enemies. Do not you, of all men, I implore you, men of Athens, act thus. Why, these laws are your own, to them, beyond all else you owe your greatness. Guard them jealously; in nothing, I implore you, act without their sanction.

(11) See below, II. iii; also cf. Thuc. viii. 90, 98.

“But now, turn for a moment and consider with me the actual occurrences which have created the suspicion of misconduct on the part of our late generals. The sea-fight had been fought and won, and the ships had returned to land, when Diomedon urged that the whole squadron should sail out in line and pick up the wrecks and floating crews. Erasinides was in favour of all the vessels sailing as fast as possible to deal with the enemy’s forces at Mitylene. And Thrasylus represented that both objects could be effected, by leaving one division of the fleet there, and with the rest sailing against the enemy; and if this resolution were agreed to, he advised that each of the eight generals should leave

three ships of his own division with the ten vessels of the taxiarchs, the ten Samian vessels, and the three belonging to the navarchs. These added together make forty-seven, four for each of the lost vessels, twelve in number. Among the taxiarchs left behind, two were Thrasybulus and Theramenes, the men who in the late meeting of this assembly undertook to accuse the generals. With the remainder of the fleet they were to sail to attack the enemy's fleet. Everything, you must admit, was duly and admirably planned. It was only common justice, therefore, that those whose duty it was to attack the enemy should render an account for all miscarriages of operations against the enemy; while those who were commissioned to pick up the dead and dying should, if they failed to carry out the instructions of the generals, be put on trial to explain the reasons of the failure. This indeed I may say in behalf of both parites. It was really the storm which, in spite of what the generals had planned, prevented anything being done. There are witnesses ready to attest the truth of this: the men who escaped as by a miracle, and among these one of these very generals, who was on a sinking ship and was saved. And this man, who needed picking up as much as anybody at that moment, is, they insist, to be tried by one and the same vote as those who neglected to perform their orders! Once more, I beg you, men of Athens, to accept your victory and your good fortune, instead of behaving like the desperate victims of misfortune and defeat. Recognise the finger of divine necessity; do not incur the reproach of stony-heartedness by discovering treason where there was merely powerlessness, and condemning as guilty those who were prevented by the storm from carrying out their instructions. Nay! you will better satisfy the demands of justice by crowning these conquerors with wreaths of victory than by punishing them with death at the instigation of wicked men."

At the conclusion of his speech Euryptolemus proposed, as an amendment, that the prisoners should, in accordance with the decree of Cannonus, be tried each separately, as against the proposal of the senate to try them all by a single vote.

At the show of hands the tellers gave the majority in favour of Euryptolemus's amendment, but upon the application of Menecles, who took formal exception (12) to this decision, the show of hands was gone through again, and now the verdict was in favour of the resolution of the senate. At a later date the balloting was made, and by the votes recorded the eight generals were condemned, and the six who were in Athens were put to death.

(12) For this matter cf. Schomann, "De Comitiis Athen." p. 161 foll.; also Grote, "Hist. of Grece," vol. viii. p. 276 note (2d ed.)

Not long after, repentance seized the Athenians, and they passed a decree authorising the public prosecution of those who had deceived the people, and the appointment of proper securities for their persons until the trial was over. Callixenus was one of those committed for trail. There were, besides Callixenus, four others against whom true bills were declared, and they were all five imprisoned by their sureties. But all subsequently effected their escape before the trial, at the time of the sedition in which Cleophon (13) was killed. Callixenus eventually came back when the party in Piraeus returned to the city, at the date of the amnesty, (14) but only to die of hunger, an object of universal detestation.

(13) Cleophon, the well-known demagogue. For the occasion of his death see Grote, "Hist. of Greece," vol. viii. pp. 166, 310 (2d ed.); Prof. Jebb, "Attic Orators," i. 266, ii. 288. For his character, as popularly conceived, cf. Aristoph. "Frogs," 677.

(14) B.C. 403.

BOOK II

I

To return to Eteonicus and his troops in Chios. During summer they were well able to support themselves on the fruits of the season, or by labouring for hire in different parts of the island, but with the approach of winter these means of subsistence began to fail. Ill-clad at the same time, and ill-shod, they fell to caballing and arranging plans to attack the city of Chios. It was agreed amongst them, that in order to gauge their numbers, every member of the conspiracy should carry a reed. Eteonicus got wind of the design, but was at a loss how to deal with it, considering the number of these reed-bearers. To make an open attack upon them seemed dangerous. It would probably lead to a rush to arms, in which the conspirators would seize the city and commence hostilities, and, in the event of their success, everything hitherto achieved would be lost. Or again, the destruction on his part of many fellow-creatures and allies was a terrible alternative, which would place the Spartans in an unenviable light with regard to the rest of Hellas, and render the soldiers ill-disposed to the cause in hand. Accordingly he took with him fifteen men, armed with daggers, and marched through the city. Falling in with one of the reed-bearers, a man suffering from ophthalmia, who was returning from the surgeon’s house, he put him to death. This led to some uproar, and people asked why the man was thus slain. By Eteonicus’s orders the answer was set afloat, “because he carried a reed.” As the explanation circulated, one reed-bearer after another threw away the symbol, each one saying to himself, as he heard the reason given, “I have better not be seen with this.” After a while Eteonicus called a meeting of the Chians, and imposed upon them a contribution of money, on the ground that with pay in their

pockets the sailors would have no temptation to revolutionary projects. The Chians acquiesced. Whereupon Eteonicus promptly ordered his crews to get on board their vessels. He then rowed alongside each ship in turn, and addressed the men at some length in terms of encouragement and cheery admonition, just as though he knew nothing of what had taken place, and so distributed a month's pay to every man on board.

After this the Chians and the other allies held a meeting in Ephesus, and, considering the present posture of affairs, determined to send ambassadors to Lacedaemon with a statement of the facts, and a request that Lysander might be sent out to take command of the fleet. Lysander's high reputation among the allies dated back to his former period of office, when as admiral he had won the naval victory of Notium. The ambassadors accordingly were despatched, accompanied by envoys also from Cyrus, charged with the same message. The Lacedaemonians responded by sending them Lysander as second in command, (1) with Aracus as admiral, since it was contrary to their custom that the same man should be admiral twice. At the same time the fleet was entrusted to Lysander. (2)

(1) Epistoleus. See above.

(2) "At this date the war had lasted five-and-twenty years." So the MSS. read. The words are probably an interpolation.

It was in this year (3) that Cyrus put Autoboesaces and Mitraeus to death. These were sons of the sister of Dariaeus (4) (the daughter of Xerxes, the father of Darius). (5) He put them to death for neglecting, when they met him, to thrust their hands into the sleeve (or "kore") which is a tribute of respect paid to the king alone. This "kore" is longer than the ordinary sleeve, so long in fact that a man with his hand inside is rendered helpless. In consequence of this act on the part of Cyrus, Hieramenes (6) and his wife urged upon Dariaeus the danger of overlooking such excessive insolence on the part of the young prince, and Dariaeus, on the plea of

sickness, sent a special embassy to summon Cyrus to his bedside.

(3) B.C. 406.

(4) Dariaeus, i.e. Darius, but the spelling of the name is correct, and occurs in Ctesias, though in the “Anabasis” we have the spelling Darius.

(5) These words look like the note of a foolish and ignorant scribe. He ought to have written, “The daughter of Artaxerxes and own sister of Darius, commonly so called.”

(6) For Hieramenes cf. Thuc. viii. 95, and Prof. Jowett ad loc.

B.C. 405. In the following year (7) Lysander arrived at Ephesus, and sent for Eteonicus with his ships from Chios, and collected all other vessels elsewhere to be found. His time was now devoted to refitting the old ships and having new ones built in Antandrus. He also made a journey to the court of Cyrus with a request for money. All Cyrus could say was, that not only the money sent by the king was spent, but much more besides; and he pointed out the various sums which each of the admirals had received, but at the same time he gave him what he asked for. Furnished with this money, Lysander appointed captains to the different men-of-war, and remitted to the sailors their arrears of pay. Meanwhile the Athenian generals, on their side, were devoting their energies to the improvements of their navy at Samos.

(7) The MSS. add “during the ephorate of Archytas and the archonship at Athens of Alexias,” which, though correct enough, is probably an interpolation.

It was now Cyrus’s turn to send for Lysander. It was the moment at which the envoy from his father had arrived with the message: “Your father is on his sick-bed and desires your presence.” The king lay at Thamneria, in Media, near the territory of the Cadusians, against whom he had marched to put down a revolt. When Lysander presented himself, Cyrus was urgent with him not to engage the Athenians at sea unless he had many more ships than they. “The king,” he added, “and I have plenty of wealth, so that, as far as money goes, you can man plenty of vessels.” He then consigned to him all the tributes from the several cities which belonged to him personally, and gave him the ready money which he had as a gift; and finally, reminding him of the sincere

friendship he entertained towards the state of Lacedaemon, as well as to himself personally, he set out up country to visit his father. Lysander, finding himself thus left with the complete control of the property of Cyrus (during the absence of that prince, so summoned to the bedside of his father), was able to distribute pay to his troops, after which he set sail for the Ceramic Gulf of Caria. Here he stormed a city in alliance with the Athenians named Cedreae, and on the following day's assault took it, and reduced the inhabitants to slavery. These were of a mixed Hellene and barbaric stock. From Cedreae he continued his voyage to Rhodes. The Athenians meanwhile, using Samos as their base of operations, were employed in devastating the king's territory, or in swooping down upon Chios and Ephesus, and in general were preparing for a naval battle, having but lately chosen three new generals in addition to those already in office, whose names were Menander, Tydeus, and Cephisodotus. Now Lysander, leaving Rhodes, and coasting along Ionia, made his way to the Hellespont, having an eye to the passage of vessels through the Straits, and, in a more hostile sense, on the cities which had revolted from Sparta. The Athenians also set sail from Chios, but stood out to open sea, since the seaboard of Asia was hostile to them.

Lysander was again on the move; leaving Abydos, he passed up channel to Lampsacus, which town was allied with Athens; the men of Abydos and the rest of the troops advancing by land, under the command of the Lacedaemonian Thorax. They then attacked and took by storm the town, which was wealthy, and with its stores of wine and wheat and other commodities was pillaged by the soldiery. All free-born persons, however, were without exception released by Lysander. And now the Athenian fleet, following close on his heels, came to moorings at Elaeus, in the Chersonesus, one hundred and eighty sail in all. It was not until they had reached this place, and were getting their

early meal, that the news of what had happened at Lampsacus reached them. Then they instantly set sail again to Sestos, and, having halted long enough merely to take in stores, sailed on further to Aegospotami, a point facing Lampsacus, where the Hellespont is not quite two miles (8) broad. Here they took their evening meal.

(8) Lit. fifteen stades.

The night following, or rather early next morning, with the first streak of dawn, Lysander gave the signal for the men to take their breakfasts and get on board their vessels; and so, having got all ready for a naval engagement, with his ports closed and movable bulwarks attached, he issued the order that no one was to stir from his post or put out to sea. As the sun rose the Athenians drew up their vessels facing the harbour, in line of battle ready for action; but Lysander declining to come out to meet them, as the day advanced they retired again to Aegospotami. Then Lysander ordered the swiftest of his ships to follow the Athenians, and as soon as the crews had disembarked, to watch what they did, sail back, and report to him. Until these look-outs returned he would permit no disembarkation from his ships. This performance he repeated for four successive days, and each day the Athenians put out to sea and challenged an engagement.

But now Alcibiades, from one of his fortresses, could espy the position of his fellow-countrymen, moored on an open beach beyond reach of any city, and forced to send for supplies to Sestos, which was nearly two miles distant, while their enemies were safely lodged in a harbour, with a city adjoining, and everything within reach. The situation did not please him, and he advised them to shift their anchorage to Sestos, where they would have the advantage of a harbour and a city. “Once there,” he concluded, “you can engage the enemy whenever it suits you.” But the generals, and more particularly Tydeus and Menander, bade him go about his

business. “We are generals now — not you,” they said; and so he went away. And now for five days in succession the Athenians had sailed out to offer battle, and for the fifth time retired, followed by the same swift sailors of the enemy. But this time Lysander’s orders to the vessels so sent in pursuit were, that as soon as they saw the enemy’s crew fairly disembarked and dispersed along the shores of the Chersonesus (a practice, it should be mentioned, which had grown upon them from day to day owing to the distance at which eatables had to be purchased, and out of sheer contempt, no doubt, of Lysander, who refused to accept battle), they were to begin their return voyage, and when in mid-channel to hoist a shield. The orders were punctually carried out, and Lysander at once signalled to his whole squadron to put across with all speed, while Thorax, with the land forces, was to march parallel with the fleet along the coast. Aware of the enemy’s fleet, which he could see bearing down upon him, Conon had only time to signal to the crews to join their ships and rally to the rescue with all their might. But the men were scattered far and wide, and some of the vessels had only two out of their three banks of rowers, some only a single one, while others again were completely empty. Conon’s own ship, with seven others in attendance on him and the “Paralus,” (9) put out to sea, a little cluster of nine vessels, with their full complement of men; but every one of the remaining one hundred and seventy-one vessels were captured by Lysander on the beach. As to the men themselves, the large majority of them were easily made prisoners on shore, a few only escaping to the small fortresses of the neighbourhood. Meanwhile Conon and his nine vessels made good their escape. For himself, knowing that the fortune of Athens was ruined, he put into Abarnis, the promontory of Lampsacus, and there picked up the great sails of Lysander’s ships, and then with eight ships set sail himself to seek refuge with Evagoras in Cyprus, while

the “Paralus” started for Athens with tidings of what had taken place.

(9) The “Paralus” — the Athenian sacred vessel; cf. Thuc. iii. 33 et passim.

Lysander, on his side, conveyed the ships and prisoners and all other spoil back to Lampsacus, having on board some of the Athenian generals, notably Philocles and Adeimantus. On the very day of these achievements he despatched Theopompus, a Milesian privateersman, to Lacedaemon to report what had taken place. This envoy arrived within three days and delivered his message. Lysander’s next step was to convene the allies and bid them deliberate as to the treatment of the prisoners. Many were the accusations here levied against the Athenians. There was talk of crimes committed against the law of Hellas, and of cruelties sanctioned by popular decrees; which, had they conquered in the late sea-fight, would have been carried out; such as the proposal to cut off the right hand of every prisoner taken alive, and lastly the ill-treatment of two captured men-of-war, a Corinthian and an Andrian vessel, when every man on board had been hurled headlong down the cliff. Philocles was the very general of the Athenians who had so ruthlessly destroyed those men. Many other tales were told; and at length a resolution was passed to put all the Athenian prisoners, with the exception of Adeimantus, to death. He alone, it was pleaded, had taken exception to the proposal to cut off the prisoners’ hands. On the other hand, he was himself accused by some people of having betrayed the fleet. As to Philocles, Lysander put to him one question, as the officer who had thrown (10) the Corinthians and Andrians down the cliff: What fate did the man deserve to suffer who had embarked on so cruel a course of illegality against Hellenes? and so delivered him to the executioner.

(10) Reading {os… katekremnise}.

II

When he had set the affairs of Lampsacus in order, Lysander sailed to Byzantium and Chalcedon, where the inhabitants, having first dismissed the Athenian garrison under a flag of truce, admitted him within their walls. Those citizens of Byzantium, who had betrayed Byzantium into the hands of Alcibiades, fled as exiles into Pontus, but subsequently betaking themselves to Athens, became Athenian citizens. In dealing with the Athenian garrisons, and indeed with all Athenians wheresoever found, Lysander made it a rule to give them safe conduct to Athens, and to Athens only, in the certainty that the larger the number collected within the city and Piraeus, the more quickly the want of necessaries of life would make itself felt. And now, leaving Sthenelaus, a Laconian, as governor-general of Byzantium and Chalcedon, he sailed back himself to Lampsacus and devoted himself to refitting his ships.

It was night when the “Paralus” reached Athens with her evil tidings, on receipt of which a bitter wail of woe broke forth. From Piraeus, following the line of the long walls up to the heart of the city, it swept and swelled, as each man to his neighbour passed on the news. On that night no man slept. There was mourning and sorrow for those that were lost, but the lamentation for the dead was merged in even deeper sorrow for themselves, as they pictured the evils they were about to suffer, the like of which they themselves had inflicted upon the men of Melos, who were colonists of the Lacedaemonians, when they mastered them by siege. Or on the men of Histiaea; on Scione and Torone; on the Aeginetans, and many another Hellene city. (1) On the following day the public assembly met, and, after debate, it was resolved to block up all the harbours save one, to put the walls in a state of defence, to post guards at various points, and to make all other necessary preparations for a siege. Such were the concerns of the men of Athens.

(1) With regard to these painful recollections, see (1) for the siege and surrender of Melos (in B.C. 416), Thuc. v. 114, 116; and cf. Aristoph. “Birds,” 186; Plut. (“Lysander,” 14); (2) for the ejection of the Histiaeans, an incident of the recovery of Euboea in 445 B.C., see Thuc. i. 14; Plut. (“Pericles,” 23); (3) for the matter of Scione, which revolted in 423 B.C., and was for a long time a source of disagreement between the Athenians

and Lacedaemonians, until finally captured by the former in 421 B.C., when the citizens were slain and the city given to the Plataeans, see Thuc. iv. 120-122, 129-133; v. 18, 32; (4) for Torone see Thuc. ib., and also v. 3; (5) for the expulsion of the Aeginetans in 431 B.C. see Thuc. ii. 27.

Lysander presently left the Hellespont with two hundred sail and arrived at Lesbos, where he established a new order of things in Mitylene and the other cities of the island. Meanwhile he despatched Eteonicus with a squadron of ten ships to the northern coasts, (2) where that officer brought about a revolution of affairs which placed the whole region in the hands of Lacedaemon. Indeed, in a moment of time, after the sea-fight, the whole of Hellas had revolted from Athens, with the solitary exception of the men of Samos. These, having massacred the notables, (3) held the state under their control. After a while Lysander sent messages to Agis at Deceleia, and to Lacedaemon, announcing his approach with a squadron of two hundred sail.

(2) Lit. “the Thraceward districts.” See above, p. 16.

(3) Or, “since they had slain their notables, held the state under popular control.” See Grote, “Hist. of Greece,” vol. viii. p. 303 note 3 (2d ed.), who thinks that the incident referred to is the violent democratic revolution in Samos described in Thuc. viii. 21, B.C. 412.

In obedience to a general order of Pausanias, the other king of Lacedaemon, a levy in force of the Lacedaemonians and all the rest of Peloponnesus, except the Argives, was set in motion for a campaign. As soon as the several contingents had arrived, the king put himself at their head and marched against Athens, encamping in the gymnasium of the Academy, (4) as it is called. Lysander had now reached Aegina, where, having got together as many of the former inhabitants as possible, he formally reinstated them in their city; and what he did in behalf of the Aeginetans, he did also in behalf of the Melians, and of the rest who had been deprived of their countries. He then pillaged the island of Salamis, and finally came to moorings off Piraeus with one hundred and fifty ships of the line, and established a strict blockade against all merchant ships entering that harbour.

(4) For this most illustrious of Athenian gymnasia, which still retains its name, see Leake, “Topography of Athens,” i. 195 foll.

The Athenians, finding themselves besieged by land and sea, were in sore perplexity what to do. Without ships, without allies, without provisions, the belief gained hold

upon them that there was no way of escape. They must now, in their turn, suffer what they had themselves inflincted upon others; not in retaliation, indeed, for ills received, but out of sheer insolence, overriding the citizens of petty states, and for no better reason than that these were allies of the very men now at their gates. In this frame of mind they enfranchised those who at any time had lost their civil rights, and schooled themselves to endurance; and, albeit many succumbed to starvation, no thought of truce or reconciliation with their foes was breathed. (5) But when the stock of corn was absolutely insufficient, they sent an embassage to Agis, proposing to become allies of the Lacedaemonians on the sole condition of keeping their fortification walls and Piraeus; and to draw up articles of treaty on these terms. Agis bade them betake themselves to Lacedaemon, seeing that he had no authority to act himself. With this answer the ambassadors returned to Athens, and were forthwith sent on to Lacedaemon. On reaching Sellasia, (6) a town in (7) Laconian territory, they waited till they got their answer from the ephors, who, having learnt their terms (which were identical to those already proposed to Agis), bade them instantly to be gone, and, if they really desired peace, to come with other proposals, the fruit of happier reflection. Thus the ambassadors returned home, and reported the result of their embassage, whereupon despondency fell upon all. It was a painful reflection that in the end they would be sold into slavery; and meanwhile, pending the return of a second embassy, many must needs fall victims to starvation. The razing of their fortifications was not a solution which any one cared to recommend. A senator, Archestratus, had indeed put the question in the senate, whether it were not best to make peace with the Lacedaemonians on such terms as they were willing to propose; but he was thrown into prison. The Laconian proposals referred to involved the destruction of both long walls for a space of more than a mile. And a decree had been

passed, making it illegal to submit any such proposition about the walls. Things having reached this pass, Theramenes made a proposal in the public assembly as follows: If they chose to send him as an ambassador to Lysander, he would go and find out why the Lacedaemonians were so unyielding about the walls; whether it was they really intended to enslave the city, or merely that they wanted a guarantee of good faith. Despatched accordingly, he lingered on with Lysander for three whole months and more, watching for the time when the Athenians, at the last pinch of starvation, would be willing to accede to any terms that might be offered. At last, in the fourth month, he returned and reported to the public assembly that Lysander had detained him all this while, and had ended by bidding him betake himself to Lacedaemon, since he had no authority himself to answer his questions, which must be addressed directly to the ephors. After this Theramenes was chosen with nine others to go to Lacedaemon as ambassadors with full powers. Meanwhile Lysander had sent an Athenian exile, named Aristoteles, in company of certain Lacedaemonians, to Sparta to report to the board of ephors how he had answered Theramenes, that they, and they alone, had supreme authority in matters of peace and war.

(5) Or, “they refused to treat for peace.”

(6) Sellasia, the bulwark of Sparta in the valley of the Oenus.

(7) The MSS. have “in the neighbourhood of,” which words are inappropriate at this date, though they may well have been added by some annotator after the Cleomenic war and the battle of Sellasia, B.C. 222, when Antigonus of Macedon destroyed the place in the interests of the Achaean League.

Theramenes and his companions presently reached Sellasia, and being there questioned as to the reason of their visit, replied that they had full powers to treat of peace. After which the ephors ordered them to be summoned to their presence. On their arrival a general assembly was convened, in which the Corinthians and Thebans more particularly, though their views were shared by many other Hellenes also, urged the meeting not to come to terms with

the Athenians, but to destroy them. The Lacedaemonians replied that they would never reduce to slavery a city which was itself an integral portion of Hellas, and had performed a great and noble service to Hellas in the most perilous of emergencies. On the contrary, they were willing to offer peace on the terms now specified — namely, “That the long walls and the fortifications of Piraeus should be destroyed; that the Athenian fleet, with the exception of twelve vessels, should be surrendered; that the exiles should be restored; and lastly, that the Athenians should acknowledge the headship of Sparta in peace and war, leaving to her the choice of friends and foes, and following her lead by land and sea.” Such were the terms which Theramenes and the rest who acted with him were able to report on their return to Athens. As they entered the city, a vast crowd met them, trembling lest their mission have proved fruitless. For indeed delay was no longer possible, so long already was the list of victims daily perishing from starvation. On the day following, the ambassadors delivered their report, stating the terms upon which the Lacedaemonians were willing to make peace. Theramenes acted as spokesman, insisting that they ought to obey the Lacedaemonians and pull down the walls. A small minority raised their voice in opposition, but the majority were strongly in favour of the proposition, and the resolution was passed to accept the peace. After that, Lysander sailed into the Piraeus, and the exiles were readmitted. And so they fell to levelling the fortifications and walls with much enthusiasm, to the accompaniment of female flute-players, deeming that day the beginning of liberty to Greece.

Thus the year drew to its close (8) — during its middle months took place the accession of Dionysius, the son of Hermocrates the Syracusan, to the tyranny of Syracuse; an incident itself preceded by a victory gained over the Carthaginians by the Syracusans; the reduction of

Agrigentum through famine by the Carthaginians themselves; and the exodus of the Sicilian Greeks from that city.

(8) For the puzzling chronology of this paragraph see Grote, “Hist. of Greece,” vol. x. p 619 (2d ed.) If genuine, the words may perhaps have slipt out of their natural place in chapter i. above, in front of the words “in the following year Lysander arrived,” etc. L. Dindorf brackets them as spurious. Xen., “Hist. Gr.” ed. tertia, Lipsiae, MDCCCLXXII. For the incidents referred to see above; Grote, “Hist. of Greece,” vol. x. pp. 582, 598 (2d ed.)

III

B.C. 404. In the following year (1) the people passed a resolution to choose thirty men who were to draft a constitution based on the ancestral laws of the State. The following were chosen to act on this committee: — Polychares, Critias, Melobius, Hippolochus, Eucleides, Hiero, Mnesilochus, Chremo, Theramenes, Aresias, Diocles, Phaedrias, Chaereleos, Anaetius, Piso, Sophocles, Erastosthenes, Charicles, Onomacles, Theognis, Aeschines, Theogones, Cleomedes, Erasistratus, Pheido, Dracontides, Eumathes, Aristoteles, Hippomachus, Mnesitheides. After these transactions, Lysander set sail for Samos; and Agis withdrew the land force from Deceleia and disbanded the troops, dismissing the contingents to their several cities.

(1) The MSS. here add “it was that year of the Olympiad cycle in which Crocinas, a Thessalian, won the Stadium; when Endius was ephor at Sparta, and Pythodorus archon at Athens, though the Athenians indeed do not call the year by that archon’s name, since he was elected during the oligarchy, but prefer to speak of the year of ‘anarchy’; the aforesaid oligarchy originated thus,” — which, though correct, probably was not written by Xenophon. The year of anarchy might perhaps be better rendered “the year without archons.”

In was at this date, about the time of the solar eclipse, (2) that Lycophron of Pherae, who was ambitious of ruling over the whole of Thessaly, defeated those sections of the Thessalians who opposed him, such as the men of Larissa and others, and slew many of them. It was also about this date that Dionysius, now tyrant of Syracuse, was defeated by the Carthaginians and lost Gela and Camarina. And again, a little later, the men of Leontini, who previously had been amalgamated with the Syracusans, separated themselves from Syracuse and Dionysius, and asserted their independence, and returned to their native city. Another incident of this period was the sudden despatch and introduction of Syracusan horse into Catana by Dionysius.

(2) This took place on 2d September B.C. 404.

Now the Samians, though besieged by Lysander on all sides, were at first unwilling to come to terms. But at the last moment, when Lysander was on the point of assaulting the town, they accepted the terms, which allowed every free man to leave the island, but not to carry away any part of his property, except the clothes on his back. On these conditions they marched out. The city and all it contained was then delivered over to its ancient citizens by Lysander, who finally appointed ten governors to garrison the island. (3) After which, he disbanded the allied fleet, dismissing them to their respective cities, while he himself, with the Lacedaemonian squadron, set sail for Laconia, bringing with him the prows of the conquered vessels and the whole navy of Piraeus, with the exception of twelve ships. He also brought the crowns which he had received from the cities as private gifts, and a sum of four hundred and seventy talents (4) in silver (the surplus of the tribute money which Cyrus had assigned to him for the prosecution of the war), besides other property, the fruit of his military exploits. All these things Lysander delivered to the Lacedaemonians in the latter end of summer. (5)

(3) A council of ten, or "decarchy." See Grote, "H. G." viii. 323 (1st ed.)

(4) About 112,800 pounds.

(5) The MSS. add "a summer, the close of which coincided with the termination of a war which had lasted twenty-eight and a half years, as the list of annual ephors, appended in order, serves to show. Aenesias is the first name. The war began during his ephorate, in the fifteenth year of the thirty years' truce after the capture of Euboea. His successors were Brasidas, Isanor, Sostratidas, Exarchus, Agesistratus, Angenidas, Onomacles, Zeuxippus, Pityas, Pleistolas, Cleinomachus, Harchus, Leon, Chaerilas, Patesiadas, Cleosthenes, Lycarius, Eperatus, Onomantius, Alexippidas, Misgolaidas, Isias, Aracus, Euarchippus, Pantacles, Pityas, Archytas, and lastly, Endius, during whose year of office Lysander sailed home in triumph, after performing the exploits above recorded," — the interpolation, probably, of some editor or copyist, the words "twenty-eight and a half" being probably a mistake on his part for "twenty-seven and a half." Cf. Thuc. v. 26; also Buchsenschutz, Einleitung, p. 8 of his school edition of the "Hellenica."

The Thirty had been chosen almost immediately after the long walls and the fortifications round Piraeus had been razed. They were chosen for the express purpose of compiling a code of laws for the future constitution of the State. The laws were always on the point of being published, yet they were never forthcoming; and the thirty compilers contented themselves meanwhile with appointing a senate and the other magistracies as suited their fancy best. That

done, they turned their attention, in the first instance, to such persons as were well known to have made their living as informers (6) under the democracy, and to be thorns in the side of all respectable people. These they laid hold on and prosecuted on the capital charge. The new senate gladly recorded its vote of condemnation against them; and the rest of the world, conscious of bearing no resemblance to them, seemed scarcely vexed. But the Thirty did not stop there. Presently they began to deliberate by what means they could get the city under their absolute control, in order that they might work their will upon it. Here again they proceeded tentatively; in the first instance, they sent (two of their number), Aeschines and Aristoteles, to Lacedaemon, and persuaded Lysander to support them in getting a Lacedaemonian garrison despatched to Athens. They only needed it until they had got the “malignants” out of the way, and had established the constitution; and they would undertake to maintain these troops at their own cost. Lysander was not deaf to their persuasions, and by his co-operation their request was granted. A bodyguard, with Callibius as governor, was sent.

(6) Lit. “by sycophancy,” i.e. calumnious accusation — the sycophant’s trade. For a description of this pest of Athenian life cf. “Dem.” in Arist. 1, S. 52; quoted in Jebb, “Attic Orators,” chap. xxix. 14; cf. Aristoph. “Ach.” 904; Xen. “Mem.” II. ix. 1.

And now that they had got the garrison, they fell to flattering Callibius with all servile flattery, in order that he might give countenance to their doings. Thus they prevailed on him to allow some of the guards, whom they selected, to accompany them, while they proceeded to lay hands on whom they would; no longer confining themselves to base folk and people of no account, but boldly laying hands on those who they felt sure would least easily brook being thrust aside, or, if a spirit of opposition seized them, could command the largest number of partisans.

These were early days; as yet Critias was of one mind with Theramenes, and the two were friends. But the time came when, in proportion as Critias was ready to rush headlong

into wholesale carnage, like one who thirsted for the blood of the democracy, which had banished him, Theramenes balked and thwarted him. It was barely reasonable, he argued, to put people to death, who had never done a thing wrong to respectable people in their lives, simply because they had enjoyed influence and honour under the democracy. “Why, you and I, Critias,” he would add, “have said and done many things ere now for the sake of popularity.” To which the other (for the terms of friendly intimacy still subsisted) would retort, “There is no choice left to us, since we intend to take the lion’s share, but to get rid of those who are best able to hinder us. If you imagine, because we are thirty instead of one, our government requires one whit the less careful guarding than an actual tyranny, you must be very innocent.”

So things went on. Day after day the list of persons put to death for no just reason grew longer. Day after day the signs of resentment were more significant in the groups of citizens banding together and forecasting the character of this future constitution; till at length Theramenes spoke again, protesting: — There was no help for it but to associate with themselves a sufficient number of persons in the conduct of affairs, or the oligarchy would certainly come to an end. Critias and the rest of the Thirty, whose fears had already converted Theramenes into a dangerous popular idol, proceeded at once to draw up a list of three thousand citizens; fit and proper persons to have a share in the conduct of affairs. But Theramenes was not wholly satisfied, “indeed he must say, for himself, he regarded it as ridiculous, that in their effort to associate the better classes with themselves in power, they should fix on just that particular number, three thousand, as if that figure had some necessary connection with the exact number of gentlemen in the State, making it impossible to discover any respectability outside or rascality within the magic number.

And in the second place," he continued, "I see we are trying to do two things, diametrically opposed; we are manufacturing a government, which is based on force, and at the same time inferior in strength to those whom we propose to govern." That was what he said, but what his colleagues did, was to institute a military inspection or review. The Three Thousand were drawn up in the Agora, and the rest of the citizens, who were not included in the list, elsewhere in various quarters of the city. The order to take arms was given; (7) but while the men's backs were turned, at the bidding of the Thirty, the Laconian guards, with those of the citizens who shared their views, appeared on the scene and took away the arms of all except the Three Thousand, carried them up to the Acropolis, and safely deposited them in the temple.

(7) Or, "a summons to the 'place d'armes' was given; but." Or, "the order to seize the arms was given, and." It is clear from Aristoph. "Acharn." 1050, that the citizens kept their weapons at home. On the other hand, it was a custom not to come to any meeting in arms. See Thuc. vi. 58. It seems probable that while the men were being reviewed in the market-place and elsewhere, the ruling party gave orders to seize their weapons (which they had left at home), and this was done except in the case of the Three Thousand. Cf. Arnold, "Thuc." II. 2. 5; and IV. 91.

The ground being thus cleared, as it were, and feeling that they had it in their power to do what they pleased, they embarked on a course of wholesale butchery, to which many were sacrificed to the merest hatred, many to the accident of possessing riches. Presently the question rose, How they were to get money to pay their guards? and to meet this difficulty a resolution was passed empowering each of the committee to seize on one of the resident aliens apiece, to put his victim to death, and to confiscate his property. Theramenes was invited, or rather told to seize some one or other. "Choose whom you will, only let it be done." To which he made answer, it hardly seemed to him a noble or worthy course on the part of those who claimed to be the elite of society to go beyond the informers (8) in injustice. "Yesterday they, to-day we; with this difference, the victim of the informer must live as a source of income; our innocents must die that we may get their wealth. Surely their method was innocent in comparison with ours."

(8) See above.

The rest of the Thirty, who had come to regard Theramenes as an obstacle to any course they might wish to adopt, proceeded to plot against him. They addressed themselves to the members of the senate in private, here a man and there a man, and denounced him as the marplot of the constitution. Then they issued an order to the young men, picking out the most audacious characters they could find, to be present, each with a dagger hidden in the hollow of the armpit; and so called a meeting of the senate. When Theramenes had taken his place, Critias got up and addressed the meeting:

"If," said he, "any member of this council, here seated, imagines that an undue amount of blood has been shed, let me remind him that with changes of constitution such things can not be avoided. It is the rule everywhere, but more particularly at Athens it was inevitable there should be found a specially large number of persons sworn foes to any constitutional change in the direction of oligarchy, and this for two reasons. First, because the population of this city, compared with other Hellenic cities, is enormously large; and again, owing to the length of time during which the people has battened upon liberty. Now, as to two points we are clear. The first is that democracy is a form of government detestable to persons like ourselves — to us and to you; the next is that the people of Athens could never be got to be friendly to our friends and saviours, the Lacedaemonians. But on the loyalty of the better classes the Lacedaemonians can count. And that is our reason for establishing an oligarchical constitution with their concurrence. That is why we do our best to rid us of every one whom we perceive to be opposed to the oligarchy; and, in our opinion, if one of ourselves should elect to undermine this constitution of ours, he would deserve punishment. Do you not agree? And the case," he continued, "is no imaginary one. The offender is here present — Theramenes. And what we say of him is,

that he is bent upon destroying yourselves and us by every means in his power. These are not baseless charges; but if you will consider it, you will find them amply established in this unmeasured censure of the present posture of affairs, and his persistent opposition to us, his colleagues, if ever we seek to get rid of any of these demagogues. Had this been his guiding principle of action from the beginning, in spite of hostility, at least he would have escaped all imputation of villainy. Why, this is the very man who originated our friendly and confidential relations with Lacedaemon. This is the very man who authorised the abolition of the democracy, who urged us on to inflict punishment on the earliest batch of prisoners brought before us. But to-day all is changed; now you and we are out of odour with the people, and he accordingly has ceased to be pleased with our proceedings. The explanation is obvious. In case of a catastrophe, how much pleasanter for him once again to light upon his legs, and leave us to render account for our past performances.

“I contend that this man is fairly entitled to render his account also, not only as an ordinary enemy, but as a traitor to yourselves and us. And let us add, not only is treason more formidable than open war, in proportion as it is harder to guard against a hidden assassin than an open foe, but it bears the impress of a more enduring hostility, inasmuch as men fight their enemies and come to terms with them again and are fast friends; but whoever heard of reconciliation with a traitor? There he stands unmasked; he has forfeited our confidence for evermore. But to show you that these are no new tactics of his, to prove to you that he is a traitor in grain, I will recall to your memories some points in his past history.

“He began by being held in high honour by the democracy; but taking a leaf out of his father’s, Hagnon’s, book, he next showed a most headlong anxiety to transform

the democracy into the Four Hundred, and, in fact, for a time held the first place in that body. But presently, detecting the formation of rival power to the oligarchs, round he shifted; and we find him next a ringleader of the popular party in assailing them. It must be admitted, he has well earned his nickname ‘Buskin.’ (9) Yes, Theramenes! clever you may be, but the man who deserves to live should not show his cleverness in leading on his associates into trouble, and when some obstacle presents itself, at once veer round; but like a pilot on shipboard, he ought then to redouble his efforts, until the wind is fair. Else, how in the name of wonderment are those mariners to reach the haven where they would be, if at the first contrary wind or tide they turn about and sail in the opposite direction? Death and destruction are concomitants of constitutional changes and revolution, no doubt; but you are such an impersonation of change, that, as you twist and turn and double, you deal destruction on all sides. At one swoop you are the ruin of a thousand oligarchs at the hands of the people, and at another of a thousand democrats at the hands of the better classes. Why, sirs, this is the man to whom the orders were given by the generals, in the sea-fight off Lesbos, to pick up the crews of the disabled vessels; and who, neglecting to obey orders, turned round and accused the generals; and to save himself murdered them! What, I ask you, of a man who so openly studied the art of self-seeking, deaf alike to the pleas of honour and to the claims of friendship? Would not leniency towards such a creature be misplaced? Can it be our duty at all to spare him? Ought we not rather, when we know the doublings of his nature, to guard against them, lest we enable him presently to practise on ourselves? The case is clear. We therefore hereby cite this man before you, as a conspirator and traitor against yourselves and us. The reasonableness of our conduct, one further reflection may make clear. No one, I take it, will dispute the splendour, the perfection of the Laconian constitution. Imagine one of the

ephors there in Sparta, in lieu of devoted obedience to the majority, taking on himself to find fault with the government and to oppose all measures. Do you not think that the ephors themselves, and the whole commonwealth besides, would hold this renegade worthy of condign punishment? So, too, by the same token, if you are wise, do you spare yourselves, not him. For what does the alternative mean? I will tell you. His preservation will cause the courage of many who hold opposite views to your own to rise; his destruction will cut off the last hopes of all your enemies, whether within or without the city."

(9) An annotator seems to have added here the words, occurring in the MSS., "the buskin which seems to fit both legs equally, but is constant to neither," unless, indeed, they are an original "marginal note" of the author. For the character of Theramenes, as popularly conceived, cf. Aristoph. "Frogs," 538, 968 foll., and Thuc. viii. 92; and Prof. Jowett, "Thuc." vol. ii. pp. 523, 524.

With these words he sat down, but Theramenes rose and said: "Sirs, with your permission I will first touch upon the charge against me which Critias has mentioned last. The assertion is that as the accuser of the generals I was their murderer. Now I presume it was not I who began the attack upon them, but it was they who asserted that in spite of the orders given me I had neglected to pick up the unfortunates in the sea-fight off Lesbos. All I did was to defend myself. My defence was that the storm was too violent to permit any vessel to ride at sea, much more therefore to pick up the men, and this defence was accepted by my fellow-citizens as highly reasonable, while the generals seemed to be condemned out of their own mouths. For while they kept on asserting that it was possible to save the men, the fact still remained that they abandoned them to their fate, set sail, and were gone.

"However, I am not surprised, I confess, at this grave misconception (10) on the part of Critias, for at the date of these occurrences he was not in Athens. He was away in Thessaly, laying the foundations of a democracy with Prometheus, and arming the Penestae (11) against their masters. Heaven forbid that any of his transactions there

should be re-enacted here. However, I must say, I do heartily concur with him on one point. Whoever desires to exclude you from the government, or to strength the hands of your secret foes, deserves and ought to meet with condign punishment; but who is most capable of so doing? That you will best discover, I think, by looking a little more closely into the past and the present conduct of each of us. Well, then! up to the moment at which you were formed into a senatorial body, when the magistracies were appointed, and certain notorious ‘informers’ were brought to trial, we all held the same views. But later on, when our friends yonder began to hale respectable honest folk to prison and to death, I, on my side, began to differ from them. From the moment when Leon of Salamis, (12) a man of high and well-deserved reputation, was put to death, though he had not committed the shadow of a crime, I knew that all his equals must tremble for themselves, and, so trembling, be driven into opposition to the new constitution. In the same way, when Niceratus, (13) the son of Nicias, was arrested; a wealthy man, who, no more than his father, had never done anything that could be called popular or democratic in his life; it did not require much insight to discover that his compeers would be converted into our foes. But to go a step further: when it came to Antiphon (14) falling at our hands — Antiphon, who during the war contributed two fast-sailing men-of-war out of his own resources, it was then plain to me, that all who had ever been zealous and patriotic must eye us with suspicion. Once more I could not help speaking out in opposition to my colleagues when they suggested that each of us ought to seize some one resident alien. (15) For what could be more certain than that their death-warrant would turn the whole resident foreign population into enemies of the constitution. I spoke out again when they insisted on depriving the populace of their arms; it being no part of my creed that we ought to take the strength out of the city; nor, indeed, so far as I could see, had the

Lacedaemonians stept between us and destruction merely that we might become a handful of people, powerless to aid them in the day of need. Had that been their object, they might have swept us away to the last man. A few more weeks, or even days, would have sufficed to extinguish us quietly by famine. Nor, again, can I say that the importation of mercenary foreign guards was altogether to my taste, when it would have been so easy for us to add to our own body a sufficient number of fellow-citizens to ensure our supremacy as governors over those we essayed to govern. But when I saw what an army of malcontents this government had raised up within the city walls, besides another daily increasing host of exiles without, I could not but regard the banishment of people like Thrasybulus and Anytus and Alcibiades (16) as impolitic. Had our object been to strengthen the rival power, we could hardly have set about it better than by providing the populace with the competent leaders whom they needed, and the would-be leaders themselves with an army of willing adherents.

(10) Reading with Cobet {paranenomikenai}.

(11) I.e. serfs — Penestae being the local name in Thessaly for the villein class. Like the {Eilotes} in Laconia, they were originally a conquered tribe, afterwards increased by prisoners of war, and formed a link between the freemen and born slaves.

(12) Cf. "Mem." IV. iv. 3; Plat. "Apol." 8. 32.

(13) Cf. Lysias, "Or." 18. 6.

(14) Probably the son of Lysidonides. See Thirlwall, "Hist. of Greece," vol. iv. p. 179 (ed. 1847); also Lysias, "Or." 12. contra Eratosth. According to Lysias, Theramenes, when a member of the first Oligarchy, betrayed his own closest friends, Antiphon and Archeptolemus. See Prof. Jebb, "Attic Orators," I. x. p. 266.

(15) The resident aliens, or {metoikoi}, "metics," so technically called.

(16) Isocr. "De Bigis," 355; and Prof. Jebb's "Attic Orators," ii. 230. In the defence of his father's career, which the younger Alcibiades, the defendant in this case (B.C. 397 probably) has occasion to make, he reminds the court, that under the Thirty, others were banished from Athens, but his father was driven out of the civilised world of Hellas itself, and finally murdered. See Plutarch, "Alcibiades," ad fin.

"I ask then is the man who tenders such advice in the full light of day justly to be regarded as a traitor, and not as a benefactor? Surely Critias, the peacemaker, the man who hinders the creation of many enemies, whose counsels tend to the acquistion of yet more friends, (17) cannot be accused of strengthening the hands of the enemy. Much more truly may the imputation be retorted on those who wrongfully appropriate their neighbours' goods and put to death those who have done no wrong. These are they who

cause our adversaries to grow and multiply, and who in very truth are traitors, not to their friends only, but to themselves, spurred on by sordid love of gain.

(17) Or, “the peacemaker, the healer of differences, the cementer of new alliances, cannot,” etc.

“I might prove the truth of what I say in many ways, but I beg you to look at the matter thus. With which condition of affairs here in Athens do you think will Thrasybulus and Anytus and the other exiles be the better pleased? That which I have pictured as desirable, or that which my colleagues yonder are producing? For my part I cannot doubt but that, as things now are, they are saying to themselves, ‘Our allies muster thick and fast.’ But were the real strength, the pith and fibre of this city, kindly disposed to us, they would find it an uphill task even to get a foothold anywhere in the country.

“Then, with regard to what he said of me and my propensity to be for ever changing sides, let me draw your attention to the following facts. Was it not the people itself, the democracy, who voted the constitution of the Four Hundred? This they did, because they had learned to think that the Lacedaemonians would trust any other form of government rather than a democracy. But when the efforts of Lacedaemon were not a whit relaxed, when Aristoteles, Melanthius, and Aristarchus, (18) and the rest of them acting as generals, were plainly minded to construct an intrenched fortress on the mole for the purpose of admitting the enemy, and so getting the city under the power of themselves and their associates; (19) because I got wind of these schemes, and nipped them in the bud, is that to be a traitor to one’s friends?

(18) Cf. Thuc. viii. 90-92, for the behaviour of the Lacedaemonian party at Athens and the fortification of Eetioneia in B.C. 411.

(19) I.e. of the political clubs.

“Then he threw in my teeth the nickname ‘Buskin,’ as descriptive of an endeavour on my part to fit both parties. But what of the man who pleases neither? What in heaven’s

name are we to call him? Yes! you — Critias? Under the democracy you were looked upon as the most arrant hater of the people, and under the aristocracy you have proved yourself the bitterest foe of everything respectable. Yes! Critias, I am, and ever have been, a foe of those who think that a democracy cannot reach perfection until slaves and those who, from poverty, would sell the city for a drachma, can get their drachma a day. (20) But not less am I, and ever have been, a pronounced opponent of those who do not think there can possibly exist a perfect oligarchy until the State is subjected to the despotism of a few. On the contrary, my own ambition has been to combine with those who are rich enough to possess a horse and shield, and to use them for the benefit of the State. (21) That was my ideal in the old days, and I hold to it without a shadow of turning still. If you can imagine when and where, in conjunction with despots or demagogues, I have set to my hand to deprive honest gentlefolk of their citizenship, pray speak. If you can convict me of such crimes at present, or can prove my perpetration of them in the past, I admit that I deserve to die, and by the worst of deaths."

(20) I.e. may enjoy the senatorial stipend of a drachma a day = 9 3/4 pence.

(21) See Thuc. viii. 97, for a momentary realisation of that "duly attempered compound of Oligarchy and Democracy" which Thucydides praises, and which Theramenes here refers to. It threw the power into the hands of the wealthier upper classes to the exclusion of the {nautikos okhlos}. See Prof. Jowett, vol. ii. note, ad loc. cit.

With these words he ceased, and the loud murmur of the applause which followed marked the favourable impression produced upon the senate. It was plain to Critias, that if he allowed his adversary's fate to be decided by formal voting, Theramenes would escape, and life to himself would become intolerable. Accordingly he stepped forward and spoke a word or two in the ears of the Thirty. This done, he went out and gave an order to the attendants with the daggers to stand close to the bar in full view of the senators. Again he entered and addressed the senate thus: "I hold it to be the duty of a good president, when he sees the friends about him being made the dupes of some delusion, to intervene.

That at any rate is what I propose to do. Indeed our friends here standing by the bar say that if we propose to acquit a man so openly bent upon the ruin of the oligarchy, they do not mean to let us do so. Now there is a clause in the new code forbidding any of the Three Thousand to be put to death without your vote; but the Thirty have power of life and death over all outside that list. Accordingly," he proceeded, "I herewith strike this man, Theramenes, off the list; and this with the concurrence of my colleagues. And now," he continued, "we condemn him to death."

Hearing these words Theramenes sprang upon the altar of Hestia, exclaiming: "And I, sirs, supplicate you for the barest forms of law and justice. Let it not be in the power of Critias to strike off either me, or any one of you whom he will. But in my case, in what may be your case, if we are tried, let our trial be in accordance with the law they have made concerning those on the list. I know," he added, "but too well, that this altar will not protect me; but I will make it plain that these men are as impious towards the gods as they are nefarious towards men. Yet I do marvel, good sirs and honest gentlemen, for so you are, that you will not help yourselves, and that too when you must see that the name of every one of you is as easily erased as mine."

But when he had got so far, the voice of the herald was heard giving the order to the Eleven to seize Theramenes. They at that instant entered with their satellites — at their head Satyrus, the boldest and most shameless of the body — and Critias exclaimed, addressing the Eleven, "We deliver over to you Theramenes yonder, who has been condemned according to the law. Do you take him and lead him away to the proper place, and do there with him what remains to do." As Critias uttered the words, Satyrus laid hold upon Theramenes to drag him from the altar, and the attendants lent their aid. But he, as was natural, called upon gods and men to witness what was happening. The senators the while kept silence, seeing the companions of Satyrus at the bar,

and the whole front of the senate house crowded with the foreign guards, nor did they need to be told that there were daggers in reserve among those present.

And so Theramenes was dragged through the Agora, in vehement and loud tones proclaiming the wrongs that he was suffering. One word, which is said to have fallen from his lips, I cite. It is this: Satyrus, bade him “Be silent, or he would rue the day;” to which he made answer, “And if I be silent, shall I not rue it?” Also, when they brought him the hemlock, and the time was come to drink the fatal draught, they tell how he playfully jerked out the dregs from the bottom of the cup, like one who plays “Cottabos,” (22) with the words, “This to the lovely Critias.” These are but “apophthegms” (23) too trivial, it may be thought, to find a place in history. Yet I must deem it an admirable trait in this man’s character, if at such a moment, when death confronted him, neither his wits forsook him, nor could the childlike sportiveness vanish from his soul.

(22) “A Sicilian game much in vogue at the drinking parties of young men at Athens. The simplest mode was when each threw the wine left in his cup so as to strike smartly in a metal basin, at the same time invoking his mistress’s name; if all fell into the basin and the sound was clear, it was a sign he stood well with her.” — Liddell and Scott, sub. v. For the origin of the game compare curiously enough the first line of the first Elegy of Critias himself, who was a poet and political philosopher, as well as a politician: —

“{ Kottabos ek Sikeles esti khthonos, euprepes ergon on skopon es latagon toxa kathistametha.} ” Bergk. “Poetae Lyr. Graec.” Pars II. xxx.

(23) Or, “these are sayings too slight, perhaps, to deserve record; yet,” etc. By an “apophthegm” was meant originally a terse (sententious) remark, but the word has somewhat altered in meaning.

IV

So Theramenes met his death; and, now that this obstacle was removed, the Thirty, feeling that they had it in their power to play the tyrant without fear, issued an order forbidding all, whose names were not on the list, to set foot within the city. Retirement in the country districts was no protection, thither the prosecutor followed them, and thence dragged them, that their farms and properties might fall to the possession of the Thirty and their friends. Even Piraeus

was not safe; of those who sought refuge there, many were driven forth in similar fashion, until Megara and Thebes overflowed with the crowd of refugees.

Presently Thrasybulus, with about seventy followers, sallied out from Thebes, and made himself master of the fortress of Phyle. (1) The weather was brilliant, and the Thirty marched out of the city to repel the invader; with them were the Three Thousand and the Knights. When they reached the place, some of the young men, in the foolhardiness of youth, made a dash at the fortress, but without effect; all they got was wounds, and so retired. The intention of the Thirty now was to blockade the place; by shutting off all the avenues of supplies, they thought to force the garrison to capitulate. But this project was interrupted by a steady downfall of snow that night and the following day. Baffled by this all-pervading enemy they beat a retreat to the city, but not without the sacrifice of many of their camp-followers, who fell a prey to the men in Phyle. The next anxiety of the government in Athens was to secure the farms and country houses against the plunderings and forays to which they would be exposed, if there were no armed force to protect them. With this object a protecting force was despatched to the “boundary estates,” (2) about two miles south of Phyle. This corps consisted of the Lacedaemonian guards, or nearly all of them, and two divisions of horse. (3) They encamped in a wild and broken district, and the round of their duties commenced.

(1) “A strong fortress (the remains of which still exist) commanding the narrow pass across Mount Parnes, through which runs the direct road from Thebes to Athens, past Acharnae. The precipitous rock on which it stands can only be approached by a ridge on the eastern side. The height commands a magnificent view of the whole Athenian plain, of the city itself, of Mount Hymettus, and the Saronic Gulf,”— “Dict. of Geog., The demi of the Diacria and Mount Parnes.”

(2) Cf. Boeckh, “P. E. A.” p. 63, Eng. ed.

(3) Lit. tribes, each of the ten tribes furnishing about one hundred horse.

But by this time the small garrison above them had increased tenfold, until there were now something like seven hundred men collected in Phyle; and with these Thrasybulus one night descended. When he was not quite half a mile

from the enemy’s encampment he grounded arms, and a deep silence was maintained until it drew towards day. In a little while the men opposite, one by one, were getting to their legs or leaving the camp for necessary purposes, while a suppressed din and murmur arose, caused by the grooms currying and combing their horses. This was the moment for Thrasybulus and his men to snatch up their arms and make a dash at the enemy’s position. Some they felled on the spot; and routing the whole body, pursued them six or seven furlongs, killing one hundred and twenty hoplites and more. Of the cavalry, Nicostratus, “the beautiful,” as men called him, and two others besides were slain; they were caught while still in their beds. Returning from the pursuit, the victors set up a trophy, got together all the arms they had taken, besides baggage, and retired again to Phyle. A reinforcement of horse sent from the city could not discover the vestige of a foe; but waited on the scene of battle until the bodies of the slain had been picked up by their relatives, when they withdrew again to the city.

After this the Thirty, who had begun to realise the insecurity of their position, were anxious to appropriate Eleusis, so that an asylum might be ready for them against the day of need. With this view an order was issued to the Knights; and Critias, with the rest of the Thirty, visited Eleusis. There they held a review of the Eleusians in the presence of the Knights; (4) and, on the pretext of wishing to discover how many they were, and how large a garrison they would further require, they ordered the townsfolk to enter their names. As each man did so he had to retire by a postern leading to the sea. But on the sea-beach this side there were lines of cavalry drawn up in waiting, and as each man appeared he was handcuffed by the satellites of the Thirty. When all had so been seized and secured, they gave orders to Lysimachus, the commander of the cavalry, to take them off to the city and deliver them over to the Eleven.

Next day they summoned the heavy armed who were on the list, and the rest of the Knights (5) to the Odeum, and Critias rose and addressed them. He said: “Sirs, the constitution, the lines of which we are laying down, is a work undertaken in your interests no less than ours; it is incumbent on you therefore to participate in its dangers, even as you will partake of its honours. We expect you therefore, in reference to these Eleusians here, who have been seized and secured, to vote their condemnation, so that our hopes and fears may be identical.” Then, pointing to a particular spot, he said peremptorily, “You will please deposit your votes there within sight of all.” It must be understood that the Laconian guards were present at the time, and armed to the teeth, and filling one-half of the Odeum. As to the proceedings themselves, they found acceptance with those members of the State, besides the Thirty, who could be satisfied with a simple policy of self-aggrandisement.

(4) Or, “in the cavalry quarters,” cf. {en tois ikhthusin} = in the fish market. Or, “at the review of the horse.”

(5) For the various Odeums at Athens vide Prof. Jebb, “Theophr.” xviii. 235, 236. The one here named was near the fountain Callirhoe by the Ilissus.

But now Thrasybulus at the head of his followers, by this time about one thousand strong, descended from Phyle and reached Piraeus in the night. The Thirty, on their side, informed of this new move, were not slow to rally to the rescue, with the Laconian guards, supported by their own cavalry and hoplites. And so they advanced, marching down along the broad carriage road which leads into Piraeus. The men from Phyle seemed at first inclined to dispute their passage, but as the wide circuit of the walls needed a defence beyond the reach of their still scanty numbers, they fell back in a compact body upon Munychia. (6) Then the troops from the city poured into the Agora of Hippodmus. (7) Here they formed in line, stretching along and filling the street which leads to the temple of Artemis and the Bendideum. (8) This line must have been at least fifty shields deep; and in this formation they at once began to

march up. As to the men of Phyle, they too blocked the street at the opposite end, and facing the foe. They presented only a thin line, not more than ten deep, though behind these, certainly, were ranged a body of targeteers and light-armed javelin men, who were again supported by an artillery of stone-throwers — a tolerably numerous division drawn from the population of the port and district itself. While his antagonists were still advancing, Thrasybulus gave the order to ground their heavy shields, and having done so himself, whilst retaining the rest of his arms, he stood in the midst, and thus addressed them: “Men and fellow-citizens, I wish to inform some, and to remind others of you, that of the men you see advancing beneath us there, the right division are the very men we routed and pursued only five days ago; while on the extreme left there you see the Thirty. These are the men who have not spared to rob us of our city, though we did no wrong; who have hounded us from our homes; who have set the seal of proscription on our dearest friends. But to-day the wheel of fortune has revolved; that has come about which least of all they looked for, which most of all we prayed for. Here we stand with our good swords in our hands, face to face with our foes; and the gods themselves are with us, seeing that we were arrested in the midst of our peaceful pursuits; at any moment, whilst we supped, or slept, or marketed, sentence of banishment was passed upon us: we had done no wrong — nay, many of us were not even resident in the country. To-day, therefore, I repeat, the gods do visibly fight upon our side; the great gods, who raise a tempest even in the midst of calm for our benefit, and when we lay to our hand to fight, enable our little company to set up the trophy of victory over the multitude of our foes. On this day they have brought us hither to a place where the steep ascent must needs hinder our foes from reaching with lance or arrow further than our foremost ranks; but we with our volley of spears and arrows and stones cannot fail to reach

them with terrible effect. Had we been forced to meet them vanguard to vanguard, on an equal footing, who could have been surprised? But as it is, all I say to you is, let fly your missiles with a will in right brave style. No one can miss his mark when the road is full of them. To avoid our darts they must be for ever ducking and skulking beneath their shields; but we will rain blows upon them in their blindness; we will leap upon them and lay them low. But, O sirs! let me call upon you so to bear yourselves that each shall be conscious to himself that victory was won by him and him alone. Victory — which, God willing, shall this day restore to us the land of our fathers, our homes, our freedom, and the rewards of civic life, our children, if children we have, our darlings, and our wives! Thrice happy those among us who as conquerors shall look upon this gladdest of all days. Nor less fortunate the man who falls to-day. Not all the wealth in the world shall purchase him a monument so glorious. At the right instant I will strike the keynote of the paean; then, with an invocation to the God of battle, (9) and in return for the wanton insults they put upon us, let us with one accord wreak vengeance on yonder men."

(6) The citadel quarter of Piraeus.

(7) Named after the famous architect Hippodamus, who built the town. It was situated near where the two long walls joined the wall of Piraeus; a broad street led from it up to the citadel of Munychia.

(8) I.e. the temple of Bendis (the Thracian Artemis). Cf. Plat. "Rep." 327, 354; and Prof. Jowett, "Plato," vol. iii. pp. 193, 226.

(9) Lit. "Enyalius," in Homer an epithet of Ares; at another date (cf. Aristoph. "Peace," 456) looked upon as a distinct divinity.

Having so spoken, he turned round, facing the foemen, and kept quiet, for the order passed by the soothsayer enjoined on them, not to charge before one of their side was slain or wounded. "As soon as that happens," said the seer, "we will lead you onwards, and the victory shall be yours; but for myself, if I err not, death is waiting." And herein he spoke truly, for they had barely resumed their arms when he himself as though he were driven by some fatal hand, leapt out in front of the ranks, and so springing into the midst of the foe, was slain, and lies now buried at the passage of the Cephisus. But the rest were victorious, and pursued the

routed enemy down to the level ground. There fell in this engagement, out of the number of the Thirty, Critias himself and Hippomachus, and with them Charmides, (10) the son of Glaucon, one of the ten archons in Piraeus, and of the rest about seventy men. The arms of the slain were taken; but, as fellow-citizens, the conquerors forebore to despoil them of their coats. This being done, they proceeded to give back the dead under cover of a truce, when the men, on either side, in numbers stept forward and conversed with one another. Then Cleocritus (he was the Herald of the Initiated, (11) a truly “sweet-voiced herald,” if ever there was), caused a deep silence to reign, and addressed their late combatants as follows: “Fellow-citizens — Why do you drive us forth? why would you slay us? what evil have we wrought you at any time? or is it a crime that we have shared with you in the most solemn rites and sacrifices, and in festivals of the fairest: we have been companions in the chorus, the school, the army. We have braved a thousand dangers with you by land and sea in behalf of our common safety, our common liberty. By the gods of our fathers, by the gods of our mothers, by the hallowed names of kinship, intermarriage, comradeship, those three bonds which knit the hearts of so many of us, bow in reverence before God and man, and cease to sin against the land of our fathers: cease to obey these most unhallowed Thirty, who for the sake of private gain have in eight months slain almost more men than the Peloponnesians together in ten years of warfare. See, we have it in our power to live as citizens in peace; it is only these men, who lay upon us this most foul burthen, this hideous horror of fratricidal war, loathed of God and man. Ah! be well assured, for these men slain by our hands this day, ye are not the sole mourners. There are among them some whose deaths have wrung from us also many a bitter tear.”

(10) He was cousin to Critias, and uncle by the mother’s side to Plato, who introduces him in the dialogue, which bears his name (and treats of Temperance), as a very young man at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. We hear more of him also from Xenophon himself in the “Memorabilia,” iii. 6. 7; and as one of the interlocutors in the “Symposium.”

(11) I.e. of the Eleusinian mysteries. He had not only a loud voice, but a big body. Cf. Aristoph. “Frogs,” 1237.

So he spoke, but the officers and leaders of the defeated army who were left, unwilling that their troops should listen to such topics at that moment, led them back to the city. But the next day the Thirty, in deep down-heartedness and desolation, sat in the council chamber. The Three Thousand, wherever their several divisions were posted, were everywhere a prey to discord. Those who were implicated in deeds of violence, and whose fears could not sleep, protested hotly that to yield to the party in Piraeus were preposterous. Those on the other hand who had faith in their own innocence, argued in their own minds, and tried to convince their neighbours that they could well dispense with most of their present evils. “Why yield obedience to these Thirty?” they asked, “Why assign to them the privilege of destroying the State?” In the end they voted a resolution to depose the government, and to elect another. This was a board of ten, elected one from each tribe.

B.C. 403. As to the Thirty, they retired to Eleusis; but the Ten, assisted by the cavalry officers, had enough to do to keep watch over the men in the city, whose anarchy and mutual distrust were rampant. The Knights did not return to quarters at night, but slept out in the Odeum, keeping their horses and shields close beside them; indeed the distrust was so great that from evening onwards they patrolled the walls on foot with their shields, and at break of day mounted their horses, at every moment fearing some sudden attack upon them by the men in Piraeus. These latter were now so numerous, and of so mixed a company, that it was difficult to find arms for all. Some had to be content with shields of wood, others of wicker-work, which they spent their time in coating with whitening. Before ten days had elapsed guarantees were given, securing full citizenship, with equality of taxation and tribute to all, even foreigners, who would take part in the fighting. Thus they were presently able to take the field, with large detachments both of heavy

infantry and light-armed troops, besides a division of cavalry, about seventy in number. Their system was to push forward foraging parties in quest of wood and fruits, returning at nightfall to Piraeus. Of the city party no one ventured to take the field under arms; only, from time to time, the cavalry would capture stray pillagers from Piraeus or inflict some damage on the main body of their opponents. Once they fell in with a party belonging to the deme Aexone, (12) marching to their own farms in search of provisions. These, in spite of many prayers for mercy and the strong disapprobation of many of the knights, were ruthlessly slaughtered by Lysimachus, the general of cavalry. The men of Piraeus retaliated by putting to death a horseman, named Callistratus, of the tribe Leontis, whom they captured in the country. Indeed their courage ran so high at present that they even meditated an assault upon the city walls. And here perhaps the reader will pardon the record of a somewhat ingenious device on the part of the city engineer, who, aware of the enemy's intention to advance his batteries along the racecourse, which slopes from the Lyceum, had all the carts and waggons which were to be found laden with blocks of stone, each one a cartload in itself, and so sent them to deposit their freights "pele-mele" on the course in question. The annoyance created by these separate blocks of stone was enormous, and quite out of proportion to the simplicity of the contrivance.

(12) On the coast south of Phalerum, celebrated for its fisheries. Cf. "Athen." vii. 325.

But it was to Lacedaemon that men's eyes now turned. The Thirty despatched one set of ambassadors from Eleusis, while another set representing the government of the city, that is to say the men on the list, was despatched to summon the Lacedaemonians to their aid, on the plea that the people had revolted from Sparta. At Sparta, Lysander, taking into account the possibility of speedily reducing the party in Piraeus by blockading them by land and sea, and so

cutting them off from all supplies, supported the application, and negotiated the loan of one hundred talents (13) to his clients, backed by the appointment of himself as harmost on land, and of his brother, Libys, as admiral of the fleet. And so proceeding to the scene of action at Eleusis, he got together a large body of Peloponnesian hoplites, whilst his brother, the admiral, kept watch and ward by sea to prevent the importation of supplies into Piraeus by water. Thus the men in Piraeus were soon again reduced to their former helplessness, while the ardour of the city folk rose to a proportionally high pitch under the auspices of Lysander.

(13) 24,375 pounds, reckoning one tal. = 243 pounds 15 shillings.

Things were progressing after this sort when King Pausanias intervened. Touched by a certain envy of Lysander — (who seemed, by a final stroke of achievement, about to reach the pinnacle of popularity, with Athens laid like a pocket dependency at his feet) — the king persuaded three of the ephors to support him, and forthwith called out the ban. With him marched contingents of all the allied States, except the Boeotians and Corinthians. These maintained, that to undertake such an expedition against the Athenians, in whose conduct they saw nothing contrary to the treaty, was inconsistent with their oaths. But if that was the language held by them, the secret of their behaviour lay deeper; they seemed to be aware of a desire on the part of the Lacedaemonians to annex the soil of the Athenians and to reduce the state to vassalage. Pausanias encamped on the Halipedon, (14) as the sandy flat is called, with his right wing resting on Piraeus, and Lysander and his mercenaries forming the left. His first act was to send an embassage to the party in Piraeus, calling upon them to retire peacably to their homes; when they refused to obey, he made, as far as mere noise went, the semblance of an attack, with sufficient show of fight to prevent his kindly disposition being too apparent. But gaining nothing by the feint, he was forced to

retire. Next day he took two Laconian regiments, with three tribes of Athenian horse, and crossed over to the Mute (15) Harbour, examining the lie of the ground to discover how and where it would be easiest to draw lines of circumvallation round Piraeus. As he turned his back to retire, a party of the enemy sallied out and caused him annoyance. Nettled at the liberty, he ordered the cavalry to charge at the gallop, supported by the ten-year-service (16) infantry, whilst he himself, with the rest of the troops, followed close, holding quietly back in reserve. They cut down about thirty of the enemy's light troops and pursued the rest hotly to the theatre in Piraeus. Here, as chance would have it, the whole light and heavy infantry of the Piraeus men were getting under arms; and in an instant their light troops rushed out and dashed at the assailants; thick and fast flew missiles of all sorts — javelins, arrows and sling stones. The Lacedaemonians finding the number of their wounded increasing every minute, and sorely called, slowly fell back step by step, eyeing their opponents. These meanwhile resolutely pressed on. Here fell Chaeron and Thibrachus, both polemarchs, here also Lacrates, an Olympic victor, and other Lacedaemonians, all of whom now lie entombed before the city gates in the Ceramicus. (17)

(14) The Halipedon is the long stretch of flat sandy land between Piraeus Phalerum and the city.

(15) Perhaps the landlocked creek just round the promontory of Eetioneia, as Leake conjectures, "Topog. of Athens," p. 389. See also Prof. Jowett's note, "Thuc." v. 2; vol. ii. p. 286.

(16) I.e. who had already seen ten years of service, i.e. over twenty- eight, as the Spartan was eligible to serve at eighteen. Cf. Xen. "Hell." III. iv. 23; VI. iv. 176.

(17) The outer Ceramicus, "the most beautiful spot outside the walls." Cf. Thuc. ii. 34; through it passes the street of the tombs on the sacred road; and here was the place of burial for all persons honoured with a public funeral. Cf. Arist. "Birds," 395.

Watching how matters went, Thrasybulus began his advance with the whole of his heavy infantry to support his light troops and quickly fell into line eight deep, acting as a screen to the rest of his troops. Pausanias, on his side, had retired, sorely pressed, about half a mile towards a bit of rising ground, where he sent orders to the Lacedaemonians and the other allied troops to bring up reinforcements. Here, on this slope, he reformed his troops, giving his phalanx the

full depth, and advanced against the Athenians, who did not hesitate to receive him at close quarters, but presently had to give way; one portion being forced into the mud and clay at Halae, (18) while the others wavered and broke their line; one hundred and fifty of them were left dead on the field, whereupon Pausanias set up a trophy and retired. Not even so, were his feelings embittered against his adversary. On the contrary he sent secretly and instructed the men of Piraeus, what sort of terms they should propose to himself and the ephors in attendance. To this advice they listened. He also fostered a division in the party within the city. A deputation, acting on his orders, sought an audience of him and the ephors. It had all the appearance of a mass meeting. In approaching the Spartan authorities, they had no desire or occasion, they stated, to look upon the men of Piraeus as enemies, they would prefer a general reconciliation and the friendship of both sides with Lacedaemon. The propositions were favourably received, and by no less a person than Nauclidas. He was present as ephor, in accordance with the custom which obliges two members of that board to serve on all military expeditions with the king, and with his colleague shared the political views represented by Pausanias, rather than those of Lysander and his party. Thus the authorities were quite ready to despatch to Lacedaemon the representatives of Piraeus, carrying their terms of truce with the Lacedaemonians, as also two private individuals belonging to the city party, whose names were Cephisophon and Meletus. This double deputation, however, had no sooner set out to Lacedaemon than the “de facto” government of the city followed suit, by sending a third set of representatives to state on their behalf: that they were prepared to deliver up themselves and the fortifications in their possession to the Lacedaemonians, to do with them what they liked. “Are the men of Piraeus,” they asked, “prepared to surrender Piraeus and Munychia in the same way? If they are sincere in their profession of friendship to

Lacedaemon, they ought to do so." The ephors and the members of assembly at Sparta (19) gave audience to these several parties, and sent out fifteen commissioners to Athens empowered, in conjunction with Pausanias, to discover the best settlement possible. The terms (20) arrived at were that a general peace between the rival parties should be established, liberty to return to their own homes being granted to all, with the exception of the Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten who had been governors in Piraeus; but a proviso was added, enabling any of the city party who feared to remain at Athens to find a home in Eleusis.

(18) Halae, the salt marshy ground immediately behind the great harbour of Piraeus, but outside the fortification lines.

(19) Cf. "Hell." VI. iii. 3, {oi ekkletoi}.

(20) Cf. Prof. Jebb, "Orators," i. 262, note 2.

And now that everything was happily concluded, Pausanias disbanded his army, and the men from Piraeus marched up under arms into the acropolis and offered sacrifice to Athena. When they were come down, the generals called a meeting of the Ecclesia, (21) and Thrasybulus made a speech in which, addressing the city party, he said: "Men of the city! I have one piece of advice I would tender to you; it is that you should learn to know yourselves, and towards the attainment of that self-knowledge I would have you make a careful computation of your good qualities and satisfy yourselves on the strength of which of these it is that you claim to rule over us. Is it that you are more just than ourselves? Yet the people, who are poorer — have never wronged you for the purposes of plunder; but you, whose wealth would outweight the whole of ours, have wrought many a shameful deed for the sake of gain. If, then, you have no monopoly of justice, can it be on the score of courage that you are warranted to hold your heads so high? If so, what fairer test of courage will you propose than the arbitrament of war — the war just ended? Or do you claim superiority of intelligence? — you, who with all your wealth of arms and walls, money and Peloponnesian

allies, have been paralysed by men who had none of these things to aid them! Or is it on these Laconian friends of yours that you pride yourselves? What! when these same friends have dealt by you as men deal by vicious dogs. You know how that is. They put a heavy collar round the neck of the brutes and hand them over muzzled to their masters. So too have the Lacedaemonians handed you over to the people, this very people whom you have injured; and now they have turned their backs and are gone. But" (turning to the mass) "do not misconceive me. It is not for me, sirs, coldly to beg of you, in no respect to violate your solemn undertakings. I go further; I beg you, to crown your list of exploits by one final display of virtue. Show the world that you can be faithful to your oaths, and flawless in your conduct." By these and other kindred arguments he impressed upon them that there was no need for anarchy or disorder, seeing that there were the ancient laws ready for use. And so he broke up (22) the assembly.

(21) I.e. the Public Assembly, see above; and reading with Sauppe after Cobet {ekklesian epoiesan}, which words are supposed to have dropt out of the MSS. Or, keeping to the MSS., translate "When the generals were come down, Thrasybulus," etc. See next note.

(22) The Greek words are {antestese ten ekklesian} (an odd phrase for the more technical {eluse} or {dieluse ten ekklesian}). Or, accepting the MSS. reading above (see last note), translate "he set up (i.e. restored) the Assembly." So Mr. J. G. Philpotts, Mr. Herbert Hailstone, and others.

At this auspicious moment, then, they reappointed the several magistrates; the constitution began to work afresh, and civic life was recommenced. At a subsequent period, on receiving information that the party at Eleusis were collecting a body of mercenaries, they marched out with their whole force against them, and put to death their generals, who came out to parley. These removed, they introduced to the others their friends and connections, and so persuaded them to come to terms and be reconciled. The oath they bound themselves by consisted of a simple asseveration: "We will remember past offences no more;" and to this day (23) the two parties live amicably together as good citizens, and the democracy is steadfast to its oaths.

(23) It would be interesting to know the date at which the author penned these words. Was this portion of the "Hellenica" written before the expedition of Cyrus? i.e. in the interval between the formal restoration of the Democracy, September B.C. 403, and March B.C. 401. The remaining books of the "Hellenica" were clearly written after that expedition, since reference is made to it quite early in Bk. III. i. 2. Practically, then, the first volume of Xenophon's "History of Hellenic Affairs" ends here. This history is resumed in Bk. III. i. 3. after the Cyreian expedition (of which episode we

have a detailed account in the "Anabasis" from March B.C. 401 down to March B.C. 399, when the remnant of the Ten Thousand was handed over to the Spartan general Thibron in Asia). Some incidents belonging to B.C. 402 are referred to in the opening paragraphs of "Hellenica," III. i. 1, 2, but only as an introduction to the new matter; and with regard to the historian himself, it is clear that "a change has come o'er the spirit of his dream." This change of view is marked by a change of style in writing. I have thought it legitimate, under the circumstances, to follow the chronological order of events, and instead of continuing the "Hellenica," at this point to insert the "Anabasis." My next volume will contain the remaining books of the "Hellenica" and the rest of Xenophon's "historical" writings.

BOOK III

I

B.C. 403-402. Thus the civil strife at Athens had an end. At a subsequent date Cyrus sent messengers to Lacedaemon, claiming requital in kind for the service which he had lately rendered in the war with Athens. (1) The demand seemed to the ephorate just and reasonable. Accordingly they ordered Samius, (2) who was admiral at the time, to put himself at the disposition of Cyrus for any service which he might require. Samius himself needed no persuasion to carry out the wishes of Cyrus. With his own fleet, accompanied by that of Cyrus, he sailed round to Cilicia, and so made it impossible for Syennesis, the ruler of that province, to oppose Cyrus by land in his advance against the king his brother.

(1) Lit. "what Cyrus himself had been to the Lacedaemonians let the Lacedaemonians in their turn be to Cyrus."

(2) Samius (Diod. Sic. xiv. 19). But see "Anab." I. iv. 2, where Pythagoras is named as admiral. Possibly the one officer succeeded the other.

B.C. 401. The particulars of the expedition are to be found in the pages of the Syracusan Themistogenes, (3) who describes the mustering of the armament, and the advance of Cyrus at the head of his troops; and then the battle, and death of Cyrus himself, and the consequent retreat of the Hellenes while effecting their escape to the sea. (4)

(3) Lit. "as to how then Cyrus collected an army and with it went up against his brother, and how the battle was fought and how he died, and how in the sequel the Hellenes escaped to the sea (all this), is written by (or 'for,' or 'in honour of') Themistogenes the Syracusan." My impression is that Xenophon's "Anabasis," or a portion of the work so named, was edited originally by Themistogenes. See "Philol. Museum," vol. i. p. 489; L. Dindorf, {Xen. Ell.}, Ox. MDCCCLIII., node ad loc. {Themistogenei}. Cf. Diod. Sic. xiv. 19-31, 37, after Ephorus and Theopompus probably.

(4) At Trapezus, March 10, B.C. 400.

B.C. 400. It was in recognition of the service which he had rendered in this affair, that Tissaphernes was despatched to Lower Asia by the king his master. He came as satrap, not only of his own provinces, but of those which had belonged to Cyrus; and he at once demanded the absolute submission of the Ionic cities, without exception, to his authority. These communities, partly from a desire to maintain their freedom,

and partly from fear of Tissaphernes himself, whom they had rejected in favour of Cyrus during the lifetime of that prince, were loth to admit the satrap within their gates. They thought it better to send an embassy to the Lacedaemonians, calling upon them as representatives and leaders (5) of the Hellenic world to look to the interests of their petitioners, who were Hellenes also, albeit they lived in Asia, and not to suffer their country to be ravaged and themselves enslaved.

(5) {Prostatai}, "patrons and protectors."

In answer to this appeal, the Lacedaemonians sent out Thibron (6) as governor, providing him with a body of troops, consisting of one thousand neodamodes (7) (i.e. enfranchised helots) and four thousand Peloponnesians. In addition to these, Thibron himself applied to the Athenians for a detachment of three hundred horse, for whose service-money he would hold himself responsible. The Athenians in answer sent him some of the knights who had served under the Thirty, (8) thinking that the people of Athens would be well rid of them if they went abroad and perished there.

(6) "As harmost." See "Anab." ad fin.

(7) See "Hell." I. iii. 15; Thuc. vii. 58.

(8) See "Hell." II. iv. 2.

B.C. 400-399. On their arrival in Asia, Thibron further collected contingents from the Hellenic cities on the continent; for at this time the word of a Lacedaemonian was law. He had only to command, and every city must needs obey. (9) But although he had this armament, Thibron, when he saw the cavalry, had no mind to descend into the plain. If he succeeded in protecting from pillage the particular district in which he chanced to be, he was quite content. It was only when the troops (10) who had taken part in the expedition of Cyrus had joined him on their safe return, that he assumed a bolder attitude. He was now ready to confront Tissaphernes, army against army, on the level ground, and won over a number of cities. Pergamum came in of her own

accord. So did Teuthrania and Halisarna. These were under the government of Eurysthenes and Procles, (11) the descendants of Demaratus the Lacedaemonian, who in days of old had received this territory as a gift from the Persian monarch in return for his share in the campaign against Hellas. Gorgion and Gongylus, two brothers, also gave in their adhesion; they were lords, the one of Gambreum and Palae-Gambreum, the other of Myrina and Gryneum, four cities which, like those above named, had originally been gifts from the king to an earlier Gongylus — the sole Eretrian who "joined the Mede," and in consequence was banished. Other cities which were too weak to resist, Thibron took by force of arms. In the case of one he was not so successful. This was the Egyptian (12) Larisa, as it is called, which refused to capitulate, and was forthwith invested and subjected to a regular siege. When all other attempts to take it failed, he set about digging a tank or reservoir, and in connection with the tank an underground channel, by means of which he proposed to draw off the water supply of the inhabitants. In this he was baffled by frequent sallies of the besieged, and a continual discharge of timber and stones into the cutting. He retaliated by the construction of a wooden tortoise which he erected over the tank; but once more the tortoise was burnt to a cinder in a successful night attack on the part of the men of Larisa. These ineffectual efforts induced the ephors to send a despatch bidding Thibron give up Larisa and march upon Caria.

(9) See "Anab." VI. vi. 12.

(10) March B.C. 399. See the final sentence of the "Anabasis."

(11) See "Anab." VII. viii. 8-16.

(12) Seventy stades S.E. of Cyme in the Aeolid. See Strabo, xiii. 621. For the origin of the name cf. "Cyrop." VII. i. 45.

He had already reached Ephesus, and was on the point of marching into Caria, when Dercylidas arrived to take command of his army. The new general was a man whose genius for invention had won him the nickname of Sisyphus. Thus it was that Thibron returned home, where on his arrival

he was fined and banished, the allies accusing him of allowing his troops to plunder their friends.

Dercylidas was not slow to perceive and turn to account the jealousy which subsisted between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. Coming to terms with the former, he marched into the territory of the latter, preferring, as he said, to be at war with one of the pair at a time, rather than the two together. His hostility, indeed, to Pharnabazus was an old story, dating back to a period during the naval command (13) of Lysander, when he was himself governor in Abydos; where, thanks to Pharnabazus, he had got into trouble with his superior officer, and had been made to stand “with his shield on his arm” — a stigma on his honour which no true Lacedaemonian would forgive, since this is the punishment of insubordination. (14) For this reason, doubtless, Dercylidas had the greater satisfaction in marching against Pharnabazus. From the moment he assumed command there was a marked difference for the better between his methods and those of his predecessor. Thus he contrived to conduct his troops into that portion of the Aeolid which belonged to Pharnabazus, through the heart of friendly territory without injury to the allies.

(13) Technically “navarchy,” in B.C. 408-407. “Hell.” I. v. 1.

(14) See Plut. “Aristid.” 23 (Clough, ii. p. 309).

This district of Aeolis belonged to Pharnabazus, (15) but had been held as a satrapy under him by a Dardanian named Zenis whilst he was alive; but when Zenis fell sick and died, Pharnabazus made preparation to give the satrapy to another. Then Mania the wife of Zenis, herself also a Dardanian, fitted out an expedition, and taking with her gifts wherewith to make a present to Pharnabazus himself, and to gratify his concubines and those whose power was greatest with Pharnabazus, set forth on her journey. When she had obtained audience with him she spoke as follows: “O Pharnabazus, thou knowest that thy servant my husband

was in all respects friendly to thee; moreover, he paid my lord the tributes which were thy due, so that thou didst praise and honour him. Now therefore, if I do thee service as faithfully as my husband, why needest thou to appoint another satrap? — nay but, if in any matter I please thee not, is it not in thy power to take from me the government on that day, and to give it to another?” When he had heard her words, Pharnabazus decided that the woman ought to be satrap. She, as soon as she was mistress of the territory, never ceased to render the tribute in due season, even as her husband before her had done. Moreover, whenever she came to the court of Pharnabazus she brought him gifts continually, and whenever Pharnabazus went down to visit her provinces she welcomed him with all fair and courteous entertainment beyond what his other viceroys were wont to do. The cities also which had been left to her by her husband, she guarded safely for him; while of those cities that owed her no allegiance, she acquired, on the seaboard, Larisa and Hamaxitus and Colonae — attacking their walls by aid of Hellenic mercenaries, whilst she herself sat in her carriage and watched the spectacle. Nor was she sparing of her gifts to those who won her admiration; and thus she furnished herself with a mercenary force of exceptional splendour. She also went with Pharnabazus on his campaigns, even when, on pretext of some injury done to the king’s territory, Mysians or Pisidians were the object of attack. In requital, Pharnabazus paid her magnificent honour, and at times invited her to assist him with her counsel. (16)

(15) I.e. as suzerain.

(16) Grote, “H. G.” ix. 292; cf. Herod. viii. 69.

Now when Mania was more than forty years old, the husband of her own daughter, Meidias — flustered by the suggestions of certain people who said that it was monstrous a woman should rule and he remain a private person (17) — found his way into her presence, as the story goes, and

strangled her. For Mania, albeit she carefully guarded herself against all ordinary comers, as behoved her in the exercise of her “tyranny,” trusted in Meidias, and, as a woman might her own son-in-law, was ready to greet him at all times with open arms. He also murdered her son, a youth of marvellous beauty, who was about seventeen years of age. He next seized upon the strong cities of Scepsis and Gergithes, in which lay for the most part the property and wealth of Mania. As for the other cities of the satrapy, they would not receive the usurper, their garrisons keeping them safely for Pharnabazus. Thereupon Meidias sent gifts to Pharnabazus, and claimed to hold the district even as Mania had held it; to whom the other answered, “Keep your gifts and guard them safely until that day when I shall come in person and take both you and them together”; adding, “What care I to live longer if I avenge not myself for the murder of Mania!”

(17) Or, “his brains whimsied with insinuations.”

Just at the critical moment Dercylidas arrived, and in a single day received the adhesion of the three seaboard cities Larisa, Hamaxitus, and Colonae — which threw open their gates to him. Then he sent messengers to the cities of the Aeolid also, offering them freedom if they would receive him within their walls and become allies. Accordingly the men of Neandria and Ilium and Cocylium lent willing ears; for since the death of Mania their Hellenic garrisons had been treated but ill. But the commander of the garrison in Cebrene, a place of some strength, bethinking him that if he should succeed in guarding that city for Pharnabazus, he would receive honour at his hands, refused to admit Dercylidas. Whereupon the latter, in a rage, prepared to take the place by force; but when he came to sacrifice, on the first day the victims would not yield good omens; on the second, and again upon the third day, it was the same story. Thus for as many as four days he persevered in sacrificing, cherishing wrath the while — for he was in haste to become master of

the whole Aeolid before Pharnabazus came to the succour of the district.

Meanwhile a certain Sicyonian captain, Athenadas by name, said to himself: “Dercylidas does but trifle to waste his time here, whilst I with my own hand can draw off their water from the men of Cybrene”; wherewith he ran forward with his division and essayed to choke up the spring which supplied the city. But the garrison sallied out and covered the Sicyonian himself with wounds, besides killing two of his men. Indeed, they plied their swords and missiles with such good effect that the whole company was forced to beat a retreat. Dercylidas was not a little annoyed, thinking that now the spirit of the besiegers would certainly die away; but whilst he was in this mood, behold! there arrived from the beleaguered fortress emissaries of the Hellenes, who stated that the action taken by the commandant was not to their taste; for themselves, they would far rather be joined in bonds of fellowship with Hellenes than with barbarians. While the matter was still under discussion there came a messenger also from the commandant, to say that whatever the former deputation had proposed he, on his side, was ready to endorse. Accordingly Dercylidas, who, it so happened, had at length obtained favourable omens on that day, marched his force without more ado up to the gates of the city, which were flung open by those within; and so he entered. (18) Here, then, he was content to appoint a garrison, and without further stay advanced upon Scepsis and Gergithes.

(18) Grote (“H. G.” ix. 294) says: “The reader will remark how Xenophon shapes the narrative in such a manner as to inculcate the pious duty in a general of obeying the warnings furnished by the sacrifice — either for action or for inaction.... Such an inference is never (I believe) to be found suggested in Thucydides.” See Brietenbach, “Xen. Hell.” I et II, praef. in alteram ed. p. xvii.

And now Meidias, partly expecting the hostile advance of Pharnabazus, and partly mistrusting the citizens — for to such a pass things had come — sent to Dercylidas, proposing to meet him in conference provided he might take security of hostages. In answer to this suggestion the other

sent him one man from each of the cities of the allies, and bade him take his pick of these, whichsoever and how many soever he chose, as hostages for his own security. Meidias selected ten, and so went out. In conversation with Dercylidas, he asked him on what terms he would accept his alliance. The other answered: “The terms are that you grant the citizens freedom and self-government.” The words were scarcely out of his mouth before he began marching upon Scepsis. Whereupon Meidias, perceiving it was vain to hinder him in the teeth of the citizens, suffered him to enter. That done, Dercylidas offered sacrifice to Athena in the citadel of the Scepsians, turned out the bodyguards of Meidias, and handed over the city to the citizens. And so, having admonished them to regulate their civic life as Hellenes and free men ought, he left the place and continued his advance against Gergithes. On this last march he was escorted by many of the Scepsians themselves; such was the honour they paid him and so great their satisfaction at his exploits. Meidias also followed close at his side, petitioning that he would hand over the city of Gergithians to himself. To whom Dercylidas only made reply, that he should not fail to obtain any of his just rights. And whilst the words were yet upon his lips, he was drawing close to the gates, with Meidias at his side. Behind him followed the troops, marching two and two in peaceful fashion. The defenders of Gergithes from their towers — which were extraordinarily high — espied Meidias in company of the Spartan, and abstained from shooting. And Dercylidas said: “Bid them open the gates, Meidias, when you shall lead the way, and I will enter the temple along with you and do sacrifice to Athena.” And Meidias, though he shrank from opening the gates, yet in terror of finding himself on a sudden seized, reluctantly gave the order to open the gates. As soon as he was entered in, the Spartan, still taking Meidias with him, marched up to the citadel and there ordered the main body of his soldiers to take up their

position round the walls, whilst he with those about him did sacrifice to Athena. When the sacrifice was ended he ordered Meidias's bodyguard to pile arms (19) in the van of his troops. Here for the future they would serve as mercenaries, since Meidias their former master stood no longer in need of their protection. The latter, being at his wits' end what to do, exclaimed: "Look you, I will now leave you; I go to make preparation for my guest." But the other replied: "Heaven forbid! Ill were it that I who have offered sacrifice should be treated as a guest by you. I rather should be the entertainer and you the guest. Pray stay with us, and while the supper is preparing, you and I can consider our obligations, and perform them."

(19) I.e. take up a position, or "to order arms," whilst he addressed them; not probably "to ground arms," as if likely to be mutinous.

When they were seated Dercylidas put certain questions: "Tell me, Meidias, did your father leave you heir to his estates?" "Certainly he did," answered the other. "And how many dwelling-houses have you? what landed estates? how much pasturage?" The other began running off an inventory, whilst some of the Scepsians who were present kept interposing, "He is lying to you, Dercylidas." "Nay, you take too minute a view of matters," replied the Spartan. When the inventory of the paternal property was completed, he proceeded: "Tell me, Meidias, to whom did Mania belong?" A chorus of voices rejoined, "To Pharnabazus." "Then must her property have belonged to Pharnabazus too." "Certainly," they answered. "Then it must now be ours," he remarked, "by right of conquest, since Pharnabazus is at war with us. Will some one of you escort me to the place where the property of Mania and Pharnabazus lies?" So the rest led the way to the dwelling-place of Mania which Meidias had taken from her, and Meidias followed too. When he was entered, Dercylidas summoned the stewards, and bidding his attendants seize them, gave them to understand that, if detected stealing

anything which belonged to Mania, they would lose their heads on the spot. The stewards proceeded to point out the treasures, and he, when he had looked through the whole store, bolted and barred the doors, affixing his seal, and setting a watch. As he went out he found at the doors certain of the generals (20) and captains, and said to them: “Here, sirs, we have pay ready made for the army — a year’s pay nearly for eight thousand men — and if we can win anything besides, there will be so much the more.” This he said, knowing that those who heard it would be all the more amenable to discipline, and would yield him a more flattering obedience. Then Meidias asked, “And where am I to live, Dercylidas?” “Where you have the very best right to live,” replied the other, “in your native town of Scepsis, and in your father’s house.”

(20) Lit. “of the taxiarchs and lochagoi.”

II

Such were the exploits of Dercylidas: nine cities taken in eight days. Two considerations now began to occupy his mind: how was he to avoid falling into the fatal error of Thibron and becoming a burthen to his allies, whilst wintering in a friendly country? how, again, was he to prevent Pharnabazus from overriding the Hellenic states in pure contempt with his cavalry? Accordingly he sent to Pharnabazus and put it to him point-blank: Which will you have, peace or war? Whereupon Pharnabazus, who could not but perceive that the whole Aeolid had now been converted practically into a fortified base of operations, which threatened his own homestead of Phrygia, chose peace.

B.C. 399-398. This being so, Dercylidas advanced into Bithynian Thrace, and there spent the winter; nor did Pharnabazus exhibit a shadow of annoyance, since the Bithynians were perpetually at war with himself. For the most part, Dercylidas continued to harry (1) Bithynia in

perfect security, and found provisions without stint. Presently he was joined from the other side of the straits by some Odrysian allies sent by Seuthes; (2) they numbered two hundred horse and three hundred peltasts. These fellows pitched upon a site a little more than a couple of miles (3) from the Hellenic force, where they entrenched themselves; then having got from Dercylidas some heavy infantry soldiers to act as guards of their encampment, they devoted themselves to plundering, and succeeded in capturing an ample store of slaves and other wealth. Presently their camp was full of prisoners, when one morning the Bithynians, having ascertained the actual numbers of the marauding parties as well as of the Hellenes left as guards behind, collected in large masses of light troops and cavalry, and attacked the garrison, who were not more than two hundred strong. As soon as they came close enough, they began discharging spears and other missiles on the little body, who on their side continued to be wounded and shot down, but were quite unable to retaliate, cooped up as they were within a palisading barely six feet high, until in desperation they tore down their defences with their own hands, and dashed at the enemy. These had nothing to do but to draw back from the point of egress, and being light troops easily escaped beyond the grasp of heavy-armed men, while ever and again, from one point of vantage or another, they poured their shower of javelins, and at every sally laid many a brave man low, till at length, like sheep penned in a fold, the defenders were shot down almost to a man. A remnant, it is true, did escape, consisting of some fifteen who, seeing the turn affairs were taking, had already made off in the middle of the fighting. Slipping through their assailants' fingers, (4) to the small concern of the Bithynians, they reached the main Hellenic camp in safety. The Bithynians, satisfied with their achievement, part of which consisted in cutting down the tent guards of the Odrysian Thracians and recovering all their prisoners, made

off without delay; so that by the time the Hellenes got wind of the affair and rallied to the rescue, they found nothing left in the camp save only the stripped corpses of the slain. When the Odrysians themselves returned, they fell to burying their own dead, quaffing copious draughts of wine in their honour and holding horse-races; but for the future they deemed it advisable to camp along with the Hellenes. Thus they harried and burned Bithynia the winter through.

(1) {Pheson kai agon}, i.e. “there was plenty of live stock to lift and chattels to make away with.”

(2) For Seuthes see “Anab.” VII. i. 5; and below, IV. viii. 26.

(3) Lit. “twenty stades.”

(4) Or, “slipping through the enemy’s fingers, who took no heed of them, they,” etc.

B.C. 398. With the commencement of spring Dercylidas turned his back upon the Bithynians and came to Lampsacus. Whilst at this place envoys reached him from the home authorities. These were Aracus, Naubates, and Antisthenes. They were sent to inquire generally into the condition of affairs in Asia, and to inform Dercylidas of the extension of his office for another year. They had been further commissioned by the ephors to summon a meeting of the soldiers and inform them that the ephors held them to blame for their former doings, though for their present avoidance of evil conduct they must needs praise them; and for the future they must understand that while no repetition of misdoing would be tolerated, all just and upright dealing by the allies would receive its meed of praise. The soldiers were therefore summoned, and the envoys delivered their message, to which the leader of the Cyreians answered: “Nay, men of Lacedaemon, listen; we are the same to-day as we were last year; only our general of to-day is different from our general in the past. If to-day we have avoided our offence of yesterday, the cause is not far to seek; you may discover it for yourselves.”

Aracus and the other envoys shared the hospitality of Dercylidas’s tent, and one of the party chanced to mention how they had left an embassy from the men of Chersonese

in Lacedaemon. According to their statement, he added, it was impossible for them to till their land nowadays, so perpetually were they robbed and plundered by the Thracians; whereas the peninsula needed only to be walled across from sea to sea, and there would be abundance of good land to cultivate — enough for themselves and as many others from Lacedaemon as cared to come. “So that it would not surprise us,” continued the envoys, “if a Lacedaemonian were actually sent out from Sparta with a force to carry out the project.” Dercylidas kept his ears open but his counsel close, and so sent forward the commissioners to Ephesus. (5) It pleased him to picture their progress through the Hellenic cities, and the spectacle of peace and prosperity which would everywhere greet their eyes. When he knew that his stay was to be prolonged, he sent again to Pharnabazus and offered him once more as an alternative either the prolongation of the winter truce or war. And once again Pharnabazus chose truce. It was thus that Dercylidas was able to leave the cities in the neighbourhood of the satrap (6) in peace and friendship. Crossing the Hellespont himself he brought his army into Europe, and marching through Thrace, which was also friendly, was entertained by Seuthes, (7) and so reached the Chersonese.

(5) See Grote, “H. G.” ix. 301.

(6) Or, reading after Cobet, {tas peri ekeina poleis} — “the cities of that neighbourhood.”

(7) See “Anab.” VII. vii. 51.

This district, he soon discovered, not only contained something like a dozen cities, (8) but was singularly fertile. The soil was of the best, but ruined by the ravages of the Thracians, precisely as he had been told. Accordingly, having measured and found the breadth of the isthmus barely four miles, (9) he no longer hesitated. Having offered sacrifice, he commenced his line of wall, distributing the area to the soldiers in detachments, and promising to award them prizes for their industry — a first prize for the section first completed, and the rest as each detachment of workers

might deserve. By this means the whole wall begun in spring was finished before autumn. Within these lines he established eleven cities, with numerous harbours, abundance of good arable land, and plenty of land under plantation, besides magnificent grazing grounds for sheep and cattle of every kind.

(8) Lit. “eleven or twelve cities.” For the natural productivity, see “Anab.” V. vi. 25.

(9) Lit. “thirty-seven stades.” Mod. Gallipoli. See Herod. vi. 36; Plut. “Pericl.” xix.

Having finished the work, he crossed back again into Asia, and on a tour of inspection, found the cities for the most part in a thriving condition; but when he came to Atarneus he discovered that certain exiles from Chios had got possession of the stronghold, which served them as a convenient base for pillaging and plundering Ionia; and this, in fact, was their means of livelihood. Being further informed of the large supplies of grain which they had inside, he proceeded to draw entrenchments around the place with a view to a regular investment, and by this means he reduced it in eight months. Then having appointed Draco of Pellene (10) commandant, he stocked the fortress with an abundance of provisions of all sorts, to serve him as a halting-place when he chanced to pass that way, and so withdrew to Ephesus, which is three days’ journey from Sardis.

(10) Cf. Isocr. “Panegyr.” 70; Jebb. “Att. Or.” ii. p. 161. Of Pellene (or Pellana) in Laconia, not Pellene in Achaia? though that is the opinion of Grote and Thirlwall.

B.C. 397. Up to this date peace had been maintained between Tissaphernes and Dercylidas, as also between the Hellenes and the barbarians in those parts. But the time came when an embassy arrived at Lacedaemon from the Ionic cities, protesting that Tissaphernes might, if he chose, leave the Hellenic cities independent. “Our idea,” they added, “is, that if Caria, the home of Tissaphernes, felt the pinch of war, the satrap would very soon agree to grant us independence.” The ephors, on hearing this, sent a despatch to Dercylidas, and bade him cross the frontier with his army

into Caria, whilst Pharax the admiral coasted round with the fleet. These orders were carried out. Meanwhile a visitor had reached Tissaphernes. This was not less a person than Pharnabazus. His coming was partly owing to the fact that Tissaphernes had been appointed general-in-chief, and party in order to testify his readiness to make common cause with his brother satrap in fighting and expelling the Hellenes from the king’s territory; for if his heart was stirred by jealousy on account of the generalship bestowed upon his rival, he was not the less aggrieved at finding himself robbed of the Aeolid. Tissaphernes, lending willing ears to the proposal, had answered: “First cross over with me in Caria, and then we will take counsel on these matters.” But being arrived in Caria, they determined to establish garrisons of some strength in the various fortresses, and so crossed back again into Ionia.

Hearing that the satraps had recrossed the Maeander, Dercylidas grew apprehensive for the district which lay there unprotected. “If Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus,” he said to Pharax, “chose to make a descent, they could harry the country right and left.” In this mind he followed suit, and recrossed the frontier too. And now as they marched on, preserving no sort of battle order — on the supposition that the enemy had got far ahead of them into the district of Ephesus — suddenly they caught sight of his scouts perched on some monumental structures facing them. To send up scouts into similar edifices and towers on their own side was the work of a few moments, and before them lay revealed the long lines of troops drawn up just where their road lay. These were the Carians, with their white shields, and the whole Persian troops there present, with all the Hellenic contingents belonging to either satrap. Besides these there was a great cloud of cavalry: on the right wing the squadrons of Tissaphernes, and on the left those of Pharnabazus.

Seeing how matters lay, Dercylidas ordered the generals of brigade and captains to form into line as quickly as possible, eight deep, placing the light infantry on the fringe of battle, with the cavalry — such cavalry, that is, and of such numerical strength, as he chanced to have. Meanwhile, as general, he sacrificed. (11) During this interval the troops from Peloponnese kept quiet in preparation as for battle. Not so the troops from Priene and Achilleum, from the islands and the Ionic cities, some of whom left their arms in the corn, which stood thick and deep in the plain of the Maeander, and took to their heels; while those who remained at their posts gave evident signs that their steadiness would not last. Pharnabazus, it was reported, had given orders to engage; but Tissaphernes, who recalled his experience of his own exploits with the Cyreian army, and assumed that all other Hellenes were of similar mettle, had no desire to engage, but sent to Dercylidas saying, he should be glad to meet him in conference. So Dercylidas, attended by the pick of his troops, horse and foot, in personal attendance on himself, (12) went forward to meet the envoys. He told them that for his own part he had made his preparations to engage, as they themselves might see, but still, if the satraps were minded to meet in conference, he had nothing to say against it— “Only, in that case, there must be mutual exchange of hostages and other pledges.”

(11) I.e. according to custom on the eve of battle. See “Pol. Lac.” xiii. 8.

(12) Lit. “they were splendid fellows to look at.” See “Anab.” II. iii. 3.

When this proposal had been agreed to and carried out, the two armies retired for the night — the Asiatics to Tralles in Caria, the Hellenes to Leucophrys, where was a temple (13) of Artemis of great sanctity, and a sandy-bottomed lake more than a furlong in extent, fed by a spring of ever-flowing water fit for drinking and warm. For the moment so much was effected. On the next day they met at the place appointed, and it was agreed that they should mutually ascertain the terms on which either party was willing to

make peace. On his side, Dercylidas insisted that the king should grant independence to the Hellenic cities; while Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus demanded the evacuation of the country by the Hellenic army, and the withdrawal of the Lacedaemonian governors from the cities. After this interchange of ideas a truce was entered into, so as to allow time for the reports of the proceedings to be sent by Dercylidas to Lacedaemon, and by Tissaphernes to the king.

(13) Lately unearthed. See “Class. Rev.” v. 8, p. 391.

B.C. 401 (?). Whilst such was the conduct of affairs in Asia under the guidance of Dercylidas, the Lacedaemonians at home were at the same time no less busily employed with other matters. They cherished a long-standing embitterment against the Eleians, the grounds of which were that the Eleians had once (14) contracted an alliance with the Athenians, Argives, and Mantineans; moreover, on pretence of a sentence registered against the Lacedaemonians, they had excluded them from the horse-race and gymnastic contests. Nor was that the sum of their offending. They had taken and scourged Lichas, (15) under the following circumstances: — Being a Spartan, he had formally consigned his chariot to the Thebans, and when the Thebans were proclaimed victors he stepped forward to crown his charioteer; whereupon, in spite of his grey hairs, the Eleians put those indignities upon him and expelled him from the festival. Again, at a date subsequent to that occurrence, Agis being sent to offer sacrifice to Olympian Zeus in accordance with the bidding of an oracle, the Eleians would not suffer him to offer prayer for victory in war, asserting that the ancient law and custom (16) forbade Hellenes to consult the god for war with Hellenes; and Agis was forced to go away without offering the sacrifice.

(14) In 421 B.C. (see Thuc. v. 31); for the second charge, see Thuc. v. 49 foll.

(15) See “Mem.” I. ii. 61; Thuc. v. 50; and Jowett, note ad loc. vol. ii. p. 314.

(16) See Grote, “H. G.” ix. 311 note.

In consequence of all these annoyances the ephors and the Assembly determined “to bring the men of Elis to their senses.” Thereupon they sent an embassy to that state, announcing that the authorities of Lacedaemon deemed it just and right that they should leave the country (17) townships in the territory of Elis free and independent. This the Eleians flatly refused to do. The cities in question were theirs by right of war. Thereupon the ephors called out the ban. The leader of the expedition was Agis. He invaded Elis through Achaia (18) by the Larisus; but the army had hardly set foot on the enemy’s soil and the work of devastation begun, when an earthquake took place, and Agis, taking this as a sign from Heaven, marched back again out of the country and disbanded his army. Thereat the men of Elis were much more emboldened, and sent embassies to various cities which they knew to be hostile to the Lacedaemonians.

(17) Lit. “perioecid.”

(18) From the north. The Larisus is the frontier stream between Achaia and Elis. See Strabo, viii. 387.

The year had not completed its revolution (19) ere the ephors again called out the ban against Elis, and the invading host of Agis was this time swelled by the rest of the allies, including the Athenians; the Boeotians and Corinthians alone excepted. The Spartan king now entered through Aulon, (20) and the men of Lepreum (21) at once revolted from the Eleians and gave in their adhesion to the Spartan, and simultaneously with these the Macistians and their next-door neighbours the Epitalians. As he crossed the river further adhesions followed, on the part of the Letrinians, the Amphidolians, and the Marganians.

(19) Al. “on the coming round of the next year.” See Jowett (note to Thuc. i. 31), vol. ii. p. 33.

(20) On the south. For the history, see Busolt, “Die Laked.” pp. 146-200. “The river” is the Alpheus.

(21) See below, VI. v. 11; Paus. IV. xv. 8.

B.C. 400 (?). Upon this he pushed on into Olympian territory and did sacrifice to Olympian Zeus. There was no attempt to stay his proceedings now. After sacrifice he

marched against the capital, (22) devastating and burning the country as he went. Multitudes of cattle, multitudes of slaves, were the fruits of conquest yielded, insomuch that the fame thereof spread, and many more Arcadians and Achaeans flocked to join the standard of the invader and to share in the plunder. In fact, the expedition became one enormous foray. Here was the chance to fill all the granaries of Peloponnese with corn. When he had reached the capital, the beautiful suburbs and gymnasia became a spoil to the troops; but the city itself, though it lay open before him a defenceless and unwalled town, he kept aloof from. He would not, rather than could not, take it. Such was the explanation given. Thus the country was a prey to devastation, and the invaders massed round Cyllene.

(22) I.e. Elis, of which Cyllene is the port town. For the wealth of the district, see Polyb. iv. 73; and below, VII. iv. 33.

Then the friends of a certain Xenias — a man of whom it was said that he might measure the silver coin, inherited from his father, by the bushel — wishing to be the leading instrument in bringing over the state to Lacedaemon, rushed out of the house, sword in hand, and began a work of butchery. Amongst other victims they killed a man who strongly resembled the leader of the democratic party, Thrasydaeus. (23) Everyone believed it was really Thrasydaeus who was slain. The popular party were panic-stricken, and stirred neither hand nor foot. On their side, the cut-throats poured their armed bands into the market-place. But Thrasydaeus was laid asleep the while where the fumes of wine had overpowered him. When the people came to discover that their hero was not dead, they crowded round his house this side and that, (24) like a swarm of bees clinging to their leader; and as soon as Thrasydaeus had put himself in the van, with the people at his back, a battle was fought, and the people won. And those who had laid their hands to deeds of butchery went as exiles to the Lacedaemonians.

(23) See Paus. III. viii. 4. He was a friend of Lysias (“Vit. X. Orat. 835”).

(24) The house was filled to overflowing by the clustering close- packed crowd.

After a while Agis himself retired, recrossing the Alpheus; but he was careful to leave a garrison in Epitalium near that river, with Lysippus as governor, and the exiles from Elis along with him. Having done so, he disbanded his army and returned home himself.

B.C. 400-399 (?). (25) During the rest of the summer and the ensuing winter the territory of the Eleians was ravaged and ransacked by Lysippus and his troops, until Thrasydaeus, the following summer, sent to Lacedaemon and agreed to dismantle the walls of Phea and Cyllene, and to grant autonomy to the Triphylian townships (26) — together with Phrixa and Epitalium, the Letrinians, Amphidolians, and Marganians; and besides these to the Acroreians and to Lasion, a place claimed by the Arcadians. With regard to Epeium, a town midway between Heraea and Macistus, the Eleians claimed the right to keep it, on the plea that they had purchased the whole district from its then owners, for thirty talents, (27) which sum they had actually paid. But the Lacedaemonians, acting on the principle “that a purchase which forcibly deprives the weaker party of his possession is no more justifiable than a seizure by violence,” compelled them to emancipate Epeium also. From the presidency of the temple of Olympian Zeus, however, they did not oust them; not that it belonged to Elis of ancient right, but because the rival claimants, (28) it was felt, were “villagers,” hardly equal to the exercise of the presidency. After these concessions, peace and alliance between the Eleians and the Lacedaemonians were established, and the war between Elis and Sparta ceased.

(25) Grote (“H. G.” ix. 316) discusses the date of this war between Elis and Sparta, which he thinks, reaches over three different years, 402-400 B.C. But Curtius (vol. iv. Eng. tr. p. 196) disagrees: “The Eleian war must have occurred in 401-400 B.C., and Grote rightly conjectures that the Eleians were anxious to bring it to a close before the celebration of the festival. But he errs in extending its duration over three years.” See Diod. xiv. 17. 24; Paus. III. viii. 2 foll.

(26) Grote remarks: “There is something perplexing in Xenophon’s description of the Triphylian townships which the Eleians surrendered” (“H. G.” ix. 315). I adopt Grote’s emend. {kai Phrixan}. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 176.

(27) = 7,312 pounds: 10 shillings.

(28) I.e. the men of the Pisatid. See below, VII. iv. 28; Busolt, op. cit. p 156.

III

After this Agis came to Delphi and offered as a sacrifice a tenth of the spoil. On his return journey he fell ill at Heraea — being by this time an old man — and was carried back to Lacedaemon. He survived the journey, but being there arrived, death speedily overtook him. He was buried with a sepulchre transcending in solemnity the lot of ordinary mortality. (1)

(1) See “Ages.” xi. 16; “Pol. Lac.” xv. 9.

When the holy days of mourning were accomplished, and it was necessary to choose another king, there were rival claimants to the throne. Leotychides claimed it as the son, Agesilaus as the brother, of Agis. Then Leotychides protested: “Yet consider, Agesilaus, the law bids not ‘the king’s brother,’ but ‘the king’s son’ to be king; only if there chance to be no son, in that case shall the brother of the king be king.” Agesilaus: “Then must I needs be king.” Leotychides: “How so, seeing that I am not dead?” Agesilaus: “Because he whom you call your father denied you, saying, ‘Leotychides is no son of mine.’” Leotychides: “Nay, but my mother, who would know far better than he, said, and still to-day says, I am.” Agesilaus: “Nay, but the god himself, Poteidan, laid his finger on thy falsity when by his earthquake he drove forth thy father from the bridal chamber into the light of day; and time, ‘that tells no lies,’ as the proverb has it, bare witness to the witness of the god; for just ten months from the moment at which he fled and was no more seen within that chamber, you were born.” (2) So they reasoned together.

(2) I have followed Sauppe as usual, but see Hartman (“Anal. Xen.” p. 327) for a discussion of the whole passage. He thinks Xenophon wrote {ex ou gar toi ephugen} ({o sos pater}, i.e. adulterer) {ek to thalamo dekato meni tu ephus}. The Doric {ek to thalamo} was corrupted into {en to thalamo} and {kai ephane} inserted. This corrupt reading Plutarch had before him, and hence his distorted version of the story.

Diopethes, (3) a great authority upon oracles, supported Leotychides. There was an oracle of Apollo, he urged, which said “Beware of the lame reign.” But Diopethes was met by Lysander, who in behalf of Agesilaus demurred to this

interpretation put upon the language of the god. If they were to beware of a lame reign, it meant not, beware lest a man stumble and halt, but rather, beware of him in whose veins flows not the blood of Heracles; most assuredly the kingdom would halt, and that would be a lame reign in very deed, whensoever the descendants of Heracles should cease to lead the state. Such were the arguments on either side, after hearing which the city chose Agesilaus to be king.

(3) See Plut. "Ages." ii. 4; "Lys." xxii. (Clough, iv. 3; iii. 129); Paus. III. viii. 5.

Now Agesilaus had not been seated on the throne one year when, as he sacrificed one of the appointed sacrifices in behalf of the city, (4) the soothsayer warned him, saying: "The gods reveal a conspiracy of the most fearful character"; and when the king sacrificed a second time, he said: "The aspect of the victims is now even yet more terrible"; but when he had sacrificed for the third time, the soothsayer exclaimed: "O Agesilaus, the sign is given to me, even as though we were in the very midst of the enemy." Thereupon they sacrificed to the deities who avert evil and work salvation, and so barely obtained good omens and ceased sacrificing. Nor had five days elapsed after the sacrifices were ended, ere one came bringing information to the ephors of a conspiracy, and named Cinadon as the ringleader; a young man robust of body as of soul, but not one of the peers. (5) Accordingly the ephors questioned their informant: "How say you the occurrence is to take place?" and he who gave the information answered: "Cinadon took me to the limit of the market-place, and bade me count how many Spartans there were in the market-place; and I counted— 'king, ephors, and elders, and others — maybe forty. But tell me, Cinadon,' I said to him, 'why have you bidden me count them?' and he answered me: 'Those men, I would have you know, are your sworn foes; and all those others, more than four thousand, congregated there are your natural allies.' Then he took and showed me

in the streets, here one and there two of ‘our enemies,’ as we chanced to come across them, and all the rest ‘our natural allies’; and so again running through the list of Spartans to be found in the country districts, he still kept harping on that string: ‘Look you, on each estate one foeman — the master — and all the rest allies.’” The ephors asked: “How many do you reckon are in the secret of this matter?” The informant answered: “On that point also he gave me to understand that there were by no means many in their secret who were prime movers of the affair, but those few to be depended on; ‘and to make up,’ said he, ‘we ourselves are in their secret, all the rest of them — helots, enfranchised, inferiors, provincials, one and all. (6) Note their demeanour when Spartans chance to be the topic of their talk. Not one of them can conceal the delight it would give him if he might eat up every Spartan raw.’” (7) Then, as the inquiry went on, the question came: “And where did they propose to find arms?” The answer followed: “He explained that those of us, of course, who are enrolled in regiments have arms of our own already, and as for the mass — he led the way to the war foundry, and showed me scores and scores of knives, of swords, of spits, hatchets, and axes, and reaping-hooks. ‘Anything or everything,’ he told me, ‘which men use to delve in earth, cut timber, or quarry stone, would serve our purpose; nay, the instruments used for other arts would in nine cases out of ten furnish weapons enough and to spare, especially when dealing with unarmed antagonists.’” Once more being asked what time the affair was to come off, he replied his orders were “not to leave the city.”

(4) “Pol. Lac.” xv. 2.

(5) For the {omoioi}, see Muller, “Dorians,” iii. 5, 7 (vol. ii. p. 84); Grote, “H. G.” ix. 345, note 2.

(6) For the neodamodes, hypomeiones, perioeci, see Arnold, “Thuc.” v. 34; Muller, “Dorians,” ii. 43, 84, 18; Busolt, op. cit. p 16.

(7) See “Anab.” IV. viii. 14; and Hom. “Il.” iv. 34.

As the result of their inquiry the ephors were persuaded that the man’s statements were based upon things he had

really seen, (8) and they were so alarmed that they did not even venture to summon the Little Assembly, (9) as it was named; but holding informal meetings among themselves — a few senators here and a few there — they determined to send Cinadon and others of the young men to Aulon, with instructions to apprehend certain of the inhabitants and helots, whose names were written on the scytale (or scroll). (10) He had further instructions to capture another resident in Aulon; this was a woman, the fashionable beauty of the place — supposed to be the arch-corruptress of all Lacedaemonians, young and old, who visited Aulon. It was not the first mission of the sort on which Cinadon had been employed by the ephors. It was natural, therefore, that the ephors should entrust him with the scytale on which the names of the suspects were inscribed; and in answer to his inquiry which of the young men he was to take with him, they said: “Go and order the eldest of the Hippagretae (11) (or commanders of horse) to let you have six or seven who chance to be there.” But they had taken care to let the commander know whom he was to send, and that those sent should also know that their business was to capture Cinadon. Further, the authorities instructed Cinadon that they would send three waggons to save bringing back his captives on foot — concealing as deeply as possible the fact that he, and he alone, was the object of the mission. Their reason for not securing him in the city was that they did not really know the extent of the mischief; and they wished, in the first instance, to learn from Cinadon who his accomplices were before these latter could discover they were informed against and effect their escape. His captors were to secure him first, and having learnt from him the names of his confederates, to write them down and send them as quickly as possible to the ephors. The ephors, indeed, were so much concerned about the whole occurrence that they further sent a company of horse to assist their agents at Aulon. (12) As soon as the capture was effected, and one of the

horsemen was back with the list of names taken down on the information of Cinadon, they lost no time in apprehending the soothsayer Tisamenus and the rest who were the principals in the conspiracy. When Cinadon (13) himself was brought back and cross-examined, and had made a full confession of the whole plot, his plans, and his accomplices, they put to him one final question: “What was your object in undertaking this business?” He answered: “I wished to be inferior to no man in Lacedaemon.” Let that be as it might, his fate was to be taken out forthwith in irons, just as he was, and to be placed with his two hands and his neck in the collar, and so under scourge and goad to be driven, himself and his accomplices, round the city. Thus upon the heads of those was visited the penalty of their offences.

(8) “And pointed to a well-concerted plan.”

(9) See Grote, “H. G.” ix. 348.

(10) See Thuc. i. 131; Plut. “Lys.” 19 (Clough, iii. p. 125).

(11) “The Hippagretes (or commander of the three hundred guards called horsemen, though they were not really mounted).” Grote, “H. G.” vol. ix. p. 349; see “Pol. Lac.” iv. 3.

(12) Or, “to those on the way to Aulon.”

(13) See for Cinadon’s case, Arist. “Pol.” v. 7, 3.

IV

B.C. 397. (1) It was after the incidents just recorded that a Syracusan named Herodas brought news to Lacedaemon. He had chanced to be in Phoenicia with a certain shipowner, and was struck by the number of Phoenician triremes which he observed, some coming into harbour from other ports, others already there with their ships’ companies complete, while others again were still completing their equipments. Nor was it only what he saw, but he had heard say further that there were to be three hundred of these vessels all told; whereupon he had taken passage on the first sailing ship bound for Hellas. He was in haste to lay this information before the Lacedaemonians, feeling sure that the king and Tissaphernes were concerned in these preparations —

though where the fleet was to act, or against whom, he would not venture to predict.

(1) See Grote, “H. G.” ix. 353, for chronology, etc.

These reports threw the Lacedaemonians into a flutter of expectation and anxiety. They summoned a meeting of the allies, and began to deliberate as to what ought to be done. Lysander, convinced of the enormous superiority of the Hellenic navy, and with regard to land forces drawing an obvious inference from the exploits and final deliverance of the troops with Cyrus, persuaded Agesilaus, to undertake a campaign into Asia, provided the authorities would furnish him with thirty Spartans, two thousand of the enfranchised, (2) and contingents of the allies amounting to six thousand men. Apart from these calculations, Lysander had a personal object: he wished to accompany the king himself, and by his aid to re-establish the decarchies originally set up by himself in the different cities, but at a later date expelled through the action of the ephors, who had issued a fiat re-establishing the old order of constitution.

(2) Technically, “neodamodes.”

B.C. 396. To this offer on the part of Agesilaus to undertake such an expedition the Lacedaemonians responded by presenting him with all he asked for, and six months’ provisions besides. When the hour of departure came he offered all such sacrifices as are necessary, and lastly those “before crossing the border,” (3) and so set out. This done, he despatched to the several states (4) messengers with directions as to the numbers to be sent from each, and the points of rendezvous; but for himself he was minded to go and do sacrifice at Aulis, even as Agamemnon had offered sacrifice in that place ere he set sail for Troy. But when he had reached the place and had begun to sacrifice, the Boeotarchs (5) being apprised of his design, sent a body of cavalry and bade him desist from further sacrificing; (6) and lighting upon victims already

offered, they hurled them from off the altars, scattering the fragments. Then Agesilaus, calling the gods to witness, got on board his trireme in bitter indignation, and sailed away. Arrived at Geraestus, he there collected as large a portion of his troops as possible, and with the armada made sail for Ephesus.

(3) “Pol. Lac.” xiii. 2 foll.

(4) Or, “To the several cities he had already despatched messengers with directions,” etc.; see Paus. III. ix. 1-3.

(5) See Freeman, “Hist. of Federal Government,” ch. iv. “Constitution of the Boeotian League,” pp. 162, 163. The Boeotarchs, as representatives of the several Boeotian cities, were the supreme military commanders of the League, and, as it would appear, the general administrators of Federal affairs. “The Boeotarchs of course command at Delion, but they also act as administrative magistrates of the League by hindering Agesilaus from sacrificing at Aulis.”

(6) Plut. “Ages.” vi.; “Pelop.” xxi. See Breitenb. op. cit. Praef. p. xvi.; and below, III. v. 5; VI. iv. 23.

When he had reached that city the first move was made by Tissaphernes, who sent asking, “With what purpose he was come thither?” And the Spartan king made answer: “With the intention that the cities in Asia shall be independent even as are the cities in our quarter of Hellas.” In answer to this Tissaphernes said: “If you on your part choose to make a truce whilst I send ambassadors to the king, I think you may well arrange the matter, and sail back home again, if so you will.” “Willing enough should I be,” replied Agesilaus, “were I not persuaded that you are cheating me.” “Nay, but it is open to you,” replied the satrap, “to exact a surety for the execution of the terms... ‘Provided always that you, Tissaphernes, carry out what you say without deceit, we on our side will abstain from injuring your dominion in any respect whatever during the truce.’” (7) Accordingly in the presence of three commissioners — Herippidas, Dercylidas, and Megillus — Tissaphernes took an oath in the words prescribed: “Verily and indeed, I will effect peace honestly and without guile.” To which the commissioners, on behalf of Agesilaus, swore a counter-oath: “Verily and indeed, provided Tissaphernes so acts, we on our side will observe the truce.”

(7) For this corrupt passage, see Hartman, “Anal. Xen.” p. 332; also Otto Keller’s critical edition of the “Hellenica” (Lips, MDCCCLXXX.)

Tissaphernes at once gave the lie to what he had sworn. Instead of adhering to peace he sent up to demand a large

army from the king, in addition to what he already had. But Agesilaus, though he was fully alive to these proceedings, adhered as rigidly as ever to the truce.

To keep quiet and enjoy leisure was his duty, in the exercise of which he wore away the time at Ephesus. But in reference to the organisation of the several states it was a season of vehement constitutional disturbance in the several cities; that is to say, there were neither democracies as in the old days of the Athenians, nor yet were there decarchies as in the days of Lysander. But here was Lysander back again. Every one recognised him, and flocked to him with petitions for one favour or another, which he was to obtain for them from Agesilaus. A crowd of suitors danced attendance on his heels, and formed so conspicuous a retinue that Agesilaus, any one would have supposed, was the private person and Lysander the king. All this was maddening to Agesilaus, as was presently plain. As to the rest of the Thirty, jealousy did not suffer them to keep silence, and they put it plainly to Agesilaus that the super-regal splendour in which Lysander lived was a violation of the constitution. So when Lysander took upon himself to introduce some of his petitioners to Agesilaus, the latter turned them a deaf ear. Their being aided and abetted by Lysander was sufficient; he sent them away discomfited. At length, as time after time things turned out contrary to his wishes, Lysander himself perceived the position of affairs. He now no longer suffered that crowd to follow him, and gave those who asked him help in anything plainly to understand that they would gain nothing, but rather be losers, by his intervention. But being bitterly annoyed at the degradation put upon him, he came to the king and said to him: “Ah, Agesilaus, how well you know the art of humbling your friends!” “Ay, indeed,” the king replied; “those of them whose one idea it is to appear greater than myself; if I did not know how also to requite with honour those who work for

my good, I should be ashamed." And Lysander said: "maybe there is more reason in your doings than ever guided my conduct;" adding, "Grant me for the rest one favour, so shall I cease to blush at the loss of my influence with you, and you will cease to be embarrassed by my presence. Send me off on a mission somewhere; wherever I am I will strive to be of service to you." Such was the proposal of Lysander. Agesilaus resolved to act upon it, and despatched Lysander to the Hellespont. And this is what befell. (8) Lysander, being made aware of a slight which had been put upon Spithridates the Persian by Pharnabazus, got into conversation with the injured man, and so worked upon him that he was persuaded to bring his children and his personal belongings, and with a couple of hundred troops to revolt. The next step was to deposit all the goods safely in Cyzicus, and the last to get on shipboard with Spithridates and his son, and so to present himself with his Persian friends to Agesilaus. Agesilaus, on his side, was delighted at the transaction, and set himself at once to get information about Pharnabazus, his territory and his government.

(8) See "Ages." iii. 3; "Anab." VI. v. 7.

Meanwhile Tissaphernes had waxed bolder. A large body of troops had been sent down by the king. On the strength of that he declared war against Agesilaus, if he did not instantly withdraw his troops from Asia. The Lacedaemonians there (9) present, no less than the allies, received the news with profound vexation, persuaded as they were that Agesilaus had no force capable of competing with the king's grand armament. But a smile lit up the face of Agesilaus as he bade the ambassadors return to Tissaphernes and tell him that he was much in his debt for the perjury by which he had won the enmity of Heaven and made the very gods themselves allies of Hellas. He at once issued a general order to the troops to equip themselves for a forward movement. He warned the cities through which he

must pass in an advance upon Caria, to have markets in readiness, and lastly, he despatched a message to the Ionian, Aeolian, and Hellespontine communities to send their contingents to join him at Ephesus.

(9) I.e. at Ephesus.

Tissaphernes, putting together the facts that Agesilaus had no cavalry and that Caria was a region unadapted to that arm, and persuaded in his own mind also that the Spartan could not but cherish wrath against himself personally for his chicanery, felt convinced that he was really intending to invade Caria, and that the satrap’s palace was his final goal. Accordingly he transferred the whole of his infantry to that province, and proceeded to lead his cavalry round into the plain of the Maeander. Here he conceived himself capable of trampling the Hellenes under foot with his horsemen before they could reach the craggy districts where no cavalry could operate.

But, instead of marching straight into Caria, Agesilaus turned sharp off in the opposite direction towards Phrygia. Picking up various detachments of troops which met him on his march, he steadily advanced, laying cities prostrate before him, and by the unexpectedness of his attack reaping a golden harvest of spoil. As a rule the march was prosecuted safely; but not far from Dascylium his advanced guard of cavalry were pushing on towards a knoll to take a survey of the state of things in front, when, as chance would have it, a detachment of cavalry sent forward by Pharnabazus — the corps, in fact, of Rhathines and his natural brother Bagaeus — just about equal to the Hellenes in number, also came galloping up to the very knoll in question. The two bodies found themselves face to face not one hundred and fifty yards (10) apart, and for the first moment or two stood stock still. The Hellenic horse were drawn up like an ordinary phalanx four deep, the barbarians presenting a narrow front of twelve or thereabouts, and a

very disproportionate depth. There was a moment’s pause, and then the barbarians, taking the initiative, charged. There was a hand-to-hand tussle, in which any Hellene who succeeded in striking his man shivered his lance with the blow, while the Persian troopers, armed with cornel-wood javelins, speedily despatched a dozen men and a couple of horses. (11) At this point the Hellenic cavalry turned and fled. But as Agesilaus came up to the rescue with his heavy infantry, the Asiatics were forced in their turn to withdraw, with the loss of one man slain. This cavalry engagement gave them pause. Agesilaus on the day following it offered sacrifice. “Was he to continue his advance?” But the victims proved hopeless. (12) There was nothing for it after this manifestation but to turn and march towards the sea. It was clear enough to his mind that without a proper cavalry force it would be impossible to conduct a campaign in the flat country. Cavalry, therefore, he must get, or be driven to mere guerilla warfare. With this view he drew up a list of all the wealthiest inhabitants belonging to the several cities of those parts. Their duty would be to support a body of cavalry, with the proviso, however, that any one contributing a horse, arms, and rider, up to the standard, would be exempted from personal service. The effect was instantaneous. The zeal with which the recipients of these orders responded could hardly have been greater if they had been seeking substitutes to die for them.

(10) Lit. “four plethra.”

(11) See Xenophon’s treatise “On Horsemanship,” xii. 12.

(12) Lit. “lobeless,” i.e. with a lobe of the liver wanting — a bad sign.

B.C. 395. After this, at the first indication of spring, he collected the whole of his army at Ephesus. But the army needed training. With that object he proposed a series of prizes — prizes to the heavy infantry regiments, to be won by those who presented their men in the best condition; prizes for the cavalry regiments which could ride best; prizes for those divisions of peltasts and archers which proved

most efficient in their respective duties. And now the gymnasiums were a sight to see, thronged as they were, one and all, with warriors stripping for exercise; or again, the hippodrome crowded with horses and riders performing their evolutions; or the javelin men and archers going through their peculiar drill. In fact, the whole city where he lay presented under his hands a spectacle not to be forgotten. The market-place literally teemed with horses, arms, and accoutrements of all sorts for sale. The bronze-worker, the carpenter, the smith, the leather-cutter, the painter and embosser, were all busily engaged in fabricating the implements of war; so that the city of Ephesus itself was fairly converted into a military workshop. (13) It would have done a man's heart good to see those long lines of soldiers with Agesilaus at their head, as they stepped gaily be-garlanded from the gymnasiums to dedicate their wreaths to the goddess Artemis. Nor can I well conceive of elements more fraught with hope than were here combined. Here were reverence and piety towards Heaven; here practice in war and military training; here discipline with habitual obedience to authority. But contempt for one's enemy will infuse a kind of strength in battle. So the Spartan leader argued; and with a view to its production he ordered the quartermasters to put up the prisoners who had been captured by his foraging bands for auction, stripped naked; so that his Hellenic soldiery, as they looked at the white skins which had never been bared to sun and wind, the soft limbs unused to toil through constant riding in carriages, came to the conclusion that war with such adversaries would differ little from a fight with women.

(13) See Plut. "Marc." (Clough, ii. 262); Polyb. "Hist." x. 20.

By this date a full year had elapsed since the embarkation of Agesilaus, and the time had come for the Thirty with Lysander to sail back home, and for their successors, with Herippidas, to arrive. Among these Agesilaus appointed

Xenocles and another to the command of the cavalry, Scythes to that of the heavy infantry of the enfranchised, (14) Herippidas to that of the Cyreians, and Migdon to that of the contingents from the states. Agesilaus gave them to understand that he intended to lead them forthwith by the most expeditious route against the stronghold of the country, (15) so that without further ceremony they might prepare their minds and bodies for the tug of battle. Tissaphernes, however, was firmly persuaded that this was only talk intended to deceive him; Agesilaus would this time certainly invade Caria. Accordingly he repeated his former tactics, transporting his infantry bodily into Caria and posting his cavalry in the valley of the Maeander. But Agesilaus was as good as his word, and at once invaded the district of Sardis. A three days' march through a region denuded of the enemy threw large supplies into his hands. On the fourth day the cavalry of the enemy approached. Their general ordered the officer in charge of his baggage-train to cross the Pactolus and encamp, while his troopers, catching sight of stragglers from the Hellenic force scattered in pursuit of booty, put several of them to the sword. Perceiving which, Agesilaus ordered his cavalry to the rescue; and the Persians on their side, seeing their advance, collected together in battle order to receive them, with dense squadrons of horse, troop upon troop. The Spartan, reflecting that the enemy had as yet no infantry to support him, whilst he had all branches of the service to depend upon, concluded that the critical moment had arrived at which to risk an engagement. In this mood he sacrificed, and began advancing his main line of battle against the serried lines of cavalry in front of him, at the same time ordering the flower of his heavy infantry — the ten-years-service men (16) — to close with them at a run, and the peltasts to bring up their supports at the double. The order passed to his cavalry was to charge in confidence that he and the whole body of his troops were close behind them. The cavalry

charge was received by the Persians without flinching, but presently finding themselves environed by the full tide of war they swerved. Some found a speedy grave within the river, but the mass of them gradually made good their escape. The Hellenes followed close on the heels of the flying foe and captured his camp. here the peltasts not unnaturally fell to pillaging; whereupon Agesilaus planted his troops so as to form a cordon enclosing the property of friends and foes alike. The spoil taken was considerable; it fetched more than seventy talents, (17) not to mention the famous camels, subsequently brought over by Agesilaus into Hellas, which were captured here. At the moment of the battle Tissaphernes lay in Sardis. Hence the Persians argued that they had been betrayed by the satrap. And the king of Persia, coming to a like conclusion himself that Tissaphernes was to blame for the evil turn of his affairs, sent down Tithraustes and beheaded him. (18)

(14) The neodamodes.

(15) I.e. Lydia. See Plut. "Ages." x. (Clough, iv. 11).

(16) See note to "Hell." II. iv. 32.

(17) = 17,062 pounds: 10 shillings.

(18) See Diod. xiv. 80.

This done, Tithraustes sent an embassy to Agesilaus with a message as follows: "The author of all our trouble, yours and ours, Agesilaus, has paid the penalty of his misdoings; the king therefore asks of you first that you should sail back home in peace; secondly, that the cities in Asia secured in their autonomy should continue to render him the ancient tribute." To this proposition Agesilaus made answer that "without the authorities at home he could do nothing in the matter." "Then do you, at least," replied Tithraustes, "while awaiting advice from Lacedaemon, withdraw into the territory of Pharnabazus. Have I not avenged you of your enemy?" "While, then, I am on my way thither," rejoined Agesilaus, "will you support my army with provisions?" On this wise Tithraustes handed him thirty talents, (19) which

the other took, and forthwith began his march into Phrygia (the Phrygia of Pharnabazus). He lay in the plain district above Cyme, (20) when a message reached him from the home authorities, giving him absolute disposal of the naval forces, (21) with the right to appoint the admiral of his choice. This course the Lacedaemonians were led to adopt by the following considerations: If, they argued, the same man were in command of both services, the land force would be greatly strengthened through the concentration of the double force at any point necessary; and the navy likewise would be far more useful through the immediate presence and co-operation of the land force where needed. Apprised of these measures, Agesilaus in the first instance sent an order to the cities on the islands and the seaboard to fit out as many ships of war as they severally might deem desirable. The result was a new navy, consisting of the vessels thus voluntarily furnished by the states, with others presented by private persons out of courtesy to their commander, and amounting in all to a fleet of one hundred and twenty sail. The admiral whom he selected was Peisander, his wife's brother, a man of genuine ambition and of a vigorous spirit, but not sufficiently expert in the details of equipment to achieve a great naval success. Thus while Peisander set off to attend to naval matters, Agesilaus continued his march whither he was bound to Phrygia.

(19) = 7,312 pounds: 10 shillings.

(20) See "Cyrop." VII. i. 45.

(21) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 327, note 3; Arist. "Pol." ii. 9, 33.

V

But now Tithraustes seemed to have discovered in Agesilaus a disposition to despise the fortunes of the Persian monarch — he evidently had no intention to withdraw from Asia; on the contrary, he was cherishing hopes vast enough to include the capture of the king himself. Being at his wits' end how to manage matters, he resolved to send Timocrates

the Rhodian to Hellas with a gift of gold worthy fifty silver talents, (1) and enjoined upon him to endeavour to exchange solemn pledges with the leading men in the several states, binding them to undertake a war against Lacedaemon. Timocrates arrived and began to dole out his presents. In Thebes he gave gifts to Androcleidas, Ismenias, and Galaxidorus; in Corinth to Timolaus and Polyanthes; in Argos to Cylon and his party. The Athenians, (2) though they took no share of the gold, were none the less eager for the war, being of opinion that empire was theirs by right. (3) The recipients of the moneys forthwith began covertly to attack the Lacedaemonians in their respective states, and, when they had brought these to a sufficient pitch of hatred, bound together the most important of them in a confederacy.

(1) = 12,187 pounds: 10 shillings.

(2) See Paus. III. ix. 8; Plut. "Ages." xv.

(3) Reading {nomizontes auton to arkhein} with Sauppe; or if, as Breitinbach suggests, {enomizon de oukh outon to arkhesthai}, translate "but thought it was not for them to take the initiative."

But it was clear to the leaders in Thebes that, unless some one struck the first blow, the Lacedaemonians would never be brought to break the truce with their allies. They therefore persuaded the Opuntian Locrians (4) to levy moneys on a debatable district, (5) jointly claimed by the Phocians and themselves, when the Phocians would be sure to retaliate by an attack on Locris. These expectations were fulfilled. The Phocians immediately invaded Locris and seized moneys on their side with ample interest. Then Androcleidas and his friends lost no time in persuading the Thebans to assist the Locrians, on the ground that it was no debatable district which had been entered by the Phocians, but the admittedly friendly and allied territory of Locris itself. The counter-invasion of Phocis and pillage of their country by the Thebans promptly induced the Phocians to send an embassy to Lacedaemon. In claiming assistance they explained that the war was not of their own seeking, but that they had attacked the Locrians in self-defence. On their side the Lacedaemonians were glad enough to seize a

pretext for marching upon the Thebans, against whom they cherished a long-standing bitterness. They had not forgotten the claim which the Thebans had set up to a tithe for Apollo in Deceleia, (6) nor yet their refusal to support Lacedaemon in the attack on Piraeus; (7) and they accused them further of having persuaded the Corinthians not to join that expedition. Nor did they fail to call to mind some later proceedings of the Thebans — their refusal to allow Agesilaus to sacrifice in Aulis; (8) their snatching the victims already offered and hurling them from the altars; their refusal to join the same general in a campaign directed even against Asia. (9) The Lacedaemonians further reasoned that now, if ever, was the favourable moment to conduct an expedition against the Thebans, and once for all to put a stop to their insolent behaviour towards them. Affairs in Asia were prospering under the strong arm of Agesilaus, and in Hellas they had no other war on hand to trammel their movements. Such, therefore, being the general view of the situation adopted at Lacedaemon, the ephors proceeded to call out the ban. Meanwhile they despatched Lysander to Phocis with orders to put himself at the head of the Phocians along with the Oetaeans, Heracleotes, Melians, and Aenianians, and to march upon Haliartus; before the walls of which place Pausanias, the destined leader of the expedition, undertook to present himself at the head of the Lacedaemonians and other Peloponnesian forces by a specified date. Lysander not only carried out his instructions to the letter, but going a little beyond them, succeeded in detaching Orchomenus from Thebes. (10) Pausanias, on the other hand, after finding the sacrifice for crossing the frontier favourable, sat down at Tegea and set about despatching to and fro the commandants of allied troops whilst contentedly awaiting the soldiers from the provincial (11) districts of Laconia.

(4) For an alliance between Athens and the Locrians, B.C. 395, see Hicks, 67; and below, IV. ii. 17.

(5) Lit. “the.” See Paus. III. ix. 9.

(6) See Grote, “H. G.” ix. 309, 403; viii. 355.

(7) “Hell.” II. iv. 30, B.C. 403.

(8) See above, III. iv. 3; and below, VII. i. 34.

(9) See Paus. III. ix. 1-3.

(10) See Freeman, op. cit. p. 167, “Ill feeling between Thebes and other towns.”— “Against Thebes, backed by Sparta, resistance was hopeless. It was not till long after that, at last (in 395 B.C.), on a favourable opportunity during the Corinthian war, Orchomenos openly seceded.” And for the prior “state of disaffection towards Thebes on the part of the smaller cities,” see “Mem.” III. v. 2, in reference to B.C. 407.

(11) Lit. “perioecid.”

And now that it was fully plain to the Thebans that the Lacedaemonians would invade their territory, they sent ambassadors to Athens, who spoke as follows: —

“Men of Athens, it is a mistake on your part to blame us for certain harsh resolutions concerning Athens at the conclusion of the war. (12) That vote was not authorised by the state of Thebes. It was the utterance merely of one man, (13) who was at that time seated in the congress of the allies. A more important fact is that when the Lacedaemonians summoned us to attack Piraeus (14) the collective state of Thebes passed a resolution refusing to join in the campaign. As then you are to a large extent the cause of the resentment which the Lacedaemonians feel towards us, we consider it only fair that you in your turn should render us assistance. Still more do we demand of you, sirs, who were of the city party at that date, to enter heart and soul into war with the Lacedaemonians. For what were their services to you? They first deliberately converted you into an oligarchy and placed you in hostility to the democracy, and then they came with a great force under guise of being your allies, and delivered you over to the majority, so that, for any service they rendered you, you were all dead men; and you owe your lives to our friends here, the people of Athens. (15)

(12) See “Hell.” II. ii. 19; and below, VI. v. 35.

(13) Plut. “Lys.” xv. “Erianthus the Theban gave his vote to pull down the city, and turn the country into sheep-pasture.” — Clough, iii. 121.

(14) See “Hell.” II. iv. 30.

(15) See “Hell.” II. iv. 38, 40, 41.

“But to pass on — we all know, men of Athens, that you would like to recover the empire which you formerly possessed; and how can you compass your object better

than by coming to the aid yourselves of the victims of Lacedaemonian injustice? Is it their wide empire of which you are afraid? Let not that make cowards of you — much rather let it embolden you as you lay to heart and ponder your own case. When your empire was widest then the crop of your enemies was thickest. Only so long as they found no opportunity to revolt did they keep their hatred of you dark; but no sooner had they found a champion in Lacedaemon than they at once showed what they really felt towards you. So too to-day. Let us show plainly that we mean to stand shoulder to shoulder (16) embattled against the Lacedaemonians; and haters enough of them — whole armies — never fear, will be forthcoming. To prove the truth of this assertion you need only to count upon your fingers. How many friends have they left to them to-day? The Argives have been, are, and ever will be, hostile to them. Of course. But the Eleians? Why, the Eleians have quite lately (17) been robbed of so much territory and so many cities that their friendship is converted into hatred. And what shall we say of the Corinthians? the Arcadians? the Achaeans? In the war which Sparta waged against you, there was no toil, no danger, no expense, which those peoples did not share, in obedience to the dulcet coaxings (18) and persuasions of that power. The Lacedaemonians gained what they wanted, and then not one fractional portion of empire, honour, or wealth did these faithful followers come in for. That is not all. They have no scruple in appointing their helots (19) as governors, and on the free necks of their alies, in the day of their good fortune, they have planted the tyrant’s heel.

(16) Lit. “shield to shield.”

(17) Lit. “to-day,” “nowadays.”

(18) {mala liparoumenoi}. See Thuc. i. 66 foll.; vi. 88.

(19) See “Pol. Lac.” xiv.

“Then again take the case of those whom they have detached from yourselves. In the most patent way they have cajoled and cheated them; in place of freedom they have

presented them with a twofold slavery. The allies are tyrannised over by the governor and tyrannised over by the ten commissioners set up by Lysander over every city. (20) And to come lastly to the great king. In spite of all the enormous contributions with which he aided them to gain a mastery over you, is the lord of Asia one whit better off to-day than if he had taken exactly the opposite course and joined you in reducing them?

(20) Grote ("H. G." ix. 323), referring to this passage, and to "Hell." Vl. iii. 8-11, notes the change in Spartan habits between 405 and 394 B.C. (i.e. between the victory of Aegospotami and the defeat of Cnidos), when Sparta possessed a large public revenue derived from the tribute of the dependent cities. For her earlier condition, 432 B.C., cf. Thuc. i. 80. For her subsequent condition, 334 B.C., cf. Arist. "Pol." ii. 6, 23.

"Is it not clear that you have only to step forward once again as the champions of this crowd of sufferers from injustice, and you will attain to a pinnacle of power quite unprecedented? In the days of your old empire you were leaders of the maritime powers merely — that is clear; but your new empire to-day will be universal. You will have at your backs not only your former subjects, but ourselves, and the Peloponnesians, and the king himself, with all that mighty power which is his. We do not deny that we were serviceable allies enough to Lacedaemon, as you will bear us witness; but this we say: — If we helped the Lacedaemonians vigorously in the past, everything tends to show that we shall help you still more vigorously to-day; for our swords will be unsheathed, not in behalf of islanders, or Syracusans, or men of alien stock, as happened in the late war, but of ourselves, suffering under a sense of wrong. And there is another important fact which you ought to realise: this selfish system of organised greed which is Sparta's will fall more readily to pieces than your own late empire. Yours was the proud assertion of naval empire over subjects powerless by sea. Theirs is the selfish sway of a minority asserting dominion over states equally well armed with themselves, and many times more numerous. Here our remarks end. Do not forget, however, men of Athens, that as far as we can understand the matter, the field to which we

invite you is destined to prove far richer in blessings to your own state of Athens than to ours, Thebes."

With these words the speaker ended. Among the Athenians, speaker after speaker spoke in favour of the proposition, (21) and finally a unanimous resolution was passed voting assistance to the Thebans. Thrasybulus, in an answer communicating the resolution, pointed out with pride that in spite of the unfortified condition of Piraeus, Athens would not shrink from repaying her former debt of gratitude to Thebes with interest. "You," he added, "refused to join in a campaign against us; we are prepared to fight your battles with you against the enemy, if he attacks you." Thus the Thebans returned home and made preparations to defend themselves, whilst the Athenians made ready to assist them.

(21) For the alliance between Boeotia and Athens, B.C. 395, see Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 6; Hicks, op. cit. 65; Lys. "pro Man." S. 13; Jebb, "Att. Or." i. p. 247; and the two speeches of the same orator Lysias against Alcibiades (son of the famous Alcibiades), on a Charge of Desertion ("Or." xiv.), and on a Charge of Failure to Serve ("Or." xv.) — Jebb, op. cit. i. p. 256 foll.

And now the Lacedaemonians no longer hesitated. Pausanias the king advanced into Boeotia with the home army and the whole of the Peloponnesian contingents, saving only the Corinthians, who declined to serve. Lysander, at the head of the army supplied by Phocis and Orchomenus and the other strong places in those parts, had already reached Haliartus, in front of Pausanias. Being arrived, he refused to sit down quietly and await the arrival of the army from Lacedaemon, but at once marched with what troops he had against the walls of Haliartus; and in the first instance he tried to persuade the citizens to detach themselves from Thebes and to assume autonomy, but the intention was cut short by certain Thebans within the fortress. Whereupon Lysander attacked the place. The Thebans were made aware, (22) and hurried to the rescue with heavy infantry and cavalry. Then, whether it was that the army of relief fell upon Lysander unawares, or that with clear knowledge of his approach he preferred to await the

enemy, with intent to crush him, is uncertain. This only is clear: a battle was fought beside the walls, and a trophy still exists to mark the victory of the townsfolk before the gates of Haliartus. Lysander was slain, and the rest fled to the mountains, the Thebans hotly pursuing. But when the pursuit had led them to some considerable height, and they were fairly environed and hemmed in by difficult ground and narrow space, then the heavy infantry turned to bay, and greeted them with a shower of darts and missiles. First two or three men dropped who had been foremost of the pursuers, and then upon the rest they poured volleys of stones down the precipitous incline, and pressed on their late pursuers with much zeal, until the Thebans turned tail and quitted the deadly slope, leaving behind them more than a couple of hundred corpses.

(22) See Plut. “Lys.” xxviii. (Clough, iii. 137).

On this day, thereafter, the hearts of the Thebans failed them as they counted their losses and found them equal to their gains; but the next day they discovered that during the night the Phocians and the rest of them had made off to their several homes, whereupon they fell to pluming themselves highly on their achievement. But presently Pausanias appeared at the head of the Lacedaemonian army, and once more their dangers seemed to thicken round them. Deep, we are told, was the silence and abasement which reigned in their host. It was not until the third day, when the Athenians arrived (23) and were duely drawn up beside them, whilst Pausanias neither attacked nor offered battle, that at length the confidence of the Thebans took a larger range. Pausanias, on his side, having summoned his generals and commanders of fifties, (24) deliberated whether to give battle or to content himself with picking up the bodies of Lysander and those who fell with him, under cover of a truce.

(23) See Dem. “On the Crown,” 258.

(24) Lit. “polemarchs and penteconters”— “colonels and lieutenants.” See “Pol. Lac.” xi.

The considerations which weighed upon the minds of Pausanias and the other high officers of the Lacedaemonians seem to have been that Lysander was dead and his defeated army in retreat; while, as far as they themselves were concerned, the Corinthian contingent was absolutely wanting, and the zeal of the troops there present at the lowest ebb. They further reasoned that the enemy’s cavalry was numerous and theirs the reverse; whilst, weightiest of all, there lay the dead right under the walls, so that if they had been ever so much stronger it would have been no easy task to pick up the bodies within range of the towers of Haliartus. On all these grounds they determined to ask for a flag of truce, in order to pick up the bodies of the slain. These, however, the Thebans were not disposed to give back unless they agreed to retire from their territory. The terms were gladly accepted by the Lacedaemonians, who at once picked up the corpses of the slain, and prepared to quit the territory of Boeotia. The preliminaries were transacted, and the retreat commenced. Despondent indeed was the demeanour of the Lacedaemonians, in contrast with the insolent bearing of the Thebans, who visited the slightest attempt to trespass on their private estates with blows and chased the offenders back on to the high roads unflinchingly. Such was the conclusion of the campaign of the Lacedaemonians.

As for Pausanias, on his arrival at home he was tried on the capital charge. The heads of indictment set forth that he had failed to reach Haliartus as soon as Lysander, in spite of his undertaking to be there on the same day: that, instead of using any endeavour to pick up the bodies of the slain by force of arms, he had asked for a flag of truce: that at an earlier date, when he had got the popular government of Athens fairly in his grip at Piraeus, he had suffered it to slip through his fingers and escape. Besides this, (25) he failed to present himself at the trial, and a sentence of death was

passed upon him. He escaped to Tegea and there died of an illness whilst still in exile. Thus closes the chapter of events enacted on the soil of Hellas. To return to Asia and Agesilaus.

(25) Or, add, “as a further gravamen.”

BOOK IV

I

B.C. 395. With the fall of the year Agesilaus reached Phrygia — the Phrygia of Pharnabazus — and proceeded to burn and harry the district. City after city was taken, some by force and some by voluntary surrender. To a proposal of Spithridates to lead him into Paphlagonia, (1) where he would introduce the king of the country to him in conference and obtain his alliance, he readily acceded. It was a long-cherished ambition of Agesilaus to alienate some one of the subject nations from the Persian monarch, and he pushed forward eagerly.

(1) See Hartman ("An. Xen." p. 339), who suggests {Otun auto} for {sun auto}.

On his arrival in Paphlagonia, King Otys (2) came, and an alliance was made. (The fact was, he had been summoned by the king to Susa and had not gone up.) More than that, through the persuasion of Spithridates he left behind as a parting gift to Agesilaus one thousand cavalry and a couple of thousand peltasts. Agesilaus was anxious in some way to show his gratitude to Spithridates for such help, and spoke as follows:— "Tell me," he said to Spithridates, "would you not like to give your daughter to King Otys?" "Much more would I like to give her," he answered, "than he to take her — I an outcast wanderer, and he lord of a vast territory and forces." Nothing more was said at the time about the marriage; but when Otys was on the point of departure and came to bid farewell, Agesilaus, having taken care that Spithridates should be out of the way, in the presence of the Thirty broached the subject: (3) "Can you tell me, Otys, to what sort of family Spithridates belongs?" "To one of the noblest in Persia," replied the king. Agesilaus: "Have you observed how beautiful his son is?" Otys: "To be sure; last evening I was supping with him." Agesilaus: "And they tell

me his daughter is yet more beautiful." Otys: "That may well be; beautiful she is." Agesilaus: "For my part, as you have proved so good a friend to us, I should like to advise you to take this girl to wife. Not only is she very beautiful — and what more should a husband ask for? — but her father is of noble family, and has a force at his back large enough to retaliate on Pharnabazus for an injury. He has made the satrap, as you see, a fugitive and a vagabond in his own vast territory. I need not tell you," he added, "that a man who can so chastise an enemy is well able to benefit a friend; and of this be assured: by such an alliance you will gain not the connection of Spithridates alone, but of myself and the Lacedaemonians, and, as we are the leaders of Hellas, of the rest of Hellas also. And what a wedding yours will be! Were ever nuptials celebrated on so grand a scale before? Was ever bride led home by such an escort of cavalry and light-armed troops and heavy infantry, as shall escort your wife home to your palace?" Otys asked: "Is Spithridates of one mind with you in this proposal?" and Agesilaus answered: "In good sooth he did not bid me make it for him. And for my own part in the matter, though it is, I admit, a rare pleasure to requite an enemy, yet I had far rather at any time discover some good fortune for my friends." Otys: "Why not ask if your project pleases Spithridates too?" Then Agesilaus, turning to Herippidas and the rest of the Thirty, bade them go to Spithridates; "and give him such good instruction," he added, "that he shall wish what we wish." The Thirty rose and retired to administer their lesson. But they seemed to tarry a long time, and Agesilaus asked: "What say you, King Otys — shall we summon him hither ourselves? You, I feel certain, are better able to persuade him than the whole Thirty put together." Thereupon Agesilaus summoned Spithridates and the others. As they came forward, Herippidas promptly delivered himself thus: "I spare you the details, Agesilaus. To make a long story short, Spithridates says, 'He will be glad to do whatever pleases

you.’” Then Agesilaus, turning first to one and then to the other: “What pleases me,” said he, “is that you should wed a daughter — and you a wife — so happily. (4) But,” he added, “I do not see how we can well bring home the bride by land till spring.” “No, not by land,” the suitor answered, “but you might, if you chose, conduct her home at once by sea.” Thereupon they exchanged pledges to ratify the compact; and so sent Otys rejoicing on his way.

(2) See “Ages.” iii. 4, where he is called Cotys.

(3) I.e. “Spartan counsellors.”

(4) Or, “and may the wedding be blest!”

Agesilaus, who had not failed to note the king’s impatience, at once fitted out a ship of war and gave orders to Callias, a Lacedaemonian, to escort the maiden to her new home; after which he himself began his march on Dascylium. Here was the palace of Pharnabazus. It lay in the midst of abundant supplies. Here, too, were most fair hunting grounds, offering the hunter choice between enclosed parks (5) and a wide expanse of field and fell; and all around there flowed a river full of fish of every sort; and for the sportsman versed in fowling, winged game in abundance.

(5) Lit. “paradises.” See “Anab.” I. ii. 7; “Cyrop.” I. iv. 11.

In these quarters the Spartan king passed the winter, collecting supplies for the army either on the spot or by a system of forage. On one of these occasions the troops, who had grown reckless and scornful of the enemy through long immunity from attack, whilst engaged in collecting supplies were scattered over the flat country, when Pharnabazus fell upon them with two scythe-chariots and about four hundred horse. Seeing him thus advancing, the Hellenes ran together, mustering possibly seven hundred men. The Persian did not hesitate, but placing his chariots in front, supported by himself and the cavalry, he gave the command to charge. The scythe-chariots charged and scattered the compact mass, and speedily the cavalry had laid low in the

dust about a hundred men, while the rest retreated hastily, under cover of Agesilaus and his hoplites, who were fortunately near.

It was the third or fourth day after this that Spithridates made a discovery: Pharnabazus lay encamped in Caue, a large village not more than eighteen miles (6) away. This news he lost no time in reporting to Herippidas. The latter, who was longing for some brilliant exploit, begged Agesilaus to furnish him with two thousand hoplites, an equal number of peltasts, and some cavalry — the latter to consist of the horsemen of Spithridates, the Paphlagonians, and as many Hellene troopers as he might perchance persuade to follow him. Having got the promise of them from Agesilaus, he proceeded to take the auspices. Towards late afternoon he obtained favourable omens and broke off the sacrifice. Thereupon he ordered the troops to get their evening meal, after which they were to present themselves in front of the camp. But by the time darkness had closed in, not one half of them had come out. To abandon the project was to call down the ridicule of the rest of the Thirty. So he set out with the force to hand, and about daylight, falling on the camp of Pharnabazus, put many of his advanced guard of Mysians to the sword. The men themselves made good their escape in different directions, but the camp was taken, and with it divers goblets and other gear such as a man like Pharnabazus would have, not to speak of much baggage and many baggage animals. It was the dread of being surrounded and besieged, if he should establish himself for long at any one spot, which induced Pharnabazus to flee in gipsy fashion from point to point over the country, carefully obliterating his encampments. Now as the Paphlagonians and Spithridates brought back the captured property, they were met by Herippidas with his brigadiers and captains, who stopped them and (7) relieved them of all they had; the object being to have as large a list as possible of captures to

deliver over to the officers who superintended the sale of booty. (8) This treatment the Asiatics found intolerable. They deemed themselves at once injured and insulted, got their kit together in the night, and made off in the direction of Sardis to join Ariaeus without mistrust, seeing that he too had revolted and gone to war with the king. On Agesilaus himself no heavier blow fell during the whole campaign than the desertion of Spithridates and Megabates and the Paphlagonians.

(6) Lit. “one hundred and sixty stades.”

(7) Or, “captains posted to intercept them, who relieved…” See “Anab.” IV. i. 14.

(8) See “Pol. Lac.” xiii. 11, for these officers.

Now there was a certain man of Cyzicus, Apollophanes by name; he was an old friend of Pharnabazus, and at this time had become a friend also of Agesilaus. (9) This man informed Agesilaus that he thought he could bring about a meeting between him and Pharnabazus, which might tend to friendship; and having so got ear of him, he obtained pledges of good faith between his two friends, and presented himself with Pharnabazus at the trysting-place, where Agesilaus with the Thirty around him awaited their coming, reclined upon a grassy sward. Pharnabazus presently arrived clad in costliest apparel; but just as his attendants were about to spread at his feet the carpets on which the Persians delicately seat themselves, he was touched with a sense of shame at his own luxury in sight of the simplicity of Agesilaus, and he also without further ceremony seated himself on the bare ground. And first the two bade one another hail, and then Pharnabazus stretched out his right hand and Agesilaus his to meet him, and the conversation began. Pharnabazus, as the elder of the two, spoke first. “Agesilaus,” he said, “and all you Lacedaemonians here present, while you were at war with the Athenians I was your friend and ally; it was I who furnished the wealth that made your navy strong on sea; on land I fought on horseback by your side, and pursued your

enemies into the sea. (10) As to duplicity like that of Tissaphernes, I challenge you to accuse me of having played you false by word or deed. Such have I ever been; and in return how am I treated by yourselves to-day? — in such sort that I cannot even sup in my own country unless, like the wild animals, I pick up the scraps you chance to leave. The beautiful palaces which my father left me as an heirloom, the parks (11) full of trees and beasts of the chase in which my heart rejoiced, lie before my eyes hacked to pieces, burnt to ashes. Maybe I do not comprehend the first principles of justice and holiness; do you then explain to me how all this resembles the conduct of men who know how to repay a simple debt of gratitude." He ceased, and the Thirty were ashamed before him and kept silence. (12)

(9) "Ages." v. 4; Plut. "Ages." xi. (Clough, iv. p. 14).

(10) See "Hell." I. i. 6.

(11) Lit. "paradises."

(12) Theopompus of Chios, the historian (b. B.C. 378, fl. B.C. 333), "in the eleventh book (of his {Suntazis Ellenikon}) borrowed Xenophon's lively account of the interview between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus (Apollonius apud Euseb. B, "Praep. Evang." p. 465)." See "Hist. Lit. of Anc. Gr.," Muller and Donaldson, ii. p. 380.

At length, after some pause, Agesilaus spoke. "I think you are aware," he said, "Pharnabazus, that within the states of Hellas the folk of one community contract relations of friendship and hospitality with one another; (13) but if these states should go to war, then each man will side with his fatherland, and friend will find himself pitted against friend in the field of battle, and, if it so betide, the one may even deal the other his death-blow. So too we to-day, being at war with your sovereign lord the king, must needs regard as our enemy all that he calls his; not but that with yourself personally we should esteem it our high fortune to be friends. If indeed it were merely an exchange of service — were you asked to give up your lord the king and to take us as your masters in his stead, I could not so advise you; but the fact is, by joining with us it is in your power to-day to bow your head to no man, to call no man master, to reap the produce of your own domain in freedom — freedom, which to

my mind is more precious than all riches. Not that we bid you to become a beggar for the sake of freedom, but rather to use our friendship to increase not the king’s authority, but your own, by subduing those who are your fellow-slaves to-day, and who to-morrow shall be your willing subjects. Well, then, freedom given and wealth added — what more would you desire to fill the cup of happiness to overflowing?” Pharnabazus replied: “Shall I tell you plainly what I will do?” “That were but kind and courteous on your part,” he answered. “Thus it stands with me, then,” said Pharnabazus. “If the king should send another general, and if he should wish to rank me under this new man’s orders, I, for my part, am willing to accept your friendship and alliance; but if he offers me the supreme command — why, then, I plainly tell you, there is a certain something in the very name ambition which whispers me that I shall war against you to the best of my ability.” (14) When he heard that, Agesilaus seized the satrap’s hand, exclaiming: “Ah, best of mortals, may the day arrive which sends us such a friend! Of one thing rest assured. This instant I leave your territory with what haste I may, and for the future — even in case of war — as long as we can find foes elsewhere our hands shall hold aloof from you and yours.”

(13) Or, add, “we call them guest friends.”

(14) Or, “so subtle a force, it seems, is the love of honour that.” Grote, “H. G.” ix. 386; cf. Herod. iii. 57 for “ambition,” {philotimia}.

And with these words he broke up the meeting. Pharnabazus mounted his horse and rode away, but his son by Parapita, who was still in the bloom of youth, lingered behind; then, running up to Agesilaus, he exclaimed: “See, I choose you as my friend.” “And I accept you,” replied the king. “Remember, then,” the lad answered, and with the word presented the beautiful javelin in his hand to Agesilaus, who received it, and unclasping a splendid trapping (15) which his secretary, Idaeus, had round the neck of his charger, he gave it in return to the youth; whereupon the boy leapt on his horse’s back and galloped

after his father. (16) At a later date, during the absence of Pharnabazus abroad, this same youth, the son of Parapita, was deprived of the government by his brother and driven into exile. Then Agesilaus took great interest in him, and as he had a strong attachment to the son of Eualces, an Athenian, Agesilaus did all he could to have this friend of his, who was the tallest of the boys, admitted to the two hundred yards race at Olympia.

(15) {phalara}, bosses of gold, silver, or other metals, cast or chased, with some appropriate device in relief, which were worn as an ornamental trapping for horses, affixed to the head-stall or to a throat-collar, or to a martingale over the chest. — Rich's "Companion to Lat. Dict. and Greek Lex.," s.v.

(16) See Grote, ix. 387; Plut. "Ages." xiv. (Clough, iv. 15); "Ages." iii. 5. The incident is idealised in the "Cyrop." I. iv. 26 foll. See "Lyra Heroica": CXXV. A Ballad of East and West — the incident of the "turquoise-studded rein."

B.C. 394. But to return to the actual moment. Agesilaus was as good as his word, and at once marched out of the territory of Pharnabazus. The season verged on spring. Reaching the plain of Thebe, (17) he encamped in the neighbourhood of the temple of Artemis of Astyra, (18) and there employed himself in collecting troops from every side, in addition to those which he already had, so as to form a complete armament. These preparations were pressed forward with a view to penetrating as far as possible into the interior. He was persuaded that every tribe or nation placed in his rear might be considered as alienated from the king.

(17) "Anab." VII. viii. 7.

(18) Vide Strab. xiii. 606, 613. Seventy stades from Thebe.

II

Such were the concerns and projects of Agesilaus. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians at home were quite alive to the fact that moneys had been sent into Hellas, and that the bigger states were leagued together to declare war against them. It was hard to avoid the conclusion that Sparta herself was in actual danger, and that a campaign was inevitable. While busy, therefore, with preparations themselves, they lost no time in despatching Epicydidas to fetch Agesilaus. That officer, on his arrival, explained the position of affairs,

and concluded by delivering a peremptory summons of the state recalling him to the assistance of the fatherland without delay. The announcement could not but come as a grievous blow to Agesilaus, as he reflected on the vanished hopes, and the honours plucked from his grasp. Still, he summoned the allies and announced to them the contents of the despatch from home. “To aid our fatherland,” he added, “is an imperative duty. If, however, matters turn out well on the other side, rely upon it, friends and allies, I will not forget you, but I shall be back anon to carry out your wishes.” When they heard the announcement many wept, and they passed a resolution, one and all, to assist Agesilaus in assisting Lacedaemon; if matters turned out well there, they undertook to take him as their leader and come back again to Asia; and so they fell to making preparations to follow him.

Agesilaus, on his side, determined to leave behind him in Asia Euxenus as governor, and with him a garrison numbering no less than four thousand troops, which would enable him to protect the states in Asia. But for himself, as on the one hand he could see that the majority of the soldiers would far rather stay behind than undertake service against fellow-Hellenes, and on the other hand he wished to take as fine and large an army with him as he could, he offered prizes first to that state or city which should continue the best corps of troops, and secondly to that captain of mercenaries who should join the expedition with the best equipped battalion of heavy infantry, archers, and light infantry. On the same principle he informed the chief cavalry officers that the general who succeeded in presenting the best accoutred and best mounted regiment would receive from himself some victorious distinction. “The final adjudication,” he said, “would not be made until they had crossed from Asia into Europe and had reached the Chersonese; and this with a view to impress upon them that

the prizes were not for show but for real campaigners.” (1) These consisted for the most part of infantry or cavalry arms and accoutrements tastefully furnished, besides which there were chaplets of gold. The whole, useful and ornamental alike, must have cost nearly a thousand pounds, (2) but as the result of this outlay, no doubt, arms of great value were procured for the expedition. (3) When the Hellespont was crossed the judges were appointed. The Lacedaemonians were represented by Menascus, Herippidas, and Orsippus, and the allies by one member from each state. As soon as the adjudication was complete, the army commenced its march with Agesilaus at its head, following the very route taken by the great king when he invaded Hellas.

(1) Or, “that the perfection of equipment was regarded as anticipative of actual service in the field.” Cobet suggests for {eukrinein} {dieukrinein}; cf. “Oecon.” viii. 6.

(2) Lit. “at least four talents” = 975 pounds.

(3) Or, “beyond which, the arms and material to equip the expedition were no doubt highly costly.”

Meanwhile the ephors had called out the ban, and as Agesipolis was still a boy, the state called upon Aristodemus, who was of the royal family and guardian of the young king, to lead the expedition; and now that the Lacedaemonians were ready to take the field and the forces of their opponents were duly mustered, the latter met (4) to consider the most advantageous method of doing battle.

(4) At Corinth. See above, III. iv. 11; below, V. iv. 61, where the victory of Nixos is described but not localised.

Timolaus of Corinth spoke: “Soldiers of the allied forces,” he said, “the growth of Lacedaemon seems to me just like that of some mighty river — at its sources small and easily crossed, but as it farther and farther advances, other rivers discharge themselves into its channel, and its stream grows ever more formidable. So is it with the Lacedaemonians. Take them at the starting-point and they are but a single community, but as they advance and attach city after city they grow more numerous and more resistless. I observe that when people wish to take wasps’ nests — if they try to capture the creatures on the wing, they are liable to be

attacked by half the hive; whereas, if they apply fire to them ere they leave their homes, they will master them without scathe themselves. On this principle I think it best to bring about the battle within the hive itself, or, short of that, as close to Lacedaemon as possible." (5)

(5) Or, "if not actually at Lacedaemon, then at least as near as possible to the hornet's nest."

The arguments of the speaker were deemed sound, and a resolution was passed in that sense; but before it could be carried out there were various arrangements to be made. There was the question of headship. Then, again, what was the proper depth of line to be given to the different army corps? for if any particular state or states gave too great a depth to their battle line they would enable the enemy to turn their flank. Whilst they were debating these points, the Lacedaemonians had incorporated the men of Tegea and the men of Mantinea, and were ready to debouch into the bimarine region. (6) And as the two armies advanced almost at the same time, the Corinthians and the rest reached the Nemea, (7) and the Lacedaemonians and their allies occupied Sicyon. The Lacedaemonians entered by Epieiceia, and at first were severely handled by the light-armed troops of the enemy, who discharged stones and arrows from the vantage-ground on their right; but as they dropped down upon the Gulf of Corinth they advanced steadily onwards through the flat country, felling timber and burning the fair land. Their rivals, on their side, after a certain forward movement, (8) paused and encamped, placing the ravine in front of them; but still the Lacedaemonians advanced, and it was only when they were within ten furlongs (9) of the hostile position that they followed suit and encamped, and then they remained quiet.

(6) I.e. "the shores of the Corinthian Gulf." Or, "upon the strand or coast road or coast land of Achaia" (aliter {ten aigialon} (?) the Strand of the Corinthian Gulf, the old name of this part of Achaia).

(7) Or, "the district of Nemea."

(8) {epelthontes}, but see Grote ("H. G." ix. 425 note), who prefers {apelthontes} = retreated and encamped.

(9) Lit. "ten stades." For the numbers below, see Grote, "H. G." ix. 422, note 1.

And here I may state the numbers on either side. The Lacedaemonian heavy-armed infantry levies amounted to six thousand men. Of Eleians, Triphylians, Acroreians, and Lasionians, there must have been nearly three thousand, with fifteen hundred Sicyonians, while Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and Halieis (10) contributed at least another three thousand. To these heavy infantry troops must be added six hundred Lacedaemonian cavalry, a body of Cretan archers about three hundred strong, besides another force of slingers, at least four hundred in all, consisting of Marganians, Letrinians, and Amphidolians. The men of Phlius were not represented. Their plea was they were keeping "holy truce." That was the total of the forces on the Lacedaemonian side. There was collected on the enemy's side six thousand Athenian heavy infantry, with about, as was stated, seven thousand Argives, and in the absence of the men of Orchomenus something like five thousand Boeotians. There were besides three thousand Corinthians, and again from the whole of Euboea at least three thousand. These formed the heavy infantry. Of cavalry the Boeotians, again in the absence of the Orchomenians, furnished eight hundred, the Athenians (11) six hundred, the Chalcidians of Euboea one hundred, the Opuntian Locrians (12) fifty. Their light troops, including those of the Corinthians, were more numerous, as the Ozolian Locrians, the Melians, and Arcarnanians (13) helped to swell their numbers.

(10) Halieis, a seafaring people (Strabo, viii. 373) and town on the coast of Hermionis; Herod. vii. 137; Thuc. i. 105, ii. 56, iv. 45; Diod. xi. 78; "Hell." VI. ii. 3.

(11) For a treaty between Athens and Eretria, B.C. 395, see Hicks, 66; and below, "Hell." IV. iii. 15; Hicks, 68, 69; Diod. xiv. 82.

(12) See above, "Hell." III. v. 3.

(13) See below, "Hell." IV. vi. 1; ib. vii. 1; VI. v. 23.

Such was the strength of the two armies. The Boeotians, as long as they occupied the left wing, showed no anxiety to join battle, but after a rearrangement which gave them the right, placing the Athenians opposite the Lacedaemonians, and themselves opposite the Achaeans, at once, we are told, (14) the victims proved favourable, and the order was

passed along the lines to prepare for immediate action. The Boeotians, in the first place, abandoning the rule of sixteen deep, chose to give their division the fullest possible depth, and, moreover, kept veering more and more to their right, with the intention of overlapping their opponent's flank. The consequence was that the Athenians, to avoid being absolutely severed, were forced to follow suit, and edged towards the right, though they recognised the risk they ran of having their flank turned. For a while the Lacedaemonians had no idea of the advance of the enemy, owing to the rough nature of the ground, (15) but the notes of the paean at length announced to them the fact, and without an instant's delay the answering order "prepare for battle" ran along the different sections of their army. As soon as their troops were drawn up, according to the tactical disposition of the various generals of foreign brigades, the order was passed to "follow the lead," and then the Lacedaemonians on their side also began edging to their right, and eventually stretched out their wing so far that only six out of the ten regimental divisions of the Athenians confronted the Lacedaemonians, the other four finding themselves face to face with the men of Tegea. And now when they were less than a furlong (16) apart, the Lacedaemonians sacrificed in customary fashion a kid to the huntress goddess, (17) and advanced upon their opponents, wheeling round their overlapping columns to outflank his left. As the two armies closed, the allies of Lacedaemon were as a rule fairly borne down by their opponents. The men of Pellene alone, steadily confronting the Thespiaeans, held their ground, and the dead of either side strewed the position. (18) As to the Lacedaemonians themselves: crushing that portion of the Athenian troops which lay immediately in front of them, and at the same time encircling them with their overlapping right, they slew man after man of them; and, absolutely unscathed themselves, their unbroken columns continued their march, and so passed behind the four remaining

divisions (19) of the Athenians before these latter had returned from their own victorious pursuit. Whereby the four divisions in question also emerged from battle intact, except for the casualties inflicted by the Tegeans in the first clash of the engagement. The troops next encountered by the Lacedaemonians were the Argives retiring. These they fell foul of, and the senior polemarch was just on the point of closing with them “breast to breast” when some one, it is said, shouted, “Let their front ranks pass.” This was done, and as the Argives raced past, their enemies thrust at their unprotected (20) sides and killed many of them. The Corinthians were caught in the same way as they retired, and when their turn had passed, once more the Lacedaemonians lit upon a portion of the Theban division retiring from the pursuit, and strewed the field with their dead. The end of it all was that the defeated troops in the first instance made for safety to the walls of their city, but the Corinthians within closed the gates, whereupon the troops took up quarters once again in their old encampment. The Lacedaemonians on their side withdrew to the point at which they first closed with the enemy, and there set up a trophy of victory. So the battle ended.

(14) Or, “then they lost no time in discovering that the victims proved favourable.”

(15) See Grote, “H. G.” ix. 428; cf. Lys. “pro Mant.” 20.

(16) Lit. “a stade.”

(17) Lit. “our Lady of the Chase.” See “Pol. Lac.” xiii. 8.

(18) Lit. “men on either side kept dropping at their post.”

(19) Lit. “tribes.”

(20) I.e. “right.”

III

Meanwhile Agesilaus was rapidly hastening with his reinforcements from Asia. He had reached Amphipolis when Dercylidas brought the news of this fresh victory of the Lacedaemonians; their own loss had been eight men, that of the enemy considerable. It was his business at the same time to explain that not a few of the allies had fallen also.

Agesilaus asked, “Would it not be opportune, Dercylidas, if the cities that have furnished us with contingents could hear of this victory as soon as possible?” And Dercylidas replied: “The news at any rate is likely to put them in better heart.” Then said the king: “As you were an eye-witness there could hardly be a better bearer of the news than yourself.” To this proposal Dercylidas lent a willing ear — to travel abroad (1) was his special delight — and he replied, “Yes, under your orders.” “Then you have my orders,” the king said. “And you may further inform the states from myself that we have not forgotten our promise; if all goes well over here we shall be with them again ere long.” So Dercylidas set off on his travels, in the first instance to the Hellespont; (2) while Agesilaus crossed Macedonia, and arrived in Thessaly. And now the men of Larissa, Crannon, Scotussa, and Pharsalus, who were allies of the Boeotians — and in fact all the Thessalians except the exiles for the time being — hung on his heels (3) and did him damage.

(1) See “Pol. Lac.” xiv. 4.

(2) See below, “Hell.” IV. viii. 3.

(3) See “Ages.” ii. 2; Grote, “H. G.” ix. 420, note 2.

For some while he marched his troops in a hollow square, (4) posting half his cavalry in front and half on his rear; but finding that the Thessalians checked his passage by repeated charges from behind, he strengthened his rearguard by sending round the cavalry from his van, with the exception of his own personal escort. (5) The two armies stood confronted in battle order; but the Thessalians, not liking the notion of a cavalry engagement with heavy infantry, turned, and step by step retreated, while the others followed them with considerable caution. Agesilaus, perceiving the error under which both alike laboured, now sent his own personal guard of stalwart troopers with orders that both they and the rest of the horsemen should charge at full gallop, (6) and not give the enemy the chance to recoil. The Thessalians were taken aback by this unexpected

onslaught, and half of them never thought of wheeling about, whilst those who did essay to do so presented the flanks of their horses to the charge, (7) and were made prisoners. Still Polymarchus of Pharsalus, the general in command of their cavalry, rallied his men for an instant, and fell, sword in hand, with his immediate followers. This was the signal for a flight so precipitate on the part of the Thessalians, that their dead and dying lined the road, and prisoners were taken; nor was any halt made until they reached Mount Narthacius. Here, then, midway between Pras and Narthacius, Agesilaus set up a trophy, halting for the moment, in unfeigned satisfaction at the exploit. It was from antagonists who prided themselves on their cavalry beyond everything that he had wrested victory, with a body of cavalry of his own mustering. Next day he crossed the mountains of Achaea Phthiotis, and for the future continued his march through friendly territory until he reached the confines of Boeotia.

(4) See Rustow and Kochly, S. 187 foll.

(5) See Thuc. v. 72; Herod. vi. 56, viii. 124.

(6) Lit. “and bids them pass the order to the others and themselves to charge,” etc.

(7) See “Horsemanship,” vii. 16; Polyb. iv. 8.

Here, at the entrance of that territory, the sun (in partial eclipse) (8) seemed to appear in a crescent shape, and the news reached him of the defeat of the Lacedaemonians in a naval engagement, and the death of the admiral Peisander. Details of the disaster were not wanting. The engagement of the hostile fleets took place off Cnidus. Pharnabazus, the Persian admiral, was present with the Phoenician fleet, and in front of him were ranged the ships of the Hellenic squadron under Conon. Peisander had ventured to draw out his squadron to meet the combined fleets, though the numerical inferiority of his fleet to that of the Hellenic navy under Conon was conspicuous, and he had the mortification of seeing the allies who formed his left wing take to flight immediately. He himself came to close quarters with the

enemy, and was driven on shore, on board his trireme, under pressure of the hostile rams. The rest, as many as were driven to shore, deserted their ships and sought safety as best they could in the territory of Cnidus. The admiral alone stuck to his ship, and fell sword in hand.

(8) B.C. 394, August 14.

It was impossible for Agesilaus not to feel depressed by those tidings at first; on further reflection, however, it seemed to him that the moral quality of more than half his troops well entitled them to share in the sunshine of success, but in the day of trouble, when things looked black, he was not bound to take them into his confidence. Accordingly he turned round and gave out that he had received news that Peisander was dead, but that he had fallen in the arms of victory in a sea-fight; and suiting his action to the word, he proceeded to offer sacrifice in return for good tidings, (9) distributing portions of the victims to a large number of recipients. So it befell that in the first skirmish with the enemy the troops of Agesilaus gained the upper hand, in consequence of the report that the Lacedaemonians had won a victory by sea.

(9) “Splendide mendax.” For the ethics of the matter, see “Mem.” IV. ii. 17; “Cyrop.” I. vi. 31.

To confront Agesilaus stood an army composed of the Boeotians, Athenians, Argives, Corinthians, Aenianians, Euboeans, and both divisions of the Locrians. Agesilaus on his side had with him a division (10) of Lacedaemonians, which had crossed from Corinth, also half the division from Orchomenus; besides which there were the neodamodes (11) from Lacedaemon, on service with him already; and in addition to these the foreign contingent under Herippidas; (12) and again the quota furnished by the Hellenic cities in Asia, with others from the cities in Europe which he had brought over during his progress; and lastly, there were additional levies from the spot — Orchomenian and Phocian heavy infantry. In light-armed troops, it must be admitted,

the numbers told heavily in favour of Agesilaus, but the cavalry (13) on both sides were fairly balanced.

(10) Lit. “a mora”; for the numbers, see “Ages.” ii. 6; Plut. “Ages.” 17; Grote, “H. G.” ix. 433.

(11) I.e. “enfranchised helots.”

(12) See “Ages.” ii. 10, 11; and above, “Hell.” III. iv. 20.

(13) See Hicks, op. cit. 68.

Such were the forces of either party. I will describe the battle itself, if only on account of certain features which distinguish it from the battles of our time. The two armies met on the plain of Coronea — the troops of Agesilaus advancing from the Cephisus, the Thebans and their allies from the slopes of Helicon. Agesilaus commanded his own right in person, with the men of Orchomenus on his extreme left. The Thebans formed their own right, while the Argives held their left. As they drew together, for a while deep silence reigned on either side; but when they were not more than a furlong (14) apart, with the loud hurrah (15) the Thebans, quickening to a run, rushed furiously (16) to close quarters; and now there was barely a hundred yards (17) breadth between the two armies, when Herippidas with his foreign brigade, and with them the Ionians, Aeolians, and Hellespontines, darted out from the Spartans’ battle-lines to greet their onset. One and all of the above played their part in the first rush forward; in another instant they were (18) within spear-thrust of the enemy, and had routed the section immediately before them. As to the Argives, they actually declined to receive the attack of Agesilaus, and betook themselves in flight to Helicon. At this moment some of the foreign division were already in the act of crowning Agesilaus with the wreath of victory, when some one brought him word that the Thebans had cut through the Orchomenians and were in among the baggage train. At this the Spartan general immediately turned his army right about and advanced against them. The Thebans, on their side, catching sight of their allies withdrawn in flight to the

base of the Helicon, and anxious to get across to their own friends, formed in close order and tramped forward stoutly.

(14) Lit. “a stade.”

(15) Lit. “Alalah.”

(16) Like a tornado.

(17) Lit. “about three plethra.”

(18) Or, “All these made up the attacking columns… and coming within… routed…”

At this point no one will dispute the valour of Agesilaus, but he certainly did not choose the safest course. It was open to him to make way for the enemy to pass, which done, he might have hung upon his heels and mastered his rear. This, however, he refused to do, preferring to crash full front against the Thebans. Thereupon, with close interlock of shield wedged in with shield, they shoved, they fought, they dealt death, (19) they breathed out life, till at last a portion of the Thebans broke their way through towards Helicon, but paid for that departure by the loss of many lives. And now the victory of Agesilaus was fairly won, and he himself, wounded, had been carried back to the main line, when a party of horse came galloping up to tell him that something like eighty of the enemy, under arms, were sheltering under the temple, and they asked what they ought to do. Agesilaus, though he was covered with wounds, did not, for all that, forget his duty to God. He gave orders to let them retire unscathed, and would not suffer any injury to be done to them. And now, seeing it was already late, they took their suppers and retired to rest.

(19) Or, “they slew, they were slain.” In illustration of this famous passage, twice again worked up in “Ages.” ii. 12, and “Cyrop.” VII. i. 38, commented on by Longinus, {peri upsous}, 19, and copied by Dio Cassius, 47, 45, I venture to quote a passage from Mr. Rudyard Kipling, “With the Main Guard,” p. 57, Mulvaney loquitur: “The Tyrone was pushin’ an’ pushin’ in, an’ our men was sweerin’ at thim, an’ Crook was workin’ away in front av us all, his sword-arm swingin’ like a pump-handle an’ his revolver spittin’ like a cat. But the strange thing av ut was the quiet that lay upon. ’Twas like a fight in a dhrame — excipt for thim that wus dead.”

But with the morning Gylis the polemarch received orders to draw up the troops in battle order, and to set up a trophy, every man crowned with a wreath in honour of the god, and all the pipers piping. Thus they busied themselves in the Spartan camp. On their side the Thebans sent heralds asking to bury their dead, under a truce; and in this wise a truce was made. Agesilaus withdrew to Delphi, where on

arrival he offered to the god a tithe of the produce of his spoils — no less than a hundred talents. (20) Gylis the polemarch meanwhile withdrew into Phocis at the head of his troops, and from that district made a hostile advance into Locris. Here nearly a whole day was spent by the men in freely helping themselves to goods and chattels out of the villages and pillaging the corn; (21) but as it drew towards evening the troops began to retire, with the Lacedaemonians in the rear. The Locrians hung upon their heels with a heavy pelt of stones and javelins. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians turned short round and gave chase, laying some of their assailants low. Then the Locrians ceased clinging to their rear, but continued their volleys from the vantage-ground above. The Lacedaemonians again made efforts to pursue their persistent foes even up the slope. At last darkness descended on them, and as they retired man after man dropped, succumbing to the sheer difficulty of the ground; some in their inability to see what lay in front, or else shot down by the enemy’s missiles. It was then that Gylis the polemarch met his end, as also Pelles, who was on his personal staff, and the whole of the Spartans present without exception — eighteen or thereabouts — perished, either crushed by stones or succumbing to other wounds. Indeed, except for timely aid brought from the camp where the men were supping, the chances are that not a man would have escaped to tell the tale.

(20) = 25,000 pounds nearly.

(21) Or, “not to speak of provisions.”

IV

This incident ended the campaign. The army as a whole was disbanded, the contingents retiring to their several cities, and Agesilaus home across the Gulf by sea.

B.C. 393. Subsequently (1) the war between the two parties recommenced. The Athenians, Boeotians, Argives,

and the other allies made Corinth the base of their operations; the Lacedaemonians and their allies held Sicyon as theirs. As to the Corinthians, they had to face the fact that, owing to their proximity to the seat of war, it was their territory which was ravaged and their people who perished, while the rest of the allies abode in peace and reaped the fruits of their lands in due season. Hence the majority of them, including the better class, desired peace, and gathering into knots they indoctrinated one another with these views.

(1) B.C. 393. See Grote, ix. p. 455, note 2 foll.; “Hell.” IV. viii. 7.

B.C. 392. (2) On the other hand, it could hardly escape the notice of the allied powers, the Argives, Athenians, and Boeotians, as also those of the Corinthians themselves who had received a share of the king’s moneys, or for whatever reason were most directly interested in the war, that if they did not promptly put the peace party out of the way, ten chances to one the old laconising policy would again hold the field. It seemed there was nothing for it but the remedy of the knife. There was a refinement of wickedness in the plan adopted. With most people the life even of a legally condemned criminal is held sacred during a solemn season, but these men deliberately selected the last day of the Eucleia, (3) when they might reckon on capturing more victims in the crowded market-place, for their murderous purposes. Their agents were supplied with the names of those to be gotten rid of, the signal was given, and then, drawing their daggers, they fell to work. Here a man was struck down standing in the centre of a group of talkers, and there another seated; a third while peacably enjoying himself at the play; a fourth actually whilst officiating as a judge at some dramatic contest. (4) When what was taking place became known, there was a general flight on the part of the better classes. Some fled to the images of the gods in the market-place, others to the altars; and here these

unhallowed miscreants, ringleaders and followers alike, utterly regardless of duty and law, fell to butchering their victims even within the sacred precincts of the gods; so that even some of those against whom no hand was lifted — honest, law-abiding folk — were filled with sore amazement at sight of such impiety. In this way many of the elder citizens, as mustering more thickly in the market-place, were done to death. The younger men, acting on a suspicion conceived by one of their number, Pasimelus, as to what was going to take place, kept quiet in the Kraneion; (5) but hearing screams and shouting and being joined anon by some who had escaped from the affair, they took the hint, and, running up along the slope of the Acrocorinthus, succeeded in repelling an attack of the Argives and the rest. While they were still deliberating what they ought to do, down fell a capital from its column — without assignable cause, whether of earthquake or wind. Also, when they sacrificed, the aspect of the victims was such that the soothsayers said it was better to descend from that position.

(2) Others assign the incidents of this whole chapter iv. to B.C. 393.

(3) The festival of Artemis Eucleia.

(4) See Diod. xiv. 86.

(5) See Paus. II. ii. 4.

So they retired, in the first instance prepared to go into exile beyond the territory of Corinth. It was only upon the persuasion of their friends and the earnest entreaties of their mothers and sisters who came out to them, supported by the solemn assurance of the men in power themselves, who swore to guarantee them against evil consequences, that some of them finally consented to return home. Presented to their eyes was the spectacle of a tyranny in full exercise, and to their minds the consciousness of the obliteration of their city, seeing that boundaries were plucked up and the land of their fathers had come to be re-entitled by the name of Argos instead of Corinth; and furthermore, compulsion was put upon them to share in the constitution in vogue at

Argos, for which they had little appetite, while in their own city they wielded less power than the resident aliens. So that a party sprang up among them whose creed was, that life was not worth living on such terms: their endeavour must be to make their fatherland once more the Corinth of old days — to restore freedom to their city, purified from the murderer and his pollution and fairly rooted in good order and legality. (6) It was a design worth the venture: if they succeeded they would become the saviours of their country; if not — why, in the effort to grasp the fairest flower of happiness, they would but overreach, and find instead a glorious termination to existence.

(6) {eunomia}. See “Pol. Ath.” i. 8; Arist. “Pol.” iv. 8, 6; iii. 9, 8; v. 7, 4.

It was in furtherance of this design that two men — Pasimelus and Alcimenes — undertook to creep through a watercourse and effect a meeting with Praxitas the polemarch of the Lacedaemonians, who was on garrison duty with his own division in Sicyon. They told him they could give him ingress at a point in the long walls leading to Lechaeum. Praxitas, knowing from previous experience that the two men might be relied upon, believed their statement; and having arranged for the further detention in Sicyon of the division which was on the point of departure, he busied himself with plans for the enterprise. When the two men, partly by chance and partly by contrivance, came to be on guard at the gate where the tophy now stands, without further ado Praxitas presented himself with his division, taking with him also the men of Sicyon and the whole of the Corinthian exiles. (7) Having reached the gate, he had a qualm of misgiving, and hesitated to step inside until he had first sent in a man on whom he could rely to take a look at things within. The two Corinthians introduced him, and made so simple and straightforward a representation (8) that the visitor was convinced, and reported everything as free of pitfalls as the two had asserted. Then the polemarch

entered, but owing to the wide space between the double walls, as soon as they came to form in line within, the intruders were impressed by the paucity of their numbers. They therefore erected a stockade, and dug as good a trench as they could in front of them, pending the arrival of reinforcements from the allies. In their rear, moreover, lay the guard of the Boeotians in the harbour. Thus they passed the whole day which followed the night of ingress without striking a blow.

(8) Or, “showed him the place in so straightforward a manner.”

On the next day, however, the Argive troops arrived in all haste, hurrying to the rescue, and found the enemy duly drawn up. The Lacedaemonians were on their own right, the men of Sicyon next, and leaning against the eastern wall the Corinthian exiles, one hundred and fifty strong. (9) Their opponents marshalled their lines face to face in correspondence: Iphicrates with his mercenaries abutting on the eastern wall; next to them the Argives, whilst the Corinthians of the city held their left. In the pride inspired by numbers they began advancing at once. They overpowered the Sicyonians, and tearing asunder the stockade, pursued them to the sea and here slew numbers of them. At that instant Pasimachus, the cavalry general, at the head of a handful of troopers, seeing the Sicyonians sore presed, made fast the horses of his troops to the trees, and relieving the Sicyonians of their heavy infantry shields, advanced with his volunteers against the Argives. The latter, seeing the Sigmas on the shields and taking them to be “Sicyonians,” had not the slightest fear. Whereupon, as the story goes, Pasimachus, exclaiming in his broad Doric, “By the twin gods! these Sigmas will cheat you, you Argives,” came to close quarters, and in that battle of a handful against a host, was slain himself with all his followers. In another quarter of the field, however, the Corinthian exiles had got the better

of their opponents and worked their way up, so that they were now touching the city circumvallation walls.

(9) See Grote, ix. p. 333 foll.

The Lacedaemonians, on their side, perceiving the discomfiture of the Sicyonians, sprang out with timely aid, keeping the palisade-work on their left. But the Argives, discovering that the Lacedaemonians were behind them, wheeled round and came racing back, pouring out of the palisade at full speed. Their extreme right, with unprotected flanks exposed, fell victims to the Lacedaemonians; the rest, hugging the wall, made good their retreat in dense masses towards the city. Here they encountered the Corinthian exiles, and discovering that they had fallen upon foes, swerved aside in the reverse direction. In this predicament some mounted by the ladders of the city wall, and, leaping down from its summit, were destroyed; (10) others yielded up their lives, thrust through, as they jostled at the foot of the steps; others again were literally trampled under one another's feet and suffocated.

(10) Or, "plunged from its summit into perdition." See Thuc. ii. 4.

The Lacedaemonians had no difficulty in the choice of victims; for at that instant a work was assigned to them to do, (11) such as they could hardly have hoped or prayed for. To find delivered into their hands a mob of helpless enemies, in an ecstasy of terror, presenting their unarmed sides in such sort that none turned to defend himself, but each victim rather seemed to contribute what he could towards his own destruction — if that was not divine interposition, I know now what to call it. Miracle or not, in that little space so many fell, and the corpses lay piled so thick, that eyes familiar with the stacking of corn or wood or piles of stones were called upon to gaze at layers of human bodies. Nor did the guard of the Boeotians in the port itself (12) escape death; some were slain upon the ramparts, others on the roofs of the dock-houses, which they had scaled for refuge.

Nothing remained but for the Corinthians and Argives to carry away their dead under cover of a truce; whilst the allies of Lacedaemon poured in their reinforcements. When these were collected, Praxitas decided in the first place to raze enough of the walls to allow a free broadway for an army on march. This done, he put himself at the head of his troops and advanced on the road to Megara, taking by assault, first Sidus and next Crommyon. Leaving garrisons in these two fortresses, he retraced his steps, and finally fortifying Epieiceia as a garrison outpost to protect the territory of the allies, he at once disbanded his troops and himself withdrew to Lacedaemon.

(11) Or, “Heaven assigned to them a work…” Lit. “The God…”

(12) I.e. “of Lechaeum.”

B.C. 392-391. (13) After this the great armaments of both belligerents had ceased to exist. The states merely furnished garrisons — the one set at Corinth, the other set at Sicyon — and were content to guard the walls. Though even so, a vigorous war was carried on by dint of the mercenary troops with which both sides were furnished.

(13) So Grote and Curtius; al. B.C. 393.

A signal incident in the period was the invasion of Phlius by Iphicrates. He laid an ambuscade, and with a small body of troops adopting a system of guerilla war, took occasion of an unguarded sally of the citizens of Phlius to inflict such losses on them, that though they had never previously received the Lacedaemonians within their walls, they received them now. They had hitherto feared to do so lest it might lead to the restoration of the banished members of their community, who gave out that they owed their exile to their Lacedaemonian sympathies; (14) but they were now in such abject fear of the Corinthian party that they sent to fetch the Lacedaemonians, and delivered the city and citadel to their safe keeping. These latter, however, well disposed to the exiles of Phlius, did not, at the time they held the city, so much as breathe the thought of bringing

back the exiles; on the contrary, as soon as the city seemed to have recovered its confidence, they took their departure, leaving city and laws precisely as they had found them on their entry.

(14) Lit. “laconism.”

To return to Iphicrates and his men: they frequently extended their incursions even into Arcadia in many directions, (15) following their usual guerilla tactics, but also making assaults on fortified posts. The heavy infantry of the Arcadians positively refused to face them in the field, so profound was the terror in which they held these light troops. In compensation, the light troops themselves entertained a wholesome dread of the Lacedaemonians, and did not venture to approach even within javelin-range of their heavy infantry. They had been taught a lesson when, within that distance, some of the younger hoplites had made a dash at them, catching and putting some of them to the sword. But however profound the contempt of the Lacedaemonians for these light troops, their contempt for their own allies was deeper. (On one occasion (16) a reinforcement of Mantineans had sallied from the walls between Corinth and Lechaeum to engage the peltasts, and had no sooner come under attack than they swerved, losing some of their men as they made good their retreat. The Lacedaemonians were unkind enough to poke fun at these unfortunates. “Our allies,” they said, “stand in as much awe of these peltasts as children of the bogies and hobgoblins of their nurses.” For themselves, starting from Lechaeum, they found no difficulty in marching right round the city of Corinth with a single Lacedaemonian division and the Corinthian exiles.) (17)

(15) See Thuc. ii. 4.

(16) See Grote, ix. 472 note. Lechaeum was not taken by the Lacedaemonians until the Corinthian long walls had been rebuilt by the Athenians. Possibly the incidents in this section (S. 17) occurred after the capture of Lechaeum. The historian introduces them parenthetically, as it were, in illustration of his main topic — the success of the peltasts.

(17) Or, adopting Schneider’s conjecture, {estratopedeuonto}, add “and encamping.”

The Athenians, on their side, who felt the power of the Lacedaemonians to be dangerously close, now that the walls of Corinth had been laid open, and even apprehended a direct attack upon themselves, determined to rebuild the portion of the wall severed by Praxitas. Accordingly they set out with their whole force, including a suite of stonelayers, masons, and carpenters, and within a few days erected a quite splendid wall on the side facing Sicyon towards the west, (18) and then proceeded with more leisure to the completion of the eastern portion.

(18) See Thuc. vi. 98.

To turn once more to the other side: the Lacedaemonians, indignant at the notion that the Argives should be gathering the produce of their lands in peace at home, as if war were a pastime, marched against them. Agesilaus commanded the expedition, and after ravaging their territory from one end to the other, crossed their frontier at Tenea (19) and swooped down upon Corinth, taking the walls which had been lately rebuilt by the Athenians. He was supported on the sea side by his brother Teleutias (20) with a naval force of about twelve triremes, and the mother of both was able to congratulate herself on the joint success of both her sons; one having captured the enemy's walls by land and the other his ships and naval arsenal by sea, on the same day. These achievements sufficed Agesilaus for the present; he disbanded the army of the allies and led the state troops home.

(19) Reading {Tenean}, Koppen's emendation for {tegean}. In the parallel passage ("Ages." ii. 17) the text has {kata ta stena}. See Grote, "H. G." ix. 471.

(20) See below, IV. viii. 11.

V

B.C. 390. (1) Subsequently the Lacedaemonians made a second expedition against Corinth. They heard from the exiles that the citizens contrived to preserve all their cattle in Peiraeum; indeed, large numbers derived their

subsistence from the place. Agesilaus was again in command of the expedition. In the first instance he advanced upon the Isthmus. It was the month of the Isthmian games, (2) and here he found the Argives engaged in conducting the sacrifice to Poseidon, as if Corinth were Argos. So when they perceived the approach of Agesilaus, the Argives and their friends left the offerings as they lay, including the preparations for the breakfast, and retired with undisguised alarm into the city by the Cenchrean road. (3) Agesilaus, though he observed the movement, refrained from giving chase, but taking up his quarters in the temple, there proceeded to offer victims to the god himself, and waited until the Corinthian exiles had celebrated the sacrifice to Poseidon, along with the games. But no sooner had Agesilaus turned his back and retired, than the Argives returned and celebrated the Isthmian games afresh; so that in this particular year there were cases in which the same competitors were twice defeated in this or that contest, or conversely, the same man was proclaimed victor twice over.

(1) Al. B.C. 392. The historian omits the overtures for peace, B.C. 391 (or 391-390) referred to in Andoc. "De Pace." See Jebb, "Att. Or." i. 83, 108; Grote, "H. G." ix. 474; Curtius, "H. G." Eng. tr. iv. 261.

(2) Grote and Curtius believe these to be the Isthmian games of 390 B.C., not of 392 B.C., as Sauppe and others suppose. See Peter, "Chron. Table," p. 89, note 183; Jowett, "Thuc." ii. 468, note on VIII. 9, 1.

(3) Lit. "road to Cenchreae."

On the fourth day Agesilaus led his troops against Peiraeum, but finding it strongly defended, he made a sudden retrograde march after the morning meal in the direction of the capital, as though he calculated on the betrayal of the city. The Corinthians, in apprehension of some such possible catastrophe, sent to summon Iphicrates with the larger portion of his light infantry. These passed by duly in the night, not unobserved, however, by Agesilaus, who at once turned round at break of day and advanced on Piraeum. He himself kept to the low ground by the hot springs, (4) sending a division to scale the top of the pass. That night he encamped at the hot springs, while the division bivouacked in the open, in possession of the pass.

Here Agesilaus distinguished himself by an invention as seasonable as it was simple. Among those who carried provisions for the division not one had thought of bringing fire. The altitude was considerable; there had been a fall of rain and hail towards evening and the temperature was low; besides which, the scaling party were clad in thin garments suited to the summer season. There they sat shivering in the dark, with scarcely heart to attack their suppers, when Agesilaus sent up to them as many as ten porters carrying fire in earthen pots. One found his way up one way, one another, and presently there were many bonfires blazing — magnificently enough, since there was plenty of wood to hand; so that all fell to oiling themselves and many supped over again. The same night the sky was lit up by the blaze of the temple of Poseidon — set on fire no one knows how.

(4) Near mod. Lutraki.

When the men in Piraeum perceived that the pass was occupied, they at once abandoned all thought of self-defence and fled for refuge to the Heraion (5) — men and women, slaves and free-born, with the greater part of their flocks and herds. Agesilaus, with the main body, meanwhile pursued his march by the sea-shore, and the division, simultaneously descending from the heights, captured the fortified position of Oenoe, appropriating its contents. Indeed, all the troops on that day reaped a rich harvest in the supplies they brought in from various farmsteads. Presently those who had escaped into the Heraion came out, offering to leave it to Agesilaus to decide what he would do with them. He decided to deliver up to the exiles all those concerned with the late butchery, and that all else should be sold. And so from the Heraion streamed out a long line of prisoners, whilst from other sides embassies arrived in numbers; and amongst these a deputation from the Boeotians, anxious to learn what they should do to obtain peace. These latter Agesilaus, with a certain loftiness of

manner, affected not even to see, although Pharax, (6) their proxenus, stood by their side to introduce them. Seated in a circular edifice on the margin of the lake, (7) he surveyed the host of captives and valuables as they were brought out. Beside the prisoners, to guard them, stepped the Lacedaemonian warriors from the camp, carrying their spears — and themselves plucked all gaze their way, so readily will success and the transient fortune of the moment rivet attention. But even while Agesilaus was still thus seated, wearing a look betokening satisfaction at some great achievement, a horseman came galloping up; the flanks of his charger streamed with sweat. To the many inquiries what news he brought, the rider responded never a word; but being now close beside Agesilaus, he leaped from his horse, and running up to him with lowering visage narrated the disaster of the Spartan division (8) at Lechaeum. At these tidings the king sprang instantly from his seat, clutching his spear, and bade his herald summon to a meeting the generals, captains of fifties, and commanders of foreign brigades. (9) When these had rapidly assembled he bade them, seeing that the morning meal had not yet been tasted, to swallow hastily what they could, and with all possible speed to overtake him. But for himself, he, with the officers of the royal staff, (10) set off at once without breakfast. His bodyguard, with their heavy arms, accompanied him with all speed — himself in advance, the officers following behind. In this fashion he had already passed beyond the warm springs, and was well within the plateau of Lechaeum, when three horsemen rode up with further news: the dead bodies had been picked up. On receipt of these tidings he commanded the troops to order arms, and having rested them a little space, led them back again to the Heraion. The next day he spent in disposing of the captured property. (11)

(5) Or, “Heraeum,” i.e. sanctuary of Hera, on a promontory so called. See Leake, “Morea,” iii. 317.

(6) See “Hell.” III. ii. 12, if the same.

(7) Or, “on the round pavilion by the lake” (mod. Vuliasmeni).

(8) Technically “mora.”

(9) Lit. the polemarchs, penteconters, and xenagoi.

(10) See “Pol. Lac.” xiii. 1.

(11) See Grote, “H. G.” ix. 480, in reference to “Ages.” vii. 6.

The ambassadors of the Boeotians were then summoned, and, being asked to explain the object of their coming, made no further mention of the word “peace,” but replied that, if there was nothing to hinder it, they wished to have a pass to their own soldiers within the capital. The king answered with a smile: “I know your desire is not so much to see your soldiers as to feast your eyes on the good fortune of your friends, and to measure its magnitude. Wait then, I will conduct you myself; with me you will be better able to discover the true value of what has taken place.” And he was as good as his word. Next day he sacrificed, and led his army up to the gates of Corinth. The trophy he respected, but not one tree did he leave standing — chopping and burning, as proof positive that no one dared to face him in the field. And having so done, he encamped about Lechaeum; and as to the Theban ambassadors, in lieu of letting them pass into the city, he sent them off by sea across to Creusis.

But in proportion to the unwontedness of such a calamity befalling Lacedaemonians, a widespread mourning fell upon the whole Laconian army, those alone excepted whose sons or fathers or brothers had died at their post. The bearing of these resembled that of conquerors, (12) as with bright faces they moved freely to and fro, glorying in their domestic sorrow. Now the tragic fate which befell the division was on this wise: It was the unvaried custom of the men of Amyclae to return home at the Hyacinthia, (13) to join in the sacred paean, a custom not to be interrupted by active service or absence from home or for any other reason. So, too, on this occasion, Agesilaus had left behind all the Amyclaeans serving in any part of his army at Lechaeum. At

the right moment the general in command of the garrison at that place had posted the garrison troops of the allies to guard the walls during his absence, and put himself at the head of his division of heavy infantry with that of the cavalry, (14) and led the Amyclaeans past the walls of Corinth. Arrived at a point within three miles or so (15) of Sicyon, the polemarch turned back himself in the direction of Lechaeum with his heavy infantry regiment, six hundred strong, giving orders to the cavalry commandant to escort the Amyclaeans with his division as far as they required, and then to turn and overtake him. It cannot be said that the Lacedaemonians were ignorant of the large number of light troops and heavy infantry inside Corinth, but owing to their former successes they arrogantly presumed that no one would attack them. Within the capital of the Corinthians, however, their scant numbers — a thin line of heavy infantry unsupported by light infantry or cavalry — had been noted; and Callias, the son of Hipponicus, (16) who was in command of the Athenian hoplites, and Iphicrates at the head of his peltasts, saw no risk in attacking with the light brigade. Since if the enemy continued his march by the high road, he would be cut up by showers of javelins on his exposed right flank; or if he were tempted to take the offensive, they with their peltasts, the nimblest of all light troops, would easily slip out of the grasp of his hoplites.

(12) See Grote, “H. G.” ix. 488.

(13) Observed on three days of the month Hecatombaeus (= July). See Muller’s “Dorians,” ii. 360. For Amyclae, see Leake, “Morea,” i. ch. iv. p. 145 foll.; Baedeker’s “Greece,” p. 279.

(14) See below, “Hell.” VI. iv. 12; and “Pol. Lac.” xi. 4, xiii. 4.

(15) Lit. “twenty or thirty stades.”

(16) See Cobet, “Prosop. Xen.” p. 67 foll.

With this clearly-conceived idea they led out their troops; and while Callias drew up his heavy infantry in line at no great distance from the city, Iphicrates and his peltasts made a dash at the returning division.

The Lacedaemonians were presently within range of the javelins. (17) Here a man was wounded, and there another

dropped, not to rise again. Each time orders were given to the attendant shield-bearers (18) to pick up the men and bear them into Lechaeum; and these indeed were the only members of the mora who were, strictly speaking, saved. Then the polemarch ordered the ten-years-service men (19) to charge and drive off their assailants. Charge, however, as they might, they took nothing by their pains — not a man could they come at within javelin range. Being heavy infantry opposed to light troops, before they could get to close quarters the enemy's word of command sounded "Retire!" whilst as soon as their own ranks fell back, scattered as they were in consequence of a charge where each man's individual speed had told, Iphicrates and his men turned right about and renewed the javelin attack, while others, running alongside, harassed their exposed flank. At the very first charge the assailants had shot down nine or ten, and, encouraged by this success, pressed on with increasing audacity. These attacks told so severely that the polemarch a second time gave the order (and this time for the fifteen-years-service men) to charge. The order was promptly obeyed, but on retiring they lost more men than on the first occasion, and it was not until the pick and flower of the division had succumbed that they were joined by their returning cavalry, in whose company they once again attempted a charge. The light infantry gave way, but the attack of the cavalry was feebly enforced. Instead of pressing home the charge until at least they had sabred some of the enemy, they kept their horses abreast of their infantry skirmishers, (20) charging and wheeling side by side.

(17) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 467, note on the improvements of Iphicrates.

(18) Grote, "H. G." ix. 484; cf. "Hell." IV. viii. 39; "Anab." IV. ii. 20; Herod. ix. 10-29.

(19) Youngest rank and file, between eighteen and twenty-eight years of age, who formed the first line. The Spartan was liable to service at the age of eighteen. From twenty-eight to thirty-three he would belong to the fifteen-years-service division (the second line); and so on. See below, IV. vi. 10.

(20) See Thuc. iv. 125.

Again and again the monotonous tale of doing and suffering repeated itself, except that as their own ranks grew thinner and their courage ebbed, the courage of their assailants grew bolder and their numbers increased. In desperation they massed compactly upon the narrow slope of a hillock, distant a couple of furlongs (21) or so from the sea, and a couple of miles (22) perhaps from Lechaeum. Their friends in Lechaeum, perceiving them, embarked in boats and sailed round until they were immediately under the hillock. And now, in the very slough of despair, being so sorely troubled as man after man dropped dead, and unable to strike a blow, to crown their distress they saw the enemy's heavy infantry advancing. Then they took to flight; some of them threw themselves into the sea; others — a mere handful — escaped with the cavalry into Lechaeum. The death-roll, including those who fell in the second fight and the final flight, must have numbered two hundred and fifty slain, or thereabouts. (23) Such is the tale of the destruction of the Lacedaemonian mora.

(21) Lit. "two stades."

(22) Lit. "sixteen or seventeen stades."

(23) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 486.

Subsequently, with the mutilated fragment of the division, Agesilaus turned his back upon Lechaeum, leaving another division behind to garrison that port. On his passage homewards, as he wound his way through the various cities, he made a point of arriving at each as late in the day as possible, renewing his march as early as possible next morning. Leaving Orchomenus at the first streak of dawn, he passed Mantinea still under cover of darkness. The spectacle of the Mantineans rejoicing at their misfortune would have been too severe an ordeal for his soldiers.

But Iphicrates had not yet reached the summit of his good fortune. Success followed upon success. Lacedaemonian garrisons had been placed in Sidus and Crommyon by Praxitas when he took these fortresses, and again in Oenoe,

when Peiraeum was taken quite lately by Agesilaus. One and all of these now fell into the hands of Iphicrates. Lechaeum still held out, garrisoned as it was by the Lacedaemonians and their allies; while the Corinthian exiles, unable since (24) the disaster of the mora any longer to pass freely by land from Sicyon, had the sea passage still open to them, and using Lechaeum as their base, (25) kept up a game of mutual annoyance with the party in the capital.

(24) Lit. “owing to.”

(25) The illustrative incidents narrated in chapter iv. 17 may belong to this period.

VI

B.C. 390-389. (1) At a later date the Achaeans, being in possession of Calydon, a town from old times belonging to Aetolia, and having further incorporated the Calydonians as citizens, (2) were under the necessity of garrisoning their new possession. The reason was, that the Arcarnanians were threatening the place with an army, and were aided by contingents from Athens and Boeotia, who were anxious to help their allies. (3) Under the strain of this combined attack the Achaeans despatched ambassadors to Lacedaemon, who on arrival complained of the unfair conduct of Lacedaemon towards themselves. “We, sirs,” they said, “are ever ready to serve in your armies, in obedience to whatever orders you choose to issue; we follow you whithersoever you think fit to lead; but when it comes to our being beleaguered by the Acarnanians, with their allies the Athenians and Boeotians, you show not the slightest concern. Understand, then, that if things go on thus we cannot hold out; but either we must give up all part in the war in Peloponnesus and cross over in full force to engage the Arcarnanians, or we must make peace with them on whatever terms we can.” This language was a tacit threat that if they failed to obtain the assistance they felt entitled to from Lacedaemon they would quit the alliance.

(1) According to others (who suppose that the Isthmia and the events recorded in chapter v. 1-19 above belong to B.C. 392), we have now reached B.C. 391.

(2) Or, “having conferred a city organisation on the Calydonians.”

(3) See Thuc. ii. 68.

The ephors and the assembly concluded that there was no alternative but to assist the Achaeans in their campaign against the Acarnanians. Accordingly they sent out Agesilaus with two divisions and the proper complement of allies. The Achaeans none the less marched out in full force themselves. No sooner had Agesilaus crossed the gulf than there was a general flight of the population from the country districts into the towns, whilst the flocks and herds were driven into remote districts that they might not be captured by the troops. Being now arrived on the frontier of the enemy’s territory, Agesilaus sent to the general assembly of the Acarnanians at Stratus, (4) warning them that unless they chose to give up their alliance with the Boeotians and Athenians, and to take instead themselves and their allies, he would ravage their territory through its length and breadth, and not spare a single thing. When they turned a deaf ear to this summons, the other proceeded to do what he threatened, systematically laying the district waste, felling the timber and cutting down the fruit-trees, while slowly moving on at the rate of ten or twelve furlongs a day. The Acarnanians, owing to the snail-like progress of the enemy, were lulled into a sense of security. They even began bringing down their cattle from their alps, and devoted themselves to the tillage of far the greater portion of their fields. But Agesilaus only waited till their rash confidence reached its climax; then on the fifteenth or sixteenth day after he head first entered the country he sacrificed at early dawn, and before evening had traversed eighteen miles (5) or so of country to the lake (6) round which were collected nearly all the flocks and herds of the Acarnanians, and so captured a vast quantity of cattle, horses, and grazing stock of all kinds, besides numerous slaves.

(4) “The Akarnanians had, in early times, occupied the hill of Olpai as a place for judicial proceedings common to the whole nation” (see Thuc. iii. 105). “But in Thucydides’ own time Stratos had attained its position as the greatest city of Akarnania, and probably the Federal Assemblies were

already held there" (Thuc. ii. 80). "In the days of Agesilaos we find Stratos still more distinctly marked as the place of Federal meeting." — Freeman, "Hist. Fed. Gov." ch. iv. p. 148 foll., "On the constitution of the League."

(5) Lit. "one hundred and sixty stades."

(6) See Thuc. ii. 80; vi. 106.

Having secured this prize, he stayed on the spot the whole of the following day, and devoted himself to disposing of the captured property by public sale. While he was thus engaged, a large body of Arcarnanian light infantry appeared, and availing themselves of the position in which Agesilaus was encamped against the mountain side, assailed him with volleys of sling-stones and rocks from the razor-edge of the mountain, without suffering any scathe themselves. By this means they succeeded in dislodging and forcing his troops down into the level plain, and that too at an hour when the whole camp was engaged in preparations for the evening meal. As night drew on, the Acarnanians retired; sentinels were posted, and the troops slept in peace.

Next day Agesilaus led off his army. The exit from the plain and meadow-land round the lake was a narrow aperture through a close encircling range of hills. In occupation of this mountain barrier the Acarnanians, from the vantage-ground above, poured down a continuous pelt of stones and other missiles, or, creeping down to the fringes, dogged and annoyed them so much that the army was no longer able to proceed. If the heavy infantry or cavalry made sallies from the main line they did no harm to their assailants, for the Acarnanians had only to retire and they had quickly gained their strongholds. It was too severe a task, Agesilaus thought, to force his way through the narrow pass so sorely beset. He made up his mind, therefore, to charge that portion of the enemy who dogged his left, though these were pretty numerous. The range of hills on this side was more accessible to heavy infantry and horse alike. During the interval needed for the inspection of victims, the Acarnanians kept plying them with javelins and bullets, and, coming into close proximity, wounded man after man. But

presently came the word of command, “Advance!” and the fifteen-years-service men of the heavy infantry (7) ran forward, accompanied by the cavalry, at a round pace, the general himself steadily following with the rest of the column. Those of the Acarnanians who had crept down the mountain side at that instant in the midst of their sharpshooting turned and fled, and as they climbed the steep, man after man was slain. When, however, the top of the pass was reached, there stood the hoplites of the Acarnanians drawn up in battle line, and supported by the mass of their light infantry. There they steadily waited, keeping up a continuous discharge of missiles the while, or launching their long spears; whereby they dealt wounds to the cavalry troopers and death in some cases to the horses. But when they were all but within the clutches of the advancing heavy infantry (8) of the Lacedaemonians their firmness forsook them; they swerved and fled, and there died of them on that day about three hundred. So ended the affair.

(7) I.e. “the first two ranks.” See above, IV. v. 14.

(8) See “Ages.” ii. 20, for an extraordinary discrepancy.

Agesilaus set up a trophy of victory, and afterwards making a tour of the country, he visited it with fire and sword. (9) Occasionally, in obedience to pressure put upon him by the Achaeans, he would assault some city, but did not capture a single one. And now, as the season of autumn rapidly approached, he prepared to leave the country; whereupon the Achaeans, who looked upon his exploits as abortive, seeing that not a single city, willingly or unwillingly, had as yet been detached from their opponents, begged him, as the smallest service he could render them, at any rate to stay long enough in the country to prevent the Acarnanians from sowing their corn. He answered that the course they suggested ran counter to expediency. “You forget,” he said, “that I mean to invade your enemies again next summer; and therefore the larger their sowing now, the

stronger will be their appetite for peace hereafter.” With this retort he withdrew overland through Aetolia, and by roads, moreover, which no army, small or great, could possibly have traversed without the consent of the inhabitants. The Aetolians, however, were only too glad to yield the Spartan king a free passage, cherishing hopes as they did that he would aid them to recover Naupactus. On reaching Rhium (10) he crossed the gulf at that point and returned homewards, the more direct passage from Calydon to Peloponnesus being effectually barred by an Athenian squadron stationed at Oeniadae.

(9) Or lit. “burning and felling.”

(10) Or Antirrhium (as more commonly called).

VII

B.C. 389-388. (1) On the expiration of winter, and in fulfilment of his promise to the Achaeans, Agesilaus called out the ban once more with early spring to invade the Acarnanians. The latter were apprised of his intention, and, being persuaded that owing to the midland situation of their cities they would just as truly be blockaded by an enemy who chose to destroy their corn as they would be if besieged with entrenchments in regular form, they sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon, and made peace with the Achaeans and alliance with the Lacedaemonians. Thus closes this page of history concerning the affairs of Arcarnania.

(1) According to others, B.C. 390.

To turn to the next. There was a feeling on the part of the Lacedaemonians (2) that no expedition against Athens or Boeotia would be safe so long as a state so important and so close to their own frontier as Argos remained in open hostility behind them. Accordingly they called out the ban against Argos. Now when Agesipolis learnt that the duty of leadership devolved on him, and, moreover, that the sacrifices before crossing the frontier were favourable, he

went to Olympia and consulted the will of the god. “Would it be lawful to him,” he inquired, “not to accept the holy truce, on the ground that the Argives made the season for it (3) depend not on a fixed date, but on the prospect of a Lacedaemonian invasion?” The god indicated to the inquirer that he might lawfully repudiate any holy truce which was fraudulently antedated. (4) Not content with this, the young king, on leaving Olympia, went at once to Delphi, and at that shrine put the same question to Apollo: “Were his views in accordance with his Father’s as touching the holy truce?” — to which the son of Zeus made answer: “Yea, altogether in accordance.” (5)

(2) Or, “It was agreed by the Lacedaemonians.”

(3) I.e. “the season of the Carneia.”

(4) Or, “wrongfully put forward.” See below, V. i. 29; iii. 28; Paus. III. v. 8; Jebb. “Att. Or.” i. p. 131; Grote, “H. G.” ix. 494 foll.; Jowett, “Thuc.” ii. 315; note to Thuc. V. liv. 3.

(5) Grote; cf. Aristot. “Rhet.” ii. 33.

Then without further hesitation, picking up his army at Phlius (where, during his absence to visit the temples, the troops had been collecting), he advanced by Nemea into the enemy’s territory. The Argives, on their side, perceiving that they would be unable to hinder his advance, in accordance with their custom sent a couple of heralds, garlanded, and presented their usual plea of a holy truce. Agesipolis answered them curtly that the gods were not satisfied with the justice of their plea, and, refusing to accept the truce, pushed forward, causing thereby great perplexity and consternation throughout the rural districts and the capital itself.

But while he was getting his evening meal that first evening in the Argive territory — just at the moment when the after-dinner libation had been poured out — the god sent an earthquake; and with one consent the Lacedaemonians, beginning with the officers of the royal quarters, sang the sacred hymn of Poseidon. The soldiers, in general, expected to retreat, arguing that, on the occurrence of an earthquake once before, Agis had retired from Elis. But

Agesipolis held another view: if the god had sent his earthquake at the moment when he was meditating invasion, he should have understood that the god forbade his entrance; but now, when the invasion was a thing effected, he must needs take it as a signal of his approval. (6) Accordingly next morning he sacrificed to Poseidon, and advanced a short distance further into the country.

(6) Or, “interpret the signal as a summons to advance.”

The late expedition of Agesilaus into Argos (7) was still fresh in men’s minds, and Agesipolis was eager to ascertain from the soldiers how close his predecessor had advanced to the fortification walls; or again, how far he had gone in ravaging the open country — not unlike a competitor in the pentathlon, (8) eager to cap the performance of his rival in each event. On one occasion it was only the discharge of missiles from the towers which forced him to recross the trenches round the walls; on another, profiting by the absence of the majority of the Argives in Laconian territory, he came so close to the gates that their officers actually shut out their own Boeotian cavalry on the point of entering, in terror lest the Lacedaemonians might pour into the town in company, and these Boeotian troopers were forced to cling, like bats to a wall, under each coign of vantage beneath the battlements. Had it not been for the accidental absence of the Cretans, (9) who had gone off on a raid to Nauplia, without a doubt numbers of men and horses would have been shot down. At a later date, while encamping in the neighbourhood of the Enclosures, (10) a thunder-bolt fell into his camp. One or two men were struck, while others died from the effect of the concussion on their brains. At a still later period he was anxious to fortify some sort of garrison outpost in the pass of Celusa, (11) but upon offering sacrifice the victims proved lobeless, (12) and he was constrained to lead back and disband his army — not

without serious injury inflicted on the Argives, as the result of an invasion which had taken them wholly by surprise.

(7) See above, “Hell.” IV. iv. 19.

(8) The pentathlon of Olympia and the other great games consisted of five contests, in the following order — (1) leaping, (2) discus- throwing, (3) javelin-throwing, (4) running, (5) wrestling. Cf. Simonides, {alma podokeien diskon akonta palen}, where, “metri gratia,” the order is inverted. The competitors were drawn in pairs. The odd man who drew a bye in any particular round or heat was called the “ephedros.” The successful athletes of the pairs, that is, those who had won any three events out of five, would then again be drawn against each other, and so on until only two were left, between whom the final heat took place. See, for an exhaustive discussion of the subject, Prof. Percy Gardner, “The Pentathlon of the Greeks” (“Journal of Hellenic Studies,” vol. i. 9, p. 210 foll. pl. viii.), from whom this note is taken.

(9) See Thuc. vii. 57.

(10) {peri tas eirktas} — what these were no one knows, possibly a stone quarry used as a prison. Cf. “Cyrop.” III. i. 19; “Mem.” II. i. 5; see Grote, “H. G.” ix. 497; Paus. III. v.. 8.

(11) Or Celossa. See Strabo, viii. 382.

(12) I.e. “hopeless.” See above, III. iv. 15.

VIII

394 B.C. Such were the land operations in the war. Meanwhile another series of events was being enacted on the sea and within the seaboard cities; and these I will now narrate in detail. But I shall confine my pen to the more memorable incidents, and others of less account I shall pass over.

In the first place, then, Pharnabazus and Conon, after defeating the Lacedaemonians in the naval engagement of Cnidus, commenced a tour of inspection round the islands and the maritime states, expelling from them, as they visited them, one after another the Spartan governors. (1) Everywhere they gave consolatory assurances to the citizens that they had no intention of establishing fortress citadels within their walls, or in any way interfering with their self-government. (2) Such words fell soothingly upon the ears of those to whom they were addressed; the proposals were courteously accepted; all were eager to present Pharnabazus with gifts of friendship and hospitality. The satrap, indeed, was only applying the instructions of his master Conon on these matters — who had taught him that if he acted thus all the states would be friendly to him, whereas, if he showed any intention to enslave them, the smallest of them would, as Conon insisted, be capable of causing a world of trouble, and the chances were, if

apprehensions were once excited, he would find himself face to face with a coalition of united Hellas. To these admonitions Pharnabazus lent a willing ear.

(1) Lit. “the Laconian harmosts.”

(2) See Hicks, 70, “Honours to Konon,” Inscript. found at Erythrae in Ionia. Cf. Diod. xiv. 84.

Accordingly, when disembarking at Ephesus, he presented Conon with a fleet of forty sail, (3) and having further instructed him to meet him at Sestos, (4) set off himself by land along the coast to visit his own provinces. For here it should be mentioned that his old enemy Dercylidas happened to be in Abydos at the time of the sea-fight; (5) nor had he at a later date suffered eclipse with the other governors, (6) but on the contrary, had kept tight hold of Abydos and still preserved it in attachment to Lacedaemon. The course he had adopted was to summon a meeting of the Abydenians, when he made them a speech as follows: “Sirs, to-day it is possible for you, who have before been friends to my city, to appear as benefactors of the Lacedaemonians. For a man to prove faithful to his friends in the heyday of their good fortune is no great marvel; but to prove steadfast when his friends are in misfortune — that is a service monumental for all time. But do not mistake me. It does not follow that, because we have been defeated in a great sea-fight, we are therefore annihilated. (7) Certainly not. Even in old days, you will admit, when Athens was mistress of the sea, our state was not powerless to benefit friends or chastise enemies. Moreover, in proportion as the rest of the cities have joined hands with fortune to turn their backs upon us, so much the more certainly will the grandeur of your fidelity shine forth. Or, is any one haunted by the fear that we may find ourselves blockaded by land and sea? — let him consider that at present there is no Hellenic navy whatever on the seas, and if the barbarian attempts to clutch the empire of the sea, Hellas will not sit by and suffer it; so that, if only in self-defence, she must inevitably take your side.”

(3) See Diod. xiv. 83.

(4) See above, “Hell.” II. i. 27 foll.

(5) See above, “Hell.” IV. iii. 3.

(6) Lit. “harmosts.”

(7) Or, “we are beaten, ergo, it is all over with us.”

To this the Abydenians lent no deaf ears, but rather responded with willingness approaching enthusiasm — extending the hand of fellowship to the ex-governors, some of whom were already flocking to Abydos as a harbour of refuge, whilst others they sent to summon from a distance.

So when a number of efficient and serviceable men had been collected, Dercylidas ventured to cross over to Sestos — lying, as it does, not more than a mile (8) distant, directly facing Abydos. There he not only set about collecting those who held lands in the Chersonese through Lacedaemonian influence, but extended his welcome also to the governors (9) who had been driven out of European states. (10) He insisted that, if they came to think of it, not even was their case desperate, reminding them that even in Asia, which originally belonged to the Persian monarch, places were to be found — such as the little state of Temnos, or Aegae, and others, capable of administering their affairs, unsubjected to the king of Persia. “But,” he added, “if you want a strong impregnable position, I cannot conceive what better you can find than Sestos. Why, it would need a combined naval and military force to invest that port.” By these and such like arguments he rescued them from the lethargy of despair.

(8) Lit. “eight stades.”

(9) Lit. “harmosts.”

(10) See Demos. “de Cor.” 96.

Now when Pharnabazus found Abydos and Sestos so conditioned, he gave them to understand that unless they chose to eject the Lacedaemonians, he would bring war to bear upon them; and when they refused to obey, having first assigned to Conon as his business to keep the sea closed against them, he proceeded in person to ravage the territory of the men of Abydos. Presently, finding himself no nearer

the fulfilment of his object — which was their reduction — he set off home himself and left it to Conon the while so to conciliate the Hellespontine states that as large a naval power as possible might be mustered against the coming spring. In his wrath against the Lacedaemonians, in return for the treatment he had received from them, his paramount object was to invade their territory and exact what vengeance he could.

B.C. 393. The winter was thus fully taken up with preparations; but with the approach of spring, Pharnabazus and Conon, with a large fleet fully manned, and a foreign mercenary brigade to boot, threaded their way through the islands to Melos. (11) This island was to serve as a base of operations against Lacedaemon. And in the first instance he sailed down to Pherae (12) and ravaged that district, after which he made successive descents at various other points on the seaboard, and did what injury he could. But in apprehension of the harbourless character of the coast, coupled with the enemy's facility of reinforcement and his own scarcity of supplies, he very soon turned back and sailed away, until finally he came to moorings in the harbour of Phoenicus in Cythera. The occupants of the city of the Cytherians, in terror of being taken by storm, evacuated the walls. To dismiss these under a flag of truce across to Laconia was his first step; his second was to repair the fortress in question and to leave a garrison in the island under an Athenian governor — Nicophemus. After this he set sail to the Isthmus of Corinth, where he delivered an exhortation to the allies begging them to prosecute the war vigorously, and to show themselves faithful to the Great King; and so, having left them all the moneys he had with him, set off on his voyage home.

(11) See Lys. xix. "de bon. Arist." 19 foll.; and Hicks, 71, "Honours to Dionysios I. and his court"; Grote, "H. G." ix. 453.

(12) Mod. Kalamata.

But Conon had a proposal to make: — If Pharnabazus would allow him to keep the fleet, he would undertake, in

the first place, to support it free of expense from the islands; besides which, he would sail to his own country and help his fellow-citizens the Athenians to rebuild their long walls and the fortifications round Piraeus. No heavier blow, he insisted, could well be inflicted on Lacedaemon. “In this way, I can assure you,” he added, “you will win the eternal gratitude of the Athenians and wreak consummate vengeance on the Lacedaemonians, since at one stroke you will render null and void that on which they have bestowed their utmost labour.” These arguments so far weighed with Pharnabazus that he despatched Conon to Athens with alacrity, and further supplied him with funds for the restoration of the walls. Thus it was that Conon, on his arrival at Athens, was able to rebuild a large portion of the walls — partly by lending his own crews, and partly by giving pay to carpenters and stone-masons, and meeting all the necessary expenses. There were other portions of the walls which the Athenians and Boeotians and other states raised as a joint voluntary undertaking.

Nor must it be forgotten that the Corinthians, with the funds left them by Pharnabazus, manned a fleet — the command of which they entrusted to their admiral Agathinus — and so were undisputed masters of the sea within the gulf round Achaia and Lechaeum.

B.C. 393-391. The Lacedaemonians, in opposition, fitted out a fleet under the command of Podanemus. That officer, in an attack of no great moment, lost his life, and Pollis, (13) his second in command, was presently in his turn obliged to retire, being wounded, whereupon Herippidas took command of the vessels. On the other hand, Proaenus the Corinthian, who had relieved Agathinus, evacuated Rhium, and the Lacedaemonians recovered that post. Subsequently Teleutias succeeded to Herippidas’s fleet, and it was then the turn of that admiral to dominate the gulf. (14)

(13) See “Hell.” I. i. 23.

(14) According to Grote (“H. G.” ix. 471, note 2), this section summarises the Lacedaemonian maritime operations in the Corinthian Gulf from the late autumn of 393 B.C. till the appointment of Teleutias in the spring or early summer of 391 B.C., the year of the expedition of Agesilaus recounted above, “Hell.” IV. iv. 19.

B.C. 392. The Lacedaemonians were well informed of the proceedings of Conon. They knew that he was not only restoring the fortifications of Athens by help of the king’s gold, but maintaining a fleet at his expense besides, and conciliating the islands and seaboard cities towards Athens. If, therefore, they could indoctrinate Tiribazus — who was a general of the king — with their sentiments, they believed they could not fail either to draw him aside to their own interests, or, at any rate, to put a stop to his feeding Conon’s navy. With this intention they sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus: (15) his orders were to carry out this policy and, if possible, to arrange a peace between Lacedaemon and the king. The Athenians, getting wind of this, sent a counter-embassy, consisting of Hermogenes, Dion, Callisthenes, and Callimedon, with Conon himself. They at the same time invited the attendance of ambassadors from the allies, and there were also present representatives of the Boeotians, of Corinth, and of Argos. When they had arrived at their destination, Antalcidas explained to Tiribazus the object of his visit: he wished, if possible, to cement a peace between the state he represented and the king — a peace, moreover, exactly suited to the aspirations of the king himself; in other words, the Lacedaemonians gave up all claim to the Hellenic cities in Asia as against the king, while for their own part they were content that all the islands and other cities should be independent. “Such being our unbiased wishes,” he continued, “for what earthly reason should (the Hellenes or) the king go to war with us? or why should he expend his money? The king is guaranteed against attack on the part of Hellas, since the Athenians are powerless apart from our hegemony, and we are powerless so long as the separate states are independent.” The proposals of Antalcidas sounded very pleasantly in the ears of Tiribazus, but to the opponents of Sparta they were the merest talk. The

Athenians were apprehensive of an agreement which provided for the independence of the cities in the islands, whereby they might be deprived of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. The Thebans, again, were afraid of being compelled to let the Boeotian states go free. The Argives did not see how such treaty contracts and covenants were compatible with the realisation of their own great object — the absorption of Corinth by Argos. And so it came to pass that this peace (16) proved abortive, and the representatives departed each to his own home.

(15) See Plut. “Ages.” xxiii. (Clough, iv. p. 27); and for the date B.C. 392 (al. B.C. 393) see Grote, “H. G.” ix. 498.

(16) See Andoc. “de Pace”; Jebb, “Attic Or.” i. 83, 128 foll. Prof. Jebb assigns this speech to B.C. 390 rather than B.C. 391. See also Grote, “H. G.” ix. 499; Diod. xiv. 110.

Tiribazus, on his side, thought it hardly consistent with his own safety to adopt the cause of the Lacedaemonians without the concurrence of the king — a scruple which did not prevent him from privately presenting Antalcidas with a sum of money, in hopes that when the Athenians and their allies discovered that the Lacedaemonians had the wherewithal to furnish a fleet, they might perhaps be more disposed to desire peace. Further, accepting the statements of the Lacedaemonians as true, he took on himself to secure the person of Conon, as guilty of wrongdoing towards the king, and shut him up. (17) That done, he set off up country to the king to recount the proposals of Lacedaemon, with his own subsequent capture of Conon as a mischievous man, and to ask for further guidance on all these matters.

(17) See Diod. xiv. 85; and Corn. Nep. 5.

On the arrival of Tiribazus at the palace, the king sent down Struthas to take charge of the seaboard district. The latter, however, was a strong partisan of Athens and her allies, since he found it impossible to forget the long list of evils which the king’s country had suffered at the hands of Agesilaus; so that the Lacedaemonians, contrasting the hostile disposition of the new satrap towards themselves

with his friendliness to the Athenians, sent Thibron to deal with him by force of arms.

B.C. 391. (18) That general crossed over and established his base of operations in Ephesus and the towns in the plain of the Maeander — Priene, Leucophrys, and Achilleum — and proceeded to harry the king’s territory, sparing neither live nor dead chattels. But as time went on, Struthas, who could not but note the disorderly, and indeed recklessly scornful manner in which the Lacedaemonian brought up his supports on each occasion, despatched a body of cavalry into the plain. Their orders were to gallop down and scour the plain, making a clean sweep (19) of all they could lay their hands on. Thibron, as it befell, had just finished breakfast, and was returning to the mess with Thersander the flute-player. The latter was not only a good flute-player, but, as affecting Lacedaemonian manners, laid claim to personal prowess. Struthas, then, seeing the disorderly advance of the supports and the paucity of the vanguard, appeared suddenly at the head of a large body of cavalry, all in orderly array. Thibron and Thersander were the first to be cut down, and when these had fallen the rest of the troops were easily turned. A mere chase ensued, in which man after man was felled to earth, though a remnant contrived to escape into the friendly cities; still larger numbers owed their safety to their late discovery of the business on hand. Nor, indeed, was this the first time the Spartan commander had rushed to the field, without even issuing a general order. So ends the history of these events.

(18) Al. B.C. 392, al. B.C. 390.

(19) See “Hell.” VII. i. 40; “Cyrop.” I. iv. 17; III. iii. 23; “Anab.” VI. iii. 3.

B.C. 390. (20) We pass on to the arrival at Lacedaemon of a party of Rhodian exiles expelled by the popular party. They insisted that it was not equitable to allow the Athenians to subjugate Rhodes and thus build up so vast a power. The Lacedaemonians were alive to the fact that the fate of

Rhodes depended on which party in the state prevailed: if the democracy were to dominate, the whole island must fall into the hands of Athens; if the wealthier classes, (21) into their own. Accordingly they fitted out for them a fleet of eight vessels, and put Ecdicus in command of it as admiral.

(20) Grote, “H. G.” ix. 504; al. B.C. 391.

(21) Or, “the Lacedaemonians were not slow to perceive that the whole island of Rhodes was destined to fall either into the hands of Athens or of themselves, according as the democracy or the wealthier classes respectively dominated.”

At the same time they despatched another officer on board these vessels named Diphridas, on a separate mission. His orders were to cross over into Asia and to secure the states which had received Thibron. He was also to pick up the survivors of Thibron’s army, and with these troops, aided by a second army which he would collect from any other quarter open to him, he was to prosecute the war against Struthas. Diphridas followed out his instructions, and amongst other achievements was fortunate enough to capture Tigranes, (22) the son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife, on their road to Sardis. The sum paid for their ransom was so large that he at once had the wherewithal to pay his mercenaries. Diphridas was no less attractive than his predecessor Thibron; but he was of a more orderly temperament, steadier, and incomparably more enterprising as a general; the secret of this superiority being that he was a man over whom the pleasures of the body exercised no sway. He became readily absorbed in the business before him — whatever he had to do he did it with a will.

(22) See “Anab.” VII. viii. 9 for a similar exploit.

Ecdicus having reached Cnidus, there learned that the democracy in Rhones were entirely masters of the situation. They were dominant by land and sea; indeed they possessed a fleet twice the size of his own. He was therefore content to keep quiet in Cnidus until the Lacedaemonians, perceiving that his force was too small to allow him to benefit their friends, determined to relieve him. With this view they ordered Teleutias to take the twelve ships which formed his

squadron (at present in the gulf adjoining Achaia and Lechaeum), (23) and to feel his way round to Ecdicus: that officer he was to send home. For himself, he was to undertake personally to protect the interests of all who cared to be their friends, whilst injuring the enemy by every possible means.

(23) See above, IV. viii. 11.

So then Teleutias, having reached Samos, where he added some vessels to his fleet, set sail to Cnidus. At this point Ecdicus returned home, and Teleutias, continuing his voyage, reached Rhodes, at the head now of seven-and-twenty vessels. It was during this portion of the voyage that he fell in with Philocrates, the son of Ephialtes, who was sailing from Athens to Cyprus with ten triremes, in aid of their ally Evagoras. (24) The whole flotilla fell into the Spartan's hands — a curious instance, it may be added, of cross purposes on the part of both belligerents. Here were the Athenians, supposed to be on friendly terms with the king, engaged in sending an allied force to support Evagoras, who was at open war with him; and here again was Teleutias, the representative of a people at war with Persia, engaged in crippling a fleet which had been despatched on a mission hostile to their adversary. Teleutias put back into Cnidus to dispose of his captives, and so eventually reached Rhodes, where his arrival brought timely aid to the party in favour of Lacedaemon.

(24) See Diod. xiv. 98; Hicks, 72; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. p. 397; Isoc. "Evag." 54-57; Paus. I. iii. 1; Lys. "de bon. Ar." 20; Dem. p. 161.

B.C. 389. (25) And now the Athenians, fully impressed with the belief that their rivals were laying the basis of a new naval supremacy, despatched Thrasybulus the Steirian to check them, with a fleet of forty sail. That officer set sail, but abstained from bringing aid to Rhodes, and for good reasons. In Rhodes the Lacedaemonian party had hold of the fortress, and would be out of reach of his attack, especially as Teleutias was close at hand to aid them with his fleet. On

the other hand, his own friends ran no danger of succumbing to the enemy, as they held the cities and were numerically much stronger, and they had established their superiority in the field. Consequently he made for the Hellespont, where, in the absence of any rival power, he hoped to achieve some stroke of good fortune for his city. Thus, in the first place, having detected the rivalries existing between Medocus, (26) the king of the Odrysians, and Seuthes, (27) the rival ruler of the seaboard, he reconciled them to each other, and made them friends and allies of Athens; in the belief that if he secured their friendship the Hellenic cities on the Thracian coast would show greater proclivity to Athens. Such being the happy state of affairs not only in Europe but as regards the states in Asia also, thanks to the friendly attitude of the king to his fellow-citizens, he sailed into Byzantium and sold the tithe-duty levied on vessels arriving from the Euxine. By another stroke he converted the oligarchy of Byzantium into a democracy. The result of this was that the Byzantine demos (28) were no longer sorry to see as vast a concourse of Athenians in their city as possible. Having so done, and having further won the friendship of the men of Calchedon, he set sail south of the Hellespont. Arrived at Lesbos, he found all the cities devoted to Lacedaemon with the exception of Mytilene. He was therefore loth to attack any of the former until he had organised a force within the latter. This force consisted of four hundred hoplites, furnished from his own vessels, and a corps of exiles from the different cities who had sought shelter in Mytilene; to which he added a stout contingent, the pick of the Mytileneian citizens themselves. He stirred the ardour of the several contingents by suitable appeals: representing to the men of Mytilene that by their capture of the cities they would at once become the chiefs and patrons of Lesbos; to the exiles he made it appear that if they would but unite to attack each several city in turn, they might all reckon on their particular restoration; while he needed only

to remind his own warriors that the acquisition of Lesbos meant not only the attachment of a friendly city, but the discovery of a mine of wealth. The exhortations ended and the contingents organised, he advanced against Methymna.

(25) Grote, “H. G.” ix. 507.

(26) Al. Amedocus.

(27) For Seuthes, see above, “Hell.” III. ii. 2, if the same.

(28) For the varying fortunes of the democrats at Byzantium in 408 B.C. and 405 B.C., see above, (“Hell.” I. iii. 18; II. ii. 2); for the present moment, 390-389 B.C., see Demosth. “c. Lept.” 475; for the admission of Byzantium into the new naval confederacy in 378 B.C., see Hicks, 68; Kohler, “C. I. A.” ii. 19; and for B.C. 363, Isocr. “Phil.” 53; Diod. xv. 79; and for its commercial prosperity, Polyb. iv. 38-47.

Therimachus, who chanced to be the Lacedaemonian governor at the time, on hearing of the meditated attack of Thrasybulus, had taken a body of marines from his vessels, and, aided by the citizens of Methymna themselves, along with all the Mytileneian exiles to be found in that place, advanced to meet the enemy on their borders. A battle was fought and Therimachus was slain, a fate shared by several of the exiles of his party.

As a result (29) of his victory the Athenian general succeeded in winning the adhesion of some of the states; or, where adhesion was refused, he could at least raise supplies for his soldiers by freebooting expeditions, and so hastened to reach his goal, which was the island of Rhodes. His chief concern was to support as powerful an army as possible in those parts, and with this object he proceeded to levy money aids, visiting various cities, until he finally reached Aspendus, and came to moorings in the river Eurymedon. The money was safely collected from the Aspendians, and the work completed, when, taking occasion of some depredations (30) of the soldiers on the farmsteads, the people of the place in a fit of irritation burst into the general’s quarters at night and butchered him in his tent.

(29) According to some critics, B.C. 389 is only now reached.

(30) See Diod. xiv. 94.

So perished Thrasybulus, (31) a good and great man by all admission. In room of him the Athenians chose Agyrrhius, (32) who was despatched to take command of the fleet. And now the Lacedaemonians — alive to the fact that the sale of

the Euxine tithe-dues had been negotiated in Byzantium by Athens; aware also that as long as the Athenians kept hold on Calchedon the loyalty of the other Hellespontine cities was secured to them (at any rate while Pharnabazus remained their friend) — felt that the state of affairs demanded their serious attention. They attached no blame indeed to Dercylidas. Anaxibius, however, through the friendship of the ephors, contrived to get himself appointed as governor, on a mission to Abydos. With the requisite funds and ships, he promised to exert such hostile pressure upon Athens that at least her prospects in the Hellespont would cease to be so sunny. His friends the ephors granted him in return for these promises three ships of war and funds to support a thousand mercenaries, and so they despatched him on his mission. Reaching Abydos, he set about improving his naval and military position. First he collected a foreign brigade, by help of which he drew off some of the Aeolid cities from Pharnabazus. Next he set on foot a series of retaliatory expeditions against the states which attacked Abydos, marching upon them and ravaging their territories; and lastly, manning three vessels besides those which he already held in the harbour of Abydos, he intercepted and brought into port all the merchant ships of Athens or of her allies which he could lay hands on.

(31) “Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than any one else, Athens owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise, generous, and harmonious working, after renovation.” — Grote, “H. G.” ix. 509.

(32) For this statesman, see Demosth. “c. Timocr.” 742; Andoc. “de Myst.” 133; Aristot. “Ath. Pol.” 41, and Mr. Kenyon’s notes ad loc.; Aristoph. “Eccles.” 102, and the Schol. ad loc.; Diod. xiv. 99; Curtius, “H. G.” Eng tr. iv. 280.

Getting wind of these proceedings, the Athenians, fearing lest the fair foundation laid for them by Thrasybulus in the Hellespont should be ruined, sent out Iphicrates with eight vessels and twelve hundred peltasts. The majority of them (33) consisted of troops which he had commanded at Corinth. In explanation it may be stated that the Argives, when once they had appropriated Corinth and incorporated it with Argos, gave out they had no further need of Iphicrates and his troops; the real fact being that he had put

to death some of the partisans of Argos. (34) And so it was he turned his back on Corinth and found himself at home in Athens at the present crisis.

(33) Or, “The mass of them.”

(34) See Grote, “H. G.” ix. p. 491 note. The “Argolising” or philo- Argeian party, as opposed to the philo-Laconian party. See above, “Hell.” IV. iv. 6.

B.C. 389-388. When Iphicrates first reached the Chersonese he and Anaxibius carried on war against each other by the despatch of guerilla or piratic bands across the straits. But as time wore on, information reached him of the departure of Anaxibius to Antandrus, accompanied by his mercenaries and his own bodyguard of Laconians and two hundred Abydenian hoplites. Hearing further that Anaxibius had won the friendly adhesion of Antandrus, Iphicrates conjectured that after establishing a garrison in that place he would make the best of his way back, if only to bring the Abydenians home again. He therefore crossed in the night, selecting a desert point on the Abydene coast, from which he scaled the hills above the town and planted himself in ambuscade within their folds. The triremes which brought him across had orders at break of day to coast up northwards along the Chersonese, which would suggest the notion that he was only out on one of his customary voyages to collect money. The sequel more than fulfilled his expectations. Anaxibius began his return march, and if report speaks truly, he did so notwithstanding that the victims were against his marching that day; contemptuously disregarding the warning, and satisfied that his march lay all along through a friendly country and was directed to a friendly city. Besides which, those whom he met assured him that Iphicrates was off on a voyage to Proconnesus: hence the unusual absence of precaution on the march. On his side Iphicrates saw the chance, but, so long as the troops of Anaxibius lingered on the level bottoms, refused to spring from his lair, waiting for the moment when the Abydenian division in the van was safely landed in the plain of

Cremaste, at the point where the gold mines stand; the main column following on the downward slope, and Anaxibius with his Laconians just beginning the descent. At that instant Iphicrates set his ambuscade in motion, and dashed against the Spartan at full speed. The latter quickly discerned that there was no hope of escape as he scanned the long straggling line of his attenuated column. The troops in advance, he was persuaded, would never be able to come back to his aid up the face of that acclivity; besides which, he observed the utter bewilderment of the whole body at sight of the ambuscade. He therefore turned to those next him, and spoke as follows: “Sirs, it is good for me to die on this spot, where honour bids me; but for you, sirs, yonder your path lies, haste and save yourselves (35) before the enemy can close with us.” As the words died on his lips he took from the hands of his attendant shield-bearer his heavy shield, and there, at his post, unflinchingly fought and fell; not quite alone, for by his side faithfully lingered a favourite youth, and of the Lacedaemonian governors who had rallied to Abydos from their several cities yet other twelve fought and fell beside the pair. The rest fled, dropping down one by one as the army pursued them to the walls of the city. The death-roll amounted to something like fifty hoplites of the Abydenians, and of the rest two hundred. After this exploit Iphicrates returned to the Chersonese. (36)

(35) Or, “sauve qui peut.”

(36) See Hicks, 76; and below, “Hell.” V. i. 31.

BOOK V

I

B.C. 388. Such was the state of affairs in the Hellespont, so far at least as Athens and Sparta are concerned. Eteonicus was once more in Aegina; and notwithstanding that the Aeginetans and Athenians had up to this time held commercial intercourse, yet now that the war was plainly to be fought out on the sea, that officer, with the concurrence of the ephorate, gave permission to any one who liked to plunder Attica. (1) The Athenians retaliated by despatching a body of hoplites under their general Pamphilus, who constructed a fort against the Aeginetans, (2) and proceeded to blockade them by land and sea with ten warships. Teleutias, however, while threading his way among the islands in question of contributions, had chanced to reach a point where he received information of the turn in affairs with regard to the construction of the fortress, whereupon he came to the rescue of the beleaguered Aeginetans, and so far succeeded that he drove off the enemy's blockading squadron. But Pamphilus kept a firm hold on the offensive fortress, and was not to be dislodged.

(1) Or, "determined to let slip the hounds of war;" or, more prosaically, "issued letters of marque." See Grote, "H. G." ix. 517.

(2) I.e. in Aegina as an {epiteikhisma}.

After this the new admiral Hierax arrived from Lacedaemon. The naval force was transferred into his successor's hands, and under the happiest auspices Teleutias set sail for home. As he descended to the seashore to start on his homeward voyage there was not one among his soldiers who had not a warm shake of the hand for their old admiral. Here one presented him with a crown, and there another with a victor's wreath; and those who arrived too late, still, as the ship weighed anchor, threw garlands into the sea and wafted him many a blessing with prayerful lips. I

am well aware that in the above incident I have no memorable story of munificence, peril, or invention to narrate, but in all sincerity I protest that a man may find food for reflection in the inquiry what Teleutias had done to create such a disposition in his subordinates. Here we are brought face to face with a true man’s work more worthy of account than multitudes of riches or adventure. (3)

(3) See Grote, “H. G.” ix. 518: “The ideal of government as it presented itself to Xenophon was the paternal despotism or something like it,” {to ethelonton arkhein}. Cf. “Cyrop.” passim, “Heiro,” and his various other compositions.

The new admiral Hierax, taking with him the larger portion of the fleet, set sail once more for Rhodes. He left behind him twelve vessels in Aegina under his vice-admiral Gorgopas, who was now installed as governor of that island. In consequence of this chance the Athenian troops inside the fortres were more blockaded than the Aeginetans themselves, so much so that a vote was passed by the Athenian assembly, in obedience to which a large fleet was manned, and the garrison, after four months’ sojourn in Aegina, were brought back. But this was no sooner done than they began to be harassed by Gorgopas and the privateers again. To operate aganst these they fitted out thirteen vessels, choosing Eunomus as admiral in command. Hierax was still in Rhodes when the Lacedaemonians sent out a new admiral, Antalcidas; they believed that they could not find a better mode of gratifying Tiribazus. Accordingly Antalcidas, after visiting Aegina in order to pick up the vessels under Gorgopas, set sail for Ephesus. At this point he sent back Gorgopas with his twelve ships to Aegina, and appointed his vice-admiral Nicolochus to command the remainder of the fleet.

Nicolochus was to relieve Abydos, and thither set sail; but in the course of the voyage turned aside to Tenedos, where he ravaged the territory, and, with the money so secured, sailed on to Abydos. The Athenian generals (4) on their side, collecting from Samothrace, Thasos, and the fortresses in that quarter, hastened to the relief of Tenedos; but, finding

that Nicolochus had continued his voyage to Abydos, they selected the Chersonese as their base, and proceeded to blockade him and his fleet of five-and-twenty vessels with the two-and-thirty vessels under their joint command.

(4) And among the rest Iphicrates and Diotimus. See below, S. 25; above, IV. viii. 39.

Meanwhile Gorgopas, returning from Ephesus, fell in with the Athenian admiral Eunomus, and, shunning an encounter at the moment, sought shelter in Aegina, which he reached a little before sunset; and at once disembarking his men, set them down to their evening meal; whilst Eunomus on his side, after hanging back for a little while, sailed away. Night fell, and the Athenian, showing the customary signal light to prevent his squadron straggling, led the way in the darkness. Gorgopas instantly got his men on board again, and, taking the lantern for his guide, followed the Athenians, craftily lagging behind a little space, so as not to show himself or raise any suspicion of his presence. In place of the usual cry the boatswains timed the rowers by a clink of stones, and silently the oars slid, feathering through the waves (5); and just when the squadron of Eunomus was touching the coast, off Cape Zoster (6) in Attica, the Spartan sounded the bugle-note for the charge. Some of Eunomus's vessels were in the act of discharging their crews, others were still getting to their moorings, whilst others were as yet only bearing down to land. The engagement was fought by the light of the moon, and Gorgopas captured four triremes, which he tied astern, and so set sail with his prizes in tow towards Aegina. The rest of the Athenian squadron made their escape into the harbour of Piraeus.

(5) Lit. "the boatswains employing a clink of stones and a sliding motion of the oars."

(6) I.e. "Cape Girdle," mod. Cape Karvura. See Tozer, "Geog. of Greece," pp. 78, 372.

It was after these events that Chabrias (7) commenced his voyage to Cyprus, bringing relief to Evagoras. His force consisted at first of eight hundred light troops and ten triremes, but was further increased by other vessels from Athens and a body of heavy infantry. Thus reinforced, the

admiral chose a night and landed in Aegina; and secreted himself in ambuscade with his light troops in hollow ground some way beyond the temple of Heracles. At break of day, as prearranged, the Athenian hoplites made their appearance under command of Demaenetus, and began mounting up between two and three miles (8) beyond the Kerakleion at Tripurgia, as it is called. The news soon reached Gorgopas, who sallied out to the rescue with the Aeginetans and the marines of his vessels, being further accompanied by eight Spartans who happened to be with him. Not content with these he issued orders inviting any of the ships' crews, who were free men, to join the relief party. A large number of these sailors responded. They armed themselves as best they could, and the advance commenced. When the vanguard were well past the ambuscade, Chabrias and his men sprang up from their hiding-place, and poured a volley of javelins and stones upon the enemy. At the same moment the hoplites, who had disembarked, (9) were advancing, so that the Spartan vanguard, in the absence of anything like collective action, were speedily cut down, and among them fell Gorgopas with the Lacedaemonians. At their fall the rest of course turned and fled. One hundred and fifty Aeginetans were numbered among the slain, while the loss incurred by the foreigners, metics, and sailors who had joined the relief party, reached a total of two hundred. After this the Athenians sailed the sea as freely as in the times of actual peace. Nor would anything induce the sailors to row a single stroke for Eteonicus — even under pressure — since he had no pay to give.

(7) According to Diod. xiv. 92, Chabrias had been for some time in Corinth. See also above, IV. viii. 24.

(8) Lit. "about sixteen stades."

(9) Or, reading {oi anabebekotes}, "who had scaled the height." See Hartman, "Anal. Xen." p. 364.

Subsequently the Lacedaemonians despatched Teleutias once again to take command of the squadron, and when the sailors saw it was he who had come, they were overjoyed. He summoned a meeting and addressed them thus: "Soldiers, I

am back again, but I bring with me no money. Yet if God be willing, and your zeal flag not, I will endeavour to supply you with provisions without stint. Be well assured, as often as I find myself in command of you, I have but one prayer — that your lives may be spared no less than mine; and as for the necessaries of existence, perhaps it would astonish you if I said I would rather you should have them than I. Yet by the gods I swear I would welcome two days' starvation in order to spare you one. Was not my door open in old days to every comer? Open again it shall stand now; and so it shall be; where your own board overflows, you shall look in and mark the luxury of your general; but if at other times you see him bearing up against cold and heat and sleepless nights, you must apply the lesson to yourselves and study to endure those evils. I do not bid you do aught of this for self-mortification's sake, but that you may derive some after-blessing from it. Soldiers, let Lacedaemon, our own mother-city, be to you an example. Her good fortune is reputed to stand high. That you know; and you know too, that she purchased her glory and her greatness not by faint-heartedness, but by choosing to suffer pain and incur dangers in the day of need. 'Like city,' I say, 'like citizens.' You, too, as I can bear you witness, have been in times past brave; but to-day must we strive to be better than ourselves. So shall we share our pains without repining, and when fortune smiles, mingle our joys; for indeed the sweetest thing of all surely is to flatter no man, Hellene or Barbarian, for the sake of hire; we will suffice to ourselves, and from a source to which honour pre-eminently invites us; since, I need not remind you, abundance won from the enemy in war furnishes forth not bodily nutrition only, but a feast of glory the wide world over."

So he spoke, and with one voice they all shouted to him to issue what orders he thought fit; they would not fail him in willing service. The general's sacrifice was just concluded, and he answered: "Good, then, my men; go now, as

doubtless you were minded, and take your evening meal, and next provide yourselves, please, with one day’s food. After that repair to your ships without delay, for we have a voyage on hand, whither God wills, and must arrive in time.” So then, when the men returned, he embarked them on their ships, and sailed under cover of night for the great harbour of Piraeus: at one time he gave the rowers rest, passing the order to take a snatch of sleep; at another he pushed forward towards his goal with rise and fall of oars. If any one supposes that there was a touch of madness in such an expedition — with but twelve triremes to attack an enemy possessed of a large fleet — he should consider the calculations of Teleutias. He was under the firm persuasion that the Athenians were more careless than ever about their navy in the harbour since the death of Gorgopas; and in case of finding warships riding at anchor — even so, there was less danger, he conjectured, in attacking twenty ships in the port of Athens than ten elsewhere; for, whereas, anywhere outside the harbour the sailors would certainly be quartered on board, at Athens it was easy to divine that the captains and officers would be sleeping at their homes, and the crews located here and there in different quarters.

This minded he set sail, and when he was five or six furlongs (10) distant from the harbour he lay on his oars and rested. But with the first streak of dawn he led the way, the rest following. The admiral’s orders to the crews were explicit. They were on no account to sink any merchant vessel; they were equally to avoid damaging (11) their own vessels, but if at any point they espied a warship at her moorings they must try and cripple her. The trading vessels, provided they had got their cargoes on board, they must seize and tow out of the harbour; those of larger tonnage they were to board wherever they could and capture the crews. Some of his men actually jumped on to the Deigma quay, (12) where they seized hold of various traders and

pilots and deposited them bodily on board ship. So the Spartan admiral carried out his programme.

(10) Lit. “five or six stades.”

(11) See Hartman, “Anal. Xen.” pp. 365, 366.

(12) See Grote (“H. G.” ix. 523): cf. Thuc. ii. 94, the attempt of Brasidas on the port of Megara. For the wealth of Piraeus, Grote “H. G.” ix. 351. See below, “Pol. Ath.” i. 17; “Rev.” iii. 13.

As to the Athenians, meanwhile, some of them who got wind of what was happening rushed from indoors outside to see what the commotion meant, others from the streets home to get their arms, and others again were off to the city with the news. The whole of Athens rallied to the rescue at that instant, heavy infantry and cavalry alike, the apprehension being that Piraeus was taken. But the Spartan sent off the captured vessels to Aegina, telling off three or four of his triremes to convoy them thither; with the rest he followed along the coast of Attica, and emerging in seemingly innocent fashion from the harbour, captured a number of fishing smacks, and passage boats laden with passengers crossing to Piraeus from the islands; and finally, on reaching Sunium he captured some merchantmen laden with corn or other merchandise. After these performances he sailed back to Aegina, where he sold his prizes, and with the proceeds was able to provide his troops with a month’s pay, and for the future was free to cruise about and make what reprisals chance cast in his way. By such a procedure he was able to support a full quota of mariners on board his squadron, and procured to himself the prompt and enthusiastic service of his troops.

B.C. 388-387. Antalcidas had now returned from the Persian court with Tiribazus. The negotiations had been successful. He had secured the alliance of the Persian king and his military co-operation in case the Athenians and their allies refused to abide by the peace which the king dictated. But learning that his second in command, Nicolochus, was being blockaded with his fleet by Iphicrates and Diotimus (13) in Abydos, he set off at once by land for that city. Being

come thither he took the fleet one night and put out to sea, having first spread a story that he had invitations from a party in Calchedon; but as a matter of fact he came to anchorage in Percote and there kept quiet. Meanwhile the Athenian forces under Demaenetus and Dionysius and Leontichus and Phanias had got wind of his movement, and were in hot pursuit towards Proconnesus. As soon as they were well past, the Spartan veered round and returned to Abydos, trusting to information brought him of the approach of Polyxenus with the Syracusan (14) and Italian squadron of twenty ships, which he wished to pick up and incorporate with his own.

(13) See above; Lysias, “de bon. Arist.” (Jebb, “Att. Or.” i. p. 327).

(14) See below, VI. ii. 4 foll; Hicks, 71, 84, 88.

A little later the Athenian Thrasybulus (15) (of Collytus) was making his way up with eight ships from Thrace, his object being to effect a junction with the main Athenian squadron. The scouts signalled the approach of eight triremes, whereupon Antalcidas, embarking his marines on board twelve of the fastest sailers of his fleet, ordered them to make up their full complements, where defective, from the remaining vessels; and so lay to, skulking in his lair with all possible secrecy. As soon as the enemy’s vessels came sailing past he gave chase; and they catching sight of him took to flight. With his swiftest sailors he speedily overhauled their laggards, and ordering his vanguard to let these alone, he followed hard on those ahead. But when the foremost had fallen into his clutches, the enemy’s hinder vessels, seeing their leaders taken one by one, out of sheer despondency fell an easy prey to the slower sailors of the foe, so that not one of the eight vessels escaped.

(15) His name occurs on the famous stele of the new Athenian confederacy, B.C. 378. See Hicks, 81; Kohler, “C. I. A.” ii. 17; Demos. “de. Cor.” p. 301; Arist. “Rhet.” ii. 23; Demos. “c. Timocr.” 742.

Presently the Syracusan squadron of twenty vessels joined him, and again another squadron from Ionia, or rather so much of that district as lay under the control of Tiribazus.

The full quota of the contingent was further made up from the territory of Ariobarzanes (which whom Antalcidas kept up a friendship of long standing), in the absence of Pharnabazus, who by this date had already been summoned up country on the occasion of his marriage with the king’s daughter. With this fleet, which, from whatever sources derived, amounted to more than eighty sail, Antalcidas ruled the seas, and was in a position not only to cut off the passage of vessels bound to Athens from the Euxine, but to convoy them into the harbours of Sparta’s allies.

The Athenians could not but watch with alarm the growth of the enemy’s fleet, and began to fear a repetition of their former discomfiture. To be trampled under foot by the hostile power seemed indeed no remote possibility, now that the Lacedaemonians had procured an ally in the person of the Persian monarch, and they were in little less than a state of siege themselves, pestered as they were by privateers from Aegina. On all these grounds the Athenians became passionately desirous of peace. (16) The Lacedaemonians were equally out of humour with the war for various reasons — what with their garrison duties, one mora at Lechaeum and another at Orchomenus, and the necessity of keeping watch and ward on the states, if loyal not to lose them, if disaffected to prevent their revolt; not to mention that reciprocity of annoyance (17) of which Corinth was the centre. So again the Argives had a strong appetite for peace; they knew that the ban had been called out against them, and, it was plain, that no fictitious alteration of the calendar would any longer stand them in good stead. Hence, when Tiribazus issued a summons calling on all who were willing to listen to the terms of peace sent down by the king (18) to present themselves, the invitation was promptly accepted. At the opening of the conclave (19) Tiribazus pointed to the king’s seal attached to the document, and proceeded to read the contents, which ran as follows:

(16) See, at this point, Grote on the financial condition of Athens and the “Theorikon,” “H. G.” ix. 525.

(17) Or, “that give-and-take of hard knocks.”

(18) See Hicks, 76.

(19) At Sardis, doubtless.

“The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just that the cities in Asia, with the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, should belong to himself; the rest of the Hellenic cities he thinks it just to leave independent, both small and great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which three are to belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the parties concerned not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will war against him or them with those who share my views. This will I do by land and by sea, with ships and with money.”

After listening to the above declaration the ambassadors from the several states proceeded to report the same to their respective governments. One and all of these took the oaths (20) to ratify and confirm the terms unreservedly, with the exception of the Thebans, who claimed to take the oaths in behalf of all Boeotians. This claim Agesilaus repudiated: unless they chose to take the oaths in precise conformity with the words of the king’s edict, which insisted on “the future autonomy of each state, small or great,” he would not admit them. To this the Theban ambassadors made no other reply, except that the instructions they had received were different. “Pray go, then,” Agesilaus retorted, “and ask the question; and you may inform your countrymen that if they will not comply, they will be excluded from the treaty.” The Theban ambassadors departed, but Agesilaus, out of hatred to the Thebans, took active measures at once. Having got the consent of the ephors he forthwith offered sacrifice. The offerings for crossing the frontier were propitious, and he pushed on to Tegea. From Tegea he despatched some of the knights right and left to visit the perioeci and hasten their mobilisation, and at the same time sent commanders of foreign brigades to the allied cities on a similar errand. But before he had started from Tegea the answer from Thebes arrived; the point was yielded, they would suffer the states

to be independent. Under these circumstances the Lacedaemonians returned home, and the Thebans were forced to accept the truce unconditionally, and to recognise the autonomy of the Boeotian cities. (21) But now the Corinthians were by no means disposed to part with the garrison of the Argives. Accordingly Agesilaus had a word of warning for both. To the former he said, “if they did not forthwith dismiss the Argives,” and to the latter, “if they did not instantly quit Corinth,” he would march an army into their territories. The terror of both was so great that the Argives marched out of Corinth, and Corinth was once again left to herself; (22) whereupon the “butchers” (23) and their accomplices in the deed of blood determined to retire from Corinth, and the rest of the citizens welcomed back their late exiles voluntarily.

(20) At Sparta, doubtless.

(21) See Freeman, op. cit. pp. 168, 169.

(22) See “Ages.” ii. 21; Grote, “H. G.” ix. 537.

(23) {oi sphageis}, a party catchword (in reference to the incidents narrated above, “Hell.” IV. iv. 2). See below, {ton bareon demagogon}, “Hell.” V. ii. 7; {oi kedomenoi tes Peloponnesou}, “Hell.” VII. v. 1; above, {oi sphageis}, “Hell.” III. ii. 27, of the philo-Laconian oligarchs in Elis. See Dem. “c. Lept.” 473.

Now that the transactions were complete, and the states were bound by their oaths to abide by the peace sent down to them by the king, the immediate result was a general disarmament, military and naval forces being alike disbanded; and so it was that the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, with their allies, found themselves in the enjoyment of peace for the first time since the period of hostilities subsequent to the demolition of the walls of Athens. From a condition which, during the war, can only be described as a sort of even balance with their antagonists, the Lacedaemonians now emerged; and reached a pinnacle of glory consequent upon the Peace of Antalcidas, (24) so called. As guarantors of the peace presented by Hellas to the king, and as administrators personally of the autonomy of the states, they had added Corinth to their alliance; they had obtained the independence of the states of Boeotia at

the expense of Thebes, (25) which meant the gratification of an old ambition; and lastly, by calling out the ban in case the Argives refused to evacuate Corinth, they had put a stop to the appropriation of that city by the Argives.

(24) Or, more correctly, the peace “under,” or “at the date of,” {ep ‘Antalkidou}. See Grote, “H. G.” x. 1, note 1.

(25) Or, “they had made the states of Boeotia independent of Thebes.” See Grote, “H. G.” x. 44.

II

B.C. 386. Indeed the late events had so entirely shaped themselves in conformity with the wishes of the Lacedaemonians, that they determined to go a step farther and chastise those of their allies who either had borne hard on them during the war, or otherwise had shown themselves less favourable to Lacedaemon than to her enemies. (1) Chastisement was not all; they must lay down such secure foundations for the future as should render the like disloyalty impossible again. (2) As the first step towards this policy they sent a dictatorial message to the Mantinaeans, and bade them raze their fortifications, on the sole ground that they could not otherwise trust them not to side with their enemies. Many things in their conduct, they alleged, from time to time, had not escaped their notice: their frequent despatches of corn to the Argives while at war with Lacedaemon; at other times their refusal to furnish contingents during a campaign, on the pretext of some holy truce or other; (3) or if they did reluctantly take the field — the miserable inefficiency of their service. “But, more than that,” they added, “we note the jealousy with which you eye any good fortune which may betide our state; the extravagant pleasure (4) you exhibit at the sudden descent of some disaster.”

(1) See Hartman, “An. Xen.” p. 367 foll.; Busolt, “Die Lak.” p. 129 foll.

(2) Or, “they determined to chastise… and reduce to such order that disloyalty should be impossible.”

(3) See above, “Hell.” IV. ii. 16.

(4) Ib. IV. v. 18.

This very year, moreover, it was commonly said, (5) saw the expiration, as far as the Mantineans were concerned, of the thirty years' truce, consequent upon the battle of Mantinea. On their refusal, therefore, to raze their fortification walls the ban was called out against them. Agesilaus begged the state to absolve him from the conduct of this war on the plea that the city of Mantinea had done frequent service to his father (6) in his Messenian wars. Accordingly Agesipolis led the expedition — in spite of the cordial relations of his father Pausanias (7) with the leaders of the popular party in Mantinea.

(5) As to this point, see Curtius, "H. G." V. v. (iv. 305 note, Eng. trans.) There appears to be some confusion. According to Thuc. v. 81, "When the Argives deserted the alliance (with Mantinea, Athens, and Elis, making a new treaty of alliance with Lacedaemon for fifty years) the Mantineans held out for a time, but without the Argives they were helpless, and so they came to terms with the Lacedaemonians, and gave up their claims to supremacy over the cities in Arcadia, which had been subject to them.... These changes were effected at the close of winter (418 B.C.) towards the approach of spring (417 B.C.), and so ended the fourteenth year of the war." Jowett. According to Diod. xv. 5, the Lacedaemonians attacked Mantinea within two years after the Peace of Antalcidas, apparently in 386 B.C. According to Thuc. v. 82, and "C. I. A. 50, in B.C. 417 Argos had reverted to her alliance with Athens, and an attempt to connect the city with the sea by long walls was made, certain other states in Peloponnese being privy to the project" (Thuc. v. 83) — an attempt frustrated by Lacedaemon early in B.C. 416. Is it possible that a treaty of alliance between Mantinea and Lacedaemon for thirty years was formally signed in B.C. 416?

(6) I.e. Archidamus.

(7) See above, "Hell." III. v. 25.

B.C. 385. The first move of the invader was to subject the enemy's territory to devastation; but failing by such means to induce them to raze their walls, he proceeded to draw lines of circumvallation round the city, keeping half his troops under arms to screen the entrenching parties whilst the other half pushed on the work with the spade. As soon as the trench was completed, he experienced no further difficulty in building a wall round the city. Aware, however, of the existence of a huge supply of corn inside the town, the result of the bountiful harvest of the preceding year, and averse to the notion of wearing out the city of Lacedaemon and her allies by tedious campaigning, he hit upon the expedient of damming up the river which flowed through the town.

It was a stream of no inconsiderable size. (8) By erecting a barrier at its exit from the town he caused the water to rise above the basements of the private dwellings and the foundations of the fortification walls. Then, as the lower

layers of bricks became saturated and refused their support to the rows above, the wall began to crack and soon to totter to its fall. The citizens for some time tried to prop it with pieces of timber, and used other devices to avert the imminent ruin of their tower; but finding themselves overmatched by the water, and in dread lest the fall at some point or other of the circular wall (9) might deliver them captive to the spear of the enemy, they signified their consent to raze their walls. But the Lacedaemonians now steadily refused any form of truce, except on the further condition that the Mantineans would suffer themselves to be broken up and distributed into villages. They, looking the necessity in the face, consented to do even that. The sympathisers with Argos among them, and the leaders of their democracy, thought their fate was sealed. Then the father treated with the son, Pausanias with Agesipolis, on their behalf, and obtained immunity for them — sixty in number — on condition that they should quit the city. The Lacedaemonian troops stood lining the road on both sides, beginning from the gates, and watched the outgoers; and with their spears in their hands, in spite of bitter hatred, kept aloof from them with less difficulty than the Mantineans of the better classes themselves — a weighty testimony to the power of Spartan discipline, be it said. In conclusion, the wall was razed, and Mantinea split up into four parts, (10) assuming once again its primitive condition as regards inhabitants. The first feeling was one of annoyance at the necessity of pulling down their present houses and erecting others, yet when the owners (11) found themselves located so much nearer their estates round about the villages, in the full enjoyment of aristocracy, and rid for ever of “those troublesome demagogues,” they were delighted with the turn which affairs had taken. It became the custom for Sparta to send them, not one commander of contingents, (12) but four, one for each village; and the zeal displayed, now that the quotas for military service were furnished from

the several village centres, was far greater than it had been under the democratic system. So the transactions in connection with Mantinea were brought to a conclusion, and thereby one lesson of wisdom was taught mankind — not to conduct a river through a fortress town.

(8) I.e. the Ophis. See Leake, “Morea,” III. xxiv. p. 71; Pausan. “Arcad.” 8; Grote, “H. G.” x. 48, note 2.

(9) Or, “in the circuit of the wall.”

(10) See Diod. xv. 5; Strab. viii. 337; Ephor. fr. 138, ed. Did.; and Grote, “H. G.” x. 51.

(11) Or, “holders of properties.” The historian is referring not to the population at large, I think, but to the rich landowners, i.e. the {Beltistoi}, and is not so partial as Grote supposes (“H. G.” x. 51 foll.)

(12) Technically {zenagoi}, Lacedaemonian officers who commanded the contingents of the several allies. See above, “Hell.” III. v. 7; Thuc. ii. 76; and Arnold’s note ad loc.; also C. R. Kennedy, “ap. Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities,” s.v.; Muller, “Dorians,” ii. 250, Eng. tr.; Busolt, “Die Lak.” p. 125.

B.C. 384-383. To pass on. The party in exile from Phlius, seeing the severe scrutiny to which the behaviour of the allies of Lacedaemon during the late war was being subjected, felt that their opportunity had come. They repaired to Lacedaemon, and laid great emphasis on the fact that, so long as they had been in power themselves at home, “their city used to welcome Lacedaemonians within her walls, and her citizens flocked to the campaign under their leadership; but no sooner had they been driven into exile than a change had come. The men of Phlius now flatly refused to follow Lacedaemon anywhere; the Lacedaemonians, alone of all men living, must not be admitted within their gates.” After listening to their story, the ephors agreed that the matter demanded attention. Then they sent to the state of Phlius a message to this effect; the Phliasian exiles were friends of Lacedaemon; nor did it appear that they owed their exile to any misdoing. Under the circumstances, Lacedaemon claimed their recall from banishment, not by force, but as a concession voluntarily granted. When the matter was thus stated, the Phliasians were not without alarm that an army might much upon Phlius, and a party inside the town might admit the enemy within the walls; for within the walls of Phlius were to be found many who, either as blood relations or for other reasons, were partisans of the exiles, and as so often

happens, at any rate in the majority of states, there was a revolutionary party who, in their ardour to reform, would welcome gladly their restoration. Owing to fears of this character, a formal decree was passed: to welcome home the exiles, and to restore to them all undisputed property, the purchasers of the same being indemnified from the treasury of the state; and in the event of any ambiguity or question arising between the parties, the same to be determined before a court of justice. Such was the position of affairs in connection with the Phliasian exiles at the date in question.

B.C. 383. (13) And now from yet another quarter ambassadors arrived at Lacedaemon: that is to say, from Acanthus and Apollonia, the two largest and most important states of the Olynthian confederacy. The ephorate, after learning from them the object of their visit, presented them to the assembly and the allies, in presence of whom Cleigenes of Acanthus made a speech to this effect:

(13) Al. B.C. 382.

“Men of Lacedaemon and of the allied states,” he said, “are you aware of a silent but portentous growth within the bosom of Hellas? (14) Few here need to be told that for size and importance Olynthus now stands at the head of the Thracian cities. But are you aware that the citizens of Olynthus had already brought over several states by the bribe of joint citizenship and common laws; that they have forcibly annexed some of the larger states; and that, so encouraged, they have taken in hand further to free the cities of Macedonia from Amyntas the king of the Macedonians; that, as soon as their immediate neighbours had shown compliance, they at once proceeded to attack larger and more distant communities; so much so, that when we started to come hither, we left them masters not only of many other places, but of Pella itself, the capital of Macedonia. Amyntas, (15) we saw plainly, must ere long

withdraw from his cities, and was in fact already all but in name an outcast from Macedonia.

(14) Or, “are you aware of a new power growing up in Hellas?”

(15) For Amyntas’s reign, see Diod. xiv. 89, 92; xv. 19; Isocr. “Panegyr.” 126, “Archid.” 46.

“The Olynthians have actually sent to ourselves and to the men of Apollonia a joint embassy, warning us of their intention to attack us if we refuse to present ourselves at Olynthus with a military contingent. Now, for our parts, men of Lacedaemon, we desire nothing better than to abide by our ancestral laws and institutions, to be free and independent citizens; but if aid from without is going to fail us, we too must follow the rest and coalesce with the Olynthians. Why, even now they muster no less than eight hundred (16) heavy infantry and a considerably larger body of light infantry, while their cavalry, when we have joined them, will exceed one thousand men. At the date of our departure we left embassies from Athens and Boeotia in Olynthus, and we were told that the Olynthians themselves had passed a formal resolution to return the compliment. They were to send an embassy on their side to the aforesaid states to treat of an alliance. And yet, if the power of the Athenians and the Thebans is to be further increased by such an accession of strength, look to it,” the speaker added, “whether hereafter you will find things so easy to manage in that quarter.

(16) See Grote, “H. G.” x. 72; Thirlwall, “H. G.” v. 12 (ch. xxxvii).

“They hold Potidaea, the key to the isthmus of Pallene, and therefore, you can well believe, they can command the states within that peninsula. If you want any further proof of the abject terror of those states, you have it in the fact that notwithstanding the bitter hatred which they bear to Olynthus, not one of them has dared to send ambassadors along with us to apprise you of these matters.

“Reflect, how you can reconcile your anxiety to prevent the unification of Boeotia with your neglect to hinder the

solidifying of a far larger power — a power destined, moreover, to become formidable not on land only, but by sea? For what is to stop it, when the soil itself supplies timber for shipbuilding, (17) and there are rich revenues derived from numerous harbours and commercial centres? — it cannot but be that abundance of food and abundance of population will go hand in hand. Nor have we yet reached the limits of Olynthian expansion; there are their neighbours to be thought of — the kingless or independent Thracians. These are already to-day the devoted servants of Olynthus, and when it comes to their being actually under her, that means at once another vast accession of strength to her. With the Thracians in her train, the gold mines of Pangaeus would stretch out to her the hand of welcome.

(17) See Hicks, 74, for a treaty between Amyntas and the Chalcidians, B.C. 390-389: "The article of the treaty between Amyntas III., father of Philip, and the Chalcidians, about timber, etc., reminds us that South Macedonia, the Chalcidic peninsula, and Amphipolis were the chief sources whence Athens derived timber for her dockyards." Thuc. iv. 108; Diod. xx. 46; Boeckh, "P. E. A." p. 250; and for a treaty between Athens and Amyntas, B.C. 382, see Hicks, 77; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 397, 423.

"In making these assertions, we are but uttering remarks ten thousand times repeated in the democracy of Olynthus. And as to their confident spirit, who shall attempt to describe it? It is God, for aught I know, who, with the growth of a new capacity, gives increase also to the proud thoughts and vast designs of humanity. For ourselves, men of Lacedaemon and of the allied states, our task is completed. We have played our parts in announcing to you how things stand there. To you it is left to determine whether what we have described is worthy of your concern. One only thing further you ought to recognise: the power we have spoken of as great is not as yet invincible, for those states which are involuntary participants in the citizenship of Olynthus will, in prospect of any rival power appearing in the field, speedily fall away. On the contrary, let them be once closely knit and welded together by the privileges of intermarriage and reciprocal rights of holding property in land — which have already become enactments; let them discover that it is a gain to them to follow in the wake of conquerors (just as

the Arcadians, (18) for instance, find it profitable to march in your ranks, whereby they save their own property and pillage their neighbours'); let these things come to pass, and perhaps you may find the knot no longer so easy to unloose."

(18) For the point of the comparison, see Freeman, "Hist. Fed. Gov." ch. iv. "Real nature of the Olynthian scheme," pp. 190 foll., and note 2, p. 197; also Grote, "H. G." x. 67 foll., 278 foll.

At the conclusion of this address, the Lacedaemonians requested the allies to speak, bidding them give their joint advice as to the best course to be pursued in the interests of Peloponnese and the allies. Thereupon many members, and especially those who wished to gratify the Lacedaemonians, agreed in counselling active measures; and it was resolved that the states should severally send contingents to form a total of ten thousand men. Proposals were also made to allow any state, so wishing, to give money instead of men, at the rate of three Aeginetan obols (19) a day per man; or where the contingent consisted of cavalry, the pay given for one horseman was to be the equivalent to that of four hoplites; while, in the event of any defaulting in service, the Lacedaemonians should be allowed to mulct the said state of a stater per man per diem. These resolutions were passed, and the deputies from Acanthus rose again. They argued that, though excellent, these resolutions were not of a nature to be rapidly carried into effect. Would it not be better, they asked, pending the mobilisation of the troops, to despatch an officer at once in command of a force from Lacedaemon and the other states, not too large to start immediately. The effect would be instantaneous, for the states which had not yet given in their adhesion to Olynthus would be brought to a standstill, and those already forcibly enrolled would be shaken in their alliance. These further resolutions being also passed, the Lacedaemonians despatched Eudamidas, accompanied by a body of neodamodes, with perioeci and Sciritae, (20) to the number of two thousand odd. Eudamidas lost no time in setting out,

having obtained leave from the ephors for his brother Phoebidas to follow later with the remainder of the troops assigned to him. Pushing on himself to the Thracian territory, he set about despatching garrisons to various cities at their request. He also secured the voluntary adhesion of Potidaea, although already a member of the Olynthian alliance; and this town now served as his base of operations for carrying on war on a scale adapted to his somewhat limited armament.

(19) I.e. “rather more than sixpence a day for a hoplite, and two shillings for a horseman.” “The Aeginetan stater weighed about 196 grains, rather more than two of our shillings, and was divided into two drachms of 98 grains, each of which contained six obols of about 16 grains each.” See Percy Gardner, “Types of Greek Coins,” “Hist. Int.” p. 8; Jowett, note to Thuc. III. lxx. 4, vol. i. pp. 201, 202.

(20) Or, “new citizens, provincials, and Sciritae.”

Phoebidas, when the remaining portion of his brother’s forces was duly mustered, put himself at their head and commenced his march. On reaching Thebes the troops encamped outside the city, round the gymnasium. Faction was rife within the city. The two polemarchs in office, Ismenias and Leontiades, were diametrically opposed, (21) being the respective heads of antagonistic political clubs. Hence it was that, while Ismenias, ever inspired by hatred to the Lacedaemonians, would not come anywhere near the Spartan general, Leontiades, on the other hand, was assiduous in courting him; and when a sufficient intimacy was established between them, he made a proposal as follows: “You have it in your power,” he said, addressing Phoebidas, “this very day to confer supreme benefit on your country. Follow me with your hoplites, and I will introduce you into the citadel. That done, you may rest assured Thebes will be completely under the thumb of Lacedaemon and of us, your friends. At present, as you see, there is a proclamation forbidding any Theban to take service with you against Olynthus, but we will change all that. You have only to act with us as we suggest, and we shall at once be able to furnish you with large supplies of infantry and cavalry, so that you will join your brother with a magnificent reinforcement, and pending his proposed reduction of

Olynthus, you will have accomplished the reduction of a far larger state than that — to wit, this city of Thebes."

(21) See Grote, "H. G." vol. x. p. 80: "We have little or no information respecting the government of Thebes," etc. The "locus classicus" seems to be Plut. "de Genio Socratis." See Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. S. 2, "Of the Boeotian League," pp. 154-184; and, in reference to the seizure of the Kadmeia, p. 170.

The imagination of Phoebidas was kindled as he listened to the tempting proposal. To do a brilliant deed was far dearer to him than life; (22) on the other hand, he had no reasoning capacity, and would seem to have been deficient altogether in sound sense. The consent of the Spartan secured, Leontiades bade him set his troops in motion, as if everything were ready for his departure. "And anon, when the hour is come," added the Theban, "I will be with you, and show you the way myself."

(22) Or, "Renown was his mistress." See Grote, "H. G." x. 84.

The senate was seated in the arcade or stoa in the market-place, since the Cadmeia was in possession of the women who were celebrating the Thesmophoria. (23) It was noon of a hot summer's day; scarcely a soul was stirring in the streets. This was the moment for Leontiades. He mounted on horseback and galloped off to overtake Phoebidas. He turned him back, and led him without further delay into the acropolis. Having posted Phoebidas and his soldiers inside, he handed him the key of the gates, and warning him not to suffer any one to enter into the citadel without a pass from himself, he straightway betook himself to the senate. Arrived there, he delivered himself thus: "Sirs, the Lacedaemonians are in possession of the citadel; but that is no cause for despondency, since, as they assure us, they have no hostile intention, except, indeed, towards any one who has an appetite for war. For myself, and acting in obedience to the law, which empowers the polemarch to apprehend all persons suspected of capital crimes, I hereby seize the person of Ismenias as an arch-fomenter of war. I call upon you, sirs, who are captains of companies, and you who are ranked with them, to do your duty. Arise and secure the prisoner, and lead him away to the place appointed."

(23) An ancient festival held by women in honour of Demeter and Persephone ({to Thesmophoro}), who gave the first impulse to civil society, lawful marriage, etc. See Herod. ii. 171; Diod. v. 5.

Those who were privy to the affair, it will be understood, presented themselves, and the orders were promptly carried out. Of those not in the secret, but opposed to the party of Leontiades, some sought refuge at once outside the city in terror for their lives; whilst the rest, albeit they retired to their houses at first, yet when they found that Ismenias was imprisoned in the Cadmeia, and further delay seemed dangerous, retreated to Athens. These were the men who shared the views of Androcleidas and Ismenias, and they must have numbered about three hundred.

Now that the transactions were concluded, another polemarch was chosen in place of Ismenias, and Leontiades at once set out to Lacedaemon. There he found the ephors and the mass of the community highly incensed against Phoebidas, “who had failed to execute the orders assigned to him by the state.” Against this general indignation, however, Agesilaus protested. (24) If mischief had been wrought to Lacedaemon by this deed, it was just that the doer of it should be punished; but, if good, it was a time-honoured custom to allow full scope for impromptu acts of this character. “The sole point you have to look to,” he urged, “is whether what has been done is good or evil.” After this, however, Leontiades presented himself to the assembly (25) and addressed the members as follows: “Sirs, Lacedaemonians, the hostile attitude of Thebes towards you, before the occurrence of late events, was a topic constantly on your lips, since time upon time your eyes were called upon to witness her friendly bearing to your foes in contrast with her hatred of your friends. Can it be denied that Thebes refused to take part with you in the campaign against your direst enemy, the democracy in Piraeus; and balanced that lukewarmness by on onslaught on the Phocians, whose sole crime was cordiality to yourselves? (26) Nor is that all. In full knowledge that you were likely to be engaged in war with

Olynthus, she proceeded at once to make an alliance with that city. So that up to the last moment you were in constant expectation of hearing that the whole of Boeotia was laid at the feet of Thebes. With the late incidents all is changed. You need fear Thebes no longer. One brief despatch (27) in cipher will suffice to procure a dutiful subservience to your every wish in that quarter, provided only you will take as kindly an interest in us as we in you."

(24) See "Ages." vii.

(25) "Select Committee." See "Hell." II. iv. 38; and below, VI. iii. 3.

(26) See above, "Hell." III. v. 4.

(27) Lit. "scytale."

This appeal told upon the meeting, and the Lacedaemonians (28) resolved formally, now that the citadel had been taken, to keep it, and to put Ismenias on his trial. In consequence of this resolution a body of commissioners (29) was despatched, three Lacedaemonians and one for each of the allied states, great and small alike. The court of inquiry thus constituted, the sittings commenced, and an indictment was preferred against Ismenias. He was accused of playing into the hands of the barbarian; of seeking amity with the Persians to the detriment of Hellas; of accepting sums of money as bribes from the king; and, finally, of being, along with Androcleidas, the prime cause of the whole intestine trouble to which Hellas was a prey. Each of these charges was met by the defendant, but to no purpose, since he failed to disabuse the court of their conviction that the grandeur of his designs was only equalled by their wickedness. (30) The verdict was given against him, and he was put to death. The party of Leontiades thus possessed the city; and went beyond the injunctions given them in the eager performance of their services.

(28) See Grote, "H. G." vol. x. p. 85; Diod. xv. 20; Plut. "Pelop." vi.; ib. "de Genio Socratis," V. vii. 6 A; Cor. Nep. "Pelop." 1.

(29) Lit. "Dicasts."

(30) Or, "that he was a magnificent malefactor." See Grote, "H. G." vol. ix. p. 420, "the great wicked man" (Clarendon's epithets for Cromwell); Plato, "Meno." 90 B; "Republic," 336 A, "a rich and mighty man." See also Plut. "Ages." xxxii. 2, Agesilaus's exclamation at sight of Epaminondas, {o tou megalopragmonos anthropou}.

B.C. 382. As a result of these transactions the Lacedaemonians pressed on the combined campaign against Olynthus with still greater enthusiasm. They not only set out Teleutias as governor, but by their united efforts furnished him with an aggregate army of ten thousand men. (31) They also sent despatches to the allied states, calling upon them to support Teleutias in accordance with the resolution of the allies. All the states were ready to display devotion to Teleutias, and to do him service, since he was a man who never forgot a service rendered him. Nor was Thebes an exception; for was not the governor a brother of Agesilaus? Thebes, therefore, was enthusiastic in sending her contribution of heavy infantry and cavalry. The Spartan conducted his march slowly and surely, taking the utmost pains to avoid injuring his friends, and to collect as large a force as possible. He also sent a message in advance to Amyntas, begging him, if he were truly desirous of recovering his empire, to raise a body of mercenaries, and to distribute sums of money among the neighbouring kings with a view to their alliance. Nor was that all. He sent also to Derdas, the ruler of Elimia, pointing out to him that the Olynthians, having laid at their feet the great power of Macedonia, would certainly not suffer his lesser power to escape unless they were stayed up by force in arms in their career of insolence. Proceeding thus, by the time he had reached the territory of the allied powers he was at the head of a very considerable army. At Potidaea he halted to make the necessary disposition of his troops, and thence advanced into the territory of the enemy. As he approached the hostile city, he abstained from felling and firing alike, being persuaded that to do so was only to create difficulties in his own path, whether advancing or retreating; it would be time enough, when he retired from Olynthus, to fell the trees and lay them as a barrier in the path of any assailant in the rear.

(31) Lit. “sent out along with him the combined force of ten thousand men,” in ref to S. 20 above.

Being now within a mile or so (32) of the city he came to a halt. The left division was under his personal command, for it suited him to advance in a line opposite the gate from which the enemy sallied; the other division of the allies stretched away to the right. The cavalry were thus distributed: the Laconians, Thebans, and all the Macedonians present were posted on the right. With his own division he kept Derdas and his troopers, four hundred strong. This he did partly out of genuine admiration for this body of horse, and partly as a mark of courtesy to Derdas, which should make him not regret his coming.

(32) Lit. “ten stades.”

Presently the enemy issued forth and formed in line opposite, under cover of their walls. Then their cavalry formed in close order and commenced the attack. Dashing down upon the Laconians and Boeotians they dismounted Polycharmus, the Lacedaemonian cavalry general, inflicting a hundred wounds on him as he lay on the ground, and cut down others, and finally put to flight the cavalry on the right wing. The flight of these troopers infected the infantry in close proximity to them, who in turn swerved; and it looked as if the whole army was about to be worsted, when Derdas at the head of his cavalry dashed straight at the gates of Olynthus, Teleutias supporting him with the troops of his division. The Olynthian cavalry, seeing how matters were going, and in dread of finding the gates closed upon them, wheeled round and retired with alacrity. Thus it was that Derdas had his chance to cut down man after man as their cavalry ran the gauntlet past him. In the same way, too, the infantry of the Olynthians retreated within their city, though, owing to the closeness of the walls in their case, their loss was trifling. Teleutias claimed the victory, and a trophy was duly erected, after which he turned his back on Olynthus and devoted himself to felling the fruit-trees. This was the campaign of the summer. He now dismissed both the

Macedonians and the cavalry force of Derdas. Incursions, however, on the part of the Olynthians themselves against the states allied to Lacedaemon were frequent; lands were pillaged, and people put to the sword.

III

B.C. 381. With the first symptoms of approaching spring the Olynthian cavalry, six hundred strong, had swooped into the territory of Apollonia — about the middle of the day — and dispersing over the district, were employed in pillaging; but as luck would have it, Derdas had arrived that day with his troopers, and was breakfasting in Apollonia. He noted the enemy's incursion, but kept quiet, biding his time; his horses were ready saddled, and his troopers armed cap-a-pied. As the Olynthians came galloping up contemptuously, not only into the suburbs, but to the very gates of the city, he seized his opportunity, and with his compact and well-ordered squadron dashed out; whereupon the invaders took to flight. Having once turned them, Derdas gave them no respite, pursuing and slaughtering them for ten miles or more, (1) until he had driven them for shelter within the very ramparts of Olynthus. Report said that Derdas slew something like eighty men in this affair. After this the Olynthians were more disposed to keep to their walls, contenting themselves with tilling the merest corner of their territory.

(1) Lit. "ninety stades."

Time advanced, and Teleutias was in conduct of another expedition against the city of Olynthus. His object was to destroy any timber (2) still left standing, or fields still cultivated in the hostile territory. This brought out the Olynthian cavalry, who, stealthily advancing, crossed the river which washes the walls of the town, and again continued their silent march right up to the adversary's camp. At sight of an audacity which nettled him, Teleutias at

once ordered Tlemonidas, the officer commanding his light infantry division, to charge the assailants at the run. On their side the men of Olynthus, seeing the rapid approach of the light infantry, wheeled and quietly retired until they had recrossed the river, drawing the enemy on, who followed with conspicuous hardihood. Arrogating to themselves the position of pursuers towards fugitives, they did not hesitate to cross the river which stood between them and their prey. Then the Olynthian cavalry, choosing a favourable moment, when those who had crossed seemed easy to deal with, wheeled and attacked them, putting Tlemonidas himself to the sword with more than a hundred others of his company. Teleutias, when he saw what was happening, snatched up his arms in a fit of anger and began leading his hoplites swiftly forward, ordering at the same time his peltasts and cavalry to give chase and not to slacken. Their fate was the fate of many before and since, who, in the ardour of pursuit, have come too close to the enemy’s walls and found it hard to get back again. Under a hail of missiles from the walls they were forced to retire in disorder and with the necessity of guarding themselves against the missiles. At this juncture the Olynthians sent out their cavalry at full gallop, backed by supports of light infantry; and finally their heavy infantry reserves poured out and fell upon the enemy’s lines, now in thorough confusion. Here Teleutias fell fighting, and when that happened, without further pause the troops immediately about him swerved. Not one soul longer cared to make a stand, but the flight became general, some fleeing towards Spartolus, others in the direction of Acanthus, a third set seeking refuge within the walls of Apollonia, and the majority within those of Potidaea. As the tide of fugitives broke into several streams, so also the pursuers divided the work between them; this way and that they poured, dealing death wholesale. So perished the pith and kernel of the armament.

(2) I.e. fruit-trees.

Such calamities are not indeed without a moral. The lesson they are meant to teach mankind, I think, is plain. If in a general sense one ought not to punish any one, even one's own slave, in anger — since the master in his wrath may easily incur worse evil himself than he inflicts — so, in the case of antagonists in war, to attack an enemy under the influence of passion rather than of judgment is an absolute error. For wrath is but a blind impulse devoid of foresight, whereas to the penetrating eye of reason a blow parried may be better than a wound inflicted. (3)

(3) See, for the same sentiment, "Horsemanship," vi. 13. See also Plut. "Pel." and "Marc." (Clough, ii. p. 278).

When the news of what had happened reached Lacedaemon it was agreed, after due deliberation, that a force should be sent, and of no trifling description, if only to quench the victors' pride, and to prevent their own achievements from becoming null and void. In this determination they sent out King Agesipolis, as general, attended, like Agesilaus (4) on his Asiatic campaign, by thirty Spartans. (5) Volunteers flocked to his standard. They were partly the pick and flower of the provincials, (6) partly foreigners of the class called Trophimoi, (7) or lastly, bastard sons of Spartans, comely and beautiful of limb, and well versed in the lore of Spartan chivalry. The ranks of this invading force were further swelled by volunteers from the allied states, the Thessalians notably contributing a corps of cavalry. All were animated by the desire of becoming known to Agesipolis, so that even Amyntas and Derdas in zeal of service outdid themselves. With this promise of success Agesipolis marched forward against Olynthus.

(4) See above, "Hell." III. iv. 2.

(5) Lit. "Spartiates." The new army was sent out B.C. 380, according to Grote.

(6) Lit. "beautiful and brave of the Perioeci."

(7) Xenophon's own sons educated at Sparta would belong to this class. See Grote, "H. G." x. 91.

Meanwhile the state of Phlius, complimented by Agesipolis on the amount of the funds contributed by them to his expedition and the celerity with which the money had been

raised, and in full belief that while one king was in the field they were secure against the hostile attack of the other (since it was hardly to be expected that both kings should be absent from Sparta at one moment), boldly desisted from doing justice by her lately reinstated citizens. On the one hand, these exiles claimed that points in dispute should be determined before an impartial court of justice; the citizens, on the other, insisted on the claimants submitting the cases for trial in the city itself. And when the latter demurred to that solution, asking “What sort of trial that would be where the offenders were also the judges?” they appealed to deaf ears. Consequently the restored party appealed at Sparta, to prefer a complaint against their city. They were accompanied by other members of the community, who stated that many of the Phliasians themselves besides the appellants recognised the injustice of their treatment. The state of Phlius was indignant at this manouvre, and retaliated by imposing a fine on all who had betaken themselves to Lacedaemon without a mandate from the state. Those who incurred the fine hesitated to return home; they preferred to stay where they were and enforce their views: “It is quite plain now who were the perpetrators of all the violence — the very people who originally drove us into exile, and shut their gates upon Lacedaemon; the confiscators of our property one day, the ruthless opponents of its restoration the next. Who else but they have now brought it about that we should be fined for appearing at Lacedaemon? and for what purpose but to deter any one else for the future from venturing to expose the proceedings at Phlius?” Thus far the appellants. And in good sooth the conduct of the men of Phlius did seem to savour of insolence; so much so that the ephors called out the ban against them.

B.C. 380. Nor was Agesilaus otherwise than well satisfied with this decision, not only on the ground of old relations of

friendly hospitality between his father Archidamus and the party of Podanemus, who were numbered among the restored exiles at this time, but because personally he was bound by similar ties himself towards the adherents of Procles, son of Hipponicus. The border sacrifices proving favourable, the march commenced at once. As he advanced, embassy after embassy met him, and would fain by presents of money avert invasion. But the king answered that the purpose of his march was not to commit wrongdoing, but to protect the victims of injustice. Then the petitioners offered to do anything, only they begged him to forgo invasion. Again he replied — How could he trust to their words when they had lied to him already? He must have the warrant of acts, not promises. And being asked, “What act (would satisfy him)?” he answered once more, saying, “The same which you performed aforetime, and suffered no wrong at our hands” — in other words, the surrender of the acropolis. (8) But to this they could not bring themselves. Whereupon he invaded the territory of Phlius, and promptly drawing lines of circumvallation, commenced the siege. Many of the Lacedaemonians objected, for the sake of a mere handful of wretched people, so to embroil themselves with a state of over five thousand men. (9) For, indeed, to leave no doubt on this score, the men of Phlius met regularly in assembly in full view of those outside. But Agesilaus was not to be beaten by this move. Whenever any of the townsmen came out, drawn by friendship or kinship with the exiles, in every case the king’s instructions were to place the public messes (10) at the service of the visitors, and, if they were willing to go through the course of gymnastic training, to give them enough to procure necessaries. All members of these classes were, by the general’s strict injunctions, further to be provided with arms, and loans were to be raised for the purpose without delay. Presently the superintendents of this branch of the service were able to turn out a detachment of over a thousand men, in the prime of bodily perfection, well

disciplined and splendidly armed, so that in the end the Lacedaemonians affirmed: “Fellow-soldiers of this stamp are too good to lose.” Such were the concerns of Agesilaus.

(8) See above, IV. iv. 15.

(9) See Grote, “H. G.” x. 45, note 4; and below, V. iv. 13.

(10) See “Pol. Lac.” v.

Meanwhile Agesipolis on leaving Macedonia advanced straight upon Olynthus and took up a strategical position in front of the town. Finding that no one came out to oppose him, he occupied himself for the present with pillaging any remnant of the district till intact, and with marching into the territory allied with the enemy, where he destroyed the corn. The town of Torone he attacked and took by storm. But while he was so engaged, in the height of mid-summer he was attacked by a burning fever. In this condition his mind reverted to a scene once visited, the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis, and a longing for its cool and sparkling waters and embowered shades (11) seized him. To this spot accordingly he was carried, still living, but only to breathe his last outside the sacred shrine, within a week of the day on which he sickened. His body was laid in honey and conveyed home to Sparta, where he obtained royal sepulchre.

(11) Lit. “shady tabernacles.”

When the news reached Agesilaus he displayed none of the satisfaction which might possibly have been expected at the removal of an antagonist. On the contrary, he wept and pined for the companionship so severed, it being the fashion at Sparta for the kings when at home to mess together and to share the same quarters. Moreover, Agesipolis was admirably suited to Agesilaus, sharing with the merriment of youth in tales of the chase and horsemanship and boyish loves; (12) while, to crown all, the touch of reverence due from younger to elder was not wanting in their common life. In place of Agesipolis, the Lacedaemonians despatched Polybiades as governor to Olynthus.

(12) See “Ages.” viii. 2.

B.C. 379. Agesilaus had already exceeded the time during which the supplies of food in Phlius were expected to last. The difference, in fact, between self-command and mere appetite is so great that the men of Phlius had only to pass a resolution to cut down the food expenditure by one half, and by doing so were able to prolong the siege for twice the calculated period. But if the contrast between self-restraint and appetite is so great, no less startling is that between boldness and faint-heartedness. A Phliasian named Delphion, a real hero, it would seem, took to himself three hundred Phliasians, and not only succeeded in preventing the peace-party from carrying out their wishes, but was equal to the task of incarcerating and keeping safely under lock and key those whom he mistrusted. Nor did his ability end there. He succeeded in forcing the mob of citizens to perform garrison duty, and by vigorous patrolling kept them constant to the work. Over and over again, accompanied by his personal attendants, he would dash out of the walls and drive in the enemy’s outposts, first at one point and then at another of the beleaguering circle. But the time eventually came when, search as they might by every means, these picked defenders (13) could find no further store of food within the walls, and they were forced to send to Agesilaus, requesting a truce for an embassy to visit Sparta, adding that they were resolved to leave it to the discretion of the authorities at Lacedaemon to do with their city what they liked. Agesilaus granted a pass to the embassy, but, at the same time, he was so angry at their setting his personal authority aside, that he sent to his friends at home and arranged that the fate of Phlius should be left to his discretion. Meanwhile he proceeded to tighten the cordon of investment, so as to render it impossible that a single soul inside the city should escape. In spite of this, however, Delphion, with one comrade, a branded dare-devil, who had shown great dexterity in relieving the besieging parties of their arms, escaped by night. Presently the deputation

returned with the answer from Lacedaemon that the state simply left it entirely to the discretion of Agesilaus to decide the fate of Phlius as seemed to him best. Then Agesilaus announced his verdict. A board of one hundred — fifty taken from the restored exiles, fifty from those within the city — were in the first place to make inquisition as to who deserved to live and who to die, after which they were to lay down laws as the basis of a new constitution. Pending the carrying out of these transactions, he left a detachment of troops to garrison the place for six months, with pay for that period. After this he dismissed the allied forces, and led the state (14) division home. Thus the transactions concerning Phlius were brought to a conclusion, having occupied altogether one year and eight months.

(13) See below, “Hell.” VII. i. 19.

(14) {to politokon}, the citizen army. See above, IV. iv. 19; “Pol. Lac.” xi.

Meanwhile Polybiades had reduced the citizens of Olynthus to the last stage of misery through famine. Unable to supply themselves with corn from their own land, or to import it by sea, they were forced to send an embassy to Lacedaemon to sue for peace. The plenipotentiaries on their arrival accepted articles of agreement by which they bound themselves to have the same friends and the same foes as Lacedaemon, to follow her lead, and to be enrolled among her allies; and so, having taken an oath to abide by these terms, they returned home.

On every side the affairs of Lacedaemon had signally prospered: Thebes and the rest of the Boeotian states lay absolutely at her feet; Corinth had become her most faithful ally; Argos, unable longer to avail herself of the subterfuge of a movable calendar, was humbled to the dust; Athens was isolated; and, lastly, those of her own allies who displayed a hostile feeling towards her had been punished; so that, to all outward appearance, the foundations of her empire were at length absolutely well and firmly laid.

IV

Abundant examples might be found, alike in Hellenic and in foreign history, to prove that the Divine powers mark what is done amiss, winking neither at impiety nor at the commission of unhallowed acts; but at present I confine myself to the facts before me. (1) The Lacedaemonians, who had pledged themselves by oath to leave the states independent, had laid violent hands on the acropolis of Thebes, and were eventually punished by the victims of that iniquity single-handed — the Lacedaemonians, be it noted, who had never before been mastered by living man; and not they alone, but those citizens of Thebes who introduced them to their acropolis, and who wished to enslave their city to Lacedaemon, that they might play the tyrant themselves — how fared it with them? A bare score of the fugitives were sufficient to destroy their government. How this happened I will now narrate in detail.

(1) Or, "it is of my own subject that I must now speak." For the "peripety," or sudden reversal of circumstances, on which the plot of the "Hellenica" hinges, see Grote, "H. G." x. 100-108. Cf. Soph. "Oed. Tyr." 450; "Antig." 1066; Thuc. v. 116; "Hellenica Essays," "Xenophon," p. 382 foll. This passage is perhaps the key to the historian's position.

There was a man named Phyllidas — he was secretary to Archias, that is, to the polemarchs. (2) Beyond his official duties, he had rendered his chief other services, and all apparently in an exemplary fashion. A visit to Athens in pursuance of some business brought this man into contact with a former acquaintance of his, Melon, one of the exiles who had fled for safety to Athens. Melon had various questions to ask touching the sort of tyranny practised by Archias in the exercise of the polemarchy, and by Philip. He soon discovered that affairs at home were still more detestable to Phyllidas than to himself. It only remained to exchange pledges, and to arrange the details of what was to be done. After a certain interval Melon, accompanied by six of the trustiest comrades he could find among his fellow-exiles, set off for Thebes. They were armed with nothing but daggers, and first of all crept into the neighbourhood under

cover of night. The whole of the next day they lay concealed in a desert place, and drew near to the city gates in the guise of labourers returning home with the latest comers from the fields. Having got safely within the city, they spent the whole of that night at the house of a man named Charon, and again the next day in the same fashion. Phyllidas meanwhile was busily taken up with the concerns of the polemarchs, who were to celebrate a feast of Aphrodite on going out of office. Amongst other things, the secretary was to take this opportunity of fulfilling an old undertaking, which was the introduction of certain women to the polemarchs. They were to be the most majestic and the most beautiful to be found in Thebes. The polemarchs, on their side (and the character of the men is sufficiently marked), were looking forward to the pleasures of the night with joyful anticipation. Supper was over, and thanks to the zeal with which the master of the ceremonies responded to their mood, they were speedily intoxicated. To their oft-repeated orders to introduce their mistresses, he went out and fetched Melon and the rest, three of them dressed up as ladies and the rest as their attendant maidens. Having brought them into the treasury of the polemarchs' residence, (3) he returned himself and announced to Archias and his friends that the women would not present themselves as long as any of the attendants remained in the room; whereupon they promptly bade all withdraw, and Phyllidas, furnishing the servants with a stoup of wine, sent them off to the house of one of them. And now at last he introduced the mistresses, and led them to their seats beside their respective lords. It was preconcerted that as soon as they were seated they were to throw aside their veils and strike home. That is one version of the death of the polemarchs. (4) According to another, Melon and his friends came in as revellers, and so despatched their victims.

(2) Lit. "to Archias and his (polemarchs)"; but the Greek phrase does not, as the English would, imply that there were actually more than two polemarchs, viz. Archias and Philippus. Hypates and Leontiades belonged to the faction, but were neither of them polemarchs.

(3) Lit. "Polemarcheion."

(4) Or, “and so, according to the prevalent version of the matter, the polemarchs were slain. But some say that…”

That over, Phyllidas, with three of the band, set off to the house of Leontiades. Arrived there, he knocked on the door, and sent in word that he had a message from the polemarchs. Leontiades, as chance befell, was still reclining in privacy after dinner, and his wife was seated beside him working wools. The fidelity of Phyllidas was well known to him, and he gave orders to admit him at once. They entered, slew Leontiades, and with threats silenced his wife. As they went out they ordered the door to be shut, threatening that if they found it open they would kill every one in the house. And now that this deed was done, Phyllidas, with two of the band, presented himself at the prison, telling the gaoler he had brought a man from the polemarchs to be locked up. The gaoler opened the door, and was at once despatched, and the prisoners were released. These they speedily supplied with arms taken from the armoury in the stoa, and then led them to the Ampheion, (5) and bade them take up a position there, after which they at once made a proclamation calling on all Thebans to come out, horse and foot, seeing that the tyrants were dead. The citizens, indeed, as long as it was night, not knowing whom or what to trust, kept quiet, but when day dawned and revealed what had occurred, the summons was responded to with alacrity, heavy infantry and cavalry under arms alike sallying forth. Horsemen were also despatched by the now restored exiles to the two Athenian generals on the frontier; and they, being aware of the object of the message (promptly responded). (6)

(5) See plan of Thebes, “Dict. Geog.”; Arrian, “Anab.” i. 8; Aesch. “Sept. c. Theb.” 528.

(6) Supply {epeboethoun}. There is a lacuna in the MSS. at this point.

On the other hand, the Lacedaemonian governor in the citadel, as soon as that night’s proclamation reached his ears, was not slow to send to Plataeae (7) and Thespiae for reinforcements. The approach of the Plataeans was perceived by the Theban cavalry, who met them and killed a

score of them and more, and after that achievement returned to the city, to find the Athenians from the frontier already arrived. Then they assaulted the acropolis. The troops within recognised the paucity of their own numbers, whilst the zeal of their opponents (one and all advancing to the attack) was plainly visible, and loud were the proclamations, promising rewards to those who should be first to scale the walls. All this so worked upon their fears that they agreed to evacuate the place if the citizens would allow them a safe-conduct to retire with their arms. To this request the others gladly yielded, and they made a truce. Oaths were taken on the terms aforesaid, and the citizens dismissed their adversaries. For all that, as the garrison retired, those of them who were recognised as personal foes were seized and put to death. Some were rescued through the good offices of the Athenian reinforcements from the frontier, who smuggled them across and saved them. The Thebans were not content with putting the men to death; if any of them had children, these also were sacrificed to their vengeance.

(7) This city had been refounded in B.C. 386 (Isocr. "Plat." 20, 21). See Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. p. 170: "Its restoration implied not only a loss of Theban supremacy, but the actual loss of that portion of the existing Theban territory which had formerly formed the Plataian district."

B.C. 378. When the news of these proceedings reached Sparta the first thing the Lacedaemonians did was to put to death the governor, who had abandoned the Cadmeia instead of awaiting reinforcements, and the next was to call out the ban against Thebes. Agesilaus had little taste to head the expedition; he pointed out that he had seen more than forty years' service, (8) and that the exemption from foreign duty applicable to others at that age was applicable on the same principle to the king. Such were the ostensible grounds on which he excused himself from the present expedition, but his real objections lay deeper. He felt certain that if he led the expedition his fellow-citizens would say: "Agesilaus caused all this trouble to the state in order to aid and abet tyrants." Therefore he preferred to leave his

countrymen to settle the matter themselves as they liked. Accordingly the ephors, instructed by the Theban exiles who had escaped the late massacres, despatched Cleombrotus. He had not commanded before, and it was the depth of winter.

(8) And was therefore more than fifty-eight years old at this date. See “Ages.” i. 6.

Now while Chabrias, with a body of Athenian peltasts, kept watch and ward over the road through Eleutherae, Cleombrotus made his way up by the direct route to Plataeae. His column of light infantry, pushing forward in advance, fell upon the men who had been released from the Theban prison, guarding the summit, to the number of about one hundred and fifty. These, with the exception of one or two who escaped, were cut down by the peltasts, and Cleombrotus descended in person upon Plataeae, which was still friendly to Sparta. Presently he reached Thespiae, and that was the base for an advance upon Cynoscephalae, where he encamped on Theban territory. Here he halted sixteen days, and then again fell back upon Thespiae. At this latter place he now left Sphodrias as governor, with a third portion of each of the contingents of the allies, handing over to him all the moneys he had brought with him from home, with directions to supplement his force with a contingent of mercenaries.

While Sphodrias was so employed, Cleombrotus himself commenced his homeward march, following the road through Creusis at the head of his own moiety of the troops, who indeed were in considerable perplexity to discover whether they were at war with the Thebans or at peace, seeing that the general had led his army into Theban territory, had inflicted the minimum of mischief, and again retired. No sooner, however, was his back turned than a violent wind storm assailed him in his rear, which some construed as an omen clearly significant of what was about to take place. Many a blow this assailant dealt them, and as

the general and his army, crossing from Creusis, scaled that face of the mountain (9) which stretches seaward, the blast hurled headlong from the precipices a string of asses, baggage and all: countless arms were wrested from the bearers' grasp and whirled into the sea; finally, numbers of the men, unable to march with their arms, deposited them at different points of the pass, first filling the hollow of their shields with stones. For the moment, then, they halted at Aegosthena, on Megarian soil, and supped as best they could. Next day they returned and recovered their arms. After this adventure the contingents lost no time in returning to their several homes, as Cleombrotus disbanded them.

(9) I.e. "Cithaeron."

Meanwhile at Athens and Thebes alike fear reigned. To the Athenians the strength of the Lacedaemonians was unmistakable: the war was plainly no longer confined to Corinth; on the contrary, the Lacedaemonians had ventured to skirt Athenian territory and to invade Thebes. They were so worked upon by their alarm that the two generals who had been privy to the insurrection of Melon against Leontiades and his party had to suffer: the one was formally tried and put to death; the other, refusing to abide his trial, was banished.

The apprehensions of the Thebans were of a different sort: their fear was rather lest they should find themselves in single-handed war with Lacedaemon. To prevent this they hit upon the following expedient. They worked upon Sphodrias, (10) the Spartan governor left in Thespiae, by offering him, as at least was suspected, a substantial sum, in return for which he was to make an incursion into Attica; their great object being to involve Athens and Lacedaemon in hostilities. Sphodrias lent a willing ear, and, pretending that he could easily capture Piraeus in its present gateless condition, gave his troops an early evening meal and

marched out of Thespiae, saying that he would reach Piraeus before daybreak. As a matter of fact day overtook him at Thria, nor did he take any pains even to draw a veil over his intentions; on the contrary, being forced to turn aside, he amused himself by recklessly lifting cattle and sacking houses. Meanwhile some who chanced upon him in the night had fled to the city and brought news to the men of Athens that a large body of troops was approaching. It needs no saying with what speed the cavalry and heavy infantry armed themselves and stood on guard to protect the city. As chance befell, there were some Lacedaemonian ambassadors in Athens at the moment, at the house of Callias their proxenos; their names were Etymocles, Aristolochus, and Ocyllus. Immediately on receipt of the news the Athenians seized these three and imprisoned them, as not improbably concerned in the plot. Utterly taken aback by the affair themselves, the ambassadors pleaded that, had they been aware of an attempt to seize Piraeus, they would hardly have been so foolish as to put themselves into the power of the Athenians, or have selected the house of their proxenos for protection, where they were so easily to be found. It would, they further urged, soon be plain to the Athenians themselves that the state of Lacedaemon was quite as little cognisant of these proceedings as they. “You will hear before long” — such was their confident prediction — “that Sphodrias has paid for his behaviour by his life.” On this wise the ambassadors were acquitted of all concern in the matter and dismissed. Sphodrias himself was recalled and indicted by the ephors on the capital charge, and, in spite of his refusal to face the trial, he was acquitted. This miscarriage of justice, as it seemed to many, who described it as unprecedented in Lacedaemon, has an explanation.

(10) See Plut. “Pel.” xiv. (Clough, ii. p. 214).

Sphodrias had a son named Cleonymus. He was just at the age when youth emerges from boyhood, very handsome and

of high repute among his fellows. To this youth Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, was passionately attached. Now the friends of Cleombrotus, as comrades of Sphodrias, were disposed to acquit him; but they feared Agesilaus and his friends, not to mention the intermediate party, for the enormity of his proceeding was clear. So when Sphodrias addressed his son Cleonymus: “You have it in your power, my son, to save your father, if you will, by begging Archidamus to dispose Agesilaus favourably to me at my trial.” Thus instructed, the youth did not shrink from visiting Archidamus, and implored him for his sake to save his father. Now when Archidamus saw how Cleonymus wept, he too was melted to tears as he stood beside him, but to his petition he made answer thus: “Nay, Cleonymus, it is the bare truth I tell you, I cannot so much as look my father in the face; (11) if I wished anything transacted for me in the city I would beg assistance from the whole world sooner than from my father. Still, since it is you who bid me, rest assured I will do my best to bring this about for you as you desire.” He then left the common hall (12) and retired home to rest, but with dawn he arose and kept watch that his father might not go out without his knowledge. Presently, when he saw him ready to go forth, first some citizen was present, and then another and another; and in each case he stepped aside, while they held his father in conversation. By and by a stranger would come, and then another; and so it went on until he even found himself making way for a string of petitioning attendants. At last, when his father had turned his back on the Eurotas, and was entering his house again, he was fain to turn his back also and be gone without so much as accosting him. The next day he fared no better: all happened as on the previous day. Now Agesilaus, although he had his suspicions why his son went to and fro in this way, asked no questions, but left him to take his own course. Archidamus, on his side, was longing, as was natural, to see his friend Cleonymus; but how he was to visit him, without

having held the desired conversation with his father, he knew not. The friends of Sphodrias, observing that he who was once so frequent a visitor had ceased coming, were in agony; he must surely have been deterred by the reproaches of his father. At last, however, Archidamus dared to go to his father, and said, “Father, Cleonymus bids me ask you to save his father; grant me this boon, if possible, I beg you.” He answered: “For yourself, my son, I can make excuse, but how shall my city make excuse for me if I fail to condemn that man who, for his own base purpose, traffics to the injury of the state?” For the moment the other made no reply, but retired crestfallen before the verdict of justice. Afterwards, whether the thought was his own or that he was prompted by some other, he came and said, “Father, if Sphodrias had done no wrong you would have released him, that I know; but now, if he has done something wrong, may he not be excused by you for our sakes?” And the father answered: “If it can be done without loss of honour on our parts, so shall it be.” At that word the young man, in deep despondency, turned and went. Now one of the friends of Sphodrias, conversing with Etymocles, remarked to him: “You are all bent on putting Sphodrias to death, I take it, you friends of Agesilaus?” And Etymocles replied: “If that be so, we all are bent on one thing, and Agesilaus on another, since in all his conversations he still harps upon one string: that Sphodrias has done a wrong there is no denying, yet Sphodrias is a man who, from boyhood to ripe manhood, (13) was ever constant to the call of honour. To put such a man as that to death is hard; nay, Sparta needs such soldiers.” The other accordingly went off and reported what he had just heard to Cleonymus; and he in the joy of his heart went straightway to Archidamus and said: “Now we know that you care for us; rest assured, Archidamus, that we in turn will take great pains that you shall never have cause to blush for our friendship.” Nor did his acts belie his words; but so long as he lived he was ever faithful to the code of

Spartan chivalry; and at Leuctra, fighting in front of the king side by side with Deinon the polemarch, thrice fell or ever he yielded up his breath — foremost of the citizens amidst the foe. And so, albeit he caused his friend the bitterest sorrow, yet to that which he had promised he was faithful, seeing he wrought Archidamus no shame, but contrariwise shed lustre on him. (14) In this way Sphodrias obtained his acquittal.

(11) See “Cyrop.” I. iv. 12.

(12) Lit. “the Philition.” See “Pol. Lac.” iii. 6.

(13) Lit. “who, whether as child, boy, or young man”; and for the three stages of growth, see “Pol. Lac.” ii. iii. iv.

(14) I.e. both in life and in death.

At Athens the friends of Boeotia were not slow to instruct the people that his countrymen, so far from punishing Sphodrias, had even applauded him for his designs on Athens; and in consequence of this the Athenians not only furnished Piraeus with gates, but set to work to build a fleet, and displayed great zeal in sending aid to the Boeotians. (15) The Lacedaemonians, on their side, called out the ban against the Thebans; and being persuaded that in Agesilaus they would find a more prudent general than Cleombrotus had proved, they begged the former to undertake the expedition. (16) He, replying that the wish of the state was for him law, began making preparations to take the field.

(15) For the new Athenian confederacy of Delos of this year, B.C. 378, see “Pol. Lac.” xiv. 6; “Rev.” v. 6; Diod. xv. 28-30; Plut. “Pelop.” xv.; Hicks, 78, 81; and for an alliance between Athens and Chalcis in Euboea, see Hicks, 79; and for a treaty with Chios, Hicks, 80.

(16) See “Ages.” ii. 22.

Now he had come to the conclusion that without the occupation of Mount Cithaeron any attack on Thebes would be difficult. Learning then that the men of Cleitor were just now at war with the men of Orchomenus, (17) and were maintaining a foreign brigade, he came to an understanding with the Cleitorians that in the event of his needing it, this force would be at his service; and as soon as the sacrifices for crossing the frontier proved favourable, he sent to the commander of the Cleitorian mercenaries, and handing him a month’s pay, ordered him to occupy Cithaeron with his men. This was before he himself reached Tegea. Meanwhile

he sent a message to the men of Orchomenus that so long as the campaign lasted they must cease from war. If any city during his campaign abroad took on itself to march against another city, his first duty, he declared, would be to march against such offending city in accordance with a decree of the allies.

(17) In Arcadia. See Busolt, “Die Lak.” 120 foll.

Thus crossing Cithaeron he reached Thespiae, (18) and from that base made the territory of Thebes his objective. Finding the great plain fenced round with ditch and palisade, as also the most valuable portions of the country, he adopted the plan of shifting his encampment from one place to another. Regularly each day, after the morning meal, he marched out his troops and ravaged the territory, confining himself to his own side of the palisadings and trench. The appearance of Agesilaus at any point whatever was a signal to the enemy, who within the circuit of his entrenchment kept moving in parallel line to the invader, and was ever ready to defend the threatened point. On one occasion, the Spartan king having retired and being well on the road back to camp, the Theban cavalry, hitherto invisible, suddenly dashed out, following one of the regularly constructed roads out of the entrenchment. Taking advantage of the enemy’s position — his light troops breaking off to supper or busily preparing the meal, and the cavalry, some of them on their legs just (19) dismounted, and others in the act of mounting — on they rode, pressing the charge home. Man after man of the light troops was cut down; and three cavalry troopers besides — two Spartans, Cleas and Epicydidas by name, and the third a provincial (20) named Eudicus, who had not had time to mount their horses, and whose fate was shared by some Theban (21) exiles. But presently Agesilaus wheeled about and advanced with his heavy infantry to the succour; his cavalry dashed at the enemy’s cavalry, and the flower of the heavy infantry,

the ten-years-service men, charged by their side. The Theban cavalry at that instant looked like men who had been imbibing too freely in the noontide heat — that is to say, they awaited the charge long enough to hurl their spears; but the volley sped without effect, and wheeling about within that distance they left twelve of their number dead upon the field.

(18) By Cynoscephalae. See “Ages.” ii. 22.

(19) Read, after Courier, {arti} for the vulg. {eti}; or, better still, adopt Hartman’s emendation (op. cit. p. 379), {ton men ede katabebekoton ton de katabainonton}, and translate “some — already dismounted, and others dismounting.”

(20) Lit. “one of the perioeci.”

(21) Reading {Thebaion} after Dind. for {‘Athenaion}.

Agesilaus had not failed to note with what regularity the enemy presented himself after the morning meal. Turning the observation to account, he offered sacrifice with day’s dawn, and marched with all possible speed, and so crossed within the palisadings, through what might have been a desert, as far as defence or sign of living being went. Once well inside, he proceeded to cut down and set on fire everything up to the city gates. After this exploit he beat a retreat, retiring into Thespiae, where he fortified their citadel for them. Here he left Phoebidas as governor, while he himself crossed the passes back into Megara. Arrived here he disbanded the allies, and led the city troops homewards.

After the departure of Agesilaus, Phoebidas devoted himself to harrying the Thebans by sending out robber bands, and laid waste their land by a system of regular incursions. The Thebans, on their side, desiring to retaliate, marched out with their whole force into the territory of Thespiae. But once well inside the district they found themselves closely beset by Phoebidas and his light troops, who would not give them the slightest chance to scatter from their main body, so that the Thebans, heartily vexed at the turn their foray had taken, beat a retreat quicker than they had come. The muleteers threw away with their own hands the fruits they had captured, in their anxiety to get home as quickly as possible; so dire a dread had fallen upon

the invading army. This was the chance for the Spartan to press home his attack boldly, keeping his light division in close attendance on himself, and leaving the heavy infantry under orders to follow him in battle order. He was in hopes even that he might put the enemy to complete rout, so valiantly did he lead the advance, encouraging the light troops to “come to a close grip with the invadors,” or summoning the heavy infantry of the Thespiaeans to “bring up their supports.” Presently the Theban cavalry as they retired found themselves face to face with an impassable glen or ravine, where in the first instance they collected in a mob, and next wheeled right-about-face in sheer resourcelessness where to cross. The handful of light troops who formed the Spartan vanguard took fright at the Thebans and fled, and the Theban horsemen seeing this put in practice the lesson of attack which the fugitives taught them. As for Phoebidas himself, he and two or three with him fell sword in hand, whereupon his mercenary troops all took to their heels.

When the stream of fugitives reached the Thespiaean heavy infantry reserves, they too, in spite of much boasting beforehand that they would never yield to Thebans, took to flight, though there was now absolutely no pursuit whatever, for it was now late. The number slain was not large, but, for all that, the men of Thespiae did not come to a standstill until they found themselves safe inside their walls. As a sequel, the hopes and spirits of the Thebans were again kindled into new life, and they made campaigns against Thespiae and the other provincial cities of Boeotia. (22) It must be admitted that in each case the democratical party retired from these cities to Thebes; since absolute governments had been established in all of them on the pattern previously adopted at Thebes; and the result was that the friends of Lacedaemon in these cities also needed her assistance. (23) After the death of Phoebidas the

Lacedaemonians despatched a polemarch with a division by sea to form the garrison of Thespiae.

(22) Lit. “their other perioecid cities.” For the significance of this title as applied by the Thebans (and perhaps commonly) to the other cities of Boeotia, see Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. pp. 157, 173 foll.

(23) See Grote, “H. G.” x. 174; Freeman, op. cit. iv. 171, 172.

B.C. 377. With the advent of spring (24) the ephors again called out the ban against Thebes, and requested Agesilaus to lead the expedition, as on the former campaign. He, holding to his former theory with regard to the invasion, even before sacrificing the customary frontier sacrifice, sent a despatch to the polemarch at Thespiae, with orders to seize the pass which commands the road over Cithaeron, and to guard it against his arrival. Then, having once more crossed the pass and reached Plataeae, he again made a feint of marching first into Thespiae, and so sent a despatch ordering supplies to be in readiness, and all embassies to be waiting his arrival there; so that the Thebans concentrated their attention on the approaches from Thespiae, which they strongly guarded. Next morning, however, Agesilaus sacrificed at daybreak and set out on the road to Erythrae, (25) and completing in one day what was a good two days’ march for an army, gave the Thebans the slip, and crossed their palisade-work at Scolus before the enemy had arrived from the closely-guarded point at which he had effected his entrance formerly. This done he proceeded to ravage the eastward-facing districts of the city of Thebes as far as the territory of Tanagra, for at that date Tanagra was still in the hands of Hypatodorus and his party, who were friends of the Lacedaemonians. After that he turned to retire, keeping the walls of Thebes on his left. But the Thebans, who had stolen, as it were, upon the scene, drew up at the spot called “The Old Wife’s Breast,” (26) keeping the trench and palisading in their rear: they were persuaded that here, if anywhere, lay their chance to risk a decisive engagement, the ground at this point being somewhat narrow and difficult to traverse. Agesilaus, however, in view of the situation, refused to

accept the challenge. Instead of marching upon them he turned sharp off in the direction of the city; and the Thebans, in alarm for the city in its undefended state, abandoned the favourable ground on which they were drawn up in battle line, and retired at the double towards the city along the road to Potniae, which seemed the safer route. This last move of Agesilaus may be described as a stroke of genius: (27) while it allowed him to retire to a distance, it forced the enemy themselves to retreat at the double. In spite of this, however, one or two of the polemarchs, with their divisions, charged the foe as he raced past. But again the Thebans, from the vantage-ground of their heights, sent volleys of spears upon the assailants, which cost one of the polemarchs, Alypetus, his life. He fell pierced by a spear. But again from this particular crest the Thebans on their side were forced to turn in flight; so much so that the Sciritae, with some of the cavalry, scaled up and speedily cut down the rearmost ranks of the Thebans as they galloped past into the city. When, however, they were close under cover of their walls the Thebans turned, and the Sciritae seeing them retreated at more than a steady walking pace. No one, it is true, was slain; but the Thebans all the same set up a trophy in record of the incident at the point where the scaling party had been forced to retreat.

(24) See for affairs of Delos, never actually named by Xenophon, between B.C. 377 and 374, the Sandwich Marble in Trinity College, Cambridge; Boeckh, “C. I. G” 158, and “P. E. A.” ii. p. 78 foll.; Hicks, 82.

(25) Erythrae (Redlands) stands between Hysiae and Scolus, east of Katzula. — Leake, “N. Gr.” ii. 329. See Herod. ix. 15, 25; Thuc. iii. 24; Paus. IX. ii. 1; Strab. IX. ii.

(26) Lit. “Graos Stethos.”

(27) Or, “and this move of Agesilaus was regarded as a very pretty one.”

And now, since the hour was come, Agesilaus fell back and encamped on the very site on which he had seen the enemy drawn up in battle array. Next day he retired by the road to Thespiae. The light troops, who formed a free corps in the pay of the Thebans, hung audaciously at his heels. Their shouts could be heard calling out to Chabrias (28) for not bringing up his supports; when the cavalry of the Olynthians

(who now contributed a contingent in accordance with their oaths) (29) wheeled round on them, caught the pursuers in the heat of their pursuit, and drove them uphill, putting large numbers of them to the sword — so quickly are infantry overhauled by cavalry on steep ground which can be ridden over. Being arrived within the walls of Thespiae, Agesilaus found the citizens in a state of party feud, the men of Lacedaemonian proclivities desiring to put their political opponents, one of whom was Menon, to death (30) — a proceeding which Agesilaus would not sanction. After having healed their differences and bound them over by solemn oath to keep the peace with one another, he at once retired, taking his old route across Cithaeron to Megara. Here once more he disbanded the allies, and at the head of the city troops himself marched back to Sparta.

(28) For the exploits of Chabrias, who commanded a division of mixed Athenians and mercenaries (see above, S. 14), see Dem. "c. Lept." 479; Polyaen. ii. 1, 2; Diod. xv. 32, 33, who gives interesting details; Grote, "H. G." x. 172 foll.

(29) See above, "Hell." V. iii. 26.

(30) Or, "under the pretext of furthering Laconian interests there was a desire to put political opponents to death." For "Menon," Diod. conj. "Melon."

The Thebans had not gathered in the fruits of their soil for two years now, and began to be sorely pinched for want of corn; they therefore sent a body of men on board a couple of triremes to Pagasae, with ten talents (31) in hand for the purchase of corn. But while these commissioners were engaged in effecting their purchases, Alcetas, the Lacedaemonian who was garrisoning Oreus, (32) fitted out three triremes, taking precautions that no rumour of his proceedings should leak out. As soon as the corn was shipped and the vessels under weigh, he captured not only the corn but the triremes, escort and all, numbering no less than three hundred men. This done he locked up his prisoners in the citadel, where he himself was also quartered. Now there was a youth, the son of a native of Oreus, fair of mien and of gentle breeding, (33) who danced attendance on the commandant: and the latter must needs leave the citadel and go down to busy himself with this

youth. This was a piece of carelessness which the prisoners did not fail to observe, and turned to good account by seizing the citadel, whereupon the town revolted, and the Thebans experienced no further difficulty in obtaining corn supplies.

(31) = 2,437 pounds: 10 shillings.

(32) Oreus, formerly called Histiaea, in the north of Euboea. See Thuc. vii. 57, viii. 95; Diod. xv. 30; Grote, "H. G." ix. 263. For Pagasae at the north extremity of the Pagasaean Gulf, "the cradle of Greek navigation," see Tozer, "Geog. Gr." vi. p. 124; Strab. IX. v. 15.

(33) Or, "beautiful and brave if ever youth was."

B.C. 376. At the return of spring Agesilaus lay sick — a bedridden invalid. The history of the case is this: During the withdrawal of his army from Thebes the year before, when at Megara, while mounting from the Aphrodision (34) to the Government house he ruptured a vein or other vessel of the body. This was followed by a rush of blood to his sound leg. The knee was much swelled, and the pain intolerable, until a Syracusan surgeon made an incision in the vein near the ankle. The blood thus let flowed night and day; do what they could to stop the discharge, all failed, till the patient fainted away; then it ceased. In this plight Agesilaus was conveyed home on a litter to Lacedaemon, and remained an invalid the rest of that summer and throughout the winter.

(34) Pausanius (I. xi. 6) mentions a temple of Aphrodite {'Epistrophoa} (Verticordia), on the way up to the Carian Acropolis of Megara.

But to resume: at the first burst of spring the Lacedaemonians again called out the ban, and gave orders to Cleombrotus to lead the expedition. The king found himself presently with his troops at the foot of Cithaeron, and his light infantry advanced to occupy the pass which commands the road. But here they found a detachment of Thebans and Athenians already in occupation of the desired height, who for a while suffered them to approach; but when they were close upon them, sprang from their position and charged, putting about forty to the sword. This incident was sufficient to convince Cleombrotus that to invade Thebes by this mountain passage was out of the question, and in this faith he led back and disbanded his troops.

The allies met in Lacedaemon, and arguments were adduced on the part of the allies to show that faintheartedness would very soon lead to their being absolutely worn out by the war. They had got it in their power, it was urged, to fit out a fleet far outnumbering that of Athens, and to reduce that city by starvation; it was open to them, in the self-same ships, to carry an army across into Theban territory, and they had a choice of routes — the road into Phocis, or, if they preferred, by Creusis. After thus carefully considering the matter they manned a fleet of sixty triremes, and Pollis was appointed admiral in command. Nor indeed were their expectations altogether belied. The Athenians were soon so closely blockaded that their corn vessels could get no farther than Geraestus; (35) there was no inducing them to coast down father south, with a Lacedaemonian navy hovering about Aegina and Ceos and Andros. The Athenians, making a virtue of necessity, manned their ships in person, gave battle to Pollis under the leadership of Chabrias, and came out of the sea-fight (36) victorious.

(35) The promontory at the southern extremity of Euboea.

(36) Battle of Naxos, B.C. 376. For interesting details, see Diod. xv. 35, 35.

B.C. 375. Then the corn supplies flowed freely into Athens. The Lacedaemonians, on their side, were preparing to transport an army across the water into Boeotia, when the Thebans sent a request to the Athenians urging them to despatch an armament round Peloponnesus, under the persuasion that if this were done the Lacedaemonians would find it impossible at once to guard their own or the allied territory in that part of the world, and at the same time to convery an army of any size to operate against Thebes. The proposals fell in with the present temper of the Athenians, irritated with Lacedaemon on account of the exploit of Sphodrias. Accordingly they eagerly manned a fleet of sixty vessels, appointing Timotheus as admiral in command, and despatched it on a cruise round Peloponnesus.

The Thebans, seeing that there had been no hostile invasion of their territory for so long (neither during the campaign of Cleombrotus nor now, (37) whilst Timotheus prosecuted his coasting voyage), felt emboldened to carry out a campaign on their own account against the provincial cities; (38) and one by one they again recovered them.

(37) Lit. “nor at the date of Timotherus’s periplus.” To the historian writing of the events of this period several years later, the coasting voyage of Timotheus is a single incident ({periepleuse}), and as Grote (“H. G.” x. 185, note 3) observes, the words may “include not simply the time which Timotheus took in actually circumnavigating Peloponnesos, but the year which he spent afterwards in the Ionian sea, and the time which he occupied in performing his exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, and the neighbourhood generally.” For the character and exploits of Timotheus, son of Conon, see Isocr. “Or.” xv. “On the Antidosis,” SS. 101-139; Jebb, “Att. Or.” ii. p. 140 foll.; Rehdantz, “Vit. Iphicr. Chabr. Timoth. Atheniensium.”

(38) Or, “the cities round about their territory,” lit. “the perioecid cities.” For the import of the epithet, see V. iv. 46; Freeman, op. cit. iv. 173, note 1, in reference to Grote, “H. G.” x. 183, note 4. For the battle of Tegyra see Grote, ib. 182; Plut. “Pelop.” 17; Diod. xv. 57 (“evidently this battle,” Grote); Callisthenes, fr. 3, ed. Did. Cf. Steph. Byz., {Tegura}.

Timotheus in his cruise reached Corcyra, and reduced it at a blow. That done, he neither enslaved the inhabitants nor drove them into exile, nor changed their laws. And of this conduct he reaped the benefit of the increased cordiality (39) of all the cities of those parts. The Lacedaemonians thereupon fitted out and despatched a counter fleet, with Nicolochus in command, an officer of consummate boldness. This admiral no sooner caught sight of Timotheus’s fleet than without hesitation, and in spite of the absence of six Ambraciot vessels which formed part of his squadron, he gave battle, with fifty-five ships to the enemy’s sixty. The result was a defeat at the moment, and Timotheus set up a trophy at Alyzia. But as soon as the six missing Ambraciot vessels had reinforced him — the ships of Timotheus meanwhile being docked and undergoing repairs — he bore down upon Alyzia in search of the Athenian, and as Timotheus refused to put out to meet him, the Lacedaemonian in turn set up a trophy on the nearest group of islands.

(39) The Corcyraeans, Acarnanians, and Cephallenians join the alliance B.C. 375; see Hicks, 83. “This decree dates from the autumn of B.C. 375, immediately after Timotheos’s visit to Korkyra (Xen. ‘Hell.’ V. iv. 64). The result was that the names of Korkyra, Kephallenia, and Akarnania were inscribed upon the list (No. 81), and an alliance was made with them.” (See “C. I. A.” ii. p. 399 foll.; Hicks, loc. cit.; “Hell.” VI. v. 23); “C. I. A.” ii. 14. The tablet is in the Asclepeian collection at the entrance of the Acropolis at Athens. See Milchofer, “Die Museum Athens,” 1881, p. 45.

B.C. 374. Timotheus, after repairing his original squadron and manning more vessels from Corcyra, found himself at the head of more than seventy ships. His naval superiority

was undisputed, but he was forced to send to Athens for moneys, seeing his fleet was large and his wants not trifling.

BOOK VI

I

B.C. 374. The Athenians and Lacedaemonians were thus engaged. But to return to the Thebans. After the subjugation of the cities in Boeotia, they extended the area of aggression and marched into Phocis. The Phocians, on their side, sent an embassy to Lacedaemon, and pleaded that without assistance from that power they must inevitably yield to Thebes. The Lacedaemonians in response conveyed by sea into the territory of Phocis their king Cleombrotus, at the head of four regiments and the contingents of the allies.

About the same time Polydamus of Pharsalus arrived from Thessaly to address the general assembly (1) of Lacedaemon. He was a man of high repute throughout the whole of Thessaly, while in his native city he was regarded as so true a gentleman that the faction-ridden Pharsalians were content to entrust the citadel to his keeping, and to allow their revenues to pass through his hands. It was his privilege to disburse the money needed for sacred rites or other expenditure, within the limits of their written law and constitution. Out of these moneys this faithful steward of the state was able to garrison and guard in safety for the citizens their capital. Every year he rendered an account of his administration in general. If there was a deficit he made it up out of his own pocket, and when the revenues expanded he paid himself back. For the rest, his hospitality to foreigners and his magnificence were on a true Thessalian scale. Such was the style and character of the man who now arrived in Lacedaemon and spoke as follows:

(1) {pros to koinon}, "h.e. vel ad ad senatum vel ad ephoros vel ad concionem." — Sturz, "Lex. Xen." s.v.

"Men of Lacedaemon, it is in my capacity as 'proxenos' and 'benefactor' (titles borne by my ancestry from time

immemorial) that I claim, or rather am bound, in case of any difficulty to come to you, and, in case of any complication dangerous to your interests in Thessaly, to give you warning. The name of Jason, I feel sure, is not unknown to Lacedaemonian ears. His power as a prince is sufficiently large, and his fame widespread. It is of Jason I have to speak. Under cover of a treaty of peace he has lately conferred with me, and this is the substance of what he urged: ‘Polydamas,’ he said, ‘if I chose I could lay your city at my feet, even against its will, as the following considerations will prove to you. See,’ he went on, ‘the majority and the most important of the states of Thessaly are my allies. I subdued them in campaigns in which you took their side in opposition to myself. Again, you do not need to be told that I have six thousand mercenaries who are a match in themselves, I take it, for any single state. It is not the mere numbers on which I insist. No doubt as large an army could be raised in other quarters; but these citizen armies have this defect — they include men who are already advanced in years, with others whose beards are scarcely grown. Again, it is only a fraction of the citizens who attend to bodily training in a state, whereas with me no one takes mercenary service who is not as capable of endurance as myself.’

“And here, Lacedaemonians, I must tell you what is the bare truth. This Jason is a man stout of limb and robust of body, with an insatiable appetite for toil. Equally true is it that he tests the mettle of those with him day by day. He is always at their head, whether on a field-day under arms, or in the gymnasium, or on some military expedition. The weak members of the corps he weeds out, but those whom he sees bear themselves stout-heartedly in the face of war, like true lovers of danger and of toil, he honours with double, treble, and quadruple pay, or with other gifts. On the bed of sickness they will not lack attendance, nor honour in their graves. Thus every foreigner in his service knows that his

valour in war may obtain for him a livelihood — a life replete at once with honour and abundance. (2)

(2) Or, “a life satisfying at once to soul and body.”

“Then with some parade he pointed out to me what I knew before, that the Maracians, and the Dolopians, and Alcetas the hyparch (3) in Epirus, were already subject to his sway; ‘so that I may fairly ask you, Polydamas,’ he proceeded, ‘what I have to apprehend that I should not look on your future subjugation as mere child’s play. Perhaps some one who did not know me, and what manner of man I am, might put it to me: “Well! Jason, if all you say be true, why do you hesitate? why do you not march at once against Pharsalia?” For the good reason, I reply, that it suits me better to win you voluntarily than to annex you against your wills. Since, if you are forced, you will always be planning all the mischief you can against me, and I on my side shall be striving to diminish your power; whereas if you throw in your lot with mine trustfully and willingly, it is certain we shall do what we can to help each other. I see and know, Polydamas, that your country fixes her eyes on one man only, and that is yourself: what I guarantee you, therefore, is that, if you will dispose her lovingly to myself, I on my side will raise you up to be the greatest man in Hellas next to me. Listen, while I tell you what it is in which I offer you the second prize. Listen, and accept nothing which does not approve itself as true to your own reasoning. First, is it not plain to us both, that with the adhesion of Pharsalus and the swarm of pettier states dependent on yourselves, I shall with infinite ease become Tagos (4) of all the Thessalians; and then the corollary — Thessaly so united — sixteen thousand cavalry and more than ten thousand heavy infantry leap into life. Indeed, when I contemplate the physique and proud carriage of these men, I cannot but persuade myself that, with proper handling, there is not a nation or tribe of men to which Thessalians would deign to yield submission. Look at

the broad expanse of Thessaly and consider: when once a Tagos is established here, all the tribes in a circle round will lie stilled in subjection; and almost every member of each of these tribes is an archer born, so that in the light infantry division of the service our power must needs excel. Furthermore, the Boeotians and all the rest of the world in arms against Lacedaemon are my allies; they clamour to follow my banner, if only I will free them from Sparta's yoke. So again the Athenians, I make sure, will do all they can to gain our alliance; but with them I do not think we will make friends, for my persuasion is that empire by sea will be even easier to acquire than empire by land; and to show you the justice of this reasoning I would have you weigh the following considerations. With Macedonia, which is the timber-yard (5) of the Athenian navy, in our hands we shall be able to construct a far larger fleet than theirs. That stands to reason. And as to men, which will be the better able to man vessels, think you — Athens, or ourselves with our stalwart and numerous Penestae? (6) Which will better support mariners — a nation which, like our own, out of her abundance exports her corn to foreign parts, or Athens, which, but for foreign purchases, has not enough to support herself? And so as to wealth in general it is only natural, is it not, that we, who do not look to a string of little islands for supplies, but gather the fruits of continental peoples, should find our resources more copious? As soon as the scattered powers of Thessaly are gathered into a principality, all the tribes around, I repeat, will become our tributaries. I need not tell you that the king of Persia reaps the fruits, not of islands, but of a continent, and he is the wealthiest of men! But the reduction of Persia will be still more practicable, I imagine, than that of Hellas, for there the men, save one, are better versed in slavery than in prowess. Nor have I forgotten, during the advance of Cyrus, and afterwards under Agesilaus, how scant the force was before which the Persian quailed.'

(3) Or, “his underlord in Epirus.” By hyparch, I suppose, is implied that Alcetas regarded Jason as his suzerain. Diodorus (xv. 13, 36) speaks of him as “king” of the Molossians.

(4) Or, “Prince,” and below, “Thessaly so converted into a Principality.” “The Tagos of Thessaly was not a King, because his office was not hereditary or even permanent; neither was he exactly a Tyrant, because his office had some sort of legal sanction. But he came much nearer to the character either of a King or of a Tyrant than to that of a Federal President like the General of the Achaians.… Jason of Pherai acts throughout like a King, and his will seems at least as uncontrolled as that of his brother sovereign beyond the Kambunian hills. Even Jason seems to have been looked upon as a Tyrant (see below, ‘Hell.’ VI. iv. 32); possibly, like the Athenian Demos, he himself did not refuse the name” (cf. Arist. “Pol.” iii. 4, 9). — Freeman, “Hist. Fed. Gov.” “No True Federation in Thessaly,” iv. pp. 152 foll.

(5) See above, and Hicks, 74.

(6) Or, “peasantry.”

“Such, Lacedaemonians, were the glowing arguments of Jason. In answer I told him that what he urged was well worth weighing, but that we, the friends of Lacedaemon, should so, without a quarrel, desert her and rush into the arms of her opponents, seemed to me sheer madness. Whereat he praised me, and said that now must he needs cling all the closer to me if that were my disposition, and so charged me to come to you and tell you the plain truth, which is, that he is minded to march against Pharsalus if we will not hearken to him. Accordingly he bade me demand assistance from you; ‘and if they suffer you,’ (7) he added, ‘so to work upon them that they will send you a force sufficient to do battle with me, it is well: we will abide by war’s arbitrament, nor quarrel with the consequence; but if in your eyes that aid is insufficient, look to yourself. How shall you longer be held blameless before that fatherland which honours you and in which you fare so well?’ (8)

(7) Or, reading {theoi}, after Cobet; translate “if providentially they should send you.”

(8) Reading {kai e su pratteis}, after Cobet. The chief MSS. give {ouk ede anegkletos an dikaios eies en te patridi e se tima kai su prattois ta kratista}, which might be rendered either, “and how be doing best for yourself?” (lit. “and you would not be doing best for yourself,” {ouk an} carried on from previous clause), or (taking {prattois} as pure optative), “may you be guided to adopt the course best for yourself!” “may the best fortune attend you! Farewell.” See Otto Keller, op. cit. ad loc. for various emendations.

“These are the matters,” Polydamas continued, “which have brought me to Lacedaemon. I have told you the whole story; it is based partly on what I see to be the case, and partly on what I have heard from yonder man. My firm belief is, men of Lacedaemon, that if you are likely to despatch a force sufficient, not in my eyes only, but in the eyes of all the rest of Thessaly, to cope with Jason in war, the states will revolt from him, for they are all in alarm as to the future development of the man’s power; but if you think a company of newly-enfranchised slaves and any amateur

general will suffice, I advise you to rest in peace. You may take my word for it, you will have a great power to contend against, and a man who is so prudent a general that, in all he essays to do, be it an affair of secrecy, or speed, or force, he is wont to hit the mark of his endeavours: one who is skilled, should occasion serve, to make the night of equal service to him with the day; (9) or, if speed be needful, will labour on while breakfasting or taking an evening meal. And as for repose, he thinks that the time for it has come when the goal is reached or the business on hand accomplished. And to this same practice he has habituated those about him. Right well he knows how to reward the expectations of his soldiers, when by the extra toil which makes the difference they have achieved success; so that in his school all have laid to heart that maxim, ‘Pain first and pleasure after.’ (10) And in regard to pleasure of the senses, of all men I know, he is the most continent; so that these also are powerless to make him idle at the expense of duty. You must consider the matter then and tell me, as befits you, what you can and will do.”

(9) See “Cyrop.” III. i. 19.

(10) For this sentiment, see “Mem.” II. i. 20 et passim.

Such were the representations of Polydamas. The Lacedaemonians, for the time being, deferred their answer; but after calculating the next day and the day following how many divisions (11) they had on foreign service, and how many ships on the coast of Laconia to deal with the foreign squadron of the Athenians, and taking also into account the war with their neighbours, they gave their answer to Polydamas: “For the present they would not be able to send him sufficient aid: under the circumstances they advised him to go back and make the best settlement he could of his own affairs and those of his city.” He, thanking the Lacedaemonians for their straightforwardness, withdrew.

(11) Lit. “morai.”

The citadel of Pharsalus he begged Jason not to force him to give up: his desire was to preserve it for those who had entrusted it to his safe keeping; his own sons Jason was free to take as hostages, and he would do his best to procure for him the voluntary adhesion of his city by persuasion, and in every way to further his appointment as Tagos of Thessaly. Accordingly, after interchange of solemn assurances between the pair, the Pharsalians were let alone and in peace, and ere long Jason was, by general consent, appointed Tagos of all the Thessalians. Once fairly vested with that authority, he drew up a list of the cavalry and heavy infantry which the several states were capable of furnishing as their quota, with the result that his cavalry, inclusive of allies, numbered more than eight thousand, while his infantry force was computed at not less than twenty thousand; and his light troops would have been a match for those of the whole world — the mere enumeration of their cities would be a labour in itself. (12) His next act was a summons to all the dwellers round (13) to pay tribute exactly the amount imposed in the days of Scopas. (14) And here in this state of accomplishment we may leave these matters. I return to the point reached when this digression into the affairs of Jason began.

(12) See “Cyrop.” I. i. 5.

(13) Lit. perioeci.

(14) It is conjectured that the Scopadae ruled at Pherae and Cranusa in the earlier half of the fifth century B.C.; see, for the change of dynasty, what is said of Lycophron of Pherae in “Hell.” II. iii. 4. There was a famous Scopas, son of Creon, to whom Simonides addressed his poem —

{Andr’ agathon men alatheos genesthai khalepon khersin te kai posi kai noo tetragonon, aneu psogou tetugmenon.}

a sentiment criticised by Plato, “Protag.” 359 A. “Now Simonides says to Scopas, the son of Creon, the Thessalian:

‘Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good; built four-square in hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw.’

Do you know the poem?” — Jowett, “Plat.” i. 153. But whether this Scopas is the Scopas of our text and a hero of Jason’s is not clear.

II

B.C. 374. The Lacedaemonians and their allies were collecting in Phocia, and the Thebans, after retreating into their own territory, were guarding the approaches. At this juncture the Athenians, seeing the Thebans growing strong at their expense without contributing a single penny to the maintenance of the fleet, while they themselves, what with money contributions, and piratical attacks from Aegina, and the garrisoning of their territory, were being pared to the bone, conceived a desire to cease from war. In this mood they sent an embassy to Lacedaemon and concluded peace. (1)

(1) See Curtius, “H. G.” vol. iv. p. 376 (Eng. trans.)

B.C. 374-373. This done, two of the ambassadors, in obedience to a decree of the state, set sail at once from Laconian territory, bearing orders to Timotheus to sail home, since peace was established. That officer, while obeying his orders, availed himself of the homeward voyage to land certain Zacynthian exiles (2) on their native soil, whereupon the Zacynthian city party sent to Lacedaemon and complained of the treatment they had received from Timotheus; and the Lacedaemonians, without further consideration, decided that the Athenians were in the wrong, and proceeded to equip another navy, and at length collected from Laconia itself, from Corinth, Leucas, (3) Ambracia, Elis, Zacynthus, Achaia, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and Halieis, a force amounting to sixty sail. In command of this squadron they appointed Mnasippus admiral, with orders to attack Corcyra, and in general to look after their interests in those seas. They, moreover, sent an embassy to Dionysius, instructing him that his interests would be advanced by the withdrawal of Corcyra from Athenian hands.

(2) See Hicks, 81, p. 142.

(3) Ibid. 81, 86.

B.C. 373. Accordingly Mnasippus set sail, as soon as his squadron was ready, direct to Corcyra; he took with him, besides his troops from Lacedaemon, a body of mercenaries, making a total in all of no less than fifteen hundred men. His disembarked, and soon became master of the island, the country district falling a prey to the spoiler. It was in a high state of cultivation, and rich with fruit-trees, not to speak of magnificent dwelling-houses and wine-cellars fitted up on the farms: so that, it was said, the soldiers reached such a pitch of luxury that they refused to drink wine which had not a fine bouquet. A crowd of slaves, too, and fat beasts were captured on the estates.

The general's next move was to encamp with his land forces about three-quarters of a mile (4) from the city district, so that any Corcyraean who attempted to leave the city to go into the country would certainly be cut off on that side. The fleet he stationed on the other side of the city, at a point where he calculated on detecting and preventing the approach of convoys. Besides which he established a blockade in front of the harbour when the weather permitted. In this way the city was completely invested.

(4) Lit. "five stades."

The Corcyraeans, on their side, were in the sorest straits. They could get nothing from their soil owing to the vice in which they were gripped by land, whilst owing to the predominance of the enemy at sea nothing could be imported. Accordingly they sent to the Athenians and begged for their assistance. They urged upon them that it would be a great mistake if they suffered themselves to be robbed of Corcyra. If they did so, they would not only throw away a great advantage to themselves, but add a considerable strength to their enemy; since, with the exception of Athens, no state was capable of furnishing a larger fleet or revenue. Moreover, Corcyra lay favourably (5) for commanding the Corinthian gulf and the cities which line

its shores; it was splendidly situated for injuring the rural districts of Laconia, and still more splendidly in relation to the opposite shores of the continent of Epirus, and the passage between Peloponnesus and Sicily.

(5) See Thuc. i. 36.

This appeal did not fall on deaf ears. The Athenians were persuaded that the matter demanded their most serious attention, and they at once despatched Stesicles as general, (6) with about six hundred peltasts. They also requested Alcetas to help them in getting their troops across. Thus under cover of night the whole body were conveyed across to a point in the open country, and found their way into the city. Nor was that all. The Athenians passed a decree to man sixty ships of war, and elected (7) Timotheus admiral. The latter, being unable to man the fleet on the spot, set sail on a cruise to the islands and tried to make up the complements of his crews from those quarters. He evidently looked upon it as no light matter to sail round Peloponnesus as if on a voyage of pleasure, and to attack a fleet in the perfection of training. (8) To the Athenians, however, it seemed that he was wasting the precious time seasonable for the coastal voyage, and they were not disposed to condone such an error, but deposed him, appointing Iphicrates in his stead. The new general was no sooner appointed than he set about getting his vessels manned with the utmost activity, putting pressure on the trierarchs. He further procured from the Athenians for his use not only any vessels cruising on the coast of Attica, but the Paralus and Salaminia (9) also, remarking that, if things turned out well yonder, he would soon send them back plenty of ships. Thus his numbers grew to something like seventy sail.

(6) The name of the general was Ctesicles, according to Diod. xv. 47. Read {strategon} for {tagon}, with Breitenbach, Cobet, etc. For Alcetas, see above, “Hell.” VI. i. 7.

(7) I.e. by show of hands, {ekheirotonoun}.

(8) See Jowett, note to Thuc. VIII. xcv. 2, ii. p. 525.

(9) The two sacred galleys. See Thuc. iii. 33; Aristoph. “Birds,” 147 foll.

Meanwhile the Corcyraeans were sore beset with famine: desertion became every day more frequent, so much so that Mnasippus caused proclamation to be made by herald that all deserters would be sold there and then; (10) and when that had no effect in lessening the stream of runaways, he ended by driving them back with the lash. Those within the walls, however, were not disposed to receive these miserable slaves within the lines, and numbers died outside. Mnasippus, not blind to what was happening, soon persuaded himself that he had as good as got the city into his possession: and he began to try experiments on his mercenaries. Some of them he had already paid off; (11) others still in his service had as much as two months' pay owing to them by the general, who, if report spoke true, had no lack of money, since the majority of the states, not caring for a campaign across the seas, sent him hard cash instead of men. But now the beleaguered citizens, who could espy from their towers that the outposts were less carefully guarded than formerly, and the men scattered about the rural districts, made a sortie, capturing some and cutting down others. Mnasippus, perceiving the attack, donned his armour, and, with all the heavy troops he had, rushed to the rescue, giving orders to the captains and brigadiers (12) to lead out the mercenaries. Some of the captains answered that it was not so easy to command obedience when the necessaries of life were lacking; whereat the Spartan struck one man with his staff, and another with the butt of his spear. Without spirit and full of resentment against their general, the men mustered — a condition very unfavourable to success in battle. Having drawn up the troops, the general in person repulsed the division of the enemy which was opposite the gates, and pursued them closely; but these, rallying close under their walls, turned right about, and from under cover of the tombs kept up a continuous discharge of darts and other missiles; other detachments, dashing out at other gates, meanwhile fell heavily on the flanks of the

enemy. The Lacedaemonians, being drawn up eight deep, and thinking that the wing of their phalanx was of inadequate strength, essayed to wheel around; but as soon as they began the movement the Corcyraeans attacked them as if they were fleeing, and they were then unable to recover themselves, (13) while the troops next in position abandoned themselves to flight. Mnasippus, unable to succour those who were being pressed owing to the attack of the enemy immediately in front, found himself left from moment to moment with decreasing numbers. At last the Corcyraeans collected, and with one united effort made a final rush upon Mnasippus and his men, whose numbers were now considerably reduced. At the same instant the townsmen, (14) eagerly noticing the posture of affairs, rushed out to play their part. First Mnasippus was slain, and then the pursuit became general; nor could the pursuers well have failed to capture the camp, barricade and all, had they not caught sight of the mob of traffickers with a long array of attendants and slaves, and thinking that here was a prize indeed, desisted from further chase.

(10) Or, “he would knock them all down to the hammer.”

(11) Or, “cut off from their pay.”

(12) Lit. “lochagoi and taxiarchs.”

(13) Or, “to retaliate”; or, “to complete the movement.”

(14) Reading, after Dindorf, {oi politai}, or, if with the MSS., {oi oplitai}; translate “the heavy-armed among the assailants saw their advantage and pressed on.”

The Corcyraeans were well content for the moment to set up a trophy and to give back the enemy’s dead under a flag of truce; but the after-consequences were even more important to them in the revival of strength and spirits which were sunk in despondency. The rumour spread that Iphicrates would soon be there — he was even at the doors; and in fact the Corcyraeans themselves were manning a fleet. So Hypermenes, who was second in command to Mnasippus and the bearer of his despatches, manned every vessel of the fleet as full as it would hold, and then sailing round to the entrenched camp, filled all the transports with

prisoners and valuables and other stock, and sent them off. He himself, with his marines and the survivors of his troops, kept watch over the entrenchments; but at last even this remnant in the excess of panic and confusion got on board the men-of-war and sailed off, leaving behind them vast quantities of corn and wine, with numerous prisoners and invalided soldiers. The fact was, they were sorely afraid of being caught by the Athenians in the island, and so they made safely off to Leucas.

Meanwhile Iphicrates had commenced his voyage of circumnavigation, partly voyaging and partly making every preparation for an engagement. He at once left his large sails behind him, as the voyage was only to be the prelude of a battle; his flying jibs, even if there was a good breeze, were but little used, since by making his progress depend on sheer rowing, he hoped at once to improve the physique of his men and the speed of his attack. Often when the squadron was about to put into shore for the purpose of breakfast or supper, he would seize the moment, and draw back the leading wing of the column from the land off the point in question; and then facing round again with the triremes posted well in line, prow for prow, at a given signal let loose the whole fleet in a stoutly contested race for the shore. Great was the triumph in being the first to take in water or whatever else they might need, or the first to breakfast; just as it was a heavy penalty on the late-comers, not only to come short in all these objects of desire, but to have to put out to sea with the rest as soon as the signal was given; since the first-comers had altogether a quiet time of it, whilst the hindmost must get through the whole business in hot haste. So again, in the matter of outposts, if he chanced to be getting the morning meal on hostile territory, pickets would be posted, as was right and proper, on the land; but, apart from these, he would raise his masts and keep look-out men on the maintops. These commanded of course a far wider prospect from their lofty perches than the

outposts on the level ground. So too, when he dined or slept he had no fires burning in the camp at night, but only a beacon kindled in front of the encampment to prevent any unseen approach; and frequently in fine weather he put out to sea immediately after the evening meal, when, if the breeze favoured, they ran along and took their rest simultaneously, or if they depended on oars he gave his mariners repose by turns. During the voyage in daytime he would at one time signal to “sail in column,” and at another signal “abreast in line.” So that whilst they prosecuted the voyage they at the same time became (both as to theory and practice) well versed in all the details of an engagement before they reached the open sea — a sea, as they imagined, occupied by their foes. For the most part they breakfasted and dined on hostile territory; but as he confined himself to bare necessaries he was always too quick for the enemy. Before the hostile reinforcement would come up he had finished his business and was out to sea again.

At the date of Mnasippus’s death he chanced to be off Sphagiae in Laconian territory. Reaching Elis, and coasting past the mouth of the Alpheus, he came to moorings under Cape Ichthus, (15) as it is called. The next day he put out from that port for Cephallenia, so drawing up his line and conducting the voyage that he might be prepared in every detail to engage if necessary. The tale about Mnasippus and his demise had reached him, but he had not heard it from an eye-witness, and suspected that it might have been invented to deceive him and throw him off his guard. He was therefore on the look-out. It was, in fact, only on arrival in Cephallenia that he learned the news in an explicit form, and gave his troops rest.

(15) Cape Fish, mod. Cape Katakolon, protecting harbour of Pyrgos in Elis.

I am well aware that all these details of practice and manouvring are customary in anticipation of a sea-fight, but

what I single out for praise in the case before us is the skill with which the Athenian admiral attained a twofold object. Bearing in mind that it was his duty to reach a certain point at which he expected to fight a naval battle without delay, it was a happy discovery on his part not to allow tactical skill, on the one hand, to be sacrificed to the pace of sailing, (16) nor, on the other, the need of training to interfere with the date of arrival.

(16) Lit. “the voyage.”

After reducing the towns of Cephallenia, Iphicrates sailed to Corcyra. There the first news he heard was that the triremes sent by Dionysius were expected to relieve the Lacedaemonians. On receipt of this information he set off in person and surveyed the country, in order to find a spot from which it would be possible to see the vessels approaching and to signal to the city. Here he stationed his look-out men. A code of signals was agreed upon to signify “vessels in sight,” “mooring,” etc.; which done he gave his orders to twenty of his captains of men-of-war who were to follow him at a given word of command. Any one who failed to follow him must not grumble at the penalty; that he warned them. Presently the vessels were signalled approaching; the word of command was given, and then the enthusiasm was a sight to see — every man of the crews told off for the expedition racing to join his ship and embark. Sailing to the point where the enemy’s vessels lay, he had no difficulty in capturing the crews, who had disembarked from all the ships with one exception. The exception was that of Melanippus the Rhodian, who had advised the other captains not to stop at this point, and had then manned his own vessel and sailed off. Thus he encountered the ships of Iphicrates, but contrived to slip through his fingers, while the whole of the Syracusan vessels were captured, crews and all.

Having cut the beaks off the prows, Iphicrates bore down into the harbour of Corcyra with the captured triremes in tow. With the captive crews themselves he came to an agreement that each should pay a fixed sum as ransom, with one exception, that of Crinippus, their commander. Him he kept under guard, with the intention apparently of exacting a handsome sum in his case or else of selling him. The prisoner, however, from vexation of spirit, put an end to his own life. The rest were sent about their business by Iphicrates, who accepted the Corcyraeans as sureties for the money. His own sailors he supported for the most part as labourers on the lands of the Corcyraeans, while at the head of his light infantry and the hoplites of the contingent he crossed over into Acarnania, and there lent his aid to any friendly state that needed his services; besides which he went to war with the Thyrians, (17) a sturdy race of warriors in possession of a strong fortress.

(17) Thyreum (or Thyrium), in Acarnania, a chief city at the time of the Roman wars in Greece; and according to Polybius (xxxviii. 5), a meeting-place of the League on one occasion. See “Dict. Anct. Geog.” s.v.; Freeman, op. cit. iv. 148; cf. Paus. IV. xxvi. 3, in reference to the Messenians and Naupactus; Grote, “H. G.” x. 212.

B.C. 372. Having attached to his squadron the navy also of Corcyra, with a fleet numbering now about ninety ships he set sail, in the first instance to Cephallenia, where he exacted money — which was in some cases voluntarily paid, in others forcibly extorted. In the next place he began making preparations partly to harass the territory of the Lacedaemonians, and partly to win over voluntarily the other states in that quarter which were hostile to Athens; or in case of refusal to go to war with them.

The whole conduct of the campaign reflects, I think, the highest credit on Iphicrates. If his strategy was admirable, so too was the instinct which led him to advise the association with himself of two such colleagues as Callistratus and Chabrias — the former a popular orator but no great friend of himself politically, (18) the other a man of high military reputation. Either he looked upon them as men of unusual

sagacity, and wished to profit by their advice, in which case I commend the good sense of the arrangement, or they were, in his belief, antagonists, in which case the determination to approve himself a consummate general, neither indolent nor incautious, was bold, I admit, but indicative of a laudable self-confidence. Here, however, we must part with Iphicrates and his achievements to return to Athens.

(18) Reading with the MSS. {ou mala epitedeion onta}. See Grote, "H. G." x. 206. Boeckh ("P. E. A.," trans. Cornewall Lewis, p. 419) wished to read {eu mala} for {ou mala k.t.l.}, in which case translate "the former a popular orator, and a man of singular capacity"; and for {epitedeion} in that sense, see "Hipparch." i. 8; for {eu mala}, see "Hipparch." i. 25. For details concerning Callistratus, see Dindorf, op. cit. note ad. loc.; Curtius, "H. G." iv. 367, 381 foll., v. 90. For Chabrias, Rehdantz, op. cit. In the next sentence I have again adhered to the reading of the MSS., but the passage is commonly regarded as corrupt; see Otto Keller, op. cit. p. 215 for various emendations.

III

The Athenians, forced to witness the expatriation from Boeotia of their friends the Plataeans (who had sought an asylum with themselves), forced also to listen to the supplications of the Thespiaeans (who begged them not to suffer them to be robbed of their city), could no longer regard the Thebans with favour; (1) though, when it came to a direct declaration of war, they were checked in part by a feeling of shame, and partly by considerations of expediency. Still, to go hand in hand with them, to be a party to their proceedings, this they absolutely refused, now that they saw them marching against time-honoured friends of the city like the Phocians, and blotting out states whose loyalty in the great Persian war was conspicuous no less than their friendship to Athens. Accordingly the People passed a decree to make peace; but in the first instance they sent an embassy to Thebes, inviting that state to join them if it pleased them on an embassy which they proposed to send to Lacedaemon to treat of peace. In the next place they despatched such an embassy on their own account. Among the commissioners appointed were Callias the son of Hipponicus, Autocles the son of Strombichides, Demostratus the son of Aristophon, Aristocles, Cephisodotus, (2) Melanopus, and Lycaethus.

(1) Plataea destroyed in B.C. 373. See Jowett, "Thuc." ii. 397.

(2) See below, “Hell.” VII. i. 12; Hicks, 87.

B.C. 371. (These were formally introduced to the Deputies of the Lacedaemonians and the allies. (3)) Nor ought the name of Callistratus to be omitted. That statesman and orator was present. He had obtained furlough from Iphicrates on an undertaking either to send money for the fleet or to arrange a peace. Hence his arrival in Athens and transactions in behalf of peace. After being introduced to the assembly (4) of the Lacedaemonians and to the allies, Callias, (5) who was the dadouchos (or torch-holder) in the mysteries, made the first speech. He was a man just as well pleased to praise himself as to hear himself praised by others. He opened the proceedings as follows:

(3) The bracketed words read like an annotator’s comment, or possibly they are a note by the author.

(4) See above, “Hell.” II. iv. 38.

(5) See above, “Hell.” IV. v. 13; Cobet, “Prosop. Xen.” p. 67 foll.; Xen. “Symp.”; Plat. “Protag.”; Andoc. “de Myst.” If this is one and the same person he must have been an elderly man at this date, 371 B.C.

“Lacedaemonians, the duty of representing you as proxenos at Athens is a privilege which I am not the first member of my family to enjoy; my father’s father held it as an heirloom of our family and handed it down as a heritage to his descendants. If you will permit me, I should like to show you the disposition of my fatherland towards yourselves. If in times of war she chooses us as her generals, so when her heart is set upon quiet she sends us out as her messengers of peace. I myself have twice already (6) stood here to treat for conclusion of war, and on both embassies succeeded in arranging a mutually agreeable peace. Now for the third time I am come, and I flatter myself that to-day again I shall obtain a reconciliation, and on grounds exceptionally just. My eyes bear witness that our hearts are in accord; you and we alike are pained at the effacement of Plataeae and Thespiae. Is it not then reasonable that out of agreement should spring concord rather than discord? It is never the part, I take it, of wise men to raise the standard of war for the sake of petty differences; but where there is nothing but unanimity they must be marvellous folk who

refuse the bond of peace. But I go further. It were just and right on our parts even to refuse to bear arms against each other; since, as the story runs, the first strangers to whom our forefather Triptolemus showed the unspeakable mystic rites of Demeter and Core, the mother and the maiden, were your ancestors; — I speak of Heracles, the first founder of your state, and of your two citizens, the great twin sons of Zeus — and to Peloponnesus first he gave as a gift the seed of Demeter's corn-fruits. How, then, can it be just or right either that you should come and ravage the corn crops of those from whom you got the sacred seed of corn, or that we should not desire that they to whom the gift was given should share abundantly of this boon? But if, as it would seem, it is a fixed decree of heaven that war shall never cease among men, yet ought we — your people and our people — to be as slow as possible to begin it, and being in it, as swift as possible to bring it to an end."

(6) B.C. 387 and 374; see Curtius, "H. G." vol. iv. p. 376 (Eng. ed.)

After him Autocles (7) spoke: he was of repute as a versatile lawyer and orator, and addressed the meeting as follows: "Lacedaemonians, I do not conceal from myself that what I am about to say is not calculated to please you, but it seems to me that, if you wish the friendship which we are cementing to last as long as possible, we are wise to show each other the underlying causes of our wars. Now, you are perpetually saying that the states ought to be independent; but it is you yourselves who most of all stand in the way of independence — your first and last stipulation with the allied states being that they should follow you whithersoever you choose to lead; and yet what has this principle of follow-my-leader got to do with independent action? (8) Again, you pick quarrels without consulting your allies, and lead them against those whom you account enemies; so that in many cases, with all their vaunted independence, they are forced to march against their

greatest friends; and, what is still more opposed to independence than all else, you are for ever setting up here your decarchies and there your thirty commissioners, and your chief aim in appointing these officers and governors seems to be, not that they should fulfil their office and govern legally, but that they should be able to keep the cities under their heels by sheer force. So that it looks as if you delighted in despotisms rather than free constitutions. Let us go back to the date (9) at which the Persian king enjoined the independence of the states. At that time you made no secret of your conviction that the Thebans, if they did not suffer each state to govern itself and to use the laws of its own choice, would be failing to act in the spirit of the king's rescript. But no sooner had you got hold of Cadmeia than you would not suffer the Thebans themselves to be independent. Now, if the maintenance of friendship be an object, it is no use for people to claim justice from others while they themselves are doing all they can to prove the selfishness of their aims."

(7) For the political views of Autocles, see Curtius, "H. G." iv. 387, v. 94 (Eng. tr.); see also Grote, "H. G." x. 225.

(8) Or, "what consistency is there between these precepts of yours and political independence?"

(9) Sixteen years before — B.C. 387. See "Pol. Lac." xiv. 5.

These remarks were received in absolute silence, yet in the hearts of those who were annoyed with Lacedaemon they stirred pleasure. After Autocles spoke Callistratus: "Trespasses, men of Lacedaemon, have been committed on both sides, yours and ours, I am free to confess; but still it is not my view that because a man has done wrong we can never again have dealings with him. Experience tells me that no man can go very far without a slip, and it seems to me that sometimes the transgressor by reason of his transgression becomes more tractable, especially if he be chastened through the error he has committed, as has been the case with us. And so on your own case I see that ungenerous acts have sometimes reaped their own proper reward: blow has been met by counter-blow; and as a

specimen I take the seizure of the Cadmeia in Thebes. To-day, at any rate, the very cities whose independence you strove for have, since your unrighteous treatment of Thebes, fallen one and all of them again into her power. (10) We are schooled now, both of us, to know that grasping brings not gain. We are prepared, I hope, to be once more moderate under the influence of a mutual friendship. Some, I know, in their desire to render our peace (11) abortive accuse us falsely, as though we were come hither, not seeking friendship, but because we dread the arrival of some (12) Antalcidas with moneys from the king. But consider, what arrant nonsense they talk! Was it not, pray, the great king who demanded that all the states in Hellas should be independent? and what have we Athenians, who are in full agreement with the king, both in word and deed, to fear from him? Or is it conceivable that he prefers spending money in making others great to finding his favourite projects realised without expense?

(10) Reading, with Breitenbach and Hartman, {as} instead of {os espoudasate k.t.l.}

(11) Or, more lit. "to avert the peace" as an ill-omened thing.

(12) Without inserting {tis}, as Hartman proposes ("An. Xen." p. 387), that, I think, is the sense. Antalcidas is the arch-diplomat — a name to conjure with, like that of Bismarck in modern European politics. But see Grote, "H. G." x. 213, note 2.

"Well! what is it really that has brought us here? No especial need or difficulty in our affairs. That you may discover by a glance at our maritime condition, or, if you prefer, at the present posture of our affairs on land. Well, then, how does the matter stand? It is obvious that some of our allies please us no better than they please you; (13) and, possibly, in return for your former preservation of us, we may be credited with a desire to point out to you the soundness of our policy.

(13) See, for this corrupt passage, Otto Keller, op. cit. p. 219; Hartman, op. cit. p. 387; and Breitenbach, n. ad loc. In the next sentence I should like to adopt Hartman's emendation (ib.) {on orthos egnote} for the MSS. {a orthos egnomen}, and translate "we may like to prove to you the soundness of your policy at the time." For the "preservation" referred to, see below, VI. v. 35, and above, II. ii. 20.

"But, to revert once more to the topic of expediency and common interests. It is admitted, I presume, that, looking at the states collectively, half support your views, half ours; and in every single state one party is for Sparta and another

for Athens. Suppose, then, we were to shake hands, from what quarter can we reasonably anticipate danger and trouble? To put the case in so many words, so long as you are our friends no one can vex us by land; no one, whilst we are your supports, can injure you by sea. Wars like tempests gather and grow to a head from time to time, and again they are dispelled. That we all know. Some future day, if not to-day, we shall crave, both of us, for peace. Why, then, need we wait for that moment, holding on until we expire under the multitude of our ills, rather than take time by the forelock and, before some irremediable mischief betide, make peace? I cannot admire the man who, because he has entered the lists and has scored many a victory and obtained to himself renown, is so eaten up with the spirit of rivalry that he must needs go on until he is beaten and all his training is made futile. Nor again do I praise the gambler who, if he makes one good stroke of luck, insists on doubling the stakes. Such conduct in the majority of cases must end in absolute collapse. Let us lay the lesson of these to heart, and forbear to enter into any such lists as theirs for life or death; but, while we are yet in the heyday of our strength and fortune, shake hands in mutual amity. So assuredly shall we through you and you through us attain to an unprecedented pinnacle of glory throughout Hellas."

The arguments of the speakers were approved, and the Lacedaemonians passed a resolution to accept peace on a threefold basis: the withdrawal of the governors from the cities, (14) the disbanding of armaments naval and military, and the guarantee of independence to the states. "If any state transgressed these stipulations, it lay at the option of any power whatsoever to aid the states so injured, while, conversely, to bring such aid was not compulsory on any power against its will." On these terms the oaths were administered and accepted by the Lacedaemonians on behalf of themselves and their allies, and by the Athenians

and their allies separately state by state. The Thebans had entered their individual name among the states which accepted the oaths, but their ambassadors came the next day with instructions to alter the name of the signatories, substituting for Thebans Boeotians. (15) But Agesilaus answered to this demand that he would alter nothing of what they had in the first instance sworn to and subscribed. If they did not wish to be included in the treaty, he was willing to erase their name at their bidding. So it came to pass that the rest of the world made peace, the sole point of dispute being confined to the Thebans; and the Athenians came to the conclusion that there was a fair prospect of the Thebans being now literally decimated. (16) As to the Thebans themselves, they retired from Sparta in utter despondency.

(14) Grote ("H. G." x. 236) thinks that Diod. xv. 38 ({exagogeis}) belongs to this time, not to the peace between Athens and Sparta in 374 B.C.

(15) See, for a clear explanation of the matter, Freeman, "Hist. Red. Gov." iv. p. 175, note 3, in reference to Grote, ib. x. 231 note, and Paus. IX. xiii. 2; Plut. "Ages." 28; Thirlwall, "H. G." v. p 69 note.

(16) Or, "as the saying is, taken and tithed." See below, VI. v. 35, and for the origin of the saying, Herod. vii. 132.

IV

In consequence of the peace the Athenians proceeded to withdraw their garrisons from the different sates, and sent to recall Iphicrates with his fleet; besides which they forced him to restore everything captured subsequently to the late solemn undertaking at Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemonians acted differently. Although they withdrew their governors and garrisons from the other states, in Phocis they did not do so. Here Cleombrotus was quartered with his army, and had sent to ask directions from the home authorities. A speaker, Prothous, maintained that their business was to disband the army in accordance with their oaths, and then to send round invitations to the states to contribute what each felt individually disposed, and lay such sum in the temple of Apollo; after which, if any attempt to hinder the independence of the states on any side were manifested, it

would be time enough then again to invite all who cared to protect the principle of autonomy to march against its opponents. “In this way,” he added, “I think the goodwill of heaven will be secured, and the states will suffer least annoyance.” But the Assembly, on hearing these views, agreed that this man was talking nonsense. Puppets in the hands of fate! (1) An unseen power, it would seem, was already driving them onwards; so they sent instructions to Cleombrotus not to disband the army, but to march straight against the Thebans if they refused to recognise the autonomy of the states. (Cleombrotus, it is understood, had, on hearing the news of the establishment of peace, sent to the ephorate to ask for guidance; and then they sent him the above instructions, bidding him under the circumstances named to march upon Thebes. (2))

(1) See Grote, “H. G.” x. 237: “The miso-Theban impulse now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts… a misguiding inspiration sent by the gods — like that of the Homeric Ate.”

(2) This passage reads like an earlier version for which the above was substituted by the author.

The Spartan king soon perceived that, so far from leaving the Boeotian states their autonomy, the Thebans were not even preparing to disband their army, clearly in view of a general engagement; he therefore felt justified in marching his troops into Boeotia. The point of ingress which he adopted was not that which the Thebans anticipated from Phocis, and where they were keeping guard at a defile; but, marching through Thisbae by a mountainous and unsuspected route, he arrived before Creusis, taking that fortress and capturing twelve Theban war-vessels besides. After this achievement he advanced from the seaboard and encamped in Leuctra on Thespian territory. The Thebans encamped in a rising ground immediately opposite at no great distance, and were supported by no allies except the Boeotians.

At this juncture the friends of Cleombrotus came to him and urged upon him strong reasons for delivering battle. “If you let the Thebans escape without a battle,” they said, “you will run great risks of suffering the extreme penalty at

the hands of the state. People will call to mind against you the time when you reached Cynoscephelae and did not ravage a square foot of Theban territory; and again, a subsequent expedition when you were driven back foiled in your attempt to make an entry into the enemy's country — while Agesilaus on each occasion found his entry by Mount Cithaeron. If then you have any care for yourself, or any attachment to your fatherland, march you against the enemy." That was what his friends urged. As to his opponents, what they said was, "Now our fine friend will show whether he really is so concerned on behalf of the Thebans as he is said to be."

Cleombrotus, with these words ringing in his ears, felt driven (3) to join battle. On their side the leaders of Thebes calculated that, if they did not fight, their provincial cities (4) would hold aloof from them and Thebes itself would be besieged; while, if the commonalty of Thebes failed to get supplies, there was every prospect that the city itself would turn against them; and, seeing that many of them had already tasted the bitterness of exile, they came to the conclusion that it was better for them to die on the field of battle than to renew that experience. Besides this they were somewhat encouraged by the recital of an oracle which predicted that the Lacedaemonians would be defeated on the spot where the monument of the maidens stood, who, as the story goes, being violated by certain Lacedaemonians, had slain themselves. (5) This sepulchral monument the Thebans decked with ornaments before the battle. Furthermore, tidings were brought them from the city that all the temples had opened of their own accord; and the priestesses asserted that the gods revealed victory. Again, from the Heracleion men said that the arms had disappeared, as though Heracles himself had sallied forth to battle. It is true that another interpretation (6) of these marvels made them out to be one and all the artifices of the

leaders of Thebes. However this may be, everything in the battle turned out adverse to the Lacedaemonians; while fortune herself lent aid to the Thebans and crowned their efforts with success. Cleombrotus held his last council “whether to fight or not,” after the morning meal. In the heat of noon a little goes a long way; and the people said that it took a somewhat provocative effect on their spirits. (7)

(3) Or, “was provoked.”

(4) Lit. “perioecid.” See Thuc. iv. 76, Arnold’s note, and “Hell.” V. iv. 46, 63.

(5) See Diod. xv. 54; Paus. IX. xiii. 3; Plut. “Pelop.” xx.

(6) Or, “it is true that some people made out these marvels.”

(7) Or, “they were somewhat excited by it.”

Both sides were now arming, and there was the unmistakeable signs of approaching battle, when, as the first incident, there issued from the Boeotian lines a long train bent on departure — these were the furnishers of the market, a detachment of baggage bearers, and in general such people as had no inclination to join in the fight. These were met on their retreat and attacked by the mercenary troops under Hiero, who got round them by a circular movement. (8) The mercenaries were supported by the Phocian light infantry and some squadrons of Heracleot and Phliasian cavalry, who fell upon the retiring train and turned them back, pursuing them and driving them into the camp of the Boeotians. The immediate effect was to make the Boeotian portion of the army more numerous and closer packed than before. The next feature of the combat was that in consequence of the flat space of plain (9) between the opposing armies, the Lacedaemonians posted their cavalry in front of their squares of infantry, and the Thebans followed suit. Only there was this difference — the Theban cavalry was in a high state of training and efficiency, owing to their war with the Orchomenians and again their war with Thespiae, whilst the cavalry of the Lacedaemonians was at its worst at this period. (10) The horses were reared and kept by the wealthiest members of the state; but whenever the

ban was called out, an appointed trooper appeared who took the horse with any sort of arms which might be presented to him, and set off on the expedition at a moment’s notice. Moreover, these troopers were the least able-bodied of the men: raw recruits set simply astride their horses, and devoid of soldierly ambition. Such was the cavalry of either antagonist.

(8) Or, “surrounded them.”

(9) See Rustow and Kochly, op. cit. p. 173.

(10) See “Hipparch.” ix. 4; also “Cyrop.” VIII. viii.

The heavy infantry of the Lacedaemonians, it is said, advanced by sections three files abreast, (11) allowing a total depth to the whole line of not more than twelve. The Thebans were formed in close order of not less than fifty shields deep, calculating that victory gained over the king’s division of the army implied the easy conquest of the rest.

(11) It would appear that the “enomoty” (section) numbered thirty-six files. See “Pol. Lac.” xi. 4; xiii. 4. For further details as to the tactical order of the Thebans, see Diod. xv. 55; Plut. “Pelop.” xxiii.

Cleombrotus had hardly begun to lead his division against the foe when, before in fact the troops with him were aware of his advance, the cavalry had already come into collision, and that of the Lacedaemonians was speedily worsted. In their flight they became involved with their own heavy infantry; and to make matters worse, the Theban regiments were already attacking vigorously. Still strong evidence exists for supposing that Cleombrotus and his division were, in the first instance, victorious in the battle, if we consider the fact that they could never have picked him up and brought him back alive unless his vanguard had been masters of the situation for the moment.

When, however, Deinon the polemarch and Sphodrias, a member of the king’s council, with his son Cleonymus, (12) had fallen, then it was that the cavalry and the polemarch’s adjutants, (13) as they are called, with the rest, under pressure of the mass against them, began retreating; and the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, seeing the right borne

down in this way, also swerved. Still, in spite of the numbers slain, and broken as they were, as soon as they had crossed the trench which protected their camp in front, they grounded arms on the spot (14) whence they had rushed to battle. This camp, it must be borne in mind, did not lie at all on the level, but was pitched on a somewhat steep incline. At this juncture there were some of the Lacedaemonians who, looking upon such a disaster as intolerable, maintained that they ought to prevent the enemy from erecting a trophy, and try to recover the dead not under a flag of truce but by another battle. The polemarchs, however, seeing that nearly a thousand men of the total Lacedaemonian troops were slain; seeing also that of the seven hundred Spartans themselves who were on the field something like four hundred lay dead; (15) aware, further, of the despondency which reigned among the allies, and the general disinclination on their parts to fight longer (a frame of mind not far removed in some instances from positive satisfaction at what had taken place) — under the circumstances, I say, the polemarchs called a council of the ablest representatives of the shattered army (16) and deliberated as to what should be done. Finally the unanimous opinion was to pick up the dead under a flag of truce, and they sent a herald to treat for terms. The Thebans after that set up a trophy and gave back the bodies under a truce.

(12) See above, V. iv. 33.

(13) {sumphoreis}. For the readings of this corrupt passage see Otto Keller.

(14) Or, “in orderly way.” See Curt. “H. G.” iv. 400.

(15) See “Ages.” ii. 24.

(16) {tous epikairiotatous}. See above, III. iii. 10; “Cyrop.” VII. iv. 4; VIII. iv. 32, vi. 2.

After these events, a messenger was despatched to Lacedaemon with news of the calamity. He reached his destination on the last day of the gymnopaediae, (17) just when the chorus of grown men had entered the theatre. The ephors heard the mournful tidings not without grief and pain, as needs they must, I take it; but for all that they did

not dismiss the chorus, but allowed the contest to run out its natural course. What they did was to deliver the names of those who had fallen to their friends and families, with a word of warning to the women not to make any loud lamentations but to bear their sorrow in silence; and the next day it was a striking spectacle to see those who had relations among the slain moving to and fro in public with bright and radiant looks, whilst of those whose friends were reported to be living barely a man was to be seen, and these flitted by with lowered heads and scowling brows, as if in humiliation.

(17) The festival was celebrated annually about midsummer. See Herod. vi. 67; Thuc. v. 82, and Arnold's note; Pollux. iv. 105; Athen. xiv. 30, xv. 22; Muller, "Dorians," ii. 389.

After this the ephors proceeded to call out the ban, including the forty-years-service men of the two remaining regiments; (18) and they proceeded further to despatch the reserves of the same age belonging to the six regiments already on foreign service. Hitherto the Phocian campaign had only drawn upon the thirty-five-years-service list. Besides these they now ordered out on active service the troops retained at the beginning of the campaign in attendance on the magistrates at the government offices. Agesilaus being still disabled by his infirmity, the city imposed the duty of command upon his son Archidamus. The new general found eager co-operators in the men of Tegea. The friends of Stasippus at this date were still living, (19) and they were stanch in their Lacedaemonian proclivities, and wielded considerable power in their state. Not less stoutly did the Mantineans from their villages under their aristocratic form of government flock to the Spartan standard. Besides Tegea and Mantinea, the Corinthians and Sicyonians, the Phliasians and Achaeans were equally enthusiastic to joining the campaign, whilst other states sent out soldiers. Then came the fitting out and manning of ships of war on the part of the Lacedaemonians themselves and of the Corinthians, whilst the Sicyonians were requested

to furnish a supply of vessels on board of which it was proposed to transport the army across the gulf. And so, finally, Archidamus was able to offer the sacrifices usual at the moment of crossing the frontier. But to return to Thebes.

(18) I.e. every one up to fifty-eight years of age.

(19) See below, VI. v. 9.

Immediately after the battle the Thebans sent a messenger to Athens wearing a chaplet. Whilst insisting on the magnitude of the victory they at the same time called upon the Athenians to send them aid, for now the opportunity had come to wreak vengeance on the Lacedaemonians for all the evil they had done to Athens. As it chanced, the senate of the Athenians was holding a session on the Acropolis. As soon as the news was reported, the annoyance caused by its announcement was unmistakeable. They neither invited the herald to accept of hospitality nor sent back one word in reply to the request for assistance. And so the herald turned his back on Athens and departed.

But there was Jason still to look to, and he was their ally. To him then the Thebans sent, and earnestly besought his aid, their thoughts running on the possible turn which events might take. Jason on his side at once proceeded to man a fleet, with the apparent intention of sending assistance by sea, besides which he got together his foreign brigade and his own cavalry; and although the Phocians and he were implacable enemies, (20) he marched through their territory to Boeotia. Appearing like a vision to many of the states before his approach was even announced — at any rate before levies could be mustered from a dozen different points — he had stolen a march upon them and was a long way ahead, giving proof that expedition is sometimes a better tool to work with than sheer force.

(20) Or, “though the Phocians maintained a war ‘a outrance’ with him.”

When he arrived in Boeotia the Thebans urged upon him that now was the right moment to attack the

Lacedaemonians: he with his foreign brigade from the upper ground, they face to face in front; but Jason dissuaded them from their intention. He reminded them that after a noble achievement won it was not worth their while to play for so high a stake, involving a still greater achievement or else the loss of victory already gained. “Do you not see,” he urged, “that your success followed close on the heels of necessity? You ought then to reflect that the Lacedaemonians in their distress, with a choice between life and death, will fight it out with reckless desperation. Providence, as it seems, ofttimes delights to make the little ones great and the great ones small.” (21)

(21) Cf. “Anab.” III. ii. 10.

By such arguments he diverted the Thebans from the desperate adventure. But for the Lacedaemonians also he had words of advice, insisting on the difference between an army defeated and an army flushed with victory. “If you are minded,” he said, “to forget this disaster, my advice to you is to take time to recover breath and recruit your energies. When you have grown stronger then give battle to these unconquered veterans. (22) At present,” he continued, “you know without my telling you that among your own allies there are some who are already discussing terms of friendship with your foes. My advice is this: by all means endeavour to obtain a truce. This,” he added, “is my own ambition: I want to save you, on the ground of my father’s friendship with yourselves, and as being myself your representative.” (23) Such was the tenor of his speech, but the secret of action was perhaps to be found in a desire to make these mutual antagonists put their dependence on himself alone. Whatever his motive, the Lacedaemonians took his advice, and commissioned him to procure a truce.

(22) Or, “the invincibles.”

(23) Lit. “your proxenos.”

As soon as the news arrived that the terms were arranged, the polemarchs passed an order round: the troops were to

take their evening meal, get their kit together, and be ready to set off that night, so as to scale the passes of Cithaeron by next morning. After supper, before the hour of sleep, the order to march was given, and with the generals at their head the troops advanced as the shades of evening fell, along the road to Creusis, trusting rather to the chance of their escaping notice, than to the truce itself. It was weary marching in the dead of night, making their retreat in fear, and along a difficult road, until they fell in with Archidamus's army of relief. At this point, then, Archidamus waited till all the allies had arrived, and so led the whole of the united armies back to Corinth, from which point he dismissed the allies and led his fellow-citizens home.

Jason took his departure from Boeotia through Phocis, where he captured the suburbs of Hyampolis (24) and ravaged the country districts, putting many to the sword. Content with this, he traversed the rest of Phocis without meddling or making. Arrived at Heraclea, (25) he knocked down the fortress of the Heracleots, showing that he was not troubled by any apprehension lest when the pass was thrown open somebody or other might march against his own power at some future date. Rather was he haunted by the notion that some one or other might one day seize Heraclea, which commanded the pass, and bar his passage into Hellas — should Hellas ever be his goal. (26) At the moment of his return to Thessaly he had reached the zenith of his greatness. He was the lawfully constituted Prince (27) of Thessaly, and he had under him a large mercenary force of infantry and cavalry, and all in the highest perfection of training. For this twofold reason he might claim the title great. But he was still greater as the head of a vast alliance. Those who were prepared to fight his battles were numerous, and he might still count upon the help of many more eager to do so; but I call Jason greatest among his contemporaries,

because not one among them could afford to look down upon him. (28)

(24) An ancient town in Phocis (see Hom. “Il.” ii. 521) on the road leading from Orchomenus to Opus, and commanding a pass from Locris into Phocis and Boeotia. See Herod. viii. 28; Paus. ix. 35, S. 5; Strab. ix. 424; “Dict. of Geog.” s.v.

(25) Or, “Heracleia Trachinia,” a fortress city founded (as a colony) by the Lacedaemonians in B.C. 426, to command the approach to Thermopylae from Thessaly, and to protect the Trachinians and the neighbouring Dorians from the Oetean mountaineers. See “Dict. of Geog.” “Trachis”; Thuc. iii. 92, 93, v. 51, 52; Diod. xii. 59.

(26) B.C. 370. The following sections 28-37 form an episode concerning Thessalian affairs between B.C. 370 and B.C. 359.

(27) Lit. “Tagos.”

(28) For a similar verbal climax see below, VI. v. 47.

B.C. 370. The Pythian games were now approaching, and an order went round the cities from Jason to make preparation for the solemn sacrifice of oxen, sheep and goats, and swine. It was reported that although the requisitions upon the several cities were moderate, the number of beeves did not fall short of a thousand, while the rest of the sacrificial beasts exceeded ten times that number. He issued a proclamation also to this effect: a golden wreath of victory should be given to whichever city could produce the best-bred bull to head the procession in honour of the god. And lastly there was an order issued to all the Thessalians to be ready for a campaign at the date of the Pythian games. His intention, as people said, was to act as manager of the solemn assembly and games in person. What the thought was that passed through his mind with reference to the sacred money, remains to this day uncertain; only, a tale is rife to the effect that in answer to the inquiry of the Delphians, “What ought we to do, if he takes any of the treasures of the god?” the god made answer, “He would see to that himself.” This great man, his brain teeming with vast designs of this high sort, came now to his end. He had ordered a military inspection. The cavalry of the Pheraeans were to pass muster before him. He was already seated, delivering answers to all petitioners, when seven striplings approached, quarrelling, as it seemed, about some matter. Suddenly by these seven the Prince was despatched; his throat gashed, his body gored with wounds. Stoutly his guard rushed to the rescue with their long

spears, and one of the seven, while still in the act of aiming a blow at Jason, was thrust through with a lance and died; a second, in the act of mounting his horse, was caught, and dropped dead, the recipient of many wounds. The rest leaped on the horses which they had ready waiting and escaped. To whatever city of Hellas they came honours were almost universally accorded them. The whole incident proves clearly that the Hellenes stood in much alarm of Jason. They looked upon him as a tyrant in embryo.

So Jason was dead; and his brothers Polydorus and Polyphron were appointed princes (29) in his place. But of these twain, as they journeyed together to Larissa, Polydorus was slain in the night, as he slept, by his brother Polyphron, it was thought; since a death so sudden, without obvious cause, could hardly be otherwise accounted for.

(29) Lit. “Tagoi.”

Polyphron governed for a year, and by the year’s end he had refashioned his princedom into the likeness of a tyranny. In Pharsalus he put to death Polydamas (30) and eight other of the best citizens; and from Larissa he drove many into exile. But while he was thus employed, he, in his turn, was done to death by Alexander, who slew him to avenge Polydorus and to destroy the tyranny. This man now assumed the reins of office, and had no sooner done so than he showed himself a harsh prince to the Thessalians: harsh too and hostile to the Thebans and Athenians, (31) and an unprincipled freebooter everywhere by land and by sea. But if that was his character, he too was doomed to perish shortly. The perpetrators of the deed were his wife’s brothers. (32) The counsellor of it and the inspiring soul was the wife herself. She it was who reported to them that Alexander had designs against them; who hid them within the house a whole day; who welcomed home her husband deep in his cups and laid him to rest, and then while the lamp still burned brought out the prince’s sword. It was she

also who, perceiving her brothers shrank bank, fearing to go in and attack Alexander, said to them, “If you do not be quick and do the deed, I will wake him up!” After they had gone in, she, too, it was who caught and pulled to the door, clinging fast to the knocker till the breath was out of her husband’s body. (33) Her fierce hatred against the man is variously explained. By some it was said to date from the day when Alexander, having imprisoned his own favourite — who was a fair young stripling — when his wife supplicated him to release the boy, brought him forth and stabbed him in the throat. Others say it originated through his sending to Thebes and seeking the hand of the wife of Jason in marriage, because his own wife bore him no children. These are the various causes assigned to explain the treason of his wife against him. Of the brothers who executed it, the eldest, Tisiphonus, in virtue of his seniority accepted, and up to the date of this history (34) succeeded in holding, the government.

(30) See above, VI. i. 2 foll.

(31) See Dem. “c. Aristocr.” 120; Diod. xv. 60 foll.

(32) B.C. 359 or 358.

(33) The woman’s name was Thebe. See Diod. xvi. 14; Cicero, “de Inven.” II. xlix. 144; “de Div.” I. xxv. 52; “de Off.” II. vii. 25; Ovid, “Ibis,” iii. 21 foll.

(34) Or, “portion of my work;” lit. “argument,” {logos}. See {Kuprianos, Peri ton ‘Ell}: p. 111.

V

The above is a sketch of Thessalian affairs, including the incidents connected with Jason, and those subsequent to his death, down to the government of Tisiphonus. I now return to the point at which we digressed.

B.C. 371. Archidamus, after the relief of the army defeated at Leuctra, had led back the united forces. When he was gone, the Athenians, impressed by the fact that the Peloponessians still felt under an obligation to follow the Lacedaemonians to the field, whilst Sparta herself was by no means as yet reduced to a condition resembling that to

which she had reduced Athens, sent invitations to those states which cared to participate in the peace authorised by the great king. (1) A congress met, and they passed a resolution in conjunction with those who wished to make common cause with them to bind themselves by oath as follows: “I will abide by the treaty terms as conveyed in the king’s rescript, as also by the decrees of the Athenians and the allies. If any one marches against any city among those which have accepted this oath, I will render assistance to that city with all my strength.” The oath gave general satisfaction, the Eleians alone gainsaying its terms and protesting that it was not right to make either the Marganians or the Scilluntians or the Triphylians independent, since these cities belonged to them, and were a part of Elis. (2) The Athenians, however, and the others passed the decree in the precise language of the king’s rescript: that all states — great and small alike — were to be independent; and they sent out administrators of the oath, and enjoined upon them to administer it to the highest authorities in each state. This oath they all, with the exception of the Eleians, swore to.

(1) I.e. in B.C. 387, the peace “of” Antalcidas. See Grote, “H. G.” x. 274.

(2) See Busolt, op. cit. p. 186.

B.C. 371-370. As an immediate consequence of this agreement, the Mantineans, on the assumption that they were now absolutely independent, met in a body and passed a decree to make Mantinea into a single state and to fortify the town. (3) The proceeding was not overlooked by the Lacedaemonians, who thought it would be hard if this were done without their consent. Accordingly they despatched Agesilaus as ambassador to the Mantineans, choosing him as the recognised ancestral friend of that people. When the ambassador arrived, however, the chief magistrates had no inclination to summon a meeting of the commons to listen to him, but urged him to make a statement of his wishes to themselves. He, on his side, was ready to undertake for

himself and in their interests that, if they would at present desist from their fortification work, he would bring it about that the defensive walls should be built with the sanction of Lacedaemon and without cost. Their answer was, that it was impossible to hold back, since a decree had been passed by the whole state of Mantinea to build at once. Whereupon Agesilaus went off in high dudgeon; though as to sending troops to stop them, (4) the idea seemed impracticable, as the peace was based upon the principle of autonomy. Meanwhile the Mantineans received help from several of the Arcadian states in the building of their walls; and the Eleians contributed actually three talents (5) of silver to cover the expense of their construction. And here leaving the Mantineans thus engaged, we will turn to the men of Tegea.

(3) For the restoration of Mantinea, see Freeman, “Fed. Gov.” iv. p. 198; Grote, “H. G.” x. 283 foll.

(4) See above, V. ii. 1, sub anno B.C. 386.

(5) = 731 pounds: 5 shillings. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 199.

There were in Tegea two political parties. The one was the party of Callibius and Proxenus, who were for drawing together the whole Arcadian population in a confederacy, (6) in which all measures carried in the common assembly should be held valid for the individual component states. The programme of the other (Stasippus’s) party was to leave Tegea undisturbed and in the enjoyment of the old national laws. Perpetually defeated in the Sacred College, (7) the party of Callibius and Proxenus were persuaded that if only the commons met they would gain an easy victory by an appeal to the multitude; and in this faith they proceeded to march out the citizen soldiers. (8) At sight of this Stasippus and his friends on their side armed in opposition, and proved not inferior in numbers. The result was a collision and battle, in which Proxenus and some few others with him were slain and the rest put to flight; though the conquerors did not pursue, for Stasippus was a man who did not care to stain his hands with the blood of his fellow-citizens. (9)

(6) Although the historian does not recount the foundation of Megalopolis (see Pausanias and Diodorus), the mention of the common assembly of the League {en to koino} in this passage and, still more, of the Ten Thousand (below, “Hell.” VII. i. 38), implies it. See Freeman, op. cit. iv. 197 foll.;

Grote, “H. G.” x. 306 foll., ii. 599; “Dict. of Geog.” “Megalopolis.” As to the date of its foundation Pausanias (VIII. xxvii. 8) says “a few months after the battle of Leuctra,” before midsummer B.C. 370; Diodorus (xv. 72) says B.C. 368. The great city was not built in a day. Messene, according to Paus. IV. xxvii. 5, was founded between the midsummers of B.C. 370 and B.C. 369.

(7) Lit. “in the Thearoi.” For the Theari, see Thuc. v. 47, Arnold’s note; and “C. I. G.” 1756 foll.; and for the revolution at Tegea here recounted, see Grote, “H. G.” x. 285 foll.

(8) Or, “they mustered under arms.”

(9) Or, “opposed to a wholesale slaughter of the citizens.”

Callibius and his friends had retired under the fortification walls and gates facing Mantinea; but, as their opponents made no further attempts against them, they here collected together and remained quiet. Some while ago they had sent messages to the Mantineans demanding assistance, but now they were ready to discuss terms of reconciliation with the party of Stasippus. Presently they saw the Mantineans advancing; whereupon some of them sprang to the walls, and began calling to them to bring succour with all speed. With shouts they urged upon them to make haste, whilst others threw open wide the gates to them. Stasippus and his party, perceiving what was happening, poured out by the gates leading to Pallantium, (10) and, outspeeding their pursuers, succeeded in reaching the temple of Artemis, where they found shelter, and, shutting to the doors, kept quiet. Following close upon their heels, however, their foes scaled the temple, tore off the roof, and began striking them down with the tiles. They, recognising that there was no choice, called upon their assailants to desist, and undertook to come forth. Then their opponents, capturing them like birds in a fowler’s hand, bound them with chains, threw them on to the prisoner’s van, (11) and led them off to Tegea. Here with the Mantineans they sentenced and put them to death.

(10) Pallantium, one of the most ancient towns of Arcadia, in the Maenalia (Paus. VIII. xliv. 5; Livy, i. 5), situated somewhat south of the modern Tripolitza (see “Dict. of Anc. Geog.”); like Asea and Eutaea it helped to found Megalopolis (Paus. VIII. xxvii. 3, where for {‘Iasaia} read {‘Asea}); below, VII. v. 5; Busolt, op. cit. p. 125.

(11) For the sequel of the matter, see above, “Hell.” VI. iv. 18; Busolt, op. cit. p. 134.

The outcome of these proceedings was the banishment to Lacedaemon of the Tegeans who formed the party of Stasippus, numbering eight hundred; but as a sequel to what had taken place, the Lacedaemonians determined that they were bound by their oaths to aid the banished Tegeans

and to avenge the slain. With this purpose they marched against the Mantineans, on the ground that they had violated their oaths in marching against Tegea with an armed force. The ephors called out the ban and the state commanded Agesilaus to head the expedition.

Meanwhile most of the Arcadian contingents were mustering at Asea. (12) The Orchomenians not only refused to take part in the Arcadian league, on account of their personal hatred to Mantinea, but had actually welcomed within their city a mercenary force under Polytropus, which had been collected at Corinth. The Mantineans themselves were forced to stay at home to keep an eye on these. The men of Heraea and Lepreum made common cause with the Lacedaemonians in a campaign against Mantinea.

(12) Asea is placed by Leake (“Travels in Morea,” i. 84; iii. 34) near Frangovrysi, a little south of Pallantium.

Heraea, the most important town of Arcadia in the Cynuria, near Elis, on the high road to Olympia, and commanding other main roads. See Leake, “Peloponnesiaca,” p. 1 foll.; “Morea,” ii. 91.

Lepreum, chief town of the Triphylia (Herod. iv. 148, ix. 28; Thuc. v. 31; above, III. ii. 25; Paus. V. v. 3; Polyb. iv. 77 foll.; Strab. viii. 345), near modern Strovitzi; Leake, “Morea,” i. 56; Dodwell, “Tour,” ii. 347.

Eutaea is placed by Leake between Asea and Pallantium at Barbitza (“Morea,” iii. 31); but see Grote, “H. G.” x. 288.

Finding the frontier sacrifices favourable, Agesilaus began his march at once upon Arcadia. He began by occupying the border city of Eutaea, where he found the old men, women, and children dwelling in their houses, while the rest of the population of a military age were off to join the Arcadian league. In spite of this he did not stir a finger unjustly against the city, but suffered the inhabitants to continue in their homes undisturbed. The troops took all they needed, and paid for it in return; if any pillage had occurred on his first entrance into the town, the property was hunted up and

restored by the Spartan king. Whilst awaiting the arrival of Polytropus's mercenaries, he amused himself by repairing such portions of their walls as necessity demanded.

Meanwhile the Mantineans had taken the field against Orchomenus; but from the walls of that city the invaders had some difficulty in retiring, and lost some of their men. On their retreat they found themselves in Elymia; (13) here the heavy infantry of the Orchomenians ceased to follow them; but Polytropus and his troops continued to assail their rear with much audacity. At this conjuncture, seeing at a glance that either they must beat back the foe or suffer their own men to be shot down, the Mantineans turned right about and met the assailant in a hand-to-hand encounter. Polytropus fell fighting on that battlefield; and of the rest who took to flight, many would have shared his fate, but for the opportune arrival of the Phliasian cavalry, who swooped round to the conqueror's rear and checked him in his pursuit. (14)

(13) Elymia, mentioned only by Xenophon, must have been on the confines of the Mantinice and Orchomenus, probably at Levidhi. — Leake, "Morea," iii. 75; "Peloponn." p. 229.

(14) See "Cyrop." VII. i. 36.

Content with this achievement, the Mantineans retired homewards; while Agesilaus, to whom the news was brought, no longer expecting that the Orchomenian mercenaries could effect a junction with himself, determined to advance without further delay. (15) On the first day he encamped for the evening meal in the open country of Tegea, and the day following crossed into Mantinean territory. Here he encamped under the westward-facing (16) mountains of Mantinea, and employed himself in ravaging the country district and sacking the farmsteads; while the troops of the Arcadians who were mustered in Asea stole by night into Tegea. The next day Agesilaus shifted his position, encamping about two miles' (17) distance from Mantinea; and the Arcadians, issuing from Tegea and clinging to the mountains between Mantinea and that city, appeared with

large bodies of heavy infantry, wishing to effect a junction with the Mantineans. The Argives, it is true, supported them, but they were not in full force. And here counsellors were to be found who urged on Agesilaus to attack these troops separately; but fearing lest, in proportion as he pressed on to engage them, the Mantineans might issue from the city behind and attack him on flank and rear, he decided it was best to let the two bodies coalesce, and then, if they would accept battle, to engage them on an open and fair field.

(15) See “Ages.” ii. 23.

(16) See Leake, “Morea,” iii. 73.

(17) Lit. “twenty stades.”

And so ere long the Arcadians had effected their object and were united with the Mantineans. The next incident was the sudden apparition at break of day, as Agesilaus was sacrificing in front of the camp, of a body of troops. These proved to be the light infantry from Orchomenus, who in company with the Phliasian cavalry had during the night made their way across past the town of Mantinea; and so caused the mass of the army to rush to their ranks, and Agesilaus himself to retire within the lines. Presently, however, the newcomers were recognised as friends; and as the sacrifices were favourable, Agesilaus led his army forward a stage farther after breakfast. As the shades of evening descended he encamped unobserved within the fold of the hills behind the Mantinean territory, with mountains in close proximity all round. (18)

(18) Lit. “within the hindmost bosom of the Mantinice.” In reference to the position, Leake (“Morea,” iii. 75) says: “The northern bay (of the Mantinic plain between Mantinea and the Argon) corresponds better by its proximity to Mantinea; by Mount Alesium it was equally hidden from the city, while its small dimensions, and the nearness of the incumbent mountains, rendered it a more hazardous position to an army under the circumstances of that of Agesilaus” (than had he encamped in the Argon itself). For the Argon (or Inert Plain), see Leake, ib. 54 foll.

On the next morning, as day broke, he sacrificed in front of the army; and observing a mustering of men from the city of Mantinea on the hills which overhung the rear of his army, he decided that he must lead his troops out of the hollow by the quickest route. But he feared lest, if he himself led off, the enemy might fall upon his rear. In this dilemma he kept quiet; presenting a hostile front to the enemy, he sent

orders to his rear to face about to the right, (19) and so getting into line behind his main body, to move forward upon him; and in this way he at once extricated his troops from their cramped position and kept continually adding to the weight and solidity of his line. As soon as the phalanx was doubled in depth he emerged upon the level ground, with his heavy infantry battalions in this order, and then again extended his line until his troops were once more nine or ten shields deep. But the Mantineans were no longer so ready to come out. The arguments of the Eleians who had lent them their co-operation had prevailed: that it was better not to engage until the arrival of the Thebans. The Thebans, it was certain, would soon be with them; for had they not borrowed ten talents (20) from Elis in order to be able to send aid? The Arcadians with this information before them kept quiet inside Mantinea. On his side Agesilaus was anxious to lead off his troops, seeing it was midwinter; but, to avoid seeming to hurry his departure out of fear, he preferred to remain three days longer and no great distance from Mantinea. On the fourth day, after an early morning meal, the retreat commenced. His intention was to encamp on the same ground which he had made his starting-point on leaving Eutaea. But as none of the Arcadians appeared, he marched with all speed and reached Eutaea itself, although very late, that day; being anxious to lead off his troops without catching a glimpse of the enemy’s watch-fires, so as to silence the tongues of any one pretending that he withdrew in flight. His main object was in fact achieved. To some extent he had recovered the state from its late despondency, since he had invaded Arcadia and ravaged the country without any one caring to offer him battle. But, once arrived on Laconian soil, he dismissed the Spartan troops to their homes and disbanded the provincials (21) to their several cities.

(19) See “Anab.” IV. iii. 29; “Pol. Lac.” xi. 10.

(20) 2,437 pounds: 10 shillings. See Busult, op. cit. p. 199.

(21) Lit. “perioeci”; and below, SS. 25, 32.

B.C. 370-369. The Arcadians, now that Agesilaus had retired, realising that he had disbanded his troops, while they themselves were fully mustered, marched upon Heraea, the citizens of which town had not only refused to join the Arcadian league, but had joined the Lacedaemonians in their invasion of Arcadia. For this reason they entered the country, burning the homesteads and cutting down the fruit-trees.

Meanwhile news came of the arrival of the Theban reinforcements at Mantinea, on the strength of which they left Heraea and hastened to fraternise (22) with their Theban friends. When they were met together, the Thebans, on their side, were well content with the posture of affairs: they had duly brought their succour, and no enemy was any longer to be discovered in the country; so they made preparations to return home. But the Arcadians, Argives and Eleians were eager in urging them to lead the united forces forthwith into Laconia: they dwelt proudly on their own numbers, extolling above measure the armament of Thebes. And, indeed, the Boeotians one and all were resolute in their military manouvres and devotion to arms, (23) exulting in the victory of Leuctra. In the wake of Thebes followed the Phocians, who were now their subjects, Euboeans from all the townships of the island, both sections of the Locrians, the Acarnanians, (24) and the men of Heraclea and of Melis; while their force was further swelled by Thessalian cavalry and light infantry. With the full consciousness of facts like these, and further justifying their appeal by dwelling on the desolate condition of Lacedaemon, deserted by her troops, they entreated them not to turn back without invading the territory of Laconia. But the Thebans, albeit they listened to their prayers, urged arguments on the other side. In the first place, Laconia was by all accounts most difficult to invade; and their belief was that garrisons were posted at all the

points most easily approached. (As a matter of fact, Ischolaus was posted at Oeum in the Sciritid, with a garrison of neodamodes and about four hundred of the youngest of the Tegean exiles; and there was a second outpost on Leuctrum above the Maleatid. (25)) Again it occurred to the Thebans that the Lacedaemonian forces, though disbanded, would not take long to muster, and once collected they would fight nowhere better than on their own native soil. Putting all these considerations together, they were not by any means impatient to march upon Lacedaemon. A strong counter-impulse, however, was presently given by the arrival of messengers from Caryae, giving positive information as to the defenceless condition of the country, and offering to act as guides themselves; they were ready to lose their lives if they were convicted of perfidy. A further impulse in the same direction was given by the presence of some of the provincials, (26) with invitations and promises of revolt, if only they would appear in the country. These people further stated that even at the present moment, on a summons of the Spartans proper, the provincials did not care to render them assistance. With all these arguments and persuasions echoing from all sides, the Thebans at last yielded, and invaded. They chose the Caryan route themselves, while the Arcadians entered by Oeum in the Sciritid. (27)

(22) Or, “effect a junction with.”

(23) Or, “in practising gymnastics about the place of arms.” See “Pol. Lac.” xii. 5.

(24) See “Hell.” IV. vii. 1; “Ages.” ii. 20. For a sketch of the relations of Acarnania to Athens and Sparta, see Hicks, No. 83, p. 150; and above, “Hell.” V. iv. 64.

(25) Leuctrum, a fortress of the district Aegytis on the confines of Arcadia and Laconia (“in the direction of Mount Lycaeum,” Thuc. v. 54). See Leake, “Morea,” ii. 322; also “Peloponn.” p. 248, in which place he corrects his former view as to the situation of Leuctrum and the Maleatid.

Oeum or Ium, the chief town of the Sciritis, probably stood in the Klisura or series of narrow passes through the watershed of the mountains forming the natural boundary between Laconia and Arcadia (in the direct line north from Sparta to Tegea), “Dict. of Anc. Geog.” s.v. Leake says (“Morea,” iii. 19, 30 foll.) near the modern village of Kolina; Baedeker (“Greece,” p. 269) says perhaps at Palaeogoulas.

Caryae. This frontier town was apparently (near Arachova) on the road from Thyrea (in the direction of the Argolid) to Sparta (Thuc. v. 55; Paus. III. x. 7; Livy, xxxiv. 26, but see Leake, “Morea,” iii. 30; “Peloponn.” p. 342).

Sellasia, probably rightly placed “half an hour above Vourlia” (Baedeker, “Greece,” p. 269). The famous battle of Sellasia, in the spring of B.C. 221, in which the united Macedonians under Antigonus and the Achaeans finally broke the power of Sparta, was fought in the little valley where the stream Gorgylus joins the river Oenus and the Khan of Krevatas now stands. For a plan, see “Dict. of Anc. Geog.” s.v.

(26) “Perioeci.”

(27) Diodorus (xv. 64) gives more details; he makes the invaders converge upon Sellasia by four separate routes. See Leake, “Morea,” iii. 29 foll.

By all accounts Ischolaus made a mistake in not advancing to meet them on the difficult ground above Oeum. Had he done so, not a man, it is believed, would have scaled the passes there. But for the present, wishing to turn the help of the men of Oeum to good account, he waited down in the village; and so the invading Arcadians scaled the heights in a body. At this crisis Ischolaus and his men, as long as they fought face to face with their foes, held the superiority; but, presently, when the enemy, from rear and flank, and even from the dwelling-houses up which they scaled, rained blows and missiles upon them, then and there Ischolaus met his end, and every man besides, save only one or two who, failing to be recognised, effected their escape.

After these achievements the Arcadians marched to join the Thebans at Caryae, and the Thebans, hearing what wonders the Arcadians had performed, commenced their descent with far greater confidence. Their first exploit was to burn and ravage the district of Sellasia, but finding themselves ere long in the flat land within the sacred enclosure of Apollo, they encamped for the night, and the next day continued their march along the Eurotas. When

they came to the bridge they made no attempt to cross it to attack the city, for they caught sight of the heavy infantry in the temple of Alea (28) ready to meet them. So, keeping the Eurotas on their right, they tramped along, burning and pillaging homesteads stocked with numerous stores. The feelings of the citizens may well be imagined. The women who had never set eyes upon a foe (29) could scarcely contain themselves as they beheld the cloud of smoke. The Spartan warriors, inhabiting a city without fortifications, posted at intervals, here one and there another, were in truth what they appeared to be — the veriest handful. And these kept watch and ward. The authorities passed a resolution to announce to the helots that whosoever among them chose to take arms and join a regiment should have his freedom guaranteed to him by solemn pledges in return for assistance in the common war. (30) More than six thousand helots, it is said, enrolled themselves, so that a new terror was excited by the very incorporation of these men, whose numbers seemed to be excessive. But when it was found that the mercenaries from Orchomenus remained faithful, and reinforcements came to Lacedaemon from Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, and Pellene, and some other states, the dread of these new levies was speedily diminished.

(28) See Pausanias, III. xix. 7.

(29) See Plutarch, “Ages.” xxxi. 3 (Clough, vol. iv. p. 38); Aristot. “Pol.” ii. 9-10.

(30) See below, VII. ii. 2.

The enemy in his advance came to Amyclae. (31) Here he crossed the Eurotas. The Thebans wherever they encamped at once formed a stockade of the fruit-trees they had felled, as thickly piled as possible, and so kept ever on their guard. The Arcadians did nothing of the sort. They left their camping-ground and took themselves off to attack the homesteads and loot. On the third or fourth day after their arrival the cavalry advanced, squadron by squadron, as far as the racecourse, (32) within the sacred enclosure of Gaiaochos. These consisted of the entire Theban cavalry and

the Eleians, with as many of the Phocian or Thessalian or Locrian cavalry as were present. The cavalry of the Lacedaemonians, looking a mere handful, were drawn up to meet them. They had posted an ambuscade chosen from their heavy infantry, the younger men, about three hundred in number, in the house of the Tyndarids (33); and while the cavalry charged, out rushed the three hundred at the same instant at full pace. The enemy did not wait to receive the double charge, but swerved, and at sight of that many also of the infantry took to headlong flight. But the pursuers presently paused; the Theban army remained motionless; and both parties returned to their camps. And now the hope, the confidence strengthened that an attack upon the city itself would never come; nor did it. The invading army broke up from their ground, and marched off on the road to Helos and Gytheum. (34) The unwalled cities were consigned to the flames, but Gytheum, where the Lacedaemonians had their naval arsenal, was subjected to assault for three days. Certain of the provincials (35) also joined in this attack, and shared the campaign with the Thebans and their friends.

(31) For this ancient (Achaean) town, see Paus. III. ii. 6; Polyb. v. 19. It lay only twenty stades (a little more than two miles) from the city of Sparta.

(32) Or, "hippodrome." See Paus. III. ii. 6.

(33) Paus. III. xvi. 2.

(34) See Baedeker's "Greece," p. 279. Was Gytheum taken? See Grote, "H. G." x. 305; Curt. "H. G." Eng. trans. iv. 431.

(35) "Perioeci." See above, III. iii. 6; VI. v. 25; below, VII. ii. 2; Grote, "H. G." x. 301. It is a pity that the historian should hurry us off to Athens just at this point. The style here is suggestive of notes ({upomnemata}) unexpanded.

The news of these proceedings set the Athenians deeply pondering what they ought to do concerning the Lacedaemonians, and they held an assembly in accordance with a resolution of the senate. It chanced that the ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians and the allies still faithful to Lacedaemon were present. The Lacedaemonian ambassadors were Aracus, Ocyllus, Pharax, Etymocles, and Olontheus, and from the nature of the case they all used, roughly speaking, similar arguments. They reminded the Athenians how they had often in old days stood happily together, shoulder to shoulder, in more than one great crisis.

They (the Lacedaemonians), on their side, had helped to expel the tyrant from Athens, and the Athenians, when Lacedaemon was besieged by the Messenians, had heartily leant her a helping hand. (36) Then they fell to enumerating all the blessings that marked the season when the two states shared a common policy, hinting how in common they had warred against the barbarians, and more boldly recalling how the Athenians with the full consent and advice of the Lacedaemonians were chosen by united Hellas leaders of the common navy (37) and guardians of all the common treasure, while they themselves were selected by all the Hellenes as confessedly the rightful leaders on land; and this also not without the full consent and concurrence of the Athenians.

(36) In reference (1) to the expulsion of the Peisistratidae (Herod. v. 64); (2) the "third" Messenian war (Thuc. i. 102).

(37) See "Revenues," v. 6.

One of the speakers ventured on a remark somewhat to this strain: "If you and we, sirs, can only agree, there is hope to-day that the old saying may be fulfilled, and Thebes be 'taken and tithed.'" (38) The Athenians, however, were not in the humour to listen to that style of argument. A sort of suppressed murmur ran through the assembly which seemed to say, "That language may be well enough now; but when they were well off they pressed hard enough on us." But of all the pleas put forward by the Lacedaemonians, the weightiest appeared to be this: that when they had reduced the Athenians by war, and the Thebans wished to wipe Athens off the face of the earth, they (the Lacedaemonians) themselves had opposed the measure. (39) If that was the argument of most weight, the reasoning which was the most commonly urged was to the effect that "the solemn oaths necessitated the aid demanded. Sparta had done no wrong to justify this invasion on the part of the Arcadians and their allies. All she had done was to assist the men of Tegea when (40) the Mantineans had marched against that township contrary to their solemn oaths."

Again, for the second time, at these expressions a confused din ran through the assembly, half the audience maintaining that the Mantineans were justified in supporting Proxenus and his friends, who were put to death by the party with Stasippus; the other half that they were wrong in bringing an armed force against the men of Tegea.

(38) Or, “the Thebans be decimated”; for the phrase see above, “Hell.” VI. iii. 20.

(39) See “Hell.” II. ii. 19; and “Hell.” III. v. 8.

(40) Lit. “because,” {oti}.

Whilst these distinctions were being drawn by the assembly itself, Cleiteles the Corinthian got up and spoke as follows: “I daresay, men of Athens, there is a double answer to the question, Who began the wrongdoing? But take the case of ourselves. Since peace began, no one can accuse us either of wantonly attacking any city, or of seizing the wealth of any, or of ravaging a foreign territory. In spite of which the Thebans have come into our country and cut down our fruit-trees, burnt to the ground our houses, filched and torn to pieces our cattle and our goods. How then, I put it to you, will you not be acting contrary to your solemn oaths if you refuse your aid to us, who are so manifestly the victims of wrongdoings? Yes; and when I say solemn oaths, I speak of oaths and undertakings which you yourselves took great pains to exact from all of us.” At that point a murmur of applause greeted Cleiteles, the Athenians feeling the truth and justice of the speaker’s language.

He sat down, and then Procles of Phlius got up and spoke as follows: “What would happen, men of Athens, if the Lacedaemonians were well out of the way? The answer to that question is obvious. You would be the first object of Theban invasion. Clearly; for they must feel that you and you alone stand in the path between them and empire over Hellas. If this be so, I do not consider that you are more supporting Lacedaemon by a campaign in her behalf than you are helping yourselves. For imagine the Thebans, your own sworn foes and next-door neighbours, masters of Hellas!

You will find it a painful and onerous exchange indeed for the distant antagonism of Sparta. As a mere matter of self-interest, now is the time to help yourselves, while you may still reckon upon allies, instead of waiting until they are lost, and you are forced to fight a life-and-death battle with the Thebans single-handed. But the fear suggests itself, that should the Lacedaemonians escape now, they will live to cause you trouble at some future date. Lay this maxim to heart, then, that it is not the potential greatness of those we benefit, but of those we injure, which causes apprehension. And this other also, that it behoves individuals and states alike so to better their position (41) while yet in the zenith of their strength that, in the day of weakness, when it comes, they may find some succour and support in what their former labours have achieved. (42) To you now, at this time, a heaven-sent opportunity is presented. In return for assistance to the Lacedaemonians in their need, you may win their sincere, unhesitating friendship for all time. Yes, I say it deliberately, for the acceptance of these benefits at your hands will not be in the presence of one or two chance witnesses. The all-seeing gods, in whose sight to-morrow is even as to-day, will be cognisant of these things. The knowledge of them will be jointly attested by allies and enemies; nay, by Hellenes and barbarians alike, since to not one of them is what we are doing a matter of unconcern. If, then, in the presence of these witnesses, the Lacedaemonians should prove base towards you, no one will ever again be eager in their cause. But our hope, our expectation should rather be that they will prove themselves good men and not base; since they beyond all others would seem persistently to have cherished a high endeavour, reaching forth after true praise, and holding aloof from ugly deeds.

(41) Lit. “to acquire some good.”

(42) Or, “for what,” etc.

“But there are further considerations which it were well you should lay to heart. If danger were ever again to visit Hellas from the barbarian world outside, in whom would you place your confidence if not in the Lacedaemonians? Whom would you choose to stand at your right hand in battle if not these, whose soldiers at Thermopylae to a man preferred to fall at their posts rather than save their lives by giving the barbarian free passage into Hellas? Is it not right, then, considering for what thing’s sake they displayed that bravery in your companionship, considering also the good hope there is that they will prove the like again — is it not just that you and we should lend them all countenance and goodwill? Nay, even for us their allies’ sake, who are present, it would be worth your while to manifest this goodwill. Need you be assured that precisely those who continue faithful to them in their misfortunes would in like manner be ashamed not to requite you with gratitude? And if we seem to be but small states, who are willing to share their dangers with them, lay to heart that there is a speedy cure for this defect: with the accession of your city the reproach that, in spite of all our assistance, we are but small cities, will cease to be.

“For my part, men of Athens, I have hitherto on hearsay admired and envied this great state, whither, I was told, every one who was wronged or stood in terror of aught needed only to betake himself and he would obtain assistance. To-day I no longer hear, I am present myself and see these famous citizens of Lacedaemon here, and by their side their trustiest friends, who have come to you, and ask you in their day of need to give them help. I see Thebans also, the same who in days bygone failed to persuade the Lacedaemonians to reduce you to absolute slavery, (43) to-day asking you to suffer those who saved you to be destroyed.

(43) See “Hell.” II. ii. 19; III. v. 8, in reference to B.C. 405.

“That was a great deed and of fair renown, attributed in old story to your ancestors, that they did not suffer those Argives who died on the Cadmeia (44) to lie unburied; but a fairer wreath of glory would you weave for your own brows if you suffer not these still living Lacedaemonians to be trampled under the heel of insolence and destroyed. Fair, also, was that achievement when you stayed the insolence of Eurystheus and saved the sons of Heracles; (45) but fairer still than that will your deed be if you rescue from destruction, not the primal authors (46) merely, but the whole city which they founded; fairest of all, if because yesterday the Lacedaemonians won you your preservation by a vote which cost them nothing, you to-day shall bring them help with arms, and at the price of peril. It is a proud day for some of us to stand here and give what aid we can in pleading for assistance to brave men. What, then, must you feel, who in very deed are able to render that assistance! How generous on your parts, who have been so often the friends and foes of Lacedaemon, to forget the injury and remember only the good they have done! How noble of you to repay, not for yourselves only, but for the sake of Hellas, the debt due to those who proved themselves good men and true in her behalf!”

(44) In reference to the Seven against Thebes, see Herod. IX. xxvii. 4; Isoc. “Paneg.” 55.

(45) Herod. IX. xxvii. 3; see Isoc. “Paneg.” 56. “The greatness of Sparta was founded by the succour which Athens lent to the Heraklid invaders of the Peloponnese — a recollection which ought to restrain Sparta from injuring or claiming to rule Athens. Argos, Thebes, Sparta were in early times, as they are now, the foremost cities of Hellas; but Athens was the greatest of them all — the avenger of Argos, the chastiser of Thebes, the patron of those who founded Sparta.” — Jebb, “Att. Or.” ii. 154.

(46) Plut. “Lyc.” vi.

After these speeches the Athenians deliberated, and though there was opposition, the arguments of gainsayers (47) fell upon deaf ears. The assembly finally passed a decree to send assistance to Lacedaemon in force, and they chose Iphicrates general. Then followed the preliminary sacrifices, and then the general’s order to his troops to take the evening meal in the grove of the Academy. (48) But the general himself, it is said, was in no hurry to leave the city; many were found at their posts before him. Presently,

however, he put himself at the head of his troops, and the men followed cheerily, in firm persuasion that he was about to lead them to some noble exploit. On arrival at Corinth he frittered away some days, and there was a momentary outburst of discontent at so much waste of precious time; but as soon as he led the troops out of Corinth there was an obvious rebound. The men responded to all orders with enthusiasm, heartily following their general's lead, and attacking whatever fortified place he might confront them with.

(47) As to the anti-Laconian or Boeotian party at Athens, see Curtius, "H. G." vol. v. ch. ii. (Eng. tr.)

(48) See Baedeker, "Greece," p. 103.

And now reverting to the hostile forces on Laconian territory, we find that the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians had retired in large numbers. They had every inducement so to do since their homes bordered on Laconia; and off they went, driving or carrying whatever they had looted. The Thebans and the rest were no less anxious to get out of the country, though for other reasons, partly because the army was melting away under their eyes day by day, partly because the necessities of life were growing daily scantier, so much had been either fairly eaten up and pillaged or else recklessly squandered and reduced to ashes. Besides this, it was winter; so that on every ground there was a general desire by this time to get away home.

As son as the enemy began his retreat from Laconian soil, Iphicrates imitated his movement, and began leading back his troops out of Arcadia into Corinthia. Iphicrates exhibited much good generalship, no doubt, with which I have no sort of fault to find. But it is not so with that final feature of the campaign to which we are now come. Here I find his strategy either meaningless in intent or inadequate in execution. He made an attempt to keep guard at Oneion, in order to prevent the Boeotians making their way out homewards; but left meanwhile far the best passage through Cenchreae unguarded. Again, when he wished to discover whether or

not the Thebans had passed Oneion, he sent out on a reconnaissance the whole of the Athenian and Corinthian cavalry; whereas, for the object in view, the eyes of a small detachment would have been as useful as a whole regiment; (49) and when it came to falling back, clearly the smaller number had a better chance of hitting on a traversable road, and so effecting the desired movement quietly. But the height of folly seems to have been reached when he threw into the path of the enemy a large body of troops which were still too weak to cope with him. As a matter of fact, this body of cavalry, owing to their very numbers, could not help covering a large space of ground; and when it became necessary to retire, had to cling to a series of difficult positions in succession, so that they lost not fewer than twenty horsemen. (50) It was thus the Thebans effected their object and retired from Peloponnese.

(49) See “Hipparch.” viii. 10 foll.

(50) See Diod. xv. 63; Plut. “Pelop.” 24.

BOOK VII

I

B.C. 369. In the following year (1) plenipotentiary ambassadors (2) from the Lacedaemonians and their allies arrived at Athens to consider and take counsel in what way the alliance between Athens and Lacedaemon might be best cemented. It was urged by many speakers, foreigners and Athenians also, that the alliance ought to be based on the principle of absolute equality, (3) “share and share alike,” when Procles of Phlius put forward the following argument:

(1) I.e. the official year from spring to spring. See Peter, “Chron. Table” 95, note 215; see Grote, “H. G.” x. 346, note 1.

(2) See Hicks, 89.

(3) For the phrase {epi toi isois kai omoiois}, implying “share and share alike,” see Thuc. i. 145, etc.

“Since you have already decided, men of Athens, that it is good to secure the friendship of Lacedaemon, the point, as it appears to me, which you ought now to consider is, by what means this friendship may be made to last as long as possible. The probability is, that we shall hold together best by making a treaty which shall suit the best interests of both parties. On most points we have, I believe, a tolerable unanimity, but there remains the question of leadership. The preliminary decree of your senate anticipates a division of the hegemony, crediting you with the chief maritime power, Lacedaemon with the chief power on land; and to me, personally, I confess, that seems a division not more established by human invention than preordained by some divine naturalness or happy fortune. For, in the first place, you have a geographical position pre-eminently adapted for naval supremacy; most of the states to whom the sea is important are massed round your own, and all of these are inferior to you in strength. Besides, you have harbours and roadsteads, without which it is not possible to turn a naval power to account. Again, you have many ships of war. To

extend your naval empire is a traditional policy; all the arts and sciences connected with these matters you possess as home products, and, what is more, in skill and experience of nautical affairs you are far ahead of the rest of the world. The majority of you derive your livelihood from the sea, or things connected with it; so that in the very act of minding your own affairs you are training yourselves to enter the lists of naval combat. (4) Again, no other power in the world can send out a larger collective fleet, and that is no insignificant point in reference to the question of leadership. The nucleus of strength first gained becomes a rallying-point, round which the rest of the world will gladly congregate. Furthermore, your good fortune in this department must be looked upon as a definite gift of God: for, consider among the numberless great sea-fights which you have fought how few you have lost, how many you have won. It is only rational, then, that your allies should much prefer to share this particular risk with you. Indeed, to show you how natural and vital to you is this maritime study, the following reflection may serve. For several years the Lacedaemonians, when at war with you in old days, dominated your territory, but they made no progress towards destroying you. At last God granted them one day to push forward their dominion on the sea, and then in an instant you completely succumbed to them. (5) Is it not self-evident that your safety altogether depends upon the sea? The sea is your natural element — your birthright; it would be base indeed to entrust the hegemony of it to the Lacedaemonians, and the more so, since, as they themselves admit, they are far less acquainted with this business than yourselves; and, secondly, your risk in naval battles would not be for equal stakes — theirs involving only the loss of the men on board their ships, but yours, that of your children and your wives and the entire state.

(4) See “Pol. Ath.” i. 19 foll.

(5) See “Hell.” II. i.

“And if this is a fair statement of your position, turn, now, and consider that of the Lacedaemonians. The first point to notice is, that they are an inland power; as long as they are dominant on land it does not matter how much they are cut off from the sea — they can carry on existence happily enough. This they so fully recognise, that from boyhood they devote themselves to training for a soldier’s life. The keystone of this training is obedience to command, (6) and in this they hold the same pre-eminence on land which you hold on the sea. Just as you with your fleets, so they on land can, at a moment’s notice, put the largest army in the field; and with the like consequence, that their allies, as is only rational, attach themselves to them with undying courage. (7) Further, God has granted them to enjoy on land a like good fortune to that vouchsafed to you on sea. Among all the many contests they have entered into, it is surprising in how few they have failed, in how many they have been successful. The same unflagging attention which you pay to maritime affairs is required from them on land, and, as the facts of history reveal, it is no less indispensable to them. Thus, although you were at war with them for several years and gained many a naval victory over them, you never advanced a step nearer to reducing them. But once worsted on land, in an instant they were confronted with a danger affecting the very lives of child and wife, and vital to the interests of the entire state. We may very well understand, then, the strangeness, not to say monstrosity, in their eyes, of surrendering to others the military leadership on land, in matters which they have made their special study for so long and with such eminent success. I end where I began. I agree absolutely with the preliminary decrees of your own senate, which I consider the solution most advantageous to both parties. My prayer (8) is that you may be guided in your deliberations to that conclusion which is best for each and all of us.”

(6) Or, “the spirit of discipline.” See “Mem.” III. v. 16; IV. iv. 15; Thuc. ii. 39; “Pol. Lac.” viii.

(7) Or, “with unlimited confidence.”

(8) See above, “Hell.” Vl. i. 13, {kai su prattois ta kratista}, “and so may the best fortune attend you!” — if that reading and rendering be adopted.

Such were the words of the orator, and the sentiments of his speech were vehemently applauded by the Athenians no less than by the Lacedaemonians who were present. Then Cephisodotus (9) stepped forward and addressed the assembly. He said, “Men of Athens, do you not see how you are being deluded? Lend me your ears, and I will prove it to you in a moment. There is no doubt about your leadership by sea: it is already secured. But suppose the Lacedaemonians in alliance with you: it is plain they will send you admirals and captains, and possibly marines, of Laconian breed; but who will the sailors be? Helots obviously, or mercenaries of some sort. These are the folk over whom you will exercise your leadership. Reverse the case. The Lacedaemonians have issued a general order summoning you to join them in the field; it is plain again, you will be sending your heavy infantry and your cavalry. You see what follows. You have invented a pretty machine, by which they become leaders of your very selves, and you become the leaders either of their slaves or of the dregs of their state. I should like to put a question to the Lacedaemonian Timocrates seated yonder. Did you not say just now, Sir, that you came to make an alliance on terms of absolute equality, ‘share and share alike’? Answer me.” “I did say so.” “Well, then, here is a plan by which you get the perfection of equality. I cannot conceive of anything more fair and impartial than that ‘turn and turn about’ each of us should command the navy, each the army; whereby whatever advantage there may be in maritime or military command we may each of us share.”

(9) See above, “Hell.” Vl. iii. 2; Hicks, 87.

These arguments were successful. The Athenians were converted, and passed a decree vesting the command in either state (10) for periods of five days alternately.

(10) See “Revenues,” v. 7.

B.C. 369. (11) The campaign was commenced by both Athenians and Lacedaemonians with their allies, marching upon Corinth, where it was resolved to keep watch and ward over Oneion jointly. On the advance of the Thebans and their allies the troops were drawn out to defend the pass. They were posted in detachments at different points, the most assailable of which was assigned to the Lacedaemonians and the men of Pellene. (12)

(11) See Grote, "H. G." x. 349 foll.; al. B.C. 368.

(12) "During the wars of Epameinondas Pellene adhered firmly to her Spartan policy, at a time when other cities were, to say the least, less strenuous in the Spartan cause." — Freeman, "Hist. Fed. Gov." p. 241. Afterwards Pellene is found temporarily on the Theban side ("Hell." VII. ii. 11).

The Thebans and their allies, finding themselves within three or four miles (13) of the troops guarding the pass, encamped in the flat ground below; but presently, after a careful calculation of the time it would take to start and reach the goal in the gloaming, they advanced against the Lacedaemonian outposts. In spite of the difficulty they timed their movements to a nicety, and fell upon the Lacedaemonians and Pellenians just at the interval when the night pickets were turning in and the men were leaving their shakedowns and retiring for necessary purposes. (14) This was the instant for the Thebans to fling themselves upon them; they plied their weapons with good effect, blow upon blow. Order was pitted against disorder, preparation against disarray. When, however, those who escaped from the thick of the business had retired to the nearest rising ground, the Lacedaemonian polemarch, who might have taken as many heavy, or light, infantry of the allies as he wanted, and thus have held the position (no bad one, since it enabled him to get his supplies safely enough from Cenchreae), failed to do so. On the contrary, and in spite of the great perplexity of the Thebans as to how they were to get down from the high level facing Sicyon or else retire the way they came, the Spartan general made a truce, which in the opinion of the majority, seemed more in favour of the Thebans than himself, and so he withdrew his division and fell back.

(13) Lit. "thirty stades."

(14) Or, “intent on their personal concerns.” See “Hell.” II. iv. 6; “Hipparch.” vii. 12.

The Thebans were now free to descend without hindrance, which they did; and, effecting a junction with their allies the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians, at once attacked (15) Sicyon and Pellene, and, marching on Epidaurus, laid waste the whole territory of that people. Returning from that exploit with a consummate disdain for all their opponents, when they found themselves near the city of Corinth they advanced at the double against the gate facing towards Phlius; intending if they found it open to rush in. However, a body of light troops sallied out of the city to the rescue, and met the advance of the Theban picked corps (16) not one hundred and fifty yards (17) from the walls. Mounting on the monuments and commanding eminences, with volleys of sling stones and arrows they laid low a pretty large number in the van of the attack, and routing them, gave chase for three or four furlongs’ (18) distance. After this incident the Corinthians dragged the corpses of the slain to the wall, and finally gave them up under a flag of truce, erecting a trophy to record the victory. As a result of this occurrence the allies of the Lacedaemonians took fresh heart.

(15) And took (apparently); see below; Diod. xv. 69.

(16) See “Anab.” III. iv. 43; and above, “Hell.” V. iii. 23.

(17) Lit. “four plethra.”

(18) Lit. “three or four stades.”

At the date of the above transactions the Lacedeamonians were cheered by the arrival of a naval reinforcement from Dionysius, consisting of more than twenty warships, which conveyed a body of Celts and Iberians and about fifty cavalry. The day following, the Thebans and the rest of the allies, posted, at intervals, in battle order, and completely filling the flat land down to the sea on one side, and up to the knolls on the other which form the buttresses of the city, proceeded to destroy everything precious they could lay their hands on in the plain. The Athenian and Corinthian cavalry, eyeing the strength, physical and numerical, of their antagonists, kept at a safe distance from their

armament. But the little body of cavalry lately arrived from Dionysius spread out in a long thin line, and one at one point and one at another galloped along the front, discharging their missiles as they dashed forward, and when the enemy rushed against them, retired, and again wheeling about, showered another volley. Even while so engaged they would dismount from their horses and take breath; and if their foemen galloped up while they were so dismounted, in an instant they had leapt on their horses' backs and were in full retreat. Or if, again, a party pursued them some distance from the main body, as soon as they turned to retire, they would press upon them, and discharging volleys of missiles, made terrible work, forcing the whole army to advance and retire, merely to keep pace with the movements of fifty horsemen.

B.C. 369-368. After this the Thebans remained only a few more days and then turned back homewards; and the rest likewise to their several homes. Thereupon the troops sent by Dionysius attacked Sicyon. Engaging the Sicyonians in the flat country, they defeated them, killing about seventy men and capturing by assault the fortres of Derae. (19) After these achievements this first reinforcement from Dionysius re-embarked and set sail for Syracuse.

(19) "East of Sicyon was Epieiceia (see above, "Hell." IV. ii. 14, iv. 13) on the river Nemea. In the same direction was the fortress Derae." ("Dict. Anct. Geog." "Topography of Sicyonia"), al. Gerae. So Leake ("Morea," iii. 376), who conjectures that this fortress was in the maritime plain.

Up to this time the Thebans and all the states which had revolted from Lacedaemon had acted together in perfect harmony, and were content to campaign under the leadership of Thebes; but now a certain Lycomedes, (20) a Mantinean, broke the spell. Inferior in birth and position to none, while in wealth superior, he was for the rest a man of high ambition. This man was able to inspire the Arcadians with high thoughts by reminding them that to Arcadians alone the Peloponnese was in a literal sense a fatherland; since they and they alone were the indigenous inhabitants of its sacred soil, and the Arcadian stock the largest among

the Hellenic tribes — a good stock, moreover, and of incomparable physique. And then he set himself to panegyrise them as the bravest of the brave, adducing as evidence, if evidence were needed, the patent fact, that every one in need of help invariably turned to the Arcadians. (21) Never in old days had the Lacedaemonians yet invaded Athens without the Arcadians. “If then,” he added, “you are wise, you will be somewhat chary of following at the beck and call of anybody, or it will be the old story again. As when you marched in the train of Sparta you only enhanced her power, so to-day, if you follow Theban guidance without thought or purpose instead of claiming a division of the headship, you will speedily find, perhaps, in her only a second edition of Lacedaemon.” (22)

(20) For the plan of an Arcadian Federation and the part played by Lycomedes, its true author, “who certainly merits thereby a high place among the statesmen of Greece,” see Freeman, “Hist. Fed. Gov.” ch. iv. p. 199 foll.

(21) For this claim on the part of the Arcadians, see “Anab.” VI. ii. 10 foll.

(22) Or, “Lacedaemonians under another name.”

These words uttered in the ears of the Arcadians were sufficient to puff them up with pride. They were lavish in their love of Lycomedes, and thought there was no one his equal. He became their hero; he had only to give his orders, and they appointed their magistrates (23) at his bidding. But, indeed, a series of brilliant exploits entitled the Arcadians to magnify themselves. The first of these arose out of an invasion of Epidaurus by the Argives, which seemed likely to end in their finding their escape barred by Chabrias and his foreign brigade with the Athenians and Corinthians. Only, at the critical moment the Arcadians came to the rescue and extricated the Argives, who were closely besieged, and this in spite not only of the enemy, but of the savage nature of the ground itself. Again they marched on Asine (24) in Laconian territory, and defeated the Lacedaemonian garrison, putting the polemarch Geranor, who was a Spartan, to the sword, and sacking the suburbs of the town. Indeed, whenever or wherever they had a mind to send an invading force, neither night nor wintry

weather, nor length of road nor mountain barrier could stay their march. So that at this date they regarded their prowess as invincible. (25) The Thebans, it will be understood, could not but feel a touch of jealousy at these pretensions, and their former friendship to the Arcadians lost its ardour. With the Eleians, indeed, matters were worse. The revelation came to them when they demanded back from the Arcadians certain cities (26) of which the Lacedaemonians had deprived them. They discovered that their views were held of no account, but that the Triphylians and the rest who had revolted from them were to be made much of, because they claimed to be Arcadians. (27) Hence, as contrasted with the Thebans, the Eleians cherished feelings towards their late friends which were positively hostile.

(23) {arkhontas}, see below, “Hell.” VII. iv. 33. The formal title of these Federal magistrates may or may not have been {arkhontes}; Freeman, “H. F. G.” 203, note 6.

(24) See Grote, “H. G.” x. 356.

(25) Or, “regarded themselves as the very perfection of soldiery.”

(26) In reference to “Hell.” III. ii. 25 foll., see Freeman, op. cit. p. 201, and below, “Hell.” VII. iv. 12 (B.C. 365); Busolt, op. cit. p. 186 foll., in reference to Lasion.

(27) Busolt, p. 150.

B.C. 368. Self-esteem amounting to arrogance — such was the spirit which animated each section of the allies, when a new phase was introduced by the arrival of Philiscus (28) of Abydos on an embassy from Ariobarzanes (29) with large sums of money. This agent’s first step was to assemble a congress of Thebans, allies, and Lacedaemonians at Delphi to treat of peace. On their arrival, without attempting to communicate or take counsel with the god as to how peace might be re-established, they fell to deliberating unassisted; and when the Thebans refused to acquiesce in the dependency of Messene (30) upon Lacedaemon, Philiscus set about collecting a large foreign brigade to side with Lacedaemon and to prosecute the war.

(28) See Hicks, 84, p. 152; Kohler, “C. I. A.” ii. 51; Grote, “H. G.” x. 357; Curtius, “H. G.” (Eng. tr.) iv. 458; Diod. xv. 90.

(29) See above, V. i. 28; “Ages.” ii. 26.

(30) See Hicks, 86.

Whilst these matters were still pending, the second reinforcements from Dionysius (31) arrived. There was a difference of opinion as to where the troops should be employed, the Athenians insisting that they ought to march into Thessaly to oppose the Thebans, the Lacedaemonians being in favour of Laconia; and among the allies this latter opinion carried the day. The reinforcement from Dionysius accordingly sailed round to Laconia, where Archidamus incorporated them with the state troops and opened the campaign. Caryae he took by storm, and put every one captured to the sword, and from this point marching straight upon the Parrhasians of Arcadia, he set about ravaging the country along with his Syracusan supporters.

(31) See above, SS. 20, 22, p. 191 foll. The date is B.C. 368 according to Grote, “H. G.” x. 362 foll.; al. B.C. 367.

Presently when the Arcadians and Argives arrived with succours, he retreated and encamped on the knolls above Medea. (32) While he was there, Cissidas, the officer in charge of the reinforcement from Dionysius, made the announcement that the period for his stay abroad had elapsed; and the words were no sooner out of his lips than off he set on the road to Sparta. The march itself, however, was not effected without delays, for he was met and cut off by a body of Messenians at a narrow pass, and was forced in these straits to send to Archidamus and beg for assistance, which the latter tendered. When they had got as far as the bend (33) on the road to Eutresia, there were the Arcadians and Argives advancing upon Laconia and apparently intending, like the Messenians, to shut the Spartan off from the homeward road.

(32) Or, “Melea,” or “Malea.” E. Curtius conjectures {Meleas} for {Medeas} of the MSS., and probably the place referred to is the township of Malea in the Aegytis (Pausan. VIII. xxvii. 4); see above, “Hell.” VI. v. 24, “the Maleatid.” See Dind. “Hist. Gr.,” Ox. MDCCCLIII., note ad loc.; Curtius, “H. G.” iv. 459; Grote, “H. G.” x. 362.

(33) Or, “the resting-place”; cf. mod. “Khan.” L. and S. cf. Arist. “Frogs,” 113. “Medea,” below, is probably “Malea,” (see last note).

Archidamus, debouching upon a flat space of ground where the roads to Eutresia and Medea converge, drew up his troops and offered battle. When happened then is thus told: — He passed in front of the regiments and addressed

them in terms of encouragement thus: “Fellow-citizens, the day has come which calls upon us to prove ourselves brave men and look the world in the face with level eyes. (34) Now are we to deliver to those who come after us our fatherland intact as we received it from our fathers; now will we cease hanging our heads in shame before our children and wives, our old men and our foreign friends, in sight of whom in days of old we shone forth conspicuous beyond all other Hellenes.”

(34) See Plut. “Ages.” 53 (Clough, vol. iv. p. 41).

The words were scarcely uttered (so runs the tale), when out of the clear sky came lightnings and thunderings, (35) with propitious manifestation to him; and it so happened that on his right wing there stood a sacred enclosure and a statue of Heracles, his great ancestor. As the result of all these things, so deep a strength and courage came into the hearts of his soldiers, as they tell, that the generals had hard work to restrain their men as they pushed forward to the front. Presently, when Archidamus led the advance, a few only of the enemy cared to await them at the spear’s point, and were slain; the mass of them fled, and fleeing fell. Many were cut down by the cavalry, many by the Celts. When the battle ceased and a trophy had been erected, the Spartan at once despatched home Demoteles, the herald, with the news. He had to announce not only the greatness of the victory, but the startling fact that, while the enemy’s dead were numerous, not one single Lacedaemonian had been slain. (36) Those in Sparta to whom the news was brought, as says the story, when they heard it, one and all, beginning with Agesilaus, and, after him, the elders and the ephors, wept for joy — so close akin are tears to joy and pain alike. There were others hardly less pleased than the Lacedaemonians themselves at the misfortune which had overtaken the Arcadians: these were the Thebans and

Eleians — so offensive to them had the boastful behaviour of these men become.

(35) See Xen. “Apolog.” 12; Homer, “Il.” ii. 353; “Od.” xx. 113 foll.

(36) According to Diod. xv. 72, ten thousand of the enemy fell.

The problem perpetually working in the minds of the Thebans was how they were to compass the headship of Hellas; and they persuaded themselves that, if they sent an embassy to the King of Persia, they could not but gain some advantage by his help. Accordingly they did not delay, but called together the allies, on the plea that Euthycles the Lacedaemonian was already at the Persian court. The commissioners sent up were, on the part of the Thebans, Pelopidas; (37) on the part of the Arcadians, Antiochus, the pancratiast; and on that of the Eleians, Archidamus. There was also an Argive in attendance. The Athenians on their side, getting wind of the matter, sent up two commissioners, Timagoras and Leon.

(37) See Plut. “Pelop.” 30 (Clough, vol. ii. p. 230). For the date see Grote, “H. G.” x. 365, 379; Curtius, “H. G.” iv. 460.

When they arrived at the Persian court the influence of Pelopidas was preponderant with the Persian. He could point out that, besides the fact that the Thebans alone among all the Hellenes had fought on the king’s side at Plataeae, (38) they had never subsequently engaged in military service against the Persians; nay, the very ground of Lacedaemonian hostility to them was that they had refused to march against the Persian king with Agesilaus, (39) and would not even suffer him to sacrifice to Artemis at Aulis (where Agamemnon sacrificed before he set sail for Asia and captured Troy). In addition, there were two things which contributed to raise the prestige of Thebes, and redounded to the honour of Pelopidas. These were the victory of the Thebans at Leuctra, and the indisputable fact that they had invaded and laid waste the territory of Laconia. Pelopidas went on to point out that the Argives and Arcadians had lately been defeated in battle by the Lacedaemonians, when his own countrymen were not there to assist. The Athenian

Timagoras supported all these statements of the Theban by independent testimony, and stood second in honour after Pelopidas.

(38) See Thuc. iii. 58, 59, 60.

(39) See above, “Hell.” lll. iv. 3; Lincke, “Zur. Xen. Krit.” p. 315.

At this point of the proceedings Pelopidas was asked by the king, what special clause he desired inserted in the royal rescript. He replied as follows: “Messene to be independent of Lacedaemon, and the Athenians to lay up their ships of war. Should either power refuse compliance in these respects, such refusal to be a casus belli; and any state refusing to take part in the military proceedings consequent, to be herself the first object of attack.” These clauses were drawn up and read to the ambassadors, when Leon, in the hearing of the king, exclaimed: “Upon my word! Athenians, it strikes me it is high time you looked for some other friend than the great king.” The secretary reported the comment of the Athenian envoy, and produced presently an altered copy of the document, with a clause inserted: “If the Athenians have any better and juster views to propound, let them come to the Persian court and explain them.” (40)

(40) See Grote, “H. G.” x. 402; and “Ages.” viii. 3.

Thus the ambassadors returned each to his own home and were variously received. Timagoras, on the indictment of Leon, who proved that his fellow-commissioner not only refused to lodge with him at the king’s court, but in every way played into the hands of Pelopidas, was put to death. Of the other joint commissioners, the Eleian, Archidamus, was loud in his praises of the king and his policy, because he had shown a preference to Elis over the Arcadians; while for a converse reason, because the Arcadian league was slighted, Antiochus not only refused to accept any gift, but brought back as his report to the general assembly of the Ten Thousand, (41) that the king appeared to have a large army of confectioners and pastry-cooks, butlers and doorkeepers; but as for men capable of doing battle with Hellenes, he had

looked carefully, and could not discover any. Besides all which, even the report of his wealth seemed to him, he said, bombastic nonsense. “Why, the golden plane-tree that is so belauded is not big enough to furnish shade to a single grasshopper.” (42)

(41) See above, VI. v. 6; Freeman, “Hist. Fed. Gov.” 202; Demosth. “F. L.” 220, etc.

(42) Or, “the golden plane-tree they romance about would not suffice to,” etc.

At Thebes a conference of the states had been convened to listen to the great king’s letter. The Persian who bore the missive merely pointed to the royal seal, and read the document; whereupon the Thebans invited all, who wished to be their friends, to take an oath to what they had just heard, as binding on the king and on themselves. To which the ambassadors from the states replied that they had been sent to listen to a report, not to take oaths; if oaths were wanted, they recommended the Thebans to send ambassadors to the several states. The Arcadian Lycomedes, moreover, added that the congress ought not to be held at Thebes at all, but at the seat of war, wherever that might be. This remark brought down the wrath of the Thebans on the speaker; they exclaimed that he was bent on breaking up the alliance. Whereupon the Arcadian refused to take a seat in the congress at all, and got up and betook himself off there and then, accompanied by all the Arcadian envoys. Since, therefore, the assembled representatives refused to take the oaths at Thebes, the Thebans sent to the different states, one by one in turn, urging each to undertake solemnly to act in accordance with the great king’s rescript. They were persuaded that no individual state would venture to quarrel with themselves and the Persian monarch at once. As a matter of fact, however, when they arrived at Corinth — which was the first stated vist — the Corinthians stood out and gave as their answer, that they had no desire for any common oath or undertaking with the king. The rest of the states followed suit, giving answers of a similar tenor, so

that this striving after empire on the part of Pelopidas and the Thebans melted like a cloud-castle into air.

B.C. 367. (43) But Epaminondas was bent on one more effort. With a view to forcing the Arcadians and the rest of the allies to pay better heed to Thebes, he desired first to secure the adhesion of the Achaeans, and decided to march an army into Achaea. Accordingly, he persuaded the Argive Peisias, who was at the head of military affairs in Argos, to seize and occupy Oneion in advance. Persias, having ascertained that only a sorry guard was maintained over Oneion by Naucles, the general commanding the Lacedaemonian foreign brigade, and by Timomachus the Athenian, under cover of night seized and occupied with two thousand heavy infantry the rising ground above Cenchreae, taking with him provisions for seven days. Within the interval the Thebans arrived and surmounted the pass of Oneion; whereupon the allied troops with Epaminondas at their head, advanced into Achaea. The result of the campaign was that the better classes of Achaea gave in their adhesion to him; and on his personal authority Epaminondas insisted that there should be no driving of the aristocrats into exile, nor any modification of the constitution. He was content to take a pledge of fealty from the Achaeans to this effect: “Verily and indeed we will be your allies, and follow whithersoever the Thebans lead.” (44)

(43) B.C. 367, according to Grote, “H. G.” x. 365, note 1; al. B.C. 366.

(44) See Freeman, “Hist. Fed. Gov.” p. 241: “We read of local oligarchies (in the several cities of Achaia) which Epameinondas found and left in possession, but which the home government of Thebes thought good to expel, and to substitute democracies under the protection of Theban harmosts. This policy did not answer, as the large bodies of exiles thus formed contrived to recover the cities, and to bring them to a far more decided Spartan partisanship than before.”

So he departed home. The Arcadians, however, and the partisans of the opposite faction in Thebes were ready with an indictment against him: “Epaminondas,” they said, “had merely swept and garnished Achaea for the Lacedaemonians, and then gone off.” The Thebans accordingly resolved to send governors (45) into the states of Achaea; and those officers on arrival joined with the

commonalty and drove out the better folk, and set up democracies throughout Achaea. On their side, these exiles coalesced, and, marching upon each separate state in turn, for they were pretty numerous, speedily won their restoration and dominated the states. As the party thus reinstated no longer steered a middle course, but went heart and soul into an alliance with Lacedaemon, the Arcadians found themselves between the upper and the nether millstone — that is to say, the Lacedaemonians and the Achaeans.

(45) Lit. “harmosts.”

At Sicyon, hitherto, (46) the constitution was based on the ancient laws; but at this date Euphron (who during the Lacedaemonian days had been the greatest man in Sicyon, and whose ambition it was to hold a like pre-eminence under their opponents) addressed himself to the Argives and Arcadians as follows: “If the wealthiest classes should ever come into power in Sicyon, without a doubt the city would take the first opportunity of readopting a Laconian policy; whereas, if a democracy be set up,” he added, “you may rest assured Sicyon will hold fast by you. All I ask you is to stand by me; I will do the rest. It is I who will call a meeting of the people; and by that selfsame act I shall give you a pledge of my good faith and present you with a state firm in its alliance. All this, be assured,” he added, “I do because, like yourselves, I have long ill brooked the pride of Lacedaemon, and shall be glad to escape the yoke of bondage.”

(46) See Grote, “H. G.” x. 379.

These proposals found favour with the Arcadians and the Argives, who gladly gave the assistance demanded. Euphron straightway, in the market-place, in the presence of the two powers concerned, (47) proceeded to convene the Demos, as if there were to be a new constitution, based on the principle of equality. (48) When the convention met, he bade them appoint generals: they might choose whom they

liked. Whereupon they elected Euphron himself, Hippodamus, Cleander, Acrisius, and Lysander. When these matters were arranged he appointed Adeas, his own son, over the foreign brigade, in place of the former commander, Lysimenes, whom he removed. His next step was promptly to secure the fidelity of the foreign mercenaries by various acts of kindness, and to attach others; and he spared neither the public nor the sacred moneys for this object. He had, to aid him, further, the property of all the citizens whom he exiled on the ground of Laconism, and of this without scruple he in every case availed himself. As for his colleagues in office, some he treacherously put to death, others he exiled, by which means he got everything under his own power, and was now a tyrant without disguise. The method by which he got the allies to connive at his doings was twofold. Partly he worked on them by pecuniary aid, partly by the readiness with which he lent the support of his foreign troops on any campaign to which they might invite him.

(47) Lit. “the Argives and the Arcadians.”

(48) Lit. “on fair and equal terms.” See Thuc. v. 79.

II

B.C. 366. Matters had so far progressed that the Argives had already fortified the Trikaranon above the Heraion as an outpost to threaten Phlius, while the Sicyonians were engaged in fortifying Thyamia (1) on their frontier; and between the two the Phliasians were severely pinched. They began to suffer from dearth of necessaries; but, in spite of all, remained unshaken in their alliance. It is the habit of historians, I know, to record with admiration each noble achievement of the larger powers, but to me it seems a still more worthy task to bring to light the great exploits of even a little state found faithful in the performance of fair deeds.

(1) “Thyamia is placed by Ross on the lofty hill of Spiria, the northern prolongation of Tricaranum, between the villages Stimanga and Skrapani.”— “Dict. Anct. Geog.” “Phlius.”

B.C. 370-369. Now these Phliasians were friends of Lacedaemon while at the zenith of her power. After her disaster on the field of Leuctra, when many of the Perioeci, and the helots to a man, revolted; when, more than that, the allies, save only quite a few, forsook her; (2) and when united Hellas, so to speak, was marching on her — these Phliasians remained stanch in their allegiance; and, in spite of the hostility of the most powerful states of the Peloponnese, to wit the Arcardians and the Argives, they insisted on coming to her aid. It fell to their lot to cross into Prasiae as the rearguard of the reinforcements, which consisted of the men of Corinth, of Epidaurus and of Troezen, of Hermione, Halieis, and Sicyon and Pellene, in the days before any of these had revolted. (3) Not even when the commander of the foreign brigade, picking up the divisions already across, left them behind and was gone — not even so did they flinch or turn back, but hired a guide from Prasiae, and though the enemy was massed round Amyclae, slipped through his ranks, as best they could, and so reached Sparta. It was then that the Lacedaemonians, besides other honours conferred upon them, sent them an ox as a gift of hospitality.

(2) See above, “VI.” v. 29.

(3) See “Hell.” VII. i. 18.

B.C. 369. Later on, when the enemy had retired from Laconia, the Argives, ill brooking so much zeal for Lacedaemon on the part of Phlius, marched in full force against the little state, and fell to ravaging their territory. Even then they remained undaunted; and when the enemy turned to retire, destroying all that he could lay hands upon, out dashed the cavalry of the Phliasians and dogged his retreat. And notwithstanding that the Argive’s rear consisted of the whole of his cavalry, with some companies of infantry to support them, they attacked him, sixty in number, and routed his whole rearguard. They slew, indeed, but a few of them; but, having so slain that handful, they paused and

erected a trophy in full sight of the Argive army with as little concern as if they had cut down their enemies to a man.

Once again the Lacedaemonians and their allies were guarding Oneion, (4) and the Thebans were threatening to scale the pass. The Arcadians and Eleians (5) were moving forwards through Nemea to effect a junction with the Thebans, when a hint was conveyed to them by some Phliasian exiles, “Only show yourselves before Phlius and the town is yours.” An agreement was made, and in the dead of night a party consisting of the exiles themselves and others with them, about six hundred in number, planted themselves close under the walls with scaling-ladders. Presently the scouts from the Trikaranon signalled to the city that the enemy was advancing. The citizens were all attention; their eyes fixed upon their scouts. Meanwhile the traitors within were likewise signalling to those seated under lee of the walls “to scale”; and these, scaling up, seized the arms of the guards, which they found abandoned, and fell to pursuing the day sentinels, ten in number (one out of each squad of five being always left on day duty). (6) One of these was put to the sword as he lay asleep, and a second as he was escaping to the Heraion; but the other eight day-pickets leapt down the wall on the side towards the city, one after another. The scaling party now found themselves in undisputed possession of the citadel. But the shouting had reached the city below: the citizens rallied to the rescue; and the enemy began by sallying forth from the citadel, and did battle in the forefront of the gate leading down to the city. By and by, being strongly beleaguered by the ever-increasing reinforcements of the citizens, they retired, falling back upon the citadel; and the citizens along with the enemy forced their way in. The centre of the citadel was speedily deserted; for the enemy scaled the walls and towers, and showered blows and missiles upon the citizens below. These defended themselves from the ground, or

pressed the encounter home by climbing the ladders which led to the walls. Once masters of certain towers on this side and the other of the invaders, the citizens came to close quarters with them with reckless desperation. The invaders, pushed and pommelled by dint of such audacity and hard hitting, were cooped up like sheep into narrower and narrower space. But at that critical moment the Arcadians and the Argives were circling round the city, and had begun to dig through the walls of the citadel from its upper side. (7) Of the citizens inside some were beating down their assailants on the wall; (8) others, those of them who were climbing up from outside and were still on the scaling-ladders, whilst a third set were delivering battle against those who had mounted the towers. These last had found fire in the men's quarters, and were engaged in setting the towers and all ablaze, bringing up sheaves of corn and grass — an ample harvesting, as luck would have it, garnered off the citadel itself. Thereupon the occupants of the towers, in terror of the flames, leapt down one by one, while those on the walls, under the blows of the defenders, tumbled off with similar expedition; and as soon as they had once begun to yield, the whole citadel, in almost less time than it takes to tell, was cleared of the enemy. In an instant out dashed the cavalry, and the enemy, seeing them, beat a hasty retreat, leaving behind scaling-ladders and dead, besides some comrades hopelessly maimed. In fact, the enemy, what between those who were slain inside and those who leapt from the walls, lost not less than eighty men. And now it was a goodly sight to see the brave men grasp one another by the hand and pledge each other on their preservation, whilst the women brought them drink and cried for joy. Not one there present but in very sooth was overcome by laughter mixed with tears. (9)

(4) B.C. 369? al. B.C. 368. See above, "Hell." VII. i. 15; Grote, "H. G." x. 346.

(5) See above, "Hell." VII. i. 18, and below, S. 8.

(6) Or, "one member of both the squads of five was left behind" — i.e. two out of the ten could not keep up with the rest in their flight, and were taken and killed; one indeed had not started, but was killed in sleep.

(7) Or, “downwards” (L. and S.); or, “in front,” “von vorn” (Buchs).

(8) Reading, {tous eti toi teikhous}. See Otto Keller for various emendations of the passage.

(9) In true Homeric fashion, as Pollux (ii. 64) observes. See Homer, “Il.” vi. 484. See above, VII. i. 32; “Cyrop.” VII. v. 32; “Hiero,” iii. 5; “Sym.” ii. 24; “Antony and Cleopatra,” III. ii. 43.

Next year also (10) Phlius was invaded by the Argives and all the Arcadians. The reason of this perpetually-renewed attack on Phlius is not far to seek: partly it was the result of spleen, partly the little township stood midway between them, and they cherished the hope that through want of the necessaries of life they would bring it over. During this invasion the cavalry and the picked troop of the Phliasians, assisted by some Athenian knights, made another famous charge at the crossing of the river. (11) They made it so hot for the enemy that for the rest of that day he was forced to retire under the mountain ridges, and to hold aloof as if afraid to trample down the corn-crops of a friendly people on the flat below.

(10) B.C. 368 (or 367).

(11) The Asopus.

Again another time (12) the Theban commander in Sicyon marched out against Phlius, taking with him the garrison under his personal command, with the Sicyonians and Pellenians (for at the date of the incident these states followed in the wake of Thebes). Euphron was there also with his mercenaries, about two thousand in number, to share the fortunes of the field. The mass of the troops began their descent on the Heraion by the Trikaranon, intending to ravage the flat bottom below. At the gate leading to Corinth the Theban general left his Sicyonians and Pellenians on the height, to prevent the Phliasians getting behind him at this point and so over the heads of his troops as they lay at the Heraion beneath. (13) As soon as the citizens of Phlius found that hostile troops were advancing on their corn-land, out dashed the cavalry with the chosen band of the Phliasians and gave battle, not suffering the enemy to penetrate into the plain. The best part of the day was spent in taking long shots at one another on that field; Euphron pushing his

attack down to the point where cavalry could operate, the citizens retaliating as far as the Heraion. Presently the time to withdraw had come, and the enemy began to retire, following the circle of the Trikaranon; the short cut to reach the Pellenians being barred by the ravine which runs in front of the walls. The Phliasians escorted their retreating foes a little way up the steep, and then turning off dashed along the road beside the walls, making for the Pellenians and those with them; whereupon the Theban, perceiving the haste of the Phliasians, began racing with his infantry to outspeed them and bring succour to the Pellenians. The cavalry, however, arrived first and fell to attacking the Pellenians, who received and withstood the shock, and the cavalry drew back. A second time they charged, and were supported by some infantry detachments, which had now come up. It ended in a hand-to-hand fight; and eventually the enemy gave way. On the field lay dead some Sicyonians, and of the Pellenians many a good man. In record of the feat the Phliasians began to raise a trophy, as well they might; and loud and clear the paean rang. As to the Theban and Euphron, they and all their men stood by and stared at the proceedings, like men who had raced to see a sight. After all was over the one party retired to Sicyon and the other withdrew into their city.

(12) B.C. 367 (or 366).

(13) Lit. “above the Heraion” (where his main body lay).

That too was another noble exploit of the Phliasians, when they took the Pellenian Proxenus prisoner and, although suffering from scarcity at the time, sent him back without a ransom. “As generous as brave,” such is their well-earned title who were capable of such performance.

The heroic resolution with which these men maintained their loyalty to their friends is manifest. When excluded from the fruits of their own soil, they contrived to live, partly by helping themselves from the enemy’s territory, partly by purchasing from Corinth, though to reach that market they

must run the gauntlet of a thousand risks; and having reached it their troubles began afresh. There were difficulties in providing the requisite sum, difficulties in arranging with the purveyors, and it was barely possible to find sureties for the very beasts which should carry home their marketing. They had reached the depth of despair, and were absolutely at a loss what to do, when they arranged with Chares to escort their convoy. Once safe inside Phlius, they begged him to help them to convey their useless and sick folk to Pellene. (14) These they left at that place; and after making purchases and packing as many beasts of burthen as they could, they set off to return in the night, not in ignorance that they would be laid in wait for by the enemy, but persuaded that the want of provisions was a worse evil than mere fighting.

(14) What is the date of this incident? See above, “Hell.” Vll. ii. 3; below Vll. iv. 17.

The men of Phlius pushed forward with Chares; presently they stumbled on the enemy and at once grappled to their work. Pressing hard on the foe, they called cheerily to one another, and shouted at the same time to Chares to bring up his aid. In short, the victory was theirs; and the enemy was driven off the road; and so they got themselves and their supplies safely home. The long night-watching superinduced sleep which lasted well into the next day. But Chares was no sooner out of bed then he was accosted by the cavalry and the pick of the heavy infantry with the following appeal: “Chares, to-day you have it in your power to perform the noblest deed of arms. The Sicyonians are fortifying an outpost on our borders, they have plenty of stone-masons but a mere handful of hoplites. We the knights of Phlius and we the flower of our infantry force will lead the way; and you shall follow after with your mercenaries. Perhaps when you appear on the scene you will find the whole thing finished, or perhaps your coming will send the enemy flying, as happened at Pellene. If you do not like the sound of these

proposals, sacrifice and take counsel of the gods. Our belief is that the gods will bid you yet more emphatically than we to take this step. Only this, Chares, you must well consider, that if you do take it you will have established an outpost on the enemy's frontier; you will have saved from perdition a friendly city; you will win eternal glory in your own fatherland; and among friends and foes alike no name will be heralded with louder praise than that of Chares."

Chares was persuaded, and proceeded to offer sacrifice. Meanwhile the Phliasian cavalry were donning their breastplates and bridling their horses, and the heavy infantry made every preparation for the march. Then they took their arms, fell into line, and tramped off to the place of sacrifice. Chares with the soothsayer stepped forward to meet them, announcing that the victims were favourable. "Only wait for us," they exclaimed; "we will sally forth with you at once." The heralds' cry "To arms!" was sounded, and with a zeal which was almost miraculous the mercenaries themselves rushed out. As soon as Chares began the march, the Phliasian cavalry and infantry got in front of him. At first they led off at a smart pace; presently they began to bowl (15) along more quickly, and finally the cavalry were tearing over the ground might and main, whilst the infantry, at the greatest pace compatible with keeping their ranks, tore after them; and behind them, again, came Chares zealously following up in their rear. There only remained a brief interval of daylight before the sun went down, and they came upon the enemy in the fortress, some washing, some cooking a savoury meal, others kneading their bread, others making their beds. These, when they saw the vehemence of the attack, at once, in utter panic, took to flight, leaving behind all their provisions for the brave fellows who took their place. They, as their reward, made a fine supper off these stores and others which had come from home, pouring out libations for their good fortune and chanting the battle-

hymn; after which they posted pickets for the night and slumbered well. The messenger with the news of their success at Thyamia arrived at Corinth in the night. The citizens of that state with hearty friendship at once ordered out by herald all the oxen and beasts of burthen, which they loaded with food and brought to Phlius; and all the while the fortress was building day by day these convoys of food were duly despatched.

(15) See “Anab.” VII. iii. 46.

III

But on this topic enough, perhaps, has been said to demonstrate the loyalty of the men of Phlius to their friends, their bravery in war, and, lastly, their steadfastness in maintaining their alliance in spite of famine.

B.C. 367-366. It seems to have been somewhere about this date that Aeneas the Stymphalian, (1) who had become general of the Arcadians, finding that the state of affairs in Sicyon was intolerable, marched up with his army into the acropolis. Here he summoned a meeting of the Sicyonian aristocrats already within the walls, and sent to fetch those others who had been banished without a decree of the people. (2) Euphron, taking fright at these proceedings, fled for safety to the harbour-town of Sicyon. Hither he summoned Pasimelus from Corinth, and by his instrumentality handed over the harbour to the Lacedaemonians. Once more reappearing in his old character, he began to pose as an ally of Sparta. He asserted that his fidelity to Lacedaemon had never been interrupted; for when the votes were given in the city whether Sicyon should give up her allegiance to Lacedaemon, “I, with one or two others,” said he, “voted against the measure; but afterwards these people betrayed me, and in my desire to avenge myself on them I set up a democracy. At present all traitors to yourselves are banished — I have seen to that. If

only I could get the power into my own hands, I would go over to you, city and all, at once. All that I can do at present, I have done; I have surrendered to you this harbour." That was what Euphron said to his audience there, but of the many who heard his words, how many really believed his words is by no means evident. However, since I have begun the story of Euphron, I desire to bring it to its close.

(1) Is this man the famous writer {o taktikos}, a portion of whose works, the "Treatise on Siege Operations," has been preserved (recently re-edited by Arnold Hug— "Commentarius Poliorceticus," Lips. Trubner, 1884)? So Casaubon supposed. Cf. "Com. Pol." 27, where the writer mentions {paneia} as the Arcadian term for "panics." Readers of the "Anabasis" will recollect the tragic end of another Aeneas, also of Stymphalus, an Arcadian officer. On the official title {strategos} (general), Freeman ("Hist. Fed. Gov." 204) notes that "at the head of the whole League there seems to have been, as in so many other cases, a single Federal general." Cf. Diod. xv. 62.

(2) See above, VII. i. 46.

Faction and party strife ran high in Sicyon between the better classes and the people, when Euphron, getting a body of foreign troops from Athens, once more obtained his restoration. The city, with the help of the commons, he was master of, but the Theban governor held the citadel. Euphron, perceiving that he would never be able to dominate the state whilst the Thebans held the acropolis, collected money and set off to Thebes, intending to persuade the Thebans to expel the aristocrats and once again to hand over the city to himself. But the former exiles, having got wind of this journey of his, and of the whole intrigue, set off themselves to Thebes in front of him. (3) When, however, they saw the terms of intimacy on which he associated with the Theban authorities, in terror of his succeeding in his mission some of them staked their lives on the attempt and stabbed Euphron in the Cadmeia, where the magistrates and senate were seated. The magistrates, indeed, could not but indict the perpetrators of the deed before the senate, and spoke as follows:

(3) Or, "on an opposition journey."

"Fellow-citizens, it is our duty to arraign these murderers of Euphron, the men before you, on the capital charge. Mankind may be said to fall into two classes: there are the wise and temperate, (4) who are incapable of any wrong and unhallowed deed; and there are the base, the bad, who do

indeed such things, but try to escape the notice of their fellows. The men before you are exceptional. They have so far exceeded all the rest of men in audacity and foul villainy that, in the very presence of the magistrates and of yourselves, who alone have the power of life and death, they have taken the law into their own hands, (5) and have slain this man. But they stand now before the bar of justice, and they must needs pay the extreme penalty; for, if you spare them, what visitor will have courage to approach the city? Nay, what will become of the city itself, if license is to be given to any one who chooses to murder those who come here, before they have even explained the object of their visit? It is our part, then, to prosecute these men as arch-villains and miscreants, whose contempt for law and justice is only matched by the supreme indifference with which they treat this city. It is your part, now that you have heard the charges, to impose upon them that penalty which seems to be the measure of their guilt."

(4) Lit. "the sound of soul."

(5) Or, "they have been judge and jury both, and executioners to boot."

Such were the words of the magistrates. Among the men thus accused, all save one denied immediate participation in the act. It was not their hands that had dealt the blow. This one not only confessed the deed, but made a defence in words somewhat as follows:

"As to treating you with indifference, men of Thebes, that is not possible for a man who knows that with you lies the power to deal with him as you list. Ask rather on what I based my confidence when I slew the man; and be well assured that, in the first place, I based it on the conviction that I was doing right; next, that your verdict will also be right and just. I knew assuredly how you dealt with Archias (6) and Hypates and that company whom you detected in conduct similar to that of Euphron: you did not stay for formal voting, but at the first opportunity within your reach you guided the sword of vengeance, believing that by the

verdict of mankind a sentence of death had already been passed against the conspicuously profane person, the manifest traitor, and him who lays to his hand to become a tyrant. See, then, what follows. Euphron was liable on each of these several counts: he was a conspicuously profane person, who took into his keeping temples rich in votive offerings of gold and silver, and swept them bare of their sacred treasures; he was an arrant traitor — for what treason could be more manifest than Euphron's? First he was the bosom friend of Lacedaemon, but presently chose you in their stead; and, after exchange of solemn pledges between yourselves and him, once more turned round and played the traitor to you, and delivered up the harbour to your enemies. Lastly, he was most undisguisedly a tyrant, who made not free men only, but free fellow-citizens his slaves; who put to death, or drove into exile, or robbed of their wealth and property, not malefactors, note you, but the mere victims of his whim and fancy; and these were ever the better folk. Once again restored by the help of your sworn foes and antagonists, the Athenians, to his native town of Sicyon, the first thing he did was to take up arms against the governor from Thebes; but, finding himself powerless to drive him from the acropolis, he collected money and betook himself hither. Now, if it were proved that he had mustered armed bands to attack you, I venture to say, you would have thanked me that I slew him. What then, when he came furnished with vile moneys, to corrupt you therewith, to bribe you to make him once more lord and master of the state? How shall I, who dealt justice upon him, justly suffer death at your hands? For to be worsted in arms implies injury certainly, but of the body only: the defeated man is not proved to be dishonest by his loss of victory. But he who is corrupted by filthy lucre, contrary to the standard of what is best, (7) is at once injured and involved in shame.

(6) See above, V. iv. 2.

(7) Or, as we should say, "in violation of conscience."

“Now if he had been your friend, however much he was my national foe, I do confess it had been scarce honourable of me to have stabbed him to death in your presence: but why, I should like to ask, should the man who betrayed you be less your enemy than mine? ‘Ah, but,’ I hear some one retort, ‘he came of his own accord.’ I presume, sir, you mean that had he chanced to be slain by somebody at a distance from your state, that somebody would have won your praise; but now, on the ground that he came back here to work mischief on the top of mischief, ‘he had the right to live’! (8) In what part of Hellas, tell me, sir, do Hellenes keep a truce with traitors, double-dyed deserters, and tyrants? Moreover, I must remind you that you passed a resolution — if I mistake not, it stands recorded in your parliamentary minutes — that ‘renegades are liable to be apprehended (9) in any of the allied cities.’ Now, here is a renegade restoring himself without any common decree of the allied states: will any one tell me on what ground this person did not deserve to die? What I maintain, sirs, is that if you put me to death, by so doing you will be aiding and abetting your bitterest foe; while, by a verdict sanctioning the justice of my conduct, you will prove your willingness to protect the interests not of yourselves only, but of the whole body of your allies.”

(8) Or, “he was wrongfully slain.”

(9) For this right of extradition see Plut. “Lys.” xxvii.

The Thebans on hearing these pleadings decided that Euphron had only suffered the fate which he deserved. His own countrymen, however, conveyed away the body with the honours due to a brave and good man, and buried him in the market-place, where they still pay pious reverence to his memory as “a founder of the state.” So strictly, it would seem, do the mass of mankind confine the term brave and good to those who are the benefactors of themselves.

IV

B.C. 366. And so ends the history of Euphron. I return to the point reached at the commencement of this digression. (1) The Phliasians were still fortifying Thyamia, and Chares was still with them, when Oropus (2) was seized by the banished citizens of that place. The Athenians in consequence despatched an expedition in full force to the point of danger, and recalled Chares from Thyamia; whereupon the Sicyonians and the Arcadians seized the opportunity to recapture the harbour of Sicyon. Meanwhile the Athenians, forced to act single-handed, with none of their allies to assist them, retired from Oropus, leaving that town in the hands of the Thebans as a deposit till the case at issue could be formally adjudicated.

(1) See above, VII. ii. 23; iii. 3; Diod. xv. 76.

(2) See Thuc. viii. 60.

Now Lycomedes (3) had discovered that the Athenians were harbouring a grievance against her allies, as follows: — They felt it hard that, while Athens was put to vast trouble on their account, yet in her need not a man among them stepped forward to render help. Accordingly he persuaded the assembly of Ten Thousand to open negotiations with Athens for the purpose of forming an alliance. (4) At first some of the Athenians were vexed that they, being friends of Lacedaemon, should become allied to her opponents; but on further reflection they discovered it was no less desirable for the Lacedaemonians than for themselves that the Arcadians should become independent of Thebes. That being so, they were quite ready to accept an Arcadian alliance. Lycomedes himself was still engaged on this transaction when, taking his departure from Athens, he died, in a manner which looked like divine intervention.

(3) See above, VII. i. 23.

(4) This proves that "the Ten Thousand made war and peace in the name of all Arkadia"; cf. "Hell." VII. i. 38; Diod. xv. 59. "They received and listened to the ambassadors of other Greek states"; Demosth. "F. L." 220. "They regulated and paid the standing army of the Federation"; "Hell." VII. iv. 22, 23; Diod. xv. 62. "They sat in judgment on political offenders against the collective majority of the Arkadian League"; "Hell." VII. iv. 33; Freeman, "Hist. Fed. Gov." 203, note 1.

Out of the many vessels at his service he had chosen the one he liked best, and by the terms of contract was entitled

to land at any point he might desire; but for some reason, selected the exact spot where a body of Mantinean exiles lay. Thus he died; but the alliance on which he had set his heart was already consummated.

Now an argument was advanced by Demotion (5) in the Assembly of Athens, approving highly of the friendship with the Arcadians, which to his mind was an excellent thing, but arguing that the generals should be instructed to see that Corinth was kept safe for the Athenian people. The Corinthians, hearing this, lost no time in despatching garrisons of their own large enough to take the place of the Athenian garrisons at any point where they might have them, with orders to these latter to retire: “We have no further need of foreign garrisons,” they said. The garrisons did as they were bid.

(5) Of Demotion nothing more, I think, is known. Grote (“H. G.” x. 397) says: “The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favourable to the success of a scheme like that proposed by Demotion, to which secrecy was indispensable. Compare another scheme” (the attempted surprise of Mitylene, B.C. 428), “divulged in like manner, in Thuc. iii. 3.”

As soon as the Athenian garrison troops were met together in the city of Corinth, the Corinthian authorities caused proclamation to be made inviting all Athenians who felt themselves wronged to enter their names and cases upon a list, and they would recover their dues. While things were in this state, Chares arrived at Cenchreae with a fleet. Learning what had been done, he told them that he had heard there were designs against the state of Corinth, and had come to render assistance. The authorities, while thanking him politely for his zeal, were not any the more ready to admit the vessels into the harbour, but bade him sail away; and after rendering justice to the infantry troops, they sent them away likewise. Thus the Athenians were quit of Corinth. To the Arcadians, to be sure, they were forced by the terms of their alliance to send an auxiliary force of cavalry, “in case of any foreign attack upon Arcadia.” At the same time they were careful not to set foot on Laconian soil for the purposes of war.

The Corinthians had begun to realise on how slender a thread their political existence hung. They were overmastered by land still as ever, with the further difficulty of Athenian hostility, or quasi-hostility, now added. They resolved to collect bodies of mercenary troops, both infantry and horse. At the head of these they were able at once to guard their state and to inflict much injury on their neighbouring foes. To Thebes, indeed, they sent ambassadors to ascertain whether they would have any prospect of peace if they came to seek it. The Thebans bade them come: “Peace they should have.” Whereupon the Corinthians asked that they might be allowed to visit their allies; in making peace they would like to share it with those who cared for it, and would leave those who preferred war to war. This course also the Thebans sanctioned; and so the Corinthians came to Lacedaemon and said:

“Men of Lacedaemon, we, your friends, are here to present a petition, and on this wise. If you can discover any safety for us whilst we persist in warlike courses, we beg that you will show it us; but if you recognise the hopelessness of our affairs, we would, in that case, proffer this alternative: if peace is alike conducive to your interests, we beg that you would join us in making peace, since there is no one with whom we would more gladly share our safety than with you; if, on the other hand, you are persuaded that war is more to your interest, permit us at any rate to make peace for ourselves. So saved to-day, perhaps we may live to help you in days to come; whereas, if to-day we be destroyed, plainly we shall never at any time be serviceable again.”

The Lacedaemonians, on hearing these proposals, counselled the Corinthians to arrange a peace on their own account; and as for the rest of their allies, they permitted any who did not care to continue the war along with them to take a respite and recruit themselves. “As for ourselves,” they said, “we will go on fighting and accept whatever

Heaven has in store for us," — adding, "never will we submit to be deprived of our territory of Messene, which we received as an heirloom from our fathers." (6)

(6) See Isocr. "Or." vi. "Archidamos," S. 70; Jebb, "Att. Or." ii. 193.

Satisfied with this answer, the Corinthians set off to Thebes in quest of peace. The Thebans, indeed, asked them to agree on oath, not to peace only but an alliance; to which they answered: "An alliance meant, not peace, but merely an exchange of war. If they liked, they were ready there and then," they repeated, "to establish a just and equitable peace." And the Thebans, admiring the manner in which, albeit in danger, they refused to undertake war against their benefactors, conceded to them and the Phliasians and the rest who came with them to Thebes, peace on the principle that each should hold their own territory. On these terms the oaths were taken.

Thereupon the Phliasians, in obedience to the compact, at once retired from Thyamia; but the Argives, who had taken the oath of peace on precisely the same terms, finding that they were unable to procure the continuance of the Phliasian exiles in the Trikaranon as a point held within the limits of Argos, (7) took over and garrisoned the place, asserting now that this land was theirs — land which only a little while before they were ravaging as hostile territory. Further, they refused to submit the case to arbitration in answer to the challenge of the Phliasians.

(7) Or, "as a post held by them within the territory of the state." The passage is perhaps corrupt.

It was nearly at the same date that the son of Dionysius (8) (his father, Dionysius the first, being already dead) sent a reinforcement to Lacedaemon of twelve triremes under Timocrates, who on his arrival helped the Lacedaemonians to recover Sellasia, and after that exploit sailed away home.

(8) Concerning Dionysius the first, see above, VII. i. 20 foll. 28.

B.C. 366-365. Not long after this the Eleians seized Lasion, (9) a place which in old days was theirs, but at present was

attached to the Arcadian league. The Arcadians did not make light of the matter, but immediately summoned their troops and rallied to the rescue. Counter-reliefs came also on the side of Elis — their Three Hundred, and again their Four Hundred. (10) The Eleians lay encamped during the day face to face with the invader, but on a somewhat more level position. The Arcadians were thereby induced under cover of night to mount on to the summit of the hill overhanging the Eleians, and at day-dawn they began their descent upon the enemy. The Eleians soon caught sight of the enemy advancing from the vantage ground above them, many times their number; but a sense of shame forbade retreat at such a distance. Presently they came to close quarters; there was a hand-to-hand encounter; the Eleians turned and fled; and in retiring down the difficult ground lost many men and many arms.

(9) See above, VII. i. 26; Freeman, “Hist. Fed. Gov.” p. 201.

(10) From the sequel it would appear that the former were a picked corps of infantry and the latter of cavalry. See Thuc. ii. 25; Busolt, op. cit. p. 175 foll.

Flushed with this achievement the Arcadians began marching on the cities of the Acroreia, (11) which, with the exception of Thraustus, they captured, and so reached Olympia. There they made an entrenched camp on the hill of Kronos, established a garrison, and held control over the Olympian hill-country. Margana also, by help of a party inside who gave it up, next fell into their hands.

(11) The mountainous district of Elis on the borders of Arcadia, in which the rivers Peneius and Ladon take their rise; see “Dict. of Anct. Geog.” s.v.; above, III. ii. 30, IV. ii. 16. Thraustus was one of the four chief townships of the district. For Margana, see above, III. ii. 25, 30, IV. ii. 16, VI. v. 2.

These successive advantages gained by their opponents reacted on the Eleians, and threw them altogether into despair. Meanwhile the Arcadians were steadily advancing upon their capital. (12) At length they arrived, and penetrated into the market-place. Here, however, the cavalry and the rest of the Eleians made a stand, drove the enemy out with some loss, and set up a trophy.

(12) I.e. Elis.

It should be mentioned that the city of Elis had previously been in a state of disruption. The party of Charopus, Thrasonidas and Argeius were for converting the state into a democracy; the party of Eualcas, Hippias, and Stratolas (13) were for oligarchy. When the Arcadians, backed by a large force, appeared as allies of those who favoured a democratic constitution, the party of Charopus were at once emboldened; and, having obtained the promise of assistance from the Arcadians, they seized the acropolis. The Knights and the Three Hundred did not hesitate, but at once marched up and dislodged them; with the result that about four hundred citizens, with Argeius and Charopus, were banished. Not long afterwards these exiles, with the help of some Arcadians, seized and occupied Pylus; (14) where many of the commons withdrew from the capital to join them, attracted not only by the beauty of the position, but by the great power of the Arcadians, in alliance with them.

(13) See below, VII. iv. 31; Busolt, op. cit. p. 175.

(14) Pylus, a town in "hollow" Elis, upon the mountain road from Elis to Olympia, at the place where the Ladon flows into the Peneius (Paus. VI. xxii. 5), near the modern village of Agrapidokhori. — Baedeker, "Greece," p. 320. See Busolt, p. 179.

There was subsequently another invasion of the territory of the Eleians on the part of the Arcadians, who were influenced by the representations of the exiles that the city would come over to them. But the attempt proved abortive. The Achaeans, who had now become friends with the Eleians, kept firm guard on the capital, so that the Arcadians had to retire without further exploit than that of ravaging the country. Immediately, however, on marching out of Eleian territory they were informed that the men of Pellene were in Elis; whereupon they executed a marvellously long night march and seized the Pellenian township of Olurus (15) (the Pellenians at the date in question having already reverted to their old alliance with Lacedaemon). And now the men of Pellene, in their turn getting wind of what had happened at Olurus, made their way round as best they could, and got into their own city of Pellene; after which

there was nothing for it but to carry on war with the Arcadians in Olurus and the whole body of their own commons; and in spite of their small numbers they did not cease till they had reduced Olurus by siege.

(15) This fortress (placed by Leake at modern Xylokastro) lay at the entrance of the gorge of the Sys, leading from the Aigialos or coast-land into the territory of Pellene, which itself lay about sixty stades from the sea at modern Zougra. For the part played by Pellene as one of the twelve Achaean states at this period, see above.

B.C. 365. (16) The Arcadians were presently engaged on another campaign against Elis. While they were encamped between Cyllene (17) and the capital the Eleians attacked them, but the Arcadians made a stand and won the battle. Andromachus, the Eleian cavalry general, who was regarded as responsible for the engagement, made an end of himself; and the rest withdrew into the city. This battle cost the life also of another there present — the Spartan Socleides; since, it will be understood, the Lacedaemonians had by this time become allies of the Eleians. Consequently the Eleians, being sore pressed on their own territory, sent an embassy and begged the Lacedaemonians to organise an expedition against the Arcadians. They were persuaded that in this way they would best arrest the progress of the Arcadians, who would thus be placed between the two foes. In accordance with this suggestion Archidamus marched out with a body of the city troops and seized Cromnus. (18) Here he left a garrison — three out of the twelve regiments (19) — and so withdrew homewards. The Arcadians had just ended their Eleian campaign, and, without disbanding their levies, hastened to the rescue, surrounded Cromnus with a double line of trenches, and having so secured their position, proceeded to lay siege to those inside the place. The city of Lacedaemon, annoyed at the siege of their citizens, sent out an army, again under Archidamus, who, when he had come, set about ravaging Arcadia to the best of his power, as also the Sciritid, and did all he could to draw off, if possible, the besieging army. The Arcadians, for all that, were not one whit the more to be stirred: they seemed callous to all his proceedings.

(16) See Grote, “H. G.” x. 429 foll.; al. B.C. 364.

(17) The port town of Elis.

(18) Cromnus, a township near Megalopolis. See Callisthenes, ap. Athen. 10, p. 452 A. See Schneider’s note ad loc.

(19) Lit. “lochi.” See Arnold’s note to Thuc. v. 68; below, VII. v. 10.

Presently espying a certain rising ground, across which the Arcadians had drawn their outer line of circumvallation, Archidamus proposed to himself to take it. If he were once in command of that knoll, the besiegers at its foot would be forced to retire. Accordingly he set about leading a body of troops round to the point in question, and during this movement the light infantry in advance of Archidamus, advancing at the double, caught sight of the Arcadian Eparitoi (20) outside the stockade and attacked them, while the cavalry made an attempt to enforce their attack simultaneously. The Arcadians did not swerve: in compact order they waited impassively. The Lacedaemonians charged a second time: a second time they swerved not, but on the contrary began advancing. Then, as the hoarse roar and shouting deepened, Archidamus himself advanced in support of his troops. To do so he turned aside along the carriage-road leading to Cromnus, and moved onward in column two abreast, (21) which was his natural order. When they came into close proximity to one another — Archidamus’s troops in column, seeing they were marching along a road; the Arcadians in compact order with shields interlinked — at this conjuncture the Lacedaemonians were not able to hold out for any length of time against the numbers of the Arcadians. Before long Archidamus had received a wound which pierced through his thigh, whilst death was busy with those who fought in front of him, Polyaenidas and Chilon, who was wedded to the sister of Archidamus, included. The whole of these, numbering no less than thirty, perished in this action. Presently, falling back along the road, they emerged into the open ground, and now with a sense of relief the Lacedaemonians got themselves into battle order, facing the foe. The Arcadians, without altering their position, stood in compact line, and

though falling short in actual numbers, were in far better heart — the moral result of an attack on a retreating enemy and the severe loss inflicted on him. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, were sorely down-hearted: Archidamus lay wounded before their eyes; in their ears rang the names of those who had died, the fallen being not only brave men, but, one may say, the flower of Spartan chivalry. The two armies were now close together, when one of the older men lifted up his voice and cried: “Why need we fight, sirs? Why not rather make truce and part friends?” Joyously the words fell on the ears of either host, and they made a truce. The Lacedaemonians picked up their dead and retired; the Arcadians withdrew to the point where their advance originally began, and set up a trophy of victory.

(20) So the troops of the Arcadian Federation were named. Diodorus (xv. 62) calls them “the select troops,” {tous kaloumenous epilektous}.

(21) See above, Ill. i. 22.

Now, as the Arcadians lay at Cromnus, the Eleians from the capital, advancing in the first instance upon Pylus, fell in with the men of that place, who had been beaten back from Thalamae. (22) Galloping along the road, the cavalry of the Eleians, when they caught sight of them, did not hesitate, but dashed at them at once, and put some to the sword, while others of them fled for safety to a rising knoll. Ere long the Eleian infantry arrived, and succeeded in dislodging this remnant on the hillock also; some they slew, and others, nearly two hundred in number, they took alive, all of whom where either sold, if foreigners, or, if Eleian exiles, put to death. After this the Eleians captured the men of Pylus and the place itself, as no one came to their rescue, and recovered the Marganians.

(22) A strong fortress in an unfrequented situation, defended by narrow passes (Leake, “Morea,” ii. 204); it lay probably in the rocky recesses of Mount Scollis (modern Santameri), on the frontier of Achaea, near the modern village of Santameri. See Polyb. iv. 75. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 179.

The Lacedaemonians presently made a second attempt on Cromnus by a night attack, got possession of the part of the palisading facing the Argives, and at once began summoning their besieged fellow-citizens to come out. Out

accordingly came all who happened to be within easy distance, and who took time by the forelock. The rest were not quick enough; a strong Arcadian reinforcement cut them off, and they remained shut up inside, and were eventually taken prisoners and distributed. One portion of them fell to the lot of the Argives, one to the Thebans, (23) one to the Arcadians, and one to the Messenians. The whole number taken, whether true-born Spartans or Perioeci, amounted to more than one hundred.

(23) “The Thebans must have been soldiers in garrison at Tegea, Megalopolis, or Messene.” — Grote, “H. G.” x. 433.

B.C. 364. And now that the Arcadians had leisure on the side of Cromnus, they were again able to occupy themselves with the Eleians, and to keep Olympia still more strongly garrisoned. In anticipation of the approaching Olympic year, (24) they began preparations to celebrate the Olympian games in conjunction with the men of Pisa, who claim to be the original presidents of the Temple. (25) Now, when the month of the Olympic Festival — and not the month only, but the very days, during which the solemn assembly is wont to meet, were come, the Eleians, in pursuance of preparations and invitations to the Achaeans, of which they made no secret, at length proceeded to march along the road to Olympia. The Arcadians had never imagined that they would really attack them; and they were themselves just now engaged with the men of Pisa in carrying out the details of the solemn assembly. They had already completed the chariot-race, and the foot-race of the pentathlon. (26) The competitors entitled to enter for the wrestling match had left the racecourse, and were getting through their bouts in the space between the racecourse and the great altar.

(24) I.e. “Ol. 104. 1” (July B.C. 364).

(25) For this claim on the part of the Pisatans (as the old inhabitants), see above, III. ii. 31; Paus. VI. xxii. 2; Diod. xv. 78; Busolt, op. cit. p. 154.

(26) As to the pentathlon, see above, IV. vii. 5. Whether the preceding {ippodromia} was, at this date, a horse or chariot race, or both, I am unable to say.

It must be understood that the Eleians under arms were already close at hand within the sacred enclosure. (27) The Arcadians, without advancing farther to meet them, drew up their troops on the river Cladaus, which flows past the Altis and discharges itself into the Alpheus. Their allies, consisting of two hundred Argive hoplites and about four hundred Athenian cavalry, were there to support them. Presently the Eleians formed into line on the opposite side of the stream, and, having sacrificed, at once began advancing. Though heretofore in matters of war despised by Arcadians and Argives, by Achaeans and Athenians alike, still on this day they led the van of the allied force like the bravest of the brave. Coming into collision with the Arcadians first, they at once put them to flight, and next receiving the attack of the Argive supports, mastered these also. Then having pursued them into the space between the senate-house, the temple of Hestia, and the theatre thereto adjoining, they still kept up the fighting as fiercely as ever, pushing the retreating foe towards the great altar. But now being exposed to missiles from the porticoes and the senate-house and the great temple, (28) while battling with their opponents on the level, some of the Eleians were slain, and amongst others the commander of the Three Hundred himself, Stratolas. At this state of the proceedings they retired to their camp.

(27) "The {temenos} must here be distinguished from the Altis, as meaning the entire breadth of consecrated ground at Olympia, of which the Altis formed a smaller interior portion enclosed with a wall. The Eleians entered into a {temenos} before they crossed the river Kladeus, which flowed through the {temenos}, but alongside the Altis. The tomb of Oenomaus, which was doubtless included in the {temenos}, was on the right bank of the Kladeus (Paus. VI. xxi. 3); while the Altis was on the left bank of the river." — Grote, "H. G." x. 438, note 1. For the position of the Altis (Paus. V. x. 1) and several of the buildings here mentioned, and the topography of Olympia in general, see Baedeker's "Greece," p. 322 foll.; and Dorpfeld's Plan ("Olympia und Umgegend," Berlin, 1882), there reproduced.

(28) Or, "from the porticoes of the senate-house and the great temple."

The Arcadians and those with them were so terrified at the thought of the coming day that they gave themselves neither respite nor repose that night, but fell to chopping up the carefully-compacted booths and constructing them into palisades; so that when the Eleians did again advance the next day and saw the strength of the barriers and the number mounted on the temples, they withdrew to their city.

They had proved themselves to be warriors of such mettle as a god indeed by the breath of his spirit may raise up and bring to perfection in a single day, but into which it were impossible for mortal men to convert a coward even in a lifetime.

B.C. 363. The employment of the sacred treasures of the temple by the Arcadian magistrates (29) as a means of maintaining the Eparitoi (30) aroused protest. The Mantineans were the first to pass a resolution forbidding such use of the sacred property. They set the example themselves of providing the necessary quota for the Troop in question from their state exchequer, and this sum they sent to the federal government. The latter, affirming that the Mantineans were undermining the Arcadian league, retaliated by citing their leading statesmen to appear before the assembly of Ten Thousand; and on their refusal to obey the summons, passed sentence upon them, and sent the Eparitoi to apprehend them as convicted persons. The Mantineans, however, closed their gates, and would not admit the Troop within their walls. Their example was speedily followed: others among the Ten Thousand began to protest against the enormity of so applying the sacred treasures; it was doubly wrong to leave as a perpetual heirloom to their children the imputation of a crime so heinous against the gods. But no sooner was a resolution passed in the general assembly (31) forbidding the use of the sacred moneys for profane purposes than those (members of the league) who could not have afforded to serve as Eparitoi without pay began speedily to melt away; while those of more independent means, with mutual encouragement, began to enrol themselves in the ranks of the Eparitoi — the feeling being that they ought not to be a mere tool in the hands of the corps, but rather that the corps itself should be their instrument. Those members of the government who had manipulated the sacred money soon

saw that when they came to render an account of their stewardship, in all likelihood they would lose their heads. They therefore sent an embassy to Thebes, with instructions to the Theban authorities warning them that, if they did not open a campaign, the Arcadians would in all probability again veer round to Lacedaemon.

(29) See above, VII. i. 24. “Were these magistrates, or merely popular leaders?” — Freeman, “Hist. Fed. Gov.” p. 203, note 3.

(30) Or, “Select Troop.” See above.

(31) “The common formula for a Greek confederation, {to koinon ton ‘Arkadon}, is used as an equivalent of {oi mupioi}” (here and below, SS. 35, 38) — Freeman, op. cit. 202, note 4.

The Thebans, therefore, began making preparations for opening a campaign, but the party who consulted the best interests of Peloponnese (32) persuaded the general assembly of the Arcadians to send an embassy and tell the Thebans not to advance with an army into Arcadia, unless they sent for them; and whilst this was the language they addressed to Thebes, they reasoned among themselves that they could dispense with war altogether. The presidency over the temple of Zeus, they were persuaded, they might easily dispense with; indeed, it would at once be a more upright and a holier proceeding on their parts to give it back, and with such conduct the god, they thought, might be better pleased. As these were also the views and wishes of the Eleians, both parties agreed to make peace, and a truce was established.

(32) See below, VII. v. 1, {oi kedouenoi tes Peloponnesou}. I regard these phrases as self-laudatory political catchwords.

B.C. 362. The oaths were ratified; and amongst those who swore to them were included not only the parties immediately concerned, but the men of Tegea, and the Theban general himself, who was inside Tegea with three hundred heavy infantry of the Boeotians. Under these circumstances the Arcadians in Tegea remained behind feasting and keeping holy day, with outpouring of libations and songs of victory, to celebrate the establishment of peace. Here was an opportunity for the Theban and those of the government who regarded the forthcoming inquiry with

apprehension. Aided by the Boeotians and those of the Eparitoi who shared their sentiments, they first closed the gates of the fortress of Tegea, and then set about sending to the various quarters to apprehend those of the better class. But, inasmuch as there were Arcadians present from all the cities, and there was a general desire for peace, those apprehended must needs be many. So much so, that the prison-house was eventually full to overflowing, and the town-hall was full also. Besides the number lodged in prison, a number had escaped by leaping down the walls, and there were others who were suffered to pass through the gates (a laxity easily explained, since no one, excepting those who were anticipating their own downfall, cherished any wrathful feeling against anybody). But what was a source of still graver perplexity to the Theban commander and those acting with him — of the Mantineans, the very people whom they had set their hearts on catching, they had got but very few. Nearly all of them, owing to the proximity of their city, had, in fact, betaken themselves home. Now, when day came and the Mantineans learned what had happened, they immediately sent and forewarned the other Arcadian states to be ready in arms, and to guard the passes; and they set the example themselves by so doing. They sent at the same time to Tegea and demanded the release of all Mantineans there detained. With regard to the rest of the Arcadians they further claimed that no one should be imprisoned or put to death without trial. If any one had any accusation to bring against any, than by the mouth of their messengers there present they gave notice that the state of Mantinea was ready to offer bail, “Verily and indeed to produce before the general assembly of the Arcadians all who might be summoned into court.” The Theban accordingly, on hearing this, was at a loss what to make of the affair, and released his prisoners. Next day, summoning a congress of all the Arcadians who chose to come, he explained, with some show of apology, that he had been altogether deceived; he had

heard, he said, that “the Lacedaemonians were under arms on the frontier, and that some of the Arcadians were about to betray Tegea into their hands.” His auditors acquitted him for the moment, albeit they knew that as touching themselves he was lying. They sent, however, an embassy to Thebes and there accused him as deserving of death. Epaminondas (who was at that time the general at the head of the war department) is reported to have maintained that the Theban commander had acted far more rightly when he seized than when he let go the prisoners. “Thanks to you,” he argued, “we have been brought into a state of war, and then you, without our advice or opinion asked, make peace on your own account; would it not be reasonable to retort upon you the charge of treason in such conduct? Anyhow, be assured,” he added, “we shall bring an army into Arcadia, and along with those who share our views carry on the war which we have undertaken.”

V

B.C. 362. This answer was duly reported to the general assembly of the Arcadians, and throughout the several states of the league. Consequently the Mantineans, along with those of the Arcadians who had the interests of Peloponnesus at heart, as also the Eleians and the Achaeans, came to the conclusion that the policy of the Thebans was plain. They wished Peloponnesus to be reduced to such an extremity of weakness that it might fall an easy prey into their hands who were minded to enslave it. “Why else,” they asked, “should they wish us to fight, except that we may tear each other to pieces, and both sides be driven to look to them for support? or why, when we tell them that we have no need of them at present, do they insist on preparing for a foreign campaign? Is it not plain that these preparations are for an expedition which will do us some mischief?”

In this mood they sent to Athens, (1) calling on the Athenians for military aid. Ambassadors also went to Lacedaemon on behalf of the Eparitoi, summoning the Lacedaemonians, if they wished to give a helping hand, to put a stop to the proceedings of any power approaching to enslave Peloponnesus. As regards the headship, they came to an arrangement at once, on the principle that each of the allied states should exercise the generalship within its own territory.

(1) For a treaty of alliance between Athens, the Arkadians, Achaeans, Eleians, and Phliasians, immediately before Mantinea, B.C. 362, {epi Molonos arkhontos}, see Hicks, 94; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. p. 405. It is preserved on a stele ("broken at bottom; but the top is surmounted by a relief representing Zeus enthroned, with a thunderbolt; a female figure (= the {Summakhia}?) approaches lifting her veil, while Athena stands by") now standing among the sculptures from the Asklepieion on the Acropolis at Athens. See Milchhofer, p. 47, no. 7, "Die Museum," Athens, 1881. For the date, see Demosth. "c. Polycl." 1207.

While these matters were in progress, Epaminondas was prosecuting his march at the head of all the Boeotians, with the Euboeans, and a large body of Thessalians, furnished both by Alexander (2) and by his opponents. The Phocians were not represented. Their special agreement only required them to render assistance in case of an attack on Thebes; to assist in a hostile expedition against others was not in the bond. Epaminondas, however, reflected that inside Peloponnesus itself they might count upon the Argives and the Messenians, with that section of the Arcadians which shared their views. These latter were the men of Tegea and Megalopolis, of Asea and Pallantium, with any townships which owing to their small size or their position in the midst of these larger cities were forced to follow their lead.

(2) For Alexander of Pherae, see above, VI. iv. 34. In B.C. 363 the Thebans had sent an army under Pelopidas into Thessaly to assist their allies among the Thessalians with the Phthiot Achaeans and the Magnetes against Alexander. At Kynos Kephelae Alexander was defeated, but Pelopidas was slain (see Grote, "H. G." x. 420 foll.). "His death, as it brought grief, so likewise it produced advantage to the allies; for the Thebans, as soon as they heard of his fall, delayed not their revenge, but presently sent seven thousand foot and seven hundred horse, under the command of Malcitas and Diogiton. And they, finding Alexander weak and without forces, compelled him to restore the cities he had taken, to withdraw his garrisons from the Magnesians and Achaeans of Phthiotos and swear to assist the Thebans against whatsoever enemies they should require." — Plut. "Pelop." 35 (Clough, ii. 236).

Epaminondas advanced with rapid strides; but on reaching Nemea he slackened speed, hoping to catch the Athenians as they passed, and reflecting on the magnitude of such an achievement, whether in stimulating the courage of his own allies, or in plunging his foes into despondency; since, to state the matter concisely, any blow to Athens

would be a gain to Thebes. But during his pause at Nemea those who shared the opposite policy had time to converge on Mantinea. Presently the news reached Epaminondas that the Athenians had abandoned the idea of marching by land, and were preparing to bring their supports to Arcadia by sea through Lacedaemon. This being so, he abandoned his base of Nemea and pushed on to Tegea.

That the strategy of the Theban general was fortunate I will not pretend to assert, but in the particular combination of prudence and daring which stamps these exploits, I look upon him as consummate. In the first place, I cannot but admire the sagacity which led him to form his camp within the walls of Tegea, where he was in greater security that he would have been if entrenched outside, and where his future movements were more completely concealed from the enemy. Again, the means to collect material and furnish himself with other necessaries were readier to his hand inside the city; while, thirdly, he was able to keep an eye on the movements of his opponents marching outside, and to watch their successful dispositions as well as their mistakes. More than this: in spite of his sense of superiority to his antagonists, over and over again, when he saw them gaining some advantage in position, he refused to be drawn out to attack them. It was only when he saw plainly that no city was going to give him its adhesion, and that time was slipping by, that he made up his mind that a blow must be struck, failing which, he had nothing to expect save a vast ingloriousness, in place of his former fame. (3) He had ascertained that his antagonists held a strong position round Mantinea, and that they had sent to fetch Agesilaus and the whole Lacedaemonian army. He was further aware that Agesilaus had commenced his advance and was already at Pellene. (4) Accordingly he passed the word of command (5) to his troops to take their evening meal, put himself at their head and advanced straight upon Sparta. Had it not been

for the arrival (by some providential chance) of a Cretan, who brought the news to Agesilaus of the enemy's advance, he would have captured the city of Sparta like a nest of young birds absolutely bereft of its natural defenders. As it was, Agesilaus, being forewarned, had time to return to the city before the Thebans came, and here the Spartans made distribution of their scanty force and maintained watch and ward, albeit few enough in numbers, since the whole of their cavalry were away in Arcadia, and so was their foreign brigade, and so were three out of their twelve regiments. (6)

(3) Or, "dull obscurity in place of renown."

(4) Pellene (or Pellana), a town of Laconia on the Eurotas, and on the road from Sparta to Arcadia; in fact the frontier fortress on the Eurotas, as Sellasia on the Oenus; "Dict. of Anct. Geog." s.v.; see Paus. iii. 20, S. 2; Strab. viii. 386; Polyb. iv. 81, xvi. 37; Plut. "Agis," 8; Leake, "Morea," iii. 14 foll.

(5) Cf. "Hipparch." iv. 9.

(6) Lit. "lochi." See above, VII. iv. 20; "Pol. Lac." xi. 4.

Arrived within the city of Sparta, (7) Epaminondas abstained from gaining an entry at a point where his troops would have to fight on level ground and under attack from the houses above; where also their large numbers would give them no superiority over the small numbers of the foemen. But, singling out a position which he conceived would give him the advantage, he occupied it and began his advance against the city upon a downward instead of an upward incline.

(7) Grote ("H. G." x. 455) says: "Though he crossed the Eurotas and actually entered into the city of Sparta," as the words {epei de egeneto en te polei ton Spartiaton} certainly seem to me to imply. Others interpret "in the close neighbourhood of."

With regard to what subsequently took place, two possible explanations suggest themselves: either it was miraculous, or it may be maintained that there is no resisting the fury of desperation. Archidamus, advancing at the head of but a hundred men, and crossing the one thing which might have been expected to form an obstacle to the enemy, (8) began marching uphill against his antagonists. At this crisis these fire-breathing warriors, these victorious heroes of Leuctra, (9) with their superiority at every point, aided, moreover, by the advantage of their position, did not withstand the attack of Archidamus and those with him, but swerved in flight.

(8) Or, “to serve as his defence”; or, “the one obstacle to his progress,” i.e. Archidamus’s. It was a miraculous thing that the Thebans did not stop him.

(9) See Mahaffy, “Hist. Gk. Lit.” vol. ii. p. 268, 1st ed. See above, “Hell.” VI. iv. 24; Diod. xv. 39, 56.

The vanguard of Epaminondas’s troops were cut down; when, however, flushed with the glory of their victory, the citizens followed up their pursuit beyond the right point, they in turn were cut down — so plainly was the demarking line of victory drawn by the finger of God. So then Archidamus set up a trophy to note the limit of his success, and gave back those who had there fallen of the enemy under a truce. Epaminondas, on his side, reflecting that the Arcadians must already be hastening to the relief of Lacedaemon, and being unwilling to engage them in conjunction with the whole of the Lacedaemonian force, especially now that the star of Sparta’s fortune shone, whilst theirs had suffered some eclipse, turned and marched back the way he came with all speed possible into Tegea. There he gave his heavy infantry pause and refreshment, but his cavalry he sent on to Mantinea; he begged them to “have courage and hold on,” instructing them that in all likelihood they would find the flocks and herds of the Mantineans and the entire population itself outside their walls, especially as it was the moment for carrying the corn. So they set off.

The Athenian cavalry, started from Eleusis, had made their evening meal at the Isthmus, and passing through Cleonae, as chance befell, had arrived at Mantinea and had encamped within the walls in the houses. As soon as the enemy were seen galloping up with evidently hostile intent, the Mantineans fell to praying the Athenian knights to lend them all the succour they could, and they showed them all their cattle outside, and all their labourers, and among them were many children and graybeards who were free-born citizens. The Athenians were touched by this appeal, and, though they had not yet broken fast, neither the men themselves nor their horses, went out eagerly to the rescue. And here we must needs pause to admire the valour of these men also. The enemy whom they had to cope with far

outnumbered them, as was plain to see, and the former misadventure of the cavalry in Corinth was not forgotten. (10) But none of these things entered into their calculations now — nor yet the fact that they were on the point of engaging Thebans and Thessalians, the finest cavalry in the world by all repute. The only thing they thought of was the shame and the dishonour, if, being there, they did not lend a helping hand to their allies. In this mood, so soon as they caught sight of the enemy, they fell with a crash upon him in passionate longing to recover the old ancestral glory. Nor did they fight in vain — the blows they struck enabled the Mantineans to recover all their property outside, but among those who dealt them died some brave heroes; (11) brave heroes also, it is evident, were those whom they slew, since on either side the weapons wielded were not so short but that they could lunge at one another with effect. The dead bodies of their own men they refused to abandon; and there were some of the enemy's slain whom they restored to him under a flag of truce.

(10) Or, "and in Corinth an untoward incident had been experienced by the cavalry." See Grote, "H. G." x. 458, note 2. Possibly in reference to "Hell." Vl. v. 51, 52.

(11) Probably Xenophon's own son Gryllus was among them.

The thoughts now working in the mind of Epaminondas were such as these: that within a few days he would be forced to retire, as the period of the campaign was drawing to a close; if it ended in his leaving in the lurch those allies whom he came out to assist, they would be besieged by their antagonists. What a blow would that be to his own fair fame, already somewhat tarnished! Had he not been defeated in Lacedaemon, with a large body of heavy infantry, by a handful of men? defeated again at Mantinea, in the cavalry engagement, and himself the main cause finally of a coalition between five great powers — that is to say, the Lacedaemonians, the Arcadians, the Achaeans, the Eleians, and the Athenians? On all grounds it seemed to him impossible to steal past without a battle. And the more so as he computed the alternatives of victory or death. If the

former were his fortune, it would resolve all his perplexities; if death, his end would be noble. How glorious a thing to die in the endeavour to leave behind him, as his last legacy to his fatherland, the empire of Peloponnesus! That such thoughts should pass through his brain strikes me as by no means wonderful, as these are thoughts distinctive to all men of high ambition. Far more wonderful to my mind was the pitch of perfection to which he had brought his army. There was no labour which his troops would shrink from, either by night or by day; there was no danger they would flinch from; and, with the scantiest provisions, their discipline never failed them.

And so, when he gave his last orders to them to prepare for impending battle, they obeyed with alacrity. He gave the word; the cavalry fell to whitening their helmets, the heavy infantry of the Arcadians began inscribing their clubs as the crest on their shields, (12) as though they were Thebans, and all were engaged in sharpening their lances and swords and polishing their heavy shields. When the preparations were complete and he had led them out, his next movement is worthy of attention. First, as was natural, he paid heed to their formation, and in so doing seemed to give clear evidence that he intended battle; but no sooner was the army drawn up in the formation which he preferred, than he advanced, not by the shortest route to meet the enemy, but towards the westward-lying mountains which face Tegea, and by this movement created in the enemy an expectation that he would not do battle on that day. In keeping with this expectation, as soon as he arrived at the mountain-region, he extended his phalanx in long line and piled arms under the high cliffs; and to all appearance he was there encamping. The effect of this manouvre on the enemy in general was to relax the prepared bent of their souls for battle, and to weaken their tactical arrangements. Presently, however, wheeling his regiments (which were marching in

column) to the front, with the effect of strengthening the beak-like (13) attack which he proposed to lead himself, at the same instant he gave the order, “Shoulder arms, forward,” and led the way, the troops following.

(12) Grote (“H. G.” x. 463) has another interpretation.

(13) Or, “the wedge-like attack of his own division”; see Grote, “H. G.” x. 469 foll. I do not, however, think that the attacking column was actually wedge-shaped like the “acies cuneata” of the Romans. It was the unusual depth of the column which gave it the force of an ironclad’s ram. Cf. “Cyrop.” II. iv. for {eis metopon}.

When the enemy saw them so unexpectedly approaching, not one of them was able to maintain tranquility: some began running to their divisions, some fell into line, some might be seen bitting and bridling their horses, some donning their cuirasses, and one and all were like men about to receive rather than to inflict a blow. He, the while, with steady impetus pushed forward his armament, like a ship-of-war prow forward. Wherever he brought his solid wedge to bear, he meant to cleave through the opposing mass, and crumble his adversary’s host to pieces. With this design he prepared to throw the brunt of the fighting on the strongest half of his army, while he kept the weaker portion of it in the background, knowing certainly that if worsted it would only cause discouragement to his own division and add force to the foe. The cavalry on the side of his opponents were disposed like an ordinary phalanx of heavy infantry, regular in depth and unsupported by foot-soldiers interspersed among the horses. (14) Epaminondas again differed in strengthening the attacking point of his cavalry, besides which he interspersed footmen between their lines in the belief that, when he had once cut through the cavalry, he would have wrested victory from the antagonist along his whole line; so hard is it to find troops who will care to keep their own ground when once they see any of their own side flying. Lastly, to prevent any attempt on the part of the Athenians, who were on the enemy’s left wing, to bring up their reliefs in support of the portion next them, he posted bodies of cavalry and heavy infantry on certain hillocks in front of them, intending to create in their minds an

apprehension that, in case they offered such assistance, they would be attacked on their own rear by these detachments. Such was the plan of encounter which he formed and executed; nor was he cheated in his hopes. He had so much the mastery at his point of attack that he caused the whole of the enemy’s troops to take flight.

(14) See Rustow and Kochly, p. 176; and for the {amippoi} Harpocration, s.v.; Pollus, i. 131; “Hipparch.” v. 13; Thuc. v. 58; Herod. vii. 158; Caes. “B. G.” i. 48; “B. Civ.” iii. 84.

But after he himself had fallen, the rest of the Thebans were not able any longer to turn their victory rightly to account. Though the main battle line of their opponents had given way, not a single man afterwards did the victorious hoplites slay, not an inch forward did they advance from the ground on which the collision took place. Though the cavalry had fled before them, there was no pursuit; not a man, horseman or hoplite, did the conquering cavalry cut down; but, like men who have suffered a defeat, as if panic-stricken (15) they slipped back through the ranks of the fleeing foemen. Only the footmen fighting amongst the cavalry and the light infantry, who had together shared in the victory of the cavalry, found their way round to the left wing as masters of the field, but it cost them dear; here they encountered the Athenians, and most of them were cut down.

(15) Or, “they timorously slipped back.”

The effective result of these achievements was the very opposite of that which the world at large anticipated. Here, where well-nigh the whole of Hellas was met together in one field, and the combatants stood rank against rank confronted, there was no one doubted that, in the event of battle, the conquerors would this day rule; and that those who lost would be their subjects. But God so ordered it that both belligerents alike set up trophies as claiming victory, and neither interfered with the other in the act. Both parties alike gave back their enemy’s dead under a truce, and in right of victory; both alike, in symbol of defeat, under a

truce took back their dead. And though both claimed to have won the day, neither could show that he had thereby gained any accession of territory, or state, or empire, or was better situated than before the battle. Uncertainty and confusion, indeed, had gained ground, being tenfold greater throughout the length and breadth of Hellas after the battle than before.

At this point I lay aside my pen: the sequel of the story may haply commend itself (16) to another.

(16) Or, “win the attention of some other writer.”

The Greek Text

Thasos, a Greek island in the northern Aegean Sea, where Thucydides was sent as a general in 424 BC. During the winter of 424-423 BC, the Spartan general Brasidas attacked Amphipolis, a half-day's sail west from Thasos on the Thracian coast, instigating the Battle of Amphipolis. Thucydides was unable to arrive in time and for this reason he was blamed for its subsequent surrender. Therefore, he was sent into exile, allowing him to write his History from a neutral standpoint. Using his status as an exile from Athens to travel freely among the Peloponnesian allies, he was able to view the war from a unique perspective of both sides.

PRONOUNCING ANCIENT GREEK

This is a brief guide to pronouncing Ancient Greek, allowing readers to voice aloud Thucydides' original text. You may wish to bookmark this page for future reference.

The Letters

Like the Roman alphabet, Greek has separate capital and lowercase letters, which are all provided here with their Roman equivalents.

Α, α	a
Β, β	b
Γ, γ	g
Δ, δ	d
Ε, ε	e
Ζ, ζ	z
Η, η	ê
Θ, θ	th
Ι, ι	i
Κ, κ	k
Λ, λ	l
Μ, μ	m
Ν, ν	n
Ξ, ξ	x
Ο, ο	o
Π, π	p
Ρ, ρ	r
Σ, σ, ς	s
Τ, τ	t
Υ, υ	y
Φ, φ	ph
Χ, χ	ch

Ψ, ψ ps
Ω, ω ô

Consonants

Most of the consonants are pronounced exactly as in English, except for:

The g is always hard as in ‘golf’, never soft.
z is pronounced zd.
x is pronounced with a ks sound.
r is rolled as in Spanish or Italian.
ps is always pronounced as two sounds
With aspirated consonants ph, th, ch and rh, ignore the h.
The ch should be pronounced the same as a k.

Diphthongs

ai as in aisle
ei as in vein
oi as in oil
au as ow in cow
eu as e of get followed by oo
ou as in soup

CONTENTS OF GREEK TEXT

In this section of the eBook, readers can view the original Greek text of Thucydides' History. You may wish to Bookmark this page for future reference.

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Βιβλίο Γ'
Βιβλίο Δ'
Βιβλίο Ε'
Βιβλίο ΣΤ'
Βιβλίο Ζ'
Βιβλίο Η'

Βιβλίο Α’

1. Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς καθισταμένου καὶ ἐλπίσας μέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων, τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι ἀκμάζοντές τε ᾖσαν ἐς αὐτὸν ἀμφότεροι παρασκευῇ τῇ πάσῃ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ὁρῶν ξυνιστάμενον πρὸς ἑκατέρους, τὸ μὲν εὐθύς, τὸ δὲ καὶ διανοούμενον. [2] κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο καὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡς δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων. [3] τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔτι παλαίτερα σαφῶς μὲν εὑρεῖν διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἀδύνατα ἦν, ἐκ δὲ τεκμηρίων ὧν ἐπὶ μακρότατον σκοποῦντί μοι πιστεῦσαι ξυμβαίνει οὐ μεγάλα νομίζω γενέσθαι οὔτε κατὰ τοὺς πολέμους οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἄλλα.

2. φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ νῦν Ἑλλὰς καλουμένη οὐ πάλαι βεβαίως οἰκουμένη, ἀλλὰ μεταναστάσεις τε οὖσαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἕκαστοι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπολείποντες βιαζόμενοι ὑπό τινων αἰεὶ πλειόνων. [2] τῆς γὰρ ἐμπορίας οὐκ οὔσης, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιμειγνύντες ἀδεῶς ἀλλήλοις οὔτε κατὰ γῆν οὔτε διὰ θαλάσσης, νεμόμενοί τε τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι ὅσον ἀποζῆν καὶ περιουσίαν χρημάτων οὐκ ἔχοντες οὐδὲ γῆν φυτεύοντες, ἄδηλον ὂν ὁπότε τις ἐπελθὼν καὶ ἀτειχίστων ἅμα ὄντων ἄλλος ἀφαιρήσεται, τῆς τε καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς πανταχοῦ ἂν ἡγούμενοι ἐπικρατεῖν, οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπανίσταντο, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ οὔτε μεγέθει πόλεων ἴσχυον οὔτε τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ. [3] μάλιστα δὲ τῆς γῆς ἡ ἀρίστη αἰεὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν οἰκητόρων εἶχεν, ἥ τε νῦν Θεσσαλία καλουμένη καὶ Βοιωτία Πελοποννήσου τε τὰ πολλὰ πλὴν Ἀρκαδίας, τῆς τε ἄλλης ὅσα ἦν κράτιστα. [4] διὰ γὰρ ἀρετὴν γῆς αἵ τε δυνάμεις τισὶ μείζους ἐγγιγνόμεναι στάσεις ἐνεποίουν ἐξ ὧν ἐφθείροντο, καὶ ἅμα ὑπὸ ἀλλοφύλων μᾶλλον ἐπεβουλεύοντο. [5] τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον διὰ τὸ λεπτόγεων ἀστασίαστον οὖσαν ἄνθρωποι

ᾤκουν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεί. [6] καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι: ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος οἱ πολέμῳ ἢ στάσει ἐκπίπτοντες παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους οἱ δυνατώτατοι ὡς βέβαιον ὂν ἀνεχώρουν, καὶ πολῖται γιγνόμενοι εὐθὺς ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ μείζω ἔτι ἐποίησαν πλήθει ἀνθρώπων τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε καὶ ἐς Ἰωνίαν ὕστερον ὡς οὐχ ἱκανῆς οὔσης τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψαν.

3. δηλοῖ δέ μοι καὶ τόδε τῶν παλαιῶν ἀσθένειαν οὐχ ἥκιστα: πρὸ γὰρ τῶν Τρωικῶν οὐδὲν φαίνεται πρότερον κοινῇ ἐργασαμένη ἡ Ἑλλάς: [2] δοκεῖ δέ μοι, οὐδὲ τοὔνομα τοῦτο ξύμπασά πω εἶχεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸ Ἕλληνος τοῦ Δευκαλίωνος καὶ πάνυ οὐδὲ εἶναι ἡ ἐπίκλησις αὕτη, κατὰ ἔθνη δὲ ἄλλα τε καὶ τὸ Πελασγικὸν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν παρέχεσθαι, Ἕλληνος δὲ καὶ τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ Φθιώτιδι ἰσχυσάντων, καὶ ἐπαγομένων αὐτοὺς ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ ἐς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, καθ᾽ ἑκάστους μὲν ἤδη τῇ ὁμιλίᾳ μᾶλλον καλεῖσθαι Ἕλληνας, οὐ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε χρόνου [ἐδύνατο] καὶ ἅπασιν ἐκνικῆσαι. [3] τεκμηριοῖ δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος: πολλῷ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔτι καὶ τῶν Τρωικῶν γενόμενος οὐδαμοῦ τοὺς ξύμπαντας ὠνόμασεν, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς μετ᾽ Ἀχιλλέως ἐκ τῆς Φθιώτιδος, οἵπερ καὶ πρῶτοι Ἕλληνες ἦσαν, Δαναοὺς δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι καὶ Ἀργείους καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς ἀνακαλεῖ. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ βαρβάρους εἴρηκε διὰ τὸ μηδὲ Ἑλληνάς πω, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἀντίπαλον ἐς ἓν ὄνομα ἀποκεκρίσθαι. [4] οἱ δ᾽ οὖν ὡς ἕκαστοι Ἕλληνες κατὰ πόλεις τε ὅσοι ἀλλήλων ξυνίεσαν καὶ ξύμπαντες ὕστερον κληθέντες οὐδὲν πρὸ τῶν Τρωικῶν δι᾽ ἀσθένειαν καὶ ἀμειξίαν ἀλλήλων ἀθρόοι ἔπραξαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτην τὴν στρατείαν θαλάσσῃ ἤδη πλείω χρώμενοι ξυνεξῆλθον.

4. Μίνως γὰρ παλαίτατος ὧν ἀκοῇ ἴσμεν ναυτικὸν ἐκτήσατο καὶ τῆς νῦν Ἑλληνικῆς θαλάσσης ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐκράτησε καὶ τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἦρξέ τε καὶ οἰκιστὴς πρῶτος τῶν πλείστων ἐγένετο, Κᾶρας ἐξελάσας καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ἡγεμόνας ἐγκαταστήσας: τό τε λῃστικόν, ὡς

εἰκός, καθῄρει ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐδύνατο, τοῦ τὰς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἰέναι αὐτῷ.

5. οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες τὸ πάλαι καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων οἵ τε ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ παραθαλάσσιοι καὶ ὅσοι νήσους εἶχον, ἐπειδὴ ἤρξαντο μᾶλλον περαιοῦσθαι ναυσὶν ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους, ἐτράποντο πρὸς λῃστείαν, ἡγουμένων ἀνδρῶν οὐ τῶν ἀδυνατωτάτων κέρδους τοῦ σφετέρου αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσι τροφῆς, καὶ προσπίπτοντες πόλεσιν ἀτειχίστοις καὶ κατὰ κώμας οἰκουμέναις ἥρπαζον καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιοῦντο, οὐκ ἔχοντός πω αἰσχύνην τούτου τοῦ ἔργου, φέροντος δέ τι καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον: [2] δηλοῦσι δὲ τῶν τε ἠπειρωτῶν τινὲς ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἷς κόσμος καλῶς τοῦτο δρᾶν, καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰς πύστεις τῶν καταπλεόντων πανταχοῦ ὁμοίως ἐρωτῶντες εἰ λῃσταί εἰσιν, ὡς οὔτε ὧν πυνθάνονται ἀπαξιούντων τὸ ἔργον, οἷς τε ἐπιμελὲς εἴη εἰδέναι οὐκ ὀνειδιζόντων. [3] ἐλῄζοντο δὲ καὶ κατ᾽ ἤπειρον ἀλλήλους.καὶ μέχρι τοῦδε πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ νέμεται περί τε Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ὀζόλας καὶ Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ τὴν ταύτῃ ἤπειρον. τό τε σιδηροφορεῖσθαι τούτοις τοῖς ἠπειρώταις ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς λῃστείας ἐμμεμένηκεν:

6. πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐσιδηροφόρει διὰ τὰς ἀφάρκτους τε οἰκήσεις καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐφόδους, καὶ ξυνήθη τὴν δίαιταν μεθ᾽ ὅπλων ἐποιήσαντο ὥσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι. [2] σημεῖον δ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔτι οὕτω νεμόμενα τῶν ποτὲ καὶ ἐς πάντας ὁμοίων διαιτημάτων. [3]ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τόν τε σίδηρον κατέθεντο καὶ ἀνειμένῃ τῇ διαίτῃ ἐς τὸ τρυφερώτερον μετέστησαν. καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων διὰ τὸ ἁβροδίαιτον οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐπειδὴ χιτῶνάς τε λινοῦς ἐπαύσαντο φοροῦντες καὶ χρυσῶν τεττίγων ἐνέρσει κρωβύλον ἀναδούμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τριχῶν: ἀφ᾽ οὗ καὶ Ἰώνων τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς ἐπὶ πολὺ αὕτη ἡ σκευὴ κατέσχεν. [4] μετρίᾳ δ᾽ αὖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ἐς τὸν νῦν τρόπον πρῶτοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐχρήσαντο καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ τὰ μείζω κεκτημένοι ἰσοδίαιτοι

μάλιστα κατέστησαν. [5] ἐγυμνώθησάν τε πρῶτοι καὶ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν ἀποδύντες λίπα μετὰ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι ἠλείψαντο: τὸ δὲ πάλαι καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ ἀγῶνι διαζώματα ἔχοντες περὶ τὰ αἰδοῖα οἱ ἀθληταὶ ἠγωνίζοντο, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἔτη ἐπειδὴ πέπαυται. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἔστιν οἷς νῦν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς Ἀσιανοῖς, πυγμῆς καὶ πάλης ἆθλα τίθεται, καὶ διεζωμένοι τοῦτο δρῶσιν. [6] πολλὰ δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄλλα τις ἀποδείξειε τὸ παλαιὸν Ἑλληνικὸν ὁμοιότροπα τῷ νῦν βαρβαρικῷ διαιτώμενον.

7. τῶν δὲ πόλεων ὅσαι μὲν νεώτατα ᾠκίσθησαν καὶ ἤδη πλωιμωτέρων ὄντων, περιουσίας μᾶλλον ἔχουσαι χρημάτων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς τείχεσιν ἐκτίζοντο καὶ τοὺς ἰσθμοὺς ἀπελάμβανον ἐμπορίας τε ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς προσοίκους ἕκαστοι ἰσχύος: αἱ δὲ παλαιαὶ διὰ τὴν λῃστείαν ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντίσχουσαν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ᾠκίσθησαν, αἵ τε ἐν ταῖς νήσοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἠπείροις ▯ ἔφερον γὰρ ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ὄντες οὐ θαλάσσιοι κάτω ᾤκουν▯, καὶ μέχρι τοῦδε ἔτι ἀνῳκισμένοι εἰσίν.

8. καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον λῃσταὶ ἦσαν οἱ νησιῶται, Κᾶρές τε ὄντες καὶ Φοίνικες: οὗτοι γὰρ δὴ τὰς πλείστας τῶν νήσων ᾤκησαν. μαρτύριον δέ: Δήλου γὰρ καθαιρομένης ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ τῶν θηκῶν ἀναιρεθεισῶν ὅσαι ἦσαν τῶν τεθνεώτων ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ Κᾶρες ἐφάνησαν, γνωσθέντες τῇ τε σκευῇ τῶν ὅπλων ξυντεθαμμένῃ καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧ νῦν ἔτι θάπτουσιν. [2] καταστάντος δὲ τοῦ Μίνω ναυτικοῦ πλωιμώτερα ἐγένετο παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ▯οἱ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νήσων κακοῦργοι ἀνέστησαν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὅτεπερ καὶ τὰς πολλὰς αὐτῶν κατῴκιζε▯, [3] καὶ οἱ παρὰ θάλασσαν ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ἤδη τὴν κτῆσιν τῶν χρημάτων ποιούμενοι βεβαιότερον ᾤκουν, καί τινες καὶ τείχη περιεβάλλοντο ὡς πλουσιώτεροι ἑαυτῶν γιγνόμενοι: ἐφιέμενοι γὰρ τῶν κερδῶν οἵ τε ἥσσους ὑπέμενον τὴν τῶν κρεισσόνων δουλείαν, οἵ τε δυνατώτεροι περιουσίας ἔχοντες προσεποιοῦντο ὑπηκόους τὰς ἐλάσσους πόλεις. [4] καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ μᾶλλον ἤδη ὄντες ὕστερον χρόνῳ ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἐστράτευσαν.

9. Ἀγαμέμνων τέ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν τότε δυνάμει προύχων καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον τοῖς Τυνδάρεω ὅρκοις κατειλημμένους τοὺς Ἑλένης μνηστῆρας ἄγων τὸν στόλον ἀγεῖραι. [2] λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σαφέστατα Πελοποννησίων μνήμῃ παρὰ τῶν πρότερον δεδεγμένοι Πέλοπά τε πρῶτον πλήθει χρημάτων, ἃ ἦλθεν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας ἔχων ἐς ἀνθρώπους ἀπόρους, δύναμιν περιποιησάμενον τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τῆς χώρας ἔπηλυν ὄντα ὅμως σχεῖν, καὶ ὕστερον τοῖς ἐκγόνοις ἔτι μείζω ξυνενεχθῆναι,Εὐρυσθέως μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὑπὸ Ἡρακλειδῶν ἀποθανόντος, Ἀτρέως δὲ μητρὸς ἀδελφοῦ ὄντος αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπιτρέψαντος Εὐρυσθέως, ὅτ᾽ ἐστράτευε, Μυκήνας τε καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον Ἀτρεῖ τυγχάνειν δὲ αὐτὸν φεύγοντα τὸν πατέρα διὰ τὸν Χρυσίππου θάνατον, καὶ ὡς οὐκέτι ἀνεχώρησεν Εὐρυσθεύς, βουλομένων καὶ τῶν Μυκηναίων φόβῳ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν καὶ ἅμα δυνατὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τεθεραπευκότα τῶν Μυκηναίων τε καὶ ὅσων Εὐρυσθεὺς ἦρχε τὴν βασιλείαν Ἀτρέα παραλαβεῖν, καὶ τῶν Περσειδῶν τοὺς Πελοπίδας μείζους καταστῆναι. [3] ἅ μοι δοκεῖ Ἀγαμέμνων παραλαβὼν καὶ ναυτικῷ [τε] ἅμα ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ἰσχύσας, τὴν στρατείαν οὐ χάριτι τὸ πλέον ἢ φόβῳ ξυναγαγὼν ποιήσασθαι. [4] φαίνεται γὰρ ναυσί τε πλείσταις αὐτὸς ἀφικόμενος καὶ Ἀρκάσι προσπαρασχών, ὡς Ὅμηρος τοῦτο δεδήλωκεν, εἴ τῳ ἱκανὸς τεκμηριῶσαι. καὶ ἐν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἅμα τῇ παραδόσει εἴρηκεν αὐτὸν”πολλῇσι νήσοισι καὶ Ἄργεϊ παντὶ ἀνάσσειν:”Hom. Il. 2.108οὐκ ἂν οὖν νήσων ἔξω τῶν περιοικίδων αὖται δὲ οὐκ ἂν πολλαὶ εἶεν ἠπειρώτης ὢν ἐκράτει, εἰ μή τι καὶ ναυτικὸν εἶχεν. εἰκάζειν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ στρατείᾳ οἷα ἦν τὰ πρὸ αὐτῆς.

10. καὶ ὅτι μὲν Μυκῆναι μικρὸν ἦν, ἢ εἴ τι τῶν τότε πόλισμα νῦν μὴ ἀξιόχρεων δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀκριβεῖ ἄν τις σημείῳ χρώμενος ἀπιστοίη μὴ γενέσθαι τὸν στόλον τοσοῦτον ὅσον οἵ τε ποιηταὶ εἰρήκασι καὶ ὁ λόγος κατέχει. [2] Λακεδαιμονίων γὰρ εἰ ἡ πόλις ἐρημωθείη, λειφθείη δὲ τά τε ἱερὰ καὶ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὰ ἐδάφη, πολλὴν ἂν οἶμαι ἀπιστίαν τῆς δυνάμεως προελθόντος πολλοῦ χρόνου τοῖς

ἔπειτα πρὸς τὸ κλέος αὐτῶν εἶναι· καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοίρας νέμονται, τῆς τε ξυμπάσης ἡγοῦνται καὶ τῶν ἔξω ξυμμάχων πολλῶν: ὅμως δὲ οὔτε ξυνοικισθείσης πόλεως οὔτε ἱεροῖς καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένης, κατὰ κώμας δὲ τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθείσης, φαίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ὑποδεεστέρα·, Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παθόντων διπλασίαν ἂν τὴν δύναμιν εἰκάζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς φανερᾶς ὄψεως τῆς πόλεως ἢ ἔστιν. [3] οὔκουν ἀπιστεῖν εἰκός, οὐδὲ τὰς ὄψεις τῶν πόλεων μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὰς δυνάμεις, νομίζειν δὲ τὴν στρατείαν ἐκείνην μεγίστην μὲν γενέσθαι τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς, λειπομένην δὲ τῶν νῦν, τῇ Ὁμήρου αὖ ποιήσει εἴ τι χρὴ κἀνταῦθα πιστεύειν, ἣν εἰκὸς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον μὲν ποιητὴν ὄντα κοσμῆσαι, ὅμως δὲ φαίνεται καὶ οὕτως ἐνδεεστέρα. [4] πεποίηκε γὰρ χιλίων καὶ διακοσίων νεῶν τὰς μὲν Βοιωτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν, τὰς δὲ Φιλοκτήτου πεντήκοντα, δηλῶν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰς μεγίστας καὶ ἐλαχίστας: ἄλλων γοῦν μεγέθους πέρι ἐν νεῶν καταλόγῳ οὐκ ἐμνήσθη. αὐτερέται δὲ ὅτι ἦσαν καὶ μάχιμοι πάντες, ἐν ταῖς Φιλοκτήτου ναυσὶ δεδήλωκεν: τοξότας γὰρ πάντας πεποίηκε τοὺς προσκώπους. περίνεως δὲ οὐκ εἰκὸς πολλοὺς ξυμπλεῖν ἔξω τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τῶν μάλιστα ἐν τέλει, ἄλλως τε καὶ μέλλοντας πέλαγος περαιώσεσθαι μετὰ σκευῶν πολεμικῶν, οὐδ᾽ αὖ τὰ πλοῖα κατάφαρκτα ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ λῃστικώτερον παρεσκευασμένα. [5] πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας δ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἐλαχίστας ναῦς τὸ μέσον σκοποῦντι οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἀπὸ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος κοινῇ πεμπόμενοι.

11. αἴτιον δ᾽ ἦν οὐχ ἡ ὀλιγανθρωπία τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἡ ἀχρηματία. τῆς γὰρ τροφῆς ἀπορίᾳ τόν τε στρατὸν ἐλάσσω ἤγαγον καὶ ὅσον ἤλπιζον αὐτόθεν πολεμοῦντα βιοτεύσειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν· δῆλον δέ: τὸ γὰρ ἔρυμα τῷ στρατοπέδῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐτειχίσαντο·, φαίνονται δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐνταῦθα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει χρησάμενοι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γεωργίαν τῆς Χερσονήσου τραπόμενοι καὶ λῃστείαν τῆς τροφῆς ἀπορίᾳ. ᾗ καὶ μᾶλλον οἱ Τρῶες αὐτῶν διεσπαρμένων

τὰ δέκα ἔτη ἀντεῖχον βίᾳ, τοῖς αἰεὶ ὑπολειπομένοις ἀντίπαλοι ὄντες. [2] περιουσίαν δὲ εἰ ἦλθον ἔχοντες τροφῆς καὶ ὄντες ἀθρόοι ἄνευ λῃστείας καὶ γεωργίας ξυνεχῶς τὸν πόλεμον διέφερον, ῥᾳδίως ἂν μάχῃ κρατοῦντες εἷλον, οἵ γε καὶ οὐχ ἀθρόοι, ἀλλὰ μέρει τῷ αἰεὶ παρόντι ἀντεῖχον, πολιορκίᾳ δ᾽ ἂν προσκαθεζόμενοι ἐν ἐλάσσονί τε χρόνῳ καὶ ἀπονώτερον τὴν Τροίαν εἷλον. ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἀχρηματίαν τά τε πρὸ τούτων ἀσθενῆ ἦν καὶ αὐτά γε δὴ ταῦτα, ὀνομαστότατα τῶν πρὶν γενόμενα, δηλοῦται τοῖς ἔργοις ὑποδεέστερα ὄντα τῆς φήμης καὶ τοῦ νῦν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τοὺς ποιητὰς λόγου κατεσχηκότος:

12. ἐπεὶ καὶ μετὰ τὰ Τρωικὰ ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἔτι μετανίστατό τε καὶ κατῳκίζετο, ὥστε μὴ ἡσυχάσασαν αὐξηθῆναι. [2] ἥ τε γὰρ ἀναχώρησις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξ Ἰλίου χρονία γενομένη πολλὰ ἐνεόχμωσε, καὶ στάσεις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐγίγνοντο, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐκπίπτοντες τὰς πόλεις ἔκτιζον. [3] Βοιωτοί τε γὰρ οἱ νῦν ἑξηκοστῷ ἔτει μετὰ Ἰλίου ἅλωσιν ἐξ Ἄρνης ἀναστάντες ὑπὸ Θεσσαλῶν τὴν νῦν μὲν Βοιωτίαν, πρότερον δὲ Καδμηίδα γῆν καλουμένην ᾤκισαν· ἦν δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποδασμὸς πρότερον ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ, ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ ἐς Ἴλιον ἐστράτευσαν·, Δωριῆς τε ὀγδοηκοστῷ ἔτει ξὺν Ἡρακλείδαις Πελοπόννησον ἔσχον. [4] μόλις τε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἡσυχάσασα ἡ Ἑλλὰς βεβαίως καὶ οὐκέτι ἀνισταμένη ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψε, καὶ Ἴωνας μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ νησιωτῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ᾤκισαν, Ἰταλίας δὲ καὶ Σικελίας τὸ πλεῖστον Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς τε ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἔστιν ἃ χωρία. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὕστερον τῶν Τρωικῶν ἐκτίσθη.

13. δυνατωτέρας δὲ γιγνομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτῆσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιουμένης τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο, τῶν προσόδων μειζόνων γιγνομένων· πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι·, ναυτικά τε ἐξηρτύετο ἡ Ἑλλάς, καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ἀντείχοντο. [2] πρῶτοι δὲ Κορίνθιοι λέγονται ἐγγύτατα τοῦ νῦν τρόπου μεταχειρίσαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τριήρεις ἐν Κορίνθῳ πρῶτον τῆς Ἑλλάδος ναυπηγηθῆναι. [3] φαίνεται δὲ καὶ Σαμίοις

Ἀμεινοκλῆς Κορίνθιος ναυπηγὸς ναῦς ποιήσας τέσσαρας: ἔτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ μάλιστα τριακόσια ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ὅτε Ἀμεινοκλῆς Σαμίοις ἦλθεν. [4] ναυμαχία τε παλαιτάτη ὧν ἴσμεν γίγνεται Κορινθίων πρὸς Κερκυραίους: ἔτη δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ταύτῃ ἑξήκοντα καὶ διακόσιά ἐστι μέχρι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρόνου. [5] οἰκοῦντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ αἰεὶ δή ποτε ἐμπόριον εἶχον, τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸ πάλαι κατὰ γῆν τὰ πλείω ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, τῶν τε ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῶν ἔξω, διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐπιμισγόντων, χρήμασί τε δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ποιηταῖς δεδήλωται: ἀφνειὸν γὰρ ἐπωνόμασαν τὸ χωρίον. ἐπειδή τε οἱ Ἕλληνες μᾶλλον ἔπλῳζον, τὰς ναῦς κτησάμενοι τὸ λῃστικὸν καθῄρουν, καὶ ἐμπόριον παρέχοντες ἀμφότερα δυνατὴν ἔσχον χρημάτων προσόδῳ τὴν πόλιν. [6] καὶ Ἴωσιν ὕστερον πολὺ γίγνεται ναυτικὸν ἐπὶ Κύρου Περσῶν πρώτου βασιλεύοντος καὶ Καμβύσου τοῦ υἱέος αὐτοῦ, τῆς τε καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς θαλάσσης Κύρῳ πολεμοῦντες ἐκράτησάν τινα χρόνον. καὶ Πολυκράτης Σάμου τυραννῶν ἐπὶ Καμβύσου ναυτικῷ ἰσχύων ἄλλας τε τῶν νήσων ὑπηκόους ἐποιήσατο καὶ Ῥήνειαν ἑλὼν ἀνέθηκε τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Δηλίῳ. Φωκαῆς τε Μασσαλίαν οἰκίζοντες Καρχηδονίους ἐνίκων ναυμαχοῦντες:

14. δυνατώτατα γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ναυτικῶν ἦν. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα πολλαῖς γενεαῖς ὕστερα γενόμενα τῶν Τρωικῶν τριήρεσι μὲν ὀλίγαις χρώμενα, πεντηκοντόροις δ᾽ ἔτι καὶ πλοίοις μακροῖς ἐξηρτυμένα ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνα. [2] ὀλίγον τε πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν καὶ τοῦ Δαρείου θανάτου, ὃς μετὰ Καμβύσην Περσῶν ἐβασίλευσε, τριήρεις περί τε Σικελίαν τοῖς τυράννοις ἐς πλῆθος ἐγένοντο καὶ Κερκυραίοις: ταῦτα γὰρ τελευταῖα πρὸ τῆς Ξέρξου στρατείας ναυτικὰ ἀξιόλογα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι κατέστη. [3] Αἰγινῆται γὰρ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι, βραχέα ἐκέκτηντο, καὶ τούτων τὰ πολλὰ πεντηκοντόρους: ὀψέ τε ἀφ᾽ οὗ Ἀθηναίους Θεμιστοκλῆς ἔπεισεν Αἰγινήταις πολεμοῦντας, καὶ ἅμα τοῦ βαρβάρου προσδοκίμου ὄντος, τὰς ναῦς ποιήσασθαι αἵσπερ καὶ

ἐναυμάχησαν: καὶ αὗται οὔπω εἶχον διὰ πάσης καταστρώματα.

15. τὰ μὲν οὖν ναυτικὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοιαῦτα ἦν, τά τε παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ὕστερον γενόμενα. ἰσχὺν δὲ περιεποιήσαντο ὅμως οὐκ ἐλαχίστην οἱ προσσχόντες αὐτοῖς χρημάτων τε προσόδῳ καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχῇ: ἐπιπλέοντες γὰρ τὰς νήσους κατεστρέφοντο, καὶ μάλιστα ὅσοι μὴ διαρκῆ εἶχον χώραν. [2] κατὰ γῆν δὲ πόλεμος, ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο, οὐδεὶς ξυνέστη: πάντες δὲ ἦσαν, ὅσοι καὶ ἐγένοντο, πρὸς ὁμόρους τοὺς σφετέρους ἑκάστοις, καὶ ἐκδήμους στρατείας πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων καταστροφῇ οὐκ ἐξῆσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες. οὐ γὰρ ξυνειστήκεσαν πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις ὑπήκοοι, οὐδ᾽ αὖ αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης κοινὰς στρατείας ἐποιοῦντο, κατ᾽ ἀλλήλους δὲ μᾶλλον ὡς ἕκαστοι οἱ ἀστυγείτονες ἐπολέμουν. [3] μάλιστα δὲ ἐς τὸν πάλαι ποτὲ γενόμενον πόλεμον Χαλκιδέων καὶ Ἐρετριῶν καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν ἑκατέρων διέστη.

16. ἐπεγένετο δὲ ἄλλοις τε ἄλλοθι κωλύματα μὴ αὐξηθῆναι, καὶ Ἴωσι προχωρησάντων ἐπὶ μέγα τῶν πραγμάτων Κῦρος καὶ ἡ Περσικὴ βασιλεία Κροῖσον καθελοῦσα καὶ ὅσα ἐντὸς Ἅλυος ποταμοῦ πρὸς θάλασσαν ἐπεστράτευσε καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ πόλεις ἐδούλωσε, Δαρεῖός τε ὕστερον τῷ Φοινίκων ναυτικῷ κρατῶν καὶ τὰς νήσους.

17. τύραννοί τε ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς πόλεσι,τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν μόνον προορώμενοι ἔς τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐς τὸ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον αὔξειν δι᾽ ἀσφαλείας ὅσον ἐδύναντο μάλιστα τὰς πόλεις ᾤκουν, ἐπράχθη δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀξιόλογον, εἰ μὴ εἴ τι πρὸς περιοίκους τοὺς αὐτῶν ἑκάστοις: οἱ γὰρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως. οὕτω πανταχόθεν ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον κατείχετο μήτε κοινῇ φανερὸν μηδὲν κατεργάζεσθαι, κατὰ πόλεις τε ἀτολμοτέρα εἶναι.

18. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἵ τε Ἀθηναίων τύραννοι καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ πρὶν τυραννευθείσης οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὑπὸ

Λακεδαιμονίων κατελύθησαν ▯ἡ γὰρ Λακεδαίμων μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν τῶν νῦν ἐνοικούντων αὐτὴν Δωριῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ὧν ἴσμεν χρόνον στασιάσασα ὅμως ἐκ παλαιτάτου καὶ ηὐνομήθη καὶ αἰεὶ ἀτυράννευτος ἦν: ἔτη γάρ ἐστι μάλιστα τετρακόσια καὶ ὀλίγῳ πλείω ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ἀφ᾽ οὗ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῇ αὐτῇ πολιτείᾳ χρῶνται, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ δυνάμενοι καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι καθίστασαν▯, μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον καὶ ἡ ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχη Μήδων πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐγένετο. [2] δεκάτῳ δὲ ἔτει μετ᾽ αὐτὴν αὖθις ὁ βάρβαρος τῷ μεγάλῳ στόλῳ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα δουλωσόμενος ἦλθεν. καὶ μεγάλου κινδύνου ἐπικρεμασθέντος οἵ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν ξυμπολεμησάντων Ἑλλήνων ἡγήσαντο δυνάμει προύχοντες, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιόντων τῶν Μήδων διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβάντες ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο. κοινῇ τε ἀπωσάμενοι τὸν βάρβαρον, ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ διεκρίθησαν πρός τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους οἵ τε ἀποστάντες βασιλέως Ἕλληνες καὶ οἱ ξυμπολεμήσαντες. δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα μέγιστα διεφάνη: ἴσχυον γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ναυσίν. [3] καὶ ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον ξυνέμεινεν ἡ ὁμαιχμία, ἔπειτα διενεχθέντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς ἀλλήλους: καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων εἴ τινές που διασταῖεν, πρὸς τούτους ἤδη ἐχώρουν. ὥστε ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε αἰεὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὰ μὲν σπενδόμενοι, τὰ δὲ πολεμοῦντες ἢ ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυμμάχοις ἀφισταμένοις εὖ παρεσκευάσαντο τὰ πολέμια καὶ ἐμπειρότεροι ἐγένοντο μετὰ κινδύνων τὰς μελέτας ποιούμενοι.

19. καὶ οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἡγοῦντο, κατ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ναῦς τε τῶν πόλεων τῷ χρόνῳ παραλαβόντες πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων, καὶ χρήματα τοῖς πᾶσι τάξαντες φέρειν. καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἰδία

παρασκευὴ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραιφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἤνθησαν.

20. τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τοιαῦτα ηὗρον, χαλεπὰ ὄντα παντὶ ἐξῆς τεκμηρίῳ πιστεῦσαι. οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν προγεγενημένων, καὶ ἢν ἐπιχώρια σφίσιν ᾖ, ὁμοίως ἀβασανίστως παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων δέχονται. [2] Ἀθηναίων γοῦν τὸ πλῆθος Ἵππαρχον οἴονται ὑφ᾽ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος τύραννον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν ὅτι Ἱππίας μὲν πρεσβύτατος ὢν ἦρχε τῶν Πεισιστράτου υἱέων, Ἵππαρχος δὲ καὶ Θεσσαλὸς ἀδελφοὶ ἦσαν αὐτοῦ, ὑποτοπήσαντες δέ τι ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ παραχρῆμα Ἁρμόδιος καὶ Ἀριστογείτων ἐκ τῶν ξυνειδότων σφίσιν Ἱππίᾳ μεμηνῦσθαι τοῦ μὲν ἀπέσχοντο ὡς προειδότος, βουλόμενοι δὲ πρὶν ξυλληφθῆναι δράσαντές τι καὶ κινδυνεῦσαι, τῷ Ἱππάρχῳ περιτυχόντες περὶ τὸ Λεωκόρειον καλούμενον τὴν Παναθηναϊκὴν πομπὴν διακοσμοῦντι ἀπέκτειναν. [3] πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὄντα καὶ οὐ χρόνῳ ἀμνηστούμενα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται, ὥσπερ τούς τε Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέας μὴ μιᾷ ψήφῳ προστίθεσθαι ἑκάτερον, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν, καὶ τὸν Πιτανάτην λόχον αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὃς οὐδ᾽ ἐγένετο πώποτε. οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα μᾶλλον τρέπονται.

21. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τεκμηρίων ὅμως τοιαῦτα ἄν τις νομίζων μάλιστα ἃ διῆλθον οὐχ ἁμαρτάνοι, καὶ οὔτε ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον κοσμοῦντες μᾶλλον πιστεύων, οὔτε ὡς λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον, ὄντα ἀνεξέλεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνενικηκότα, ηὑρῆσθαι δὲ ἡγησάμενος ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων σημείων ὡς παλαιὰ εἶναι ἀποχρώντως. [2] καὶ ὁ πόλεμος οὗτος, καίπερ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἂν πολεμῶσι τὸν παρόντα αἰεὶ μέγιστον κρινόντων, παυσαμένων δὲ τὰ ἀρχαῖα μᾶλλον θαυμαζόντων, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων σκοποῦσι δηλώσει ὅμως μείζων γεγενημένος αὐτῶν.

22. καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἕκαστοι ἢ μέλλοντες πολεμήσειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη ὄντες, χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεῦσαι ἦν ἐμοί τε ὧν αὐτὸς ἤκουσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν: ὡς δ᾽ ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ᾽ εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται. [2] τὰ δ᾽ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος ἠξίωσα γράφειν, οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ᾽ οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου ἐπεξελθών. [3] ἐπιπόνως δὲ ηὑρίσκετο, διότι οἱ παρόντες τοῖς ἔργοις ἑκάστοις οὐ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔλεγον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἑκατέρων τις εὐνοίας ἢ μνήμης ἔχοι. [4] καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται: ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἕξει. κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται.

23. τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἔργων μέγιστον ἐπράχθη τὸ Μηδικόν, καὶ τοῦτο ὅμως δυοῖν ναυμαχίαιν καὶ πεζομαχίαιν ταχεῖαν τὴν κρίσιν ἔσχεν. τούτου δὲ τοῦ πολέμου μῆκός τε μέγα προύβη, παθήματά τε ξυνηνέχθη γενέσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ Ἑλλάδι οἷα οὐχ ἕτερα ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ. [2] οὔτε γὰρ πόλεις τοσαίδε ληφθεῖσαι ἠρημώθησαν, αἱ μὲν ὑπὸ βαρβάρων, αἱ δ᾽ ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιπολεμούντων εἰσὶ δ᾽ αἳ καὶ οἰκήτορας μετέβαλον ἁλισκόμεναι , οὔτε φυγαὶ τοσαίδε ἀνθρώπων καὶ φόνος, ὁ μὲν κατ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν πόλεμον, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν. [3] τά τε πρότερον ἀκοῇ μὲν λεγόμενα, ἔργῳ δὲ σπανιώτερον βεβαιούμενα οὐκ ἄπιστα κατέστη, σεισμῶν τε πέρι, οἳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἅμα μέρος γῆς καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐπέσχον, ἡλίου τε ἐκλείψεις, αἳ πυκνότεραι παρὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πρὶν χρόνου μνημονευόμενα ξυνέβησαν, αὐχμοί τε ἔστι παρ᾽ οἷς μεγάλοι καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ λιμοὶ καὶ ἡ οὐχ ἥκιστα βλάψασα καὶ μέρος τι φθείρασα ἡ

λοιμώδης νόσος: ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα μετὰ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ἅμα ξυνεπέθετο. [4] ἤρξαντο δὲ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι λύσαντες τὰς τριακοντούτεις σπονδὰς αἳ αὐτοῖς ἐγένοντο μετὰ Εὐβοίας ἅλωσιν. [5] διότι δ᾽ ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρῶτον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, τοῦ μή τινα ζητῆσαί ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοσοῦτος πόλεμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατέστη. [6] τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν: αἱ δ᾽ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἵδ᾽ ἦσαν ἑκατέρων, ἀφ᾽ ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν.

24. Ἐπίδαμνός ἐστι πόλις ἐν δεξιᾷ ἐσπλέοντι ἐς τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον: προσοικοῦσι δ᾽ αὐτὴν Ταυλάντιοι βάρβαροι, Ἰλλυρικὸν ἔθνος. [2] ταύτην ἀπῴκισαν μὲν Κερκυραῖοι, οἰκιστὴς δ᾽ ἐγένετο Φαλίος Ἐρατοκλείδου Κορίνθιος γένος τῶν ἀφ᾽ Ἡρακλέους, κατὰ δὴ τὸν παλαιὸν νόμον ἐκ τῆς μητροπόλεως κατακληθείς. ξυνῴκισαν δὲ καὶ Κορινθίων τινὲς καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου Δωρικοῦ γένους. [3] προελθόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου ἐγένετο ἡ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων δύναμις μεγάλη καὶ πολυάνθρωπος: [4] στασιάσαντες δὲ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἔτη πολλά, ὡς λέγεται, ἀπὸ πολέμου τινὸς τῶν προσοίκων βαρβάρων ἐφθάρησαν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς πολλῆς ἐστερήθησαν. [5] τὰ δὲ τελευταῖα πρὸ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν ἐξεδίωξε τοὺς δυνατούς, οἱ δὲ ἐπελθόντες μετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐλῄζοντο τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [6] οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει ὄντες Ἐπιδάμνιοι ἐπειδὴ ἐπιέζοντο, πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πρέσβεις ὡς μητρόπολιν οὖσαν, δεόμενοι μὴ σφᾶς περιορᾶν φθειρομένους, ἀλλὰ τούς τε φεύγοντας ξυναλλάξαι σφίσι καὶ τὸν τῶν βαρβάρων πόλεμον καταλῦσαι. [7] ταῦτα δὲ ἱκέται καθεζόμενοι ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον ἐδέοντο. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν ἱκετείαν οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμψαν.

25. γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἐπιδάμνιοι οὐδεμίαν σφίσιν ἀπὸ Κερκύρας τιμωρίαν οὖσαν ἐν ἀπόρῳ εἴχοντο θέσθαι τὸ παρόν, καὶ πέμψαντες ἐς Δελφοὺς τὸν θεὸν ἐπήροντο εἰ

παραδοῖεν Κορινθίοις τὴν πόλιν ὡς οἰκισταῖς καὶ τιμωρίαν τινὰ πειρῶντ᾽ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀνεῖλε παραδοῦναι καὶ ἡγεμόνας ποιεῖσθαι. [2] ἐλθόντες δὲ οἱ Ἐπιδάμνιοι ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον κατὰ τὸ μαντεῖον παρέδοσαν τὴν ἀποικίαν, τόν τε οἰκιστὴν ἀποδεικνύντες σφῶν ἐκ Κορίνθου ὄντα καὶ τὸ χρηστήριον δηλοῦντες, ἐδέοντό τε μὴ σφᾶς περιορᾶν φθειρομένους, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπαμῦναι. [3] Κορίνθιοι δὲ κατά τε τὸ δίκαιον ὑπεδέξαντο τὴν τιμωρίαν, νομίζοντες οὐχ ἧσσον ἑαυτῶν εἶναι τὴν ἀποικίαν ἢ Κερκυραίων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ μίσει τῶν Κερκυραίων, ὅτι αὐτῶν παρημέλουν ὄντες ἄποικοι: [4] οὔτε γὰρ ἐν πανηγύρεσι ταῖς κοιναῖς διδόντες γέρα τὰ νομιζόμενα οὔτε Κορινθίῳ ἀνδρὶ προκαταρχόμενοι τῶν ἱερῶν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι, περιφρονοῦντες δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ χρημάτων δυνάμει ὄντες κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὁμοῖα τοῖς Ἑλλήνων πλουσιωτάτοις καὶ τῇ ἐς πόλεμον παρασκευῇ δυνατώτεροι, ναυτικῷ δὲ καὶ πολὺ προύχειν ἔστιν ὅτε ἐπαιρόμενοι καὶ κατὰ τὴν Φαιάκων προενοίκησιν τῆς Κερκύρας κλέος ἐχόντων τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς ᾗ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξηρτύοντο τὸ ναυτικὸν καὶ ἦσαν οὐκ ἀδύνατοι: τριήρεις γὰρ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ὑπῆρχον αὐτοῖς ὅτε ἤρχοντο πολεμεῖν,

26. πάντων οὖν τούτων ἐγκλήματα ἔχοντες οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔπεμπον ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον ἄσμενοι τὴν ὠφελίαν, οἰκήτορά τε τὸν βουλόμενον ἰέναι κελεύοντες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων καὶ ἑαυτῶν φρουρούς. [2] ἐπορεύθησαν δὲ πεζῇ ἐς Ἀπολλωνίαν, Κορινθίων οὖσαν ἀποικίαν, δέει τῶν Κερκυραίων μὴ κωλύωνται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν περαιούμενοι. [3] Κερκυραῖοι δὲ ἐπειδὴ ᾔσθοντο τούς τε οἰκήτορας καὶ φρουροὺς ἥκοντας ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον τήν τε ἀποικίαν Κορινθίοις δεδομένην, ἐχαλέπαινον: καὶ πλεύσαντες εὐθὺς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσὶ καὶ ὕστερον ἑτέρῳ στόλῳ τούς τε φεύγοντας ἐκέλευον κατ᾽ ἐπήρειαν δέχεσθαι αὐτούς ἦλθον γὰρ ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν οἱ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων φυγάδες, τάφους τε ἀποδεικνύντες καὶ ξυγγένειαν, ἣν προϊσχόμενοι ἐδέοντο σφᾶς κατάγειν τούς τε φρουροὺς οὓς Κορίνθιοι ἔπεμψαν καὶ τοὺς οἰκήτορας

ἀποπέμπειν. [4] οἱ δὲ Ἐπιδάμνιοι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὑπήκουσαν, ἀλλὰ στρατεύουσιν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ μετὰ τῶν φυγάδων ὡς κατάξοντες, καὶ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς προσλαβόντες. [5] προσκαθεζόμενοι δὲ τὴν πόλιν προεῖπον Ἐπιδαμνίων τε τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ τοὺς ξένους ἀπαθεῖς ἀπιέναι: εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς πολεμίοις χρήσεσθαι. ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπείθοντο, οἱ μὲν Κερκυραῖοι ▯ἔστι δ᾽ ἰσθμὸς τὸ χωρίον▯ ἐπολιόρκουν τὴν πόλιν,

27. Κορίνθιοι δ᾽, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς Ἐπιδάμνου ἦλθον ἄγγελοι ὅτι πολιορκοῦνται, παρεσκευάζοντο στρατείαν, καὶ ἅμα ἀποικίαν ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον ἐκήρυσσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ τὸν βουλόμενον ἰέναι: εἰ δέ τις τὸ παραυτίκα μὲν μὴ ἐθέλει ξυμπλεῖν, μετέχειν δὲ βούλεται τῆς ἀποικίας, πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς καταθέντα Κορινθίας μένειν. ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ πλέοντες πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ τἀργύριον καταβάλλοντες. [2] ἐδεήθησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν Μεγαρέων ναυσὶ σφᾶς ξυμπροπέμψαι, εἰ ἄρα κωλύοιντο ὑπὸ Κερκυραίων πλεῖν: οἱ δὲ παρεσκευάζοντο αὐτοῖς ὀκτὼ ναυσὶ ξυμπλεῖν, καὶ Παλῆς Κεφαλλήνων τέσσαρσιν. καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίων ἐδεήθησαν, οἳ παρέσχον πέντε, Ἑρμιονῆς δὲ μίαν καὶ Τροιζήνιοι δύο, Λευκάδιοι δὲ δέκα καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται ὀκτώ. Θηβαίους δὲ χρήματα ᾔτησαν καὶ Φλειασίους, Ἠλείους δὲ ναῦς τε κενὰς καὶ χρήματα. αὐτῶν δὲ Κορινθίων νῆες παρεσκευάζοντο τριάκοντα καὶ τρισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται.

28. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπύθοντο οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν παρασκευήν, ἐλθόντες ἐς Κόρινθον μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Σικυωνίων πρέσβεων, οὓς παρέλαβον, ἐκέλευον Κορινθίους τοὺς ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ φρουρούς τε καὶ οἰκήτορας ἀπάγειν, ὡς οὐ μετὸν αὐτοῖς Ἐπιδάμνου. [2] εἰ δέ τι ἀντιποιοῦνται, δίκας ἤθελον δοῦναι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ παρὰ πόλεσιν αἷς ἂν ἀμφότεροι ξυμβῶσιν: ὁποτέρων δ᾽ ἂν δικασθῇ εἶναι τὴν ἀποικίαν, τούτους κρατεῖν. ἤθελον δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς μαντείῳ ἐπιτρέψαι. [3] πόλεμον δὲ οὐκ εἴων ποιεῖν: εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναγκασθήσεσθαι ἔφασαν, ἐκείνων βιαζομένων, φίλους ποιεῖσθαι οὓς οὐ βούλονται ἑτέρους τῶν νῦν ὄντων μᾶλλον ὠφελίας ἕνεκα. [4] οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι ἀπεκρίναντο αὐτοῖς, ἢν

τάς τε ναῦς καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀπὸ Ἐπιδάμνου ἀπαγάγωσι, βουλεύσεσθαι: πρότερον δ᾽ οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν τοὺς μὲν πολιορκεῖσθαι, αὐτοὺς δὲ δικάζεσθαι. [5] Κερκυραῖοι δὲ ἀντέλεγον, ἢν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ ἀπαγάγωσι, ποιήσειν ταῦτα: ἑτοῖμοι δὲ εἶναι καὶ ὥστε ἀμφοτέρους μένειν κατὰ χώραν, σπονδὰς δὲ ποιήσασθαι ἕως ἂν ἡ δίκη γένηται.

29. Κορίνθιοι δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων ὑπήκουον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ πλήρεις αὐτοῖς ἦσαν αἱ νῆες καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι παρῆσαν, προπέμψαντες κήρυκα πρότερον πόλεμον προεροῦντα Κερκυραίοις, ἄραντες ἑβδομήκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ πέντε δισχιλίοις τε ὁπλίταις ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον Κερκυραίοις ἐναντία πολεμήσοντες: [2] ἐστρατήγει δὲ τῶν μὲν νεῶν Ἀριστεὺς ὁ Πελλίχου καὶ Καλλικράτης ὁ Καλλίου καὶ Τιμάνωρ ὁ Τιμάνθους, τοῦ δὲ πεζοῦ Ἀρχέτιμός τε ὁ Εὐρυτίμου καὶ Ἰσαρχίδας ὁ Ἰσάρχου. [3] ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐγένοντο ἐν Ἀκτίῳ τῆς Ἀνακτορίας γῆς, οὗ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνός ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, οἱ Κερκυραῖοι κήρυκά τε προύπεμψαν αὐτοῖς ἐν ἀκατίῳ ἀπεροῦντα μὴ πλεῖν ἐπὶ σφᾶς καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἅμα ἐπλήρουν, ζεύξαντές τε τὰς παλαιὰς ὥστε πλωίμους εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκευάσαντες. [4] ὡς δὲ ὁ κῆρύξ τε ἀπήγγειλεν οὐδὲν εἰρηναῖον παρὰ τῶν Κορινθίων καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτοῖς ἐπεπλήρωντο οὖσαι ὀγδοήκοντα τεσσαράκοντα γὰρ Ἐπίδαμνον ἐπολιόρκουν , ἀνταναγαγόμενοι καὶ παραταξάμενοι ἐναυμάχησαν: [5] καὶ ἐνίκησαν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι παρὰ πολὺ καὶ ναῦς πέντε καὶ δέκα διέφθειραν τῶν Κορινθίων. τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ αὐτοῖς ξυνέβη καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον πολιορκοῦντας παραστήσασθαι ὁμολογίᾳ ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐπήλυδας ἀποδόσθαι, Κορινθίους δὲ δήσαντας ἔχειν ἕως ἂν ἄλλο τι δόξῃ.

30. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ τῆς Κερκυραίας ἀκρωτηρίῳ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους οὓς ἔλαβον αἰχμαλώτους ἀπέκτειναν, Κορινθίους δὲ δήσαντες εἶχον. [2] ὕστερον δέ, ἐπειδὴ οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἡσσημένοι ταῖς ναυσὶν

ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, τῆς θαλάσσης ἀπάσης ἐκράτουν τῆς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὰ χωρία οἱ Κερκυραῖοι, καὶ πλεύσαντες ἐς Λευκάδα τὴν Κορινθίων ἀποικίαν τῆς γῆς ἔτεμον καὶ Κυλλήνην τὸ Ἠλείων ἐπίνειον ἐνέπρησαν, ὅτι ναῦς καὶ χρήματα παρέσχον Κορινθίοις. [3] τοῦ τε χρόνου τὸν πλεῖστον μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἐπεκράτουν τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τοὺς τῶν Κορινθίων ξυμμάχους ἐπιπλέοντες ἔφθειρον, μέχρι οὗ Κορίνθιοι περιιόντι τῷ θέρει πέμψαντες ναῦς καὶ στρατιάν, ἐπεὶ σφῶν οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπόνουν, ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἐπὶ Ἀκτίῳ καὶ περὶ τὸ Χειμέριον τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος φυλακῆς ἕνεκα τῆς τε Λευκάδος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ὅσαι σφίσι φίλιαι ἦσαν. [4] ἀντεστρατοπεδεύοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ ναυσί τε καὶ πεζῷ. ἐπέπλεον δὲ οὐδέτεροι ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ θέρος τοῦτο ἀντικαθεζόμενοι χειμῶνος ἤδη ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἑκάτεροι.

31. τὸν δ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν πάντα τὸν μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὸν ὕστερον οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὀργῇ φέροντες τὸν πρὸς Κερκυραίους πόλεμον ἐναυπηγοῦντο καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο τὰ κράτιστα νεῶν στόλον, ἔκ τε αὐτῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀγείροντες καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἑρέτας, μισθῷ πείθοντες. [2] πυνθανόμενοι δὲ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν παρασκευὴν αὐτῶν ἐφοβοῦντο, καί ἦσαν γὰρ οὐδενὸς Ἑλλήνων ἔνσπονδοι οὐδὲ ἐσεγράψαντο ἑαυτοὺς οὔτε ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδὰς οὔτε ἐς τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἐλθοῦσιν ὡς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι καὶ ὠφελίαν τινὰ πειρᾶσθαι ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν εὑρίσκεσθαι. [3] οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι πυθόμενοι ταῦτα ἦλθον καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρεσβευσόμενοι, ὅπως μὴ σφίσι πρὸς τῷ Κερκυραίων ναυτικῷ καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν προσγενόμενον ἐμπόδιον γένηται θέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον ᾗ βούλονται. [4] καταστάσης δὲ ἐκκλησίας ἐς ἀντιλογίαν ἦλθον, καὶ οἱ μὲν Κερκυραῖοι ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.

32. ‘Δίκαιον, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς μήτε εὐεργεσίας μεγάλης μήτε ξυμμαχίας προυφειλομένης ἥκοντας παρὰ τοὺς πέλας ἐπικουρίας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς νῦν, δεησομένους ἀναδιδάξαι πρῶτον, μάλιστα μὲν ὡς καὶ ξύμφορα δέονται, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι

γε οὐκ ἐπιζήμια, ἔπειτα δὲ ὡς καὶ τὴν χάριν βέβαιον ἕξουσιν: εἰ δὲ τούτων μηδὲν σαφὲς καταστήσουσι, μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢν ἀτυχῶσιν. [2] Κερκυραῖοι δὲ μετὰ τῆς ξυμμαχίας τῆς αἰτήσεως καὶ ταῦτα πιστεύοντες ἐχυρὰ ὑμῖν παρέξεσθαι ἀπέστειλαν ἡμᾶς. [3] τετύχηκε δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιτήδευμα πρός τε ὑμᾶς ἐς τὴν χρείαν ἡμῖν ἄλογον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀξύμφορον. [4] ξύμμαχοί τε γὰρ οὐδενός πω ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνῳ ἑκούσιοι γενόμενοι νῦν ἄλλων τοῦτο δεησόμενοι ἥκομεν, καὶ ἅμα ἐς τὸν παρόντα πόλεμον Κορινθίων ἐρῆμοι δι᾽ αὐτὸ καθέσταμεν. καὶ περιέστηκεν ἡ δοκοῦσα ἡμῶν πρότερον σωφροσύνη, τὸ μὴ ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ξυμμαχίᾳ τῇ τοῦ πέλας γνώμῃ ξυγκινδυνεύειν, νῦν ἀβουλία καὶ ἀσθένεια φαινομένη. [5] τὴν μὲν οὖν γενομένην ναυμαχίαν αὐτοὶ κατὰ μόνας ἀπεωσάμεθα Κορινθίους: ἐπειδὴ δὲ μείζονι παρασκευῇ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς ὥρμηνται καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατοι ὁρῶμεν ὄντες τῇ οἰκείᾳ μόνον δυνάμει περιγενέσθαι, καὶ ἅμα μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος εἰ ἐσόμεθα ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῖς, ἀνάγκη καὶ ὑμῶν καὶ ἄλλου παντὸς ἐπικουρίας δεῖσθαι, καὶ ξυγγνώμη εἰ μὴ μετὰ κακίας, δόξης δὲ μᾶλλον ἁμαρτίᾳ τῇ πρότερον ἀπραγμοσύνῃ ἐναντία τολμῶμεν.

33. ‘γενήσεται δὲ ὑμῖν πειθομένοις καλὴ ἡ ξυντυχία κατὰ πολλὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας χρείας, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἀδικουμένοις καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρους βλάπτουσι τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ποιήσεσθε, ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων κινδυνεύοντας δεξάμενοι ὡς ἂν μάλιστα μετ᾽ αἰειμνήστου μαρτυρίου τὴν χάριν καταθήσεσθε: ναυτικόν τε κεκτήμεθα πλὴν τοῦ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν πλεῖστον. [2] καὶ σκέψασθε: τίς εὐπραξία σπανιωτέρα ἢ τίς τοῖς πολεμίοις λυπηροτέρα, εἰ ἦν ὑμεῖς ἂν πρὸ πολλῶν χρημάτων καὶ χάριτος ἐτιμήσασθε δύναμιν ὑμῖν προσγενέσθαι, αὕτη πάρεστιν αὐτεπάγγελτος ἄνευ κινδύνων καὶ δαπάνης διδοῦσα ἑαυτήν, καὶ προσέτι φέρουσα ἐς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀρετήν, οἷς δὲ ἐπαμυνεῖτε χάριν, ὑμῖν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἰσχύν: ἃ ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγοις δὴ ἅμα πάντα ξυνέβη, καὶ ὀλίγοι ξυμμαχίας δεόμενοι οἷς ἐπικαλοῦνται ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον οὐχ ἧσσον διδόντες ἢ ληψόμενοι

παραγίγνονται. [3] τὸν δὲ πόλεμον, δι᾽ ὅνπερ χρήσιμοι ἂν εἶμεν, εἴ τις ὑμῶν μὴ οἴεται ἔσεσθαι, γνώμης ἁμαρτάνει καὶ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πολεμησείοντας καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους δυναμένους παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν ἐχθροὺς ὄντας καὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντας ἡμᾶς νῦν ἐς τὴν ὑμετέραν ἐπιχείρησιν, ἵνα μὴ τῷ κοινῷ ἔχθει κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων στῶμεν μηδὲ δυοῖν φθάσαι ἁμάρτωσιν, ἢ κακῶσαι ἡμᾶς ἢ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βεβαιώσασθαι. [4] ἡμέτερον δέ γ᾽ αὖ ἔργον προτερῆσαι, τῶν μὲν διδόντων, ὑμῶν δὲ δεξαμένων τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, καὶ προεπιβουλεύειν αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἀντεπιβουλεύειν.

34. ‘Ἢν δὲ λέγωσιν ὡς οὐ δίκαιον τοὺς σφετέρους ἀποίκους ὑμᾶς δέχεσθαι, μαθόντων ὡς πᾶσα ἀποικία εὖ μὲν πάσχουσα τιμᾷ τὴν μητρόπολιν, ἀδικουμένη δὲ ἀλλοτριοῦται: οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ δοῦλοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοῖοι τοῖς λειπομένοις εἶναι ἐκπέμπονται. [2] ὡς δὲ ἠδίκουν σαφές ἐστιν: προκληθέντες γὰρ περὶ Ἐπιδάμνου ἐς κρίσιν πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐβουλήθησαν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μετελθεῖν. [3] καὶ ὑμῖν ἔστω τι τεκμήριον ἃ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ξυγγενεῖς δρῶσιν, ὥστε ἀπάτῃ τε μὴ παράγεσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν δεομένοις τε ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέος μὴ ὑπουργεῖν: ὁ γὰρ ἐλαχίστας τὰς μεταμελείας ἐκ τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις λαμβάνων ἀσφαλέστατος ἂν διατελοίη.

35. λύσετε δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων σπονδὰς δεχόμενοι ἡμᾶς μηδετέρων ὄντας ξυμμάχους: [2] εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν αὐταῖς, τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων ἥτις μηδαμοῦ ξυμμαχεῖ,ἐξεῖναι παρ᾽ ὁποτέρους ἂν ἀρέσκηται ἐλθεῖν. [3] καὶ δεινὸν εἰ τοῖσδε μὲν ἀπό τε τῶν ἐνσπόνδων ἔσται πληροῦν τὰς ναῦς καὶ προσέτι καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑπηκόων, ἡμᾶς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς προκειμένης τε ξυμμαχίας εἴρξουσι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ὠφελίας, εἶτα ἐν ἀδικήματι θήσονται πεισθέντων ὑμῶν ἃ δεόμεθα. [4] πολὺ δὲ ἐν πλέονι αἰτίᾳ ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες ὑμᾶς ἔξομεν: ἡμᾶς μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύοντας καὶ οὐκ ἐχθροὺς ὄντας ἀπώσεσθε, τῶνδε δὲ οὐχ ὅπως κωλυταὶ ἐχθρῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐπιόντων γενήσεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς

ὑμετέρας ἀρχῆς δύναμιν προσλαβεῖν περιόψεσθε: ἢν οὐ δίκαιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κἀκείνων κωλύειν τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὑμετέρας μισθοφόρους ἢ καὶ ἡμῖν πέμπειν καθ᾽ ὅτι ἂν πεισθῆτε ὠφελίαν, μάλιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς δεξαμένους βοηθεῖν. [5] πολλὰ δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὑπείπομεν, τὰ ξυμφέροντα ἀποδείκνυμεν, καὶ μέγιστον ὅτι οἵ τε αὐτοὶ πολέμιοι ἡμῖν ἦσαν, ὅπερ σαφεστάτη πίστις, καὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ἀσθενεῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανοὶ τοὺς μεταστάντας βλάψαι: καὶ ναυτικῆς καὶ οὐκ ἠπειρώτιδος τῆς ξυμμαχίας διδομένης οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀλλοτρίωσις, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μέν, εἰ δύνασθε, μηδένα ἄλλον ἐᾶν κεκτῆσθαι ναῦς, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅστις ἐχυρώτατος, τοῦτον φίλον ἔχειν.

36. ‘καὶ ὅτῳ τάδε ξυμφέροντα μὲν δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, φοβεῖται δὲ μὴ δι᾽ αὐτὰ πειθόμενος τὰς σπονδὰς λύσῃ, γνώτω τὸ μὲν δεδιὸς αὐτοῦ ἰσχὺν ἔχον τοὺς ἐναντίους μᾶλλον φοβῆσον, τὸ δὲ θαρσοῦν μὴ δεξαμένου ἀσθενὲς ὂν πρὸς ἰσχύοντας τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀδεέστερον ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἅμα οὐ περὶ τῆς Κερκύρας νῦν τὸ πλέον ἢ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν βουλευόμενος, καὶ οὐ τὰ κράτιστα αὐταῖς προνοῶν, ὅταν ἐς τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντα πόλεμον τὸ αὐτίκα περισκοπῶν ἐνδοιάζῃ χωρίον προσλαβεῖν ὃ μετὰ μεγίστων καιρῶν οἰκειοῦταί τε καὶ πολεμοῦται. [2] τῆς τε γὰρ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλου κεῖται, ὥστε μήτε ἐκεῖθεν ναυτικὸν ἐᾶσαι Πελοποννησίοις ἐπελθεῖν τό τε ἐνθένδε πρὸς τἀκεῖ παραπέμψαι, καὶ ἐς τἆλλα ξυμφορώτατόν ἐστιν. [3] βραχυτάτῳ δ᾽ ἂν κεφαλαίῳ, τοῖς τε ξύμπασι καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, τῷδ᾽ ἂν μὴ προέσθαι ἡμᾶς μάθοιτε: τρία μὲν ὄντα λόγου ἄξια τοῖς Ἕλλησι ναυτικά, τὸ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον καὶ τὸ Κορινθίων: τούτων δὲ εἰ περιόψεσθε τὰ δύο ἐς ταὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν καὶ Κορίνθιοι ἡμᾶς προκαταλήψονται, Κερκυραίοις τε καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἅμα ναυμαχήσετε, δεξάμενοι δὲ ἡμᾶς ἕξετε πρὸς αὐτοὺς πλείοσι ναυσὶ ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἀγωνίζεσθαι.’ [4] τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι εἶπον: οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς τοιάδε.

37. ‘ἀναγκαῖον Κερκυραίων τῶνδε οὐ μόνον περὶ τοῦ δέξασθαι σφᾶς τὸν λόγον ποιησαμένων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς

τε ἀδικοῦμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐκ εἰκότως πολεμοῦνται, μνησθέντας πρῶτον καὶ ἡμᾶς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄλλον λόγον ἰέναι, ἵνα τὴν ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν τε ἀξίωσιν ἀσφαλέστερον προειδῆτε καὶ τὴν τῶνδε χρείαν μὴ ἀλογίστως ἀπώσησθε. [2] ᾽φασὶ δὲ ξυμμαχίαν διὰ τὸ σῶφρον οὐδενός πω δέξασθαι: τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ κακουργίᾳ καὶ οὐκ ἀρετῇ ἐπετήδευσαν, ξύμμαχόν τε οὐδένα βουλόμενοι πρὸς τἀδικήματα οὐδὲ μάρτυρα ἔχειν οὔτε παρακαλοῦντες αἰσχύνεσθαι. [3] καὶ ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἅμα αὐτάρκη θέσιν κειμένη παρέχει αὐτοὺς δικαστὰς ὧν βλάπτουσί τινα μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ ξυνθήκας γίγνεσθαι, διὰ τὸ ἥκιστα ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλας ἐκπλέοντας μάλιστα τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνάγκῃ καταίροντας δέχεσθαι. [4] καὶ τοῦτο τὸ εὐπρεπὲς ἄσπονδον οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ξυναδικῶσιν ἑτέροις προβέβληνται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως κατὰ μόνας ἀδικῶσι καὶ ὅπως ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἂν κρατῶσι βιάζωνται, οὗ δ᾽ ἂν λάθωσι πλέον ἔχωσιν, ἢν δέ πού τι προσλάβωσιν ἀναισχυντῶσιν: [5] καίτοι εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες,ὥσπερ φασίν, ἀγαθοί, ὅσῳ ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν τοῖς πέλας, τόσῳ δὲ φανερωτέραν ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν διδοῦσι καὶ δεχομένοις τὰ δίκαια δεικνύναι.

38. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους οὔτε ἐς ἡμᾶς τοιοίδε εἰσίν, ἄποικοι δ᾽ ὄντες ἀφεστᾶσί τε διὰ παντὸς καὶ νῦν πολεμοῦσι, λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κακῶς πάσχειν ἐκπεμφθεῖεν. [2] ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ αὐτοί φαμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβρίζεσθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι. [3] αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποίκων στεργόμεθα: [4] καὶ δῆλον ὅτι, εἰ τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀρέσκοντές ἐσμεν, τοῖσδ᾽ ἂν μόνοις οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαρέσκοιμεν, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστρατεύομεν ἐκπρεπῶς μὴ καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἀδικούμενοι. [5] καλὸν δ᾽ ἦν, εἰ καὶ ἡμαρτάνομεν, τοῖσδε μὲν εἶξαι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ὀργῇ, ἡμῖν δὲ αἰσχρὸν βιάσασθαι τὴν τούτων μετριότητα: ὕβρει δὲ καὶ ἐξουσίᾳ πλούτου πολλὰ ἐς ἡμᾶς ἄλλα τε ἡμαρτήκασι καὶ Ἐπίδαμνον ἡμετέραν οὖσαν κακουμένην μὲν οὐ προσεποιοῦντο, ἐλθόντων δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ ἑλόντες βίᾳ ἔχουσιν.

39. ‘καὶ φασὶ δὴ δίκῃ πρότερον ἐθελῆσαι κρίνεσθαι, ἤν γε οὐ τὸν προύχοντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς προκαλούμενον λέγειν τι δοκεῖν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐς ἴσον τά τε ἔργα ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς λόγους πρὶν διαγωνίζεσθαι καθιστάντα. [2] οὗτοι δὲ οὐ πρὶν πολιορκεῖν τὸ χωρίον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἡγήσαντο ἡμᾶς οὐ περιόψεσθαι, τότε καὶ τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τῆς δίκης παρέσχοντο. καὶ δεῦρο ἥκουσιν οὐ τἀκεῖ μόνον αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς νῦν ἀξιοῦντες οὐ ξυμμαχεῖν, ἀλλὰ ξυναδικεῖν καὶ διαφόρους ὄντας ἡμῖν δέχεσθαι σφᾶς: [3] οὓς χρῆν, ὅτε ἀσφαλέσταται ἦσαν, τότε προσιέναι, καὶ μὴ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἠδικήμεθα, οὗτοι δὲ κινδυνεύουσι, μηδ᾽ ἐν ᾧ ὑμεῖς τῆς τε δυνάμεως αὐτῶν τότε οὐ μεταλαβόντες τῆς ὠφελίας νῦν μεταδώσετε καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἀπογενόμενοι τῆς ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν αἰτίας τὸ ἴσον ἕξετε, πάλαι δὲ κοινώσαντας τὴν δύναμιν κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἔχειν.

40. ‘ὡς μὲν οὖν αὐτοί τε μετὰ προσηκόντων ἐγκλημάτων ἐρχόμεθα καὶ οἵδε βίαιοι καὶ πλεονέκται εἰσὶ δεδήλωται: ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δικαίως αὐτοὺς δέχοισθε μαθεῖν χρή. [2] εἰ γὰρ εἴρηται ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς ἐξεῖναι παρ᾽ ὁποτέρους τις βούλεται τῶν ἀγράφων πόλεων ἐλθεῖν, οὐ τοῖς ἐπὶ βλάβῃ ἑτέρων ἰοῦσιν ἡ ξυνθήκη ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις μὴ ἄλλου ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερῶν ἀσφαλείας δεῖται καὶ ὅστις μὴ τοῖς δεξαμένοις, εἰ σωφρονοῦσι, πόλεμον ἀντ᾽ εἰρήνης ποιήσει: ὃ νῦν ὑμεῖς μὴ πειθόμενοι ἡμῖν πάθοιτε ἄν. [3] οὐ γὰρ τοῖσδε μόνον ἐπίκουροι ἂν γένοισθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμῖν ἀντὶ ἐνσπόνδων πολέμιοι: ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ ἴτε μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἀμύνεσθαι μὴ ἄνευ ὑμῶν τούτους. [4] καίτοι δίκαιοί γ᾽ ἐστὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐκποδὼν στῆναι ἀμφοτέροις, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὐναντίον ἐπὶ τούτους μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἰέναι ⸂Κορινθίοις μέν γε ἔνσπονδοί ἐστε, Κερκυραίοις δὲ οὐδὲ δι᾽ ἀνοκωχῆς πώποτ᾽ ἐγένεσθε⸃, καὶ τὸν νόμον μὴ καθιστάναι ὥστε τοὺς ἑτέρων ἀφισταμένους δέχεσθαι. [5] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σαμίων ἀποστάντων ψῆφον προσεθέμεθα ἐναντίαν ὑμῖν, τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων δίχα ἐψηφισμένων εἰ χρὴ αὐτοῖς ἀμύνειν, φανερῶς δὲ ἀντείπομεν τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν. [6] εἰ γὰρ τοὺς κακόν τι δρῶντας δεχόμενοι

τιμωρήσετε, φανεῖται καὶ ἃ τῶν ὑμετέρων οὐκ ἐλάσσω ἡμῖν πρόσεισι, καὶ τὸν νόμον ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν θήσετε.

41. ‘δικαιώματα μὲν οὖν τάδε πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔχομεν ἱκανὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἑλλήνων νόμους, παραίνεσιν δὲ καὶ ἀξίωσιν χάριτος τοιάνδε, ἣν οὐκ ἐχθροὶ ὄντες ὥστε βλάπτειν οὐδ᾽ αὖ φίλοι ὥστ᾽ ἐπιχρῆσθαι, ἀντιδοθῆναι ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι φαμὲν χρῆναι. [2] νεῶν γὰρ μακρῶν σπανίσαντές ποτε πρὸς τὸν Αἰγινητῶν ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικὰ πόλεμον παρὰ Κορινθίων εἴκοσι ναῦς ἐλάβετε: καὶ ἡ εὐεργεσία αὕτη τε καὶ ἡ ἐς Σαμίους, τὸ δι᾽ ἡμᾶς Πελοποννησίους αὐτοῖς μὴ βοηθῆσαι, παρέσχεν ὑμῖν Αἰγινητῶν μὲν ἐπικράτησιν, Σαμίων δὲ κόλασιν, καὶ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις ἐγένετο οἷς μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι ἐπ᾽ ἐχθροὺς τοὺς σφετέρους ἰόντες τῶν ἀπάντων ἀπερίοπτοί εἰσι παρὰ τὸ νικᾶν: [3] φίλον τε γὰρ ἡγοῦνται τὸν ὑπουργοῦντα, ἢν καὶ πρότερον ἐχθρὸς ᾖ, πολέμιόν τε τὸν ἀντιστάντα, ἢν καὶ τύχῃ φίλος ὤν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα χεῖρον τίθενται φιλονικίας ἕνεκα τῆς αὐτίκα.

42. ‘ὧν ἐνθυμηθέντες καὶ νεώτερός τις παρὰ πρεσβυτέρου αὐτὰ μαθὼν ἀξιούτω τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἡμᾶς ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ νομίσῃ δίκαια μὲν τάδε λέγεσθαι, ξύμφορα δέ, εἰ πολεμήσει, ἄλλα εἶναι. [2] τό τε γὰρ ξυμφέρον ἐν ᾧ ἄν τις ἐλάχιστα ἁμαρτάνῃ μάλιστα ἕπεται, καὶ τὸ μέλλον τοῦ πολέμου ᾧ φοβοῦντες ὑμᾶς Κερκυραῖοι κελεύουσιν ἀδικεῖν ἐν ἀφανεῖ ἔτι κεῖται, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπαρθέντας αὐτῷ φανερὰν ἔχθραν ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλουσαν πρὸς Κορινθίους κτήσασθαι, τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχούσης πρότερον διὰ Μεγαρέας ὑποψίας σῶφρον ὑφελεῖν μᾶλλον ἡ γὰρ τελευταία χάρις καιρὸν ἔχουσα, [3] κἂν ἐλάσσων ᾖ, δύναται μεῖζον ἔγκλημα λῦσαι , [4] μηδ᾽ ὅτι ναυτικοῦ ξυμμαχίαν μεγάλην διδόασι, τούτῳ ἐφέλκεσθαι: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐχυρωτέρα δύναμις ἢ τῷ αὐτίκα φανερῷ ἐπαρθέντας διὰ κινδύνων τὸ πλέον ἔχειν.

43. ἡμεῖς δὲ περιπεπτωκότες οἷς ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι αὐτοὶ προείπομεν, τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν, νῦν παρ᾽ ὑμῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀξιοῦμεν κομίζεσθαι, καὶ

μὴ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψήφῳ ὠφεληθέντας τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ἡμᾶς βλάψαι. [2] τὸ δὲ ἴσον ἀνταπόδοτε, γνόντες τοῦτον ἐκεῖνον εἶναι τὸν καιρὸν ἐν ᾧ ὅ τε ὑπουργῶν φίλος μάλιστα καὶ ὁ ἀντιστὰς ἐχθρός. [3] καὶ Κερκυραίους τούσδε μήτε ξυμμάχους δέχεσθε βίᾳ ἡμῶν μήτε ἀμύνετε αὐτοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν. [4] καὶ τάδε ποιοῦντες τὰ προσήκοντά τε δράσετε καὶ τὰ ἄριστα βουλεύσεσθε ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς.’

44. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἀμφοτέρων, γενομένης καὶ δὶς ἐκκλησίας, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἧσσον τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγνωσαν Κερκυραίοις ξυμμαχίαν μὲν μὴ ποιήσασθαι ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ Κόρινθον ἐκέλευον σφίσιν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ξυμπλεῖν, ἐλύοντ᾽ ἂν αὐτοῖς αἱ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους σπονδαί , ἐπιμαχίαν δ᾽ ἐποιήσαντο τῇ ἀλλήλων βοηθεῖν, ἐάν τις ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἴῃ ἢ Ἀθήνας ἢ τοὺς τούτων ξυμμάχους. [2] ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμος καὶ ὡς ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ἐβούλοντο μὴ προέσθαι τοῖς Κορινθίοις ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν τοσοῦτον, ξυγκρούειν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις, ἵνα ἀσθενεστέροις οὖσιν, ἤν τι δέῃ, Κορινθίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ναυτικὸν ἔχουσιν ἐς πόλεμον καθιστῶνται. [3] ἅμα δὲ τῆς τε Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς ἡ νῆσος ἐν παράπλῳ κεῖσθαι.

45. τοιαύτῃ μὲν γνώμῃ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς Κερκυραίους προσεδέξαντο, καὶ τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπελθόντων οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον δέκα ναῦς αὐτοῖς ἀπέστειλαν βοηθούς: [2] ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Λακεδαιμόνιός τε ὁ Κίμωνος καὶ Διότιμος ὁ Στρομβίχου καὶ Πρωτέας ὁ Ἐπικλέους. [3] προεῖπον δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ ναυμαχεῖν Κορινθίοις, ἢν μὴ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλέωσι καὶ μέλλωσιν ἀποβαίνειν ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίων: οὕτω δὲ κωλύειν κατὰ δύναμιν. προεῖπον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ μὴ λύειν ἕνεκα τὰς σπονδάς.

46. αἱ μὲν δὴ νῆες ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν, οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς παρεσκεύαστο, ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ναυσὶ πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν. ἦσαν δὲ Ἠλείων

μὲν δέκα, Μεγαρέων δὲ δώδεκα καὶ Λευκαδίων δέκα, Ἀμπρακιωτῶν δὲ ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι καὶ Ἀνακτορίων μία, αὐτῶν δὲ Κορινθίων ἐνενήκοντα: [2] στρατηγοὶ δὲ τούτων ἦσαν μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἑκάστων, Κορινθίων δὲ Ξενοκλείδης ὁ Εὐθυκλέους πέμπτος αὐτός. [3] ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσέμειξαν τῇ κατὰ Κέρκυραν ἠπείρῳ ἀπὸ Λευκάδος πλέοντες, ὁρμίζονται ἐς Χειμέριον τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος γῆς. [4] ἔστι δὲ λιμήν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κεῖται ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐν τῇ Ἐλαιάτιδι τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος Ἐφύρη. ἐξίησι δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτὴν Ἀχερουσία λίμνη ἐς θάλασσαν: διὰ δὲ τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος Ἀχέρων ποταμὸς ῥέων ἐσβάλλει ἐς αὐτήν, ἀφ᾽ οὗ καὶ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει. ῥεῖ δὲ καὶ Θύαμις ποταμός, ὁρίζων τὴν Θεσπρωτίδα καὶ Κεστρίνην, ὧν ἐντὸς ἡ ἄκρα ἀνέχει τὸ Χειμέριον. [5] οἱ μὲν οὖν Κορίνθιοι τῆς ἠπείρου ἐνταῦθα ὁρμίζονταί τε καὶ στρατόπεδον ἐποιήσαντο.

47. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι ὡς ᾔσθοντο αὐτοὺς προσπλέοντας, πληρώσαντες δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν ναῦς, ὧν ἦρχε Μικιάδης καὶ Αἰσιμίδης καὶ Εὐρύβατος, ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἐν μιᾷ τῶν νήσων αἳ καλοῦνται Σύβοτα: καὶ αἱ Ἀττικαὶ δέκα παρῆσαν. [2] ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ αὐτοῖς τῷ ἀκρωτηρίῳ ὁ πεζὸς ἦν καὶ Ζακυνθίων χίλιοι ὁπλῖται βεβοηθηκότες. [3] ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς Κορινθίοις ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων παραβεβοηθηκότες: οἱ γὰρ ταύτῃ ἠπειρῶται αἰεί ποτε αὐτοῖς φίλοι εἰσίν.

48. ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο τοῖς Κορινθίοις, λαβόντες τριῶν ἡμερῶν σιτία ἀνήγοντο ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ Χειμερίου νυκτός, [2] καὶ ἅμα ἕῳ πλέοντες καθορῶσι τὰς τῶν Κερκυραίων ναῦς μετεώρους τε καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς πλεούσας. [3] ὡς δὲ κατεῖδον ἀλλήλους, ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο, ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας Κερκυραίων αἱ Ἀττικαὶ νῆες, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπεῖχον τρία τέλη ποιήσαντες τῶν νεῶν, ὧν ἦρχε <τῶν> τριῶν στρατηγῶν ἑκάστου εἷς. [4] οὕτω μὲν Κερκυραῖοι ἐτάξαντο, Κορινθίοις δὲ τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας αἱ Μεγαρίδες νῆες εἶχον καὶ αἱ Ἀμπρακιώτιδες, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέσον οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ὡς ἕκαστοι: εὐώνυμον δὲ κέρας αὐτοὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι

ταῖς ἄριστα τῶν νεῶν πλεούσαις κατὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν Κερκυραίων εἶχον.

49. ξυμμείξαντες δέ, ἐπειδὴ τὰ σημεῖα ἑκατέροις ἤρθη, ἐναυμάχουν, πολλοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἔχοντες ἀμφότεροι ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων, πολλοὺς δὲ τοξότας τε καὶ ἀκοντιστάς, τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ ἀπειρότερον ἔτι παρεσκευασμένοι. [2] ἦν τε ἡ ναυμαχία καρτερά, τῇ μὲν τέχνῃ οὐχ ὁμοίως, πεζομαχίᾳ δὲ τὸ πλέον προσφερὴς οὖσα. [3] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ προσβάλοιεν ἀλλήλοις, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἀπελύοντο ὑπό τε τοῦ πλήθους καὶ ὄχλου τῶν νεῶν, καὶ μᾶλλόν τι πιστεύοντες τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος ὁπλίταις ἐς τὴν νίκην, οἳ καταστάντες ἐμάχοντο ἡσυχαζουσῶν τῶν νεῶν: διέκπλοι δ᾽ οὐκ ἦσαν, ἀλλὰ θυμῷ καὶ ῥώμῃ τὸ πλέον ἐναυμάχουν ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ. [4] πανταχῇ μὲν οὖν πολὺς θόρυβος καὶ ταραχώδης ἦν ἡ ναυμαχία, ἐν ᾗ αἱ Ἀττικαὶ νῆες παραγιγνόμεναι τοῖς Κερκυραίοις, εἴ πῃ πιέζοιντο, φόβον μὲν παρεῖχον τοῖς ἐναντίοις, μάχης δὲ οὐκ ἦρχον δεδιότες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν πρόρρησιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων. [5] μάλιστα δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Κορινθίων ἐπόνει: οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι εἴκοσι ναυσὶν αὐτοὺς τρεψάμενοι καὶ καταδιώξαντες σποράδας ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον καὶ μέχρι τοῦ στρατοπέδου πλεύσαντες αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπεκβάντες ἐνέπρησάν τε τὰς σκηνὰς ἐρήμους καὶ τὰ χρήματα διήρπασαν. [6] ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἡσσῶντό [τε] καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐπεκράτουν: ᾗ δὲ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν οἱ Κορίνθιοι, ἐπὶ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ, πολὺ ἐνίκων, τοῖς Κερκυραίοις τῶν εἴκοσι νεῶν ἀπὸ ἐλάσσονος πλήθους ἐκ τῆς διώξεως οὐ παρουσῶν. [7] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁρῶντες τοὺς Κερκυραίους πιεζομένους μᾶλλον ἤδη ἀπροφασίστως ἐπεκούρουν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπεχόμενοι ὥστε μὴ ἐμβάλλειν τινί: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ τροπὴ ἐγίγνετο λαμπρῶς καὶ ἐνέκειντο οἱ Κορίνθιοι, τότε δὴ ἔργου πᾶς εἴχετο ἤδη καὶ διεκέκριτο οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ ξυνέπεσεν ἐς τοῦτο ἀνάγκης ὥστε ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἀλλήλοις τοὺς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἀθηναίους.

50. τῆς δὲ τροπῆς γενομένης οἱ Κορίνθιοι τὰ σκάφη μὲν οὐχ εἷλκον ἀναδούμενοι τῶν νεῶν ἂς καταδύσειαν, πρὸς δὲ

τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐτράποντο φονεύειν διεκπλέοντες μᾶλλον ἢ ζωγρεῖν, τούς τε αὐτῶν φίλους, οὐκ ᾐσθημένοι ὅτι ἥσσηντο οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ κέρᾳ, ἀγνοοῦντες ἔκτεινον. [2] πολλῶν γὰρ νεῶν οὐσῶν ἀμφοτέρων καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπεχουσῶν, ἐπειδὴ ξυνέμειξαν ἀλλήλοις, οὐ ῥᾳδίως τὴν διάγνωσιν ἐποιοῦντο ὁποῖοι ἐκράτουν ἢ ἐκρατοῦντο: ναυμαχία γὰρ αὕτη Ἕλλησι πρὸς Ἕλληνας νεῶν πλήθει μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς γεγένηται. [3] ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατεδίωξαν τοὺς Κερκυραίους οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐς τὴν γῆν, πρὸς τὰ ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς σφετέρους ἐτράποντο, καὶ τῶν πλείστων ἐκράτησαν ὥστε προσκομίσαι πρὸς τὰ Σύβοτα, οἷ αὐτοῖς ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς τῶν βαρβάρων προσεβεβοηθήκει: ἔστι δὲ τὰ Σύβοτα τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος λιμὴν ἐρῆμος. τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσαντες αὖθις ἀθροισθέντες ἐπέπλεον τοῖς Κερκυραίοις. [4] οἱ δὲ ταῖς πλωίμοις καὶ ὅσαι ἦσαν λοιπαὶ μετὰ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντεπέπλεον, δείσαντες μὴ ἐς τὴν γῆν σφῶν πειρῶσιν ἀποβαίνειν. [5] ἤδη δὲ ἦν ὀψὲ καὶ ἐπεπαιάνιστο αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐς ἐπίπλουν, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐξαπίνης πρύμναν ἐκρούοντο κατιδόντες εἴκοσι ναῦς Ἀθηναίων προσπλεούσας, ἃς ὕστερον τῶν δέκα βοηθοὺς ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, δείσαντες, ὅπερ ἐγένετο, μὴ νικηθῶσιν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι καὶ αἱ σφέτεραι δέκα νῆες ὀλίγαι ἀμύνειν ὦσιν.

51. ταύτας οὖν προϊδόντες οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ ὑποτοπήσαντες ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν εἶναι οὐχ ὅσας ἑώρων ἀλλὰ πλείους ὑπανεχώρουν. [2] τοῖς δὲ Κερκυραίοις ἐπέπλεον γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς οὐχ ἑωρῶντο, καὶ ἐθαύμαζον τοὺς Κορινθίους πρύμναν κρουομένους, πρίν τινες ἰδόντες εἶπον ὅτι νῆες ἐκεῖναι ἐπιπλέουσιν. τότε δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀνεχώρουν: ξυνεσκόταζε γὰρ ἤδη, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἀποτραπόμενοι τὴν διάλυσιν ἐποιήσαντο. [3] οὕτω μὲν ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἐγένετο ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἡ ναυμαχία ἐτελεύτα ἐς νύκτα. [4] τοῖς δὲ Κερκυραίοις στρατοπεδευομένοις ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ αἱ εἴκοσι νῆες αἱ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὖται, ὧν ἦρχε Γλαύκων τε ὁ Λεάγρου καὶ † Ἀνδοκίδης ὁ Λεωγόρου †, διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκομισθεῖσαι κατέπλεον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον

οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἢ ὤφθησαν. [5] οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι ἦν γὰρ νύξ ἐφοβήθησαν μὴ πολέμιαι ὦσιν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἔγνωσαν: καὶ ὡρμίσαντο.

52. τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀναγαγόμεναι αἵ τε Ἀττικαὶ τριάκοντα νῆες καὶ τῶν Κερκυραίων ὅσαι πλώιμοι ἦσαν ἐπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς Συβότοις λιμένα, ἐν ᾧ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὥρμουν, βουλόμενοι εἰδέναι εἰ ναυμαχήσουσιν. [2] οἱ δὲ τὰς μὲν ναῦς ἄραντες ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ παραταξάμενοι μετεώρους ἡσύχαζον, ναυμαχίας οὐ διανοούμενοι ἄρχειν ἑκόντες ὁρῶντες προσγεγενημένας τε ναῦς ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἀκραιφνεῖς καὶ σφίσι πολλὰ τὰ ἄπορα ξυμβεβηκότα, αἰχμαλώτων τε περὶ φυλακῆς οὓς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν εἶχον, καὶ ἐπισκευὴν οὐκ οὖσαν τῶν νεῶν ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ: [3] τοῦ δὲ οἴκαδε πλοῦ μᾶλλον διεσκόπουν ὅπῃ κομισθήσονται, δεδιότες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδάς, διότι ἐς χεῖρας ἦλθον, οὐκ ἐῶσι σφᾶς ἀποπλεῖν.

53. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς ἄνδρας ἐς κελήτιον ἐσβιβάσαντας ἄνευ κηρυκείου προσπέμψαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ πεῖραν ποιήσασθαι. πέμψαντές τε ἔλεγον τοιάδε. [2] ‘ἀδικεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολέμου ἄρχοντες καὶ σπονδὰς λύοντες: ἡμῖν γὰρ πολεμίους τοὺς ἡμετέρους τιμωρουμένοις ἐμποδὼν ἵστασθε ὅπλα ἀνταιρόμενοι. εἰ δ᾽ ὑμῖν γνώμη ἐστὶ κωλύειν τε ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἢ ἄλλοσε εἴ ποι βουλόμεθα πλεῖν καὶ τὰς σπονδὰς λύετε, ἡμᾶς τούσδε πρώτους λαβόντες χρήσασθε ὡς πολεμίοις.’ [3] οἱ μὲν δὴ τοιαῦτα εἶπον: τῶν δὲ Κερκυραίων τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον ὅσον ἐπήκουσεν ἀνεβόησεν εὐθὺς λαβεῖν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τοιάδε ἀπεκρίναντο. [4] ‘οὔτε ἄρχομεν πολέμου, ὦ ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, οὔτε τὰς σπονδὰς λύομεν, Κερκυραίοις δὲ τοῖσδε ξυμμάχοις οὖσι βοηθοὶ ἤλθομεν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοσέ ποι βούλεσθε πλεῖν, οὐ κωλύομεν: εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλευσεῖσθε ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίων, οὐ περιοψόμεθα κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.’

54. τοιαῦτα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποκριναμένων οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι τόν τε πλοῦν τὸν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησαν ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Συβότοις: οἱ δὲ

Κερκυραῖοι τά τε ναυάγια καὶ νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο τὰ κατὰ σφᾶς ἐξενεχθέντα ὑπό τε τοῦ ῥοῦ καὶ ἀνέμου, ὃς γενόμενος τῆς νυκτὸς διεσκέδασεν αὐτὰ πανταχῇ, καὶ τροπαῖον ἀντέστησαν ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Συβότοις ὡς νενικηκότες. [2] γνώμῃ δὲ τοιᾷδε ἑκάτεροι τὴν νίκην προσεποιήσαντο: Κορίνθιοι μὲν κρατήσαντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ μέχρι νυκτός, ὥστε καὶ ναυάγια πλεῖστα καὶ νεκροὺς προσκομίσασθαι, καὶ ἄνδρας ἔχοντες αἰχμαλώτους οὐκ ἐλάσσους χιλίων ναῦς τε καταδύσαντες περὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔστησαν τροπαῖον: Κερκυραῖοι δὲ τριάκοντα ναῦς μάλιστα διαφθείραντες, καὶ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦλθον, ἀνελόμενοι τὰ κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ναυάγια καὶ νεκρούς, καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς τῇ τε προτεραίᾳ πρύμναν κρουόμενοι ὑπεχώρησαν οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἰδόντες τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναῦς, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἦλθον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐκ ἀντεπέπλεον ἐκ τῶν Συβότων, διὰ ταῦτα τροπαῖον ἔστησαν.

55. οὕτω μὲν ἑκάτεροι νικᾶν ἠξίουν: οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι ἀποπλέοντες ἐπ᾽ οἴκου Ἀνακτόριον, ὅ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, εἷλον ἀπάτῃ ἦν δὲ κοινὸν Κερκυραίων καὶ ἐκείνων καὶ καταστήσαντες ἐν αὐτῷ Κορινθίους οἰκήτορας ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, καὶ τῶν Κερκυραίων ὀκτακοσίους μὲν οἳ ἦσαν δοῦλοι ἀπέδοντο, πεντήκοντα δὲ καὶ διακοσίους δήσαντες ἐφύλασσον καὶ ἐν θεραπείᾳ εἶχον πολλῇ, ὅπως αὐτοῖς τὴν Κέρκυραν ἀναχωρήσαντες προσποιήσειαν: ἐτύγχανον δὲ καὶ δυνάμει αὐτῶν οἱ πλείους πρῶτοι ὄντες τῆς πόλεως. [2] ἡ μὲν οὖν Κέρκυρα οὕτω περιγίγνεται τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν Κορινθίων, καὶ αἱ νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀνεχώρησαν ἐξ αὐτῆς: αἰτία δὲ αὕτη πρώτη ἐγένετο τοῦ πολέμου τοῖς Κορινθίοις ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὅτι σφίσιν ἐν σπονδαῖς μετὰ Κερκυραίων ἐναυμάχουν.

56. μετὰ ταῦτα δ᾽ εὐθὺς καὶ τάδε ξυνέβη γενέσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις διάφορα ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν. [2] τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων πρασσόντων ὅπως τιμωρήσονται αὐτούς, ὑποτοπήσαντες τὴν ἔχθραν αὐτῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Ποτειδεάτας, οἳ οἰκοῦσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἰσθμῷ τῆς Παλλήνης, Κορινθίων ἀποίκους, ἑαυτῶν δὲ ξυμμάχους φόρου

ὑποτελεῖς, ἐκέλευον τὸ ἐς Παλλήνην τεῖχος καθελεῖν καὶ ὁμήρους δοῦναι, τούς τε ἐπιδημιουργοὺς ἐκπέμπειν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ δέχεσθαι οὓς κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον Κορίνθιοι ἔπεμπον, δείσαντες μὴ ἀποστῶσιν ὑπό τε Περδίκκου πειθόμενοι καὶ Κορινθίων, τούς τε ἄλλους τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ξυναποστήσωσι ξυμμάχους.

57. ταῦτα δὲ περὶ τοὺς Ποτειδεάτας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προπαρεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ναυμαχίαν: [2] οἵ τε γὰρ Κορίνθιοι φανερῶς ἤδη διάφοροι ἦσαν, Περδίκκας τε ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς ἐπεπολέμωτο ξύμμαχος πρότερον καὶ φίλος ὤν. [3] ἐπολεμώθη δὲ ὅτι Φιλίππῳ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδελφῷ καὶ Δέρδᾳ κοινῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐναντιουμένοις οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο. [4] δεδιώς τε ἔπρασσεν ἔς τε τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πέμπων ὅπως πόλεμος γένηται αὐτοῖς πρὸς Πελοποννησίους, καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους προσεποιεῖτο τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἕνεκα ἀποστάσεως: [5] προσέφερε δὲ λόγους καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης Χαλκιδεῦσι καὶ Βοττιαίοις ξυναποστῆναι, νομίζων, εἰ ξύμμαχα ταῦτα ἔχοι ὅμορα ὄντα τὰ χωρία, ῥᾷον ἂν τὸν πόλεμον μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι. [6] ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰσθόμενοι καὶ βουλόμενοι προκαταλαμβάνειν τῶν πόλεων τὰς ἀποστάσεις ἔτυχον γὰρ τριάκοντα ναῦς ἀποστέλλοντες καὶ χιλίους ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ, Ἀρχεστράτου τοῦ Λυκομήδους μετ᾽ ἄλλων † δέκα † στρατηγοῦντος ἐπιστέλλουσι τοῖς ἄρχουσι τῶν νεῶν Ποτειδεατῶν τε ὁμήρους λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ τεῖχος καθελεῖν, τῶν τε πλησίον πόλεων φυλακὴν ἔχειν ὅπως μὴ ἀποστήσονται.

58. Ποτειδεᾶται δὲ πέμψαντες μὲν καὶ παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους πρέσβεις, εἴ πως πείσειαν μὴ σφῶν πέρι νεωτερίζειν μηδέν, ἐλθόντες δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα μετὰ Κορινθίων, [ἔπρασσον] ὅπως ἑτοιμάσαιντο τιμωρίαν, ἢν δέῃ, ἐπειδὴ ἔκ τε Ἀθηνῶν ἐκ πολλοῦ πράσσοντες οὐδὲν ηὕροντο ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλ᾽ αἱ νῆες αἱ ἐπὶ Μακεδονίαν καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς ὁμοίως ἔπλεον, καὶ τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπέσχετο αὐτοῖς, ἢν ἐπὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἴωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν

ἐσβαλεῖν, τότε δὴ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἀφίστανται μετὰ Χαλκιδέων καὶ Βοττιαίων κοινῇ ξυνομόσαντες. [2] καὶ Περδίκκας πείθει Χαλκιδέας τὰς ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πόλεις ἐκλιπόντας καὶ καταβαλόντας ἀνοικίσασθαι ἐς Ὄλυνθον μίαν τε πόλιν ταύτην ἰσχυρὰν ποιήσασθαι: τοῖς τ᾽ ἐκλιποῦσι τούτοις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γῆς τῆς Μυγδονίας περὶ τὴν Βόλβην λίμνην ἔδωκε νέμεσθαι, ἕως ἂν ὁ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πόλεμος ᾖ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνῳκίζοντό τε καθαιροῦντες τὰς πόλεις καὶ ἐς πόλεμον παρεσκευάζοντο:

59. αἱ δὲ τριάκοντα νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τήν τε Ποτείδαιαν καὶ τἆλλα ἀφεστηκότα. [2] νομίσαντες δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀδύνατα εἶναι πρός τε Περδίκκαν πολεμεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ δυνάμει καὶ τὰ ξυναφεστῶτα χωρία τρέπονται ἐπὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν, ἐφ᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐξεπέμποντο, καὶ καταστάντες ἐπολέμουν μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν Δέρδου ἀδελφῶν ἄνωθεν στρατιᾷ ἐσβεβληκότων.

60. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Κορίνθιοι, τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἀφεστηκυίας καὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν περὶ Μακεδονίαν οὐσῶν, δεδιότες περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ καὶ οἰκεῖον τὸν κίνδυνον ἡγούμενοι πέμπουσιν ἑαυτῶν τε ἐθελοντὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων μισθῷ πείσαντες ἑξακοσίους καὶ χιλίους τοὺς πάντας ὁπλίτας καὶ ψιλοὺς τετρακοσίους. [2] ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀριστεὺς ὁ Ἀδειμάντου, κατὰ φιλίαν τε αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐκ Κορίνθου στρατιῶται ἐθελονταὶ ξυνέσποντο: ἦν γὰρ τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις αἰεί ποτε ἐπιτήδειος. [3] καὶ ἀφικνοῦνται τεσσαρακοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὕστερον ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἢ Ποτείδαια ἀπέστη.

61. ἦλθε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εὐθὺς ἡ ἀγγελία τῶν πόλεων ὅτι ἀφεστᾶσι, καὶ πέμπουσιν, ὡς ᾔσθοντο καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽ Ἀριστέως ἐπιπαριόντας, δισχιλίους ἑαυτῶν ὁπλίτας καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς πρὸς τὰ ἀφεστῶτα, καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου πέμπτον αὐτὸν στρατηγόν, [2] οἳ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Μακεδονίαν πρῶτον καταλαμβάνουσι τοὺς προτέρους χιλίους Θέρμην ἄρτι ᾑρηκότας καὶ Πύδναν πολιορκοῦντας. [3] προσκαθεζόμενοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν Πύδναν ἐπολιόρκησαν

μέν, ἔπειτα δὲ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκαν, ὡς αὐτοὺς κατήπειγεν ἡ Ποτείδαια καὶ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς παρεληλυθώς, ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, [4] καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν κἀκεῖθεν ἐπὶ Στρέψαν καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν, τρισχιλίοις μὲν ὁπλίταις ἑαυτῶν, χωρὶς δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων πολλοῖς, ἱππεῦσι δὲ ἑξακοσίοις Μακεδόνων τοῖς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Παυσανίου: ἅμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἑβδομήκοντα. [5] κατ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο.

62. Ποτειδεᾶται δὲ καὶ οἱ μετὰ Ἀριστέως Πελοποννήσιοι προσδεχόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο πρὸς Ὀλύνθου ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ, καὶ ἀγορὰν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐπεποίηντο. [2] στρατηγὸν μὲν οὖν τοῦ πεζοῦ παντὸς οἱ ξύμμαχοι ᾑρηντο Ἀριστέα, τῆς δὲ ἵππου Περδίκκαν: ἀπέστη γὰρ εὐθὺς πάλιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ξυνεμάχει τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις, Ἰόλαον ἀνθ᾽ αὐτοῦ καταστήσας ἄρχοντα. [3] ἦν δὲ ἡ γνώμη τοῦ Ἀριστέως τὸ μὲν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ στρατόπεδον ἔχοντι ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ ἐπιτηρεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἢν ἐπίωσι, Χαλκιδέας δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἔξω ἰσθμοῦ ξυμμάχους καὶ τὴν παρὰ Περδίκκου διακοσίαν ἵππον ἐν Ὀλύνθῳ μένειν, καὶ ὅταν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ σφᾶς χωρῶσι, κατὰ νώτου βοηθοῦντας ἐν μέσῳ ποιεῖν αὐτῶν τοὺς πολεμίους. [4] Καλλίας δ᾽ αὖ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς καὶ οἱ ξυνάρχοντες τοὺς μὲν Μακεδόνας ἱππέας καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὀλίγους ἐπὶ Ὀλύνθου ἀποπέμπουσιν, ὅπως εἴργωσι τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιβοηθεῖν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀναστήσαντες τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν Ποτείδαιαν. [5] καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τῷ ἰσθμῷ ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον τοὺς ἐναντίους παρασκευαζομένους ὡς ἐς μάχην, ἀντικαθίσταντο καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ξυνέμισγον. [6] καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ τοῦ Ἀριστέως κέρας καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ἐκεῖνον ἦσαν Κορινθίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων λογάδες ἔτρεψαν τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ἐπεξῆλθον διώκοντες ἐπὶ πολύ: τὸ δὲ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον Ποτειδεατῶν καὶ Πελοποννησίων ἡσσᾶτο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἐς τὸ τεῖχος κατέφυγεν.

63. ἐπαναχωρῶν δὲ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς ἀπὸ τῆς διώξεως, ὡς ὁρᾷ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα ἡσσημένον, ἠπόρησε μὲν ὁποτέρωσε διακινδυνεύσῃ χωρήσας, ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς Ὀλύνθου ἢ ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν: ἔδοξε δ᾽ οὖν ξυναγαγόντι τοὺς μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ ὡς ἐς ἐλάχιστον χωρίον δρόμῳ βιάσασθαι ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν, καὶ παρῆλθε παρὰ τὴν χηλὴν διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης βαλλόμενός τε καὶ χαλεπῶς, ὀλίγους μέν τινας ἀποβαλών, τοὺς δὲ πλείους σώσας. [2] οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς Ὀλύνθου τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις βοηθοί ἀπέχει δὲ ἑξήκοντα μάλιστα σταδίους καὶ ἔστι καταφανές, ὡς ἡ μάχη ἐγίγνετο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἤρθη, βραχὺ μέν τι προῆλθον ὡς βοηθήσοντες, καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες ἱππῆς ἀντιπαρετάξαντο ὡς κωλύσοντες: ἐπειδὴ δὲ διὰ τάχους ἡ νίκη τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγίγνετο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα κατεσπάσθη, πάλιν ἐπανεχώρουν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους: ἱππῆς δ᾽ οὐδετέροις παρεγένοντο. [3] μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην τροπαῖον ἔστησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις: ἀπέθανον δὲ Ποτειδεατῶν μὲν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τριακοσίων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ αὐτῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν καὶ Καλλίας ὁ στρατηγός.

64. τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ [τεῖχος] εὐθὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποτειχίσαντες ἐφρούρουν: τὸ δ᾽ ἐς τὴν Παλλήνην ἀτείχιστον ἦν: οὐ γὰρ ἱκανοὶ ἐνόμιζον εἶναι ἔν τε τῷ ἰσθμῷ φρουρεῖν καὶ ἐς τὴν Παλλήνην διαβάντες τειχίζειν, δεδιότες μὴ σφίσιν οἱ Ποτειδεᾶται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι γενομένοις δίχα ἐπίθωνται. [2] καὶ πυνθανόμενοι οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν Παλλήνην ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν, χρόνῳ ὕστερον πέμπουσιν ἑξακοσίους καὶ χιλίους ὁπλίτας ἑαυτῶν καὶ Φορμίωνα τὸν Ἀσωπίου στρατηγόν: ὃς ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Παλλήνην καὶ ἐξ Ἀφύτιος ὁρμώμενος προσήγαγε τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ τὸν στρατὸν κατὰ βραχὺ προϊὼν καὶ κείρων ἅμα τὴν γῆν, ὡς δὲ οὐδεὶς ἐπεξῄει ἐς μάχην, ἀπετείχισε τὸ ἐκ τῆς Παλλήνης [τεῖχος]. [3] καὶ οὕτως ἤδη κατὰ κράτος ἡ Ποτείδαια ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐπολιορκεῖτο καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ναυσὶν ἅμα ἐφορμούσαις.

65. Ἀριστεὺς δὲ ἀποτειχισθείσης αὐτῆς καὶ ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν ἔχων σωτηρίας, ἢν μή τι ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἢ ἄλλο παρὰ λόγον γίγνηται, ξυνεβούλευε μὲν πλὴν πεντακοσίων ἄνεμον τηρήσασι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκπλεῦσαι, ὅπως ἐπὶ πλέον ὁ σῖτος ἀντίσχῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελε τῶν μενόντων εἶναι: ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἔπειθε, βουλόμενος τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις παρασκευάζειν καὶ ὅπως τὰ ἔξωθεν ἔξει ὡς ἄριστα, ἔκπλουν ποιεῖται λαθὼν τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων. [2] καὶ παραμένων ἐν Χαλκιδεῦσι τά τε ἄλλα ξυνεπολέμει καὶ Σερμυλιῶν λοχήσας πρὸς τῇ πόλει πολλοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἔς τε τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἔπρασσεν ὅπῃ ὠφελία τις γενήσεται. μετὰ δὲ τῆς Ποτειδαίας τὴν ἀποτείχισιν Φορμίων μὲν ἔχων τοὺς ἑξακοσίους καὶ χιλίους τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν καὶ Βοττικὴν ἑδῄου καὶ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ πολίσματα εἶλεν.

66. τοῖς δ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις αἰτίαι μὲν αὗται προυγεγένηντο ἐς ἀλλήλους, τοῖς μὲν Κορινθίοις ὅτι τὴν Ποτείδαιαν ἑαυτῶν οὖσαν ἀποικίαν καὶ ἄνδρας Κορινθίων τε καὶ Πελοποννησίων ἐν αὐτῇ ὄντας ἐπολιόρκουν, τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ὅτι ἑαυτῶν τε πόλιν ξυμμαχίδα καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῆ ἀπέστησαν, καὶ ἐλθόντες σφίσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐμάχοντο μετὰ Ποτειδεατῶν. οὐ μέντοι ὅ γε πόλεμός πω ξυνερρώγει, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἀνοκωχὴ ἦν: ἰδίᾳ γὰρ ταῦτα οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔπραξαν.

67. πολιορκουμένης δὲ τῆς Ποτειδαίας οὐχ ἡσύχαζον, ἀνδρῶν τε σφίσιν ἐνόντων καὶ ἅμα περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ δεδιότες: παρεκάλουν τε εὐθὺς ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ κατεβόων ἐλθόντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅτι σπονδάς τε λελυκότες εἶεν καὶ ἀδικοῖεν τὴν Πελοπόννησον. [2] Αἰγινῆταί τε φανερῶς μὲν οὐ πρεσβευόμενοι, δεδιότες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, κρύφα δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐνῆγον τὸν πόλεμον, λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς σπονδάς. [3] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προσπαρακαλέσαντες τῶν ξυμμάχων τε καὶ εἴ τίς τι ἄλλο ἔφη ἠδικῆσθαι ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ξύλλογον σφῶν αὐτῶν ποιήσαντες τὸν εἰωθότα λέγειν ἐκέλευον. [4] καὶ ἄλλοι τε παριόντες ἐγκλήματα ἐποιοῦντο ὡς ἕκαστοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διάφορα,

μάλιστα δὲ λιμένων τε εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀγορᾶς παρὰ τὰς σπονδάς. [5] παρελθόντες δὲ τελευταῖοι Κορίνθιοι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐάσαντες πρῶτον παροξῦναι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεῖπον τοιάδε.

68. ‘τὸ πιστὸν ὑμᾶς, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τῆς καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς πολιτείας καὶ ὁμιλίας ἀπιστοτέρους ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους ἤν τι λέγωμεν καθίστησιν: καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ σωφροσύνην μὲν ἔχετε, ἀμαθίᾳ δὲ πλέονι πρὸς τὰ ἔξω πράγματα χρῆσθε. [2] πολλάκις γὰρ προαγορευόντων ἡμῶν ἃ ἐμέλλομεν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων βλάπτεσθαι, οὐ περὶ ὧν ἐδιδάσκομεν ἑκάστοτε τὴν μάθησιν ἐποιεῖσθε, ἀλλὰ τῶν λεγόντων μᾶλλον ὑπενοεῖτε ὡς ἕνεκα τῶν αὐτοῖς ἰδίᾳ διαφόρων λέγουσιν: καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ οὐ πρὶν πάσχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐσμέν, τοὺς ξυμμάχους τούσδε παρεκαλέσατε, ἐν οἷς προσήκει ἡμᾶς οὐχ ἥκιστα εἰπεῖν, ὅσῳ καὶ μέγιστα ἐγκλήματα ἔχομεν ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ὑβριζόμενοι, ὑπὸ δὲ ὑμῶν ἀμελούμενοι. [3] ’καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀφανεῖς που ὄντες ἠδίκουν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, διδασκαλίας ἂν ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσι προσέδει: νῦν δὲ τί δεῖ μακρηγορεῖν, ὧν τοὺς μὲν δεδουλωμένους ὁρᾶτε, τοῖς δὲ ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτούς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῖς ἡμετέροις ξυμμάχοις, καὶ ἐκ πολλοῦ προπαρεσκευασμένους, εἴ ποτε ἄρα πολεμήσονται; [4] οὐ γὰρ ἂν Κέρκυράν τε ὑπολαβόντες βίᾳ ἡμῶν εἶχον καὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἐπολιόρκουν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐπικαιρότατον χωρίον πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἀποχρῆσθαι, ἡ δὲ ναυτικὸν ἂν μέγιστον παρέσχε Πελοποννησίοις.

69. καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι, τό τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στῆσαι τείχη,ἐς τόδε τε αἰεὶ ἀποστεροῦντες οὐ μόνον τοὺς ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων δεδουλωμένους ἐλευθερίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἤδη ξυμμάχους: οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δυνάμενος μὲν παῦσαι περιορῶν δὲ ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾷ, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται. [2] μόλις δὲ νῦν γε ξυνήλθομεν καὶ οὐδὲ νῦν ἐπὶ φανεροῖς. χρῆν γὰρ οὐκ εἰ ἀδικούμεθα ἔτι σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ὅτι ἀμυνούμεθα: οἱ γὰρ δρῶντες βεβουλευμένοι πρὸς οὐ διεγνωκότας ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντες ἐπέρχονται. [3] καὶ

ἐπιστάμεθα οἵᾳ ὁδῷ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὅτι κατ᾽ ὀλίγον χωροῦσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλας. καὶ λανθάνειν μὲν οἰόμενοι διὰ τὸ ἀναίσθητον ὑμῶν ἧσσον θαρσοῦσι, γνόντες δὲ εἰδότας περιορᾶν ἰσχυρῶς ἐγκείσονται. [4] ἡσυχάζετε γάρ, μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινά, ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν διπλασιουμένην δὲ καταλύοντες. [5] καίτοι ἐλέγεσθε ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι, ὧν ἄρα ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἐκράτει. τόν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν ἐκ περάτων γῆς πρότερον ἐπὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα ἢ τὰ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἀξίως προαπαντῆσαι, καὶ νῦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἑκάς, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγγὺς ὄντας περιορᾶτε, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπελθεῖν αὐτοὶ ἀμύνεσθαι βούλεσθε μᾶλλον ἐπιόντας, καὶ ἐς τύχας πρὸς πολλῷ δυνατωτέρους ἀγωνιζόμενοι καταστῆναι, ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὐτῷ τὰ πλείω σφαλέντα, καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἤδη τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἀφ᾽ ὑμῶν τιμωρίᾳ περιγεγενημένους, ἐπεὶ αἵ γε ὑμέτεραι ἐλπίδες ἤδη τινάς που καὶ ἀπαρασκεύους διὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι ἔφθειραν. [6] καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐπ᾽ ἔχθρᾳ τὸ πλέον ἢ αἰτίᾳ νομίσῃ τάδε λέγεσθαι: αἰτία μὲν γὰρ φίλων ἀνδρῶν ἐστὶν ἁμαρτανόντων, κατηγορία δὲ ἐχθρῶν ἀδικησάντων.

70. ‘καὶ ἅμα, εἴπερ τινὲς καὶ ἄλλοι, ἄξιοι νομίζομεν εἶναι τοῖς πέλας ψόγον ἐπενεγκεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ μεγάλων τῶν διαφερόντων καθεστώτων, περὶ ὧν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡμῖν γε δοκεῖτε, οὐδ᾽ ἐκλογίσασθαι πώποτε πρὸς οἵους ὑμῖν Ἀθηναίους ὄντας καὶ ὅσον ὑμῶν καὶ ὡς πᾶν διαφέροντας ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται. [2] οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν: ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σῴζειν καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. [3] αὖθις δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες: τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον τῆς τε δυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ πρᾶξαι τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. [4] καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους: οἴονται γὰρ

οἱ μὲν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἄν τι κτᾶσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι. [5] κρατοῦντές τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξέρχονται καὶ νικώμενοι ἐπ᾽ ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτουσιν. [6] ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς. [7] καὶ ἃ μὲν ἂν ἐπινοήσαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων στέρεσθαι ἡγοῦνται, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν ἐπελθόντες κτήσωνται, ὀλίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες. ἢν δ᾽ ἄρα του καὶ πείρᾳ σφαλῶσιν, ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρείαν: μόνοι γὰρ ἔχουσί τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν ἃ ἂν ἐπινοήσωσι διὰ τὸ ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν γνῶσιν. [8] καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον: [9] ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι.

71. ‘ταύτης μέντοι τοιαύτης ἀντικαθεστηκυίας πόλεως, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, διαμέλλετε καὶ οἴεσθε τὴν ἡσυχίαν οὐ τούτοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀρκεῖν οἳ ἂν τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ δίκαια πράσσωσι, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ, ἢν ἀδικῶνται, δῆλοι ὦσι μὴ ἐπιτρέψοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τε τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμυνόμενοι μὴ βλάπτεσθαι τὸ ἴσον νέμετε. [2] μόλις δ᾽ ἂν πόλει ὁμοίᾳ παροικοῦντες ἐτυγχάνετε τούτου: νῦν δ᾽, ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐδηλώσαμεν, ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. [3] ἀνάγκη δὲ ὥσπερ τέχνης αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν: καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ. δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τῆς πολυπειρίας ἐπὶ πλέον ὑμῶν κεκαίνωται. [4] μέχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦδε ὡρίσθω ὑμῶν ἡ βραδυτής: νῦν δὲ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ Ποτειδεάταις, ὥσπερ ὑπεδέξασθε, βοηθήσατε κατὰ τάχος ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνδρας τε φίλους καὶ ξυγγενεῖς τοῖς

ἐχθίστοις προῆσθε καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀθυμίᾳ πρὸς ἑτέραν τινὰ ξυμμαχίαν τρέψητε. [5] δρῶμεν δ᾽ ἂν ἄδικον οὐδὲν οὔτε πρὸς θεῶν τῶν ὁρκίων οὔτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων τῶν αἰσθανομένων: λύουσι γὰρ σπονδὰς οὐχ οἱ δι᾽ ἐρημίαν ἄλλοις προσιόντες, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὴ βοηθοῦντες οἷς ἂν ξυνομόσωσιν. [6] βουλομένων δὲ ὑμῶν προθύμων εἶναι μενοῦμεν: οὔτε γὰρ ὅσια ἂν ποιοῖμεν μεταβαλλόμενοι οὔτε ξυνηθεστέρους ἂν ἄλλους εὕροιμεν. [7] πρὸς τάδε βουλεύεσθε εὖ καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πειρᾶσθε μὴ ἐλάσσω ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ οἱ πατέρες ὑμῖν παρέδοσαν.’

72. τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον. τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἔτυχε γὰρ πρεσβεία πρότερον ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι περὶ ἄλλων παροῦσα, καὶ ὡς ᾔσθοντο τῶν λόγων, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς παριτητέα ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ἐγκλημάτων πέρι μηδὲν ἀπολογησομένους ὧν αἱ πόλεις ἐνεκάλουν,δηλῶσαι δὲ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ὡς οὐ ταχέως αὐτοῖς βουλευτέον εἴη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν πλέονι σκεπτέον. καὶ ἅμα τὴν σφετέραν πόλιν ἐβούλοντο σημῆναι ὅση εἴη δύναμιν, καὶ ὑπόμνησιν ποιήσασθαι τοῖς τε πρεσβυτέροις ὧν ᾔδεσαν καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἐξήγησιν ὧν ἄπειροι ἦσαν, νομίζοντες μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν λόγων πρὸς τὸ ἡσυχάζειν τραπέσθαι ἢ πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν. [2] προσελθόντες οὖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔφασαν βούλεσθαι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐς τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι μὴ ἀποκωλύοι. οἱ δὲ ἐκέλευόν τε παριέναι, καὶ παρελθόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

73. ‘ἡ μὲν πρέσβευσις ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐς ἀντιλογίαν τοῖς ὑμετέροις ξυμμάχοις ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἡ πόλις ἔπεμψεν: αἰσθανόμενοι δὲ καταβοὴν οὐκ ὀλίγην οὖσαν ἡμῶν παρήλθομεν οὐ τοῖς ἐγκλήμασι τῶν πόλεων ἀντεροῦντες — οὐ γὰρ παρὰ δικασταῖς ὑμῖν οὔτε ἡμῶν οὔτε τούτων οἱ λόγοι ἂν γίγνοιντο —, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ ῥᾳδίως περὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων τοῖς ξυμμάχοις πειθόμενοι χεῖρον βουλεύσησθε, καὶ ἅμα βουλόμενοι περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λόγου τοῦ ἐς ἡμᾶς καθεστῶτος δηλῶσαι ὡς οὔτε ἀπεικότως ἔχομεν ἃ κεκτήμεθα, ἥ τε πόλις ἡμῶν ἀξία λόγου ἐστίν. [2] ’καὶ τὰ μὲν πάνυ παλαιὰ τί δεῖ λέγειν, ὧν ἀκοαὶ μᾶλλον λόγων

μάρτυρες ἢ ὄψις τῶν ἀκουσομένων; τὰ δὲ Μηδικὰ καὶ ὅσα αὐτοὶ ξύνιστε, εἰ καὶ δι᾽ ὄχλου μᾶλλον ἔσται αἰεὶ προβαλλομένοις, ἀνάγκη λέγειν: καὶ γὰρ ὅτε ἐδρῶμεν, ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ ἐκινδυνεύετο, ἧς τοῦ μὲν ἔργου μέρος μετέσχετε, τοῦ δὲ λόγου μὴ παντός, εἴ τι ὠφελεῖ, στερισκώμεθα. [3] ῥηθήσεται δὲ οὐ παραιτήσεως μᾶλλον ἕνεκα ἢ μαρτυρίου καὶ δηλώσεως πρὸς οἵαν ὑμῖν πόλιν μὴ εὖ βουλευομένοις ὁ ἀγὼν καταστήσεται. [4] φαμὲν γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι προκινδυνεῦσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ καὶ ὅτε τὸ ὕστερον ἦλθεν, οὐχ ἱκανοὶ ὄντες κατὰ γῆν ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς πανδημεὶ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ξυνναυμαχῆσαι, ὅπερ ἔσχε μὴ κατὰ πόλεις αὐτὸν ἐπιπλέοντα τὴν Πελοπόννησον πορθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων ἂν ὄντων πρὸς ναῦς πολλὰς ἀλλήλοις ἐπιβοηθεῖν. [5] τεκμήριον δὲ μέγιστον αὐτὸς ἐποίησεν: νικηθεὶς γὰρ ταῖς ναυσὶν ὡς οὐκέτι αὐτῷ ὁμοίας οὔσης τῆς δυνάμεως κατὰ τάχος τῷ πλέονι τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀνεχώρησεν.

74. τοιούτου μέντοι τούτου ξυμβάντος, καὶ σαφῶς δηλωθέντος ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πράγματα ἐγένετο, τρία τὰ ὠφελιμώτατα ἐς αὐτὸ παρεσχόμεθα, ἀριθμόν τε νεῶν πλεῖστον καὶ ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν ξυνετώτατον καὶ προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην: ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ ἄρχοντα, ὃς αἰτιώτατος ἐν τῷ στενῷ ναυμαχῆσαι ἐγένετο, ὅπερ σαφέστατα ἔσωσε τὰ πράγματα, καὶ αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦτο ὑμεῖς ἐτιμήσατε μάλιστα δὴ ἄνδρα ξένον τῶν ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐλθόντων: [2] προθυμίαν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τολμηροτάτην ἐδείξαμεν, οἵ γε, ἐπειδὴ ἡμῖν κατὰ γῆν οὐδεὶς ἐβοήθει, τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη μέχρι ἡμῶν δουλευόντων ἠξιώσαμεν ἐκλιπόντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα διαφθείραντες μηδ᾽ ὣς τὸ τῶν περιλοίπων ξυμμάχων κοινὸν προλιπεῖν μηδὲ σκεδασθέντες ἀχρεῖοι αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς κινδυνεῦσαι καὶ μὴ ὀργισθῆναι ὅτι ἡμῖν οὐ προυτιμωρήσατε. [3] ὥστε φαμὲν οὐχ ἧσσον αὐτοὶ ὠφελῆσαι ὑμᾶς ἢ τυχεῖν τούτου. ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπό τε οἰκουμένων τῶν πόλεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ λοιπὸν νέμεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἐδείσατε ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ οὐχ ἡμῶν τὸ

πλέον, ἐβοηθήσατε ὅτε γοῦν ἦμεν ἔτι σῶοι, οὐ παρεγένεσθε : ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπό τε τῆς οὐκ οὔσης ἔτι ὁρμώμενοι καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐν βραχείᾳ ἐλπίδι οὔσης κινδυνεύοντες ξυνεσώσαμεν ὑμᾶς τε τὸ μέρος καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. [4] εἰ δὲ προσεχωρήσαμεν πρότερον τῷ Μήδῳ δείσαντες, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι, περὶ τῇ χώρᾳ, ἢ μὴ ἐτολμήσαμεν ὕστερον ἐσβῆναι ἐς τὰς ναῦς ὡς διεφθαρμένοι, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει ἔτι ὑμᾶς μὴ ἔχοντας ναῦς ἱκανὰς ναυμαχεῖν,ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν ἂν αὐτῷ προυχώρησε τὰ πράγματα ᾗ ἐβούλετο.

75. ‘Ἆρ᾽ ἄξιοί ἐσμεν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ προθυμίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώμης ξυνέσεως ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχομεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι; [2] καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελησάντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι: [3] ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας. [4] καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἔτι ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθημένους, καί τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων κατεστραμμένων, ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνέντας κινδυνεύειν: καὶ γὰρ ἂν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐγίγνοντο. [5] πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων πέρι κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι.

76. ὑμεῖς γοῦν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὰς ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεις ἐπὶ τὸ ὑμῖν ὠφέλιμον καταστησάμενοι ἐξηγεῖσθε: καὶ εἰ τότε ὑπομείναντες διὰ παντὸς ἀπήχθεσθε ἐν τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, εὖ ἴσμεν μὴ ἂν ἧσσον ὑμᾶς λυπηροὺς γενομένους τοῖς ξυμμάχοις καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ἂν ἢ ἄρχειν ἐγκρατῶς ἢ αὐτοὺς κινδυνεύειν. [2] οὕτως οὐδ᾽ ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου, εἰ ἀρχήν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνεῖμεν ὑπὸ <τριῶν> τῶν μεγίστων νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὠφελίας, οὐδ᾽ αὖ πρῶτοι τοῦ τοιούτου

ὑπάρξαντες, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι, ἄξιοί τε ἅμα νομίζοντες εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν δοκοῦντες μέχρι οὗ τὰ ξυμφέροντα λογιζόμενοι τῷ δικαίῳ λόγῳ νῦν χρῆσθε, ὃν οὐδείς πω παρατυχὸν ἰσχύι τι κτήσασθαι προθεὶς τοῦ μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπετο. [3] ἐπαινεῖσθαί τε ἄξιοι οἵτινες χρησάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει ὥστε ἑτέρων ἄρχειν δικαιότεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν γένωνται. [4] ἄλλους γ᾽ ἂν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἴ τι μετριάζομεν: ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἀδοξία τὸ πλέον ἢ ἔπαινος οὐκ εἰκότως περιέστη.

77. ‘καὶ ἐλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν. [2] καὶ οὐδεὶς σκοπεῖ αὐτῶν τοῖς καὶ ἄλλοθί που ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι καὶ ἧσσον ἡμῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπηκόους μετρίοις οὖσι διότι τοῦτο οὐκ ὀνειδίζεται: βιάζεσθαι γὰρ οἷς ἂν ἐξῇ, δικάζεσθαι οὐδὲν προσδέονται. [3] οἱ δὲ εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλεῖν, ἤν τι παρὰ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι χρῆναι ἢ γνώμῃ ἢ δυνάμει τῇ διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἐλασσωθῶσιν, οὐ τοῦ πλέονος μὴ στερισκόμενοι χάριν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς χαλεπώτερον φέρουσιν ἢ εἰ ἀπὸ πρώτης ἀποθέμενοι τὸν νόμον φανερῶς ἐπλεονεκτοῦμεν. ἐκείνως δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἀντέλεγον ὡς οὐ χρεὼν τὸν ἥσσω τῷ κρατοῦντι ὑποχωρεῖν. [4] ἀδικούμενοί τε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται ἢ βιαζόμενοι: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου δοκεῖ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι, τὸ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος καταναγκάζεσθαι. [5] ὑπὸ γοῦν τοῦ Μήδου δεινότερα τούτων πάσχοντες ἠνείχοντο, ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἀρχὴ χαλεπὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰκότως: τὸ παρὸν γὰρ αἰεὶ βαρὺ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις. [6] ὑμεῖς γ᾽ ἂν οὖν εἰ καθελόντες ἡμᾶς ἄρξαιτε, τάχα ἂν τὴν εὔνοιαν ἣν διὰ τὸ ἡμέτερον δέος εἰλήφατε μεταβάλοιτε, εἴπερ οἷα καὶ τότε πρὸς τὸν Μῆδον δι᾽ ὀλίγου ἡγησάμενοι ὑπεδείξατε, ὁμοῖα καὶ νῦν γνώσεσθε. ἄμεικτα γὰρ τά τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε καὶ προσέτι εἷς

ἕκαστος ἐξιὼν οὔτε τούτοις χρῆται οὔθ᾽ οἷς ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς νομίζει.

78. ‘βουλεύεσθε οὖν βραδέως ὡς οὐ περὶ βραχέων, καὶ μὴ ἀλλοτρίαις γνώμαις καὶ ἐγκλήμασι πεισθέντες οἰκεῖον πόνον πρόσθησθε. τοῦ δὲ πολέμου τὸν παράλογον, ὅσος ἐστί, πρὶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι προδιάγνωτε: [2] μηκυνόμενος γὰρ φιλεῖ ἐς τύχας τὰ πολλὰ περιίστασθαι, ὧν ἴσον τε ἀπέχομεν καὶ ὁποτέρως ἔσται ἐν ἀδήλῳ κινδυνεύεται. [3] ἰόντες τε οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους τῶν ἔργων πρότερον ἔχονται, ἃ χρῆν ὕστερον δρᾶν, κακοπαθοῦντες δὲ ἤδη τῶν λόγων ἅπτονται. [4] ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ πω τοιαύτῃ ἁμαρτίᾳ ὄντες οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ οὔθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντες λέγομεν ὑμῖν, ἕως ἔτι αὐθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἡ εὐβουλία, σπονδὰς μὴ λύειν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρκους, τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκῃ λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνθήκην. εἰ δὲ μή, θεοὺς τοὺς ὁρκίους μάρτυρας ποιούμενοι πειρασόμεθα ἀμύνεσθαι πολέμου ἄρχοντας ταύτῃ ᾗ ἂν ὑφηγῆσθε.’

79. τοιαῦτα δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶπον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν τε ξυμμάχων ἤκουσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ ἐγκλήματα τὰ ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἃ ἔλεξαν, μεταστησάμενοι πάντας ἐβουλεύοντο κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ τῶν παρόντων. [2] καὶ τῶν μὲν πλεόνων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἱ γνῶμαι ἔφερον, ἀδικεῖν τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἤδη καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι ἐν τάχει: παρελθὼν δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν, ἀνὴρ καὶ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων, ἔλεξε τοιάδε.

80. ‘καὶ αὐτὸς πολλῶν ἤδη πολέμων ἔμπειρός εἰμι, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὁρῶ, ὥστε μήτε ἀπειρίᾳ ἐπιθυμῆσαί τινα τοῦ ἔργου, ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ πάθοιεν, μήτε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀσφαλὲς νομίσαντα. [2] εὕροιτε δ᾽ ἂν τόνδε περὶ οὗ νῦν βουλεύεσθε οὐκ ἂν ἐλάχιστον γενόμενον, εἰ σωφρόνως τις αὐτὸν ἐκλογίζοιτο. [3] πρὸς μὲν γὰρ Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας παρόμοιος ἡμῶν ἡ ἀλκή, καὶ διὰ ταχέων οἷόν τε ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστα ἐλθεῖν: πρὸς δὲ ἄνδρας οἳ γῆν τε ἑκὰς ἔχουσι καὶ προσέτι θαλάσσης ἐμπειρότατοί εἰσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἄριστα

ἐξήρτυνται, πλούτῳ τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ ὄχλῳ ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑνί γε χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῷ ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ξυμμάχους πολλοὺς φόρου ὑποτελεῖς ἔχουσι, πῶς χρὴ πρὸς τούτους ῥᾳδίως πόλεμον ἄρασθαι καὶ τίνι πιστεύσαντας ἀπαρασκεύους ἐπειχθῆναι; [4] πότερον ταῖς ναυσίν; ἀλλ᾽ ἥσσους ἐσμέν: εἰ δὲ μελετήσομεν καὶ ἀντιπαρασκευασόμεθα, χρόνος ἐνέσται. ἀλλὰ τοῖς χρήμασιν; ἀλλὰ πολλῷ πλέον ἔτι τούτου ἐλλείπομεν καὶ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν οὔτε ἑτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν.

81. τάχ᾽ ἄν τις θαρσοίη ὅτι τοῖς ὅπλοις αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ πλήθει ὑπερφέρομεν, ὥστε τὴν γῆν δῃοῦν ἐπιφοιτῶντες. [2] τοῖς δὲ ἄλλη γῆ ἐστὶ πολλὴ ἧς ἄρχουσι, καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ὧν δέονται ἐπάξονται. [3] εἰ δ᾽ αὖ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀφιστάναι πειρασόμεθα, δεήσει καὶ τούτοις ναυσὶ βοηθεῖν τὸ πλέον οὖσι νησιώταις. [4] τίς οὖν ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ πόλεμος; εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἢ ναυσὶ κρατήσομεν ἢ τὰς προσόδους ἀφαιρήσομεν ἀφ᾽ ὧν τὸ ναυτικὸν τρέφουσι, βλαψόμεθα τὰ πλείω. [5] κἀν τούτῳ οὐδὲ καταλύεσθαι ἔτι καλόν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ δόξομεν ἄρξαι μᾶλλον τῆς διαφορᾶς. [6] μὴ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνῃ γε τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαιρώμεθα ὡς ταχὺ παυσθήσεται ὁ πόλεμος, ἢν τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν τέμωμεν. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτὸν ὑπολίπωμεν: οὕτως εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίους φρονήματι μήτε τῇ γῇ δουλεῦσαι μήτε ὥσπερ ἀπείρους καταπλαγῆναι τῷ πολέμῳ.

82. ‘οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀναισθήτως αὐτοὺς κελεύω τούς τε ξυμμάχους ἡμῶν ἐᾶν βλάπτειν καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας μὴ καταφωρᾶν, ἀλλὰ ὅπλα μὲν μήπω κινεῖν, πέμπειν δὲ καὶ αἰτιᾶσθαι μήτε πόλεμον ἄγαν δηλοῦντας μήθ᾽ ὡς ἐπιτρέψομεν, κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, εἴ ποθέν τινα ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα ἀνεπίφθονον δέ, ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι , καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἅμα ἐκποριζώμεθα. [2] καὶ ἢν μὲν ἐσακούωσί τι πρεσβευομένων ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἄριστα: ἢν δὲ μή, διελθόντων ἐτῶν δύο καὶ

τριῶν ἄμεινον ἤδη, ἢν δοκῇ, πεφραγμένοι ἴμεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς. [3] καὶ ἴσως ὁρῶντες ἡμῶν ἤδη τήν τε παρασκευὴν καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῇ ὁμοῖα ὑποσημαίνοντας μᾶλλον ἂν εἴκοιεν, καὶ γῆν ἔτι ἄτμητον ἔχοντες καὶ περὶ παρόντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὔπω ἐφθαρμένων βουλευόμενοι. [4] μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι νομίσητε τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἐξείργασται: ἧς φείδεσθαι χρὴ ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, καὶ μὴ ἐς ἀπόνοιαν καταστήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἀληπτοτέρους ἔχειν. [5] εἰ γὰρ ἀπαράσκευοι τοῖς τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐγκλήμασιν ἐπειχθέντες τεμοῦμεν αὐτήν, ὁρᾶτε ὅπως μὴ αἴσχιον καὶ ἀπορώτερον τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πράξομεν. [6] ἐγκλήματα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν οἷόν τε καταλῦσαι: πόλεμον δὲ ξύμπαντας ἀραμένους ἕνεκα τῶν ἰδίων, ὃν οὐχ ὑπάρχει εἰδέναι καθ᾽ ὅτι χωρήσει, οὐ ῥᾴδιον εὐπρεπῶς θέσθαι.

83. ‘καὶ ἀνανδρία μηδενὶ πολλοὺς μιᾷ πόλει μὴ ταχὺ ἐπελθεῖν δοκείτω εἶναι. [2] εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἐλάσσους χρήματα φέροντες ξύμμαχοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ πόλεμος οὐχ ὅπλων τὸ πλέον ἀλλὰ δαπάνης, δι᾽ ἣν τὰ ὅπλα ὠφελεῖ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἠπειρώταις πρὸς θαλασσίους. [3] πορισώμεθα οὖν πρῶτον αὐτήν, καὶ μὴ τοῖς τῶν ξυμμάχων λόγοις πρότερον ἐπαιρώμεθα, οἵπερ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων τὸ πλέον ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα τῆς αἰτίας ἔξομεν, οὗτοι καὶ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν προΐδωμεν.

84. καὶ τὸ βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον, ὃ μέμφονται μάλιστα ἡμῶν, μὴ αἰσχύνεσθε. σπεύδοντές τε γὰρ σχολαίτερον ἂν παύσαισθε διὰ τὸ ἀπαράσκευοι ἐγχειρεῖν, καὶ ἅμα ἐλευθέραν καὶ εὐδοξοτάτην πόλιν διὰ παντὸς νεμόμεθα. [2] καὶ δύναται μάλιστα σωφροσύνη ἔμφρων τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι: μόνοι γὰρ δι᾽ αὐτὸ εὐπραγίαις τε οὐκ ἐξυβρίζομεν καὶ ξυμφοραῖς ἧσσον ἑτέρων εἴκομεν: τῶν τε ξὺν ἐπαίνῳ ἐξοτρυνόντων ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὰ δεινὰ παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐπαιρόμεθα ἡδονῇ, καὶ ἤν τις ἄρα ξὺν κατηγορίᾳ παροξύνῃ, οὐδὲν δὴ μᾶλλον ἀχθεσθέντες ἀνεπείσθημεν. [3] πολεμικοί τε καὶ εὔβουλοι διὰ τὸ εὔκοσμον γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν ὅτι αἰδὼς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία, εὔβουλοι δὲ ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας

παιδευόμενοι καὶ ξὺν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν, καὶ μὴ τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ἄγαν ὄντες τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ ἐπεξιέναι, νομίζειν δὲ τάς τε διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίους εἶναι καὶ τὰς προσπιπτούσας τύχας οὐ λόγῳ διαιρετάς. [4] αἰεὶ δὲ ὡς πρὸς εὖ βουλευομένους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἔργῳ παρασκευαζόμεθα: καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐκείνων ὡς ἁμαρτησομένων ἔχειν δεῖ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς προνοουμένων. πολύ τε διαφέρειν οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ὅστις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις παιδεύεται.

85. ‘ταύτας οὖν ἃς οἱ πατέρες τε ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν μελέτας καὶ αὐτοὶ διὰ παντὸς ὠφελούμενοι ἔχομεν μὴ παρῶμεν, μηδὲ ἐπειχθέντες ἐν βραχεῖ μορίῳ ἡμέρας περὶ πολλῶν σωμάτων καὶ χρημάτων καὶ πόλεων καὶ δόξης βουλεύσωμεν, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν. ἔξεστι δ᾽ ἡμῖν μᾶλλον ἑτέρων διὰ ἰσχύν. [2] καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πέμπετε μὲν περὶ τῆς Ποτειδαίας, πέμπετε δὲ περὶ ὧν οἱ ξύμμαχοί φασιν ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων αὐτῶν δίκας δοῦναι: ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν διδόντα οὐ πρότερον νόμιμον ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀδικοῦντα ἰέναι. παρασκευάζεσθε δὲ τὸν πόλεμον ἅμα. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ κράτιστα βουλεύσεσθε καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις φοβερώτατα.’ [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀρχίδαμος τοιαῦτα εἶπεν: παρελθὼν δὲ Σθενελαΐδας τελευταῖος, εἷς τῶν ἐφόρων τότε ὤν, ἔλεξεν [τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις] ὧδε.

86. ‘τοὺς μὲν λόγους τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐ γιγνώσκω: ἐπαινέσαντες γὰρ πολλὰ ἑαυτοὺς οὐδαμοῦ ἀντεῖπον ὡς οὐκ ἀδικοῦσι τοὺς ἡμετέρους ξυμμάχους καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον: καίτοι εἰ πρὸς τοὺς Μήδους ἐγένοντο ἀγαθοὶ τότε, πρὸς δ᾽ ἡμᾶς κακοὶ νῦν, διπλασίας ζημίας ἄξιοί εἰσιν, ὅτι ἀντ᾽ ἀγαθῶν κακοὶ γεγένηνται. [2] ἡμεῖς δὲ ὁμοῖοι καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἐσμέν, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ περιοψόμεθα ἀδικουμένους οὐδὲ μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν: οἱ δ᾽ οὐκέτι μέλλουσι κακῶς πάσχειν. [3] ἄλλοις μὲν γὰρ χρήματά ἐστι πολλὰ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἵπποι, ἡμῖν δὲ ξύμμαχοι ἀγαθοί, οὓς οὐ παραδοτέα τοῖς

Ἀθηναίοις ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δίκαις καὶ λόγοις διακριτέα μὴ λόγῳ καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους, ἀλλὰ τιμωρητέα ἐν τάχει καὶ παντὶ σθένει. [4] καὶ ὡς ἡμᾶς πρέπει βουλεύεσθαι ἀδικουμένους μηδεὶς διδασκέτω, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον πρέπει πολὺν χρόνον βουλεύεσθαι. [5] ψηφίζεσθε οὖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἀξίως τῆς Σπάρτης τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ μήτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐᾶτε μείζους γίγνεσθαι μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους καταπροδιδῶμεν, ἀλλὰ ξὺν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπίωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας.’

87. τοιαῦτα λέξας ἐπεψήφιζεν αὐτὸς ἔφορος ὢν ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. [2] ὁ δέ κρίνουσι γὰρ βοῇ καὶ οὐ ψήφῳ οὐκ ἔφη διαγιγνώσκειν τὴν βοὴν ὁποτέρα μείζων, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς φανερῶς ἀποδεικνυμένους τὴν γνώμην ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ὁρμῆσαι ἔλεξεν ‘ὅτῳ μὲν ὑμῶν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, δοκοῦσι λελύσθαι αἱ σπονδαὶ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀδικεῖν, ἀναστήτω ἐς ἐκεῖνο τὸ χωρίον,’ δείξας τι χωρίον αὐτοῖς, ‘ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ δοκοῦσιν, ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερα.’ ἀναστάντες δὲ διέστησαν, [3] καὶ πολλῷ πλείους ἐγένοντο οἷς ἐδόκουν αἱ σπονδαὶ λελύσθαι. [4] προσκαλέσαντές τε τοὺς ξυμμάχους εἶπον ὅτι σφίσι μὲν δοκοῖεν ἀδικεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, βούλεσθαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πάντας ξυμμάχους παρακαλέσαντες ψῆφον ἐπαγαγεῖν, ὅπως κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ποιῶνται, ἢν δοκῇ. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου διαπραξάμενοι ταῦτα, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ὕστερον ἐφ᾽ ἅπερ ἦλθον χρηματίσαντες: [6] ἡ δὲ διαγνώμη αὕτη τῆς ἐκκλησίας, τοῦ τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι, ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει τῶν τριακοντουτίδων σπονδῶν προκεχωρηκυιῶν, αἳ ἐγένοντο μετὰ τὰ Εὐβοϊκά.

88. ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις ὅσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον δυνηθῶσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑποχείρια ἤδη ὄντα.

89. οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι τρόπῳ τοιῷδε ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐν οἷς ηὐξήθησαν. [2] ἐπειδὴ Μῆδοι ἀνεχώρησαν ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης νικηθέντες καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων καὶ οἱ

καταφυγόντες αὐτῶν ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς Μυκάλην διεφθάρησαν, Λεωτυχίδης μὲν ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅσπερ ἡγεῖτο τῶν ἐν Μυκάλῃ Ἑλλήνων, ἀπεχώρησεν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἔχων τοὺς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ξυμμάχους, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου ξύμμαχοι ἤδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως ὑπομείναντες Σηστὸν ἐπολιόρκουν Μήδων ἐχόντων, καὶ ἐπιχειμάσαντες εἷλον αὐτὴν ἐκλιπόντων τῶν βαρβάρων, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπέπλευσαν ἐξ Ἑλλησπόντου ὡς ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις. [3] Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ κοινόν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ βάρβαροι ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀπῆλθον, διεκομίζοντο εὐθὺς ὅθεν ὑπεξέθεντο παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν περιοῦσαν κατασκευήν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνοικοδομεῖν παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ τὰ τείχη: τοῦ τε γὰρ περιβόλου βραχέα εἱστήκει καὶ οἰκίαι αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ ἐπεπτώκεσαν, ὀλίγαι δὲ περιῆσαν, ἐν αἷς αὐτοὶ ἐσκήνωσαν οἱ δυνατοὶ τῶν Περσῶν.

90. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τὸ μέλλον ἦλθον πρεσβείᾳ, τὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἥδιον ἂν ὁρῶντες μήτ᾽ ἐκείνους μήτ᾽ ἄλλον μηδένα τεῖχος ἔχοντα, τὸ δὲ πλέον τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐξοτρυνόντων καὶ φοβουμένων τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὃ πρὶν οὐχ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον τόλμαν γενομένην. [2] ἠξίουν τε αὐτοὺς μὴ τειχίζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἔξω Πελοποννήσου μᾶλλον ὅσοις εἱστήκει ξυγκαθελεῖν μετὰ σφῶν τοὺς περιβόλους, τὸ μὲν βουλόμενον καὶ ὕποπτον τῆς γνώμης οὐ δηλοῦντες ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὡς δὲ τοῦ βαρβάρου, εἰ αὖθις ἐπέλθοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοντος ἀπὸ ἐχυροῦ ποθέν, ὥσπερ νῦν ἐκ τῶν Θηβῶν, ὁρμᾶσθαι: τήν τε Πελοπόννησον πᾶσιν ἔφασαν ἀναχώρησίν τε καὶ ἀφορμὴν ἱκανὴν εἶναι. [3] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι Θεμιστοκλέους γνώμῃ τοὺς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους ταῦτ᾽ εἰπόντας ἀποκρινάμενοι ὅτι πέμψουσιν ὡς αὐτοὺς πρέσβεις περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν εὐθὺς ἀπήλλαξαν: ἑαυτὸν δ᾽ ἐκέλευεν ἀποστέλλειν ὡς τάχιστα ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα, ἄλλους δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτῷ ἑλομένους πρέσβεις μὴ εὐθὺς ἐκπέμπειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπισχεῖν μέχρι τοσούτου ἕως ἂν τὸ τεῖχος ἱκανὸν ἄρωσιν ὥστε ἀπομάχεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ

ἀναγκαιοτάτου ὕψους: τειχίζειν δὲ πάντας πανδημεὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει [καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας], φειδομένους μήτε ἰδίου μήτε δημοσίου οἰκοδομήματος ὅθεν τις ὠφελία ἔσται ἐς τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καθαιροῦντας πάντα. [4] καὶ ὁ μὲν ταῦτα διδάξας καὶ ὑπειπὼν τἆλλα ὅτι αὐτὸς τἀκεῖ πράξοι ᾤχετο. [5] καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν οὐ προσῄει πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ διῆγε καὶ προυφασίζετο. καὶ ὁπότε τις αὐτὸν ἔροιτο τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέρχεται ἐπὶ τὸ κοινόν, ἔφη τοὺς ξυμπρέσβεις ἀναμένειν, ἀσχολίας δέ τινος οὔσης αὐτοὺς ὑπολειφθῆναι, προσδέχεσθαι μέντοι ἐν τάχει ἥξειν καὶ θαυμάζειν ὡς οὔπω πάρεισιν.

91. οἱ δὲ ἀκούοντες τῷ μὲν Θεμιστοκλεῖ ἐπείθοντο διὰ φιλίαν αὐτοῦ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀφικνουμένων καὶ σαφῶς κατηγορούντων ὅτι τειχίζεταί τε καὶ ἤδη ὕψος λαμβάνει, οὐκ εἶχον ὅπως χρὴ ἀπιστῆσαι. [2] γνοὺς δὲ ἐκεῖνος κελεύει αὐτοὺς μὴ λόγοις μᾶλλον παράγεσθαι ἢ πέμψαι σφῶν αὐτῶν ἄνδρας οἵτινες χρηστοὶ καὶ πιστῶς ἀναγγελοῦσι σκεψάμενοι. [3] ἀποστέλλουσιν οὖν, καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κρύφα πέμπει κελεύων ὡς ἥκιστα ἐπιφανῶς κατασχεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀφεῖναι πρὶν ἂν αὐτοὶ πάλιν κομισθῶσιν ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἦκον αὐτῷ οἱ ξυμπρέσβεις, Ἀβρώνιχός τε ὁ Λυσικλέους καὶ Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου, ἀγγέλλοντες ἔχειν ἱκανῶς τὸ τεῖχος ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ μὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι σφᾶς, ὁπότε σαφῶς ἀκούσειαν, οὐκέτι ἀφῶσιν. [4] οἵ τε οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς πρέσβεις, ὥσπερ ἐπεστάλη, κατεῖχον, καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐπελθὼν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐνταῦθα δὴ φανερῶς εἶπεν ὅτι ἡ μὲν πόλις σφῶν τετείχισται ἤδη ὥστε ἱκανὴ εἶναι σῴζειν τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας, εἰ δέ τι βούλονται Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἢ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρεσβεύεσθαι παρὰ σφᾶς, ὡς πρὸς διαγιγνώσκοντας τὸ λοιπὸν ἰέναι τά τε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξύμφορα καὶ τὰ κοινά. [5] τήν τε γὰρ πόλιν ὅτε ἐδόκει ἐκλιπεῖν ἄμεινον εἶναι καὶ ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβῆναι, ἄνευ ἐκείνων ἔφασαν γνόντες τολμῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα αὖ μετ᾽ ἐκείνων βουλεύεσθαι, οὐδενὸς ὕστεροι γνώμῃ φανῆναι. [6] δοκεῖν οὖν σφίσι καὶ νῦν ἄμεινον εἶναι τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν τεῖχος ἔχειν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ τοῖς πολίταις καὶ ἐς

τοὺς πάντας ξυμμάχους ὠφελιμώτερον ἔσεσθαι: [7] οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι μὴ ἀπὸ ἀντιπάλου παρασκευῆς ὁμοῖόν τι ἢ ἴσον ἐς τὸ κοινὸν βουλεύεσθαι. ἢ πάντας οὖν ἀτειχίστους ἔφη χρῆναι ξυμμαχεῖν ἢ καὶ τάδε νομίζειν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.

92. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀκούσαντες ὀργὴν μὲν φανερὰν οὐκ ἐποιοῦντο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ κωλύμῃ, ἀλλὰ γνώμης παραινέσει δῆθεν τῷ κοινῷ ἐπρεσβεύσαντο, ἅμα δὲ καὶ προσφιλεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ τότε διὰ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μῆδον προθυμίαν τὰ μάλιστ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐτύγχανον , τῆς μέντοι βουλήσεως ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδήλως ἤχθοντο. οἵ τε πρέσβεις ἑκατέρων ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀνεπικλήτως.

93. τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν πόλιν ἐτείχισαν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. [2] καὶ δήλη ἡ οἰκοδομία ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ὅτι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐγένετο: οἱ γὰρ θεμέλιοι παντοίων λίθων ὑπόκεινται καὶ οὐ ξυνειργασμένων ἔστιν ᾗ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἕκαστόν ποτε προσέφερον, πολλαί τε στῆλαι ἀπὸ σημάτων καὶ λίθοι εἰργασμένοι ἐγκατελέγησαν. μείζων γὰρ ὁ περίβολος πανταχῇ ἐξήχθη τῆς πόλεως, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντα ὁμοίως κινοῦντες ἠπείγοντο. [3] ἔπεισε δὲ καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ λοιπὰ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν ὑπῆρκτο δ᾽ αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς ἧς κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίοις ἦρξε νομίζων τό τε χωρίον καλὸν εἶναι, λιμένας ἔχον τρεῖς αὐτοφυεῖς, καὶ αὐτοὺς ναυτικοὺς γεγενημένους μέγα προφέρειν ἐς τὸ [4] κτήσασθαι δύναμιν τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστί, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατεσκεύαζεν. [5] καὶ ᾠκοδόμησαν τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ τὸ πάχος τοῦ τείχους ὅπερ νῦν ἔτι δῆλόν ἐστι περὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ: δύο γὰρ ἅμαξαι ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις τοὺς λίθους ἐπῆγον. ἐντὸς δὲ οὔτε χάλιξ οὔτε πηλὸς ἦν, ἀλλὰ ξυνῳκοδομημένοι μεγάλοι λίθοι καὶ ἐντομῇ ἐγγώνιοι, σιδήρῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὰ ἔξωθεν καὶ μολύβδῳ δεδεμένοι. τὸ δὲ ὕψος ἥμισυ μάλιστα ἐτελέσθη οὗ διενοεῖτο. [6] ἐβούλετο γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει ἀφιστάναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλάς, ἀνθρώπων τε ἐνόμιζεν ὀλίγων καὶ τῶν ἀχρειοτάτων ἀρκέσειν τὴν φυλακήν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβήσεσθαι. [7] ταῖς γὰρ ναυσὶ μάλιστα προσέκειτο,

ἰδών, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς βασιλέως στρατιᾶς τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἔφοδον εὐπορωτέραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν οὖσαν: τόν τε Πειραιᾶ ὠφελιμώτερον ἐνόμιζε τῆς ἄνω πόλεως, καὶ πολλάκις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρῄνει, ἢν ἄρα ποτὲ κατὰ γῆν βιασθῶσι, καταβάντας ἐς αὐτὸν ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθίστασθαι. [8] Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐτειχίσθησαν καὶ τἆλλα κατεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν Μήδων ἀναχώρησιν.

94. Παυσανίας δὲ ὁ Κλεομβρότου ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξεπέμφθη μετὰ εἴκοσι νεῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου: ξυνέπλεον δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τριάκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων πλῆθος. [2] καὶ ἐστράτευσαν ἐς Κύπρον καὶ αὐτῆς τὰ πολλὰ κατεστρέψαντο, καὶ ὕστερον ἐς Βυζάντιον Μήδων ἐχόντων, καὶ ἐξεπολιόρκησαν ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ.

95. ἤδη δὲ βιαίου ὄντος αὐτοῦ οἵ τε ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἤχθοντο καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ Ἴωνες καὶ ὅσοι ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεωστὶ ἠλευθέρωντο: φοιτῶντές τε πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠξίουν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ Παυσανίᾳ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, ἤν που βιάζηται. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐδέξαντό τε τοὺς λόγους καὶ προσεῖχον τὴν γνώμην ὡς οὐ περιοψόμενοι τἆλλά τε καταστησόμενοι ᾗ φαίνοιτο ἄριστα αὐτοῖς. [3] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μετεπέμποντο Παυσανίαν ἀνακρινοῦντες ὧν πέρι ἐπυνθάνοντο: καὶ γὰρ ἀδικία πολλὴ κατηγορεῖτο αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἀφικνουμένων, καὶ τυραννίδος μᾶλλον ἐφαίνετο μίμησις ἢ στρατηγία. [4] ξυνέβη τε αὐτῷ καλεῖσθαί τε ἅμα καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τῷ ἐκείνου ἔχθει παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους μετατάξασθαι πλὴν τῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου στρατιωτῶν. [5] ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐς Λακεδαίμονα τῶν μὲν ἰδίᾳ πρός τινα ἀδικημάτων ηὐθύνθη, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα ἀπολύεται μὴ ἀδικεῖν: κατηγορεῖτο δὲ αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἥκιστα μηδισμὸς καὶ ἐδόκει σαφέστατον εἶναι. [6] καὶ ἐκεῖνον μὲν οὐκέτι ἐκπέμπουσιν ἄρχοντα, Δόρκιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ στρατιὰν ἔχοντας οὐ πολλήν: οἷς οὐκέτι ἐφίεσαν οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. [7] οἱ δὲ αἰσθόμενοι ἀπῆλθον, καὶ ἄλλους οὐκέτι ὕστερον ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι,

φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσιν οἱ ἐξιόντες χείρους γίγνωνται, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ Παυσανίᾳ ἐνεῖδον, ἀπαλλαξείοντες δὲ καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους νομίζοντες ἱκανοὺς ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ σφίσιν ἐν τῷ τότε παρόντι ἐπιτηδείους.

96. παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἑκόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ τὸ Παυσανίου μῖσος, ἔταξαν ἅς τε ἔδει παρέχειν τῶν πόλεων χρήματα πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον καὶ ἃς ναῦς: πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν ἀμύνεσθαι ὧν ἔπαθον δῃοῦντας τὴν βασιλέως χώραν. [2] καὶ Ἑλληνοταμίαι τότε πρῶτον Ἀθηναίοις κατέστη ἀρχή, οἳ ἐδέχοντο τὸν φόρον: οὕτω γὰρ ὠνομάσθη τῶν χρημάτων ἡ φορά. ἦν δ᾽ ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεὶς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἑξήκοντα. ταμιεῖόν τε Δῆλος ἦν αὐτοῖς, καὶ αἱ ξύνοδοι ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐγίγνοντο.

97. ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ, ἃ ἐγένετο πρός τε τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους νεωτερίζοντας καὶ Πελοποννησίων τοὺς αἰεὶ προστυγχάνοντας ἐν ἑκάστῳ. [2] ἔγραψα δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐποιησάμην διὰ τόδε, ὅτι τοῖς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἅπασιν ἐκλιπὲς τοῦτο ἦν τὸ χωρίον καὶ ἢ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν Ἑλληνικὰ ξυνετίθεσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά: τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ καὶ ἥψατο ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ξυγγραφῇ Ἑλλάνικος, βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν οἵῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη.

98. πρῶτον μὲν Ἠιόνα τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι Μήδων ἐχόντων πολιορκίᾳ εἷλον καὶ ἠνδραπόδισαν, Κίμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγοῦντος. [2] ἔπειτα Σκῦρον τὴν ἐν τῷ Αἰγαίῳ νῆσον, ἣν ᾤκουν Δόλοπες, ἠνδραπόδισαν καὶ ᾤκισαν αὐτοί. [3] πρὸς δὲ Καρυστίους αὐτοῖς ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων Εὐβοέων πόλεμος ἐγένετο, καὶ χρόνῳ ξυνέβησαν καθ᾽ ὁμολογίαν. [4] Ναξίοις δὲ ἀποστᾶσι μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπολέμησαν καὶ πολιορκίᾳ παρεστήσαντο, πρώτη τε αὕτη πόλις ξυμμαχὶς παρὰ τὸ

καθεστηκὸς ἐδουλώθη, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἑκάστῃ ξυνέβη.

99. αἰτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι τε ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστάσεων καὶ μέγισται αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἔκδειαι καὶ λιποστράτιον εἴ τῳ ἐγένετο: οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον καὶ λυπηροὶ ἦσαν οὐκ εἰωθόσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες τὰς ἀνάγκας. [2] ἦσαν δέ πως καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὔτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ῥᾴδιόν τε προσάγεσθαι ἦν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀφισταμένους. [3] ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἐγένοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι: διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκνησιν ταύτην τῶν στρατειῶν οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ᾽ οἴκου ὦσι, χρήματα ἐτάξαντο ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἱκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ηὔξετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἣν ἐκεῖνοι ξυμφέροιεν, αὐτοὶ δέ, ὁπότε ἀποσταῖεν, ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἄπειροι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο.

100. ἐγένετο δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἐπ᾽ Εὐρυμέδοντι ποταμῷ ἐν Παμφυλίᾳ πεζομαχία καὶ ναυμαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς Μήδους, καὶ ἐνίκων τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀμφότερα Ἀθηναῖοι Κίμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ εἷλον τριήρεις Φοινίκων καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς πάσας ἐς διακοσίας. [2] χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον ξυνέβη Θασίους αὐτῶν ἀποστῆναι, διενεχθέντας περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας Θρᾴκῃ ἐμπορίων καὶ τοῦ μετάλλου ἃ ἐνέμοντο. καὶ ναυσὶ μὲν ἐπὶ Θάσον πλεύσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ναυμαχίᾳ ἐκράτησαν καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀπέβησαν, [3] ἐπὶ δὲ Στρυμόνα πέμψαντες μυρίους οἰκήτορας αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ὡς οἰκιοῦντες τὰς τότε καλουμένας Ἐννέα ὁδούς, νῦν δὲ Ἀμφίπολιν, τῶν μὲν Ἐννέα ὁδῶν αὐτοὶ ἐκράτησαν, ἃς εἶχον Ἠδωνοί, προελθόντες δὲ τῆς Θρᾴκης ἐς μεσόγειαν διεφθάρησαν ἐν Δραβησκῷ τῇ Ἠδωνικῇ ὑπὸ τῶν Θρᾳκῶν ξυμπάντων, οἷς πολέμιον ἦν τὸ χωρίον [αἱ Ἐννέα ὁδοὶ] κτιζόμενον.

101. Θάσιοι δὲ νικηθέντες μάχῃ καὶ πολιορκούμενοι Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεκαλοῦντο καὶ ἐπαμύνειν ἐκέλευον ἐσβαλόντας ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν. [2] οἱ δὲ ὑπέσχοντο μὲν κρύφα

τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἔμελλον, διεκωλύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ, ἐν ᾧ καὶ οἱ Εἵλωτες αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν περιοίκων Θουριᾶταί τε καὶ Αἰθαιῆς ἐς Ἰθώμην ἀπέστησαν. πλεῖστοι δὲ τῶν Εἱλώτων ἐγένοντο οἱ τῶν παλαιῶν Μεσσηνίων τότε δουλωθέντων ἀπόγονοι: ᾗ καὶ Μεσσήνιοι ἐκλήθησαν οἱ πάντες. [3] πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν Ἰθώμῃ πόλεμος καθειστήκει Λακεδαιμονίοις, Θάσιοι δὲ τρίτῳ ἔτει πολιορκούμενοι ὡμολόγησαν Ἀθηναίοις τεῖχός τε καθελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες, χρήματά τε ὅσα ἔδει ἀποδοῦναι αὐτίκα ταξάμενοι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν φέρειν, τήν τε ἤπειρον καὶ τὸ μέταλλον ἀφέντες.

102. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δέ, ὡς αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἰθώμῃ ἐμηκύνετο ὁ πόλεμος, ἄλλους τε ἐπεκαλέσαντο ξυμμάχους καὶ Ἀθηναίους: οἱ δ᾽ ἦλθον Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος πλήθει οὐκ ὀλίγῳ. [2] μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐπεκαλέσαντο ὅτι τειχομαχεῖν ἐδόκουν δυνατοὶ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκίας μακρᾶς καθεστηκυίας τούτου ἐνδεᾶ ἐφαίνετο: βίᾳ γὰρ ἂν εἷλον τὸ χωρίον. [3] καὶ διαφορὰ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς στρατείας πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις φανερὰ ἐγένετο. οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ χωρίον βίᾳ οὐχ ἡλίσκετο, δείσαντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ τολμηρὸν καὶ τὴν νεωτεροποιίαν, καὶ ἀλλοφύλους ἅμα ἡγησάμενοι, μή τι, ἢν παραμείνωσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰθώμῃ πεισθέντες νεωτερίσωσι, μόνους τῶν ξυμμάχων ἀπέπεμψαν, τὴν μὲν ὑποψίαν οὐ δηλοῦντες, εἰπόντες δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν προσδέονται αὐτῶν ἔτι. [4] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔγνωσαν οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίονι λόγῳ ἀποπεμπόμενοι, ἀλλά τινος ὑπόπτου γενομένου, καὶ δεινὸν ποιησάμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἀξιώσαντες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τοῦτο παθεῖν, εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀνεχώρησαν, ἀφέντες τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἀργείοις τοῖς ἐκείνων πολεμίοις ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς Θεσσαλοὺς ἅμα ἀμφοτέροις οἱ αὐτοὶ ὅρκοι καὶ ξυμμαχία κατέστη.

103. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν Ἰθώμῃ δεκάτῳ ἔτει, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐδύναντο ἀντέχειν, ξυνέβησαν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἐξίασιν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπόσπονδοι καὶ μηδέποτε ἐπιβήσονται αὐτῆς: ἢν δέ τις ἁλίσκηται, τοῦ λαβόντος εἶναι

δοῦλον. [2] ἦν δέ τι καὶ χρηστήριον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις Πυθικὸν πρὸ τοῦ, τὸν ἱκέτην τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ἰθωμήτα ἀφιέναι. [3] ἐξῆλθον δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες, καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεξάμενοι κατ᾽ ἔχθος ἤδη τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐς Ναύπακτον κατῴκισαν, ἣν ἔτυχον ᾑρηκότες νεωστὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἐχόντων. [4] προσεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς ξυμμαχίαν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστάντες, ὅτι αὐτοὺς Κορίνθιοι περὶ γῆς ὅρων πολέμῳ κατεῖχον: καὶ ἔσχον Ἀθηναῖοι Μέγαρα καὶ Πηγάς, καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ᾠκοδόμησαν Μεγαρεῦσι τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐς Νίσαιαν καὶ ἐφρούρουν αὐτοί. καὶ Κορινθίοις μὲν οὐχ ἥκιστα ἀπὸ τοῦδε τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος ἤρξατο πρῶτον ἐς Ἀθηναίους γενέσθαι.

104. Ἰνάρως δὲ ὁ Ψαμμητίχου, Λίβυς, βασιλεὺς Λιβύων τῶν πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ, ὁρμώμενος ἐκ Μαρείας τῆς ὑπὲρ Φάρου πόλεως ἀπέστησεν Αἰγύπτου τὰ πλείω ἀπὸ βασιλέως Ἀρταξέρξου, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρχων γενόμενος Ἀθηναίους ἐπηγάγετο. [2] οἱ δέ ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐς Κύπρον στρατευόμενοι ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἦλθον ἀπολιπόντες τὴν Κύπρον, καὶ ἀναπλεύσαντες ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐς τὸν Νεῖλον τοῦ τε ποταμοῦ κρατοῦντες καὶ τῆς Μέμφιδος τῶν δύο μερῶν πρὸς τὸ τρίτον μέρος ὃ καλεῖται Λευκὸν τεῖχος ἐπολέμουν: ἐνῆσαν δὲ αὐτόθι Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων οἱ καταφυγόντες καὶ Αἰγυπτίων οἱ μὴ ξυναποστάντες.

105. Ἀθηναίοις δὲ ναυσὶν ἀποβᾶσιν ἐς Ἁλιᾶς πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους μάχη ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐνίκων Κορίνθιοι. καὶ ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι ἐναυμάχησαν ἐπὶ Κεκρυφαλείᾳ Πελοποννησίων ναυσί, καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι. [2] πολέμου δὲ καταστάντος πρὸς Αἰγινήτας Ἀθηναίοις μετὰ ταῦτα ναυμαχία γίγνεται ἐπ᾽ Αἰγίνῃ μεγάλη Ἀθηναίων καὶ Αἰγινητῶν, καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἑκατέροις παρῆσαν, καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ναῦς ἑβδομήκοντα λαβόντες αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀπέβησαν καὶ ἐπολιόρκουν, Λεωκράτους τοῦ Στροίβου στρατηγοῦντος. [3] ἔπειτα Πελοποννήσιοι ἀμύνειν βουλόμενοι Αἰγινήταις ἐς μὲν τὴν Αἴγιναν τριακοσίους ὁπλίτας πρότερον Κορινθίων καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίων ἐπικούρους

διεβίβασαν, τὰ δὲ ἄκρα τῆς Γερανείας κατέλαβον καὶ ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα κατέβησαν Κορίνθιοι μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων, νομίζοντες ἀδυνάτους ἔσεσθαι Ἀθηναίους βοηθεῖν τοῖς Μεγαρεῦσιν ἔν τε Αἰγίνῃ ἀπούσης στρατιᾶς πολλῆς καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ: ἦν δὲ καὶ βοηθῶσιν, ἀπ᾽ Αἰγίνης ἀναστήσεσθαι αὐτούς. [4] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ μὲν πρὸς Αἰγίνῃ στράτευμα οὐκ ἐκίνησαν, τῶν δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπολοίπων οἵ τε πρεσβύτατοι καὶ οἱ νεώτατοι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ Μέγαρα Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος. [5] καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἰσορρόπου πρὸς Κορινθίους διεκρίθησαν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐνόμισαν αὐτοὶ ἑκάτεροι οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ. [6] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκράτησαν γὰρ ὅμως μᾶλλον ἀπελθόντων τῶν Κορινθίων τροπαῖον ἔστησαν: οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι κακιζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων καὶ παρασκευασάμενοι, ἡμέραις ὕστερον δώδεκα μάλιστα ἐλθόντες ἀνθίστασαν τροπαῖον καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς νικήσαντες. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκβοηθήσαντες ἐκ τῶν Μεγάρων τούς τε τὸ τροπαῖον ἱστάντας διαφθείρουσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβαλόντες ἐκράτησαν.

106. οἱ δὲ νικώμενοι ὑπεχώρουν, καί τι αὐτῶν μέρος οὐκ ὀλίγον προσβιασθὲν καὶ διαμαρτὸν τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐσέπεσεν ἔς του χωρίον ἰδιώτου, ᾧ ἔτυχεν ὄρυγμα μέγα περιεῖργον καὶ οὐκ ἦν ἔξοδος. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι γνόντες κατὰ πρόσωπόν τε εἶργον τοῖς ὁπλίταις καὶ περιστήσαντες κύκλῳ τοὺς ψιλοὺς κατέλευσαν πάντας τοὺς ἐσελθόντας, καὶ πάθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίοις ἐγένετο. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἀπεχώρησεν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

107. ἤρξαντο δὲ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς θάλασσαν οἰκοδομεῖν, τό τε Φαληρόνδε καὶ τὸ ἐς Πειραιᾶ. [2] καὶ Φωκέων στρατευσάντων ἐς Δωριᾶς τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων μητρόπολιν, Βοιὸν καὶ Κυτίνιον καὶ Ἐρινεόν, καὶ ἑλόντων ἓν τῶν πολισμάτων τούτων, οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Νικομήδους τοῦ Κλεομβρότου ὑπὲρ Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου βασιλέως νέου ὄντος ἔτι ἡγουμένου ἐβοήθησαν τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν ἑαυτῶν τε πεντακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις ὁπλίταις καὶ

τῶν ξυμμάχων μυρίοις, καὶ τοὺς Φωκέας ὁμολογίᾳ ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ἀπεχώρουν πάλιν. [3] καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν μὲν αὐτούς, διὰ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου εἰ βούλοιντο περαιοῦσθαι, Ἀθηναῖοι ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες ἔμελλον κωλύσειν: διὰ δὲ τῆς Γερανείας οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνετο Ἀθηναίων ἐχόντων Μέγαρα καὶ Πηγὰς πορεύεσθαι. δύσοδός τε γὰρ ἡ Γερανεία καὶ ἐφρουρεῖτο αἰεὶ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τότε ᾐσθάνοντο αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας καὶ ταύτῃ κωλύσειν. [4] ἔδοξε δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς περιμείνασι σκέψασθαι ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἀσφαλέστατα διαπορεύσονται. τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄνδρες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπῆγον αὐτοὺς κρύφα, ἐλπίσαντες δῆμόν τε καταπαύσειν καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη οἰκοδομούμενα. [5] ἐβοήθησαν δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεὶ καὶ Ἀργείων χίλιοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων ὡς ἕκαστοι: ξύμπαντες δὲ ἐγένοντο τετρακισχίλιοι καὶ μύριοι. [6] νομίσαντες δὲ ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ διέλθωσιν ἐπεστράτευσαν αὐτοῖς, καί τι καὶ τοῦ δήμου καταλύσεως ὑποψίᾳ. [7] ἦλθον δὲ καὶ Θεσσαλῶν ἱππῆς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν, οἳ μετέστησαν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ παρὰ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.

108. γενομένης δὲ μάχης ἐν Τανάγρᾳ τῆς Βοιωτίας ἐνίκων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, καὶ φόνος ἐγένετο ἀμφοτέρων πολύς. [2] καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα ἐλθόντες καὶ δενδροτομήσαντες πάλιν ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου διὰ Γερανείας καὶ Ἰσθμοῦ: Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ δευτέρᾳ καὶ ἑξηκοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐστράτευσαν ἐς Βοιωτοὺς Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος, [3] καὶ μάχῃ ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς νικήσαντες τῆς τε χώρας ἐκράτησαν τῆς Βοιωτίας καὶ Φωκίδος καὶ Ταναγραίων τὸ τεῖχος περιεῖλον καὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀπουντίων ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας ὁμήρους τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους ἔλαβον, τά τε τείχη ἑαυτῶν τὰ μακρὰ ἀπετέλεσαν. [4] ὡμολόγησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Αἰγινῆται μετὰ ταῦτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τείχη τε περιελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες φόρον τε ταξάμενοι ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. [5] καὶ Πελοπόννησον περιέπλευσαν Ἀθηναῖοι Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμαίου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ τὸ νεώριον τῶν

Λακεδαιμονίων ἐνέπρησαν καὶ Χαλκίδα Κορινθίων πόλιν εἶλον καὶ Σικυωνίους ἐν ἀποβάσει τῆς γῆς μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν.

109. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπέμενον, καὶ αὐτοῖς πολλαὶ ἰδέαι πολέμων κατέστησαν. [2] τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐκράτουν τῆς Αἰγύπτου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ βασιλεὺς πέμπει ἐς Λακεδαίμονα Μεγάβαζον ἄνδρα Πέρσην χρήματα ἔχοντα, ὅπως ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβαλεῖν πεισθέντων τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἀπ᾽ Αἰγύπτου ἀπαγάγοι Ἀθηναίους. [3] ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ προυχώρει καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἄλλως ἀνηλοῦτο, ὁ μὲν Μεγάβαζος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν χρημάτων πάλιν ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀνεκομίσθη, Μεγάβυζον δὲ τὸν Ζωπύρου πέμπει ἄνδρα Πέρσην μετὰ στρατιᾶς πολλῆς: [4] ὃς ἀφικόμενος κατὰ γῆν τούς τε Αἰγυπτίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μάχῃ ἐκράτησε καὶ ἐκ τῆς Μέμφιδος ἐξήλασε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ τέλος ἐς Προσωπίτιδα τὴν νῆσον κατέκλῃσε καὶ ἐπολιόρκει ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ ἓξ μῆνας, μέχρι οὗ ξηράνας τὴν διώρυχα καὶ παρατρέψας ἄλλῃ τὸ ὕδωρ τάς τε ναῦς ἐπὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ ἐποίησε καὶ τῆς νήσου τὰ πολλὰ ἤπειρον, καὶ διαβὰς εἶλε τὴν νῆσον πεζῇ.

110. οὕτω μὲν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πράγματα ἐφθάρη ἓξ ἔτη πολεμήσαντα: καὶ ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν πορευόμενοι διὰ τῆς Λιβύης ἐς Κυρήνην ἐσώθησαν, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι ἀπώλοντο. [2] Αἴγυπτος δὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ βασιλέα ἐγένετο πλὴν Ἀμυρταίου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἕλεσι βασιλέως: τοῦτον δὲ διὰ μέγεθός τε τοῦ ἕλους οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν, καὶ ἅμα μαχιμώτατοί εἰσι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων οἱ ἕλειοι. [3] Ἰνάρως δὲ ὁ Λιβύων βασιλεύς, ὃς τὰ πάντα ἔπραξε περὶ τῆς Αἰγύπτου, προδοσίᾳ ληφθεὶς ἀνεσταυρώθη. [4] ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ξυμμαχίδος πεντήκοντα τριήρεις διάδοχοι πλέουσαι ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἔσχον κατὰ τὸ Μενδήσιον κέρας, οὐκ εἰδότες τῶν γεγονότων οὐδέν: καὶ αὐτοῖς ἔκ τε γῆς ἐπιπεσόντες πεζοὶ καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης Φοινίκων ναυτικὸν διέφθειραν τὰς πολλὰς τῶν νεῶν, αἱ δ᾽ ἐλάσσους διέφυγον πάλιν. τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην στρατείαν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς Αἴγυπτον οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

111. ἐκ δὲ Θεσσαλίας Ὀρέστης ὁ Ἐχεκρατίδου υἱὸς τοῦ Θεσσαλῶν βασιλέως φεύγων ἔπεισεν Ἀθηναίους ἑαυτὸν κατάγειν: καὶ παραλαβόντες Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Φωκέας ὄντας ξυμμάχους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευσαν τῆς Θεσσαλίας ἐπὶ Φάρσαλον. καὶ τῆς μὲν γῆς ἐκράτουν ὅσα μὴ προϊόντες πολὺ ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων [οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εἶργον], τὴν δὲ πόλιν οὐχ εἶλον, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο προυχώρει αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ὧν ἕνεκα ἐστράτευσαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπεχώρησαν πάλιν Ὀρέστην ἔχοντες ἄπρακτοι. [2] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον χίλιοι Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τὰς ἐν Πηγαῖς ἐπιβάντες [εἶχον δ᾽ αὐτοὶ τὰς Πηγάς] παρέπλευσαν ἐς Σικυῶνα Περικλέους τοῦ Ξανθίππου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ ἀποβάντες Σικυωνίων τοὺς προσμείξαντας μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν. [3] καὶ εὐθὺς παραλαβόντες Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ διαπλεύσαντες πέραν τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας ἐς Οἰνιάδας ἐστράτευσαν καὶ ἐπολιόρκουν, οὐ μέντοι εἶλόν γε, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

112. ὕστερον δὲ διαλιπόντων ἐτῶν τριῶν σπονδαὶ γίγνονται Πελοποννησίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πεντέτεις. [2] καὶ Ἑλληνικοῦ μὲν πολέμου ἔσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐς δὲ Κύπρον ἐστρατεύοντο ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος. [3] καὶ ἑξήκοντα μὲν νῆες ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἔπλευσαν, Ἀμυρταίου μεταπέμποντος τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἕλεσι βασιλέως, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι Κίτιον ἐπολιόρκουν. [4] Κίμωνος δὲ ἀποθανόντος καὶ λιμοῦ γενομένου ἀπεχώρησαν ἀπὸ Κιτίου, καὶ πλεύσαντες ὑπὲρ Σαλαμῖνος τῆς ἐν Κύπρῳ Φοίνιξι καὶ Κυπρίοις καὶ Κίλιξιν ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ ἐπεζομάχησαν ἅμα, καὶ νικήσαντες ἀμφότερα ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου καὶ αἱ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου νῆες πάλιν [αἱ] ἐλθοῦσαι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν. [5] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν ἱερὸν καλούμενον πόλεμον ἐστράτευσαν, καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱεροῦ παρέδοσαν Δελφοῖς: καὶ αὖθις ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποχωρησάντων αὐτῶν στρατεύσαντες καὶ κρατήσαντες παρέδοσαν Φωκεῦσιν.

113. καὶ χρόνου ἐγγενομένου μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι, Βοιωτῶν τῶν φευγόντων ἐχόντων Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ Χαιρώνειαν καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα χωρία τῆς Βοιωτίας,

ἐστράτευσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν χιλίοις ὁπλίταις, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ὡς ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα πολέμια ὄντα, Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμαίου στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἑλόντες καὶ ἀνδραποδίσαντες ἀπεχώρουν φυλακὴν καταστήσαντες. [2] πορευομένοις δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐν Κορωνείᾳ ἐπιτίθενται οἵ τε ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχομενοῦ φυγάδες Βοιωτῶν καὶ Λοκροὶ μετ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ Εὐβοέων φυγάδες καὶ ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν, καὶ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς μὲν διέφθειραν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἔλαβον. [3] καὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐξέλιπον Ἀθηναῖοι πᾶσαν, σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιοῦνται. [4] καὶ οἱ φεύγοντες Βοιωτῶν κατελθόντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες αὐτόνομοι πάλιν ἐγένοντο.

114. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον Εὔβοια ἀπέστη ἀπὸ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐς αὐτὴν διαβεβηκότος ἤδη Περικλέους στρατιᾷ Ἀθηναίων ἠγγέλθη αὐτῷ ὅτι Μέγαρα ἀφέστηκε καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι μέλλουσιν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ οἱ φρουροὶ Ἀθηναίων διεφθαρμένοι εἰσὶν ὑπὸ Μεγαρέων, πλὴν ὅσοι ἐς Νίσαιαν ἀπέφυγον: ἐπαγαγόμενοι δὲ Κορινθίους καὶ Σικυωνίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους ἀπέστησαν οἱ Μεγαρῆς. ὁ δὲ Περικλῆς πάλιν κατὰ τάχος ἐκόμιζε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας. [2] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ Θριῶζε ἐσβαλόντες ἐδῄωσαν Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου βασιλέως Λακεδαιμονίων ἡγουμένου, καὶ τὸ πλέον οὐκέτι προελθόντες ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [3] καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι πάλιν ἐς Εὔβοιαν διαβάντες Περικλέους στρατηγοῦντος κατεστρέψαντο πᾶσαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ὁμολογίᾳ κατεστήσαντο, Ἑστιαιᾶς δὲ ἐξοικίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν ἔσχον.

115. ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἀπ᾽ Εὐβοίας οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τριακοντούτεις, ἀποδόντες Νίσαιαν καὶ Πηγὰς καὶ Τροιζῆνα καὶ Ἀχαΐαν: ταῦτα γὰρ εἶχον Ἀθηναῖοι Πελοποννησίων. [2]ἔκτῳ δὲ ἔτει Σαμίοις καὶ Μιλησίοις πόλεμος ἐγένετο περὶ Πριήνης, καὶ οἱ Μιλήσιοι ἐλασσούμενοι τῷ πολέμῳ παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἐλθόντες

κατεβόων τῶν Σαμίων. ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Σάμου ἄνδρες ἰδιῶται νεωτερίσαι βουλόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν. [3] πλεύσαντες οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς Σάμον ναυσὶ τεσσαράκοντα δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν, καὶ ὁμήρους ἔλαβον τῶν Σαμίων πεντήκοντα μὲν παῖδας, ἴσους δὲ ἄνδρας, καὶ κατέθεντο ἐς Λῆμνον, καὶ φρουρὰν ἐγκαταλιπόντες ἀνεχώρησαν. [4] τῶν δὲ Σαμίων ἦσαν γάρ τινες οἳ οὐχ ὑπέμειναν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔφυγον ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον, ξυνθέμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τοῖς δυνατωτάτοις καὶ Πισσούθνῃ τῷ Ὑστάσπου ξυμμαχίαν, ὃς εἶχε Σάρδεις τότε, ἐπικούρους τε ξυλλέξαντες ἐς ἑπτακοσίους διέβησαν ὑπὸ νύκτα ἐς τὴν Σάμον, [5] καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν πλείστων, ἔπειτα τοὺς ὁμήρους ἐκκλέψαντες ἐκ Λήμνου τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν, καὶ τοὺς φρουροὺς τοὺς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας οἳ ἦσαν παρὰ σφίσιν ἐξέδοσαν Πισσούθνῃ, ἐπί τε Μίλητον εὐθὺς παρεσκευάζοντο στρατεύειν. ξυναπέστησαν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ Βυζάντιοι.

116. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὡς ᾔσθοντο, πλεύσαντες ναυσὶν ἑξήκοντα ἐπὶ Σάμου ταῖς μὲν ἑκκαίδεκα τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχρήσαντο ἔτυχον γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ Καρίας ἐς προσκοπὴν τῶν Φοινισσῶν νεῶν οἰχόμεναι, αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου περιαγγέλλουσαι βοηθεῖν , τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ναυσὶ καὶ τέσσαρσι Περικλέους δεκάτου αὐτοῦ στρατηγοῦντος ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς Τραγίᾳ τῇ νήσῳ Σαμίων ναυσὶν ἑβδομήκοντα, ὧν ἦσαν αἱ εἴκοσι στρατιώτιδες ἔτυχον δὲ αἱ πᾶσαι ἀπὸ Μιλήτου πλέουσαι , καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι. [2] ὕστερον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐβοήθησαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν νῆες τεσσαράκοντα καὶ Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι, καὶ ἀποβάντες καὶ κρατοῦντες τῷ πεζῷ ἐπολιόρκουν τρισὶ τείχεσι τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἅμα. [3] Περικλῆς δὲ λαβὼν ἑξήκοντα ναῦς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐφορμουσῶν ᾤχετο κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ Καύνου καὶ Καρίας, ἐσαγγελθέντων ὅτι Φοίνισσαι νῆες ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς πλέουσιν: ᾤχετο γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πέντε ναυσὶ Στησαγόρας καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας.

117. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Σάμιοι ἐξαπιναίως ἔκπλουν ποιησάμενοι ἀφάρκτῳ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἐπιπεσόντες τάς τε προφυλακίδας ναῦς διέφθειραν καὶ ναυμαχοῦντες τὰς ἀνταναγομένας ἐνίκησαν, καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης τῆς καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκράτησαν ἡμέρας περὶ τέσσαρας καὶ δέκα, καὶ ἐσεκομίσαντο καὶ ἐξεκομίσαντο ἃ ἐβούλοντο. [2] ἐλθόντος δὲ Περικλέους πάλιν ταῖς ναυσὶ κατεκλῄσθησαν. καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ὕστερον προσεβοήθησαν τεσσαράκοντα μὲν αἱ μετὰ Θουκυδίδου καὶ Ἄγνωνος καὶ Φορμίωνος νῆες, εἴκοσι δὲ αἱ μετὰ Τληπολέμου καὶ Ἀντικλέους, ἐκ δὲ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου τριάκοντα. [3] καὶ ναυμαχίαν μέν τινα βραχεῖαν ἐποιήσαντο οἱ Σάμιοι, ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀντίσχειν ἐξεπολιορκήθησαν ἐνάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογίᾳ, τεῖχός τε καθελόντες καὶ ὁμήρους δόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες καὶ χρήματα τὰ ἀναλωθέντα ταξάμενοι κατὰ χρόνους ἀποδοῦναι. ξυνέβησαν δὲ καὶ Βυζάντιοι ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον ὑπήκοοι εἶναι.

118. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη γίγνεται οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον τὰ προειρημένα, τά τε Κερκυραϊκὰ καὶ τὰ Ποτειδεατικὰ καὶ ὅσα πρόφασις τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου κατέστη. [2] ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα ὅσα ἔπραξαν οἱ Ἕλληνες πρός τε ἀλλήλους καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον ἐγένετο ἐν ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ξέρξου ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου: ἐν οἷς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τήν τε ἀρχὴν ἐγκρατεστέραν κατεστήσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι οὔτε ἐκώλυον εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ βραχύ, ἡσύχαζόν τε τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου, ὄντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἰέναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, ἢν μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται, τὸ δέ τι καὶ πολέμοις οἰκείοις ἐξειργόμενοι, πρὶν δὴ ἡ δύναμις τῶν Ἀθηναίων σαφῶς ἤρετο καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας αὐτῶν ἥπτοντο. τότε δὲ οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιχειρητέα ἐδόκει εἶναι πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ καὶ καθαιρετέα ἡ ἰσχύς, ἢν δύνωνται, ἀραμένοις τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον. [3] αὐτοῖς μὲν οὖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις διέγνωστο λελύσθαι τε τὰς σπονδὰς καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀδικεῖν, πέμψαντες δὲ ἐς Δελφοὺς ἐπηρώτων τὸν θεὸν εἰ

πολεμοῦσιν ἄμεινον ἔσται: ὁ δὲ ἀνεῖλεν αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, κατὰ κράτος πολεμοῦσι νίκην ἔσεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔφη ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἄκλητος.

119. αὖθις δὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους παρακαλέσαντες ψῆφον ἐβούλοντο ἐπαγαγεῖν εἰ χρὴ πολεμεῖν. καὶ ἐλθόντων τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπὸ τῆς ξυμμαχίας καὶ ξυνόδου γενομένης οἵ τε ἄλλοι εἶπον ἃ ἐβούλοντο, κατηγοροῦντες οἱ πλείους τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀξιοῦντες γίγνεσθαι, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι δεηθέντες μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις πρότερον ἑκάστων ἰδίᾳ ὥστε ψηφίσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον, δεδιότες περὶ τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ μὴ προδιαφθαρῇ, παρόντες δὲ καὶ τότε καὶ τελευταῖοι ἐπελθόντες ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

120. ‘τοὺς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι αἰτιασαίμεθα ὡς οὐ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐψηφισμένοι τὸν πόλεμόν εἰσι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐς τοῦτο νῦν ξυνήγαγον. χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τὰ ἴδια ἐξ ἴσου νέμοντας τὰ κοινὰ προσκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐκ πάντων προτιμῶνται. [2] ἡμῶν δὲ ὅσοι μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ἤδη ἐνηλλάγησαν οὐχὶ διδαχῆς δέονται ὥστε φυλάξασθαι αὐτούς: τοὺς δὲ τὴν μεσόγειαν μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ ἐν πόρῳ κατῳκημένους εἰδέναι χρὴ ὅτι, τοῖς κάτω ἢν μὴ ἀμύνωσι, χαλεπωτέραν ἕξουσι τὴν κατακομιδὴν τῶν ὡραίων καὶ πάλιν ἀντίληψιν ὧν ἡ θάλασσα τῇ ἠπείρῳ δίδωσι, καὶ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων μὴ κακοὺς κριτὰς ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων εἶναι, προσδέχεσθαι δέ ποτε, εἰ τὰ κάτω πρόοιντο, κἂν μέχρι σφῶν τὸ δεινὸν προελθεῖν, καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐχ ἧσσον νῦν βουλεύεσθαι. [3] δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ μὴ ὀκνεῖν δεῖ αὐτοὺς τὸν πόλεμον ἀντ᾽ εἰρήνης μεταλαμβάνειν. ἀνδρῶν γὰρ σωφρόνων μέν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖντο, ἡσυχάζειν, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ἀδικουμένους ἐκ μὲν εἰρήνης πολεμεῖν, εὖ δὲ παρασχὸν ἐκ πολέμου πάλιν ξυμβῆναι, καὶ μήτε τῇ κατὰ πόλεμον εὐτυχίᾳ ἐπαίρεσθαι μήτε τῷ ἡσύχῳ τῆς εἰρήνης ἡδόμενον ἀδικεῖσθαι. [4] ὅ τε γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὀκνῶν τάχιστ᾽ ἂν ἀφαιρεθείη τῆς ῥᾳστώνης τὸ τερπνὸν δι᾽ ὅπερ ὀκνεῖ, εἰ ἡσυχάζοι, ὅ τε ἐν πολέμῳ εὐτυχίᾳ πλεονάζων οὐκ ἐντεθύμηται θράσει ἀπίστῳ ἐπαιρόμενος. [5] πολλὰ γὰρ κακῶς γνωσθέντα ἀβουλοτέρων τῶν ἐναντίων τυχόντα

κατωρθώθη, καὶ ἔτι πλείω καλῶς δοκοῦντα βουλευθῆναι ἐς τοὐναντίον αἰσχρῶς περιέστη: ἐνθυμεῖται γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὁμοῖα τῇ πίστει καὶ ἔργῳ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀλλὰ μετ᾽ ἀσφαλείας μὲν δοξάζομεν, μετὰ δέους δὲ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐλλείπομεν.

121. ‘ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν καὶ ἀδικούμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ἐγείρομεν καὶ ἱκανὰ ἔχοντες ἐγκλήματα, καὶ ὅταν ἀμυνώμεθα Ἀθηναίους, καταθησόμεθα αὐτὸν ἐν καιρῷ. [2] κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατῆσαι, πρῶτον μὲν πλήθει προύχοντας καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῇ, ἔπειτα ὁμοίως πάντας ἐς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἰόντας, [3] ναυτικόν τε, ᾧ ἰσχύουσιν, ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης τε ἑκάστοις οὐσίας ἐξαρτυσόμεθα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳ χρημάτων: δάνεισμα γὰρ ποιησάμενοι ὑπολαβεῖν οἷοί τ᾽ ἐσμὲν μισθῷ μείζονι τοὺς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας. ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία: ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἧσσον ἂν τοῦτο πάθοι, τοῖς σώμασι τὸ πλέον ἰσχύουσα ἢ τοῖς χρήμασιν. [4] μιᾷ τε νίκῃ ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἁλίσκονται: εἰ δ᾽ ἀντίσχοιεν, μελετήσομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν πλέονι χρόνῳ τὰ ναυτικά, καὶ ὅταν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐς τὸ ἴσον καταστήσωμεν, τῇ γε εὐψυχίᾳ δήπου περιεσόμεθα. ὃ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν φύσει ἀγαθόν, ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο διδαχῇ: ὃ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἐπιστήμῃ προύχουσι, καθαιρετὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μελέτῃ. [5] χρήματα δὲ ὥστε ἔχειν ἐς αὐτά, οἵσομεν: ἢ δεινὸν ἂν εἴη εἰ οἱ μὲν ἐκείνων ξύμμαχοι ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν φέροντες οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ τιμωρούμενοι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἅμα σῴζεσθαι οὐκ ἄρα δαπανήσομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων αὐτὰ ἀφαιρεθέντες αὐτοῖς τούτοις κακῶς πάσχειν.

122. ὑπάρχουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὁδοὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἡμῖν, ξυμμάχων τε ἀπόστασις, μάλιστα παραίρεσις οὖσα τῶν προσόδων αἷς ἰσχύουσι, καὶ ἐπιτειχισμὸς τῇ χώρᾳ, ἄλλα τε ὅσα οὐκ ἄν τις νῦν προΐδοι. ἥκιστα γὰρ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφ᾽ αὑτοῦ τὰ πολλὰ τεχνᾶται πρὸς τὸ παρατυγχάνον: ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν εὐοργήτως αὐτῷ προσομιλήσας βεβαιότερος, ὁ δ᾽ ὀργισθεὶς περὶ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐλάσσω πταίει. [2] ᾽ἐνθυμώμεθα δὲ καὶ ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἡμῶν ἦσαν ἑκάστοις πρὸς ἀντιπάλους περὶ γῆς ὅρων αἱ διαφοραί, οἰστὸν ἂν ἦν: νῦν δὲ πρὸς ξύμπαντάς τε ἡμᾶς Ἀθηναῖοι ἱκανοὶ καὶ κατὰ πόλιν ἔτι δυνατώτεροι, ὥστε εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀθρόοι καὶ κατὰ ἔθνη καὶ ἕκαστον ἄστυ μιᾷ γνώμῃ ἀμυνούμεθα αὐτούς, δίχα γε ὄντας ἡμᾶς ἀπόνως χειρώσονται. καὶ τὴν ἧσσαν, εἰ καὶ δεινόν τῳ ἀκοῦσαι, ἵστω οὐκ ἄλλο τι φέρουσαν ἢ ἄντικρυς δουλείαν: [3] ὃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐνδοιασθῆναι αἰσχρὸν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ πόλεις τοσάσδε ὑπὸ μιᾶς κακοπαθεῖν. ἐν ᾧ ἢ δικαίως δοκοῖμεν ἂν πάσχειν ἢ διὰ δειλίαν ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τῶν πατέρων χείρους φαίνεσθαι, οἳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἠλευθέρωσαν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς βεβαιοῦμεν αὐτό, τύραννον δὲ ἐῶμεν ἐγκαθεστάναι πόλιν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν μιᾷ μονάρχους ἀξιοῦμεν καταλύειν. [4] καὶ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅπως τάδε τριῶν τῶν μεγίστων ξυμφορῶν ἀπήλλακται, ἀξυνεσίας ἢ μαλακίας ἢ ἀμελείας. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πεφευγότες αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὴν πλείστους δὴ βλάψασαν καταφρόνησιν κεχωρήκατε, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πολλοὺς σφάλλειν τὸ ἐναντίον ὄνομα ἀφροσύνη μετωνόμασται.

123. τὰ μὲν οὖν προγεγενημένα τί δεῖ μακρότερον ἢ ἐς ὅσον τοῖς νῦν ξυμφέρει αἰτιᾶσθαι; περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔπειτα μελλόντων τοῖς παροῦσι βοηθοῦντας χρὴ ἐπιταλαιπωρεῖν ⸂πάτριον γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐκ τῶν πόνων τὰς ἀρετὰς κτᾶσθαι⸃, καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἔθος, εἰ ἄρα πλούτῳ τε νῦν καὶ ἐξουσίᾳ ὀλίγον προφέρετε ⸂οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον ἃ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐκτήθη τῇ περιουσίᾳ ἀπολέσθαι⸃, ἀλλὰ θαρσοῦντας ἰέναι κατὰ πολλὰ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, τοῦ τε θεοῦ χρήσαντος καὶ αὐτοῦ ὑποσχομένου ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἁπάσης ξυναγωνιουμένης, τὰ μὲν φόβῳ, τὰ δὲ ὠφελίᾳ. [2] σπονδάς τε οὐ λύσετε πρότεροι, ἅς γε καὶ ὁ θεὸς κελεύων πολεμεῖν

νομίζει παραβεβάσθαι, ἠδικημέναις δὲ μᾶλλον βοηθήσετε: λύουσι γὰρ οὐχ οἱ ἀμυνόμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πρότεροι ἐπιόντες.

124. ‘ὥστε πανταχόθεν καλῶς ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν πολεμεῖν καὶ ἡμῶν κοινῇ τάδε παραινούντων, εἴπερ βεβαιότατον τὸ ταὐτὰ ξυμφέροντα καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις εἶναι, μὴ μέλλετε Ποτειδεάταις τε ποιεῖσθαι τιμωρίαν οὖσι Δωριεῦσι καὶ ὑπὸ Ἰώνων πολιορκουμένοις, οὗ πρότερον ἦν τοὐναντίον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετελθεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐνδέχεται περιμένοντας τοὺς μὲν ἤδη βλάπτεσθαι, τοὺς δ᾽, εἰ γνωσθησόμεθα ξυνελθόντες μέν, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ οὐ τολμῶντες, μὴ πολὺ ὕστερον τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν: [2] ἀλλὰ νομίσαντες ἐς ἀνάγκην ἀφῖχθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, καὶ ἅμα τάδε ἄριστα λέγεσθαι, ψηφίσασθε τὸν πόλεμον μὴ φοβηθέντες τὸ αὐτίκα δεινόν, τῆς δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ διὰ πλείονος εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμήσαντες: ἐκ πολέμου μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνη μᾶλλον βεβαιοῦται, ἀφ᾽ ἡσυχίας δὲ μὴ πολεμῆσαι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκίνδυνον. [3] καὶ τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι πόλιν τύραννον ἡγησάμενοι ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως καθεστάναι, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἤδη ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ διανοεῖσθαι,παραστησώμεθα ἐπελθόντες, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀκινδύνως τὸ λοιπὸν οἰκῶμεν καὶ τοὺς νῦν δεδουλωμένους Ἕλληνας ἐλευθερώσωμεν.’ τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον.

125. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπειδὴ ἀφ᾽ ἁπάντων ἤκουσαν γνώμην, ψῆφον ἐπήγαγον τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἅπασιν ὅσοι παρῆσαν ἑξῆς, καὶ μείζονι καὶ ἐλάσσονι πόλει: καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμεῖν. [2] δεδογμένον δὲ αὐτοῖς εὐθὺς μὲν ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀπαρασκεύοις οὖσιν, ἐκπορίζεσθαι δὲ ἐδόκει ἑκάστοις ἃ πρόσφορα ἦν καὶ μὴ εἶναι μέλλησιν. ὅμως δὲ καθισταμένοις ὧν ἔδει ἐνιαυτὸς μὲν οὐ διετρίβη, ἔλασσον δέ, πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἄρασθαι φανερῶς.

126. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐπρεσβεύοντο τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι, ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ἢν μή τι ἐσακούωσιν. [2]καὶ πρῶτον μὲν πρέσβεις πέμψαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ ἄγος ἐλαύνειν τῆς θεοῦ: τὸ δὲ ἄγος ἦν

τοιόνδε. [3] Κύλων ἦν Ἀθηναῖος ἀνὴρ Ὀλυμπιονίκης τῶν πάλαι εὐγενής τε καὶ δυνατός, ἐγεγαμήκει δὲ θυγατέρα Θεαγένους Μεγαρέως ἀνδρός, ὃς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐτυράννει Μεγάρων. [4] χρωμένῳ δὲ τῷ Κύλωνι ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεὸς ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τῇ μεγίστῃ ἑορτῇ καταλαβεῖν τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἀκρόπολιν. [5] ὁ δὲ παρά τε τοῦ Θεαγένους δύναμιν λαβὼν καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἀναπείσας, ἐπειδὴ ἐπῆλθεν Ὀλύμπια τὰ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, κατέλαβε τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ὡς ἐπὶ τυραννίδι, νομίσας ἑορτήν τε τοῦ Διὸς μεγίστην εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτῷ τι προσήκειν Ὀλύμπια νενικηκότι. [6] εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἡ μεγίστη ἑορτὴ εἴρητο, οὔτε ἐκεῖνος ἔτι κατενόησε τό τε μαντεῖον οὐκ ἐδήλου ἔστι γὰρ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις Διάσια ἃ καλεῖται Διὸς ἑορτὴ Μειλιχίου μεγίστη ἔξω τῆς πόλεως, ἐν ᾗ πανδημεὶ θύουσι πολλὰ οὐχ ἱερεῖα, ἀλλ᾽ <ἀγνὰ> θύματα ἐπιχώρια , δοκῶν δὲ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν ἐπεχείρησε τῷ ἔργῳ. [7] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐβοήθησάν τε πανδημεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ προσκαθεζόμενοι ἐπολιόρκουν. [8] χρόνου δὲ ἐγγιγνομένου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τρυχόμενοι τῇ προσεδρίᾳ ἀπῆλθον οἱ πολλοί, ἐπιτρέψαντες τοῖς ἐννέα ἄρχουσι τήν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτοκράτορσι διαθεῖναι ᾗ ἂν ἄριστα διαγιγνώσκωσιν: τότε δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ἔπρασσον. [9] οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Κύλωνος πολιορκούμενοι φλαύρως εἶχον σίτου τε καὶ ὕδατος ἀπορίᾳ. [10] ὁ μὲν οὖν Κύλων καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἐκδιδράσκουσιν: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ὡς ἐπιέζοντο καί τινες καὶ ἀπέθνῃσκον ὑπὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ, καθίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν ἱκέται τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει. [11] ἀναστήσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακήν, ὡς ἑώρων ἀποθνῄσκοντας ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιήσουσιν, ἀπαγαγόντες ἀπέκτειναν: καθεζομένους δέ τινας καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σεμνῶν θεῶν τοῖς βωμοῖς ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ ἀπεχρήσαντο. καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐναγεῖς καὶ ἀλιτήριοι τῆς θεοῦ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἐκαλοῦντο καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων. [12] ἤλασαν μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς ἐναγεῖς τούτους, ἤλασε δὲ καὶ Κλεομένης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ὕστερον μετὰ Ἀθηναίων στασιαζόντων, τούς

τε ζῶντας ἐλαύνοντες καὶ τῶν τεθνεώτων τὰ ὀστᾶ ἀνελόντες ἐξέβαλον: κατῆλθον μέντοι ὕστερον, καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἔτι ἐν τῇ πόλει.

127. τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἄγος οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευον ἐλαύνειν δῆθεν τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες, εἰδότες δὲ Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου προσεχόμενον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μητέρα καὶ νομίζοντες ἐκπεσόντος αὐτοῦ ῥᾷον <ἂν> σφίσι προχωρεῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. [2] οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἤλπιζον παθεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν τοῦτο ὅσον διαβολὴν οἴσειν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὡς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ξυμφορὰν τὸ μέρος ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος. [3] ὢν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν ἡναντιοῦτο πάντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ οὐκ εἴα ὑπείκειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ὥρμα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.

128. ἀντεκέλευον δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὸ ἀπὸ Ταινάρου ἄγος ἐλαύνειν: οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀναστήσαντές ποτε ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος [ἀπὸ Ταινάρου] τῶν Εἱλώτων ἱκέτας ἀπαγαγόντες διέφθειραν, δι᾽ ὃ δὴ καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς νομίζουσι τὸν μέγαν σεισμὸν γενέσθαι ἐν Σπάρτῃ. [2] ἐκέλευον δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Χαλκιοίκου ἄγος ἐλαύνειν αὐτούς: ἐγένετο δὲ τοιόνδε. [3] ἐπειδὴ Παυσανίας ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος τὸ πρῶτον μεταπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Σπαρτιατῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ καὶ κριθεὶς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀπελύθη μὴ ἀδικεῖν, δημοσίᾳ μὲν οὐκέτι ἐξεπέμφθη, ἰδίᾳ δὲ αὐτὸς τριήρη λαβὼν Ἑρμιονίδα ἄνευ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἑλλήσποντον, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν πόλεμον, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ τὰ πρὸς βασιλέα πράγματα πράσσειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησεν, ἐφιέμενος τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀρχῆς. [4] εὐεργεσίαν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦδε πρῶτον ἐς βασιλέα κατέθετο καὶ τοῦ παντὸς πράγματος ἀρχὴν ἐποιήσατο: [5] Βυζάντιον γὰρ ἑλὼν τῇ προτέρᾳ παρουσίᾳ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ Κύπρου ἀναχώρησιν εἶχον δὲ Μῆδοι αὐτὸ καὶ βασιλέως προσήκοντές τινες καὶ ξυγγενεῖς οἳ ἐάλωσαν ἐν αὐτῷ τότε τούτους οὓς ἔλαβεν ἀποπέμπει βασιλεῖ κρύφα τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ἀπέδρασαν αὐτόν. [6] ἔπρασσε δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ Γογγύλου τοῦ

Ἐρετριῶς, ᾧπερ ἐπέτρεψε τό τε Βυζάντιον καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους. ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ ἐπιστολὴν τὸν Γόγγυλον φέροντα αὐτῷ: ἐνεγέγραπτο δὲ τάδε ἐν αὐτῇ, ὡς ὕστερον ἀνηυρέθη: [7] ‘Παυσανίας ὁ ἡγεμὼν τῆς Σπάρτης τούσδε τέ σοι χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος ἀποπέμπει δορὶ ἑλών,καὶ γνώμην ποιοῦμαι, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ, θυγατέρα τε τὴν σὴν γῆμαι καί σοι Σπάρτην τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα ὑποχείριον ποιῆσαι. δυνατὸς δὲ δοκῶ εἶναι ταῦτα πρᾶξαι μετὰ σοῦ βουλευόμενος. εἰ οὖν τί σε τούτων ἀρέσκει, πέμπε ἄνδρα πιστὸν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν δι᾽ οὗ τὸ λοιπὸν τοὺς λόγους ποιησόμεθα.’

129. τοσαῦτα μὲν ἡ γραφὴ ἐδήλου, Ξέρξης δὲ ἥσθη τε τῇ ἐπιστολῇ καὶ ἀποστέλλει Ἀρτάβαζον τὸν Φαρνάκου ἐπὶ θάλασσαν καὶ κελεύει αὐτὸν τήν τε Δασκυλῖτιν σατραπείαν παραλαβεῖν Μεγαβάτην ἀπαλλάξαντα, ὃς πρότερον ἦρχε, καὶ παρὰ Παυσανίαν ἐς Βυζάντιον ἐπιστολὴν ἀντεπετίθει αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα διαπέμψαι καὶ τὴν σφραγῖδα ἀποδεῖξαι, καὶ ἤν τι αὐτῷ Παυσανίας παραγγέλλῃ περὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πραγμάτων, πράσσειν ὡς ἄριστα καὶ πιστότατα. [2] ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος τά τε ἄλλα ἐποίησεν ὥσπερ εἴρητο καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν διέπεμψεν: [3] ἀντενεγέγραπτο δὲ τάδε: ‘ὧδε λέγει βασιλεὺς Ξέρξης Παυσανίᾳ. καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὕς μοι πέραν θαλάσσης ἐκ Βυζαντίου ἔσωσας κείσεταί σοι εὐεργεσία ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ ἐς αἰεὶ ἀνάγραπτος, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρέσκομαι. καί σε μήτε νὺξ μήθ᾽ ἡμέρα ἐπισχέτω ὥστε ἀνεῖναι πράσσειν τι ὧν ἐμοὶ ὑπισχνῇ, μηδὲ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου δαπάνῃ κεκωλύσθω μηδὲ στρατιᾶς πλήθει, εἴ ποι δεῖ παραγίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετ᾽ Ἀρταβάζου ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ὅν σοι ἔπεμψα, πρᾶσσε θαρσῶν καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ σὰ ὅπῃ κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα ἕξει ἀμφοτέροις.’

130. ταῦτα λαβὼν ὁ Παυσανίας τὰ γράμματα, ὢν καὶ πρότερον ἐν μεγάλῳ ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν Πλαταιᾶσιν ἡγεμονίαν, πολλῷ τότε μᾶλλον ἦρτο καὶ οὐκέτι ἐδύνατο ἐν τῷ καθεστῶτι τρόπῳ βιοτεύειν, ἀλλὰ σκευάς τε Μηδικὰς ἐνδυόμενος ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ἐξῄει καὶ διὰ τῆς Θρᾴκης πορευόμενον αὐτὸν Μῆδοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι

ἐδορυφόρουν, τράπεζάν τε Περσικὴν παρετίθετο καὶ κατέχειν τὴν διάνοιαν οὐκ ἐδύνατο,ἀλλ᾽ ἔργοις βραχέσι προυδήλου ἃ τῇ γνώμῃ μειζόνως ἐς ἔπειτα ἔμελλε πράξειν. [2] δυσπρόσοδόν τε αὐτὸν παρεῖχε καὶ τῇ ὀργῇ οὕτω χαλεπῇ ἐχρῆτο ἐς πάντας ὁμοίως ὥστε μηδένα δύνασθαι προσιέναι: δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἥκιστα ἡ ξυμμαχία μετέστη.

131. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι τό τε πρῶτον δι᾽ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀνεκάλεσαν αὐτόν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ τῇ Ἑρμιονίδι νηὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἐκπλεύσας οὐ κελευσάντων αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα ἐφαίνετο ποιῶν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου βίᾳ ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐκπολιορκηθεὶς ἐς μὲν τὴν Σπάρτην οὐκ ἐπανεχώρει, ἐς δὲ Κολωνὰς τὰς Τρῳάδας ἱδρυθεὶς πράσσων τε ἐσηγγέλλετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ τὴν μονὴν ποιούμενος, οὕτω δὴ οὐκέτι ἐπέσχον, ἀλλὰ πέμψαντες κήρυκα οἱ ἔφοροι καὶ σκυτάλην εἶπον τοῦ κήρυκος μὴ λείπεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, πόλεμον αὐτῷ Σπαρτιάτας προαγορεύειν. [2] ὁ δὲ βουλόμενος ὡς ἥκιστα ὕποπτος εἶναι καὶ πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολὴν ἀνεχώρει τὸ δεύτερον ἐς Σπάρτην. καὶ ἐς μὲν τὴν εἱρκτὴν ἐσπίπτει τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἔξεστι δὲ τοῖς ἐφόροις τὸν βασιλέα δρᾶσαι τοῦτο , ἔπειτα διαπραξάμενος ὕστερον ἐξῆλθε καὶ καθίστησιν ἑαυτὸν ἐς κρίσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐλέγχειν.

132. καὶ φανερὸν μὲν εἶχον οὐδὲν οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται σημεῖον, οὔτε οἱ ἐχθροὶ οὔτε ἡ πᾶσα πόλις, ὅτῳ ἂν πιστεύσαντες βεβαίως ἐτιμωροῦντο ἄνδρα γένους τε τοῦ βασιλείου ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τιμὴν ἔχοντα Πλείσταρχον γὰρ τὸν Λεωνίδου ὄντα βασιλέα καὶ νέον ἔτι ἀνεψιὸς ὢν ἐπετρόπευεν , [2] ὑποψίας δὲ πολλὰς παρεῖχε τῇ τε παρανομίᾳ καὶ ζηλώσει τῶν βαρβάρων μὴ ἴσος βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοῖς παροῦσι, τά τε ἄλλα αὐτοῦ ἀνεσκόπουν, εἴ τί που ἐξεδεδιήτητο τῶν καθεστώτων νομίμων, καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸν τρίποδά ποτε τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, ὃν ἀνέθεσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀπὸ τῶν Μήδων ἀκροθίνιον, ἠξίωσεν ἐπιγράψασθαι αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ τὸ ἐλεγεῖον τόδε:”Ἑλλήνων ἀρχηγὸς ἐπεὶ στρατὸν ὤλεσε

Μήδων,Παυσανίας Φοίβῳ μνῆμ᾽ ἀνέθηκε τόδε.” [3] τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐλεγεῖον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐξεκόλαψαν εὐθὺς τότε ἀπὸ τοῦ τρίποδος τοῦτο καὶ ἐπέγραψαν ὀνομαστὶ τὰς πόλεις ὅσαι ξυγκαθελοῦσαι τὸν βάρβαρον ἔστησαν τὸ ἀνάθημα: τοῦ μέντοι Παυσανίου ἀδίκημα καὶ τότ᾽ ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπεί γε δὴ ἐν τούτῳ καθειστήκει, πολλῷ μᾶλλον παρόμοιον πραχθῆναι ἐφαίνετο τῇ παρούσῃ διανοίᾳ. [4] ἐπυνθάνοντο δὲ καὶ ἐς τοὺς Εἵλωτας πράσσειν τι αὐτόν, καὶ ἦν δὲ οὕτως: ἐλευθέρωσίν τε γὰρ ὑπισχνεῖτο αὐτοῖς καὶ πολιτείαν, ἢν ξυνεπαναστῶσι καὶ τὸ πᾶν ξυγκατεργάσωνται. [5] ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὡς οὐδὲ τῶν Εἱλώτων μηνυταῖς τισὶ πιστεύσαντες ἠξίωσαν νεώτερόν τι ποιεῖν ἐς αὐτόν, χρώμενοι τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ εἰώθασιν ἐς σφᾶς αὐτούς, μὴ ταχεῖς εἶναι περὶ ἀνδρὸς Σπαρτιάτου ἄνευ ἀναμφισβητήτων τεκμηρίων βουλεῦσαί τι ἀνήκεστον, πρίν γε δὴ αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, ὁ μέλλων τὰς τελευταίας βασιλεῖ ἐπιστολὰς πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον κομιεῖν, ἀνὴρ Ἀργίλιος, παιδικά ποτε ὢν αὐτοῦ καὶ πιστότατος ἐκείνῳ, μηνυτὴς γίγνεται, δείσας κατὰ ἐνθύμησίν τινα ὅτι οὐδείς πω τῶν πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγγέλων πάλιν ἀφίκετο, καὶ παρασημηνάμενος σφραγῖδα, ἵνα, ἢν ψευσθῇ τῆς δόξης ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνός τι μεταγράψαι αἰτήσῃ, μὴ ἐπιγνῷ, λύει τὰς ἐπιστολάς, ἐν αἷς ὑπονοήσας τι τοιοῦτον προσεπεστάλθαι καὶ αὐτὸν ηὗρεν ἐγγεγραμμένον κτείνειν.

133. τότε δὴ οἱ ἔφοροι δείξαντος αὐτοῦ τὰ γράμματα μᾶλλον μὲν ἐπίστευσαν, αὐτήκοοι δὲ βουληθέντες ἔτι γενέσθαι αὐτοῦ Παυσανίου τι λέγοντος, ἀπὸ παρασκευῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ Ταίναρον ἱκέτου οἰχομένου καὶ σκηνησαμένου διπλῆν διαφράγματι καλύβην, ἐς ἣν τῶν [τε] ἐφόρων ἐντός τινας ἔκρυψε, καὶ Παυσανίου ὡς αὐτὸν ἐλθόντος καὶ ἐρωτῶντος τὴν πρόφασιν τῆς ἱκετείας ᾔσθοντο πάντα σαφῶς, αἰτιωμένου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τά τε περὶ αὐτοῦ γραφέντα καὶ τἄλλ᾽ ἀποφαίνοντος καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ὡς οὐδὲν πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς βασιλέα διακονίαις παραβάλοιτο, προτιμηθείη δ᾽ ἐν ἴσῳ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν διακόνων ἀποθανεῖν, κἀκείνου αὐτά τε ταῦτα ξυνομολογοῦντος καὶ περὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἐῶντος

ὀργίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πίστιν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ διδόντος τῆς ἀναστάσεως καὶ ἀξιοῦντος ὡς τάχιστα πορεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὰ πρασσόμενα διακωλύειν.

134. ἀκούσαντες δὲ ἀκριβῶς τότε μὲν ἀπῆλθον οἱ ἔφοροι, βεβαίως δὲ ἤδη εἰδότες ἐν τῇ πόλει τὴν ξύλληψιν ἐποιοῦντο. λέγεται δ᾽ αὐτὸν μέλλοντα ξυλληφθήσεσθαι ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ, ἑνὸς μὲν τῶν ἐφόρων τὸ πρόσωπον προσιόντος ὡς εἶδε, γνῶναι ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἐχώρει, ἄλλου δὲ νεύματι ἀφανεῖ χρησαμένου καὶ δηλώσαντος εὐνοίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Χαλκιοίκου χωρῆσαι δρόμῳ καὶ προκαταφυγεῖν: ἦν δ᾽ ἐγγὺς τὸ τέμενος. καὶ ἐς οἴκημα οὐ μέγα ὃ ἦν τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐσελθών, ἵνα μὴ ὑπαίθριος ταλαιπωροίη, ἡσύχαζεν. [2] οἱ δὲ τὸ παραυτίκα μὲν ὑστέρησαν τῇ διώξει, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ τε οἰκήματος τὸν ὄροφον ἀφεῖλον καὶ τὰς θύρας ἔνδον ὄντα τηρήσαντες αὐτὸν καὶ ἀπολαβόντες ἔσω ἀπῳκοδόμησαν, προσκαθεζόμενοί τε ἐξεπολιόρκησαν λιμῷ. [3] καὶ μέλλοντος αὐτοῦ ἀποψύχειν ὥσπερ εἶχεν ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι, αἰσθόμενοι ἐξάγουσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἔτι ἔμπνουν ὄντα, καὶ ἐξαχθεὶς ἀπέθανε παραχρῆμα. [4] καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέλλησαν μὲν ἐς τὸν Καιάδαν [οὗπερ τοὺς κακούργους] ἐσβάλλειν: ἔπειτα ἔδοξε πλησίον που κατορύξαι. ὁ δὲ θεὸς ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς τόν τε τάφον ὕστερον ἔχρησε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις μετενεγκεῖν οὗπερ ἀπέθανε καὶ νῦν κεῖται ἐν τῷ προτεμενίσματι, ὃ γραφῇ στῆλαι δηλοῦσι καὶ ὡς ἄγος αὐτοῖς ὂν τὸ πεπραγμένον δύο σώματα ἀνθ᾽ ἑνὸς τῇ Χαλκιοίκῳ ἀποδοῦναι. οἱ δὲ ποιησάμενοι χαλκοῦς ἀνδριάντας δύο ὡς ἀντὶ Παυσανίου ἀνέθεσαν.

135. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄγος κρίναντος, ἀντεπέταξαν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐλαύνειν αὐτό. [2]τοῦ δὲ μηδισμοῦ τοῦ Παυσανίου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρέσβεις πέμψαντες παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ξυνεπῃτιῶντο καὶ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα, ὡς ηὕρισκον ἐκ τῶν περὶ Παυσανίαν ἐλέγχων, ἠξίουν τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς κολάζεσθαι αὐτόν. [3] οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες ἔτυχε γὰρ ὠστρακισμένος καὶ ἔχων δίαιταν μὲν ἐν Ἄργει, ἐπιφοιτῶν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον πέμπουσι

μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἑτοίμων ὄντων ξυνδιώκειν ἄνδρας οἷς εἴρητο ἄγειν ὅπου ἂν περιτύχωσιν.

136. ὁ δὲ Θεμιστοκλῆς προαισθόμενος φεύγει ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἐς Κέρκυραν, ὢν αὐτῶν εὐεργέτης. δεδιέναι δὲ φασκόντων Κερκυραίων ἔχειν αὐτὸν ὥστε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἀπεχθέσθαι, διακομίζεται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον τὴν καταντικρύ. [2] καὶ διωκόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν προστεταγμένων κατὰ πύστιν ᾗ χωροίη, ἀναγκάζεται κατά τι ἄπορον παρὰ Ἄδμητον τὸν Μολοσσῶν βασιλέα ὄντα αὐτῷ οὐ φίλον καταλῦσαι. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἔτυχεν ἐπιδημῶν, ὁ δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς ἱκέτης γενόμενος διδάσκεται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς τὸν παῖδα σφῶν λαβὼν καθέζεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἑστίαν. [4] καὶ ἐλθόντος οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον τοῦ Ἀδμήτου δηλοῖ τε ὅς ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀξιοῖ, εἴ τι ἄρα αὐτὸς ἀντεῖπεν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναίων δεομένῳ, φεύγοντα τιμωρεῖσθαι: καὶ γὰρ ἂν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου πολλῷ ἀσθενεστέρου ἐν τῷ παρόντι κακῶς πάσχειν, γενναῖον δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου τιμωρεῖσθαι. καὶ ἅμα αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκείνῳ χρείας τινὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὸ σῶμα σῴζεσθαι ἐναντιωθῆναι, ἐκεῖνον δ᾽ ἄν, εἰ ἐκδοίη αὐτόν ⟨εἰπὼν ὑφ᾽ ὧν καὶ ἐφ᾽ ᾧ διώκεται⟩, σωτηρίας ἂν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποστερῆσαι.

137. ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας ἀνίστησί τε αὐτὸν μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ υἱέος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔχων αὐτὸν ἐκαθέζετο, καὶ μέγιστον ἦν ἱκέτευμα τοῦτο, καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ τοῖς τε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἐλθοῦσι καὶ πολλὰ εἰποῦσιν οὐκ ἐκδίδωσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποστέλλει βουλόμενον ὡς βασιλέα πορευθῆναι ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν πεζῇ ἐς Πύδναν τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου. [2] ἐν ᾗ ὁλκάδος τυχὼν ἀναγομένης ἐπ᾽ Ἰωνίας καὶ ἐπιβὰς καταφέρεται χειμῶνι ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, ὃ ἐπολιόρκει Νάξον. καί ⟨ἦν γὰρ ἀγνὼς τοῖς ἐν τῇ νηί⟩ δείσας φράζει τῷ ναυκλήρῳ ὅστις ἐστὶ καὶ δι᾽ ἃ φεύγει, καὶ εἰ μὴ σώσει αὐτόν, ἔφη ἐρεῖν ὅτι χρήμασι πεισθεὶς αὐτὸν ἄγει: τὴν δὲ ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι μηδένα ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τῆς νεὼς μέχρι πλοῦς γένηται: πειθομένῳ δ᾽ αὐτῷ χάριν ἀπομνήσεσθαι ἀξίαν. ὁ δὲ ναύκληρος ποιεῖ τε ταῦτα καὶ ἀποσαλεύσας ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα ὑπὲρ τοῦ στρατοπέδου

ὕστερον ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἔφεσον. [3] καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐκεῖνόν τε ἐθεράπευσε χρημάτων δόσει· ἦλθε γὰρ αὐτῷ ὕστερον ἔκ τε Ἀθηνῶν παρὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐξ Ἄργους ἃ ὑπεξέκειτο· καὶ μετὰ τῶν κάτω Περσῶν τινὸς πορευθεὶς ἄνω ἐσπέμπει γράμματα πρὸς βασιλέα Ἀρταξέρξην τὸν Ξέρξου νεωστὶ βασιλεύοντα. [4] ἐδήλου δὲ ἡ γραφὴ ὅτι ‘Θεμιστοκλῆς ἥκω παρὰ σέ, ὃς κακὰ μὲν πλεῖστα Ἑλλήνων εἴργασμαι τὸν ὑμέτερον οἶκον, ὅσον χρόνον τὸν σὸν πατέρα ἐπιόντα ἐμοὶ ἀνάγκη ἠμυνόμην, πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι πλείω ἀγαθά, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ μὲν ἐμοί, ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἐν ἐπικινδύνῳ πάλιν ἡ ἀποκομιδὴ ἐγίγνετο. καί μοι εὐεργεσία ὀφείλεται· γράψας τήν τε ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος προάγγελσιν τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν, ἣν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο, τότε δι᾽ αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν·, καὶ νῦν ἔχων σε μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ δρᾶσαι πάρειμι διωκόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν σὴν φιλίαν. βούλομαι δ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπισχὼν αὐτός σοι περὶ ὧν ἥκω δηλῶσαι.’

138. βασιλεὺς δέ, ὡς λέγεται, ἐθαύμασέ τε αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ἐκέλευε ποιεῖν οὕτως. ὁ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν ἐπέσχε τῆς τε Περσίδος γλώσσης ὅσα ἐδύνατο κατενόησε καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τῆς χώρας: [2] ἀφικόμενος δὲ μετὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν γίγνεται παρ᾽ αὐτῷ μέγας καὶ ὅσος οὐδείς πω Ἑλλήνων διά τε τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν ἀξίωσιν καὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἐλπίδα, ἣν ὑπετίθει αὐτῷ δουλώσειν, μάλιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πεῖραν διδοὺς ξυνετὸς φαίνεσθαι. [3] ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάσαι: οἰκείᾳ γὰρ ξυνέσει καὶ οὔτε προμαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὔτ᾽ ἐπιμαθών, τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δι᾽ ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνώμων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής: καὶ ἃ μὲν μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἷός τε, ὧν δ᾽ ἄπειρος εἴη, κρῖναι ἱκανῶς οὐκ ἀπήλλακτο: τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα. καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο. [4] νοσήσας δὲ τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον: λέγουσι δέ τινες καὶ ἑκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν

αὐτόν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ ἃ ὑπέσχετο. [5] μνημεῖον μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ ἐν Μαγνησίᾳ ἐστὶ τῇ Ἀσιανῇ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ: ταύτης γὰρ ἦρχε τῆς χώρας, δόντος βασιλέως αὐτῷ Μαγνησίαν μὲν ἄρτον, ἢ προσέφερε πεντήκοντα τάλαντα τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, Λάμψακον δὲ οἶνον ⟨ἐδόκει γὰρ πολυοινότατον τῶν τότε εἶναι⟩, Μυοῦντα δὲ ὄψον. [6] τὰ δὲ ὀστᾶ φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσήκοντες οἴκαδε κελεύσαντος ἐκείνου καὶ τεθῆναι κρύφα Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ: οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν θάπτειν ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ φεύγοντος. τὰ μὲν κατὰ Παυσανίαν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον, λαμπροτάτους γενομένους τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς Ἑλλήνων, οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

139. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς πρώτης πρεσβείας τοιαῦτα ἐπέταξάν τε καὶ ἀντεκελεύσθησαν περὶ τῶν ἐναγῶν τῆς ἐλάσεως: ὕστερον δὲ φοιτῶντες παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους Ποτειδαίας τε ἀπανίστασθαι ἐκέλευον καὶ Αἴγιναν αὐτόνομον ἀφιέναι, καὶ μάλιστά γε πάντων καὶ ἐνδηλότατα προύλεγον τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθελοῦσι μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι πόλεμον, ἐν ᾧ εἴρητο αὐτοὺς μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς λιμέσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ μηδὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἀγορᾷ. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι οὔτε τἆλλα ὑπήκουον οὔτε τὸ ψήφισμα καθῄρουν, ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἀφισταμένων. [3] τέλος δὲ ἀφικομένων τῶν τελευταίων πρέσβεων ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος, Ῥαμφίου τε καὶ Μελησίππου καὶ Ἀγησάνδρου, καὶ λεγόντων ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ὧν πρότερον εἰώθεσαν, αὐτὰ δὲ τάδε ὅτι ‘Λακεδαιμόνιοι βούλονται τὴν εἰρήνην εἶναι, εἴη δ᾽ ἂν εἰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖτε,’ ποιήσαντες ἐκκλησίαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι γνώμας σφίσιν αὐτοῖς προυτίθεσαν, καὶ ἐδόκει ἅπαξ περὶ ἁπάντων βουλευσαμένους ἀποκρίνασθαι. [4] καὶ παριόντες ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ ἔλεγον ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα γιγνόμενοι ταῖς γνώμαις καὶ ὡς χρὴ πολεμεῖν καὶ ὡς μὴ ἐμπόδιον εἶναι τὸ ψήφισμα εἰρήνης, ἀλλὰ καθελεῖν, καὶ παρελθὼν Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου, ἀνὴρ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος, παρῄνει τοιάδε.

140. ‘τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι, μὴ εἴκειν Πελοποννησίοις, καίπερ εἰδὼς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ ὀργῇ ἀναπειθομένους τε πολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ πράσσοντας, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ξυμφορὰς καὶ τὰς γνώμας τρεπομένους. ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁμοῖα καὶ παραπλήσια ξυμβουλευτέα μοι ὄντα, καὶ τοὺς ἀναπειθομένους ὑμῶν δικαιῶ τοῖς κοινῇ δόξασιν, ἢν ἄρα τι καὶ σφαλλώμεθα, βοηθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲ κατορθοῦντας τῆς ξυνέσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἧσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ, εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι. [2]᾽Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πρότερόν τε δῆλοι ἦσαν ἐπιβουλεύοντες ἡμῖν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἥκιστα. εἰρημένον γὰρ δίκας μὲν τῶν διαφορῶν ἀλλήλοις διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, ἔχειν δὲ ἑκατέρους ἃ ἔχομεν, οὔτε αὐτοὶ δίκας πω ᾔτησαν οὔτε ἡμῶν διδόντων δέχονται, βούλονται δὲ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγοις τὰ ἐγκλήματα διαλύεσθαι, καὶ ἐπιτάσσοντες ἤδη καὶ οὐκέτι αἰτιώμενοι πάρεισιν. [3] Ποτειδαίας τε γὰρ ἀπανίστασθαι κελεύουσι καὶ Αἴγιναν αὐτόνομον ἀφιέναι καὶ τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθαιρεῖν: οἱ δὲ τελευταῖοι οἵδε ἥκοντες καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας προαγορεύουσιν αὐτονόμους ἀφιέναι. [4] ὑμῶν δὲ μηδεὶς νομίσῃ περὶ βραχέος ἂν πολεμεῖν, εἰ τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα μὴ καθέλοιμεν, ὅπερ μάλιστα προύχονται, εἰ καθαιρεθείη, μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον, μηδὲ ἐν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ὑπολίπησθε ὡς διὰ μικρὸν ἐπολεμήσατε. [5] τὸ γὰρ βραχύ τι τοῦτο πᾶσαν ὑμῶν ἔχει τὴν βεβαίωσιν καὶ πεῖραν τῆς γνώμης. οἷς εἰ ξυγχωρήσετε, καὶ ἄλλο τι μεῖζον εὐθὺς ἐπιταχθήσεσθε ὡς φόβῳ καὶ τοῦτο ὑπακούσαντες: ἀπισχυρισάμενοι δὲ σαφὲς ἂν καταστήσαιτε αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὑμῖν μᾶλλον προσφέρεσθαι.

141. αὐτόθεν δὴ διανοήθητε ἢ ὑπακούειν πρίν τι βλαβῆναι, ἢ εἰ πολεμήσομεν, ὥσπερ ἔμοιγε ἄμεινον δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μεγάλῃ καὶ ἐπὶ βραχείᾳ ὁμοίως προφάσει μὴ εἴξοντες μηδὲ ξὺν φόβῳ ἔξοντες ἃ κεκτήμεθα: τὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν δύναται δούλωσιν ἥ τε μεγίστη καὶ ἐλαχίστη

δικαίωσις ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων πρὸ δίκης τοῖς πέλας ἐπιτασσομένη. [2] ’τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῶν ἑκατέροις ὑπαρχόντων ὡς οὐκ ἀσθενέστερα ἔξομεν γνῶτε καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀκούοντες. [3] αὐτουργοί τε γάρ εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτ᾽ ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα χρονίων πολέμων καὶ διαποντίων ἄπειροι διὰ τὸ βραχέως αὐτοὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους ὑπὸ πενίας ἐπιφέρειν. [4] καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὔτε ναῦς πληροῦντες οὔτε πεζὰς στρατιὰς πολλάκις ἐκπέμπειν δύνανται, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τε ἅμα ἀπόντες καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν δαπανῶντες καὶ προσέτι καὶ θαλάσσης εἰργόμενοι: [5] αἱ δὲ περιουσίαι τοὺς πολέμους μᾶλλον ἢ αἱ βίαιοι ἐσφοραὶ ἀνέχουσιν. σώμασί τε ἑτοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ χρήμασι πολεμεῖν, τὸ μὲν πιστὸν ἔχοντες ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων κἂν περιγενέσθαι, τὸ δὲ οὐ βέβαιον μὴ οὐ προαναλώσειν, ἄλλως τε κἂν παρὰ δόξαν, ὅπερ εἰκός, ὁ πόλεμος αὐτοῖς μηκύνηται. [6] μάχῃ μὲν γὰρ μιᾷ πρὸς ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας δυνατοὶ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀντισχεῖν, πολεμεῖν δὲ μὴ πρὸς ὁμοίαν ἀντιπαρασκευὴν ἀδύνατοι, ὅταν μήτε βουλευτηρίῳ ἑνὶ χρώμενοι παραχρῆμά τι ὀξέως ἐπιτελῶσι πάντες τε ἰσόψηφοι ὄντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμόφυλοι τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος σπεύδῃ: ἐξ ὧν φιλεῖ μηδὲν ἐπιτελὲς γίγνεσθαι. [7] καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὡς μάλιστα τιμωρήσασθαί τινα βούλονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἥκιστα τὰ οἰκεῖα φθεῖραι. χρόνιοί τε ξυνιόντες ἐν βραχεῖ μὲν μορίῳ σκοποῦσί τι τῶν κοινῶν, τῷ δὲ πλέονι τὰ οἰκεῖα πράσσουσι, καὶ ἕκαστος οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν οἴεται βλάψειν, μέλειν δέ τινι καὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ τι προϊδεῖν, ὥστε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπὸ ἁπάντων ἰδίᾳ δοξάσματι λανθάνειν τὸ κοινὸν ἀθρόον φθειρόμενον.

142. ‘μέγιστον δέ, τῇ τῶν χρημάτων σπάνει κωλύσονται, ὅταν σχολῇ αὐτὰ ποριζόμενοι διαμέλλωσιν: τοῦ δὲ πολέμου οἱ καιροὶ οὐ μενετοί. [2] καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἐπιτείχισις οὐδὲ τὸ ναυτικὸν αὐτῶν ἄξιον φοβηθῆναι. [3] τὴν μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόλιν ἀντίπαλον κατασκευάσασθαι, ἦ που δὴ ἐν πολεμίᾳ τε καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ἐκείνοις ἡμῶν ἀντεπιτετειχισμένων: [4] φρούριον δ᾽ εἰ ποιήσονται, τῆς μὲν

γῆς βλάπτοιεν ἄν τι μέρος καταδρομαῖς καὶ αὐτομολίαις, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανόν γε ἔσται ἐπιτειχίζειν τε κωλύειν ἡμᾶς πλεύσαντας ἐς τὴν ἐκείνων καί, ᾗπερ ἰσχύομεν, ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀμύνεσθαι: [5] πλέον γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν τοῦ κατὰ γῆν ἐκ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκεῖνοι ἐκ τοῦ κατ᾽ ἤπειρον ἐς τὰ ναυτικά. [6] τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας γενέσθαι οὐ ῥᾳδίως αὐτοῖς προσγενήσεται. [7] οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς μελετῶντες αὐτὸ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐξείργασθέ πω: πῶς δὴ ἄνδρες γεωργοὶ καὶ οὐ θαλάσσιοι, καὶ προσέτι οὐδὲ μελετῆσαι ἐασόμενοι διὰ τὸ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν πολλαῖς ναυσὶν αἰεὶ ἐφορμεῖσθαι, ἄξιον ἄν τι δρῷεν; [8] πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγας ἐφορμούσας κἂν διακινδυνεύσειαν πλήθει τὴν ἀμαθίαν θρασύνοντες, πολλαῖς δὲ εἰργόμενοι ἡσυχάσουσι καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι ἀξυνετώτεροι ἔσονται καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ ὀκνηρότεροι. [9] τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν τέχνης ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἐκ παρέργου μελετᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μηδὲν ἐκείνῳ πάρεργον ἄλλο γίγνεσθαι.

143. ‘εἴ τε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυμπίασιν ἢ Δελφοῖς χρημάτων μισθῷ μείζονι πειρῷντο ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν, μὴ ὄντων μὲν ἡμῶν ἀντιπάλων ἐσβάντων αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν μετοίκων δεινὸν ἂν ἦν: νῦν δὲ τόδε τε ὑπάρχει, καί, ὅπερ κράτιστον, κυβερνήτας ἔχομεν πολίτας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν πλείους καὶ ἀμείνους ἢ ἅπασα ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς. [2] καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ κινδύνῳ οὐδεὶς ἂν δέξαιτο τῶν ξένων τήν τε αὐτοῦ φεύγειν καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἥσσονος ἅμα ἐλπίδος ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν ἕνεκα μεγάλου μισθοῦ δόσεως ἐκείνοις ξυναγωνίζεσθαι. [3]’καὶ τὰ μὲν Πελοποννησίων ἔμοιγε τοιαῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια δοκεῖ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἡμέτερα τούτων τε ὧνπερ ἐκείνοις ἐμεμψάμην ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μεγάλα ἔχειν. [4] ἤν τε ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἡμῶν πεζῇ ἴωσιν, ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνων πλευσούμεθα, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἔσται Πελοποννήσου τε μέρος τι τμηθῆναι καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἅπασαν: οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕξουσιν ἄλλην ἀντιλαβεῖν ἀμαχεί,ἡμῖν δ᾽ ἐστὶ γῆ πολλὴ καὶ ἐν νήσοις καὶ κατ᾽ ἤπειρον: [5] μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς

θαλάσσης κράτος. σκέψασθε δέ: εἰ γὰρ ἦμεν νησιῶται, τίνες ἂν ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν; καὶ νῦν χρὴ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτου διανοηθέντας τὴν μὲν γῆν καὶ οἰκίας ἀφεῖναι, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης καὶ πόλεως φυλακὴν ἔχειν, καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὀργισθέντας πολλῷ πλέοσι μὴ διαμάχεσθαι κρατήσαντές τε γὰρ αὖθις οὐκ ἐλάσσοσι μαχούμεθα καὶ ἢν σφαλῶμεν, τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅθεν ἰσχύομεν, προσαπόλλυται: οὐ γὰρ ἡσυχάσουσι μὴ ἱκανῶν ἡμῶν ὄντων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς στρατεύειν, τήν τε ὀλόφυρσιν μὴ οἰκιῶν καὶ γῆς ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν σωμάτων: οὐ γὰρ τάδε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἄνδρες ταῦτα κτῶνται. καὶ εἰ ᾤμην πείσειν ὑμᾶς, αὐτοὺς ἂν ἐξελθόντας ἐκέλευον αὐτὰ δῃῶσαι καὶ δεῖξαι Πελοποννησίοις ὅτι τούτων γε ἕνεκα οὐχ ὑπακούσεσθε.

144. ‘πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι, ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι: μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας. [2] ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνα μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ἅμα τοῖς ἔργοις δηλωθήσεται: νῦν δὲ τούτοις ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν, Μεγαρέας μὲν ὅτι ἐάσομεν ἀγορᾷ καὶ λιμέσι χρῆσθαι, ἢν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ξενηλασίας μὴ ποιῶσι μήτε ἡμῶν μήτε τῶν ἡμετέρων ξυμμάχων οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνο κωλύει ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς οὔτε τόδε, τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι μὴ σφίσι [τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις] ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις ὡς βούλονται: δίκας τε ὅτι ἐθέλομεν δοῦναι κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας, πολέμου δὲ οὐκ ἄρξομεν, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἀμυνούμεθα. ταῦτα γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πρέποντα ἅμα τῇδε τῇ πόλει ἀποκρίνασθαι. [3] εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη πολεμεῖν, ἢν δὲ ἑκούσιοι μᾶλλον δεχώμεθα, ἧσσον ἐγκεισομένους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἕξομεν, ἔκ τε τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων ὅτι καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώτῃ μέγισται τιμαὶ περιγίγνονται. [4] οἱ γοῦν πατέρες ἡμῶν ὑποστάντες Μήδους καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοσῶνδε ὁρμώμενοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα

ἐκλιπόντες, γνώμῃ τε πλέονι ἢ τύχῃ καὶ τόλμῃ μείζονι ἢ δυνάμει τόν τε βάρβαρον ἀπεώσαντο καὶ ἐς τάδε προήγαγον αὐτά. ὧν οὐ χρὴ λείπεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούς τε ἐχθροὺς παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις πειρᾶσθαι αὐτὰ μὴ ἐλάσσω παραδοῦναι.’

145. ὁ μὲν Περικλῆς τοιαῦτα εἶπεν, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες ἄριστα σφίσι παραινεῖν αὐτὸν ἐψηφίσαντο ἃ ἐκέλευε, καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀπεκρίναντο τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ, καθ᾽ ἕκαστά τε ὡς ἔφρασε καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν, οὐδὲν κελευόμενοι ποιήσειν, δίκῃ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας ἑτοῖμοι εἶναι διαλύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἐπὶ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου καὶ οὐκέτι ὕστερον ἐπρεσβεύοντο:

146. αἰτίαι δὲ αὗται καὶ διαφοραὶ ἐγένοντο ἀμφοτέροις πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου, ἀρξάμεναι εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ καὶ Κερκύρᾳ: ἐπεμείγνυντο δὲ ὅμως ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων ἀκηρύκτως μέν, ἀνυπόπτως δὲ οὔ: σπονδῶν γὰρ ξύγχυσις τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν καὶ πρόφασις τοῦ πολεμεῖν.

Βιβλίο Β’

1. ἄρχεται δὲ ὁ πόλεμος ἐνθένδε ἤδη Ἀθηναίων καὶ Πελοποννησίων καὶ τῶν ἑκατέροις ξυμμάχων, ἐν ᾧ οὔτε ἐπεμείγνυντο ἔτι ἀκηρυκτεὶ παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους καταστάντες τε ξυνεχῶς ἐπολέμουν: γέγραπται δὲ ἐξῆς ὡς ἕκαστα ἐγίγνετο κατὰ θέρος καὶ χειμῶνα.

2. τέσσαρα μὲν γὰρ καὶ δέκα ἔτη ἐνέμειναν αἱ τριακοντούτεις σπονδαὶ αἳ ἐγένοντο μετ᾽ Εὐβοίας ἄλωσιν: τῷ δὲ πέμπτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει, ἐπὶ Χρυσίδος ἐν Ἄργει τότε πεντήκοντα δυοῖν δέοντα ἔτη ἱερωμένης καὶ Αἰνησίου ἐφόρου ἐν Σπάρτῃ καὶ Πυθοδώρου ἔτι δύο μῆνας ἄρχοντος Ἀθηναίοις, μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ μάχην μηνὶ ἕκτῳ καὶ ἅμα ἦρι ἀρχομένῳ Θηβαίων ἄνδρες ὀλίγῳ πλείους τριακοσίων ἦγον ἡγοῦντο δὲ αὐτῶν βοιωταρχοῦντες Πυθάγγελός τε ὁ Φυλείδου καὶ Διέμπορος ὁ Ὀνητορίδου ἐσῆλθον περὶ πρῶτον ὕπνον ξὺν ὅπλοις ἐς Πλάταιαν τῆς Βοιωτίας οὖσαν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίδα. [2] ἐπηγάγοντο δὲ καὶ ἀνέῳξαν τὰς πύλας Πλαταιῶν ἄνδρες, Ναυκλείδης τε καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, βουλόμενοι ἰδίας ἕνεκα δυνάμεως ἄνδρας τε τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς σφίσιν ὑπεναντίους διαφθεῖραι καὶ τὴν πόλιν Θηβαίοις προσποιῆσαι. [3] ἔπραξαν δὲ ταῦτα δι᾽ Εὐρυμάχου τοῦ Λεοντιάδου, ἀνδρὸς Θηβαίων δυνατωτάτου. προϊδόντες γὰρ οἱ Θηβαῖοι ὅτι ἔσοιτο ὁ πόλεμος ἐβούλοντο τὴν Πλάταιαν αἰεὶ σφίσι διάφορον οὖσαν ἔτι ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ τοῦ πολέμου μήπω φανεροῦ καθεστῶτος προκαταλαβεῖν. ᾗ καὶ ῥᾷον ἔλαθον ἐσελθόντες, φυλακῆς οὐ προκαθεστηκυίας. [4] θέμενοι δὲ ἐς τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ ὅπλα τοῖς μὲν ἐπαγαγομένοις οὐκ ἐπείθοντο ὥστε εὐθὺς ἔργου ἔχεσθαι καὶ ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας τῶν ἐχθρῶν, γνώμην δ᾽ ἐποιοῦντο κηρύγμασί τε χρήσασθαι ἐπιτηδείοις καὶ ἐς ξύμβασιν μᾶλλον καὶ φιλίαν τὴν πόλιν ἀγαγεῖν καὶ ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κῆρυξ, εἴ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχεῖν, τίθεσθαι παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα, νομίζοντες σφίσι ῥᾳδίως τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τὴν πόλιν.

3. οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς ὡς ᾔσθοντο ἔνδον τε ὄντας τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ ἐξαπιναίως κατειλημμένην τὴν πόλιν, καταδείσαντες καὶ νομίσαντες πολλῷ πλείους ἐσεληλυθέναι ·οὐ γὰρ ἐώρων ἐν τῇ νυκτί· πρὸς ξύμβασιν ἐχώρησαν καὶ τοὺς λόγους δεξάμενοι ἡσύχαζον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς οὐδένα οὐδὲν ἐνεωτέριζον. [2] πράσσοντες δέ πως ταῦτα κατενόησαν οὐ πολλοὺς τοὺς Θηβαίους ὄντας καὶ ἐνόμισαν ἐπιθέμενοι ῥᾳδίως κρατήσειν: τῷ γὰρ πλήθει τῶν Πλαταιῶν οὐ βουλομένῳ ἦν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφίστασθαι. [3] ἐδόκει οὖν ἐπιχειρητέα εἶναι, καὶ ξυνελέγοντο διορύσσοντες τοὺς κοινοὺς τοίχους παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους, ὅπως μὴ διὰ τῶν ὁδῶν φανεροὶ ὦσιν ἰόντες, ἁμάξας τε ἄνευ τῶν ὑποζυγίων ἐς τὰς ὁδοὺς καθίστασαν, ἵνα ἀντὶ τείχους ᾖ, καὶ τἆλλα ἐξήρτυον ᾗ ἕκαστον ἐφαίνετο πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ξύμφορον ἔσεσθαι. [4] ἐπεὶ δὲ ὡς ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ἑτοῖμα ἦν, φυλάξαντες ἔτι νύκτα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ περίορθρον ἐχώρουν ἐκ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς, ὅπως μὴ κατὰ φῶς θαρσαλεωτέροις οὖσι προσφέροιντο καὶ σφίσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου γίγνωνται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν νυκτὶ φοβερώτεροι ὄντες ἥσσους ὦσι τῆς σφετέρας ἐμπειρίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν. προσέβαλόν τε εὐθὺς καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ᾖσαν κατὰ τάχος.

4. οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἔγνωσαν ἐξηπατημένοι, ξυνεστρέφοντό τε ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰς προσβολὰς ᾗ προσπίπτοιεν ἀπεωθοῦντο. [2] καὶ δὶς μὲν ἢ τρὶς ἀπεκρούσαντο, ἔπειτα πολλῷ θορύβῳ αὐτῶν τε προσβαλόντων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν ἅμα ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν κραυγῇ τε καὶ ὀλολυγῇ χρωμένων λίθοις τε καὶ κεράμῳ βαλλόντων, καὶ ὑετοῦ ἅμα διὰ νυκτὸς πολλοῦ ἐπιγενομένου, ἐφοβήθησαν καὶ τραπόμενοι ἔφευγον διὰ τῆς πόλεως, ἄπειροι μὲν ὄντες οἱ πλείους ἐν σκότῳ καὶ πηλῷ τῶν διόδων ᾗ χρὴ σωθῆναι · καὶ γὰρ τελευτῶντος τοῦ μηνὸς τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν · , ἐμπείρους δὲ ἔχοντες τοὺς διώκοντας τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν, ὥστε διεφθείροντο οἱ πολλοί. [3] τῶν δὲ Πλαταιῶν τις τὰς πύλας ᾗ ἐσῆλθον καὶ αἵπερ ἦσαν μόναι ἀνεῳγμέναι ἔκλῃσε στυρακίῳ ἀκοντίου ἀντὶ βαλάνου χρησάμενος ἐς τὸν μοχλόν, ὥστε μηδὲ ταύτῃ ἔξοδον ἔτι εἶναι. [4] διωκόμενοι δὲ

κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οἱ μέν τινες αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀναβάντες ἔρριψαν ἐς τὸ ἔξω σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ διεφθάρησαν οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πύλας ἐρήμους γυναικὸς δούσης πέλεκυν λαθόντες καὶ διακόψαντες τὸν μοχλὸν ἐξῆλθον οὐ πολλοί αἴσθησις γὰρ ταχεῖα ἐπεγένετο, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλῃ τῆς πόλεως σποράδες ἀπώλλυντο. [5] τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον καὶ ὅσον μάλιστα ἦν ξυνεστραμμένον ἐσπίπτουσιν ἐς οἴκημα μέγα, ὃ ἦν τοῦ τείχους καὶ αἱ θύραι ἀνεῳγμέναι ἔτυχον αὐτοῦ, οἰόμενοι πύλας τὰς θύρας τοῦ οἰκήματος εἶναι καὶ ἄντικρυς δίοδον ἐς τὸ ἔξω. [6] ὁρῶντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἀπειλημμένους ἐβουλεύοντο εἴτε κατακαύσωσιν ὥσπερ ἔχουσιν, ἐμπρήσαντες τὸ οἴκημα, εἴτε τι ἄλλο χρήσωνται. [7] τέλος δὲ οὗτοί τε καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τῶν Θηβαίων περιῆσαν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν πλανώμενοι, ξυνέβησαν τοῖς Πλαταιεῦσι παραδοῦναι σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ὅπλα χρήσασθαι ὅτι ἂν βούλωνται. [8] οἱ μὲν δὴ ἐν τῇ Πλαταίᾳ οὕτως ἐπεπράγεσαν:

5. οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι Θηβαῖοι, οὓς ἔδει ἔτι τῆς νυκτὸς παραγενέσθαι πανστρατιᾷ, εἴ τι ἄρα μὴ προχωροίη τοῖς ἐσεληλυθόσι, τῆς ἀγγελίας ἅμα καθ᾽ ὁδὸν αὐτοῖς ῥηθείσης περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων ἐπεβοήθουν. [2] ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Πλάταια τῶν Θηβῶν σταδίους ἑβδομήκοντα, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ γενόμενον τῆς νυκτὸς ἐποίησε βραδύτερον αὐτοὺς ἐλθεῖν: ὁ γὰρ Ἀσωπὸς ποταμὸς ἐρρύη μέγας καὶ οὐ ῥᾳδίως διαβατὸς ἦν. [3] πορευόμενοί τε ἐν ὑετῷ καὶ τὸν ποταμὸν μόλις διαβάντες ὕστερον παρεγένοντο, ἤδη τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν μὲν διεφθαρμένων, τῶν δὲ ζώντων ἐχομένων. [4] ὡς δ᾽ ᾔσθοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι τὸ γεγενημένον, ἐπεβούλευον τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πόλεως τῶν Πλαταιῶν: ἦσαν γὰρ καὶ ἄνθρωποι κατὰ τοὺς ἀγροὺς καὶ κατασκευή, οἷα ἀπροσδοκήτου κακοῦ ἐν εἰρήνῃ γενομένου: ἐβούλοντο γὰρ σφίσιν, εἴ τινα λάβοιεν, ὑπάρχειν ἀντὶ τῶν ἔνδον, ἢν ἄρα τύχωσί τινες ἐζωγρημένοι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα διενοοῦντο, [5] οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς ἔτι διαβουλευομένων αὐτῶν ὑποτοπήσαντες τοιοῦτόν τι ἔσεσθαι καὶ δείσαντες περὶ τοῖς ἔξω κήρυκα ἐξέπεμψαν παρὰ τοὺς Θηβαίους, λέγοντες ὅτι οὔτε τὰ πεποιημένα ὅσια δράσειαν ἐν σπονδαῖς σφῶν πειράσαντες καταλαβεῖν τὴν

πόλιν, τά τε ἔξω ἔλεγον αὐτοῖς μὴ ἀδικεῖν: εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔφασαν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀποκτενεῖν οὓς ἔχουσι ζῶντας: ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ πάλιν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀποδώσειν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄνδρας. [6] Θηβαῖοι μὲν ταῦτα λέγουσι καὶ ἐπομόσαι φασὶν αὐτούς: Πλαταιῆς δ᾽ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσι τοὺς ἄνδρας εὐθὺς ὑποσχέσθαι ἀποδώσειν, ἀλλὰ λόγων πρῶτον γενομένων ἤν τι ξυμβαίνωσι, καὶ ἐπομόσαι οὕ φασιν. [7] ἐκ δ᾽ οὖν τῆς γῆς ἀνεχώρησαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι οὐδὲν ἀδικήσαντες: οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας κατὰ τάχος ἐσεκομίσαντο, ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς ἄνδρας εὐθύς. ἦσαν δὲ ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν οἱ ληφθέντες, καὶ Εὐρύμαχος εἷς αὐτῶν ἦν, πρὸς ὃν ἔπραξαν οἱ προδιδόντες.

6. τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσαντες ἔς τε τὰς Ἀθήνας ἄγγελον ἔπεμπον καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν τοῖς Θηβαίοις, τά τε ἐν τῇ πόλει καθίσταντο πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ᾗ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς. [2] τοῖς δ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις ἠγγέλθη εὐθὺς τὰ περὶ τῶν Πλαταιῶν γεγενημένα, καὶ Βοιωτῶν τε παραχρῆμα ξυνέλαβον ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πλάταιαν ἔπεμψαν κήρυκα, κελεύοντες εἰπεῖν μηδὲν νεώτερον ποιεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὓς ἔχουσι Θηβαίων, πρὶν ἄν τι καὶ αὐτοὶ βουλεύσωσι περὶ αὐτῶν: [3] οὐ γὰρ ἠγγέλθη αὐτοῖς ὅτι τεθνηκότες εἶεν. ἅμα γὰρ τῇ ἐσόδῳ γιγνομένῃ τῶν Θηβαίων ὁ πρῶτος ἄγγελος ἐξῄει, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος ἄρτι νενικημένων τε καὶ ξυνειλημμένων: καὶ τῶν ὕστερον οὐδὲν ᾔδεσαν. οὕτω δὴ οὐκ εἰδότες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπέστελλον: ὁ δὲ κῆρυξ ἀφικόμενος ηὗρε τοὺς ἄνδρας διεφθαρμένους. [4] καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύσαντες ἐς Πλάταιαν σῖτόν τε ἐσήγαγον καὶ φρουροὺς ἐγκατέλιπον, τῶν τε ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἀχρειοτάτους ξὺν γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν ἐξεκόμισαν.

7. γεγενημένου δὲ τοῦ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἔργου καὶ λελυμένων λαμπρῶς τῶν σπονδῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς πολεμήσοντες, παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, πρεσβείας τε μέλλοντες πέμπειν παρὰ βασιλέα καὶ ἄλλοσε πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, εἴ ποθέν τινα ὠφελίαν ἤλπιζον ἑκάτεροι προσλήψεσθαι, πόλεις τε ξυμμαχίδας ποιούμενοι ὅσαι ἦσαν ἐκτὸς τῆς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεως. [2] καὶ

Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν πρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχούσαις ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τἀκείνων ἑλομένοις ναῦς ἐπετάχθη ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἐς τὸν πάντα ἀριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἐσομένων, καὶ ἀργύριον ῥητὸν ἑτοιμάζειν, τά τε ἄλλα ἡσυχάζοντας καὶ Ἀθηναίους δεχομένους μιᾷ νηὶ ἕως ἂν ταῦτα παρασκευασθῇ. [3] Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τήν τε ὑπάρχουσαν ξυμμαχίαν ἐξήταζον καὶ ἐς τὰ περὶ Πελοπόννησον μᾶλλον χωρία ἐπρεσβεύοντο, Κέρκυραν καὶ Κεφαλληνίαν καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ Ζάκυνθον, ὁρῶντες, εἰ σφίσι φίλια ταῦτ᾽ εἴη βεβαίως, πέριξ τὴν Πελοπόννησον καταπολεμήσοντες.

8. ὀλίγον τε ἐπενόουν οὐδὲν ἀμφότεροι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔρρωντο ἐς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἀπεικότως: ἀρχόμενοι γὰρ πάντες ὀξύτερον ἀντιλαμβάνονται, τότε δὲ καὶ νεότης πολλὴ μὲν οὖσα ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ, πολλὴ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις οὐκ ἀκουσίως ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἥπτετο τοῦ πολέμου, ἥ τε ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς ἅπασα μετέωρος ἦν ξυνιουσῶν τῶν πρώτων πόλεων. [2] καὶ πολλὰ μὲν λόγια ἐλέγετο, πολλὰ δὲ χρησμολόγοι ᾖδον ἔν τε τοῖς μέλλουσι πολεμήσειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν. [3] ἔτι δὲ Δῆλος ἐκινήθη ὀλίγον πρὸ τούτων, πρότερον οὔπω σεισθεῖσα ἀφ᾽ οὗ Ἕλληνες μέμνηνται: ἐλέγετο δὲ καὶ ἐδόκει ἐπὶ τοῖς μέλλουσι γενήσεσθαι σημῆναι. εἴ τέ τι ἄλλο τοιουτότροπον ξυνέβη γενέσθαι, πάντα ἀνεζητεῖτο. [4] ἡ δὲ εὔνοια παρὰ πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν. ἔρρωτό τε πᾶς καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις εἴ τι δύναιτο καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ξυνεπιλαμβάνειν αὐτοῖς: ἐν τούτῳ τε κεκωλῦσθαι ἐδόκει ἑκάστῳ τὰ πράγματα ᾧ μή τις αὐτὸς παρέσται. [5] οὕτως <ἐν> ὀργῇ εἶχον οἱ πλείους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οἱ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπολυθῆναι βουλόμενοι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀρχθῶσι φοβούμενοι.

9. παρασκευῇ μὲν οὖν καὶ γνώμῃ τοιαύτῃ ὥρμηντο, πόλεις δὲ ἑκάτεροι τάσδε ἔχοντες ξυμμάχους ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο. [2] Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν οἵδε ξύμμαχοι: Πελοποννήσιοι μὲν οἱ ἐντὸς Ἰσθμοῦ πάντες πλὴν Ἀργείων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν τούτοις δὲ ἐς ἀμφοτέρους φιλία ἦν: Πελληνῆς

δὲ Ἀχαιῶν μόνοι ξυνεπολέμουν τὸ πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ ὕστερον καὶ ἅπαντες , ἔξω δὲ Πελοποννήσου Μεγαρῆς, Βοιωτοί, Λοκροί, Φωκῆς, Ἀμπρακιῶται, Λευκάδιοι, Ἀνακτόριοι. [3] τούτων ναυτικὸν παρείχοντο Κορίνθιοι, Μεγαρῆς, Σικυώνιοι, Πελληνῆς, Ἠλεῖοι, Ἀμπρακιῶται, Λευκάδιοι, ἱππέας δὲ Βοιωτοί, Φωκῆς, Λοκροί: αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι πόλεις πεζὸν παρεῖχον. αὕτη μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμαχία: [4] Ἀθηναίων δὲ Χῖοι, Λέσβιοι, Πλαταιῆς, Μεσσήνιοι οἱ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ, Ἀκαρνάνων οἱ πλείους, Κερκυραῖοι, Ζακύνθιοι, καὶ ἄλλαι πόλεις αἱ ὑποτελεῖς οὖσαι ἐν ἔθνεσι τοσοῖσδε, Καρία ἡ ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ, Δωριῆς Καρσὶ πρόσοικοι, Ἰωνία, Ἑλλήσποντος, τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, νῆσοι ὅσαι ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου καὶ Κρήτης πρὸς ἥλιον ἀνίσχοντα, πᾶσαι αἱ Κυκλάδες πλὴν Μήλου καὶ Θήρας. [5] τούτων ναυτικὸν παρείχοντο Χῖοι, Λέσβιοι, Κερκυραῖοι, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πεζὸν καὶ χρήματα. [6] ξυμμαχία μὲν αὕτη ἑκατέρων καὶ παρασκευὴ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἦν.

10. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς εὐθὺς περιήγγελλον κατὰ τὴν Πελοπόννησον καὶ τὴν ἔξω ξυμμαχίδα στρατιὰν παρασκευάζεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι τά τε ἐπιτήδεια οἷα εἰκὸς ἐπὶ ἔξοδον ἔκδημον ἔχειν, ὡς ἐσβαλοῦντες ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν. [2] ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἑκάστοις ἑτοῖμα γίγνοιτο, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸν εἰρημένον ξυνῆσαν τὰ δύο μέρη ἀπὸ πόλεως ἑκάστης ἐς τὸν Ἰσθμόν. [3] καὶ ἐπειδὴ πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα ξυνειλεγμένον ἦν, Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅσπερ ἡγεῖτο τῆς ἐξόδου ταύτης, ξυγκαλέσας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων πασῶν καὶ τοὺς μάλιστα ἐν τέλει καὶ ἀξιολογωτάτους παρῄνει τοιάδε.

11. ‘ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, καὶ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν πολλὰς στρατείας καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ ἔξω ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι οὐκ ἄπειροι πολέμων εἰσίν: ὅμως δὲ τῆσδε οὔπω μείζονα παρασκευὴν ἔχοντες ἐξήλθομεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πόλιν δυνατωτάτην νῦν ἐρχόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ πλεῖστοι καὶ ἄριστοι στρατεύοντες. [2] δίκαιον οὖν ἡμᾶς μήτε τῶν πατέρων χείρους φαίνεσθαι μήτε ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῆς δόξης ἐνδεεστέρους. ἡ γὰρ Ἑλλὰς

πᾶσα τῇδε τῇ ὁρμῇ ἐπῆρται καὶ προσέχει τὴν γνώμην, εὔνοιαν ἔχουσα διὰ τὸ Ἀθηναίων ἔχθος πρᾶξαι ἡμᾶς ἃ ἐπινοοῦμεν. [3] οὔκουν χρή, εἴ τῳ καὶ δοκοῦμεν πλήθει ἐπιέναι καὶ ἀσφάλεια πολλὴ εἶναι μὴ ἂν ἐλθεῖν τοὺς ἐναντίους ἡμῖν διὰ μάχης, τούτων ἕνεκα ἀμελέστερόν τι παρεσκευασμένους χωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεως ἑκάστης ἡγεμόνα καὶ στρατιώτην τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν αἰεὶ προσδέχεσθαι ἐς κίνδυνόν τινα ἥξειν. [4] ἄδηλα γὰρ τὰ τῶν πολέμων, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου τὰ πολλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ὀργῆς αἱ ἐπιχειρήσεις γίγνονται: πολλάκις τε τὸ ἔλασσον πλῆθος δεδιὸς ἄμεινον ἠμύνατο τοὺς πλέονας διὰ τὸ καταφρονοῦντας ἀπαρασκεύους γενέσθαι. [5] χρὴ δὲ αἰεὶ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ θαρσαλέους στρατεύειν, τῷ δ᾽ ἔργῳ δεδιότας παρεσκευάσθαι: οὕτω γὰρ πρός τε τὸ ἐπιέναι τοῖς ἐναντίοις εὐψυχότατοι ἂν εἶεν πρός τε τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖσθαι ἀσφαλέστατοι. [6] ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ ἀδύνατον ἀμύνεσθαι οὕτω πόλιν ἐρχόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἄριστα παρεσκευασμένην, ὥστε χρὴ καὶ πάνυ ἐλπίζειν διὰ μάχης ἰέναι αὐτούς, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν ὥρμηνται ἐν ᾧ οὔπω πάρεσμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἐν τῇ γῇ ὁρῶσιν ἡμᾶς δῃοῦντάς τε καὶ τἀκείνων φθείροντας. [7] πᾶσι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ὁρᾶν πάσχοντάς τι ἄηθες ὀργὴ προσπίπτει: καὶ οἱ λογισμῷ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι θυμῷ πλεῖστα ἐς ἔργον καθίστανται. [8] Ἀθηναίους δὲ καὶ πλέον τι τῶν ἄλλων εἰκὸς τοῦτο δρᾶσαι, οἳ ἄρχειν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιοῦσι καὶ ἐπιόντες τὴν τῶν πέλας δῃοῦν μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν αὐτῶν ὁρᾶν. [9] ὡς οὖν ἐπὶ τοσαύτην πόλιν στρατεύοντες καὶ μεγίστην δόξαν οἰσόμενοι τοῖς τε προγόνοις καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, ἕπεσθ᾽ ὅπῃ ἄν τις ἡγῆται, κόσμον καὶ φυλακὴν περὶ παντὸς ποιούμενοι καὶ τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ὀξέως δεχόμενοι: κάλλιστον γὰρ τόδε καὶ ἀσφαλέστατον, πολλοὺς ὄντας ἑνὶ κόσμῳ χρωμένους φαίνεσθαι.’

12. τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν καὶ διαλύσας τὸν ξύλλογον ὁ Ἀρχίδαμος Μελήσιππον πρῶτον ἀποστέλλει ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας τὸν Διακρίτου ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην, εἴ τι ἄρα μᾶλλον ἐνδοῖεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁρῶντες σφᾶς ἤδη ἐν ὁδῷ ὄντας. [2] οἱ δὲ οὐ

προσεδέξαντο αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν πόλιν οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ κοινόν: ἦν γὰρ Περικλέους γνώμη πρότερον νενικηκυῖα κήρυκα καὶ πρεσβείαν μὴ προσδέχεσθαι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐξεστρατευμένων: ἀποπέμπουσιν οὖν αὐτὸν πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἐκέλευον ἐκτὸς ὅρων εἶναι αὐθημερόν, τό τε λοιπὸν ἀναχωρήσαντας ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν, ἤν τι βούλωνται, πρεσβεύεσθαι. ξυμπέμπουσί τε τῷ Μελησίππῳ ἀγωγούς, ὅπως μηδενὶ ξυγγένηται. [3] ὁ δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁρίοις ἐγένετο καὶ ἔμελλε διαλύσεσθαι, τοσόνδε εἰπὼν ἐπορεύετο ὅτι ‘ἥδε ἡ ἡμέρα τοῖς Ἕλλησι μεγάλων κακῶν ἄρξει.’ [4] ὡς δὲ ἀφίκετο ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ ἔγνω ὁ Ἀρχίδαμος ὅτι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδέν πω ἐνδώσουσιν, οὕτω δὴ ἄρας τῷ στρατῷ προυχώρει ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν. [5] Βοιωτοὶ δὲ μέρος μὲν τὸ σφέτερον καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας παρείχοντο Πελοποννησίοις ξυστρατεύειν, τοῖς δὲ λειπομένοις ἐς Πλάταιαν ἐλθόντες τὴν γῆν ἐδῄουν.

13. ἔτι δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ξυλλεγομένων τε ἐς τὸν Ἰσθμὸν καὶ ἐν ὁδῷ ὄντων, πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν, Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου στρατηγὸς ὢν Ἀθηναίων δέκατος αὐτός, ὡς ἔγνω τὴν ἐσβολὴν ἐσομένην, ὑποτοπήσας, ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ξένος ὢν ἐτύγχανε, μὴ πολλάκις ἢ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ βουλόμενος χαρίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγροὺς αὐτοῦ παραλίπῃ καὶ μὴ δῃώσῃ, ἢ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων κελευσάντων ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γένηται τοῦτο, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄγη ἐλαύνειν προεῖπον ἕνεκα ἐκείνου, προηγόρευε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μέν οἱ ξένος εἴη, οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ κακῷ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο, τοὺς δὲ ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οἰκίας ἢν ἄρα μὴ δῃώσωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀφίησιν αὐτὰ δημόσια εἶναι καὶ μηδεμίαν οἱ ὑποψίαν κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι. [2] παρῄνει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἅπερ καὶ πρότερον, παρασκευάζεσθαί τε ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐσκομίζεσθαι, ἔς τε μάχην μὴ ἐπεξιέναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐσελθόντας φυλάσσειν, καὶ τὸ ναυτικόν, ᾗπερ ἰσχύουσιν, ἐξαρτύεσθαι, τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν, λέγων τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι τῶν χρημάτων τῆς προσόδου, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τοῦ

πολέμου γνώμῃ καὶ χρημάτων περιουσίᾳ κρατεῖσθαι. [3] θαρσεῖν τε ἐκέλευε προσιόντων μὲν ἑξακοσίων ταλάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φόρου κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων τῇ πόλει ἄνευ τῆς ἄλλης προσόδου, ὑπαρχόντων δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει ἔτι τότε ἀργυρίου ἐπισήμου ἑξακισχιλίων ταλάντων —τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστα τριακοσίων ἀποδέοντα μύρια ἐγένετο, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἔς τε τὰ προπύλαια τῆς ἀκροπόλεως καὶ τἆλλα οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἐς Ποτείδαιαν ἀπανηλώθη—, [4] χωρὶς δὲ χρυσίου ἀσήμου καὶ ἀργυρίου ἔν τε ἀναθήμασιν ἰδίοις καὶ δημοσίοις καὶ ὅσα ἱερὰ σκεύη περί τε τὰς πομπὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ σκῦλα Μηδικὰ καὶ εἴ τι τοιουτότροπον, οὐκ ἐλάσσονος [ἦν] ἢ πεντακοσίων ταλάντων. [5] ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἱερῶν προσετίθει χρήματα οὐκ ὀλίγα, οἷς χρήσεσθαι αὐτούς, καὶ ἢν πάνυ ἐξείργωνται πάντων, καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς θεοῦ τοῖς περικειμένοις χρυσίοις: ἀπέφαινε δ᾽ ἔχον τὸ ἄγαλμα τεσσαράκοντα τάλαντα σταθμὸν χρυσίου ἀπέφθου, καὶ περιαιρετὸν εἶναι ἅπαν. χρησαμένους τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἔφη χρῆναι μὴ ἐλάσσω ἀντικαταστῆσαι πάλιν. [6] χρήμασι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐθάρσυνεν αὐτούς, ὁπλίτας δὲ τρισχιλίους καὶ μυρίους εἶναι ἄνευ τῶν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις καὶ τῶν παρ᾽ ἔπαλξιν ἑξακισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων. [7] τοσοῦτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσον τὸ πρῶτον ὁπότε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐσβάλοιεν, ἀπό τε τῶν πρεσβυτάτων καὶ τῶν νεωτάτων, καὶ μετοίκων ὅσοι ὁπλῖται ἦσαν. τοῦ τε γὰρ Φαληρικοῦ τείχους στάδιοι ἦσαν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα πρὸς τὸν κύκλον τοῦ ἄστεως, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τὸ φυλασσόμενον τρεῖς καὶ τεσσαράκοντα —ἔστι δὲ αὐτοῦ ὃ καὶ ἀφύλακτον ἦν, τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε μακροῦ καὶ τοῦ Φαληρικοῦ—, τὰ δὲ μακρὰ τείχη πρὸς τὸν Πειραιᾶ τεσσαράκοντα σταδίων, ὧν τὸ ἔξωθεν ἐτηρεῖτο: καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς ξὺν Μουνιχίᾳ ἑξήκοντα μὲν σταδίων ὁ ἅπας περίβολος, τὸ δ᾽ ἐν φυλακῇ ὃν ἥμισυ τούτου. [8] ἱππέας δὲ ἀπέφαινε διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους ξὺν ἱπποτοξόταις, ἑξακοσίους δὲ καὶ χιλίους τοξότας, καὶ τριήρεις τὰς πλωίμους τριακοσίας. [9] ταῦτα γὰρ ὑπῆρχεν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ οὐκ ἐλάσσω ἕκαστα τούτων, ὅτε ἡ ἐσβολὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἔμελλε Πελοποννησίων ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον

καθίσταντο. ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα οἷάπερ εἰώθει Περικλῆς ἐς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέσεσθαι τῷ πολέμῳ.

14. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἀνεπείθοντό τε καὶ ἐσεκομίζοντο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην κατασκευὴν ᾗ κατ᾽ οἶκον ἐχρῶντο, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν οἰκιῶν καθαιροῦντες τὴν ξύλωσιν: πρόβατα δὲ καὶ ὑποζύγια ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν διεπέμψαντο καὶ ἐς τὰς νήσους τὰς ἐπικειμένας. [2] χαλεπῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ εἰωθέναι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς διαιτᾶσθαι ἡ ἀνάστασις ἐγίγνετο.

15. ξυνεβεβήκει δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάνυ ἀρχαίου ἑτέρων μᾶλλον Ἀθηναίοις τοῦτο. ἐπὶ γὰρ Κέκροπος καὶ τῶν πρώτων βασιλέων ἡ Ἀττικὴ ἐς Θησέα αἰεὶ κατὰ πόλεις ᾠκεῖτο πρυτανεῖά τε ἐχούσας καὶ ἄρχοντας, καὶ ὁπότε μή τι δείσειαν, οὐ ξυνῇσαν βουλευσόμενοι ὡς τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἕκαστοι ἐπολίτευον καὶ ἐβουλεύοντο: καί τινες καὶ ἐπολέμησάν ποτε αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐλευσίνιοι μετ᾽ Εὐμόλπου πρὸς Ἐρεχθέα. [2] ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς τά τε ἄλλα διεκόσμησε τὴν χώραν καὶ καταλύσας τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τά τε βουλευτήρια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐς τὴν νῦν πόλιν οὖσαν, ἓν βουλευτήριον ἀποδείξας καὶ πρυτανεῖον, ξυνῴκισε πάντας, καὶ νεμομένους τὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάστους ἅπερ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἠνάγκασε μιᾷ πόλει ταύτῃ χρῆσθαι, ἣ ἁπάντων ἤδη ξυντελούντων ἐς αὐτὴν μεγάλη γενομένη παρεδόθη ὑπὸ Θησέως τοῖς ἔπειτα: καὶ ξυνοίκια ἐξ ἐκείνου Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτι καὶ νῦν τῇ θεῷ ἑορτὴν δημοτελῆ ποιοῦσιν. [3] τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἡ ἀκρόπολις ἡ νῦν οὖσα πόλις ἦν, καὶ τὸ ὑπ᾽ αὐτὴν πρὸς νότον μάλιστα τετραμμένον. [4] τεκμήριον δέ: τὰ γὰρ ἱερὰ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει † καὶ ἄλλων θεῶν ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἔξω πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς πόλεως μᾶλλον ἵδρυται, τό τε τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου καὶ τὸ Πύθιον καὶ τὸ τῆς Γῆς καὶ τὸ <τοῦ> ἐν Λίμναις Διονύσου, ᾧ τὰ ἀρχαιότερα Διονύσια [τῇ δωδεκάτῃ] ποιεῖται ἐν μηνὶ Ἀνθεστηριῶνι, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων Ἴωνες ἔτι καὶ νῦν νομίζουσιν. ἵδρυται δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἱερὰ ταύτῃ ἀρχαῖα. [5] καὶ τῇ κρήνῃ τῇ νῦν μὲν τῶν τυράννων οὕτω σκευασάντων Ἐννεακρούνῳ καλουμένῃ, τὸ

δὲ πάλαι φανερῶν τῶν πηγῶν οὐσῶν Καλλιρρόῃ ὠνομασμένῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε ἐγγὺς οὔσῃ τὰ πλείστου ἄξια ἐχρῶντο, καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχαίου πρό τε γαμικῶν καὶ ἐς ἄλλα τῶν ἱερῶν νομίζεται τῷ ὕδατι χρῆσθαι: [6] καλεῖται δὲ διὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ταύτῃ κατοίκησιν καὶ ἡ ἀκρόπολις μέχρι τοῦδε ἔτι ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων πόλις.

16. τῇ τε οὖν ἐπὶ πολὺ κατὰ τὴν χώραν αὐτονόμῳ οἰκήσει μετεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ξυνῳκίσθησαν, διὰ τὸ ἔθος ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς ὅμως οἱ πλείους τῶν τε ἀρχαίων καὶ τῶν ὕστερον μέχρι τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου γενόμενοί τε καὶ οἰκήσαντες οὐ ῥᾳδίως πανοικεσίᾳ τὰς μεταναστάσεις ἐποιοῦντο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄρτι ἀνειληφότες τὰς κατασκευὰς μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά: [2] ἐβαρύνοντο δὲ καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔφερον οἰκίας τε καταλείποντες καὶ ἱερὰ ἃ διὰ παντὸς ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πολιτείας πάτρια δίαιτάν τε μέλλοντες μεταβάλλειν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολείπων ἕκαστος.

17. ἐπειδή τε ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὸ ἄστυ, ὀλίγοις μέν τισιν ὑπῆρχον οἰκήσεις καὶ παρὰ φίλων τινὰς ἢ οἰκείων καταφυγή, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τά τε ἐρῆμα τῆς πόλεως ᾤκησαν καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ ἡρῷα πάντα πλὴν τῆς ἀκροπόλεως καὶ τοῦ Ἐλευσινίου καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο βεβαίως κληστὸν ἦν: τό τε Πελαργικὸν καλούμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὃ καὶ ἐπάρατόν τε ἦν μὴ οἰκεῖν καί τι καὶ Πυθικοῦ μαντείου ἀκροτελεύτιον τοιόνδε διεκώλυε, λέγον ὡς ‘τὸ Πελαργικὸν ἀργὸν ἄμεινον,’ ὅμως ὑπὸ τῆς παραχρῆμα ἀνάγκης ἐξῳκήθη. [2] καί μοι δοκεῖ τὸ μαντεῖον τοὐναντίον ξυμβῆναι ἢ προσεδέχοντο: οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν παράνομον ἐνοίκησιν αἱ ξυμφοραὶ γενέσθαι τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἀνάγκη τῆς οἰκήσεως, ὃν οὐκ ὀνομάζον τὸ μαντεῖον προῄδει μὴ ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ ποτὲ αὐτὸ κατοικισθησόμενον. [3] κατεσκευάσαντο δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πύργοις τῶν τειχῶν πολλοὶ καὶ ὡς ἕκαστός που ἐδύνατο: οὐ γὰρ ἐχώρησε ξυνελθόντας αὐτοὺς ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ᾽ ὕστερον δὴ τά τε μακρὰ τείχη ᾤκησαν κατανειμάμενοι καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ πολλά. [4] ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἥπτοντο, ξυμμάχους τε ἀγείροντες καὶ τῇ

Πελοποννήσῳ ἑκατὸν νεῶν ἐπίπλουν ἐξαρτύοντες. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τούτῳ παρασκευῆς ἦσαν.

18. ὁ δὲ στρατὸς τῶν Πελοποννησίων προϊὼν ἀφίκετο τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Οἰνόην πρῶτον, ᾗπερ ἔμελλον ἐσβαλεῖν. καὶ ὡς ἐκαθέζοντο, προσβολὰς παρεσκευάζοντο τῷ τείχει ποιησόμενοι μηχαναῖς τε καὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ: [2] ἡ γὰρ Οἰνόη οὖσα ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ Βοιωτίας ἐτετείχιστο, καὶ αὐτῷ φρουρίῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐχρῶντο ὁπότε πόλεμος καταλάβοι. τάς τε οὖν προσβολὰς ηὐτρεπίζοντο καὶ ἄλλως ἐνδιέτριψαν χρόνον περὶ αὐτήν. [3] αἰτίαν τε οὐκ ἐλαχίστην Ἀρχίδαμος ἔλαβεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, δοκῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ξυναγωγῇ τοῦ πολέμου μαλακὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτήδειος, οὐ παραινῶν προθύμως πολεμεῖν: ἐπειδή τε ξυνελέγετο ὁ στρατός, ἥ τε ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ἐπιμονὴ γενομένη καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην πορείαν ἡ σχολαιότης διέβαλεν αὐτόν, μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐν τῇ Οἰνόῃ ἐπίσχεσις. [4] οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐσεκομίζοντο ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, καὶ ἐδόκουν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπελθόντες ἂν διὰ τάχους πάντα ἔτι ἔξω καταλαβεῖν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου μέλλησιν. [5] ἐν τοιαύτῃ μὲν ὀργῇ ὁ στρατὸς τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον ἐν τῇ καθέδρᾳ εἶχεν. ὁ δὲ προσδεχόμενος, ὡς λέγεται, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς γῆς ἔτι ἀκεραίου οὔσης ἐνδώσειν τι καὶ κατοκνήσειν περιιδεῖν αὐτὴν τμηθεῖσαν, ἀνεῖχεν.

19. ἐπειδὴ μέντοι προσβαλόντες τῇ Οἰνόῃ καὶ πᾶσαν ἰδέαν πειράσαντες οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν, οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο, οὕτω δὴ ὁρμήσαντες ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλαταίᾳ [τῶν ἐσελθόντων Θηβαίων] γενόμενα ἡμέρᾳ ὀγδοηκοστῇ μάλιστα, θέρους καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἀκμάζοντος, ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν: ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. [2] καὶ καθεζόμενοι ἔτεμνον πρῶτον μὲν Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ τὸ Θριάσιον πεδίον καὶ τροπήν τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἱππέων περὶ τοὺς Ῥείτους καλουμένους ἐποιήσαντο: ἔπειτα προυχώρουν ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ Αἰγάλεων ὄρος διὰ Κρωπιᾶς, ἕως ἀφίκοντο ἐς Ἀχαρνάς, χωρίον μέγιστον τῆς Ἀττικῆς τῶν δήμων

καλουμένων, καὶ καθεζόμενοι ἐς αὐτὸ στρατόπεδόν τε ἐποιήσαντο χρόνον τε πολὺν ἐμμείναντες ἔτεμνον.

20. γνώμῃ δὲ τοιᾷδε λέγεται τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον περί τε τὰς Ἀχαρνὰς ὡς ἐς μάχην ταξάμενον μεῖναι καὶ ἐς τὸ πεδίον ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἐσβολῇ οὐ καταβῆναι: [2] τοὺς γὰρ Ἀθηναίους ἤλπιζεν, ἀκμάζοντάς τε νεότητι πολλῇ καὶ παρεσκευασμένους ἐς πόλεμον ὡς οὔπω πρότερον, ἴσως ἂν ἐπεξελθεῖν καὶ τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἂν περιιδεῖν τμηθῆναι. [3] ἐπειδὴ οὖν αὐτῷ ἐς Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ τὸ Θριάσιον πεδίον οὐκ ἀπήντησαν, πεῖραν ἐποιεῖτο περὶ τὰς Ἀχαρνὰς καθήμενος εἰ ἐπεξίασιν: [4] ἅμα μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ χῶρος ἐπιτήδειος ἐφαίνετο ἐνστρατοπεδεῦσαι, ἅμα δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀχαρνῆς μέγα μέρος ὄντες τῆς πόλεως —τρισχίλιοι γὰρ ὁπλῖται ἐγένοντο— οὐ περιόψεσθαι ἐδόκουν τὰ σφέτερα διαφθαρέντα, ἀλλ᾽ ὁρμήσειν καὶ τοὺς πάντας ἐς μάχην. εἴ τε καὶ μὴ ἐπεξέλθοιεν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἐσβολῇ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδεέστερον ἤδη ἐς τὸ ὕστερον τό τε πεδίον τεμεῖν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν χωρήσεσθαι: τοὺς γὰρ Ἀχαρνέας ἐστερημένους τῶν σφετέρων οὐχ ὁμοίως προθύμους ἔσεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων κινδυνεύειν, στάσιν δ᾽ ἐνέσεσθαι τῇ γνώμῃ. [5] τοιαύτῃ μὲν διανοίᾳ ὁ Ἀρχίδαμος περὶ τὰς Ἀχαρνὰς ἦν.

21. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ μέχρι μὲν οὗ περὶ Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ τὸ Θριάσιον πεδίον ὁ στρατὸς ἦν, καί τινα ἐλπίδα εἶχον ἐς τὸ ἐγγυτέρω αὐτοὺς μὴ προϊέναι, μεμνημένοι καὶ Πλειστοάνακτα τὸν Παυσανίου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέα, ὅτε ἐσβαλὼν τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ Θριῶζε στρατῷ Πελοποννησίων πρὸ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου τέσσαρσι καὶ δέκα ἔτεσιν ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐς τὸ πλέον οὐκέτι προελθών —διὸ καὶ ἡ φυγὴ αὐτῷ ἐγένετο ἐκ Σπάρτης δόξαντι χρήμασι πεισθῆναι [τὴν ἀναχώρησιν]—: [2] ἐπειδὴ δὲ περὶ Ἀχαρνὰς εἶδον τὸν στρατὸν ἑξήκοντα σταδίους τῆς πόλεως ἀπέχοντα, οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῖς, ὡς εἰκός, γῆς τεμνομένης ἐν τῷ ἐμφανεῖ, ὃ οὔπω ἑοράκεσαν οἵ γε νεώτεροι, οὐδ᾽ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πλὴν τὰ Μηδικά, δεινὸν ἐφαίνετο καὶ ἐδόκει τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ μάλιστα τῇ νεότητι ἐπεξιέναι καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν. [3] κατὰ ξυστάσεις τε γιγνόμενοι

ἐν πολλῇ ἔριδι ἦσαν, οἱ μὲν κελεύοντες ἐπεξιέναι, οἱ δέ τινες οὐκ ἐῶντες. χρησμολόγοι τε ἦδον χρησμοὺς παντοίους, ὧν ἀκροᾶσθαι ὡς ἕκαστος ὥρμητο. οἵ τε Ἀχαρνῆς οἰόμενοι παρὰ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐλαχίστην μοῖραν εἶναι Ἀθηναίων, ὡς αὐτῶν ἡ γῆ ἐτέμνετο, ἐνῆγον τὴν ἔξοδον μάλιστα. παντί τε τρόπῳ ἀνηρέθιστο ἡ πόλις, καὶ τὸν Περικλέα ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον, καὶ ὧν παρῄνεσε πρότερον ἐμέμνηντο οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι, αἴτιόν τε σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον πάντων ὧν ἔπασχον.

22. Περικλῆς δὲ ὁρῶν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ οὐ τὰ ἄριστα φρονοῦντας, πιστεύων δὲ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι, ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα, τοῦ μὴ ὀργῇ τι μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν, τήν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε καὶ δι᾽ ἡσυχίας μάλιστα ὅσον ἐδύνατο εἶχεν. [2] ἱππέας μέντοι ἐξέπεμπεν αἰεὶ τοῦ μὴ προδρόμους ἀπὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐσπίπτοντας ἐς τοὺς ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν: καὶ ἱππομαχία τις ἐγένετο βραχεῖα ἐν Φρυγίοις τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων τέλει ἐνὶ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ Θεσσαλοῖς μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς Βοιωτῶν ἱππέας, ἐν ᾗ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Θεσσαλοί, μέχρι οὗ προσβοηθησάντων τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τροπὴ ἐγένετο αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπέθανον τῶν Θεσσαλῶν καὶ Ἀθηναίων οὐ πολλοί: ἀνείλοντο μέντοι αὐτοὺς αὐθημερὸν ἀσπόνδους. [3] καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τροπαῖον τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἔστησαν. ἡ δὲ βοήθεια αὕτη τῶν Θεσσαλῶν κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν ξυμμαχικὸν ἐγένετο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ἀφίκοντο παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς Λαρισαῖοι, Φαρσάλιοι, [Παράσιοι], Κραννώνιοι, Πυράσιοι, Γυρτώνιοι, Φεραῖοι. ἡγοῦντο δὲ αὐτῶν ἐκ μὲν Λαρίσης Πολυμήδης καὶ Ἀριστόνους, ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως ἑκάτερος, ἐκ δὲ Φαρσάλου Μένων: ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ πόλεις ἄρχοντες.

23. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐπεξῆσαν αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς μάχην, ἅραντες ἐκ τῶν Ἀχαρνῶν ἐδῄουν τῶν δήμων τινὰς ἄλλους τῶν μεταξὺ Πάρνηθος καὶ Βριλησσοῦ ὄρους. [2] ὄντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέστειλαν τὰς ἑκατὸν ναῦς περὶ Πελοπόννησον ἅσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο

καὶ χιλίους ὁπλίτας ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ τοξότας τετρακοσίους: ἐστρατήγει δὲ Καρκίνος τε ὁ Ξενοτίμου καὶ Πρωτέας ὁ Ἐπικλέους καὶ Σωκράτης ὁ Ἀντιγένους. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄραντες τῇ παρασκευῇ ταύτῃ περιέπλεον, οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι χρόνον ἐμμείναντες ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὅσου εἶχον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἀνεχώρησαν διὰ Βοιωτῶν, οὐχ ᾗπερ ἐσέβαλον: παριόντες δὲ Ὠρωπὸν τὴν γῆν τὴν Γραϊκὴν καλουμένην, ἣν νέμονται Ὠρώπιοι Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι, ἐδῄωσαν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς Πελοπόννησον διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις ἕκαστοι.

24. ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι φυλακὰς κατεστήσαντο κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ὥσπερ δὴ ἔμελλον διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου φυλάξειν: καὶ χίλια τάλαντα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει χρημάτων ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἐξαίρετα ποιησαμένοις χωρὶς θέσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀναλοῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολεμεῖν: ἢν δέ τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ κινεῖν τὰ χρήματα ταῦτα ἐς ἄλλο τι, ἢν μὴ οἱ πολέμιοι νηίτῃ στρατῷ ἐπιπλέωσι τῇ πόλει καὶ δέῃ ἀμύνασθαι, θάνατον ζημίαν ἐπέθεντο. [2] τριήρεις τε μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐξαιρέτους ἑκατὸν ἐποιήσαντο κατὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἕκαστον τὰς βελτίστας, καὶ τριηράρχους αὐταῖς, ὧν μὴ χρῆσθαι μηδεμιᾷ ἐς ἄλλο τι ἢ μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κινδύνου, ἢν δέῃ.

25. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Κερκυραῖοι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πεντήκοντα ναυσὶ προσβεβοηθηκότες καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχων ἄλλα τε ἐκάκουν περιπλέοντες καὶ ἐς Μεθώνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἀποβάντες τῷ τείχει προσέβαλον ὄντι ἀσθενεῖ καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἐνόντων. [2] ἔτυχε δὲ περὶ τοὺς χώρους τούτους Βρασίδας ὁ Τέλλιδος ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιάτης φρουρὰν ἔχων, καὶ αἰσθόμενος ἐβοήθει τοῖς ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ μετὰ ὁπλιτῶν ἑκατόν. διαδραμὼν δὲ τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον ἐσκεδασμένον κατὰ τὴν χώραν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος τετραμμένον ἐσπίπτει ἐς τὴν Μεθώνην καὶ ὀλίγους τινὰς ἐν τῇ ἐσδρομῇ ἀπολέσας τῶν μεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ τήν τε πόλιν περιεποίησε καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ τολμήματος πρῶτος τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπῃνέθη ἐν Σπάρτῃ. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι

ἄραντες παρέπλεον, καὶ σχόντες τῆς Ἠλείας ἐς Φειὰν ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν ἐπὶ δύο ἡμέρας καὶ προσβοηθήσαντας τῶν ἐκ τῆς κοίλης Ἤλιδος τριακοσίους λογάδας καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ἐκ τῆς περιοικίδος Ἠλείων μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν. [4] ἀνέμου δὲ κατιόντος μεγάλου χειμαζόμενοι ἐν ἀλιμένῳ χωρίῳ, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐπέβησαν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ περιέπλεον τὸν Ἰχθῦν καλούμενον τὴν ἄκραν ἐς τὸν ἐν τῇ Φειᾷ λιμένα, οἱ δὲ Μεσσήνιοι ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς οἱ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπιβῆναι κατὰ γῆν χωρήσαντες τὴν Φειὰν αἱροῦσιν. [5] καὶ ὕστερον αἵ τε νῆες περιπλεύσασαι ἀναλαμβάνουσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐξανάγονται ἐκλιπόντες Φειάν, καὶ τῶν Ἠλείων ἡ πολλὴ ἤδη στρατιὰ προσεβεβοηθήκει. παραπλεύσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ ἄλλα χωρία ἐδῄουν.

26. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον Ἀθηναῖοι τριάκοντα ναῦς ἐξέπεμψαν περὶ τὴν Λοκρίδα καὶ Εὐβοίας ἅμα φυλακήν: ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Κλεόπομπος ὁ Κλεινίου. [2] καὶ ἀποβάσεις ποιησάμενος τῆς τε παραθαλασσίου ἔστιν ἃ ἐδῄωσε καὶ Θρόνιον εἶλεν, ὁμήρους τε ἔλαβεν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν Ἀλόπῃ τοὺς βοηθήσαντας Λοκρῶν μάχῃ ἐκράτησεν.

27. ἀνέστησαν δὲ καὶ Αἰγινήτας τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τούτῳ ἐξ Αἰγίνης Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐτούς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας, ἐπικαλέσαντες οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῦ πολέμου σφίσιν αἰτίους εἶναι: καὶ τὴν Αἴγιναν ἀσφαλέστερον ἐφαίνετο τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐπικειμένην αὐτῶν πέμψαντας ἐποίκους ἔχειν. καὶ ἐξέπεμψαν ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ ἐς αὐτὴν τοὺς οἰκήτορας. [2] ἐκπεσοῦσι δὲ τοῖς Αἰγινήταις οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔδοσαν Θυρέαν οἰκεῖν καὶ τὴν γῆν νέμεσθαι, κατά τε τὸ Ἀθηναίων διάφορον καὶ ὅτι σφῶν εὐεργέται ἦσαν ὑπὸ τὸν σεισμὸν καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων τὴν ἐπανάστασιν. ἡ δὲ Θυρεᾶτις γῆ μεθορία τῆς Ἀργείας καὶ Λακωνικῆς ἐστίν, ἐπὶ θάλασσαν καθήκουσα. καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα ᾤκησαν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐσπάρησαν κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα.

28. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους νουμηνίᾳ κατὰ σελήνην, ὥσπερ καὶ μόνον δοκεῖ εἶναι γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ὁ ἥλιος ἐξέλιπε μετὰ μεσημβρίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀνεπληρώθη, γενόμενος μηνοειδὴς καὶ ἀστέρων τινῶν ἐκφανέντων.

29. καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει Νυμφόδωρον τὸν Πύθεω ἄνδρα Ἀβδηρίτην, οὗ εἶχε τὴν ἀδελφὴν Σιτάλκης, δυνάμενον παρ᾽ αὐτῷ μέγα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρότερον πολέμιον νομίζοντες πρόξενον ἐποιήσαντο καὶ μετεπέμψαντο, βουλόμενοι Σιτάλκην σφίσι τὸν Τήρεω, Θρᾳκῶν βασιλέα, ξύμμαχον γενέσθαι. [2] ὁ δὲ Τήρης οὗτος ὁ τοῦ Σιτάλκου πατὴρ πρῶτος Ὀδρύσαις τὴν μεγάλην βασιλείαν ἐπὶ πλέον τῆς ἄλλης Θρᾴκης ἐποίησεν: πολὺ γὰρ μέρος καὶ αὐτόνομόν ἐστι Θρᾳκῶν. [3] Τηρεῖ δὲ τῷ Πρόκνην τὴν Πανδίονος ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν σχόντι γυναῖκα προσήκει ὁ Τήρης οὗτος οὐδέν, οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῆς Θρᾴκης ἐγένοντο, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἐν Δαυλίᾳ τῆς Φωκίδος νῦν καλουμένης γῆς [ὁ Τηρεὺς] ᾤκει, τότε ὑπὸ Θρᾳκῶν οἰκουμένης, καὶ τὸ ἔργον τὸ περὶ τὸν Ἴτυν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ ἔπραξαν ·πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ἀηδόνος μνήμῃ Δαυλιὰς ἡ ὄρνις ἐπωνόμασται·, εἰκός τε καὶ τὸ κῆδος Πανδίονα ξυνάψασθαι τῆς θυγατρὸς διὰ τοσούτου ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ἐς Ὀδρύσας ὁδοῦ. Τήρης δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα ἔχων βασιλεύς [τε] πρῶτος ἐν κράτει Ὀδρυσῶν ἐγένετο. [4] οὗ δὴ ὄντα τὸν Σιτάλκην οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξύμμαχον ἐποιοῦντο, βουλόμενοι σφίσι τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία καὶ Περδίκκαν ξυνεξελεῖν αὐτόν. [5] ἐλθών τε ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ὁ Νυμφόδωρος τήν τε τοῦ Σιτάλκου ξυμμαχίαν ἐποίησε καὶ Σάδοκον τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖον τόν τε ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης πόλεμον ὑπεδέχετο καταλύσειν: πείσειν γὰρ Σιτάλκην πέμπειν στρατιὰν Θρᾳκίαν Ἀθηναίοις ἱππέων τε καὶ πελταστῶν. [6] ξυνεβίβασε δὲ καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Θέρμην αὐτῷ ἔπεισεν ἀποδοῦναι: ξυνεστράτευσέ τε εὐθὺς Περδίκκας ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας μετὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Φορμίωνος. [7] οὕτω μὲν Σιτάλκης τε ὁ Τήρεω Θρᾳκῶν βασιλεὺς ξύμμαχος ἐγένετο Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Περδίκκας ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου Μακεδόνων βασιλεύς.

30. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσὶν Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτι ὄντες περὶ Πελοπόννησον Σόλλιόν τε Κορινθίων πόλισμα αἱροῦσι καὶ παραδιδόασι Παλαιρεῦσιν Ἀκαρνάνων μόνοις τὴν γῆν καὶ πόλιν νέμεσθαι: καὶ Ἀστακόν, ἧς Εὔαρχος ἐτυράννει,

λαβόντες κατὰ κράτος καὶ ἐξελάσαντες αὐτὸν τὸ χωρίον ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προσεποιήσαντο. [2] ἐπί τε Κεφαλληνίαν τὴν νῆσον προσπλεύσαντες προσηγάγοντο ἄνευ μάχης: κεῖται δὲ ἡ Κεφαλληνία κατὰ Ἀκαρνανίαν καὶ Λευκάδα τετράπολις οὖσα, Παλῆς, Κράνιοι, Σαμαῖοι, Προννα῀οι. ὕστερον δ᾽ οὐ πολλῷ ἀνεχώρησαν αἱ νῆες ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας.

31. περὶ δὲ τὸ φθινόπωρον τοῦ θέρους τούτου Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεί, αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι, ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα Περικλέους τοῦ Ξανθίππου στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ οἱ περὶ Πελοπόννησον Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσίν ⸀ἔτυχον γὰρ ἤδη ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ὄντες ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀνακομιζόμενοι⸁ ὡς ᾔσθοντο τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πανστρατιᾷ ἐν Μεγάροις ὄντας, ἔπλευσαν παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ ξυνεμείχθησαν. [2] στρατόπεδόν τε μέγιστον δὴ τοῦτο ἀθρόον Ἀθηναίων ἐγένετο, ἀκμαζούσης ἔτι τῆς πόλεως καὶ οὔπω νενοσηκυίας: μυρίων γὰρ ὁπλιτῶν οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἦσαν αὐτοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι ⸀χωρὶς δὲ αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ τρισχίλιοι ἦσαν⸁, μέτοικοι δὲ ξυνεσέβαλον οὐκ ἐλάσσους τρισχιλίων ὁπλιτῶν, χωρὶς δὲ ὁ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ψιλῶν οὐκ ὀλίγος. δῃώσαντες δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῆς γῆς ἀνεχώρησαν. [3] ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὕστερον ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον ἐσβολαὶ Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα καὶ ἱππέων καὶ πανστρατιᾷ, μέχρι οὗ Νίσαια ἑάλω ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων.

32. ἐτειχίσθη δὲ καὶ Ἀταλάντη ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων φρούριον τοῦ θέρους τούτου τελευτῶντος, ἡ ἐπὶ Λοκροῖς τοῖς Ὀπουντίοις νῆσος ἐρήμη πρότερον οὖσα, τοῦ μὴ λῃστὰς ἐκπλέοντας ἐξ Ὀποῦντος καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Λοκρίδος κακουργεῖν τὴν Εὔβοιαν.τα῀υτα μὲν ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ μετὰ τὴν Πελοποννησίων ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀναχώρησιν ἐγένετο.

33. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Εὔαρχος ὁ Ἀκαρνὰν βουλόμενος ἐς τὴν Ἀστακὸν κατελθεῖν πείθει Κορινθίους τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ πεντακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἑαυτὸν κατάγειν πλεύσαντας, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικούρους τινὰς προσεμισθώσατο: ἦρχον δὲ τῆς στρατιᾶς Εὐφαμίδας τε ὁ Ἀριστωνύμου καὶ Τιμόξενος ὁ Τιμοκράτους καὶ Εὔμαχος ὁ Χρύσιδος. [2] καὶ πλεύσαντες κατήγαγον: καὶ τῆς ἄλλης

Ἀκαρνανίας τῆς περὶ θάλασσαν ἔστιν ἃ χωρία βουλόμενοι προσποιήσασθαι καὶ πειραθέντες, ὡς οὐκ ἐδύναντο, ἀπέπλεον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [3] σχόντες δ᾽ ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ ἐς Κεφαλληνίαν καὶ ἀπόβασιν ποιησάμενοι ἐς τὴν Κρανίων γῆν, ἀπατηθέντες ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐξ ὁμολογίας τινὸς ἄνδρας τε ἀποβάλλουσι σφῶν αὐτῶν, ἐπιθεμένων ἀπροσδοκήτοις τῶν Κρανίων, καὶ βιαιότερον ἀναγαγόμενοι ἐκομίσθησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

34. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι Ἀθηναῖοι τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ χρώμενοι δημοσίᾳ ταφὰς ἐποιήσαντο τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ πρώτων ἀποθανόντων τρόπῳ τοιῷδε. [2] τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ προτίθενται τῶν ἀπογενομένων πρότριτα σκηνὴν ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἐπιφέρει τῷ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος ἤν τι βούληται: [3] ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ ἐκφορὰ ᾖ, λάρνακας κυπαρισσίνας ἄγουσιν ἅμαξαι, φυλῆς ἑκάστης μίαν: ἔνεστι δὲ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἧς ἕκαστος ἦν φυλῆς. μία δὲ κλίνη κενὴ φέρεται ἐστρωμένη τῶν ἀφανῶν, οἳ ἂν μὴ εὑρεθῶσιν ἐς ἀναίρεσιν. [4] ξυνεκφέρει δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων, καὶ γυναῖκες πάρεισιν αἱ προσήκουσαι ἐπὶ τὸν τάφον ὀλοφυρόμεναι. [5] τιθέασιν οὖν ἐς τὸ δημόσιον σῆμα, ὅ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ καλλίστου προαστείου τῆς πόλεως, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν αὐτῷ θάπτουσι τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων, πλήν γε τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι: ἐκείνων δὲ διαπρεπῆ τὴν ἀρετὴν κρίναντες αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐποίησαν. [6] ἐπειδὰν δὲ κρύψωσι γῇ, ἀνὴρ ᾑρημένος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃς ἂν γνώμῃ τε δοκῇ μὴ ἀξύνετος εἶναι καὶ ἀξιώσει προήκῃ, λέγει ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔπαινον τὸν πρέποντα: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀπέρχονται. [7] ὧδε μὲν θάπτουσιν: καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου, ὁπότε ξυμβαίη αὐτοῖς, ἐχρῶντο τῷ νόμῳ. [8] ἐπὶ δ᾽ οὖν τοῖς πρώτοις τοῖσδε Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου ᾑρέθη λέγειν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ καιρὸς ἐλάμβανε, προελθὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ σήματος ἐπὶ βῆμα ὑψηλὸν πεποιημένον, ὅπως ἀκούοιτο ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ ὁμίλου, ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

35. ‘οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἤδη εἰρηκότων ἐπαινοῦσι τὸν προσθέντα τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον τόνδε, ὡς καλὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων θαπτομένοις ἀγορεύεσθαι αὐτόν. ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀρκοῦν ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργῳ γενομένων

ἔργῳ καὶ δηλοῦσθαι τὰς τιμάς, οἷα καὶ νῦν περὶ τὸν τάφον τόνδε δημοσίᾳ παρασκευασθέντα ὁρᾶτε, καὶ μὴ ἐν ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ πολλῶν ἀρετὰς κινδυνεύεσθαι εὖ τε καὶ χεῖρον εἰπόντι πιστευθῆναι. [2] χαλεπὸν γὰρ τὸ μετρίως εἰπεῖν ἐν ᾧ μόλις καὶ ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας βεβαιοῦται. ὅ τε γὰρ ξυνειδὼς καὶ εὔνους ἀκροατὴς τάχ᾽ ἄν τι ἐνδεεστέρως πρὸς ἃ βούλεταί τε καὶ ἐπίσταται νομίσειε δηλοῦσθαι, ὅ τε ἄπειρος ἔστιν ἃ καὶ πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον, εἴ τι ὑπὲρ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀκούοι. μέχρι γὰρ τοῦδε ἀνεκτοὶ οἱ ἔπαινοί εἰσι περὶ ἑτέρων λεγόμενοι, ἐς ὅσον ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος οἴηται ἱκανὸς εἶναι δρᾶσαί τι ὧν ἤκουσεν: τῷ δὲ ὑπερβάλλοντι αὐτῶν φθονοῦντες ἤδη καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν. [3] ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς πάλαι οὕτως ἐδοκιμάσθη ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν, χρὴ καὶ ἐμὲ ἐπόμενον τῷ νόμῳ πειρᾶσθαι ὑμῶν τῆς ἑκάστου βουλήσεώς τε καὶ δόξης τυχεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον.

36. ‘ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων πρῶτον: δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ πρέπον δὲ ἅμα ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην τῆς μνήμης δίδοσθαι. τὴν γὰρ χώραν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ οἰκοῦντες διαδοχῇ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων μέχρι τοῦδε ἐλευθέραν δι᾽ ἀρετὴν παρέδοσαν. [2] καὶ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν: κτησάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξαντο ὅσην ἔχομεν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπόνως ἡμῖν τοῖς νῦν προσκατέλιπον. [3] τὰ δὲ πλείω αὐτῆς αὐτοὶ ἡμεῖς οἵδε οἱ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες μάλιστα ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ ἡλικίᾳ ἐπηυξήσαμεν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς πᾶσι παρεσκευάσαμεν καὶ ἐς πόλεμον καὶ ἐς εἰρήνην αὐταρκεστάτην. [4] ὧν ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν κατὰ πολέμους ἔργα, οἷς ἕκαστα ἐκτήθη, ἢ εἴ τι αὐτοὶ ἢ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν βάρβαρον ἢ Ἕλληνα πολέμιον ἐπιόντα προθύμως ἠμυνάμεθα, μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἐάσω: ἀπὸ δὲ οἵας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλθομεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὰ καὶ μεθ᾽ οἵας πολιτείας καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οἵων μεγάλα ἐγένετο, ταῦτα δηλώσας πρῶτον εἶμι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τῶνδε ἔπαινον, νομίζων ἐπί τε τῷ παρόντι οὐκ ἂν ἁπρεπῆ λεχθῆναι αὐτὰ καὶ τὸν πάντα ὅμιλον καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ξύμφορον εἶναι ἐπακοῦσαι αὐτῶν.

37. ‘χρώμεθα γὰρ πολιτείᾳ οὐ ζηλούσῃ τοὺς τῶν πέλας νόμους, παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ ὄντες τισὶν ἢ μιμούμενοι ἑτέρους. καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ᾽ ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται: μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀξίωσιν, ὡς ἕκαστος ἔν τῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ, οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ πλέον ἐς τὰ κοινὰ ἢ ἀπ᾽ ἀρετῆς προτιμᾶται, οὐδ᾽ αὖ κατὰ πενίαν, ἔχων γέ τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν πόλιν, ἀξιώματος ἀφανείᾳ κεκώλυται. [2] ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι᾽ ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ᾽ ἡδονήν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μέν, λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὄψει ἀχθηδόνας προστιθέμενοι. [3] ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν.

38. ‘καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν πόνων πλείστας ἀναπαύλας τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπορισάμεθα, ἀγῶσι μέν γε καὶ θυσίαις διετησίοις νομίζοντες, ἰδίαις δὲ κατασκευαῖς εὐπρεπέσιν, ὧν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἡ τέρψις τὸ λυπηρὸν ἐκπλήσσει. [2] ἐπεσέρχεται δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ἐκ πάσης γῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν μηδὲν οἰκειοτέρᾳ τῇ ἀπολαύσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καρποῦσθαι ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.

39. ‘διαφέρομεν δὲ καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολεμικῶν μελέταις τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖσδε. τήν τε γὰρ πόλιν κοινὴν παρέχομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε ξενηλασίαις ἀπείργομέν τινα ἢ μαθήματος ἢ θεάματος, ὃ μὴ κρυφθὲν ἄν τις τῶν πολεμίων ἰδὼν ὠφεληθείη, πιστεύοντες οὐ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς τὸ πλέον καὶ ἀπάταις ἢ τῷ ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐς τὰ ἔργα εὐψύχῳ: καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν. [2] τεκμήριον δέ: οὔτε γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καθ᾽ ἑαυτούς, μεθ᾽

ἁπάντων δὲ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν στρατεύουσι, τήν τε τῶν πέλας αὐτοὶ ἐπελθόντες οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ τοὺς περὶ τῶν οἰκείων ἀμυνομένους μαχόμενοι τὰ πλείω κρατοῦμεν. [3] ἀθρόᾳ τε τῇ δυνάμει ἡμῶν οὐδείς πω πολέμιος ἐνέτυχε διὰ τὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τε ἅμα ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπίπεμψιν: ἢν δέ που μορίῳ τινὶ προσμείξωσι, κρατήσαντές τέ τινας ἡμῶν πάντας αὐχοῦσιν ἀπεῶσθαι καὶ νικηθέντες ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων ἡσσῆσθαι. [4] καίτοι εἰ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτῃ καὶ μὴ μετὰ νόμων τὸ πλέον ἢ τρόπων ἀνδρείας ἐθέλομεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς τε μέλλουσιν ἀλγεινοῖς μὴ προκάμνειν, καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ ἐλθοῦσι μὴ ἀτολμοτέρους τῶν αἰεὶ μοχθούντων φαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔν τε τούτοις τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἄλλοις.

40. ‘φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ᾽ εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας: πλούτῳ τε ἔργου μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἢ λόγου κόμπῳ χρώμεθα, καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινὶ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἴσχιον. [2] ἔνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια, καὶ ἑτέροις πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι: μόνοι γὰρ τόν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν, καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομέν γε ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. [3] διαφερόντως γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν ὥστε τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι: ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει. κράτιστοι δ᾽ ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν δικαίως κριθεῖεν οἱ τά τε δεινὰ καὶ ἡδέα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὴ ἀποτρεπόμενοι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων. [4] καὶ τὰ ἐς ἀρετὴν ἐνηντιώμεθα τοῖς πολλοῖς: οὐ γὰρ πάσχοντες εὖ, ἀλλὰ δρῶντες κτώμεθα τοὺς φίλους. βεβαιότερος δὲ ὁ δράσας τὴν χάριν ὥστε ὀφειλομένην δι᾽ εὐνοίας ᾧ δέδωκε σῴζειν: ὁ δὲ ἀντοφείλων ἀμβλύτερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ ἐς χάριν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς ὀφείλημα τὴν ἀρετὴν

ἀποδώσων. [5] καὶ μόνοι οὐ τοῦ ξυμφέροντος μᾶλλον λογισμῷ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῷ ἀδεῶς τινὰ ὠφελοῦμεν.

41. ‘ξυνελών τε λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἄν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν εἴδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὔταρκες παρέχεσθαι. [2] καὶ ὡς οὐ λόγων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κόμπος τάδε μᾶλλον ἢ ἔργων ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια, αὐτὴ ἡ δύναμις τῆς πόλεως, ἣν ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν τρόπων ἐκτησάμεθα, σημαίνει. [3] μόνη γὰρ τῶν νῦν ἀκοῆς κρείσσων ἐς πεῖραν ἔρχεται, καὶ μόνη οὔτε τῷ πολεμίῳ ἐπελθόντι ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει ὑφ᾽ οἵων κακοπαθεῖ οὔτε τῷ ὑπηκόῳ κατάμεμψιν ὡς οὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἀξίων ἄρχεται. [4] μετὰ μεγάλων δὲ σημείων καὶ οὐ δή τοι ἀμάρτυρόν γε τὴν δύναμιν παρασχόμενοι τοῖς τε νῦν καὶ τοῖς ἔπειτα θαυμασθησόμεθα, καὶ οὐδὲν προσδεόμενοι οὔτε Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτου οὔτε ὅστις ἔπεσι μὲν τὸ αὐτίκα τέρψει, τῶν δ᾽ ἔργων τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἡ ἀλήθεια βλάψει, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ γῆν ἐσβατὸν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τόλμῃ καταναγκάσαντες γενέσθαι, πανταχοῦ δὲ μνημεῖα κακῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἀίδια ξυγκατοικίσαντες. [5] περὶ τοιαύτης οὖν πόλεως οἵδε τε γενναίως δικαιοῦντες μὴ ἀφαιρεθῆναι αὐτὴν μαχόμενοι ἐτελεύτησαν, καὶ τῶν λειπομένων πάντα τινὰ εἰκὸς ἐθέλειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς κάμνειν.

42. ‘δι᾽ ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐμήκυνα τὰ περὶ τῆς πόλεως, διδασκαλίαν τε ποιούμενος μὴ περὶ ἴσου ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ οἷς τῶνδε μηδὲν ὑπάρχει ὁμοίως, καὶ τὴν εὐλογίαν ἅμα ἐφ᾽ οἷς νῦν λέγω φανερὰν σημείοις καθιστάς. [2] καὶ εἴρηται αὐτῆς τὰ μέγιστα: ἃ γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ὕμνησα, αἱ τῶνδε καὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀρεταὶ ἐκόσμησαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἰσόρροπος ὥσπερ τῶνδε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἔργων φανείη. δοκεῖ δέ μοι δηλοῦν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν πρώτη τε μηνύουσα καὶ τελευταία βεβαιοῦσα ἡ νῦν τῶνδε καταστροφή. [3] καὶ γὰρ τοῖς τἆλλα χείροσι δίκαιον τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολέμους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἀνδραγαθίαν προτίθεσθαι: ἀγαθῷ γὰρ κακὸν ἀφανίσαντες κοινῶς μᾶλλον ὠφέλησαν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔβλαψαν. [4] τῶνδε δὲ οὔτε

πλούτου τις τὴν ἔτι ἀπόλαυσιν προτιμήσας ἐμαλακίσθη οὔτε πενίας ἐλπίδι, ὡς κἂν ἔτι διαφυγὼν αὐτὴν πλουτήσειεν, ἀναβολὴν τοῦ δεινοῦ ἐποιήσατο: τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τιμωρίαν ποθεινοτέραν αὐτῶν λαβόντες καὶ κινδύνων ἅμα τόνδε κάλλιστον νομίσαντες ἐβουλήθησαν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοὺς μὲν τιμωρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ ἐφίεσθαι, ἐλπίδι μὲν τὸ ἀφανὲς τοῦ κατορθώσειν ἐπιτρέψαντες, ἔργῳ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἤδη ὁρωμένου σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀξιοῦντες πεποιθέναι, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἡγησάμενοι ἢ [τὸ] ἐνδόντες σῴζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν αἰσχρὸν τοῦ λόγου ἔφυγον, τὸ δ᾽ ἔργον τῷ σώματι ὑπέμειναν καὶ δι᾽ ἐλαχίστου καιροῦ τύχης ἅμα ἀκμῇ τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ δέους ἀπηλλάγησαν.

43. ‘καὶ οἵδε μὲν προσηκόντως τῇ πόλει τοιοίδε ἐγένοντο: τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς χρὴ ἀσφαλεστέραν μὲν εὔχεσθαι, ἀτολμοτέραν δὲ μηδὲν ἀξιοῦν τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους διάνοιαν ἔχειν, σκοποῦντας μὴ λόγῳ μόνῳ τὴν ὠφελίαν, ἣν ἄν τις πρὸς οὐδὲν χεῖρον αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς εἰδότας μηκύνοι, λέγων ὅσα ἐν τῷ τοὺς πολεμίους ἀμύνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἔνεστιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι,ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὁπότε καὶ πείρᾳ του σφαλεῖεν, οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὴν πόλιν γε τῆς σφετέρας ἀρετῆς ἀξιοῦντες στερίσκειν, κάλλιστον δὲ ἔρανον αὐτῇ προϊέμενοι. [2] κοινῇ γὰρ τὰ σώματα διδόντες ἰδίᾳ τὸν ἀγήρων ἔπαινον ἐλάμβανον καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐπισημότατον, οὐκ ἐν ᾧ κεῖνται μᾶλλον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ᾧ ἡ δόξα αὐτῶν παρὰ τῷ ἐντυχόντι αἰεὶ καὶ λόγου καὶ ἔργου καιρῷ αἰείμνηστος καταλείπεται. [3] ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος, καὶ οὐ στηλῶν μόνον ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ σημαίνει ἐπιγραφή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ μὴ προσηκούσῃ ἄγραφος μνήμη παρ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τῆς γνώμης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ἔργου ἐνδιαιτᾶται. [4] οὓς νῦν ὑμεῖς ζηλώσαντες καὶ τὸ εὔδαιμον τὸ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δ᾽ ἐλεύθερον τὸ εὔψυχον κρίναντες μὴ περιορᾶσθε τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους. [5] οὐ γὰρ οἱ κακοπραγοῦντες δικαιότερον ἀφειδοῖεν ἂν τοῦ βίου,

οἷς ἐλπὶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ οἷς ἡ ἐναντία μεταβολὴ ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἔτι κινδυνεύεται καὶ ἐν οἷς μάλιστα μεγάλα τὰ διαφέροντα, ἤν τι πταίσωσιν. [6] ἀλγεινοτέρα γὰρ ἀνδρί γε φρόνημα ἔχοντι ἡ μετὰ τοῦ [ἐν τῷ] μαλακισθῆναι κάκωσις ἢ ὁ μετὰ ῥώμης καὶ κοινῆς ἐλπίδος ἅμα γιγνόμενος ἀναίσθητος θάνατος.

44. ‘δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τοὺς τῶνδε νῦν τοκέας, ὅσοι πάρεστε, οὐκ ὀλοφύρομαι μᾶλλον ἢ παραμυθήσομαι. ἐν πολυτρόποις γὰρ ξυμφοραῖς ἐπίστανται τραφέντες: τὸ δ᾽ εὐτυχές, οἳ ἂν τῆς εὐπρεπεστάτης λάχωσιν, ὥσπερ οἵδε μὲν νῦν, τελευτῆς, ὑμεῖς δὲ λύπης, καὶ οἷς ἐνευδαιμονῆσαί τε ὁ βίος ὁμοίως καὶ ἐντελευτῆσαι ξυνεμετρήθη. [2] χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν οἶδα πείθειν ὅν, ὧν καὶ πολλάκις ἔξετε ὑπομνήματα ἐν ἄλλων εὐτυχίαις, αἷς ποτὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἠγάλλεσθε: καὶ λύπη οὐχ ὧν ἄν τις μὴ πειρασάμενος ἀγαθῶν στερίσκηται, ἀλλ᾽ οὗ ἂν ἐθὰς γενόμενος ἀφαιρεθῇ. [3] καρτερεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ἄλλων παίδων ἐλπίδι,οἷς ἔτι ἡλικία τέκνωσιν ποιεῖσθαι: ἰδίᾳ τε γὰρ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων λήθη οἱ ἐπιγιγνόμενοί τισιν ἔσονται, καὶ τῇ πόλει διχόθεν, ἔκ τε τοῦ μὴ ἐρημοῦσθαι καὶ ἀσφαλείᾳ, ξυνοίσει: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἴσον τι ἢ δίκαιον βουλεύεσθαι οἳ ἂν μὴ καὶ παῖδας ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου παραβαλλόμενοι κινδυνεύωσιν. [4] ὅσοι δ᾽ αὖ παρηβήκατε, τόν τε πλέονα κέρδος ὂν ηὐτυχεῖτε βίον ἡγεῖσθε καὶ τόνδε βραχὺν ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τῇ τῶνδε εὐκλείᾳ κουφίζεσθε. τὸ γὰρ φιλότιμον ἀγήρων μόνον, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀχρείῳ τῆς ἡλικίας τὸ κερδαίνειν, ὥσπερ τινές φασι, μᾶλλον τέρπει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι.

45. παισὶ δ᾽ αὖ ὅσοι τῶνδε πάρεστε ἢ ἀδελφοῖς ὁρῶ μέγαν τὸν ἀγῶνα ⟨τὸν γὰρ οὐκ ὄντα ἅπας εἴωθεν ἐπαινεῖν⟩, καὶ μόλις ἂν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς οὐχ ὁμοῖοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὀλίγῳ χείρους κριθεῖτε. φθόνος γὰρ τοῖς ζῶσι πρὸς τὸ ἀντίπαλον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐμποδὼν ἀνανταγωνίστῳ εὐνοίᾳ τετίμηται. [2] εἰ δέ με δεῖ καὶ γυναικείας τι ἀρετῆς, ὅσαι νῦν ἐν χηρείᾳ ἔσονται, μνησθῆναι, βραχείᾳ παραινέσει ἅπαν σημανῶ. τῆς τε γὰρ ὑπαρχούσης φύσεως μὴ χείροσι γενέσθαι ὑμῖν μεγάλη ἡ

δόξα καὶ ἧς ἂν ἐπ᾽ ἐλάχιστον ἀρετῆς πέρι ἢ ψόγου ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλέος ᾖ.

46. ‘εἴρηται καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγῳ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ὅσα εἶχον πρόσφορα, καὶ ἔργῳ οἱ θαπτόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἤδη κεκόσμηνται, τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν τοὺς παῖδας τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε δημοσίᾳ ἡ πόλις μέχρι ἥβης θρέψει, ὠφέλιμον στέφανον τοῖσδέ τε καὶ τοῖς λειπομένοις τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀγώνων προτιθεῖσα: ἆθλα γὰρ οἷς κεῖται ἀρετῆς μέγιστα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἄνδρες ἄριστοι πολιτεύουσιν. [2] νῦν δὲ ἀπολοφυράμενοι ὃν προσήκει ἑκάστῳ ἄπιτε.’

47. τοιόσδε μὲν ὁ τάφος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ: καὶ διελθόντος αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἔτος τοῦ πολέμου τοῦδε ἐτελεύτα. [2] τοῦ δὲ θέρους εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὰ δύο μέρη ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς, καὶ καθεζόμενοι ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν. [3] καὶ ὄντων αὐτῶν οὐ πολλάς πω ἡμέρας ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἡ νόσος πρῶτον ἤρξατο γενέσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, λεγόμενον μὲν καὶ πρότερον πολλαχόσε ἐγκατασκῆψαι καὶ περὶ Λῆμνον καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις χωρίοις, οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτός γε λοιμὸς οὐδὲ φθορὰ οὕτως ἀνθρώπων οὐδαμοῦ ἐμνημονεύετο γενέσθαι. [4] οὔτε γὰρ ἰατροὶ ἤρκουν τὸ πρῶτον θεραπεύοντες ἀγνοίᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα ἔθνῃσκον ὅσῳ καὶ μάλιστα προσῇσαν, οὔτε ἄλλη ἀνθρωπεία τέχνη οὐδεμία: ὅσα τε πρὸς ἱεροῖς ἱκέτευσαν ἢ μαντείοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐχρήσαντο, πάντα ἀνωφελῆ ἦν, τελευτῶντές τε αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ νικώμενοι.

48. ἤρξατο δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡς λέγεται, ἐξ Αἰθιοπίας τῆς ὑπὲρ Αἰγύπτου, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς Αἴγυπτον καὶ Λιβύην κατέβη καὶ ἐς τὴν βασιλέως γῆν τὴν πολλήν. [2] ἐς δὲ τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν ἐξαπιναίως ἐσέπεσε, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἥψατο τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ ἐλέχθη ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὡς οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι φάρμακα ἐσβεβλήκοιεν ἐς τὰ φρέατα: κρῆναι γὰρ οὔπω ἦσαν αὐτόθι. ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλιν ἀφίκετο, καὶ ἔθνῃσκον πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἤδη. [3] λεγέτω μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἕκαστος γιγνώσκει καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ

ἰδιώτης, ἀφ᾽ ὅτου εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι αὐτό, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἄστινας νομίζει τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς ἱκανὰς εἶναι δύναμιν ἐς τὸ μεταστῆσαι σχεῖν: ἐγὼ δὲ οἷόν τε ἐγίγνετο λέξω, καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἄν τις σκοπῶν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις ἐπιπέσοι, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἔχοι τι προειδὼς μὴ ἀγνοεῖν, ταῦτα δηλώσω αὐτός τε νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλους πάσχοντας.

49. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτος, ὡς ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ πάντων μάλιστα δὴ ἐκεῖνο ἄνοσον ἐς τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθενείας ἐτύγχανεν ὄν: εἰ δέ τις καὶ προύκαμνέ τι, ἐς τοῦτο πάντα ἀπεκρίθη. [2] τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀπ᾽ οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξαίφνης ὑγιεῖς ὄντας πρῶτον μὲν τῆς κεφαλῆς θέρμαι ἰσχυραὶ καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθήματα καὶ φλόγωσις ἐλάμβανε, καὶ τὰ ἐντός, ἥ τε φάρυγξ καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα, εὐθὺς αἱματώδη ἦν καὶ πνεῦμα ἄτοπον καὶ δυσῶδες ἠφίει: [3] ἔπειτα ἐξ αὐτῶν πταρμὸς καὶ βράγχος ἐπεγίγνετο, καὶ ἐν οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατέβαινεν ἐς τὰ στήθη ὁ πόνος μετὰ βηχὸς ἰσχυροῦ: καὶ ὁπότε ἐς τὴν καρδίαν στηρίξειεν, ἀνέστρεφέ τε αὐτὴν καὶ ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πᾶσαι ὅσαι ὑπὸ ἰατρῶν ὠνομασμέναι εἰσὶν ἐπῆσαν, καὶ αὗται μετὰ ταλαιπωρίας μεγάλης. [4] λύγξ τε τοῖς πλέοσιν ἐνέπιπτε κενή, σπασμὸν ἐνδιδοῦσα ἰσχυρόν, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ ταῦτα λωφήσαντα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ πολλῷ ὕστερον. [5] καὶ τὸ μὲν ἔξωθεν ἁπτομένῳ σῶμα οὔτ᾽ ἄγαν θερμὸν ἦν οὔτε χλωρόν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπέρυθρον, πελιτνόν, φλυκταίναις μικραῖς καὶ ἕλκεσιν ἐξηνθηκός: τὰ δὲ ἐντὸς οὕτως ἐκάετο ὥστε μήτε τῶν πάνυ λεπτῶν ἱματίων καὶ σινδόνων τὰς ἐπιβολὰς μηδ᾽ ἄλλο τι ἢ γυμνοὶ ἀνέχεσθαι, ἥδιστά τε ἂν ἐς ὕδωρ ψυχρὸν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ῥίπτειν. καὶ πολλοὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἠμεληκότων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἔδρασαν ἐς φρέατα, τῇ δίψῃ ἀπαύστῳ ξυνεχόμενοι: καὶ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ καθειστήκει τό τε πλέον καὶ ἔλασσον ποτόν. [6] καὶ ἡ ἀπορία τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχάζειν καὶ ἡ ἀγρυπνία ἐπέκειτο διὰ παντός. καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὅσονπερ χρόνον καὶ ἡ νόσος ἀκμάζοι, οὐκ ἐμαραίνετο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντεῖχε παρὰ δόξαν τῇ ταλαιπωρίᾳ, ὥστε ἢ διεφθείροντο οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐναταῖοι καὶ ἑβδομαῖοι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντὸς καύματος, ἔτι ἔχοντές τι δυνάμεως, ἢ εἰ διαφύγοιεν, ἐπικατιόντος τοῦ νοσήματος ἐς τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ ἑλκώσεώς

τε αὐτῇ ἰσχυρᾶς ἐγγιγνομένης καὶ διαρροίας ἅμα ἀκράτου ἐπιπιπτούσης οἱ πολλοὶ ὕστερον δι᾽ αὐτὴν ἀσθενείᾳ διεφθείροντο. [7] διεξῄει γὰρ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος ἄνωθεν ἀρξάμενον τὸ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ πρῶτον ἱδρυθὲν κακόν, καὶ εἴ τις ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων περιγένοιτο, τῶν γε ἀκρωτηρίων ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ ἐπεσήμαινεν. [8] κατέσκηπτε γὰρ ἐς αἰδοῖα καὶ ἐς ἄκρας χεῖρας καὶ πόδας, καὶ πολλοὶ στερισκόμενοι τούτων διέφευγον, εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἳ καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. τοὺς δὲ καὶ λήθη ἐλάμβανε παραυτίκα ἀναστάντας τῶν πάντων ὁμοίως, καὶ ἠγνόησαν σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους.

50. γενόμενον γὰρ κρεῖσσον λόγου τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου τά τε ἄλλα χαλεπωτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν προσέπιπτεν ἑκάστῳ καὶ ἐν τῷδε ἐδήλωσε μάλιστα ἄλλο τι ὂν ἢ τῶν ξυντρόφων τι: τὰ γὰρ ὄρνεα καὶ τετράποδα ὅσα ἀνθρώπων ἅπτεται, πολλῶν ἀτάφων γιγνομένων ἢ οὐ προσῄει ἢ γευσάμενα διεφθείρετο. [2] τεκμήριον δέ: τῶν μὲν τοιούτων ὀρνίθων ἐπίλειψις σαφὴς ἐγένετο, καὶ οὐχ ἑωρῶντο οὔτε ἄλλως οὔτε περὶ τοιοῦτον οὐδέν: οἱ δὲ κύνες μᾶλλον αἴσθησιν παρεῖχον τοῦ ἀποβαίνοντος διὰ τὸ ξυνδιαιτᾶσθαι.

51. τὸ μὲν οὖν νόσημα, πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα παραλιπόντι ἀτοπίας, ὡς ἑκάστῳ ἐτύγχανέ τι διαφερόντως ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον γιγνόμενον, τοιοῦτον ἦν ἐπὶ πᾶν τὴν ἰδέαν. καὶ ἄλλο παρελύπει κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον οὐδὲν τῶν εἰωθότων: ὃ δὲ καὶ γένοιτο, ἐς τοῦτο ἐτελεύτα. [2] ἔθνῃσκον δὲ οἱ μὲν ἀμελείᾳ, οἱ δὲ καὶ πάνυ θεραπευόμενοι. ἕν τε οὐδὲ ἓν κατέστη ἴαμα ὡς εἰπεῖν ὅτι χρῆν προσφέροντας ὠφελεῖν: τὸ γάρ τῳ ξυνενεγκὸν ἄλλον τοῦτο ἔβλαπτεν. [3] σῶμά τε αὔταρκες ὂν οὐδὲν διεφάνη πρὸς αὐτὸ ἰσχύος πέρι ἢ ἀσθενείας, ἀλλὰ πάντα ξυνῄρει καὶ τὰ πάσῃ διαίτῃ θεραπευόμενα. [4] δεινότατον δὲ παντὸς ἦν τοῦ κακοῦ ἥ τε ἀθυμία ὁπότε τις αἴσθοιτο κάμνων □πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀνέλπιστον εὐθὺς τραπόμενοι τῇ γνώμῃ πολλῷ μᾶλλον προΐεντο σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐκ ἀντεῖχον □, καὶ ὅτι ἕτερος ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου θεραπείας ἀναπιμπλάμενοι ὥσπερ τὰ πρόβατα ἔθνῃσκον: καὶ

τὸν πλεῖστον φθόρον τοῦτο ἐνεποίει. [5] εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ‘θέλοιεν δεδιότες ἀλλήλοις προσιέναι, ἀπώλλυντο ἐρῆμοι, καὶ οἰκίαι πολλαὶ ἐκενώθησαν ἀπορίᾳ τοῦ θεραπεύσοντος: εἴτε προσίοιεν, διεφθείροντο, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀρετῆς τι μεταποιούμενοι: αἰσχύνῃ γὰρ ἠφείδουν σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐσιόντες παρὰ τοὺς φίλους, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰς ὀλοφύρσεις τῶν ἀπογιγνομένων τελευτῶντες καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι ἐξέκαμνον ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ κακοῦ νικώμενοι. [6] ἐπὶ πλέον δ᾽ ὅμως οἱ διαπεφευγότες τόν τε θνῄσκοντα καὶ τὸν πονούμενον ὠκτίζοντο διὰ τὸ προειδέναι τε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤδη ἐν τῷ θαρσαλέῳ εἶναι: δὶς γὰρ τὸν αὐτόν, ὥστε καὶ κτείνειν, οὐκ ἐπελάμβανεν. καὶ ἐμακαρίζοντό τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ αὐτοὶ τῷ παραχρῆμα περιχαρεῖ καὶ ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἐλπίδος τι εἶχον κούφης μηδ᾽ ἂν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου νοσήματός ποτε ἔτι διαφθαρῆναι.

52. ἐπίεσε δ᾽ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον πρὸς τῷ ὑπάρχοντι πόνῳ καὶ ἡ ξυγκομιδὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τοὺς ἐπελθόντας. [2] οἰκιῶν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπαρχουσῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν καλύβαις πνιγηραῖς ὥρᾳ ἔτους διαιτωμένων ὁ φθόρος ἐγίγνετο οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νεκροὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ἀποθνῄσκοντες ἔκειντο καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλινδοῦντο καὶ περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἁπάσας ἡμιθνῆτες τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιθυμίᾳ. [3] τά τε ἱερὰ ἐν οἷς ἐσκήνηντο νεκρῶν πλέα ἦν, αὐτοῦ ἐναποθνῃσκόντων: ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅτι γένωνται, ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων ὁμοίως. [4] νόμοι τε πάντες ξυνεταράχθησαν οἷς ἐχρῶντο πρότερον περὶ τὰς ταφάς, ἔθαπτον δὲ ὡς ἕκαστος ἐδύνατο. καὶ πολλοὶ ἐς ἀναισχύντους θήκας ἐτράποντο σπάνει τῶν ἐπιτηδείων διὰ τὸ συχνοὺς ἤδη προτεθνάναι σφίσιν: ἐπὶ πυρὰς γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας φθάσαντες τοὺς νήσαντας οἱ μὲν ἐπιθέντες τὸν ἑαυτῶν νεκρὸν ὑφῆπτον, οἱ δὲ καιομένου ἄλλου ἐπιβαλόντες ἄνωθεν ὃν φέροιεν ἀπῆσαν.

53. πρῶτόν τε ἦρξε καὶ ἐς τἆλλα τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ πλέον ἀνομίας τὸ νόσημα. ῥᾷον γὰρ ἐτόλμα τις ἃ πρότερον ἀπεκρύπτετο μὴ καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν, ἀγχίστροφον τὴν

μεταβολὴν ὁρῶντες τῶν τε εὐδαιμόνων καὶ αἰφνιδίως θνῃσκόντων καὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρότερον κεκτημένων, εὐθὺς δὲ τἀκείνων ἐχόντων. [2] ὥστε ταχείας τὰς ἐπαυρέσεις καὶ πρὸς τὸ τερπνὸν ἠξίουν ποιεῖσθαι, ἐφήμερα τά τε σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ὁμοίως ἡγούμενοι. [3] καὶ τὸ μὲν προσταλαιπωρεῖν τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν, ἄδηλον νομίζων εἰ πρὶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ ἐλθεῖν διαφθαρήσεται: ὅτι δὲ ἤδη τε ἡδὺ πανταχόθεν τε ἐς αὐτὸ κερδαλέον, τοῦτο καὶ καλὸν καὶ χρήσιμον κατέστη. [4] θεῶν δὲ φόβος ἢ ἀνθρώπων νόμος οὐδεὶς ἀπεῖργε, τὸ μὲν κρίνοντες ἐν ὁμοίῳ καὶ σέβειν καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὁρᾶν ἐν ἴσῳ ἀπολλυμένους, τῶν δὲ ἁμαρτημάτων οὐδεὶς ἐλπίζων μέχρι τοῦ δίκην γενέσθαι βιοὺς ἂν τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀντιδοῦναι, πολὺ δὲ μείζω τὴν ἤδη κατεψηφισμένην σφῶν ἐπικρεμασθῆναι, ἣν πρὶν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰκὸς εἶναι τοῦ βίου τι ἀπολαῦσαι.

54. τοιούτῳ μὲν πάθει οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περιπεσόντες ἐπιέζοντο, ἀνθρώπων τ᾽ ἔνδον θνῃσκόντων καὶ γῆς ἔξω δῃουμένης. [2] ἐν δὲ τῷ κακῷ οἷα εἰκὸς ἀνεμνήσθησαν καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους, φάσκοντες οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πάλαι ᾄδεσθαι "'ἥξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος καὶ λοιμὸς ἅμ᾽ αὐτῷ.'" [3] ἐγένετο μὲν οὖν ἔρις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ λοιμὸν ὠνομάσθαι ἐν τῷ ἔπει ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀλλὰ λιμόν, ἐνίκησε δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἰκότως λοιμὸν εἰρῆσθαι: οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἔπασχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιοῦντο. ἢν δέ γε οἶμαί ποτε ἄλλος πόλεμος καταλάβῃ Δωρικὸς τοῦδε ὕστερος καὶ ξυμβῇ γενέσθαι λιμόν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς οὕτως ᾄσονται. [4] μνήμη δὲ ἐγένετο καὶ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίων χρηστηρίου τοῖς εἰδόσιν, ὅτε ἐπερωτῶσιν αὐτοῖς τὸν θεὸν εἰ χρὴ πολεμεῖν ἀνεῖλε κατὰ κράτος πολεμοῦσι νίκην ἔσεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔφη ξυλλήψεσθαι. [5] περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ χρηστηρίου τὰ γιγνόμενα ᾔκαζον ὁμοῖα εἶναι: ἐσβεβληκότων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἡ νόσος ἤρξατο εὐθύς, καὶ ἐς μὲν Πελοπόννησον οὐκ ἐσῆλθεν, ὅτι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, ἐπενείματο δὲ Ἀθήνας μὲν μάλιστα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τὰ πολυανθρωπότατα. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ κατὰ τὴν νόσον γενόμενα.

55. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπειδὴ ἔτεμον τὸ πεδίον, παρῆλθον ἐς τὴν Πάραλον γῆν καλουμένην μέχρι Λαυρείου, οὗ τὰ ἀργύρεια μέταλλά ἐστιν Ἀθηναίοις. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἔτεμον ταύτην ᾗ πρὸς Πελοπόννησον ὁρᾷ, ἔπειτα δὲ τὴν πρὸς Εὔβοιάν τε καὶ Ἄνδρον τετραμμένην. [2] Περικλῆς δὲ στρατηγὸς ὢν καὶ τότε περὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην εἶχεν ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐσβολῇ.

56. ἔτι δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ ὄντων, πρὶν ἐς τὴν παραλίαν ἐλθεῖν, ἑκατὸν νεῶν ἐπίπλουν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ παρεσκευάζετο, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ἀνήγετο. [2] ἦγε δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν ὁπλίτας Ἀθηναίων τετρακισχιλίους καὶ ἱππέας τριακοσίους ἐν ναυσὶν ἱππαγωγοῖς πρῶτον τότε ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν νεῶν ποιηθείσαις: ξυνεστρατεύοντο δὲ καὶ Χῖοι καὶ Λέσβιοι πεντήκοντα ναυσίν. [3] ὅτε δὲ ἀνήγετο ἡ στρατιὰ αὕτη Ἀθηναίων, Πελοποννησίους κατέλιπον τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὄντας ἐν τῇ παραλίᾳ. [4] ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἔτεμον τῆς γῆς τὴν πολλήν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν προσβαλόντες ἐς ἐλπίδα μὲν ἦλθον τοῦ ἑλεῖν, οὐ μέντοι προυχώρησέ γε. [5] ἀναγαγόμενοι δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἐπιδαύρου ἔτεμον τήν τε Τροιζηνίδα γῆν καὶ Ἁλιάδα καὶ Ἑρμιονίδα: ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιθαλάσσια τῆς Πελοποννήσου. [6] ἄραντες δὲ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀφίκοντο ἐς Πρασιὰς τῆς Λακωνικῆς πόλισμα ἐπιθαλάσσιον, καὶ τῆς τε γῆς ἔτεμον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πόλισμα εἷλον καὶ ἐπόρθησαν. ταῦτα δὲ ποιήσαντες ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀνεχώρησαν. τοὺς δὲ Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι κατέλαβον ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὄντας, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνακεχωρηκότας.

57. ὅσον δὲ χρόνον οἵ τε Πελοποννήσιοι ἦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευον ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν, ἡ νόσος ἔν τε τῇ στρατιᾷ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔφθειρε καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὥστε καὶ ἐλέχθη τοὺς Πελοποννησίους δείσαντας τὸ νόσημα, ὡς ἐπυνθάνοντο τῶν αὐτομόλων ὅτι ἐν τῇ πόλει εἴη καὶ θάπτοντας ἅμα ᾐσθάνοντο, θᾶσσον ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐξελθεῖν. [2] τῇ δὲ ἐσβολῇ ταύτῃ πλεῖστόν τε χρόνον ἐνέμειναν καὶ τὴν γῆν πᾶσαν ἔτεμον: ἡμέρας γὰρ τεσσαράκοντα μάλιστα ἐν τῇ γῇ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἐγένοντο.

58. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους Ἄγνων ὁ Νικίου καὶ Κλεόπομπος ὁ Κλεινίου, ξυστράτηγοι ὄντες Περικλέους, λαβόντες τὴν στρατιὰν ᾗπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐχρήσατο ἐστράτευσαν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης καὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἔτι πολιορκουμένην, ἀφικόμενοι δὲ μηχανάς τε τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ προσέφερον καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπειρῶντο ἑλεῖν. [2] προυχώρει δὲ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἡ αἵρεσις τῆς πόλεως οὔτε τἆλλα τῆς παρασκευῆς ἀξίως: ἐπιγενομένη γὰρ ἡ νόσος ἐνταῦθα δὴ πάνυ ἐπίεσε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, φθείρουσα τὴν στρατιάν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς προτέρους στρατιώτας νοσῆσαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τῆς ξὺν Ἄγνωνι στρατιᾶς, ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνῳ ὑγιαίνοντας. Φορμίων δὲ καὶ οἱ ἑξακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι οὐκέτι ἦσαν περὶ Χαλκιδέας. [3] ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἄγνων ἀνεχώρησε ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἀπὸ τετρακισχιλίων ὁπλιτῶν χιλίους καὶ πεντήκοντα τῇ νόσῳ ἀπολέσας ἐν τεσσαράκοντα μάλιστα ἡμέραις: οἱ δὲ πρότεροι στρατιῶται κατὰ χώραν μένοντες ἐπολιόρκουν τὴν Ποτείδαιαν.

59. μετὰ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἐσβολὴν τῶν Πελοποννησίων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἥ τε γῆ αὐτῶν ἐτέτμητο τὸ δεύτερον καὶ ἡ νόσος ἐπέκειτο ἅμα καὶ ὁ πόλεμος, ἠλλοίωντο τὰς γνώμας, [2] καὶ τὸν μὲν Περικλέα ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶχον ὡς πείσαντα σφᾶς πολεμεῖν καὶ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς περιπεπτωκότες,πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ὥρμηντο ξυγχωρεῖν: καὶ πρέσβεις τινὰς πέμψαντες ὡς αὐτοὺς ἄπρακτοι ἐγένοντο. πανταχόθεν τε τῇ γνώμῃ ἄποροι καθεστηκότες ἐνέκειντο τῷ Περικλεῖ. [3] ὁ δὲ ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὰ παρόντα χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἤλπιζε, ξύλλογον ποιήσας — ἔτι δ᾽ ἐστρατήγει — ἐβούλετο θαρσῦναί τε καὶ ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης πρὸς τὸ ἠπιώτερον καὶ ἀδεέστερον καταστῆσαι: παρελθὼν δὲ ἔλεξε τοιάδε.

60. ‘καὶ προσδεχομένῳ μοι τὰ τῆς ὀργῆς ὑμῶν ἔς με γεγένηται — αἰσθάνομαι γὰρ τὰς αἰτίας — καὶ ἐκκλησίαν τούτου ἕνεκα ξυνήγαγον, ὅπως ὑπομνήσω καὶ μέμψωμαι εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς ἢ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνετε ἢ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς εἴκετε. [2] ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην ὠφελεῖν

τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἀθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην. [3] καλῶς μὲν γὰρ φερόμενος ἀνὴρ τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν διαφθειρομένης τῆς πατρίδος οὐδὲν ἧσσον ξυναπόλλυται, κακοτυχῶν δὲ ἐν εὐτυχούσῃ πολλῷ μᾶλλον διασῴζεται. [4] ὁπότε οὖν πόλις μὲν τὰς ἰδίας ξυμφορὰς οἵα τε φέρειν, εἷς δ᾽ ἕκαστος τὰς ἐκείνης ἀδύνατος, πῶς οὐ χρὴ πάντας ἀμύνειν αὐτῇ, καὶ μὴ ὃ νῦν ὑμεῖς δρᾶτε: ταῖς κατ᾽ οἶκον κακοπραγίαις ἐκπεπληγμένοι τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας ἀφίεσθε, καὶ ἐμέ τε τὸν παραινέσαντα πολεμεῖν καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἳ ξυνέγνωτε δι᾽ αἰτίας ἔχετε. [5] καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε ὃς οὐδενὸς ἥσσων οἶομαι εἶναι γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων. [6] ὅ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη: ὅ τε ἔχων ἀμφότερα, τῇ δὲ πόλει δύσνους, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως τι οἰκείως φράζοι: προσόντος δὲ καὶ τοῦδε, χρήμασι δὲ νικωμένου, τὰ ξύμπαντα τούτου ἑνὸς ἂν πωλοῖτο. [7] ὥστ᾽ εἴ μοι καὶ μέσως ἡγούμενοι μᾶλλον ἑτέρων προσεῖναι αὐτὰ πολεμεῖν ἐπείσθητε, οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως νῦν τοῦ γε ἀδικεῖν αἰτίαν φεροίμην.

61. ‘καὶ γὰρ οἷς μὲν αἵρεσις γεγένηται τἆλλα εὐτυχοῦσι, πολλὴ ἄνοια πολεμῆσαι: εἰ δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἢ εἴξαντας εὐθὺς τοῖς πέλας ὑπακοῦσαι ἢ κινδυνεύσαντας περιγενέσθαι, ὁ φυγὼν τὸν κίνδυνον τοῦ ὑποστάντος μεμπτότερος. [2] καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι: ὑμεῖς δὲ μεταβάλλετε, ἐπειδὴ ξυνέβη ὑμῖν πεισθῆναι μὲν ἀκεραίοις, μεταμέλειν δὲ κακουμένοις, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον ἐν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἀσθενεῖ τῆς γνώμης μὴ ὀρθὸν φαίνεσθαι, διότι τὸ μὲν λυποῦν ἔχει ἤδη τὴν αἴσθησιν ἑκάστῳ, τῆς δὲ ὠφελίας ἄπεστιν ἔτι ἡ δήλωσις ἅπασι, καὶ μεταβολῆς μεγάλης, καὶ ταύτης ἐξ ὀλίγου, ἐμπεσούσης ταπεινὴ ὑμῶν ἡ διάνοια ἐγκαρτερεῖν ἃ ἔγνωτε. [3] δουλοῖ γὰρ φρόνημα τὸ αἰφνίδιον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ τὸ πλείστῳ παραλόγῳ ξυμβαῖνον: ὃ ὑμῖν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐχ ἥκιστα καὶ κατὰ τὴν νόσον γεγένηται. [4] ὅμως δὲ πόλιν μεγάλην οἰκοῦντας καὶ ἐν ἤθεσιν ἀντιπάλοις αὐτῇ τεθραμμένους χρεὼν καὶ

ξυμφοραῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις ἐθέλειν ὑφίστασθαι καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν μὴ ἀφανίζειν ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δικαιοῦσι τῆς τε ὑπαρχούσης δόξης αἰτιᾶσθαι ὅστις μαλακίᾳ ἐλλείπει καὶ τῆς μὴ προσηκούσης μισεῖν τὸν θρασύτητι ὀρεγόμενον, ἀπαλγήσαντας δὲ τὰ ἴδια τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι.

62. ‘τὸν δὲ πόνον τὸν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, μὴ γένηταί τε πολὺς καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον περιγενώμεθα, ἀρκείτω μὲν ὑμῖν καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐν οἷς ἄλλοτε πολλάκις γε δὴ ἀπέδειξα οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸν ὑποπτευόμενον, δηλώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε, ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους πέρι ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις: οὐδ᾽ ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἑώρων. [2] οἴεσθε μὲν γὰρ τῶν ξυμμάχων μόνων ἄρχειν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποφαίνω δύο μερῶν τῶν ἐς χρῆσιν φανερῶν, γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης, τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμᾶς παντὸς κυριωτάτους ὄντας, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον τε νῦν νέμεσθε καὶ ἦν ἐπὶ πλέον βουληθῆτε: καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις τῇ ὑπαρχούσῃ παρασκευῇ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ πλέοντας ὑμᾶς οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἔθνος τῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κωλύσει. [3] ὥστε οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῶν οἰκιῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς χρείαν, ὧν μεγάλων νομίζετε ἐστερῆσθαι, αὕτη ἡ δύναμις φαίνεται: οὐδ᾽ εἰκὸς χαλεπῶς φέρειν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ κηπίον καὶ ἐγκαλλώπισμα πλούτου πρὸς ταύτην νομίσαντας ὀλιγωρῆσαι, καὶ γνῶναι ἐλευθερίαν μέν, ἣν ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι αὐτῆς διασώσωμεν, ῥᾳδίως ταῦτα ἀναληψομένην, ἄλλων δὲ ὑπακούσασι καὶ τὰ προκεκτημένα φιλεῖν ἐλασσοῦσθαι, τῶν τε πατέρων μὴ χείρους κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα φανῆναι, οἳ μετὰ πόνων καὶ οὐ παρ᾽ ἄλλων δεξάμενοι κατέσχον τε καὶ προσέτι διασώσαντες παρέδοσαν ὑμῖν αὐτά· αἴσχιον δὲ ἔχοντας ἀφαιρεθῆναι ἢ κτωμένους ἀτυχῆσαι·, ἰέναι δὲ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὁμόσε μὴ φρονήματι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταφρονήματι. [4] αὔχημα μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀμαθίας εὐτυχοῦς καὶ δειλῷ τινὶ ἐγγίγνεται, καταφρόνησις δὲ ὃς ἂν καὶ γνώμῃ πιστεύῃ τῶν ἐναντίων προύχειν, ὃ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. [5] καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ἀπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας

τύχης ἡ ξύνεσις ἐκ τοῦ ὑπέρφρονος ἐχυρωτέραν παρέχεται, ἐλπίδι τε ἧσσον πιστεύει, ἧς ἐν τῷ ἀπόρῳ ἡ ἰσχύς, γνώμῃ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἧς βεβαιοτέρα ἡ πρόνοια.

63. τῆς τε πόλεως ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχειν, ᾧπερ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθε, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν: μηδὲ νομίσαι περὶ ἑνὸς μόνου, δουλείας ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθερίας, ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχῆς στερήσεως καὶ κινδύνου ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἀπήχθεσθε. [2] ἧς οὐδ᾽ ἐκστῆναι ἔτι ὑμῖν ἔστιν, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιὼς ἀπραγμοσύνῃ ἀνδραγαθίζεται: ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον. [3] τάχιστ᾽ ἄν τε πόλιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑτέρους τε πείσαντες ἀπολέσειαν καὶ εἴ που ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν αὐτόνομοι οἰκήσειαν: τὸ γὰρ ἄπραγμον οὐ σῴζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγμένον, οὐδὲ ἐν ἀρχούσῃ πόλει ξυμφέρει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὑπηκόῳ, ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν.

64. ‘ὑμεῖς δὲ μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε πολιτῶν παράγεσθε μήτε ἐμὲ δι᾽ ὀργῆς ἔχετε, ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ ξυνδιέγνωτε πολεμεῖν, εἰ καὶ ἐπελθόντες οἱ ἐναντίοι ἔδρασαν ἅπερ εἰκὸς ἦν μὴ ἐθελησάντων ὑμῶν ὑπακούειν, ἐπιγεγένηταί τε πέρα ὧν προσεδεχόμεθα ἡ νόσος ἥδε, πρᾶγμα μόνον δὴ τῶν πάντων ἐλπίδος κρεῖσσον γεγενημένον. καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὴν οἶδ᾽ ὅτι μέρος τι μᾶλλον ἔτι μισοῦμαι, οὐ δικαίως, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὅταν παρὰ λόγον τι εὖ πράξητε ἐμοὶ ἀναθήσετε. [2] φέρειν δὲ χρὴ τά τε δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως τά τε ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνδρείως: ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἔθει τῇδε τῇ πόλει πρότερόν τε ἦν νῦν τε μὴ ἐν ὑμῖν κωλυθῇ. [3] γνῶτε δὲ ὄνομα μέγιστον αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν ἐν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὸ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μὴ εἴκειν, πλεῖστα δὲ σώματα καὶ πόνους ἀνηλωκέναι πολέμῳ, καὶ δύναμιν μεγίστην δὴ μέχρι τοῦδε κεκτημένην, ἧς ἐς ἀίδιον τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις, ἢν καὶ νῦν ὑπενδῶμέν ποτε πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι , μνήμη καταλελείψεται, Ἑλλήνων τε ὅτι Ἕλληνες πλείστων δὴ ἤρξαμεν, καὶ πολέμοις μεγίστοις ἀντέσχομεν πρός τε ξύμπαντας καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους, πόλιν τε τοῖς πᾶσιν

εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μεγίστην ᾠκήσαμεν. [4] καίτοι ταῦτα ὁ μὲν ἀπράγμων μέμψαιτ᾽ ἄν, ὁ δὲ δρᾶν τι καὶ αὐτὸς βουλόμενος ζηλώσει: εἰ δέ τις μὴ κέκτηται, φθονήσει. [5] τὸ δὲ μισεῖσθαι καὶ λυπηροὺς εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι πᾶσι μὲν ὑπῆρξε δὴ ὅσοι ἕτεροι ἑτέρων ἠξίωσαν ἄρχειν: ὅστις δὲ ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τὸ ἐπίφθονον λαμβάνει, ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται. μῖσος μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντέχει, ἡ δὲ παραυτίκα τε λαμπρότης καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα δόξα αἰείμνηστος καταλείπεται. [6] ὑμεῖς δὲ ἔς τε τὸ μέλλον καλὸν προγνόντες ἔς τε τὸ αὐτίκα μὴ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἤδη προθύμῳ ἀμφότερα κτήσασθε, καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μήτε ἐπικηρυκεύεσθε μήτε ἔνδηλοι ἔστε τοῖς παροῦσι πόνοις βαρυνόμενοι, ὡς οἵτινες πρὸς τὰς ξυμφορὰς γνώμῃ μὲν ἥκιστα λυποῦνται, ἔργῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἀντέχουσιν, οὗτοι καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν κράτιστοί εἰσιν.’

65. τοιαῦτα ὁ Περικλῆς λέγων ἐπειρᾶτο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς τε ἐς αὐτὸν ὀργῆς παραλύειν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἀπάγειν τὴν γνώμην. [2] οἱ δὲ δημοσίᾳ μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἀνεπείθοντο καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτι ἔπεμπον ἔς τε τὸν πόλεμον μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐλυποῦντο, ὁ μὲν δῆμος ὅτι ἀπ᾽ ἐλασσόνων ὁρμώμενος ἐστέρητο καὶ τούτων, οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πόλεμον ἀντ᾽ εἰρήνης ἔχοντες. [3] οὐ μέντοι πρότερόν γε οἱ ξύμπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ ἔχοντες αὐτὸν πρὶν ἐζημίωσαν χρήμασιν. [4] ὕστερον δ᾽ αὖθις οὐ πολλῷ, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὅμιλος ποιεῖν, στρατηγὸν εἵλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν, ὧν μὲν περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕκαστος ἤλγει ἀμβλύτεροι ἤδη ὄντες, ὧν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις προσεδεῖτο πλείστου ἄξιον νομίζοντες εἶναι. [5] ὅσον τε γὰρ χρόνον προύστη τῆς πόλεως ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ, μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διεφύλαξεν αὐτήν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνου μεγίστη, ἐπειδή τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προγνοὺς τὴν δύναμιν. [6] ἐπεβίω δὲ δύο ἔτη καὶ ἓξ μῆνας: καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀπέθανεν, ἐπὶ πλέον ἔτι ἐγνώσθη ἡ πρόνοια αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον. [7] ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχάζοντάς

τε καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν θεραπεύοντας καὶ ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἔφη περιέσεσθαι: οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τοὐναντίον ἔπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἔς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπολίτευσαν, ἃ κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς ἰδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μᾶλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο. [8] αἴτιον δ᾽ ἦν ὅτι ἐκεῖνος μὲν δυνατὸς ὢν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὐ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονήν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχων ἐπ᾽ ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὀργήν τι ἀντειπεῖν. [9] ὁπότε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. [10] οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρῶτος ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἐτράποντο καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι. [11] ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλά, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς, ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῇσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. [12] σφαλέντες δὲ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἄλλῃ τε παρασκευῇ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τῷ πλέονι μορίῳ καὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἤδη ἐν στάσει ὄντες ὅμως † τρία † μὲν ἔτη ἀντεῖχον τοῖς τε πρότερον ὑπάρχουσι πολεμίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σικελίας μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἔτι τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀφεστηκόσι, Κύρῳ τε ὕστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, ὃς παρεῖχε χρήματα Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὸ ναυτικόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐν σφίσι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς περιπεσόντες ἐσφάλησαν. [13] τοσοῦτον

τῷ Περικλεῖ ἐπερίσσευσε τότε ἀφ᾽ ὧν αὐτὸς προέγνω καὶ πάνυ ἂν ῥᾳδίως περιγενέσθαι τὴν πόλιν Πελοποννησίων αὐτῶν τῷ πολέμῳ.

66. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐστράτευσαν ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν ἐς Ζάκυνθον τὴν νῆσον, ἣ κεῖται ἀντιπέρας Ἤλιδος: εἰσὶ δὲ Ἀχαιῶν τῶν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἄποικοι καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ξυνεμάχουν. [2] ἐπέπλεον δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων χίλιοι ὁπλῖται καὶ Κνῆμος Σπαρτιάτης ναύαρχος. ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐδῄωσαν τὰ πολλά. καὶ ἐπειδὴ οὐ ξυνεχώρουν, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

67. καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος Ἀριστεὺς Κορίνθιος καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις Ἀνήριστος καὶ Νικόλαος καὶ Πρατόδαμος καὶ Τεγεάτης Τιμαγόρας καὶ Ἀργεῖος ἰδίᾳ Πόλλις, πορευόμενοι ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ὡς βασιλέα, εἴ πως πείσειαν αὐτὸν χρήματά τε παρασχεῖν καὶ ξυμπολεμεῖν, ἀφικνοῦνται ὡς Σιτάλκην πρῶτον τὸν Τήρεω ἐς Θρᾴκην, βουλόμενοι πεῖσαί τε αὐτόν, εἰ δύναιντο, μεταστάντα τῆς Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίας στρατεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ποτείδαιαν, οὗ ἦν στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων πολιορκοῦν, καὶ ᾗπερ ὥρμηντο, δι᾽ ἐκείνου πορευθῆναι πέραν τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου ὡς Φαρνάκην τὸν Φαρναβάζου, ὃς αὐτοὺς ἔμελλεν ὡς βασιλέα ἀναπέμψειν. [2] παρατυχόντες δὲ Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις Λέαρχος Καλλιμάχου καὶ Ἀμεινιάδης Φιλήμονος παρὰ τῷ Σιτάλκῃ πείθουσι τὸν Σάδοκον τὸν γεγενημένον Ἀθηναῖον, Σιτάλκου υἱόν, τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγχειρίσαι σφίσιν, ὅπως μὴ διαβάντες ὡς βασιλέα τὴν ἐκείνου πόλιν τὸ μέρος βλάψωσιν. [3] ὁ δὲ πεισθεὶς πορευομένους αὐτοὺς διὰ τῆς Θρᾴκης ἐπὶ τὸ πλοῖον ᾧ ἔμελλον τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον περαιώσειν, πρὶν ἐσβαίνειν ξυλλαμβάνει, ἄλλους ξυμπέμψας μετὰ τοῦ Λεάρχου καὶ Ἀμεινιάδου, καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἐκείνοις παραδοῦναι: οἱ δὲ λαβόντες ἐκόμισαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. [4] ἀφικομένων δὲ αὐτῶν δείσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν Ἀριστέα μὴ αὖθις σφᾶς ἔτι πλείω κακουργῇ διαφυγών, ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τούτων τὰ τῆς Ποτειδαίας καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης πάντα ἐφαίνετο πράξας, ἀκρίτους καὶ βουλομένους ἔστιν ἃ εἰπεῖν αὐθημερὸν ἀπέκτειναν πάντας

καὶ ἐς φάραγγα ἐσέβαλον, δικαιοῦντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀμύνεσθαι οἷσπερ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπῆρξαν, τοὺς ἐμπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐν ὁλκάσι περὶ Πελοπόννησον πλέοντας ἀποκτείναντες καὶ ἐς φάραγγας ἐσβαλόντες. πάντας γὰρ δὴ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὅσους λάβοιεν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὡς πολεμίους διέφθειρον, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ξυμπολεμοῦντας καὶ τοὺς μηδὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων.

68. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους, τοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος, καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται αὐτοί τε καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων πολλοὺς ἀναστήσαντες ἐστράτευσαν ἐπ᾽ Ἄργος τὸ Ἀμφιλοχικὸν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἀμφιλοχίαν. [2] ἔχθρα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους ἀπὸ τοῦδε αὐτοῖς ἤρξατο πρῶτον γενέσθαι. [3] Ἄργος τὸ Ἀμφιλοχικὸν καὶ Ἀμφιλοχίαν τὴν ἄλλην ἔκτισε μὲν μετὰ τὰ Τρωικὰ οἴκαδε ἀναχωρήσας καὶ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος τῇ ἐν Ἄργει καταστάσει Ἀμφίλοχος ὁ Ἀμφιάρεω ἐν τῷ Ἀμπρακικῷ κόλπῳ, ὁμώνυμον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδι Ἄργος ὀνομάσας [4] καὶ ἦν ἡ πόλις αὕτη μεγίστη τῆς Ἀμφιλοχίας καὶ τοὺς δυνατωτάτους εἶχεν οἰκήτορας, [5] ὑπὸ ξυμφορῶν δὲ πολλαῖς γενεαῖς ὕστερον πιεζόμενοι Ἀμπρακιώτας ὁμόρους ὄντας τῇ Ἀμφιλοχικῇ ξυνοίκους ἐπηγάγοντο, καὶ ἡλληνίσθησαν τὴν νῦν γλῶσσαν τότε πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ξυνοικησάντων: οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἀμφίλοχοι βάρβαροί εἰσιν. [6] ἐκβάλλουσιν οὖν τοὺς Ἀργείους οἱ Ἀμπρακιῶται χρόνῳ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἴσχουσι τὴν πόλιν. [7] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀμφίλοχοι γενομένου τούτου διδόασιν ἑαυτοὺς Ἀκαρνᾶσι, καὶ προσπαρακαλέσαντες ἀμφότεροι Ἀθηναίους, οἳ αὐτοῖς Φορμίωνά τε στρατηγὸν ἔπεμψαν καὶ ναῦς τριάκοντα, ἀφικομένου [δὲ] τοῦ Φορμίωνος αἱροῦσι κατὰ κράτος Ἄργος καὶ τοὺς Ἀμπρακιώτας ἠνδραπόδισαν, κοινῇ τε ᾤκισαν αὐτὸ Ἀμφίλοχοι καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνες. [8] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἡ ξυμμαχία πρῶτον ἐγένετο Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶσιν. [9] οἱ δὲ Ἀμπρακιῶται τὴν μὲν ἔχθραν ἐς τοὺς Ἀργείους ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ σφῶν αὐτῶν πρῶτον ἐποιήσαντο, ὕστερον δὲ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τήνδε τὴν στρατείαν ποιοῦνται αὐτῶν τε καὶ Χαόνων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν πλησιοχώρων βαρβάρων:

ἐλθόντες τε πρὸς τὸ Ἄργος τῆς μὲν χώρας ἐκράτουν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡς οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν προσβαλόντες, ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ ἔθνη. τοσαῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ θέρει ἐγένετο.

69. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Ἀθηναῖοι ναῦς ἔστειλαν εἴκοσι μὲν περὶ Πελοπόννησον καὶ Φορμίωνα στρατηγόν, ὃς ὁρμώμενος ἐκ Ναυπάκτου φυλακὴν εἶχε μήτ᾽ ἐκπλεῖν ἐκ Κορίνθου καὶ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου μηδένα μήτ᾽ ἐσπλεῖν, ἑτέρας δὲ ἓξ ἐπὶ Καρίας καὶ Λυκίας καὶ Μελήσανδρον στρατηγόν, ὅπως ταῦτά τε ἀργυρολογῶσι καὶ τὸ λῃστικὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων μὴ ἐῶσιν αὐτόθεν ὁρμώμενον βλάπτειν τὸν πλοῦν τῶν ὁλκάδων τῶν ἀπὸ Φασήλιδος καὶ Φοινίκης καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖθεν ἠπείρου. [2] ἀναβὰς δὲ στρατιᾷ Ἀθηναίων τε τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς τὴν Λυκίαν ὁ Μελήσανδρος ἀποθνῄσκει καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς μέρος τι διέφθειρε νικηθεὶς μάχῃ.

70. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος οἱ Ποτειδεᾶται ἐπειδὴ οὐκέτι ἐδύναντο πολιορκούμενοι ἀντέχειν, ἀλλ᾽ αἵ τε ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολαὶ Πελοποννησίων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀπανίστασαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὅ τε σῖτος ἐπελελοίπει, καὶ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἐπεγεγένητο αὐτόθι ἤδη βρώσεως πέρι ἀναγκαίας καί τινες καὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγέγευντο, οὕτω δὴ λόγους προσφέρουσι περὶ ξυμβάσεως τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς ἐπὶ σφίσι τεταγμένοις, Ξενοφῶντί τε τῷ Εὐριπίδου καὶ Ἑστιοδώρῳ τῷ Ἀριστοκλείδου καὶ Φανομάχῳ τῷ Καλλιμάχου. [2] οἱ δὲ προσεδέξαντο, ὁρῶντες μὲν τῆς στρατιᾶς τὴν ταλαιπωρίαν ἐν χωρίῳ χειμερινῷ, ἀνηλωκυίας δὲ ἤδη τῆς πόλεως δισχίλια τάλαντα ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν. [3] ἐπὶ τοῖσδε οὖν ξυνέβησαν, ἐξελθεῖν αὐτοὺς καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς ἐπικούρους ξὺν ἑνὶ ἱματίῳ, γυναῖκας δὲ ξὺν δυοῖν, καὶ ἀργύριόν τι ῥητὸν ἔχοντας ἐφόδιον. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν ὑπόσπονδοι ἐξῆλθον ἔς τε τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν καὶ ᾗ ἕκαστος ἐδύνατο: Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τούς τε στρατηγοὺς ἐπῃτιάσαντο ὅτι ἄνευ αὐτῶν ξυνέβησαν ⟨ἐνόμιζον γὰρ ἂν κρατῆσαι τῆς πόλεως ᾗ ἐβούλοντο⟩, καὶ ὕστερον ἐποίκους ἔπεμψαν ἑαυτῶν ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν καὶ

κατῴκισαν. ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι ἐγένετο, καὶ [τὸ] δεύτερον ἔτος ἐτελεύτα τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

71. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐς μὲν τὴν Ἀττικὴν οὐκ ἐσέβαλον, ἐστράτευσαν δὲ ἐπὶ Πλάταιαν: ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. καὶ καθίσας τὸν στρατὸν ἔμελλε δῃώσειν τὴν γῆν: οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς εὐθὺς πρέσβεις πέμψαντες πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔλεγον τοιάδε: [2] ‘Ἀρχίδαμε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ δίκαια ποιεῖτε οὐδ᾽ ἄξια οὔτε ὑμῶν οὔτε πατέρων ὧν ἐστέ, ἐς γῆν τὴν Πλαταιῶν στρατεύοντες. Παυσανίας γὰρ ὁ Κλεομβρότου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐλευθερώσας τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀπὸ τῶν Μήδων μετὰ Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἐθελησάντων ξυνάρασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον τῆς μάχης ἣ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, θύσας ἐν τῇ Πλαταιῶν ἀγορᾷ ἱερὰ Διὶ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ξυγκαλέσας πάντας τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀπεδίδου Πλαταιεῦσι γῆν καὶ πόλιν τὴν σφετέραν ἔχοντας αὐτονόμους οἰκεῖν, στρατεῦσαί τε μηδένα ποτὲ ἀδίκως ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς μηδ᾽ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ: εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμύνειν τοὺς παρόντας ξυμμάχους κατὰ δύναμιν. [3] τάδε μὲν ἡμῖν πατέρες οἱ ὑμέτεροι ἔδοσαν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ προθυμίας τῆς ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς κινδύνοις γενομένης, ὑμεῖς δὲ τἀναντία δρᾶτε: μετὰ γὰρ Θηβαίων τῶν ἡμῖν ἐχθίστων ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἥκετε. [4] μάρτυρας δὲ θεοὺς τούς τε ὁρκίους τότε γενομένους ποιούμενοι καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους πατρῴους καὶ ἡμετέρους ἐγχωρίους, λέγομεν ὑμῖν γῆν τὴν Πλαταιίδα μὴ ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρκους, ἐᾶν δὲ οἰκεῖν αὐτονόμους καθάπερ Παυσανίας ἐδικαίωσεν.’

72. τοσαῦτα εἰπόντων τῶν Πλαταιῶν Ἀρχίδαμος ὑπολαβὼν εἶπεν: ‘δίκαια λέγετε, ὦ ἄνδρες Πλαταιῆς, ἢν ποιῆτε ὁμοῖα τοῖς λόγοις. καθάπερ γὰρ Παυσανίας ὑμῖν παρέδωκεν, αὐτοί τε αὐτονομεῖσθε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνελευθεροῦτε, ὅσοι μετασχόντες τῶν τότε κινδύνων ὑμῖν τε ξυνώμοσαν καὶ εἰσὶ νῦν ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις, παρασκευή τε τοσήδε καὶ πόλεμος γεγένηται αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθερώσεως. ἧς μάλιστα μὲν μετασχόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμμείνατε τοῖς ὅρκοις: εἰ δὲ μή, ἅπερ καὶ πρότερον ἤδη προυκαλεσάμεθα, ἡσυχίαν

ἄγετε νεμόμενοι τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν, καὶ ἔστε μηδὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων, δέχεσθε δὲ ἀμφοτέρους φίλους, ἐπὶ πολέμῳ δὲ μηδετέρους. καὶ τάδε ἡμῖν ἀρκέσει.’ [2] ὁ μὲν Ἀρχίδαμος τοσαῦτα εἶπεν: οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῶν πρέσβεις ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα ἐσῆλθον ἐς τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῷ πλήθει τὰ ῥηθέντα κοινώσαντες ἀπεκρίναντο αὐτῷ ὅτι ἀδύνατα σφίσιν εἴη ποιεῖν ἃ προκαλεῖται ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων παῖδες γὰρ σφῶν καὶ γυναῖκες παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις εἶεν, δεδιέναι δὲ καὶ περὶ τῇ πάσῃ πόλει μὴ ἐκείνων ἀποχωρησάντων Ἀθηναῖοι ἐλθόντες σφίσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρέπωσιν, ἢ Θηβαῖοι, ὡς ἔνορκοι ὄντες κατὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρους δέχεσθαι, αὖθις σφῶν τὴν πόλιν πειράσωσι καταλαβεῖν. [3] ὁ δὲ θαρσύνων αὐτοὺς πρὸς ταῦτα ἔφη: ‘ὑμεῖς δὲ πόλιν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας ἡμῖν παράδοτε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ γῆς ὅρους ἀποδείξατε καὶ δένδρα ἀριθμῷ τὰ ὑμέτερα καὶ ἄλλο εἴ τι δυνατὸν ἐς ἀριθμὸν ἐλθεῖν: αὐτοὶ δὲ μεταχωρήσατε ὅποι βούλεσθε, ἕως ἂν ὁ πόλεμος ᾖ: ἐπειδὰν δὲ παρέλθῃ, ἀποδώσομεν ὑμῖν ἃ ἂν παραλάβωμεν. μέχρι δὲ τοῦδε ἕξομεν παρακαταθήκην, ἐργαζόμενοι καὶ φορὰν φέροντες ἣ ἂν ὑμῖν μέλλῃ ἱκανὴ ἔσεσθαι.’

73. οἱ δ᾽ ἀκούσαντες ἐσῆλθον αὖθις ἐς τὴν πόλιν, καὶ βουλευσάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους ἔλεξαν ὅτι βούλονται ἃ προκαλεῖται Ἀθηναίοις κοινῶσαι πρῶτον, καὶ ἢν πείθωσιν αὐτούς, ποιεῖν ταῦτα: μέχρι δὲ τούτου σπείσασθαι σφίσιν ἐκέλευον καὶ τὴν γῆν μὴ δῃοῦν. ὁ δὲ ἡμέρας τε ἐσπείσατο ἐν αἷς εἰκὸς ἦν κομισθῆναι, καὶ τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἔτεμνεν. [2] ἐλθόντες δὲ οἱ [Πλαταιῆς] πρέσβεις ὡς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ βουλευσάμενοι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πάλιν ἦλθον ἀπαγγέλλοντες τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει τοιάδε: [3] ‘οὔτ᾽ ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνῳ, ὦ ἄνδρες Πλαταιῆς, ἀφ᾽ οὗ ξύμμαχοι ἐγενόμεθα, Ἀθηναῖοί φασιν ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑμᾶς προέσθαι ἀδικουμένους οὔτε νῦν περιόψεσθαι, βοηθήσειν δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν. ἐπισκήπτουσί τε ὑμῖν πρὸς τῶν ὅρκων οὓς οἱ πατέρες ὤμοσαν μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν περὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν.’

74. τοιαῦτα τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπαγγειλάντων οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἐβουλεύσαντο Ἀθηναίους μὴ προδιδόναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ

γῆν τεμνομένην, εἰ δεῖ, ὁρῶντας καὶ ἄλλο πάσχοντας ὅτι ἂν ξυμβαίνῃ: ἐξελθεῖν τε μηδένα ἔτι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι ἀδύνατα σφίσι ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προκαλοῦνται. [2] ὡς δὲ ἀπεκρίναντο, ἐντεῦθεν δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐς ἐπιμαρτυρίαν καὶ θεῶν καὶ ἡρώων τῶν ἐγχωρίων Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς κατέστη, λέγων ὧδε: ‘θεοὶ ὅσοι γῆν τὴν Πλαταιίδα ἔχετε καὶ ἥρωες, ξυνίστορές ἐστε ὅτι οὔτε τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδίκως, ἐκλιπόντων δὲ τῶνδε προτέρων τὸ ξυνώμοτον, ἐπὶ γῆν τήνδε ἤλθομεν, ἐν ᾗ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν εὐξάμενοι ὑμῖν Μήδων ἐκράτησαν καὶ παρέσχετε αὐτὴν εὐμενῆ ἐναγωνίσασθαι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, οὔτε νῦν, ἤν τι ποιῶμεν, ἀδικήσομεν: προκαλεσάμενοι γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ εἰκότα οὐ τυγχάνομεν. ξυγγνώμονες δὲ ἔστε τῆς μὲν ἀδικίας κολάζεσθαι τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι προτέροις, τῆς δὲ τιμωρίας τυγχάνειν τοῖς ἐπιφέρουσι νομίμως.’

75. τοσαῦτα ἐπιθειάσας καθίστη ἐς πόλεμον τὸν στρατόν, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν περιεσταύρωσαν αὐτοὺς τοῖς δένδρεσιν ἃ ἔκοψαν, τοῦ μηδένα ἐπεξιέναι, ἔπειτα χῶμα ἔχουν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἐλπίζοντες ταχίστην αἵρεσιν ἔσεσθαι αὐτῶν στρατεύματος τοσούτου ἐργαζομένου. [2] ξύλα μὲν οὖν τέμνοντες ἐκ τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος παρῳκοδόμουν ἑκατέρωθεν, φορμηδὸν ἀντὶ τοίχων τιθέντες, ὅπως μὴ διαχέοιτο ἐπὶ πολὺ τὸ χῶμα: ἐφόρουν δὲ ὕλην ἐς αὐτὸ καὶ λίθους καὶ γῆν καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀνύτειν μέλλοι ἐπιβαλλόμενον. [3] ἡμέρας δὲ ἔχουν † ἑβδομήκοντα † καὶ νύκτας ξυνεχῶς, διῃρημένοι κατ᾽ ἀναπαύλας, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν φέρειν, τοὺς δὲ ὕπνον τε καὶ σῖτον αἱρεῖσθαι: Λακεδαιμονίων τε οἱ ξεναγοὶ ἑκάστης πόλεως ξυνεφεστῶτες ἠνάγκαζον ἐς τὸ ἔργον. [4] οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς ὁρῶντες τὸ χῶμα αἰρόμενον, ξύλινον τεῖχος ξυνθέντες καὶ ἐπιστήσαντες τῷ ἑαυτῶν τείχει ᾗ προσεχοῦτο, ἐσῳκοδόμουν ἐς αὐτὸ πλίνθους ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς οἰκιῶν καθαιροῦντες. [5] ξύνδεσμος δ᾽ ἦν αὐτοῖς τὰ ξύλα, τοῦ μὴ ὑψηλὸν γιγνόμενον ἀσθενὲς εἶναι τὸ οἰκοδόμημα, καὶ προκαλύμματα εἶχε δέρσεις καὶ διφθέρας, ὥστε τοὺς ἐργαζομένους καὶ τὰ ξύλα μήτε πυρφόροις οἰστοῖς βάλλεσθαι ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ τε εἶναι. [6] ἦρετο δὲ τὸ ὕψος τοῦ

τείχους μέγα, καὶ τὸ χῶμα οὐ σχολαίτερον ἀντανῄει αὐτῷ. καὶ οἱ Πλαταιῆς τοιόνδε τι ἐπινοοῦσιν: διελόντες τοῦ τείχους ᾗ προσέπιπτε τὸ χῶμα ἐσεφόρουν τὴν γῆν.

76. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐν ταρσοῖς καλάμου πηλὸν ἐνίλλοντες ἐσέβαλλον ἐς τὸ διῃρημένον, ὅπως μὴ διαχεόμενον ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ φοροῖτο. [2] οἱ δὲ ταύτῃ ἀποκλῃόμενοι τοῦτο μὲν ἐπέσχον, ὑπόνομον δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὀρύξαντες καὶ ξυντεκμηράμενοι ὑπὸ τὸ χῶμα ὑφεῖλκον αὖθις παρὰ σφᾶς τὸν χοῦν: καὶ ἐλάνθανον ἐπὶ πολὺ τοὺς ἔξω, ὥστε ἐπιβάλλοντας ἧσσον ἀνύτειν ὑπαγομένου αὐτοῖς κάτωθεν τοῦ χώματος καὶ ἰζάνοντος αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ κενούμενον. [3] δεδιότες δὲ μὴ οὐδ᾽ οὕτω δύνωνται ὀλίγοι πρὸς πολλοὺς ἀντέχειν, προσεπεξηῦρον τόδε: τὸ μὲν μέγα οἰκοδόμημα ἐπαύσαντο ἐργαζόμενοι τὸ κατὰ τὸ χῶμα, ἔνθεν δὲ καὶ ἔνθεν αὐτοῦ ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ βραχέος τείχους ἐκ τοῦ ἐντὸς μηνοειδὲς ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐσῳκοδόμουν, ὅπως, εἰ τὸ μέγα τεῖχος ἁλίσκοιτο, τοῦτ᾽ ἀντέχοι, καὶ δέοι τοὺς ἐναντίους αὖθις πρὸς αὐτὸ χοῦν καὶ προχωροῦντας ἔσω διπλάσιόν τε πόνον ἔχειν καὶ ἐν ἀμφιβόλῳ μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι. [4] ἅμα δὲ τῇ χώσει καὶ μηχανὰς προσῆγον οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τῇ πόλει, μίαν μὲν ἣ τοῦ μεγάλου οἰκοδομήματος κατὰ τὸ χῶμα προσαχθεῖσα ἐπὶ μέγα τε κατέσεισε καὶ τοὺς Πλαταιᾶς ἐφόβησεν, ἄλλας δὲ ἄλλῃ τοῦ τείχους, ἃς βρόχους τε περιβάλλοντες ἀνέκλων οἱ Πλαταιῆς, καὶ δοκοὺς μεγάλας ἀρτήσαντες ἁλύσεσι μακραῖς σιδηραῖς ἀπὸ τῆς τομῆς ἑκατέρωθεν ἀπὸ κεραιῶν δύο ἐπικεκλιμένων καὶ ὑπερτεινουσῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τείχους ἀνελκύσαντες ἐγκαρσίας, ὁπότε προσπεσεῖσθαί πῃ μέλλοι ἡ μηχανή, ἀφίεσαν τὴν δοκὸν χαλαραῖς ταῖς ἁλύσεσι καὶ οὐ διὰ χειρὸς ἔχοντες, ἡ δὲ ῥύμῃ ἐμπίπτουσα ἀπεκαύλιζε τὸ προῦχον τῆς ἐμβολῆς.

77. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ὡς αἵ τε μηχαναὶ οὐδὲν ὠφέλουν καὶ τῷ χώματι τὸ ἀντιτείχισμα ἐγίγνετο, νομίσαντες ἄπορον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἑλεῖν τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὴν περιτείχισιν παρεσκευάζοντο. [2] πρότερον δὲ πυρὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς πειρᾶσαι εἰ δύναιντο

πνεύματος γενομένου ἐπιφλέξαι τὴν πόλιν οὖσαν οὐ μεγάλην: πᾶσαν γὰρ δὴ ἰδέαν ἐπενόουν, εἴ πως σφίσιν ἄνευ δαπάνης καὶ πολιορκίας προσαχθείη. [3] φοροῦντες δὲ ὕλης φακέλους παρέβαλον ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος ἐς τὸ μεταξὺ πρῶτον τοῦ τείχους καὶ τῆς προσχώσεως, ταχὺ δὲ πλήρους γενομένου διὰ πολυχειρίαν ἐπιπαρένησαν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως ὅσον ἐδύναντο ἀπὸ τοῦ μετεώρου πλεῖστον ἐπισχεῖν, ἐμβαλόντες δὲ πῦρ ξὺν θείῳ καὶ πίσσῃ ἦψαν τὴν ὕλην. [4] καὶ ἐγένετο φλὸξ τοσαύτη ὅσην οὐδείς πω ἔς γε ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον χειροποίητον εἶδεν: ἤδη γὰρ ἐν ὄρεσιν ὕλη τριφθεῖσα ὑπ᾽ ἀνέμων πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου πῦρ καὶ φλόγα ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀνῆκεν. [5] τοῦτο δὲ μέγα τε ἦν καὶ τοὺς Πλαταιᾶς τἆλλα διαφυγόντας ἐλαχίστου ἐδέησε διαφθεῖραι: ἐντὸς γὰρ πολλοῦ χωρίου τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἦν πελάσαι, πνεῦμά τε εἰ ἐπεγένετο αὐτῇ ἐπίφορον, ὅπερ καὶ ἤλπιζον οἱ ἐναντίοι, οὐκ ἂν διέφυγον. [6] νῦν δὲ καὶ τόδε λέγεται ξυμβῆναι, ὕδωρ [ἐξ οὐρανοῦ] πολὺ καὶ βροντὰς γενομένας σβέσαι τὴν φλόγα καὶ οὕτω παυσθῆναι τὸν κίνδυνον.

78. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπειδὴ καὶ τούτου διήμαρτον, μέρος μέν τι καταλιπόντες τοῦ στρατοῦ, τὸ δὲ πλέον ἀφέντες περιετείχιζον τὴν πόλιν κύκλῳ, διελόμενοι κατὰ πόλεις τὸ χωρίον: τάφρος δὲ ἐντός τε ἦν καὶ ἔξωθεν ἐξ ἧς ἐπλινθεύσαντο. [2] καὶ ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἐξείργαστο περὶ ἀρκτούρου ἐπιτολάς, καταλιπόντες φυλακὰς τοῦ ἡμίσεος τείχους [τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ Βοιωτοὶ ἐφύλασσον] ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ στρατῷ καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις. [3] Πλαταιῆς δὲ παῖδας μὲν καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους τε καὶ πλῆθος τὸ ἀχρεῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρότερον ἐκκεκομισμένοι ἦσαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ἐγκαταλελειμμένοι τετρακόσιοι, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὀγδοήκοντα, γυναῖκες δὲ δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν σιτοποιοί. [4] τοσοῦτοι ἦσαν οἱ ξύμπαντες ὅτε ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν καθίσταντο, καὶ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἦν ἐν τῷ τείχει οὔτε δοῦλος οὔτ᾽ ἐλεύθερος. τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ Πλαταιῶν πολιορκία κατεσκευάσθη.

79. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους καὶ ἅμα τῇ τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἐπιστρατείᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι δισχιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἑαυτῶν καὶ

ἱππεῦσι διακοσίοις ἐπεστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης καὶ Βοττιαίους ἀκμάζοντος τοῦ σίτου: ἐστρατήγει δὲ Ξενοφῶν ὁ Εὐριπίδου τρίτος αὐτός. [2] ἐλθόντες δὲ ὑπὸ Σπάρτωλον τὴν Βοττικὴν τὸν σῖτον διέφθειραν. ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ προσχωρήσειν ἡ πόλις ὑπό τινων ἔνδοθεν πρασσόντων. προσπεμψάντων δὲ ἐς Ὄλυνθον τῶν οὐ ταὐτὰ βουλομένων ὁπλῖταί τε ἦλθον καὶ στρατιὰ ἐς φυλακήν: ἧς ἐπεξελθούσης ἐκ τῆς Σπαρτώλου ἐς μάχην καθίστανται οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν ὁπλῖται τῶν Χαλκιδέων καὶ ἐπίκουροί τινες μετ᾽ αὐτῶν νικῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐς τὴν Σπάρτωλον, οἱ δὲ ἱππῆς τῶν Χαλκιδέων καὶ ψιλοὶ νικῶσι τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἱππέας καὶ ψιλούς: [4] εἶχον δέ τινας οὐ πολλοὺς πελταστὰς ἐκ τῆς Κρουσίδος γῆς καλουμένης. ἄρτι δὲ τῆς μάχης γεγενημένης ἐπιβοηθοῦσιν ἄλλοι πελτασταὶ ἐκ τῆς Ὀλύνθου. [5] καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σπαρτώλου ψιλοὶ ὡς εἶδον, θαρσήσαντες τοῖς τε προσγιγνομένοις καὶ ὅτι πρότερον οὐχ ἥσσηντο, ἐπιτίθενται αὖθις μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδέων ἱππέων καὶ τῶν προσβοηθησάντων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις: καὶ ἀναχωροῦσι πρὸς τὰς δύο τάξεις ἃς κατέλιπον παρὰ τοῖς σκευοφόροις. [6] καὶ ὁπότε μὲν ἐπίοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐνεδίδοσαν, ἀναχωροῦσι δ᾽ ἐνέκειντο καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον. οἵ τε ἱππῆς τῶν Χαλκιδέων προσιππεύοντες ᾗ δοκοίη προσέβαλλον, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα φοβήσαντες ἔτρεψαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐπεδίωξαν ἐπὶ πολύ. [7] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν καταφεύγουσι, καὶ ὕστερον τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους κομισάμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀναχωροῦσι τῷ περιόντι τοῦ στρατοῦ: ἀπέθανον δὲ αὐτῶν τριάκοντα καὶ τετρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ πάντες. οἱ δὲ Χαλκιδῆς καὶ Βοττιαῖοι τροπαῖόν τε ἔστησαν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀνελόμενοι διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

80. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους, οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον τούτων, Ἀμπρακιῶται καὶ Χάονες βουλόμενοι Ἀκαρνανίαν τὴν πᾶσαν καταστρέψασθαι καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἀποστῆσαι πείθουσι Λακεδαιμονίους ναυτικόν τε παρασκευάσασθαι ἐκ τῆς ξυμμαχίδος καὶ ὁπλίτας χιλίους πέμψαι ἐπ᾽ Ἀκαρνανίαν,

λέγοντες ὅτι, ἢν ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ἅμα μετὰ σφῶν ἔλθωσιν, ἀδυνάτων ὄντων ξυμβοηθεῖν τῶν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης Ἀκαρνάνων ῥᾳδίως Ἀκαρνανίαν σχόντες καὶ τῆς Ζακύνθου καὶ Κεφαλληνίας κρατήσουσι, καὶ ὁ περίπλους οὐκέτι ἔσοιτο Ἀθηναίοις ὁμοίως περὶ Πελοπόννησον: ἐλπίδα δ᾽ εἶναι καὶ Ναύπακτον λαβεῖν. [2] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πεισθέντες Κνῆμον μὲν ναύαρχον ἔτι ὄντα καὶ τοὺς ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ ναυσὶν ὀλίγαις εὐθὺς πέμπουσι, τῷ δὲ ναυτικῷ περιήγγειλαν παρασκευασαμένῳ ὡς τάχιστα πλεῖν ἐς Λευκάδα. [3] ἦσαν δὲ Κορίνθιοι ξυμπροθυμούμενοι μάλιστα τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ἀποίκοις οὖσιν. καὶ τὸ μὲν ναυτικὸν ἔκ τε Κορίνθου καὶ Σικυῶνος καὶ τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ Λευκάδος καὶ Ἀνακτορίου καὶ Ἀμπρακίας πρότερον ἀφικόμενον ἐν Λευκάδι περιέμενεν. [4] Κνῆμος δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ χίλιοι ὁπλῖται ἐπειδὴ ἐπεραιώθησαν λαθόντες Φορμίωνα, ὃς ἦρχε τῶν εἴκοσι νεῶν τῶν Ἀττικῶν αἳ περὶ Ναύπακτον ἐφρούρουν, εὐθὺς παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν κατὰ γῆν στρατείαν. [5] καὶ αὐτῷ παρῆσαν Ἑλλήνων μὲν Ἀμπρακιῶται καὶ Λευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀνακτόριοι καὶ οὓς αὐτὸς ἔχων ἦλθε χίλιοι Πελοποννησίων, βάρβαροι δὲ Χάονες χίλιοι ἀβασίλευτοι, ὧν ἡγοῦντο ἐπετησίῳ προστατείᾳ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους Φώτιος καὶ Νικάνωρ. ξυνεστρατεύοντο δὲ μετὰ Χαόνων καὶ Θεσπρωτοὶ ἀβασίλευτοι. [6] Μολοσσοὺς δὲ ἦγε καὶ Ἀτιντᾶνας Σαβύλινθος ἐπίτροπος ὢν Θάρυπος τοῦ βασιλέως ἔτι παιδὸς ὄντος, καὶ Παραυαίους Ὄροιδος βασιλεύων. Ὀρέσται δὲ χίλιοι, ὧν ἐβασίλευεν Ἀντίοχος, μετὰ Παραυαίων ξυνεστρατεύοντο Ὀροίδῳ Ἀντιόχου ἐπιτρέψαντος. [7] ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων χιλίους Μακεδόνων, οἳ ὕστερον ἦλθον. [8] τούτῳ τῷ στρατῷ ἐπορεύετο Κνῆμος οὐ περιμείνας τὸ ἀπὸ Κορίνθου ναυτικόν, καὶ διὰ τῆς Ἀργείας ἰόντες Λιμναίαν, κώμην ἀτείχιστον, ἐπόρθησαν. ἀφικνοῦνταί τε ἐπὶ Στράτον, πόλιν μεγίστην τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας, νομίζοντες, εἰ ταύτην πρώτην λάβοιεν, ῥᾳδίως σφίσι τἆλλα προσχωρήσειν.

81. Ἀκαρνᾶνες δὲ αἰσθόμενοι κατά τε γῆν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἐσβεβληκυῖαν ἔκ τε θαλάσσης ναυσὶν ἅμα τοὺς

πολεμίους παρεσομένους, οὔτε ξυνεβοήθουν ἐφύλασσόν τε τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι, παρά τε Φορμίωνα ἔπεμπον κελεύοντες ἀμύνειν: ὁ δὲ ἀδύνατος ἔφη εἶναι ναυτικοῦ ἐκ Κορίνθου μέλλοντος ἐκπλεῖν Ναύπακτον ἐρήμην ἀπολιπεῖν. [2] οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τρία τέλη ποιήσαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐχώρουν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Στρατίων πόλιν, ὅπως ἐγγὺς στρατοπεδευσάμενοι, εἰ μὴ λόγοις πείθοιεν, ἔργῳ πειρῷντο τοῦ τείχους. [3] καὶ μέσον μὲν ἔχοντες προσῇσαν Χάονες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι βάρβαροι, ἐκ δεξιᾶς δ᾽ αὐτῶν Λευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀνακτόριοι καὶ οἱ μετὰ τούτων, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δὲ Κνῆμος καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται: διεῖχον δὲ πολὺ ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε οὐδὲ ἑωρῶντο. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες τεταγμένοι τε προσῇσαν καὶ διὰ φυλακῆς ἔχοντες, ἕως ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἐν ἐπιτηδείῳ: οἱ δὲ Χάονες σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς πιστεύοντες καὶ ἀξιούμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκείνῃ ἠπειρωτῶν μαχιμώτατοι εἶναι οὔτε ἐπέσχον τὸ στρατόπεδον καταλαβεῖν, χωρήσαντές τε ῥύμῃ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων βαρβάρων ἐνόμισαν αὐτοβοεὶ ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἑλεῖν καὶ αὐτῶν τὸ ἔργον γενέσθαι. [5] γνόντες δ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ Στράτιοι ἔτι προσιόντας καὶ ἡγησάμενοι, μεμονωμένων εἰ κρατήσειαν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι σφίσι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὁμοίως προσελθεῖν, προλοχίζουσι δὴ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐνέδραις, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ἦσαν, ἔκ τε τῆς πόλεως ὁμόσε χωρήσαντες καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεδρῶν προσπίπτουσιν. [6] καὶ ἐς φόβον καταστάντων διαφθείρονταί τε πολλοὶ τῶν Χαόνων, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι βάρβαροι ὡς εἶδον αὐτοὺς ἐνδόντας, οὐκέτι ὑπέμειναν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν. [7] τῶν δὲ Ἑλληνικῶν στρατοπέδων οὐδέτερον ᾔσθετο τῆς μάχης διὰ τὸ πολὺ προελθεῖν αὐτοὺς καὶ στρατόπεδον οἰηθῆναι καταληψομένους ἐπείγεσθαι. [8] ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐνέκειντο φεύγοντες οἱ βάρβαροι, ἀνελάμβανόν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ξυναγαγόντες τὰ στρατόπεδα ἡσύχαζον αὐτοῦ τὴν ἡμέραν, ἐς χεῖρας μὲν οὐκ ἰόντων σφίσι τῶν Στρατίων διὰ τὸ μήπω τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀκαρνᾶνας ξυμβεβοηθηκέναι, ἄπωθεν δὲ σφενδονώντων καὶ ἐς ἀπορίαν καθιστάντων: οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ ὅπλων κινηθῆναι. δοκοῦσι δὲ οἱ Ἀκαρνᾶνες κράτιστοι εἶναι τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

82. ἐπειδὴ δὲ νὺξ ἐγένετο, ἀναχωρήσας ὁ Κνῆμος τῇ στρατιᾷ κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄναπον ποταμόν, ὃς ἀπέχει σταδίους ὀγδοήκοντα Στράτου, τούς τε νεκροὺς κομίζεται τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ὑποσπόνδους, καὶ Οἰνιαδῶν ξυμπαραγενομένων κατὰ φιλίαν ἀναχωρεῖ παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς πρὶν τὴν ξυμβοήθειαν ἐλθεῖν. κἀκεῖθεν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀπῆλθον ἕκαστοι. οἱ δὲ Στράτιοι τροπαῖον ἔστησαν τῆς μάχης τῆς πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους.

83. τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου ναυτικόν, ὃ ἔδει παραγενέσθαι τῷ Κνήμῳ, ὅπως μὴ ξυμβοηθῶσιν οἱ ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἄνω Ἀκαρνᾶνες, οὐ παραγίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἠναγκάσθησαν περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας τῆς ἐν Στράτῳ μάχης ναυμαχῆσαι πρὸς Φορμίωνα καὶ τὰς εἴκοσι ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἳ ἐφρούρουν ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ. [2] ὁ γὰρ Φορμίων παραπλέοντας αὐτοὺς ἔξω τοῦ κόλπου ἐτήρει, βουλόμενος ἐν τῇ εὐρυχωρίᾳ ἐπιθέσθαι. [3] οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔπλεον μὲν οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίᾳ, ἀλλὰ στρατιωτικώτερον παρεσκευασμένοι ἐς τὴν Ἀκαρνανίαν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἑπτὰ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς τὰς σφετέρας τολμῆσαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἴκοσι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ναυμαχίαν ποιήσασθαι: ἐπειδὴ μέντοι ἀντιπαραπλέοντάς τε ἑώρων αὐτούς, παρὰ γῆν σφῶν κομιζομένων, καὶ ἐκ Πατρῶν τῆς Ἀχαΐας πρὸς τὴν ἀντιπέρας ἤπειρον διαβάλλοντες ἐπ᾽ Ἀκαρνανίας κατεῖδον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Εὐήνου ποταμοῦ προσπλέοντας σφίσι καὶ οὐκ ἔλαθον νυκτὸς ἀφορμισάμενοι, οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκάζονται ναυμαχεῖν κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν. [4] στρατηγοὶ δὲ ἦσαν μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἑκάστων οἳ παρεσκευάζοντο, Κορινθίων δὲ Μαχάων καὶ Ἰσοκράτης καὶ Ἀγαθαρχίδας. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν Πελοποννήσιοι ἐτάξαντο κύκλον τῶν νεῶν ὡς μέγιστον οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν μὴ διδόντες διέκπλουν, τὰς πρῴρας μὲν ἔξω, ἔσω δὲ τὰς πρύμνας, καὶ τά τε λεπτὰ πλοῖα ἃ ξυνέπλει ἐντὸς ποιοῦνται καὶ πέντε ναῦς τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως ἐκπλέοιεν διὰ βραχέος παραγιγνόμενοι, εἴ πῃ προσπίπτοιεν οἱ ἐναντίοι.

84. οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ μίαν ναῦν τεταγμένοι περιέπλεον αὐτοὺς κύκλῳ καὶ ξυνῆγον ἐς ὀλίγον, ἐν χρῷ αἰεὶ

παραπλέοντες καὶ δόκησιν παρέχοντες αὐτίκα ἐμβαλεῖν: προείρητο δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ Φορμίωνος μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸς σημήνῃ. [2] ἤλπιζε γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐ μενεῖν τὴν τάξιν, ὥσπερ ἐν γῇ πεζήν, ἀλλὰ ξυμπεσεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ταραχὴν παρέξειν, εἴ τ᾽ ἐκπνεύσειεν ἐκ τοῦ κόλπου τὸ πνεῦμα, ὅπερ ἀναμένων τε περιέπλει καὶ εἰώθει γίγνεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἕω, οὐδένα χρόνον ἡσυχάσειν αὐτούς: καὶ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, ὁπόταν βούληται, τῶν νεῶν ἄμεινον πλεουσῶν, καὶ τότε καλλίστην γίγνεσθαι. [3] ὡς δὲ τό τε πνεῦμα κατῄει καὶ αἱ νῆες ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἤδη οὖσαι ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ τε ἀνέμου τῶν τε πλοίων, ἅμα προσκειμένων ἐταράσσοντο, καὶ ναῦς τε νηὶ προσέπιπτε καὶ τοῖς κοντοῖς διεωθοῦντο, βοῇ τε χρώμενοι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀντιφυλακῇ τε καὶ λοιδορίᾳ οὐδὲν κατήκουον οὔτε τῶν παραγγελλομένων οὔτε τῶν κελευστῶν, καὶ τὰς κώπας ἀδύνατοι ὄντες ἐν κλύδωνι ἀναφέρειν ἄνθρωποι ἄπειροι τοῖς κυβερνήταις ἀπειθεστέρας τὰς ναῦς παρεῖχον, τότε δὴ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον σημαίνει, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προσπεσόντες πρῶτον μὲν καταδύουσι τῶν στρατηγίδων νεῶν μίαν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ᾗ χωρήσειαν διέφθειρον, καὶ κατέστησαν ἐς ἀλκὴν μὲν μηδένα τρέπεσθαι αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ταραχῆς, φεύγειν δὲ ἐς Πάτρας καὶ Δύμην τῆς Ἀχαΐας. [4] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καταδιώξαντες καὶ ναῦς δώδεκα λαβόντες τούς τε ἄνδρας ἐξ αὐτῶν τοὺς πλείστους ἀνελόμενοι ἐς Μολύκρειον ἀπέπλεον, καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ῥίῳ καὶ ναῦν ἀναθέντες τῷ Ποσειδῶνι ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς Ναύπακτον. [5] παρέπλευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι εὐθὺς ταῖς περιλοίποις τῶν νεῶν ἐκ τῆς Δύμης καὶ Πατρῶν ἐς Κυλλήνην τὸ Ἠλείων ἐπίνειον: καὶ ἀπὸ Λευκάδος Κνῆμος καὶ αἱ ἐκείνων νῆες, ἃς ἔδει ταύταις ξυμμεῖξαι, ἀφικνοῦνται μετὰ τὴν ἐν Στράτῳ μάχην ἐς τὴν Κυλλήνην.

85. πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῷ Κνήμῳ ξυμβούλους ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς Τιμοκράτη καὶ Βρασίδαν καὶ Λυκόφρονα, κελεύοντες ἄλλην ναυμαχίαν βελτίω παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὑπ᾽ ὀλίγων νεῶν εἴργεσθαι τῆς

θαλάσσης. [2] ἐδόκει γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως τε καὶ πρῶτον ναυμαχίας πειρασαμένοις πολὺς ὁ παράλογος εἶναι, καὶ οὐ τοσούτῳ ᾤοντο σφῶν τὸ ναυτικὸν λείπεσθαι, γεγενῆσθαι δέ τινα μαλακίαν, οὐκ ἀντιτιθέντες τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐμπειρίαν τῆς σφετέρας δι᾽ ὀλίγου μελέτης. ὀργῇ οὖν ἀπέστελλον. [3] οἱ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ Κνήμου ναῦς τε προσπεριήγγειλαν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ τὰς προϋπαρχούσας ἐξηρτύοντο ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν. [4] πέμπει δὲ καὶ ὁ Φορμίων ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας τήν τε παρασκευὴν αὐτῶν ἀγγελοῦντας καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἣν ἐνίκησαν φράσοντας, καὶ κελεύων αὐτῷ ναῦς ὅτι πλείστας διὰ τάχους ἀποστεῖλαι, ὡς καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἑκάστην ἐλπίδος οὔσης αἰεὶ ναυμαχήσειν. [5] οἱ δὲ ἀποπέμπουσιν εἴκοσι ναῦς αὐτῷ, τῷ δὲ κομίζοντι αὐτὰς προσεπέστειλαν ἐς Κρήτην πρῶτον ἀφικέσθαι. Νικίας γὰρ Κρὴς Γορτύνιος πρόξενος ὢν πείθει αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Κυδωνίαν πλεῦσαι, φάσκων προσποιήσειν αὐτὴν οὖσαν πολεμίαν: ἐπῆγε δὲ Πολιχνίταις χαριζόμενος ὁμόροις τῶν Κυδωνιατῶν. [6] καὶ ὁ μὲν λαβὼν τὰς ναῦς ᾤχετο ἐς Κρήτην, καὶ μετὰ τῶν Πολιχνιτῶν ἐδῄου τὴν γῆν τῶν Κυδωνιατῶν, καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἀνέμων καὶ ἀπλοίας ἐνδιέτριψεν οὐκ ὀλίγον χρόνον:

86. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Κυλλήνῃ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐν τούτῳ ἐν ᾧ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ Κρήτην κατείχοντο, παρεσκευασμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν παρέπλευσαν ἐς Πάνορμον τὸν Ἀχαϊκόν, οὗπερ αὐτοῖς ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς τῶν Πελοποννησίων προσεβεβοηθήκει. [2] παρέπλευσε δὲ καὶ ὁ Φορμίων ἐπὶ τὸ Ῥίον τὸ Μολυκρικὸν καὶ ὡρμίσατο ἔξω αὐτοῦ ναυσὶν εἴκοσιν, αἷσπερ καὶ ἐναυμάχησεν. [3] ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ Ῥίον φίλιον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον Ῥίον ἐστὶν ἀντιπέρας, τὸ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ: διέχετον δὲ ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων σταδίους μάλιστα ἑπτὰ τῆς θαλάσσης, τοῦ δὲ Κρισαίου κόλπου στόμα τοῦτό ἐστιν. [4] ἐπὶ οὖν τῷ Ῥίῳ τῷ Ἀχαϊκῷ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἀπέχοντι οὐ πολὺ τοῦ Πανόρμου, ἐν ᾧ αὐτοῖς ὁ πεζὸς ἦν, ὡρμίσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ναυσὶν ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἶδον. [5] καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ἓξ ἢ ἑπτὰ ἡμέρας ἀνθώρμουν ἀλλήλοις μελετῶντές τε καὶ παρασκευαζόμενοι τὴν ναυμαχίαν, γνώμην ἔχοντες οἱ μὲν μὴ ἐκπλεῖν ἔξω τῶν

Ῥίων ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, φοβούμενοι τὸ πρότερον πάθος, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐσπλεῖν ἐς τὰ στενά, νομίζοντες πρὸς ἐκείνων εἶναι τὴν ἐν ὀλίγῳ ναυμαχίαν. [6] ἔπειτα ὁ Κνῆμος καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν Πελοποννησίων στρατηγοί, βουλόμενοι ἐν τάχει τὴν ναυμαχίαν ποιῆσαι πρίν τι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβοηθῆσαι, ξυνεκάλεσαν τοὺς στρατιώτας πρῶτον, καὶ ὁρῶντες αὐτῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς διὰ τὴν προτέραν ἧσσαν φοβουμένους καὶ οὐ προθύμους ὄντας παρεκελεύσαντο καὶ ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.

87. ‘ἡ μὲν γενομένη ναυμαχία, ὦ ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, εἴ τις ἄρα δι᾽ αὐτὴν ὑμῶν φοβεῖται τὴν μέλλουσαν, οὐχὶ δικαίαν ἔχει τέκμαρσιν τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι. [2] τῇ τε γὰρ παρασκευῇ ἐνδεὴς ἐγένετο, ὥσπερ ἴστε, καὶ οὐχὶ ἐς ναυμαχίαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐπλέομεν: ξυνέβη δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης οὐκ ὀλίγα ἐναντιωθῆναι, καί πού τι καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία πρῶτον ναυμαχοῦντας ἔσφηλεν. [3] ὥστε οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν κακίαν τὸ ἡσσᾶσθαι προσεγένετο, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τῆς γνώμης τὸ μὴ κατὰ κράτος νικηθέν, ἔχον δέ τινα ἐν αὑτῷ ἀντιλογίαν, τῆς γε ξυμφορᾶς τῷ ἀποβάντι ἀμβλύνεσθαι, νομίσαι δὲ ταῖς μὲν τύχαις ἐνδέχεσθαι σφάλλεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους,ταῖς δὲ γνώμαις τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ ὀρθῶς ἀνδρείους εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἀνδρείου παρόντος προβαλλομένους εἰκότως ἂν ἔν τινι κακοὺς γενέσθαι. [4] ὑμῶν δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἀπειρία τοσοῦτον λείπεται ὅσον τόλμῃ προύχετε: τῶνδε δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἢν μάλιστα φοβεῖσθε, ἀνδρείαν μὲν ἔχουσα καὶ μνήμην ἕξει ἐν τῷ δεινῷ ἐπιτελεῖν ἃ ἔμαθεν, ἄνευ δὲ εὐψυχίας οὐδεμία τέχνη πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους ἰσχύει. φόβος γὰρ μνήμην ἐκπλήσσει, τέχνη δὲ ἄνευ ἀλκῆς οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ. [5] πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐμπειρότερον αὐτῶν τὸ τολμηρότερον ἀντιτάξασθε, πρὸς δὲ τὸ διὰ τὴν ἧσσαν δεδιέναι τὸ ἀπαράσκευοι τότε τυχεῖν. [6] περιγίγνεται δὲ ὑμῖν πλῆθός τε νεῶν καὶ πρὸς τῇ γῇ οἰκείᾳ οὔσῃ ὁπλιτῶν παρόντων ναυμαχεῖν: τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τῶν πλεόνων καὶ ἄμεινον παρεσκευασμένων τὸ κράτος ἐστίν. [7] ὥστε οὐδὲ καθ᾽ ἓν εὑρίσκομεν εἰκότως ἂν ἡμᾶς σφαλλομένους: καὶ ὅσα ἡμάρτομεν πρότερον, νῦν αὐτὰ

ταῦτα προσγενόμενα διδασκαλίαν παρέξει. [8] θαρσοῦντες οὖν καὶ κυβερνῆται καὶ ναῦται τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος ἔπεσθε, χώραν μὴ προλείποντες ᾗ ἄν τις προσταχθῇ. [9] τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἡγεμόνων οὐ χεῖρον τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμεῖς παρασκευάσομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδώσομεν πρόφασιν οὐδενὶ κακῷ γενέσθαι: ἢν δέ τις ἄρα καὶ βουληθῇ, κολασθήσεται τῇ πρεπούσῃ ζημίᾳ, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τιμήσονται τοῖς προσήκουσιν ἄθλοις τῆς ἀρετῆς.’

88. τοιαῦτα μὲν τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεκελεύσαντο. ὁ δὲ Φορμίων δεδιὼς καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὀρρωδίαν καὶ αἰσθόμενος ὅτι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεῶν κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ξυνιστάμενοι ἐφοβοῦντο, ἐβούλετο ξυγκαλέσας θαρσῦναί τε καὶ παραίνεσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ποιήσασθαι. [2] πρότερον μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ αὐτοῖς ἔλεγε καὶ προπαρεσκεύαζε τὰς γνώμας ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς πλῆθος νεῶν τοσοῦτον, ἢν ἐπιπλέῃ, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπομενετέον ἐστί, καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀξίωσιν ταύτην εἰλήφεσαν, μηδένα ὄχλον Ἀθηναῖοι ὄντες Πελοποννησίων νεῶν ὑποχωρεῖν: [3] τότε δὲ πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ὄψιν ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς ἀθυμοῦντας ἐβούλετο ὑπόμνησιν ποιήσασθαι τοῦ θαρσεῖν, καὶ ξυγκαλέσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

89. ‘ὁρῶν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες στρατιῶται, πεφοβημένους τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων ξυνεκάλεσα, οὐκ ἀξιῶν τὰ μὴ δεινὰ ἐν ὀρρωδίᾳ ἔχειν. [2] οὗτοι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ προνενικῆσθαι καὶ μηδ᾽ αὐτοὶ οἴεσθαι ὁμοῖοι ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου παρεσκευάσαντο: ἔπειτα ᾧ μάλιστα πιστεύοντες προσέρχονται, ὡς προσῆκον σφίσιν ἀνδρείοις εἶναι, οὐ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι θαρσοῦσιν ἢ διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ πεζῷ ἐμπειρίαν τὰ πλείω κατορθοῦντες, καὶ οἴονται σφίσι καὶ ἐν τῷ ναυτικῷ ποιήσειν τὸ αὐτό. [3] τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου ἡμῖν μᾶλλον νῦν περιέσται, εἴπερ καὶ τούτοις ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἐπεὶ εὐψυχίᾳ γε οὐδὲν προφέρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἑκάτεροί τι εἶναι ἐμπειρότεροι θρασύτεροί ἐσμεν. [4] Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε ἡγούμενοι αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν σφετέραν δόξαν ἄκοντας προσάγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐς τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐνεχείρησαν ἡσσηθέντες παρὰ πολὺ αὖθις ναυμαχεῖν. [5] μὴ

δὴ αὐτῶν τὴν τόλμαν δείσητε. πολὺ δὲ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνοις πλείω φόβον παρέχετε καὶ πιστότερον κατά τε τὸ προνενικηκέναι καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῦνται μὴ μέλλοντάς τι ἄξιον τοῦ παρὰ πολὺ πράξειν ἀνθίστασθαι ὑμᾶς. [6] ἀντίπαλοι μὲν γὰρ οἱ πλείους, ὥσπερ οὗτοι, τῇ δυνάμει τὸ πλέον πίσυνοι ἢ τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπέρχονται: οἱ δὲ ἐκ πολλῷ ὑποδεεστέρων, καὶ ἅμα οὐκ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, μέγα τι τῆς διανοίας τὸ βέβαιον ἔχοντες ἀντιτολμῶσιν. ἃ λογιζόμενοι οὗτοι τῷ οὐκ εἰκότι πλέον πεφόβηνται ἡμᾶς ἢ τῇ κατὰ λόγον παρασκευῇ. [7] πολλὰ δὲ καὶ στρατόπεδα ἤδη ἔπεσεν ὑπ᾽ ἐλασσόνων τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ, ἔστι δὲ ἃ καὶ τῇ ἀτολμίᾳ: ὧν οὐδετέρου ἡμεῖς νῦν μετέχομεν. [8] τὸν δὲ ἀγῶνα οὐκ ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ ἑκὼν εἶναι ποιήσομαι οὐδ᾽ ἐσπλεύσομαι ἐς αὐτόν. ὁρῶ γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς πολλὰς ναῦς ἀνεπιστήμονας ὀλίγαις ναυσὶν ἐμπείροις καὶ ἄμεινον πλεούσαις ἡ στενοχωρία οὐ ξυμφέρει. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἐπιπλεύσειέ τις ὡς χρὴ ἐς ἐμβολήν, μὴ ἔχων τὴν πρόσοψιν τῶν πολεμίων ἐκ πολλοῦ, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἀποχωρήσειεν ἐν δέοντι πιεζόμενος: διέκπλοι τε οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδ᾽ ἀναστροφαί, ἅπερ νεῶν ἄμεινον πλεουσῶν ἔργα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη ἂν εἴη τὴν ναυμαχίαν πεζομαχίαν καθίστασθαι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ αἱ πλείους νῆες κρείσσους γίγνονται. [9] τούτων μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἔξω τὴν πρόνοιαν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: ὑμεῖς δὲ εὔτακτοι παρὰ ταῖς ναυσὶ μένοντες τά τε παραγγελλόμενα ὀξέως δέχεσθε, ἄλλως τε καὶ δι᾽ ὀλίγου τῆς ἐφορμήσεως οὔσης, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ κόσμον καὶ σιγὴν περὶ πλείστου ἡγεῖσθε, ὃ ἔς τε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολεμίων ξυμφέρει καὶ ναυμαχίᾳ οὐχ ἥκιστα, ἀμύνεσθέ τε τούσδε ἀξίως τῶν προειργασμένων. [10] ὁ δὲ ἀγὼν μέγας ὑμῖν, ἢ καταλῦσαι Πελοποννησίων τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἢ ἐγγυτέρω καταστῆσαι Ἀθηναίοις τὸν φόβον περὶ τῆς θαλάσσης. [11] ἀναμιμνήσκω δ᾽ αὖ ὑμᾶς ὅτι νενικήκατε αὐτῶν τοὺς πολλούς: ἠσσημένων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν αἱ γνῶμαι πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς κινδύνους ὁμοῖαι εἶναι.’

90. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ὁ Φορμίων παρεκελεύσατο. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενά, βουλόμενοι ἄκοντας ἔσω

προαγαγεῖν αὐτούς, ἀναγαγόμενοι ἅμα ἕῳ ἔπλεον, ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξιῷ κέρᾳ ἡγουμένῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὥρμουν: [2] ἐπὶ δ᾽ αὐτῷ εἴκοσιν ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτῃ παραπλέοι, μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, ἀλλ᾽ αὖται αἱ νῆες περικλῄσειαν. [3] ὁ δέ, ὅπερ ἐκεῖνοι προσεδέχοντο, φοβηθεὶς περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ ὄντι, ὡς ἑώρα ἀναγομένους αὐτούς, ἄκων καὶ κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐμβιβάσας ἔπλει παρὰ τὴν γῆν: καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα τῶν Μεσσηνίων παρεβοήθει. [4] ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι κατὰ μίαν ἐπὶ κέρως παραπλέοντας καὶ ἤδη ὄντας ἐντὸς τοῦ κόλπου τε καὶ πρὸς τῇ γῇ, ὅπερ ἐβούλοντο μάλιστα, ἀπὸ σημείου ἑνὸς ἄφνω ἐπιστρέψαντες τὰς ναῦς μετωπηδὸν ἔπλεον, ὡς εἶχε τάχους ἕκαστος, ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἤλπιζον πάσας τὰς ναῦς ἀπολήψεσθαι. [5] τῶν δὲ ἔνδεκα μέν τινες αἵπερ ἡγοῦντο ὑπεκφεύγουσι τὸ κέρας τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν: τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας ἐπικαταλαβόντες ἐξέωσάν τε πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὑποφευγούσας καὶ διέφθειραν, ἄνδρας τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπέκτειναν ὅσοι μὴ ἐξένευσαν αὐτῶν. [6] καὶ τῶν νεῶν τινὰς ἀναδούμενοι εἷλκον κενάς μίαν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἷλον ἤδη , τὰς δέ τινας οἱ Μεσσήνιοι παραβοηθήσαντες καὶ ἐπεσβαίνοντες ξὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐπιβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων μαχόμενοι ἀφείλοντο ἑλκομένας ἤδη.

91. ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐκράτουν τε καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναῦς: αἱ δὲ εἴκοσι νῆες αὐτῶν αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως ἐδίωκον τὰς ἔνδεκα ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἵπερ ὑπεξέφυγον τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν. καὶ φθάνουσιν αὐτοὺς πλὴν μιᾶς νεὼς προκαταφυγοῦσαι ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον, καὶ σχοῦσαι ἀντίπρῳροι κατὰ τὸ Ἀπολλώνιον παρεσκευάζοντο ἀμυνούμενοι, ἢν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐπὶ σφᾶς πλέωσιν. [2] οἱ δὲ παραγενόμενοι ὕστερον ἐπαιάνιζόν τε ἅμα πλέοντες ὡς

νενικηκότες, καὶ τὴν μίαν ναῦν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὴν ὑπόλοιπον ἐδίωκε Λευκαδία ναῦς μία πολὺ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων. [3] ἔτυχε δὲ ὁλκὰς ὁρμοῦσα μετέωρος, περὶ ἣν ἡ Ἀττικὴ ναῦς φθάσασα καὶ περιπλεύσασα τῇ Λευκαδίᾳ διωκούσῃ ἐμβάλλει μέσῃ καὶ καταδύει. [4] τοῖς μὲν οὖν Πελοποννησίοις γενομένου τούτου ἀπροσδοκήτου τε καὶ παρὰ λόγον φόβος ἐμπίπτει, καὶ ἅμα ἀτάκτως διώκοντες διὰ τὸ κρατεῖν αἱ μέν τινες τῶν νεῶν καθεῖσαι τὰς κώπας ἐπέστησαν τοῦ πλοῦ, ἀξύμφορον δρῶντες πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ὀλίγου ἀντεφόρμησιν, βουλόμενοι τὰς πλείους περιμεῖναι, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς βράχεα ἀπειρίᾳ χωρίων ὤκειλαν.

92. τοὺς δ᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἰδόντας ταῦτα γιγνόμενα θάρσος τε ἔλαβε, καὶ ἀπὸ ἑνὸς κελεύσματος ἐμβοήσαντες ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὥρμησαν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀταξίαν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον ὑπέμειναν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐτράποντο ἐς τὸν Πάνορμον, ὅθενπερ ἀνηγάγοντο. [2] ἐπιδιώκοντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τάς τε ἐγγὺς οὔσας μάλιστα ναῦς ἔλαβον ἓξ καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀφείλοντο, ἃς ἐκεῖνοι πρὸς τῇ γῇ διαφθείραντες τὸ πρῶτον ἀνεδήσαντο: ἄνδρας τε τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τινὰς δὲ καὶ ἐζώγρησαν. [3] ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Λευκαδίας νεώς, ἣ περὶ τὴν ὁλκάδα κατέδυ, Τιμοκράτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος πλέων, ὡς ἡ ναῦς διεφθείρετο, ἔσφαξεν ἑαυτόν, καὶ ἐξέπεσεν ἐς τὸν Ναυπακτίων λιμένα. [4] ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖον ἔστησαν, ὅθεν ἀναγαγόμενοι ἐκράτησαν, καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τὰ ναυάγια ὅσα πρὸς τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἦν ἀνείλοντο, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τὰ ἐκείνων ὑπόσπονδα ἀπέδοσαν. [5] ἔστησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τροπαῖον ὡς νενικηκότες τῆς τροπῆς, ἃς πρὸς τῇ γῇ διέφθειραν ναῦς: καὶ ἥνπερ ἔλαβον ναῦν, ἀνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Ῥίον τὸ Ἀχαϊκὸν παρὰ τὸ τροπαῖον. [6] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα φοβούμενοι τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν ὑπὸ νύκτα ἐσέπλευσαν ἐς τὸν κόλπον τὸν Κρισαῖον καὶ Κόρινθον ἅπαντες πλὴν Λευκαδίων. [7] καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Κρήτης Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσίν, αἷς ἔδει πρὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας τῷ Φορμίωνι παραγενέσθαι, οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως

τῶν νεῶν ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

93. πρὶν δὲ διαλῦσαι τὸ ἐς Κόρινθόν τε καὶ τὸν Κρισαῖον κόλπον ἀναχωρῆσαν ναυτικόν, ὁ Κνῆμος καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄρχοντες τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἀρχομένου τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐβούλοντο διδαξάντων Μεγαρέων ἀποπειρᾶσαι τοῦ Πειραιῶς τοῦ λιμένος τῶν Ἀθηναίων: ἦν δὲ ἀφύλακτος καὶ ἄκλητος εἰκότως διὰ τὸ ἐπικρατεῖν πολὺ τῷ ναυτικῷ. [2] ἐδόκει δὲ λαβόντα τῶν ναυτῶν ἕκαστον τὴν κώπην καὶ τὸ ὑπηρέσιον καὶ τὸν τροπωτῆρα πεζῇ ἰέναι ἐκ Κορίνθου ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἀθήνας θάλασσαν καὶ ἀφικομένους κατὰ τάχος ἐς Μέγαρα καθελκύσαντας ἐκ Νισαίας τοῦ νεωρίου αὐτῶν τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς, αἳ ἔτυχον αὐτόθι οὖσαι, πλεῦσαι εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ: [3] οὔτε γὰρ ναυτικὸν ἦν προφυλάσσον ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδὲν οὔτε προσδοκία οὐδεμία μὴ ἄν ποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐξαπιναίως οὕτως ἐπιπλεύσειαν, ἐπεὶ οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς τολμῆσαι ἂν καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν, οὐδ᾽ εἰ διενοοῦντο, μὴ οὐκ ἂν προαισθέσθαι. [4] ὡς δὲ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐχώρουν εὐθύς: καὶ ἀφικόμενοι νυκτὸς καὶ καθελκύσαντες ἐκ τῆς Νισαίας τὰς ναῦς ἔπλεον ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Πειραιᾶ οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ διενοοῦντο, καταδείσαντες τὸν κίνδυνον καί τις καὶ ἄνεμος αὐτοὺς λέγεται κωλῦσαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Σαλαμῖνος τὸ ἀκρωτήριον τὸ πρὸς Μέγαρα ὁρῶν: καὶ φρούριον ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἦν καὶ νεῶν τριῶν φυλακὴ τοῦ μὴ ἐσπλεῖν Μεγαρεῦσι μηδὲ ἐκπλεῖν μηδέν. τῷ τε φρουρίῳ προσέβαλον καὶ τὰς τριήρεις ἀφείλκυσαν κενάς, τήν τε ἄλλην Σαλαμῖνα ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἐπιπεσόντες ἐπόρθουν.

94. ἐς δὲ τὰς Ἀθήνας φρυκτοί τε ᾔροντο πολέμιοι καὶ ἔκπληξις ἐγένετο οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐλάσσων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ᾤοντο τοὺς πολεμίους ἐσπεπλευκέναι ἤδη, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ τήν τε Σαλαμῖνα ᾑρῆσθαι καὶ παρὰ σφᾶς ὅσον οὐκ ἐσπλεῖν αὐτούς: ὅπερ ἄν, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν μὴ κατοκνῆσαι, ῥᾳδίως ἐγένετο, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄνεμος ἐκώλυσεν. [2] βοηθήσαντες δὲ ἅμ᾽ ἡμέρᾳ πανδημεὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ναῦς τε καθεῖλκον καὶ ἐσβάντες κατὰ σπουδὴν καὶ πολλῷ θορύβῳ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶν

ἐπὶ τὴν Σαλαμῖνα ἔπλεον, τῷ πεζῷ δὲ φυλακὰς τοῦ Πειραιῶς καθίσταντο. [3] οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ὡς ᾔσθοντο τὴν βοήθειαν, καταδραμόντες τῆς Σαλαμῖνος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λείαν λαβόντες καὶ τὰς τρεῖς ναῦς ἐκ τοῦ Βουδόρου τοῦ φρουρίου κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τῆς Νισαίας ἀπέπλεον: ἔστι γὰρ ὅτι καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτοὺς διὰ χρόνου καθελκυσθεῖσαι καὶ οὐδὲν στέγουσαι ἐφόβουν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς τὰ Μέγαρα πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς Κορίνθου ἀπεχώρησαν πεζῇ: [4] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι καταλαβόντες πρὸς τῇ Σαλαμῖνι ἀπέπλευσαν καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο φυλακὴν ἤδη τοῦ Πειραιῶς μᾶλλον τὸ λοιπὸν ἐποιοῦντο λιμένων τε κλῄσει καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπιμελείᾳ.

95. ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους, τοῦ χειμῶνος τούτου ἀρχομένου, Σιτάλκης ὁ Τήρεω Ὀδρύσης Θρᾳκῶν βασιλεὺς ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Περδίκκαν τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου Μακεδονίας βασιλέα καὶ ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, δύο ὑποσχέσεις τὴν μὲν βουλόμενος ἀναπρᾶξαι, τὴν δὲ αὐτὸς ἀποδοῦναι. [2] ὅ τε γὰρ Περδίκκας αὐτῷ ὑποσχόμενος, εἰ Ἀθηναίοις τε διαλλάξειεν ἑαυτὸν κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τῷ πολέμῳ πιεζόμενον καὶ Φίλιππον τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ πολέμιον ὄντα μὴ καταγάγοι ἐπὶ βασιλείᾳ, ἃ ὑπεδέξατο οὐκ ἐπετέλει: τοῖς τε Ἀθηναίοις αὐτὸς ὡμολογήκει, ὅτε τὴν ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιεῖτο, τὸν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης Χαλκιδικὸν πόλεμον καταλύσειν. [3] ἀμφοτέρων οὖν ἕνεκα τὴν ἔφοδον ἐποιεῖτο καὶ τόν τε Φιλίππου υἱὸν Ἀμύνταν ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλείᾳ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἦγε καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις, οἳ ἔτυχον παρόντες τούτων ἕνεκα, καὶ ἡγεμόνα Ἄγνωνα: ἔδει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ναυσί τε καὶ στρατιᾷ ὡς πλείστῃ ἐπὶ τοὺς Χαλκιδέας παραγενέσθαι.

96. ἀνίστησιν οὖν ἐκ τῶν Ὀδρυσῶν ὁρμώμενος πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ἐντὸς τοῦ Αἵμου τε ὄρους καὶ τῆς Ῥοδόπης Θρᾷκας, ὅσων ἦρχε μέχρι θαλάσσης [ἐς τὸν Εὔξεινόν τε πόντον καὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον], ἔπειτα τοὺς ὑπερβάντι Αἶμον Γέτας καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα μέρη ἐντὸς τοῦ Ἴστρου ποταμοῦ πρὸς θάλασσαν μᾶλλον τὴν τοῦ Εὐξείνου πόντου κατῴκητο: εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἱ Γέται καὶ οἱ ταύτῃ ὅμοροί τε τοῖς Σκύθαις καὶ

ὁμόσκευοι, πάντες ἱπποτοξόται. [2] παρεκάλει δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρεινῶν Θρᾳκῶν πολλοὺς τῶν αὐτονόμων καὶ μαχαιροφόρων, οἳ Δῖοι καλοῦνται, τὴν Ῥοδόπην οἱ πλεῖστοι οἰκοῦντες: καὶ τοὺς μὲν μισθῷ ἔπειθεν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐθελονταὶ ξυνηκολούθουν. [3] ἀνίστη δὲ καὶ Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ Λαιαίους καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα ἔθνη Παιονικὰ ὧν ἦρχε καὶ ἔσχατοι τῆς ἀρχῆς οὗτοι ἦσαν: μέχρι γὰρ Λαιαίων Παιόνων καὶ τοῦ Στρυμόνος ποταμοῦ, ὃς ἐκ τοῦ Σκόμβρου ὄρους δι᾽ Ἀγριάνων καὶ Λαιαίων ῥεῖ, [οὗ] ὡρίζετο ἡ ἀρχὴ τὰ πρὸς Παίονας αὐτονόμους ἤδη. [4] τὰ δὲ πρὸς Τριβαλλούς, καὶ τούτους αὐτονόμους, Τρῆρες ὥριζον καὶ Τιλαταῖοι: οἰκοῦσι δ᾽ οὗτοι πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ Σκόμβρου ὄρους καὶ παρήκουσι πρὸς ἡλίου δύσιν μέχρι τοῦ Ὀσκίου ποταμοῦ. ῥεῖ δ᾽ οὗτος ἐκ τοῦ ὄρους ὅθενπερ καὶ ὁ Νέστος καὶ ὁ Ἕβρος: ἔστι δὲ ἐρῆμον τὸ ὄρος καὶ μέγα, ἐχόμενον τῆς Ῥοδόπης.

97. ἐγένετο δὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ Ὀδρυσῶν μέγεθος ἐπὶ μὲν θάλασσαν καθήκουσα ἀπὸ Ἀβδήρων πόλεως ἐς τὸν Εὔξεινον πόντον μέχρι Ἴστρου ποταμοῦ: αὕτη περίπλους ἐστὶν ἡ γῆ τὰ ξυντομώτατα, ἢν αἰεὶ κατὰ πρύμναν ἱστῆται τὸ πνεῦμα, νηὶ στρογγύλῃ τεσσάρων ἡμερῶν καὶ ἴσων νυκτῶν: ὁδῷ δὲ τὰ ξυντομώτατα ἐξ Ἀβδήρων ἐς Ἴστρον ἀνὴρ εὔζωνος ἑνδεκαταῖος τελεῖ. [2] τὰ μὲν πρὸς θάλασσαν τοσαύτη ἦν, ἐς ἤπειρον δὲ ἀπὸ Βυζαντίου ἐς Λαιαίους καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Στρυμόνα — ταύτῃ γὰρ διὰ πλείστου ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἄνω ἐγίγνετο — ἡμερῶν ἀνδρὶ εὐζώνῳ τριῶν καὶ δέκα ἀνύσαι. [3] φόρος τε ἐκ πάσης τῆς βαρβάρου καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ὅσον προσῆξαν ἐπὶ Σεύθου, ὃς ὕστερον Σιτάλκου βασιλεύσας πλεῖστον δὴ ἐποίησε, τετρακοσίων ταλάντων ἀργυρίου μάλιστα δύναμις, ἃ χρυσὸς καὶ ἄργυρος ᾖει: καὶ δῶρα οὐκ ἐλάσσω τούτων χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου προσεφέρετο, χωρὶς δὲ ὅσα ὑφαντά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευή, καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς παραδυναστεύουσί τε καὶ γενναίοις Ὀδρυσῶν. [4] κατεστήσαντο γὰρ τοὐναντίον τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας τὸν νόμον, ὄντα μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Θρᾳξί, λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἢ διδόναι — καὶ αἴσχιον ἦν αἰτηθέντα μὴ δοῦναι ἢ αἰτήσαντα μὴ τυχεῖν —, ὅμως δὲ κατὰ

τὸ δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῷ ἐχρήσαντο: οὐ γὰρ ἦν πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν μὴ διδόντα δῶρα. ὥστε ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ βασιλεία ἦλθεν ἰσχύος. [5] τῶν γὰρ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ὅσαι μεταξὺ τοῦ Ἰονίου κόλπου καὶ τοῦ Εὐξείνου πόντου μεγίστη ἐγένετο χρημάτων προσόδῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἰσχύι δὲ μάχης καὶ στρατοῦ πλήθει πολὺ δευτέρα μετὰ τὴν Σκυθῶν. [6] ταύτῃ δὲ ἀδύνατα ἐξισοῦσθαι οὐχ ὅτι τὰ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ἔθνος ἓν πρὸς ἓν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι δυνατὸν Σκύθαις ὁμογνωμονοῦσι πᾶσιν ἀντιστῆναι. οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην εὐβουλίαν καὶ ξύνεσιν περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἐς τὸν βίον ἄλλοις ὁμοιοῦνται.

98. Σιτάλκης μὲν οὖν χώρας τοσαύτης βασιλεύων παρεσκευάζετο τὸν στρατόν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ἄρας ἐπορεύετο ἐπὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς, ἔπειτα διὰ Κερκίνης ἐρήμου ὄρους, ὅ ἐστι μεθόριον Σιντῶν καὶ Παιόνων: ἐπορεύετο δὲ δι᾽ αὐτοῦ τῇ ὁδῷ ἣν πρότερον αὐτὸς ἐποιήσατο τεμὼν τὴν ὕλην, ὅτε ἐπὶ Παίονας ἐστράτευσεν. [2] τὸ δὲ ὄρος ἐξ Ὀδρυσῶν διιόντες ἐν δεξιᾷ μὲν εἶχον Παίονας, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δὲ Σιντοὺς καὶ Μαιδούς. διελθόντες δὲ αὐτὸ ἀφίκοντο ἐς Δόβηρον τὴν Παιονικήν. [3] πορευομένῳ δὲ αὐτῷ ἀπεγίγνετο μὲν οὐδὲν τοῦ στρατοῦ εἰ μή τι νόσῳ, προσεγίγνετο δέ: πολλοὶ γὰρ τῶν αὐτονόμων Θρᾳκῶν ἀπαράκλητοι ἐφ᾽ ἁρπαγὴν ἠκολούθουν, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος λέγεται οὐκ ἔλασσον πέντε καὶ δέκα μυριάδων γενέσθαι: [4] καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πλέον πεζὸν ἦν, τριτημόριον δὲ μάλιστα ἱππικόν. τοῦ δ᾽ ἱππικοῦ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοὶ Ὀδρύσαι παρείχοντο καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς Γέται. τοῦ δὲ πεζοῦ οἱ μαχαιροφόροι μαχιμώτατοι μὲν ἦσαν οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ῥοδόπης αὐτόνομοι καταβάντες, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ξύμμεικτος πλήθει φοβερώτατος ἠκολούθει.

99. ξυνηθροίζοντο οὖν ἐν τῇ Δοβήρῳ καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο, ὅπως κατὰ κορυφὴν ἐσβαλοῦσιν ἐς τὴν κάτω Μακεδονίαν, ἧς ὁ Περδίκκας ἦρχεν. [2] τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ Ἐλιμιῶται καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη ἐπάνωθεν, ἃ ξύμμαχα μέν ἐστι τούτοις καὶ ὑπήκοα, βασιλείας δ᾽ ἔχει καθ᾽ αὑτά. [3] τὴν δὲ παρὰ θάλασσαν νῦν Μακεδονίαν

Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Περδίκκου πατὴρ καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι αὐτοῦ, Τημενίδαι τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄντες ἐξ Ἄργους, πρῶτοι ἐκτήσαντο καὶ ἐβασίλευσαν ἀναστήσαντες μάχῃ ἐκ μὲν Πιερίας Πίερας, οἳ ὕστερον ὑπὸ τὸ Πάγγαιον πέραν Στρυμόνος ᾤκησαν Φάγρητα καὶ ἄλλα χωρία καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πιερικὸς κόλπος καλεῖται ἡ ὑπὸ τῷ Παγγαίῳ πρὸς θάλασσαν γῆ, ἐκ δὲ τῆς Βοττίας καλουμένης Βοττιαίους, οἳ νῦν ὅμοροι Χαλκιδέων οἰκοῦσιν: [4] τῆς δὲ Παιονίας παρὰ τὸν Ἀξιὸν ποταμὸν στενήν τινα καθήκουσαν ἄνωθεν μέχρι Πέλλης καὶ θαλάσσης ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ πέραν Ἀξιοῦ μέχρι Στρυμόνος τὴν Μυγδονίαν καλουμένην Ἠδῶνας ἐξελάσαντες νέμονται. [5] ἀνέστησαν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς νῦν Ἐορδίας καλουμένης Ἐορδούς, ὧν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐφθάρησαν, βραχὺ δέ τι αὐτῶν περὶ Φύσκαν κατῴκηται, καὶ ἐξ Ἀλμωπίας Ἄλμωπας. [6] ἐκράτησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν οἱ Μακεδόνες οὗτοι, ἃ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔχουσι, τόν τε Ἀνθεμοῦντα καὶ Κρηστωνίαν καὶ Βισαλτίαν καὶ Μακεδόνων αὐτῶν πολλήν. τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν Μακεδονία καλεῖται, καὶ Περδίκκας Ἀλεξάνδρου βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν ἦν ὅτε Σιτάλκης ἐπῄει.

100. καὶ οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες οὗτοι ἐπιόντος πολλοῦ στρατοῦ ἀδύνατοι ὄντες ἀμύνεσθαι ἔς τε τὰ καρτερὰ καὶ τὰ τείχη, ὅσα ἦν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, ἐσεκομίσθησαν. [2] ἦν δὲ οὐ πολλά, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Περδίκκου υἱὸς βασιλεὺς γενόμενος τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ᾠκοδόμησε καὶ ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε καὶ τἆλλα διεκόσμησε τά [τε] κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ κρείσσονι ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι βασιλῆς ὀκτὼ οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι. [3] ὁ δὲ στρατὸς τῶν Θρᾳκῶν ἐκ τῆς Δοβήρου ἐσέβαλε πρῶτον μὲν ἐς τὴν Φιλίππου πρότερον οὖσαν ἀρχήν, καὶ εἷλεν Εἰδομενὴν μὲν κατὰ κράτος, Γορτυνίαν δὲ καὶ Ἀταλάντην καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα χωρία ὁμολογίᾳ διὰ τὴν Ἀμύντου φιλίαν προσχωροῦντα τοῦ Φιλίππου υἱέος παρόντος: Εὐρωπὸν δὲ ἐπολιόρκησαν μέν, ἑλεῖν δὲ οὐκ ἐδύναντο. [4] ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Μακεδονίαν προυχώρει τὴν ἐν ἀριστερᾷ Πέλλης καὶ Κύρρου. ἔσω δὲ τούτων ἐς τὴν Βοττιαίαν καὶ Πιερίαν οὐκ ἀφίκοντο,ἀλλὰ τήν τε Μυγδονίαν καὶ Κρηστωνίαν καὶ

Ἀνθεμοῦντα ἐδῄουν. [5] οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες πεζῷ μὲν οὐδὲ διενοοῦντο ἀμύνεσθαι, ἵππους δὲ προσμεταπεμψάμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω ξυμμάχων, ὅπῃ δοκοίη, ὀλίγοι πρὸς πολλοὺς ἐσέβαλλον ἐς τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Θρᾳκῶν. καὶ ᾗ μὲν προσπέσοιεν, οὐδεὶς ὑπέμενεν ἄνδρας ἱππέας τε ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τεθωρακισμένους, ὑπὸ δὲ πλήθους περικλῃόμενοι αὐτοὺς πολλαπλασίῳ τῷ ὁμίλῳ ἐς κίνδυνον καθίσταν, ὥστε τέλος ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, οὐ νομίζοντες ἱκανοὶ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πλέον κινδυνεύειν.

101. ὁ δὲ Σιτάλκης πρός τε τὸν Περδίκκαν λόγους ἐποιεῖτο ὧν ἕνεκα ἐστράτευσε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ παρῆσαν ταῖς ναυσίν, ἀπιστοῦντες αὐτὸν μὴ ἥξειν, δῶρα δὲ καὶ πρέσβεις ἔπεμψαν αὐτῷ, ἔς τε τοὺς Χαλκιδέας καὶ Βοττιαίους μέρος τι τοῦ στρατοῦ πέμπει, καὶ τειχήρεις ποιήσας ἐδῄου τὴν γῆν. [2] καθημένου δ᾽ αὐτοῦ περὶ τοὺς χώρους τούτους οἱ πρὸς νότον οἰκοῦντες Θεσσαλοὶ καὶ Μάγνητες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὑπήκοοι Θεσσαλῶν καὶ οἱ μέχρι Θερμοπυλῶν Ἕλληνες ἐφοβήθησαν μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς ὁ στρατὸς χωρήσῃ, καὶ ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦσαν. [3] ἐφοβήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ πέραν Στρυμόνος πρὸς βορέαν Θρᾷκες, ὅσοι πεδία εἶχον, Παναῖοι καὶ Ὀδόμαντοι καὶ Δρῶοι καὶ Δερσαῖοι: αὐτόνομοι δ᾽ εἰσὶ πάντες. [4] παρέσχε δὲ λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πολεμίους Ἕλληνας, μὴ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀγόμενοι κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς χωρήσωσιν. [5] ὁ δὲ τήν τε Χαλκιδικὴν καὶ Βοττικὴν καὶ Μακεδονίαν ἅμα ἐπέχων ἔφθειρε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲν ἐπράσσετο ὧν ἕνεκα ἐσέβαλε καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ σῖτόν τε οὐκ εἶχεν αὐτῷ καὶ ὑπὸ χειμῶνος ἐταλαιπώρει, ἀναπείθεται ὑπὸ Σεύθου τοῦ Σπαραδόκου, ἀδελφιδοῦ ὄντος καὶ μέγιστον μεθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν δυναμένου, ὥστ᾽ ἐν τάχει ἀπελθεῖν. τὸν δὲ Σεύθην κρύφα Περδίκκας ὑποσχόμενος ἀδελφὴν ἑαυτοῦ δώσειν καὶ χρήματα ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ προσποιεῖται. [6] καὶ ὁ μὲν πεισθεὶς καὶ μείνας τριάκοντα τὰς πάσας ἡμέρας, τούτων δὲ ὀκτὼ ἐν Χαλκιδεῦσιν, ἀνεχώρησε τῷ στρατῷ κατὰ τάχος ἐπ᾽ οἴκου: Περδίκκας δὲ ὕστερον Στρατονίκην τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδελφὴν

δίδωσι Σεύθῃ, ὥσπερ ὑπέσχετο. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Σιτάλκου στρατείαν οὕτως ἐγένετο.

102. οἱ δὲ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναυτικὸν διελύθη, Φορμίωνος ἡγουμένου ἐστράτευσαν, παραπλεύσαντες ἐπ᾽ Ἀστακοῦ καὶ ἀποβάντες, ἐς τὴν μεσόγειαν τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας τετρακοσίοις μὲν ὁπλίταις Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, τετρακοσίοις δὲ Μεσσηνίων, καὶ ἔκ τε Στράτου καὶ Κορόντων καὶ ἄλλων χωρίων ἄνδρας οὐ δοκοῦντας βεβαίους εἶναι ἐξήλασαν, καὶ Κύνητα τὸν Θεολύτου ἐς Κόροντα καταγαγόντες ἀνεχώρησαν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. [2] ἐς γὰρ Οἰνιάδας αἰεί ποτε πολεμίους ὄντας μόνους Ἀκαρνάνων οὐκ ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι χειμῶνος ὄντος στρατεύειν: ὁ γὰρ Ἀχελῷος ποταμὸς ῥέων ἐκ Πίνδου ὄρους διὰ Δολοπίας καὶ Ἀγραίων καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων καὶ διὰ τοῦ Ἀκαρνανικοῦ πεδίου, ἄνωθεν μὲν παρὰ Στράτον πόλιν, ἐς θάλασσαν δ᾽ ἐξιεὶς παρ᾽ Οἰνιάδας καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς περιλιμνάζων, ἄπορον ποιεῖ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν χειμῶνι στρατεύειν. [3] κεῖνται δὲ καὶ τῶν νήσων τῶν Ἐχινάδων αἱ πολλαὶ καταντικρὺ Οἰνιαδῶν τοῦ Ἀχελῴου τῶν ἐκβολῶν οὐδὲν ἀπέχουσαι, ὥστε μέγας ὢν ὁ ποταμὸς προσχοῖ αἰεὶ καὶ εἰσὶ τῶν νήσων αἳ ἠπείρωνται, ἐλπὶς δὲ καὶ πάσας οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ ἂν χρόνῳ τοῦτο παθεῖν: [4] τό τε γὰρ ῥεῦμά ἐστι μέγα καὶ πολὺ καὶ θολερόν, αἵ τε νῆσοι πυκναί, καὶ ἀλλήλαις τῆς προσχώσεως [τῷ μὴ σκεδάννυσθαι] ξύνδεσμοι γίγνονται, παραλλὰξ καὶ οὐ κατὰ στοῖχον κείμεναι, οὐδ᾽ ἔχουσαι εὐθείας διόδους τοῦ ὕδατος ἐς τὸ πέλαγος. [5] ἐρῆμοι δ᾽ εἰσὶ καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀλκμέωνι τῷ Ἀμφιάρεω, ὅτε δὴ ἀλᾶσθαι αὐτὸν μετὰ τὸν φόνον τῆς μητρός, τὸν Ἀπόλλω ταύτην τὴν γῆν χρῆσαι οἰκεῖν, ὑπειπόντα οὐκ εἶναι λύσιν τῶν δειμάτων πρὶν ἂν εὑρὼν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ χώρᾳ κατοικίσηται ἥτις ὅτε ἔκτεινε τὴν μητέρα μήπω ὑπὸ ἡλίου ἑωρᾶτο μηδὲ γῆ ἦν, ὡς τῆς γε ἄλλης αὐτῷ μεμιασμένης. [6] ὁ δ᾽ ἀπορῶν, ὥς φασι, μόλις κατενόησε τὴν πρόσχωσιν ταύτην τοῦ Ἀχελῴου, καὶ ἐδόκει αὐτῷ ἱκανὴ ἂν κεχῶσθαι δίαιτα τῷ σώματι ἀφ᾽ οὗπερ κτείνας τὴν μητέρα οὐκ ὀλίγον χρόνον ἐπλανᾶτο. καὶ κατοικισθεὶς ἐς τοὺς περὶ Οἰνιάδας τόπους ἐδυνάστευσέ τε

καὶ ἀπὸ Ἀκαρνᾶνος παιδὸς ἑαυτοῦ τῆς χώρας τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐγκατέλιπεν. τὰ μὲν περὶ Ἀλκμέωνα τοιαῦτα λεγόμενα παρελάβομεν.

103. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὁ Φορμίων ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον ἅμα ἦρι κατέπλευσαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, τούς τε ἐλευθέρους τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἐκ τῶν ναυμαχιῶν ἄγοντες, οἳ ἀνὴρ ἀντ᾽ ἀνδρὸς ἐλύθησαν, καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἃς εἷλον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα οὗτος, καὶ τρίτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

Βιβλίο Γ’

1. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἅμα τῷ σίτῳ ἀκμάζοντι ἐστράτευσαν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν: ἡγεῖτο δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. [2] καὶ ἐγκαθεζόμενοι ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν: καὶ προσβολαί, ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, ἐγίγνοντο τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἱππέων ὅπῃ παρείκοι, καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον ὅμιλον τῶν ψιλῶν εἶργον τὸ μὴ προεξιόντας τῶν ὅπλων τὰ ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν. [3] ἐμμείναντες δὲ χρόνον οὗ εἶχον τὰ σιτία ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

2. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐσβολὴν τῶν Πελοποννησίων εὐθὺς Λέσβος πλὴν Μηθύμνης ἀπέστη ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων, βουληθέντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ προσεδέξαντο, ἀναγκασθέντες δὲ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπόστασιν πρότερον ἢ διενοοῦντο ποιήσασθαι. [2] τῶν τε γὰρ λιμένων τὴν χῶσιν καὶ τειχῶν οἰκοδόμησιν καὶ νεῶν ποίησιν ἐπέμενον τελεσθῆναι, καὶ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου ἔδει ἀφικέσθαι, τοξότας τε καὶ σῖτον, καὶ ἃ μεταπεμπόμενοι ἦσαν. [3] Τενέδιοι γὰρ ὄντες αὐτοῖς διάφοροι καὶ Μηθυμναῖοι καὶ αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν, πρόξενοι Ἀθηναίων, μηνυταὶ γίγνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ξυνοικίζουσί τε τὴν Λέσβον ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην βίᾳ καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἅπασαν μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ξυγγενῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει ἐπείγονται: καὶ εἰ μή τις προκαταλήψεται ἤδη, στερήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς Λέσβου.

3. οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν γὰρ τεταλαιπωρημένοι ὑπό τε τῆς νόσου καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἄρτι καθισταμένου καὶ ἀκμάζοντος μέγα μὲν ἔργον ἡγοῦντο εἶναι Λέσβον προσπολεμώσασθαι ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν καὶ δύναμιν ἀκέραιον, καὶ οὐκ ἀπεδέχοντο τὸ πρῶτον τὰς κατηγορίας, μεῖζον μέρος νέμοντες τῷ μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀληθῆ εἶναι: ἐπειδὴ μέντοι καὶ πέμψαντες πρέσβεις οὐκ ἔπειθον τοὺς Μυτιληναίους τήν τε ξυνοίκισιν καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν διαλύειν, δείσαντες προκαταλαβεῖν ἐβούλοντο. [2] καὶ πέμπουσιν ἐξαπιναίως

τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς αἳ ἔτυχον περὶ Πελοπόννησον παρεσκευασμέναι πλεῖν: Κλεϊππίδης δὲ ὁ Δεινίου τρίτος αὐτὸς ἐστρατήγει. [3] ἐσηγγέλθη γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὡς εἴη Ἀπόλλωνος Μαλόεντος ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἑορτή, ἐν ᾗ πανδημεὶ Μυτιληναῖοι ἑορτάζουσι, καὶ ἐλπίδα εἶναι ἐπειχθέντας ἐπιπεσεῖν ἄφνω, καὶ ἢν μὲν ξυμβῇ ἡ πεῖρα: εἰ δὲ μή, Μυτιληναίοις εἰπεῖν ναῦς τε παραδοῦναι καὶ τείχη καθελεῖν, μὴ πειθομένων δὲ πολεμεῖν. [4] καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆες ᾤχοντο: τὰς δὲ τῶν Μυτιληναίων δέκα τριήρεις, αἳ ἔτυχον βοηθοὶ παρὰ σφᾶς κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν παροῦσαι, κατέσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐς φυλακὴν ἐποιήσαντο. [5] τοῖς δὲ Μυτιληναίοις ἀνὴρ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν διαβὰς ἐς Εὔβοιαν καὶ πεζῇ ἐπὶ Γεραιστὸν ἐλθών, ὁλκάδος ἀναγομένης ἐπιτυχών, πλῷ χρησάμενος καὶ τριταῖος ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἐς Μυτιλήνην ἀφικόμενος ἀγγέλλει τὸν ἐπίπλουν. οἱ δὲ οὔτε ἐς τὸν Μαλόεντα ἐξῆλθον, τά τε ἄλλα τῶν τειχῶν καὶ λιμένων περὶ τὰ ἡμιτέλεστα φαρξάμενοι ἐφύλασσον.

4. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον καταπλεύσαντες ὡς ἑώρων, ἀπήγγειλαν μὲν οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα, οὐκ ἐσακουόντων δὲ τῶν Μυτιληναίων ἐς πόλεμον καθίσταντο. [2] ἀπαράσκευοι δὲ οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ ἐξαίφνης ἀναγκασθέντες πολεμεῖν ἔκπλουν μέν τινα ἐποιήσαντο τῶν νεῶν ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ λιμένος, ἔπειτα καταδιωχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν λόγους ἤδη προσέφερον τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, βουλόμενοι τὰς ναῦς τὸ παραυτίκα, εἰ δύναιντο, ὁμολογίᾳ τινὶ ἐπιεικεῖ ἀποπέμψασθαι. [3] καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπεδέξαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ οὐχ ἱκανοὶ ὦσι Λέσβῳ πάσῃ πολεμεῖν. [4] καὶ ἀνοκωχὴν ποιησάμενοι πέμπουσιν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι τῶν τε διαβαλλόντων ἕνα, ᾧ μετέμελεν ἤδη, καὶ ἄλλους, εἴ πως πείσειαν τὰς ναῦς ἀπελθεῖν ὡς σφῶν οὐδὲν νεωτεριούντων. [5] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἀποστέλλουσι καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις τριήρει, λαθόντες τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναυτικόν, οἳ ὥρμουν ἐν τῇ Μαλέᾳ πρὸς βορέαν τῆς πόλεως: οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστευον τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προχωρήσειν. [6] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν

Λακεδαίμονα ταλαιπώρως διὰ τοῦ πελάγους κομισθέντες αὐτοῖς ἔπρασσον ὅπως τις βοήθεια ἥξει:

5. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν πρέσβεις ὡς οὐδὲν ἦλθον πράξαντες, ἐς πόλεμον καθίσταντο οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Λέσβος πλὴν Μηθύμνης: οὗτοι δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐβεβοηθήκεσαν, καὶ Ἴμβριοι καὶ Λήμνιοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγοι τινὲς ξυμμάχων. [2] καὶ ἔξοδον μέν τινα πανδημεὶ ἐποιήσαντο οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, καὶ μάχη ἐγένετο, ἐν ᾗ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι οὔτε ἐπηυλίσαντο οὔτε ἐπίστευσαν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνεχώρησαν: ἔπειτα οἱ μὲν ἡσύχαζον, ἐκ Πελοποννήσου καὶ μετ᾽ ἄλλης παρασκευῆς βουλόμενοι εἰ προσγένοιτό τι κινδυνεύειν: καὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς Μελέας Λάκων ἀφικνεῖται καὶ Ἑρμαιώνδας Θηβαῖος, οἳ προαπεστάλησαν μὲν τῆς ἀποστάσεως, φθάσαι δὲ οὐ δυνάμενοι τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπίπλουν κρύφα μετὰ τὴν μάχην ὕστερον ἐσπλέουσι τριήρει, καὶ παρῄνουν πέμπειν τριήρη ἄλλην καὶ πρέσβεις μεθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν: καὶ ἐκπέμπουσιν.

6. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πολὺ ἐπιρρωσθέντες διὰ τὴν τῶν Μυτιληναίων ἡσυχίαν ξυμμάχους τε προσεκάλουν, οἳ πολὺ θᾶσσον παρῆσαν ὁρῶντες οὐδὲν ἰσχυρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Λεσβίων, καὶ περιορμισάμενοι τὸ πρὸς νότον τῆς πόλεως ἐτείχισαν στρατόπεδα δύο ἑκατέρωθεν τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τοὺς ἐφόρμους ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς λιμέσιν ἐποιοῦντο. [2] καὶ τῆς μὲν θαλάσσης εἶργον μὴ χρῆσθαι τοὺς Μυτιληναίους, τῆς δὲ γῆς τῆς μὲν ἄλλης ἐκράτουν οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Λέσβιοι προσβεβοηθηκότες ἤδη, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα οὐ πολὺ κατεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ναύσταθμον δὲ μᾶλλον ἦν αὐτοῖς πλοίων καὶ ἀγορὰ ἡ Μαλέα. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Μυτιλήνην οὕτως ἐπολεμεῖτο.

7. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦ θέρους τούτου Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον ναῦς ἀπέστειλαν τριάκοντα καὶ Ἀσώπιον τὸν Φορμίωνος στρατηγόν, κελευσάντων Ἀκαρνάνων τῶν Φορμίωνός τινα σφίσι πέμψαι ἢ υἱὸν ἢ ξυγγενῆ ἄρχοντα. [2] καὶ παραπλέουσαι αἱ νῆες τῆς Λακωνικῆς τὰ ἐπιθαλάσσια χωρία ἐπόρθησαν. [3] ἔπειτα τὰς

μὲν πλείους ἀποπέμπει τῶν νεῶν πάλιν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ὁ Ἀσώπιος, αὐτὸς δ᾽ ἔχων δώδεκα ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ναύπακτον, καὶ ὕστερον Ἀκαρνᾶνας ἀναστήσας πανδημεὶ στρατεύει ἐπ᾽ Οἰνιάδας, καὶ ταῖς τε ναυσὶ κατὰ τὸν Ἀχελῷον ἔπλευσε καὶ ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς ἐδῄου τὴν χώραν. [4] ὡς δ᾽ οὐ προσεχώρουν, τὸν μὲν πεζὸν ἀφίησιν, αὐτὸς δὲ πλεύσας ἐς Λευκάδα καὶ ἀπόβασιν ἐς Νήρικον ποιησάμενος ἀναχωρῶν διαφθείρεται αὐτός τε καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τι μέρος ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτόθεν τε ξυμβοηθησάντων καὶ φρουρῶν τινῶν ὀλίγων. [5] καὶ ὕστερον ὑποσπόνδους τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀποπλεύσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρὰ τῶν Λευκαδίων ἐκομίσαντο.

8. οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης νεὼς ἐκπεμφθέντες Μυτιληναίων πρέσβεις, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εἶπον Ὀλυμπίαζε παρεῖναι, ὅπως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ἀκούσαντες βουλεύσωνται, ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν Ὀλυμπίαν: ἦν δὲ Ὀλυμπιὰς ᾗ Δωριεὺς Ῥόδιος τὸ δεύτερον ἐνίκα. [2] καὶ ἐπειδὴ μετὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν κατέστησαν ἐς λόγους, εἶπον τοιάδε.

9. ‘τὸ μὲν καθεστὸς τοῖς Ἕλλησι νόμιμον, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἴσμεν: τοὺς γὰρ ἀφισταμένους ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ξυμμαχίαν τὴν πρὶν ἀπολείποντας οἱ δεξάμενοι, καθ᾽ ὅσον μὲν ὠφελοῦνται, ἐν ἡδονῇ ἔχουσι, νομίζοντες δὲ εἶναι προδότας τῶν πρὸ τοῦ φίλων χείρους ἡγοῦνται. [2] καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος αὕτη ἡ ἀξίωσίς ἐστιν, εἰ τύχοιεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἵ τε ἀφιστάμενοι καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν διακρίνοιντο ἴσοι μὲν τῇ γνώμῃ ὄντες καὶ εὐνοίᾳ, ἀντίπαλοι δὲ τῇ παρασκευῇ καὶ δυνάμει, πρόφασίς τε ἐπιεικὴς μηδεμία ὑπάρχοι τῆς ἀποστάσεως: ὃ ἡμῖν καὶ Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἦν. [3] μηδέ τῳ χείρους δόξωμεν εἶναι εἰ ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ τιμώμενοι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀφιστάμεθα.

10. ‘περὶ γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀρετῆς πρῶτον ἄλλως τε καὶ ξυμμαχίας δεόμενοι τοὺς λόγους ποιησόμεθα, εἰδότες οὔτε φιλίαν ἰδιώταις βέβαιον γιγνομένην οὔτε κοινωνίαν πόλεσιν ἐς οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ μετ᾽ ἀρετῆς δοκούσης ἐς ἀλλήλους γίγνοιντο καὶ τἆλλα ὁμοιότροποι εἶεν: ἐν γὰρ τῷ διαλλάσσοντι τῆς γνώμης καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν ἔργων καθίστανται. [2] ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ξυμμαχία ἐγένετο

πρῶτον ἀπολιπόντων μὲν ὑμῶν ἐκ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου, παραμεινάντων δὲ ἐκείνων πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων. [3] ξύμμαχοι μέντοι ἐγενόμεθα οὐκ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. [4] καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἡγοῦντο, προθύμως εἱπόμεθα: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἑωρῶμεν αὐτοὺς τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων δούλωσιν ἐπαγομένους, οὐκ ἀδεεῖς ἔτι ἦμεν. [5] ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες καθ᾽ ἓν γενόμενοι διὰ πολυψηφίαν ἀμύνασθαι οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐδουλώθησαν πλὴν ἡμῶν καὶ Χίων: ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν. [6] καὶ πιστοὺς οὐκέτι εἴχομεν ἡγεμόνας Ἀθηναίους, παραδείγμασι τοῖς προγιγνομένοις χρώμενοι: οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοὺς οὓς μὲν μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐνσπόνδους ἐποιήσαντο καταστρέψασθαι, τοὺς δὲ ὑπολοίπους, εἴ ποτε ἄρα ἐδυνήθησαν, μὴ δρᾶσαι τοῦτο.

11. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτόνομοι ἔτι ἦμεν ἅπαντες, βεβαιότεροι ἂν ἡμῖν ἦσαν μηδὲν νεωτεριεῖν: ὑποχειρίους δὲ ἔχοντες τοὺς πλείους, ἡμῖν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλοῦντες, χαλεπώτερον εἰκότως ἔμελλον οἴσειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ πλέον ἤδη εἶκον τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἔτι μόνου ἀντισουμένου, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅσῳ δυνατώτεροι αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐρημότεροι. [2] τὸ δὲ ἀντίπαλον δέος μόνον πιστὸν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν: ὁ γὰρ παραβαίνειν τι βουλόμενος τῷ μὴ προύχων ἂν ἐπελθεῖν ἀποτρέπεται. [3] αὐτόνομοί τε ἐλείφθημεν οὐ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐπρεπείᾳ τε λόγου καὶ γνώμης μᾶλλον ἐφόδῳ ἢ ἰσχύος τὰ πράγματα ἐφαίνετο καταληπτά. [4] ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο μὴ ἂν τούς γε ἰσοψήφους ἄκοντας, εἰ μή τι ἠδίκουν οἷς ἐπῇσαν, ξυστρατεύειν: ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ τὰ κράτιστα ἐπί τε τοὺς ὑποδεεστέρους πρώτους ξυνεπῆγον καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα λιπόντες τοῦ ἄλλου περιῃρημένου ἀσθενέστερα ἔμελλον ἕξειν. [5] εἰ δὲ ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν ἤρξαντο, ἐχόντων ἔτι τῶν πάντων αὐτῶν τε ἰσχὺν καὶ πρὸς ὅτι χρὴ στῆναι, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως ἐχειρώσαντο. [6] τό τε ναυτικὸν ἡμῶν παρεῖχέ τινα φόβον μή ποτε καθ᾽ ἓν γενόμενον ἢ ὑμῖν ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ

προσθέμενον κίνδυνον σφίσι παράσχῃ. [7] τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ θεραπείας τοῦ τε κοινοῦ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν αἰεὶ προεστώτων περιεγιγνόμεθα. [8] οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ πολύ γ᾽ ἂν ἐδοκοῦμεν δυνηθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ὁ πόλεμος ὅδε κατέστη, παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τοῖς ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους.

12. τίς οὖν αὕτη ἦ φιλία ἐγίγνετο ἢ ἐλευθερία πιστή, ἐν ᾗ παρὰ γνώμην ἀλλήλους ὑπεδεχόμεθα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες ἐθεράπευον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνους ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐποιοῦμεν: ὅ τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μάλιστα εὔνοια πίστιν βεβαιοῖ, ἡμῖν τοῦτο ὁ φόβος ἐχυρὸν παρεῖχε, δέει τε τὸ πλέον ἢ φιλίᾳ κατεχόμενοι ξύμμαχοι ἦμεν: καὶ ὁποτέροις θᾶσσον παράσχοι ἀσφάλεια θάρσος,οὗτοι πρότεροί τι καὶ παραβήσεσθαι ἔμελλον. [2] ὥστε εἴ τῳ δοκοῦμεν ἀδικεῖν προαποστάντες διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων μέλλησιν τῶν ἐς ἡμᾶς δεινῶν, αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἀνταναμείναντες σαφῶς εἰδέναι εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἔσται, οὐκ ὀρθῶς σκοπεῖ. [3] εἰ γὰρ δυνατοὶ ἦμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ἀντεπιβουλεῦσαι καὶ ἀντιμελλῆσαι, τί ἔδει ἡμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις εἶναι; ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις δὲ ὄντος αἰεὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι δεῖ τὸ προαμύνασθαι.

13. ‘τοιαύτας ἔχοντες προφάσεις καὶ αἰτίας, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἀπέστημεν, σαφεῖς μὲν τοῖς ἀκούουσι γνῶναι ὡς εἰκότως ἐδράσαμεν, ἱκανὰς δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐκφοβῆσαι καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειάν τινα τρέψαι, βουλομένους μὲν καὶ πάλαι, ὅτε ἔτι ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἐπέμψαμεν ὡς ὑμᾶς περὶ ἀποστάσεως, ὑμῶν δὲ οὐ προσδεξαμένων κωλυθέντας: νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ Βοιωτοὶ προυκαλέσαντο εὐθὺς ὑπηκούσαμεν, καὶ ἐνομίζομεν ἀποστήσεσθαι διπλῆν ἀπόστασιν, ἀπό τε τῶν Ἑλλήνων μὴ ξὺν κακῶς ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἀλλὰ ξυνελευθεροῦν, ἀπό τε Ἀθηναίων μὴ αὐτοὶ διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων ἐν ὑστέρῳ ἀλλὰ προποιῆσαι. [2] ἡ μέντοι ἀπόστασις ἡμῶν θᾶσσον γεγένηται καὶ ἀπαράσκευος: ᾗ καὶ μᾶλλον χρὴ ξυμμάχους δεξαμένους ἡμᾶς διὰ ταχέων βοήθειαν ἀποστέλλειν, ἵνα φαίνησθε ἀμύνοντές τε οἷς δεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοὺς πολεμίους βλάπτοντες. [3] καιρὸς δὲ ὡς οὔπω πρότερον. νόσῳ τε γὰρ ἐφθάραται Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ χρημάτων δαπάνῃ, νῆές τε αὐτοῖς αἱ μὲν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν εἰσίν, αἱ

δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν τετάχαται. [4] ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς αὐτοὺς περιουσίαν νεῶν ἔχειν, ἢν ὑμεῖς ἐν τῷ θέρει τῷδε ναυσί τε καὶ πεζῷ ἅμα ἐπεσβάλητε τὸ δεύτερον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἀμυνοῦνται ἐπιπλέοντας ἢ ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ἀποχωρήσονται. [5] νομίσῃ τε μηδεὶς ἀλλοτρίας γῆς πέρι οἰκεῖον κίνδυνον ἕξειν. ᾧ γὰρ δοκεῖ μακρὰν ἀπεῖναι ἡ Λέσβος, τὴν ὠφελίαν αὐτῷ ἐγγύθεν παρέξει. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος, ὥς τις οἴεται, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἣν ἡ Ἀττικὴ ὠφελεῖται. [6] ἔστι δὲ τῶν χρημάτων ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἡ πρόσοδος, καὶ ἔτι μείζων ἔσται, εἰ ἡμᾶς καταστρέψονται: οὔτε γὰρ ἀποστήσεται ἄλλος τά τε ἡμέτερα προσγενήσεται, πάθοιμέν τ᾽ ἂν δεινότερα ἢ οἱ πρὶν δουλεύοντες. [7] βοηθησάντων δὲ ὑμῶν προθύμως πόλιν τε προσλήψεσθε ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν μέγα, οὗπερ ὑμῖν μάλιστα προσδεῖ, καὶ Ἀθηναίους ῥᾷον καθαιρήσετε ὑφαιροῦντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ξυμμάχους ⌈θρασύτερον γὰρ πᾶς τις προσχωρήσεται⌉, τήν τε αἰτίαν ἀποφεύξεσθε ἣν εἴχετε μὴ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις. ἢν δ᾽ ἐλευθεροῦντες φαίνησθε, τὸ κράτος τοῦ πολέμου βεβαιότερον ἕξετε.

14. ‘αἰσχυνθέντες οὖν τάς τε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐς ὑμᾶς ἐλπίδας καὶ Δία τὸν Ὀλύμπιον, ἐν οὗ τῷ ἱερῷ ἴσα καὶ ἱκέται ἐσμέν, ἐπαμύνατε Μυτιληναίοις ξύμμαχοι γενόμενοι, καὶ μὴ προῆσθε ἡμᾶς ἴδιον μὲν τὸν κίνδυνον τῶν σωμάτων παραβαλλομένους, κοινὴν δὲ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατορθῶσαι ὠφελίαν ἅπασι δώσοντας, ἔτι δὲ κοινοτέραν τὴν βλάβην, εἰ μὴ πεισθέντων ὑμῶν σφαλησόμεθα. [2] γίγνεσθε δὲ ἄνδρες οἵουσπερ ὑμᾶς οἵ τε Ἕλληνες ἀξιοῦσι καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον δέος βούλεται.’

15. τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι εἶπον. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπειδὴ ἤκουσαν, προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς λόγους ξυμμάχους τε τοὺς Λεσβίους ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολὴν τοῖς τε ξυμμάχοις παροῦσι κατὰ τάχος ἔφραζον ἰέναι ἐς τὸν Ἰσθμὸν τοῖς δύο μέρεσιν ὡς ποιησόμενοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι ἀφίκοντο, καὶ ὁλκοὺς παρεσκεύαζον τῶν νεῶν ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ὡς ὑπεροίσοντες ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου ἐς τὴν πρὸς Ἀθήνας θάλασσαν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ

πεζῷ ἅμα ἐπιόντες. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν προθύμως ταῦτα ἔπρασσον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι βραδέως τε ξυνελέγοντο καὶ ἐν καρποῦ ξυγκομιδῇ ἦσαν καὶ ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ στρατεύειν.

16. αἰσθόμενοι δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ κατάγνωσιν ἀσθενείας σφῶν παρασκευαζομένους, δηλῶσαι βουλόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐγνώκασιν ἀλλ᾽ οἷοί τέ εἰσι μὴ κινοῦντες τὸ ἐπὶ Λέσβῳ ναυτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἐπιὸν ῥᾳδίως ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐπλήρωσαν ναῦς ἑκατὸν ἐσβάντες αὐτοί τε πλὴν ἱππέων καὶ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι, καὶ παρὰ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ἀναγαγόντες ἐπίδειξίν τε ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ἀποβάσεις τῆς Πελοποννήσου ᾗ δοκοίη αὐτοῖς. [2] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὁρῶντες πολὺν τὸν παράλογον τά τε ὑπὸ τῶν Λεσβίων ῥηθέντα ἡγοῦντο οὐκ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἄπορα νομίζοντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἅμα οὐ παρῆσαν καὶ ἠγγέλλοντο καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον τριάκοντα νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὴν περιοικίδα αὐτῶν πορθοῦσαι, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [3] ὕστερον δὲ ναυτικὸν παρεσκεύαζον ὅτι πέμψουσιν ἐς τὴν Λέσβον, καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἐπήγγελλον τεσσαράκοντα νεῶν πλῆθος καὶ ναύαρχον προσέταξαν Ἀλκίδαν, ὃς ἔμελλεν ἐπιπλεύσεσθαι. [4] ἀνεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσίν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνους εἶδον.

17. [καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ὃν αἱ νῆες ἔπλεον ἐν τοῖς πλεῖσται δὴ νῆες ἅμ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοὶ † κάλλει ἐγένοντο, παραπλήσιαι δὲ καὶ ἔτι πλείους ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου. [2] τήν τε γὰρ Ἀττικὴν καὶ Εὔβοιαν καὶ Σαλαμῖνα ἑκατὸν ἐφύλασσον, καὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον ἕτεραι ἑκατὸν ἦσαν, χωρὶς δὲ αἱ περὶ Ποτείδαιαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις χωρίοις, ὥστε αἱ πᾶσαι ἅμα ἐγίγνοντο ἐν ἑνὶ θέρει διακόσιαι καὶ πεντήκοντα. [3] καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦτο μάλιστα ὑπανήλωσε μετὰ Ποτειδαίας. [4] τήν τε γὰρ Ποτείδαιαν δίδραχμοι ὁπλῖται ἐφρούρουν αὐτῷ γὰρ καὶ ὑπηρέτῃ δραχμὴν ἐλάμβανε τῆς ἡμέρας , τρισχίλιοι μὲν οἱ πρῶτοι, ὧν οὐκ ἐλάσσους διεπολιόρκησαν, ἑξακόσιοι δὲ καὶ χίλιοι μετὰ Φορμίωνος, οἳ προαπῆλθον: νῆές τε αἱ πᾶσαι τὸν αὐτὸν μισθὸν ἔφερον. τὰ μὲν οὖν χρήματα οὕτως ὑπανηλώθη τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ νῆες τοσαῦται δὴ πλεῖσται ἐπληρώθησαν.]

18. Μυτιληναῖοι δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ὃν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι περὶ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ἦσαν ἐπὶ Μήθυμναν ὡς προδιδομένην ἐστράτευσαν κατὰ γῆν αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ἐπίκουροι: καὶ προσβαλόντες τῇ πόλει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ προυχώρει ᾗ προσεδέχοντο, ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ Ἀντίσσης καὶ Πύρρας καὶ Ἐρέσου, καὶ καταστησάμενοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ταύταις βεβαιότερα καὶ τείχη κρατύναντες διὰ τάχους ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [2] ἐστράτευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Μηθυμναῖοι ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν ἐπ᾽ Ἄντισσαν: καὶ ἐκβοηθείας τινὸς γενομένης πληγέντες ὑπό τε τῶν Ἀντισσαίων καὶ τῶν ἐπικούρων ἀπέθανόν τε πολλοὶ καὶ ἀνεχώρησαν οἱ λοιποὶ κατὰ τάχος. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα, τούς τε Μυτιληναίους τῆς γῆς κρατοῦντας καὶ τοὺς σφετέρους στρατιώτας οὐχ ἱκανοὺς ὄντας εἴργειν, πέμπουσι περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον ἤδη ἀρχόμενον Πάχητα τὸν Ἐπικούρου στρατηγὸν καὶ χιλίους ὁπλίτας ἑαυτῶν. [4] οἱ δὲ αὐτερέται πλεύσαντες τῶν νεῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ περιτειχίζουσι Μυτιλήνην ἐν κύκλῳ ἁπλῷ τείχει: φρούρια δ᾽ ἔστιν ᾗ ἐπὶ τῶν καρτερῶν ἐγκατῳκοδόμηται. [5] καὶ ἡ μὲν Μυτιλήνη κατὰ κράτος ἤδη ἀμφοτέρωθεν καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης εἴργετο, καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἤρχετο γίγνεσθαι.

19. προσδεόμενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι χρημάτων ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσενεγκόντες τότε πρῶτον ἐσφορὰν διακόσια τάλαντα, ἐξέπεμψαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀργυρολόγους ναῦς δώδεκα καὶ Λυσικλέα πέμπτον αὐτὸν στρατηγόν. [2] ὁ δὲ ἄλλα τε ἠργυρολόγει καὶ περιέπλει, καὶ τῆς Καρίας ἐκ Μυοῦντος ἀναβὰς διὰ τοῦ Μαιάνδρου πεδίου μέχρι τοῦ Σανδίου λόφου, ἐπιθεμένων τῶν Καρῶν καὶ Ἀναιιτῶν αὐτός τε διαφθείρεται καὶ τῆς ἄλλης στρατιᾶς πολλοί.

20. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἔτι γὰρ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ὑπὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἐπειδὴ τῷ τε σίτῳ ἐπιλείποντι ἐπιέζοντο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν οὐδεμία ἐλπὶς ἦν τιμωρίας οὐδὲ ἄλλη σωτηρία ἐφαίνετο, ἐπιβουλεύουσιν αὐτοί τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων οἱ ξυμπολιορκούμενοι πρῶτον μὲν πάντες ἐξελθεῖν καὶ

ὑπερβῆναι τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεμίων, ἢν δύνωνται βιάσασθαι, ἐσηγησαμένων τὴν πεῖραν αὐτοῖς Θεαινέτου τε τοῦ Τολμίδου ἀνδρὸς μάντεως καὶ Εὐπομπίδου τοῦ Δαϊμάχου, ὃς καὶ ἐστρατήγει: [2] ἔπειτα οἱ μὲν ἡμίσεις ἀπώκνησάν πως τὸν κίνδυνον μέγαν ἡγησάμενοι, ἐς δὲ ἄνδρας διακοσίους καὶ εἴκοσι μάλιστα ἐνέμειναν τῇ ἐξόδῳ ἐθελονταὶ τρόπῳ τοιῷδε. [3] κλίμακας ἐποιήσαντο ἴσας τῷ τείχει τῶν πολεμίων: ξυνεμετρήσαντο δὲ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τῶν πλίνθων, ᾗ ἔτυχε πρὸς σφᾶς οὐκ ἐξαληλιμμένον τὸ τεῖχος αὐτῶν. ἠριθμοῦντο δὲ πολλοὶ ἅμα τὰς ἐπιβολάς, καὶ ἔμελλον οἱ μέν τινες ἁμαρτήσεσθαι οἱ δὲ πλείους τεύξεσθαι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λογισμοῦ, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλάκις ἀριθμοῦντες καὶ ἅμα οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχοντες, ἀλλὰ ῥᾳδίως καθορωμένου ἐς ὃ ἐβούλοντο τοῦ τείχους. [4] τὴν μὲν οὖν ξυμμέτρησιν τῶν κλιμάκων οὕτως ἔλαβον, ἐκ τοῦ πάχους τῆς πλίνθου εἰκάσαντες τὸ μέτρον.

21. τὸ δὲ τεῖχος ἦν τῶν Πελοποννησίων τοιόνδε τῇ οἰκοδομήσει. εἶχε μὲν δύο τοὺς περιβόλους, πρός τε Πλαταιῶν καὶ εἴ τις ἔξωθεν ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν ἐπίοι, διεῖχον δὲ οἱ περίβολοι ἑκκαίδεκα πόδας μάλιστα ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων. [2] τὸ οὖν μεταξὺ τοῦτο [οἱ ἑκκαίδεκα πόδες] τοῖς φύλαξιν οἰκήματα διανενεμημένα ᾠκοδόμητο, καὶ ἦν ξυνεχῆ ὥστε ἓν φαίνεσθαι τεῖχος παχὺ ἐπάλξεις ἔχον ἀμφοτέρωθεν. [3] διὰ δέκα δὲ ἐπάλξεων πύργοι ἦσαν μεγάλοι καὶ ἰσοπλατεῖς τῷ τείχει, διήκοντες ἔς τε τὸ ἔσω μέτωπον αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὸ ἔξω, ὥστε πάροδον μὴ εἶναι παρὰ πύργον, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ αὐτῶν μέσων διῆσαν. [4] τὰς οὖν νύκτας, ὁπότε χειμὼν εἴη νοτερός, τὰς μὲν ἐπάλξεις ἀπέλειπον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πύργων ὄντων δι᾽ ὀλίγου καὶ ἄνωθεν στεγανῶν τὴν φυλακὴν ἐποιοῦντο. τὸ μὲν οὖν τεῖχος ᾧ περιεφρουροῦντο οἱ Πλαταιῆς τοιοῦτον ἦν.

22. οἱ δ᾽, ἐπειδὴ παρεσκεύαστο αὐτοῖς, τηρήσαντες νύκτα χειμέριον ὕδατι καὶ ἀνέμῳ καὶ ἅμ᾽ ἀσέληνον ἐξῆσαν: ἡγοῦντο δὲ οἵπερ καὶ τῆς πείρας αἴτιοι ἦσαν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν τάφρον διέβησαν ἣ περιεῖχεν αὐτούς, ἔπειτα προσέμειξαν τῷ τείχει τῶν πολεμίων λαθόντες τοὺς

φύλακας, ἀνὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν μὲν οὐ προϊδόντων αὐτῶν, ψόφῳ δὲ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ προσιέναι αὐτοὺς ἀντιπαταγοῦντος τοῦ ἀνέμου οὐ κατακουσάντων: [2] ἅμα δὲ καὶ διέχοντες πολὺ ᾖσαν, ὅπως τὰ ὅπλα μὴ κρουόμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα αἴσθησιν παρέχοι. ἦσαν δὲ εὐσταλεῖς τε τῇ ὁπλίσει καὶ τὸν ἀριστερὸν μόνον πόδα ὑποδεδεμένοι ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα τῆς πρὸς τὸν πηλόν. [3] κατὰ οὖν μεταπύργιον προσέμισγον πρὸς τὰς ἐπάλξεις, εἰδότες ὅτι ἐρῆμοί εἰσι, πρῶτον μὲν οἱ τὰς κλίμακας φέροντες, καὶ προσέθεσαν: ἔπειτα ψιλοὶ δώδεκα ξὺν ξιφιδίῳ καὶ θώρακι ἀνέβαινον, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Ἀμμέας ὁ Κοροίβου καὶ πρῶτος ἀνέβη: μετὰ δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ ἑπόμενοι, ἓξ ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερον τῶν πύργων, ἀνέβαινον. ἔπειτα ψιλοὶ ἄλλοι μετὰ τούτους ξὺν δορατίοις ἐχώρουν, οἷς ἕτεροι κατόπιν τὰς ἀσπίδας ἔφερον, ὅπως ἐκεῖνοι ῥᾷον προσβαίνοιεν, καὶ ἔμελλον δώσειν ὁπότε πρὸς τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶεν. [4] ὡς δὲ ἄνω πλείους ἐγένοντο, ᾔσθοντο οἱ ἐκ τῶν πύργων φύλακες: κατέβαλε γάρ τις τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπάλξεων κεραμίδα, ἣ πεσοῦσα δοῦπον ἐποίησεν. [5] καὶ αὐτίκα βοὴ ἦν, τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος ὥρμησεν: οὐ γὰρ ᾔδει ὅτι ἦν τὸ δεινὸν σκοτεινῆς νυκτὸς καὶ χειμῶνος ὄντος, καὶ ἅμα οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν Πλαταιῶν ὑπολελειμμένοι ἐξελθόντες προσέβαλον τῷ τείχει τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἐκ τοὔμπαλιν ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες αὐτῶν ὑπερέβαινον, ὅπως ἥκιστα πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὸν νοῦν ἔχοιεν. [6] ἐθορυβοῦντο μὲν οὖν κατὰ χώραν μένοντες, βοηθεῖν δὲ οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμα ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φυλακῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἦσαν εἰκάσαι τὸ γιγνόμενον. [7] καὶ οἱ τριακόσιοι αὐτῶν, οἷς ἐτέτακτο παραβοηθεῖν εἴ τι δέοι, ἐχώρουν ἔξω τοῦ τείχους πρὸς τὴν βοήν. φρυκτοί τε ᾔροντο ἐς τὰς Θήβας πολέμιοι: [8] παρανῖσχον δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Πλαταιῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους φρυκτοὺς πολλοὺς πρότερον παρεσκευασμένους ἐς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅπως ἀσαφῆ τὰ σημεῖα τῆς φρυκτωρίας τοῖς πολεμίοις ᾖ καὶ μὴ βοηθοῖεν, ἄλλο τι νομίσαντες τὸ γιγνόμενον εἶναι ἢ τὸ ὄν, πρὶν σφῶν οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἐξιόντες διαφύγοιεν καὶ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς ἀντιλάβοιντο.

23. οἱ δ᾽ ὑπερβαίνοντες τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς οἱ πρῶτοι αὐτῶν ἀνεβεβήκεσαν καὶ τοῦ πύργου ἑκατέρου τοὺς φύλακας διαφθείραντες ἐκεκρατήκεσαν, τάς τε διόδους τῶν πύργων ἐνστάντες αὐτοὶ ἐφύλασσον μηδένα δι᾽ αὐτῶν ἐπιβοηθεῖν, καὶ κλίμακας προσθέντες ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους τοῖς πύργοις καὶ ἐπαναβιβάσαντες ἄνδρας πλείους, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων τοὺς ἐπιβοηθοῦντας καὶ κάτωθεν καὶ ἄνωθεν εἶργον βάλλοντες, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ πλείους πολλὰς προσθέντες κλίμακας ἅμα καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπώσαντες διὰ τοῦ μεταπυργίου ὑπερέβαινον. [2] ὁ δὲ διακομιζόμενος αἰεὶ ἵστατο ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους τῆς τάφρου καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐτόξευόν τε καὶ ἠκόντιζον, εἴ τις παραβοηθῶν παρὰ τὸ τεῖχος κωλυτὴς γίγνοιτο τῆς διαβάσεως. [3] ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες διεπεπεραίωντο, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων χαλεπῶς οἱ τελευταῖοι καταβαίνοντες ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν τάφρον, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ τριακόσιοι αὐτοῖς ἐπεφέροντο λαμπάδας ἔχοντες. [4] οἱ μὲν οὖν Πλαταιῆς ἐκείνους ἑώρων μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ σκότους ἑστῶτες ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους τῆς τάφρου, καὶ ἐτόξευόν τε καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον ἐς τὰ γυμνά, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ὄντες ἧσσον διὰ τὰς λαμπάδας καθεωρῶντο, ὥστε φθάνουσι τῶν Πλαταιῶν καὶ οἱ ὕστατοι διαβάντες τὴν τάφρον, χαλεπῶς δὲ καὶ βιαίως: [5] κρύσταλλός τε γὰρ ἐπεπήγει οὐ βέβαιος ἐν αὐτῇ ὥστ᾽ ἐπελθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷος ἀπηλιώτου [ἢ βορέου] ὑδατώδης μᾶλλον, καὶ ἡ νὺξ τοιούτῳ ἀνέμῳ ὑπονειφομένη πολὺ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεποιήκει, ὃ μόλις ὑπερέχοντες ἐπεραιώθησαν. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ ἡ διάφευξις αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον διὰ τοῦ χειμῶνος τὸ μέγεθος.

24. ὁρμήσαντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τάφρου οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἐχώρουν ἁθρόοι τὴν ἐς Θήβας φέρουσαν ὁδόν, ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἡρῷον, νομίζοντες ἥκιστ᾽ <ἂν> σφᾶς ταύτην αὐτοὺς ὑποτοπῆσαι τραπέσθαι τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους: καὶ ἅμα ἑώρων τοὺς Πελοποννησίους τὴν πρὸς Κιθαιρῶνα καὶ Δρυὸς κεφαλὰς τὴν ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν φέρουσαν μετὰ λαμπάδων διώκοντας. [2] καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ἓξ ἢ ἑπτὰ σταδίους οἱ Πλαταιῆς τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν Θηβῶν ἐχώρησαν, ἔπειθ᾽ ὑποστρέψαντες ᾖσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄρος φέρουσαν ὁδὸν ἐς

Ἐρύθρας καὶ Ὑσιάς, καὶ λαβόμενοι τῶν ὀρῶν διαφεύγουσιν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἄνδρες δώδεκα καὶ διακόσιοι ἀπὸ πλειόνων: εἰσὶ γάρ τινες αὐτῶν οἳ ἀπετράποντο ἐς τὴν πόλιν πρὶν ὑπερβαίνειν, εἷς δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῇ ἔξω τάφρῳ τοξότης ἐλήφθη. [3] οἱ μὲν οὖν Πελοποννήσιοι κατὰ χώραν ἐγένοντο τῆς βοηθείας παυσάμενοι: οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Πλαταιῆς τῶν μὲν γεγενημένων εἰδότες οὐδέν, τῶν δὲ ἀποτραπομένων σφίσιν ἀπαγγειλάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς περίεστι, κήρυκα ἐκπέμψαντες, ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, ἐσπένδοντο ἀναίρεσιν τοῖς νεκροῖς, μαθόντες δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπαύσαντο. οἱ μὲν δὴ τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἄνδρες οὕτως ὑπερβάντες ἐσώθησαν.

25. ἐκ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος τελευτῶντος ἐκπέμπεται Σάλαιθος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐς Μυτιλήνην τριήρει. καὶ πλεύσας ἐς Πύρραν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς πεζῇ κατὰ χαράδραν τινά, ᾗ ὑπερβατὸν ἦν τὸ περιτείχισμα, διαλαθὼν ἐσέρχεται ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην, καὶ ἔλεγε τοῖς προέδροις ὅτι ἐσβολή τε ἅμα ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἔσται καὶ αἱ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες παρέσονται ἃς ἔδει βοηθῆσαι αὐτοῖς, προαποπεμφθῆναί τε αὐτὸς τούτων ἕνεκα καὶ ἅμα τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελησόμενος. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν Μυτιληναῖοι ἐθάρσουν τε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἧσσον εἶχον τὴν γνώμην ὥστε ξυμβαίνειν. ὅ τε χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα οὗτος, καὶ τέταρτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

26. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπειδὴ τὰς ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην δύο καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς ἀπέστειλαν ἄρχοντα Ἀλκίδαν, ὃς ἦν αὐτοῖς ναύαρχος, προστάξαντες, αὐτοὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐσέβαλον, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν θορυβούμενοι ἧσσον ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην καταπλεούσαις ἐπιβοηθήσωσιν. [2] ἡγεῖτο δὲ τῆς ἐσβολῆς ταύτης Κλεομένης ὑπὲρ Παυσανίου τοῦ Πλειστοάνακτος υἱέος βασιλέως ὄντος καὶ νεωτέρου ἔτι, πατρὸς δὲ ἀδελφὸς ὤν. [3] ἐδῄωσαν δὲ τῆς Ἀττικῆς τά τε πρότερον τετμημένα [καὶ] εἴ τι ἐβεβλαστήκει καὶ ὅσα ἐν ταῖς πρὶν ἐσβολαῖς παρελέλειπτο: καὶ ἡ ἐσβολὴ αὕτη χαλεπωτάτη ἐγένετο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις μετὰ τὴν δευτέραν. [4] ἐπιμένοντες γὰρ αἰεὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Λέσβου τι

πεύσεσθαι τῶν νεῶν ἔργον ὡς ἤδη πεπεραιωμένων ἐπεξῆλθον τὰ πολλὰ τέμνοντες. ὡς δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἀπέβαινεν αὐτοῖς ὧν προσεδέχοντο κὰ ἐπελελοίπει ὁ σῖτος, ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

27. οἱ δὲ Μυτιληναῖοι ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς αἵ τε νῆες αὐτοῖς οὐχ ἥκον ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀλλὰ ἐνεχρόνιζον καὶ ὁ σῖτος ἐπελελοίπει, ἀναγκάζονται ξυμβαίνειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διὰ τάδε. [2] ὁ Σάλαιθος καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ προσδεχόμενος ἔτι τὰς ναῦς ὁπλίζει τὸν δῆμον πρότερον ψιλὸν ὄντα ὡς ἐπεξιὼν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις: [3] οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἔλαβον ὅπλα, οὔτε ἠκροῶντο ἔτι τῶν ἀρχόντων, κατὰ ξυλλόγους τε γιγνόμενοι ἢ τὸν σῖτον ἐκέλευον τοὺς δυνατοὺς φέρειν ἐς τὸ φανερὸν καὶ διανέμειν ἅπασιν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ξυγχωρήσαντες πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἔφασαν παραδώσειν τὴν πόλιν.

28. γνόντες δὲ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν οὔτ᾽ ἀποκωλύειν δυνατοὶ ὄντες, εἴ τ᾽ ἀπομονωθήσονται τῆς ξυμβάσεως κινδυνεύσοντες, ποιοῦνται κοινῇ ὁμολογίαν πρός τε Πάχητα καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, ὥστε Ἀθηναίοις μὲν ἐξεῖναι βουλεῦσαι περὶ Μυτιληναίων ὁποῖον ἄν τι βούλωνται καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν ἐς τὴν πόλιν δέχεσθαι αὐτούς, πρεσβείαν δὲ ἀποστέλλειν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας Μυτιληναίους περὶ ἑαυτῶν: ἐν ὅσῳ δ᾽ ἂν πάλιν ἔλθωσι, Πάχητα μήτε δῆσαι Μυτιληναίων μηδένα μηδὲ ἀνδραποδίσαι μήτε ἀποκτεῖναι. [2] ἡ μὲν ξύμβασις αὕτη ἐγένετο, οἱ δὲ πράξαντες πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μάλιστα τῶν Μυτιληναίων περιδεεῖς ὄντες, ὡς ἡ στρατιὰ ἐσῆλθεν, οὐκ ἠνέσχοντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοὺς βωμοὺς ὅμως καθίζουσιν: Πάχης δ᾽ ἀναστήσας αὐτοὺς ὥστε μὴ ἀδικῆσαι, κατατίθεται ἐς Τένεδον μέχρι οὗ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τι δόξῃ. [3] πέμψας δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἄντισσαν τριήρεις προσεκτήσατο καὶ τἆλλα τὰ περὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον καθίστατο ᾗ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει.

29. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ Πελοποννήσιοι, οὓς ἔδει ἐν τάχει παραγενέσθαι, πλέοντες περί τε αὐτὴν τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐνδιέτριψαν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον πλοῦν σχολαῖοι κομισθέντες τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Ἀθηναίους λανθάνουσι, πρὶν δὴ τῇ Δήλῳ ἔσχον, προσμείξαντες δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῇ Ἰκάρῳ καὶ Μυκόνῳ πυνθάνονται πρῶτον ὅτι ἡ

Μυτιλήνη ἑάλωκεν. [2] βουλόμενοι δὲ τὸ σαφὲς εἰδέναι κατέπλευσαν ἐς Ἔμβατον τῆς Ἐρυθραίας: ἡμέραι δὲ μάλιστα ἦσαν τῇ Μυτιλήνῃ ἑαλωκυίᾳ ἑπτὰ ὅτε ἐς τὸ Ἔμβατον κατέπλευσαν. πυθόμενοι δὲ τὸ σαφὲς ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, καὶ ἔλεξεν αὐτοῖς Τευτίαπλος ἀνὴρ Ἠλεῖος τάδε.

30. ‘Ἀλκίδα καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι πάρεσμεν ἄρχοντες τῆς στρατιᾶς, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πλεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Μυτιλήνην πρὶν ἐκπύστους γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔχομεν. [2] κατὰ γὰρ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀνδρῶν νεωστὶ πόλιν ἐχόντων πολὺ τὸ ἀφύλακτον εὑρήσομεν, κατὰ μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ πάνυ, ᾗ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἀνέλπιστοι ἐπιγενέσθαι ἄν τινα σφίσι πολέμιον καὶ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀλκὴ τυγχάνει μάλιστα οὖσα: εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ τὸ πεζὸν αὐτῶν κατ᾽ οἰκίας ἀμελέστερον ὡς κεκρατηκότων διεσπάρθαι. [3] εἰ οὖν προσπέσοιμεν ἄφνω τε καὶ νυκτός, ἐλπίζω μετὰ τῶν ἔνδον, εἴ τις ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὑπόλοιπος εὔνους, καταληφθῆναι ἂν τὰ πράγματα. [4] καὶ μὴ ἀποκνήσωμεν τὸν κίνδυνον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ εἴ τις στρατηγὸς ἔν τε αὐτῷ φυλάσσοιτο καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐνορῶν ἐπιχειροίη, πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοῖτο.’

31. ὁ μὲν τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἔπειθε τὸν Ἀλκίδαν. ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν ἀπ᾽ Ἰωνίας φυγάδων καὶ οἱ Λέσβιοι <οἱ> ξυμπλέοντες παρῄνουν, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον φοβεῖται, τῶν ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ πόλεων καταλαβεῖν τινὰ ἢ Κύμην τὴν Αἰολίδα, ὅπως ἐκ πόλεως ὁρμώμενοι τὴν Ἰωνίαν ἀποστήσωσιν ⟦ἐλπίδα δ᾽ εἶναι: οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἀκουσίως ἀφῖχθαι⟧ καὶ τὴν πρόσοδον ταύτην μεγίστην οὖσαν Ἀθηναίων [ἣν] ὑφέλωσι, καὶ ἅμα, ἣν ἐφορμῶσι σφίσιν, αὐτοῖς δαπάνη γίγνηται: πείσειν τε οἴεσθαι καὶ Πισσούθνην ὥστε ξυμπολεμεῖν. [2] ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐνεδέχετο, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς γνώμης εἶχεν, ἐπειδὴ τῆς Μυτιλήνης ὑστερήκει, ὅτι τάχιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πάλιν προσμεῖξαι.

32. ἄρας δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Ἐμβάτου παρέπλει, καὶ προσσχὼν Μυοννήσῳ τῇ Τηίων τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους οὓς κατὰ πλοῦν εἱλήφει ἀπέσφαξε τοὺς πολλούς. [2] καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἔφεσον

καθορμισαμένου αὐτοῦ Σαμίων τῶν ἐξ Ἀναίων ἀφικόμενοι πρέσβεις ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτόν, εἰ ἄνδρας διέφθειρεν οὔτε χεῖρας ἀνταιρομένους οὔτε πολεμίους, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ξυμμάχους: εἴ τε μὴ παύσεται, ὀλίγους μὲν αὐτὸν τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐς φιλίαν προσάξεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ πλείους τῶν φίλων πολεμίους ἕξειν. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐπείσθη τε καὶ Χίων ἄνδρας ὅσους εἶχεν ἔτι ἀφῆκε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινάς: ὁρῶντες γὰρ τὰς ναῦς οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἔφευγον, ἀλλὰ προσεχώρουν μᾶλλον ὡς Ἀττικαῖς καὶ ἐλπίδα οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην εἶχον μή ποτε Ἀθηναίων τῆς θαλάσσης κρατούντων ναῦς Πελοποννησίων ἐς Ἰωνίαν παραβαλεῖν.

33. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Ἐφέσου ὁ Ἀλκίδας ἔπλει κατὰ τάχος καὶ φυγὴν ἐποιεῖτο: ὤφθη γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς Σαλαμινίας καὶ Παράλου ἔτι περὶ Κλάρον ὁρμῶν [αἱ δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν ἔτυχον πλέουσαι], καὶ δεδιὼς τὴν δίωξιν ἔπλει διὰ τοῦ πελάγους ὡς γῇ ἐκούσιος οὐ σχήσων ἄλλῃ ἢ Πελοποννήσῳ. [2] τῷ δὲ Πάχητι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἦλθε μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐρυθραίας ἀγγελία, ἀφικνεῖτο δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν: ἀτειχίστου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς Ἰωνίας μέγα τὸ δέος ἐγένετο μὴ παραπλέοντες οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, εἰ καὶ ὡς μὴ διενοοῦντο μένειν, πορθῶσιν ἅμα προσπίπτοντες τὰς πόλεις. αὐτάγγελοι δ᾽ αὐτὸν ἰδοῦσαι ἐν τῇ Κλάρῳ ἥ τε Πάραλος καὶ ἡ Σαλαμινία ἔφρασαν. [3] ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἐποιεῖτο τὴν δίωξιν: καὶ μέχρι μὲν Πάτμου τῆς νήσου ἐπεδίωξεν, ὡς δ᾽ οὐκέτι ἐν καταλήψει ἐφαίνετο, ἐπανεχώρει. κέρδος δὲ ἐνόμισεν, ἐπειδὴ οὐ μετεώροις περιέτυχεν, ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ ἐγκαταληφθεῖσαι ἠναγκάσθησαν στρατόπεδόν τε ποιεῖσθαι καὶ φυλακὴν σφίσι καὶ ἐφόρμησιν παρασχεῖν.

34. παραπλέων δὲ πάλιν ἔσχε καὶ ἐς Νότιον τὸ Κολοφωνίων, οὗ κατῴκηντο Κολοφώνιοι τῆς ἄνω πόλεως ἐαλωκυίας ὑπὸ Ἰταμάνους καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων κατὰ στάσιν ἰδίαν ἐπαχθέντων: ἐάλω δὲ μάλιστα αὖτη ὅτε ἡ δευτέρα Πελοποννησίων ἐσβολὴ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐγίγνετο. [2] ἐν οὖν τῷ Νοτίῳ οἱ καταφυγόντες καὶ κατοικήσαντες αὐτόθι αὖθις στασιάσαντες, οἱ μὲν παρὰ Πισσούθνου ἐπικούρους

Ἀρκάδων τε καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπαγαγόμενοι ἐν διατειχίσματι εἶχον, καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἄνω πόλεως Κολοφωνίων οἱ μηδίσαντες ξυνεσελθόντες ἐπολίτευον, οἱ δὲ ὑπεξελθόντες τούτους καὶ ὄντες φυγάδες τὸν Πάχητα ἐπάγονται. [3] ὁ δὲ προκαλεσάμενος ἐς λόγους Ἱππίαν τῶν ἐν τῷ διατειχίσματι Ἀρκάδων ἄρχοντα, ὥστε, ἢν μηδὲν ἀρέσκον λέγῃ, πάλιν αὐτὸν καταστήσειν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος σῶν καὶ ὑγιᾶ, ὁ μὲν ἐξῆλθε παρ᾽ αὐτόν, ὁ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἐν φυλακῇ ἀδέσμῳ εἶχεν, αὐτὸς δὲ προσβαλὼν τῷ τειχίσματι ἐξαπιναίως καὶ οὐ προσδεχομένων αἱρεῖ, τούς τε Ἀρκάδας καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ὅσοι ἐνῆσαν διαφθείρει: καὶ τὸν Ἱππίαν ὕστερον ἐσαγαγὼν ὥσπερ ἐσπείσατο, ἐπειδὴ ἔνδον ἦν, ξυλλαμβάνει καὶ κατατοξεύει. [4] Κολοφωνίοις δὲ Νότιον παραδίδωσι πλὴν τῶν μηδισάντων. καὶ ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι οἰκιστὰς πέμψαντες κατὰ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νόμους κατῴκισαν τὸ Νότιον, ξυναγαγόντες πάντας ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, εἴ πού τις ἦν Κολοφωνίων.

35. ὁ δὲ Πάχης ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην τήν τε Πύρραν καὶ Ἔρεσον παρεστήσατο, καὶ Σάλαιθον λαβὼν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον κεκρυμμένον ἀποπέμπει ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Τενέδου Μυτιληναίων ἄνδρας ἅμα οὓς κατέθετο καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὐτῷ αἴτιος ἐδόκει εἶναι τῆς ἀποστάσεως: [2] ἀποπέμπει δὲ καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τὸ πλέον, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ὑπομένων καθίστατο τὰ περὶ τὴν Μυτιλήνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Λέσβον ᾗ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει.

36. ἀφικομένων δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ Σαλαίθου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν μὲν Σάλαιθον εὐθὺς ἀπέκτειναν, ἔστιν ἃ παρεχόμενον τά τ᾽ ἄλλα καὶ ἀπὸ Πλαταιῶν ἔτι γὰρ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ἀπάξειν Πελοποννησίους: [2] περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γνώμας ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς οὐ τοὺς παρόντας μόνον ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἅπαντας Μυτιληναίους ὅσοι ἡβῶσι, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἀνδραποδίσαι, ἐπικαλοῦντες τήν τε ἄλλην ἀπόστασιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀρχόμενοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ προσξυνελάβοντο οὐκ ἐλάχιστον τῆς ὁρμῆς αἱ Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἐς Ἰωνίαν ἐκείνοις βοηθοὶ τολμήσασαι

παρακινδυνεῦσαι: οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ βραχείας διανοίας ἐδόκουν τὴν ἀπόστασιν ποιήσασθαι. [3] πέμπουσιν οὖν τριήρη ὡς Πάχητα ἄγγελον τῶν δεδογμένων, κατὰ τάχος κελεύοντες διαχρήσασθαι Μυτιληναίους. [4] καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετάνοιά τις εὐθὺς ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς ὠμὸν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγνῶσθαι, πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους. [5] ὡς δ᾽ ᾔσθοντο τοῦτο τῶν Μυτιληναίων οἱ παρόντες πρέσβεις καὶ οἱ αὐτοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμπράσσοντες, παρεσκεύασαν τοὺς ἐν τέλει ὥστε αὖθις γνώμας προθεῖναι: καὶ ἔπεισαν ῥᾷον, διότι καὶ ἐκείνοις ἔνδηλον ἦν βουλόμενον τὸ πλέον τῶν πολιτῶν αὖθίς τινας σφίσιν ἀποδοῦναι βουλεύσασθαι. [6] καταστάσης δ᾽ εὐθὺς ἐκκλησίας ἄλλαι τε γνῶμαι ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστων ἐλέγοντο καὶ Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ὅσπερ καὶ τὴν προτέραν ἐνενικήκει ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ὢν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος, παρελθὼν αὖθις ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

37. ‘πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλοτε ἔγνων δημοκρατίαν ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἑτέρων ἄρχειν, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐν τῇ νῦν ὑμετέρᾳ περὶ Μυτιληναίων μεταμελείᾳ. [2] διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχετε, καὶ ὅτι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ πεισθέντες ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἁμάρτητε ἢ οἴκτῳ ἐνδῶτε, οὐκ ἐπικινδύνως ἡγεῖσθε ἐς ὑμᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὴν τῶν ξυμμάχων χάριν μαλακίζεσθαι, οὐ σκοποῦντες ὅτι τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄκοντας ἀρχομένους, οἳ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν χαρίζησθε βλαπτόμενοι αὐτοὶ ἀκροῶνται ὑμῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐκείνων εὐνοίᾳ περιγένησθε. [3] πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ βέβαιον ἡμῖν μηδὲν καθεστήξει ὧν ἂν δόξῃ πέρι, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χείροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις, ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφροσύνης ὠφελιμώτερον ἢ δεξιότης μετὰ ἀκολασίας, οἵ τε φαυλότεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς ξυνετωτέρους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον ἄμεινον οἰκοῦσι τὰς πόλεις. [4] οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι τῶν τε αἰεὶ

λεγομένων ἐς τὸ κοινὸν περιγίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις μείζοσιν οὐκ ἂν δηλώσαντες τὴν γνώμην, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις: οἱ δ᾽ ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἐξ αὐτῶν ξυνέσει ἀμαθέστεροι μὲν τῶν νόμων ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀδυνατώτεροι δὲ τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος μέμψασθαι λόγον, κριταὶ δὲ ὄντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγωνισταὶ ὀρθοῦνται τὰ πλείω. [5] ὡς οὖν χρὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς ποιοῦντας μὴ δεινότητι καὶ ξυνέσεως ἀγῶνι ἐπαιρομένους παρὰ δόξαν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει παραινεῖν.

38. ‘ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ θαυμάζω μὲν τῶν προθέντων αὖθις περὶ Μυτιληναίων λέγειν καὶ χρόνου διατριβὴν ἐμποιησάντων, ὅ ἐστι πρὸς τῶν ἠδικηκότων μᾶλλον ὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι ἀμβλυτέρᾳ τῇ ὀργῇ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ τῷ παθεῖν ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω κείμενον ἀντίπαλον ὂν μάλιστα τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀναλαμβάνει , θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ ὅστις ἔσται ὁ ἀντερῶν καὶ ἀξιώσων ἀποφαίνειν τὰς μὲν Μυτιληναίων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὠφελίμους οὔσας, τὰς δ᾽ ἡμετέρας ξυμφορὰς τοῖς ξυμμάχοις βλάβας καθισταμένας. [2] καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἢ τῷ λέγειν πιστεύσας τὸ πάνυ δοκοῦν ἀνταποφῆναι ὡς οὐκ ἔγνωσταιἀγωνίσαιτ᾽ ἄν, ἢ κέρδει ἐπαιρόμενος τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου ἐκπονήσας παράγειν πειράσεται. [3] ἡ δὲ πόλις ἐκ τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀγώνων τὰ μὲν ἆθλα ἑτέροις δίδωσιν, αὐτὴ δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους ἀναφέρει. [4] αἴτιοι δ᾽ ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες, οἵτινες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι, ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων, τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἔργα ἀπὸ τῶν εὖ εἰπόντων σκοποῦντες ὡς δυνατὰ γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πεπραγμένα ἤδη, οὐ τὸ δρασθὲν πιστότερον ὄψει λαβόντες ἢ τὸ ἀκουσθέν, ἀπὸ τῶν λόγῳ καλῶς ἐπιτιμησάντων: [5] καὶ μετὰ καινότητος μὲν λόγου ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι, μετὰ δεδοκιμασμένου δὲ μὴ ξυνέπεσθαι ἐθέλειν, δοῦλοι ὄντες τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων, ὑπερόπται δὲ τῶν εἰωθότων, [6] καὶ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος βουλόμενος δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι τοῖς τοιαῦτα λέγουσι μὴ ὕστεροι ἀκολουθῆσαι δοκεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ, ὀξέως δέ τι λέγοντος προεπαινέσαι, καὶ προαισθέσθαι τε πρόθυμοι εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ προνοῆσαι

βραδεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποβησόμενα, [7] ζητοῦντές τε ἄλλο τι ὡς εἰπεῖν ἢ ἐν οἷς ζῶμεν, φρονοῦντες δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἱκανῶς: ἁπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις.

39. ‘ὧν ἐγὼ πειρώμενος ἀποτρέπειν ὑμᾶς ἀποφαίνω Μυτιληναίους μάλιστα δὴ μίαν πόλιν ἠδικηκότας ὑμᾶς. [2] ἐγὼ γάρ, οἵτινες μὲν μὴ δυνατοὶ φέρειν τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀρχὴν ἢ οἵτινες ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀναγκασθέντες ἀπέστησαν, ξυγγνώμην ἔχω: νῆσον δὲ οἵτινες ἔχοντες μετὰ τειχῶν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν μόνον φοβούμενοι τοὺς ἡμετέρους πολεμίους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ τριήρων παρασκευῇ οὐκ ἄφαρκτοι ἦσαν πρὸς αὐτούς, αὐτόνομοί τε οἰκοῦντες καὶ τιμώμενοι ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ὑπὸ ἡμῶν τοιαῦτα εἰργάσαντο, τί ἄλλο οὗτοι ἢ ἐπεβούλευσάν τε καὶ ἐπανέστησαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπέστησαν ἀπόστασις μέν γε τῶν βίαιόν τι πασχόντων ἐστίν, ἐζήτησάν τε μετὰ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων ἡμᾶς στάντες διαφθεῖραι; καίτοι δεινότερόν ἐστιν ἢ εἰ καθ᾽ αὐτοὺς δύναμιν κτώμενοι ἀντεπολέμησαν. [3] παράδειγμα δὲ αὐτοῖς οὔτε αἱ τῶν πέλας ξυμφοραὶ ἐγένοντο, ὅσοι ἀποστάντες ἤδη ἡμῶν ἐχειρώθησαν, οὔτε ἡ παροῦσα εὐδαιμονία παρέσχεν ὅκνον μὴ ἐλθεῖν ἐς τὰ δεινά: γενόμενοι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον θρασεῖς καὶ ἐλπίσαντες μακρότερα μὲν τῆς δυνάμεως, ἐλάσσω δὲ τῆς βουλήσεως, πόλεμον ἤραντο, ἰσχὺν ἀξιώσαντες τοῦ δικαίου προθεῖναι: ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ᾠήθησαν περιέσεσθαι, ἐπέθεντο ἡμῖν οὐκ ἀδικούμενοι. [4] εἴωθε δὲ τῶν πόλεων αἷς ἂν μάλιστα καὶ δι᾽ ἐλαχίστου ἀπροσδόκητος εὐπραγία ἔλθῃ, ἐς ὕβριν τρέπειν: τὰ δὲ πολλὰ κατὰ λόγον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐτυχοῦντα ἀσφαλέστερα ἢ παρὰ δόξαν, καὶ κακοπραγίαν ὡς εἰπεῖν ῥᾷον ἀπωθοῦνται ἢ εὐδαιμονίαν διασῴζονται. [5] χρῆν δὲ Μυτιληναίους καὶ πάλαι μηδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν τετιμῆσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐς τόδε ἐξύβρισαν: πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος τὸ μὲν θεραπεῦον ὑπερφρονεῖν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὑπεῖκον θαυμάζειν. [6] κολασθέντων δὲ καὶ νῦν ἀξίως τῆς ἀδικίας, καὶ μὴ τοῖς μὲν ὀλίγοις ἡ αἰτία προστεθῇ, τὸν δὲ δῆμον ἀπολύσητε. πάντες

γὰρ ὑμῖν γε ὁμοίως ἐπέθεντο, οἷς γ᾽ ἐξῆν ὡς ἡμᾶς τραπομένοις νῦν πάλιν ἐν τῇ πόλει εἶναι: ἀλλὰ τὸν μετὰ τῶν ὀλίγων κίνδυνον ἡγησάμενοι βεβαιότερον ξυναπέστησαν. [7] τῶν τε ξυμμάχων σκέψασθε εἰ τοῖς τε ἀναγκασθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τοῖς ἑκοῦσιν ἀποστᾶσι τὰς αὐτὰς ζημίας προσθήσετε, τίνα οἴεσθε ὄντινα οὐ βραχείᾳ προφάσει ἀποστήσεσθαι, ὅταν ἢ κατορθώσαντι ἐλευθέρωσις ᾖ ἢ σφαλέντι μηδὲν παθεῖν ἀνήκεστον; [8] ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς ἑκάστην πόλιν ἀποκεκινδυνεύσεται τά τε χρήματα καὶ αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ τυχόντες μὲν πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην παραλαβόντες τῆς ἔπειτα προσόδου, δι᾽ ἣν ἰσχύομεν, τὸ λοιπὸν στερήσεσθε, σφαλέντες δὲ πολεμίους πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξομεν, καὶ ὃν χρόνον τοῖς νῦν καθεστηκόσι δεῖ ἐχθροῖς ἀνθίστασθαι, τοῖς οἰκείοις ξυμμάχοις πολεμήσομεν.

40. ‘οὔκουν δεῖ προθεῖναι ἐλπίδα οὔτε λόγῳ πιστὴν οὔτε χρήμασιν ὠνητήν, ὡς ξυγγνώμην ἁμαρτεῖν ἀνθρωπίνως λήψονται. ἄκοντες μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔβλαψαν, εἰδότες δὲ ἐπεβούλευσαν: ξύγγνωμον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον. [2] ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε πρῶτον καὶ νῦν διαμάχομαι μὴ μεταγνῶναι ὑμᾶς τὰ προδεδογμένα, μηδὲ τρισὶ τοῖς ἀξυμφορωτάτοις τῇ ἀρχῇ, οἴκτῳ καὶ ἡδονῇ λόγων καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ, ἁμαρτάνειν. [3] ἔλεός τε γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους δίκαιος ἀντιδίδοσθαι, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς οὔτ᾽ ἀντοικτιοῦντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καθεστῶτας αἰεὶ πολεμίους: οἵ τε τέρποντες λόγῳ ῥήτορες ἔξουσι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐλάσσοσιν ἀγῶνα, καὶ μὴ ἐν ᾧ ἡ μὲν πόλις βραχέα ἡσθεῖσα μεγάλα ζημιώσεται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εὖ εἰπεῖν τὸ παθεῖν εὖ ἀντιλήψονται: καὶ ἡ ἐπιείκεια πρὸς τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐπιτηδείους καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσεσθαι μᾶλλον δίδοται ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους τε καὶ οὐδὲν ἧσσον πολεμίους ὑπολειπομένους. [4] ἔν τε ξυνελὼν λέγω: πειθόμενοι μὲν ἐμοὶ τά τε δίκαια ἐς Μυτιληναίους καὶ τὰ ξύμφορα ἅμα ποιήσετε, ἄλλως δὲ γνόντες τοῖς μὲν οὐ χαριεῖσθε, ὑμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον δικαιώσεσθε. εἰ γὰρ οὗτοι ὀρθῶς ἀπέστησαν, ὑμεῖς ἂν οὐ χρεὼν ἄρχοιτε. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ οὐ προσῆκον ὅμως ἀξιοῦτε τοῦτο δρᾶν, παρὰ τὸ εἰκός τοι καὶ τούσδε ξυμφόρως δεῖ κολάζεσθαι, ἢ παύεσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ

ἀκινδύνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι. [5] τῇ τε αὐτῇ ζημίᾳ ἀξιώσατε ἀμύνασθαι καὶ μὴ ἀναλγητότεροι οἱ διαφεύγοντες τῶν ἐπιβουλευσάντων φανῆναι, ἐνθυμηθέντες ἃ εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι κρατήσαντας ὑμῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ προϋπάρξαντας ἀδικίας. [6] μάλιστα δὲ οἱ μὴ ξὺν προφάσει τινὰ κακῶς ποιοῦντες ἐπεξέρχονται καὶ διολλύναι, τὸν κίνδυνον ὑφορώμενοι τοῦ ὑπολειπομένου ἐχθροῦ: ὁ γὰρ μὴ ξὺν ἀνάγκῃ τι παθὼν χαλεπώτερος διαφυγὼν τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἐχθροῦ. [7] ’μὴ οὖν προδόται γένησθε ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, γενόμενοι δ᾽ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ὡς πρὸ παντὸς ἂν ἐτιμήσασθε αὐτοὺς χειρώσασθαι, νῦν ἀνταπόδοτε μὴ μαλακισθέντες πρὸς τὸ παρὸν αὐτίκα μηδὲ τοῦ ἐπικρεμασθέντος ποτὲ δεινοῦ ἀμνημονοῦντες. κολάσατε δὲ ἀξίως τούτους τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις παράδειγμα σαφὲς καταστήσατε, ὃς ἂν ἀφιστῆται, θανάτῳ ζημιωσόμενον. τόδε γὰρ ἦν γνῶσιν, ἧσσον τῶν πολεμίων ἀμελήσαντες τοῖς ὑμετέροις αὐτῶν μαχεῖσθε ξυμμάχοις.’

41. τοιαῦτα μὲν ὁ Κλέων εἶπεν: μετὰ δ᾽ αὐτὸν Διόδοτος ὁ Εὐκράτους, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀντέλεγε μάλιστα μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι Μυτιληναίους, παρελθὼν καὶ τότε ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

42. ‘οὔτε τοὺς προθέντας τὴν διαγνώμην αὖθις περὶ Μυτιληναίων αἰτιῶμαι, οὔτε τοὺς μεμφομένους μὴ πολλάκις περὶ τῶν μεγίστων βουλεύεσθαι ἐπαινῶ, νομίζω δὲ δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εὐβουλίᾳ εἶναι, τάχος τε καὶ ὀργήν, ὧν τὸ μὲν μετὰ ἀνοίας φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ἀπαιδευσίας καὶ βραχύτητος γνώμης. [2] τούς τε λόγους ὅστις διαμάχεται μὴ διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμάτων γίγνεσθαι, ἢ ἀξύνετός ἐστιν ἢ ἰδίᾳ τι αὐτῷ διαφέρει: ἀξύνετος μέν, εἰ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἡγεῖται περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐμφανοῦς φράσαι, διαφέρει δ᾽ αὐτῷ, εἰ βουλόμενός τι αἰσχρὸν πεῖσαι εὖ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἂν ἡγεῖται περὶ τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ δύνασθαι, εὖ δὲ διαβαλὼν ἐκπλῆξαι ἂν τούς τε ἀντεροῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους. [3] χαλεπώτατοι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ χρήμασι προσκατηγοροῦντες ἐπίδειξίν τινα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμαθίαν κατῃτιῶντο, ὁ μὴ πείσας ἀξυνετώτερος ἂν δόξας εἶναι ἢ

ἀδικώτερος ἀπεχώρει: ἀδικίας δ᾽ ἐπιφερομένης πείσας τε ὕποπτος γίγνεται καὶ μὴ τυχὼν μετὰ ἀξυνεσίας καὶ ἄδικος. [4] ἥ τε πόλις οὐκ ὠφελεῖται ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε: φόβῳ γὰρ ἀποστερεῖται τῶν ξυμβούλων. καὶ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοῖτο ἀδυνάτους λέγειν ἔχουσα τοὺς τοιούτους τῶν πολιτῶν: ἐλάχιστα γὰρ ἂν πεισθεῖεν ἁμαρτάνειν. [5] χρὴ δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην μὴ ἐκφοβοῦντα τοὺς ἀντεροῦντας, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου φαίνεσθαι ἄμεινον λέγοντα, τὴν δὲ σώφρονα πόλιν τῷ τε πλεῖστα εὖ βουλεύοντι μὴ προστιθέναι τιμήν, ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἐλασσοῦν τῆς ὑπαρχούσης, καὶ τὸν μὴ τυχόντα γνώμης οὐχ ὅπως ζημιοῦν ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἀτιμάζειν. [6] οὕτω γὰρ ὅ τε κατορθῶν ἥκιστα ἂν ἐπὶ τῷ ἔτι μειζόνων ἀξιοῦσθαι παρὰ γνώμην τι καὶ πρὸς χάριν λέγοι, ὅ τε μὴ ἐπιτυχὼν ὀρέγοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ χαριζόμενός τι καὶ αὐτὸς προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος.

43. ‘ὧν ἡμεῖς τἀναντία δρῶμεν, καὶ προσέτι ἤν τις καὶ ὑποπτεύηται κέρδους μὲν ἕνεκα τὰ βέλτιστα δὲ ὅμως λέγειν, φθονήσαντες τῆς οὐ βεβαίου δοκήσεως τῶν κερδῶν τὴν φανερὰν ὠφελίαν τῆς πόλεως ἀφαιρούμεθα. [2] καθέστηκε δὲ τἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐθέος λεγόμενα μηδὲν ἀνυποπτότερα εἶναι τῶν κακῶν, ὥστε δεῖν ὁμοίως τόν τε τὰ δεινότατα βουλόμενον πεῖσαι ἀπάτῃ προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνω λέγοντα ψευσάμενον πιστὸν γενέσθαι. [3] μόνην τε πόλιν διὰ τὰς περινοίας εὖ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς μὴ ἐξαπατήσαντα ἀδύνατον: ὁ γὰρ διδοὺς φανερῶς τι ἀγαθὸν ἀνθυποπτεύεται ἀφανῶς πῃ πλέον ἕξειν. [4] χρὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε ἀξιοῦν τι ἡμᾶς περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας λέγειν ὑμῶν τῶν δι᾽ ὀλίγου σκοπούντων, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὑπεύθυνον τὴν παραίνεσιν ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀνεύθυνον τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀκρόασιν. [5] εἰ γὰρ ὅ τε πείσας καὶ ὁ ἐπισπόμενος ὁμοίως ἐβλάπτοντο, σωφρονέστερον ἂν ἐκρίνετε: νῦν δὲ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἥντινα τύχητε ἔστιν ὅτε σφαλέντες τὴν τοῦ πείσαντος μίαν γνώμην ζημιοῦτε καὶ οὐ τὰς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν, εἰ πολλαὶ οὖσαι ξυνεξήμαρτον.

44. ‘ἐγὼ δὲ παρῆλθον οὔτε ἀντερῶν περὶ Μυτιληναίων οὔτε κατηγορήσων. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐβουλίας. [2] ἤν τε γὰρ ἀποφήνω πάνυ ἀδικοῦντας αὐτούς, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι κελεύσω, εἰ μὴ ξυμφέρον, ἤν τε καὶ ἔχοντάς τι ξυγγνώμης † εἶεν †, εἰ τῇ πόλει μὴ ἀγαθὸν φαίνοιτο. [3] νομίζω δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον βουλεύεσθαι ἢ τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ τοῦτο ὃ μάλιστα Κλέων ἰσχυρίζεται, ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν ξυμφέρον ἔσεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἧσσον ἀφίστασθαι θάνατον ζημίαν προθεῖσι, καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τοῦ ἐς τὸ μέλλον καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀντισχυριζόμενος τἀναντία γιγνώσκω. [4] καὶ οὐκ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς τῷ εὐπρεπεῖ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου τὸ χρήσιμον τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἀπώσασθαι. δικαιότερος γὰρ ὢν αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὴν νῦν ὑμετέραν ὀργὴν ἐς Μυτιληναίους τάχ᾽ ἂν ἐπισπάσαιτο: ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως χρησίμως ἕξουσιν.

45. ‘ἐν οὖν ταῖς πόλεσι πολλῶν θανάτου ζημίαι πρόκεινται, καὶ οὐκ ἴσων τῷδε, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλασσόνων ἁμαρτημάτων: ὅμως δὲ τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαιρόμενοι κινδυνεύουσι, καὶ οὐδείς πω καταγνοὺς ἑαυτοῦ μὴ περιέσεσθαι τῷ ἐπιβουλεύματι ἦλθεν ἐς τὸ δεινόν. [2] πόλις τε ἀφισταμένη τίς πω ἥσσω τῇ δοκήσει ἔχουσα τὴν παρασκευὴν ἢ οἰκείαν ἢ ἄλλων ξυμμαχίᾳ τούτῳ ἐπεχείρησεν; [3] πεφύκασί τε ἅπαντες καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἁμαρτάνειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος ὅστις ἀπείρξει τούτου, ἐπεὶ διεξεληλύθασί γε διὰ πασῶν τῶν ζημιῶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι προστιθέντες, εἴ πως ἧσσον ἀδικοῖντο ὑπὸ τῶν κακούργων. καὶ εἰκὸς τὸ πάλαι τῶν μεγίστων ἀδικημάτων μαλακωτέρας κεῖσθαι αὐτάς, παραβαινομένων δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐς τὸν θάνατον αἱ πολλαὶ ἀνήκουσιν: καὶ τοῦτο ὅμως παραβαίνεται. [4] ἢ τοίνυν δεινότερόν τι τούτου δέος εὑρετέον ἐστὶν ἢ τόδε γε οὐδὲν ἐπίσχει, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκῃ τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δ᾽ ἐξουσία ὕβρει τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὀργῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἑκάστη τις κατέχεται ὑπ᾽ ἀνηκέστου τινὸς κρείσσονος ἐξάγουσιν ἐς τοὺς κινδύνους. [5] ἥ τε ἐλπὶς καὶ ὁ

ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἡγούμενος, ἡ δ᾽ ἐφεπομένη, καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν ἐκφροντίζων, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα, πλεῖστα βλάπτουσι, καὶ ὄντα ἀφανῆ κρείσσω ἐστὶ τῶν ὁρωμένων δεινῶν. [6] καὶ ἡ τύχη ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔλασσον ξυμβάλλεται ἐς τὸ ἐπαίρειν: ἀδοκήτως γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε παρισταμένη καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων κινδυνεύειν τινὰ προάγει, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τὰς πόλεις, ὅσῳ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε, ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς, καὶ μετὰ πάντων ἕκαστος ἀλογίστως ἐπὶ πλέον τι αὐτὸν ἐδόξασεν. [7] ἁπλῶς τε ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐηθείας,ὅστις οἴεται τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὁρμωμένης προθύμως τι πρᾶξαι ἀποτροπήν τινα ἔχειν ἢ νόμων ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ δεινῷ.

46. ‘οὔκουν χρὴ οὔτε τοῦ θανάτου τῇ ζημίᾳ ὡς ἐχεγγύῳ πιστεύσαντας χεῖρον βουλεύσασθαι οὔτε ἀνέλπιστον καταστῆσαι τοῖς ἀποστᾶσιν ὡς οὐκ ἔσται μεταγνῶναι καὶ ὅτι ἐν βραχυτάτῳ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καταλῦσαι. [2] σκέψασθε γὰρ ὅτι νῦν μέν, ἤν τις καὶ ἀποστᾶσα πόλις γνῷ μὴ περιεσομένη, ἔλθοι ἂν ἐς ξύμβασιν δυνατὴ οὖσα ἔτι τὴν δαπάνην ἀποδοῦναι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ὑποτελεῖν: ἐκείνως δὲ τίνα οἴεσθε ἤντινα οὐκ ἄμεινον μὲν ἢ νῦν παρασκευάσεσθαι, πολιορκίᾳ δὲ παρατενεῖσθαι ἐς τοὔσχατον, εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ δύναται σχολῇ καὶ ταχὺ ξυμβῆναι; [3] ἡμῖν τε πῶς οὐ βλάβη δαπανᾶν καθημένοις διὰ τὸ ἀξύμβατον καί, ἢν ἕλωμεν, πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην παραλαβεῖν καὶ τῆς προσόδου τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς στέρεσθαι; ἰσχύομεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους τῷδε. [4] ὥστε οὐ δικαστὰς ὄντας δεῖ ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον τῶν ἐξαμαρτανόντων ἀκριβεῖς βλάπτεσθαι ἢ ὁρᾶν ὅπως ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον μετρίως κολάζοντες ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔξομεν ἐς χρημάτων λόγον ἰσχυούσαις χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων τῆς δεινότητος ἀξιοῦν ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἐπιμελείας. [5] οὗ νῦν τοὐναντίον δρῶντες, ἤν τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ βίᾳ ἀρχόμενον εἰκότως πρὸς αὐτονομίαν ἀποστάντα χειρωσώμεθα, χαλεπῶς οἰόμεθα χρῆναι τιμωρεῖσθαι. [6] χρὴ δὲ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους οὐκ ἀφισταμένους σφόδρα κολάζειν, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἀποστῆναι σφόδρα φυλάσσειν καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν ὅπως μηδ᾽ ἐς

ἐπίνοιαν τούτου ἴωσι, κρατήσαντάς τε ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ἐλάχιστον τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέρειν.

47. ‘ὑμεῖς δὲ σκέψασθε ὅσον ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ἁμαρτάνοιτε Κλέωνι πειθόμενοι. [2] νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν ὁ δῆμος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν εὔνους ἐστί, καὶ ἢ οὐ ξυναφίσταται τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἤ, ἐὰν βιασθῇ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασι πολέμιος εὐθύς, καὶ τῆς ἀντικαθισταμένης πόλεως τὸ πλῆθος ξύμμαχον ἔχοντες ἐς πόλεμον ἐπέρχεσθε. [3] εἰ δὲ διαφθερεῖτε τὸν δῆμον τὸν Μυτιληναίων, ὃς οὔτε μετέσχε τῆς ἀποστάσεως, ἐπειδή τε ὅπλων ἐκράτησεν, ἐκὼν παρέδωκε τὴν πόλιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδικήσετε τοὺς εὐεργέτας κτείνοντες, ἔπειτα καταστήσετε τοῖς δυνατοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὃ βούλονται μάλιστα: ἀφιστάντες γὰρ τὰς πόλεις τὸν δῆμον εὐθὺς ξύμμαχον ἕξουσι, προδειξάντων ὑμῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ζημίαν τοῖς τε ἀδικοῦσιν ὁμοίως κεῖσθαι καὶ τοῖς μή. [4] δεῖ δέ, καὶ εἰ ἠδίκησαν, μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι, ὅπως ὃ μόνον ἡμῖν ἔτι ξύμμαχόν ἐστι μὴ πολέμιον γένηται. [5] καὶ τοῦτο πολλῷ ξυμφορώτερον ἡγοῦμαι ἐς τὴν κάθεξιν τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἑκόντας ἡμᾶς ἀδικηθῆναι ἢ δικαίως οὓς μὴ δεῖ διαφθεῖραι: καὶ τὸ Κλέωνος τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον καὶ ξύμφορον τῆς τιμωρίας οὐχ εὑρίσκεται ἐν αὐτῷ δυνατὸν ὂν ἅμα γίγνεσθαι.

48. ‘ὑμεῖς δὲ γνόντες ἀμείνω τάδε εἶναι καὶ μήτε οἴκτῳ πλέον νείμαντες μήτ᾽ ἐπιεικείᾳ, οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἐῶ προσάγεσθαι, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παραινουμένων πείθεσθέ μοι Μυτιληναίων οὓς μὲν Πάχης ἀπέπεμψεν ὡς ἀδικοῦντας κρῖναι καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἐᾶν οἰκεῖν. [2] τάδε γὰρ ἔς τε τὸ μέλλον ἀγαθὰ καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἤδη φοβερά: ὅστις γὰρ εὖ βουλεύεται πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ μετ᾽ ἔργων ἰσχύος ἀνοίᾳ ἐπιών.’

49. τοιαῦτα δὲ ὁ Διόδοτος εἶπεν. ῥηθεισῶν δὲ τῶν γνωμῶν τούτων μάλιστα ἀντιπάλων πρὸς ἀλλήλας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦλθον μὲν ἐς ἀγῶνα ὅμως τῆς δόξης καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ ἀγχώμαλοι, ἐκράτησε δὲ ἡ τοῦ Διοδότου. [2] καὶ τριήρη εὐθὺς ἄλλην ἀπέστελλον κατὰ σπουδήν, ὅπως μὴ φθασάσης τῆς προτέρας εὕρωσι διεφθαρμένην τὴν πόλιν:

προεῖχε δὲ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ νυκτὶ μάλιστα. [3] παρασκευασάντων δὲ τῶν Μυτιληναίων πρέσβεων τῇ νηὶ οἶνον καὶ ἄλφιτα καὶ μεγάλα ὑποσχομένων, εἰ φθάσειαν, ἐγένετο σπουδὴ τοῦ πλοῦ τοιαύτη ὥστε ἥσθιόν τε ἅμα ἐλαύνοντες οἴνῳ καὶ ἐλαίῳ ἄλφιτα πεφυραμένα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὕπνον ᾑροῦντο κατὰ μέρος, οἱ δὲ ἤλαυνον. [4] κατὰ τύχην δὲ πνεύματος οὐδενὸς ἐναντιωθέντος καὶ τῆς μὲν προτέρας νεὼς οὐ σπουδῇ πλεούσης ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον, ταύτης δὲ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἐπειγομένης, ἡ μὲν ἔφθασε τοσοῦτον ὅσον Πάχητα ἀνεγνωκέναι τὸ ψήφισμα καὶ μέλλειν δράσειν τὰ δεδογμένα, ἡ δ᾽ ὑστέρα αὐτῆς ἐπικατάγεται καὶ διεκώλυσε μὴ διαφθεῖραι. παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἦλθε κινδύνου.

50. τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἄνδρας οὓς ὁ Πάχης ἀπέπεμψεν ὡς αἰτιωτάτους ὄντας τῆς ἀποστάσεως Κλέωνος γνώμῃ διέφθειραν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ⌊ἦσαν δὲ ὀλίγῳ πλείους χιλίων⌋, καὶ Μυτιληναίων τείχη καθεῖλον καὶ ναῦς παρέλαβον. [2] ὕστερον δὲ φόρον μὲν οὐκ ἔταξαν Λεσβίοις, κλήρους δὲ ποιήσαντες τῆς γῆς πλὴν τῆς Μηθυμναίων τρισχιλίους τριακοσίους μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἱεροὺς ἐξεῖλον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους σφῶν αὐτῶν κληρούχους τοὺς λαχόντας ἀπέπεμψαν: οἷς ἀργύριον Λέσβιοι ταξάμενοι τοῦ κλήρου ἑκάστου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύο μνᾶς φέρειν αὐτοὶ εἰργάζοντο τὴν γῆν. [3] παρέλαβον δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ πολίσματα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅσων Μυτιληναῖοι ἐκράτουν, καὶ ὑπήκουον ὕστερον Ἀθηναίων. τὰ μὲν κατὰ Λέσβον οὕτως ἐγένετο.

51. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει μετὰ τὴν Λέσβου ἅλωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Νικίου τοῦ Νικηράτου στρατηγοῦντος ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Μινῴαν τὴν νῆσον, ἣ κεῖται πρὸ Μεγάρων: ἐχρῶντο δὲ αὐτῇ πύργον ἐνοικοδομήσαντες οἱ Μεγαρῆς φρουρίῳ. [2] ἐβούλετο δὲ Νικίας τὴν φυλακὴν αὐτόθεν δι᾽ ἐλάσσονος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ Βουδόρου καὶ τῆς Σαλαμῖνος εἶναι, τούς τε Πελοποννησίους, ὅπως μὴ ποιῶνται ἔκπλους αὐτόθεν λανθάνοντες τριήρων τε, οἷον καὶ τὸ πρὶν γενόμενον, καὶ λῃστῶν ἐκπομπαῖς, τοῖς τε Μεγαρεῦσιν ἅμα μηδὲν ἐσπλεῖν. [3] ἑλὼν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς Νισαίας πρῶτον δύο πύργω προύχοντε μηχαναῖς ἐκ θαλάσσης καὶ

τὸν ἔσπλουν ἐς τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς νήσου ἐλευθερώσας ἀπετείχιζε καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου, ᾗ κατὰ γέφυραν διὰ τενάγους ἐπιβοήθεια ἦν τῇ νήσῳ οὐ πολὺ διεχούσῃ τῆς ἠπείρου. [4] ὡς δὲ τοῦτο ἐξειργάσαντο ἐν ἡμέραις ὀλίγαις, ὕστερον δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ τεῖχος ἐγκαταλιπὼν καὶ φρουρὰν ἀνεχώρησε τῷ στρατῷ.

52. ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τούτου καὶ οἱ Πλαταιῆς οὐκέτι ἔχοντες σῖτον οὐδὲ δυνάμενοι πολιορκεῖσθαι ξυνέβησαν τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις τοιῷδε τρόπῳ. [2] προσέβαλλον αὐτῶν τῷ τείχει, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἀμύνεσθαι. γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἄρχων τὴν ἀσθένειαν αὐτῶν βίᾳ μὲν οὐκ ἐβούλετο ἑλεῖν ⟨εἰρημένον γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος, ὅπως, εἰ σπονδαὶ γίγνοιντό ποτε πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ξυγχωροῖεν ὅσα πολέμῳ χωρία ἔχουσιν ἑκάτεροι ἀποδίδοσθαι, μὴ ἀνάδοτος εἴη ἡ Πλάταια ὡς αὐτῶν ἑκόντων προσχωρησάντων⟩, προσπέμπει δὲ αὐτοῖς κήρυκα λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ἑκόντες τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ δικασταῖς ἐκείνοις χρήσασθαι, τούς τε ἀδίκους κολάζειν, παρὰ δίκην δὲ οὐδένα. [3] τοσαῦτα μὲν ὁ κῆρυξ εἶπεν: οἱ δέ ⟨ἦσαν γὰρ ἤδη ἐν τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ⟩ παρέδοσαν τὴν πόλιν. καὶ τοὺς Πλαταιᾶς ἔτρεφον οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἡμέρας τινάς, ἐν ὅσῳ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος δικασταὶ πέντε ἄνδρες ἀφίκοντο. [4] ἐλθόντων δὲ αὐτῶν κατηγορία μὲν οὐδεμία προυτέθη, ἠρώτων δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐπικαλεσάμενοι τοσοῦτον μόνον, εἴ τι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ καθεστῶτι ἀγαθόν [τι] εἰργασμένοι εἰσίν. [5] οἱ δ᾽ ἔλεγον αἰτησάμενοι μακρότερα εἰπεῖν καὶ προτάξαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν Ἀστύμαχόν τε τὸν Ἀσωπολάου καὶ Λάκωνα τὸν Αἰειμνήστου πρόξενον ὄντα Λακεδαιμονίων: καὶ ἐπελθόντες ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

53. ‘τὴν μὲν παράδοσιν τῆς πόλεως, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πιστεύσαντες ὑμῖν ἐποιησάμεθα, οὐ τοιάνδε δίκην οἰόμενοι ὑφέξειν, νομιμωτέραν δέ τινα ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ἐν δικασταῖς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοις δεξάμενοι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐσμέν, γενέσθαι [ἢ ὑμῖν], ἡγούμενοι τὸ ἴσον μάλιστ᾽ ἂν φέρεσθαι. [2] νῦν δὲ φοβούμεθα

μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἅμα ἡμαρτήκαμεν: τόν τε γὰρ ἀγῶνα περὶ τῶν δεινοτάτων εἶναι εἰκότως ὑποπτεύομεν καὶ ὑμᾶς μὴ οὐ κοινοὶ ἀποβῆτε, τεκμαιρόμενοι προκατηγορίας τε ἡμῶν οὐ προγεγενημένης ᾗ χρὴ ἀντειπεῖν ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ λόγον ᾐτησάμεθα τό τε ἐπερώτημα βραχὺ ὄν, ᾧ τὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐναντία γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ ἔλεγχον ἔχει. [3] πανταχόθεν δὲ ἄποροι καθεστῶτες ἀναγκαζόμεθα καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον δοκεῖ εἶναι εἰπόντας τι κινδυνεύειν: καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὴ ῥηθεὶς λόγος τοῖς ὧδ᾽ ἔχουσιν αἰτίαν ἂν παράσχοι ὡς, εἰ ἐλέχθη, σωτήριος ἂν ἦν. [4] χαλεπῶς δὲ ἔχει ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἡ πειθώ. ἀγνῶτες μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀλλήλων ἐπεσενεγκάμενοι μαρτύρια ὧν ἄπειροι ἦτε ὠφελούμεθ᾽ ἄν: νῦν δὲ πρὸς εἰδότας πάντα λελέξεται, καὶ δέδιμεν οὐχὶ μὴ προκαταγνόντες ἡμῶν τὰς ἀρετὰς ἥσσους εἶναι τῶν ὑμετέρων ἔγκλημα αὐτὸ ποιῆτε, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλοις χάριν φέροντες ἐπὶ διεγνωσμένην κρίσιν καθιστώμεθα.

54. παρεχόμενοι δὲ ὅμως ἃ ἔχομεν δίκαια πρός τε τὰ Θηβαίων διάφορα καὶ ἐς ὑμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, τῶν εὖ δεδραμένων ὑπόμνησιν ποιησόμεθα καὶ πείθειν πειρασόμεθα. [2] φαμὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἐρώτημα τὸ βραχύ, εἴ τι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε ἀγαθὸν πεποιήκαμεν, εἰ μὲν ὡς πολεμίους ἐρωτᾶτε, οὐκ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς μὴ εὖ παθόντας, φίλους δὲ νομίζοντας αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον τοὺς ἡμῖν ἐπιστρατεύσαντας. [3] τὰ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸν Μῆδον ἀγαθοὶ γεγενήμεθα, τὴν μὲν οὐ λύσαντες νῦν πρότεροι, τῷ δὲ ξυνεπιθέμενοι τότε ἐς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος μόνοι Βοιωτῶν. [4] καὶ γὰρ ἠπειρῶταί τε ὄντες ἐναυμαχήσαμεν ἐπ᾽ Ἀρτεμισίῳ, μάχῃ τε τῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ γῇ γενομένῃ παρεγενόμεθα ὑμῖν τε καὶ Παυσανίᾳ: εἴ τέ τι ἄλλο κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο ἐπικίνδυνον τοῖς Ἕλλησι, πάντων παρὰ δύναμιν μετέσχομεν. [5] καὶ ὑμῖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἰδίᾳ, ὅτεπερ δὴ μέγιστος φόβος περιέστη τὴν Σπάρτην μετὰ τὸν σεισμὸν τῶν ἐς Ἰθώμην Εἱλώτων ἀποστάντων, τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐξεπέμψαμεν ἐς ἐπικουρίαν: ὧν οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀμνημονεῖν.

55. ‘καὶ τὰ μὲν παλαιὰ καὶ μέγιστα τοιοῦτοι ἠξιώσαμεν εἶναι, πολέμιοι δὲ ἐγενόμεθα ὕστερον. ὑμεῖς δὲ αἴτιοι: δεομένων γὰρ ξυμμαχίας ὅτε Θηβαῖοι ἡμᾶς ἐβιάσαντο, ὑμεῖς ἀπεώσασθε καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκελεύετε τραπέσθαι ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντας, ὑμῶν δὲ μακρὰν ἀποικούντων. [2] ἐν μέντοι τῷ πολέμῳ οὐδὲν ἐκπρεπέστερον ὑπὸ ἡμῶν οὔτε ἐπάθετε οὔτε ἐμελλήσατε. [3] εἰ δ᾽ ἀποστῆναι Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἠθελήσαμεν ὑμῶν κελευσάντων, οὐκ ἠδικοῦμεν: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἐβοήθουν ἡμῖν ἐναντία Θηβαίοις ὅτε ὑμεῖς ἀπωκνεῖτε, καὶ προδοῦναι αὐτοὺς οὐκέτι ἦν καλόν, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὓς εὖ παθών τις καὶ αὐτὸς δεόμενος προσηγάγετο ξυμμάχους καὶ πολιτείας μετέλαβεν, ἰέναι δὲ ἐς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα εἰκὸς ἦν προθύμως. [4] ἃ δὲ ἑκάτεροι ἐξηγεῖσθε τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, οὐχ οἱ ἑπόμενοι αἴτιοι εἴ τι μὴ καλῶς ἑδρᾶτο, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ τὰ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντα.

56. ‘θηβαῖοι δὲ πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα ἡμᾶς ἠδίκησαν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον αὐτοὶ ξύνιστε, δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τάδε πάσχομεν. [2] πόλιν γὰρ αὐτοὺς τὴν ἡμετέραν καταλαμβάνοντας ἐν σπονδαῖς καὶ προσέτι ἱερομηνίᾳ ὀρθῶς τε ἐτιμωρησάμεθα κατὰ τὸν πᾶσι νόμον καθεστῶτα, τὸν ἐπιόντα πολέμιον ὅσιον εἶναι ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ νῦν οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως δι᾽ αὐτοὺς βλαπτοίμεθα. [3] εἰ γὰρ τῷ αὐτίκα χρησίμῳ ὑμῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνων πολεμίῳ τὸ δίκαιον λήψεσθε, τοῦ μὲν ὀρθοῦ φανεῖσθε οὐκ ἀληθεῖς κριταὶ ὄντες, τὸ δὲ ξυμφέρον μᾶλλον θεραπεύοντες. [4] καίτοι εἰ νῦν ὑμῖν ὠφέλιμοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πολὺ καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες μᾶλλον τότε ὅτε ἐν μείζονι κινδύνῳ ἦτε. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἑτέροις ὑμεῖς ἐπέρχεσθε δεινοί, ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ καιρῷ, ὅτε πᾶσι δουλείαν ἐπέφερεν ὁ βάρβαρος, οἵδε μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἦσαν. [5] καὶ δίκαιον ἡμῶν τῆς νῦν ἁμαρτίας, εἰ ἄρα ἡμάρτηταί τι, ἀντιθεῖναι τὴν τότε προθυμίαν: καὶ μείζω τε πρὸς ἐλάσσω εὑρήσετε καὶ ἐν καιροῖς οἷς σπάνιον ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰ ἀρετὴν τῇ Ξέρξου δυνάμει ἀντιτάξασθαι, ἐπῃνοῦντό τε μᾶλλον οἱ μὴ τὰ ξύμφορα πρὸς τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτοῖς ἀσφαλείᾳ πράσσοντες, ἐθέλοντες δὲ τολμᾶν μετὰ κινδύνων τὰ βέλτιστα. [6] ὧν ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι καὶ τιμηθέντες ἐς τὰ πρῶτα νῦν ἐπὶ τοῖς

αὐτοῖς δέδιμεν μὴ διαφθαρῶμεν, Ἀθηναίους ἑλόμενοι δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ ὑμᾶς κερδαλέως. [7] καίτοι χρὴ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁμοίως φαίνεσθαι γιγνώσκοντας, καὶ τὸ ξυμφέρον μὴ ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὅταν αἰεὶ βέβαιον τὴν χάριν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔχωσι καὶ τὸ παραυτίκα που ὑμῖν ὠφέλιμον καθιστῆται.

57. ‘προσκέψασθέ τε ὅτι νῦν μὲν παράδειγμα τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀνδραγαθίας νομίζεσθε: εἰ δὲ περὶ ἡμῶν γνώσεσθε μὴ τὰ εἰκότα —οὐ γὰρ ἀφανῆ κρινεῖτε τὴν δίκην τήνδε, ἐπαινούμενοι δὲ περὶ οὐδ᾽ ἡμῶν μεμπτῶν—, ὁρᾶτε ὅπως μὴ οὐκ ἀποδέξωνται ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρι αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ὄντας ἀπρεπές τι ἐπιγνῶναι, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἱεροῖς τοῖς κοινοῖς σκῦλα ἀπὸ ἡμῶν τῶν εὐεργετῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνατεθῆναι. [2] δεινὸν δὲ δόξει εἶναι Πλάταιαν Λακεδαιμονίους πορθῆσαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πατέρας ἀναγράψαι ἐς τὸν τρίποδα τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς δι᾽ ἀρετὴν τὴν πόλιν, ὑμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ πανοικεσίᾳ διὰ Θηβαίους ἐξαλεῖψαι. [3] ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ξυμφορᾶς προκεχωρήκαμεν, οἵτινες Μήδων τε κρατησάντων ἀπωλλύμεθα καὶ νῦν ἐν ὑμῖν τοῖς πρὶν φιλτάτοις Θηβαίων ἡσσώμεθα καὶ δύο ἀγῶνας τοὺς μεγίστους ὑπέστημεν, τότε μέν, τὴν πόλιν εἰ μὴ παρέδομεν, λιμῷ διαφθαρῆναι, νῦν δὲ θανάτου δίκῃ κρίνεσθαι. [4] καὶ περιεώσμεθα ἐκ πάντων Πλαταιῆς οἱ παρὰ δύναμιν πρόθυμοι ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐρῆμοι καὶ ἀτιμώρητοι: καὶ οὔτε τῶν τότε ξυμμάχων ὠφελεῖ οὐδείς, ὑμεῖς τε, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἡ μόνη ἐλπίς, δέδιμεν μὴ οὐ βέβαιοι ἦτε.

58. ‘καίτοι ἀξιοῦμέν γε καὶ θεῶν ἕνεκα τῶν ξυμμαχικῶν ποτὲ γενομένων καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας καμφθῆναι ὑμᾶς καὶ μεταγνῶναι εἴ τι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων ἐπείσθητε, τήν τε δωρεὰν ἀνταπαιτῆσαι αὐτοὺς μὴ κτείνειν οὓς μὴ ὑμῖν πρέπει, σώφρονά τε ἀντὶ αἰσχρᾶς κομίσασθαι χάριν, καὶ μὴ ἡδονὴν δόντας ἄλλοις κακίαν αὐτοὺς ἀντιλαβεῖν: [2] βραχὺ γὰρ τὸ τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα διαφθεῖραι, ἐπίπονον δὲ τὴν δύσκλειαν αὐτοῦ ἀφανίσαι. οὐκ ἐχθροὺς γὰρ ἡμᾶς εἰκότως τιμωρήσεσθε, ἀλλ᾽ εὔνους, κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην πολεμήσαντας. [3] ὥστε καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἄδειαν ποιοῦντες

ὅσια ἂν δικάζοιτε καὶ προνοοῦντες ὅτι ἑκόντας τε ἐλάβετε καὶ χεῖρας προϊσχομένους ὁ δὲ νόμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ κτείνειν τούτους, ἔτι δὲ καὶ εὐεργέτας γεγενημένους διὰ παντός. [4] ἀποβλέψατε γὰρ ἐς πατέρων τῶν ὑμετέρων θήκας, οὓς ἀποθανόντας ὑπὸ Μήδων καὶ ταφέντας ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐτιμῶμεν κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον δημοσίᾳ ἐσθήμασί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, ὅσα τε ἡ γῆ ἡμῶν ἀνεδίδου ὡραῖα, πάντων ἀπαρχὰς ἐπιφέροντες, εὖνοι μὲν ἐκ φιλίας χώρας, ξύμμαχοι δὲ ὁμαίχμοις ποτὲ γενομένοις. ὧν ὑμεῖς τοὐναντίον ἂν δράσαιτε μὴ ὀρθῶς γνόντες. [5] σκέψασθέ τε: Παυσανίας μὲν γὰρ ἔθαπτεν αὐτοὺς νομίζων ἐν γῇ τε φιλίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνδράσι τοιούτοις: ὑμεῖς δὲ εἰ κτενεῖτε ἡμᾶς καὶ χώραν τὴν Πλαταιίδα Θηβαΐδα ποιήσετε, τί ἄλλο ἢ ἐν πολεμίᾳ τε καὶ παρὰ τοῖς αὐθένταις πατέρας τοὺς ὑμετέρους καὶ ξυγγενεῖς ἀτίμους γερῶν ὧν νῦν ἴσχουσι καταλείψετε; πρὸς δὲ καὶ γῆν ἐν ᾗ ἠλευθερώθησαν οἱ Ἕλληνες δουλώσετε, ἱερά τε θεῶν οἷς εὐξάμενοι Μήδων ἐκράτησαν ἐρημοῦτε καὶ θυσίας τὰς πατρίους τῶν ἐσσαμένων καὶ κτισάντων ἀφαιρήσεσθε.

59. ‘οὐ πρὸς τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τάδε, οὔτε ἐς τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμιμα καὶ ἐς τοὺς προγόνους ἁμαρτάνειν οὔτε ἡμᾶς τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἀλλοτρίας ἕνεκα ἔχθρας μὴ αὐτοὺς ἀδικηθέντας διαφθεῖραι, φείσασθαι δὲ καὶ ἐπικλασθῆναι τῇ γνώμῃ οἴκτῳ σώφρονι λαβόντας, μὴ ὧν πεισόμεθα μόνον δεινότητα κατανοοῦντας, ἀλλ᾽ οἷοί τε ἂν ὄντες πάθοιμεν καὶ ὡς ἀστάθμητον τὸ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ᾧτινί ποτ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἀναξίῳ ξυμπέσοι. [2] ἡμεῖς τε, ὡς πρέπον ἡμῖν καὶ ὡς ἡ χρεία προάγει, αἰτούμεθα ὑμᾶς, θεοὺς τοὺς ὁμοβωμίους καὶ κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπιβοώμενοι, πεῖσαι τάδε: προφερόμενοι ὅρκους οὓς οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ὤμοσαν μὴ ἀμνημονεῖν ἱκέται γιγνόμεθα ὑμῶν τῶν πατρῴων τάφων καὶ ἐπικαλούμεθα τοὺς κεκμηκότας μὴ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Θηβαίοις μηδὲ τοῖς ἐχθίστοις φίλτατοι ὄντες παραδοθῆναι. ἡμέρας τε ἀναμιμνῄσκομεν ἐκείνης ᾗ τὰ λαμπρότατα μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πράξαντες νῦν ἐν τῇδε τὰ δεινότατα κινδυνεύομεν παθεῖν. [3]

ὅπερ δὲ ἀναγκαῖόν τε καὶ χαλεπώτατον τοῖς ὧδε ἔχουσι, λόγου τελευτᾶν, διότι καὶ τοῦ βίου ὁ κίνδυνος ἐγγὺς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, παυόμενοι λέγομεν ἤδη ὅτι οὐ Θηβαίοις παρέδομεν τὴν πόλιν εἰλόμεθα γὰρ ἂν πρό γε τούτου τῷ αἰσχίστῳ ὀλέθρῳ λιμῷ τελευτῆσαι , ὑμῖν δὲ πιστεύσαντες προσήλθομεν καὶ δίκαιον, εἰ μὴ πείθομεν, ἐς τὰ αὐτὰ καταστήσαντας τὸν ξυντυχόντα κίνδυνον ἐᾶσαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑλέσθαι, [4] ἐπισκήπτομέν τε ἅμα μὴ Πλαταιῆς ὄντες οἱ προθυμότατοι περὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας γενόμενοι Θηβαίοις τοῖς ἡμῖν ἐχθίστοις ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων χειρῶν καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας πίστεως ἱκέται ὄντες,ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, παραδοθῆναι, γενέσθαι δὲ σωτῆρας ἡμῶν καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας ἐλευθεροῦντας ἡμᾶς διολέσαι.’

60. τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Πλαταιῆς εἶπον. οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι δείσαντες πρὸς τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν μὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοί τι ἐνδῶσι, παρελθόντες ἔφασαν καὶ αὐτοὶ βούλεσθαι εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνοις παρὰ γνώμην τὴν αὐτῶν μακρότερος λόγος ἐδόθη τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐρώτημα ἀποκρίσεως. ὡς δ᾽ ἐκέλευσαν, ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

61. ‘τοὺς μὲν λόγους οὐκ ἂν ᾐτησάμεθα εἰπεῖν, εἰ καὶ αὐτοὶ βραχέως τὸ ἐρωτηθὲν ἀπεκρίναντο καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ ἡμᾶς τραπόμενοι κατηγορίαν ἐποιήσαντο καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἔξω τῶν προκειμένων καὶ ἅμα οὐδὲ ᾐτιαμένων πολλὴν τὴν ἀπολογίαν καὶ ἔπαινον ὧν οὐδεὶς ἐμέμψατο. νῦν δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀντειπεῖν δεῖ, τῶν δὲ ἔλεγχον ποιήσασθαι, ἵνα μήτε ἡ ἡμετέρα αὐτοὺς κακία ὠφελῇ μήτε ἡ τούτων δόξα, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἀκούσαντες κρίνητε. [2]’ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς διάφοροι ἐγενόμεθα πρῶτον ὅτι ἡμῶν κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὕστερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ᾽ αὐτῆς, ἃ ξυμμείκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἔσχομεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι, ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια, ἐπειδὴ προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἔβλαπτον, ἀνθ᾽ ὧν καὶ ἀντέπασχον.

62. ‘ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ὁ βάρβαρος ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, φασὶ μόνοι Βοιωτῶν οὐ μηδίσαι, καὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα αὐτοί τε ἀγάλλονται καὶ ἡμᾶς λοιδοροῦσιν. [2] ἡμεῖς δὲ μηδίσαι μὲν αὐτοὺς οὔ φαμεν διότι οὐδ᾽ Ἀθηναίους, τῇ μέντοι αὐτῇ ἰδέᾳ ὕστερον ἰόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας μόνους αὖ Βοιωτῶν ἀττικίσαι. [3] καίτοι σκέψασθε ἐν οἵῳ εἴδει ἑκάτεροι ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἔπραξαν. ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις τότε ἐτύγχανεν οὔτε κατ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον πολιτεύουσα οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν: ὅπερ δέ ἐστι νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τυράννου, δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν εἶχε τὰ πράγματα. [4] καὶ οὗτοι ἰδίας δυνάμεις ἐλπίσαντες ἔτι μᾶλλον σχήσειν εἰ τὰ τοῦ Μήδου κρατήσειε, κατέχοντες ἰσχύι τὸ πλῆθος ἐπηγάγοντο αὐτόν: καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις οὐκ αὐτοκράτωρ οὖσα ἑαυτῆς τοῦτ᾽ ἔπραξεν, οὐδ᾽ ἄξιον αὐτῇ ὀνειδίσαι ὧν μὴ μετὰ νόμων ἥμαρτεν. [5] ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ὅ τε Μῆδος ἀπῆλθε καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔλαβε, σκέψασθαι χρή, Ἀθηναίων ὕστερον ἐπιόντων τήν τε ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν χώραν πειρωμένων ὑφ᾽ αὐτοῖς ποιεῖσθαι καὶ κατὰ στάσιν ἤδη ἐχόντων αὐτῆς τὰ πολλά, εἰ μαχόμενοι ἐν Κορωνείᾳ καὶ νικήσαντες αὐτοὺς ἠλευθερώσαμεν τὴν Βοιωτίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νῦν προθύμως ξυνελευθεροῦμεν, ἵππους τε παρέχοντες καὶ παρασκευὴν ὅσην οὐκ ἄλλοι τῶν ξυμμάχων.

63. ‘καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐς τὸν μηδισμὸν τοσαῦτα ἀπολογούμεθα: ὡς δὲ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλόν τε ἠδικήκατε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ ἀξιώτεροί ἐστε πάσης ζημίας, πειρασόμεθα ἀποφαίνειν. [2] ἐγένεσθε ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τιμωρίᾳ, ὡς φατέ, Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι καὶ πολῖται. οὐκοῦν χρῆν τὰ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μόνον ὑμᾶς ἐπάγεσθαι αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ξυνεπιέναι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἄλλοις, ὑπάρχον γε ὑμῖν, εἴ τι καὶ ἄκοντες προσήγεσθε ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων, τῆς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τῶνδε ἤδη ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξυμμαχίας γεγενημένης, ἣν αὐτοὶ μάλιστα προβάλλεσθε: ἱκανή γε ἦν ἡμᾶς τε ὑμῶν ἀποτρέπειν, καί, τὸ μέγιστον, ἀδεῶς παρέχειν βουλεύεσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ ἑκόντες καὶ οὐ βιαζόμενοι ἔτι εἵλεσθε μᾶλλον τὰ Ἀθηναίων. [3] καὶ λέγετε ὡς αἰσχρὸν ἦν προδοῦναι τοὺς εὐεργέτας: πολὺ δέ γε

αἴσχιον καὶ ἀδικώτερον τοὺς πάντας Ἕλληνας καταπροδοῦναι, οἷς ξυνωμόσατε, ἢ Ἀθηναίους μόνους, τοὺς μὲν καταδουλουμένους τὴν Ἑλλάδα, τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθεροῦντας. [4] καὶ οὐκ ἴσην αὐτοῖς τὴν χάριν ἀνταπέδοτε οὐδὲ αἰσχύνης ἀπηλλαγμένην: ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀδικούμενοι αὐτούς, ὡς φατέ, ἐπηγάγεσθε, τοῖς δὲ ἀδικοῦσιν ἄλλους ξυνεργοὶ κατέστητε. καίτοι τὰς ὁμοίας χάριτας μὴ ἀντιδιδόναι αἰσχρὸν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς μετὰ δικαιοσύνης μὲν ὀφειληθείσας, ἐς ἀδικίαν δὲ ἀποδιδομένας.

64. δῆλόν τε ἐποιήσατε οὐδὲ τότε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕνεκα μόνοι οὐ μηδίσαντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τοῖς μὲν ταὐτὰ βουλόμενοι ποιεῖν, τοῖς δὲ τἀναντία. [2] καὶ νῦν ἀξιοῦτε, ἀφ᾽ ὧν δι᾽ ἑτέρους ἐγένεσθε ἀγαθοί, ἀπὸ τούτων ὠφελεῖσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰκός: ὥσπερ δὲ Ἀθηναίους εἵλεσθε, τούτοις ξυναγωνίζεσθε, καὶ μὴ προφέρετε τὴν τότε γενομένην ξυνωμοσίαν ὡς χρὴ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς νῦν σῴζεσθαι. [3] ἀπελίπετε γὰρ αὐτὴν καὶ παραβάντες ξυγκατεδουλοῦσθε μᾶλλον Αἰγινήτας καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν ξυνομοσάντων ἢ διεκωλύετε, καὶ ταῦτα οὔτε ἄκοντες ἔχοντές τε τοὺς νόμους οὕσπερ μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο καὶ οὐδενὸς ὑμᾶς βιασαμένου ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς. τὴν τελευταίαν τε πρὶν περιτειχίζεσθαι πρόκλησιν ἐς ἡσυχίαν ἡμῶν, ὥστε μηδετέροις ἀμύνειν, οὐκ ἐδέχεσθε. [4] τίνες ἂν οὖν ὑμῶν δικαιότερον πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι μισοῖντο, οἵτινες ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκείνων κακῷ ἀνδραγαθίαν προύθεσθε; καὶ ἃ μέν ποτε χρηστοὶ ἐγένεσθε, ὡς φατέ, οὐ προσήκοντα νῦν ἐπεδείξατε, ἃ δὲ ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ ἐβούλετο, ἐξηλέγχθη ἐς τὸ ἀληθές: μετὰ γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ἄδικον ὁδὸν ἰόντων ἐχωρήσατε. [5] τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐς τὸν ἡμέτερόν τε ἀκούσιον μηδισμὸν καὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον ἑκούσιον ἀττικισμὸν τοιαῦτα ἀποφαίνομεν:

65. ἃ δὲ τελευταῖά φατε ἀδικηθῆναι, παρανόμως γὰρ ἐλθεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐν σπονδαῖς καὶ ἱερομηνίᾳ ἐπὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν πόλιν, οὐ νομίζομεν οὐδ᾽ ἐν τούτοις ὑμῶν μᾶλλον ἁμαρτεῖν. [2] εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ πρός τε τὴν πόλιν ἐλθόντες ἐμαχόμεθα καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐδῃοῦμεν ὡς πολέμιοι, ἀδικοῦμεν: εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει,

βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας ὑμᾶς παῦσαι, ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἐκόντες, τί ἀδικοῦμεν; οἱ γὰρ ἄγοντες παρανομοῦσι μᾶλλον τῶν ἑπομένων. [3] ἀλλ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι, ὡς ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν, οὔτε ἡμεῖς: πολῖται δὲ ὄντες ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς καὶ πλείω παραβαλλόμενοι, τὸ ἑαυτῶν τεῖχος ἀνοίξαντες καὶ ἐς τὴν αὐτῶν πόλιν φιλίως, οὐ πολεμίως κομίσαντες ἐβούλοντο τούς τε ὑμῶν χείρους μηκέτι μᾶλλον γενέσθαι τούς τε ἀμείνους τὰ ἄξια ἔχειν, σωφρονισταὶ ὄντες τῆς γνώμης καὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἀλλοτριοῦντες ἀλλ᾽ ἐς τὴν ξυγγένειαν οἰκειοῦντες, ἐχθροὺς οὐδενὶ καθιστάντες, ἅπασι δ᾽ ὁμοίως ἐνσπόνδους.

66. τεκμήριον δὲ ὡς οὐ πολεμίως ἐπράσσομεν: οὔτε γὰρ ἠδικήσαμεν οὐδένα, προείπομέν τε τὸν βουλόμενον κατὰ τὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια πολιτεύειν ἰέναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. [2] καὶ ὑμεῖς ἄσμενοι χωρήσαντες καὶ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡσυχάζετε, ὕστερον δὲ κατανοήσαντες ἡμᾶς ὀλίγους ὄντας, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἐδοκοῦμέν τι ἀνεπιεικέστερον πρᾶξαι οὐ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους ὑμῶν ἐσελθόντες, τὰ μὲν ὁμοῖα οὐκ ἀνταπέδοτε ἡμῖν, μήτε νεωτερίσαι ἔργῳ λόγοις τε πείθειν ὥστε ἐξελθεῖν, ἐπιθέμενοι δὲ παρὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν, οὓς μὲν ἐν χερσὶν ἀπεκτείνατε, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλγοῦμεν [κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δή τινα ἔπασχον], οὓς δὲ χεῖρας προϊσχομένους καὶ ζωγρήσαντες ὑποσχόμενοί τε ἡμῖν ὕστερον μὴ κτενεῖν παρανόμως διεφθείρατε, πῶς οὐ δεινὰ εἴργασθε; [3] καὶ ταῦτα τρεῖς ἀδικίας ἐν ὀλίγῳ πράξαντες, τήν τε λυθεῖσαν ὁμολογίαν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὸν ὕστερον θάνατον καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν μὴ κτενεῖν ψευσθεῖσαν ὑπόσχεσιν, ἢν τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς ὑμῖν μὴ ἀδικῶμεν, ὅμως φατὲ ἡμᾶς παρανομῆσαι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀξιοῦτε μὴ ἀντιδοῦναι δίκην. οὔκ, ἤν γε οὗτοι τὰ ὀρθὰ γιγνώσκωσιν: πάντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα κολασθήσεσθε.

67. ‘καὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τούτου ἕνεκα ἐπεξήλθομεν καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ ἡμῶν, ἵνα ὑμεῖς μὲν εἰδῆτε δικαίως αὐτῶν καταγνωσόμενοι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔτι ὁσιώτερον τετιμωρημένοι. [2] καὶ μὴ παλαιὰς ἀρετάς, εἴ τις ἄρα καὶ

ἐγένετο, ἀκούοντες ἐπικλασθῆτε, ἃς χρὴ τοῖς μὲν ἀδικουμένοις ἐπικούρους εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ αἰσχρόν τι δρῶσι διπλασίας ζημίας, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ προσηκόντων ἁμαρτάνουσιν. μηδὲ ὀλοφυρμῷ καὶ οἴκτῳ ὠφελείσθων, πατέρων τε τάφους τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐπιβοώμενοι καὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἐρημίαν. [3] καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἀνταποφαίνομεν πολλῷ δεινότερα παθοῦσαν τὴν ὑπὸ τούτων ἡλικίαν ἡμῶν διεφθαρμένην, ὧν πατέρες οἱ μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἄγοντες ἀπέθανον ἐν Κορωνείᾳ, οἱ δὲ πρεσβῦται λελειμμένοι καὶ οἰκίαι ἐρῆμοι πολλῷ δικαιοτέραν ὑμῶν ἱκετείαν ποιοῦνται τούσδε τιμωρήσασθαι. [4] οἴκτου τε ἀξιώτεροι τυγχάνειν οἱ ἀπρεπές τι πάσχοντες τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ δὲ δικαίως, ὥσπερ οἵδε, τὰ ἐναντία ἐπίχαρτοι εἶναι. [5] καὶ τὴν νῦν ἐρημίαν δι᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἔχουσιν: τοὺς γὰρ ἀμείνους ξυμμάχους ἑκόντες ἀπεώσαντο. παρενόμησάν τε οὐ προπαθόντες ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, μίσει δὲ πλέον ἢ δίκῃ κρίναντες καὶ οὐκ ἀνταποδόντες νῦν τὴν ἴσην τιμωρίαν: ἔννομα γὰρ πείσονται καὶ οὐχὶ ἐκ μάχης χεῖρας προϊσχόμενοι, ὥσπερ φασίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ἐς δίκην σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παραδόντες. [6] ἀμύνατε οὖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τῷ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμῳ ὑπὸ τῶνδε παραβαθέντι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἄνομα παθοῦσιν ἀνταπόδοτε χάριν δικαίαν ὧν πρόθυμοι γεγενήμεθα, καὶ μὴ τοῖς τῶνδε λόγοις περιωσθῶμεν ἐν ὑμῖν, ποιήσατε δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησι παράδειγμα οὐ λόγων τοὺς ἀγῶνας προθήσοντες ἀλλ᾽ ἔργων, ὧν ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων βραχεῖα ἡ ἀπαγγελία ἀρκεῖ, ἁμαρτανομένων δὲ λόγοι ἔπεσι κοσμηθέντες προκαλύμματα γίγνονται. [7] ἀλλ᾽ ἢν οἱ ἡγεμόνες, ὥσπερ νῦν ὑμεῖς, κεφαλαιώσαντες πρὸς τοὺς ξύμπαντας διαγνώμας ποιήσησθε, ἧσσόν τις ἐπ᾽ ἀδίκοις ἔργοις λόγους καλοὺς ζητήσει.’

68. τοιαῦτα δὲ οἱ Θηβαῖοι εἶπον. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δικασταὶ νομίζοντες τὸ ἐπερώτημα σφίσιν ὀρθῶς ἔξειν, εἴ τι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθασι, διότι τόν τε ἄλλον χρόνον ἠξίουν δῆθεν αὐτοὺς κατὰ τὰς παλαιὰς Παυσανίου μετὰ τὸν Μῆδον σπονδὰς ἡσυχάζειν καὶ ὅτε ὕστερον ἃ πρὸ τοῦ περιτειχίζεσθαι προείχοντο αὐτοῖς, κοινοὺς εἶναι κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα, ὡς οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἡγούμενοι τῇ

ἑαυτῶν δικαίᾳ βουλήσει ἔκσπονδοι ἤδη ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν κακῶς πεπονθέναι, αὖθις τὸ αὐτὸ ἕνα ἕκαστον παραγαγόντες καὶ ἐρωτῶντες, εἴ τι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀγαθὸν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδρακότες εἰσίν, ὁπότε μὴ φαῖεν, ἀπάγοντες ἀπέκτεινον καὶ ἐξαίρετον ἐποιήσαντο οὐδένα. [2] διέφθειραν δὲ Πλαταιῶν μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐλάσσους διακοσίων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν, οἳ ξυνεπολιορκοῦντο: γυναῖκας δὲ ἠνδραπόδισαν. [3] τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐνιαυτὸν μέν τινα [Θηβαῖοι] Μεγαρέων ἀνδράσι κατὰ στάσιν ἐκπεπτωκόσι καὶ ὅσοι τὰ σφέτερα φρονοῦντες Πλαταιῶν περιῆσαν ἔδοσαν ἐνοικεῖν: ὕστερον δὲ καθελόντες αὐτὴν ἐς ἔδαφος πᾶσαν ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων ᾠκοδόμησαν πρὸς τῷ Ἡραίῳ καταγώγιον διακοσίων ποδῶν πανταχῇ, κύκλῳ οἰκήματα ἔχον κάτωθεν καὶ ἄνωθεν, καὶ ὀροφαῖς καὶ θυρώμασι τοῖς τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἃ ἦν ἐν τῷ τείχει ἔπιπλα, χαλκὸς καὶ σίδηρος, κλίνας κατασκευάσαντες ἀνέθεσαν τῇ Ἥρᾳ, καὶ νεὼν ἑκατόμπεδον λίθινον ᾠκοδόμησαν αὐτῇ. τὴν δὲ γῆν δημοσιώσαντες ἀπεμίσθωσαν ἐπὶ δέκα ἔτη, καὶ ἐνέμοντο Θηβαῖοι. [4] σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν περὶ Πλαταιῶν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὕτως ἀποτετραμμένοι ἐγένοντο Θηβαίων ἕνεκα, νομίζοντες ἐς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὺς ἄρτι τότε καθιστάμενον ὠφελίμους εἶναι. [5] καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ Πλάταιαν ἔτει τρίτῳ καὶ ἐνενηκοστῷ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

69. αἱ δὲ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες τῶν Πελοποννησίων αἱ Λεσβίοις βοηθοὶ ἐλθοῦσαι, ὡς τότε φεύγουσαι διὰ τοῦ πελάγους ἔκ τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιδιωχθεῖσαι καὶ πρὸς τῇ Κρήτῃ χειμασθεῖσαι καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς σποράδες πρὸς τὴν Πελοπόννησον κατηνέχθησαν, καταλαμβάνουσιν ἐν τῇ Κυλλήνῃ τρεῖς καὶ δέκα τριήρεις Λευκαδίων καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Βρασίδαν τὸν Τέλλιδος ξύμβουλον Ἀλκίδᾳ ἐπεληλυθότα. [2] ἐβούλοντο γὰρ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὡς τῆς Λέσβου ἡμαρτήκεσαν, πλέον τὸ ναυτικὸν ποιήσαντες ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πλεῦσαι στασιάζουσαν, δώδεκα μὲν ναυσὶ μόναις παρόντων Ἀθηναίων περὶ Ναύπακτον, πρὶν δὲ πλέον τι

ἐπιβοηθῆσαι ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ναυτικόν, ὅπως προφθάσωσι, καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο ὅ τε Βρασίδας καὶ ὁ Ἀλκίδας πρὸς ταῦτα.

70. οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι ἐστασίαζον, ἐπειδὴ οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι ἦλθον αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐκ τῶν περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον ναυμαχιῶν ὑπὸ Κορινθίων ἀφεθέντες, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ὀκτακοσίων ταλάντων τοῖς προξένοις διηγγυημένοι, ἔργῳ δὲ πεπεισμένοι Κορινθίοις Κέρκυραν προσποιῆσαι. καὶ ἔπρασσον οὗτοι, ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν μετιόντες, ὅπως ἀποστήσωσιν Ἀθηναίων τὴν πόλιν. [2] καὶ ἀφικομένης Ἀττικῆς τε νεὼς καὶ Κορινθίας πρέσβεις ἀγουσῶν καὶ ἐς λόγους καταστάντων ἐψηφίσαντο Κερκυραῖοι Ἀθηναίοις μὲν ξύμμαχοι εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα, Πελοποννησίοις δὲ φίλοι ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον. [3] καὶ ἦν γὰρ Πειθίας ἐθελοπρόξενός τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοῦ δήμου προειστήκει ὑπάγουσιν αὐτὸν οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἐς δίκην, λέγοντες Ἀθηναίοις τὴν Κέρκυραν καταδουλοῦν. [4] ὁ δὲ ἀποφυγὼν ἀνθυπάγει αὐτῶν τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους πέντε ἄνδρας, φάσκων τέμνειν χάρακας ἐκ τοῦ τε Διὸς τοῦ τεμένους καὶ τοῦ Ἀλκίνου: ζημία δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην χάρακα ἐπέκειτο στατήρ. [5] ὀφλόντων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ ἱκετῶν καθεζομένων διὰ πλῆθος τῆς ζημίας, ὅπως ταξάμενοι ἀποδῶσιν, ὁ Πειθίας ἐτύγχανε γὰρ καὶ βουλῆς ὤν πείθει ὥστε τῷ νόμῳ χρήσασθαι. [6] οἱ δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ τῷ τε νόμῳ ἐξείργοντο καὶ ἅμα ἐπυνθάνοντο τὸν Πειθίαν, ἕως ἔτι βουλῆς ἐστί, μέλλειν τὸ πλῆθος ἀναπείσειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις φίλους τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς νομίζειν, ξυνίσταντό τε καὶ λαβόντες ἐγχειρίδια ἐξαπιναίως ἐς τὴν βουλὴν ἐσελθόντες τόν τε Πειθίαν κτείνουσι καὶ ἄλλους τῶν τε βουλευτῶν καὶ ἰδιωτῶν ἐς ἑξήκοντα: οἱ δέ τινες τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης τῷ Πειθίᾳ ὀλίγοι ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν τριήρη κατέφυγον ἔτι παροῦσαν.

71. δράσαντες δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ξυγκαλέσαντες Κερκυραίους εἶπον ὅτι ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστα εἴη καὶ ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν δουλωθεῖεν ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων, τό τε λοιπὸν μηδετέρους δέχεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μιᾷ νηὶ ἡσυχάζοντας, τὸ δὲ πλέον πολέμιον ἡγεῖσθαι. ὡς δὲ εἶπον, καὶ ἐπικυρῶσαι ἠνάγκασαν τὴν γνώμην. [2] πέμπουσι

δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας εὐθὺς πρέσβεις περί τε τῶν πεπραγμένων διδάξοντας ὡς ξυνέφερε καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ καταπεφευγότας πείσοντας μηδὲν ἀνεπιτήδειον πράσσειν, ὅπως μή τις ἐπιστροφὴ γένηται.

72. ἐλθόντων δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τούς τε πρέσβεις ὡς νεωτερίζοντας ξυλλαβόντες, καὶ ὅσους ἔπεισαν, κατέθεντο ἐς Αἴγιναν. [2]ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῶν Κερκυραίων οἱ ἔχοντες τὰ πράγματα ἐλθούσης τριήρους Κορινθίας καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεων ἐπιτίθενται τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ μαχόμενοι ἐνίκησαν. [3] ἀφικομένης δὲ νυκτὸς ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὰ μετέωρα τῆς πόλεως καταφεύγει καὶ αὐτοῦ ξυλλεγεὶς ἱδρύθη, καὶ τὸν Ὑλλαϊκὸν λιμένα εἶχον: οἱ δὲ τήν τε ἀγορὰν κατέλαβον, οὗπερ οἱ πολλοὶ ᾤκουν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸν λιμένα τὸν πρὸς αὐτῇ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἤπειρον.

73. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἠκροβολίσαντό τε ὀλίγα καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἀγροὺς περιέπεμπον ἀμφότεροι, τοὺς δούλους παρακαλοῦντές τε καὶ ἐλευθερίαν ὑπισχνούμενοι: καὶ τῷ μὲν δήμῳ τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸ πλῆθος παρεγένετο ξύμμαχον, τοῖς δ᾽ ἑτέροις ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου ἐπίκουροι ὀκτακόσιοι.

74. διαλιπούσης δ᾽ ἡμέρας μάχη αὖθις γίγνεται καὶ νικᾷ ὁ δῆμος χωρίων τε ἰσχύι καὶ πλήθει προύχων: αἵ τε γυναῖκες αὐτοῖς τολμηρῶς ξυνεπελάβοντο βάλλουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν τῷ κεράμῳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπομένουσαι τὸν θόρυβον. [2] γενομένης δὲ τῆς τροπῆς περὶ δείλην ὀψίαν, δείσαντες οἱ ὀλίγοι μὴ αὐτοβοεὶ ὁ δῆμος τοῦ τε νεωρίου κρατήσειεν ἐπελθὼν καὶ σφᾶς διαφθείρειεν, ἐμπιπρᾶσι τὰς οἰκίας τὰς ἐν κύκλῳ τῆς ἀγορᾶς καὶ τὰς ξυνοικίας, ὅπως μὴ ᾖ ἔφοδος, φειδόμενοι οὔτε οἰκείας οὔτε ἀλλοτρίας, ὥστε καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ ἐμπόρων κατεκαύθη καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐκινδύνευσε πᾶσα διαφθαρῆναι, εἰ ἄνεμος ἐπεγένετο τῇ φλογὶ ἐπίφορος ἐς αὐτήν. [3]καὶ οἱ μὲν παυσάμενοι τῆς μάχης ὡς ἑκάτεροι ἡσυχάσαντες τὴν νύκτα ἐν φυλακῇ ἦσαν: καὶ ἡ Κορινθία ναῦς τοῦ δήμου κεκρατηκότος ὑπεξανήγετο, καὶ τῶν ἐπικούρων οἱ πολλοὶ ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον λαθόντες διεκομίσθησαν.

75. τῇ δὲ ἐπιγιγνομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ Νικόστρατος ὁ Διειτρέφους Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς παραγίγνεται βοηθῶν ἐκ Ναυπάκτου δώδεκα ναυσὶ καὶ Μεσσηνίων πεντακοσίοις ὁπλίταις: ξύμβασίν τε ἔπρασσε καὶ πείθει ὥστε ξυγχωρῆσαι ἀλλήλοις δέκα μὲν ἄνδρας τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους κρῖναι, οἳ οὐκέτι ἔμειναν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους οἰκεῖν σπονδὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιησαμένους καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν. [2] καὶ ὁ μὲν ταῦτα πράξας ἔμελλεν ἀποπλεύσεσθαι: οἱ δὲ τοῦ δήμου προστάται πείθουσιν αὐτὸν πέντε μὲν ναῦς τῶν αὐτοῦ σφίσι καταλιπεῖν, ὅπως ἧσσόν τι ἐν κινήσει ὦσιν οἱ ἐναντίοι, ἴσας δὲ αὐτοὶ πληρώσαντες ἐκ σφῶν αὐτῶν ξυμπέμψειν. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν ξυνεχώρησεν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κατέλεγον ἐς τὰς ναῦς. δείσαντες δὲ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀποπεμφθῶσι καθίζουσιν ἐς τὸ τῶν Διοσκόρων ἱερόν. [4] Νικόστρατος δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀνίστη τε καὶ παρεμυθεῖτο. ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ὁ δῆμος ὁπλισθεὶς ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει ταύτῃ, ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὑγιὲς διανοουμένων τῇ τοῦ μὴ ξυμπλεῖν ἀπιστίᾳ, τά τε ὅπλα αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἔλαβε καὶ αὐτῶν τινὰς οἷς ἐπέτυχον, εἰ μὴ Νικόστρατος ἐκώλυσε, διέφθειραν ἄν. [5] ὁρῶντες δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι τὰ γιγνόμενα καθίζουσιν ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον ἱκέται καὶ γίγνονται οὐκ ἐλάσσους τετρακοσίων. ὁ δὲ δῆμος δείσας μή τι νεωτερίσωσιν ἀνίστησί τε αὐτοὺς πείσας καὶ διακομίζει ἐς τὴν πρὸ τοῦ Ἡραίου νῆσον, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐκεῖσε αὐτοῖς διεπέμπετο.

76. τῆς δὲ στάσεως ἐν τούτῳ οὔσης τετάρτῃ ἢ πέμπτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μετὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐς τὴν νῆσον διακομιδὴν αἱ ἐκ τῆς Κυλλήνης Πελοποννησίων νῆες, μετὰ τὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἰωνίας πλοῦν ἔφορμοι οὖσαι, παραγίγνονται τρεῖς καὶ πεντήκοντα: ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀλκίδας, ὅσπερ καὶ πρότερον, καὶ Βρασίδας αὐτῷ ξύμβουλος ἐπέπλει. ὁρμισάμενοι δὲ ἐς Σύβοτα λιμένα τῆς ἠπείρου ἅμα ἕῳ ἐπέπλεον τῇ Κερκύρᾳ.

77. οἱ δὲ πολλῷ θορύβῳ καὶ πεφοβημένοι τά τ᾽ ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὸν ἐπίπλουν παρεσκευάζοντό τε ἅμα ἑξήκοντα ναῦς καὶ τὰς αἰεὶ πληρουμένας ἐξέπεμπον πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους, παραινούντων Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς τε ἐᾶσαι πρῶτον

ἐκπλεῦσαι καὶ ὕστερον πάσαις ἅμα ἐκείνους ἐπιγενέσθαι. [2] ὡς δὲ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοῖς πολεμίοις ἦσαν σποράδες αἱ νῆες, δύο μὲν εὐθὺς ηὐτομόλησαν, ἐν ἑτέραις δὲ ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἐμπλέοντες ἐμάχοντο, ἦν δὲ οὐδεὶς κόσμος τῶν ποιουμένων. [3] ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τὴν ταραχὴν εἴκοσι μὲν ναυσὶ πρὸς τοὺς Κερκυραίους ἐτάξαντο, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς πρὸς τὰς δώδεκα ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὧν ἦσαν αἱ δύο Σαλαμινία καὶ Πάραλος.

78. καὶ οἱ μὲν Κερκυραῖοι κακῶς τε καὶ κατ᾽ ὀλίγας προσπίπτοντες ἐταλαιπώρουν τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτούς: οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι φοβούμενοι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν περικύκλωσιν ἀθρόαις μὲν οὐ προσέπιπτον οὐδὲ κατὰ μέσον ταῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς τεταγμέναις, προσβαλόντες δὲ κατὰ κέρας καταδύουσι μίαν ναῦν. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κύκλον ταξαμένων αὐτῶν περιέπλεον καὶ ἐπειρῶντο θορυβεῖν. [2] γνόντες δὲ οἱ πρὸς τοῖς Κερκυραίοις καὶ δείσαντες μὴ ὅπερ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ γένοιτο, ἐπιβοηθοῦσι, καὶ γενόμεναι ἀθρόαι αἱ νῆες ἅμα τὸν ἐπίπλουν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐποιοῦντο. [3] οἱ δ᾽ ὑπεχώρουν ἤδη πρύμναν κρουόμενοι καὶ ἅμα τὰς τῶν Κερκυραίων ἐβούλοντο προκαταφυγεῖν ὅτι μάλιστα, ἑαυτῶν σχολῇ τε ὑποχωρούντων καὶ πρὸς σφᾶς τεταγμένων τῶν ἐναντίων. [4]ἡ μὲν οὖν ναυμαχία τοιαύτη γενομένη ἐτελεύτα ἐς ἡλίου δύσιν,

79. καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι δείσαντες μὴ σφίσιν ἐπιπλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ὡς κρατοῦντες οἱ πολέμιοι ἢ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἀναλάβωσιν ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι νεωτερίσωσι, τούς τε ἐκ τῆς νήσου πάλιν ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον διεκόμισαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐφύλασσον. [2] οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν πλεῦσαι κρατοῦντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ, τρεῖς δὲ καὶ δέκα ναῦς ἔχοντες τῶν Κερκυραίων ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον, ὅθενπερ ἀνηγάγοντο. [3] τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐπέπλεον, καίπερ ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ καὶ φόβῳ ὄντας καὶ Βρασίδου παραινοῦντος, ὡς λέγεται, Ἀλκίδᾳ, ἰσοψήφου δὲ οὐκ ὄντος: ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Λευκίμμην τὸ ἀκρωτήριον ἀποβάντες ἐπόρθουν τοὺς ἀγρούς.

80. ὁ δὲ δῆμος τῶν Κερκυραίων ἐν τούτῳ περιδεὴς γενόμενος μὴ ἐπιπλεύσωσιν αἱ νῆες, τοῖς τε ἱκέταις ᾖσαν ἐς λόγους καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅπως σωθήσεται ἡ πόλις, καί τινας αὐτῶν ἔπεισαν ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβῆναι: ἐπλήρωσαν γὰρ ὅμως τριάκοντα προσδεχόμενοι τὸν ἐπίπλουν. [2] οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι μέχρι μέσου ἡμέρας δῃώσαντες τὴν γῆν ἀπέπλευσαν, καὶ ὑπὸ νύκτα αὐτοῖς ἐφρυκτωρήθησαν ἑξήκοντα νῆες Ἀθηναίων προσπλέουσαι ἀπὸ Λευκάδος: ἃς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πυνθανόμενοι τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὰς μετ᾽ Ἀλκίδου ναῦς ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν μελλούσας πλεῖν ἀπέστειλαν καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους στρατηγόν.

81. οἱ μὲν οὖν Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς νυκτὸς εὐθὺς κατὰ τάχος ἐκομίζοντο ἐπ᾽ οἴκου παρὰ τὴν γῆν: καὶ ὑπερενεγκόντες τὸν Λευκαδίων ἰσθμὸν τὰς ναῦς, ὅπως μὴ περιπλέοντες ὀφθῶσιν, ἀποκομίζονται. [2] Κερκυραῖοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τάς τε Ἀττικὰς ναῦς προσπλεούσας τάς τε τῶν πολεμίων οἰχομένας, λαβόντες τούς τε Μεσσηνίους ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἤγαγον πρότερον ἔξω ὄντας, καὶ τὰς ναῦς περιπλεῦσαι κελεύσαντες ἃς ἐπλήρωσαν ἐς τὸν Ὑλλαϊκὸν λιμένα, ἐν ὅσῳ περιεκομίζοντο, τῶν ἐχθρῶν εἴ τινα λάβοιεν, ἀπέκτεινον: καὶ ἐκ τῶν νεῶν ὅσους ἔπεισαν ἐσβῆναι ἐκβιβάζοντες ἀπεχρῶντο, ἐς τὸ Ἥραιόν τε ἐλθόντες τῶν ἱκετῶν ὡς πεντήκοντα ἄνδρας δίκην ὑποσχεῖν ἔπεισαν καὶ κατέγνωσαν πάντων θάνατον. [3] οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἱκετῶν, ὅσοι οὐκ ἐπείσθησαν, ὡς ἑώρων τὰ γιγνόμενα, διέφθειρον αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐκ τῶν δένδρων τινὲς ἀπήγχοντο, οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐδύναντο ἀνηλοῦντο. [4] ἡμέρας τε ἑπτά, ἃς ἀφικόμενος ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ παρέμεινε, Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ἐφόνευον, τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέροντες τοῖς τὸν δῆμον καταλύουσιν, ἀπέθανον δέ τινες καὶ ἰδίας ἔχθρας ἕνεκα, καὶ ἄλλοι χρημάτων σφίσιν ὀφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων: [5] πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου, καὶ οἷον φιλεῖ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ ξυνέβη καὶ ἔτι περαιτέρω. καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ παῖδα ἀπέκτεινε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν

ἱερῶν ἀπεσπῶντο καὶ πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἐκτείνοντο, οἱ δέ τινες καὶ περιοικοδομηθέντες ἐν τοῦ Διονύσου τῷ ἱερῷ ἀπέθανον.

82. οὕτως ὠμὴ <ἡ> στάσις προυχώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη, διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἑκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ᾽ ἑτοίμων παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμουμένων δὲ καὶ ξυμμαχίας ἅμα ἑκατέροις τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥᾳδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγαὶ τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλομένοις ἐπορίζοντο. [2] καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται. ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν: ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ. [3] ἐστασίαζέ τε οὖν τὰ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύστει τῶν προγενομένων πολὺ ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ᾽ ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπίᾳ. [4] καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν: τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσετέθη, ἀσφαλείᾳ δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεί, ὁ δ᾽ ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὕποπτος. ἐπιβουλεύσας δέ τις τυχὼν ξυνετὸς καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος: προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μηδὲν αὐτῶν δεήσει, τῆς τε ἑταιρίας διαλυτὴς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένος. ἁπλῶς δὲ ὁ φθάσας τὸν μέλλοντα κακόν τι δρᾶν ἐπῃνεῖτο,

καὶ ὁ ἐπικελεύσας τὸν μὴ διανοούμενον. [6] καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ ἑτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν: οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίας αἱ τοιαῦται ξύνοδοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας πλεονεξίᾳ. καὶ τὰς ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πίστεις οὐ τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ἢ τῷ κοινῇ τι παρανομῆσαι. [7] τά τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων καλῶς λεγόμενα ἐνεδέχοντο ἔργων φυλακῇ, εἰ προύχοιεν, καὶ οὐ γενναιότητι. ἀντιτιμωρήσασθαί τέ τινα περὶ πλείονος ἦν ἢ αὐτὸν μὴ προπαθεῖν. καὶ ὅρκοι εἴ που ἄρα γένοιντο ξυναλλαγῆς, ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα πρὸς τὸ ἄπορον ἑκατέρῳ διδόμενοι ἴσχυον οὐκ ἐχόντων ἄλλοθεν δύναμιν: ἐν δὲ τῷ παρατυχόντι ὁ φθάσας θαρσῆσαι, εἰ ἴδοι ἄφαρκτον, ἥδιον διὰ τὴν πίστιν ἐτιμωρεῖτο ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς, καὶ τό τε ἀσφαλὲς ἐλογίζετο καὶ ὅτι ἀπάτῃ περιγενόμενος ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα προσελάμβανεν. ῥᾷον δ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ κακοῦργοι ὄντες δεξιοὶ κέκληνται ἢ ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοί, καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται. [8] πάντων δ᾽ αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν: ἐκ δ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον. οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετὰ ὀνόματος ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς, πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἆθλα ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα ἐπεξῆσάν τε τὰς τιμωρίας ἔτι μείζους, οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῇ πόλει ξυμφόρου προτιθέντες, ἐς δὲ τὸ ἑκατέροις που αἰεὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ὁρίζοντες, καὶ ἢ μετὰ ψήφου ἀδίκου καταγνώσεως ἢ χειρὶ κτώμενοι τὸ κρατεῖν ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν ἐκπιμπλάναι. ὥστε εὐσεβείᾳ μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον, εὐπρεπείᾳ δὲ λόγου οἷς ξυμβαίη ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι, ἄμεινον ἤκουον. τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο.

83. οὕτω πᾶσα ἰδέα κατέστη κακοτροπίας διὰ τὰς στάσεις τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ, καὶ τὸ εὔηθες, οὗ τὸ γενναῖον

πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη, τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως ἐπὶ πολὺ διήνεγκεν: [2] οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὁ διαλύσων οὔτε λόγος ἐχυρὸς οὔτε ὅρκος φοβερός, κρείσσους δὲ ὄντες ἅπαντες λογισμῷ ἐς τὸ ἀνέλπιστον τοῦ βεβαίου μὴ παθεῖν μᾶλλον προυσκόπουν ἢ πιστεῦσαι ἐδύναντο. [3] καὶ οἱ φαυλότεροι γνώμην ὡς τὰ πλείω περιεγίγνοντο: τῷ γὰρ δεδιέναι τό τε αὐτῶν ἐνδεὲς καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ξυνετόν, μὴ λόγοις τε ἥσσους ὦσι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πολυτρόπου αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης φθάσωσι προεπιβουλευόμενοι, τολμηρῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἐχώρουν. [4] οἱ δὲ καταφρονοῦντες κἀν προαισθέσθαι καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲν σφᾶς δεῖν λαμβάνειν ἃ γνώμῃ ἔξεστιν, ἄφαρκτοι μᾶλλον διεφθείροντο.

84. [ἐν δ᾽ οὖν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν προυτολμήθη, καὶ ὁπόσα ὕβρει μὲν ἀρχόμενοι τὸ πλέον ἢ σωφροσύνῃ ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν τιμωρίαν παρασχόντων οἱ ἀνταμυνόμενοι δράσειαν, πενίας δὲ τῆς εἰωθυίας ἀπαλλαξείοντές τινες, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἂν διὰ πάθους, ἐπιθυμοῦντες τὰ τῶν πέλας ἔχειν, παρὰ δίκην γιγνώσκοιεν, οἵ τε μὴ ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, ἀπὸ ἴσου δὲ μάλιστα ἐπιόντες ἀπαιδευσίᾳ ὀργῆς πλεῖστον ἐκφερόμενοι ὠμῶς καὶ ἀπαραιτήτως ἐπέλθοιεν. [2] ξυνταραχθέντος τε τοῦ βίου ἐς τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον τῇ πόλει καὶ τῶν νόμων κρατήσασα ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις, εἰωθυῖα καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀδικεῖν, ἀσμένη ἐδήλωσεν ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὀργῆς οὖσα, κρείσσων δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, πολεμία δὲ τοῦ προύχοντος: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦ τε ὁσίου τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι προυτίθεσαν τοῦ τε μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὸ κερδαίνειν, ἐν ᾧ μὴ βλάπτουσαν ἰσχὺν εἶχε τὸ φθονεῖν. [3] ἀξιοῦσί τε τοὺς κοινοὺς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἅπασιν ἐλπὶς ὑπόκειται σφαλεῖσι κἀν αὐτοὺς διασῴζεσθαι, ἐν ἄλλων τιμωρίαις προκαταλύειν καὶ μὴ ὑπολείπεσθαι, εἴ ποτε ἄρα τις κινδυνεύσας τινὸς δεήσεται αὐτῶν.]

85. οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν Κερκυραῖοι τοιαύταις ὀργαῖς ταῖς πρώταις ἐς ἀλλήλους ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέπλευσαν ταῖς ναυσίν: [2] ὕστερον δὲ οἱ φεύγοντες τῶν Κερκυραίων διεσώθησαν γὰρ

αὐτῶν ἐς πεντακοσίους τείχη τε λαβόντες, ἃ ἦν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ, ἐκράτουν τῆς πέραν οἰκείας γῆς καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ὁρμώμενοι ἐλῄζοντο τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ πολλὰ ἔβλαπτον, καὶ λιμὸς ἰσχυρὸς ἐγένετο ἐν τῇ πόλει. [3] ἐπρεσβεύοντο δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Κόρινθον περὶ καθόδου: καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἐπράσσετο, ὕστερον χρόνῳ πλοῖα καὶ ἐπικούρους παρασκευασάμενοι διέβησαν ἐς τὴν νῆσον ἑξακόσιοι μάλιστα οἱ πάντες, καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἐμπρήσαντες, ὅπως ἀπόγνοια ᾖ τοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ κρατεῖν τῆς γῆς, ἀναβάντες ἐς τὸ ὄρος τὴν Ἰστώνην, τεῖχος ἐνοικοδομησάμενοι ἔφθειρον τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τῆς γῆς ἐκράτουν.

86. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναῦς ἔστειλαν ἐς Σικελίαν καὶ Λάχητα τὸν Μελανώπου στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν καὶ Χαροιάδην τὸν Εὐφιλήτου. [2] οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι καὶ Λεοντῖνοι ἐς πόλεμον ἀλλήλοις καθέστασαν. ξύμμαχοι δὲ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις ἦσαν πλὴν Καμαριναίων αἱ ἄλλαι Δωρίδες πόλεις, αἵπερ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου ξυμμαχίαν ἐτάχθησαν, οὐ μέντοι ξυνεπολέμησάν γε, τοῖς δὲ Λεοντίνοις αἱ Χαλκιδικαὶ πόλεις καὶ Καμάρινα: τῆς δὲ Ἰταλίας Λοκροὶ μὲν Συρακοσίων ἦσαν, Ῥηγῖνοι δὲ κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς Λεοντίνων. [3] ἐς οὖν τὰς Ἀθήνας πέμψαντες οἱ τῶν Λεοντίνων ξύμμαχοι κατά τε παλαιὰν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ὅτι Ἴωνες ἦσαν πείθουσι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πέμψαι σφίσι ναῦς: ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν Συρακοσίων τῆς τε γῆς εἴργοντο καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης. [4] καὶ ἔπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς μὲν οἰκειότητος προφάσει, βουλόμενοι δὲ μήτε σῖτον ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἄγεσθαι αὐτόθεν πρόπειράν τε ποιούμενοι εἰ σφίσι δυνατὰ εἴη τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ὑποχείρια γενέσθαι. [5] καταστάντες οὖν ἐς Ῥήγιον τῆς Ἰταλίας τὸν πόλεμον ἐποιοῦντο μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

87. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἡ νόσος τὸ δεύτερον ἐπέπεσε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἐκλιποῦσα μὲν οὐδένα χρόνον τὸ παντάπασιν, ἐγένετο δέ τις ὅμως διοκωχή. [2] παρέμεινε δὲ τὸ μὲν ὕστερον οὐκ ἔλασσον ἐνιαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ δύο ἔτη, ὥστε Ἀθηναίους γε μὴ εἶναι ὅτι μᾶλλον τούτου

ἐπίεσε καὶ ἐκάκωσε τὴν δύναμιν: [3] τετρακοσίων γὰρ ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τετρακισχιλίων οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἀπέθανον ἐκ τῶν τάξεων καὶ τριακοσίων ἱππέων, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου ὄχλου ἀνεξεύρετος ἀριθμός. [4] ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ σεισμοὶ τότε τῆς γῆς, ἔν τε Ἀθήναις καὶ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ καὶ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς καὶ μάλιστα ἐν Ὀρχομενῷ τῷ Βοιωτίῳ.

88. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Ῥηγῖνοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος τριάκοντα ναυσὶ στρατεύουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰόλου νήσους καλουμένας: θέρους γὰρ δι᾽ ἀνυδρίαν ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐπιστρατεύειν. [2] νέμονται δὲ Λιπαραῖοι αὐτάς, Κνιδίων ἄποικοι ὄντες. οἰκοῦσι δ᾽ ἐν μιᾷ τῶν νήσων οὐ μεγάλῃ, καλεῖται δὲ Λιπάρα: τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐκ ταύτης ὁρμώμενοι γεωργοῦσι, Διδύμην καὶ Στρογγύλην καὶ Ἱεράν. [3] νομίζουσι δὲ οἱ ἐκείνῃ ἄνθρωποι ἐν τῇ Ἱερᾷ ὡς ὁ Ἥφαιστος χαλκεύει, ὅτι τὴν νύκτα φαίνεται πῦρ ἀναδιδοῦσα πολὺ καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν καπνόν. κεῖνται δὲ αἱ νῆσοι αὗται κατὰ τὴν Σικελῶν καὶ Μεσσηνίων γῆν, ξύμμαχοι δ᾽ ἦσαν Συρακοσίων. [4] τεμόντες δ᾽ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν γῆν, ὡς οὐ προσεχώρουν, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ πέμπτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

89. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ ἦλθον ὡς ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβαλοῦντες, Ἄγιδος τοῦ Ἀρχιδάμου ἡγουμένου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως, σεισμῶν δὲ γενομένων πολλῶν ἀπετράποντο πάλιν καὶ οὐκ ἐγένετο ἐσβολή. [2] καὶ περὶ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους, τῶν σεισμῶν κατεχόντων, τῆς Εὐβοίας ἐν Ὀροβίαις ἡ θάλασσα ἐπανελθοῦσα ἀπὸ τῆς τότε οὔσης γῆς καὶ κυματωθεῖσα ἐπῆλθε τῆς πόλεως μέρος τι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κατέκλυσε,τὸ δ᾽ ὑπενόστησε, καὶ θάλασσα νῦν ἐστὶ πρότερον οὖσα γῆ: καὶ ἀνθρώπους διέφθειρεν ὅσοι μὴ ἐδύναντο φθῆναι πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἀναδραμόντες. [3] καὶ περὶ Ἀταλάντην τὴν ἐπὶ Λοκροῖς τοῖς Ὀπουντίοις νῆσον παραπλησία γίγνεται ἐπίκλυσις, καὶ τοῦ τε φρουρίου τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεῖλε καὶ δύο νεῶν ἀνειλκυσμένων τὴν ἑτέραν κατέαξεν. [4] ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ ἐν Πεπαρήθῳ κύματος

ἐπαναχώρησίς τις, οὐ μέντοι ἐπέκλυσέ γε: καὶ σεισμὸς τοῦ τείχους τι κατέβαλε καὶ τὸ πρυτανεῖον καὶ ἄλλας οἰκίας ὀλίγας. [5] αἴτιον δ᾽ ἔγωγε νομίζω τοῦ τοιούτου, ᾗ ἰσχυρότατος ὁ σεισμὸς ἐγένετο, κατὰ τοῦτο ἀποστέλλειν τε τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐξαπίνης πάλιν ἐπισπωμένην βιαιότερον τὴν ἐπίκλυσιν ποιεῖν: ἄνευ δὲ σεισμοῦ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτο ξυμβῆναι γενέσθαι.

90. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐπολέμουν μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι, ὡς ἑκάστοις ξυνέβαινεν, ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ Σικελιῶται ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους στρατεύοντες καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξὺν τοῖς σφετέροις ξυμμάχοις: ἃ δὲ λόγου μάλιστα ἄξια ἢ μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔπραξαν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ ἀντιπόλεμοι, τούτων μνησθήσομαι. [2] Χαροιάδου γὰρ ἤδη τοῦ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦ τεθνηκότος ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων πολέμῳ Λάχης ἅπασαν ἔχων τῶν νεῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐστράτευσε μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ Μυλὰς τὰς Μεσσηνίων. ἔτυχον δὲ δύο φυλαὶ ἐν ταῖς Μυλαῖς τῶν Μεσσηνίων φρουροῦσαι καί τινα καὶ ἐνέδραν πεποιημέναι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τούς τε ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας τρέπουσι καὶ διαφθείρουσι πολλούς, καὶ τῷ ἐρύματι προσβαλόντες ἠνάγκασαν ὁμολογίᾳ τήν τε ἀκρόπολιν παραδοῦναι καὶ ἐπὶ Μεσσήνην ξυστρατεῦσαι. [4] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπελθόντων οἱ Μεσσήνιοι τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων προσεχώρησαν καὶ αὐτοί, ὁμήρους τε δόντες καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πιστὰ παρασχόμενοι.

91. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τριάκοντα μὲν ναῦς ἔστειλαν περὶ Πελοπόννησον, ὧν ἐστρατήγει Δημοσθένης τε ὁ Ἀλκισθένους καὶ Προκλῆς ὁ Θεοδώρου, ἑξήκοντα δὲ ἐς Μῆλον καὶ δισχιλίους ὁπλίτας: ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου. [2] τοὺς γὰρ Μηλίους ὄντας νησιώτας καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ὑπακούειν οὐδὲ ἐς τὸ αὐτῶν ξυμμαχικὸν ἰέναι ἐβούλοντο προσαγαγέσθαι. [3] ὡς δὲ αὐτοῖς δῃουμένης τῆς γῆς οὐ προσεχώρουν, ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Μήλου αὐτοὶ μὲν ἔπλευσαν ἐς Ὠρωπὸν τῆς Γραϊκῆς, ὑπὸ νύκτα δὲ σχόντες εὐθὺς ἐπορεύοντο οἱ ὁπλῖται ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζῇ ἐς Τάναγραν τῆς Βοιωτίας. [4] οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πανδημεὶ

Ἀθηναῖοι, Ἱππονίκου τε τοῦ Καλλίου στρατηγοῦντος καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντος τοῦ Θουκλέους, ἀπὸ σημείου ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ γῆν ἀπήντων. [5] καὶ στρατοπεδευσάμενοι ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐν τῇ Τανάγρᾳ ἐδῄουν καὶ ἐνηυλίσαντο. καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς ἐπεξελθόντας τῶν Ταναγραίων καὶ Θηβαίων τινὰς προσβεβοηθηκότας καὶ ὅπλα λαβόντες καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἀνεχώρησαν, οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. [6] καὶ παραπλεύσας ὁ Νικίας ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ τῆς Λοκρίδος τὰ ἐπιθαλάσσια ἔτεμε καὶ ἀνεχώρησεν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

92. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχινίᾳ ἀποικίαν καθίσταντο ἀπὸ τοιᾶσδε γνώμης. [2] Μηλιῆς οἱ ξύμπαντες εἰσὶ μὲν τρία μέρη, Παράλιοι Ἰριῆς Τραχίνιοι: τούτων δὲ οἱ Τραχίνιοι πολέμῳ ἐφθαρμένοι ὑπὸ Οἰταίων ὁμόρων ὄντων, τὸ πρῶτον μελλήσαντες Ἀθηναίοις προσθεῖναι σφᾶς αὐτούς, δείσαντες δὲ μὴ οὐ σφίσι πιστοὶ ὦσι, πέμπουσιν ἐς Λακεδαίμονα, ἑλόμενοι πρεσβευτὴν Τεισαμενόν. [3] ξυνεπρεσβεύοντο δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Δωριῆς, ἡ μητρόπολις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, τῶν αὐτῶν δεόμενοι: ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν Οἰταίων καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφθείροντο. [4] ἀκούσαντες δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι γνώμην εἶχον τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐκπέμπειν, τοῖς τε Τραχινίοις βουλόμενοι καὶ τοῖς Δωριεῦσι τιμωρεῖν, καὶ ἅμα τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου καλῶς αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει ἡ πόλις καθίστασθαι: ἐπί τε γὰρ τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ ναυτικὸν παρασκευασθῆναι ἄν, ὥστ᾽ ἐκ βραχέος τὴν διάβασιν γίγνεσθαι, τῆς τε ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης παρόδου χρησίμως ἕξειν. τό τε ξύμπαν ὥρμηντο τὸ χωρίον κτίζειν. [5] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐν Δελφοῖς τὸν θεὸν ἐπήροντο, κελεύοντος δὲ ἐξέπεμψαν τοὺς οἰκήτορας αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν περιοίκων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκέλευον ἕπεσθαι πλὴν Ἰώνων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν καὶ ἔστιν ὧν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν. οἰκισταὶ δὲ τρεῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ἡγήσαντο, Λέων καὶ Ἀλκίδας καὶ Δαμάγων. [6] καταστάντες δὲ ἐτείχισαν τὴν πόλιν ἐκ καινῆς, ἣ νῦν Ἡράκλεια καλεῖται, ἀπέχουσα Θερμοπυλῶν σταδίους μάλιστα τεσσαράκοντα, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης εἴκοσι. νεώριά τε

παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ εἶρξαν τὸ κατὰ Θερμοπύλας κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ στενόν, ὅπως εὐφύλακτα αὐτοῖς εἴη.

93. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς πόλεως ταύτης ξυνοικιζομένης τὸ πρῶτον ἔδεισάν τε καὶ ἐνόμισαν ἐπὶ τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ μάλιστα καθίστασθαι, ὅτι βραχύς ἐστιν ὁ διάπλους πρὸς τὸ Κήναιον τῆς Εὐβοίας. ἔπειτα μέντοι παρὰ δόξαν αὐτοῖς ἀπέβη: οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς δεινὸν οὐδέν. [2] αἴτιον δὲ ἦν οἵ τε Θεσσαλοὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντες τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων, καὶ ὧν ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ ἐκτίζετο, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσι μεγάλῃ ἰσχύι παροικῶσιν, ἔφθειρον καὶ διὰ παντὸς ἐπολέμουν ἀνθρώποις νεοκαταστάτοις, ἕως ἐξετρύχωσαν γενομένους τὸ πρῶτον καὶ πάνυ πολλούς [πᾶς γάρ τις Λακεδαιμονίων οἰκιζόντων θαρσαλέως ᾔει, βέβαιον νομίζων τὴν πόλιν]: οὐ μέντοι ἥκιστα οἱ ἄρχοντες αὐτῶν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οἱ ἀφικνούμενοι τὰ πράγματά τε ἔφθειρον καὶ ἐς ὀλιγανθρωπίαν κατέστησαν, ἐκφοβήσαντες τοὺς πολλοὺς χαλεπῶς τε καὶ ἔστιν ἃ οὐ καλῶς ἐξηγούμενοι, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἤδη αὐτῶν οἱ πρόσοικοι ἐπεκράτουν.

94. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους, καὶ περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ὃν ἐν τῇ Μήλῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κατείχοντο, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα νεῶν Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ Πελοπόννησον ὄντες πρῶτον ἐν Ἐλλομενῷ τῆς Λευκαδίας φρουρούς τινας λοχήσαντες διέφθειραν, ἔπειτα ὕστερον ἐπὶ Λευκάδα μείζονι στόλῳ ἦλθον, Ἀκαρνᾶσί τε πᾶσιν, οἳ πανδημεὶ πλὴν Οἰνιαδῶν ξυνέσποντο, καὶ Ζακυνθίοις καὶ Κεφαλλῆσι καὶ Κερκυραίων πέντε καὶ δέκα ναυσίν. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν Λευκάδιοι τῆς τε ἔξω γῆς δῃουμένης καὶ τῆς ἐντὸς τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ, ἐν ᾗ καὶ ἡ Λευκάς ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος, πλήθει βιαζόμενοι ἡσύχαζον: οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνες ἠξίουν Δημοσθένη τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποτειχίζειν αὐτούς, νομίζοντες ῥᾳδίως γ᾽ ἂν ἐκπολιορκῆσαι καὶ πόλεως αἰεὶ σφίσι πολεμίας ἀπαλλαγῆναι. [3] Δημοσθένης δ᾽ ἀναπείθεται κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ὑπὸ Μεσσηνίων ὡς καλὸν αὐτῷ στρατιᾶς τοσαύτης ξυνειλεγμένης Αἰτωλοῖς ἐπιθέσθαι, Ναυπάκτῳ τε πολεμίοις οὖσι καί, ἢν κρατήσῃ αὐτῶν, ῥᾳδίως καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἠπειρωτικὸν τὸ ταύτῃ Ἀθηναίοις προσποιήσειν. [4] τὸ γὰρ

ἔθνος μέγα μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ μάχιμον, οἰκοῦν δὲ κατὰ κώμας ἀτειχίστους, καὶ ταύτας διὰ πολλοῦ, καὶ σκευῇ ψιλῇ χρώμενον οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπέφαινον, πρὶν ξυμβοηθῆσαι, καταστραφῆναι. [5] ἐπιχειρεῖν δ᾽ ἐκέλευον πρῶτον μὲν Ἀποδωτοῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ Ὀφιονεῦσι καὶ μετὰ τούτους Εὐρυτᾶσιν, ὅπερ μέγιστον μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, ἀγνωστότατοι δὲ γλῶσσαν καὶ ὠμοφάγοι εἰσίν, ὡς λέγονται: τούτων γὰρ ληφθέντων ῥᾳδίως καὶ τἆλλα προσχωρήσειν.

95. ὁ δὲ τῶν Μεσσηνίων χάριτι πεισθεὶς καὶ μάλιστα νομίσας ἄνευ τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως τοῖς ἠπειρώταις ξυμμάχοις μετὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δύνασθαι ἂν κατὰ γῆν ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ Βοιωτοὺς διὰ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἐς Κυτίνιον τὸ Δωρικόν, ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχων τὸν Παρνασσόν, ἕως καταβαίη ἐς Φωκέας, οἳ προθύμως ἐδόκουν κατὰ τὴν Ἀθηναίων αἰεί ποτε φιλίαν ξυστρατεύσειν ἢ κἂν βίᾳ προσαχθῆναι [καὶ Φωκεῦσιν ἤδη ὅμορος ἡ Βοιωτία ἐστίν] , ἄρας οὖν ξύμπαντι τῷ στρατεύματι ἀπὸ τῆς Λευκάδος ἀκόντων τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων παρέπλευσεν ἐς Σόλλιον. [2] κοινώσας δὲ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῖς Ἀκαρνᾶσιν, ὡς οὐ προσεδέξαντο διὰ τῆς Λευκάδος τὴν οὐ περιτείχισιν, αὐτὸς τῇ λοιπῇ στρατιᾷ, Κεφαλλῆσι καὶ Μεσσηνίοις καὶ Ζακυνθίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίων τριακοσίοις τοῖς ἐπιβάταις τῶν σφετέρων νεῶν [αἱ γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα τῶν Κερκυραίων ἀπῆλθον νῆες] , ἐστράτευσεν ἐπ᾽ Αἰτωλούς. [3] ὡρμᾶτο δὲ ἐξ Οἰνεῶνος τῆς Λοκρίδος. οἱ δὲ Ὀζόλαι οὗτοι Λοκροὶ ξύμμαχοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἔδει αὐτοὺς πανστρατιᾷ ἀπαντῆσαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὴν μεσόγειαν: ὄντες γὰρ ὅμοροι τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ ὁμόσκευοι μεγάλη ὠφελία ἐδόκουν εἶναι ξυστρατεύοντες μάχης τε ἐμπειρίᾳ τῆς ἐκείνων καὶ χωρίων.

96. αὐλισάμενος δὲ τῷ στρατῷ ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Νεμείου τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐν ᾧ Ἡσίοδος ὁ ποιητὴς λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν ταύτῃ ἀποθανεῖν, χρησθὲν αὐτῷ ἐν Νεμέᾳ τοῦτο παθεῖν, ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ἄρας ἐπορεύετο ἐς τὴν Αἰτωλίαν. [2] καὶ αἱρεῖ τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ Ποτιδανίαν καὶ τῇ δευτέρᾳ Κροκύλειον καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ Τείχιον, ἔμενέ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν λείαν ἐς Εὐπάλιον τῆς

Λοκρίδος ἀπέπεμψεν: τὴν γὰρ γνώμην εἶχε τὰ ἄλλα καταστρεψάμενος οὕτως ἐπὶ Ὀφιονέας, εἰ μὴ βούλοιντο ξυγχωρεῖν, ἐς Ναύπακτον ἐπαναχωρήσας στρατεῦσαι ὕστερον. [3] τοὺς δὲ Αἰτωλοὺς οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν αὕτη ἡ παρασκευὴ οὔτε ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεβουλεύετο, ἐπειδή τε ὁ στρατὸς ἐσεβεβλήκει, πολλῇ χειρὶ ἐπεβοήθουν πάντες, ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἔσχατοι Ὀφιονέων οἱ πρὸς τὸν Μηλιακὸν κόλπον καθήκοντες Βωμιῆς καὶ Καλλιῆς ἐβοήθησαν.

97. τῷ δὲ Δημοσθένει τοιόνδε τι οἱ Μεσσήνιοι παρῄνουν: ὅπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀναδιδάσκοντες αὐτὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ὡς εἴη ῥᾳδία ἡ αἵρεσις, ἰέναι ἐκέλευον ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπὶ τὰς κώμας καὶ μὴ μένειν ἕως ἂν ξύμπαντες ἀθροισθέντες ἀντιτάξωνται, τὴν δ᾽ ἐν ποσὶν αἰεὶ πειρᾶσθαι αἱρεῖν. [2] ὁ δὲ τούτοις τε πεισθεὶς καὶ τῇ τύχῃ ἐλπίσας, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ ἠναντιοῦτο, τοὺς Λοκροὺς οὐκ ἀναμείνας οὓς αὐτῷ ἔδει προσβοηθῆσαι ⟨ψιλῶν γὰρ ἀκοντιστῶν ἐνδεὴς ἦν μάλιστα⟩ ἐχώρει ἐπὶ Αἰγιτίου, καὶ κατὰ κράτος αἱρεῖ ἐπιών. ὑπέφευγον γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ τῶν λόφων τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως: ἦν γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ὑψηλῶν χωρίων ἀπέχουσα τῆς θαλάσσης ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίους μάλιστα. [3] οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοί ⟨βεβοηθηκότες γὰρ ἤδη ἦσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Αἰγίτιον⟩ προσέβαλλον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις καταθέοντες ἀπὸ τῶν λόφων ἄλλοι ἄλλοθεν καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον, καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἐπίοι τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, ὑπεχώρουν, ἀναχωροῦσι δὲ ἐπέκειντο: καὶ ἦν ἐπὶ πολὺ τοιαύτη ἡ μάχη, διώξεις τε καὶ ὑπαγωγαί, ἐν οἷς ἀμφοτέροις ἥσσους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι.

98. μέχρι μὲν οὖν οἱ τοξόται εἶχόν τε τὰ βέλη αὐτοῖς καὶ οἷοί τε ἦσαν χρῆσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀντεῖχον ⟨τοξευόμενοι γὰρ οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ψιλοὶ ἀνεστέλλοντο⟩: ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦ τε τοξάρχου ἀποθανόντος οὗτοι διεσκεδάσθησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐκεκμήκεσαν καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῷ αὐτῷ πόνῳ ξυνεχόμενοι, οἵ τε Αἰτωλοὶ ἐνέκειντο καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον, οὕτω δὴ τραπόμενοι ἔφευγον, καὶ ἐσπίπτοντες ἔς τε χαράδρας ἀνεκβάτους καὶ χωρία ὧν οὐκ ἦσαν ἔμπειροι διεφθείροντο: καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἡγεμὼν αὐτοῖς τῶν ὁδῶν Χρόμων ὁ Μεσσήνιος ἐτύγχανε τεθνηκώς. [2] οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες πολλοὺς μὲν

αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ τροπῇ κατὰ πόδας αἱροῦντες ἄνθρωποι ποδώκεις καὶ ψιλοὶ διέφθειρον, τοὺς δὲ πλείους τῶν ὁδῶν ἁμαρτάνοντας καὶ ἐς τὴν ὕλην ἐσφερομένους, ὅθεν διέξοδοι οὐκ ἦσαν, πῦρ κομισάμενοι περιεπίμπρασαν: [3] πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη τῆς φυγῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀλέθρου τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μόλις τε ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὸν Οἰνεῶνα τῆς Λοκρίδος, ὅθεν περ καὶ ὡρμήθησαν, οἱ περιγενόμενοι κατέφυγον. [4] ἀπέθανον δὲ τῶν τε ξυμμάχων πολλοὶ καὶ αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων ὁπλῖται περὶ εἴκοσι μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν. τοσοῦτοι μὲν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἡλικία ἡ αὐτὴ οὗτοι βέλτιστοι δὴ ἄνδρες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε ἐκ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως διεφθάρησαν: ἀπέθανε δὲ καὶ ὁ ἕτερος στρατηγὸς Προκλῆς. [5] τοὺς δὲ νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀνελόμενοι παρὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ ἀναχωρήσαντες ἐς Ναύπακτον ὕστερον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκομίσθησαν. Δημοσθένης δὲ περὶ Ναύπακτον καὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα ὑπελείφθη, τοῖς πεπραγμένοις φοβούμενος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.

99. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους καὶ οἱ περὶ Σικελίαν Ἀθηναῖοι πλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Λοκρίδα ἐν ἀποβάσει τέ τινι τοὺς προσβοηθήσαντας Λοκρῶν ἐκράτησαν καὶ περιπόλιον αἱροῦσιν ὃ ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ Ἅλικι ποταμῷ.

100. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους Αἰτωλοὶ προπέμψαντες πρότερον ἔς τε Κόρινθον καὶ ἐς Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις, Τόλοφόν τε τὸν Ὀφιονέα καὶ Βοριάδην τὸν Εὐρυτᾶνα καὶ Τείσανδρον τὸν Ἀποδωτόν, πείθουσιν ὥστε σφίσι πέμψαι στρατιὰν ἐπὶ Ναύπακτον διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγήν. [2] καὶ ἐξέπεμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον τρισχιλίους ὁπλίτας τῶν ξυμμάχων. τούτων ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι ἐξ Ἡρακλείας τῆς ἐν Τραχῖνι πόλεως τότε νεοκτίστου οὔσης: Σπαρτιάτης δ᾽ ἦρχεν Εὐρύλοχος τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ ξυνηκολούθουν αὐτῷ Μακάριος καὶ Μενεδάϊος οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται.

101. ξυλλεγέντος δὲ τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐς Δελφοὺς ἐπεκηρυκεύετο Εὐρύλοχος Λοκροῖς τοῖς Ὀζόλαις: διὰ τούτων γὰρ ἡ ὁδὸς ἦν ἐς Ναύπακτον, καὶ ἅμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐβούλετο ἀποστῆσαι αὐτούς. [2] ξυνέπρασσον δὲ μάλιστα

αὐτῷ τῶν Λοκρῶν Ἀμφισσῆς διὰ τὸ τῶν Φωκέων ἔχθος δεδιότες: καὶ αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι δόντες ὁμήρους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔπεισαν δοῦναι φοβουμένους τὸν ἐπιόντα στρατόν, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς ὁμόρους αὐτοῖς Μυονέας ﴿ταύτῃ γὰρ δυσεσβολώτατος ἡ Λοκρίς﴾, ἔπειτα Ἰπνέας καὶ Μεσσαπίους καὶ Τριταιέας καὶ Χαλαίους καὶ Τολοφωνίους καὶ Ἠσσίους καὶ Οἰανθέας. οὗτοι καὶ ξυνεστράτευον πάντες. Ὀλπαῖοι δὲ ὁμήρους μὲν ἔδοσαν, ἠκολούθουν δὲ οὔ: καὶ Ὑαῖοι οὐκ ἔδοσαν ὁμήρους πρὶν αὐτῶν εἶλον κώμην Πόλιν ὄνομα ἔχουσαν.

102. ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο πάντα καὶ τοὺς ὁμήρους κατέθετο ἐς Κυτίνιον τὸ Δωρικόν, ἐχώρει τῷ στρατῷ ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον διὰ τῶν Λοκρῶν, καὶ πορευόμενος Οἰνεῶνα αἱρεῖ αὐτῶν καὶ Εὐπάλιον: οὐ γὰρ προσεχώρησαν. [2] γενόμενοι δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Ναυπακτίᾳ καὶ οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ ἅμα ἤδη προσβεβοηθηκότες ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ προάστειον ἀτείχιστον ὂν εἶλον: ἐπί τε Μολύκρειον ἐλθόντες τὴν Κορινθίων μὲν ἀποικίαν, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπήκοον, αἱροῦσιν. [3] Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ﴿ἔτι γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν μετὰ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας περὶ Ναύπακτον﴾ προαισθόμενος τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ δείσας περὶ αὐτῆς, ἐλθὼν πείθει Ἀκαρνᾶνας, χαλεπῶς διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος ἀναχώρησιν, βοηθῆσαι Ναυπάκτῳ. [4] καὶ πέμπουσι μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν χιλίους ὁπλίτας, οἳ ἐσελθόντες περιεποίησαν τὸ χωρίον: δεινὸν γὰρ ἦν μὴ μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ τείχους, ὀλίγων δὲ τῶν ἀμυνομένων, οὐκ ἀντίσχωσιν. [5] Εὐρύλοχος δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὡς ᾔσθοντο τὴν στρατιὰν ἐσεληλυθυῖαν καὶ ἀδύνατον ὂν τὴν πόλιν βίᾳ ἑλεῖν, ἀνεχώρησαν οὐκ ἐπὶ Πελοποννήσου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς τὴν Αἰολίδα τὴν νῦν καλουμένην Καλυδῶνα καὶ Πλευρῶνα καὶ ἐς τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία καὶ ἐς Πρόσχιον τῆς Αἰτωλίας. [6] οἱ γὰρ Ἀμπρακιῶται ἐλθόντες πρὸς αὐτοὺς πείθουσιν ὥστε μετὰ σφῶν Ἄργει τε τῷ Ἀμφιλοχικῷ καὶ Ἀμφιλοχίᾳ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπιχειρῆσαι καὶ Ἀκαρνανίᾳ ἅμα, λέγοντες ὅτι, ἢν τούτων κρατήσωσι, πᾶν τὸ ἠπειρωτικὸν Λακεδαιμονίοις ξύμμαχον καθεστήξει. [7] καὶ ὁ μὲν Εὐρύλοχος πεισθεὶς καὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἀφεὶς ἡσύχαζε

τῷ στρατῷ περὶ τοὺς χώρους τούτους, ἕως τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ἐκστρατευσαμένοις περὶ τὸ Ἄργος δέοι βοηθεῖν. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

103. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἐπελθόντες μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ξυμμάχων καὶ ὅσοι Σικελῶν κατὰ κράτος ἀρχόμενοι ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων καὶ ξύμμαχοι ὄντες ἀποστάντες αὐτοῖς [ἀπὸ Συρακοσίων] ξυνεπολέμουν, ἐπ᾽ Ἴνησσαν τὸ Σικελικὸν πόλισμα, οὗ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν Συρακόσιοι εἶχον, προσέβαλον, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν, ἀπῆσαν. [2] ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀναχωρήσει ὑστέροις Ἀθηναίων τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐπιτίθενται οἱ ἐκ τοῦ τειχίσματος Συρακόσιοι, καὶ προσπεσόντες τρέπουσί τε μέρος τι τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ ἀπέκτειναν οὐκ ὀλίγους. [3] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ὁ Λάχης καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Λοκρίδα ἀποβάσεις τινὰς ποιησάμενοι κατὰ τὸν Καϊκῖνον ποταμὸν τοὺς προσβοηθοῦντας Λοκρῶν μετὰ Προξένου τοῦ Καπάτωνος ὡς τριακοσίους μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν καὶ ὅπλα λαβόντες ἀπεχώρησαν.

104. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Δῆλον ἐκάθηραν Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ χρησμὸν δή τινα. ἐκάθηρε μὲν γὰρ καὶ Πεισίστρατος ὁ τύραννος πρότερον αὐτήν, οὐχ ἅπασαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐφεωρᾶτο τῆς νήσου: τότε δὲ πᾶσα ἐκαθάρθη τοιῷδε τρόπῳ. [2] θῆκαι ὅσαι ἦσαν τῶν τεθνεώτων ἐν Δήλῳ, πάσας ἀνεῖλον, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν προεῖπον μήτε ἐναποθνῄσκειν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ μήτε ἐντίκτειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς τὴν Ῥήνειαν διακομίζεσθαι. ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Ῥήνεια τῆς Δήλου οὕτως ὀλίγον ὥστε Πολυκράτης ὁ Σαμίων τύραννος ἰσχύσας τινὰ χρόνον ναυτικῷ καὶ τῶν τε ἄλλων νήσων ἄρξας καὶ τὴν Ῥήνειαν ἑλὼν ἀνέθηκε τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Δηλίῳ ἀλύσει δήσας πρὸς τὴν Δῆλον. καὶ τὴν πεντετηρίδα τότε πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐποίησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ Δήλια. [3] ἦν δέ ποτε καὶ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλη ξύνοδος ἐς τὴν Δῆλον τῶν Ἰώνων τε καὶ περικτιόνων νησιωτῶν: ξύν τε γὰρ γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν ἐθεώρουν, ὥσπερ νῦν ἐς τὰ Ἐφέσια Ἴωνες, καὶ ἀγὼν ἐποιεῖτο αὐτόθι καὶ γυμνικὸς καὶ μουσικός, χορούς τε ἀνῆγον αἱ πόλεις. [4] δηλοῖ δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος ὅτι τοιαῦτα

ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι τοῖσδε, ἅ ἐστιν ἐκ προοιμίου Ἀπόλλωνος:”ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε Δήλῳ, Φοῖβε, μάλιστά γε θυμὸν ἐτέρφθης,ἔνθα τοι ἑλκεχίτωνες Ἰάονες ἠγερέθονταισὺν σφοῖσιν τεκέεσσι γυναιξί τε σὴν ἐς ἀγυιάν:ἔνθα σε πυγμαχίῃ τε καὶ ὀρχηστυῖ καὶ ἀοιδῇμνησάμενοι τέρπουσιν, ὅταν καθέσωσιν ἀγῶνα.” [5] ὅτι δὲ καὶ μουσικῆς ἀγὼν ἦν καὶ ἀγωνιούμενοι ἐφοίτων ἐν τοῖσδε αὖ δηλοῖ, ἅ ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προοιμίου: τὸν γὰρ Δηλιακὸν χορὸν τῶν γυναικῶν ὑμνήσας ἐτελεύτα τοῦ ἐπαίνου ἐς τάδε τὰ ἔπη, ἐν οἷς καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπεμνήσθη: “ἀλλ᾽ ἄγεθ᾽, ἰλήκοι μὲν Ἀπόλλων Ἀρτέμιδι ξύν,χαίρετε δ᾽ ὑμεῖς πᾶσαι. ἐμεῖο δὲ καὶ μετόπισθεμνήσασθ᾽, ὁππότε κέν τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπωνἐνθάδ᾽ ἀνείρηται ταλαπείριος ἄλλος ἐπελθών:’ὦ κοῦραι, τίς δ᾽ ὔμμιν ἀνὴρ ἥδιστος ἀοιδῶνἐνθάδε πωλεῖται, καὶ τέῳ τέρπεσθε μάλιστα;’ὑμεῖς δ᾽ εὖ μάλα πᾶσαι ὑποκρίνασθαι ἀφήμως:’τυφλὸς ἀνήρ, οἰκεῖ δὲ Χίῳ ἔνι παιπαλοέσσῃ.’” [6] τοσαῦτα μὲν Ὅμηρος ἐτεκμηρίωσεν ὅτι ἦν καὶ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλη ξύνοδος καὶ ἑορτὴ ἐν τῇ Δήλῳ: ὕστερον δὲ τοὺς μὲν χοροὺς οἱ νησιῶται καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μεθ᾽ ἱερῶν ἔπεμπον, τὰ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατελύθη ὑπὸ ξυμφορῶν, ὡς εἰκός, πρὶν δὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τότε τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐποίησαν καὶ ἱπποδρομίας, ὃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν.

105. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Ἀμπρακιῶται, ὥσπερ ὑποσχόμενοι Εὐρυλόχῳ τὴν στρατιὰν κατέσχον, ἐκστρατεύονται ἐπὶ Ἄργος τὸ Ἀμφιλοχικὸν τρισχιλίοις ὁπλίταις, καὶ ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν καταλαμβάνουσιν Ὄλπας, τεῖχος ἐπὶ λόφου ἰσχυρὸν πρὸς τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὅ ποτε Ἀκαρνᾶνες τειχισάμενοι κοινῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἐχρῶντο: ἀπέχει δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀργείων πόλεως ἐπιθαλασσίας οὔσης πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι σταδίους μάλιστα. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνες οἱ μὲν ἐς Ἄργος ξυνεβοήθουν, οἱ δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιλοχίας ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χωρίῳ ὃ Κρῆναι καλεῖται, φυλάσσοντες τοὺς μετὰ Εὐρυλόχου Πελοποννησίους μὴ λάθωσι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀμπρακιώτας διελθόντες, ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. [3] πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ Δημοσθένη τὸν ἐς τὴν Αἰτωλίαν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγήσαντα, ὅπως σφίσιν ἡγεμὼν γίγνηται, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς εἴκοσι ναῦς

Ἀθηναίων αἳ ἔτυχον περὶ Πελοπόννησον οὖσαι, ὧν ἦρχεν Ἀριστοτέλης τε ὁ Τιμοκράτους καὶ Ἱεροφῶν ὁ Ἀντιμνήστου. [4] ἀπέστειλαν δὲ καὶ ἄγγελον οἱ περὶ τὰς Ὄλπας Ἀμπρακιῶται ἐς τὴν πόλιν κελεύοντες σφίσι βοηθεῖν πανδημεί, δεδιότες μὴ οἱ μετ᾽ Εὐρυλόχου οὐ δύνωνται διελθεῖν τοὺς Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ σφίσιν ᾖ μονωθεῖσιν ἡ μάχη γένηται ἢ ἀναχωρεῖν βουλομένοις οὐκ ᾖ ἀσφαλές.

106. οἱ μὲν οὖν μετ᾽ Εὐρυλόχου Πελοποννήσιοι ὡς ᾔσθοντο τοὺς ἐν Ὄλπαις Ἀμπρακιώτας ἥκοντας, ἄραντες ἐκ τοῦ Προσχίου ἐβοήθουν κατὰ τάχος, καὶ διαβάντες τὸν Ἀχελῷον ἐχώρουν δι᾽ Ἀκαρνανίας οὔσης ἐρήμου διὰ τὴν ἐς Ἄργος βοήθειαν, ἐν δεξιᾷ μὲν ἔχοντες τὴν Στρατίων πόλιν καὶ τὴν φρουρὰν αὐτῶν, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δὲ τὴν ἄλλην Ἀκαρνανίαν. [2] καὶ διελθόντες τὴν Στρατίων γῆν ἐχώρουν διὰ τῆς Φυτίας καὶ αὖθις Μεδεῶνος παρ᾽ ἔσχατα, ἔπειτα διὰ Λιμναίας: καὶ ἐπέβησαν τῆς Ἀγραίων, οὐκέτι Ἀκαρνανίας, φιλίας δὲ σφίσιν. [3] λαβόμενοι δὲ τοῦ Θυάμου ὄρους, ὅ ἐστιν Ἀγραϊκόν, ἐχώρουν δι᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατέβησαν ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν νυκτὸς ἤδη, καὶ διεξελθόντες μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ἀργείων πόλεως καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ Κρήναις Ἀκαρνάνων φυλακῆς ἔλαθον καὶ προσέμειξαν τοῖς ἐν Ὄλπαις Ἀμπρακιώταις.

107. γενόμενοι δὲ ἀθρόοι ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καθίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν Μητρόπολιν καλουμένην καὶ στρατόπεδον ἐποιήσαντο. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσὶν οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον παραγίγνονται ἐς τὸν Ἀμπρακικὸν κόλπον βοηθοῦντες τοῖς Ἀργείοις, καὶ Δημοσθένης Μεσσηνίων μὲν ἔχων διακοσίους ὁπλίτας, ἑξήκοντα δὲ τοξότας Ἀθηναίων. [2] καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆες περὶ τὰς Ὄλπας τὸν λόφον ἐκ θαλάσσης ἐφώρμουν: οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνες καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων ὀλίγοι οἱ γὰρ πλείους ὑπὸ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν βίᾳ κατείχοντο ἐς τὸ Ἄργος ἤδη ξυνεληλυθότες παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς μαχούμενοι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ παντὸς ξυμμαχικοῦ αἱροῦνται Δημοσθένη μετὰ τῶν σφετέρων στρατηγῶν. [3] ὁ δὲ προσαγαγὼν ἐγγὺς τῆς Ὄλπης ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο, χαράδρα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς μεγάλη διεῖργεν. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν πέντε ἡσύχαζον, τῇ δ᾽ ἕκτῃ ἐτάσσοντο ἀμφότεροι ὡς ἐς μάχην.

καὶ μεῖζον γὰρ ἐγένετο καὶ περιέσχε τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων στρατόπεδον ὁ Δημοσθένης δείσας μὴ κυκλωθῇ λοχίζει ἐς ὁδόν τινα κοίλην καὶ λοχμώδη ὁπλίτας καὶ ψιλοὺς ξυναμφοτέρους ἐς τετρακοσίους, ὅπως κατὰ τὸ ὑπερέχον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐν τῇ ξυνόδῳ αὐτῇ ἐξαναστάντες οὗτοι κατὰ νώτου γίγνωνται. [4] ἐπεὶ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο ἀμφοτέροις, ἦσαν ἐς χεῖρας, Δημοσθένης μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχων μετὰ Μεσσηνίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὀλίγων, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο Ἀκαρνᾶνες ὡς ἕκαστοι τεταγμένοι ἐπεῖχον, καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων οἱ παρόντες ἀκοντισταί, Πελοποννήσιοι δὲ καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται ἀναμὶξ τεταγμένοι πλὴν Μαντινέων: οὗτοι δὲ ἐν τῷ εὐωνύμῳ μᾶλλον καὶ οὐ τὸ κέρας ἄκρον ἔχοντες ἀθρόοι ἦσαν, ἀλλ᾽ Εὐρύλοχος ἔσχατον εἶχε τὸ εὐώνυμον καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, κατὰ Μεσσηνίους καὶ Δημοσθένη.

108. ὡς δ᾽ ἐν χερσὶν ἤδη ὄντες περιέσχον τῷ κέρᾳ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ἐκυκλοῦντο τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ἐναντίων, οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας Ἀκαρνᾶνες ἐπιγενόμενοι αὐτοῖς κατὰ νώτου προσπίπτουσί τε καὶ τρέπουσιν, ὥστε μήτε ἐς ἀλκὴν ὑπομεῖναι φοβηθέντας τε ἐς φυγὴν καὶ τὸ πλέον τοῦ στρατεύματος καταστῆσαι: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἶδον τὸ κατ᾽ Εὐρύλοχον καὶ ὃ κράτιστον ἦν διαφθειρόμενον, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐφοβοῦντο. καὶ οἱ Μεσσήνιοι ὄντες ταύτῃ μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους τὸ πολὺ τοῦ ἔργου ἐπεξῆλθον. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀμπρακιῶται καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἐνίκων τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὸ Ἄργος ἀπεδίωξαν: καὶ γὰρ μαχιμώτατοι τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνα τὰ χωρία τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες. [3] ἐπαναχωροῦντες δὲ ὡς ἑώρων τὸ πλέον νενικημένον καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀκαρνᾶνες σφίσι προσέκειντο, χαλεπῶς διεσῴζοντο ἐς τὰς Ὄλπας, καὶ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν, ἀτάκτως καὶ οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ προσπίπτοντες πλὴν Μαντινέων: οὗτοι δὲ μάλιστα ξυντεταγμένοι παντὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀνεχώρησαν. καὶ ἡ μὲν μάχη ἐτελεύτα ἐς ὀψέ.

109. Μενεδάϊος δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ Εὐρυλόχου τεθνεῶτος καὶ Μακαρίου αὐτὸς παρειληφὼς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἀπορῶν μεγάλης ἥσσης γεγενημένης ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἢ μένων πολιορκήσεται ἔκ τε γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ταῖς Ἀττικαῖς

ναυσὶν ἀποκεκλῃμένος ἢ καὶ ἀναχωρῶν διασωθήσεται, προσφέρει λόγον περὶ σπονδῶν καὶ ἀναχωρήσεως Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς Ἀκαρνάνων στρατηγοῖς, καὶ περὶ νεκρῶν ἅμα ἀναιρέσεως. [2] οἱ δὲ νεκροὺς μὲν ἀπέδοσαν καὶ τροπαῖον αὐτοὶ ἔστησαν καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν τριακοσίους μάλιστα ἀποθανόντας ἀνείλοντο, ἀναχώρησιν δὲ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ προφανοῦς οὐκ ἐσπείσαντο ἅπασι, κρύφα δὲ Δημοσθένης μετὰ τῶν ξυστρατήγων Ἀκαρνάνων σπένδονται Μαντινεῦσι καὶ Μενεδαΐῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρχουσι τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ ὅσοι αὐτῶν ἦσαν ἀξιολογώτατοι ἀποχωρεῖν κατὰ τάχος, βουλόμενος ψιλῶσαι τοὺς Ἀμπρακιώτας τε καὶ τὸν μισθοφόρον ὄχλον [τὸν ξενικόν], μάλιστα δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Πελοποννησίους διαβαλεῖν ἐς τοὺς ἐκείνῃ χρῄζων Ἕλληνας ὡς καταπροδόντες τὸ ἑαυτῶν προυργιαίτερον ἐποιήσαντο. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν τούς τε νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο καὶ διὰ τάχους ἔθαπτον, ὥσπερ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν κρύφα οἷς ἐδέδοτο ἐπεβούλευον:

110. τῷ δὲ Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς Ἀκαρνᾶσιν ἀγγέλλεται τοὺς Ἀμπρακιώτας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πανδημεὶ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐκ τῶν Ὀλπῶν ἀγγελίαν ἐπιβοηθεῖν διὰ τῶν Ἀμφιλόχων, βουλομένους τοῖς ἐν Ὄλπαις ξυμμεῖξαι, εἰδότας οὐδὲν τῶν γεγενημένων. [2] καὶ πέμπει εὐθὺς τοῦ στρατοῦ μέρος τι τὰς ὁδοὺς προλοχιοῦντας καὶ τὰ καρτερὰ προκαταληψομένους, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ ἅμα παρεσκευάζετο βοηθεῖν ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς.

111. ἐν τούτῳ δ᾽ οἱ Μαντινῆς καὶ οἷς ἔσπειστο πρόφασιν ἐπὶ λαχανισμὸν καὶ φρυγάνων ξυλλογὴν ἐξελθόντες ὑπαπῆσαν κατ᾽ ὀλίγους, ἅμα ξυλλέγοντες ἐφ᾽ ἃ ἐξῆλθον δῆθεν: προκεχωρηκότες δὲ ἤδη ἅπωθεν τῆς Ὄλπης θᾶσσον ἀπεχώρουν. [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀμπρακιῶται καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι † μὲν ἐτύγχανον οὕτως † ἀθρόοι ξυνεξελθόντες, ὡς ἔγνωσαν ἀπιόντας, ὥρμησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἔθεον δρόμῳ, ἐπικαταλαβεῖν βουλόμενοι. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον καὶ πάντας ἐνόμισαν ἀπιέναι ἀσπόνδους ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ἐπεδίωκον, καί τινας αὐτῶν τῶν στρατηγῶν κωλύοντας καὶ φάσκοντας ἐσπεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς

ἠκόντισέ τις, νομίσας καταπροδίδοσθαι σφᾶς: ἔπειτα μέντοι τοὺς μὲν Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ἀφίεσαν, τοὺς δ᾽ Ἀμπρακιώτας ἔκτεινον. [4] καὶ ἦν πολλὴ ἔρις καὶ ἄγνοια εἴτε Ἀμπρακιώτης τίς ἐστιν εἴτε Πελοποννήσιος. καὶ ἐς διακοσίους μέν τινας αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι διέφυγον ἐς τὴν Ἀγραΐδα ὅμορον οὖσαν, καὶ Σαλύνθιος αὐτοὺς ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἀγραίων φίλος ὢν ὑπεδέξατο.

112. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Ἀμπρακιῶται ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπ᾽ Ἰδομενήν. ἐστὸν δὲ δύο λόφω ἡ Ἰδομενὴ ὑψηλώ: τούτοιν τὸν μὲν μείζω νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης οἱ προαποσταλέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἔλαθόν τε καὶ ἔφθασαν προκαταλαβόντες τὸν δ᾽ ἐλάσσω ἔτυχον οἱ Ἀμπρακιῶται προαναβάντες καὶ ηὐλίσαντο. [2] ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης δειπνήσας ἐχώρει καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα ἀπὸ ἑσπέρας εὐθύς, αὐτὸς μὲν τὸ ἥμισυ ἔχων ἐπὶ τῆς ἐσβολῆς, τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο διὰ τῶν Ἀμφιλοχικῶν ὀρῶν. [3] καὶ ἅμα ὄρθρῳ ἐπιπίπτει τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ἔτι ἐν ταῖς εὐναῖς καὶ οὐ προῃσθημένοις τὰ γεγενημένα, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον νομίσασι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν εἶναι: [4] καὶ γὰρ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους πρώτους ἐπίτηδες ὁ Δημοσθένης προύταξε καὶ προσαγορεύειν ἐκέλευε, Δωρίδα τε γλῶσσαν ἱέντας καὶ τοῖς προφύλαξι πίστιν παρεχομένους, ἅμα δὲ καὶ οὐ καθορωμένους τῇ ὄψει νυκτὸς ἔτι οὔσης. [5] ὡς οὖν ἐπέπεσε τῷ στρατεύματι αὐτῶν, τρέπουσι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς αὐτοῦ διέφθειραν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ κατὰ τὰ ὄρη ἐς φυγὴν ὥρμησαν. [6] προκατειλημμένων δὲ τῶν ὁδῶν, καὶ ἅμα τῶν μὲν Ἀμφιλόχων ἐμπείρων ὄντων τῆς ἑαυτῶν γῆς καὶ ψιλῶν πρὸς ὁπλίτας, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων καὶ ἀνεπιστημόνων ὅπῃ τράπωνται, ἐσπίπτοντες ἔς τε χαράδρας καὶ τὰς προλελοχισμένας ἐνέδρας διεφθείροντο. [7] καὶ ἐς πᾶσαν ἰδέαν χωρήσαντες τῆς φυγῆς ἐτράποντό τινες καὶ ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχουσαν, καὶ ὡς εἶδον τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναῦς παραπλεούσας ἅμα τοῦ ἔργου τῇ ξυντυχίᾳ, προσένευσαν, ἡγησάμενοι ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα φόβῳ κρεῖσσον εἶναι σφίσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν, εἰ δεῖ, διαφθαρῆναι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ ἐχθίστων Ἀμφιλόχων. [8] οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀμπρακιῶται τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ κακωθέντες ὀλίγοι

ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐσώθησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν: Ἀκαρνᾶνες δὲ σκυλεύσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τροπαῖα στήσαντες ἀπεχώρησαν ἐς Ἄργος.

113. καὶ αὐτοῖς τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦλθε κῆρυξ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐς Ἀγραίους καταφυγόντων ἐκ τῆς Ὄλπης Ἀμπρακιωτῶν, ἀναίρεσιν αἰτήσων τῶν νεκρῶν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν ὕστερον τῆς πρώτης μάχης, ὅτε μετὰ τῶν Μαντινέων καὶ τῶν ὑποσπόνδων ξυνεξῆσαν ἄσπονδοι. [2] ἰδὼν δ᾽ ὁ κῆρυξ τὰ ὅπλα τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ἐθαύμαζε τὸ πλῆθος: οὐ γὰρ ᾔδει τὸ πάθος, ἀλλ᾽ ᾤετο τῶν μετὰ σφῶν εἶναι. [3] καί τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο ὅτι θαυμάζοι καὶ ὁπόσοι αὐτῶν τεθνᾶσιν, οἰόμενος αὖ ὁ ἐρωτῶν εἶναι τὸν κήρυκα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰδομεναῖς. ὁ δ᾽ ἔφη διακοσίους μάλιστα. ὑπολαβὼν δ᾽ ὁ ἐρωτῶν εἶπεν ‘οὔκουν τὰ ὅπλα ταυτὶ φαίνεται, [4] ἀλλὰ πλέον ἢ χιλίων.’ αὖθις δὲ εἶπεν ἐκεῖνος ‘οὐκ ἄρα τῶν μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν μαχομένων ἐστίν.’ ὁ δ᾽ ἀπεκρίνατο ‘εἴπερ γε ὑμεῖς ἐν Ἰδομενῇ χθὲς ἐμάχεσθε.’ ‘ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς γε οὐδενὶ ἐμαχόμεθα χθές, ἀλλὰ πρῴην ἐν τῇ ἀποχωρήσει.’ ‘καὶ μὲν δὴ τούτοις γε ἡμεῖς χθὲς ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως βοηθήσασι τῆς Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ἐμαχόμεθα.’ [5] ὁ δὲ κῆρυξ ὡς ἤκουσε καὶ ἔγνω ὅτι ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως βοήθεια διέφθαρται, ἀνοιμώξας καὶ ἐκπλαγεὶς τῷ μεγέθει τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπῆλθεν εὐθὺς ἄπρακτος καὶ οὐκέτι ἀπῄτει τοὺς νεκρούς. [6] πάθος γὰρ τοῦτο μιᾷ πόλει Ἑλληνίδι ἐν ἴσαις ἡμέραις μέγιστον δὴ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε ἐγένετο. καὶ ἀριθμὸν οὐκ ἔγραψα τῶν ἀποθανόντων, διότι ἄπιστον τὸ πλῆθος λέγεται ἀπολέσθαι ὡς πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως. Ἀμπρακίαν μέντοι οἶδα ὅτι, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν Ἀκαρνᾶνες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Δημοσθένει πειθόμενοι ἐξελεῖν, αὐτοβοεὶ ἂν εἷλον: νῦν δ᾽ ἔδεισαν μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔχοντες αὐτὴν χαλεπώτεροι σφίσι πάροικοι ὦσιν.

114. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τρίτον μέρος νείμαντες τῶν σκύλων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὰς πόλεις διείλοντο. καὶ τὰ μὲν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πλέοντα ἐάλω, τὰ δὲ νῦν ἀνακείμενα ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ἱεροῖς Δημοσθένει ἐξῃρέθησαν τριακόσιαι πανοπλίαι, καὶ ἄγων αὐτὰς κατέπλευσεν: καὶ ἐγένετο ἅμα

αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας ξυμφορὰν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πράξεως ἀδεεστέρα ἡ κάθοδος. [2] ἀπῆλθον δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσὶν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς Ναύπακτον. Ἀκαρνᾶνες δὲ καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δημοσθένους τοῖς ὡς Σαλύνθιον καὶ Ἀγραίους καταφυγοῦσιν Ἀμπρακιώταις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἀναχώρησιν ἐσπείσαντο ἐξ Οἰνιαδῶν, οἷπερ καὶ μετανέστησαν παρὰ Σαλυνθίου. [3] καὶ ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο ἑκατὸν ἔτη Ἀκαρνᾶνες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι πρὸς Ἀμπρακιώτας ἐπὶ τοῖσδε, ὥστε μήτε Ἀμπρακιώτας μετὰ Ἀκαρνάνων στρατεύειν ἐπὶ Πελοποννησίους μήτε Ἀκαρνᾶνας μετὰ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίους, βοηθεῖν δὲ τῇ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἀποδοῦναι Ἀμπρακιώτας ὁπόσα ἢ χωρία ἢ ὁμήρους Ἀμφιλόχων ἔχουσι, καὶ ἐπὶ Ἀνακτόριον μὴ βοηθεῖν πολέμιον ὂν Ἀκαρνᾶσιν. [4] ταῦτα ξυνθέμενοι διέλυσαν τὸν πόλεμον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Κορίνθιοι φυλακὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐς τὴν Ἀμπρακίαν ἀπέστειλαν ἐς τριακοσίους ὁπλίτας καὶ Ξενοκλείδαν τὸν Εὐθυκλέους ἄρχοντα: οἳ κομιζόμενοι χαλεπῶς διὰ τῆς ἠπείρου ἀφίκοντο. τὰ μὲν κατ᾽ Ἀμπρακίαν οὕτως ἐγένετο.

115. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος ἔς τε τὴν Ἱμεραίαν ἀπόβασιν ἐποιήσαντο ἐκ τῶν νεῶν μετὰ τῶν Σικελῶν τῶν ἄνωθεν ἐσβεβληκότων ἐς τὰ ἔσχατα τῆς Ἱμεραίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰόλου νήσους ἔπλευσαν. [2] ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἐς Ῥήγιον Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸν καταλαμβάνουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς διάδοχον ὧν ὁ Λάχης ἦρχεν. [3] οἱ γὰρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ξύμμαχοι πλεύσαντες ἔπεισαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βοηθεῖν σφίσι πλείοσι ναυσίν: τῆς μὲν γὰρ γῆς αὐτῶν οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐκράτουν, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης ὀλίγαις ναυσὶν εἰργόμενοι παρεσκευάζοντο ναυτικὸν ξυναγείροντες ὡς οὐ περιοψόμενοι. [4] καὶ ἐπλήρουν ναῦς τεσσαράκοντα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὡς ἀποστελοῦντες αὐτοῖς, ἅμα μὲν ἡγούμενοι θᾶσσον τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον καταλυθήσεσθαι, ἅμα δὲ βουλόμενοι μελέτην τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ποιεῖσθαι. [5] τὸν μὲν οὖν ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπέστειλαν Πυθόδωρον ὀλίγαις ναυσί, Σοφοκλέα δὲ τὸν Σωστρατίδου καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους ἐπὶ τῶν πλειόνων νεῶν ἀποπέμψειν ἔμελλον. [6] ὁ δὲ Πυθόδωρος ἤδη ἔχων τὴν τοῦ Λάχητος τῶν νεῶν ἀρχὴν ἔπλευσε τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐπὶ τὸ Λοκρῶν φρούριον ὃ πρότερον Λάχης εἶλε, καὶ νικηθεὶς μάχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν Λοκρῶν ἀπεχώρησεν.

116. ἐρρύη δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔαρ τοῦτο ὁ ῥύαξ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τῆς Αἴτνης, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, καὶ γῆν τινὰ ἔφθειρε τῶν Καταναίων, οἳ ὑπὸ τῇ Αἴτνῃ τῷ ὄρει οἰκοῦσιν, ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ὄρος ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ. [2] λέγεται δὲ πεντηκοστῷ ἔτει ῥυῆναι τοῦτο μετὰ τὸ πρότερον ῥεῦμα, τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν τρὶς γεγενῆσθαι τὸ ῥεῦμα ἀφ᾽ οὗ Σικελία ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων οἰκεῖται. [3] ταῦτα μὲν κατὰ τὸν χειμῶνα τοῦτον ἐγένετο, καὶ ἕκτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

Βιβλίο Δ’

1. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους περὶ σίτου ἐκβολὴν Συρακοσίων δέκα νῆες πλεύσασαι καὶ Λοκρίδες ἴσαι Μεσσήνην τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ κατέλαβον, αὐτῶν ἐπαγαγομένων, καὶ ἀπέστη Μεσσήνη Ἀθηναίων. [2] ἔπραξαν δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ὁρῶντες προσβολὴν ἔχον τὸ χωρίον τῆς Σικελίας καὶ φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁρμώμενοί ποτε σφίσι μείζονι παρασκευῇ ἐπέλθωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λοκροὶ κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Ῥηγίνων, βουλόμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν αὐτοὺς καταπολεμεῖν. [3] καὶ ἐσεβεβλήκεσαν ἅμα ἐς τὴν Ῥηγίνων οἱ Λοκροὶ πανστρατιᾷ, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιβοηθῶσι τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ξυνεπαγόντων Ῥηγίνων φυγάδων, οἳ ἦσαν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς: τὸ γὰρ Ῥήγιον ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐστασίαζε καὶ ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοὺς Λοκροὺς ἀμύνεσθαι, ᾗ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπετίθεντο. [4] δηώσαντες δὲ οἱ μὲν Λοκροὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἀπεχώρησαν, αἱ δὲ νῆες Μεσσήνην ἐφρούρουν: καὶ ἄλλαι αἱ πληρούμεναι ἔμελλον αὐτόσε ἐγκαθορμισάμεναι τὸν πόλεμον ἐντεῦθεν ποιήσεσθαι.

2. ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ ἦρος, πρὶν τὸν σῖτον ἐν ἀκμῇ εἶναι, Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἄγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς, καὶ ἐγκαθεζόμενοι ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν. [2] Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τάς τε τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς ἐς Σικελίαν ἀπέστειλαν, ὥσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ στρατηγοὺς τοὺς ὑπολοίπους Εὐρυμέδοντα καὶ Σοφοκλέα: Πυθόδωρος γὰρ ὁ τρίτος αὐτῶν ἤδη προαφῖκτο ἐς Σικελίαν. [3] εἶπον δὲ τούτοις καὶ Κερκυραίων ἅμα παραπλέοντας τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιμεληθῆναι, οἳ ἐληστεύοντο ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὄρει φυγάδων: καὶ Πελοποννησίων αὐτόσε νῆες ἑξήκοντα παρεπεπλεύκεσαν τοῖς ἐν τῷ ὄρει τιμωροὶ καὶ λιμοῦ ὄντος μεγάλου ἐν τῇ πόλει νομίζοντες κατασχήσειν ῥᾳδίως τὰ πράγματα. [4] Δημοσθένει δὲ ὄντι ἰδιώτῃ μετὰ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τὴν ἐξ Ἀκαρνανίας αὐτῷ δεηθέντι εἶπον

χρῆσθαι ταῖς ναυσὶ ταύταις, ἢν βούληται, περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον.

3. καὶ ὡς ἐγένοντο πλέοντες κατὰ τὴν Λακωνικὴν καὶ ἐπυνθάνοντο ὅτι αἱ νῆες ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ἤδη εἰσὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων, ὁ μὲν Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἠπείγοντο ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν, ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Πύλον πρῶτον ἐκέλευε σχόντας αὐτοὺς καὶ πράξαντας ἃ δεῖ τὸν πλοῦν ποιεῖσθαι: ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ κατὰ τύχην χειμὼν ἐπιγενόμενος κατήνεγκε τὰς ναῦς ἐς τὴν Πύλον. [2] καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης εὐθὺς ἠξίου τειχίζεσθαι τὸ χωρίον ⟨ἐπὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ξυνεκπλεῦσαι⟩, καὶ ἀπέφαινε πολλὴν εὐπορίαν ξύλων τε καὶ λίθων, καὶ φύσει καρτερὸν ὂν καὶ ἐρῆμον αὐτό τε καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς χώρας: ἀπέχει γὰρ σταδίους μάλιστα ἡ Πύλος τῆς Σπάρτης τετρακοσίους καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνίᾳ ποτὲ οὔσῃ γῇ, καλοῦσι δὲ αὐτὴν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Κορυφάσιον. [3] οἱ δὲ πολλὰς ἔφασαν εἶναι ἄκρας ἐρήμους τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ἢν βούληται καταλαμβάνων τὴν πόλιν δαπανᾶν. τῷ δὲ διάφορόν τι ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον, λιμένος τε προσόντος καὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους οἰκείους ὄντας αὐτῷ τὸ ἀρχαῖον καὶ ὁμοφώνους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν βλάπτειν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁρμωμένους, καὶ βεβαίους ἅμα τοῦ χωρίου φύλακας ἔσεσθαι.

4. ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν οὔτε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οὔτε τοὺς στρατιώτας, ὕστερον καὶ τοῖς ταξιάρχοις κοινώσας, ἡσύχαζεν ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας, μέχρι αὐτοῖς τοῖς στρατιώταις σχολάζουσιν ὁρμὴ ἐνέπεσε περιστᾶσιν ἐκτειχίσαι τὸ χωρίον. [2] καὶ ἐγχειρήσαντες εἰργάζοντο, σιδήρια μὲν λιθουργὰ οὐκ ἔχοντες, λογάδην δὲ φέροντες λίθους, καὶ ξυνετίθεσαν ὡς ἕκαστόν τι ξυμβαίνοι: καὶ τὸν πηλόν, εἴ που δέοι χρῆσθαι, ἀγγείων ἀπορίᾳ ἐπὶ τοῦ νώτου ἔφερον, ἐγκεκυφότες τε, ὡς μάλιστα μέλλοι ἐπιμένειν, καὶ τὼ χεῖρε ἐς τοὐπίσω ξυμπλέκοντες, ὅπως μὴ ἀποπίπτοι. [3] παντί τε τρόπῳ ἠπείγοντο φθῆναι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὰ ἐπιμαχώτατα ἐξεργασάμενοι πρὶν ἐπιβοηθῆσαι: τὸ γὰρ πλέον τοῦ χωρίου αὐτὸ καρτερὸν ὑπῆρχε καὶ οὐδὲν ἔδει τείχους.

5. οἱ δὲ ἑορτήν τινα ἔτυχον ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα πυνθανόμενοι ἐν ὀλιγωρίᾳ ἐποιοῦντο, ὡς, ὅταν ἐξέλθωσιν, ἢ οὐχ ὑπομενοῦντας σφᾶς ἢ ῥᾳδίως ληψόμενοι βίᾳ: καί τι καὶ αὐτοὺς ὁ στρατὸς ἔτι ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις ὢν ἐπέσχεν. [2] τειχίσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦ χωρίου τὰ πρὸς ἤπειρον καὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἔδει ἐν ἡμέραις ἓξ τὸν μὲν Δημοσθένη μετὰ νεῶν πέντε αὐτοῦ φύλακα καταλείπουσι, ταῖς δὲ πλείοσι ναυσὶ τὸν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πλοῦν καὶ Σικελίαν ἠπείγοντο.

6. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὄντες Πελοποννήσιοι ὡς ἐπύθοντο τῆς Πύλου κατειλημμένης, ἀνεχώρουν κατὰ τάχος ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, νομίζοντες μὲν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἄγις ὁ βασιλεὺς οἰκεῖον σφίσι τὸ περὶ τὴν Πύλον: ἅμα δὲ πρῲ ἐσβαλόντες καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἔτι χλωροῦ ὄντος ἐσπάνιζον τροφῆς τοῖς πολλοῖς, χειμών τε ἐπιγενόμενος μείζων παρὰ τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ὥραν ἐπίεσε τὸ στράτευμα. [2] ὥστε πολλαχόθεν ξυνέβη ἀναχωρῆσαί τε θᾶσσον αὐτοὺς καὶ βραχυτάτην γενέσθαι τὴν ἐσβολὴν ταύτην: ἡμέρας γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα ἔμειναν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ.

7. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον Σιμωνίδης Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς Ἠιόνα τὴν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης Μενδαίων ἀποικίαν, πολεμίαν δὲ οὖσαν, ξυλλέξας Ἀθηναίους τε ὀλίγους ἐκ τῶν φρουρίων καὶ τῶν ἐκείνῃ ξυμμάχων πλῆθος προδιδομένην κατέλαβεν. καὶ παραχρῆμα ἐπιβοηθησάντων Χαλκιδέων καὶ Βοττιαίων ἐξεκρούσθη τε καὶ ἀπέβαλε πολλοὺς τῶν στρατιωτῶν.

8. ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς Πελοποννησίων οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται αὐτοὶ μὲν καὶ οἱ ἐγγύτατα τῶν περιοίκων εὐθὺς ἐβοήθουν ἐπὶ τὴν Πύλον, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Λακεδαιμονίων βραδυτέρα ἐγίγνετο ἡ ἔφοδος, ἄρτι ἀφιγμένων ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρας στρατείας. [2] περιήγγελλον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Πελοπόννησον βοηθεῖν ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπὶ Πύλον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ ναῦς σφῶν τὰς ἑξήκοντα ἔπεμψαν, αἳ ὑπερενεχθεῖσαι τὸν Λευκαδίων ἰσθμὸν καὶ λαθοῦσαι τὰς ἐν Ζακύνθῳ Ἀττικὰς ναῦς ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ Πύλον: παρῆν δὲ ἤδη καὶ ὁ πεζὸς στρατός. [3] Δημοσθένης δὲ προσπλεόντων ἔτι τῶν Πελοποννησίων ὑπεκπέμπει φθάσας δύο ναῦς

ἀγγεῖλαι Εὐρυμέδοντι καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐν Ζακύνθῳ Ἀθηναίοις παρεῖναι ὡς τοῦ χωρίου κινδυνεύοντος. [4] καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆες κατὰ τάχος ἔπλεον κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους: οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς τῷ τειχίσματι προσβαλοῦντες κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἐλπίζοντες ῥᾳδίως αἱρήσειν οἰκοδόμημα διὰ ταχέων εἰργασμένον καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγων ἐνόντων. [5] προσδεχόμενοι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Ζακύνθου τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν βοήθειαν ἐν νῷ εἶχον, ἢν ἄρα μὴ πρότερον ἕλωσι, καὶ τοὺς ἔσπλους τοῦ λιμένος ἐμφάρξαι, ὅπως μὴ ᾖ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐφορμίσασθαι ἐς αὐτόν. [6] ἡ γὰρ νῆσος ἡ Σφακτηρία καλουμένη τόν τε λιμένα παρατείνουσα καὶ ἐγγὺς ἐπικειμένη ἐχυρὸν ποιεῖ καὶ τοὺς ἔσπλους στενούς, τῇ μὲν δυοῖν νεοῖν διάπλουν κατὰ τὸ τείχισμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὴν Πύλον, τῇ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην ἤπειρον ὀκτὼ ἢ ἐννέα: ὑλώδης τε καὶ ἀτριβὴς πᾶσα ὑπ᾽ ἐρημίας ἦν καὶ μέγεθος περὶ πέντε καὶ δέκα σταδίους μάλιστα. [7] τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἔσπλους ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀντιπρῴροις βύζην κλῄσειν ἔμελλον: τὴν δὲ νῆσον ταύτην φοβούμενοι μὴ ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸν πόλεμον σφίσι ποιῶνται, ὁπλίτας διεβίβασαν ἐς αὐτὴν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἤπειρον ἄλλους ἔταξαν. [8] οὕτω γὰρ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τήν τε νῆσον πολεμίαν ἔσεσθαι τήν τε ἤπειρον, ἀπόβασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν τὰ γὰρ αὐτῆς τῆς Πύλου ἔξω τοῦ ἔσπλου πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος ἀλίμενα ὄντα οὐχ ἕξειν ὅθεν ὁρμώμενοι ὠφελήσουσι τοὺς αὐτῶν σφεῖς δὲ ἄνευ τε ναυμαχίας καὶ κινδύνου ἐκπολιορκήσειν τὸ χωρίον κατὰ τὸ εἰκός, σίτου τε οὐκ ἐνόντος καὶ δι᾽ ὀλίγης παρασκευῆς κατειλημμένον. [9] ὡς δ᾽ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ διεβίβαζον ἐς τὴν νῆσον τοὺς ὁπλίτας ἀποκληρώσαντες ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν λόχων. καὶ διέβησαν μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι πρότερον κατὰ διαδοχήν, οἱ δὲ τελευταῖοι καὶ ἐγκαταληφθέντες εἴκοσι καὶ τετρακόσιοι ἦσαν καὶ Εἵλωτες οἱ περὶ αὐτούς: ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἐπιτάδας ὁ Μολόβρου.

9. Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁρῶν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μέλλοντας προσβάλλειν ναυσί τε ἅμα καὶ πεζῷ παρεσκευάζετο καὶ αὐτός, καὶ τὰς τριήρεις αἳ περιῆσαν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῶν

καταλειφθεισῶν ἀνασπάσας ὑπὸ τὸ τείχισμα προσεσταύρωσε, καὶ τοὺς ναύτας ἐξ αὐτῶν ὥπλισεν ἀσπίσι [τε] φαύλαις καὶ οἰσυΐναις ταῖς πολλαῖς: οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὅπλα ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ πορίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκ λῃστρικῆς Μεσσηνίων τριακοντόρου καὶ κέλητος ἔλαβον, οἳ ἔτυχον παραγενόμενοι. ὁπλῖταί τε τῶν Μεσσηνίων τούτων ὡς τεσσαράκοντα ἐγένοντο, οἷς ἐχρῆτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων. [2] τοὺς μὲν οὖν πολλοὺς τῶν τε ἀόπλων καὶ ὡπλισμένων ἐπὶ τὰ τετειχισμένα μάλιστα καὶ ἐχυρὰ τοῦ χωρίου πρὸς τὴν ἤπειρον ἔταξε, προειπὼν ἀμύνασθαι τὸν πεζόν, ἢν προσβάλῃ: αὐτὸς δὲ ἀπολεξάμενος ἐκ πάντων ἑξήκοντα ὁπλίτας καὶ τοξότας ὀλίγους ἐχώρει ἔξω τοῦ τείχους ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, ᾗ μάλιστα ἐκείνους προσεδέχετο πειράσειν ἀποβαίνειν, ἐς χωρία μὲν χαλεπὰ καὶ πετρώδη πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τετραμμένα, σφίσι δὲ τοῦ τείχους ταύτῃ ἀσθενεστάτου ὄντος ἐσβιάσασθαι αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖτο προθυμήσεσθαι: [3] οὔτε γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἐλπίζοντές ποτε ναυσὶ κρατήσεσθαι οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν ἐτείχιζον, ἐκείνοις τε βιαζομένοις τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἀλώσιμον τὸ χωρίον γίγνεσθαι. [4] κατὰ τοῦτο οὖν πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν θάλασσαν χωρήσας ἔταξε τοὺς ὁπλίτας ὡς εἴρξων, ἢν δύνηται, καὶ παρεκελεύσατο τοιάδε.

10. ‘ἄνδρες οἱ ξυναράμενοι τοῦδε τοῦ κινδύνου, μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε ἀνάγκῃ ξυνετὸς βουλέσθω δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐκλογιζόμενος ἅπαν τὸ περιεστὸς ἡμᾶς δεινόν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπερισκέπτως εὔελπις ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἂν περιγενόμενος. ὅσα γὰρ ἐς ἀνάγκην ἀφῖκται ὥσπερ τάδε, λογισμὸν ἥκιστα ἐνδεχόμενα κινδύνου τοῦ ταχίστου προσδεῖται. [2] ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τὰ πλείω ὁρῶ πρὸς ἡμῶν ὄντα, ἢν ἐθέλωμέν τε μεῖναι καὶ μὴ τῷ πλήθει αὐτῶν καταπλαγέντες τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἡμῖν κρείσσω καταπροδοῦναι. [3] τοῦ τε γὰρ χωρίου τὸ δυσέμβατον ἡμέτερον νομίζω, ὃ μενόντων μὲν ἡμῶν ξύμμαχον γίγνεται, ὑποχωρήσασι δὲ καίπερ χαλεπὸν ὂν εὔπορον ἔσται μηδενὸς κωλύοντος, καὶ τὸν πολέμιον δεινότερον ἕξομεν μὴ ῥᾳδίας αὐτῷ πάλιν οὔσης τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως, ἢν καὶ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν

βιάζηται ▯ ἐπὶ γὰρ ταῖς ναυσὶ ῥᾷστοί εἰσιν ἀμύνεσθαι, ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ ἤδη▯, [4] τό τε πλῆθος αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄγαν δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι: κατ᾽ ὀλίγον γὰρ μαχεῖται καίπερ πολὺ ὂν ἀπορίᾳ τῆς προσορμίσεως, καὶ οὐκ ἐν γῇ στρατός ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου μείζων, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ νεῶν, αἷς πολλὰ τὰ καίρια δεῖ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ξυμβῆναι. [5] ὥστε τὰς τούτων ἀπορίας ἀντιπάλους ἡγοῦμαι τῷ ἡμετέρῳ πλήθει, καὶ ἅμα ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς, Ἀθηναίους ὄντας καὶ ἐπισταμένους ἐμπειρίᾳ τὴν ναυτικὴν ἐπ᾽ ἄλλους ἀπόβασιν ὅτι, εἴ τις ὑπομένοι καὶ μὴ φόβῳ ῥοθίου καὶ νεῶν δεινότητος κατάπλου ὑποχωροίη, οὐκ ἄν ποτε βιάζοιτο, καὶ αὐτοὺς νῦν μεῖναί τε καὶ ἀμυνομένους παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν ῥαχίαν σῴζειν ἡμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ χωρίον.᾽

11. τοσαῦτα τοῦ Δημοσθένους παρακελευσαμένου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐθάρσησάν τε μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπικαταβάντες ἐτάξαντο παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν θάλασσαν. [2] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἄραντες τῷ τε κατὰ γῆν στρατῷ προσέβαλλον τῷ τειχίσματι καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἅμα οὔσαις τεσσαράκοντα καὶ τρισί, ναύαρχος δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπέπλει Θρασυμηλίδας ὁ Κρατησικλέους Σπαρτιάτης. προσέβαλλε δὲ ᾗπερ ὁ Δημοσθένης προσεδέχετο. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἔκ τε γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἠμύνοντο: οἱ δὲ κατ᾽ ὀλίγας ναῦς διελόμενοι, διότι οὐκ ἦν πλέοσι προσσχεῖν, καὶ ἀναπαύοντες ἐν τῷ μέρει τοὺς ἐπίπλους ἐποιοῦντο, προθυμίᾳ τε πάσῃ χρώμενοι καὶ παρακελευσμῷ, εἴ πως ὠσάμενοι ἕλοιεν τὸ τείχισμα. [4] πάντων δὲ φανερώτατος Βρασίδας ἐγένετο. τριηραρχῶν γὰρ καὶ ὁρῶν τοῦ χωρίου χαλεποῦ ὄντος τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ κυβερνήτας, εἴ που καὶ δοκοίη δυνατὸν εἶναι σχεῖν, ἀποκνοῦντας καὶ φυλασσομένους τῶν νεῶν μὴ ξυντρίψωσιν, ἐβόα λέγων ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς εἴη ξύλων φειδομένους τοὺς πολεμίους ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ περιιδεῖν τεῖχος πεποιημένους, ἀλλὰ τάς τε σφετέρας ναῦς βιαζομένους τὴν ἀπόβασιν καταγνύναι ἐκέλευε, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μὴ ἀποκνῆσαι ἀντὶ μεγάλων εὐεργεσιῶν τὰς ναῦς τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐν τῷ

παρόντι ἐπιδοῦναι, ὀκείλαντας δὲ καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀποβάντας τῶν τε ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ χωρίου κρατῆσαι.

12. καὶ ὁ μὲν τούς τε ἄλλους τοιαῦτα ἐπέσπερχε καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κυβερνήτην ἀναγκάσας ὀκεῖλαι τὴν ναῦν ἐχώρει ἐπὶ τὴν ἀποβάθραν: καὶ πειρώμενος ἀποβαίνειν ἀνεκόπη ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τραυματισθεὶς πολλὰ ἐλιποψύχησέ τε καὶ πεσόντος αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν παρεξειρεσίαν ἡ ἀσπὶς περιερρύη ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐξενεχθείσης αὐτῆς ἐς τὴν γῆν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνελόμενοι ὕστερον πρὸς τὸ τροπαῖον ἐχρήσαντο ὃ ἔστησαν τῆς προσβολῆς ταύτης. [2] οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι προυθυμοῦντο μέν, ἀδύνατοι δ᾽ ἦσαν ἀποβῆναι τῶν τε χωρίων χαλεπότητι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μενόντων καὶ οὐδὲν ὑποχωρούντων. [3] ἐς τοῦτό τε περιέστη ἡ τύχη ὥστε Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἐκ γῆς τε καὶ ταύτης Λακωνικῆς ἀμύνεσθαι ἐκείνους ἐπιπλέοντας, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ἐκ νεῶν τε καὶ ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πολεμίαν οὖσαν ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἀποβαίνειν: ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίει τῆς δόξης ἐν τῷ τότε τοῖς μὲν ἠπειρώταις μάλιστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ πεζὰ κρατίστοις, τοῖς δὲ θαλασσίοις τε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ πλεῖστον προύχειν.

13. ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τῆς ὑστεραίας μέρος τι προσβολὰς ποιησάμενοι ἐπέπαυντο: καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ ἐπὶ ξύλα ἐς μηχανὰς παρέπεμψαν τῶν νεῶν τινὰς ἐς Ἀσίνην, ἐλπίζοντες τὸ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα τεῖχος ὕψος μὲν ἔχειν, ἀποβάσεως δὲ μάλιστα οὔσης ἐλεῖν <ἂν> μηχαναῖς. [2] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Ζακύνθου νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων παραγίγνονται τεσσαράκοντα: προσεβοήθησαν γὰρ τῶν τε φρουρίδων τινὲς αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐκ Ναυπάκτου καὶ Χῖαι τέσσαρες. [3] ὡς δὲ εἶδον τήν τε ἤπειρον ὁπλιτῶν περίπλεων τήν τε νῆσον, ἔν τε τῷ λιμένι οὔσας τὰς ναῦς καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλεούσας, ἀπορήσαντες ὅπῃ καθορμίσωνται, τότε μὲν ἐς Πρωτὴν τὴν νῆσον, ἣ οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχει ἐρῆμος οὖσα, ἔπλευσαν καὶ ηὐλίσαντο, τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ παρασκευασάμενοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ἀνήγοντο, ἢν μὲν ἀντεκπλεῖν ἐθέλωσι σφίσιν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς αὐτοὶ ἐπεσπλευσούμενοι. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν οὔτε ἀντανήγοντο οὔτε ἃ διενοήθησαν, φάρξαι τοὺς ἔσπλους, ἔτυχον ποιήσαντες,

ἡσυχάζοντες δ᾽ ἐν τῇ γῇ τάς τε ναῦς ἐπλήρουν καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο, ἢν ἐσπλέῃ τις, ὡς ἐν τῷ λιμένι ὄντι οὐ σμικρῷ ναυμαχήσοντες.

14. οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι γνόντες καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον τὸν ἔσπλουν ὥρμησαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς, καὶ τὰς μὲν πλείους καὶ μετεώρους ἤδη τῶν νεῶν καὶ ἀντιπρῴρους προσπεσόντες ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν, καὶ ἐπιδιώκοντες ὡς διὰ βραχέος ἔτρωσαν μὲν πολλάς, πέντε δὲ ἔλαβον, καὶ μίαν τούτων αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν: ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς ἐν τῇ γῇ καταπεφευγυίαις ἐνέβαλλον. αἱ δὲ καὶ πληρούμεναι ἔτι πρὶν ἀνάγεσθαι ἐκόπτοντο: καί τινας καὶ ἀναδούμενοι κενὰς εἶλκον τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐς φυγὴν ὡρμημένων. [2] ἃ ὁρῶντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ περιαλγοῦντες τῷ πάθει, ὅτιπερ αὐτῶν οἱ ἄνδρες ἀπελαμβάνοντο ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, παρεβοήθουν, καὶ ἐπεσβαίνοντες ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ξὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἀνθεῖλκον ἐπιλαμβανόμενοι τῶν νεῶν: καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κεκωλῦσθαι ἐδόκει ἕκαστος ᾧ μή τινι καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργῳ παρῆν. [3] ἐγένετό τε ὁ θόρυβος μέγας καὶ ἀντηλλαγμένου τοῦ ἑκατέρων τρόπου περὶ τὰς ναῦς: οἵ τε γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπὸ προθυμίας καὶ ἐκπλήξεως ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ ἐκ γῆς ἐναυμάχουν, οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦντες καὶ βουλόμενοι τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐπεξελθεῖν ἀπὸ νεῶν ἐπεζομάχουν. [4] πολύν τε πόνον παρασχόντες ἀλλήλοις καὶ τραυματίσαντες διεκρίθησαν, καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς κενὰς ναῦς πλὴν τῶν τὸ πρῶτον ληφθεισῶν διέσωσαν. [5] καταστάντες δὲ ἑκάτεροι ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον οἱ μὲν τροπαῖόν τε ἔστησαν καὶ νεκροὺς ἀπέδοσαν καὶ ναυαγίων ἐκράτησαν, καὶ τὴν νῆσον εὐθὺς περιέπλεον καὶ ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχον ὡς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀπειλημμένων: οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων ἤδη βεβοηθηκότες ἔμενον κατὰ χώραν ἐπὶ τῇ Πύλῳ.

15. ἐς δὲ τὴν Σπάρτην ὡς ἠγγέλθη τὰ γεγενημένα περὶ Πύλον, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ ξυμφορᾷ μεγάλῃ τὰ τέλη καταβάντας ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον βουλεύειν παραχρῆμα ὁρῶντας ὅτι ἂν δοκῇ. [2] καὶ ὡς εἶδον ἀδύνατον ὂν τιμωρεῖν τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ κινδυνεύειν οὐκ ἐβούλοντο ἢ ὑπὸ λιμοῦ τι

παθεῖν αὐτοὺς ἢ ὑπὸ πλήθους βιασθέντας κρατηθῆναι, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἢν ἐθέλωσι, σπονδὰς ποιησαμένους τὰ περὶ Πύλον ἀποστεῖλαι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρέσβεις περὶ ξυμβάσεως καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ὡς τάχιστα πειρᾶσθαι κομίσασθαι.

16. δεξαμένων δὲ τῶν στρατηγῶν τὸν λόγον ἐγίγνοντο σπονδαὶ τοιαίδε, Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν τὰς ναῦς ἐν αἷς ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πάσας, ὅσαι ἦσαν μακραί, παραδοῦναι κομίσαντας ἐς Πύλον Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν τῷ τειχίσματι μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε κατὰ θάλασσαν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἀνδράσι σῖτον ἐᾶν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐκπέμπειν τακτὸν καὶ μεμαγμένον, δύο χοίνικας ἑκάστῳ Ἀττικὰς ἀλφίτων καὶ δύο κοτύλας οἴνου καὶ κρέας, θεράποντι δὲ τούτων ἡμίσεα: ταῦτα δὲ ὁρώντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐσπέμπειν καὶ πλοῖον μηδὲν ἐσπλεῖν λάθρᾳ: φυλάσσειν δὲ καὶ τὴν νῆσον Ἀθηναίους μηδὲν ἧσσον, ὅσα μὴ ἀποβαίνοντας, καὶ ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν τῷ Πελοποννησίων στρατῷ μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε κατὰ θάλασσαν. [2] ὅτι δ᾽ ἂν τούτων παραβαίνωσιν ἑκάτεροι καὶ ὁτιοῦν, τότε λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδάς. ἐσπεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὰς μέχρι οὗ ἐπανέλθωσιν οἱ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις: ἀποστεῖλαι δὲ αὐτοὺς τριήρει Ἀθηναίους καὶ πάλιν κομίσαι. ἐλθόντων δὲ τάς τε σπονδὰς λελύσθαι ταύτας καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀποδοῦναι Ἀθηναίους ὁμοίας οἵασπερ ἂν παραλάβωσιν. [3] αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγένοντο, καὶ αἱ νῆες παρεδόθησαν οὖσαι περὶ ἑξήκοντα, καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀπεστάλησαν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.

17. ‘ἔπεμψαν ἡμᾶς Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἀνδρῶν πράξοντας ὅτι ἂν ὑμῖν τε ὠφέλιμον ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ πείθωμεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐς τὴν ξυμφορὰν ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων κόσμον μάλιστα μέλλῃ οἴσειν. [2] τοὺς δὲ λόγους μακροτέρους οὐ παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς μηκυνοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιχώριον ὂν ἡμῖν οὗ μὲν βραχεῖς ἀρκῶσι μὴ πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι, πλέοσι δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ διδάσκοντάς τι τῶν προύργου λόγοις τὸ δέον πράσσειν. [3] λάβετε δὲ αὐτοὺς μὴ πολεμίως μηδ᾽ ὡς ἀξύνετοι διδασκόμενοι, ὑπόμνησιν δὲ τοῦ

καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι πρὸς εἰδότας ἡγησάμενοι. [4] ᾽ὑμῖν γὰρ εὐτυχίαν τὴν παροῦσαν ἔξεστι καλῶς θέσθαι, ἔχουσι μὲν ὧν κρατεῖτε, προσλαβοῦσι δὲ τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν, καὶ μὴ παθεῖν ὅπερ οἱ ἀήθως τι ἀγαθὸν λαμβάνοντες τῶν ἀνθρώπων: αἰεὶ γὰρ τοῦ πλέονος ἐλπίδι ὀρέγονται διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰ παρόντα ἀδοκήτως εὐτυχῆσαι. [5] οἷς δὲ πλεῖσται μεταβολαὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα ξυμβεβήκασι, δίκαιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀπιστότατοι εἶναι ταῖς εὐπραγίαις: ὃ τῇ τε ὑμετέρᾳ πόλει δι᾽ ἐμπειρίαν καὶ ἡμῖν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος προσείη.

18. γνῶτε δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς ἡμετέρας νῦν ξυμφορὰς ἀπιδόντες, οἵτινες ἀξίωμα μέγιστον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔχοντες ἥκομεν παρ᾽ ὑμᾶς, πρότερον αὐτοὶ κυριώτεροι νομίζοντες εἶναι δοῦναι ἐφ᾽ ἃ νῦν ἀφιγμένοι ὑμᾶς αἰτούμεθα. [2] καίτοι οὔτε δυνάμεως ἐνδείᾳ ἐπάθομεν αὐτὸ οὔτε μείζονος προσγενομένης ὑβρίσαντες, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχόντων γνώμῃ σφαλέντες, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει. [3] ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν νῦν ῥώμην πόλεώς τε καὶ τῶν προσγεγενημένων καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης οἴεσθαι αἰεὶ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἔσεσθαι. [4] σωφρόνων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἵτινες τἀγαθὰ ἐς ἀμφίβολον ἀσφαλῶς ἔθεντο καὶ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς οἱ αὐτοὶ εὐξυνετώτερον ἂν προσφέροιντο, τόν τε πόλεμον νομίσωσι μὴ καθ᾽ ὅσον ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μέρος βούληται μεταχειρίζειν, τούτῳ ξυνεῖναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν αἱ τύχαι αὐτῶν ἡγήσωνται: καὶ ἐλάχιστ᾽ ἂν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πταίοντες διὰ τὸ μὴ τῷ ὀρθουμένῳ αὐτοῦ πιστεύοντες ἐπαίρεσθαι ἐν τῷ εὐτυχεῖν ἂν μάλιστα καταλύοιντο. [5] ὃ νῦν ὑμῖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καλῶς ἔχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρᾶξαι,καὶ μή ποτε ὕστερον, ἢν ἄρα μὴ πειθόμενοι σφαλῆτε, ἃ πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται, νομισθῆναι τύχῃ καὶ τὰ νῦν προχωρήσαντα κρατῆσαι, ἐξὸν ἀκίνδυνον δόκησιν ἰσχύος καὶ ξυνέσεως ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα καταλιπεῖν.

19. ‘Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν, ἀνταιτοῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας, καὶ ἄμεινον ἡγούμενοι ἀμφοτέροις μὴ διακινδυνεύεσθαι, εἴτε βίᾳ διαφύγοιεν παρατυχούσης τινὸς σωτηρίας εἴτε καὶ

ἐκπολιορκηθέντες μᾶλλον ἂν χειρωθεῖεν. [2] νομίζομέν τε τὰς μεγάλας ἔχθρας μάλιστ᾽ ἂν διαλύεσθαι βεβαίως, οὐκ ἢν ἀνταμυνόμενός τις καὶ ἐπικρατήσας τὰ πλείω τοῦ πολέμου κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ὅρκοις ἐγκαταλαμβάνων μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ξυμβῇ, ἀλλ᾽ ἢν παρὸν τὸ αὐτὸ δρᾶσαι πρὸς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ἀρετῇ αὐτὸν νικήσας παρὰ ἃ προσεδέχετο μετρίως ξυναλλαγῇ. [3] ὀφείλων γὰρ ἤδη ὁ ἐναντίος μὴ ἀνταμύνεσθαι ὡς βιασθείς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνταποδοῦναι ἀρετήν, ἑτοιμότερός ἐστιν αἰσχύνῃ ἐμμένειν οἷς ξυνέθετο. [4] καὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τοὺς μειζόνως ἐχθροὺς τοῦτο δρῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς τὰ μέτρια διενεχθέντας: πεφύκασί τε τοῖς μὲν ἑκουσίως ἐνδοῦσιν ἀνθησσᾶσθαι μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ὑπεραυχοῦντα καὶ παρὰ γνώμην διακινδυνεύειν.

20. ‘ἡμῖν δὲ καλῶς, εἴπερ ποτέ, ἔχει ἀμφοτέροις ἡ ξυναλλαγή, πρίν τι ἀνήκεστον διὰ μέσου γενόμενον ἡμᾶς καταλαβεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη ἀίδιον ὑμῖν ἔχθραν πρὸς τῇ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίαν ἔχειν, ὑμᾶς δὲ στερηθῆναι ὧν νῦν προκαλούμεθα. [2] ἔτι δ᾽ ὄντων ἀκρίτων καὶ ὑμῖν μὲν δόξης καὶ ἡμετέρας φιλίας προσγιγνομένης, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸ αἰσχροῦ τινὸς ξυμφορᾶς μετρίως κατατιθεμένης διαλλαγῶμεν, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀντὶ πολέμου εἰρήνην ἑλώμεθα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν ἀνάπαυσιν κακῶν ποιήσωμεν: οἳ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὑμᾶς αἰτιωτέρους ἡγήσονται. πολεμοῦνται μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφῶς ὁποτέρων ἀρξάντων: καταλύσεως δὲ γενομένης, ἧς νῦν ὑμεῖς τὸ πλέον κύριοί ἐστε, τὴν χάριν ὑμῖν προσθήσουσιν. [3] ἤν τε γνῶτε, Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔξεστιν ὑμῖν φίλους γενέσθαι βεβαίως, αὐτῶν τε προκαλεσαμένων χαρισαμένοις τε μᾶλλον ἢ βιασαμένοις. [4] καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὰ ἐνόντα ἀγαθὰ σκοπεῖτε ὅσα εἰκὸς εἶναι: ἡμῶν γὰρ καὶ ὑμῶν ταὐτὰ λεόντων τό γε ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ἴστε ὅτι ὑποδεέστερον ὂν τὰ μέγιστα τιμήσει.’

21. οἱ μὲν οὖν Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοσαῦτα εἶπον, νομίζοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ σπονδῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν, σφῶν δὲ ἐναντιουμένων κωλύεσθαι, διδομένης δὲ εἰρήνης ἀσμένους δέξεσθαί τε καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀποδώσειν. [2] οἱ δὲ τὰς μὲν σπονδάς, ἔχοντες τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ἤδη

σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον ἑτοίμους εἶναι, ὁπόταν βούλωνται ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ὠρέγοντο. [3] μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνῆγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος: καὶ ἔπεισεν ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς χρὴ τὰ μὲν ὅπλα καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ παραδόντας πρῶτον κομισθῆναι Ἀθήναζε, ἐλθόντων δὲ ἀποδόντας Λακεδαιμονίους Νίσαιαν καὶ Πηγὰς καὶ Τροιζῆνα καὶ Ἀχαΐαν, ἃ οὐ πολέμῳ ἔλαβον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς προτέρας ξυμβάσεως Ἀθηναίων ξυγχωρησάντων κατὰ ξυμφορὰς καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε δεομένων τι μᾶλλον σπονδῶν, κομίσασθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι ὁπόσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον ἀμφοτέροις.

22. οἱ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀπόκρισιν οὐδὲν ἀντεῖπον, ξυνέδρους δὲ σφίσιν ἐκέλευον ἑλέσθαι οἵτινες λέγοντες καὶ ἀκούοντες περὶ ἑκάστου ξυμβήσονται κατὰ ἡσυχίαν ὅτι ἂν πείθωσιν ἀλλήλους. [2] Κλέων δὲ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολὺς ἐνέκειτο, λέγων γιγνώσκειν μὲν καὶ πρότερον οὐδὲν ἐν νῷ ἔχοντας δίκαιον αὐτούς, σαφὲς δ᾽ εἶναι καὶ νῦν,οἵτινες τῷ μὲν πλήθει οὐδὲν ἐθέλουσιν εἰπεῖν, ὀλίγοις δὲ ἀνδράσι ξύνεδροι βούλονται γίγνεσθαι: ἀλλὰ εἴ τι ὑγιὲς διανοοῦνται, λέγειν ἐκέλευσεν ἅπασιν. [3] ὁρῶντες δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτε σφίσιν οἷόν τε ὂν ἐν πλήθει εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ξυγχωρεῖν, μὴ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους διαβληθῶσιν εἰπόντες καὶ οὐ τυχόντες, οὔτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ μετρίοις ποιήσοντας ἃ προυκαλοῦντο, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἄπρακτοι.

23. ἀφικομένων δὲ αὐτῶν διελέλυντο εὐθὺς αἱ σπονδαὶ αἱ περὶ Πύλον, καὶ τὰς ναῦς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπῄτουν, καθάπερ ξυνέκειτο: οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐγκλήματα ἔχοντες ἐπιδρομήν τε τῷ τειχίσματι παράσπονδον καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀξιόλογα δοκοῦντα εἶναι οὐκ ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἰσχυριζόμενοι ὅτι δὴ εἴρητο, ἐὰν καὶ ὁτιοῦν παραβαθῇ, λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδάς. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀντέλεγόν τε καὶ ἀδίκημα ἐπικαλέσαντες τὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀπελθόντες ἐς πόλεμον καθίσταντο. [2] καὶ τὰ περὶ Πύλον ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων κατὰ κράτος ἐπολεμεῖτο, Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν δυοῖν νεοῖν ἐναντίαιν αἰεὶ

τὴν νῆσον περιπλέοντες τῆς ἡμέρας ▯τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς καὶ ἅπασαι περιώρμουν, πλὴν τὰ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος, ὁπότε ἄνεμος εἴη: καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὐτοῖς εἴκοσι νῆες ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὴν φυλακήν, ὥστε αἱ πᾶσαι ἑβδομήκοντα ἐγένοντο ▯, Πελοποννήσιοι δὲ ἔν τε τῇ ἠπείρῳ στρατοπεδευόμενοι καὶ προσβολὰς ποιούμενοι τῷ τείχει, σκοποῦντες καιρὸν εἴ τις παραπέσοι ὥστε τοὺς ἄνδρας σῶσαι.

24. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρὸς ταῖς ἐν Μεσσήνῃ φρουρούσαις ναυσὶ τὸ ἄλλο ναυτικὸν ὃ παρεσκευάζοντο προσκομίσαντες τὸν πόλεμον [2] ἐποιοῦντο ἐκ τῆς Μεσσήνης ▯καὶ μάλιστα ἐνῆγον οἱ Λοκροὶ τῶν Ῥηγίνων κατὰ ἔχθραν, καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐσεβεβλήκεσαν πανδημεὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν▯, [3] καὶ ναυμαχίας ἀποπειρᾶσθαι ἐβούλοντο, ὁρῶντες τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰς μὲν παρούσας ὀλίγας ναῦς, ταῖς δὲ πλέοσι καὶ μελλούσαις ἥξειν πυνθανόμενοι τὴν νῆσον πολιορκεῖσθαι. [4] εἰ γὰρ κρατήσειαν τῷ ναυτικῷ, τὸ Ῥήγιον ἥλπιζον πεζῇ τε καὶ ναυσὶν ἐφορμοῦντες ῥᾳδίως χειρώσεσθαι, καὶ ἤδη σφῶν ἰσχυρὰ τὰ πράγματα γίγνεσθαι: ξύνεγγυς γὰρ κειμένου τοῦ τε Ῥηγίου ἀκρωτηρίου τῆς Ἰταλίας τῆς τε Μεσσήνης τῆς Σικελίας, τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις [τε] οὐκ ἂν εἶναι ἐφορμεῖν καὶ τοῦ πορθμοῦ κρατεῖν. [5] ἔστι δὲ ὁ πορθμὸς ἡ μεταξὺ Ῥηγίου θάλασσα καὶ Μεσσήνης, ᾗπερ βραχύτατον Σικελία τῆς ἠπείρου ἀπέχει: καὶ ἔστιν ἡ Χάρυβδις κληθεῖσα τοῦτο, ᾗ Ὀδυσσεὺς λέγεται διαπλεῦσαι. διὰ στενότητα δὲ καὶ ἐκ μεγάλων πελαγῶν, τοῦ τε Τυρσηνικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Σικελικοῦ, ἐσπίπτουσα ἡ θάλασσα ἐς αὐτὸ καὶ ῥοώδης οὖσα εἰκότως χαλεπὴ ἐνομίσθη.

25. ἐν τούτῳ οὖν τῷ μεταξὺ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ναυσὶν ὀλίγῳ πλέοσιν ἢ τριάκοντα ἠναγκάσθησαν ὀψὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ναυμαχῆσαι περὶ πλοίου διαπλέοντος, ἀντεπαναγόμενοι πρός τε Ἀθηναίων ναῦς ἑκκαίδεκα καὶ Ῥηγίνας ὀκτώ. [2] καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τάχους ἀπέπλευσαν ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα στρατόπεδα, τό τε ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίῳ, μίαν ναῦν ἀπολέσαντες: καὶ νὺξ ἐπεγένετο τῷ ἔργῳ. [3] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Λοκροὶ ἀπῆλθον ἐκ τῆς Ῥηγίνων, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν

Πελωρίδα τῆς Μεσσήνης ξυλλεγεῖσαι αἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων νῆες ὥρμουν καὶ ὁ πεζὸς αὐτοῖς παρῆν. [4] προσπλεύσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Ῥηγῖνοι ὁρῶντες τὰς ναῦς κενὰς ἐνέβαλον, καὶ χειρὶ σιδηρᾷ ἐπιβληθείσῃ μίαν ναῦν αὐτοὶ ἀπώλεσαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀποκολυμβησάντων. [5] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐσβάντων ἐς τὰς ναῦς καὶ παραπλεόντων ἀπὸ κάλω ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην, αὖθις προσβαλόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀποσιμωσάντων ἐκείνων καὶ προεμβαλόντων, ἑτέραν ναῦν ἀπολλύουσιν. [6] καὶ ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ καὶ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τοιουτοτρόπῳ γενομένῃ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι παρεκομίσθησαν ἐς τὸν ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ λιμένα. [7]καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι, Καμαρίνης ἀγγελθείσης προδίδοσθαι Συρακοσίοις ὑπ᾽ Ἀρχίου καὶ τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἔπλευσαν ἐκεῖσε: Μεσσήνιοι δ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ πανδημεὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἅμα ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Νάξον τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν ὅμορον οὖσαν. [8] καὶ τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τειχήρεις ποιήσαντες τοὺς Ναξίους ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν, τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες κατὰ τὸν Ἀκεσίνην ποταμὸν τὴν γῆν ἐδῄουν, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἐσέβαλλον. [9] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Σικελοὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄκρων πολλοὶ κατέβαινον βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους. καὶ οἱ Νάξιοι ὡς εἶδον, θαρσήσαντες καὶ παρακελευόμενοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὡς οἱ Λεοντῖνοι σφίσι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ξύμμαχοι ἐς τιμωρίαν ἐπέρχονται, ἐκδραμόντες ἄφνω ἐκ τῆς πόλεως προσπίπτουσι τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, καὶ τρέψαντες ἀπέκτεινάν τε ὑπὲρ χιλίους καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ χαλεπῶς ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου: καὶ γὰρ οἱ βάρβαροι ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐπιπεσόντες τοὺς πλείστους διέφθειραν. [10] καὶ αἱ νῆες σχοῦσαι ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην ὕστερον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἔκασται διεκρίθησαν. Λεοντῖνοι δὲ εὐθὺς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην ὡς κεκακωμένην ἐστράτευον, καὶ προσβάλλοντες οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ τὸν λιμένα ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐπείρων, ὁ δὲ πεζὸς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. [11] ἐπεκδρομὴν δὲ ποιησάμενοι οἱ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Λοκρῶν τινὲς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοτέλους, οἳ μετὰ τὸ πάθος ἐγκατελείφθησαν φρουροί, ἐξαπιναίως προσπεσόντες τρέπουσι τοῦ στρατεύματος τῶν

Λεοντίνων τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἀπέκτειναν πολλούς. ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ἀποβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἐβοήθουν, καὶ κατεδίωξαν τοὺς Μεσσηνίους πάλιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν,τεταραγμένοις ἐπιγενόμενοι: καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον. [12] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἕλληνες ἄνευ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατὰ γῆν ἐστράτευον ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους.

26. ἐν δὲ τῇ Πύλῳ ἔτι ἐπολιόρκουν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ στρατόπεδον τῶν Πελοποννησίων κατὰ χώραν ἔμενεν. [2] ἐπίπονος δ᾽ ἦν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἡ φυλακὴ σίτου τε ἀπορίᾳ καὶ ὕδατος: οὐ γὰρ ἦν κρήνη ὅτι μὴ μία ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει τῆς Πύλου καὶ αὕτη οὐ μεγάλη, ἀλλὰ διαμώμενοι τὸν κάχληκα οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἔπινον οἷον εἰκὸς ὕδωρ. [3] στενοχωρία τε ἐν ὀλίγῳ στρατοπεδευομένοις ἐγίγνετο, καὶ τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχουσῶν ὅρμον αἱ μὲν σῖτον ἐν τῇ γῇ ἠροῦντο κατὰ μέρος, αἱ δὲ μετέωροι ὥρμουν. [4] ἀθυμίαν τε πλείστην ὁ χρόνος παρεῖχε παρὰ λόγον ἐπιγιγνόμενος, οὓς ᾤοντο ἡμερῶν ὀλίγων ἐκπολιορκήσειν ἐν νήσῳ τε ἐρήμῃ καὶ ὕδατι ἁλμυρῷ χρωμένους. [5] αἴτιον δὲ ἦν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προειπόντες ἐς τὴν νῆσον ἐσάγειν σῖτόν τε τὸν βουλόμενον ἀληλεμένον καὶ οἶνον καὶ τυρὸν καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο βρῶμα, οἷ᾽ ἂν ἐς πολιορκίαν ξυμφέρῃ, τάξαντες ἀργυρίου πολλοῦ καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων τῷ ἐσαγαγόντι ἐλευθερίαν ὑπισχνούμενοι. [6] καὶ ἐσῆγον ἄλλοι τε παρακινδυνεύοντες καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Εἵλωτες, ἀπαίροντες ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ὁπόθεν τύχοιεν καὶ καταπλέοντες ἔτι νυκτὸς ἐς τὰ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τῆς νήσου. [7] μάλιστα δὲ ἐτήρουν ἀνέμῳ καταφέρεσθαι: ῥᾷον γὰρ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν τριήρων ἐλάνθανον, ὁπότε πνεῦμα ἐκ πόντου εἴη: ἄπορον γὰρ ἐγίγνετο περιορμεῖν, τοῖς δὲ ἀφειδὴς ὁ κατάπλους καθειστήκει: ἐπώκελλον γὰρ τὰ πλοῖα τετιμημένα χρημάτων, καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται περὶ τὰς κατάρσεις τῆς νήσου ἐφύλασσον. ὅσοι δὲ γαλήνῃ κινδυνεύσειαν, ἡλίσκοντο. [8] ἐσένεον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα κολυμβηταὶ ὕφυδροι,καλῷδίῳ ἐν ἀσκοῖς ἐφέλκοντες μήκωνα

μεμελιτωμένην καὶ λίνου σπέρμα κεκομμένον: ὧν τὸ πρῶτον λανθανόντων φυλακαὶ ὕστερον ἐγένοντο. [9] παντί τε τρόπῳ ἑκάτεροι ἐτεχνῶντο οἱ μὲν ἐσπέμπειν τὰ σιτία, οἱ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν σφᾶς.

27. ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθήναις πυνθανόμενοι περὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς ὅτι ταλαιπωρεῖται καὶ σῖτος τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ὅτι ἐσπλεῖ, ἠπόρουν καὶ ἐδεδοίκεσαν μὴ σφῶν χειμὼν τὴν φυλακὴν ἐπιλάβοι, ὁρῶντες τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων τὴν περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον κομιδὴν ἀδύνατον ἐσομένην, ἅμα ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ καὶ οὐδ᾽ ἐν θέρει οἷοί τε ὄντες ἱκανὰ περιπέμπειν, τόν τε ἔφορμον χωρίων ἁλιμένων ὄντων οὐκ ἐσόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ σφῶν ἀνέντων τὴν φυλακὴν περιγενήσεσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας ἢ τοῖς πλοίοις ἃ τὸν σῖτον αὐτοῖς ἦγε χειμῶνα τηρήσαντας ἐκπλεύσεσθαι. [2] πάντων τε ἐφοβοῦντο μάλιστα τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ὅτι ἔχοντάς τι ἰσχυρὸν αὐτοὺς ἐνόμιζον οὐκέτι σφίσιν ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι: καὶ μετεμέλοντο τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ δεξάμενοι. [3] Κλέων δὲ γνοὺς αὐτῶν τὴν ἐς αὐτὸν ὑποψίαν περὶ τῆς κωλύμης τῆς ξυμβάσεως οὐ τἀληθῆ ἔφη λέγειν τοὺς ἐξαγγέλλοντας. παραινούντων δὲ τῶν ἀφιγμένων, εἰ μὴ σφίσι πιστεύουσι, κατασκόπους τινὰς πέμψαι, ᾑρέθη κατάσκοπος αὐτὸς μετὰ Θεαγένους ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων. [4] καὶ γνοὺς ὅτι ἀναγκασθήσεται ἢ ταὐτὰ λέγειν οἷς διέβαλλεν ἢ τἀναντία εἰπὼν ψευδὴς φανήσεσθαι, παρῄνει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ ὡρμημένους τι τὸ πλέον τῇ γνώμῃ στρατεύειν, ὡς χρὴ κατασκόπους μὲν μὴ πέμπειν μηδὲ διαμέλλειν καιρὸν παριέντας, εἰ δὲ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα, πλεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας. [5] καὶ ἐς Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἀπεσήμαινεν, ἐχθρὸς ὢν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν, ῥᾴδιον εἶναι παρασκευῇ, εἰ ἄνδρες εἶεν οἱ στρατηγοί, πλεύσαντας λαβεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, καὶ αὐτός γ᾽ ἄν, εἰ ἦρχε, ποιῆσαι τοῦτο.

28. ὁ δὲ Νικίας τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων τι ὑποθορυβησάντων ἐς τὸν Κλέωνα, ὅτι οὐ καὶ νῦν πλεῖ, εἰ ῥᾴδιόν γε αὐτῷ φαίνεται, καὶ ἅμα ὁρῶν αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμῶντα, ἐκέλευεν ἥντινα βούλεται δύναμιν λαβόντα τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι ἐπιχειρεῖν. [2] ὁ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἰόμενος αὐτὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἀφιέναι ἑτοῖμος ἦν,

γνοὺς δὲ τῷ ὄντι παραδωσείοντα ἀνεχώρει καὶ οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνον στρατηγεῖν, δεδιὼς ἤδη καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενός οἱ αὐτὸν τολμῆσαι ὑποχωρῆσαι. [3] αὖθις δὲ ὁ Νικίας ἐκέλευε καὶ ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς καὶ μάρτυρας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐποιεῖτο. οἱ δέ, οἷον ὄχλος φιλεῖ ποιεῖν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ Κλέων ὑπέφευγε τὸν πλοῦν καὶ ἐξανεχώρει τὰ εἰρημένα, τόσῳ ἐπεκελεύοντο τῷ Νικίᾳ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐπεβόων πλεῖν. [4] ὥστε οὐκ ἔχων ὅπως τῶν εἰρημένων ἔτι ἐξαπαλλαγῇ, ὑφίσταται τὸν πλοῦν, καὶ παρελθὼν οὔτε φοβεῖσθαι ἔφη Λακεδαιμονίους πλεύσεσθαί τε λαβὼν ἐκ μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὐδένα, Λημνίους δὲ καὶ Ἰμβρίους τοὺς παρόντας καὶ πελταστὰς οἳ ἦσαν ἔκ τε Αἴνου βεβοηθηκότες καὶ ἄλλοθεν τοξότας τετρακοσίους: ταῦτα δὲ ἔχων ἔφη πρὸς τοῖς ἐν Πύλω στρατιώταις ἐντὸς ἡμερῶν εἴκοσιν ἢ ἄξειν Λακεδαιμονίους ζῶντας ἢ αὐτοῦ ἀποκτενεῖν. [5] τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε μέν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῇ κουφολογίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ἀσμένοις δ᾽ ὅμως ἐγίγνετο τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, λογιζομένοις δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου τεύξεσθαι, ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι, ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον, ἢ σφαλεῖσι γνώμης Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι.

29. καὶ πάντα διαπραξάμενος ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ψηφισαμένων Ἀθηναίων αὐτῷ τὸν πλοῦν, τῶν τε ἐν Πύλῳ στρατηγῶν ἕνα προσελόμενος Δημοσθένη, τὴν ἀναγωγὴν διὰ τάχους ἐποιεῖτο. [2] τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη προσέλαβε πυνθανόμενος τὴν ἀπόβασιν αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν νῆσον διανοεῖσθαι. οἱ γὰρ στρατιῶται κακοπαθοῦντες τοῦ χωρίου τῇ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ μᾶλλον πολιορκούμενοι ἢ πολιορκοῦντες ὥρμηντο διακινδυνεῦσαι. καὶ αὐτῷ ἔτι ῥώμην καὶ ἡ νῆσος ἐμπρησθεῖσα παρέσχεν. [3] πρότερον μὲν γὰρ οὔσης αὐτῆς ὑλώδους ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἀτριβοῦς διὰ τὴν αἰεὶ ἐρημίαν ἐφοβεῖτο καὶ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων τοῦτο ἐνόμιζε μᾶλλον εἶναι: πολλῷ γὰρ ἂν στρατοπέδῳ ἀποβάντι ἐξ ἀφανοῦς χωρίου προσβάλλοντας αὐτοὺς βλάπτειν. σφίσι μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἐκείνων ἁμαρτίας καὶ παρασκευὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ὕλης οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως δῆλα εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ αὐτῶν στρατοπέδου καταφανῆ ἂν

εἶναι πάντα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, ὥστε προσπίπτειν ἂν αὐτοὺς ἀπροσδοκήτως ᾗ βούλοιντο: ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις γὰρ εἶναι ἂν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν. [4] εἰ δ᾽ αὖ ἐς δασὺ χωρίον βιάζοιτο ὁμόσε ἰέναι, τοὺς ἐλάσσους, ἐμπείρους δὲ τῆς χώρας, κρείσσους ἐνόμιζε τῶν πλεόνων ἀπείρων: λανθάνειν τε ἂν τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον πολὺ ὂν διαφθειρόμενον, οὐκ οὔσης τῆς προσόψεως ᾗ χρῆν ἀλλήλοις ἐπιβοηθεῖν.

30. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰτωλικοῦ πάθους, ὃ διὰ τὴν ὕλην μέρος τι ἐγένετο, οὐχ ἥκιστα αὐτὸν ταῦτα ἐσῄει. [2] τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν ἀναγκασθέντων διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν τῆς νήσου τοῖς ἐσχάτοις προσίσχοντας ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι διὰ προφυλακῆς καὶ ἐμπρήσαντός τινος κατὰ μικρὸν τῆς ὕλης ἄκοντος καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου πνεύματος ἐπιγενομένου τὸ πολὺ αὐτῆς ἔλαθε κατακαυθέν. [3] οὕτω δὴ τούς τε Λακεδαιμονίους μᾶλλον κατιδὼν πλείους ὄντας, ὑπονοῶν πρότερον ἐλάσσοσι τὸν σῖτον αὐτοῦ ἐσπέμπειν, τήν τε νῆσον εὐαποβατωτέραν οὖσαν, τότε ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀξιόχρεων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μᾶλλον σπουδὴν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν παρεσκευάζετο, στρατιάν τε μεταπέμπων ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς ξυμμάχων καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἑτοιμάζων. [4] Κλέων δὲ ἐκείνῳ τε προπέμψας ἄγγελον ὡς ἥξων καὶ ἔχων στρατιὰν ἣν ᾑτήσατο, ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Πύλον. καὶ ἅμα γενόμενοι πέμπουσι πρῶτον ἐς τὸ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ στρατόπεδον κήρυκα, προκαλούμενοι, εἰ βούλοιντο, ἄνευ κινδύνου τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἄνδρας σφίσι τά τε ὅπλα καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κελεύειν παραδοῦναι, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ φυλακῇ τῇ μετρίᾳ τηρήσονται, ἕως ἄν τι περὶ τοῦ πλέονος ξυμβαθῇ.

31. οὐ προσδεξαμένων δὲ αὐτῶν μίαν μὲν ἡμέραν ἐπέσχον, τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀνηγάγοντο μὲν νυκτὸς ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγας ναῦς τοὺς ὁπλίτας πάντας ἐπιβιβάσαντες, πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἕω ὀλίγον ἀπέβαινον τῆς νήσου ἑκατέρωθεν, ἔκ τε τοῦ πελάγους καὶ πρὸς τοῦ λιμένος, ὀκτακόσιοι μάλιστα ὄντες ὁπλῖται, καὶ ἐχώρουν δρόμῳ ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον φυλακτήριον τῆς νήσου. [2] ὧδε γὰρ διετετάχατο: ἐν ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ φυλακῇ ὡς τριάκοντα ἦσαν ὁπλῖται, μέσον δὲ καὶ ὁμαλώτατόν τε καὶ περὶ τὸ ὕδωρ οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν καὶ

Ἐπιτάδας ὁ ἄρχων εἶχε, μέρος δέ τι οὐ πολὺ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐφύλασσε τῆς νήσου τὸ πρὸς τὴν Πύλον, ὃ ἦν ἔκ τε θαλάσσης ἀπόκρημνον καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἥκιστα ἐπίμαχον: καὶ γάρ τι καὶ ἔρυμα αὐτόθι ἦν παλαιὸν λίθων λογάδην πεποιημένον, ὃ ἐνόμιζον σφίσιν ὠφέλιμον ἂν εἶναι, εἰ καταλαμβάνοι ἀναχώρησις βιαιοτέρα. οὕτω μὲν τεταγμένοι ἦσαν.

32. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς μὲν πρώτους φύλακας, οἷς ἐπέδραμον, εὐθὺς διαφθείρουσιν ἔν τε ταῖς εὐναῖς ἔτι καὶ ἀναλαμβάνοντας τὰ ὅπλα, λαθόντες τὴν ἀπόβασιν, οἰομένων αὐτῶν τὰς ναῦς κατὰ τὸ ἔθος ἐς ἔφορμον τῆς νυκτὸς πλεῖν. [2] ἅμα δὲ ἕῳ γιγνομένῃ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος στρατὸς ἀπέβαινεν, ἐκ μὲν νεῶν ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ὀλίγῳ πλεόνων πάντες πλὴν θαλαμιῶν, ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐσκευασμένοι, τοξόται δὲ ὀκτακόσιοι καὶ πελτασταὶ οὐκ ἐλάσσους τούτων, Μεσσηνίων τε οἱ βεβοηθηκότες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι περὶ Πύλον κατεῖχον πάντες πλὴν τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους φυλάκων. [3] Δημοσθένους δὲ τάξαντος διέστησαν κατὰ διακοσίους τε καὶ πλείους, ἔστι δ᾽ ᾗ ἐλάσσους, τῶν χωρίων τὰ μετεωρότατα λαβόντες, ὅπως ὅτι πλείστη ἀπορία ᾖ τοῖς πολεμίοις πανταχόθεν κεκυκλωμένοις καὶ μὴ ἔχωσι πρὸς ὅτι ἀντιτάξωνται, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφίβολοι γίγνωνται τῷ πλήθει, εἰ μὲν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐπίοιεν, ὑπὸ τῶν κατόπιν βαλλόμενοι, εἰ δὲ τοῖς πλαγίοις, ὑπὸ τῶν ἑκατέρωθεν παρατεταγμένων. [4] κατὰ νώτου τε αἰεὶ ἔμελλον αὐτοῖς, ᾗ χωρήσειαν, οἱ πολέμιοι ἔσεσθαι ψιλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπορώτατοι, τοξεύμασι καὶ ἀκοντίοις καὶ λίθοις καὶ σφενδόναις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἔχοντες ἀλκήν, οἷς μηδὲ ἐπελθεῖν οἷόν τε ἦν: φεύγοντές τε γὰρ ἐκράτουν καὶ ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐπέκειντο. τοιαύτῃ μὲν γνώμῃ ὁ Δημοσθένης τό τε πρῶτον τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἐπενόει καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἔταξεν:

33. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπιτάδαν καὶ ὅπερ ἦν πλεῖστον τῶν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ὡς εἶδον τό τε πρῶτον φυλακτήριον διεφθαρμένον καὶ στρατὸν σφίσιν ἐπιόντα, ξυνετάξαντο καὶ τοῖς ὁπλίταις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπῇσαν, βουλόμενοι ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν: ἐξ ἐναντίας γὰρ οὗτοι καθειστήκεσαν, ἐκ πλαγίου δὲ οἱ ψιλοὶ

καὶ κατὰ νώτου. [2] τοῖς μὲν οὖν ὁπλίταις οὐκ ἐδυνήθησαν προσμεῖξαι οὐδὲ τῇ σφετέρᾳ ἐμπειρίᾳ χρήσασθαι: οἱ γὰρ ψιλοὶ ἑκατέρωθεν βάλλοντες εἶργον, καὶ ἅμα ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἀντεπῇσαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχαζον: τοὺς δὲ ψιλούς, ᾗ μάλιστα αὐτοῖς ἐπιθέοντες προσκέοιντο, ἔτρεπον, καὶ οἳ ὑποστρέφοντες ἠμύνοντο, ἄνθρωποι κούφως τε ἐσκευασμένοι καὶ προλαμβάνοντες ῥᾳδίως τῆς φυγῆς χωρίων τε χαλεπότητι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς πρὶν ἐρημίας τραχέων ὄντων, ἐν οἷς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐκ ἐδύναντο διώκειν ὅπλα ἔχοντες.

34. χρόνον μὲν οὖν τινὰ ὀλίγον οὕτω πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἠκροβολίσαντο: τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐκέτι ὀξέως ἐπεκθεῖν ᾗ προσπίπτοιεν δυναμένων, γνόντες αὐτοὺς οἱ ψιλοὶ βραδυτέρους ἤδη ὄντας τῷ ἀμύνασθαι, καὶ αὐτοὶ τῇ τε ὄψει τοῦ θαρσεῖν τὸ πλεῖστον εἰληφότες πολλαπλάσιοι φαινόμενοι καὶ ξυνειθισμένοι μᾶλλον μηκέτι δεινοὺς αὐτοὺς ὁμοίως σφίσι φαίνεσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ εὐθὺς ἄξια τῆς προσδοκίας ἐπεπόνθεσαν, ὥσπερ ὅτε πρῶτον ἀπέβαινον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, καταφρονήσαντες καὶ ἐμβοήσαντες ἀθρόοι ὥρμησαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔβαλλον λίθοις τε καὶ τοξεύμασι καὶ ἀκοντίοις, ὡς ἕκαστός τι πρόχειρον εἶχεν. [2] γενομένης δὲ τῆς βοῆς ἅμα τῇ ἐπιδρομῇ ἔκπληξίς τε ἐνέπεσεν ἀνθρώποις ἀήθεσι τοιαύτης μάχης καὶ ὁ κονιορτὸς τῆς ὕλης νεωστὶ κεκαυμένης ἐχώρει πολὺς ἄνω, ἄπορόν τε ἦν ἰδεῖν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν τοξευμάτων καὶ λίθων ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων μετὰ τοῦ κονιορτοῦ ἅμα φερομένων. [3] τό τε ἔργον ἐνταῦθα χαλεπὸν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καθίστατο: οὔτε γὰρ οἱ πῖλοι ἔστεγον τὰ τοξεύματα, δοράτιά τε ἐναπεκέκλαστο βαλλομένων, εἶχόν τε οὐδὲν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι ἀποκεκλῃμένοι μὲν τῇ ὄψει τοῦ προορᾶν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μείζονος βοῆς τῶν πολεμίων τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς παραγγελλόμενα οὐκ ἐσακούοντες, κινδύνου τε πανταχόθεν περιεστῶτος καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα καθ᾽ ὅτι χρὴ ἀμυνομένους σωθῆναι.

35. τέλος δὲ τραυματιζομένων ἤδη πολλῶν διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ξυγκλῄσαντες ἐχώρησαν ἐς τὸ

ἔσχατον ἔρυμα τῆς νήσου, ὃ οὐ πολὺ ἀπεῖχε, καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν φύλακας. [2] ὡς δὲ ἐνέδοσαν, ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πολλῷ ἔτι πλέονι βοῇ τεθαρσηκότες οἱ ψιλοὶ ἐπέκειντο, καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὅσοι μὲν ὑποχωροῦντες ἐγκατελαμβάνοντο, ἀπέθνῃσκον, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ διαφυγόντες ἐς τὸ ἔρυμα μετὰ τῶν ταύτῃ φυλάκων ἐτάξαντο παρὰ πᾶν ὡς ἀμυνούμενοι ᾗπερ ἦν ἐπίμαχον. [3] καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπισπόμενοι περίοδον μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ κύκλωσιν χωρίου ἰσχύι οὐκ εἶχον, προσιόντες δὲ ἐξ ἐναντίας ὥσασθαι ἐπειρῶντο. [4] καὶ χρόνον μὲν πολὺν καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας τὸ πλεῖστον ταλαιπωρούμενοι ἀμφότεροι ὑπό τε τῆς μάχης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἡλίου ἀντεῖχον, πειρώμενοι οἱ μὲν ἐξελάσασθαι ἐκ τοῦ μετεώρου, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐνδοῦναι: ῥᾷον δ᾽ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἠμύνοντο ἢ ἐν τῷ πρίν, οὐκ οὔσης σφῶν τῆς κυκλώσεως ἐς τὰ πλάγια.

36. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπέραντον ἦν, προσελθὼν ὁ τῶν Μεσσηνίων στρατηγὸς Κλέωνι καὶ Δημοσθένει ἄλλως ἔφη πονεῖν σφᾶς: εἰ δὲ βούλονται ἑαυτῷ δοῦναι τῶν τοξοτῶν μέρος τι καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν περιιέναι κατὰ νώτου αὐτοῖς ὁδῷ ᾗ ἂν αὐτὸς εὕρῃ, δοκεῖν βιάσεσθαι τὴν ἔφοδον. [2] λαβὼν δὲ ἃ ᾐτήσατο, ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς ὁρμήσας ὥστε μὴ ἰδεῖν ἐκείνους, κατὰ τὸ αἰεὶ παρεῖκον τοῦ κρημνώδους τῆς νήσου προσβαίνων, καὶ ᾗ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι χωρίου ἰσχύι πιστεύσαντες οὐκ ἐφύλασσον, χαλεπῶς τε καὶ μόλις περιελθὼν ἔλαθε, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μετεώρου ἐξαπίνης ἀναφανεὶς κατὰ νώτου αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ ἐξέπληξε, τοὺς δὲ ἃ προσεδέχοντο ἰδόντας πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωσεν. [3] καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι βαλλόμενοί τε ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἤδη καὶ γιγνόμενοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ξυμπτώματι, ὡς μικρὸν μεγάλῳ εἰκάσαι, τῷ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις, ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ τῇ ἀτραπῷ περιελθόντων τῶν Περσῶν διεφθάρησαν, οὗτοί τε ἀμφίβολοι ἤδη ὄντες οὐκέτι ἀντεῖχον, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς τε ὀλίγοι μαχόμενοι καὶ ἀσθενείᾳ σωμάτων διὰ τὴν σιτοδείαν ὑπεχώρουν, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκράτουν ἤδη τῶν ἐφόδων.

37. γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Κλέων καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης [ὅτι], εἰ καὶ ὀποσονοῦν μᾶλλον ἐνδώσουσι, διαφθαρησομένους αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς σφετέρας στρατιᾶς, ἔπαυσαν τὴν μάχην καὶ τοὺς

ἑαυτῶν ἀπεῖρξαν, βουλόμενοι ἀγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις ζῶντας, εἴ πως τοῦ κηρύγματος ἀκούσαντες ἐπικλασθεῖεν τῇ γνώμῃ τὰ ὅπλα παραδοῦναι καὶ ἡσσηθεῖεν τοῦ παρόντος δεινοῦ. [2] ἐκήρυξάν τε, εἰ βούλονται, τὰ ὅπλα παραδοῦναι καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις ὥστε βουλεῦσαι ὅτι ἂν ἐκείνοις δοκῇ.

38. οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες παρῆκαν τὰς ἀσπίδας οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀνέσεισαν, δηλοῦντες προσίεσθαι τὰ κεκηρυγμένα. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα γενομένης τῆς ἀνοκωχῆς ξυνῆλθον ἐς λόγους ὅ τε Κλέων καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ ἐκείνων Στύφων ὁ Φάρακος, τῶν πρότερον ἀρχόντων τοῦ μὲν πρώτου τεθνηκότος Ἐπιτάδου, τοῦ δὲ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν Ἱππαγρέτου ἐφῃρημένου ἐν τοῖς νεκροῖς ἔτι ζῶντος κειμένου ὡς τεθνεῶτος, αὐτὸς τρίτος ἐφῃρημένος ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον, εἴ τι ἐκεῖνοι πάσχοιεν. [2] ἔλεγε δὲ ὁ Στύφων καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὅτι βούλονται διακηρυκεύσασθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Λακεδαιμονίους ὅτι χρὴ σφᾶς ποιεῖν. [3] καὶ ἐκείνων μὲν οὐδένα ἀφέντων, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καλούντων ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου κήρυκας καὶ γενομένων ἐπερωτήσεων δὶς ἢ τρίς, ὁ τελευταῖος διαπλεύσας αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου Λακεδαιμονίων ἀνὴρ ἀπήγγειλεν ὅτι [οἱ] ‘Λακεδαιμόνιοι κελεύουσιν ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν βουλεύεσθαι μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιοῦντας’: οἱ δὲ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς βουλευσάμενοι τὰ ὅπλα παρέδοσαν καὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς. [4] καὶ ταύτην μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν νύκτα ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχον αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι: τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἐν τῇ νήσῳ τἆλλα διεσκευάζοντο ὡς ἐς πλοῦν, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοῖς τριηράρχοις διεδίδοσαν ἐς φυλακήν, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κήρυκα πέμψαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς διεκομίσαντο. [5] ἀπέθανον δ᾽ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ ζῶντες ἐλήφθησαν τοσοίδε: εἴκοσι μὲν ὁπλῖται διέβησαν καὶ τετρακόσιοι οἱ πάντες: τούτων ζῶντες ἐκομίσθησαν ὀκτὼ ἀποδέοντες τριακόσιοι, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἀπέθανον. καὶ Σπαρτιᾶται τούτων ἦσαν τῶν ζώντων περὶ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν. Ἀθηναίων δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ διεφθάρησαν: ἡ γὰρ μάχη οὐ σταδαία ἦν.

39. χρόνος δὲ ὁ ξύμπας ἐγένετο ὅσον οἱ ἄνδρες [οἱ] ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἐπολιορκήθησαν, ἀπὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας μέχρι τῆς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ μάχης, ἑβδομήκοντα ἡμέραι καὶ δύο. [2] τούτων περὶ εἴκοσιν ἡμέρας, ἐν αἷς οἱ πρέσβεις περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν ἀπῆσαν, ἐσιτοδοτοῦντο, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τοῖς ἐσπλέουσι λάθρᾳ διετρέφοντο. καὶ ἦν σῖτός τις ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ ἄλλα βρώματα ἐγκατελήφθη: ὁ γὰρ ἄρχων Ἐπιτάδας ἐνδεεστέρως ἑκάστῳ παρεῖχεν ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἐξουσίαν. [3] οἱ μὲν δὴ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ στρατῷ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου ἑκάτεροι ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος καίπερ μανιώδης οὖσα ἡ ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη: ἐντὸς γὰρ εἴκοσιν ἡμερῶν ἦγαγε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ὥσπερ ὑπέστη.

40. παρὰ γνώμην τε δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο: τοὺς γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίους οὔτε λιμῷ οὔτ᾽ ἀνάγκῃ οὐδεμιᾷ ἠξίουν τὰ ὅπλα παραδοῦναι, ἀλλὰ ἔχοντας καὶ μαχομένους ὡς ἐδύναντο ἀποθνῄσκειν. [2] ἀπιστοῦντές τε μὴ εἶναι τοὺς παραδόντας τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ὁμοίους, καί τινος ἐρομένου ποτὲ ὕστερον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμάχων δι᾽ ἀχθηδόνα ἕνα τῶν ἐκ τῆς νήσου αἰχμαλώτων εἰ οἱ τεθνεῶτες αὐτῶν καλοὶ κἀγαθοί, ἀπεκρίνατο αὐτῷ πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιον εἶναι τὸν ἄτρακτον, λέγων τὸν οἰστόν, εἰ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς διεγίγνωσκε, δήλωσιν ποιούμενος ὅτι ὁ ἐντυγχάνων τοῖς τε λίθοις καὶ τοξεύμασι διεφθείρετο.

41. κομισθέντων δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβούλευσαν δεσμοῖς μὲν αὐτοὺς φυλάσσειν μέχρι οὗ τι ξυμβῶσιν, ἢν δ᾽ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι πρὸ τούτου ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐσβάλωσιν, ἐξαγαγόντες ἀποκτεῖναι. [2] τῆς δὲ Πύλου φυλακὴν κατεστήσαντο, καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου Μεσσήνιοι ὡς ἐς πατρίδα ταύτην ⟨ἔστι γὰρ ἡ Πύλος τῆς Μεσσηνίδος ποτὲ οὔσης γῆς⟩ πέμψαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐλῄζοντό τε τὴν Λακωνικὴν καὶ πλεῖστα ἔβλαπτον ὁμόφωνοι ὄντες. [3] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ λῃστείας καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου πολέμου, τῶν τε Εἱλώτων αὐτομολούντων καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ μακρότερον σφίσι τι νεωτερισθῇ τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἔφερον, ἀλλὰ καίπερ οὐ βουλόμενοι ἔνδηλοι εἶναι τοῖς

Ἀθηναίοις ἐπρεσβεύοντο παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπειρῶντο τήν τε Πύλον καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομίζεσθαι. [4] οἱ δὲ μειζόνων τε ὠρέγοντο καὶ πολλάκις φοιτώντων αὐτοὺς ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμπον. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Πύλον γενόμενα.

42. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους μετὰ ταῦτα εὐθὺς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Κορινθίαν ἐστράτευσαν ναυσὶν ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ δισχιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐν ἱππαγωγοῖς ναυσὶ διακοσίοις ἱππεῦσιν: ἠκολούθουν δὲ καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Μιλήσιοι καὶ Ἄνδριοι καὶ Καρύστιοι, ἐστρατήγει δὲ Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου τρίτος αὐτός. [2] πλέοντες δὲ ἅμα ἕῳ ἔσχον μεταξὺ Χερσονήσου τε καὶ Ῥείτου ἐς τὸν αἰγιαλὸν τοῦ χωρίου ὑπὲρ οὗ ὁ Σολύγειος λόφος ἐστίν, ἐφ᾽ ὃν Δωριῆς τὸ πάλαι ἱδρυθέντες τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει Κορινθίοις ἐπολέμουν οὖσιν Αἰολεῦσιν: καὶ κώμη νῦν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ Σολύγεια καλουμένη ἐστίν. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ τούτου ἔνθα αἱ νῆες κατέσχον ἡ μὲν κώμη αὕτη δώδεκα σταδίους ἀπέχει, ἡ δὲ Κορινθίων πόλις ἑξήκοντα, ὁ δὲ Ἰσθμὸς εἴκοσι. [3] Κορίνθιοι δὲ προπυθόμενοι ἐξ Ἄργους ὅτι ἡ στρατιὰ ἥξει τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐκ πλείονος ἐβοήθησαν ἐς Ἰσθμὸν πάντες πλὴν τῶν ἔξω Ἰσθμοῦ: καὶ ἐν Ἀμπρακίᾳ καὶ ἐν Λευκάδι ἀπῆσαν αὐτῶν πεντακόσιοι φρουροί: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πανδημεὶ ἐπετήρουν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἳ κατασχήσουσιν. [4] ὡς δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔλαθον νυκτὸς καταπλεύσαντες καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτοῖς ἤρθη, καταλιπόντες τοὺς ἡμίσεις αὐτῶν ἐν Κεγχρειᾷ, ἢν ἄρα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τὸν Κρομμυῶνα ἴωσιν, ἐβοήθουν κατὰ τάχος.

43. καὶ Βάττος μὲν ὁ ἕτερος τῶν στρατηγῶν — δύο γὰρ ἦσαν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ οἱ παρόντες — λαβὼν λόχον ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Σολύγειαν κώμην φυλάξων ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν, Λυκόφρων δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυνέβαλεν. [2] καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τῷ δεξιῷ κέρᾳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων εὐθὺς ἀποβεβηκότι πρὸ τῆς Χερσονήσου οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐπέκειντο, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατεύματι. καὶ ἦν ἡ μάχη καρτερὰ καὶ ἐν χερσὶ πᾶσα. [3] καὶ τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Καρυστίων — οὗτοι γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι ἦσαν ἔσχατοι — ἐδέξαντό τε τοὺς Κορινθίους καὶ ἐώσαντο μόλις: οἱ δὲ ὑποχωρήσαντες πρὸς αἰμασιάν — ἦν γὰρ τὸ χωρίον πρόσαντες πᾶν — βάλλοντες

τοῖς λίθοις καθύπερθεν ὄντες καὶ παιανίσαντες ἐπῆσαν αὖθις, δεξαμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν χερσὶν ἦν πάλιν ἡ μάχη. [4] λόχος δέ τις τῶν Κορινθίων ἐπιβοηθήσας τῷ εὐωνύμῳ κέρᾳ ἑαυτῶν ἔτρεψε τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας καὶ ἐπεδίωξεν ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν: πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀνέστρεψαν οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ Καρύστιοι. [5] τὸ δὲ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐμάχετο ξυνεχῶς, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Κορινθίων, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ὁ Λυκόφρων ὢν κατὰ τὸ εὐώνυμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡμύνετο: ἤλπιζον γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν Σολύγειαν κώμην πειράσειν.

44. χρόνον μὲν οὖν πολὺν ἀντεῖχον οὐκ ἐνδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις: ἔπειτα ἦσαν γὰρ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οἱ ἱππῆς ὠφέλιμοι ξυμμαχόμενοι, τῶν ἑτέρων οὐκ ἐχόντων ἵππους ἐτράποντο οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ ὑπεχώρησαν πρὸς τὸν λόφον καὶ ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα καὶ οὐκέτι κατέβαινον, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχαζον. [2] ἐν δὲ τῇ τροπῇ ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας οἱ πλεῖστοί τε αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον καὶ Λυκόφρων ὁ στρατηγός. ἡ δὲ ἄλλη στρατιὰ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ οὐ κατὰ δίωξιν πολλὴν οὐδὲ ταχείας φυγῆς γενομένης, ἐπεὶ ἐβιάσθη, ἐπαναχωρήσασα πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἱδρύθη. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐκέτι αὐτοῖς ἐπῆσαν ἐς μάχην, τούς τε νεκροὺς ἐσκύλευον καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀνῃροῦντο, τροπαῖόν τε εὐθέως ἔστησαν. [4] τοῖς δ᾽ ἡμίσεσι τῶν Κορινθίων, οἳ ἐν τῇ Κεγχρειᾷ ἐκάθηντο φύλακες μὴ ἐπὶ τὸν Κρομμυῶνα πλεύσωσι, τούτοις οὐ κατάδηλος ἡ μάχη ἦν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄρους τοῦ Ὀνείου: κονιορτὸν δὲ ὡς εἶδον καὶ [ὡς] ἔγνωσαν, ἐβοήθουν εὐθύς. ἐβοήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πρεσβύτεροι τῶν Κορινθίων αἰσθόμενοι τὸ γεγενημένον. [5] ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξύμπαντας αὐτοὺς ἐπιόντας καὶ νομίσαντες τῶν ἐγγὺς ἀστυγειτόνων Πελοποννησίων βοήθειαν ἐπιέναι, ἀνεχώρουν κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, ἔχοντες τὰ σκυλεύματα καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νεκροὺς πλὴν δυοῖν, οὓς ἐγκατέλιπον οὐ δυνάμενοι εὑρεῖν. [6] καὶ ἀναβάντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπεραιώθησαν ἐς τὰς ἐπικειμένας νήσους, ἐκ δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐπικηρυκευσάμενοι τοὺς νεκροὺς οὓς ἐγκατέλιπον ὑποσπόνδους ἀνείλοντο. ἀπέθανον

δὲ Κορινθίων μὲν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ δώδεκα καὶ διακόσιοι, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους πεντήκοντα.

45. ἄραντες δὲ ἐκ τῶν νήσων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔπλευσαν αὐθημερὸν ἐς Κρομμυῶνα τῆς Κορινθίας: ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς πόλεως εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν σταδίους. καὶ καθορμισάμενοι τήν τε γῆν ἐδῄωσαν καὶ τὴν νύκτα ηὐλίσαντο. [2] τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ παραπλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν πρῶτον καὶ ἀπόβασίν τινα ποιησάμενοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Μέθανα τὴν μεταξὺ Ἐπιδαύρου καὶ Τροιζῆνος, καὶ ἀπολαβόντες τὸν τῆς χερσονήσου ἰσθμὸν ἐτείχισαν, [ἐν ᾧ ἡ Μεθώνη ἐστί,] καὶ φρούριον καταστησάμενοι ἐλῄστευον τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον τήν τε Τροιζηνίαν γῆν καὶ Ἁλιάδα καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίαν. ταῖς δὲ ναυσίν, ἐπειδὴ ἐξετείχισαν τὸ χωρίον, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

46. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, καθ᾽ ὃν ταῦτα ἐγίγνετο, καὶ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Σοφοκλῆς, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου ἀπῆραν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων, ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Κέρκυραν ἐστράτευσαν μετὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὄρει τῆς Ἰστώνης Κερκυραίων καθιδρυμένους, οἳ τότε μετὰ τὴν στάσιν διαβάντες ἐκράτουν τε τῆς γῆς καὶ πολλὰ ἔβλαπτον. [2] προσβαλόντες δὲ τὸ μὲν τείχισμα εἷλον, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες καταπεφευγότες ἀθρόοι πρὸς μετέωρόν τι ξυνέβησαν ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐπικούρους παραδοῦναι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν τὰ ὅπλα παραδόντων τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον διαγνῶναι. [3] καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐς τὴν νῆσον οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν Πτυχίαν ἐς φυλακὴν διεκόμισαν ὑποσπόνδους, μέχρι οὗ Ἀθήναζε πεμφθῶσιν, ὥστ᾽, ἐάν τις ἁλῷ ἀποδιδράσκων, ἅπασι λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδάς. [4] οἱ δὲ τοῦ δήμου προστάται τῶν Κερκυραίων, δεδιότες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς ἐλθόντας οὐκ ἀποκτείνωσι, μηχανῶνται τοιόνδε τι: [5] τῶν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πείθουσί τινας ὀλίγους, ὑποπέμψαντες φίλους καὶ διδάξαντες ὡς κατ᾽ εὔνοιαν δὴ λέγειν ὅτι κράτιστον αὐτοῖς εἴη ὡς τάχιστα ἀποδρᾶναι, πλοῖον δέ τι αὐτοὶ ἑτοιμάσειν: μέλλειν γὰρ δὴ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων παραδώσειν αὐτοὺς τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Κερκυραίων.

47. ὡς δὲ ἔπεισαν, καὶ μηχανησαμένων τὸ πλοῖον ἐκπλέοντες ἐλήφθησαν, ἐλέλυντό τε αἱ σπονδαὶ καὶ τοῖς Κερκυραίοις παρεδίδοντο οἱ πάντες. [2] ξυνελάβοντο δὲ τοῦ τοιούτου οὐχ ἥκιστα, ὥστε ἀκριβῆ τὴν πρόφασιν γενέσθαι καὶ τοὺς τεχνησαμένους ἀδεέστερον ἐγχειρῆσαι, οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατάδηλοι ὄντες τοὺς ἄνδρας μὴ ἂν βούλεσθαι ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων κομισθέντας, διότι αὐτοὶ ἐς Σικελίαν ἔπλεον, τὴν τιμὴν τοῖς ἄγουσι προσποιῆαι. [3] παραλαβόντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐς οἴκημα μέγα κατεῖρξαν, καὶ ὕστερον ἐξάγοντες κατὰ εἴκοσιν ἄνδρας διῆγον διὰ δυοῖν στοίχοιν ὁπλιτῶν ἑκατέρωθεν παρατεταγμένων, δεδεμένους τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ παιομένους καὶ κεντουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν παρατεταγμένων, εἴ πού τίς τινα ἴδοι ἐχθρὸν ἑαυτοῦ: μαστιγοφόροι τε παριόντες ἐπετάχυνον τῆς ὁδοῦ τοὺς σχολαίτερον προϊόντας.

48. καὶ ἐς μὲν ἄνδρας ἑξήκοντα ἔλαθον τοὺς ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐξαγαγόντες καὶ διαφθείραντες □ᾠόντο γὰρ αὐτοὺς μεταστήσοντάς ποι ἄλλοσε ἄγειν□: ὡς δὲ ᾔσθοντο καί τις αὐτοῖς ἐδήλωσε, τούς τε Ἀθηναίους ἐπεκαλοῦντο καὶ ἐκέλευον σφᾶς, εἰ βούλονται, αὐτοὺς διαφθείρειν, ἔκ τε τοῦ οἰκήματος οὐκέτι ἤθελον ἐξιέναι, οὐδ᾽ ἐσιέναι ἔφασαν κατὰ δύναμιν περιόψεσθαι οὐδένα. [2] οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι κατὰ μὲν τὰς θύρας οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὶ διενοοῦντο βιάζεσθαι, ἀναβάντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ τέγος τοῦ οἰκήματος καὶ διελόντες τὴν ὀροφὴν ἔβαλλον τῷ κεράμῳ καὶ ἐτόξευον κάτω. [3] οἱ δὲ ἐφυλάσσοντό τε ὡς ἐδύναντο καὶ ἅμα οἱ πολλοὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρον, οἱστούς τε οὓς ἀφίεσαν ἐκεῖνοι ἐς τὰς σφαγὰς καθιέντες καὶ ἐκ κλινῶν τινῶν αἳ ἔτυχον αὐτοῖς ἐνοῦσαι τοῖς σπάρτοις καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἱματίων παραιρήματα ποιοῦντες ἀπαγχόμενοι, παντί <τε> τρόπῳ τὸ πολὺ τῆς νυκτός □ ἐπεγένετο γὰρ νὺξ τῷ παθήματι □ ἀναλοῦντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ βαλλόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄνω διεφθάρησαν. [4] καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι, ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, φορμηδὸν ἐπὶ ἁμάξας ἐπιβαλόντες ἀπήγαγον ἔξω τῆς πόλεως. τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας, ὅσαι ἐν τῷ τειχίσματι

ἐάλωσαν, ἠνδραποδίσαντο. [5] τοιούτῳ μὲν τρόπῳ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ὄρους Κερκυραῖοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου διεφθάρησαν, καὶ ἡ στάσις πολλὴ γενομένη ἐτελεύτησεν ἐς τοῦτο, ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἦν ὑπόλοιπον τῶν ἑτέρων ὅτι καὶ ἀξιόλογον. [6] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ἵναπερ τὸ πρῶτον ὥρμηντο, ἀποπλεύσαντες μετὰ τῶν ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχων ἐπολέμουν.

49. καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνες ἅμα τελευτῶντος τοῦ θέρους στρατευσάμενοι Ἀνακτόριον Κορινθίων πόλιν, ἣ κεῖται ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, ἔλαβον προδοσίᾳ: καὶ ἐκπέμψαντες [Κορινθίους]αὐτοὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνες οἰκήτορας ἀπὸ πάντων ἔσχον τὸ χωρίον. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

50. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Ἀριστείδης ὁ Ἀρχίππου, εἷς τῶν ἀργυρολόγων νεῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, αἳ ἐξεπέμφθησαν πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους, Ἀρταφέρνην ἄνδρα Πέρσην παρὰ βασιλέως πορευόμενον ἐς Λακεδαίμονα ξυλλαμβάνει ἐν Ἠιόνι τῇ ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι. [2] καὶ αὐτοῦ κομισθέντος οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰς μὲν ἐπιστολὰς μεταγραψάμενοι ἐκ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων γραμμάτων ἀνέγνωσαν, ἐν αἷς πολλῶν ἄλλων γεγραμμένων κεφάλαιον ἦν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, οὐ γιγνώσκειν ὅτι βούλονται: πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρέσβεων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ λέγειν: εἰ οὖν τι βούλονται σαφὲς λέγειν, πέμψαι μετὰ τοῦ Πέρσου ἄνδρας ὡς αὐτόν. [3] τὸν δὲ Ἀρταφέρνην ὕστερον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποστέλλουσι τριήρει ἐς Ἔφεσον καὶ πρέσβεις ἅμα: οἳ πυθόμενοι αὐτόθι βασιλέα Ἀρταξέρξην τὸν Ξέρξου νεωστὶ τεθνηκότα [κατὰ γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἐτελεύτησεν] ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀνεχώρησαν.

51. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Χῖοι τὸ τεῖχος περιεῖλον τὸ καινὸν κελευσάντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ ὑποπτευσάντων ἐς αὐτούς τι νεωτεριεῖν, ποιησάμενοι μέντοι πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πίστεις καὶ βεβαιότητα ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν μηδὲν περὶ σφᾶς νεώτερον βουλεύσειν. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἕβδομον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

52. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς τοῦ τε ἡλίου ἐκλιπές τι ἐγένετο περὶ νουμηνίαν καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνὸς ἰσταμένου ἔσεισεν. [2] καὶ οἱ Μυτιληναίων φυγάδες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Λεσβίων, ὁρμώμενοι οἱ πολλοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου καὶ μισθωσάμενοι ἔκ τε Πελοποννήσου ἐπικουρικὸν καὶ αὐτόθεν ξυναγείραντες, αἱροῦσι Ῥοίτειον, καὶ λαβόντες δισχιλίους στατῆρας Φωκαΐτας ἀπέδοσαν πάλιν οὐδὲν ἀδικήσαντες: [3] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ Ἄνανδρον στρατεύσαντες προδοσίας γενομένης λαμβάνουσι τὴν πόλιν. καὶ ἦν αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τάς τε ἄλλας πόλεις τὰς Ἀκταίας καλουμένας, ἃς πρότερον Μυτιληναίων νεμομένων Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον, ἐλευθεροῦν, καὶ πάντων μάλιστα τὴν Ἄνανδρον: καὶ κρατυνάμενοι αὐτὴν ναῦς τε γὰρ εὐπορία ἦν ποιεῖσθαι, αὐτόθεν ξύλων ὑπαρχόντων καὶ τῆς Ἴδης ἐπικειμένης, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ σκευῇ ῥᾳδίως ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ὁρμώμενοι τήν τε Λέσβον ἐγγὺς οὖσαν κακώσειν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Αἰολικὰ πολίσματα χειρώσεσθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα παρασκευάζεσθαι ἔμελλον.

53. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ δισχιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἱππεῦσί τε ὀλίγοις καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Μιλησίους καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἀγαγόντες ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Κύθηρα: ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ Νικόστρατος ὁ Διειτρέφους καὶ Αὐτοκλῆς ὁ Τολμαίου. [2] τὰ δὲ Κύθηρα νῆσός ἐστιν, ἐπίκειται δὲ τῇ Λακωνικῇ κατὰ Μαλέαν: Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ᾽ εἰσὶ τῶν περιοίκων, καὶ κυθηροδίκης ἀρχὴ ἐκ τῆς Σπάρτης διέβαινεν αὐτόσε κατὰ ἔτος, ὁπλιτῶν τε φρουρὰν διέπεμπον αἰεὶ καὶ πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο. [3] ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν τε ἀπ᾽ Αἰγύπτου καὶ Λιβύης ὁλκάδων προσβολή, καὶ λῃσταὶ ἅμα τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἧσσον ἐλύπουν ἐκ θαλάσσης, ᾗπερ μόνον οἷόν τε ἦν κακουργεῖσθαι: πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνέχει πρὸς τὸ Σικελικὸν καὶ Κρητικὸν πέλαγος.

54. κατασχόντες οὖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῷ στρατῷ, δέκα μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ δισχιλίοις Μιλησίων ὁπλίταις τὴν ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πόλιν Σκάνδειαν καλουμένην αἱροῦσι, τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ στρατεύματι ἀποβάντες τῆς νήσου ἐς τὰ πρὸς Μαλέαν τετραμμένα ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν [ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ] πόλιν τῶν

Κυθηρίων, καὶ ηὗρον εὐθὺς αὐτοὺς ἐστρατοπεδευμένους ἅπαντας. [2] καὶ μάχης γενομένης ὀλίγον μέν τινα χρόνον ὑπέστησαν οἱ Κυθήριοι, ἔπειτα τραπόμενοι κατέφυγον ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλιν, καὶ ὕστερον ξυνέβησαν πρὸς Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ξυνάρχοντας Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτρέψαι περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν πλὴν θανάτου. [3] ἦσαν δέ τινες καὶ γενόμενοι τῷ Νικίᾳ λόγοι πρότερον πρός τινας τῶν Κυθηρίων, δι᾽ ὃ καὶ θᾶσσον καὶ ἐπιτηδειότερον τό τε παραυτίκα καὶ τὸ ἔπειτα τὰ τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐπράχθη αὐτοῖς: ἀνέστησαν γὰρ <ἂν> οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Κυθηρίους, Λακεδαιμονίους τε ὄντας καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ Λακωνικῇ τῆς νήσου οὕτως ἐπικειμένης. [4] μετὰ δὲ τὴν ξύμβασιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τήν τε Σκάνδειαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ λιμένι πόλισμα παραλαβόντες καὶ τῶν Κυθήρων φυλακὴν ποιησάμενοι ἔπλευσαν ἔς τε Ἀσίνην καὶ Ἅλος καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν περὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἀποβάσεις ποιούμενοι καὶ ἐναυλιζόμενοι τῶν χωρίων οὗ καιρὸς εἴη ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν ἡμέρας μάλιστα ἑπτά.

55. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἰδόντες μὲν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὰ Κύθηρα ἔχοντας, προσδεχόμενοι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν σφῶν ἀποβάσεις τοιαύτας ποιήσεσθαι, ἀθρόᾳ μὲν οὐδαμοῦ τῇ δυνάμει ἀντετάξαντο, κατὰ δὲ τὴν χώραν φρουρὰς διέπεμψαν, ὁπλιτῶν πλῆθος, ὡς ἑκασταχόσε ἔδει, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν φυλακῇ πολλῇ ἦσαν, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσι νεώτερόν τι γένηται τῶν περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν, γεγενημένου μὲν τοῦ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πάθους ἀνελπίστου καὶ μεγάλου, Πύλου δὲ ἐχομένης καὶ Κυθήρων καὶ πανταχόθεν σφᾶς περιεστῶτος πολέμου ταχέος καὶ ἀπροφυλάκτου, [2] ὥστε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς ἱππέας τετρακοσίους κατεστήσαντο καὶ τοξότας, ἔς τε τὰ πολεμικά, εἴπερ ποτέ, μάλιστα δὴ ὀκνηρότεροι ἐγένοντο, ξυνεστῶτες παρὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν σφῶν ἰδέαν τῆς παρασκευῆς ναυτικῷ ἀγῶνι, καὶ τούτῳ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, οἷς τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρούμενον αἰεὶ ἐλλιπὲς ἦν τῆς δοκήσεώς τι πράξειν: [3] καὶ ἅμα τὰ τῆς τύχης πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ ξυμβάντα παρὰ λόγον αὐτοῖς ἔκπληξιν μεγίστην παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐδέδισαν μή ποτε αὖθις ξυμφορά τις αὐτοῖς περιτύχῃ οἵα καὶ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ. [4] ἀτολμότεροι δὲ δι᾽ αὐτὸ ἐς τὰς μάχας

ἦσαν, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι κινήσειαν ᾤοντο ἁμαρτήσεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν γνώμην ἀνεχέγγυον γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῆς πρὶν ἀηθείας τοῦ κακοπραγεῖν.

56. τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις τότε τὴν παραθαλάσσιον δῃοῦσι τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἡσύχασαν, ὡς καθ᾽ ἑκάστην φρουρὰν γίγνοιτό τις ἀπόβασις, πλήθει τε ἐλάσσους ἕκαστοι ἡγούμενοι εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: μία δὲ φρουρά, ἥπερ καὶ ἡμύνατο περὶ Κοτύρταν καὶ Ἀφροδιτίαν, τὸν μὲν ὄχλον τῶν ψιλῶν ἐσκεδασμένον ἐφόβησεν ἐπιδρομῇ, τῶν δὲ ὁπλιτῶν δεξαμένων ὑπεχώρησε πάλιν, καὶ ἄνδρες τέ τινες ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν ὀλίγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἐλήφθη, τροπαῖόν τε στήσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Κύθηρα. [2] ἐκ δὲ αὐτῶν περιέπλευσαν ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον τὴν Λιμηράν, καὶ δῃώσαντες μέρος τι τῆς γῆς ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ Θυρέαν, ἥ ἐστι μὲν τῆς Κυνουρίας γῆς καλουμένης, μεθορία δὲ τῆς Ἀργείας καὶ Λακωνικῆς: νεμόμενοι δὲ αὐτὴν ἔδοσαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Αἰγινήταις ἐκπεσοῦσιν ἐνοικεῖν διά τε τὰς ὑπὸ τὸν σεισμὸν σφίσι γενομένας καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων τὴν ἐπανάστασιν εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὅτι Ἀθηναίων ὑπακούοντες ὅμως πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων γνώμην αἰεὶ ἔστασαν.

57. προσπλεόντων οὖν ἔτι τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ Αἰγινῆται τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὃ ἔτυχον οἰκοδομοῦντες τεῖχος ἐκλείπουσιν, ἐς δὲ τὴν ἄνω πόλιν, ἐν ᾗ ᾤκουν, ἀπεχώρησαν, ἀπέχουσαν σταδίους μάλιστα δέκα τῆς θαλάσσης. [2] καὶ αὐτοῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰ μία τῶν περὶ τὴν χώραν, ἥπερ καὶ ξυνετείχιζε, ξυνεσελθεῖν μὲν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος οὐκ ἠθέλησαν δεομένων τῶν Αἰγινητῶν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῖς κίνδυνος ἐφαίνετο ἐς τὸ τεῖχος κατακλῄεσθαι: ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μετέωρα, ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζον ἀξιόμαχοι εἶναι, ἡσύχαζον. [3] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κατασχόντες καὶ χωρήσαντες εὐθὺς πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ αἱροῦσι τὴν Θυρέαν. καὶ τήν τε πόλιν κατέκαυσαν καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα ἐξεπόρθησαν, τούς τε Αἰγινήτας, ὅσοι μὴ ἐν χερσὶ διεφθάρησαν, ἄγοντες ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα ὃς παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἦν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, Τάνταλον τὸν Πατροκλέους: ἐζωγρήθη γὰρ τετρωμένος. [4] ἦγον δέ τινας καὶ ἐκ τῶν Κυθήρων ἄνδρας

ὀλίγους, οὓς ἐδόκει ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα μεταστῆσαι. καὶ τούτους μὲν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβουλεύσαντο καταθέσθαι ἐς τὰς νήσους, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Κυθηρίους οἰκοῦντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν φόρον τέσσαρα τάλαντα φέρειν, Αἰγινήτας δὲ ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας ὅσοι ἑάλωσαν διὰ τὴν προτέραν αἰεί ποτε ἔχθραν, Τάνταλον δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίους καταδῆσαι.

58. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐν Σικελίᾳ Καμαριναίοις καὶ Γελῴοις ἐκεχειρία γίγνεται πρῶτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους: εἶτα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Σικελιῶται ξυνελθόντες ἐς Γέλαν, ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων πρέσβεις, ἐς λόγους κατέστησαν ἀλλήλοις, εἴ πως ξυναλλαγεῖεν. καὶ ἄλλαι τε πολλαὶ γνῶμαι ἐλέγοντο ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα, διαφερομένων καὶ ἀξιούντων, ὡς ἕκαστοί τι ἐλασσοῦσθαι ἐνόμιζον, καὶ Ἑρμοκράτης ὁ Ἕρμωνος Συρακόσιος, ὅσπερ καὶ ἔπεισε μάλιστα αὐτούς, ἐς τὸ κοινὸν τοιούτους δὴ λόγους εἶπεν.

59. ‘οὔτε πόλεως ὢν ἐλαχίστης, ὦ Σικελιῶται, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσομαι οὔτε πονουμένης μάλιστα τῷ πολέμῳ, ἐς κοινὸν δὲ τὴν δοκοῦσάν μοι βελτίστην γνώμην εἶναι ἀποφαινόμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ πάσῃ. [2] καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ὡς χαλεπὸν τί ἄν τις πᾶν τὸ ἐνὸν ἐκλέγων ἐν εἰδόσι μακρηγοροίη; οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε ἀμαθίᾳ ἀναγκάζεται αὐτὸ δρᾶν, οὔτε φόβῳ, ἢν οἴηταί τι πλέον σχήσειν, ἀποτρέπεται. ξυμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὰ κέρδη μείζω φαίνεσθαι τῶν δεινῶν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους ἐθέλουσιν ὑφίστασθαι πρὸ τοῦ αὐτίκα τι ἐλασσοῦσθαι: [3] αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰ μὴ ἐν καιρῷ τύχοιεν ἑκάτεροι πράσσοντες, αἱ παραινέσεις τῶν ξυναλλαγῶν ὠφέλιμοι. [4] ὃ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πειθομένοις πλείστου ἂν ἄξιον γένοιτο: τὰ γὰρ ἴδια ἕκαστοι εὖ βουλευόμενοι δὴ θέσθαι τό τε πρῶτον ἐπολεμήσαμεν καὶ νῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους δι᾽ ἀντιλογιῶν πειρώμεθα καταλλαγῆναι καί, ἢν ἄρα μὴ προχωρήσῃ ἴσον ἑκάστῳ ἔχοντι ἀπελθεῖν, πάλιν πολεμήσομεν.

60. ‘καίτοι γνῶναι χρὴ ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων μόνον, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἡ ξύνοδος ἔσται, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἐπιβουλευομένην τὴν πᾶσαν Σικελίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ κρίνω, ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων

δυνησόμεθα ἔτι διασῶσαι: καὶ διαλλακτὰς πολὺ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων ἀναγκαιοτέρους περὶ τῶνδε Ἀθηναίους νομίσαι, οἳ δύναμιν ἔχοντες μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλλήνων τάς τε ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν τηροῦσιν ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες, καὶ ὀνόματι ἐννόμῳ ξυμμαχίας τὸ φύσει πολέμιον εὐπρεπῶς ἐς τὸ ξυμφέρον καθίστανται. [2] πόλεμον γὰρ αἱρομένων ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπαγομένων αὐτούς, ἄνδρας οἳ καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπικαλουμένοις αὐτοὶ ἐπιστρατεύουσι, κακῶς τε ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ποιούντων τέλεσι τοῖς οἰκείοις, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἅμα προκοπτόντων ἐκείνοις, εἰκός, ὅταν γνῶσιν ἡμᾶς τετρυχωμένους, καὶ πλέονί ποτε στόλῳ ἐλθόντας αὐτοὺς τάδε πάντα πειράσασθαι ὑπὸ σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι.

61. ‘καίτοι τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἑκάστους, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, χρὴ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα ἐπικτωμένους μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἑτοῖμα βλάπτοντας ξυμμάχους τε ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους προσλαμβάνειν, νομίσαι τε στάσιν μάλιστα φθείρειν τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν Σικελίαν, ἧς γε οἱ ἔνοικοι ξύμπαντες μὲν ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, κατὰ πόλεις δὲ διέσταμεν. [2] ἃ χρὴ γνόντας καὶ ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτῃ καταλλαγῆναι καὶ πόλιν πόλει, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι κοινῇ σῴζειν τὴν πᾶσαν Σικελίαν, παρεστάναι δὲ μηδενὶ ὡς οἱ μὲν Δωριῆς ἡμῶν πολέμιοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τὸ δὲ Χαλκιδικὸν τῇ Ἰάδι ξυγγενείᾳ ἀσφαλές. [3] οὐ γὰρ τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, ὅτι δίχα πέφυκε, τοῦ ἑτέρου ἔχθει ἐπίασιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐφιέμενοι, ἃ κοινῇ κεκτήμεθα. [4] ἐδήλωσαν δὲ νῦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Χαλκιδικοῦ γένους παρακλήσει: τοῖς γὰρ οὐδεπώποτε σφίσι κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν προσβοηθήσασιν αὐτοὶ τὸ δίκαιον μᾶλλον τῆς ξυνθήκης προθύμως παρέσχοντο. [5] καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ταῦτα πλεονεκτεῖν τε καὶ προνοεῖσθαι πολλὴ ξυγγνώμη, καὶ οὐ τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις μέμφομαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπακούειν ἑτοιμοτέροις οὖσιν: πέφυκε γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν μὲν τοῦ εἴκοντος, φυλάσσεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἐπιόν. [6] ὅσοι δὲ γιγνώσκοντες αὐτὰ μὴ ὀρθῶς προσκοποῦμεν, μηδὲ τοῦτό τις πρεσβύτατον ἥκει κρίνας, τὸ κοινῶς φοβερὸν ἅπαντας εὖ θέσθαι, ἁμαρτάνομεν. [7] τάχιστα δ᾽ ἂν ἀπαλλαγὴ αὐτοῦ γένοιτο, εἰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβαῖμεν: οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῶν

ὁρμῶνται Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐπικαλεσαμένων. καὶ οὕτως οὐ πόλεμος πολέμῳ, εἰρήνῃ δὲ διαφοραὶ ἀπραγμόνως παύονται, οἵ τ᾽ ἐπίκλητοι εὐπρεπῶς ἄδικοι ἐλθόντες εὐλόγως ἄπρακτοι ἀπίασιν.

62. ‘καὶ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τοσοῦτον ἀγαθὸν εὖ βουλευομένοις εὑρίσκεται: [2] τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογουμένην ἄριστον εἶναι εἰρήνην πῶς οὐ χρὴ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιήσασθαι; ἢ δοκεῖτε, εἴ τῳ τι ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ἢ εἴ τῳ τὰ ἐναντία, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν μᾶλλον ἢ πόλεμον τὸ μὲν παῦσαι ἂν ἑκατέρῳ, τὸ δὲ ξυνδιασῶσαι, καὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ λαμπρότητας ἀκινδυνοτέρας ἔχειν τὴν εἰρήνην, ἄλλα τε ὅσα ἐν μήκει λόγων ἄν τις διέλθοι, ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν; ἃ χρὴ σκεψαμένους μὴ τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους ὑπεριδεῖν, τὴν δὲ αὐτοῦ τινὰ σωτηρίαν μᾶλλον ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν προϊδεῖν. [3] καὶ εἴ τις βεβαίως τι ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ βίᾳ πράξειν οἴεται, τῷ παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα μὴ χαλεπῶς σφαλλέσθω, γνοὺς ὅτι πλείους ἤδη καὶ τιμωρίαις μετιόντες τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ ἐλπίσαντες ἕτεροι δυνάμει τινὶ πλεονεκτήσειν, οἱ μὲν οὐχ ὅσον οὐκ ἡμύναντο, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐσώθησαν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀντὶ τοῦ πλέον ἔχειν προσκαταλιπεῖν τὰ αὐτῶν ξυνέβη. [4] τιμωρία γὰρ οὐκ εὐτυχεῖ δικαίως, ὅτι καὶ ἀδικεῖται: οὐδὲ ἰσχὺς βέβαιον, διότι καὶ εὔελπι. τὸ δὲ ἀστάθμητον τοῦ μέλλοντος ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον κρατεῖ, πάντων τε σφαλερώτατον ὂν ὅμως καὶ χρησιμώτατον φαίνεται: ἐξ ἴσου γὰρ δεδιότες προμηθίᾳ μᾶλλον ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐρχόμεθα.

63. ‘καὶ νῦν τοῦ ἀφανοῦς τε τούτου διὰ τὸ ἀτέκμαρτον δέος καὶ διὰ τὸ ἤδη † φοβεροὺς παρόντας Ἀθηναίους, κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἐκπλαγέντες, καὶ τὸ ἐλλιπὲς τῆς γνώμης, ὧν ἕκαστός τι ᾠήθημεν πράξειν, ταῖς κωλύμαις ταύταις ἱκανῶς νομίσαντες εἰρχθῆναι, τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας πολεμίους ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀποπέμπωμεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἐς ἀίδιον ξυμβῶμεν, εἰ δὲ μή, χρόνον ὡς πλεῖστον σπεισάμενοι τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς ἐς αὖθις ἀναβαλώμεθα. [2] τὸ ξύμπαν τε δὴ γνῶμεν πειθόμενοι μὲν ἐμοὶ πόλιν ἔξοντες ἕκαστος ἐλευθέραν, ἀφ᾽ ἧς αὐτοκράτορες ὄντες τὸν εὖ καὶ κακῶς δρῶντα ἐξ ἴσου ἀρετῇ ἀμυνούμεθα: ἢν δ᾽ ἀπιστήσαντες

ἄλλοις ὑπακούσωμεν, οὐ περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαί τινα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄγαν εἰ τύχοιμεν, φίλοι μὲν ἂν τοῖς ἐχθίστοις, διάφοροι δὲ οἷς οὐ χρὴ κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην γιγνοίμεθα.

64. ‘καὶ ἐγὼ μέν, ἅπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον, πόλιν τε μεγίστην παρεχόμενος καὶ ἐπιών τῳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀμυνούμενος ἀξιῶ προιδόμενος αὐτῶν ξυγχωρεῖν, καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐναντίους οὕτω κακῶς δρᾶν ὥστε αὐτὸς τὰ πλείω βλάπτεσθαι, μηδὲ μωρίᾳ φιλονικῶν ἡγεῖσθαι τῆς τε οἰκείας γνώμης ὁμοίως αὐτοκράτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἧς οὐκ ἄρχω τύχης, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσον εἰκὸς ἡσσᾶσθαι. [2] καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δικαιῶ ταὐτό μοι ποιῆσαι, ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων τοῦτο παθεῖν. [3] οὐδὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν οἰκείους οἰκείων ἡσσᾶσθαι, ἢ Δωριᾶ τινὰ Δωριῶς ἢ Χαλκιδέα τῶν ξυγγενῶν, τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν γείτονας ὄντας καὶ ξυνοίκους μιᾶς χώρας καὶ περιρρύτου καὶ ὄνομα ἓν κεκλημένους Σικελιώτας: οἳ πολεμήσομέν τε, οἶμαι, ὅταν ξυμβῇ, καὶ ξυγχωρησόμεθά γε πάλιν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς λόγοις κοινοῖς χρώμενοι: [4] τοὺς δὲ ἀλλοφύλους ἐπελθόντας ἀθρόοι αἰεί, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, ἀμυνούμεθα, εἴπερ καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους βλαπτόμενοι ξύμπαντες κινδυνεύομεν: ξυμμάχους δὲ οὐδέποτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπαξόμεθα οὐδὲ διαλλακτάς. [5] τάδε γὰρ ποιοῦντες ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν οὐ στερήσομεν τὴν Σικελίαν, Ἀθηναίων τε ἀπαλλαγῆναι καὶ οἰκείου πολέμου, καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέραν νεμούμεθα καὶ ὑπὸ ἄλλων ἧσσον ἐπιβουλευομένην.’

65. τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἑρμοκράτους εἰπόντος πειθόμενοι οἱ Σικελιῶται αὐτοὶ μὲν κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ξυνηνέχθησαν γνώμῃ ὥστε ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι τοῦ πολέμου ἔχοντες ἃ ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, τοῖς δὲ Καμαριναίοις Μοργαντίνην εἶναι ἀργύριον τακτὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἀποδοῦσιν: [2] οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι παρακαλέσαντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐν τέλει ὄντας εἶπον ὅτι ξυμβήσονται καὶ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἔσονται κἀκείνοις κοιναί. ἐπαινεσάντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ὁμολογίαν, καὶ αἱ νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπέπλευσαν μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκ Σικελίας. [3] ἐλθόντας δὲ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς μὲν φυγῇ ἐζημίωσαν, Πυθόδωρον καὶ

Σοφοκλέα, τὸν δὲ τρίτον Εὐρυμέδοντα χρήματα ἐπράξαντο, ὡς ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐν Σικελίᾳ καταστρέψασθαι δώροις πεισθέντες ἀποχωρήσειαν. [4] οὕτω τῇ [τε] παρούσῃ εὐτυχίᾳ χρώμενοι ἠξίουν σφίσι μηδὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ τὰ ἀπορώτερα μεγάλῃ τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐνδεεστέρᾳ παρασκευῇ κατεργάζεσθαι. αἰτία δ᾽ ἦν ἡ παρὰ λόγον τῶν πλεόνων εὐπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτιθεῖσα ἰσχὺν τῆς ἐλπίδος.

66. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους Μεγαρῆς οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει πιεζόμενοι ὑπό τε Ἀθηναίων τῷ πολέμῳ, αἰεὶ κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον δὶς ἐσβαλλόντων πανστρατιᾷ ἐς τὴν χώραν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σφετέρων φυγάδων τῶν ἐκ Πηγῶν, οἳ στασιασάντων ἐκπεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους χαλεποὶ ἦσαν λῃστεύοντες, ἐποιοῦντο λόγους ἐν ἀλλήλοις ὡς χρὴ δεξαμένους τοὺς φεύγοντας μὴ ἀμφοτέρωθεν τὴν πόλιν φθείρειν. [2] οἱ δὲ φίλοι τῶν ἔξω τὸν θροῦν αἰσθόμενοι φανερῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καὶ αὐτοὶ ἠξίουν τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἔχεσθαι. [3] γνόντες δὲ οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται οὐ δυνατὸν τὸν δῆμον ἐσόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶν μετὰ σφῶν καρτερεῖν, ποιοῦνται λόγους δείσαντες πρὸς τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγούς, Ἱπποκράτη τε τὸν Ἀρίφρονος καὶ Δημοσθένη τὸν Ἀλκισθένους, βουλόμενοι ἐνδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ νομίζοντες ἐλάσσω σφίσι τὸν κίνδυνον ἢ τοὺς ἐκπεσόντας ὑπὸ σφῶν κατελθεῖν. ξυνέβησάν τε πρῶτα μὲν τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἑλεῖν Ἀθηναίους ἦν δὲ σταδίων μάλιστα ὀκτὼ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν τὸν λιμένα αὐτῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἐπιβοηθήσωσιν ἐκ τῆς Νισαίας οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐν ᾗ αὐτοὶ μόνοι ἐφρούρουν βεβαιότητος ἕνεκα τῶν Μεγάρων, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄνω πόλιν πειρᾶσθαι ἐνδοῦναι: ῥᾷον δ᾽ ἤδη ἔμελλον προσχωρήσειν τούτου γεγενημένου.

67. οἱ οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπειδὴ ἀπό τε τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν λόγων παρεσκεύαστο ἀμφοτέροις, ὑπὸ νύκτα πλεύσαντες ἐς Μινῴαν τὴν Μεγαρέων νῆσον ὁπλίταις ἑξακοσίοις, ὧν Ἱπποκράτης ἦρχεν, ἐν ὀρύγματι ἐκαθέζοντο, ὅθεν ἐπλίνθευον τὰ τείχη καὶ ἀπεῖχεν οὐ πολύ: [2] οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους τοῦ ἑτέρου στρατηγοῦ Πλαταιῆς τε ψιλοὶ καὶ

ἕτεροι περίπολοι ἐνήδρευσαν ἐς τὸ Ἐνυάλιον, ὅ ἐστιν ἔλασσον ἄπωθεν. καὶ ᾔσθετο οὐδεὶς εἰ μὴ οἱ ἄνδρες οἷς ἐπιμελὲς ἦν εἰδέναι τὴν νύκτα ταύτην. [3] καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔως ἔμελλε γίγνεσθαι, οἱ προδιδόντες τῶν Μεγαρέων οὗτοι τοιόνδε ἐποίησαν. ἀκάτιον ἀμφηρικὸν ὡς λῃσταί, ἐκ πολλοῦ τεθεραπευκότες τὴν ἄνοιξιν τῶν πυλῶν, εἰώθεσαν ἐπὶ ἀμάξῃ, πείθοντες τὸν ἄρχοντα, διὰ τῆς τάφρου κατακομίζειν τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐκπλεῖν: καὶ πρὶν ἡμέραν εἶναι πάλιν αὐτὸ τῇ ἀμάξῃ κομίσαντες ἐς τὸ τεῖχος κατὰ τὰς πύλας ἐσῆγον, ὅπως τοῖς ἐκ τῆς Μινῴας Ἀθηναίοις ἀφανὴς δὴ εἴη ἡ φυλακή, μὴ ὄντος ἐν τῷ λιμένι πλοίου φανεροῦ μηδενός. [4] καὶ τότε πρὸς ταῖς πύλαις ἤδη ἦν ἡ ἅμαξα, καὶ ἀνοιχθεισῶν κατὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς ὡς τῷ ἀκατίῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐγίγνετο γὰρ ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος τὸ τοιοῦτον ἰδόντες ἔθεον δρόμῳ ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας, βουλόμενοι φθάσαι πρὶν ξυγκλῃσθῆναι πάλιν τὰς πύλας καὶ ἔως ἔτι ἡ ἅμαξα ἐν αὐταῖς ἦν, κώλυμα οὖσα προσθεῖναι: καὶ αὐτοῖς ἅμα καὶ οἱ ξυμπράσσοντες Μεγαρῆς τοὺς κατὰ τὰς πύλας φύλακας κτείνουσιν. [5] καὶ πρῶτον μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημοσθένη Πλαταιῆς τε καὶ περίπολοι ἐσέδραμον οὗ νῦν τὸ τροπαῖόν ἐστι, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐντὸς τῶν πυλῶν ᾔσθοντο γὰρ οἱ ἐγγύτατα Πελοποννήσιοι μαχόμενοι τοὺς προσβοηθοῦντας οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἐκράτησαν καὶ τοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὁπλίταις ἐπιφερομένοις βεβαίους τὰς πύλας παρέσχον:

68. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἤδη ὁ αἰεὶ ἐντὸς γιγνόμενος ἐχώρει ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος. [2] καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι φρουροὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντίσχοντες ἠμύνοντο ὀλίγοι, καὶ ἀπέθανόν τινες αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ πλείους ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν, φοβηθέντες ἐν νυκτί τε πολεμίων προσπεπτωκότων καὶ τῶν προδιδόντων Μεγαρέων ἀντιμαχομένων, νομίσαντες τοὺς ἅπαντας σφᾶς Μεγαρέας προδεδωκέναι. [3] ξυνέπεσε γὰρ καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκα ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ γνώμης κηρύξαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἰέναι Μεγαρέων μετὰ Ἀθηναίων θησόμενον τὰ ὅπλα. οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἤκουσαν, οὐκέτι ἀνέμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι νομίσαντες κοινῇ πολεμεῖσθαι κατέφυγον ἐς τὴν Νίσαιαν. [4] ἅμα δὲ ἕῳ ἐαλωκότων ἤδη τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει

Μεγαρέων θορυβουμένων οἱ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πράξαντες καὶ ἄλλο μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πλῆθος, ὃ ξυνῄδει, ἔφασαν χρῆναι ἀνοίγειν τὰς πύλας καὶ ἐπεξιέναι ἐς μάχην. [5] ξυνέκειτο δὲ αὐτοῖς τῶν πυλῶν ἀνοιχθεισῶν ἐσπίπτειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, αὐτοὶ δὲ διάδηλοι ἔμελλον ἔσεσθαι ⟨λίπα γὰρ ἀλείψεσθαι⟩, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶνται. ἀσφάλεια δὲ αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἐγίγνετο τῆς ἀνοίξεως: καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐλευσῖνος κατὰ τὸ ξυγκείμενον τετρακισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἱππῆς ἑξακόσιοι [οἱ] τὴν νύκτα πορευόμενοι παρῆσαν. [6] ἀληλιμμένων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὄντων ἤδη περὶ τὰς πύλας καταγορεύει τις ξυνειδὼς τοῖς ἑτέροις τὸ ἐπιβούλευμα. καὶ οἳ ξυστραφέντες ἀθρόοι ἦλθον καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν χρῆναι οὔτε ἐπεξιέναι ⟨οὐδὲ γὰρ πρότερόν πω τοῦτο ἰσχύοντες μᾶλλον τολμῆσαι⟩ οὔτε ἐς κίνδυνον φανερὸν τὴν πόλιν καταγαγεῖν: εἴ τε μὴ πείσεταί τις, αὐτοῦ τὴν μάχην ἔσεσθαι. ἐδήλουν δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι ἴσασι τὰ πρασσόμενα, ἀλλὰ ὡς τὰ βέλτιστα βουλεύοντες ἰσχυρίζοντο, καὶ ἅμα περὶ τὰς πύλας παρέμενον φυλάσσοντες, ὥστε οὐκ ἐγένετο τοῖς ἐπιβουλεύουσι πρᾶξαι ὃ ἔμελλον.

69. γνόντες δὲ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ὅτι ἐναντίωμά τι ἐγένετο καὶ τὴν πόλιν βίᾳ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἔσονται λαβεῖν, τὴν Νίσαιαν εὐθὺς περιετείχιζον, νομίζοντες, εἰ πρὶν ἐπιβοηθῆσαί τινας ἐξέλοιεν, θᾶσσον ἂν καὶ [2] τὰ Μέγαρα προσχωρῆσαι ⟨παρεγένετο δὲ σίδηρός τε ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ταχὺ καὶ λιθουργοὶ καὶ τἆλλα ἐπιτήδεια⟩: ἀρξάμενοι δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ὃ εἶχον καὶ διοικοδομήσαντες τὸ πρὸς Μεγαρέας, ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἑκατέρωθεν ἐς θάλασσαν τῆς Νισαίας τάφρον τε καὶ τείχη διελομένη ἡ στρατιά, ἔκ τε τοῦ προαστείου λίθοις καὶ πλίνθοις χρώμενοι, καὶ κόπτοντες τὰ δένδρα καὶ ὕλην ἀπεσταύρουν εἴ πῃ δέοιτό τι: καὶ αἱ οἰκίαι τοῦ προαστείου ἐπάλξεις λαμβάνουσαι αὐταὶ ὑπῆρχον ἔρυμα. [3] καὶ ταύτην μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην εἰργάζοντο: τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ περὶ δείλην τὸ τεῖχος ὅσον οὐκ ἀπετετέλεστο, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Νισαίᾳ δείσαντες, σίτου τε ἀπορίᾳ ⟨ἐφ᾽ ἡμέραν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἄνω πόλεως ἐχρῶντο⟩ καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐ νομίζοντες ταχὺ ἐπιβοηθήσειν, τούς τε Μεγαρέας

πολεμίους ἡγούμενοι, ξυνέβησαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ῥητοῦ μὲν ἕκαστον ἀργυρίου ἀπολυθῆναι ὅπλα παραδόντας, τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις, τῷ τε ἄρχοντι καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐνῆν, χρῆσθαι Ἀθηναίους ὅτι ἂν βούλωνται. [4] ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁμολογήσαντες ἐξῆλθον, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἀπορρήξαντες ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως καὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν παραλαβόντες τἆλλα παρεσκευάζοντο.

70. Βρασίδας δὲ ὁ Τέλλιδος Λακεδαιμόνιος κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἐτύγχανε περὶ Σικυῶνα καὶ Κόρινθον ὤν, ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης στρατείαν παρασκευαζόμενος. καὶ ὡς ᾔσθετο τῶν τειχῶν τὴν ἅλωσιν, δείσας περί τε τοῖς ἐν τῇ Νισαίᾳ Πελοποννησίοις καὶ μὴ τὰ Μέγαρα ληφθῇ, πέμπει ἔς τε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς κελεύων κατὰ τάχος στρατιᾷ ἀπαντῆσαι ἐπὶ Τριποδίσκον — ἔστι δὲ κώμη τῆς Μεγαρίδος ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχουσα ὑπὸ τῷ ὄρει τῇ Γερανείᾳ —, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων ἦλθεν ἑπτακοσίους μὲν καὶ δισχιλίους Κορινθίων ὁπλίτας, Φλειασίων δὲ τετρακοσίους, Σικυωνίων δὲ ἑξακοσίους, καὶ τοὺς μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ ὅσοι ἤδη ξυνειλεγμένοι ἦσαν, οἰόμενος τὴν Νίσαιαν ἔτι καταλήψεσθαι ἀνάλωτον. [2] ὡς δὲ ἐπύθετο —ἔτυχε γὰρ νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸν Τριποδίσκον ἐξελθών—, ἀπολέξας τριακοσίους τοῦ στρατοῦ, πρὶν ἔκπυστος γενέσθαι, προσῆλθε τῇ τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλει λαθὼν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὄντας περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, βουλόμενος μὲν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἅμα, εἰ δύναιτο, ἔργῳ τῆς Νισαίας πειρᾶσαι, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τὴν τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλιν ἐσελθὼν βεβαιώσασθαι. καὶ ἠξίου δέξασθαι σφᾶς, λέγων ἐν ἐλπίδι εἶναι ἀναλαβεῖν Νίσαιαν.

71. αἱ δὲ τῶν Μεγαρέων στάσεις φοβούμεναι, οἱ μὲν μὴ τοὺς φεύγοντας σφίσιν ἐσαγαγὼν αὐτοὺς ἐκβάλῃ, οἱ δὲ μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁ δῆμος δείσας ἐπίθηται σφίσι καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐν μάχῃ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν οὖσα ἐγγὺς ἐφεδρευόντων Ἀθηναίων ἁπόληται, οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις ἐδόκει ἡσυχάσασι τὸ μέλλον περιιδεῖν. [2] ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ μάχην ἑκάτεροι ἔσεσθαι τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν προσβοηθησάντων, καὶ οὕτω σφίσιν ἀσφαλεστέρως ἔχειν, οἷς τις εἴη εὔνους,

κρατήσασι προσχωρῆσαι: ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας ὡς οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐς τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα.

72. ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἕῳ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ παρῆσαν, διανενοημένοι μὲν καὶ πρὶν Βρασίδαν πέμψαι βοηθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ Μέγαρα, ὡς οὐκ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος τοῦ κινδύνου, καὶ ἤδη ὄντες πανστρατιᾷ Πλαταιᾶσιν: ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἦλθεν ὁ ἄγγελος, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐρρώσθησαν, καὶ ἀποστείλαντες διακοσίους καὶ δισχιλίους ὁπλίτας καὶ ἱππέας ἑξακοσίους τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀπῆλθον πάλιν. [2] παρόντος δὲ ἤδη ξύμπαντος τοῦ στρατεύματος, ὁπλιτῶν οὐκ ἔλασσον ἑξακισχιλίων, καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τῶν μὲν ὁπλιτῶν περί τε τὴν Νίσαιαν ὄντων καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἐν τάξει, τῶν δὲ ψιλῶν ἀνὰ τὸ πεδίον ἐσκεδασμένων, οἱ ἱππῆς οἱ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἐπιπεσόντες τοῖς ψιλοῖς ἔτρεψαν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρὸ τοῦ οὐδεμία βοήθειά πω τοῖς Μεγαρεῦσιν οὐδαμόθεν ἐπῆλθεν : [3] ἀντεπεξελάσαντες δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐς χεῖρας ᾖσαν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἱππομαχία ἐπὶ πολύ, ἐν ᾗ ἀξιοῦσιν ἑκάτεροι οὐχ ἥσσους γενέσθαι. [4] τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἵππαρχον τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς οὐ πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν Νίσαιαν προσελάσαντας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι [καὶ] ἀποκτείναντες ἐσκύλευσαν, καὶ τῶν τε νεκρῶν τούτων κρατήσαντες ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησαν: οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παντὶ ἔργῳ βεβαίως οὐδέτεροι τελευτήσαντες ἀπεκρίθησαν, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν.

73. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Βρασίδας καὶ τὸ στράτευμα ἐχώρουν ἐγγυτέρω τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως, καὶ καταλαβόντες χωρίον ἐπιτήδειον παραταξάμενοι ἡσύχαζον, οἰόμενοι σφίσιν ἐπιέναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Μεγαρέας ἐπιστάμενοι περιορωμένους ὁποτέρων ἡ νίκη ἔσται. [2] καλῶς δὲ ἐνόμιζον σφίσιν ἀμφότερα ἔχειν, ἅμα μὲν τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν προτέρους μηδὲ μάχης καὶ κινδύνου ἐκόντας ἄρξαι, ἐπειδή γε ἐν φανερῷ ἔδειξαν ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἀκονιτὶ τὴν νίκην δικαίως ἂν τίθεσθαι, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρέας ὀρθῶς ξυμβαίνειν: [3] εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὤφθησαν ἐλθόντες, οὐκ ἂν ἐν

τύχῃ γίγνεσθαι σφίσιν, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἂν ὥσπερ ἡσσηθέντων στερηθῆναι εὐθὺς τῆς πόλεως: νῦν δὲ κἂν τυχεῖν αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ βουληθέντας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ὥστε ἀμαχητὶ ἂν περιγενέσθαι αὐτοῖς ὧν ἕνεκα ἦλθον. ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο. [4] οἱ γὰρ Μεγαρῆς, ὡς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐτάξαντο μὲν παρὰ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἐξελθόντες, ἡσύχαζον δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἐπιόντων, λογιζόμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐκείνων στρατηγοὶ μὴ ἀντίπαλον εἶναι σφίσι τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πλείω αὐτοῖς προυκεχωρήκει, ἄρξασι μάχης πρὸς πλέονας αὐτῶν ἢ λαβεῖν νικήσαντας Μέγαρα ἢ σφαλέντας τῷ βελτίστῳ τοῦ ὁπλιτικοῦ βλαφθῆναι, τοῖς δὲ ξυμπάσης τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν παρόντων μέρος ἕκαστον κινδυνεύειν εἰκότως ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν, χρόνον δὲ ἐπισχόντες καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων ἐπεχειρεῖτο, ἀπῆλθον πρότερον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Νίσαιαν καὶ αὖθις οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ὅθενπερ ὡρμήθησαν. οὕτω δὴ τῷ μὲν Βρασίδᾳ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ἄρχουσιν οἱ τῶν φευγόντων φίλοι Μεγαρῆς, ὡς ἐπικρατήσαντι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐκέτι ἐθεληθέντων μάχεσθαι, θαρσοῦντες μᾶλλον ἀνοίγουσί τε τὰς πύλας καὶ δεξάμενοι καταπεπληγμένων ἤδη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πραξάντων ἐς λόγους ἔρχονται.

74. καὶ ὕστερον ὁ μὲν διαλυθέντων τῶν ξυμμάχων κατὰ πόλεις ἐπανελθὼν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον τὴν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης στρατείαν παρεσκεύαζεν, ἵναπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὥρμητο: [2] οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει Μεγαρῆς, ἀποχωρησάντων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μάλιστα μετέσχον, εἰδότες ὅτι ὤφθησαν εὐθὺς ὑπεξῆλθον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι κοινολογησάμενοι τοῖς τῶν φευγόντων φίλοις κατάγουσι τοὺς ἐκ Πηγῶν, ὁρκώσαντες πίστεσι μεγάλαις μηδὲν μνησικακήσειν, βουλεύσειν δὲ τῇ πόλει τὰ ἄριστα. [3] οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγένοντο καὶ ἐξέτασιν ὅπλων ἐποιήσαντο, διαστήσαντες τοὺς λόχους ἐξελέξαντο τῶν τε ἐχθρῶν καὶ οἳ ἐδόκουν μάλιστα ξυμπρᾶξαι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἄνδρας ὡς ἑκατόν, καὶ τούτων πέρι ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον ψῆφον φανερὰν διενεγκεῖν, ὡς κατεγνώσθησαν, ἔκτειναν, καὶ ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν

τὰ μάλιστα κατέστησαν τὴν πόλιν. [4] καὶ πλεῖστον δὴ χρόνον αὕτη ὑπ᾽ ἐλαχίστων γενομένη ἐκ στάσεως μετάστασις ξυνέμεινεν.

75. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους τῆς Ἀντάνδρου ὑπὸ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὥσπερ διενοοῦντο, μελλούσης κατασκευάζεσθαι, οἱ τῶν ἀργυρολόγων νεῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ Δημόδοκος καὶ Ἀριστείδης, ὄντες περὶ Ἑλλήσποντον [ὁ γὰρ τρίτος αὐτῶν Λάμαχος δέκα ναυσὶν ἐς τὸν Πόντον ἐσεπεπλεύκει] ὡς ᾐσθάνοντο τὴν παρασκευὴν τοῦ χωρίου καὶ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς δεινὸν εἶναι μὴ ὥσπερ τὰ Ἄναια ἐπὶ τῇ Σάμῳ γένηται, ἔνθα οἱ φεύγοντες τῶν Σαμίων καταστάντες τούς τε Πελοποννησίους ὠφέλουν ἐς τὰ ναυτικὰ κυβερνήτας πέμποντες καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει Σαμίους ἐς ταραχὴν καθίστασαν καὶ τοὺς ἐξιόντας ἐδέχοντο: οὕτω δὴ ξυναγείραντες ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων στρατιὰν καὶ πλεύσαντες, μάχῃ τε νικήσαντες τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἀντάνδρου ἐπεξελθόντας, ἀναλαμβάνουσι τὸ χωρίον πάλιν. [2] καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἐς τὸν Πόντον ἐσπλεύσας Λάμαχος, ἐν τῇ Ἡρακλεώτιδι ὁρμίσας ἐς τὸν Κάλητα ποταμὸν ἀπόλλυσι τὰς ναῦς ὕδατος ἄνωθεν γενομένου καὶ κατελθόντος αἰφνιδίου τοῦ ῥεύματος: αὐτὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ πεζῇ διὰ Βιθυνῶν Θρᾳκῶν, οἵ εἰσι πέραν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ, ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Καλχηδόνα τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Πόντου Μεγαρέων ἀποικίαν.

76. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει καὶ Δημοσθένης Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ναύπακτον, εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Μεγαρίδος ἀναχώρησιν. [2] τῷ γὰρ Ἱπποκράτει καὶ ἐκείνῳ τὰ Βοιώτια πράγματα ἀπό τινων ἀνδρῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐπράσσετο, βουλομένων μεταστῆσαι τὸν κόσμον καὶ ἐς δημοκρατίαν ὥσπερ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τρέψαι: καὶ Πτοιοδώρου μάλιστ᾽ ἀνδρὸς φυγάδος ἐκ Θηβῶν ἐσηγουμένου τάδε αὐτοῖς παρεσκευάσθη. [3] Σίφας μὲν ἔμελλόν τινες προδώσειν [αἱ δὲ Σῖφαί εἰσι τῆς Θεσπικῆς γῆς ἐν τῷ Κρισαίῳ κόλπῳ ἐπιθαλασσίδιοι]: Χαιρώνειαν δέ, ἢ ἐς Ὀρχομενὸν τὸν Μινύειον πρότερον καλούμενον, νῦν δὲ Βοιώτιον, ξυντελεῖ, ἄλλοι ἐξ Ὀρχομενοῦ ἐνεδίδοσαν, καὶ οἱ

Ὀρχομενίων φυγάδες ξυνέπρασσον τὰ μάλιστα καὶ ἄνδρας ἐμισθοῦντο ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ⟦ἔστι δὲ ἡ Χαιρώνεια ἔσχατον τῆς Βοιωτίας πρὸς τῇ Φανοτίδι τῆς Φωκίδος⟧, καὶ Φωκέων μετεῖχόν τινες. [4] τοὺς δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἔδει Δήλιον καταλαβεῖν τὸ ἐν τῇ Ταναγραίᾳ πρὸς Εὔβοιαν τετραμμένον Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερόν, ἅμα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ γίγνεσθαι, ὅπως μὴ ξυμβοηθήσωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον οἱ Βοιωτοὶ ἀθρόοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι κινούμενα. [5] καὶ εἰ κατορθοῖτο ἡ πεῖρα καὶ τὸ Δήλιον τειχισθείη, ῥᾳδίως ἤλπιζον, εἰ καὶ μὴ παραυτίκα νεωτερίζοιτό τι τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς, ἐχομένων τούτων τῶν χωρίων καὶ λῃστευομένης τῆς γῆς καὶ οὔσης ἑκάστοις διὰ βραχέος ἀποστροφῆς, οὐ μενεῖν κατὰ χώραν τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μὲν προσιόντων τοῖς ἀφεστηκόσι, τοῖς δὲ οὐκ οὔσης ἀθρόας τῆς δυνάμεως, καταστήσειν αὐτὰ ἐς τὸ ἐπιτήδειον.

77. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιβουλὴ τοιαύτη παρεσκευάζετο, ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν ἔχων, ὁπότε καιρὸς εἴη, ἔμελλε στρατεύειν ἐς τοὺς Βοιωτούς, τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη προαπέστειλε ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον, ὅπως ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν χωρίων στρατὸν ξυλλέξας Ἀκαρνάνων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων πλέοι ἐπὶ τὰς Σίφας ὡς προδοθησομένας: ἡμέρα δ᾽ αὐτοῖς εἴρητο ᾗ ἔδει ἅμα ταῦτα πράσσειν. [2] καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης ἀφικόμενος, Οἰνιάδας δὲ ὑπό τε Ἀκαρνάνων πάντων κατηναγκασμένους καταλαβὼν ἐς τὴν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναστήσας τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν τὸ ἐκείνῃ πᾶν, ἐπὶ Σαλύνθιον καὶ Ἀγραίους στρατεύσας πρῶτον καὶ προσποιησάμενος τἆλλα ἡτοιμάζετο ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς Σίφας, ὅταν δέῃ, ἀπαντησόμενος.

78. Βρασίδας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦ θέρους πορευόμενος ἑπτακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἐπειδὴ ἐγένετο ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ τῇ ἐν Τραχῖνι καί, προπέμψαντος αὐτοῦ ἄγγελον ἐς Φάρσαλον παρὰ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους, ἀξιοῦντος διάγειν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν στρατιάν, ἦλθον ἐς Μελίτειαν τῆς Ἀχαΐας Πάναιρός τε καὶ Δῶρος καὶ

Ἱπολοχίδας καὶ Τορύλαος καὶ Στρόφακος πρόξενος ὢν Χαλκιδέων, τότε δὴ ἐπορεύετο. [2] ἦγον δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Θεσσαλῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκ Λαρίσης Νικονίδας Περδίκκᾳ ἐπιτήδειος ὤν. τὴν γὰρ Θεσσαλίαν ἄλλως τε οὐκ εὔπορον ἦν διιέναι ἄνευ ἀγωγοῦ καὶ μετὰ ὅπλων γε δή, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσί γε ὁμοίως Ἕλλησιν ὕποπτον καθειστήκει τὴν τῶν πέλας μὴ πείσαντας διιέναι: τοῖς τε Ἀθηναίοις αἰεί ποτε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εὔνουν ὑπῆρχεν. [3] ὥστε εἰ μὴ δυναστείᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἰσονομίᾳ ἐχρῶντο τὸ ἐγχώριον οἱ Θεσσαλοί, οὐκ ἄν ποτε προῆλθεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τότε πορευομένῳ αὐτῷ ἀπαντήσαντες ἄλλοι τῶν τἀναντία τούτοις βουλομένων ἐπὶ τῷ Ἐνιπεῖ ποταμῷ ἐκώλυον καὶ ἀδικεῖν ἔφασαν ἄνευ τοῦ πάντων κοινοῦ πορευόμενον. [4] οἱ δὲ ἄγοντες οὔτε ἀκόντων ἔφασαν διάξειν, αἰφνίδιόν τε παραγενόμενον ξένοι ὄντες κομίζειν. ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Βρασίδας τῇ Θεσσαλῶν γῇ καὶ αὐτοῖς φίλος ὢν ἰέναι καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πολεμίοις οὖσι καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνοις ὅπλα ἐπιφέρειν, Θεσσαλοῖς τε οὐκ εἰδέναι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔχθραν οὖσαν ὥστε τῇ ἀλλήλων γῇ μὴ χρῆσθαι, νῦν τε ἀκόντων ἐκείνων οὐκ ἂν προελθεῖν [οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι], οὐ μέντοι ἀξιοῦν γε εἴργεσθαι. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα ἀπῆλθον, ὁ δὲ κελευόντων τῶν ἀγωγῶν, πρίν τι πλέον ξυστῆναι τὸ κωλῦσον, ἐχώρει οὐδὲν ἐπισχὼν δρόμῳ. καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ᾗ ἐκ τῆς Μελιτείας ἀφώρμησεν, ἐς Φάρσαλόν τε ἐτέλεσε καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀπιδανῷ ποταμῷ, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐς Φάκιον, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐς Περραιβίαν. [6] ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου ἤδη οἱ μὲν τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ἀγωγοὶ πάλιν ἀπῆλθον, οἱ δὲ Περραιβοὶ αὐτόν, ὑπήκοοι ὄντες Θεσσαλῶν, κατέστησαν ἐς Δῖον τῆς Περδίκκου ἀρχῆς, ὃ ὑπὸ τῷ Ὀλύμπῳ Μακεδονίας πρὸς Θεσσαλοὺς πόλισμα κεῖται.

79. τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ Βρασίδας Θεσσαλίαν φθάσας διέδραμε πρίν τινα κωλύειν παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ ἀφίκετο ὡς Περδίκκαν καὶ ἐς τὴν Χαλκιδικήν. [2] ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ὡς τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ηὐτύχει, δείσαντες οἵ τε ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἀφεστῶτες Ἀθηναίων καὶ Περδίκκας ἐξήγαγον τὸν στρατόν, οἱ μὲν Χαλκιδῆς νομίζοντες ἐπὶ

σφᾶς πρῶτον ὁρμήσειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἅμα αἱ πλησιόχωροι πόλεις αὐτῶν αἱ οὐκ ἀφεστηκυῖαι ξυνεπῆγον κρύφα, Περδίκκας δὲ πολέμιος μὲν οὐκ ὢν ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ, φοβούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ παλαιὰ διάφορα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ μάλιστα βουλόμενος Ἀρραβαῖον τὸν Λυγκηστῶν βασιλέα παραστήσασθαι. [3]ξυνέβη δὲ αὐτοῖς, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στρατὸν ἐξαγαγεῖν, ἡ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κακοπραγία.

80. τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ἐγκειμένων τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τῇ ἐκείνων γῇ ἤλπιζον ἀποτρέψειν αὐτοὺς μάλιστα, εἰ ἀντιπαραλυποῖεν πέμψαντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους αὐτῶν στρατιάν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων τρέφειν τε καὶ ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει σφᾶς ἐπικαλουμένων. [2] καὶ ἅμα τῶν Εἱλώτων βουλομένοις ἦν ἐπὶ προφάσει ἐκπέμψαι, μή τι πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τῆς Πύλου ἐχομένης νεωτερίσωσιν: [3] ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε ἔπραξαν φοβούμενοι αὐτῶν τὴν σκαιότητα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αἰεὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις πρὸς τοὺς Εἵλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι μάλιστα καθειστήκει: προεῖπον αὐτῶν ὅσοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γεγενῆσθαι σφίσιν ἄριστοι,κρίνεσθαι, ὡς ἐλευθερώσοντες, πεῖραν ποιούμενοι καὶ ἡγούμενοι τούτους σφίσιν ὑπὸ φρονήματος, οἵπερ καὶ ἠξίωσαν πρῶτος ἕκαστος ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, μάλιστα ἂν καὶ ἐπιθέσθαι. [4] καὶ προκρίναντες ἐς δισχιλίους, οἱ μὲν ἐστεφανώσαντό τε καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον ὡς ἠλευθερωμένοι, οἱ δὲ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἠφάνισάν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἕκαστος διεφθάρη. [5] καὶ τότε προθύμως τῷ Βρασίδᾳ αὐτῶν ξυνέπεμψαν ἑπτακοσίους ὁπλίτας, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μισθῷ πείσας ἐξήγαγεν.

81. αὐτόν τε Βρασίδαν βουλόμενον μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπέστειλαν προυθυμήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς, ἄνδρα ἔν τε τῇ Σπάρτῃ δοκοῦντα δραστήριον εἶναι ἐς τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐξῆλθε πλείστου ἄξιον Λακεδαιμονίοις γενόμενον. [2] τό τε γὰρ παραυτίκα ἑαυτὸν παρασχὼν δίκαιον καὶ μέτριον ἐς τὰς πόλεις ἀπέστησε τὰ πολλά, τὰ δὲ προδοσίᾳ εἶλε τῶν χωρίων, ὥστε τοῖς

Λακεδαιμονίοις γίγνεσθαι ξυμβαίνειν τε βουλομένοις, ὅπερ ἐποίησαν, ἀνταπόδοσιν καὶ ἀποδοχὴν χωρίων καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου λώφησιν: ἔς τε τὸν χρόνῳ ὕστερον μετὰ τὰ ἐκ Σικελίας πόλεμον ἡ τότε Βρασίδου ἀρετὴ καὶ ξύνεσις, τῶν μὲν πείρᾳ αἰσθομένων, τῶν δὲ ἀκοῇ νομισάντων, μάλιστα ἐπιθυμίαν ἐνεποίει τοῖς Ἀθηναίων ξυμμάχοις ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. [3] πρῶτος γὰρ ἐξελθὼν καὶ δόξας εἶναι κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθὸς ἐλπίδα ἐγκατέλιπε βέβαιον ὡς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν.

82. τότε δ᾽ οὖν ἀφικομένου αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πυθόμενοι τόν τε Περδίκκαν πολέμιον ποιοῦνται, νομίσαντες αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς παρόδου, καὶ τῶν ταύτῃ ξυμμάχων φυλακὴν πλέονα κατεστήσαντο.

83. Περδίκκας δὲ Βρασίδαν καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν εὐθὺς λαβὼν μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως στρατεύει ἐπὶ Ἀρραβαῖον τὸν Βρομεροῦ Λυγκηστῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλέα ὅμορον ὄντα, διαφορᾶς τε αὐτῷ οὔσης καὶ βουλόμενος καταστρέψασθαι. [2] ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο τῷ στρατῷ μετὰ τοῦ Βρασίδου ἐπὶ τῇ ἐσβολῇ τῆς Λύγκου, Βρασίδας λόγοις ἔφη βούλεσθαι πρῶτον ἐλθὼν πρὸ πολέμου Ἀρραβαῖον ξύμμαχον Λακεδαιμονίων, ἢν δύνηται, ποιῆσαι. [3] καὶ γάρ τι καὶ Ἀρραβαῖος ἐπεκηρυκεύετο, ἑτοῖμος ὢν Βρασίδᾳ μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν: καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδέων πρέσβεις ξυμπαρόντες ἐδίδασκον αὐτὸν μὴ ὑπεξελεῖν τῷ Περδίκκᾳ τὰ δεινά, ἵνα προθυμοτέρῳ ἔχοιεν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἑαυτῶν χρῆσθαι. [4] ἅμα δέ τι καὶ εἰρήκεσαν τοιοῦτον οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Περδίκκου ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι, ὡς πολλὰ αὐτοῖς τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν χωρίων ξύμμαχα ποιήσοι, ὥστε ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου κοινῇ μᾶλλον ὁ Βρασίδας τὰ τοῦ Ἀρραβαίου ἠξίου πράσσειν. [5] Περδίκκας δὲ οὔτε δικαστὴν ἔφη Βρασίδαν τῶν σφετέρων διαφορῶν ἀγαγεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ καθαιρέτην ὧν ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποφαίνῃ πολεμίων, ἀδικήσειν τε εἰ αὐτοῦ τρέφοντος τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ στρατοῦ ξυνέσται Ἀρραβαίῳ. [6] ὁ δὲ ἄκοντος καὶ ἐκ διαφορᾶς ξυγγίγνεται, καὶ πεισθεὶς τοῖς λόγοις ἀπήγαγε τὴν στρατιὰν πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν χώραν. Περδίκκας δὲ μετὰ

τοῦτο τρίτον μέρος ἀνθ᾽ ἡμίσεος τῆς τροφῆς ἐδίδου, νομίζων ἀδικεῖσθαι.

84. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει εὐθὺς ὁ Βρασίδας ἔχων καὶ Χαλκιδέας ἐπὶ Ἄκανθον τὴν Ἀνδρίων ἀποικίαν ὀλίγον πρὸ τρυγήτου ἐστράτευσεν. [2] οἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ δέχεσθαι αὐτὸν κατ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐστασίαζον, οἵ τε μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδέων ξυνεπάγοντες καὶ ὁ δῆμος. ὅμως δὲ διὰ τοῦ καρποῦ τὸ δέος ἔτι ἔξω ὄντος πεισθὲν τὸ πλῆθος ὑπὸ τοῦ Βρασίδου δέξασθαί τε αὐτὸν μόνον καὶ ἀκούσαντας βουλεύσασθαι, δέχεται: καὶ καταστὰς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ᾗ ἦν δὲ οὐδὲ ἀδύνατος, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιος, εἰπεῖν ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

85. ‘ἡ μὲν ἔκπεμψίς μου καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὦ Ἀκάνθιοι, γεγένηται τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπαληθεύουσα ἣν ἀρχόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου προείπομεν, Ἀθηναίοις ἐλευθεροῦντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα πολεμήσειν: [2] εἰ δὲ χρόνῳ ἐπήλθομεν, σφαλέντες τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκεῖ πολέμου δόξης, ᾗ διὰ τάχους αὐτοὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὑμετέρου κινδύνου ἠλπίσαμεν Ἀθηναίους καθαιρήσειν, μηδεὶς μεμφθῇ: νῦν γάρ, ὅτε παρέσχεν, ἀφιγμένοι καὶ μετὰ ὑμῶν πειρασόμεθα κατεργάζεσθαι αὐτούς. [3] θαυμάζω δὲ τῇ τε ἀποκλήσει μου τῶν πυλῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀσμένοις ὑμῖν ἀφῖγμαι. [4] ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οἰόμενοί τε παρὰ ξυμμάχους, καὶ πρὶν ἔργῳ ἀφικέσθαι, τῇ γοῦν γνώμῃ ἥξειν καὶ βουλομένοις ἔσεσθαι, κίνδυνόν [τε] τοσόνδε ἀνερρίψαμεν διὰ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν ἰόντες καὶ πᾶν τὸ πρόθυμον παρεχόμενοι: [5] ὑμεῖς δὲ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐν νῷ ἔχετε ἢ εἰ ἐναντιώσεσθε τῇ τε ὑμετέρᾳ αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, δεινὸν ἂν εἴη. [6] καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἀνθίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐπίω, ἧσσόν τις ἐμοὶ πρόσεισι, δυσχερὲς ποιούμενοι εἰ ἐπὶ οὓς πρῶτον ἦλθον ὑμᾶς, καὶ πόλιν ἀξιόχρεων παρεχομένους καὶ ξύνεσιν δοκοῦντας ἔχειν, μὴ ἐδέξασθε: καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐχ ἕξω πιστὴν ἀποδεικνύναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἄδικον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐπιφέρειν ἢ ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀδύνατος τιμωρῆσαι τὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἢν ἐπίωσιν, ἀφῖχθαι. [7] καίτοι στρατιᾷ γε τῇδ᾽ ἣν νῦν [ἐγὼ] ἔχω ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν ἐμοῦ βοηθήσαντος οὐκ ἠθέλησαν Ἀθηναῖοι

πλέονες ὄντες προσμεῖξαι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς νηίτῃ γε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἐν Νισαίᾳ στρατῷ ἴσον πλῆθος ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀποστεῖλαι.

86. αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερώσει δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα, ὅρκοις τε Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη τοῖς μεγίστοις ἦ μὴν οὓς ἂν ἔγωγε προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους ἔσεσθαι αὐτονόμους, καὶ ἅμα οὐχ ἵνα ξυμμάχους ὑμᾶς ἔχωμεν ἢ βίᾳ ἢ ἀπάτῃ προσλαβόντες, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ὑμῖν δεδουλωμένοις ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχήσοντες. [2] οὔκουν ἀξιῶ οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύεσθαι, πίστεις γε διδοὺς τὰς μεγίστας, οὐδὲ τιμωρὸς ἀδύνατος νομισθῆναι, προσχωρεῖν τε ὑμᾶς θαρσήσαντας. [3] καὶ εἴ τις ἰδίᾳ τινὰ δεδιὼς ἄρα, μὴ ἐγώ τισι προσθῶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀπρόθυμός ἐστι, πάντων μάλιστα πιστευσάτω. [4] οὐ γὰρ ξυστασιάσων ἥκω, οὐδὲ ἂν σαφῆ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, εἰ τὸ πάτριον παρεὶς τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς πᾶσι δουλώσαιμι. [5] χαλεπωτέρα γὰρ ἂν τῆς ἀλλοφύλου ἀρχῆς εἴη, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐκ ἂν ἀντὶ πόνων χάρις καθίσταιτο, ἀντὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης αἰτία μᾶλλον: οἷς τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήμασι καταπολεμοῦμεν, αὐτοὶ ἂν φαινοίμεθα ἐχθίονα ἢ ὁ μὴ ὑποδείξας ἀρετὴν κατακτώμενοι. [6] ἀπάτῃ γὰρ εὐπρεπεῖ αἴσχιον τοῖς γε ἐν ἀξιώματι πλεονεκτῆσαι ἢ βίᾳ ἐμφανεῖ: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἰσχύος δικαιώσει, ἣν ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν, ἐπέρχεται, τὸ δὲ γνώμης ἀδίκου ἐπιβουλῇ.

87. οὕτω πολλὴν περιωπὴν τῶν ἡμῖν ἐς τὰ μέγιστα διαφόρων ποιούμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείζω πρὸς τοῖς ὅρκοις βεβαίωσιν λάβοιτε ἢ οἷς τὰ ἔργα ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἀναθρούμενα δόκησιν ἀναγκαίαν παρέχεται ὡς καὶ ξυμφέρει ὁμοίως ὡς εἶπον. [2] εἰ δ᾽ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα προϊσχομένου ἀδύνατοι μὲν φήσετε εἶναι, εὖνοι δ᾽ ὄντες ἀξιώσετε μὴ κακούμενοι διωθεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν μὴ ἀκίνδυνον ὑμῖν φαίνεσθαι, δίκαιόν τε εἶναι, οἷς καὶ δυνατὸν δέχεσθαι αὐτήν, τούτοις καὶ ἐπιφέρειν, ἄκοντα δὲ μηδένα προσαναγκάζειν, μάρτυρας μὲν θεοὺς καὶ ἥρως τοὺς ἐγχωρίους ποιήσομαι ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ ἥκων οὐ πείθω, γῆν δὲ τὴν ὑμετέραν δῃῶν πειράσομαι βιάζεσθαι, [3] καὶ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν

ἔτι νομιῶ, προσεῖναι δέ τί μοι καὶ κατὰ δύο ἀνάγκας τὸ εὔλογον, τῶν μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅπως μὴ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ εὔνῳ, εἰ μὴ προσαχθήσεσθε, τοῖς ἀπὸ ὑμῶν χρήμασι φερομένοις παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους βλάπτωνται, οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες ἵνα μὴ κωλύωνται ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν δουλείας ἀπαλλαγῆναι. [4] οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἰκότως γ᾽ ἂν τάδε πράσσοιμεν, οὐδὲ ὀφείλομεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὴ κοινοῦ τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίᾳ τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν: [5] οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἀρχῆς ἐφιέμεθα, παῦσαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑτέρους σπεύδοντες τοὺς πλείους ἂν ἀδικοῖμεν, εἰ ξύμπασιν αὐτονομίαν ἐπιφέροντες ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους περιίδοιμεν. [6] πρὸς ταῦτα βουλεύεσθε εὖ, καὶ ἀγωνίσασθε τοῖς τε Ἕλλησιν ἄρξαι πρῶτοι ἐλευθερίας καὶ ἀίδιον δόξαν καταθέσθαι, καὶ αὐτοὶ τά τε ἴδια μὴ βλαφθῆναι καὶ ξυμπάσῃ τῇ πόλει τὸ κάλλιστον ὄνομα περιθεῖναι.’

88. ὁ μὲν Βρασίδας τοσαῦτα εἶπεν. οἱ δὲ Ἀκάνθιοι,πολλῶν λεχθέντων πρότερον ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα, κρύφα διαψηφισάμενοι, διά τε τὸ ἐπαγωγὰ εἰπεῖν τὸν Βρασίδαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ καρποῦ φόβῳ ἔγνωσαν οἱ πλείους ἀφίστασθαι Ἀθηναίων, καὶ πιστώσαντες αὐτὸν τοῖς ὅρκοις οὓς τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὀμόσαντα αὐτὸν ἐξέπεμψαν, ἢ μὴν ἕσεσθαι ξυμμάχους αὐτονόμους οὓς ἂν προσαγάγηται, οὕτω δέχονται τὸν στρατόν. [2] καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον καὶ Στάγιρος Ἀνδρίων ἀποικία ξυναπέστη. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ ἐγένετο.

89. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου, ὡς τῷ Ἱπποκράτει καὶ Δημοσθένει στρατηγοῖς οὖσιν Ἀθηναίων τὰ ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς ἐνεδίδοτο καὶ ἔδει τὸν μὲν Δημοσθένη ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς τὰς Σίφας ἀπαντῆσαι, τὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον, γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐς ἃς ἔδει ἀμφοτέρους στρατεύειν, ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης πρότερον πλεύσας πρὸς τὰς Σίφας καὶ ἔχων ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ πολλοὺς ξυμμάχων, ἄπρακτος γίγνεται μηνυθέντος τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύματος ὑπὸ Νικομάχου ἀνδρὸς Φωκέως ἐκ Φανοτέως, ὃς Λακεδαιμονίοις εἶπεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ Βοιωτοῖς: [2] καὶ βοηθείας γενομένης πάντων Βοιωτῶν οὐ γάρ πω

Ἱπποκράτης παρελύπει ἐν τῇ γῇ ὧν προκαταλαμβάνονται αἵ τε Σῖφαι καὶ ἡ Χαιρώνεια. ὡς δὲ ᾔσθοντο οἱ πράσσοντες τὸ ἁμάρτημα, οὐδὲν ἐκίνησαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

90. ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης ἀναστήσας Ἀθηναίους πανδημεί, αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ ξένων ὅσοι παρῆσαν ὕστερος ἀφικνεῖται ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον, ἤδη τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀνακεχωρηκότων ἀπὸ τῶν Σιφῶν: καὶ καθίσας τὸν στρατὸν Δήλιον ἐτείχιζε τοιῷδε τρόπῳ [τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος]. [2] τάφρον μὲν κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν νεὼν ἔσκαπτον, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὀρύγματος ἀνέβαλλον ἀντὶ τείχους τὸν χοῦν, καὶ σταυροὺς παρακαταπηγνύντες, ἄμπελον κόπτοντες τὴν περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ἐσέβαλλον καὶ λίθους ἅμα καὶ πλίνθον ἐκ τῶν οἰκοπέδων τῶν ἐγγὺς καθαιροῦντες, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐμετεώριζον τὸ ἔρυμα. πύργους τε ξυλίνους κατέστησαν ᾗ καιρὸς ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ οἰκοδόμημα οὐδὲν ὑπῆρχεν: ἥπερ γὰρ ἦν στοὰ κατεπεπτώκει. [3] ἡμέρᾳ δὲ ἀρξάμενοι τρίτῃ ὡς οἴκοθεν ὥρμησαν ταύτην τε εἰργάζοντο καὶ τὴν τετάρτην καὶ τῆς πέμπτης μέχρι ἀρίστου. [4] ἔπειτα, ὡς τὰ πλεῖστα ἀπετετέλεστο, τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον προαπεχώρησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Δηλίου οἷον δέκα σταδίους ὡς ἐπ᾽ οἴκου πορευόμενον, καὶ οἱ μὲν ψιλοὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν, οἱ δ᾽ ὁπλῖται θέμενοι τὰ ὅπλα ἡσύχαζον: Ἱπποκράτης δὲ ὑπομένων ἔτι καθίστατο φυλακάς τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ προτείχισμα, ὅσα ἦν ὑπόλοιπα, ὡς χρῆν ἐπιτελέσαι.

91. οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ταύταις ξυνελέγοντο ἐς τὴν Τάναγραν: καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων παρῆσαν καὶ ᾔσθάνοντο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους προχωροῦντας ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, τῶν ἄλλων βοιωταρχῶν, οἵ εἰσιν ἕνδεκα, οὐ ξυνεπαινούντων μάχεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ ἔτι εἰσί μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Ὠρωπίας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν, ὅτε ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα, Παγώνδας ὁ Αἰολάδου βοιωταρχῶν ἐκ Θηβῶν μετ᾽ Ἀριανθίδου τοῦ Λυσιμαχίδου καὶ ἡγεμονίας οὔσης αὐτοῦ βουλόμενος τὴν μάχην ποιῆσαι καὶ νομίζων ἄμεινον εἶναι κινδυνεῦσαι, προσκαλῶν ἑκάστους κατὰ λόχους, ὅπως μὴ ἀθρόοι ἐκλίποιεν τὰ ὅπλα, ἔπειθε τοὺς

Βοιωτοὺς ἰέναι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῖσθαι, λέγων τοιάδε.

92. ‘χρῆν μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Βοιωτοί, μηδ᾽ ἐς ἐπίνοιάν τινα ἡμῶν ἐλθεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίοις, ἢν ἄρα μὴ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ ἔτι καταλάβωμεν αὐτούς, διὰ μάχης ἐλθεῖν. τὴν γὰρ Βοιωτίαν ἐκ τῆς ὁμόρου ἐλθόντες τεῖχος ἐνοικοδομησάμενοι μέλλουσι φθείρειν, καὶ εἰσὶ δήπου πολέμιοι ἐν ᾧ τε ἂν χωρίῳ καταληφθῶσι καὶ ὅθεν ἐπελθόντες πολέμια ἔδρασαν. [2] νυνὶ δ᾽ εἴ τῳ καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ἔδοξεν εἶναι, μεταγνώτω. οὐ γὰρ τὸ προμηθές, οἷς ἂν ἄλλος ἐπίῃ, περὶ τῆς σφετέρας ὁμοίως ἐνδέχεται λογισμὸν καὶ ὅστις τὰ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει, τοῦ πλέονος δὲ ὀρεγόμενος ἑκών τινι ἐπέρχεται. [3] πάτριόν τε ὑμῖν στρατὸν ἀλλόφυλον ἐπελθόντα καὶ ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πέλας ὁμοίως ἀμύνεσθαι. Ἀθηναίους δὲ καὶ προσέτι ὁμόρους ὄντας πολλῷ μάλιστα δεῖ. [4] πρός τε γὰρ τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας πᾶσι τὸ ἀντίπαλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καθίσταται, καὶ πρὸς τούτους γε δή, οἳ καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐγγύς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄπωθεν πειρῶνται δουλοῦσθαι, πῶς οὐ χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀγῶνος ἐλθεῖν παράδειγμα δὲ ἔχομεν τούς τε ἀντιπέρας Εὐβοέας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος τὸ πολὺ ὡς αὐτοῖς διάκειται , καὶ γνῶναι ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις οἱ πλησιόχωροι περὶ γῆς ὅρων τὰς μάχας ποιοῦνται, ἡμῖν δὲ ἐς πᾶσαν, ἢν νικηθῶμεν, εἷς ὅρος οὐκ ἀντίλεκτος παγήσεται; [5] ἐσελθόντες γὰρ βίᾳ τὰ ἡμέτερα ἕξουσιν. τοσούτῳ ἐπικινδυνοτέραν ἑτέρων τὴν παροίκησιν τῶνδε ἔχομεν. εἰώθασί τε οἱ ἰσχύος που θράσει τοῖς πέλας, ὥσπερ Ἀθηναῖοι νῦν, ἐπιόντες τὸν μὲν ἡσυχάζοντα καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον ἀμυνόμενον ἀδεέστερον ἐπιστρατεύειν, τὸν δὲ ἔξω ὅρων προαπαντῶντα καί, ἢν καιρὸς ᾖ, πολέμου ἄρχοντα ἧσσον ἑτοίμως κατέχειν. [6] πεῖραν δὲ ἔχομεν ἡμεῖς αὐτοῦ ἐς τούσδε: νικήσαντες γὰρ ἐν Κορωνείᾳ αὐτούς, ὅτε τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν στασιαζόντων κατέσχον, πολλὴν ἄδειαν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ μέχρι τοῦδε κατεστήσαμεν. [7] ὧν χρὴ μνησθέντας ἡμᾶς τούς τε πρεσβυτέρους ὁμοιωθῆναι τοῖς πρὶν ἔργοις, τούς τε νεωτέρους πατέρων τῶν τότε ἀγαθῶν γενομένων

παῖδας πειρᾶσθαι μὴ αἰσχῦναι τὰς προσηκούσας ἀρετάς, πιστεύσαντας δὲ τῷ θεῷ πρὸς ἡμῶν ἔσεσθαι, οὗ τὸ ἱερὸν ἀνόμως τειχίσαντες νέμονται, καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἃ ἡμῖν θυσαμένοις καλὰ φαίνεται, ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοῖσδε καὶ δεῖξαι ὅτι ὧν μὲν ἐφίενται πρὸς τοὺς μὴ ἀμυνομένους ἐπιόντες κτάσθων, οἷς δὲ γενναῖον τήν τε αὐτῶν αἰεὶ ἐλευθεροῦν μάχῃ καὶ τὴν ἄλλων μὴ δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως, ἀνανταγώνιστοι ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀπίασιν.᾽

93. τοιαῦτα ὁ Παγώνδας τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς παραινέσας ἔπεισεν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. καὶ κατὰ τάχος ἀναστήσας ἦγε τὸν στρατόν ἤδη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ὀψὲ ἦν , καὶ ἐπειδὴ προσέμειξεν ἐγγὺς τοῦ στρατεύματος αὐτῶν, ἐς χωρίον καθίσας ὅθεν λόφου ὄντος μεταξὺ οὐκ ἐθεώρουν ἀλλήλους, ἔτασσέ τε καὶ παρεσκευάζετο ὡς ἐς μάχην. [2] τῷ δὲ Ἱπποκράτει ὄντι περὶ τὸ Δήλιον ὡς αὐτῷ ἠγγέλθη ὅτι Βοιωτοὶ ἐπέρχονται, πέμπει ἐς τὸ στράτευμα κελεύων ἐς τάξιν καθίστασθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐπῆλθε, καταλιπὼν ὡς τριακοσίους ἱππέας περὶ τὸ Δήλιον, ὅπως φύλακές τε ἅμα εἶεν, εἴ τις ἐπίοι αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς καιρὸν φυλάξαντες ἐπιγένοιντο ἐν τῇ μάχῃ. [3] Βοιωτοὶ δὲ πρὸς τούτους ἀντικατέστησαν τοὺς ἀμυνουμένους, καὶ ἐπειδὴ καλῶς αὐτοῖς εἶχεν, ὑπερεφάνησαν τοῦ λόφου καὶ ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ ἔμελλον, ὁπλῖται ἑπτακισχίλιοι μάλιστα καὶ ψιλοὶ ὑπὲρ μυρίους, ἱππῆς δὲ χίλιοι καὶ πελτασταὶ πεντακόσιοι. [4] εἶχον δὲ δεξιὸν μὲν κέρας Θηβαῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμοροι αὐτοῖς: μέσοι δὲ Ἁλιάρτιοι καὶ Κορωναῖοι καὶ Κωπαιῆς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ περὶ τὴν λίμνην: τὸ δὲ εὐώνυμον εἶχον Θεσπιῆς καὶ Ταναγραῖοι καὶ Ὀρχομένιοι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ κέρᾳ ἑκατέρῳ οἱ ἱππῆς καὶ ψιλοὶ ἦσαν. ἐπ᾽ ἀσπίδας δὲ πέντε μὲν καὶ εἴκοσι Θηβαῖοι ἐτάξαντο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον. [5] αὕτη μὲν Βοιωτῶν παρασκευὴ καὶ διάκοσμος ἦν:

94. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ οἱ μὲν ὁπλῖται ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ πᾶν τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐτάξαντο ὄντες πλήθει ἰσοπαλεῖς τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἱππῆς δὲ ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρῳ τῷ κέρᾳ. ψιλοὶ δὲ ἐκ παρασκευῆς μὲν ὡπλισμένοι οὔτε τότε παρῆσαν οὔτε

ἐγένοντο τῇ πόλει: οἵπερ δὲ ξυνεσέβαλον ὄντες πολλαπλάσιοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἄοπλοί τε πολλοὶ ἠκολούθησαν, ἅτε πανστρατιᾶς ξένων τῶν παρόντων καὶ ἀστῶν γενομένης, καὶ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὥρμησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, οὐ παρεγένοντο ὅτι μὴ ὀλίγοι. [2] καθεστώτων δὲ ἐς τὴν τάξιν καὶ ἤδη μελλόντων ξυνιέναι, Ἱπποκράτης ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπιπαριὼν τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεκελεύετό τε καὶ ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

95. ‘ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, δι᾽ ὀλίγου μὲν ἡ παραίνεσις γίγνεται, τὸ ἴσον δὲ πρός γε τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας δύναται καὶ ὑπόμνησιν μᾶλλον ἔχει ἢ ἐπικέλευσιν. [2] παραστῇ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑμῶν ὡς ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ οὐ προσῆκον τοσόνδε κίνδυνον ἀναρριπτοῦμεν. ἐν γὰρ τῇ τούτων ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται: καὶ ἢν νικήσωμεν, οὐ μή ποτε ὑμῖν Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς τὴν χώραν ἄνευ τῆς τῶνδε ἵππου ἐσβάλωσιν, ἐν δὲ μιᾷ μάχῃ τήνδε τε προσκτᾶσθε καὶ ἐκείνην μᾶλλον ἐλευθεροῦτε. [3] χωρήσατε οὖν ἀξίως ἐς αὐτοὺς τῆς τε πόλεως, ἣν ἕκαστος πατρίδα ἔχων πρώτην ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀγάλλεται, καὶ τῶν πατέρων, οἳ τούσδε μάχῃ κρατοῦντες μετὰ Μυρωνίδου ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις τὴν Βοιωτίαν ποτὲ ἔσχον.’

96. τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους παρακελευομένου καὶ μέχρι μὲν μέσου τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἐπελθόντος, τὸ δὲ πλέον οὐκέτι φθάσαντος, οἱ Βοιωτοί, παρακελευσαμένου καὶ σφίσιν ὡς διὰ ταχέων καὶ ἐνταῦθα Παγώνδου, παιανίσαντες ἐπῇσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου. ἀντεπῇσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ προσέμειξαν δρόμῳ. [2] καὶ ἑκατέρων τῶν στρατοπέδων τὰ ἔσχατα οὐκ ἦλθεν ἐς χεῖρας, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔπαθεν: ῥύακες γὰρ ἐκώλυσαν. τὸ δὲ ἄλλο καρτερᾷ μάχῃ καὶ ὠθισμῷ ἀσπίδων ξυνειστήκει. [3] καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ μέχρι μέσου ἡσσᾶτο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐπίεσαν τούς τε ἄλλους ταύτῃ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοὺς Θεσπιᾶς. ὑποχωρησάντων γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν παρατεταγμένων, καὶ κυκλωθέντων ἐν ὀλίγῳ, οἵπερ διεφθάρησαν Θεσπιῶν, ἐν χερσὶν ἀμυνόμενοι κατεκόπησαν: καί τινες καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τὴν κύκλωσιν ταραχθέντες ἠγνόησάν τε καὶ ἀπέκτειναν ἀλλήλους. [4] τὸ μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ ἡσσᾶτο τῶν

Βοιωτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μαχόμενον κατέφυγε, τὸ δὲ δεξιόν, ᾗ οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἦσαν, ἐκράτει τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ὡσάμενοι κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπηκολούθουν. [5] καὶ ξυνέβη, Παγώνδου περιπέμψαντος δύο τέλη τῶν ἱππέων ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς περὶ τὸν λόφον, ὡς ἐπόνει τὸ εὐώνυμον αὐτῶν, καὶ ὑπερφανέντων αἰφνιδίως, τὸ νικῶν τῶν Ἀθηναίων κέρας, νομίσαν ἄλλο στράτευμα ἐπιέναι, ἐς φόβον καταστῆναι: [6] καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἤδη, ὑπό τε τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων ἐφεπομένων καὶ παραρρηγνύντων, φυγὴ καθειστήκει παντὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. [7] καὶ οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὸ Δήλιόν τε καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ὥρμησαν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ, ἄλλοι δὲ πρὸς Πάρνηθα τὸ ὄρος, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοί τινα εἶχον ἐλπίδα σωτηρίας. [8] Βοιωτοὶ δὲ ἐφεπόμενοι ἔκτεινον, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἱππῆς οἵ τε αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ Λοκροὶ βεβοηθηκότες ἄρτι τῆς τροπῆς γιγνομένης: νυκτὸς δὲ ἐπιλαβούσης τὸ ἔργον ῥᾷον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν φευγόντων διεσώθη. [9] καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἵ τε ἐκ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Δηλίου φυλακὴν ἐγκαταλιπόντες εἶχον γὰρ αὐτὸ ὅμως ἔτι ἀπεκομίσθησαν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

97. καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀνελόμενοι νεκροὺς τούς τε τῶν πολεμίων σκυλεύσαντες καὶ φυλακὴν καταλιπόντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν Τάναγραν, καὶ τῷ Δηλίῳ ἐπεβούλευον ὡς προσβαλοῦντες. [2] ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κῆρυξ πορευόμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀπαντᾷ κήρυκι Βοιωτῷ, ὃς αὐτὸν ἀποστρέψας καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐδὲν πράξει πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸς ἀναχωρήσῃ πάλιν, καταστὰς ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τὰ παρὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν, ὅτι οὐ δικαίως δράσειαν παραβαίνοντες τὰ νόμιμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων: [3] πᾶσι γὰρ εἶναι καθεστηκὸς ἰόντας ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἱερῶν τῶν ἐνόντων ἀπέχεσθαι, Ἀθηναίους δὲ Δήλιον τειχίσαντας ἐνοικεῖν, καὶ ὅσα ἄνθρωποι ἐν βεβήλῳ δρῶσι πάντα γίγνεσθαι αὐτόθι, ὕδωρ τε ὃ ἦν ἄψαυστον σφίσι πλὴν πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ χέρνιβι χρῆσθαι, ἀνασπάσαντας ὑδρεύεσθαι: [4] ὥστε ὑπέρ τε τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἑαυτῶν Βοιωτούς, ἐπικαλουμένους τοὺς ὁμωχέτας δαίμονας καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, προαγορεύειν

αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀπιόντας ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν.

98. τοσαῦτα τοῦ κήρυκος εἰπόντος οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πέμψαντες παρὰ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἑαυτῶν κήρυκα τοῦ μὲν ἱεροῦ οὔτε ἀδικῆσαι ἔφασαν οὐδὲν οὔτε τοῦ λοιποῦ ἑκόντες βλάψειν: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐσελθεῖν ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μᾶλλον σφᾶς ἀμύνωνται. [2] τὸν δὲ νόμον τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἶναι, ὧν ἂν ᾖ τὸ κράτος τῆς γῆς ἑκάστης ἥν τε πλέονος ἥν τε βραχυτέρας, τούτων καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τρόποις θεραπευόμενα οἷς ἂν πρὸς τοῖς εἰωθόσι καὶ δύνωνται. [3] καὶ γὰρ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἐξαναστήσαντές τινα βίᾳ νέμονται γῆν, ἀλλοτρίοις ἱεροῖς τὸ πρῶτον ἐπελθόντας οἰκεῖα νῦν κεκτῆσθαι. [4] καὶ αὐτοί, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον δυνηθῆναι τῆς ἐκείνων κρατῆσαι, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν ἔχειν: νῦν δὲ ἐν ᾧ μέρει εἰσίν, ἑκόντες εἶναι ὡς ἐκ σφετέρου οὐκ ἀπιέναι. [5] ὕδωρ τε ἐν τῇ ἀνάγκῃ κινῆσαι, ἣν οὐκ αὐτοὶ ὕβρει προσθέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνους προτέρους ἐπὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἐλθόντας ἀμυνόμενοι βιάζεσθαι χρῆσθαι. [6] πᾶν δ᾽ εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸ πολέμῳ καὶ δεινῷ τινὶ κατειργόμενον ξύγγνωμόν τι γίγνεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ. καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς βωμούς, παρανομίαν τε ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀνάγκῃ κακοῖς ὀνομασθῆναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμφορῶν τι τολμήσασιν. [7] τούς τε νεκροὺς πολὺ μειζόνως ἐκείνους ἀντὶ ἱερῶν ἀξιοῦντας ἀποδιδόναι ἀσεβεῖν ἢ τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλοντας ἱεροῖς τὰ πρέποντα κομίζεσθαι. [8] σαφῶς τε ἐκέλευον σφίσιν εἰπεῖν μὴ ἀπιοῦσιν ἐκ τῆς Βοιωτῶν γῆς □οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων ἔτι εἶναι, ἐν ᾗ δὲ δορὶ ἐκτήσαντο□, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τοὺς νεκροὺς σπένδουσιν ἀναιρεῖσθαι.

99. οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπεκρίναντο, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ εἰσίν, ἀπιόντας ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα, εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων, αὐτοὺς γιγνώσκειν τὸ ποιητέον, νομίζοντες, τὴν μὲν Ὡρωπίαν, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς μάχης γενομένης κεῖσθαι ξυνέβη, Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὸ ὑπήκοον εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αὐτοὺς βίᾳ σφῶν κρατῆσαι αὐτῶν: οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἐσπένδοντο δῆθεν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων: τὸ δὲ

‘ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν’ εὐπρεπὲς εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ‘ἀπιόντας καὶ ἀπολαβεῖν ἃ ἀπαιτοῦσιν.’ ὁ δὲ κῆρυξ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀκούσας ἀπῆλθεν ἄπρακτος.

100. καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ εὐθὺς μεταπεμψάμενοι ἔκ τε τοῦ Μηλιῶς κόλπου ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ σφενδονήτας, καὶ βεβοηθηκότων αὐτοῖς μετὰ τὴν μάχην Κορινθίων τε δισχιλίων ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκ Νισαίας ἐξεληλυθότων Πελοποννησίων φρουρῶν καὶ Μεγαρέων ἅμα, ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον καὶ προσέβαλον τῷ τειχίσματι, ἄλλῳ τε τρόπῳ πειράσαντες καὶ μηχανὴν προσήγαγον, ἥπερ εἷλεν αὐτό, τοιάνδε. [2] κεραίαν μεγάλην δίχα πρίσαντες ἐκοίλαναν ἅπασαν καὶ ξυνήρμοσαν πάλιν ἀκριβῶς ὥσπερ αὐλόν, καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄκραν λέβητά τε ἥρτησαν ἀλύσεσι καὶ ἀκροφύσιον ἀπὸ τῆς κεραίας σιδηροῦν ἐς αὐτὸν νεῦον καθεῖτο, καὶ ἐσεσιδήρωτο ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ξύλου. [3] προσῆγον δὲ ἐκ πολλοῦ ἁμάξαις τῷ τείχει, ᾗ μάλιστα τῇ ἀμπέλῳ καὶ τοῖς ξύλοις ᾠκοδόμητο: καὶ ὁπότε εἴη ἐγγύς, φύσας μεγάλας ἐσθέντες ἐς τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτῶν ἄκρον τῆς κεραίας ἐφύσων. [4] ἡ δὲ πνοὴ ἰοῦσα στεγανῶς ἐς τὸν λέβητα, ἔχοντα ἄνθρακάς τε ἡμμένους καὶ θεῖον καὶ πίσσαν, φλόγα ἐποίει μεγάλην καὶ ἧψε τοῦ τείχους, ὥστε μηδένα ἔτι ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ μεῖναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπολιπόντας ἐς φυγὴν καταστῆναι καὶ τὸ τείχισμα τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἁλῶναι. [5] τῶν δὲ φρουρῶν οἱ μὲν ἀπέθανον, διακόσιοι δὲ ἐλήφθησαν: τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὸ πλῆθος ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβὰν ἀπεκομίσθη ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

101. τοῦ δὲ Δηλίου ἑπτακαιδεκάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ληφθέντος μετὰ τὴν μάχην καὶ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκος οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένου τῶν γεγενημένων ἐλθόντος οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον αὖθις περὶ τῶν νεκρῶν, ἀπέδοσαν οἱ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ οὐκέτι ταὐτὰ ἀπεκρίναντο. [2] ἀπέθανον δὲ Βοιωτῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους πεντακοσίων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους χιλίων καὶ Ἱπποκράτης ὁ στρατηγός, ψιλῶν δὲ καὶ σκευοφόρων πολὺς ἀριθμός. [3]μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην ταύτην καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον, ὡς αὐτῷ τότε πλεύσαντι τὰ περὶ τὰς Σίφας τῆς προδοσίας πέρι οὐ προυχώρησεν, ἔχων τὸν στρατὸν ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν τῶν τε Ἀκαρνάνων καὶ Ἀγραίων

καὶ Ἀθηναίων τετρακοσίους ὁπλίτας, ἀπόβασιν ἐποιήσατο ἐς τὴν Σικυωνίαν. [4] καὶ πρὶν πάσας τὰς ναῦς καταπλεῦσαι βοηθήσαντες οἱ Σικυώνιοι τοὺς ἀποβεβηκότας ἔτρεψαν καὶ κατεδίωξαν ἐς τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἔλαβον. τροπαῖον δὲ στήσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν. [5] ἀπέθανε δὲ καὶ Σιτάλκης Ὀδρυσῶν βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας τοῖς ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, στρατεύσας ἐπὶ Τριβαλλοὺς καὶ νικηθεὶς μάχῃ. Σεύθης δὲ ὁ Σπαραδόκου ἀδελφιδοῦς ὢν αὐτοῦ ἐβασίλευσεν Ὀδρυσῶν τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Θρᾴκης ἧσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖνος.

102. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Βρασίδας ἔχων τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ξυμμάχους ἐστράτευσεν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι ποταμῷ Ἀθηναίων ἀποικίαν. [2] τὸ δὲ χωρίον τοῦτο ἐφ᾽ οὗ νῦν ἡ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐπείρασε μὲν πρότερον καὶ Ἀρισταγόρας ὁ Μιλήσιος φεύγων βασιλέα Δαρεῖον κατοικίσαι, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ Ἠδώνων ἐξεκρούσθη, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτεσι δύο καὶ τριάκοντα ὕστερον, ἐποίκους μυρίους σφῶν τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν βουλόμενον πέμψαντες, οἳ διεφθάρησαν ἐν Δραβήσκῳ ὑπὸ Θρᾳκῶν. [3] καὶ αὖθις ἐνὸς δέοντι τριακοστῷ ἔτει ἐλθόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, Ἄγνωνος τοῦ Νικίου οἰκιστοῦ ἐκπεμφθέντος, Ἠδῶνας ἐξελάσαντες ἔκτισαν τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο, ὅπερ πρότερον Ἐννέα ὁδοὶ ἐκαλοῦντο. ὡρμῶντο δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἠιόνος, ἣν αὐτοὶ εἶχον ἐμπόριον ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπιθαλάσσιον, πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι σταδίους ἀπέχον ἀπὸ τῆς νῦν πόλεως, ἣν Ἀμφίπολιν Ἄγνων ὠνόμασεν, ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα περιρρέοντος τοῦ Στρυμόνος [διὰ τὸ περιέχειν αὐτὴν] τείχει μακρῷ ἀπολαβὼν ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμὸν περιφανῆ ἐς θάλασσάν τε καὶ τὴν ἤπειρον ᾠκισεν.

103. ἐπὶ ταύτην οὖν ὁ Βρασίδας ἄρας ἐξ Ἀρνῶν τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς ἐπορεύετο τῷ στρατῷ. καὶ ἀφικόμενος περὶ δείλην ἐπὶ τὸν Αὐλῶνα καὶ Βορμίσκον, ᾗ ἡ Βόλβη λίμνη ἐξίησιν ἐς θάλασσαν, καὶ δειπνοποιησάμενος ἐχώρει τὴν νύκτα. [2] χειμὼν δὲ ἦν καὶ ὑπένειφεν: ᾗ καὶ μᾶλλον ὥρμησε, βουλόμενος λαθεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ἀμφιπόλει πλὴν τῶν προδιδόντων. [3] ἦσαν γὰρ Ἀργιλίων τε ἐν αὐτῇ οἰκήτορες

 εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι Ἀνδρίων ἄποικοι καὶ ἄλλοι οἳ ξυνέπρασσον ταῦτα, οἱ μὲν Περδίκκᾳ πειθόμενοι, οἱ δὲ Χαλκιδεῦσιν. [4] μάλιστα δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι, ἐγγύς τε προσοικοῦντες καὶ αἰεί ποτε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὄντες ὕποπτοι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τῷ χωρίῳ, ἐπειδὴ παρέτυχεν ὁ καιρὸς καὶ Βρασίδας ἦλθεν, ἔπραξάν τε ἐκ πλέονος πρὸς τοὺς ἐμπολιτεύοντας σφῶν ἐκεῖ ὅπως ἐνδοθήσεται ἡ πόλις, καὶ τότε δεξάμενοι αὐτὸν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀποστάντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκείνῃ τῇ νυκτὶ κατέστησαν τὸν στρατὸν πρὸ ἕω ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ. [5] ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πόλισμα πλέον τῆς διαβάσεως, καὶ οὐ καθεῖτο τείχη ὥσπερ νῦν, φυλακὴ δέ τις βραχεῖα καθειστήκει: ἣν βιασάμενος ῥᾳδίως ὁ Βρασίδας, ἅμα μὲν τῆς προδοσίας οὔσης, ἅμα δὲ καὶ χειμῶνος ὄντος καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτοις προσπεσών, διέβη τὴν γέφυραν, καὶ τὰ ἔξω τῶν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν οἰκούντων κατὰ πᾶν τὸ χωρίον εὐθὺς εἶχεν.

104. τῆς δὲ διαβάσεως αὐτοῦ ἄφνω τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει γεγενημένης, καὶ τῶν ἔξω πολλῶν μὲν ἁλισκομένων, τῶν δὲ καὶ καταφευγόντων ἐς τὸ τεῖχος, οἱ Ἀμφιπολῖται ἐς θόρυβον μέγαν κατέστησαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὕποπτοι ὄντες. [2] καὶ λέγεται Βρασίδαν, εἰ ἠθέλησε μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἁρπαγὴν τῷ στρατῷ τραπέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς χωρῆσαι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, δοκεῖν ἂν ἑλεῖν. [3] νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν ἱδρύσας τὸν στρατόν, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἔξω ἐπέδραμε καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔνδον ὡς προσεδέχετο ἀπέβαινεν, ἡσύχαζεν: [4] οἱ δὲ ἐναντίοι τοῖς προδιδοῦσι, κρατοῦντες τῷ πλήθει ὥστε μὴ αὐτίκα τὰς πύλας ἀνοίγεσθαι, πέμπουσι μετὰ Εὐκλέους τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ὃς ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν παρῆν αὐτοῖς φύλαξ τοῦ χωρίου, ἐπὶ τὸν ἕτερον στρατηγὸν τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, Θουκυδίδην τὸν Ὀλόρου, ὃς τάδε ξυνέγραψεν, ὄντα περὶ Θάσον [ἔστι δὲ ἡ νῆσος Παρίων ἀποικία, ἀπέχουσα τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως ἡμίσεος ἡμέρας μάλιστα πλοῦν], κελεύοντες σφίσι βοηθεῖν. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκούσας κατὰ τάχος ἑπτὰ ναυσὶν αἳ ἔτυχον παροῦσαι ἔπλει, καὶ ἐβούλετο φθάσαι μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν, πρίν τι ἐνδοῦναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν Ἠιόνα προκαταλαβών.

105. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ὁ Βρασίδας δεδιὼς καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Θάσου τῶν νεῶν βοήθειαν καὶ πυνθανόμενος τὸν Θουκυδίδην κτῆσίν τε ἔχειν τῶν χρυσείων μετάλλων ἐργασίας ἐν τῇ περὶ ταῦτα Θρᾴκῃ καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἠπειρωτῶν, ἠπείγετο προκατασχεῖν, εἰ δύναιτο, τὴν πόλιν, μὴ ἀφικνουμένου αὐτοῦ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν, ἐλπίσαν ἐκ θαλάσσης ξυμμαχικὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Θρᾴκης ἀγείραντα αὐτὸν περιποιήσειν σφᾶς, οὐκέτι προσχωροίη. [2] καὶ τὴν ξύμβασιν μετρίαν ἐποιεῖτο, κήρυγμα τόδε ἀνειπών, Ἀμφιπολιτῶν καὶ Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἐνόντων τὸν μὲν βουλόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἴσης καὶ ὁμοίας μετέχοντα μένειν, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐθέλοντα ἀπιέναι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκφερόμενον πέντε ἡμερῶν.

106. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀλλοιότεροι ἐγένοντο τὰς γνώμας, ἄλλως τε καὶ βραχὺ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ἐμπολιτεῦον, τὸ δὲ πλέον ξύμμεικτον, καὶ τῶν ἔξω ληφθέντων συχνοῖς οἰκεῖοι ἔνδον ἦσαν: καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα πρὸς τὸν φόβον δίκαιον εἶναι ὑπελάμβανον, οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ τὸ ἄσμενοι ἂν ἐξελθεῖν, ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἐν ὁμοίῳ σφίσι τὰ δεινὰ εἶναι καὶ ἅμα οὐ προσδεχόμενοι βοήθειαν ἐν τάχει, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ὅμιλος πόλεώς τε ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ οὐ στερισκόμενοι καὶ κινδύνου παρὰ δόξαν ἀφιέμενοι. [2] ὥστε τῶν πρασσόντων τῷ Βρασίδᾳ ἤδη καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ διαδικαιούντων αὐτά, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐώρων τετραμμένον καὶ τοῦ παρόντος Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦ οὐκέτι ἀκροώμενον, ἐγένετο ἡ ὁμολογία καὶ προσεδέξαντο ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐκήρυξεν. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν τὴν πόλιν τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ παρέδοσαν, ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης καὶ αἱ νῆες ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὀψὲ κατέπλεον ἐς τὴν Ἠιόνα. [4] καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν Βρασίδας ἄρτι εἶχε, τὴν δὲ Ἠιόνα παρὰ νύκτα ἐγένετο λαβεῖν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐβοήθησαν αἱ νῆες διὰ τάχους, ἅμα ἕῳ ἂν εἴχετο.

107. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ὁ μὲν τὰ ἐν τῇ Ἠιόνι καθίστατο, ὅπως καὶ τὸ αὐτίκα, ἢν ἐπίῃ ὁ Βρασίδας, καὶ τὸ ἔπειτα ἀσφαλῶς ἕξει, δεξάμενος τοὺς ἐθελήσαντας ἐπιχωρῆσαι ἄνωθεν κατὰ τὰς σπονδάς: [2] ὁ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν Ἠιόνα κατά τε τὸν ποταμὸν πολλοῖς πλοίοις ἄφνω καταπλεύσας, εἴ πως τὴν

προύχουσαν ἄκραν ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους λαβὼν κρατοίη τοῦ ἔσπλου, καὶ κατὰ γῆν ἀποπειράσας ἅμα, ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀπεκρούσθη, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν ἐξηρτύετο. [3] καὶ Μύρκινός τε αὐτῷ προσεχώρησεν Ἠδωνικὴ πόλις, Πιττακοῦ τοῦ Ἠδώνων βασιλέως ἀποθανόντος ὑπὸ τῶν Γοάξιος παίδων καὶ Βραυροῦς τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ Γαληψὸς οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον καὶ Οἰσύμη: εἰσὶ δὲ αὗται Θασίων ἀποικίαι. παρὼν δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἅλωσιν ξυγκαθίστη ταῦτα.

108. ἐχομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς μέγα δέος κατέστησαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅτι ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἦν ὠφέλιμος ξύλων τε ναυπηγησίμων πομπῇ καὶ χρημάτων προσόδῳ, καὶ ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Στρυμόνος ἦν πάροδος Θεσσαλῶν διαγόντων ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους σφῶν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, τῆς δὲ γεφύρας μὴ κρατούντων, ἄνωθεν μὲν μεγάλης οὔσης ἐπὶ πολὺ λίμνης τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς Ἠιόνα τριήρεσι τηρουμένων, οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι προελθεῖν: τότε δὲ ῥᾴδια ἤδη [ἐνόμιζεν] γεγενῆσθαι. καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐφοβοῦντο μὴ ἀποστῶσιν. [2] ὁ γὰρ Βρασίδας ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μέτριον ἑαυτὸν παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πανταχοῦ ἐδήλου ὡς ἐλευθερώσων τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐκπεμφθείη. [3] καὶ αἱ πόλεις πυνθανόμεναι αἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι τῆς τε Ἀμφιπόλεως τὴν ἅλωσιν καὶ ἃ παρέχεται, τήν τε ἐκείνου πραότητα, μάλιστα δὴ ἐπήρθησαν ἐς τὸ νεωτερίζειν, καὶ ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν κρύφα, ἐπιπαριέναι τε κελεύοντες καὶ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὶ ἕκαστοι πρῶτοι ἀποστῆναι. [4] καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄδεια ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς, ἐψευσμένοις μὲν τῆς Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὅση ὕστερον διεφάνη, τὸ δὲ πλέον βουλήσει κρίνοντες ἀσαφεῖ ἢ προνοίᾳ ἀσφαλεῖ, εἰωθότες οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὗ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἐλπίδι ἀπερισκέπτῳ διδόναι, ὃ δὲ μὴ προσίενται λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι. [5] ἅμα δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς νεωστὶ πεπληγμένων καὶ τοῦ Βρασίδου ἐφολκὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγοντος, ὡς αὐτῷ ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μόνῃ στρατιᾷ οὐκ ἠθέλησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξυμβαλεῖν, ἐθάρσουν καὶ ἐπίστευον μηδένα ἂν ἐπὶ σφᾶς βοηθῆσαι. [6] τὸδὲ μέγιστον,

διὰ τὸ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα καὶ ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίων ὀργώντων ἔμελλον πειράσεσθαι, κινδυνεύειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν. ὧν αἰσθανόμενοι οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι φυλακάς, ὡς ἐξ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν χειμῶνι, διέπεμπον ἐς τὰς πόλεις, ὁ δὲ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ἐφιέμενος στρατιάν τε προσαποστέλλειν ἐκέλευε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Στρυμόνι ναυπηγίαν τριήρων παρεσκευάζετο. [7] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ὑπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ καὶ βουλόμενοι μᾶλλον τούς τε ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομίσασθαι καὶ τὸν πόλεμον καταλῦσαι.

109. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Μεγαρῆς τε τὰ μακρὰ τείχη, ἃ σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον, κατέσκαψαν ἑλόντες ἐς ἔδαφος, καὶ Βρασίδας μετὰ τὴν Ἀμφιπόλεως ἅλωσιν ἔχων τοὺς ξυμμάχους στρατεύει ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀκτὴν καλουμένην. [2] ἔστι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως διορύγματος ἔσω προύχουσα, καὶ ὁ Ἄθως αὐτῆς ὄρος ὑψηλὸν τελευτᾷ ἐς τὸ Αἰγαῖον πέλαγος. [3] πόλεις δὲ ἔχει Σάνην μὲν Ἀνδρίων ἀποικίαν παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν διώρυχα, ἐς τὸ πρὸς Εὔβοιαν πέλαγος τετραμμένην, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Θυσσὸν καὶ Κλεωνὰς καὶ Ἀκροθῴους καὶ Ὀλόφυξον καὶ Δῖον: [4] αἳ οἰκοῦνται ξυμμείκτοις ἔθνεσι βαρβάρων διγλώσσων, καί τι καὶ Χαλκιδικὸν ἔνι βραχύ, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον Πελασγικόν, τῶν καὶ Λῆμνόν ποτε καὶ Ἀθήνας Τυρσηνῶν οἰκησάντων, καὶ Βισαλτικὸν καὶ Κρηστωνικὸν καὶ Ἠδῶνες: κατὰ δὲ μικρὰ πολίσματα οἰκοῦσιν. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν πλείους προσεχώρησαν τῷ Βρασίδᾳ, Σάνη δὲ καὶ Δῖον ἀντέστη, καὶ αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν ἐμμείνας τῷ στρατῷ ἐδῄου.

110. ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐσήκουον, εὐθὺς στρατεύει ἐπὶ Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικήν, κατεχομένην ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων: καὶ αὐτὸν ἄνδρες ὀλίγοι ἐπήγοντο, ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες τὴν πόλιν παραδοῦναι. καὶ ἀφικόμενος νυκτὸς ἔτι καὶ περὶ ὄρθρον τῷ στρατῷ ἐκαθέζετο πρὸς τὸ Διοσκόρεον,ὃ ἀπέχει τῆς πόλεως τρεῖς μάλιστα σταδίους. [2] τὴν μὲν οὖν ἄλλην πόλιν τῶν Τορωναίων καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τοὺς ἐμφρουροῦντας ἔλαθεν: οἱ δὲ πράσσοντες αὐτῷ εἰδότες ὅτι ἥξοι, καὶ προελθόντες τινὲς αὐτῶν λάθρᾳ ὀλίγοι, ἐτήρουν τὴν πρόσοδον, καὶ ὡς ᾔσθοντο παρόντα, ἐσκομίζουσι παρ᾽

αὐτοὺς ἐγχειρίδια ἔχοντας ἄνδρας ψιλοὺς ἑπτά· τοσοῦτοι γὰρ μόνοι ἀνδρῶν εἴκοσι τὸ πρῶτον ταχθέντων οὐ κατέδεισαν ἐσελθεῖν: ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Λυσίστρατος Ὀλύνθιος, οἳ διαδύντες διὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τείχους καὶ λαθόντες τούς τε ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνωτάτω φυλακτηρίου φρουρούς, οὔσης τῆς πόλεως πρὸς λόφον, ἀναβάντες διέφθειραν καὶ τὴν κατὰ Καναστραῖον πυλίδα διῄρουν.

111. ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας τῷ μὲν ἄλλῳ στρατῷ ἡσύχαζεν ὀλίγον προελθών, ἑκατὸν δὲ πελταστὰς προπέμπει, ὅπως, ὁπότε πύλαι τινὲς ἀνοιχθεῖεν καὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἀρθείη ὃ ξυνέκειτο, πρῶτοι ἐσδράμοιεν. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν χρόνου ἐγγιγνομένου καὶ θαυμάζοντες κατὰ μικρὸν ἔτυχον ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως προσελθόντες: οἱ δὲ τῶν Τορωναίων ἔνδοθεν παρασκευάζοντες μετὰ τῶν ἐσεληλυθότων, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἥ τε πυλὶς διῄρητο καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν πύλαι τοῦ μοχλοῦ διακοπέντος ἀνεῴγοντο, πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὴν πυλίδα τινὰς περιαγαγόντες ἐσεκόμισαν, ὅπως κατὰ νώτου καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει οὐδὲν εἰδότας ἐξαπίνης φοβήσειαν, ἔπειτα τὸ σημεῖόν τε τοῦ πυρός, ὡς εἴρητο, ἀνέσχον, καὶ διὰ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν πυλῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς ἤδη τῶν πελταστῶν ἐσεδέχοντο.

112. καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας ἰδὼν τὸ ξύνθημα ἔθει δρόμῳ, ἀναστήσας τὸν στρατὸν ἐμβοήσαντάς τε ἀθρόον καὶ ἔκπληξιν πολλὴν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει παρασχόντας. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν κατὰ τὰς πύλας εὐθὺς ἐσέπιπτον, οἱ δὲ κατὰ δοκοὺς τετραγώνους, αἳ ἔτυχον τῷ τείχει πεπτωκότι καὶ οἰκοδομουμένῳ πρὸς λίθων ἀνολκὴν προσκείμεναι. [3] Βρασίδας μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εὐθὺς ἄνω καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ μετέωρα τῆς πόλεως ἐτράπετο, βουλόμενος κατ᾽ ἄκρας καὶ βεβαίως ἑλεῖν αὐτήν: ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ὅμιλος κατὰ πάντα ὁμοίως ἐσκεδάννυντο.

113. τῶν δὲ Τορωναίων γιγνομένης τῆς ἁλώσεως τὸ μὲν πολὺ οὐδὲν εἰδὸς ἐθορυβεῖτο, οἱ δὲ πράσσοντες καὶ οἷς ταῦτα ἤρεσκε μετὰ τῶν ἐσελθόντων εὐθὺς ἦσαν. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ὁπλῖται καθεύδοντες ὡς πεντήκοντα ἐπειδὴ ᾐσθοντο, οἱ μέν τινες ὀλίγοι

διαφθείρονται ἐν χερσὶν αὐτῶν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν οἱ μὲν πεζῇ, οἱ δὲ ἐς τὰς ναῦς, αἳ ἐφρούρουν δύο, καταφυγόντες διασῴζονται ἐς τὴν Λήκυθον τὸ φρούριον, ὃ εἶχον αὐτοὶ καταλαβόντες, ἄκρον τῆς πόλεως ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἀπειλημμένον ἐν στενῷ ἰσθμῷ. [3] κατέφυγον δὲ καὶ τῶν Τορωναίων ἐς αὐτοὺς ὅσοι ἦσαν σφίσιν ἐπιτήδειοι.

114. γεγενημένης δὲ ἡμέρας ἤδη καὶ βεβαίως τῆς πόλεως ἐχομένης ὁ Βρασίδας τοῖς μὲν μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Τορωναίοις καταπεφευγόσι κήρυγμα ἐποιήσατο τὸν βουλόμενον ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐξελθόντα ἀδεῶς πολιτεύειν, τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις κήρυκα προσπέμψας ἐξιέναι ἐκέλευεν ἐκ τῆς Ληκύθου ὑποσπόνδους καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντας ὡς οὔσης Χαλκιδέων. [2] οἱ δὲ ἐκλείψειν μὲν οὐκ ἔφασαν, σπείσασθαι δὲ σφίσιν ἐκέλευον ἡμέραν τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀνελέσθαι. ὁ δὲ ἐσπείσατο δύο. ἐν ταύταις δὲ αὐτός τε τὰς ἐγγὺς οἰκίας ἐκρατύνατο καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ σφέτερα. [3] καὶ ξύλλογον τῶν Τορωναίων ποιήσας ἔλεξε τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀκάνθῳ παραπλήσια, ὅτι οὐ δίκαιον εἴη οὔτε τοὺς πράξαντας πρὸς αὐτὸν τὴν λῆψιν τῆς πόλεως χείρους οὐδὲ προδότας ἡγεῖσθαι — οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ οὐδὲ χρήμασι πεισθέντας δρᾶσαι τοῦτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῆς πόλεως — οὔτε τοὺς μὴ μετασχόντας οἴεσθαι μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τεύξεσθαι: ἀφῖχθαι γὰρ οὐ διαφθερῶν οὔτε πόλιν οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὐδένα. [4] τὸ δὲ κήρυγμα ποιήσασθαι τούτου ἕνεκα τοῖς παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους καταπεφευγόσιν, ὡς ἡγούμενος οὐδὲν χείρους τῇ ἐκείνων φιλίᾳ: οὐδ᾽ ἂν σφῶν πειρασαμένους αὐτοὺς [τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων] δοκεῖν ἧσσον, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ δικαιότερα πράσσουσιν, εὔνους ἂν σφίσι γενέσθαι, ἀπειρίᾳ δὲ νῦν πεφοβῆσθαι. [5] τούς τε πάντας παρασκευάζεσθαι ἐκέλευεν ὡς βεβαίους τε ἐσομένους ξυμμάχους καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε ἤδη ὅτι ἂν ἁμαρτάνωσιν αἰτίαν ἔξοντας: τὰ δὲ πρότερα οὐ σφεῖς ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνους μᾶλλον ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων κρεισσόνων, καὶ ξυγγνώμην εἶναι εἴ τι ἠναντιοῦντο.

115. καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαῦτα εἰπὼν καὶ παραθαρσύνας διελθουσῶν τῶν σπονδῶν τὰς προσβολὰς ἐποιεῖτο τῇ Ληκύθῳ: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἡμύνοντό τε ἐκ φαύλου τειχίσματος καὶ ἀπ᾽ οἰκιῶν ἐπάλξεις ἐχουσῶν, [2] καὶ μίαν μὲν ἡμέραν ἀπεκρούσαντο: τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ μηχανῆς μελλούσης προσάξεσθαι αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀφ᾽ ἧς πῦρ ἐνήσειν διενοοῦντο ἐς τὰ ξύλινα παραφράγματα, καὶ προσιόντος ἤδη τοῦ στρατεύματος, ᾗ ᾤοντο μάλιστα αὐτοὺς προσκομιεῖν τὴν μηχανὴν καὶ ἦν ἐπιμαχώτατον, πύργον ξύλινον ἐπ᾽ οἴκημα ἀντέστησαν, καὶ ὕδατος ἀμφορέας πολλοὺς καὶ πίθους ἀνεφόρησαν καὶ λίθους μεγάλους, ἄνθρωποί τε πολλοὶ ἀνέβησαν. [3] τὸ δὲ οἴκημα λαβὸν μεῖζον ἄχθος ἐξαπίνης κατερράγη καὶ ψόφου πολλοῦ γενομένου τοὺς μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ ὁρῶντας τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐλύπησε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐφόβησεν, οἱ δὲ ἄπωθεν, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ διὰ πλείστου, νομίσαντες ταύτῃ ἐαλωκέναι ἤδη τὸ χωρίον, φυγῇ ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ὥρμησαν.

116. καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας ὡς ᾔσθετο αὐτοὺς ἀπολείποντάς τε τὰς ἐπάλξεις καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὁρῶν, ἐπιφερόμενος τῷ στρατῷ εὐθὺς τὸ τείχισμα λαμβάνει, καὶ ὅσους ἐγκατέλαβε διέφθειρεν. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς τε πλοίοις καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκλιπόντες τὸ χωρίον ἐς Παλλήνην διεκομίσθησαν: ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ληκύθῳ Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερόν, καὶ ἔτυχε κηρύξας, ὅτε ἔμελλε προσβαλεῖν,τῷ ἐπιβάντι πρώτῳ τοῦ τείχους τριάκοντα μνᾶς ἀργυρίου δώσειν νομίσας ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἢ ἀνθρωπείῳ τὴν ἅλωσιν γενέσθαι, τάς τε τριάκοντα μνᾶς τῇ θεῷ ἀπέδωκεν ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὴν Λήκυθον καθελὼν καὶ ἀνασκευάσας τέμενος ἀνῆκεν ἅπαν. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ χειμῶνος ἅ τε εἶχε τῶν χωρίων καθίστατο καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπεβούλευεν: καὶ τοῦ χειμῶνος διελθόντος ὄγδοον ἔτος ἐτελεύτα τῷ πολέμῳ.

117. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι ἅμα ἦρι τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς ἐκεχειρίαν ἐποιήσαντο ἐνιαύσιον, νομίσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὸν Βρασίδαν σφῶν προσαποστῆσαι οὐδὲν πρὶν

παρασκευάσαιντο καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν, καὶ ἅμα, εἰ καλῶς σφίσιν ἔχοι, καὶ ξυμβῆναι τὰ πλείω, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγούμενοι ἅπερ ἐδέδισαν φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ γενομένης ἀνοκωχῆς κακῶν καὶ ταλαιπωρίας μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμήσειν αὐτοὺς πειρασαμένους ξυναλλαγῆναί τε καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας σφίσιν ἀποδόντας σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι καὶ ἐς τὸν πλείω χρόνον. [2] τοὺς γὰρ δὴ ἄνδρας περὶ πλέονος ἐποιοῦντο κομίσασθαι, ὡς ἔτι Βρασίδας ηὐτύχει: καὶ ἔμελλον ἐπὶ μεῖζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος τῶν μὲν στέρεσθαι, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι κινδυνεύσειν καὶ κρατήσειν. [3] γίγνεται οὖν ἐκεχειρία αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἥδε.

118. ‘περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαντείου τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθίου δοκεῖ ἡμῖν χρῆσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἀδόλως καὶ ἀδεῶς κατὰ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους. [2] τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις ταῦτα δοκεῖ καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς παροῦσιν: Βοιωτοὺς δὲ καὶ Φωκέας πείσειν φασὶν ἐς δύναμιν προσκηρυκευόμενοι. [3] περὶ δὲ τῶν χρημάτων τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιμέλεσθαι ὅπως τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἐξευρήσομεν, ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρώμενοι καὶ ὑμεῖς καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ βουλόμενοι, τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρώμενοι πάντες. [4] περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἔδοξε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις κατὰ ταῦτα: τάδε δὲ ἔδοξε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις ἐὰν σπονδὰς ποιῶνται οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῶν μένειν ἑκατέρους ἔχοντας ἅπερ νῦν ἔχομεν, τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ Κορυφασίῳ ἐντὸς τῆς Βουφράδος καὶ τοῦ Τομέως μένοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἐν Κυθήροις μὴ ἐπιμισγομένους ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, μήτε ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς μήτε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν Νισαίᾳ καὶ Μινῴᾳ μὴ ὑπερβαίνοντας τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ Νίσου ἐπὶ τὸ Ποσειδώνιον, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Ποσειδωνίου εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν τὴν ἐς Μινῴαν μηδὲ Μεγαρέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὑπερβαίνειν τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην καὶ τὴν νῆσον, ἥνπερ ἔλαβον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔχοντας, μηδὲ ἐπιμισγομένους μηδετέρους μηδετέρωσε, καὶ τὰ ἐν Τροιζῆνι, ὅσαπερ νῦν ἔχουσι, καθ᾽ ἃ ξυνέθεντο πρὸς

Ἀθηναίους: [5] καὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ χρωμένους, ὅσα ἂν κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους πλεῖν μὴ μακρᾷ νηί, ἄλλῳ δὲ κωπήρει πλοίῳ, ἐς πεντακόσια τάλαντα ἄγοντι μέτρα. [6] κήρυκι δὲ καὶ πρεσβείᾳ καὶ ἀκολούθοις, ὁπόσοις ἂν δοκῇ, περὶ καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου καὶ δικῶν ἐς Πελοπόννησον καὶ Ἀθήναζε σπονδὰς εἶναι ἰοῦσι καὶ ἀπιοῦσι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [7] τοὺς δὲ αὐτομόλους μὴ δέχεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, μήτε ἐλεύθερον μήτε δοῦλον, μήτε ὑμᾶς μήτε ἡμᾶς. [8] δίκας τε διδόναι ὑμᾶς τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς ὑμῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, τὰ ἀμφίλογα δίκῃ διαλύοντας ἄνευ πολέμου. [9] τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ταῦτα δοκεῖ: εἰ δέ τι ὑμῖν εἴτε κάλλιον εἴτε δικαιότερον τούτων δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἰόντες ἐς Λακεδαίμονα διδάσκετε: οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἀποστήσονται, ὅσα ἂν δίκαια λέγητε, οὔτε οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτε οἱ ξύμμαχοι. [10] οἱ δὲ ἰόντες τέλος ἔχοντες ἰόντων, ᾗπερ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμᾶς κελεύετε. αἱ δὲ σπονδαὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἔσονται.[11] ‘ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ. Ἀκαμαντὶς ἐπρυτάνευε, Φαίνιππος ἐγραμμάτευε, Νικιάδης ἐπεστάτει. Λάχης εἶπε, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων, ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν καθ᾽ ἃ ξυγχωροῦσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν καὶ ὡμολόγησαν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ: [12] τὴν <δ᾽> ἐκεχειρίαν εἶναι ἐνιαυτόν, ἄρχειν δὲ τήνδε τὴν ἡμέραν, τετράδα ἐπὶ δέκα τοῦ Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος μηνός. [13] ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἰόντας ὡς ἀλλήλους πρέσβεις καὶ κήρυκας ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους, καθ᾽ ὅτι ἔσται ἡ κατάλυσις τοῦ πολέμου. [14] ἐκκλησίαν δὲ ποιήσαντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς πρυτάνεις πρῶτον περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ... βουλεύσασθαι Ἀθηναίους καθ᾽ ὅτι ἂν ἐσίῃ ἡ πρεσβεία περὶ τῆς καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου. σπείσασθαι δὲ αὐτίκα μάλα τὰς πρεσβείας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὰς παρούσας ἦ μὴν ἐμμενεῖν ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς τὸν ἐνιαυτόν.

119. ‘ταῦτα ξυνέθεντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι [καὶ ὤμοσαν] καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις μηνὸς ἐν Λακεδαίμονι Γεραστίου δωδεκάτῃ. [2] ξυνετίθεντο δὲ καὶ ἐσπένδοντο Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν οἵδε: Ταῦρος Ἐχετιμίδα,

Ἀθήναιος Περικλείδα, Φιλοχαρίδας Ἐρυξιλαΐδα: Κορινθίων δὲ Αἰνέας Ὠκύτου, Εὐφαμίδας Ἀριστωνύμου: Σικυωνίων δὲ Δαμότιμος Ναυκράτους, Ὀνάσιμος Μεγακλέους: Μεγαρέων δὲ Νίκασος Κεκάλου, Μενεκράτης Ἀμφιδώρου: Ἐπιδαυρίων δὲ Ἀμφίας Εὐπαιΐδα: Ἀθηναίων δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ Νικόστρατος Διειτρέφους, Νικίας Νικηράτου, Αὐτοκλῆς Τολμαίου’. [3]ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐκεχειρία αὕτη ἐγένετο, καὶ ξυνῆσαν ἐν αὐτῇ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων σπονδῶν διὰ παντὸς ἐς λόγους.

120. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἡμέρας ταύτας αἷς ἐπήρχοντο Σκιώνη ἐν τῇ Παλλήνῃ πόλις ἀπέστη ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Βρασίδαν. φασὶ δὲ οἱ Σκιωναῖοι Πελληνῆς μὲν εἶναι ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, πλέοντας δ᾽ ἀπὸ Τροίας σφῶν τοὺς πρώτους κατενεχθῆναι ἐς τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο τῷ χειμῶνι ᾧ ἐχρήσαντο Ἀχαιοί, καὶ αὐτοῦ οἰκῆσαι. [2] ἀποστᾶσι δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὁ Βρασίδας διέπλευσε νυκτὸς ἐς τὴν Σκιώνην, τριήρει μὲν φιλίᾳ προπλεούσῃ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν κελητίῳ ἄπωθεν ἐφεπόμενος, ὅπως, εἰ μέν τινι τοῦ κέλητος μείζονι πλοίῳ περιτυγχάνοι, ἡ τριήρης ἀμύνοι αὐτῷ, ἀντιπάλου δὲ ἄλλης τριήρους ἐπιγενομένης οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἔλασσον νομίζων τρέψεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ αὐτὸν διασώσειν. [3] περαιωθεὶς δὲ καὶ ξύλλογον ποιήσας τῶν Σκιωναίων ἔλεγεν ἅ τε ἐν τῇ Ἀκάνθῳ καὶ Τορώνῃ, καὶ προσέτι φάσκων ἀξιωτάτους αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐπαίνου, οἵτινες τῆς Παλλήνης ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ ἀπειλημμένης ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων Ποτείδαιαν ἐχόντων καὶ ὄντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ νησιῶται αὐτεπάγγελτοι ἐχώρησαν πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ οὐκ ἀνέμειναν ἀτολμίᾳ ἀνάγκην σφίσι προσγενέσθαι περὶ τοῦ φανερῶς οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ: σημεῖόν τ᾽ εἶναι τοῦ καὶ ἄλλο τι ἂν αὐτοὺς τῶν μεγίστων ἀνδρείως ὑπομεῖναι: εἴ τε θήσεται κατὰ νοῦν τὰ πράγματα, πιστοτάτους τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἡγήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων φίλους καὶ τἆλλα τιμήσειν.

121. καὶ οἱ μὲν Σκιωναῖοι ἐπήρθησάν τε τοῖς λόγοις καὶ θαρσήσαντες πάντες ὁμοίως, καὶ οἷς πρότερον μὴ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρασσόμενα, τόν τε πόλεμον διενοοῦντο προθύμως οἴσειν καὶ τὸν Βρασίδαν τά τ᾽ ἄλλα καλῶς ἐδέξαντο καὶ δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν ὡς ἐλευθεροῦντα τὴν

Ἑλλάδα, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐταινίουν τε καὶ προσήρχοντο ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ. [2] ὁ δὲ τό τε παραυτίκα φυλακήν τινα αὐτοῖς ἐγκαταλιπὼν διέβη πάλιν καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ στρατιὰν πλείω ἐπεραίωσε, βουλόμενος μετ᾽ αὐτῶν τῆς τε Μένδης καὶ τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἀποπειρᾶσαι, ἡγούμενος καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βοηθῆσαι ἂν ὡς ἐς νῆσον καὶ βουλόμενος φθάσαι: καί τι αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπράσσετο ἐς τὰς πόλεις ταύτας προδοσίας πέρι.

122. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔμελλεν ἐγχειρήσειν ταῖς πόλεσι ταύταις, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τριήρει οἱ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν περιαγγέλλοντες ἀφικνοῦνται παρ᾽ αὐτόν, Ἀθηναίων μὲν Ἀριστώνυμος, Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ Ἀθήναιος. [2] καὶ ἡ μὲν στρατιὰ πάλιν διέβη ἐς Τορώνην, οἱ δὲ τῷ Βρασίδᾳ ἀνήγγελλον τὴν ξυνθήκην, καὶ ἐδέξαντο πάντες οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης ξύμμαχοι Λακεδαιμονίων τὰ πεπραγμένα. [3] Ἀριστώνυμος δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κατῄνει, Σκιωναίους δὲ αἰσθόμενος ἐκ λογισμοῦ τῶν ἡμερῶν ὅτι ὕστερον ἀφεστήκοιεν, οὐκ ἔφη ἐνσπόνδους ἔσεσθαι. Βρασίδας δὲ ἀντέλεγε πολλά, ὡς πρότερον, καὶ οὐκ ἀφίει τὴν πόλιν. [4] ὡς δ᾽ ἀπήγγελλεν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ὁ Ἀριστώνυμος περὶ αὐτῶν, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εὐθὺς ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τὴν Σκιώνην. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρέσβεις πέμψαντες παραβήσεσθαι ἔφασαν αὐτοὺς τὰς σπονδάς, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀντεποιοῦντο Βρασίδᾳ πιστεύοντες, δίκῃ τε ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν περὶ αὐτῆς κρίνεσθαι. [5] οἱ δὲ δίκῃ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελον κινδυνεύειν, στρατεύειν δὲ ὡς τάχιστα, ὀργὴν ποιούμενοι εἰ καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς νήσοις ἤδη ὄντες ἀξιοῦσι σφῶν ἀφίστασθαι, τῇ κατὰ γῆν Λακεδαιμονίων ἰσχύι ἀνωφελεῖ πιστεύοντες. [6] εἶχε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια περὶ τῆς ἀποστάσεως μᾶλλον ᾗ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐδικαίουν: δύο γὰρ ἡμέραις ὕστερον ἀπέστησαν οἱ Σκιωναῖοι. ψήφισμά τ᾽ εὐθὺς ἐποιήσαντο, Κλέωνος γνώμῃ πεισθέντες, Σκιωναίους ἐξελεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι. καὶ τἆλλα ἡσυχάζοντες ἐς τοῦτο παρεσκευάζοντο.

123. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Μένδη ἀφίσταται αὐτῶν, πόλις ἐν τῇ Παλλήνῃ, Ἐρετριῶν ἀποικία. καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐδέξατο ὁ Βρασίδας, οὐ νομίζων ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκεχειρίᾳ φανερῶς

προσεχώρησαν: ἔστι γὰρ ἃ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐνεκάλει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παραβαίνειν τὰς σπονδάς. [2] δι᾽ ὃ καὶ οἱ Μενδαῖοι μᾶλλον ἐτόλμησαν, τήν τε τοῦ Βρασίδου γνώμην ὁρῶντες ἑτοίμην, τεκμαιρόμενοι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Σκιώνης ὅτι οὐ προυδίδου, καὶ ἅμα τῶν πρασσόντων σφίσιν ὀλίγων τε ὄντων καὶ ὡς τότε ἐμέλλησαν οὐκέτι ἀνέντων, ἀλλὰ περὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς φοβουμένων τὸ κατάδηλον καὶ καταβιασαμένων παρὰ γνώμην τοὺς πολλούς. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι εὐθὺς πυθόμενοι, πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὀργισθέντες παρεσκευάζοντο ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρας τὰς πόλεις. [4] καὶ Βρασίδας προσδεχόμενος τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὐτῶν ὑπεκκομίζει ἐς Ὄλυνθον τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας τῶν Σκιωναίων καὶ Μενδαίων, καὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων αὐτοῖς πεντακοσίους ὁπλίτας διέπεμψε καὶ πελταστὰς τριακοσίους Χαλκιδέων, ἄρχοντά τε τῶν ἁπάντων Πολυδαμίδαν. καὶ οἱ μὲν τὰ περὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς, ὡς ἐν τάχει παρεσομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων, κοινῇ ηὐτρεπίζοντο.

124. Βρασίδας δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας ἐν τούτῳ στρατεύουσιν ἅμα ἐπὶ Ἀρραβαῖον τὸ δεύτερον ἐς Λύγκον. καὶ ἦγον ὁ μὲν ὧν ἐκράτει Μακεδόνων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων Ἑλλήνων ὁπλίτας, ὁ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς αὐτοῦ περιλοίποις τῶν Πελοποννησίων Χαλκιδέας καὶ Ἀκανθίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ δύναμιν ἑκάστων. ξύμπαν δὲ τὸ ὁπλιτικὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τρισχίλιοι μάλιστα, ἱππῆς δ᾽ οἱ πάντες ἠκολούθουν Μακεδόνων ξὺν Χαλκιδεῦσιν ὀλίγου ἐς χιλίους, καὶ ἄλλος ὅμιλος τῶν βαρβάρων πολύς. [2] ἐσβαλόντες δὲ ἐς τὴν Ἀρραβαίου καὶ εὑρόντες ἀντεστρατοπεδευμένους αὐτοῖς τοὺς Λυγκηστὰς ἀντεκαθέζοντο καὶ αὐτοί. [3] καὶ ἐχόντων τῶν μὲν πεζῶν λόφον ἑκατέρωθεν, πεδίου δὲ τοῦ μέσου ὄντος, οἱ ἱππῆς ἐς αὐτὸ καταδραμόντες ἱππομάχησαν πρῶτα ἀμφοτέρων, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ ὁ Περδίκκας, προελθόντων προτέρων ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου μετὰ τῶν ἱππέων τῶν Λυγκηστῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων μάχεσθαι, ἀντεπαγαγόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ξυνέβαλον καὶ ἔτρεψαν τοὺς Λυγκηστάς, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν διέφθειραν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ διαφυγόντες πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἡσύχαζον. [4] μετὰ δὲ

τοῦτο τροπαῖον στήσαντες δύο μὲν ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἐπέσχον, τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς μένοντες, οἳ ἔτυχον τῷ Περδίκκᾳ μισθοῦ μέλλοντες ἥξειν: ἔπειτα ὁ Περδίκκας ἐβούλετο προϊέναι ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ Ἀρραβαίου κώμας καὶ μὴ καθῆσθαι, Βρασίδας δὲ τῆς τε Μένδης περιορώμενος, μὴ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρότερον ἐπιπλευσάντων τι πάθῃ, καὶ ἅμα τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν οὐ παρόντων, οὐ πρόθυμος ἦν, ἀλλὰ ἀναχωρεῖν μᾶλλον.

125. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ διαφερομένων αὐτῶν ἠγγέλθη ὅτι οἱ Ἰλλυριοὶ μετ᾽ Ἀρραβαίου προδόντες Περδίκκαν γεγένηνται: ὥστε ἤδη ἀμφοτέροις μὲν δοκοῦν ἀναχωρεῖν διὰ τὸ δέος αὐτῶν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων μαχίμων, κυρωθὲν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς διαφορᾶς ὀπηνίκα χρὴ ὁρμᾶσθαι, νυκτός τε ἐπιγενομένης, οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν βαρβάρων εὐθὺς φοβηθέντες, ὅπερ φιλεῖ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἀσαφῶς ἐκπλήγνυσθαι, καὶ νομίσαντες πολλαπλασίους μὲν ἢ ἦλθον ἐπιέναι, ὅσον δὲ οὔπω παρεῖναι, καταστάντες ἐς αἰφνίδιον φυγὴν ἐχώρουν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τὸ πρῶτον οὐκ αἰσθανόμενον, ὡς ἔγνω, ἠνάγκασαν πρὶν τὸν Βρασίδαν ἰδεῖν ἢ ἄπωθεν γὰρ πολὺ ἀλλήλων ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἢ προαπελθεῖν. [2] Βρασίδας δὲ ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ὡς εἶδε τοὺς Μακεδόνας προκεχωρηκότας τούς τε Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ τὸν Ἀρραβαῖον μέλλοντας ἐπιέναι, ξυναγαγὼν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τετράγωνον τάξιν τοὺς ὁπλίτας καὶ τὸν ψιλὸν ὅμιλον ἐς μέσον λαβὼν διενοεῖτο ἀναχωρεῖν. [3] ἐκδρόμους δέ, εἴ πῃ προσβάλλοιεν αὐτοῖς, ἔταξε τοὺς νεωτάτους, καὶ αὐτὸς λογάδας ἔχων τριακοσίους τελευταῖος γνώμην εἶχεν ὑποχωρῶν τοῖς τῶν ἐναντίων πρώτοις προσκεισομένοις ἀνθιστάμενος ἀμύνεσθαι. [4] καὶ πρὶν τοὺς πολεμίους ἐγγὺς εἶναι, ὡς διὰ ταχέων παρεκελεύσατο τοῖς στρατιώταις τοιάδε.

126. ‘εἰ μὲν μὴ ὑπώπτευον, ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, ὑμᾶς τῷ τε μεμονῶσθαι καὶ ὅτι βάρβαροι οἱ ἐπιόντες καὶ πολλοὶ ἔκπληξιν ἔχειν, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως διδαχὴν ἅμα τῇ παρακελεύσει ἐποιούμην: νῦν δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀπόλειψιν τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων βραχεῖ ὑπομνήματι καὶ παραινέσει τὰ μέγιστα πειράσομαι πείθειν. [2]

ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι ὑμῖν προσήκει τὰ πολέμια οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίαν ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων, οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλεόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν. [3] βαρβάρους δὲ οὓς νῦν ἀπειρίᾳ δέδιτε μαθεῖν χρή, ἐξ ὧν τε προηγώνισθε τοῖς Μακεδόσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐγὼ εἰκάζω τε καὶ ἄλλων ἀκοῇ ἐπίσταμαι, οὐ δεινοὺς ἐσομένους. [4] καὶ γὰρ ὅσα μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἀσθενῆ ὄντα τῶν πολεμίων δόκησιν ἔχει ἰσχύος, διδαχὴ ἀληθὴς προσγενομένη περὶ αὐτῶν ἐθάρσυνε μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀμυνομένους: οἷς δὲ βεβαίως τι πρόσεστιν ἀγαθόν, μὴ προειδώς τις ἂν αὐτοῖς τολμηρότερον προσφέροιτο. [5] οὗτοι δὲ τὴν μέλλησιν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβεράν: καὶ γὰρ πλήθει ὄψεως δεινοὶ καὶ βοῆς μεγέθει ἀφόρητοι, ἥ τε διὰ κενῆς ἐπανάσεισις τῶν ὅπλων ἔχει τινὰ δήλωσιν ἀπειλῆς. προσμεῖξαι δὲ τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὰ οὐχ ὁμοῖοι: οὔτε γὰρ τάξιν ἔχοντες αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν λιπεῖν τινὰ χώραν βιαζόμενοι ἥ τε φυγὴ καὶ ἡ ἔφοδος αὐτῶν ἴσην ἔχουσα δόξαν τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἔχει αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχη μάλιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ πρόφασιν τοῦ σῴζεσθαί τινι πρεπόντως πορίσειε, τοῦ τε ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν πιστότερον τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι ὑμᾶς ἀκινδύνως ἡγοῦνται: ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἂν πρὸ τούτου ἐχρῶντο. [6] σαφῶς τε πᾶν τὸ προϋπάρχον δεινὸν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὁρᾶτε ἔργῳ μὲν βραχὺ ὄν, ὄψει δὲ καὶ ἀκοῇ κατασπέρχον. ὃ ὑπομείναντες ἐπιφερόμενον καί, ὅταν καιρὸς ᾖ, κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει αὖθις ὑπαγαγόντες, ἔς τε τὸ ἀσφαλὲς θᾶσσον ἀφίζεσθε καὶ γνώσεσθε τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὄχλοι τοῖς μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον δεξαμένοις ἄπωθεν ἀπειλαῖς τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μελλήσει ἐπικομποῦσιν, οἳ δ᾽ ἂν εἴξωσιν αὐτοῖς, κατὰ πόδας τὸ εὔψυχον ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ὀξεῖς ἐνδείκνυνται.’

127. τοιαῦτα ὁ Βρασίδας παραινέσας ὑπῆγε τὸ στράτευμα. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ἰδόντες πολλῇ βοῇ καὶ θορύβῳ προσέκειντο, νομίσαντες φεύγειν τε αὐτὸν καὶ καταλαβόντες διαφθερεῖν. [2] καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς αἵ τε ἐκδρομαὶ

ὅπῃ προσπίπτοιεν ἀπήντων καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων τοὺς λογάδας ἐπικειμένους ὑφίστατο, τῇ τε πρώτῃ ὁρμῇ παρὰ γνώμην ἀντέστησαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπιφερομένους μὲν δεχόμενοι ἠμύνοντο, ἡσυχαζόντων δὲ αὐτοὶ ὑπεχώρουν, τότε δὴ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ Βρασίδου Ἑλλήνων ἐν τῇ εὐρυχωρίᾳ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπέσχοντο, μέρος δέ τι καταλιπόντες αὐτοῖς ἐπακολουθοῦν προσβάλλειν, οἱ λοιποὶ χωρήσαντες δρόμῳ ἐπί τε τοὺς φεύγοντας τῶν Μακεδόνων οἷς ἐντύχοιεν ἔκτεινον καὶ τὴν ἐσβολήν, ἥ ἐστι μεταξὺ δυοῖν λόφοιν στενὴ ἐς τὴν Ἀρραβαίου, φθάσαντες προκατέλαβον, εἰδότες οὐκ οὖσαν ἄλλην τῷ Βρασίδᾳ ἀναχώρησιν. καὶ προσιόντος αὐτοῦ ἐς αὐτὸ ἤδη τὸ ἄπορον τῆς ὁδοῦ κυκλοῦνται ὡς ἀπολῃψόμενοι.

128. ὁ δὲ γνοὺς προεῖπε τοῖς μεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ τριακοσίοις, ὃν ᾠ̓ετο μᾶλλον ἂν ἐλεῖν τῶν λόφων, χωρήσαντας πρὸς αὐτὸν δρόμῳ, ὡς τάχιστα ἕκαστος δύναται, ἄνευ τάξεως, πειρᾶσαι ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐκκροῦσαι τοὺς ἤδη ἐπόντας βαρβάρους, πρὶν καὶ τὴν πλέονα κύκλωσιν σφῶν αὐτόσε προσμεῖξαι. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν προσπεσόντες ἐκράτησάν τε τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ λόφου, καὶ ἡ πλείων ἤδη στρατιὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ῥᾷον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπορεύοντο: οἱ γὰρ βάρβαροι καὶ ἐφοβήθησαν, τῆς τροπῆς αὐτοῖς ἐνταῦθα γενομένης σφῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ μετεώρου,καὶ ἐς τὸ πλέον οὐκέτ᾽ ἐπηκολούθουν, νομίζοντες καὶ ἐν μεθορίοις εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἤδη καὶ διαπεφευγέναι. [3] Βρασίδας δὲ ὡς ἀντελάβετο τῶν μετεώρων, κατὰ ἀσφάλειαν μᾶλλον ἰὼν αὐθημερὸν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἄρνισαν πρῶτον τῆς Περδίκκου ἀρχῆς. [4] καὶ αὐτοὶ ὀργιζόμενοι οἱ στρατιῶται τῇ προαναχωρήσει τῶν Μακεδόνων, ὅσοις ἐνέτυχον κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ζεύγεσιν αὐτῶν βοεικοῖς ἢ εἴ τινι σκεύει ἐκπεπτωκότι, οἷα ἐν νυκτερινῇ καὶ φοβερᾷ ἀναχωρήσει εἰκὸς ἦν ξυμβῆναι, τὰ μὲν ὑπολύοντες κατέκοπτον, τῶν δὲ οἰκείωσιν ἐποιοῦντο. [5] ἀπὸ τούτου τε πρῶτον Περδίκκας Βρασίδαν τε πολέμιον ἐνόμισε καὶ ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν Πελοποννησίων τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ δι᾽ Ἀθηναίους οὐ ξύνηθες μῖσος εἶχε, τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων ξυμφόρων διαναστὰς

ἔπρασσεν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τάχιστα τοῖς μὲν ξυμβήσεται, τῶν δὲ ἀπαλλάξεται.

129. Βρασίδας δὲ ἀναχωρήσας ἐκ Μακεδονίας ἐς Τορώνην καταλαμβάνει Ἀθηναίους Μένδην ἤδη ἔχοντας, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἡσυχάζων ἐς μὲν τὴν Παλλήνην ἀδύνατος ἤδη ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι διαβὰς τιμωρεῖν, τὴν δὲ Τορώνην ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχεν. [2] ὑπὸ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῖς ἐν τῇ Λύγκῳ ἐξέπλευσαν ἐπί τε τὴν Μένδην καὶ τὴν Σκιώνην οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο, ναυσὶ μὲν πεντήκοντα, ὧν ἦσαν δέκα Χῖαι, ὁπλίταις δὲ χιλίοις ἑαυτῶν καὶ τοξόταις ἑξακοσίοις καὶ Θρᾳξὶ μισθωτοῖς χιλίοις καὶ ἄλλοις τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων πελτασταῖς: ἐστρατήγει δὲ Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ Νικόστρατος ὁ Διειτρέφους. [3] ἄραντες δὲ ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ σχόντες κατὰ τὸ Ποσειδώνιον ἐχώρουν ἐς τοὺς Μενδαίους. οἱ δὲ αὐτοί τε καὶ Σκιωναίων τριακόσιοι βεβοηθηκότες Πελοποννησίων τε οἱ ἐπίκουροι, ξύμπαντες [δὲ] ἑπτακόσιοι ὁπλῖται, καὶ Πολυδαμίδας ὁ ἄρχων αὐτῶν, ἔτυχον ἐξεστρατοπεδευμένοι ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ. [4] καὶ αὐτοῖς Νικίας μὲν Μεθωναίους τε ἔχων εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ψιλοὺς καὶ λογάδας τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὁπλιτῶν ἑξήκοντα καὶ τοὺς τοξότας ἅπαντας κατὰ ἀτραπόν τινα τοῦ λόφου πειρώμενος προσβῆναι καὶ τραυματιζόμενος ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐδυνήθη βιάσασθαι: Νικόστρατος δὲ ἄλλῃ ἐφόδῳ ἐκ πλέονος παντὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατοπέδῳ ἐπιὼν τῷ λόφῳ ὄντι δυσπροσβάτῳ καὶ πάνυ ἐθορυβήθη, καὶ ἐς ὀλίγον ἀφίκετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων νικηθῆναι. [5] καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ὡς οὐκ ἐνέδοσαν οἱ Μενδαῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀναχωρήσαντες ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, καὶ οἱ Μενδαῖοι νυκτὸς ἐπελθούσης ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἀπῆλθον.

130. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι περιπλεύσαντες ἐς τὸ πρὸς Σκιώνης τό τε προάστειον εἷλον καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἅπασαν ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν οὐδενὸς ἐπεξιόντος ▯ἦν γάρ τι καὶ στασιασμοῦ ἐν τῇ πόλει▯, οἱ δὲ τριακόσιοι τῶν Σκιωναίων τῆς ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [2] καὶ τῇ ἐπιγιγνομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ Νικίας μὲν τῷ ἡμίσει τοῦ στρατοῦ προϊὼν ἅμα ἐς τὰ μεθόρια τῶν Σκιωναίων τὴν γῆν ἐδῄου,

Νικόστρατος δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς κατὰ τὰς ἄνω πύλας, ᾗ ἐπὶ Ποτειδαίας ἔρχονται, προσεκάθητο τῇ πόλει. [3] ὁ δὲ Πολυδαμίδας ἔτυχε γὰρ ταύτῃ τοῖς Μενδαίοις καὶ ἐπικούροις ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους τὰ ὅπλα κείμενα διατάσσει τε ὡς ἐς μάχην καὶ παρῄνει τοῖς Μενδαίοις ἐπεξιέναι. [4] καί τινος αὐτῷ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἀντειπόντος κατὰ τὸ στασιωτικὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέξεισιν οὐδὲ δέοιτο πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀντεῖπεν ἐπισπασθέντος τε τῇ χειρὶ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ θορυβηθέντος, ὁ δῆμος εὐθὺς ἀναλαβὼν τὰ ὅπλα περιοργὴς ἐχώρει ἐπί τε Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἐναντία σφίσι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πράξαντας. [5] καὶ προσπεσόντες τρέπουσιν ἅμα μὲν μάχῃ αἰφνιδίῳ, ἅμα δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τῶν πυλῶν ἀνοιγομένων φοβηθέντων: ᾠήθησαν γὰρ ἀπὸ προειρημένου τινὸς αὐτοῖς τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν γενέσθαι. [6] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὅσοι μὴ αὐτίκα διεφθάρησαν, κατέφυγον, ἥνπερ καὶ τὸ πρότερον αὐτοὶ εἶχον: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἐπαναστρέψας πρὸς τῇ πόλει ἦν ἐσπεσόντες ἐς τὴν Μένδην πόλιν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ἀνοιχθεῖσαν, ἁπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ὡς κατὰ κράτος ἑλόντες διήρπασαν, καὶ μόλις οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατέσχον ὥστε μὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διαφθείρεσθαι. [7] καὶ τοὺς μὲν Μενδαίους μετὰ ταῦτα πολιτεύειν ἐκέλευον ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, αὐτοὺς κρίναντας ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εἴ τινας ἡγοῦνται αἰτίους εἶναι τῆς ἀποστάσεως: τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει ἀπετείχισαν ἐκατέρωθεν τείχει ἐς θάλασσαν καὶ φυλακὴν ἐπικαθίσταντο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν Μένδην κατέσχον, ἐπὶ τὴν Σκιώνην ἐχώρουν.

131. οἱ δὲ ἀντεπεξελθόντες αὐτοὶ καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι ἱδρύθησαν ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃν εἰ μὴ ἔλοιεν οἱ ἐναντίοι, οὐκ ἐγίγνετο σφῶν περιτείχισις. [2] προσβαλόντες δ᾽ αὐτῷ κατὰ κράτος οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ μάχῃ ἐκκρούσαντες τοὺς ἐπόντας ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντό τε καὶ ἐς τὸν περιτειχισμὸν τροπαῖον στήσαντες παρεσκευάζοντο. [3] καὶ αὐτῶν οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἤδη ἐν ἔργῳ ὄντων οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ἐν τῇ Μένδῃ πολιορκούμενοι ἐπίκουροι βιασάμενοι παρὰ θάλασσαν τὴν φυλακὴν νυκτὸς

ἀφικνοῦνται, καὶ διαφυγόντες οἱ πλεῖστοι τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ Σκιώνῃ στρατόπεδον ἐσῆλθον ἐς αὐτήν.

132. περιτειχιζομένης δὲ τῆς Σκιώνης Περδίκκας τοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῖς ἐπικηρυκευσάμενος ὁμολογίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διὰ τὴν τοῦ Βρασίδου ἔχθραν περὶ τῆς ἐκ τῆς Λύγκου ἀναχωρήσεως, εὐθὺς τότε ἀρξάμενος πράσσειν. [2] καὶ ἐτύγχανε γὰρ τότε Ἰσχαγόρας ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος στρατιὰν μέλλων πεζῇ πορεύσειν ὡς Βρασίδαν ὁ [δὲ] Περδίκκας, ἅμα μὲν κελεύοντος τοῦ Νικίου, ἐπειδὴ ξυνεβεβήκει, ἔνδηλόν τι ποιεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις βεβαιότητος πέρι, ἅμα δ᾽ αὐτὸς οὐκέτι βουλόμενος Πελοποννησίους ἐς τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀφικνεῖσθαι, παρασκευάσας τοὺς ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ ξένους,χρώμενος αἰεὶ τοῖς πρώτοις, διεκώλυσε τὸ στράτευμα καὶ τὴν παρασκευήν, ὥστε μηδὲ πειρᾶσθαι Θεσσαλῶν. [3] Ἰσχαγόρας μέντοι καὶ Ἀμεινίας καὶ Ἀριστεὺς αὐτοί τε ὡς Βρασίδαν ἀφίκοντο, ἐπιδεῖν πεμψάντων Λακεδαιμονίων τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῶν ἡβώντων αὐτῶν παρανόμως ἄνδρας ἐξῆγον ἐκ Σπάρτης, ὥστε τῶν πόλεων ἄρχοντας καθιστάναι καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσιν ἐπιτρέπειν. καὶ Κλεαρίδαν μὲν τὸν Κλεωνύμου καθίστησιν ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει, Πασιτελίδαν δὲ τὸν Ἡγησάνδρου ἐν Τορώνῃ.

133. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει Θηβαῖοι Θεσπιῶν τεῖχος περιεῖλον ἐπικαλέσαντες ἀττικισμόν, βουλόμενοι μὲν καὶ αἰεί, παρεσχηκὸς δὲ ῥᾷον ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους μάχῃ ὅτι ἦν αὐτῶν ἄνθος ἀπωλώλει. [2] καὶ ὁ νεὼς τῆς Ἥρας τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐν Ἄργει κατεκαύθη, Χρυσίδος τῆς ἱερείας λύχνον τινὰ θείσης ἡμμένον πρὸς τὰ στέμματα καὶ ἐπικαταδαρθούσης, ὥστε ἔλαθεν ἀφθέντα πάντα καὶ καταφλεχθέντα. [3] καὶ ἡ Χρυσὶς μὲν εὐθὺς τῆς νυκτὸς δείσασα τοὺς Ἀργείους ἐς Φλειοῦντα φεύγει: οἱ δὲ ἄλλην ἱέρειαν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ προκειμένου κατεστήσαντο Φαεινίδα ὄνομα. ἔτη δὲ ἡ Χρυσὶς τοῦ πολέμου τοῦδε ἐπέλαβεν ὀκτὼ καὶ ἕνατον ἐκ μέσου, ὅτε ἐπεφεύγει. [4] καὶ ἡ Σκιώνη τοῦ θέρους ἤδη τελευτῶντος περιετετείχιστό τε παντελῶς, καὶ

οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ φυλακὴν καταλιπόντες ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατῷ.

134. ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπιόντι χειμῶνι τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἡσύχαζε διὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ Τεγεᾶται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἑκατέρων ξυνέβαλον ἐν Λαοδοκείῳ τῆς Ὀρεσθίδος, καὶ νίκη ἀμφιδήριτος ἐγένετο: κέρας γὰρ ἑκάτεροι τρέψαντες τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς τροπαῖά τε ἀμφότεροι ἔστησαν καὶ σκῦλα ἐς Δελφοὺς ἀπέπεμψαν. [2] διαφθαρέντων μέντοι πολλῶν ἑκατέροις καὶ ἀγχωμάλου τῆς μάχης γενομένης καὶ ἀφελομένης νυκτὸς τὸ ἔργον οἱ Τεγεᾶται μὲν ἐπηυλίσαντό τε καὶ εὐθὺς ἔστησαν τροπαῖον, Μαντινῆς δὲ ἀπεχώρησάν τε ἐς Βουκολιῶνα καὶ ὕστερον ἀντέστησαν.

135. ἀπεπείρασε δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας τελευτῶντος καὶ πρὸς ἔαρ ἤδη Ποτειδαίας. προσελθὼν γὰρ νυκτὸς καὶ κλίμακα προσθεὶς μέχρι μὲν τούτου ἔλαθεν: τοῦ γὰρ κώδωνος παρενεχθέντος οὕτως ἐς τὸ διάκενον, πρὶν ἐπανελθεῖν τὸν παραδιδόντα αὐτόν, ἡ πρόσθεσις ἐγένετο: ἔπειτα μέντοι εὐθὺς αἰσθομένων, πρὶν προσβῆναι, ἀπήγαγε πάλιν κατὰ τάχος τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ οὐκ ἀνέμεινεν ἡμέραν γενέσθαι. [2] καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἔνατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

Βιβλίο Ε’

1. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκεχειρίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι Δηλίους ἀνέστησαν ἐκ Δήλου, ἡγησάμενοι κατὰ παλαιάν τινα αἰτίαν οὐ καθαροὺς ὄντας ἱερῶσθαι, καὶ ἅμα ἐλλιπὲς σφίσιν εἶναι τοῦτο τῆς καθάρσεως, ᾗ πρότερόν μοι δεδήλωται ὡς ἀνελόντες τὰς θήκας τῶν τεθνεώτων ὀρθῶς ἐνόμισαν ποιῆσαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν Δήλιοι Ἀτραμύττιον Φαρνάκου δόντος αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ᾤκησαν, οὕτως ὡς ἕκαστος ὥρμητο.

2. Κλέων δὲ Ἀθηναίους πείσας ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία ἐξέπλευσε μετὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, Ἀθηναίων μὲν ὁπλίτας ἔχων διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους καὶ ἱππέας τριακοσίους, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων πλείους, ναῦς δὲ τριάκοντα. [2] σχὼν δὲ ἐς Σκιώνην πρῶτον ἔτι πολιορκουμένην καὶ προσλαβὼν αὐτόθεν ὁπλίτας τῶν φρουρῶν, κατέπλευσεν ἐς τὸν Κωφὸν λιμένα τῶν Τορωναίων ἀπέχοντα οὐ πολὺ τῆς πόλεως. [3] ἐκ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ, αἰσθόμενος ὑπ᾽ αὐτομόλων ὅτι οὔτε Βρασίδας ἐν τῇ Τορώνῃ οὔτε οἱ ἐνόντες ἀξιόμαχοι εἶεν, τῇ μὲν στρατιᾷ τῇ πεζῇ ἐχώρει ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ναῦς δὲ περιέπεμψε δέκα <ἐς > τὸν λιμένα περιπλεῖν. [4] καὶ πρὸς τὸ περιτείχισμα πρῶτον ἀφικνεῖται, ὃ προσπεριέβαλε τῇ πόλει ὁ Βρασίδας ἐντὸς βουλόμενος ποιῆσαι τὸ προάστειον, καὶ διελὼν τοῦ παλαιοῦ τείχους μίαν αὐτὴν ἐποίησε πόλιν.

3. βοηθήσαντες δὲ ἐς αὐτὸ Πασιτελίδας τε ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἄρχων καὶ ἡ παροῦσα φυλακὴ προσβαλόντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἠμύνοντο. καὶ ὡς ἐβιάζοντο καὶ αἱ νῆες ἅμα περιέπλεον <αἱ> ἐς τὸν λιμένα περιπεμφθεῖσαι, δείσας ὁ Πασιτελίδας μὴ αἵ τε νῆες φθάσωσι λαβοῦσαι ἐρῆμον τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῦ τειχίσματος ἁλισκομένου ἐγκαταληφθῇ, ἀπολιπὼν αὐτὸ δρόμῳ ἐχώρει ἐς τὴν πόλιν. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι φθάνουσιν οἵ τε ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἑλόντες τὴν Τορώνην καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἐπισπόμενος αὐτοβοεὶ κατὰ τὸ διῃρημένον τοῦ παλαιοῦ τείχους ξυνεσπεσών. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν τῶν

Πελοποννησίων καὶ Τορωναίων εὐθὺς ἐν χερσί, τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἔλαβον, καὶ Πασιτελίδαν τὸν ἄρχοντα. [3] Βρασίδας δὲ ἐβοήθει μὲν τῇ Τορώνῃ, αἰσθόμενος δὲ καθ᾽ ὁδὸν ἐαλωκυῖαν ἀνεχώρησεν, ἀποσχὼν τεσσαράκοντα μάλιστα σταδίους μὴ φθάσαι ἐλθών. [4] ὁ δὲ Κλέων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖά τε ἔστησαν δύο, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸν λιμένα, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῷ τειχίσματι, καὶ τῶν Τορωναίων γυναῖκας μὲν καὶ παῖδας ἠνδραπόδισαν, αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ Πελοποννησίους καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος Χαλκιδέων ἦν, ξύμπαντας ἐς ἑπτακοσίους, ἀπέπεμψαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας: καὶ αὐτοῖς τὸ μὲν Πελοποννήσιον ὕστερον ἐν ταῖς γενομέναις σπονδαῖς ἀπῆλθε, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐκομίσθη ὑπ᾽ Ὀλυνθίων, ἀνὴρ ἀντ᾽ ἀνδρὸς λυθείς. [5] εἷλον δὲ καὶ Πάνακτον Ἀθηναίων ἐν μεθορίοις τεῖχος Βοιωτοὶ ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον προδοσίᾳ. [6] καὶ ὁ μὲν Κλέων φυλακὴν καταστησάμενος τῆς Τορώνης ἄρας περιέπλει τὸν Ἄθων ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν.

4. Φαίαξ δὲ ὁ Ἐρασιστράτου τρίτος αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίων πεμπόντων ναυσὶ δύο ἐς Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν πρεσβευτὴς ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἐξέπλευσεν. [2] Λεοντῖνοι γὰρ ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς καὶ ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενόει ἀναδάσασθαι. [3] οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ αἰσθόμενοι Συρακοσίους τε ἐπάγονται καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι τὸν δῆμον. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπλανήθησαν ὡς ἕκαστοι, οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ ὁμολογήσαντες Συρακοσίοις καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπόντες καὶ ἐρημώσαντες Συρακούσας ἐπὶ πολιτείᾳ ᾤκησαν. [4] καὶ ὕστερον πάλιν αὐτῶν τινὲς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκεσθαι ἀπολιπόντες ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν Φωκαίας τε τῆς πόλεώς τι τῆς Λεοντίνων χωρίον καλούμενον καταλαμβάνουσι καὶ Βρικιννίας ὂν ἔρυμα ἐν τῇ Λεοντίνῃ. καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου τότε ἐκπεσόντων οἱ πολλοὶ ἦλθον ὡς αὐτούς, καὶ καταστάντες ἐκ τῶν τειχῶν ἐπολέμουν. [5] ἃ πυνθανόμενοι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν Φαίακα πέμπουσιν, εἴ πως πείσαντες τοὺς σφίσιν ὄντας αὐτόθι ξυμμάχους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢν δύνωνται, Σικελιώτας κοινῇ ὡς Συρακοσίων δύναμιν περιποιουμένων ἐπιστρατεῦσαι, διασώσειαν τὸν δῆμον τῶν Λεοντίνων. [6] ὁ δὲ Φαίαξ

ἀφικόμενος τοὺς μὲν Καμαριναίους πείθει καὶ Ἀκραγαντίνους, ἐν δὲ Γέλᾳ ἀντιστάντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πράγματος οὐκέτι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔρχεται, αἰσθόμενος οὐκ ἂν πείθειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναχωρήσας διὰ τῶν Σικελῶν ἐς Κατάνην καὶ ἅμα ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ καὶ ἐς τὰς Βρικιννίας ἐλθὼν καὶ παραθαρσύνας ἀπέπλει.

5. ἐν δὲ τῇ παρακομιδῇ τῇ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀναχωρήσει καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ τισὶ πόλεσιν ἐχρημάτισε περὶ φιλίας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ Λοκρῶν ἐντυγχάνει τοῖς ἐκ Μεσσήνης ἐποίκοις ἐκπεπτωκόσιν, οἳ μετὰ τὴν τῶν Σικελιωτῶν ὁμολογίαν στασιασάντων Μεσσηνίων καὶ ἐπαγαγομένων τῶν ἑτέρων Λοκροὺς ἔποικοι ἐξεπέμφθησαν, καὶ ἐγένετο Μεσσήνη Λοκρῶν τινὰ χρόνον. [2] τούτοις οὖν ὁ Φαίαξ ἐντυχὼν τοῖς κομιζομένοις οὐκ ἠδίκησεν: ἐγεγένητο γὰρ τοῖς Λοκροῖς πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμολογία ξυμβάσεως πέρι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. [3] μόνοι γὰρ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅτε Σικελιῶται ξυνηλλάσσοντο, οὐκ ἐσπείσαντο Ἀθηναίοις, οὐδ᾽ ἂν τότε, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὺς κατεῖχεν ὁ πρὸς Ἱππωνιᾶς καὶ Μεδμαίους πόλεμος ὁμόρους τε ὄντας καὶ ἀποίκους. καὶ ὁ μὲν Φαίαξ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας χρόνῳ ὕστερον ἀφίκετο.

6. ὁ δὲ Κλέων ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς Τορώνης τότε περιέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν, ὁρμώμενος ἐκ τῆς Ἠιόνος Σταγίρῳ μὲν προσβάλλει Ἀνδρίων ἀποικίᾳ καὶ οὐχ εἶλε, Ἀληψὸν δὲ τὴν Θασίων ἀποικίαν λαμβάνει κατὰ κράτος. [2] καὶ πέμψας ὡς Περδίκκαν πρέσβεις, ὅπως παραγένοιτο στρατιᾷ κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν, καὶ ἐς τὴν Θρᾴκην ἄλλους παρὰ Πολλῆν τὸν Ὀδομάντων βασιλέα, ἄξοντας μισθοῦ Θρᾷκας ὡς πλείστους, αὐτὸς ἡσύχαζε περιμένων ἐν τῇ Ἠιόνι. [3] Βρασίδας δὲ πυνθανόμενος ταῦτα ἀντεκάθητο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Κερδυλίῳ: ἔστι δὲ τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο Ἀργιλίων ἐπὶ μετεώρου πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχον τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως, καὶ κατεφαίνετο πάντα αὐτόθεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν ὁρμώμενος ὁ Κλέων τῷ στρατῷ: ὅπερ προσεδέχετο ποιήσειν αὐτόν, ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν, ὑπεριδόντα σφῶν τὸ πλῆθος, τῇ παρούσῃ στρατιᾷ ἀναβήσεσθαι. [4] ἅμα δὲ καὶ παρεσκευάζετο Θρᾳκάς τε μισθωτοὺς πεντακοσίους

καὶ χιλίους, καὶ τοὺς Ἠδῶνας πάντας παρακαλῶν, πελταστὰς καὶ ἱππέας: καὶ Μυρκινίων καὶ Χαλκιδέων χιλίους πελταστὰς εἶχε πρὸς τοῖς ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει. [5] τὸ δ᾽ ὁπλιτικὸν ξύμπαν ἠθροίσθη δισχίλιοι μάλιστα καὶ ἱππῆς Ἕλληνες τριακόσιοι. τούτων Βρασίδας μὲν ἔχων ἐπὶ Κερδυλίῳ ἐκάθητο ἐς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει μετὰ Κλεαρίδου ἐτετάχατο.

7. ὁ δὲ Κλέων τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζεν, ἔπειτα ἠναγκάσθη ποιῆσαι ὅπερ ὁ Βρασίδας προσεδέχετο. [2] τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ἀχθομένων μὲν τῇ ἕδρᾳ, ἀναλογιζομένων δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου ἡγεμονίαν πρὸς οἵαν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τόλμαν μετὰ οἵας ἀνεπιστημοσύνης καὶ μαλακίας γενήσοιτο καὶ οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ξυνῆλθον, αἰσθόμενος τὸν θροῦν καὶ οὐ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καθημένους βαρύνεσθαι, ἀναλαβὼν ἦγεν. [3] καὶ ἐχρήσατο τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πύλον εὐτυχήσας ἐπίστευσέ τι φρονεῖν: ἐς μάχην μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἤλπισέν οἱ ἐπεξιέναι οὐδένα, κατὰ θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ χωρίου, καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμενεν, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, ἢν ἀναγκάζηται, περισχήσων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βίᾳ αἱρήσων τὴν πόλιν. [4] ἐλθών τε καὶ καθίσας ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ πρὸ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως τὸν στρατὸν αὐτὸς ἐθεᾶτο τὸ λιμνῶδες τοῦ Στρυμόνος καὶ τὴν θέσιν τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τῇ Θρᾴκῃ ὡς ἔχοι. [5] ἀπιέναι τε ἐνόμιζεν, ὁπόταν βούληται, ἀμαχεί: καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐφαίνετο οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους οὐδεὶς οὔτε κατὰ πύλας ἐξῄει, κεκλῃμέναι τε ἦσαν πᾶσαι. ὥστε καὶ μηχανὰς ὅτι οὐκ ἀνῆλθεν ἔχων, ἁμαρτεῖν ἐδόκει: ἑλεῖν γὰρ ἂν τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ ἐρῆμον.

8. ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας εὐθὺς ὡς εἶδε κινουμένους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καταβὰς καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ Κερδυλίου ἐσέρχεται ἐς τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν. [2] καὶ ἐπέξοδον μὲν καὶ ἀντίταξιν οὐκ ἐποιήσατο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, δεδιὼς τὴν αὐτοῦ παρασκευὴν καὶ νομίζων ὑποδεεστέρους εἶναι, οὐ τῷ πλήθει □ἀντίπαλα γάρ πως ἦν□, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀξιώματι □τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ὅπερ ἐστράτευε καθαρὸν ἐξῆλθε καὶ Λημνίων καὶ Ἰμβρίων τὸ κράτιστον □ , τέχνῃ δὲ παρεσκευάζετο

ἐπιθησόμενος. [3] εἰ γὰρ δείξειε τοῖς ἐναντίοις τό τε πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ὅπλισιν ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν τῶν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἡγεῖτο μᾶλλον περιγενέσθαι ἢ ἄνευ προόψεώς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος καταφρονήσεως. [4] ἀπολεξάμενος οὖν αὐτὸς πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν ὁπλίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Κλεαρίδᾳ προστάξας ἐβουλεύετο ἐπιχειρεῖν αἰφνιδίως πρὶν ἀπελθεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οὐκ ἂν νομίζων αὐτοὺς ὁμοίως ἀπολαβεῖν αὖθις μεμονωμένους, εἰ τύχοι ἐλθοῦσα αὐτοῖς ἡ βοήθεια.ξυγκαλέσας δὲ τοὺς πάντας στρατιώτας καὶ βουλόμενος παραθαρσῦναί τε καὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν φράσαι, ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

9. ‘ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, ἀπὸ μὲν οἵας χώρας ἥκομεν, ὅτι αἰεὶ διὰ τὸ εὔψυχον ἐλευθέρας, καὶ ὅτι Δωριῆς μέλλετε Ἴωσι μάχεσθαι, ὧν εἰώθατε κρείσσους εἶναι, ἀρκείτω βραχέως δεδηλωμένον: [2] τὴν δὲ ἐπιχείρησιν ᾧ τρόπῳ διανοοῦμαι ποιεῖσθαι, διδάξω, ἵνα μή τῳ τὸ κατ᾽ ὀλίγον καὶ μὴ ἅπαντας κινδυνεύειν ἐνδεὲς φαινόμενον ἀτολμίαν παράσχῃ. [3] τοὺς γὰρ ἐναντίους εἰκάζω καταφρονήσει τε ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐλπίσαντας ὡς ἂν ἐπεξέλθοι τις αὐτοῖς ἐς μάχην ἀναβῆναί τε πρὸς τὸ χωρίον καὶ νῦν ἀτάκτως κατὰ θέαν τετραμμένους ὀλιγωρεῖν. [4] ὅστις δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας ἁμαρτίας τῶν ἐναντίων κάλλιστα ἰδὼν καὶ ἅμα πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖται μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀντιπαραταχθέντος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ξυμφέροντος, πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοῖτο: [5] καὶ τὰ κλέμματα ταῦτα καλλίστην δόξαν ἔχει ἃ τὸν πολέμιον μάλιστ᾽ ἄν τις ἀπατήσας τοὺς φίλους μέγιστ᾽ ἂν ὠφελήσειεν. [6] ἕως οὖν ἔτι ἀπαράσκευοι θαρσοῦσι καὶ τοῦ ὑπαπιέναι πλέον ἢ τοῦ μένοντος, ἐξ ὧν ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἐν τῷ ἀνειμένῳ αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης καὶ πρὶν ξυνταθῆναι μᾶλλον τὴν δόξαν, ἐγὼ μὲν ἔχων τοὺς μετ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ φθάσας, ἢν δύνωμαι, προσπεσοῦμαι δρόμῳ κατὰ μέσον τὸ στράτευμα: [7] σὺ δέ, Κλεαρίδα, ὕστερον, ὅταν ἐμὲ ὁρᾷς ἤδη προσκείμενον καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς φοβοῦντα αὐτούς, τοὺς μετὰ σεαυτοῦ τούς τ᾽ Ἀμφιπολίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυμμάχους ἄγων αἰφνιδίως τὰς πύλας ἀνοίξας ἐπεκθεῖν καὶ ἐπείγεσθαι ὡς

τάχιστα ξυμμεῖξαι. [8] ἐλπὶς γὰρ μάλιστα αὐτοὺς οὕτω φοβηθῆναι: τὸ γὰρ ἐπιὸν ὕστερον δεινότερον τοῖς πολεμίοις τοῦ παρόντος καὶ μαχομένου. [9] καὶ αὐτός τε ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίγνου, ὥσπερ σε εἰκὸς ὄντα Σπαρτιάτην, καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, ἀκολουθήσατε ἀνδρείως, καὶ νομίσατε <τρία> εἶναι τοῦ καλῶς πολεμεῖν τὸ ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ <τὸ> τοῖς ἄρχουσι πείθεσθαι, καὶ τῇδε ὑμῖν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἢ ἀγαθοῖς γενομένοις ἐλευθερίαν τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμάχοις κεκλῆσθαι, ἢ Ἀθηναίων τε δούλοις, ἢν τὰ ἄριστα ἄνευ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ ἢ θανατώσεως πράξητε, καὶ δουλείαν χαλεπωτέραν ἢ πρὶν εἴχετε, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς Ἕλλησι κωλυταῖς γενέσθαι ἐλευθερώσεως. [10] ἀλλὰ μήτε ὑμεῖς μαλακισθῆτε, ὁρῶντες περὶ ὅσων ὁ ἀγών ἐστιν, ἐγώ τε δείξω οὐ παραινέσαι οἷός τε ὢν μᾶλλον τοῖς πέλας ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν.’

10. ὁ μὲν Βρασίδας τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν τήν τε ἔξοδον παρεσκευάζετο αὐτὸς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μετὰ τοῦ Κλεαρίδα καθίστη ἐπὶ τὰς Θρᾳκίας καλουμένας τῶν πυλῶν, ὅπως ὥσπερ εἴρητο ἐπεξίοιεν. [2] τῷ δὲ Κλέωνι, φανεροῦ γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ Κερδυλίου καταβάντος καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιφανεῖ οὔσῃ ἔξωθεν περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς θυομένου καὶ ταῦτα πράσσοντος, ἀγγέλλεται προυκεχωρήκει γὰρ τότε κατὰ τὴν θέαν ὅτι ἥ τε στρατιὰ ἅπασα φανερὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς πύλας ἵππων τε πόδες πολλοὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἐξιόντων ὑποφαίνονται. [3] ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας ἐπῆλθεν: καὶ ὡς εἶδεν, οὐ βουλόμενος μάχῃ διαγωνίσασθαι πρίν οἱ καὶ τοὺς βοηθοὺς ἥκειν καὶ οἰόμενος φθήσεσθαι ἀπελθών, σημαίνειν τε ἅμα ἐκέλευεν ἀναχώρησιν καὶ παρήγγειλε τοῖς ἀπιοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας, ὥσπερ μόνον οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν, ὑπάγειν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἠιόνος. [4] ὡς δ᾽ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει σχολὴ γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὰ γυμνὰ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους δοὺς ἀπῆγε τὴν στρατιάν. [5] κἀν τούτῳ Βρασίδας ὡς ὁρᾷ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων κινούμενον, λέγει τοῖς μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅτι ‘οἱ ἄνδρες ἡμᾶς οὐ μενοῦσιν. δῆλοι δὲ τῶν τε δοράτων τῇ κινήσει καὶ τῶν

κεφαλῶν: οἷς γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο γίγνηται, οὐκ εἰώθασι μένειν τοὺς ἐπιόντας. ἀλλὰ τάς τε πύλας τις ἀνοιγέτω ἐμοὶ ἃς εἴρηται, καὶ ἐπεξίωμεν ὡς τάχιστα θαρσοῦντες.’ [6] καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλας καὶ τὰς πρώτας τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὄντος ἐξελθὼν ἔθει δρόμῳ τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην εὐθεῖαν, ᾗπερ νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον τοῦ χωρίου ἰόντι τροπαῖον ἔστηκε, καὶ προσβαλὼν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις πεφοβημένοις τε ἅμα τῇ σφετέρᾳ ἀταξίᾳ καὶ τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ ἐκπεπληγμένοις κατὰ μέσον τὸ στράτευμα τρέπει. [7] καὶ ὁ Κλεαρίδας, ὥσπερ εἴρητο, ἅμα κατὰ τὰς Θρᾳκίας πύλας ἐπεξελθὼν τῷ στρατῷ ἐπεφέρετο. ξυνέβη τε τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ καὶ ἐξαπίνης ἀμφοτέρωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους θορυβηθῆναι, [8] καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον κέρας αὐτῶν τὸ πρὸς τὴν Ἠιόνα, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ προυκεχωρήκει, εὐθὺς ἀπορραγὲν ἔφευγεν: καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας ὑποχωροῦντος ἤδη αὐτοῦ ἐπιπαριὼν τῷ δεξιῷ τιτρώσκεται, καὶ πεσόντα αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ αἰσθάνονται, οἱ δὲ πλησίον ἄραντες ἀπήνεγκαν. [9] τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔμενέ [τε] μᾶλλον, καὶ ὁ μὲν Κλέων, ὡς τὸ πρῶτον οὐ διενοεῖτο μένειν, εὐθὺς φεύγων καὶ καταληφθεὶς ὑπὸ Μυρκινίου πελταστοῦ ἀποθνῄσκει, οἱ δὲ αὐτοῦ ξυστραφέντες ὁπλῖται ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον τόν τε Κλεαρίδαν ἠμύνοντο καὶ δὶς ἢ τρὶς προσβαλόντα, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν πρὶν ἥ τε Μυρκινία καὶ ἡ Χαλκιδικὴ ἵππος καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ περιστάντες καὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες αὐτοὺς ἔτρεψαν. [10] οὕτω δὴ τὸ στράτευμα πᾶν ἤδη τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυγὸν χαλεπῶς καὶ πολλὰς ὁδοὺς τραπόμενοι κατὰ ὄρη, ὅσοι μὴ διεφθάρησαν ἢ αὐτίκα ἐν χερσὶν ἢ ὑπὸ τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς ἵππου καὶ τῶν πελταστῶν, οἱ λοιποὶ ἀπεκομίσθησαν ἐς τὴν Ἠιόνα. [11] οἱ δὲ τὸν Βρασίδαν ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς μάχης καὶ διασώσαντες ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἔτι ἔμπνουν ἐσεκόμισαν: καὶ ᾔσθετο μὲν ὅτι νικῶσιν οἱ μεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ, οὐ πολὺ δὲ διαλιπὼν ἐτελεύτησεν. [12] καὶ ἡ ἄλλη στρατιὰ ἀναχωρήσασα μετὰ τοῦ Κλεαρίδου ἐκ τῆς διώξεως νεκρούς τε ἐσκύλευσε καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησεν.

11. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸν Βρασίδαν οἱ ξύμμαχοι πάντες ξὺν ὅπλοις ἐπισπόμενοι δημοσίᾳ ἔθαψαν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρὸ τῆς νῦν

ἀγορᾶς οὔσης: καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπολῖται, περιείρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον, ὡς ἥρωί τε ἐντέμνουσι καὶ τιμὰς δεδώκασιν ἀγῶνας καὶ ἐτησίους θυσίας, καὶ τὴν ἀποικίαν ὡς οἰκιστῇ προσέθεσαν, καταβαλόντες τὰ Ἀγνώνεια οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀφανίσαντες εἴ τι μνημόσυνόν που ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τῆς οἰκίσεως περιέσεσθαι, νομίσαντες τὸν μὲν Βρασίδαν σωτῆρά τε σφῶν γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἅμα τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμαχίαν φόβῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων θεραπεύοντες, τὸν δὲ Ἄγνωνα κατὰ τὸ πολέμιον τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως σφίσι ξυμφόρως οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἡδέως τὰς τιμὰς ἔχειν. [2] καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀπέδοσαν. ἀπέθανον δὲ Ἀθηναίων μὲν περὶ ἑξακοσίους, τῶν δ᾽ ἐναντίων ἑπτά, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐκ παρατάξεως, ἀπὸ δὲ τοιαύτης ξυντυχίας καὶ προεκφοβήσεως τὴν μάχην μᾶλλον γενέσθαι. [3] μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀναίρεσιν οἱ μὲν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀπέπλευσαν, οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Κλεαρίδου τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν καθίσταντο.

12. καὶ ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος Ῥαμφίας καὶ Αὐτοχαρίδας καὶ Ἐπικυδίδας Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία βοήθειαν ἦγον ἐνακοσίων ὁπλιτῶν, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχῖνι καθίσταντο ὅτι αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν. [2] ἐνδιατριβόντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἔτυχεν ἡ μάχη αὕτη γενομένη, καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

13. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς μέχρι μὲν Πιερίου τῆς Θεσσαλίας διῆλθον οἱ περὶ τὸν Ῥαμφίαν, κωλυόντων δὲ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν καὶ ἅμα Βρασίδου τεθνεῶτος, ᾧπερ ἦγον τὴν στρατιάν, ἀπετράποντο ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, νομίσαντες οὐδένα καιρὸν ἔτι εἶναι τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων ἥσσῃ ἀπεληλυθότων καὶ οὐκ ἀξιόχρεων αὐτῶν ὄντων δρᾶν τι ὧν κἀκεῖνος ἐπενόει. [2] μάλιστα δὲ ἀπῆλθον εἰδότες τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ὅτε ἐξῇσαν, πρὸς τὴν εἰρήνην μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην ἔχοντας.

14. ξυνέβη τε εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει μάχην καὶ τὴν Ῥαμφίου ἀναχώρησιν ἐκ θεσσαλίας ὥστε πολέμου μὲν μηδὲν ἔτι ἅψασθαι μηδετέρους, πρὸς δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι πληγέντες ἐπί τε τῷ Δηλίῳ

καὶ δι᾽ ὀλίγου αὖθις ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει, καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς ῥώμης πιστὴν ἔτι, ᾗπερ οὐ προσεδέχοντο πρότερον τὰς σπονδάς, δοκοῦντες τῇ παρούσῃ εὐτυχίᾳ καθυπέρτεροι γενήσεσθαι: [2] καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἅμα ἐδέδισαν σφῶν μὴ διὰ τὰ σφάλματα ἐπαιρόμενοι ἐπὶ πλέον ἀποστῶσι, μετεμέλοντό τε ὅτι μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πύλῳ καλῶς παρασχὸν οὐ ξυνέβησαν: [3] οἱ δ᾽ αὖ Λακεδαιμόνιοι παρὰ γνώμην μὲν ἀποβαίνοντος σφίσι τοῦ πολέμου, ἐν ᾧ ᾠόντο ὀλίγων ἐτῶν καθαιρήσειν τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν, εἰ τὴν γῆν τέμνοιεν, περιπεσόντες δὲ τῇ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορᾷ, οἵα οὔπω ἐγεγένητο τῇ Σπάρτῃ, καὶ λῃστευομένης τῆς χώρας ἐκ τῆς Πύλου καὶ Κυθήρων, αὐτομολούντων τε τῶν Εἱλώτων καὶ αἰεὶ προσδοκίας οὔσης μή τι καὶ οἱ ὑπομένοντες τοῖς ἔξω πίσυνοι πρὸς τὰ παρόντα σφίσιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον νεωτερίσωσιν. [4] ξυνέβαινε δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους αὐτοῖς τὰς τριακοντούτεις σπονδὰς ἐπ᾽ ἐξόδῳ εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλας οὐκ ἤθελον σπένδεσθαι οἱ Ἀργεῖοι εἰ μή τις αὐτοῖς τὴν Κυνουρίαν γῆν ἀποδώσει, ὥστ᾽ ἀδύνατα εἶναι ἐφαίνετο Ἀργείοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἅμα πολεμεῖν. τῶν τε ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεων ὑπώπτευόν τινας ἀποστήσεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους: ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο.

15. ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἀμφοτέροις αὐτοῖς λογιζομένοις ἐδόκει ποιητέα εἶναι ἡ ξύμβασις, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομίσασθαι: ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται αὐτῶν πρῶτοί τε καὶ † ὁμοίως † σφίσι ξυγγενεῖς. [2] ἤρξαντο μὲν οὖν καὶ εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἅλωσιν αὐτῶν πράσσειν, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὔπως ἤθελον, εὖ φερόμενοι, ἐπὶ τῇ ἴσῃ καταλύεσθαι. σφαλέντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῷ Δηλίῳ παραχρῆμα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, γνόντες νῦν μᾶλλον ἂν ἐνδεξαμένους, ποιοῦνται τὴν ἐνιαύσιον ἐκεχειρίαν, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει ξυνιόντας καὶ περὶ τοῦ πλέονος χρόνου βουλεύεσθαι.

16. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει ἦσσα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐγεγένητο καὶ ἐτεθνήκει Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδας, οἵπερ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μάλιστα ἠναντιοῦντο τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ὁ δὲ γενομένης

ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων, τότε δὴ ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ πόλει σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν Πλειστοάναξ τε ὁ Παυσανίου βασιλεὺς Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου, πλεῖστα τῶν τότε εὖ φερόμενος ἐν στρατηγίαις, πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον προυθυμοῦντο, Νικίας μὲν βουλόμενος, ἐν ᾧ ἀπαθὴς ἦν καὶ ἠξιοῦτο, διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐτυχίαν, καὶ ἔς τε τὸ αὐτίκα πόνων πεπαῦσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ τοὺς πολίτας παῦσαι καὶ τῷ μέλλοντι χρόνῳ καταλιπεῖν ὄνομα ὡς οὐδὲν σφήλας τὴν πόλιν διεγένετο, νομίζων ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου τοῦτο ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ὅστις ἐλάχιστα τύχῃ αὐτὸν παραδίδωσι, τὸ δὲ ἀκίνδυνον τὴν εἰρήνην παρέχειν, Πλειστοάναξ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν διαβαλλόμενος περὶ τῆς καθόδου, καὶ ἐς ἐνθυμίαν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰεὶ προβαλλόμενος ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ὁπότε τι πταίσειαν, ὡς διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου κάθοδον παρανομηθεῖσαν ταῦτα ξυμβαίνοι. [2] τὴν γὰρ πρόμαντιν τὴν ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπῃτιῶντο αὐτὸν πεῖσαι μετ᾽ Ἀριστοκλέους τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ὥστε χρῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπὶ πολὺ τάδε θεωροῖς ἀφικνουμένοις, Διὸς υἱοῦ ἡμιθέου τὸ σπέρμα ἐκ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀναφέρειν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀργυρέᾳ εὐλάκᾳ εὐλαξεῖν: [3] χρόνῳ δὲ προτρέψαι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους φεύγοντα αὐτὸν ἐς Λύκαιον διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ποτὲ μετὰ δώρων δοκήσεως ἀναχώρησιν, καὶ ἥμισυ τῆς οἰκίας τοῦ ἱεροῦ τότε τοῦ Διὸς οἰκοῦντα φόβῳ τῷ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἔτει ἑνὸς δέοντι εἰκοστῷ τοῖς ὁμοίοις χοροῖς καὶ θυσίαις καταγαγεῖν ὥσπερ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαίμονα κτίζοντες τοὺς βασιλέας καθίσταντο.

17. ἀχθόμενος οὖν τῇ διαβολῇ ταύτῃ καὶ νομίζων ἐν εἰρήνῃ μὲν οὐδενὸς σφάλματος γιγνομένου καὶ ἅμα τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιζομένων κἂν αὐτὸς τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀνεπίληπτος εἶναι, πολέμου δὲ καθεστῶτος αἰεὶ ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοὺς προύχοντας ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμφορῶν διαβάλλεσθαι, προυθυμήθη τὴν ξύμβασιν. [2] καὶ τόν τε χειμῶνα τοῦτον ᾖσαν ἐς λόγους καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔαρ ἤδη παρασκευή τε προεπανεσείσθη ἀπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων περιαγγελλομένη κατὰ πόλεις ὡς <ἐς > ἐπιτειχισμόν, ὅπως

οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἐσακούοιεν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῶν ξυνόδων ἅμα πολλὰς δικαιώσεις προενεγκόντων ἀλλήλοις ξυνεχωρεῖτο ὥστε ἃ ἑκάτεροι πολέμῳ ἔσχον ἀποδόντας τὴν εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι, Νίσαιαν δ᾽ ἔχειν Ἀθηναίους ἀνταπαιτούντων γὰρ Πλάταιαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἔφασαν οὐ βίᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμολογίᾳ αὐτῶν προσχωρησάντων καὶ οὐ προδόντων ἔχειν τὸ χωρίον, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ τὴν Νίσαιαν, τότε δὴ παρακαλέσαντες τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ξυμμάχους οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ ψηφισαμένων πλὴν Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων καὶ Ἠλείων καὶ Μεγαρέων τῶν ἄλλων ὥστε καταλύεσθαι τούτοις δὲ οὐκ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρασσόμενα , ποιοῦνται τὴν ξύμβασιν καὶ ἐσπείσαντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ὤμοσαν, ἐκεῖνοί τε πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, τάδε.

18. Σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι κατὰ τάδε, καὶ ὤμοσαν κατὰ πόλεις. [2] περὶμὲν τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν κοινῶν, θύειν καὶ ἰέναι καὶ μαντεύεσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀδεῶς. τὸ δ᾽ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν νεὼν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Δελφοὺς αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αὐτοδίκους καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἑαυτῶν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. [3] ἔτη δὲ εἶναι τὰς σπονδὰς πεντήκοντα Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀδόλους καὶ ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [4] ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῇ μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μήτε Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, μήτε τέχνῃ μήτε μηχανῇ μηδεμιᾷ. ἢν δέ τι διάφορον ᾖ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, δικαίῳ χρήσθων καὶ ὅρκοις, καθ᾽ ὅτι ἂν ξυνθῶνται. [5] ἀποδόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀμφίπολιν. ὅσας δὲ πόλεις παρέδοσαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίοις, ἐξέστω ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούλωνται αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντας: τὰς δὲ πόλεις φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ᾽ Ἀριστείδου αὐτονόμους εἶναι. ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν Ἀθηναίους

μηδὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἀποδιδόντων τὸν φόρον, ἐπειδὴ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο. εἰσὶ δὲ Ἄργιλος, Στάγιρος, Ἄκανθος, Σκῶλος, Ὄλυνθος, Σπάρτωλος. ξυμμάχους δ᾽ εἶναι μηδετέρων, μήτε Λακεδαιμονίων μήτε Ἀθηναίων: ἢν δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πείθωσι τὰς πόλεις, βουλομένας ταύτας ἐξέστω ξυμμάχους ποιεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις. [6] Μηκυβερναίους δὲ καὶ Σαναίους καὶ Σιγγαίους οἰκεῖν τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν, καθάπερ Ὀλύνθιοι καὶ Ἀκάνθιοι. [7] ἀποδόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Πάνακτον. ἀποδόντων δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι Λακεδαιμονίοις Κορυφάσιον καὶ Κύθηρα καὶ Μέθανα καὶ Πτελεὸν καὶ Ἀταλάντην καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ὅσοι εἰσὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων ἢ ἄλλοθί που ὅσης Ἀθηναῖοι ἄρχουσιν ἐν δημοσίῳ: καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σκιώνῃ πολιορκουμένους Πελοποννησίων ἀφεῖναι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσοι Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοι ἐν Σκιώνῃ εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσους Βρασίδας ἐσέπεμψε καὶ εἴ τις τῶν ξυμμάχων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἧς Ἀθηναῖοι ἄρχουσιν ἐν δημοσίῳ. ἀποδόντων δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι οὕστινας ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων κατὰ ταὐτά. [8] Σκιωναίων δὲ καὶ Τορωναίων καὶ Σερμυλιῶν καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλην πόλιν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, Ἀθηναίους βουλεύεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ὅτι ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς. [9] ὅρκους δὲ ποιήσασθαι Ἀθηναίους πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κατὰ πόλεις. ὀμνύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὅρκον ἑκάτεροι τὸν μέγιστον ἑπτὰ καὶ δέκα ἑκάστης πόλεως. ὁ δ᾽ ὅρκος ἔστω ὅδε: “ἐμμενῶ ταῖς ξυνθήκαις καὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖσδε δικαίως καὶ ἀδόλως.” ἔστω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὅρκος πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, [10] τὸν δὲ ὅρκον ἀνανεοῦσθαι κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀμφοτέρους. στήλας δὲ στῆσαι Ὀλυμπίασι καὶ Πυθοῖ καὶ Ἰσθμοῖ καὶ Ἀθήνησιν ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἐν Ἀμυκλαίῳ. [11] εἰ δέ τι ἀμνημονοῦσιν ὁποτεροιοῦν καὶ ὅτου πέρι, λόγοις δικαίοις χρωμένοις εὔορκον εἶναι ἀμφοτέροις ταύτῃ μεταθεῖναι ὅπῃ ἂν δοκῇ ἀμφοτέροις, Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις.

19. ‘ἄρχει δὲ τῶν σπονδῶν <ἐν μὲν Λακεδαίμονι> ἔφορος Πλειστόλας Ἀρτεμισίου μηνὸς τετάρτῃ φθίνοντος, ἐν δὲ Ἀθήναις ἄρχων Ἀλκαῖος Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος μηνὸς ἕκτῃ φθίνοντος. ὤμνυον δὲ οἵδε καὶ ἐσπένδοντο. [2] Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν <Πλειστοάναξ, Ἄγις,> Πλειστόλας, Δαμάγητος, Χίονις, Μεταγένης, Ἄκανθος, Δάιθος, Ἰσχαγόρας, Φιλοχαρίδας, Ζευξίδας, Ἄντιππος, Τέλλις, Ἀλκινάδας, Ἐμπεδίας, Μηνᾶς, Λάφιλος. Ἀθηναίων δὲ οἵδε. Λάμπων, Ἰσθμιόνικος, Νικίας, Λάχης, Εὐθύδημος, Προκλῆς, Πυθόδωρος, Ἄγνων, Μυρτίλος, Θρασυκλῆς, Θεαγένης, Ἀριστοκράτης, Ἰώλκιος, Τιμοκράτης, Λέων, Λάμαχος, Δημοσθένης.’

20. αὗται αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἅμα ἦρι, ἐκ Διονυσίων εὐθὺς τῶν ἀστικῶν, αὐτόδεκα ἐτῶν διελθόντων καὶ ἡμερῶν ὀλίγων παρενεγκουσῶν ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἡ ἐσβολὴ ἡ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦδε ἐγένετο. [2] σκοπείτω δέ τις κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους καὶ μὴ τῶν ἐκασταχοῦ ἢ ἀρχόντων ἢ ἀπὸ τιμῆς τινὸς ἐς τὰ προγεγενημένα σημαινόντων τὴν ἀπαρίθμησιν τῶν ὀνομάτων πιστεύσας μᾶλλον. οὐ γὰρ ἀκριβές ἐστιν, οἷς καὶ ἀρχομένοις καὶ μεσοῦσι καὶ ὅπως ἔτυχέ τῳ ἐπεγένετό τι. [3] κατὰ θέρη δὲ καὶ χειμῶνας ἀριθμῶν, ὥσπερ γέγραπται, εὑρήσει, ἐξ ἡμισείας ἑκατέρου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχοντος, δέκα μὲν θέρη, ἴσους δὲ χειμῶνας τῷ πρώτῳ πολέμῳ τῷδε γεγενημένους.

21. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δέ ἔλαχον γὰρ πρότεροι ἀποδιδόναι ἃ εἶχον τούς τε ἄνδρας εὐθὺς τοὺς παρὰ σφίσιν αἰχμαλώτους ἀφίεσαν καὶ πέμψαντες ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης πρέσβεις Ἰσχαγόραν καὶ Μηνᾶν καὶ Φιλοχαρίδαν ἐκέλευον τὸν Κλεαρίδαν τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν παραδιδόναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τὰς σπονδάς, ὡς εἴρητο ἑκάστοις, δέχεσθαι. [2] οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ ἤθελον, νομίζοντες οὐκ ἐπιτηδείας εἶναι: οὐδὲ ὁ Κλεαρίδας παρέδωκε τὴν πόλιν, χαριζόμενος τοῖς Χαλκιδεῦσι, λέγων ὡς οὐ δυνατὸς εἴη βίᾳ ἐκείνων παραδιδόναι. [3] ἐλθὼν δὲ αὐτὸς κατὰ τάχος μετὰ πρέσβεων αὐτόθεν ἀπολογησόμενός τε ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα, ἣν κατηγορῶσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἰσχαγόραν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπείθετο, καὶ

ἅμα βουλόμενος εἰδέναι εἰ ἔτι μετακινητὴ εἴη ἡ ὁμολογία, ἐπειδὴ ηὗρε κατειλημμένους, αὐτὸς μὲν πάλιν πεμπόντων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ κελευόντων μάλιστα μὲν καὶ τὸ χωρίον παραδοῦναι, εἰ δὲ μή, ὁπόσοι Πελοποννησίων ἔνεισιν ἐξαγαγεῖν, κατὰ τάχος ἐπορεύετο.

22. οἱ δὲ ξύμμαχοι ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι αὐτοὶ ἔτυχον ὄντες, καὶ αὐτῶν τοὺς μὴ δεξαμένους τὰς σπονδὰς ἐκέλευον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖσθαι. οἱ δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ προφάσει ᾗπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεώσαντο οὐκ ἔφασαν δέξεσθαι, ἢν μή τινας δικαιοτέρας τούτων ποιῶνται. [2] ὡς δ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐσήκουον, ἐκείνους μὲν ἀπέπεμψαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιοῦντο, νομίζοντες ἥκιστα ἂν σφίσι τούς τε Ἀργείους, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἤθελον Ἀμπελίδου καὶ Λίχου ἐλθόντων ἐπισπένδεσθαι νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων οὐ δεινοὺς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἡσυχάζειν: πρὸς γὰρ ἂν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, εἰ ἐξῆν, χωρεῖν. [3] παρόντων οὖν πρέσβεων ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ γενομένων λόγων ξυνέβησαν, καὶ ἐγένοντο ὅρκοι καὶ ξυμμαχία ἥδε.

23. ‘κατὰ τάδε ξύμμαχοι ἔσονται Λακεδαιμόνιοι <καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι> πεντήκοντα ἔτη. ἢν [δέ] τινες ἴωσιν ἐς τὴν γῆν πολέμιοι τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ κακῶς ποιῶσι Λακεδαιμονίους, ὠφελεῖν Ἀθηναίους Λακεδαιμονίους τρόπῳ ὁποίῳ ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: ἢν δὲ δῃώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων, καταλύειν δὲ ἅμα ἄμφω τὼ πόλεε. ταῦτα δ᾽ εἶναι δικαίως καὶ προθύμως καὶ ἀδόλως. [2] καὶ ἢν τινες ἐς τὴν Ἀθηναίων γῆν ἴωσι πολέμιοι καὶ κακῶς ποιῶσιν Ἀθηναίους, ὠφελεῖν Λακεδαιμονίους <Ἀθηναίους > τρόπῳ ὅτῳ ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: ἢν δὲ δῃώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων, καταλύειν δὲ ἅμα ἄμφω τὼ πόλεε. [3] ταῦτα δ᾽ εἶναι δικαίως καὶ προθύμως καὶ ἀδόλως. ἢν δὲ ἡ δουλεία ἐπανιστῆται, ἐπικουρεῖν Ἀθηναίους Λακεδαιμονίοις παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. [4] ὀμοῦνται δὲ ταῦτα οἵπερ καὶ τὰς

ἄλλας σπονδὰς ὤμνυον ἑκατέρων. ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ <τὸν ὅρκον> κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν ἰόντας ἐς Ἀθήνας πρὸς τὰ Διονύσια, Ἀθηναίους δὲ ἰόντας ἐς Λακεδαίμονα πρὸς τὰ Ὑακίνθια. [5] στήλην δὲ ἑκατέρους στῆσαι, τὴν μὲν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι παρ᾽ Ἀπόλλωνι ἐν Ἀμυκλαίῳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐν πόλει παρ᾽ Ἀθηνᾷ. [6] ἢν δέ τι δοκῇ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν περὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας, ὅτι ἂν δοκῇ, εὔορκον ἀμφοτέροις εἶναι.

24. ‘τὸν δὲ ὅρκον ὤμνυον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν οἵδε, Πλειστοάναξ, Ἄγις, Πλειστόλας, Δαμάγητος, Χίονις, Μεταγένης, Ἄκανθος, Δάιθος, Ἰσχαγόρας, Φιλοχαρίδας, Ζευξίδας, Ἄντιππος, Ἀλκινάδας, Τέλλις, Ἐμπεδίας, Μηνᾶς, Λάφιλος, Ἀθηναίων δὲ Λάμπων, Ἰσθμιόνικος, Λάχης, Νικίας, Εὐθύδημος, Προκλῆς, Πυθόδωρος, Ἄγνων, Μυρτίλος, Θρασυκλῆς, Θεαγένης, Ἀριστοκράτης, Ἰώλκιος, Τιμοκράτης, Λέων, Λάμαχος, Δημοσθένης.’ [2] αὕτη ἡ ξυμμαχία ἐγένετο μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἀπέδοσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ τὸ θέρος ἦρχε τοῦ ἑνδεκάτου ἔτους. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ δέκα ἔτη ὁ πρῶτος πόλεμος ξυνεχῶς γενόμενος γέγραπται.

25. μετὰ δὲ τὰς σπονδὰς καὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, αἳ ἐγένοντο μετὰ τὸν δεκέτη πόλεμον ἐπὶ Πλειστόλα μὲν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἐφόρου, Ἀλκαίου δ᾽ ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι, τοῖς μὲν δεξαμένοις αὐτὰς εἰρήνη ἦν, οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι καὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεών τινες διεκίνουν τὰ πεπραγμένα, καὶ εὐθὺς ἄλλη ταραχὴ καθίστατο τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα. [2] καὶ ἅμα καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου ὕποπτοι ἐγένοντο ἔστιν ἐν οἷς οὐ ποιοῦντες ἐκ τῶν ξυγκειμένων ἃ εἴρητο. [3] καὶ ἐπὶ ἓξ ἔτη μὲν καὶ δέκα μῆνας ἀπέσχοντο μὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἑκατέρων γῆν στρατεῦσαι, ἔξωθεν δὲ μετ᾽ ἀνοκωχῆς οὐ βεβαίου ἔβλαπτον ἀλλήλους τὰ μάλιστα: ἔπειτα μέντοι καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες λῦσαι τὰς μετὰ τὰ δέκα ἔτη σπονδὰς αὖθις ἐς πόλεμον φανερὸν κατέστησαν.

26. γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ἑξῆς, ὡς ἕκαστα ἐγένετο, κατὰ θέρη καὶ χειμῶνας, μέχρι οὗ τήν τε ἀρχὴν κατέπαυσαν τῶν Ἀθηναίων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατέλαβον. ἔτη δὲ ἐς τοῦτο τὰ ξύμπαντα ἐγένετο τῷ πολέμῳ ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι. [2] καὶ τὴν διὰ μέσου ξύμβασιν εἴ τις μὴ ἀξιώσει πόλεμον νομίζειν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δικαιώσει. τοῖς [τε] γὰρ ἔργοις ὡς διῄρηται ἀθρείτω, καὶ εὑρήσει οὐκ εἰκὸς ὂν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, ἐν ᾗ οὔτε ἀπέδοσαν πάντα οὔτ᾽ ἀπεδέξαντο ἃ ξυνέθεντο, ἔξω τε τούτων πρὸς τὸν Μαντινικὸν καὶ Ἐπιδαύριον πόλεμον καὶ ἐς ἄλλα ἀμφοτέροις ἁμαρτήματα ἐγένοντο καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ξύμμαχοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον πολέμιοι ἦσαν Βοιωτοί τε ἐκεχειρίαν δεχήμερον ἦγον. [3] ὥστε ξὺν τῷ πρώτῳ πολέμῳ τῷ δεκέτει καὶ τῇ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν ὑπόπτῳ ἀνοκωχῇ καὶ τῷ ὕστερον ἐξ αὐτῆς πολέμῳ εὑρήσει τις τοσαῦτα ἔτη, λογιζόμενος κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους, καὶ ἡμέρας οὐ πολλὰς παρενεγκούσας, καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ χρησμῶν τι ἰσχυρισαμένοις μόνον δὴ τοῦτο ἐχυρῶς ξυμβάν. [4] αἰεὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε μέμνημαι, καὶ ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου καὶ μέχρι οὗ ἐτελεύτησε, προφερόμενον ὑπὸ πολλῶν ὅτι τρὶς ἐννέα ἔτη δέοι γενέσθαι αὐτόν. [5] ἐπεβίων δὲ διὰ παντὸς αὐτοῦ αἰσθανόμενός τε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ προσέχων τὴν γνώμην, ὅπως ἀκριβές τι εἴσομαι: καὶ ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἔτη εἴκοσι μετὰ τὴν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν, καὶ γενομένῳ παρ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τοῖς Πελοποννησίων διὰ τὴν φυγήν, καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν μᾶλλον αἰσθέσθαι. [6] τὴν οὖν μετὰ τὰ δέκα ἔτη διαφοράν τε καὶ ξύγχυσιν τῶν σπονδῶν καὶ τὰ ἔπειτα ὡς ἐπολεμήθη ἐξηγήσομαι.

27. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αἱ πεντηκοντούτεις σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο καὶ ὕστερον ἡ ξυμμαχία, καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου πρεσβεῖαι, αἵπερ παρεκλήθησαν ἐς αὐτά, ἀνεχώρουν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος: [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀπῆλθον, Κορίνθιοι δὲ ἐς Ἄργος τραπόμενοι πρῶτον λόγους ποιοῦνται πρός τινας τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων Ἀργείων ὡς χρή, ἐπειδὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῆς

Πελοποννήσου σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους τοὺς πρὶν ἐχθίστους πεποίηνται, ὁρᾶν τοὺς Ἀργείους ὅπως σωθήσεται ἡ Πελοπόννησος καὶ ψηφίσασθαι τὴν βουλομένην πόλιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἥτις αὐτόνομός τέ ἐστι καὶ δίκας ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας δίδωσι, πρὸς Ἀργείους ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι ὥστε τῇ ἀλλήλων ἐπιμαχεῖν, ἀποδεῖξαι δὲ ἄνδρας ὀλίγους ἀρχὴν αὐτοκράτορας καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τοὺς λόγους εἶναι, τοῦ μὴ καταφανεῖς γίγνεσθαι τοὺς μὴ πείσαντας τὸ πλῆθος: ἔφασαν δὲ πολλοὺς προσχωρήσεσθαι μίσει τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι διδάξαντες ταῦτα ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου:

28. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων ἄνδρες ἀκούσαντες ἐπειδὴ ἀνήνεγκαν τοὺς λόγους ἔς τε τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὸν δῆμον, ἐψηφίσαντο Ἀργεῖοι καὶ ἄνδρας εἵλοντο δώδεκα, πρὸς οὓς τὸν βουλόμενον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι πλὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων: τούτων δὲ μηδετέροις ἐξεῖναι ἄνευ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀργείων σπείσασθαι. [2] ἐδέξαντό τε ταῦτα οἱ Ἀργεῖοι μᾶλλον ὁρῶντες τόν τε Λακεδαιμονίων σφίσι πόλεμον ἐσόμενον ἐπ᾽ ἐξόδῳ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτοὺς αἱ σπονδαὶ ἦσαν καὶ ἅμα ἐλπίσαντες τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἡγήσεσθαι: κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφοράς, οἵ τε Ἀργεῖοι ἄριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσιν, οὐ ξυναράμενοι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου, ἀμφοτέροις δὲ μᾶλλον ἔνσπονδοι ὄντες ἐκκαρπωσάμενοι. [3] οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀργεῖοι οὕτως ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προσεδέχοντο τοὺς ἐθέλοντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων,

29. Μαντινῆς δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν πρῶτοι προσεχώρησαν, δεδιότες τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον: ὥστε ἄσμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους ἐτράποντο, πόλιν τε μεγάλην νομίζοντες καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰεὶ διάφορον, δημοκρατουμένην τε ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοί. [2] ἀποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Πελοπόννησος ἐς θροῦν καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητέον τοῦτο,

νομίσαντες πλέον τέ τι εἰδότας μεταστῆναι αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἅμα δι᾽ ὀργῆς ἔχοντες, ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖς Ἀττικαῖς ἐγέγραπτο εὔορκον εἶναι προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν ὅτι ἂν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν πολέοιν δοκῇ, Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις. [3] τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ γράμμα μάλιστα τὴν Πελοπόννησον διεθορύβει καὶ ἐς ὑποψίαν καθίστη μὴ μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι δουλώσασθαι: δίκαιον γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ξυμμάχοις γεγράφθαι τὴν μετάθεσιν. [4] ὥστε φοβούμενοι οἱ πολλοὶ ὥρμηντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἕκαστοι ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι.

30. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τὸν θροῦν τοῦτον ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καθεστῶτα καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους διδασκάλους τε γενομένους καὶ αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας σπείσεσθαι πρὸς τὸ Ἄργος, πέμπουσι πρέσβεις ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον βουλόμενοι προκαταλαβεῖν τὸ μέλλον, καὶ ᾐτιῶντο τήν τε ἐσήγησιν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ εἰ Ἀργείοις σφῶν ἀποστάντες ξύμμαχοι ἔσονται, παραβήσεσθαί τε ἔφασαν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ὅρκους, καὶ ἤδη ἀδικεῖν ὅτι οὐ δέχονται τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδάς, εἰρημένον κύριον εἶναι ὅτι ἂν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ξυμμάχων ψηφίσηται, ἢν μή τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ. [2] Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν ξυμμάχων ὅσοι οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπονδάς [παρεκάλεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ πρότερον], ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἃ μὲν ἠδικοῦντο οὐ δηλοῦντες ἄντικρυς, ὅτι οὔτε Σόλλιον σφίσιν ἀπέλαβον παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίων οὔτε Ἀνακτόριον εἴ τέ τι ἄλλο ἐνόμιζον ἐλασσοῦσθαι, πρόσχημα δὲ ποιούμενοι τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης μὴ προδώσειν: ὀμόσαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὅρκους ἰδίᾳ τε, ὅτε μετὰ Ποτειδεατῶν τὸ πρῶτον ἀφίσταντο, καὶ ἄλλους ὕστερον. [3] οὔκουν παραβαίνειν τοὺς τῶν ξυμμάχων ὅρκους ἔφασαν οὐκ ἐσιόντες ἐς τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων σπονδάς: θεῶν γὰρ πίστεις ὀμόσαντες ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἂν εὐορκεῖν προδιδόντες αὐτούς. εἰρῆσθαι δ᾽ ὅτι ‘ἢν μὴ θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ:’ φαίνεσθαι οὖν σφίσι κώλυμα θεῖον τοῦτο. [4] καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν ὅρκων τοσαῦτα εἶπον, περὶ δὲ τῆς Ἀργείων ξυμμαχίας μετὰ τῶν φίλων βουλευσάμενοι ποιήσειν ὅτι ἂν δίκαιον ᾖ. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν

Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου: ἔτυχον δὲ παρόντες ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ Ἀργείων πρέσβεις, οἳ ἐκέλευον τοὺς Κορινθίους ἰέναι ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ μὴ μέλλειν: οἱ δὲ ἐς τὸν ὕστερον ξύλλογον αὐτοῖς τὸν παρὰ σφίσι προεῖπον ἥκειν.

31. ἦλθε δὲ καὶ Ἠλείων πρεσβεία εὐθὺς καὶ ἐποιήσατο πρὸς Κορινθίους ξυμμαχίαν πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ἐκεῖθεν ἐς Ἄργος ἐλθόντες, καθάπερ προείρητο, Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο. διαφερόμενοι γὰρ ἐτύγχανον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις περὶ Λεπρέου. [2] πολέμου γὰρ γενομένου ποτὲ πρὸς Ἀρκάδων τινὰς Λεπρεάταις καὶ Ἠλείων παρακληθέντων ὑπὸ Λεπρεατῶν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμισείᾳ τῆς γῆς καὶ λυσάντων τὸν πόλεμον Ἠλεῖοι τὴν γῆν νεμομένοις αὐτοῖς τοῖς Λεπρεάταις τάλαντον ἔταξαν τῷ Διὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ ἀποφέρειν. [3] καὶ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου ἀπέφερον, ἔπειτα παυσαμένων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου οἱ Ἠλεῖοι ἐπηνάγκαζον, οἱ δ᾽ ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ δίκης Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτραπείσης ὑποτοπήσαντες οἱ Ἠλεῖοι μὴ ἴσον ἕξειν ἀνέντες τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν Λερεατῶν τὴν γῆν ἔτεμον. [4] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐδίκασαν αὐτονόμους εἶναι Λεπρεάτας καὶ ἀδικεῖν Ἠλείους, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἐμμεινάντων τῇ ἐπιτροπῇ φρουρὰν ὁπλιτῶν ἐσέπεμψαν ἐς Λέπρεον. [5] οἱ δὲ Ἠλεῖοι νομίζοντες πόλιν σφῶν ἀφεστηκυῖαν δέξασθαι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τὴν ξυνθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ᾗ εἴρητο, ἃ ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἴσον ἔχοντες ἀφίστανται πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους, καὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, ὥσπερ προείρητο, καὶ οὗτοι ἐποιήσαντο. [6] ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι εὐθὺς μετ᾽ ἐκείνους καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης Χαλκιδῆς Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντες ἡσύχαζον, περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ νομίζοντες σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένοις ἧσσον ξύμφορον εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.

32. περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τούτου Σκιωναίους μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκπολιορκήσαντες ἀπέκτειναν

τοὺς ἡβῶντας, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἠνδραπόδισαν, καὶ τὴν γῆν Πλαταιεῦσιν ἔδοσαν νέμεσθαι, Δηλίους δὲ κατήγαγον πάλιν ἐς Δῆλον, ἐνθυμούμενοι τάς τε ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ξυμφορὰς καὶ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεοῦ χρήσαντος. [2] καὶ Φωκῆς καὶ Λοκροὶ ἤρξαντο πολεμεῖν. [3]καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι ἤδη ξύμμαχοι ὄντες ἔρχονται ἐς Τεγέαν ἀποστήσοντες Λακεδαιμονίων, ὁρῶντες μέγα μέρος ὂν καί, εἰ σφίσι προσγένοιτο, νομίζοντες ἅπασαν ἂν ἔχειν Πελοπόννησον. [4] ὡς δὲ οὐδὲν ἂν ἔφασαν ἐναντιωθῆναι οἱ Τεγεᾶται Λακεδαιμονίοις, οἱ Κορίνθιοι μέχρι τούτου προθύμως πράσσοντες ἀνεῖσαν τῆς φιλονικίας καὶ ὠρρώδησαν μὴ οὐδεὶς σφίσιν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων προσχωρῇ. [5] ὅμως δὲ ἐλθόντες ἐς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἐδέοντο σφῶν τε καὶ Ἀργείων γίγνεσθαι ξυμμάχους καὶ τἆλλα κοινῇ πράσσειν: τάς τε δεχημέρους ἐπισπονδάς, αἳ ἦσαν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Βοιωτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον γενόμεναι [τούτων] τῶν πεντηκοντουτίδων σπονδῶν, ἐκέλευον οἱ Κορίνθιοι τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας Ἀθήναζε καὶ σφίσι ποιῆσαι, [ὥσπερ Βοιωτοὶ εἶχον,] μὴ δεχομένων δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ σπένδεσθαι ἄνευ αὐτῶν. [6] Βοιωτοὶ δὲ δεομένων τῶν Κορινθίων περὶ μὲν τῆς Ἀργείων ξυμμαχίας ἐπισχεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευον, ἐλθόντες δὲ Ἀθήναζε μετὰ Κορινθίων οὐχ ηὕροντο τὰς δεχημέρους σπονδάς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπεκρίναντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Κορινθίοις εἶναι σπονδάς, εἴπερ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰσὶ ξύμμαχοι. [7] Βοιωτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀπεῖπον τὰς δεχημέρους, ἀξιούντων καὶ αἰτιωμένων Κορινθίων ξυνθέσθαι σφίσιν: Κορινθίοις δὲ ἀνοκωχὴ ἄσπονδος ἦν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους.

33. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους πανδημεὶ ἐστράτευσαν, Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου Λακεδαιμονίων Βασιλέως ἡγουμένου, τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἐς Παρρασίους, Μαντινέων ὑπηκόους ὄντας, κατὰ στάσιν ἐπικαλεσαμένων σφᾶς, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν Κυψέλοις τεῖχος ἀναιρήσοντες, ἢν δύνωνται, ὃ ἐτείχισαν Μαντινῆς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφρούρουν, ἐν τῇ Παρρασικῇ κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ Σκιρίτιδι τῆς

Λακωνικῆς. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν γῆν τῶν Παρρασίων ἐδῄουν, οἱ δὲ Μαντινῆς τὴν πόλιν Ἀργείοις φύλαξι παραδόντες αὐτοὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίδα ἐφρούρουν: ἀδύνατοι δ᾽ ὄντες διασῶσαι τό τε ἐν Κυψέλοις τεῖχος καὶ τὰς ἐν Παρρασίοις πόλεις ἀπῆλθον. [3] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τούς τε Παρρασίους αὐτονόμους ποιήσαντες καὶ τὸ τεῖχος καθελόντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

34. καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἤδη ἡκόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης μετὰ Βρασίδου ἐξελθόντων στρατιωτῶν, οὓς ὁ Κλεαρίδας μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς ἐκόμισεν, οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐψηφίσαντο τοὺς μὲν μετὰ Βρασίδου Εἵλωτας μαχεσαμένους ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ αὐτοὺς μετὰ τῶν νεοδαμωδῶν ἐς Λέπρεον κατέστησαν, κείμενον ἐπὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς καὶ τῆς Ἠλείας, ὄντες ἤδη διάφοροι Ἠλείοις: [2] τοὺς δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς νήσου ληφθέντας σφῶν καὶ τὰ ὅπλα παραδόντας, δείσαντες μή τι διὰ τὴν ξυμφορὰν νομίσαντες ἐλασσωθήσεσθαι καὶ ὄντες ἐπίτιμοι νεωτερίσωσιν, ἤδη καὶ ἀρχάς τινας ἔχοντας ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιάνδε ὥστε μήτε ἄρχειν μήτε πριαμένους τι ἢ πωλοῦντας κυρίους εἶναι. ὕστερον δὲ αὖθις χρόνῳ ἐπίτιμοι ἐγένοντο.

35. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους καὶ Θυσσὸν τὴν ἐν τῇ Ἄθῳ Ἀκτῇ Διῆς εἶλον, Ἀθηναίων οὖσαν ξύμμαχον. [2]καὶ τὸ θέρος τοῦτο πᾶν ἐπιμειξίαι μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις, ὑπώπτευον δὲ ἀλλήλους εὐθὺς μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ τὴν τῶν χωρίων ἀλλήλοις οὐκ ἀπόδοσιν. [3] τὴν γὰρ Ἀμφίπολιν πρότεροι λαχόντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀποδιδόναι καὶ τἆλλα οὐκ ἀπεδεδώκεσαν, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης παρεῖχον ξυμμάχους τὰς σπονδὰς δεχομένους οὐδὲ Βοιωτοὺς οὐδὲ Κορινθίους, λέγοντες αἰεὶ ὡς μετ᾽ Ἀθηναίων τούτους, ἢν μὴ ‘θέλωσι, κοινῇ ἀναγκάσουσιν: χρόνους τε προύθεντο ἄνευ ξυγγραφῆς ἐν οἷς χρῆν τοὺς μὴ ἐσιόντας ἀμφοτέροις πολεμίους εἶναι. [4] τούτων οὖν ὁρῶντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἔργῳ γιγνόμενον ὑπώπτευον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲν δίκαιον διανοεῖσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε Πύλον ἀπαιτούντων αὐτῶν

ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου δεσμώτας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες, τά τε ἄλλα χωρία εἶχον, μένοντες ἕως σφίσι κἀκεῖνοι ποιήσειαν τὰ εἰρημένα. [5] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ἔφασαν πεποιηκέναι: τοὺς γὰρ παρὰ σφίσι δεσμώτας ὄντας Ἀθηναίων ἀποδοῦναι καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης στρατιώτας ἀπαγαγεῖν καὶ εἴ του ἄλλου ἐγκρατεῖς ἦσαν: Ἀμφιπόλεως δὲ οὐκ ἔφασαν κρατεῖν ὥστε παραδοῦναι, Βοιωτοὺς δὲ πειράσεσθαι καὶ Κορινθίους ἐς τὰς σπονδὰς ἐσαγαγεῖν καὶ Πάνακτον ἀπολαβεῖν καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν Βοιωτοῖς αἰχμάλωτοι κομιεῖν. [6] πύλον μέντοι ἠξίουν σφίσιν ἀποδοῦναι: εἰ δὲ μή, Μεσσηνίους γε καὶ τοὺς Εἵλωτας ἐξαγαγεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης, Ἀθηναίους δὲ φρουρεῖν τὸ χωρίον αὐτούς, εἰ βούλονται. [7] πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ ἔπεισαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὥστε ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐκ Πύλου Μεσσηνίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Εἵλωτάς τε καὶ ὅσοι ηὐτομολήκεσαν ἐκ τῆς Λακωνικῆς: καὶ κατῴκισαν αὐτοὺς ἐν Κρανίοις τῆς Κεφαλληνίας. [8] τὸ μὲν οὖν θέρος τοῦτο ἡσυχία ἦν καὶ ἔφοδοι παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους.

36. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἔτυχον γὰρ ἔφοροι ἕτεροι καὶ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ὧν αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο ἄρχοντες ἤδη, καί τινες αὐτῶν καὶ ἐναντίοι <ταῖς> σπονδαῖς ἐλθουσῶν πρεσβειῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ξυμμαχίδος καὶ παρόντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων καὶ πολλὰ ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἰπόντων καὶ οὐδὲν ξυμβάντων, ὡς ἀπῆσαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς καὶ Κορινθίοις Κλεόβουλος καὶ Ξενάρης, οὗτοι οἵπερ τῶν ἐφόρων ἐβούλοντο μάλιστα διαλῦσαι τὰς σπονδάς, λόγους ποιοῦνται ἰδίους, παραινοῦντες ὅτι μάλιστα ταῦτά τε γιγνώσκειν καὶ πειρᾶσθαι Βοιωτούς, Ἀργείων γενομένους πρῶτον αὐτοὺς ξυμμάχους, αὖθις μετὰ Βοιωτῶν Ἀργείους Λακεδαιμονίοις ποιῆσαι ξυμμάχους οὕτω γὰρ ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν ἀναγασθῆναι Βοιωτοὺς ἐς τὰς Ἀττικὰς σπονδὰς ἐσελθεῖν: ἐλέσθαι γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίους πρὸ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἔχθρας καὶ διαλύσεως τῶν σπονδῶν Ἀργείους σφίσι φίλους καὶ ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι: τὸ γὰρ Ἄργος αἰεὶ ἠπίσταντο ἐπιθυμοῦντας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καλῶς σφίσι φίλιον

γενέσθαι, ἡγούμενοι τὸν ἔξω Πελοποννήσου πόλεμον ῥᾴω ἂν εἶναι. [2] τὸ μέντοι Πάνακτον ἐδέοντο Βοιωτοὺς ὅπως παραδώσουσι Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἵνα ἀντ᾽ αὐτοῦ Πύλον, ἣν δύνωνται, ἀπολαβόντες ῥᾷον καθιστῶνται Ἀθηναίοις ἐς πόλεμον.

37. καὶ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Κορίνθιοι ταῦτα ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπό τε τοῦ Ξενάρους καὶ Κλεοβούλου καὶ ὅσοι φίλοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὥστε ἀπαγγεῖλαι ἐπὶ τὰ κοινά, ἑκάτεροι ἀνεχώρουν. [2] Ἀργείων δὲ δύο ἄνδρες τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς μεγίστης ἐπετήρουν ἀπιόντας αὐτοὺς καθ᾽ ὁδὸν καὶ ξυγγενόμενοι ἐς λόγους ἦλθον, εἴ πως οἱ Βοιωτοὶ σφίσι ξύμμαχοι γένοιντο ὥσπερ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἠλεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς: νομίζειν γὰρ ἂν τούτου προχωρήσαντος ῥᾳδίως ἤδη καὶ πολεμεῖν καὶ σπένδεσθαι καὶ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, εἰ βούλοιντο, κοινῷ λόγῳ χρωμένους, καὶ εἴ τινα πρὸς ἄλλον δέοι. [3] τοῖς δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν πρέσβεσιν ἀκούουσιν ἤρεσκεν: κατὰ τύχην γὰρ ἐδέοντο τούτων ὧνπερ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος αὐτοῖς φίλοι ἐπεστάλκεσαν. καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀργείων ἄνδρες ὡς ᾔσθοντο αὐτοὺς δεχομένους τὸν λόγον, εἰπόντες ὅτι πρέσβεις πέμψουσιν ἐς Βοιωτοὺς ἀπῆλθον. [4] ἀφικόμενοι δὲ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπήγγειλαν τοῖς βοιωτάρχαις τά τε ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ξυγγενομένων Ἀργείων: καὶ οἱ βοιωτάρχαι ἠρέσκοντό τε καὶ πολλῷ προθυμότεροι ἦσαν, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρωθεν ξυνεβεβήκει αὐτοῖς τούς τε φίλους τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ἐς τὰ ὁμοῖα σπεύδειν. [5] καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον πρέσβεις παρῆσαν Ἀργείων τὰ εἰρημένα προκαλούμενοι: καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀπέπεμψαν ἐπαινέσαντες τοὺς λόγους οἱ βοιωτάρχαι καὶ πρέσβεις ὑποσχόμενοι ἀποστελεῖν περὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἐς Ἄργος.

38. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ἐδόκει πρῶτον τοῖς βοιωτάρχαις καὶ Κορινθίοις καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης πρέσβεσιν ὁμόσαι ὅρκους ἀλλήλοις ἦ μὴν ἕν τε τῷ παρατυχόντι ἀμυνεῖν τῷ δεομένῳ καὶ μὴ πολεμήσειν τῳ μηδὲ ξυμβήσεσθαι ἄνευ κοινῆς γνώμης, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Μεγαρέας τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐποίουν πρὸς τοὺς

Ἀργείους σπένδεσθαι. [2] πρὶν δὲ τοὺς ὅρκους γενέσθαι οἱ βοιωτάρχαι ἐκοίνωσαν ταῖς τέσσαρσι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ταῦτα, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσιν, καὶ παρῄνουν γενέσθαι ὅρκους ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅσαι βούλονται ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ σφίσι ξυνομνύναι. [3] οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ὄντες οὐ προσδέχονται τὸν λόγον, δεδιότες μὴ ἐναντία Λακεδαιμονίοις ποιήσωσι, τοῖς ἐκείνων ἀφεστῶσι Κορινθίοις ξυνομνύντες: οὐ γὰρ εἶπον αὐτοῖς οἱ βοιωτάρχαι τὰ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος, ὅτι τῶν τε ἐφόρων Κλεόβουλος καὶ Ξενάρης καὶ οἱ φίλοι παραινοῦσιν Ἀργείων πρῶτον καὶ Κορινθίων γενομένους ξυμμάχους ὕστερον μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων γίγνεσθαι, οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλήν, κἂν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν. [4] ὡς δὲ ἀντέστη τὸ πρᾶγμα, οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης πρέσβεις ἄπρακτοι ἀπῆλθον, οἱ δὲ βοιωτάρχαι μέλλοντες πρότερον, εἰ ταῦτα ἔπεισαν, καὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν πειράσεσθαι πρὸς Ἀργείους ποιεῖν, οὐκέτι ἐσήνεγκαν περὶ Ἀργείων ἐς τὰς βουλάς, οὐδὲ ἐς τὸ Ἄργος τοὺς πρέσβεις οὓς ὑπέσχοντο ἔπεμπον, ἀμέλεια δέ τις ἐνῆν καὶ διατριβὴ τῶν πάντων.

39. καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ Μηκύβερναν Ὀλύνθιοι, Ἀθηναίων φρουρούντων, ἐπιδραμόντες εἷλον. [2] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐγίγνοντο γὰρ αἰεὶ λόγοι τοῖς τε Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις περὶ ὧν εἶχον ἀλλήλων ἐλπίζοντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, εἰ Πάνακτον Ἀθηναῖοι παρὰ Βοιωτῶν ἀπολάβοιεν, κομίσασθαι ἂν αὐτοὶ Πύλον, ἦλθον ἐς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς πρεσβευόμενοι καὶ ἐδέοντο σφίσι Πάνακτόν τε καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων δεσμώτας παραδοῦναι, ἵνα ἀντ᾽ αὐτῶν Πύλον κομίσωνται. [3] οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀποδώσειν, ἢν μὴ σφίσι ξυμμαχίαν ἰδίαν ποιήσωνται ὥσπερ Ἀθηναίοις. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ εἰδότες μὲν ὅτι ἀδικήσουσιν Ἀθηναίους, εἰρημένον ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μήτε σπένδεσθαί τῳ μήτε πολεμεῖν, βουλόμενοι δὲ τὸ Πάνακτον παραλαβεῖν ὡς τὴν Πύλον ἀντ᾽ αὐτοῦ κομιούμενοι, καὶ ἅμα τῶν ξυγχέαι σπευδόντων τὰς σπονδὰς προθυμουμένων τὰ ἐς Βοιωτούς, ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τοῦ χειμῶνος τελευτῶντος ἤδη καὶ πρὸς ἔαρ:

καὶ τὸ Πάνακτον εὐθὺς καθῃρεῖτο. καὶ ἐνδέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

40. ἅμα δὲ τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους οἱ Ἀργεῖοι, ὡς οἵ τε πρέσβεις τῶν Βοιωτῶν οὓς ἔφασαν πέμψειν οὐχ ἥκον τό τε Πάνακτον ᾑσθοντο καθαιρούμενον καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἰδίαν γεγενημένην τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἔδεισαν μὴ μονωθῶσι καὶ ἐς Λακεδαιμονίους πᾶσα ἡ ξυμμαχία χωρήσῃ: [2] τοὺς γὰρ Βοιωτοὺς ᾤοντο πεπεῖσθαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τό τε Πάνακτον καθελεῖν καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδὰς ἐσιέναι, τούς τε Ἀθηναίους εἰδέναι ταῦτα, ὥστε οὐδὲ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἔτι σφίσιν εἶναι ξυμμαχίαν ποιήσασθαι, πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες ἐκ τῶν διαφορῶν, εἰ μὴ μείνειαν αὐτοῖς αἱ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους σπονδαί, τοῖς γοῦν Ἀθηναίοις ξύμμαχοι ἔσεσθαι. [3] ἀποροῦντες οὖν ταῦτα οἱ Ἀργεῖοι, καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Τεγεάταις, Βοιωτοῖς καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἅμα πολεμῶσι, πρότερον οὐ δεχόμενοι τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων σπονδάς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν φρονήματι ὄντες τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἡγήσεσθαι, ἔπεμπον ὡς ἐδύναντο τάχιστα ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις Εὔστροφον καὶ Αἴσωνα, οἳ ἐδόκουν προσφιλέστατοι αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἡγούμενοι ἐκ τῶν παρόντων κράτιστα πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι, ὅπῃ ἂν ξυγχωρῇ, ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν.

41. καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀφικόμενοι αὐτῶν λόγους ἐποιοῦντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἂν σφίσιν αἱ σπονδαὶ γίγνοιντο. [2] καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἠξίουν δίκης ἐπιτροπὴν σφίσι γενέσθαι ἢ ἐς πόλιν τινὰ ἢ ἰδιώτην περὶ τῆς Κυνουρίας γῆς, ἧς αἰεὶ πέρι διαφέρονται μεθορίας οὔσης ἔχει δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ Θυρέαν καὶ Ἀνθήνην πόλιν, νέμονται δ᾽ αὐτὴν Λακεδαιμόνιοι : ἔπειτα δ᾽ οὐκ ἐώντων Λακεδαιμονίων μεμνῆσθαι περὶ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ᾽, εἰ βούλονται σπένδεσθαι ὥσπερ πρότερον, ἑτοῖμοι εἶναι, οἱ Ἀργεῖοι πρέσβεις τάδε ὅμως ἐπηγάγοντο τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ξυγχωρῆσαι, ἐν μὲν τῷ παρόντι σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι ἔτη πεντήκοντα, ἐξεῖναι δ᾽ ὁποτεροισοῦν προκαλεσαμένοις, μήτε νόσου οὔσης μήτε πολέμου Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Ἄργει,

διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῆς γῆς ταύτης, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερόν ποτε ὅτε αὐτοὶ ἑκάτεροι ἠξίωσαν νικᾶν, διώκειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι περαιτέρω τῶν πρὸς Ἄργος καὶ Λακεδαίμονα ὅρων. [3] τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα, ἔπειτα ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος πάντως φίλιον ἔχειν ξυνεχώρησαν ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἠξίουν καὶ ξυνεγράψαντο. ἐκέλευον δ᾽ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρὶν τέλος τι αὐτῶν ἔχειν, ἐς τὸ Ἄργος πρῶτον ἐπαναχωρήσαντας αὐτοὺς δεῖξαι τῷ πλήθει, καὶ ἢν ἀρέσκοντα ᾖ, ἥκειν ἐς τὰ Ὑακίνθια τοὺς ὅρκους ποιησομένους. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνεχώρησαν:

42. ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ᾧ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ταῦτα ἔπρασσον, οἱ πρέσβεις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων Ἀνδρομένης καὶ Φαίδιμος καὶ Ἀντιμενίδας, οὓς ἔδει τὸ Πάνακτον καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς παρὰ Βοιωτῶν παραλαβόντας Ἀθηναίοις ἀποδοῦναι, τὸ μὲν Πάνακτον ὑπὸ τῶν Βοιωτῶν αὐτῶν καθῃρημένον ηὗρον, ἐπὶ προφάσει ὡς ἦσάν ποτε Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Βοιωτοῖς ἐκ διαφορᾶς περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅρκοι παλαιοὶ μηδετέρους οἰκεῖν τὸ χωρίον, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ νέμειν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄνδρας οὓς εἶχον αἰχμαλώτους Βοιωτοὶ Ἀθηναίων παραλαβόντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀνδρομένη ἐκόμισαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ἀπέδοσαν, τοῦ τε Πανάκτου τὴν καθαίρεσιν ἔλεγον αὐτοῖς, νομίζοντες καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδιδόναι: πολέμιον γὰρ οὐκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναίοις οἰκήσειν οὐδένα. [2] λεγομένων δὲ τούτων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεινὰ ἐποίουν, νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τοῦ τε Πανάκτου τῇ καθαιρέσει, ὃ ἔδει ὀρθὸν παραδοῦναι, καὶ πυνθανόμενοι ὅτι καὶ Βοιωτοῖς ἰδίᾳ ξυμμαχίαν πεποίηνται, φάσκοντες πρότερον κοινῇ τοὺς μὴ δεχομένους τὰς σπονδὰς προσαναγκάσειν. τά τε ἄλλα ἐσκόπουν ὅσα ἐξελελοίπεσαν τῆς ξυνθήκης καὶ ἐνόμιζον ἐξηπατῆσθαι, ὥστε χαλεπῶς πρὸς τοὺς πρέσβεις ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀπέπεμψαν.

43. κατὰ τοιαύτην δὴ διαφορὰν ὄντων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οἱ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις αὖ βουλόμενοι λῦσαι τὰς σπονδὰς εὐθὺς ἐνέκειντο. [2] ἦσαν δὲ ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ἔτι τότε ὢν νέος ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος: ᾧ ἐδόκει

μὲν καὶ ἄμεινον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους μᾶλλον χωρεῖν, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονικῶν ἠναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς σπονδάς, ἑαυτὸν κατά τε τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἢν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων διενοεῖτο ἀνανεώσασθαι. [3] πανταχόθεν τε νομίζων ἐλασσοῦσθαι τό τε πρῶτον ἀντεῖπεν, οὐ βεβαίους φάσκων εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα Ἀργείους σφίσι σπεισάμενοι ἐξέλωσι καὶ αὖθις ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίους μόνους ἴωσι, τούτου ἕνεκα σπένδεσθαι αὐτούς, καὶ τότε, ἐπειδὴ ἡ διαφορὰ ἐγεγένητο, πέμπει εὐθὺς ἐς Ἄργος ἰδίᾳ, κελεύων ὡς τάχιστα ἐπὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προκαλουμένους ἥκειν μετὰ Μαντινέων καὶ Ἠλείων, ὡς καιροῦ ὄντος καὶ αὐτὸς ξυμπράξων τὰ μάλιστα.

44. οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι ἀκούσαντες τῆς τε ἀγγελίας καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔγνωσαν οὐ μετ᾽ Ἀθηναίων πραχθεῖσαν τὴν τῶν Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς διαφορὰν μεγάλην καθεστῶτας αὐτοὺς πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, τῶν μὲν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι πρέσβεων, οἳ σφίσι περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν ἔτυχον ἀπόντες, ἠμέλουν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, νομίζοντες πόλιν τε σφίσι φιλίαν ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ καὶ δημοκρατουμένην ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην ἔχουσαν τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ξυμπολεμήσειν σφίσιν, ἢν καθιστῶνται ἐς πόλεμον. [2] ἔπεμπον οὖν εὐθὺς πρέσβεις ὡς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας: ξυνεπρεσβεύοντο δὲ καὶ Ἠλεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς. [3]ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις κατὰ τάχος, δοκοῦντες ἐπιτήδειοι εἶναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, Φιλοχαρίδας καὶ Λέων καὶ Ἔνδιος, δείσαντες μὴ τήν τε ξυμμαχίαν ὀργιζόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους ποιήσωνται, καὶ ἅμα Πύλον ἀπαιτήσοντες ἀντὶ Πανάκτου καὶ περὶ τῆς Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίας ἀπολογησόμενοι, ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐποιήσαντο.

45. καὶ λέγοντες ἐν τῇ βουλῇ περί τε τούτων καὶ ὡς αὐτοκράτορες ἥκουσι περὶ πάντων ξυμβῆναι τῶν διαφόρων, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐφόβουν μὴ καί, ἢν ἐς τὸν δῆμον ταῦτα

λέγωσιν, ἐπαγάγωνται τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀπωσθῇ ἡ Ἀργείων ξυμμαχία. [2] μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοιόνδε τι ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης: τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει πίστιν αὐτοῖς δούς, ἢν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν, Πύλον τε αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἀντιλέγειν καὶ τἆλλα ξυναλλάξειν. [3] βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε ἀποστῆσαι ταῦτα ἔπρασσε καὶ ὅπως ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὡς οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταὐτά, τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ. καὶ ἐγένετο οὕτως. [4] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐς τὸν δῆμον παρελθόντες καὶ ἐπερωτώμενοι οὐκ ἔφασαν ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ἠνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐσήκουόν τε καὶ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγόντες τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ξυμμάχους ποιεῖσθαι: σεισμοῦ δὲ γενομένου πρίν τι ἐπικυρωθῆναι, ἡ ἐκκλησία αὕτη ἀνεβλήθη.

46. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὁ Νικίας, καίπερ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων αὐτῶν ἠπατημένων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐξηπατημένος περὶ τοῦ μὴ αὐτοκράτορας ὁμολογῆσαι ἥκειν, ὅμως τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔφη χρῆναι φίλους μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπισχόντας τὰ πρὸς Ἀργείους πέμψαι ἔτι ὡς αὐτοὺς καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι διανοοῦνται, λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῷ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι: σφίσι μὲν γὰρ εὖ ἐστώτων τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἄριστον εἶναι διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐπραγίαν, ἐκείνοις δὲ δυστυχοῦσιν ὅτι τάχιστα εὕρημα εἶναι διακινδυνεῦσαι. [2] ἔπεισέ τε πέμψαι πρέσβεις, ὧν καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν, κελεύσοντας Λακεδαιμονίους, εἴ τι δίκαιον διανοοῦνται, Πάνακτόν τε ὀρθὸν ἀποδιδόναι καὶ Ἀμφίπολιν, καὶ τὴν Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίαν ἀνεῖναι, ἢν μὴ ἐς τὰς σπονδὰς ἐσίωσι, καθάπερ εἴρητο ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδενὶ ξυμβαίνειν. [3] εἰπεῖν τε ἐκέλευον ὅτι καὶ σφεῖς, εἰ ἐβούλοντο ἀδικεῖν, ἤδη ἂν Ἀργείους ξυμμάχους πεποιῆσθαι, ὡς παρεῖναί γ᾽ αὐτοὺς αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα. εἴ τέ τι ἄλλο ἐνεκάλουν, πάντα

ἐπιστείλαντες ἀπέπεμψαν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικίαν πρέσβεις. [4] καὶ ἀφικομένων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπαγγειλάντων τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τέλος εἰπόντων ὅτι εἰ μὴ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν ἀνήσουσι Βοιωτοῖς μὴ ἐσιοῦσιν ἐς τὰς σπονδάς, ποιήσονται καὶ αὐτοὶ Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ξυμμάχους, τὴν μὲν ξυμμαχίαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Βοιωτοῖς οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀνήσειν, ἐπικρατούντων τῶν περὶ τὸν Ξενάρη τὸν ἔφορον ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν, τοὺς δὲ ὅρκους δεομένου Νικίου ἀνενεώσαντο: ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ μὴ πάντα ἀτελῆ ἔχων ἀπέλθῃ καὶ διαβληθῇ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο, αἴτιος δοκῶν εἶναι τῶν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους σπονδῶν. [5] ἀναχωρήσαντός τε αὐτοῦ ὡς ἤκουσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος πεπραγμένον, εὐθὺς δι᾽ ὀργῆς εἶχον, καὶ νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔτυχον γὰρ παρόντες οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι παραγαγόντος Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐποιήσαντο σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τήνδε.

47. ‘σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο ἑκατὸν Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτη καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἠλεῖοι <πρὸς ἀλλήλους >, ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι, ἀδόλους καὶ ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [2] ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῇ μήτε Ἀργείους καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὧν ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι μήτε Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους <ὧν ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι> ἐπὶ Ἀργείους καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, τέχνῃ μηδὲ μηχανῇ μηδεμιᾷ. [3] κατὰ τάδε ξυμμάχους εἶναι Ἀθηναίους καὶ Ἀργείους καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ Ἠλείους ἑκατὸν ἔτη. ἢν πολέμιοι ἴωσιν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν Ἀθηναίων, βοηθεῖν Ἀργείους καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ Ἠλείους Ἀθήναζε, καθ᾽ ὅτι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, τρόπῳ ὁποίῳ ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: ἢν δὲ δῃώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Ἀργείοις καὶ Μαντινεῦσι καὶ Ἠλείοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἁπασῶν τῶν πόλεων τούτων: καταλύειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ταύτην τὴν πόλιν μηδεμιᾷ τῶν πόλεων, ἢν μὴ ἁπάσαις δοκῇ. [4] βοηθεῖν δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἐς Ἄργος καὶ Μαντίνειαν

καὶ Ἦλιν, ἢν πολέμιοι ἴωσιν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν Ἀργείων ἢ τὴν Μαντινέων ἢ τὴν Ἠλείων, καθ᾽ ὅτι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν αἱ πόλεις αὗται, τρόπῳ ὁποίῳ ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: ἢν δὲ δῃώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις καὶ Μαντινεῦσι καὶ Ἠλείοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἁπασῶν τούτων τῶν πόλεων: καταλύειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ταύτην τὴν πόλιν <μηδεμιᾷ τῶν πόλεων>, ἢν μὴ ἁπάσαις δοκῇ [ταῖς πόλεσιν]. [5] ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐᾶν ἔχοντας διιέναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ διὰ τῆς γῆς τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἕκαστοι, μηδὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἢν μὴ ψηφισαμένων τῶν πόλεων ἁπασῶν τὴν δίοδον εἶναι, Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἀργείων καὶ Μαντινέων καὶ Ἠλείων. [6] τοῖς δὲ βοηθοῦσιν ἡ πόλις ἡ πέμπουσα παρεχέτω μέχρι μὲν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν σῖτον, ἐπὴν ἔλθωσιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἐπαγγείλασαν βοηθεῖν, καὶ ἀπιοῦσι κατὰ ταὐτά: ἢν δὲ πλέονα βούληται χρόνον τῇ στρατιᾷ χρῆσθαι, ἡ πόλις ἡ μεταπεμψαμένη διδότω σῖτον, τῷ μὲν ὁπλίτῃ καὶ ψιλῷ καὶ τοξότῃ τρεῖς ὀβολοὺς Αἰγιναίους τῆς ἡμέρας ἑκάστης, τῷ δ᾽ ἱππεῖ δραχμὴν Αἰγιναίαν. [7] ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡ μεταπεμψαμένη <τῇ στρατιᾷ> τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχέτω, ὅταν ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς ὁ πόλεμος ᾖ: ἢν δέ ποι δόξῃ <ἁπάσαις > ταῖς πόλεσι κοινῇ στρατεύεσθαι, τὸ ἴσον τῆς ἡγεμονίας μετεῖναι ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν. [8] ὀμόσαι δὲ τὰς σπονδὰς Ἀθηναίους μὲν ὑπέρ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἠλεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τούτων κατὰ πόλεις ὀμνύντων. ὀμνύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὅρκον ἕκαστοι τὸν μέγιστον κατὰ ἱερῶν τελείων. ὁ δὲ ὅρκος ἔστω ὅδε: “ἐμμενῶ τῇ ξυμμαχίᾳ κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα δικαίως καὶ ἀβλαβῶς καὶ ἀδόλως, καὶ οὐ παραβήσομαι τέχνῃ οὐδὲ μηχανῇ οὐδεμιᾷ.” [9] ὀμνύντων δὲ Ἀθήνησι μὲν ἡ βουλὴ καὶ αἱ ἔνδημοι ἀρχαί, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ πρυτάνεις: ἐν Ἄργει δὲ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ οἱ ἀρτῦναι, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα: ἐν δὲ Μαντινείᾳ οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρχαί, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ θεωροὶ καὶ οἱ πολέμαρχοι: ἐν δὲ Ἤλιδι οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ

ἑξακόσιοι, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ οἱ θεσμοφύλακες. [10] ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ τοὺς ὅρκους Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἰόντας ἐς Ἦλιν καὶ ἐς Μαντίνειαν καὶ ἐς Ἄργος τριάκοντα ἡμέραις πρὸ Ὀλυμπίων, Ἀργείους δὲ καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ἰόντας Ἀθήναζε δέκα ἡμέραις πρὸ Παναθηναίων τῶν μεγάλων. [11] τὰς δὲ ξυνθήκας τὰς περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν καὶ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἀναγράψαι ἐν στήλῃ λιθίνῃ Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἐν πόλει, Ἀργείους δὲ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τῷ ἱερῷ, Μαντινέας δὲ ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τῷ ἱερῷ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ: καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκῆν κοινῇ Ὀλυμπίοις τοῖς νυνί. [12] ἐὰν δέ τι δοκῇ ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῖς πόλεσι ταύταις προσθεῖναι πρὸς τοῖς ξυγκειμένοις, ὅτι [δ᾽] ἂν δόξῃ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἁπάσαις κοινῇ βουλευομέναις, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι.’

48. αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ καὶ ἡ ξυμμαχία οὕτως ἐγένοντο, καὶ αἱ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἀπείρηντο τούτου ἕνεκα οὐδ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων. [2] Κορίνθιοι δὲ Ἀργείων ὄντες ξύμμαχοι οὐκ ἐσῆλθον ἐς αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ γενομένης πρὸ τούτου Ἠλείοις καὶ Ἀργείοις καὶ Μαντινεῦσι ξυμμαχίας, τοῖς αὐτοῖς πολεμεῖν καὶ εἰρήνην ἄγειν, οὐ ξυνώμοσαν, ἀρκεῖν δ᾽ ἔφασαν σφίσι τὴν πρώτην γενομένην ἐπιμαχίαν, ἀλλήλοις βοηθεῖν, ξυνεπιστρατεύειν δὲ μηδενί. [3] οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι οὕτως ἀπέστησαν τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πάλιν τὴν γνώμην εἶχον.

49. Ὀλύμπια δ᾽ ἐγένετο τοῦ θέρους τούτου, οἷς Ἀνδροσθένης Ἀρκὰς παγκράτιον τὸ πρῶτον ἐνίκα: καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦ ἱεροῦ ὑπὸ Ἠλείων εἴρχθησαν ὥστε μὴ θύειν μηδ᾽ ἀγωνίζεσθαι, οὐκ ἐκτίνοντες τὴν δίκην αὐτοῖς ἣν ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιακῷ νόμῳ Ἠλεῖοι κατεδικάσαντο αὐτῶν φάσκοντες <ἐς > σφᾶς ἐπὶ Φύρκον τε τεῖχος ὅπλα ἐπενεγκεῖν καὶ ἐς Λέπρεον αὐτῶν ὁπλίτας ἐν ταῖς Ὀλυμπιακαῖς σπονδαῖς ἐσπέμψαι. ἡ δὲ καταδίκη δισχίλιαι μναῖ ἦσαν, κατὰ τὸν ὁπλίτην ἕκαστον δύο μναῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ νόμος ἔχει. [2] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πρέσβεις πέμψαντες ἀντέλεγον μὴ δικαίως σφῶν καταδεδικάσθαι, λέγοντες μὴ ἐπηγγέλθαι πω ἐς Λακεδαίμονα τὰς σπονδάς, ὅτ᾽ ἐσέπεμψαν

τοὺς ὁπλίτας. [3] Ἠλεῖοι δὲ τὴν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐκεχειρίαν ἤδη ἔφασαν εἶναι □πρώτοις γὰρ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαγγέλλουσιν□, καὶ ἡσυχαζόντων σφῶν καὶ οὐ προσδεχομένων ὡς ἐν σπονδαῖς, αὐτοὺς λαθεῖν ἀδικήσαντας. [4] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπελάμβανον οὐ χρεὼν εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἐπαγγεῖλαι ἔτι ἐς Λακεδαίμονα, εἰ ἀδικεῖν γε ἤδη ἐνόμιζον αὐτούς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς νομίζοντας τοῦτο δρᾶσαι, καὶ ὅπλα οὐδαμόσε ἔτι αὐτοῖς ἐπενεγκεῖν. [5] Ἠλεῖοι δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου εἴχοντο, ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἀδικοῦσι μὴ ἂν πεισθῆναι, εἰ δὲ βούλονται σφίσι Λέπρεον ἀποδοῦναι, τό τε αὐτῶν μέρος ἀφιέναι τοῦ ἀργυρίου, καὶ ὃ τῷ θεῷ γίγνεται αὐτοὶ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ἐκτίσειν.

50. ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐσήκουον, αὖθις τάδε ἠξίουν, Λέπρεον μὲν μὴ ἀποδοῦναι, εἰ μὴ βούλονται, ἀναβάντας δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου, ἐπειδὴ προθυμοῦνται χρῆσθαι τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐπομόσαι ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἢ μὴν ἀποδώσειν ὕστερον τὴν καταδίκην. [2] ὡς δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἤθελον, Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἴργοντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ [θυσίας καὶ ἀγώνων] καὶ οἴκοι ἔθυον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἐθεώρουν πλὴν Λεπρεατῶν. [3] ὅμως δὲ οἱ Ἠλεῖοι δεδιότες μὴ βίᾳ θύσωσι, ξὺν ὅπλοις τῶν νεωτέρων φυλακὴν εἶχον: ἦλθον δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς, χίλιοι ἑκατέρων, καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἱππῆς, οἳ ἐν Ἀρπίνῃ ὑπέμενον τὴν ἑορτήν. [4] δέος δ᾽ ἐγένετο τῇ πανηγύρει μέγα μὴ ξὺν ὅπλοις ἔλθωσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ὑπὸ τῶν ῥαβδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς ἀγωνίσεως προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος δηλῶσαι ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἅρμα: ὥστε πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐπεφόβηντο πάντες καὶ ἐδόκει τι νέον ἔσεσθαι. οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἡσύχασάν τε καὶ ἡ ἑορτὴ αὐτοῖς οὕτω διῆλθεν. [5]ἐς δὲ Κόρινθον μετὰ τὰ Ὀλύμπια Ἀργεῖοί τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀφίκοντο δεησόμενοι αὐτῶν παρὰ σφᾶς ἐλθεῖν. καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις ἔτυχον παρόντες, καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων τέλος οὐδὲν ἐπράχθη, ἀλλὰ σεισμοῦ

γενομένου διελύθησαν ἕκαστοι ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

51. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Ἡρακλεώταις τοῖς ἐν Τραχῖνι μάχη ἐγένετο πρὸς Αἰνιᾶνας καὶ Δόλοπας καὶ Μηλιᾶς καὶ Θεσσαλῶν τινάς. [2] προσοικοῦντα γὰρ τὰ ἔθνη ταῦτα τῇ πόλει πολέμια ἦν: οὐ γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῃ τινὶ γῇ ἢ τῇ τούτων τὸ χωρίον ἐτειχίσθη. καὶ εὐθύς τε καθισταμένῃ τῇ πόλει ἠναντιοῦντο ἐς ὅσον ἐδύναντο φθείροντες καὶ τότε τῇ μάχῃ ἐνίκησαν τοὺς Ἡρακλεώτας, καὶ Ξενάρης ὁ Κνίδιος Λακεδαιμόνιος ἄρχων αὐτῶν ἀπέθανε, διεφθάρησαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ δωδέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

52. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου τὴν Ἡράκλειαν, ὡς μετὰ τὴν μάχην κακῶς ἐφθείρετο, Βοιωτοὶ παρέλαβον, καὶ Ἀγησιππίδαν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἄρχοντα ἐξέπεμψαν. δείσαντες δὲ παρέλαβον τὸ χωρίον μὴ Λακεδαιμονίων τὰ κατὰ Πελοπόννησον θορυβουμένων Ἀθηναῖοι λάβωσιν: Λακεδαιμόνιοι μέντοι ὠργίζοντο αὐτοῖς. [2] καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου στρατηγὸς ὢν Ἀθηναίων, Ἀργείων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ξυμπρασσόντων, ἐλθὼν ἐς Πελοπόννησον μετ᾽ ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων παραλαβὼν τά τε ἄλλα ξυγκαθίστη περὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν διαπορευόμενος Πελοπόννησον τῇ στρατιᾷ, καὶ Πατρέας τε τείχη καθεῖναι ἔπεισεν ἐς θάλασσαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἕτερον διενοεῖτο τειχίσαι ἐπὶ τῷ Ῥίῳ τῷ Ἀχαϊκῷ. Κορίνθιοι δὲ καὶ Σικυώνιοι, καὶ οἷς ἦν ἐν βλάβῃ τειχισθὲν βοηθήσαντες διεκώλυσαν.

53. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους Ἐπιδαυρίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις πόλεμος ἐγένετο, προφάσει μὲν περὶ τοῦ θύματος τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθαέως, ὃ δέον ἀπαγαγεῖν οὐκ ἀπέπεμπον ὑπὲρ βοταμίων Ἐπιδαύριοι κυριώτατοι δὲ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἦσαν Ἀργεῖοι: ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῆς αἰτίας τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον τῷ τε Ἀλκιβιάδῃ καὶ τοῖς Ἀργείοις προσλαβεῖν, ἢν δύνωνται, τῆς τε Κορίνθου ἕνεκα ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς Αἰγίνης βραχυτέραν ἔσεσθαι τὴν βοήθειαν ἢ Σκύλλαιον περιπλεῖν

τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. παρεσκευάζοντο οὖν οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ὡς αὐτοὶ ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον διὰ τοῦ θύματος τὴν ἔσπραξιν ἐσβαλοῦντες.

54. ἐξεστράτευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους πανδημεὶ ἐς Λεῦκτρα τῆς ἑαυτῶν μεθορίας πρὸς τὸ Λύκαιον, Ἄγιδος τοῦ Ἀρχιδάμου βασιλέως ἡγουμένου: ᾔδει δὲ οὐδεὶς ὅποι στρατεύουσιν, οὐδὲ αἱ πόλεις ἐξ ὧν ἐπέμφθησαν. [2] ὡς δ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὰ διαβατήρια θυομένοις οὐ προυχώρει, αὐτοί τε ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις περιήγγειλαν μετὰ τὸν μέλλοντα Καρνεῖος δ᾽ ἦν μήν, ἱερομηνία Δωριεῦσι παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς στρατευσομένους. [3] Ἀργεῖοι δ᾽ ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνείου μηνὸς ἐξελθόντες τετράδι φθίνοντος, καὶ ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν καὶ ἐδῄουν. [4] Ἐπιδαύριοι δὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπεκαλοῦντο: ὧν τινὲς οἱ μὲν τὸν μῆνα προυφασίσαντο, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς μεθορίαν τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας ἐλθόντες ἡσύχαζον.

55. καὶ καθ᾽ ὃν χρόνον ἐν τῇ Ἐπιδαύρῳ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἦσαν, ἐς Μαντίνειαν πρεσβεῖαι ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ξυνῆλθον, Ἀθηναίων παρακαλεσάντων. καὶ γιγνομένων λόγων Εὐφαμίδας ὁ Κορίνθιος οὐκ ἔφη τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις ὁμολογεῖν: σφεῖς μὲν γὰρ περὶ εἰρήνης ξυγκαθῆσθαι, τοὺς δ᾽ Ἐπιδαυρίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους μεθ᾽ ὅπλων ἀντιτετάχθαι: διαλῦσαι οὖν πρῶτον χρῆναι ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων ἐλθόντας τὰ στρατόπεδα, καὶ οὕτω πάλιν λέγειν περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης. [2] καὶ πεισθέντες ᾠχοντο καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ἀπήγαγον ἐκ τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας. ὕστερον δὲ ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ ξυνελθόντες οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἐδυνήθησαν ξυμβῆναι, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι πάλιν ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν ἐσέβαλον καὶ ἐδῄουν. [3] ἐξεστράτευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς Καρύας,καὶ ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἐνταῦθα τὰ διαβατήρια αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο, ἐπανεχώρησαν. [4] Ἀργεῖοι δὲ τεμόντες τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας ὡς τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. καὶ Ἀθηναίων αὐτοῖς χίλιοι ἐβοήθησαν ὁπλῖται καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης στρατηγός: πυθόμενος δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι, καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἔτι αὐτῶν ἔδει, ἀπῆλθεν. καὶ τὸ θέρος οὕτω διῆλθεν.

56. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Λακεδαιμόνιοι λαθόντες Ἀθηναίους φρουρούς τε τριακοσίους καὶ Ἀγησιππίδαν ἄρχοντα κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον ἐσέπεμψαν. [2] Ἀργεῖοι δ᾽ ἐλθόντες παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἐπεκάλουν ὅτι γεγραμμένον ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἑκάστους μὴ ἐᾶν πολεμίους διιέναι ἐάσειαν κατὰ θάλασσαν παραπλεῦσαι: καὶ εἰ μὴ κἀκεῖνοι ἐς Πύλον κομιοῦσιν ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους τοὺς Μεσσηνίους καὶ Εἵλωτας, ἀδικήσεσθαι αὐτοί. [3] Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδου πείσαντος τῇ μὲν Λακωνικῇ στήλῃ ὑπέγραψαν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνέμειναν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς ὅρκοις, ἐς δὲ Πύλον ἐκόμισαν τοὺς ἐκ Κρανίων Εἵλωτας λῄζεσθαι, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα ἡσύχαζον. [4] τὸν δὲ χειμῶνα τοῦτον πολεμούντων Ἀργείων καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίων μάχη μὲν οὐδεμία ἐγένετο ἐκ παρασκευῆς, ἐνέδραι δὲ καὶ καταδρομαί, ἐν αἷς ὡς τύχοιεν ἑκατέρων τινὲς διεφθείροντο. [5] καὶ τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος πρὸς ἔαρ ἤδη κλίμακας ἔχοντες οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον, ὡς ἐρήμου οὔσης διὰ τὸν πόλεμον βίᾳ αἱρήσοντες: καὶ ἄπρακτοι ἀπῆλθον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ τρίτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

57. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους μεσοῦντος Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἵ τε Ἐπιδαύριοι ξύμμαχοι ὄντες ἐταλαιπώρουν καὶ τἆλλα ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ τὰ μὲν ἀφειστήκει, τὰ δ᾽ οὐ καλῶς εἶχε, νομίσαντες, εἰ μὴ προκαταλήψονται ἐν τάχει, ἐπὶ πλέον χωρήσεσθαι αὐτά, ἐστράτευον αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ Εἵλωτες πανδημεὶ ἐπ᾽ Ἄργος: ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἆγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. [2] ξυνεστράτευον δ᾽ αὐτοῖς Τεγεᾶταί τε καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι Ἀρκάδων Λακεδαιμονίοις ξύμμαχοι ἦσαν. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Πελοποννήσου ξύμμαχοι καὶ οἱ ἔξωθεν ἐς Φλειοῦντα ξυνελέγοντο, Βοιωτοὶ μὲν πεντακισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται καὶ τοσοῦτοι ψιλοὶ καὶ ἱππῆς πεντακόσιοι καὶ ἄμιπποι ἴσοι, Κορίνθιοι δὲ δισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστοι, Φλειάσιοι δὲ πανστρατιᾷ, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων ἦν τὸ στράτευμα.

58. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ προαισθόμενοι τό τε πρῶτον τὴν παρασκευὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς τὸν Φλειοῦντα βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἄλλοις προσμεῖξαι ἐχώρουν, τότε δὴ ἐξεστράτευσαν καὶ αὐτοί: ἐβοήθησαν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ Μαντινῆς, ἔχοντες τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους, καὶ Ἠλείων τρισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται. [2] καὶ προϊόντες ἀπαντῶσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐν Μεθυδρίῳ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας. καὶ καταλαμβάνουσιν ἑκάτεροι λόφον: καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι ὡς μεμονωμένοις τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις παρεσκευάζοντο μάχεσθαι, ὁ δὲ Ἄγις τῆς νυκτὸς ἀναστήσας τὸν στρατὸν καὶ λαθὼν ἐπορεύετο ἐς Φλειοῦντα παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυμμάχους. [3] καὶ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι αἰσθόμενοι ἅμα ἕῳ ἐχώρουν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐς Ἄργος, ἔπειτα δὲ ᾗ προσεδέχοντο τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων καταβήσεσθαι, τὴν κατὰ Νεμέαν ὁδόν. [4] Ἄγις δὲ ταύτην μὲν ἣν προσεδέχοντο οὐκ ἐτράπετο, παραγγείλας δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀρκάσι καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίοις ἄλλην ἐχώρησε χαλεπὴν καὶ κατέβη ἐς τὸ Ἀργείων πεδίον: καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Πελληνῆς καὶ Φλειάσιοι ὄρθιον ἑτέραν ἐπορεύοντο: τοῖς δὲ Βοιωτοῖς καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι καὶ Σικυωνίοις εἴρητο τὴν ἐπὶ Νεμέας ὁδὸν καταβαίνειν, ᾗ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐκάθηντο, ὅπως, εἰ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἰόντες ἐς τὸ πεδίον βοηθοῖεν, ἐφεπόμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις χρῷντο. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν οὕτω διατάξας καὶ ἐσβαλὼν ἐς τὸ πεδίον ἐδῄου Σάμινθόν τε καὶ ἄλλα:

59. οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γνόντες ἐβοήθουν ἡμέρας ἤδη ἐκ τῆς Νεμέας, καὶ περιτυχόντες τῷ Φλειασίων καὶ Κορινθίων στρατοπέδῳ τῶν μὲν Φλειασίων ὀλίγους ἀπέκτειναν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν Κορινθίων αὐτοὶ οὐ πολλῷ πλείους διεφθάρησαν. [2] καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ οἱ Μεγαρῆς καὶ οἱ Σικυώνιοι ἐχώρουν, ὥσπερ εἴρητο αὐτοῖς, ἐπὶ τῆς Νεμέας, καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους οὐκέτι κατέλαβον, ἀλλὰ καταβάντες, ὡς ἑώρων τὰ ἑαυτῶν δῃούμενα, ἐς μάχην παρετάσσοντο. ἀντιπαρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. [3] ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ἀπειλημμένοι ἦσαν οἱ Ἀργεῖοι: ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πεδίου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εἶργον τῆς πόλεως καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, καθύπερθεν δὲ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Φλειάσιοι καὶ Πελληνῆς, τὸ δὲ πρὸς Νεμέας Βοιωτοὶ καὶ

Σικυώνιοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς. ἵπποι δὲ αὐτοῖς οὐ παρῆσαν: οὐ γάρ πω οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μόνοι τῶν ξυμμάχων ἦκον. [4]τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν Ἀργείων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων οὐχ οὕτω δεινὸν τὸ παρὸν ἐνόμιζον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν καλῷ ἐδόκει ἡ μάχη ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπειληφέναι ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν τε καὶ πρὸς τῇ πόλει. [5] τῶν δὲ Ἀργείων δύο ἄνδρες, Θράσυλός τε τῶν πέντε στρατηγῶν εἷς ὢν καὶ Ἀλκίφρων πρόξενος Λακεδαιμονίων, ἤδη τῶν στρατοπέδων ὅσον οὐ ξυνιόντων προσελθόντε Ἄγιδι διελεγέσθην μὴ ποιεῖν μάχην: ἑτοίμους γὰρ εἶναι Ἀργείους δίκας δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας, εἴ τι ἐπικαλοῦσιν Ἀργείοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰρήνην ἄγειν σπονδὰς ποιησαμένους.

60. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα εἰπόντες τῶν Ἀργείων ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν καὶ οὐ τοῦ πλήθους κελεύσαντος εἶπον: καὶ ὁ Ἄγις δεξάμενος τοὺς λόγους αὐτός, καὶ οὐ μετὰ τῶν πλεόνων οὐδὲ αὐτὸς βουλευσάμενος ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ κοινώσας τῶν ἐν τέλει ξυστρατευομένων, σπένδεται τέσσαρας μῆνας, ἐν οἷς ἔδει ἐπιτελέσαι αὐτοὺς τὰ ῥηθέντα. καὶ ἀπήγαγε τὸν στρατὸν εὐθύς, οὐδενὶ φράσας τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων. [2] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι εἵποντο μὲν ὡς ἡγεῖτο διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν αἰτίᾳ δ᾽ εἶχον κατ᾽ ἀλλήλους πολλῇ τὸν Ἄγιν, νομίζοντες ἐν καλῷ παρατυχὸν σφίσι ξυμβαλεῖν καὶ πανταχόθεν αὐτῶν ἀποκεκλῃμένων καὶ ὑπὸ ἱππέων καὶ πεζῶν οὐδὲν δράσαντες ἄξιον τῆς παρασκευῆς ἀπιέναι. [3] στρατόπεδον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο κάλλιστον Ἑλληνικὸν τῶν μέχρι τοῦδε ξυνῆλθεν: ὤφθη δὲ μάλιστα ἕως ἔτι ἦν ἀθρόον ἐν Νεμέᾳ, ἐν ᾧ Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε πανστρατιᾷ ἦσαν καὶ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Σικυώνιοι καὶ Πελληνῆς καὶ Φλειάσιοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς, καὶ οὗτοι πάντες λογάδες ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστων, ἀξιόμαχοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι οὐ τῇ Ἀργείων μόνον ξυμμαχίᾳ ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄλλῃ ἔτι προσγενομένῃ. [4] τὸ μὲν οὖν στρατόπεδον οὕτως ἐν αἰτίᾳ ἔχοντες τὸν Ἄγιν ἀνεχώρουν τε καὶ διελύθησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἕκαστοι, [5] Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ἐν πολλῷ πλέονι αἰτίᾳ εἶχον τοὺς σπεισαμένους ἄνευ τοῦ πλήθους, νομίζοντες κἀκεῖνοι μὴ ἂν σφίσι ποτὲ κάλλιον παρασχὸν Λακεδαιμονίους

διαπεφευγέναι: πρός τε γὰρ τῇ σφετέρᾳ πόλει καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων τὸν ἀγῶνα ἂν γίγνεσθαι. [6] τόν τε Θράσυλον ἀναχωρήσαντες ἐν τῷ Χαράδρᾳ, οὗπερ τὰς ἀπὸ στρατείας δίκας πρὶν ἐσιέναι κρίνουσιν, ἤρξαντο λεύειν. ὁ δὲ καταφυγὼν ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν περιγίγνεται: τὰ μέντοι χρήματα ἐδήμευσαν αὐτοῦ.

61. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Ἀθηναίων βοηθησάντων χιλίων ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τριακοσίων ἱππέων, ὧν ἐστρατήγουν Λάχης καὶ Νικόστρατος, οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ὅμως γὰρ τὰς σπονδὰς ὤκνουν λῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευον αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον οὐ προσῆγον βουλομένους χρηματίσαι, πρὶν δὴ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἠλεῖοι ἔτι γὰρ παρῆσαν κατηνάγκασαν δεόμενοι. [2] καὶ ἔλεγον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Ἀλκιβιάδου πρεσβευτοῦ παρόντος ἔν τε τοῖς Ἀργείοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις ταῦτα, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς αἱ σπονδαὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων καὶ γένοιντο, καὶ νῦν ἐν καιρῷ γὰρ παρεῖναι σφεῖς ἄπτεσθαι χρῆναι τοῦ πολέμου. [3] καὶ πείσαντες ἐκ τῶν λόγων τοὺς ξυμμάχους εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ Ὀρχομενὸν τὸν Ἀρκαδικὸν πάντες πλὴν Ἀργείων: οὗτοι δὲ ὅμως καὶ πεισθέντες ὑπελείποντο πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δ᾽ ὕστερον καὶ οὗτοι ἦλθον. [4] καὶ προσκαθεζόμενοι τὸν Ὀρχομενὸν πάντες ἐπολιόρκουν καὶ προσβολὰς ἐποιοῦντο, βουλόμενοι ἄλλως τε προσγενέσθαι σφίσι καὶ ὅμηροι ἐκ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἦσαν αὐτόθι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κείμενοι. [5] οἱ δὲ Ὀρχομένιοι δείσαντες τήν τε τοῦ τείχους ἀσθένειαν καὶ τοῦ στρατοῦ τὸ πλῆθος καί, ὡς οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς ἐβοήθει, μὴ προαπόλωνται, ξυνέβησαν ὥστε ξύμμαχοί τε εἶναι καὶ ὁμήρους σφῶν τε αὐτῶν δοῦναι Μαντινεῦσι καὶ οὓς κατέθεντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι παραδοῦναι.

62. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔχοντες ἤδη τὸν Ὀρχομενὸν ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐφ᾽ ὅτι χρὴ πρῶτον ἰέναι τῶν λοιπῶν. καὶ Ἠλεῖοι μὲν ἐπὶ Λέπρεον ἐκέλευον, Μαντινῆς δὲ ἐπὶ Τεγέαν: καὶ προσέθεντο οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Μαντινεῦσιν. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἠλεῖοι ὀργισθέντες ὅτι οὐκ ἐπὶ Λέπρεον ἐψηφίσαντο ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου: οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι παρεσκευάζοντο ἐν τῇ Μαντινείᾳ ὡς ἐπὶ Τεγέαν

ἰόντες. καί τινες αὐτοῖς καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνεδίδοσαν τὰ πράγματα.

63. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀνεχώρησαν ἐξ Ἄργους τὰς τετραμήνους σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι, Ἄγιν ἐν μεγάλῃ αἰτίᾳ εἶχον οὐ χειρωσάμενον σφίσιν Ἄργος, παρασχὸν καλῶς ὡς οὔπω πρότερον αὐτοὶ ἐνόμιζον: ἀθρόους γὰρ τοσούτους ξυμμάχους καὶ τοιούτους οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι λαβεῖν. [2] ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ περὶ Ὀρχομενοῦ ἠγγέλλετο ἐαλωκέναι, πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐχαλέπαινον καὶ ἐβούλευον εὐθὺς ὑπ᾽ ὀργῆς παρὰ τὸν τρόπον τὸν ἑαυτῶν ὡς χρὴ τήν τε οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ κατασκάψαι καὶ δέκα μυριάσι δραχμῶν ζημιῶσαι. [3] ὁ δὲ παρῃτεῖτο μηδὲν τούτων δρᾶν: ἔργῳ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ ῥύσεσθαι τὰς αἰτίας στρατευσάμενος, ἢ τότε ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ὅτι βούλονται. [4] οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ζημίαν καὶ τὴν κατασκαφὴν ἐπέσχον, νόμον δὲ ἔθεντο ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὃς οὔπω πρότερον ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς: δέκα γὰρ ἄνδρας Σπαρτιατῶν προσείλοντο αὐτῷ ξυμβούλους, ἄνευ ὧν μὴ κύριον εἶναι ἀπάγειν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως.

64. ἐν τούτῳ δ᾽ ἀφικνεῖται αὐτοῖς ἀγγελία παρὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐκ Τεγέας ὅτι, εἰ μὴ παρέσονται ἐν τάχει, ἀποστήσεται αὐτῶν Τεγέα πρὸς Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἀφέστηκεν. [2] ἐνταῦθα δὴ βοήθεια τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων γίγνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων πανδημεὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ οἷα οὔπω πρότερον. [3] ἐχώρουν δὲ ἐς Ὀρέσθειον τῆς Μαιναλίας: καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀρκάδων σφετέροις οὖσι ξυμμάχοις προεῖπον ἀθροισθεῖσιν ἰέναι κατὰ πόδας αὐτῶν ἐς Τεγέαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Ὀρεσθείου πάντες ἐλθόντες, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ τὸ ἕκτον μέρος σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀποπέμψαντες ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἦν, ὥστε τὰ οἴκοι φρουρεῖν, τῷ λοιπῷ στρατεύματι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Τεγέαν. καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀπ᾽ Ἀρκάδων παρῆσαν. [4] πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον καὶ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Φωκέας καὶ Λοκρούς, βοηθεῖν κελεύοντες κατὰ τάχος ἐς Μαντίνειαν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγου τε ἐγίγνετο, καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἦν μὴ ἀθρόοις καὶ ἀλλήλους περιμείνασι διελθεῖν τὴν πολεμίαν ξυνέκλῃε γὰρ

διὰ μέσου □ , ὅμως δὲ ἠπείγοντο. [5] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἀναλαβόντες τοὺς παρόντας Ἀρκάδων ξυμμάχους ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Μαντινικήν, καὶ στρατοπεδευσάμενοι πρὸς τῷ Ἡρακλείῳ ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν.

65. οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὡς εἶδον αὐτούς, καταλαβόντες χωρίον ἐρυμνὸν καὶ δυσπρόσοδον παρετάξαντο ὡς ἐς μάχην. [2] καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς αὐτοῖς ἐπῇσαν: καὶ μέχρι μὲν λίθου καὶ ἀκοντίου βολῆς ἐχώρησαν, ἔπειτα τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τις Ἄγιδι ἐπεβόησεν, ὁρῶν πρὸς χωρίον καρτερὸν ἰόντας σφᾶς, ὅτι διανοεῖται κακὸν κακῷ ἰᾶσθαι, δηλῶν τῆς ἐξ Ἄργους ἐπαιτίου ἀναχωρήσεως τὴν παροῦσαν ἄκαιρον προθυμίαν ἀνάληψιν βουλόμενον εἶναι. [3] ὁ δέ, εἴτε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐπιβόημα εἴτε καὶ αὐτῷ ἄλλο τι ἢ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δόξαν ἐξαίφνης, πάλιν τὸ στράτευμα κατὰ τάχος πρὶν ξυμμεῖξαι ἀπῆγεν. [4] καὶ ἀφικόμενος πρὸς τὴν Τεγεᾶτιν τὸ ὕδωρ ἐξέτρεπεν ἐς τὴν Μαντινικήν, περὶ οὗπερ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ βλάπτοντος ὁποτέρωσε ἂν ἐσπίπτῃ Μαντινῆς καὶ Τεγεᾶται πολεμοῦσιν. ἐβούλετο δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου βοηθοῦντας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος ἐκτροπήν, ἐπειδὰν πύθωνται, καταβιβάσαι [τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους] καὶ ἐν τῷ ὁμαλῷ τὴν μάχην ποιεῖσθαι. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην μείνας αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐξέτρεπεν: οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον καταπλαγέντες τῇ ἐξ ὀλίγου αἰφνιδίῳ αὐτῶν ἀναχωρήσει οὐκ εἶχον ὅτι εἰκάσωσιν: εἶτα ἐπειδὴ ἀναχωροῦντες ἐκεῖνοί τε ἀπέκρυψαν καὶ σφεῖς ἡσύχαζον καὶ οὐκ ἐπηκολούθουν, ἐνταῦθα τοὺς ἑαυτῶν στρατηγοὺς αὖθις ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶχον τό τε πρότερον καλῶς ληφθέντας πρὸς Ἄργει Λακεδαιμονίους ἀφεθῆναι καὶ νῦν ὅτι ἀποδιδράσκοντας οὐδεὶς ἐπιδιώκει, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν οἱ μὲν σῴζονται, σφεῖς δὲ προδίδονται. [6] οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ ἐθορυβήθησαν μὲν τὸ παραυτίκα, ὕστερον δὲ ἀπάγουσιν αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου καὶ προελθόντες ἐς τὸ ὁμαλὸν ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ὡς ἰόντες ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους.

66. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἵ τε Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ξυνετάξαντο, ὡς ἔμελλον μαχεῖσθαι, ἢν περιτύχωσιν: οἵ τε

Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος πρὸς τὸ Ἡράκλειον πάλιν ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον ἰόντες ὁρῶσι δι᾽ ὀλίγου τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐν τάξει τε ἤδη πάντας καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου προεληλυθότας. [2] μάλιστα δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς ὃ ἐμέμνηντο ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἐξεπλάγησαν. διὰ βραχείας γὰρ μελλήσεως ἡ παρασκευὴ αὐτοῖς ἐγίγνετο, καὶ εὐθὺς ὑπὸ σπουδῆς καθίσταντο ἐς κόσμον τὸν ἑαυτῶν, Ἄγιδος τοῦ βασιλέως ἕκαστα ἐξηγουμένου κατὰ τὸν νόμον. [3] βασιλέως γὰρ ἄγοντος ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου πάντα ἄρχεται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πολεμάρχοις αὐτὸς φράζει τὸ δέον, οἱ δὲ τοῖς λοχαγοῖς, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τοῖς πεντηκοντῆρσιν, αὖθις δ᾽ οὗτοι τοῖς ἐνωμοτάρχοις καὶ οὗτοι τῇ ἐνωμοτίᾳ. [4] καὶ αἱ παραγγέλσεις, ἤν τι βούλωνται, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ χωροῦσι καὶ ταχεῖαι ἐπέρχονται: σχεδὸν γάρ τι πᾶν πλὴν ὀλίγου τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντες ἀρχόντων εἰσί, καὶ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς τοῦ δρωμένου πολλοῖς προσήκει.

67. τότε δὲ κέρας μὲν εὐώνυμον Σκιρῖται αὐτοῖς καθίσταντο, αἰεὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν μόνοι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες: παρὰ δ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης Βρασίδειοι στρατιῶται καὶ νεοδαμώδεις μετ᾽ αὐτῶν: ἔπειτ᾽ ἤδη Λακεδαιμόνιοι αὐτοὶ ἑξῆς καθίστασαν τοὺς λόχους, καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς Ἀρκάδων Ἡραιῆς, μετὰ δὲ τούτους Μαινάλιοι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ κέρᾳ Τεγεᾶται καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ὀλίγοι τὸ ἔσχατον ἔχοντες, καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς αὐτῶν ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρῳ τῷ κέρᾳ. [2] Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν οὕτως ἐτάξαντο: οἱ δ᾽ ἐναντίοι αὐτοῖς δεξιὸν μὲν κέρας Μαντινῆς εἶχον, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων τὸ ἔργον ἐγίγνετο, παρὰ δ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀρκάδων ἦσαν, ἔπειτα Ἀργείων οἱ χίλιοι λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἄσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐχόμενοι αὐτῶν οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀργεῖοι, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν, Κλεωναῖοι καὶ Ὀρνεᾶται, ἔπειτα Ἀθηναῖοι ἔσχατοι τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας ἔχοντες, καὶ ἱππῆς μετ᾽ αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι.

68. τάξις μὲν ἥδε καὶ παρασκευὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἦν, τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων μεῖζον ἐφάνη. [2] ἀριθμὸν δὲ γράψαι ἢ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους ἑκατέρων ἢ ξύμπαντας οὐκ ἂν

ἐδυνάμην ἀκριβῶς: τὸ μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων πλῆθος διὰ τῆς πολιτείας τὸ κρυπτὸν ἠγνοεῖτο, τῶν δ᾽ αὖ διὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον κομπῶδες ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα πλήθη ἠπιστεῖτο. ἐκ μέντοι τοιοῦδε λογισμοῦ ἔξεστί τῳ σκοπεῖν τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τότε παραγενόμενον πλῆθος. [3] λόχοι μὲν γὰρ ἐμάχοντο ἑπτὰ ἄνευ Σκιριτῶν ὄντων ἑξακοσίων, ἐν δὲ ἑκάστῳ λόχῳ πεντηκοστύες ἦσαν τέσσαρες, καὶ ἐν τῇ πεντηκοστύι ἐνωμοτίαι τέσσαρες. τῆς τε ἐνωμοτίας ἐμάχοντο ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ζυγῷ τέσσαρες: ἐπὶ δὲ βάθος ἐτάξαντο μὲν οὐ πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς λοχαγὸς ἕκαστος ἐβούλετο, ἐπὶ πᾶν δὲ κατέστησαν ἐπὶ ὀκτώ. παρὰ δὲ ἅπαν πλὴν Σκιριτῶν τετρακόσιοι καὶ δυοῖν δέοντες πεντήκοντα ἄνδρες ἡ πρώτη τάξις ἦν.

69. ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνιέναι ἔμελλον ἤδη, ἐνταῦθα καὶ παραινέσεις καθ᾽ ἑκάστους ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων στρατηγῶν τοιαίδε ἐγίγνοντο, Μαντινεῦσι μὲν ὅτι ὑπέρ τε πατρίδος ἡ μάχη ἔσται καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς ἅμα καὶ δουλείας, τὴν μὲν μὴ πειρασαμένοις ἀφαιρεθῆναι, τῆς δὲ μὴ αὖθις πειρᾶσθαι: Ἀργείοις δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς τε παλαιᾶς ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῆς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ποτὲ ἰσομοιρίας μὴ διὰ παντὸς στερισκομένους ἀνέχεσθαι, καὶ ἄνδρας ἅμα ἐχθροὺς καὶ ἀστυγείτονας ὑπὲρ πολλῶν ἀδικημάτων ἀμύνασθαι: τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις καλὸν εἶναι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων ἀγωνιζομένους μηδενὸς λείπεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίους νικήσαντες τήν τε ἀρχὴν βεβαιοτέραν καὶ μείζω ἔξουσι καὶ οὐ μή ποτέ τις αὐτοῖς ἄλλος ἐς τὴν γῆν ἔλθῃ. [2] τοῖς μὲν Ἀργείοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις τοιαῦτα παρῃνέθη, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους τε καὶ μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὧν ἠπίσταντο τὴν παρακέλευσιν τῆς μνήμης ἀγαθοῖς οὖσιν ἐποιοῦντο, εἰδότες ἔργων ἐκ πολλοῦ μελέτην πλείω σῴζουσαν ἢ λόγων δι᾽ ὀλίγου καλῶς ῥηθεῖσαν παραίνεσιν.

70. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ ξύνοδος ἦν, Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐντόνως καὶ ὀργῇ χωροῦντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν ὁμοῦ ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ βαίνοντες

προσέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διασπασθείη αὐτοῖς ἡ τάξις, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς προσόδοις ποιεῖν.

71. ξυνιόντων δ᾽ ἔτι Ἄγις ὁ βασιλεὺς τοιόνδε ἐβουλεύσατο δρᾶσαι. τὰ στρατόπεδα ποιεῖ μὲν καὶ ἅπαντα τοῦτο: ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ κέρατα αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ξυνόδοις μᾶλλον ἐξωθεῖται, καὶ περιίσχουσι κατὰ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων εὐώνυμον ἀμφότεροι τῷ δεξιῷ, διὰ τὸ φοβουμένους προσστέλλειν τὰ γυμνὰ ἕκαστον ὡς μάλιστα τῇ τοῦ ἐν δεξιᾷ παρατεταγμένου ἀσπίδι καὶ νομίζειν τὴν πυκνότητα τῆς ξυγκλῄσεως εὐσκεπαστότατον εἶναι: καὶ ἡγεῖται μὲν τῆς αἰτίας ταύτης ὁ πρωτοστάτης τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως, προθυμούμενος ἐξαλλάσσειν αἰεὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γύμνωσιν, ἕπονται δὲ διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν φόβον καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. [2] καὶ τότε περιέσχον μὲν οἱ Μαντινῆς πολὺ τῷ κέρᾳ τῶν Σκιριτῶν, ἔτι δὲ πλέον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Τεγεᾶται τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅσῳ μεῖζον τὸ στράτευμα εἶχον. [3] δείσας δὲ Ἄγις μὴ σφῶν κυκλωθῇ τὸ εὐώνυμον, καὶ νομίσας ἄγαν περιέχειν τοὺς Μαντινέας, τοῖς μὲν Σκιρίταις καὶ Βρασιδείοις ἐσήμηνεν ἐπεξαγαγόντας ἀπὸ σφῶν ἐξισῶσαι τοῖς Μαντινεῦσιν, ἐς δὲ τὸ διάκενον τοῦτο παρήγγελλεν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως δύο λόχους τῶν πολεμάρχων Ἱπποκρατίδᾳ καὶ Ἀριστοκλεῖ ἔχουσι παρελθεῖν καὶ ἐσβαλόντας πληρῶσαι, νομίζων τῷ θ᾽ ἑαυτῶν δεξιῷ ἔτι περιουσίαν ἔσεσθαι καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Μαντινέας βεβαιότερον τετάξεσθαι.

72. ξυνέβη οὖν αὐτῷ ἅτε ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἐφόδῳ καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου παραγγείλαντι τόν τε Ἀριστοκλέα καὶ τὸν Ἱπποκράτην μὴ ‘θελῆσαι παρελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ αἰτίαμα ὕστερον φεύγειν ἐκ Σπάρτης δόξαντας μαλακισθῆναι, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους φθάσαι τῇ προσμείξει, καὶ κελεύσαντος αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τοὺς Σκιρίτας ὡς οὐ παρῆλθον οἱ λόχοι, πάλιν αὖ σφίσι προσμεῖξαι, μὴ δυνηθῆναι ἔτι μηδὲ τούτους ξυγκλῄσαι. [2] ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δὴ κατὰ πάντα τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλασσωθέντες τότε τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἔδειξαν οὐχ ἧσσον περιγενόμενοι. [3] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν χερσὶν ἐγίγνοντο τοῖς ἐναντίοις, τὸ μὲν τῶν Μαντινέων δεξιὸν τρέπει αὐτῶν τοὺς Σκιρίτας καὶ τοὺς Βρασιδείους, καὶ ἐσπεσόντες οἱ Μαντινῆς

καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων οἱ χίλιοι λογάδες κατὰ τὸ διάκενον καὶ οὐ ξυγκλῃσθὲν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους διέφθειρον καὶ κυκλωσάμενοι ἔτρεψαν καὶ ἐξέωσαν ἐς τὰς ἁμάξας καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τῶν ἐπιτεταγμένων ἀπέκτειναν τινας. [4] καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν ἡσσῶντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι: τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ στρατοπέδῳ καὶ μάλιστα τῷ μέσῳ, ᾗπερ ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἄγις ἦν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν οἱ τριακόσιοι ἱππῆς καλούμενοι, προσπεσόντες τῶν [τε] Ἀργείων τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις καὶ πέντε λόχοις ὠνομασμένοις καὶ Κλεωναίοις καὶ Ὀρνεάταις καὶ Ἀθηναίων τοῖς παρατεταγμένοις, ἔτρεψαν οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομείναντας, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπῄσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς ἐνδόντας καὶ ἔστιν οὓς καὶ καταπατηθέντας τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν.

73. ὡς δὲ ταύτῃ ἐνεδεδώκει τὸ τῶν Ἀργείων καὶ ξυμμάχων στράτευμα, παρερρήγνυντο ἤδη ἅμα καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερα, καὶ ἅμα τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Τεγεατῶν ἐκυκλοῦτο τῷ περιέχοντι σφῶν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν αὐτοὺς κίνδυνος περιειστήκει, τῇ μὲν κυκλουμένους, τῇ δὲ ἤδη ἡσσημένους. καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐταλαιπώρησαν, εἰ μὴ οἱ ἱππῆς παρόντες αὐτοῖς ὠφέλιμοι ἦσαν. [2] καὶ ξυνέβη τὸν Ἄγιν, ὡς ᾔσθετο τὸ εὐώνυμον σφῶν πονοῦντὸ κατὰ τοὺς Μαντινέας καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων τοὺς χιλίους, παραγγεῖλαι παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι χωρῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ νικώμενον. [3] καὶ γενομένου τούτου οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς παρῆλθε καὶ ἐξέκλινεν ἀπὸ σφῶν τὸ στράτευμα, καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν ἐσώθησαν καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων μετ᾽ αὐτῶν τὸ ἡσσηθέν: οἱ δὲ Μαντινῆς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων οἱ λογάδες οὐκέτι πρὸς τὸ ἐγκεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, ἀλλ᾽ ὁρῶντες τούς τε σφετέρους νενικημένους καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπιφερομένους ἐς φυγὴν ἐτράποντο. [4] καὶ τῶν μὲν Μαντινέων καὶ πλείους διεφθάρησαν, τῶν δὲ Ἀργείων λογάδων τὸ πολὺ ἐσώθη. ἡ μέντοι φυγὴ καὶ ἀποχώρησις οὐ βίαιος οὐδὲ μακρὰ ἦν: οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ τρέψαι χρονίους τὰς μάχας καὶ βεβαίους τῷ μένειν

ποιοῦνται, τρέψαντες δὲ βραχείας καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ τὰς διώξεις.

74. καὶ ἡ μὲν μάχη τοιαύτη καὶ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων ἐγένετο, πλείστου δὴ χρόνου μεγίστη δὴ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ ὑπὸ ἀξιολογωτάτων πόλεων ξυνελθοῦσα. [2] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προθέμενοι τῶν πολεμίων νεκρῶν τὰ ὅπλα τροπαῖον εὐθὺς ἵστασαν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐσκύλευον, καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀνείλοντο καὶ ἀπήγαγον ἐς Τεγέαν, οὗπερ ἐτάφησαν, καὶ τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν. [3] ἀπέθανον δὲ Ἀργείων μὲν καὶ Ὀρνεατῶν καὶ Κλεωναίων ἑπτακόσιοι, Μαντινέων δὲ διακόσιοι, καὶ Ἀθηναίων ξὺν Αἰγινήταις διακόσιοι καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀμφότεροι. Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ οἱ μὲν ξύμμαχοι οὐκ ἐταλαιπώρησαν ὥστε καὶ ἀξιόλογόν τι ἀπογενέσθαι: αὐτῶν δὲ χαλεπὸν μὲν ἦν τὴν ἀλήθειαν πυθέσθαι, ἐλέγοντο δὲ περὶ τριακοσίους ἀποθανεῖν.

75. τῆς δὲ μάχης μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι καὶ Πλειστοάναξ ὁ ἕτερος βασιλεὺς ἔχων τούς τε πρεσβυτέρους καὶ νεωτέρους ἐβοήθησε, καὶ μέχρι μὲν Τεγέας ἀφίκετο, πυθόμενος δὲ τὴν νίκην ἀπεχώρησεν. [2] καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Κορίνθου καὶ ἔξω Ἰσθμοῦ ξυμμάχους ἀπέστρεψαν πέμψαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναχωρήσαντες καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀφέντες ⸀Κάρνεια γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐτύγχανον ὄντα⸁ τὴν ἑορτὴν ἦγον. [3] καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τότε ἐπιφερομένην αἰτίαν ἔς τε μαλακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰν καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδυτῆτα ἐνὶ ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο, τύχῃ μέν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ὄντες. [4] τῇ δὲ προτέρᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ξυνέβη τῆς μάχης ταύτης καὶ τοὺς Ἐπιδαυρίους πανδημεὶ ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν ὡς ἐρῆμον οὖσαν καὶ τοὺς ὑπολοίπους φύλακας τῶν Ἀργείων ἐξελθόντων αὐτῶν διαφθεῖραι πολλούς. [5] καὶ Ἠλείων τρισχιλίων ὁπλιτῶν βοηθησάντων Μαντινεῦσιν ὕστερον τῆς μάχης καὶ Ἀθηναίων χιλίων πρὸς τοῖς προτέροις ἐστράτευσαν ἅπαντες οἱ ξύμμαχοι οὗτοι εὐθὺς ἐπὶ Ἐπίδαυρον, ἕως οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Κάρνεια ἦγον, καὶ διελόμενοι τὴν πόλιν

περιετείχιζον. [6] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐξεπαύσαντο, Ἀθηναῖοι δέ, ὥσπερ προσετάχθησαν, τὴν ἄκραν τὸ Ἡραῖον εὐθὺς ἐξειργάσαντο. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ξυγκαταλιπόντες ἅπαντες τῷ τειχίσματι φρουρὰν ἀνεχώρησαν κατὰ πόλεις ἕκαστοι. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

76. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἀρχομένου εὐθὺς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπειδὴ τὰ Κάρνεια ἦγαγον, ἐξεστράτευσαν, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Τεγέαν λόγους προύπεμπον ἐς τὸ Ἄργος ξυμβατηρίους. [2] ἦσαν δὲ αὐτοῖς πρότερόν τε ἄνδρες ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ βουλόμενοι τὸν δῆμον τὸν ἐν Ἄργει καταλῦσαι: καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἡ μάχη ἐγεγένητο, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐδύναντο πείθειν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐς τὴν ὁμολογίαν. ἐβούλοντο δὲ πρῶτον σπονδὰς ποιήσαντες πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους αὖθις ὕστερον καὶ ξυμμαχίαν, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη τῷ δήμῳ ἐπιτίθεσθαι. [3] καὶ ἀφικνεῖται πρόξενος ὢν Ἀργείων Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου παρὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δύο λόγω φέρων ἐς τὸ Ἄργος, τὸν μὲν καθ᾽ ὅτι εἰ βούλονται πολεμεῖν, τὸν δ᾽ ὡς εἰ εἰρήνην ἄγειν. καὶ γενομένης πολλῆς ἀντιλογίας ⟦ἔτυχε γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης παρών⟧ οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πράσσοντες, ἤδη καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τολμῶντες, ἔπεισαν τοὺς Ἀργείους προσδέξασθαι τὸν ξυμβατήριον λόγον. ἔστι δὲ ὅδε.

77. ‘καττάδε δοκεῖ τᾷ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμβαλέσθαι ποττὼς Ἀργείως, ἀποδιδόντας τὼς παῖδας τοῖς Ὀρχομενίοις καὶ τὼς ἄνδρας τοῖς Μαιναλίοις, καὶ τὼς ἄνδρας τὼς ἐν Μαντινείᾳ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀποδιδόντας, καὶ ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρω ἐκβῶντας καὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀναιρίοντας. [2] αἰ δέ κα μὴ εἴκωντι τοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρω, πολεμίως ἦμεν τοῖς Ἀργείοις καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμάχοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν Ἀργείων ξυμμάχοις. [3] καὶ αἴ τινα τοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι παῖδα ἔχοντι, ἀποδόμεν ταῖς πολίεσσι πάσαις. [4] περὶ δὲ τῶ σιῶ σύματος, αἰ μὲν λῆν, τοῖς Ἐπιδαυρίοις ὅρκον δόμεν, <αἰ> δέ, αὐτὼς ὀμόσαι. [5] τὰς δὲ πόλιας τὰς ἐν Πελοποννάσῳ, καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμως ἦμεν πάσας καττὰ πάτρια. [6] αἰ δέ κα τῶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσω τις ἐπὶ τὰν Πελοπόννασον γᾶν ἴῃ ἐπὶ κακῷ,

ἀλεξέμεναι ἀμόθι βωλευσαμένως, ὅπᾳ κα δικαιότατα δοκῇ τοῖς Πελοποννασίοις. [7] ὅσσοι δ᾽ ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσω τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοί ἐντι, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐσσίονται ἐν τῷπερ καὶ τοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τοὶ τῶν Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι ἐν τ<ῷ αὐτῷ ἐσσίονται ἐν τῷπερ καὶ τοὶ Ἀργεῖοι>, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες. [8] ἐπιδείξαντας δὲ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ξυμβαλέσθαι, αἴ κα αὐτοῖς δοκῇ. αἰ δέ τι δοκῇ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, οἴκαδ᾽ ἀπιάλλην.’

78. τοῦτον μὲν τὸν λόγον προσεδέξαντο πρῶτον οἱ Ἀργεῖοι, καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ στράτευμα ἀνεχώρησεν ἐκ τῆς Τεγέας ἐπ᾽ οἴκου: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐπιμειξίας οὔσης ἤδη παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους, οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἔπραξαν αὖθις οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄνδρες ὥστε τὴν Μαντινέων καὶ τὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἠλείων ξυμμαχίαν ἀφέντας Ἀργείους σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ποιήσασθαι πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἐγένοντο αἵδε.

79. ‘καττάδε ἔδοξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἦμεν πεντήκοντα ἔτη, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις δίκας διδόντας καττὰ πάτρια: ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλιες ταὶ ἐν Πελοποννάσῳ κοινανεόντων τᾶν σπονδᾶν καὶ τᾶς ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλιες, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες, καττὰ πάτρια δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας. [2] ὅσσοι δὲ ἔξω Πελοποννάσω Λακεδαιμονίοις ξύμμαχοί ἐντι, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐσσίονται τοῖσπερ καὶ τοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι: καὶ τοὶ τῶν Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐσσίονται τῷπερ καὶ τοὶ Ἀργεῖοι, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες. [3] αἰ δέ ποι στρατείας δέῃ κοινᾶς, βουλεύεσθαι Λακεδαιμονίως καὶ Ἀργείως ὅπᾳ κα δικαιότατα κρίναντας τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. [4] αἰ δέ τινι τᾶν πολίων ᾖ ἀμφίλλογα, ἢ τᾶν ἐντὸς ἢ τᾶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσω, αἴτε περὶ ὅρων αἴτε περὶ ἄλλω τινός, διακριθῆμεν. αἰ δέ τις τῶν ξυμμάχων πόλις πόλι ἐρίζοι, ἐς πόλιν ἐλθῆν ἄντινα ἴσαν ἀμφοῖν ταῖς πολίεσσι δοκείοι. τὼς δὲ ἔτας καττὰ πάτρια δικάζεσθαι.’

80. αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ καὶ ἡ ξυμμαχία αὕτη ἐγεγένητο: καὶ ὁπόσα ἀλλήλων πολέμῳ ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο εἶχον, διελύσαντο. κοινῇ δὲ ἤδη τὰ πράγματα τιθέμενοι ἐψηφίσαντο κήρυκα

καὶ πρεσβείαν παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίων μὴ προσδέχεσθαι, ἢν μὴ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἐξίωσι τὰ τείχη ἐκλιπόντες, καὶ μὴ ξυμβαίνειν τῳ μηδὲ πολεμεῖν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἅμα. [2] καὶ τά τε ἄλλα θυμῷ ἔφερον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία καὶ ὡς Περδίκκαν ἔπεμψαν ἀμφότεροι πρέσβεις, καὶ ἀνέπεισαν Περδίκκαν ξυνομόσαι σφίσιν. οὐ μέντοι εὐθύς γε ἀπέστη τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἀλλὰ διενοεῖτο, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ἐώρα: ἦν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐξ Ἄργους. καὶ τοῖς Χαλκιδεῦσι τούς τε παλαιοὺς ὅρκους ἀνενεώσαντο καὶ ἄλλους ὤμοσαν. [3] ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ Ἀργεῖοι πρέσβεις, τὸ ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου τεῖχος κελεύοντες ἐκλιπεῖν. οἱ δ᾽ ὁρῶντες ὀλίγοι πρὸς πλείους ὄντες τοὺς ξυμφύλακας, ἔπεμψαν Δημοσθένη τοὺς σφετέρους ἐξάξοντα. ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος καὶ ἀγῶνά τινα πρόφασιν γυμνικὸν ἔξω τοῦ φρουρίου ποιήσας, ὡς ἐξῆλθε τὸ ἄλλο φρούριον, ἀπέκλῃσε τὰς πύλας: καὶ ὕστερον Ἐπιδαυρίοις ἀνανεωσάμενοι τὰς σπονδὰς αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τείχισμα.

81. μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων ἀπόστασιν ἐκ τῆς ξυμμαχίας καὶ οἱ Μαντινῆς, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντέχοντες, ἔπειτ᾽ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἄνευ τῶν Ἀργείων, ξυνέβησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφεῖσαν τῶν πόλεων. [2] καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, χίλιοι ἑκάτεροι, ξυστρατεύσαντες τά τ᾽ ἐν Σικυῶνι ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον κατέστησαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλθόντες, καὶ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ξυναμφότεροι ἤδη καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἄργει δῆμον κατέλυσαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχία ἐπιτηδεία τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατέστη. καὶ πρὸς ἔαρ ἤδη ταῦτα ἦν τοῦ χειμῶνος λήγοντος, καὶ τέταρτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

82. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους Διῆς τε οἱ ἐν Ἄθῳ ἀπέστησαν Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Χαλκιδέας, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ ἐν Ἀχαΐᾳ οὐκ ἐπιτηδείως πρότερον ἔχοντα καθίσταντο. [2]καὶ Ἀργείων ὁ δῆμος κατ᾽ ὀλίγον ξυνιστάμενός τε καὶ ἀναθαρσήσας ἐπέθεντο τοῖς ὀλίγοις, τηρήσαντες αὐτὰς τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων: καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπεκράτησεν ὁ δῆμος, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε,

τοὺς δὲ ἐξήλασεν. [3] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὺς μετεπέμποντο οἱ φίλοι, οὐκ ἦλθον ἐκ πλέονος, ἀναβαλόμενοι δὲ τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας ἐβοήθουν. καὶ ἐν Τεγέᾳ πυθόμενοι ὅτι νενίκηνται οἱ ὀλίγοι, προελθεῖν μὲν οὐκέτι ἠθέλησαν δεομένων τῶν διαπεφευγότων, ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἐπ᾽ οἴκου τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας ἦγον. [4] καὶ ὕστερον ἐλθόντων πρέσβεων ἀπό τε τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει [ἀγγέλων] καὶ τῶν ἔξω Ἀργείων, παρόντων τε τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ῥηθέντων πολλῶν ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων ἔγνωσαν μὲν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς στρατεύειν ἐς Ἄργος, διατριβαὶ δὲ καὶ μελλήσεις ἐγίγνοντο. [5] ὁ δὲ δῆμος τῶν Ἀργείων ἐν τούτῳ φοβούμενος τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίαν πάλιν προσαγόμενός τε καὶ νομίζων μέγιστον ἂν σφᾶς ὠφελῆσαι, τειχίζει μακρὰ τείχη ἐς θάλασσαν, ὅπως, ἢν τῆς γῆς εἴργωνται, ἡ κατὰ θάλασσαν σφᾶς μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ὠφελῇ. [6] ξυνῄδεσαν δὲ τὸν τειχισμὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ τινὲς πόλεων. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανδημεί, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ οἰκέται, ἐτείχιζον: καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὐτοῖς ἦλθον τέκτονες καὶ λιθουργοί. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

83. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὡς ᾔσθοντο τειχιζόντων, ἐστράτευσαν ἐς τὸ Ἄργος αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πλὴν Κορινθίων: ὑπῆρχε δέ τι αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἄργους αὐτόθεν πρασσόμενον. ἦγε δὲ τὴν στρατιὰν Ἄγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. [2] καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως δοκοῦντα προϋπάρχειν οὐ προυχώρησεν ἔτι: τὰ δὲ οἰκοδομούμενα τείχη ἑλόντες καὶ καταβαλόντες καὶ Ὑσιὰς χωρίον τῆς Ἀργείας λαβόντες καὶ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἅπαντας οὓς ἔλαβον ἀποκτείναντες ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις. [3] ἐστράτευσαν δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ Ἀργεῖοι ἐς τὴν Φλειασίαν καὶ δῃώσαντες ἀπῆλθον, ὅτι σφῶν τοὺς φυγάδας ὑπεδέχοντο: οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα κατῴκηντο. [4] κατέκλῃσαν δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Μακεδόνας Ἀθηναῖοι, Περδίκκᾳ ἐπικαλοῦντες τήν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους γενομένην ξυνωμοσίαν, καὶ ὅτι παρασκευασαμένων αὐτῶν στρατιὰν ἄγειν ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας

τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης καὶ Ἀμφίπολιν Νικίου τοῦ Νικηράτου στρατηγοῦντος ἔψευστο τὴν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἡ στρατεία μάλιστα διελύθη ἐκείνου †ἀπάραντος †: πολέμιος οὖν ἦν. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα οὗτος, καὶ πέμπτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

84. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους Ἀλκιβιάδης τε πλεύσας ἐς Ἄργος ναυσὶν εἴκοσιν Ἀργείων τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἔτι ὑπόπτους εἶναι καὶ τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονεῖν ἔλαβε τριακοσίους ἄνδρας, καὶ κατέθεντο αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὰς ἐγγὺς νήσους ὧν ἦρχον: καὶ ἐπὶ Μῆλον τὴν νῆσον Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευσαν ναυσὶν ἑαυτῶν μὲν τριάκοντα, Χίαις δὲ ἕξ, Λεσβίαιν δὲ δυοῖν, καὶ ὁπλίταις ἑαυτῶν μὲν διακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις καὶ τοξόταις τριακοσίοις καὶ ἱπποτοξόταις εἴκοσι, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων καὶ νησιωτῶν ὁπλίταις μάλιστα πεντακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις. [2] οἱ δὲ Μήλιοι Λακεδαιμονίων μέν εἰσιν ἄποικοι, τῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἤθελον ὑπακούειν ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι νησιῶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐδετέρων ὄντες ἡσύχαζον, ἔπειτα ὡς αὐτοὺς ἠνάγκαζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δῃοῦντες τὴν γῆν, ἐς πόλεμον φανερὸν κατέστησαν. [3] στρατοπεδευσάμενοι οὖν ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν τῇ παρασκευῇ ταύτῃ οἱ στρατηγοὶ Κλεομήδης τε ὁ Λυκομήδους καὶ Τεισίας ὁ Τεισιμάχου, πρὶν ἀδικεῖν τι τῆς γῆς, λόγους πρῶτον ποιησομένους ἔπεμψαν πρέσβεις. οὓς οἱ Μήλιοι πρὸς μὲν τὸ πλῆθος οὐκ ἤγαγον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις λέγειν ἐκέλευον περὶ ὧν ἥκουσιν.

85. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἔλεγον τοιάδε. ‘ἐπειδὴ οὐ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος οἱ λόγοι γίγνονται, ὅπως δὴ μὴ ξυνεχεῖ ῥήσει οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ ἀνέλεγκτα ἐσάπαξ ἀκούσαντες ἡμῶν ἀπατηθῶσιν γιγνώσκομεν γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο φρονεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους ἀγωγή , ὑμεῖς οἱ καθήμενοι ἔτι ἀσφαλέστερον ποιήσατε. καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γὰρ καὶ μηδ᾽ ὑμεῖς ἑνὶ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκοῦν ἐπιτηδείως λέγεσθαι εὐθὺς ὑπολαμβάνοντες κρίνετε. καὶ πρῶτον εἰ ἀρέσκει ὡς λέγομεν εἴπατε.’

86. οἱ δὲ τῶν Μηλίων ξύνεδροι ἀπεκρίναντο ‘ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν ἀλλήλους οὐ ψέγεται,

τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα διαφέροντα αὐτοῦ φαίνεται. ὁρῶμεν γὰρ αὐτούς τε κριτὰς ἥκοντας ὑμᾶς τῶν λεχθησομένων καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς περιγενομένοις μὲν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδοῦσι πόλεμον ἡμῖν φέρουσαν, πεισθεῖσι δὲ δουλείαν.’

87. Αθ.εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ὑπονοίας τῶν μελλόντων λογιούμενοι ἢ ἄλλο τι ξυνήκετε ἢ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων καὶ ὧν ὁρᾶτε περὶ σωτηρίας βουλεύσοντες τῇ πόλει, παυοίμεθ᾽ ἄν: εἰ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦτο, λέγοιμεν ἄν.

88. ΜΗΛ.εἰκὸς μὲν καὶ ξυγγνώμη ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε καθεστῶτας ἐπὶ πολλὰ καὶ λέγοντας καὶ δοκοῦντας τρέπεσθαι: ἡ μέντοι ξύνοδος καὶ περὶ σωτηρίας ἥδε πάρεστι, καὶ ὁ λόγος ᾧ προκαλεῖσθε τρόπῳ, εἰ δοκεῖ, γιγνέσθω.

89. Αθ.ἡμεῖς τοίνυν οὔτε αὐτοὶ μετ᾽ ὀνομάτων καλῶν, ὡς ἢ δικαίως τὸν Μῆδον καταλύσαντες ἄρχομεν ἢ ἀδικούμενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόμεθα, λόγων μῆκος ἄπιστον παρέξομεν, οὔθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῦμεν ἢ ὅτι Λακεδαιμονίων ἄποικοι ὄντες οὐ ξυνεστρατεύσατε ἢ ὡς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ἠδικήκατε λέγοντας οἴεσθαι πείσειν, τὰ δυνατὰ δ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἑκάτεροι ἀληθῶς φρονοῦμεν διαπράσσεσθαι, ἐπισταμένους πρὸς εἰδότας ὅτι δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν.

90. ΜΗΛ.ἦι μὲν δὴ νομίζομέν γε, χρήσιμον ἀνάγκη γάρ, ἐπειδὴ ὑμεῖς οὕτω παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε μὴ καταλύειν ὑμᾶς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ αἰεὶ ἐν κινδύνῳ γιγνομένῳ εἶναι τὰ εἰκότα καὶ δίκαια, καί τι καὶ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς πείσαντά τινα ὠφεληθῆναι. καὶ πρὸς ὑμῶν οὐχ ἧσσον τοῦτο, ὅσῳ καὶ ἐπὶ μεγίστῃ τιμωρίᾳ σφαλέντες ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις παράδειγμα γένοισθε.

91. Αθ.ἡμεῖς δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς, ἢν καὶ παυθῇ, οὐκ ἀθυμοῦμεν τὴν τελευτήν: οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὗτοι δεινοὶ τοῖς νικηθεῖσιν ἔστι δὲ οὐ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών, ἀλλ᾽ ἢν οἱ ὑπήκοοί που τῶν ἀρξάντων αὐτοὶ ἐπιθέμενοι κρατήσωσιν. [2] καὶ περὶ μὲν

τούτου ἡμῖν ἀφείσθω κινδυνεύεσθαι: ὡς δὲ ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ τε πάρεσμεν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ νῦν τοὺς λόγους ἐροῦμεν τῆς ὑμετέρας πόλεως, ταῦτα δηλώσομεν, βουλόμενοι ἀπόνως μὲν ὑμῶν ἄρξαι, χρησίμως δ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀμφοτέροις σωθῆναι.

92. ΜΗΛ.καὶ πῶς χρήσιμον ἂν ξυμβαίη ἡμῖν δουλεῦσαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ὑμῖν ἄρξαι;

93. ΑΘ.ὅτι ὑμῖν μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τὰ δεινότατα παθεῖν ὑπακοῦσαι ἂν γένοιτο, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ διαφθείραντες ὑμᾶς κερδαίνοιμεν ἄν.

94. ΜΗΛ.ὥστε [δὲ] ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας ἡμᾶς φίλους μὲν εἶναι ἀντὶ πολεμίων, ξυμμάχους δὲ μηδετέρων, οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε;

95. ΑΘ.οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς βλάπτει ἡ ἔχθρα ὑμῶν ὅσον ἡ φιλία μὲν ἀσθενείας, τὸ δὲ μῖσος δυνάμεως παράδειγμα τοῖς ἀρχομένοις δηλούμενον.

96. ΜΗΛ.σκοποῦσι δ᾽ ὑμῶν οὕτως οἱ ὑπήκοοι τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε τούς τε μὴ προσήκοντας καὶ ὅσοι ἄποικοι ὄντες οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀποστάντες τινὲς κεχείρωνται ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ τιθέασιν;

97. ΑΘ.δικαιώματι γὰρ οὐδετέρους ἐλλείπειν ἡγοῦνται, κατὰ δύναμιν δὲ τοὺς μὲν περιγίγνεσθαι, ἡμᾶς δὲ φόβῳ οὐκ ἐπιέναι: ὥστε ἔξω καὶ τοῦ πλεόνων ἄρξαι καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἂν παράσχοιτε, ἄλλως τε καὶ νησιῶται ναυκρατόρων καὶ ἀσθενέστεροι ἑτέρων ὄντες εἰ μὴ περιγένοισθε.

98. ΜΗΛ.ἐν δ᾽ ἐκείνῳ οὐ νομίζετε ἀσφάλειαν; δεῖ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς τῶν δικαίων λόγων ἡμᾶς ἐκβιβάσαντες τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ξυμφόρῳ ὑπακούειν πείθετε, καὶ ἡμᾶς τὸ ἡμῖν χρήσιμον διδάσκοντας, εἰ τυγχάνει καὶ ὑμῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ξυμβαῖνον, πειρᾶσθαι πείθειν. ὅσοι γὰρ νῦν μηδετέροις ξυμμαχοῦσι, πῶς οὐ πολεμώσεσθε αὐτούς, ὅταν ἐς τάδε βλέψαντες ἡγήσωνταί ποτε ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἥξειν; κἀν τούτῳ τί ἄλλο ἢ τοὺς μὲν ὑπάρχοντας πολεμίους μεγαλύνετε, τοὺς δὲ μηδὲ μελλήσαντας γενέσθαι ἄκοντας ἐπάγεσθε;

99. ΑΘ.οὐ γὰρ νομίζομεν ἡμῖν τούτους δεινοτέρους ὅσοι ἠπειρῶταί που ὄντες τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ πολλὴν τὴν διαμέλλησιν

τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς φυλακῆς ποιήσονται, ἀλλὰ τοὺς νησιώτας τέ που ἀνάρκτους, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς, καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τῆς ἀρχῆς τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ παροξυνομένους. οὗτοι γὰρ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν τῷ ἀλογίστῳ ἐπιτρέψαντες σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐς προῦπτον κίνδυνον καταστήσειαν.

100. ΜΗΛ.ἦ που ἄρα, εἰ τοσαύτην γε ὑμεῖς τε μὴ παυθῆναι ἀρχῆς καὶ οἱ δουλεύοντες ἤδη ἀπαλλαγῆναι τὴν παρακινδύνευσιν ποιοῦνται, ἡμῖν γε τοῖς ἔτι ἐλευθέροις πολλὴ κακότης καὶ δειλία μὴ πᾶν πρὸ τοῦ δουλεῦσαι ἐπεξελθεῖν.

101. ΑΘ.οὔκ, ἤν γε σωφρόνως βουλεύησθε: οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ὁ ἀγὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὑμῖν, μὴ αἰσχύνην ὀφλεῖν, περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας μᾶλλον ἡ βουλή, πρὸς τοὺς κρείσσονας πολλῷ μὴ ἀνθίστασθαι.

102. ΜΗΛ.ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιστάμεθα τὰ τῶν πολέμων ἔστιν ὅτε κοινοτέρας τὰς τύχας λαμβάνοντα ἢ κατὰ τὸ διαφέρον ἑκατέρων πλῆθος: καὶ ἡμῖν τὸ μὲν εἶξαι εὐθὺς ἀνέλπιστον, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ δρωμένου ἔτι καὶ στῆναι ἐλπὶς ὀρθῶς.

103. ΑΘ.ἐλπὶς δὲ κινδύνῳ παραμύθιον οὖσα τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ περιουσίας χρωμένους αὐτῇ, κἂν βλάψῃ, οὐ καθεῖλεν: τοῖς δ᾽ ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναρριπτοῦσι δάπανος γὰρ φύσει ἅμα τε γιγνώσκεται σφαλέντων καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ ἔτι φυλάξεταί τις αὐτὴν γνωρισθεῖσαν οὐκ ἐλλείπει. [2] ὃ ὑμεῖς ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ ἐπὶ ῥοπῆς μιᾶς ὄντες μὴ βούλεσθε παθεῖν μηδὲ ὁμοιωθῆναι τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἷς παρὸν ἀνθρωπείως ἔτι σῴζεσθαι, ἐπειδὰν πιεζομένους αὐτοὺς ἐπιλίπωσιν αἱ φανεραὶ ἐλπίδες, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀφανεῖς καθίστανται μαντικήν τε καὶ χρησμοὺς καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μετ᾽ ἐλπίδων λυμαίνεται.

104. ΜΗΛ.χαλεπὸν μὲν καὶ ἡμεῖς εὖ ἴστε νομίζομεν πρὸς δύναμίν τε τὴν ὑμετέραν καὶ τὴν τύχην, εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἔσται, ἀγωνίζεσθαι: ὅμως δὲ πιστεύομεν τῇ μὲν τύχῃ ἐκ τοῦ θείου μὴ ἐλασσώσεσθαι, ὅτι ὅσιοι πρὸς οὐ δικαίους ἱστάμεθα, τῆς δὲ δυνάμεως τῷ ἐλλείποντι τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἡμῖν ξυμμαχίαν προσέσεσθαι, ἀνάγκην ἔχουσαν, καὶ εἰ μή του ἄλλου, τῆς γε ξυγγενείας ἕνεκα καὶ

αἰσχύνῃ βοηθεῖν. καὶ οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτως ἀλόγως θρασυνόμεθα.

105. Αθ.τῆς μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐμενείας οὐδ᾽ ἡμεῖς οἰόμεθα λελείψεσθαι: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξω τῆς ἀνθρωπείας τῶν μὲν ἐς τὸ θεῖον νομίσεως, τῶν δ᾽ ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βουλήσεως δικαιοῦμεν ἢ πράσσομεν. [2] ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν: καὶ ἡμεῖς οὔτε θέντες τὸν νόμον οὔτε κειμένῳ πρῶτοι χρησάμενοι, ὄντα δὲ παραλαβόντες καὶ ἐσόμενον ἐς αἰεὶ καταλείψοντες χρώμεθα αὐτῷ, εἰδότες καὶ ὑμᾶς ἂν καὶ ἄλλους ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει ἡμῖν γενομένους δρῶντας ἂν ταὐτό. [3] καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ θεῖον οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος οὐ φοβούμεθα ἐλασσώσεσθαι: τῆς δὲ ἐς Λακεδαιμονίους δόξης, ἣν διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν δὴ βοηθήσειν ὑμῖν πιστεύετε αὐτούς, μακαρίσαντες ὑμῶν τὸ ἀπειρόκακον οὐ ζηλοῦμεν τὸ ἄφρον. [4] Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ πρὸς σφᾶς μὲν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα πλεῖστα ἀρετῇ χρῶνται: πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους πολλὰ ἄν τις ἔχων εἰπεῖν ὡς προσφέρονται, ξυνελὼν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν δηλώσειεν ὅτι ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ ξυμφέροντα δίκαια. καίτοι οὐ πρὸς τῆς ὑμετέρας νῦν ἀλόγου σωτηρίας ἡ τοιαύτη διάνοια.

106. ΜΗΛ.ἡμεῖς δὲ κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἤδη καὶ μάλιστα πιστεύομεν τῷ ξυμφέροντι αὐτῶν, Μηλίους ἀποίκους ὄντας μὴ βουλήσεσθαι προδόντας τοῖς μὲν εὔνοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπίστους καταστῆναι, τοῖς δὲ πολεμίοις ὠφελίμους.

107. Αθ.οὔκουν οἴεσθε τὸ ξυμφέρον μὲν μετ᾽ ἀσφαλείας εἶναι, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν μετὰ κινδύνου δρᾶσθαι: ὃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἥκιστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τολμῶσιν.

108. ΜΗΛ.ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους τε ἡμῶν ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἡγούμεθ᾽ ἂν ἐγχειρίσασθαι αὐτούς, καὶ βεβαιοτέρους ἢ ἐς ἄλλους νομιεῖν, ὅσῳ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἔργα τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐγγὺς κείμεθα, τῆς δὲ γνώμης τῷ ξυγγενεῖ πιστότεροι ἑτέρων ἐσμέν.

109. Αθ.τὸ δ᾽ ἐχυρόν γε τοῖς ξυναγωνιουμένοις οὐ τὸ εὔνουν τῶν ἐπικαλεσαμένων φαίνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἢν τῶν ἔργων

τις δυνάμει πολὺ προύχῃ: ὃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ πλέον τι τῶν ἄλλων σκοποῦσιν ▯ τῆς γοῦν οἰκείας παρασκευῆς ἀπιστίᾳ καὶ μετὰ ξυμμάχων πολλῶν τοῖς πέλας ἐπέρχονται▯, ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐς νῆσόν γε αὐτοὺς ἡμῶν ναυκρατόρων ὄντων περαιωθῆναι.

110. ΜΗΛ.οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους ἂν ἔχοιεν πέμψαι: πολὺ δὲ τὸ Κρητικὸν πέλαγος, δι᾽ οὗ τῶν κρατούντων ἀπορώτερος ἡ λῆψις ἢ τῶν λαθεῖν βουλομένων ἡ σωτηρία. [2] καὶ εἰ τοῦδε σφάλλοιντο, τράποιντ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ὑμῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅσους μὴ Βρασίδας ἐπῆλθεν: καὶ οὐ περὶ τῆς μὴ προσηκούσης μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς οἰκειοτέρας ξυμμαχίδος τε καὶ γῆς ὁ πόνος ὑμῖν ἔσται.

111. ΑΘ.τούτων μὲν καὶ πεπειραμένοις ἄν τι γένοιτο καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ μιᾶς πώποτε πολιορκίας Ἀθηναῖοι δι᾽ ἄλλων φόβον ἀπεχώρησαν. [2] ἐνθυμούμεθα δὲ ὅτι φήσαντες περὶ σωτηρίας βουλεύσειν οὐδὲν ἐν τοσούτῳ λόγῳ εἰρήκατε ᾧ ἄνθρωποι ἂν πιστεύσαντες νομίσειαν σωθήσεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῶν τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρότατα ἐλπιζόμενα μέλλεται, τὰ δ᾽ ὑπάρχοντα βραχέα πρὸς τὰ ἤδη ἀντιτεταγμένα περιγίγνεσθαι. πολλήν τε ἀλογίαν τῆς διανοίας παρέχετε, εἰ μὴ μεταστησάμενοι ἔτι ἡμᾶς ἄλλο τι τῶνδε σωφρονέστερον γνώσεσθε. [3] οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπί γε τὴν ἐν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς καὶ προύπτοις κινδύνοις πλεῖστα διαφθείρουσαν ἀνθρώπους αἰσχύνην τρέψεσθε. πολλοῖς γὰρ προορωμένοις ἔτι ἐς οἷα φέρονται τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλούμενον ὀνόματος ἐπαγωγοῦ δυνάμει ἐπεσπάσατο ἡσσηθεῖσι τοῦ ῥήματος ἔργῳ ξυμφοραῖς ἀνηκέστοις ἑκόντας περιπεσεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνην αἰσχίω μετὰ ἀνοίας ἢ τύχῃ προσλαβεῖν. [4] ὃ ὑμεῖς, ἢν εὖ βουλεύησθε, φυλάξεσθε, καὶ οὐκ ἀπρεπὲς νομιεῖτε πόλεώς τε τῆς μεγίστης ἡσσᾶσθαι μέτρια προκαλουμένης, ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι ἔχοντας τὴν ὑμετέραν αὐτῶν ὑποτελεῖς, καὶ δοθείσης αἱρέσεως πολέμου πέρι καὶ ἀσφαλείας μὴ τὰ χείρω φιλονικῆσαι: ὡς οἵτινες τοῖς μὲν ἴσοις μὴ εἴκουσι, τοῖς δὲ κρείσσοσι καλῶς προσφέρονται, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἥσσους μέτριοί εἰσι, πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοῖντο. [5] σκοπεῖτε οὖν καὶ μεταστάντων ἡμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμεῖσθε

πολλάκις ὅτι περὶ πατρίδος βουλεύεσθε, ἧς μιᾶς πέρι καὶ ἐς μίαν βουλὴν τυχοῦσάν τε καὶ μὴ κατορθώσασαν ἔσται.

112. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι μετεχώρησαν ἐκ τῶν λόγων: οἱ δὲ Μήλιοι κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς γενόμενοι, ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς παραπλήσια καὶ ἀντέλεγον, ἀπεκρίναντο τάδε. [2] ‘οὔτε ἄλλα δοκεῖ ἡμῖν ἢ ἄπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτ᾽ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πόλεως ἑπτακόσια ἔτη ἤδη οἰκουμένης τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀφαιρησόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῇ τε μέχρι τοῦδε σῳζούσῃ τύχῃ ἐκ τοῦ θείου αὐτὴν καὶ τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων τιμωρίᾳ πιστεύοντες πειρασόμεθα σῴζεσθαι. [3] προκαλούμεθα δὲ ὑμᾶς φίλοι μὲν εἶναι, πολέμιοι δὲ μηδετέροις, καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἡμῶν ἀναχωρῆσαι σπονδὰς ποιησαμένους αἵτινες δοκοῦσιν ἐπιτήδειοι εἶναι ἀμφοτέροις.’

113. οἱ μὲν δὴ Μήλιοι τοσαῦτα ἀπεκρίναντο: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι διαλυόμενοι ἤδη ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἔφασαν ‘ἀλλ᾽ οὖν μόνοι γε ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν βουλευμάτων, ὡς ἡμῖν δοκεῖτε, τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα τῶν ὁρωμένων σαφέστερα κρίνετε, τὰ δὲ ἀφανῆ τῷ βούλεσθαι ὡς γιγνόμενα ἤδη θεᾶσθε, καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τύχῃ καὶ ἐλπίσι πλεῖστον δὴ παραβεβλημένοι καὶ πιστεύσαντες πλεῖστον καὶ σφαλήσεσθε.’

114. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὸ στράτευμα: οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς οὐδὲν ὑπήκουον οἱ Μήλιοι, πρὸς πόλεμον εὐθὺς ἐτρέποντο καὶ διελόμενοι κατὰ πόλεις περιετείχισαν κύκλῳ τοὺς Μηλίους. [2] καὶ ὕστερον φυλακὴν σφῶν τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων καταλιπόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ πλέονι τοῦ στρατοῦ. οἱ δὲ λειπόμενοι παραμένοντες ἐπολιόρκουν τὸ χωρίον.

115. καὶ Ἀργεῖοι κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Φλειασίαν καὶ λοχισθέντες ὑπό τε Φλειασίων καὶ τῶν σφετέρων φυγάδων διεφθάρησαν ὡς ὀγδοήκοντα. [2] καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου Ἀθηναῖοι Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὴν λείαν ἔλαβον: καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δι᾽ αὐτὸ τὰς μὲν σπονδὰς οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἀφέντες ἐπολέμουν αὐτοῖς, ἐκήρυξαν δὲ εἴ τις βούλεται

παρὰ σφῶν Ἀθηναίους λῄζεσθαι. [3] καὶ Κορίνθιοι ἐπολέμησαν ἰδίων τινῶν διαφορῶν ἕνεκα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι Πελοποννήσιοι ἡσύχαζον. [4] εἷλον δὲ καὶ οἱ Μήλιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ περιτειχίσματος τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν προσβαλόντες νυκτός, καὶ ἄνδρας τε ἀπέκτειναν καὶ ἐσενεγκάμενοι σῖτόν τε καὶ ὅσα πλεῖστα ἐδύναντο χρήσιμα ἀναχωρήσαντες ἡσύχαζον: καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄμεινον τὴν φυλακὴν τὸ ἔπειτα παρεσκευάζοντο. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

116. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Λακεδαιμόνιοι μελλήσαντες ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν στρατεύειν, ὡς αὐτοῖς τὰ διαβατήρια [ἱερὰ ἐν τοῖς ὁρίοις] οὐκ ἐγίγνετο, ἀνεχώρησαν. καὶ Ἀργεῖοι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων μέλλησιν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὰς ὑποπτεύσαντες τοὺς μὲν ξυνέλαβον, οἱ δ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ διέφυγον. [2] καὶ οἱ Μήλιοι περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους αὖθις καθ᾽ ἕτερόν τι τοῦ περιτειχίσματος εἷλον τῶν Ἀθηναίων, παρόντων οὐ πολλῶν τῶν φυλάκων. [3] καὶ ἐλθούσης στρατιᾶς ὕστερον ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἄλλης, ὡς ταῦτα ἐγίγνετο, ἧς ἦρχε Φιλοκράτης ὁ Δημέου, καὶ κατὰ κράτος ἤδη πολιορκούμενοι, γενομένης καὶ προδοσίας τινός, ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ξυνεχώρησαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὥστε ἐκείνους περὶ αὐτῶν βουλεῦσαι. [4] οἱ δὲ ἀπέκτειναν Μηλίων ὅσους ἡβῶντας ἔλαβον, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἠνδραπόδισαν: τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτοὶ ᾤκισαν, ἀποίκους ὕστερον πεντακοσίους πέμψαντες.

Βιβλίο ΣΤ’

1. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβούλοντο αὖθις μείζονι παρασκευῇ τῆς μετὰ Λάχητος καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντος ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεύσαντες καταστρέψασθαι, εἰ δύναιντο, ἄπειροι οἱ πολλοὶ ὄντες τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς νήσου καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων τοῦ πλήθους καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πολλῷ τινὶ ὑποδεέστερον πόλεμον ἀνῃροῦντο ἢ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους. [2] Σικελίας γὰρ περίπλους μέν ἐστιν ὀλκάδι οὐ πολλῷ τινὶ ἔλασσον ἢ ὀκτὼ ἡμερῶν, καὶ τοσαύτη οὖσα ἐν εἰκοσισταδίῳ μάλιστα μέτρῳ τῆς θαλάσσης διείργεται τὸ μὴ ἤπειρος εἶναι:

2. ᾠκίσθη δὲ ὧδε τὸ ἀρχαῖον, καὶ τοσάδε ἔθνη ἔσχε τὰ ξύμπαντα. παλαίτατοι μὲν λέγονται ἐν μέρει τινὶ τῆς χώρας Κύκλωπες καὶ Λαιστρυγόνες οἰκῆσαι, ὧν ἐγὼ οὔτε γένος ἔχω εἰπεῖν οὔτε ὁπόθεν ἐσῆλθον ἢ ὅποι ἀπεχώρησαν: ἀρκείτω δὲ ὡς ποιηταῖς τε εἴρηται καὶ ὡς ἕκαστός πῃ γιγνώσκει περὶ αὐτῶν. [2] Σικανοὶ δὲ μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς πρῶτοι φαίνονται ἐνοικισάμενοι, ὡς μὲν αὐτοί φασι, καὶ πρότεροι διὰ τὸ αὐτόχθονες εἶναι, ὡς δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια εὑρίσκεται, Ἴβηρες ὄντες καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Σικανοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ ὑπὸ Λιγύων ἀναστάντες. καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν Σικανία τότε ἡ νῆσος ἐκαλεῖτο, πρότερον Τρινακρία καλουμένη: οἰκοῦσι δὲ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ πρὸς ἑσπέραν τὴν Σικελίαν. [3] Ἰλίου δὲ ἁλισκομένου τῶν Τρώων τινὲς διαφυγόντες Ἀχαιοὺς πλοίοις ἀφικνοῦνται πρὸς τὴν Σικελίαν, καὶ ὅμοροι τοῖς Σικανοῖς οἰκήσαντες ξύμπαντες μὲν Ἔλυμοι ἐκλήθησαν, πόλεις δ᾽ αὐτῶν Ἔρυξ τε καὶ Ἔγεστα. προσξυνῴκησαν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Φωκέων τινὲς τῶν ἀπὸ Τροίας τότε χειμῶνι ἐς Λιβύην πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ἐς Σικελίαν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς κατενεχθέντες. [4] Σικελοὶ δ᾽ ἐξ Ἰταλίας ⟨ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ᾤκουν⟩ διέβησαν ἐς Σικελίαν, φεύγοντες Ὀπικούς, ὡς μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ λέγεται, ἐπὶ σχεδιῶν, τηρήσαντες τὸν πορθμὸν κατιόντος τοῦ ἀνέμου, τάχα ἂν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐσπλεύσαντες. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ Σικελοί, καὶ ἡ χώρα ἀπὸ Ἰταλοῦ βασιλέως τινὸς

Σικελῶν, τοὔνομα τοῦτο ἔχοντος, οὕτως Ἰταλία ἐπωνομάσθη. [5] ἐλθόντες δὲ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν στρατὸς πολὺς τούς τε Σικανοὺς κρατοῦντες μάχῃ ἀνέστειλαν πρὸς τὰ μεσημβρινὰ καὶ ἑσπέρια αὐτῆς καὶ ἀντὶ Σικανίας Σικελίαν τὴν νῆσον ἐποίησαν καλεῖσθαι, καὶ τὰ κράτιστα τῆς γῆς ᾠκησαν ἔχοντες, ἐπεὶ διέβησαν, ἔτη ἐγγὺς τριακόσια πρὶν Ἕλληνας ἐς Σικελίαν ἐλθεῖν: ἔτι δὲ καὶ νῦν τὰ μέσα καὶ τὰ πρὸς βορρᾶν τῆς νήσου ἔχουσιν. [6] ᾤκουν δὲ καὶ Φοίνικες περὶ πᾶσαν μὲν τὴν Σικελίαν ἄκρας τε ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἀπολαβόντες καὶ τὰ ἐπικείμενα νησίδια ἐμπορίας ἕνεκεν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Σικελούς: ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ Ἕλληνες πολλοὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπεσέπλεον, ἐκλιπόντες τὰ πλείω Μοτύην καὶ Σολόεντα καὶ Πάνορμον ἐγγὺς τῶν Ἐλύμων ξυνοικήσαντες ἐνέμοντο, ξυμμαχίᾳ τε πίσυνοι τῇ τῶν Ἐλύμων, καὶ ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν ἐλάχιστον πλοῦν Καρχηδὼν Σικελίας ἀπέχει. βάρβαροι μὲν οὖν τοσοίδε Σικελίαν καὶ οὕτως ᾤκησαν.

3. Ἑλλήνων δὲ πρῶτοι Χαλκιδῆς ἐξ Εὐβοίας πλεύσαντες μετὰ Θουκλέους οἰκιστοῦ Νάξον ᾤκισαν, καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος Ἀρχηγέτου βωμὸν ὅστις νῦν ἔξω τῆς πόλεώς ἐστιν ἱδρύσαντο, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ, ὅταν ἐκ Σικελίας θεωροὶ πλέωσι, πρῶτον θύουσιν. [2] Συρακούσας δὲ τοῦ ἐχομένου ἔτους Ἀρχίας τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν ἐκ Κορίνθου ᾤκισε, Σικελοὺς ἐξελάσας πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἐν ᾗ νῦν οὐκέτι περικλυζομένῃ ἡ πόλις ἡ ἐντός ἐστιν: ὕστερον δὲ χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ ἔξω προστειχισθεῖσα πολυάνθρωπος ἐγένετο. [3] Θουκλῆς δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς ἐκ Νάξου ὁρμηθέντες ἔτει πέμπτῳ μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκισθείσας Λεοντίνους τε πολέμῳ τοὺς Σικελοὺς ἐξελάσαντες οἰκίζουσι, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς Κατάνην: οἰκιστὴν δὲ αὐτοὶ Καταναῖοι ἐποιήσαντο Εὔαρχον.

4. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ Λάμις ἐκ Μεγάρων ἀποικίαν ἄγων ἐς Σικελίαν ἀφίκετο, καὶ ὑπὲρ Παντακύου τε ποταμοῦ Τρώτιλόν τι ὄνομα χωρίον οἰκίσας, καὶ ὕστερον αὐτόθεν τοῖς Χαλκιδεῦσιν ἐς Λεοντίνους ὀλίγον χρόνον ξυμπολιτεύσας καὶ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐκπεσὼν καὶ Θάψον οἰκίσας αὐτὸς μὲν ἀποθνῄσκει, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἐκ τῆς Θάψου ἀναστάντες Ὕβλωνος βασιλέως Σικελοῦ προδόντος τὴν

χώραν καὶ καθηγησαμένου Μεγαρέας ᾠκισαν τοὺς Ὑβλαίους κληθέντας. [2] καὶ ἔτη οἰκήσαντες πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ διακόσια ὑπὸ Γέλωνος τυράννου Συρακοσίων ἀνέστησαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ χώρας. πρὶν δὲ ἀναστῆναι, ἔτεσιν ὕστερον ἑκατὸν ἢ αὐτοὺς οἰκίσαι, Πάμιλλον πέμψαντες Σελινοῦντα κτίζουσι, καὶ ἐκ Μεγάρων τῆς μητροπόλεως οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἐπελθὼν ξυγκατῴκισεν. [3] Γέλαν δὲ Ἀντίφημος ἐκ Ῥόδου καὶ Ἔντιμος ἐκ Κρήτης ἐποίκους ἀγαγόντες κοινῇ ἔκτισαν, ἔτει πέμπτῳ καὶ τεσσαρακοστῷ μετὰ Συρακουσῶν οἴκισιν. καὶ τῇ μὲν πόλει ἀπὸ τοῦ Γέλα ποταμοῦ τοὔνομα ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ χωρίον οὗ νῦν ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ καὶ ὃ πρῶτον ἐτειχίσθη Λίνδιοι καλεῖται: νόμιμα δὲ Δωρικὰ ἐτέθη αὐτοῖς. [4] ἔτεσι δὲ ἐγγύτατα ὀκτὼ καὶ ἑκατὸν μετὰ τὴν σφετέραν οἴκισιν Γελῷοι Ἀκράγαντα ᾠκισαν, τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀκράγαντος ποταμοῦ ὀνομάσαντες, οἰκιστὰς δὲ ποιήσαντες Ἀριστόνουν καὶ Πυστίλον, νόμιμα δὲ τὰ Γελῴων δόντες. [5] Ζάγκλη δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ Κύμης τῆς ἐν Ὀπικίᾳ Χαλκιδικῆς πόλεως λῃστῶν ἀφικομένων ᾠκίσθη, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ Χαλκίδος καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Εὐβοίας πλῆθος ἐλθὸν ξυγκατενείμαντο τὴν γῆν: καὶ οἰκισταὶ Περιήρης καὶ Κραταιμένης ἐγένοντο αὐτῆς, ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ Κύμης, ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ Χαλκίδος. ὄνομα δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον Ζάγκλη ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν Σικελῶν κληθεῖσα, ὅτι δρεπανοειδὲς τὴν ἰδέαν τὸ χωρίον ἐστί —τὸ δὲ δρέπανον οἱ Σικελοὶ ζάγκλον καλοῦσιν —, ὕστερον δ᾽ αὐτοὶ μὲν ὑπὸ Σαμίων καὶ ἄλλων Ἰώνων ἐκπίπτουσιν, οἳ Μήδους φεύγοντες προσέβαλον Σικελίᾳ, [6] τοὺς δὲ Σαμίους Ἀναξίλας Ῥηγίνων τύραννος οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐκβαλὼν καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτὸς ξυμμείκτων ἀνθρώπων οἰκίσας Μεσσήνην ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πατρίδος ἀντωνόμασεν.

5. καὶ Ἱμέρα ἀπὸ Ζάγκλης ᾠκίσθη ὑπὸ Εὐκλείδου καὶ Σίμου καὶ Σάκωνος, καὶ Χαλκιδῆς μὲν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦλθον ἐς τὴν ἀποικίαν, ξυνῴκισαν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκ Συρακουσῶν φυγάδες στάσει νικηθέντες, οἱ Μυλητίδαι καλούμενοι: καὶ φωνὴ μὲν μεταξὺ τῆς τε Χαλκιδέων καὶ Δωρίδος ἐκράθη, νόμιμα δὲ τὰ Χαλκιδικὰ ἐκράτησεν. [2] Ἄκραι δὲ καὶ Κασμέναι ὑπὸ

Συρακοσίων ᾠκίσθησαν, Ἄκραι μὲν ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτεσι μετὰ Συρακούσας, Κασμέναι δ᾽ ἐγγὺς εἴκοσι μετὰ Ἄκρας. [3] καὶ Καμάρινα τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων ᾠκίσθη, ἔτεσιν ἐγγύτατα πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μετὰ Συρακουσῶν κτίσιν: οἰκισταὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο αὐτῆς Δάσκων καὶ Μενέκωλος. ἀναστάτων δὲ Καμαριναίων γενομένων πολέμῳ ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων δι᾽ ἀπόστασιν, χρόνῳ Ἱπποκράτης ὕστερον Γέλας τύραννος, λύτρα ἀνδρῶν Συρακοσίων αἰχμαλώτων λαβὼν τὴν γῆν τὴν Καμαριναίων, αὐτὸς οἰκιστὴς γενόμενος κατῴκισε Καμάριναν. καὶ αὖθις ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνάστατος γενομένη τὸ τρίτον κατῳκίσθη ὑπὸ Γελῴων.

6. τοσαῦτα ἔθνη Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων Σικελίαν ᾤκει,καὶ ἐπὶ τοσήνδε οὖσαν αὐτὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύειν ὥρμηντο, ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυγγενέσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις ξυμμάχοις. [2] μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐξώρμησαν Ἐγεσταίων [τε] πρέσβεις παρόντες καὶ προθυμότερον ἐπικαλούμενοι. ὅμοροι γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς Σελινουντίοις ἐς πόλεμον καθέστασαν περί τε γαμικῶν τινῶν καὶ περὶ γῆς ἀμφισβητήτου, καὶ οἱ Σελινούντιοι Συρακοσίους ἐπαγόμενοι ξυμμάχους κατεῖργον αὐτοὺς τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν: ὥστε τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ Λάχητος καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολέμου Λεοντίνων οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι ξυμμαχίαν ἀναμιμνῄσκοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐδέοντο σφίσι ναῦς πέμψαντας ἐπαμῦναι, λέγοντες ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ κεφάλαιον, εἰ Συρακόσιοι Λεοντίνους τε ἀναστήσαντες ἀτιμώρητοι γενήσονται καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἔτι ξυμμάχους αὐτῶν διαφθείροντες αὐτοὶ τὴν ἅπασαν δύναμιν τῆς Σικελίας σχήσουσι, κίνδυνον εἶναι μή ποτε μεγάλῃ παρασκευῇ Δωριῆς τε Δωριεῦσι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ ἅμα ἄποικοι τοῖς ἐκπέμψασι Πελοποννησίοις βοηθήσαντες καὶ τὴν ἐκείνων δύναμιν ξυγκαθέλωσιν: σῶφρον δ᾽ εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων ἔτι ξυμμάχων ἀντέχειν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, ἄλλως τε καὶ χρήματα σφῶν παρεξόντων ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανά. [3] ὧν ἀκούοντες οἱ

Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν τε Ἐγεσταίων πολλάκις λεγόντων καὶ τῶν ξυναγορευόντων αὐτοῖς ἐψηφίσαντο πρέσβεις πέμψαι πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Ἔγεσταν περί τε τῶν χρημάτων σκεψομένους εἰ ὑπάρχει, ὥσπερ φασίν, ἐν τῷ κοινῷ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἅμα πρὸς τοὺς Σελινουντίους ἐν ὅτῳ ἐστὶν εἰσομένους.

7. καὶ οἱ μὲν πρέσβεις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπεστάλησαν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν: Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πλὴν Κορινθίων στρατεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν τῆς τε γῆς ἔτεμον οὐ πολλὴν καὶ σῖτον ἀνεκομίσαντό τινα ζεύγη κομίσαντες, καὶ ἐς Ὀρνεὰς κατοικίσαντες τοὺς Ἀργείων φυγάδας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης στρατιᾶς παρακαταλιπόντες αὐτοῖς ὀλίγους, καὶ σπεισάμενοί τινα χρόνον ὥστε μὴ ἀδικεῖν Ὀρνεάτας καὶ Ἀργείους τὴν ἀλλήλων, ἀπεχώρησαν τῷ στρατῷ ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [2] ἐλθόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίων οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ναυσὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑξακοσίοις ὁπλίταις, οἱ Ἀργεῖοι μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πανστρατιᾷ ἐξελθόντες τοὺς μὲν ἐν Ὀρνεαῖς μίαν ἡμέραν ἐπολιόρκουν: ὑπὸ δὲ νύκτα αὐλισαμένου τοῦ στρατεύματος ἄπωθεν ἐκδιδράσκουσιν οἱ ἐκ τῶν Ὀρνεῶν. καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ὡς ᾔσθοντο, κατασκάψαντες τὰς Ὀρνεὰς ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὕστερον ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [3]καὶ ἐς Μεθώνην τὴν ὅμορον Μακεδονίᾳ ἱππέας κατὰ θάλασσαν κομίσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι σφῶν τε αὐτῶν καὶ Μακεδόνων τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι φυγάδας ἐκακούργουν τὴν Περδίκκου. [4] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πέμψαντες παρὰ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, ἄγοντας πρὸς Ἀθηναίους δεχημέρους σπονδάς, ξυμπολεμεῖν ἐκέλευον Περδίκκᾳ: οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ ἤθελον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἕκτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος ἐτελεύτα τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

8. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους ἅμα ἦρι οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἦκον ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας καὶ οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἄγοντες ἑξήκοντα τάλαντα ἀσήμου ἀργυρίου ὡς ἐς ἑξήκοντα ναῦς μηνὸς μισθόν, ἃς ἔμελλον δεήσεσθαι πέμπειν. [2] καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκκλησίαν ποιήσαντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες τῶν τε Ἐγεσταίων καὶ τῶν σφετέρων πρέσβεων

τά τε ἄλλα ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῆ καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὡς εἴη ἑτοῖμα ἔν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, ἐψηφίσαντο ναῦς ἑξήκοντα πέμπειν ἐς Σικελίαν καὶ στρατηγοὺς αὐτοκράτορας Ἀλκιβιάδην τε τὸν Κλεινίου καὶ Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου καὶ Λάμαχον τὸν Ξενοφάνους, βοηθοὺς μὲν Ἐγεσταίοις πρὸς Σελινουντίους, ξυγκατοικίσαι δὲ καὶ Λεοντίνους, ἤν τι περιγίγνηται αὐτοῖς τοῦ πολέμου, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πρᾶξαι ὅπῃ ἂν γιγνώσκωσιν ἄριστα Ἀθηναίοις. [3] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἡμέρᾳ πέμπτῃ ἐκκλησία αὖθις ἐγίγνετο, καθ᾽ ὅτι χρὴ τὴν παρασκευὴν ταῖς ναυσὶ τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, εἴ του προσδέοιντο, ψηφισθῆναι ἐς τὸν ἔκπλουν. [4] καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἀκούσιος μὲν ἠρημένος ἄρχειν, νομίζων δὲ τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ προφάσει βραχείᾳ καὶ εὐπρεπεῖ τῆς Σικελίας ἁπάσης, μεγάλου ἔργου, ἐφίεσθαι, παρελθὼν ἀποτρέψαι ἐβούλετο, καὶ παρῄνει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοιάδε.

9. ‘ἡ μὲν ἐκκλησία περὶ παρασκευῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας ἥδε ξυνελέγη, καθ᾽ ὅτι χρὴ ἐς Σικελίαν ἐκπλεῖν: ἐμοὶ μέντοι δοκεῖ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου ἔτι χρῆναι σκέψασθαι, εἰ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἐκπέμπειν τὰς ναῦς, καὶ μὴ οὕτω βραχείᾳ βουλῇ περὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων ἀνδράσιν ἀλλοφύλοις πειθομένους πόλεμον οὐ προσήκοντα ἄρασθαι. [2] καίτοι ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ ἧσσον ἑτέρων περὶ τῷ ἐμαυτοῦ σώματι ὀρρωδῶ, νομίζων ὁμοίως ἀγαθὸν πολίτην εἶναι ὃς ἂν καὶ τοῦ σώματός τι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας προνοῆται: μάλιστα γὰρ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως δι᾽ ἑαυτὸν βούλοιτο ὀρθοῦσθαι. ὅμως δὲ οὔτε ἐν τῷ πρότερον χρόνῳ διὰ τὸ προτιμᾶσθαι εἶπον παρὰ γνώμην οὔτε νῦν, ἀλλὰ ᾗ ἂν γιγνώσκω βέλτιστα, ἐρῶ. [3] καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἀσθενὴς ἄν μου ὁ λόγος εἴη, εἰ τά τε ὑπάρχοντα σῴζειν παραινοίην καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἑτοίμοις περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ μελλόντων κινδυνεύειν: ὡς δὲ οὔτε ἐν καιρῷ σπεύδετε οὔτε ῥᾴδιά ἐστι κατασχεῖν ἐφ᾽ ἃ ὥρμησθε, ταῦτα διδάξω.

10. ‘φημὶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς πολεμίους πολλοὺς ἐνθάδε ὑπολιπόντας καὶ ἑτέρους ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐκεῖσε πλεύσαντας δεῦρο

ἐπαγαγέσθαι. [2] καὶ οἴεσθε ἴσως τὰς γενομένας ὑμῖν σπονδὰς ἔχειν τι βέβαιον, αἳ ἡσυχαζόντων μὲν ὑμῶν ὀνόματι σπονδαὶ ἔσονται ― οὕτω γὰρ ἐνθένδε τε ἄνδρες ἔπραξαν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ―, σφαλέντων δέ που ἀξιόχρεῳ δυνάμει ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμῖν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ποιήσονται, οἷς πρῶτον μὲν διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ξύμβασις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αἰσχίονος ἢ ἡμῖν κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἐγένετο, ἔπειτα ἐν αὐτῇ ταύτῃ πολλὰ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα ἔχομεν. [3] εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἳ οὐδὲ ταύτην πω τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἐδέξαντο, καὶ οὐχ οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι: ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἄντικρυς πολεμοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτι ἡσυχάζειν δεχημέροις σπονδαῖς καὶ αὐτοὶ κατέχονται. [4] τάχα δ᾽ ἂν ἴσως, εἰ δίχα ἡμῶν τὴν δύναμιν λάβοιεν, ὅπερ νῦν σπεύδομεν, καὶ πάνυ ἂν ξυνεπιθοῖντο μετὰ Σικελιωτῶν, οὓς πρὸ πολλῶν ἂν ἐτιμήσαντο ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ. [5] ὥστε χρὴ σκοπεῖν τινὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ μετεώρῳ τε <τῇ> πόλει ἀξιοῦν κινδυνεύειν καὶ ἀρχῆς ἄλλης ὀρέγεσθαι πρὶν ἣν ἔχομεν βεβαιωσώμεθα, εἰ Χαλκιδῆς γε οἱ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἔτη τοσαῦτα ἀφεστῶτες ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν ἔτι ἀχείρωτοί εἰσι καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς κατὰ τὰς ἠπείρους ἐνδοιαστῶς ἀκροῶνται. ἡμεῖς δὲ Ἐγεσταίοις δὴ οὖσι ξυμμάχοις ὡς ἀδικουμένοις ὀξέως βοηθοῦμεν: ὑφ᾽ ὧν δ᾽ αὐτοὶ πάλαι ἀφεστώτων ἀδικούμεθα, ἔτι μέλλομεν ἀμύνεσθαι.

11. καίτοι τοὺς μὲν κατεργασάμενοι κἂν κατάσχοιμεν: τῶν δ᾽ εἰ καὶ κρατήσαιμεν, διὰ πολλοῦ γε καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων χαλεπῶς ἂν ἄρχειν δυναίμεθα. ἀνόητον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοιούτους ἰέναι ὧν κρατήσας τε μὴ κατασχήσει τις καὶ μὴ κατορθώσας μὴ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ καὶ πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἔσται. [2] Σικελιῶται δ᾽ ἄν μοι δοκοῦσιν, ὥς γε νῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ ἔτι ἂν ἧσσον δεινοὶ ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, εἰ ἄρξειαν αὐτῶν Συρακόσιοι: ὅπερ οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἐκφοβοῦσιν. [3] νῦν μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἔλθοιεν ἴσως Λακεδαιμονίων ἕκαστοι χάριτι, ἐκείνως δ᾽ οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν στρατεῦσαι: ᾧ γὰρ ἂν τρόπῳ τὴν ἡμετέραν μετὰ Πελοποννησίων ἀφέλωνται, εἰκὸς ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σφετέραν διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καθαιρεθῆναι. [4] ἡμᾶς δ᾽ ἂν οἱ ἐκεῖ Ἕλληνες μάλιστα μὲν ἐκπεπληγμένοι εἶεν

εἰ μὴ ἀφικοίμεθα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ εἰ δείξαντες τὴν δύναμιν δι᾽ ὀλίγου ἀπέλθοιμεν: τὰ γὰρ διὰ πλείστου πάντες ἴσμεν θαυμαζόμενα καὶ τὰ πεῖραν ἥκιστα τῆς δόξης δόντα. εἰ δὲ σφαλείημέν τι, τάχιστ᾽ ἂν ὑπεριδόντες μετὰ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐπιθοῖντο. [5] ὅπερ νῦν ὑμεῖς ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους πεπόνθατε: διὰ τὸ παρὰ γνώμην αὐτῶν πρὸς ἃ ἐφοβεῖσθε τὸ πρῶτον περιγεγενῆσθαι, καταφρονήσαντες ἤδη καὶ Σικελίας ἐφίεσθε. [6] χρὴ δὲ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπαίρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰς διανοίας κρατήσαντας θαρσεῖν, μηδὲ Λακεδαιμονίους ἄλλο τι ἡγήσασθαι ἢ διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σκοπεῖν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ἢν δύνωνται, σφήλαντες ἡμᾶς τὸ σφέτερον ἀπρεπὲς εὖ θήσονται, ὅσῳ καὶ περὶ πλείστου καὶ διὰ πλείστου δόξαν ἀρετῆς μελετῶσιν. [7] ὥστε οὐ περὶ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Ἐγεσταίων ἡμῖν, ἀνδρῶν βαρβάρων, ὁ ἀγών, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως πόλιν δι᾽ ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιβουλεύουσαν ὀξέως φυλαξόμεθα.

12. ‘καὶ μεμνῆσθαι χρὴ ἡμᾶς ὅτι νεωστὶ ἀπὸ νόσου μεγάλης καὶ πολέμου βραχύ τι λελωφήκαμεν, ὥστε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ηὐξῆσθαι: καὶ ταῦτα ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν δίκαιον ἐνθάδε εἶναι ἀναλοῦν, καὶ μὴ ὑπὲρ ἀνδρῶν φυγάδων τῶνδε ἐπικουρίας δεομένων, οἷς τό τε ψεύσασθαι καλῶς χρήσιμον καὶ τῷ τοῦ πέλας κινδύνῳ, αὐτοὺς λόγους μόνον παρασχομένους, ἢ κατορθώσαντας χάριν μὴ ἀξίαν εἰδέναι ἢ πταίσαντάς που τοὺς φίλους ξυναπολέσαι. [2] εἴ τέ τις ἄρχειν ἄσμενος αἱρεθεὶς παραινεῖ ὑμῖν ἐκπλεῖν, τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον σκοπῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ νεώτερος ὢν ἔτι ἐς τὸ ἄρχειν, ὅπως θαυμασθῇ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἱπποτροφίας, διὰ δὲ πολυτέλειαν καὶ ὠφεληθῇ τι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς, μηδὲ τούτῳ ἐμπαράσχητε τῷ τῆς πόλεως κινδύνῳ ἰδίᾳ ἐλλαμπρύνεσθαι, νομίσατε δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους τὰ μὲν δημόσια ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἴδια ἀναλοῦν, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μέγα εἶναι καὶ μὴ οἷον νεωτέρῳ βουλεύσασθαί τε καὶ ὀξέως μεταχειρίσαι.

13. ‘οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶν νῦν ἐνθάδε τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ παρακελευστοὺς καθημένους φοβοῦμαι, καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἀντιπαρακελεύομαι μὴ καταισχυνθῆναι, εἴ τῳ

τις παρακάθηται τῶνδε, ὅπως μὴ δόξει, ἐὰν μὴ ψηφίζηται πολεμεῖν, μαλακὸς εἶναι, μηδ᾽, ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ πάθοιεν, δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων, γνόντας ὅτι ἐπιθυμίᾳ μὲν ἐλάχιστα κατορθοῦνται, προνοίᾳ δὲ πλεῖστα, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ὡς μέγιστον δὴ τῶν πρὶν κίνδυνον ἀναρριπτούσης ἀντιχειροτονεῖν, καὶ ψηφίζεσθαι τοὺς μὲν Σικελιώτας οἵσπερ νῦν ὅροις χρωμένους πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ μεμπτοῖς, τῷ τε Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ παρὰ γῆν ἥν τις πλέῃ, καὶ τῷ Σικελικῷ διὰ πελάγους, τὰ αὐτῶν νεμομένους καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ ξυμφέρεσθαι: [2] τοῖς δ᾽ Ἐγεσταίοις ἰδίᾳ εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ξυνῆψαν πρὸς Σελινουντίους τὸ πρῶτον πόλεμον, μετὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ καταλύεσθαι: καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ξυμμάχους μὴ ποιεῖσθαι ὥσπερ εἰώθαμεν, οἷς κακῶς μὲν πράξασιν ἀμυνοῦμεν, ὠφελίας δ᾽ αὐτοὶ δεηθέντες οὐ τευξόμεθα.

14. ‘καὶ σύ, ὦ πρύτανι, ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἡγεῖ σοι προσήκειν κήδεσθαί τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ βούλει γενέσθαι πολίτης ἀγαθός, ἐπιψήφιζε καὶ γνώμας προτίθει αὖθις Ἀθηναίοις, νομίσας, εἰ ὀρρωδεῖς τὸ ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ μὲν λύειν τοὺς νόμους μὴ μετὰ τοσῶνδ᾽ ἂν μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σχεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως <κακῶς > βουλευσαμένης ἰατρὸς ἂν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἄρξαι τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι, ὃς ἂν τὴν πατρίδα ὠφελήσῃ ὡς πλεῖστα ἢ ἑκὼν εἶναι μηδὲν βλάψῃ.’

15. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοιαῦτα εἶπε, τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων παριόντες οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι στρατεύειν παρῄνουν καὶ τὰ ἐψηφισμένα μὴ λύειν, οἱ δέ τινες καὶ ἀντέλεγον. [2] ἐνῆγε δὲ προθυμότατα τὴν στρατείαν Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὢν καὶ ἐς τἆλλα διάφορος τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη, καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν. [3] ὢν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζοσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρῆτο ἔς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας: ὅπερ καὶ καθεῖλεν ὕστερον τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἥκιστα. [4] φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ

πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν δίαιταν καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὧν καθ᾽ ἓν ἕκαστον ἐν ὅτῳ γίγνοιτο ἔπρασσεν, ὡς τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμιοι καθέστασαν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν. [5] τότε δ᾽ οὖν παρελθὼν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρῄνει τοιάδε.

16. ‘καὶ προσήκει μοι μᾶλλον ἑτέρων, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄρχειν ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ἄρξασθαι, ἐπειδή μου Νικίας καθήψατο , καὶ ἄξιος ἅμα νομίζω εἶναι. ὧν γὰρ πέρι ἐπιβόητός εἰμι, τοῖς μὲν προγόνοις μου καὶ ἐμοὶ δόξαν φέρει ταῦτα, τῇ δὲ πατρίδι καὶ ὠφελίαν. [2] οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπίαζε θεωρίας, πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμῆσθαι, διότι ἅρματα μὲν ἑπτὰ καθῆκα, ὅσα οὐδείς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησα δὲ καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενόμην καὶ τἆλλα ἀξίως τῆς νίκης παρεσκευασάμην. νόμῳ μὲν γὰρ τιμὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δρωμένου καὶ δύναμις ἅμα ὑπονοεῖται. [3] καὶ ὅσα αὖ ἐν τῇ πόλει χορηγίαις ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ λαμπρύνομαι, τοῖς μὲν ἀστοῖς φθονεῖται φύσει, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ξένους καὶ αὕτη ἰσχὺς φαίνεται. καὶ οὐκ ἄχρηστος ἥδ᾽ ἡ ἄνοια, ὃς ἂν τοῖς ἰδίοις τέλεσι μὴ ἑαυτὸν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῇ. [4] οὐδέ γε ἄδικον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονοῦντα μὴ ἴσον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ κακῶς πράσσων πρὸς οὐδένα τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἰσομοιρεῖ: ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ δυστυχοῦντες οὐ προσαγορευόμεθα, ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τις ἀνεχέσθω καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν εὐπραγούντων ὑπερφρονούμενος, ἢ τὰ ἴσα νέμων τὰ ὁμοῖα ἀνταξιούτω. [5] οἶδα δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους, καὶ ὅσοι ἔν τινος λαμπρότητι προέσχον, ἐν μὲν τῷ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς βίῳ λυπηροὺς ὄντας, τοῖς ὁμοίοις μὲν μάλιστα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυνόντας, τῶν δὲ ἔπειτα ἀνθρώπων προσποίησίν τε ξυγγενείας τισὶ καὶ μὴ οὖσαν καταλιπόντας, καὶ ἧς ἂν ὦσι πατρίδος, ταύτῃ αὔχησιν ὡς οὐ περὶ ἀλλοτρίων οὐδ᾽ ἁμαρτόντων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς περὶ σφετέρων τε καὶ καλὰ πραξάντων. [6] ὧν ἐγὼ

ὀρεγόμενος καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τὰ ἴδια ἐπιβοώμενος τὰ δημόσια σκοπεῖτε εἴ του χεῖρον μεταχειρίζω. Πελοποννήσου γὰρ τὰ δυνατώτατα ξυστήσας ἄνευ μεγάλου ὑμῖν κινδύνου καὶ δαπάνης Λακεδαιμονίους ἐς μίαν ἡμέραν κατέστησα ἐν Μαντινείᾳ περὶ τῶν ἁπάντων ἀγωνίσασθαι: ἐξ οὗ καὶ περιγενόμενοι τῇ μάχῃ οὐδέπω καὶ νῦν βεβαίως θαρσοῦσιν.

17. ‘καὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἐμὴ νεότης καὶ ἄνοια παρὰ φύσιν δοκοῦσα εἶναι ἐς τὴν Πελοποννησίων δύναμιν λόγοις τε πρέπουσιν ὡμίλησε καὶ ὀργῇ πίστιν παρασχομένη ἔπεισεν. καὶ νῦν μὴ πεφόβησθε αὐτήν, ἀλλ᾽ ἕως ἐγώ τε ἔτι ἀκμάζω μετ᾽ αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ Νικίας εὐτυχὴς δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀποχρήσασθε τῇ ἑκατέρου ἡμῶν ὠφελίᾳ. [2] καὶ τὸν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν πλοῦν μὴ μεταγιγνώσκετε ὡς ἐπὶ μεγάλην δύναμιν ἐσόμενον. ὄχλοις τε γὰρ ξυμμείκτοις πολυανδροῦσιν αἱ πόλεις καὶ ῥᾳδίας ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς. [3] καὶ οὐδεὶς δι᾽ αὐτὸ ὡς περὶ οἰκείας πατρίδος οὔτε τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὅπλοις ἐξήρτυται οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ νομίμοις κατασκευαῖς: ὅτι δὲ ἕκαστος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ λέγων πείθειν οἴεται ἢ στασιάζων ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ λαβὼν ἄλλην γῆν, μὴ κατορθώσας, οἰκήσειν, ταῦτα ἑτοιμάζεται. [4] καὶ οὐκ εἰκὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὅμιλον οὔτε λόγου μιᾷ γνώμῃ ἀκροᾶσθαι οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἔργα κοινῶς τρέπεσθαι: ταχὺ δ᾽ ἂν ὡς ἕκαστοι, εἴ τι καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν λέγοιτο, προσχωροῖεν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ στασιάζουσιν, ὥσπερ πυνθανόμεθα. [5] καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ὁπλῖται οὔτ᾽ ἐκείνοις ὅσοιπερ κομποῦνται, οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες διεφάνησαν τοσοῦτοι ὄντες ὅσους ἕκαστοι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἠρίθμουν, ἀλλὰ μέγιστον δὴ αὐτοὺς ἐψευσμένη ἡ Ἑλλὰς μόλις ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ ἱκανῶς ὡπλίσθη. [6] τά τε οὖν ἐκεῖ, ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἀκοῇ αἰσθάνομαι, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἔτι εὐπορώτερα ἔσται βαρβάρους [τε] γὰρ πολλοὺς ἕξομεν οἳ Συρακοσίων μίσει ξυνεπιθήσονται αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἐπικωλύσει, ἢν ὑμεῖς ὀρθῶς βουλεύησθε. [7] οἱ γὰρ πατέρες ἡμῶν τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους οὕσπερ νῦν φασὶ πολεμίους ὑπολείποντας ἂν ἡμᾶς πλεῖν καὶ προσέτι τὸν Μῆδον ἐχθρὸν ἔχοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἢ τῇ περιουσίᾳ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἰσχύοντες. [8] καὶ νῦν οὔτε

ἀνέλπιστοί πω μᾶλλον Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο, εἴ τε καὶ πάνυ ἔρρωνται, τὸ μὲν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν ἐσβάλλειν, κἂν μὴ ἐκπλεύσωμεν, ἱκανοί εἰσι, τῷ δὲ ναυτικῷ οὐκ ἂν δύναιντο βλάπτειν: ὑπόλοιπον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἀντίπαλον ναυτικόν.

18. ὥστε τί ἂν λέγοντες εἰκὸς ἢ αὐτοὶ ἀποκνοῖμεν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχους σκηπτόμενοι μὴ βοηθοῖμεν; οἷς χρεών, ἐπειδή γε καὶ ξυνωμόσαμεν, ἐπαμύνειν, καὶ μὴ ἀντιτιθέναι ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἡμῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα δεῦρο ἀντιβοηθῶσι προσεθέμεθα αὐτούς, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἐχθροῖς ἡμῶν λυπηροὶ ὄντες δεῦρο κωλύωσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπιέναι. [2] τήν τε ἀρχὴν οὕτως ἐκτησάμεθα καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἄλλοι ἦρξαν, παραγιγνόμενοι προθύμως τοῖς αἰεὶ ἢ βαρβάροις ἢ Ἕλλησιν ἐπικαλουμένοις, ἐπεὶ εἴ γε ἡσυχάζοιεν πάντες ἢ φυλοκρινοῖεν οἷς χρεὼν βοηθεῖν, βραχὺ ἄν τι προσκτώμενοι αὐτῇ περὶ αὐτῆς ἂν ταύτης μᾶλλον κινδυνεύοιμεν. τὸν γὰρ προύχοντα οὐ μόνον ἐπιόντα τις ἀμύνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἔπεισι προκαταλαμβάνει. [3] καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμιεύεσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τῷδε καθέσταμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐπιβουλεύειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἀνιέναι, διὰ τὸ ἀρχθῆναι ἂν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων αὐτοῖς κίνδυνον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοιμεν. καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑμῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἥσυχον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐς τὸ ὁμοῖον μεταλήψεσθε. [4] λογισάμενοι οὖν τάδε μᾶλλον αὐξήσειν, ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ἦν ἴωμεν, ποιώμεθα τὸν πλοῦν, ἵνα Πελοποννησίων τε στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα, εἰ δόξομεν ὑπεριδόντες τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἡσυχίαν καὶ ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεῦσαι: καὶ ἅμα ἢ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῶν ἐκεῖ προσγενομένων πάσης τῷ εἰκότι ἄρξομεν, ἢ κακώσομέν γε Συρακοσίους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὠφελησόμεθα. [5] τὸ δὲ ἀσφαλές, καὶ μένειν, ἤν τι προχωρῇ, καὶ ἀπελθεῖν, αἱ νῆες παρέξουσιν: ναυκράτορες γὰρ ἐσόμεθα καὶ ξυμπάντων Σικελιωτῶν. [6] καὶ μὴ ὑμᾶς ἡ Νικίου τῶν λόγων ἀπραγμοσύνη καὶ διάστασις τοῖς νέοις ἐς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀποτρέψῃ, τῷ δὲ εἰωθότι κόσμῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν ἅμα νέοι γεραιτέροις βουλεύοντες ἐς τάδε ἦραν αὐτά, καὶ νῦν τῷ

αὐτῷ τρόπῳ πειρᾶσθε προαγαγεῖν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ νομίσατε νεότητα μὲν καὶ γῆρας ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲν δύνασθαι, ὁμοῦ δὲ τό τε φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνυ ἀκριβὲς ἂν ξυγκραθὲν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἰσχύειν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἐὰν μὲν ἡσυχάζῃ, τρίψεσθαί τε αὐτὴν περὶ αὐτὴν ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ πάντων τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐγγηράσεσθαι, ἀγωνιζομένην δὲ αἰεὶ προσλήψεσθαί τε τὴν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ μᾶλλον ξύνηθες ἕξειν. [7] παράπαν τε γιγνώσκω πόλιν μὴ ἀπράγμονα τάχιστ᾽ ἄν μοι δοκεῖν ἀπραγμοσύνης μεταβολῇ διαφθαρῆναι, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσφαλέστατα τούτους οἰκεῖν οἳ ἂν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἤθεσι καὶ νόμοις, ἢν καὶ χείρω ᾖ, ἥκιστα διαφόρως πολιτεύωσιν.’

19. τοιαῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης εἶπεν: οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἐκείνου τε καὶ τῶν Ἐγεσταίων καὶ Λεοντίνων φυγάδων, οἳ παρελθόντες ἐδέοντό τε καὶ τῶν ὁρκίων ὑπομιμνῄσκοντες ἱκέτευον βοηθῆσαι σφίσι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ὥρμηντο στρατεύειν. [2] καὶ ὁ Νικίας γνοὺς ὅτι ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀποτρέψειε, παρασκευῆς δὲ πλήθει, εἰ πολλὴν ἐπιτάξειε, τάχ᾽ ἂν μεταστήσειεν αὐτούς, παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς αὖθις ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

20. ‘ἐπειδὴ πάντως ὁρῶ ὑμᾶς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡρμημένους στρατεύειν, ξυνενέγκοι μὲν ταῦτα ὡς βουλόμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ παρόντι ἃ γιγνώσκω σημανῶ. [2] ἐπὶ γὰρ πόλεις, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκοῇ αἰσθάνομαι, μέλλομεν ἰέναι μεγάλας καὶ οὔθ᾽ ὑπηκόους ἀλλήλων οὔτε δεομένας μεταβολῆς, ᾗ ἂν ἐκ βιαίου τις δουλείας ἄσμενος ἐς ῥᾴω μετάστασιν χωροίη, οὐδ᾽ ἂν τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν ἡμετέραν εἰκότως ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθερίας προσδεξαμένας, τό τε πλῆθος ὡς ἐν μιᾷ νήσῳ πολλὰς τὰς Ἑλληνίδας. [3] πλὴν γὰρ Νάξου καὶ Κατάνης, ἃς ἐλπίζω ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ Λεοντίνων ξυγγενὲς προσέσεσθαι, ἄλλαι εἰσὶν ἑπτά, καὶ παρεσκευασμέναι τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοιοτρόπως μάλιστα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δυνάμει, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐπὶ ἃς μᾶλλον πλέομεν, Σελινοῦς καὶ Συράκουσαι. [4] πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ὁπλῖται ἔνεισι καὶ τοξόται καὶ ἀκοντισταί, πολλαὶ δὲ τριήρεις καὶ ὅχλος ὁ πληρώσων αὐτάς. χρήματά τ᾽ ἔχουσι τὰ μὲν ἴδια, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐστὶ Σελινουντίοις, Συρακοσίοις δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ

βαρβάρων τινῶν ἀπαρχὴ ἐσφέρεται: ᾧ δὲ μάλιστα ἡμῶν προύχουσιν, ἵππους τε πολλοὺς κέκτηνται καὶ σίτῳ οἰκείῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐπακτῷ χρῶνται.

21. ‘πρὸς οὖν τοιαύτην δύναμιν οὐ ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς μόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεζὸν πολὺν ξυμπλεῖν, εἴπερ βουλόμεθα ἄξιον τῆς διανοίας δρᾶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ἱππέων πολλῶν εἴργεσθαι τῆς γῆς, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ ξυστῶσιν αἱ πόλεις φοβηθεῖσαι καὶ μὴ ἀντιπαράσχωσιν ἡμῖν φίλοι τινὲς γενόμενοι ἄλλοι ἢ Ἐγεσταῖοι ᾧ ἀμυνούμεθα ἱππικόν [2] αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους: αὐτόθεν δὲ παρασκευῇ ἀξιόχρεῳ ἐπιέναι, γνόντας ὅτι πολύ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν μέλλομεν πλεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ στρατευσόμενοι καὶ ὅτε ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὑπηκόοις ξύμμαχοι ἤλθετε ἐπί τινα, ὅθεν ῥᾴδιαι αἱ κομιδαὶ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας ὧν προσέδει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς ἀλλοτρίαν πᾶσαν ἀπαρτήσοντες, ἐξ ἧς μηνῶν οὐδὲ τεσσάρων τῶν χειμερινῶν ἄγγελον ῥᾴδιον ἐλθεῖν.

22. ὁπλίτας τε οὖν πολλούς μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡμᾶς ἄγειν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, τῶν τε ὑπηκόων καὶ ἤν τινα ἐκ Πελοποννήσου δυνώμεθα ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ μισθῷ προσαγαγέσθαι, καὶ τοξότας πολλοὺς καὶ σφενδονήτας, ὅπως πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνων ἱππικὸν ἀντέχωσι, ναυσί τε καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾷον ἐσκομιζώμεθα, τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σῖτον ἐν ὁλκάσι, πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγμένας κριθάς, ἄγειν, καὶ σιτοποιοὺς ἐκ τῶν μυλώνων πρὸς μέρος ἠναγκασμένους ἐμμίσθους, ἵνα, ἤν που ὑπὸ ἁπλοίας ἀπολαμβανώμεθα, ἔχῃ ἡ στρατιὰ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πολλὴ γὰρ οὖσα οὐ πάσης ἔσται πόλεως ὑποδέξασθαι, τά τε ἄλλα ὅσον δυνατὸν ἑτοιμάσασθαι, καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ ἑτέροις γίγνεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ χρήματα αὐτόθεν ὡς πλεῖστα ἔχειν. τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ Ἐγεσταίων, ἃ λέγεται ἐκεῖ ἑτοῖμα, νομίσατε καὶ λόγῳ ἂν μάλιστα ἑτοῖμα εἶναι.

23. ἦν γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἔλθωμεν ἐνθένδε μὴ ἀντίπαλον μόνον παρασκευασάμενοι,πλήν γε πρὸς τὸ μάχιμον αὐτῶν, τὸ ὁπλιτικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντες τοῖς πᾶσι, μόλις οὕτως

οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα τῶν μὲν κρατεῖν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διασῶσαι. [2] πόλιν τε νομίσαι χρὴ ἐν ἀλλοφύλοις καὶ πολεμίοις οἰκιοῦντας ἰέναι, οὓς πρέπει τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ ἂν κατάσχωσιν εὐθὺς κρατεῖν τῆς γῆς, ἢ εἰδέναι ὅτι, ἢν σφάλλωνται, πάντα πολέμια ἕξουσιν. [3] ὅπερ ἐγὼ φοβούμενος, καὶ εἰδὼς πολλὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς δέον εὖ βουλεύσασθαι, ἔτι δὲ πλείω εὐτυχῆσαι χαλεπὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας , ὅτι ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοὺς ἐμαυτὸν βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἀσφαλὴς ἐκπλεῦσαι. ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ τε ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βεβαιότατα ἡγοῦμαι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς στρατευσομένοις σωτήρια. εἰ δέ τῳ ἄλλως δοκεῖ, παρίημι αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχήν.’

24. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα εἶπε νομίζων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῷ πλήθει τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ ἀποτρέψειν ἤ, εἰ ἀναγκάζοιτο στρατεύεσθαι, μάλιστ᾽ <ἂν> οὕτως ἀσφαλῶς ἐκπλεῦσαι: [2] οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν τοῦ πλοῦ οὐκ ἐξῃρέθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀχλώδους τῆς παρασκευῆς, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο, καὶ τοὐναντίον περιέστη αὐτῷ: εὖ τε γὰρ παραινέσαι ἔδοξε καὶ ἀσφάλεια νῦν δὴ καὶ πολλὴ ἔσεσθαι. [3] καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβυτέροις ὡς ἢ καταστρεψομένοις ἐφ᾽ ἃ ἔπλεον ἢ οὐδὲν ἂν σφαλεῖσαν μεγάλην δύναμιν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῆς τε ἀπούσης πόθῳ ὄψεως καὶ θεωρίας, καὶ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες σωθήσεσθαι: ὁ δὲ πολὺς ὅμιλος καὶ στρατιώτης ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι ἀργύριον οἴσειν καὶ προσκτήσεσθαι δύναμιν ὅθεν ἀίδιον μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξειν. [4] ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν τῶν πλεόνων ἐπιθυμίαν, εἴ τῳ ἄρα καὶ μὴ ἤρεσκε, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀντιχειροτονῶν κακόνους δόξειεν εἶναι τῇ πόλει ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν.

25. καὶ τέλος παρελθών τις τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ παρακαλέσας τὸν Νικίαν οὐκ ἔφη χρῆναι προφασίζεσθαι οὐδὲ διαμέλλειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐναντίον ἁπάντων ἤδη λέγειν ἥντινα αὐτῷ παρασκευὴν Ἀθηναῖοι ψηφίσωνται. [2] ὁ δὲ ἄκων μὲν εἶπεν ὅτι καὶ μετὰ τῶν ξυναρχόντων καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν μᾶλλον βουλεύσοιτο, ὅσα μέντοι ἤδη δοκεῖν αὐτῷ, τριήρεσι μὲν οὐκ ἔλασσον ἢ ἑκατὸν πλευστέα εἶναι αὐτῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἔσεσθαι ὁπλιταγωγοὺς ὅσαι ἂν δοκῶσι, καὶ ἄλλας ἐκ τῶν ξυμμάχων μεταπεμπτέας εἶναι, ὁπλίταις δὲ τοῖς ξύμπασιν

Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πεντακισχιλίων μὲν οὐκ ἐλάσσοσιν, ἢν δέ τι δύνωνται, καὶ πλέοσιν: τὴν δὲ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ὡς κατὰ λόγον, καὶ τοξοτῶν τῶν αὐτόθεν καὶ ἐκ Κρήτης καὶ σφενδονητῶν, καὶ ἤν τι ἄλλο πρέπον δοκῇ εἶναι, ἑτοιμασάμενοι ἄξειν.

26. ἀκούσαντες δ᾽ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐψηφίσαντο εὐθὺς αὐτοκράτορας εἶναι καὶ περὶ στρατιᾶς πλήθους καὶ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πλοῦ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς πράσσειν ᾗ ἂν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ ἄριστα εἶναι [Ἀθηναίοις]. [2] καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ παρασκευὴ ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ἔς τε τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἔπεμπον καὶ αὐτόθεν καταλόγους ἐποιοῦντο, ἄρτι δ᾽ ἀνειλήφει ἡ πόλις ἑαυτὴν ἀπὸ τῆς νόσου καὶ τοῦ ξυνεχοῦς πολέμου ἔς τε ἡλικίας πλῆθος ἐπιγεγενημένης καὶ ἐς χρημάτων ἄθροισιν διὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, ὥστε ῥᾷον πάντα ἐπορίζετο. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦσαν.

27. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ, ὅσοι Ἑρμαῖ ἦσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναίων εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπιχώριον, ἡ τετράγωνος ἐργασία, πολλοὶ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις προθύροις καὶ ἐν ἱεροῖς, μιᾷ νυκτὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα. [2] καὶ τοὺς δράσαντας ᾔδει οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ μεγάλοις μηνύτροις δημοσίᾳ οὗτοί τε ἐζητοῦντο καὶ προσέτι ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλο τι οἶδεν ἀσέβημα γεγενημένον, μηνύειν ἀδεῶς τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ δούλων. [3] καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μειζόνως ἐλάμβανον: τοῦ τε γὰρ ἔκπλου οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι.

28. μηνύεται οὖν ἀπὸ μετοίκων τέ τινων καὶ ἀκολούθων περὶ μὲν τῶν Ἑρμῶν οὐδέν, ἄλλων δὲ ἀγαλμάτων περικοπαί τινες πρότερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρων μετὰ παιδιᾶς καὶ οἴνου γεγενημέναι, καὶ τὰ μυστήρια ἅμα ὡς ποιεῖται ἐν οἰκίαις ἐφ᾽ ὕβρει: ὧν καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐπῃτιῶντο. [2] καὶ αὐτὰ ὑπολαμβάνοντες οἱ μάλιστα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ἀχθόμενοι ἐμποδὼν ὄντι σφίσι μὴ αὐτοῖς τοῦ δήμου βεβαίως προεστάναι, καὶ νομίσαντες, εἰ αὐτὸν ἐξελάσειαν, πρῶτοι ἂν εἶναι, ἐμεγάλυνον καὶ ἐβόων ὡς ἐπὶ δήμου καταλύσει τά τε μυστικὰ καὶ ἡ τῶν Ἑρμῶν περικοπὴ γένοιτο καὶ οὐδὲν εἴη

αὐτῶν ὅτι οὐ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐπράχθη, ἐπιλέγοντες τεκμήρια τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴν παρανομίαν.

29. ὁ δ᾽ ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι πρὸς τὰ μηνύματα ἀπελογεῖτο καὶ ἑτοῖμος ἦν πρὶν ἐκπλεῖν κρίνεσθαι, εἴ τι τούτων εἰργασμένος ἦν ἤδη γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἐπεπόριστο, καὶ εἰ μὲν τούτων τι εἴργαστο, δίκην δοῦναι, εἰ δ᾽ ἀπολυθείη, ἄρχειν. [2] καὶ ἐπεμαρτύρετο μὴ ἀπόντος πέρι αὐτοῦ διαβολὰς ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη ἀποκτείνειν, εἰ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ ὅτι σωφρονέστερον εἴη μὴ μετὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, πρὶν διαγνῶσι, πέμπειν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τοσούτῳ στρατεύματι. [3] οἱ δ᾽ ἐχθροὶ δεδιότες τό τε στράτευμα μὴ εὔνουν ἔχῃ, ἢν ἤδη ἀγωνίζηται, ὅ τε δῆμος μὴ μαλακίζηται θεραπεύων ὅτι δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον οἵ τ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι ξυνεστράτευον καὶ τῶν Μαντινέων τινές, ἀπέτρεπον καὶ ἀπέσπευδον, ἄλλους ῥήτορας ἐνιέντες οἳ ἔλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀναγωγήν, ἐλθόντα δὲ κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς, βουλόμενοι ἐκ μείζονος διαβολῆς, ἣν ἔμελλον ῥᾷον αὐτοῦ ἀπόντος ποριεῖν, μετάπεμπτον κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι. καὶ ἔδοξε πλεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην.

30. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θέρους μεσοῦντος ἤδη ἡ ἀναγωγὴ ἐγίγνετο ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ξυμμάχων τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ ταῖς σιταγωγοῖς ὁλκάσι καὶ τοῖς πλοίοις καὶ ὅση ἄλλη παρασκευὴ ξυνείπετο πρότερον εἴρητο ἐς Κέρκυραν ξυλλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐκεῖθεν ἀθρόοις ἐπὶ ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν τὸν Ἰόνιον διαβαλοῦσιν: αὐτοὶ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ εἴ τινες τῶν ξυμμάχων παρῆσαν, ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ καταβάντες ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ ἅμα ἕῳ ἐπλήρουν τὰς ναῦς ὡς ἀναξόμενοι. [2] ξυγκατέβη δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ἅπας ὡς εἰπεῖν ὁ ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων, οἱ μὲν ἐπιχώριοι τοὺς σφετέρους αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι προπέμποντες, οἱ μὲν ἑταίρους, οἱ δὲ ξυγγενεῖς, οἱ δὲ υἱεῖς, καὶ μετ᾽ ἐλπίδος τε ἅμα ἰόντες καὶ ὀλοφυρμῶν, τὰ μὲν ὡς κτήσοιντο, τοὺς δ᾽ εἴ ποτε ὄψοιντο, ἐνθυμούμενοι ὅσον πλοῦν ἐκ τῆς σφετέρας ἀπεστέλλοντο.

31. καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ, ὡς ἤδη ἔμελλον μετὰ κινδύνων ἀλλήλους ἀπολιπεῖν, μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἐσῄει τὰ δεινὰ ἢ ὅτε ἐψηφίζοντο πλεῖν: ὅμως δὲ τῇ παρούσῃ ῥώμῃ, διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἑκάστων ὧν ἑώρων, τῇ ὄψει ἀνεθάρσουν. οἱ δὲ ξένοι καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὄχλος κατὰ θέαν ἦκεν ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀξιόχρεων καὶ ἄπιστον διάνοιαν. παρασκευὴ γὰρ αὕτη πρώτη ἐκπλεύσασα μιᾶς πόλεως δυνάμει Ἑλληνικῇ πολυτελεστάτη δὴ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν ἐς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο. [2] ἀριθμῷ δὲ νεῶν καὶ ὁπλιτῶν καὶ ἡ ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον μετὰ Περικλέους καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐς Ποτείδαιαν μετὰ Ἄγνωνος οὐκ ἐλάσσων ἦν: τετράκις γὰρ χίλιοι ὁπλῖται αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τριακόσιοι ἱππῆς καὶ τριήρεις ἑκατόν, καὶ Λεσβίων καὶ Χίων πεντήκοντα, καὶ ξύμμαχοι ἔτι πολλοὶ ξυνέπλευσαν. [3] ἀλλὰ ἐπί τε βραχεῖ πλῷ ὡρμήθησαν καὶ παρασκευῇ φαύλῃ, οὗτος δὲ ὁ στόλος ὡς χρόνιός τε ἐσόμενος καὶ κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα, οὗ ἂν δέῃ, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ἅμα ἐξαρτυθείς, τὸ μὲν ναυτικὸν μεγάλαις δαπάναις τῶν τε τριηράρχων καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐκπονηθέν, τοῦ μὲν δημοσίου δραχμὴν τῆς ἡμέρας τῷ ναύτῃ ἑκάστῳ διδόντος καὶ ναῦς παρασχόντος κενὰς ἑξήκοντα μὲν ταχείας, τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ὁπλιταγωγοὺς καὶ ὑπηρεσίας ταύταις τὰς κρατίστας, τῶν <δὲ> τριηράρχων ἐπιφοράς τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ διδόντων τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν καὶ ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις καὶ τἆλλα σημείοις καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένων,καὶ ἐς τὰ μακρότατα προθυμηθέντος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ὅπως αὐτῷ τινὶ εὐπρεπείᾳ τε ἡ ναῦς μάλιστα προέξει καὶ τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν, τὸ δὲ πεζὸν καταλόγοις τε χρηστοῖς ἐκκριθὲν καὶ ὅπλων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα σκευῶν μεγάλῃ σπουδῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἁμιλληθέν. [4] ξυνέβη δὲ πρός τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἅμα ἔριν γενέσθαι, ᾧ τις ἕκαστος προσετάχθη, καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας ἐπίδειξιν μᾶλλον εἰκασθῆναι τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ ἐξουσίας ἢ ἐπὶ πολεμίους παρασκευήν. [5] εἰ γάρ τις ἐλογίσατο τήν τε τῆς πόλεως ἀνάλωσιν δημοσίαν καὶ τῶν στρατευομένων τὴν ἰδίαν, τῆς μὲν πόλεως ὅσα τε ἤδη προετετελέκει καὶ ἃ ἔχοντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀπέστελλε, τῶν δὲ ἰδιωτῶν ἅ τε περὶ τὸ σῶμά

τις καὶ τριήραρχος ἐς τὴν ναῦν ἀνηλώκει καὶ ὅσα ἔτι ἔμελλεν ἀναλώσειν, χωρὶς δ᾽ ἃ εἰκὸς ἦν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου μισθοῦ πάντα τινὰ παρασκευάσασθαι ἐφόδιον ὡς ἐπὶ χρόνιον στρατείαν, καὶ ὅσα ἐπὶ μεταβολῇ τις ἢ στρατιώτης ἢ ἔμπορος ἔχων ἔπλει, πολλὰ ἂν τάλαντα ηὑρέθη ἐκ τῆς πόλεως τὰ πάντα ἐξαγόμενα. [6] καὶ ὁ στόλος οὐχ ἧσσον τόλμης τε θάμβει καὶ ὄψεως λαμπρότητι περιβόητος ἐγένετο ἢ στρατιᾶς πρὸς οὓς ἐπῆσαν ὑπερβολῇ, καὶ ὅτι μέγιστος ἤδη διάπλους ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας καὶ ἐπὶ μεγίστῃ ἐλπίδι τῶν μελλόντων πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπεχειρήθη.

32. ἐπειδὴ δὲ αἱ νῆες πλήρεις ἦσαν καὶ ἐσέκειτο πάντα ἤδη ὅσα ἔχοντες ἔμελλον ἀνάξεσθαι, τῇ μὲν σάλπιγγι σιωπὴ ὑπεσημάνθη, εὐχὰς δὲ τὰς νομιζομένας πρὸ τῆς ἀναγωγῆς οὐ κατὰ ναῦν ἑκάστην, ξύμπαντες δὲ ὑπὸ κήρυκος ἐποιοῦντο, κρατῆράς τε κεράσαντες παρ᾽ ἅπαν τὸ στράτευμα καὶ ἐκπώμασι χρυσοῖς τε καὶ ἀργυροῖς οἵ τε ἐπιβάται καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες σπένδοντες. [2] ξυνεπηύχοντο δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ὁ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τῶν τε πολιτῶν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος εὔνους παρῆν σφίσιν. παιανίσαντες δὲ καὶ τελεώσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἀνήγοντο, καὶ ἐπὶ κέρως τὸ πρῶτον ἐκπλεύσαντες ἅμιλλαν ἤδη μέχρι Αἰγίνης ἐποιοῦντο. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν, ἔνθαπερ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα τῶν ξυμμάχων ξυνελέγετο, ἠπείγοντο ἀφικέσθαι. [3]ἐς δὲ τὰς Συρακούσας ἠγγέλλετο μὲν πολλαχόθεν τὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐπίπλου, οὐ μέντοι ἐπιστεύετο ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γενομένης ἐκκλησίας ἐλέχθησαν τοιοίδε λόγοι ἀπό τε ἄλλων, τῶν μὲν πιστευόντων τὰ περὶ τῆς στρατείας τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τῶν δὲ τὰ ἐναντία λεγόντων, καὶ Ἑρμοκράτης ὁ Ἕρμωνος παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς, ὡς σαφῶς οἰόμενος εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν, ἔλεγε καὶ παρῄνει τοιάδε.

33. ‘ἄπιστα μὲν ἴσως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, δόξω ὑμῖν περὶ τοῦ ἐπίπλου τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν, καὶ γιγνώσκω ὅτι οἱ τὰ μὴ πιστὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι ἢ λέγοντες ἢ ἀπαγγέλλοντες οὐ μόνον οὐ πείθουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄφρονες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι: ὅμως δὲ οὐ καταφοβηθεὶς ἐπισχήσω κινδυνευούσης τῆς πόλεως,

πείθων γε ἐμαυτὸν σαφέστερόν τι ἑτέρου εἰδὼς λέγειν. [2] Ἀθηναῖοι γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς, ὃ πάνυ θαυμάζετε, πολλῇ στρατιᾷ ὥρμηνται καὶ ναυτικῇ καὶ πεζῇ, πρόφασιν μὲν Ἐγεσταίων ξυμμαχίᾳ καὶ Λεοντίνων κατοικίσει, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς Σικελίας ἐπιθυμίᾳ, μάλιστα δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως, ἡγούμενοι, εἰ ταύτην σχοῖεν, ῥᾳδίως καὶ τἆλλα ἕξειν. [3] ὡς οὖν ἐν τάχει παρεσομένων, ὁρᾶτε ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὅτῳ τρόπῳ κάλλιστα ἀμυνεῖσθε αὐτούς, καὶ μήτε καταφρονήσαντες ἄφαρκτοι ληφθήσεσθε μήτε ἀπιστήσαντες τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἀμελήσετε. [4] εἰ δέ τῳ καὶ πιστά, τὴν τόλμαν αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν μὴ ἐκπλαγῇ. οὔτε γὰρ βλάπτειν ἡμᾶς πλείω οἷοί τ᾽ ἔσονται ἢ πάσχειν, οὔθ᾽ ὅτι μεγάλῳ στόλῳ ἐπέρχονται, ἀνωφελεῖς, ἀλλὰ πρός τε τοὺς ἄλλους Σικελιώτας πολὺ ἄμεινον μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐθελήσουσιν ἐκπλαγέντες ἡμῖν ξυμμαχεῖν , καὶ ἢν ἄρα ἢ κατεργασώμεθα αὐτοὺς ἢ ἀπράκτους ὧν ἐφίενται ἀπώσωμεν οὐ γὰρ δὴ μὴ τύχωσί γε ὧν προσδέχονται φοβοῦμαι , κάλλιστον δὴ ἔργον ἡμῖν ξυμβήσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον ἔμοιγε. [5] ὀλίγοι γὰρ δὴ στόλοι μεγάλοι ἢ Ἑλλήνων ἢ βαρβάρων πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀπάραντες κατώρθωσαν. οὔτε γὰρ πλείους τῶν ἐνοικούντων καὶ ἀστυγειτόνων ἔρχονται πάντα γὰρ ὑπὸ δέους ξυνίσταται , ἤν τε δι᾽ ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ γῇ σφαλῶσι, τοῖς ἐπιβουλευθεῖσιν ὄνομα, κἂν περὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὰ πλείω πταίσωσιν, ὅμως καταλείπουσιν. [6] ὅπερ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοὶ οὗτοι, τοῦ Μήδου παρὰ λόγον πολλὰ σφαλέντος, ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι ὡς ἐπ᾽ Ἀθήνας ᾔει ηὐξήθησαν, καὶ ἡμῖν οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον τὸ τοιοῦτο ξυμβῆναι.

34. ‘θαρσοῦντες οὖν τά τε αὐτοῦ παρασκευαζώμεθα καὶ ἐς τοὺς Σικελοὺς πέμποντες τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον βεβαιωσώμεθα, τοῖς δὲ φιλίαν καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πειρώμεθα ποιεῖσθαι, ἔς τε τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν πέμπωμεν πρέσβεις δηλοῦντες ὡς κοινὸς ὁ κίνδυνος, καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ὅπως ἢ ξυμμαχίαν ποιώμεθα ἡμῖν ἢ μὴ δέχωνται Ἀθηναίους. [2] δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι: οὐ γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, ὥστε τάχ᾽ ἂν ἴσως νομίσαντες, εἰ

τάδε προήσονται, κἂν σφεῖς ἐν πόνῳ εἶναι, ἐθελήσειαν ἡμῖν ἤτοι κρύφα γε ἢ φανερῶς ἢ ἐξ ἑνός γέ του τρόπου ἀμῦναι. δυνατοὶ δὲ εἰσὶ μάλιστα τῶν νῦν, βουληθέντες: χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλεῖστον κέκτηνται, ὅθεν ὅ τε πόλεμος καὶ τἆλλα εὐπορεῖ. [3] πέμπωμεν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ ἐς Κόρινθον δεόμενοι δεῦρο κατὰ τάχος βοηθεῖν καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον κινεῖν. [4] ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγώ τε νομίζω ἐπίκαιρον ὑμεῖς τε διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν ὀξέως πείθοισθε, ὅμως εἰρήσεται. Σικελιῶται γὰρ εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν ξύμπαντες, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι πλεῖστοι μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν, καθελκύσαντες ἅπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ναυτικὸν μετὰ δυοῖν μηνοῖν τροφῆς ἀπαντῆσαι Ἀθηναίοις ἐς Τάραντα καὶ ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν, καὶ δῆλον ποιῆσαι αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῆς Σικελίας πρότερον ἔσται ὁ ἀγὼν ἢ τοῦ ἐκείνους περαιωθῆναι τὸν Ἰόνιον, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκπλήξαιμεν καὶ ἐς λογισμὸν καταστήσαιμεν ὅτι ὁρμώμεθα μὲν ἐκ φιλίας χώρας φύλακες ⌈ὑποδέχεται γὰρ ἡμᾶς Τάρας⌉, τὸ δὲ πέλαγος αὐτοῖς πολὺ περαιοῦσθαι μετὰ πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς, χαλεπὸν δὲ διὰ πλοῦ μῆκος ἐν τάξει μεῖναι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἂν εὐεπίθετος εἴη, βραδεῖά τε καὶ κατ᾽ ὀλίγον προσπίπτουσα. [5] εἰ δ᾽ αὖ τῷ ταχυναυτοῦντι ἀθροωτέρῳ κουφίσαντες προσβάλοιεν, εἰ μὲν κώπαις χρήσαιντο, ἐπιθοίμεθ᾽ ἂν κεκμηκόσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ δοκοίη, ἔστι καὶ ὑποχωρῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐς Τάραντα: οἱ δὲ μετ᾽ ὀλίγων ἐφοδίων ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίᾳ περαιωθέντες ἀποροῖεν ἂν κατὰ χωρία ἐρῆμα, καὶ ἢ μένοντες πολιορκοῖντο ἂν ἢ πειρώμενοι παραπλεῖν τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἀπολείποιεν ἂν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἂν βέβαια ἔχοντες, εἰ ὑποδέξοιντο, ἀθυμοῖεν. [6] ὥστ᾽ ἔγωγε τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἡγοῦμαι ἀποκληομένους αὐτοὺς οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀπᾶραι ἀπὸ Κερκύρας, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ διαβουλευσαμένους καὶ κατασκοπαῖς χρωμένους, ὁπόσοι τ᾽ ἐσμὲν καὶ ἐν ᾧ χωρίῳ, ἐξωσθῆναι ἂν τῇ ὥρᾳ ἐς χειμῶνα, ἢ καταπλαγέντας τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ καταλῦσαι ἂν τὸν πλοῦν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἐμπειροτάτου τῶν στρατηγῶν, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκούω, ἄκοντος ἡγουμένου καὶ ἀσμένου ἂν πρόφασιν λαβόντος, εἴ τι ἀξιόχρεων ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν ὀφθείη. [7] ἀγγελλοίμεθα δ᾽ ἂν εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον: τῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὰ

λεγόμενα καὶ αἱ γνῶμαι ἵστανται, καὶ τοὺς προεπιχειροῦντας ἢ τοῖς γε ἐπιχειροῦσι προδηλοῦντας ὅτι ἀμυνοῦνται μᾶλλον πεφόβηνται, ἰσοκινδύνους ἡγούμενοι. [8] ὅπερ ἂν νῦν Ἀθηναῖοι πάθοιεν. ἐπέρχονται γὰρ ἡμῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀμυνουμένοις, δικαίως κατεγνωκότες ὅτι αὐτοὺς οὐ μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐφθείρομεν: εἰ δ᾽ ἴδοιεν παρὰ γνώμην τολμήσαντας, τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ μᾶλλον ἂν καταπλαγεῖεν ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς δυνάμει. [9]᾽πείθεσθε οὖν μάλιστα μὲν ταῦτα τολμήσαντες, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι τάχιστα τἆλλα ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἑτοιμάζειν, καὶ παραστῆναι παντὶ τὸ μὲν καταφρονεῖν τοὺς ἐπιόντας ἐν τῶν ἔργων τῇ ἀλκῇ δείκνυσθαι, τὸ δ᾽ ἤδη τὰς μετὰ φόβου παρασκευὰς ἀσφαλεστάτας νομίσαντας ὡς ἐπὶ κινδύνου πράσσειν χρησιμώτατον ἂν ξυμβῆναι. οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες καὶ ἐπέρχονται καὶ ἐν πλῷ εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι ἤδη εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσον οὔπω πάρεισιν.᾽

35. καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἑρμοκράτης τοσαῦτα εἶπεν: τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔριδι ἦσαν, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδενὶ ἂν τρόπῳ ἔλθοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδ᾽ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶν ἃ λέγει, τοῖς δέ, εἰ καὶ ἔλθοιεν, τί ἂν δράσειαν αὐτοὺς ὅτι οὐκ ἂν μεῖζον ἀντιπάθοιεν. ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ πάνυ καταφρονοῦντες ἐς γέλωτα ἔτρεπον τὸ πρᾶγμα. ὀλίγον δ᾽ ἦν τὸ πιστεῦον τῷ Ἑρμοκράτει καὶ φοβούμενον τὸ μέλλον. [2] παρελθὼν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς δήμου τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

36. ‘τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ὅστις μὴ βούλεται οὕτω κακῶς φρονῆσαι καὶ ὑποχειρίους ἡμῖν γενέσθαι ἐνθάδε ἐλθόντας, ἢ δειλός ἐστιν ἢ τῇ πόλει οὐκ εὔνους: τοὺς δὲ ἀγγέλλοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ περιφόβους ὑμᾶς ποιοῦντας τῆς μὲν τόλμης οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ ἀξυνεσίας, εἰ μὴ οἴονται ἔνδηλοι εἶναι. [2] οἱ γὰρ δεδιότες ἰδίᾳ τι βούλονται τὴν πόλιν ἐς ἔκπληξιν καθιστάναι, ὅπως τῷ κοινῷ φόβῳ τὸν σφέτερον ἐπηλυγάζωνται. καὶ νῦν αὗται αἱ ἀγγελίαι τοῦτο δύνανται: οὐκ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, ἐκ δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἵπερ αἰεὶ τάδε κινοῦσι ξύγκεινται. [3] ὑμεῖς δὲ ἢν εὖ βουλεύησθε, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν οὗτοι ἀγγέλλουσι σκοποῦντες λογιεῖσθε τὰ εἰκότα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἂν

ἄνθρωποι δεινοὶ καὶ πολλῶν ἔμπειροι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ Ἀθηναίους ἀξιῶ, δράσειαν. [4] οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰκὸς Πελοποννησίους τε ὑπολιπόντας καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον μήπω βεβαίως καταλελυμένους ἐπ᾽ ἄλλον πόλεμον οὐκ ἐλάσσω ἑκόντας ἐλθεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἔγωγε ἀγαπᾶν οἶομαι αὐτοὺς ὅτι οὐχ ἡμεῖς ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνους ἐρχόμεθα, πόλεις τοσαῦται καὶ οὕτω μεγάλαι.

37. εἰ δὲ δή, ὥσπερ λέγονται, ἔλθοιεν, ἱκανωτέραν ἡγοῦμαι Σικελίαν Πελοποννήσου διαπολεμῆσαι ὅσῳ κατὰ πάντα ἄμεινον ἐξήρτυται, τὴν δὲ ἡμετέραν πόλιν αὐτὴν τῆς νῦν στρατιᾶς, ὥς φασιν, ἐπιούσης, καὶ εἰ δὶς τοσαύτη ἔλθοι, πολὺ κρείσσω εἶναι, οἷς γ᾽ ἐπίσταμαι οὔθ᾽ ἵππους ἀκολουθήσοντας, οὐδ᾽ αὐτόθεν πορισθησομένους εἰ μὴ ὀλίγους τινὰς παρ᾽ Ἐγεσταίων, οὔθ᾽ ὁπλίτας ἰσοπληθεῖς τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἐπὶ νεῶν γε ἐλθόντας ▯μέγα γὰρ τὸ καὶ αὐταῖς ταῖς ναυσὶ κούφαις τοσοῦτον πλοῦν δεῦρο κομισθῆναι▯, τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ὅσην δεῖ ἐπὶ πόλιν τοσήνδε πορισθῆναι, οὐκ ὀλίγην οὖσαν. [2] ὥστε, παρὰ τοσοῦτον γιγνώσκω, μόλις ἄν μοι δοκοῦσιν, εἰ πόλιν ἑτέραν τοσαύτην ὅσαι Συράκουσαί εἰσιν ἔλθοιεν ἔχοντες καὶ ὅμορον οἰκίσαντες τὸν πόλεμον ποιοῖντο, οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι διαφθαρῆναι, ἦ πού γε δὴ ἐν πάσῃ πολεμίᾳ Σικελίᾳ ▯ξυστήσεται γάρ▯ στρατοπέδῳ τε ἐκ νεῶν ἱδρυθέντι καὶ ἐκ σκηνιδίων καὶ ἀναγκαίας παρασκευῆς οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἱππέων ἐξιόντες. τό τε ξύμπαν οὐδ᾽ ἂν κρατῆσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς γῆς ἡγοῦμαι: τοσούτῳ τὴν ἡμετέραν παρασκευὴν κρείσσω νομίζω.

38. ‘ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι γιγνώσκοντες τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι σῴζουσι, καὶ ἐνθένδε ἄνδρες οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἂν γενόμενα λογοποιοῦσιν, [2] οὓς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ ἐπίσταμαι ἤτοι λόγοις γε τοιοῖσδε καὶ ἔτι τούτων κακουργοτέροις ἢ ἔργοις βουλομένους καταπλήξαντας τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἄρχειν. καὶ δέδοικα μέντοι μήποτε πολλὰ πειρῶντες καὶ κατορθώσωσιν: ἡμεῖς δὲ κακοί, πρὶν ἐν τῷ παθεῖν ὦμεν, προφυλάξασθαί τε καὶ αἰσθόμενοι ἐπεξελθεῖν.

[3] τοιγάρτοι δι᾽ αὐτὰ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ὀλιγάκις μὲν ἡσυχάζει, στάσεις δὲ πολλὰς καὶ ἀγῶνας οὐ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πλέονας ἢ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀναιρεῖται, τυραννίδας δὲ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ δυναστείας ἀδίκους. [4] ὧν ἐγὼ πειράσομαι, ἤν γε ὑμεῖς ἐθέλητε ἕπεσθαι, μήποτε ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν τι περιιδεῖν γενέσθαι, ὑμᾶς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς πείθων, τοὺς δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα μηχανωμένους κολάζων, μὴ μόνον αὐτοφώρους ▯χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνειν▯, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὧν βούλονται μέν, δύνανται δ᾽ οὔ ▯τὸν γὰρ ἐχθρὸν οὐχ ὧν δρᾷ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς διανοίας προαμύνεσθαι χρή, εἴπερ καὶ μὴ προφυλαξάμενός τις προπείσεται▯, τοὺς δ᾽ αὖ ὀλίγους τὰ μὲν ἐλέγχων, τὰ δὲ φυλάσσων, τὰ δὲ καὶ διδάσκων: μάλιστα γὰρ δοκῶ ἄν μοι οὕτως ἀποτρέπειν τῆς κακουργίας. [5] καὶ δῆτα, ὃ πολλάκις ἐσκεψάμην, τί καὶ βούλεσθε, ὦ νεώτεροι; πότερον ἄρχειν ἤδη; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔννομον: ὁ δὲ νόμος ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ὑμᾶς μᾶλλον ἢ δυναμένους ἐτέθη ἀτιμάζειν. ἀλλὰ δὴ μὴ μετὰ πολλῶν ἰσονομεῖσθαι; καὶ πῶς δίκαιον τοὺς αὐτοὺς μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι;

39. φήσει τις δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετὸν οὔτ᾽ ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δ᾽ ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα βελτίστους. ἐγὼ δέ φημι πρῶτα μὲν δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος, ἔπειτα φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλεῦσαι δ᾽ ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετούς, κρῖναι δ᾽ ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς, καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν. [2]ὀλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δ᾽ ὠφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντ᾽ ἀφελομένη ἔχει: ἃ ὑμῶν οἵ τε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι προθυμοῦνται, ἀδύνατα ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατασχεῖν. ‘ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ὦ πάντων ἀξυνετώτατοι, εἰ μὴ μανθάνετε κακὰ σπεύδοντες, ἢ ἀμαθέστατοί ἐστε ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα Ἑλλήνων, ἢ ἀδικώτατοι, εἰ εἰδότες τολμᾶτε.

40. ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι μαθόντες γε ἢ μεταγνόντες τὸ τῆς πόλεως ξύμπασι κοινὸν αὔξετε, ἡγησάμενοι τοῦτο μὲν ἂν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλέον οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὑμῶν [ἥπερ τὸ τῆς πόλεως πλῆθος] μετασχεῖν, εἰ δ᾽ ἄλλα βουλήσεσθε, καὶ τοῦ παντὸς

κινδυνεῦσαι στερηθῆναι: καὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀγγελιῶν ὡς πρὸς αἰσθανομένους καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέψοντας ἀπαλλάγητε. [2] ἡ γὰρ πόλις ἥδε, καὶ εἰ ἔρχονται Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀμυνεῖται αὐτοὺς ἀξίως αὐτῆς, καὶ στρατηγοί εἰσιν ἡμῖν οἳ σκέψονται αὐτά: καὶ εἰ μή τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὥσπερ οὐκ οἴομαι, οὐ πρὸς τὰς ὑμετέρας ἀγγελίας καταπλαγεῖσα καὶ ἑλομένη ὑμᾶς ἄρχοντας αὐθαίρετον δουλείαν ἐπιβαλεῖται, αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ αὐτῆς σκοποῦσα τούς τε λόγους ἀφ᾽ ὑμῶν ὡς ἔργα δυναμένους κρινεῖ καὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐλευθερίαν οὐχὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἀφαιρεθήσεται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἔργῳ φυλασσομένη μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν πειράσεται σῴζειν.’

41. τοιαῦτα δὲ Ἀθηναγόρας εἶπεν. τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν εἷς ἀναστὰς ἄλλον μὲν οὐδένα ἔτι εἴασε παρελθεῖν, αὐτὸς δὲ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἔλεξε τοιάδε. [2] ‘διαβολὰς μὲν οὐ σῶφρον οὔτε λέγειν τινὰς ἐς ἀλλήλους οὔτε τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἀποδέχεσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐσαγγελλόμενα μᾶλλον ὁρᾶν, ὅπως εἷς τε ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις καλῶς τοὺς ἐπιόντας παρασκευασόμεθα ἀμύνεσθαι. [3] καὶ ἢν ἄρα μηδὲν δεήσῃ, οὐδεμία βλάβη τοῦ τε τὸ κοινὸν κοσμηθῆναι καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις [4] καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἷς ὁ πόλεμος ἀγάλλεται ▯τὴν δ᾽ ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ἐξέτασιν αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ἔξομεν▯, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰς πόλεις διαπομπῶν ἅμα ἔς τε κατασκοπὴν καὶ ἤν τι ἄλλο φαίνηται ἐπιτήδειον. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμεμελήμεθα ἤδη, καὶ ὅτι ἂν αἰσθώμεθα ἐς ὑμᾶς οἴσομεν.’ καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι τοσαῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ διελύθησαν ἐκ τοῦ ξυλλόγου.

42. οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἤδη ἐν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἅπαντες ἦσαν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπεξέτασιν τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ ξύνταξιν, ὥσπερ ἔμελλον ὁρμιεῖσθαί τε καὶ στρατοπεδεύεσθαι, οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ τρία μέρη νείμαντες ἓν ἑκάστῳ ἐκλήρωσαν, ἵνα μήτε ἅμα πλέοντες ἀπορῶσιν ὕδατος καὶ λιμένων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐν ταῖς καταγωγαῖς, πρός τε τἆλλα εὐκοσμότεροι καὶ ῥᾴους ἄρχειν ὦσι, κατὰ τέλη στρατηγῷ προστεταγμένοι: [2] ἔπειτα δὲ προύπεμψαν καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν τρεῖς

ναῦς εἰσομένας αἵτινες σφᾶς τῶν πόλεων δέξονται. καὶ εἴρητο αὐταῖς προαπαντᾶν, ὅπως ἐπιστάμενοι καταπλέωσιν.

43. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοσῇδε ἤδη τῇ παρασκευῇ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Κερκύρας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἐπεραιοῦντο, τριήρεσι μὲν ταῖς πάσαις τέσσαρσι καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ δυοῖν Ῥοδίοιν πεντηκοντόροιν τούτων Ἀττικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν ἑκατόν, ὧν αἱ μὲν ἑξήκοντα ταχεῖαι, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι στρατιώτιδες, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ναυτικὸν Χίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων , ὁπλίταις δὲ τοῖς ξύμπασιν ἑκατὸν καὶ πεντακισχιλίοις καὶ τούτων Ἀθηναίων μὲν αὐτῶν ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐκ καταλόγου, ἑπτακόσιοι δὲ θῆτες ἐπιβάται τῶν νεῶν, ξύμμαχοι δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι ξυνεστράτευον, οἱ μὲν τῶν ὑπηκόων, οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργείων πεντακόσιοι καὶ Μαντινέων καὶ μισθοφόρων πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι , τοξόταις δὲ τοῖς πᾶσιν ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ τετρακοσίοις καὶ τούτων Κρῆτες οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα ἦσαν καὶ σφενδονήταις Ῥοδίων ἑπτακοσίοις, καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι ψιλοῖς φυγάσιν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ ἱππαγωγῷ μιᾷ τριάκοντα ἀγούσῃ ἱππέας.

44. τοσαύτη ἡ πρώτη παρασκευὴ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον διέπλει. τούτοις δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἄγουσαι ὁλκάδες μὲν τριάκοντα σιταγωγοί, καὶ τοὺς σιτοποιοὺς ἔχουσαι καὶ λιθολόγους καὶ τέκτονας καὶ ὅσα ἐς τειχισμὸν ἐργαλεῖα, πλοῖα δὲ ἑκατόν, ἃ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετὰ τῶν ὁλκάδων ξυνέπλει: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πλοῖα καὶ ὁλκάδες ἑκούσιοι ξυνηκολούθουν τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐμπορίας ἕνεκα: ἃ τότε πάντα ἐκ τῆς Κερκύρας ξυνδιέβαλλε τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον. [2] καὶ προσβαλοῦσα ἡ πᾶσα παρασκευὴ πρός τε ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ πρὸς Τάραντα καὶ ὡς ἕκαστοι ηὐπόρησαν, παρεκομίζοντο τὴν Ἰταλίαν, τῶν μὲν πόλεων οὐ δεχομένων αὐτοὺς ἀγορᾷ οὐδὲ ἄστει, ὕδατι δὲ καὶ ὅρμῳ, Τάραντος δὲ καὶ Λοκρῶν οὐδὲ τούτοις, ἕως ἀφίκοντο ἐς Ῥήγιον τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀκρωτήριον. [3] καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἠθροίζοντο, καὶ ἔξω τῆς πόλεως, ὡς αὐτοὺς ἔσω οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, στρατόπεδόν τε κατεσκευάσαντο ἐν τῷ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερῷ, οὗ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀγορὰν παρεῖχον, καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀνελκύσαντες ἡσύχασαν. καὶ πρός [τε] τοὺς Ῥηγίνους

λόγους ἐποιήσαντο, ἀξιοῦντες Χαλκιδέας ὄντας Χαλκιδεῦσιν οὖσι Λεοντίνοις βοηθεῖν: οἱ δὲ οὐδὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων ἔφασαν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἂν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἰταλιώταις ξυνδοκῇ, τοῦτο ποιήσειν. [4] οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ἐσκόπουν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἄριστα προσοίσονται: καὶ τὰς πρόπλους ναῦς ἐκ τῆς Ἐγέστης ἅμα προσέμενον, βουλόμενοι εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν χρημάτων εἰ ἔστιν ἃ ἔλεγον ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις οἱ ἄγγελοι.

45. τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις ἐν τούτῳ πολλαχόθεν τε ἤδη καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κατασκόπων σαφῆ ἠγγέλλετο ὅτι ἐν Ῥηγίῳ αἱ νῆές εἰσι, καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτοις παρεσκευάζοντο πάσῃ τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ οὐκέτι ἠπίστουν. καὶ ἔς τε τοὺς Σικελοὺς περιέπεμπον, ἔνθα μὲν φύλακας, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις, καὶ ἐς τὰ περιπόλια τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φρουρὰς ἐσεκόμιζον, τά τε ἐν τῇ πόλει ὅπλων ἐξετάσει καὶ ἵππων ἐσκόπουν εἰ ἐντελῆ ἐστί, καὶ τἆλλα ὡς ἐπὶ ταχεῖ πολέμῳ καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντι καθίσταντο.

46. αἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Ἐγέστης τρεῖς νῆες αἱ πρόπλοι παραγίγνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον, ἀγγέλλουσαι ὅτι τἆλλα μὲν οὐκ ἔστι χρήματα ἃ ὑπέσχοντο, τριάκοντα δὲ τάλαντα μόνα φαίνεται. [2] καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ εὐθὺς ἐν ἀθυμίᾳ ἦσαν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς τοῦτό τε πρῶτον ἀντεκεκρούκει καὶ οἱ Ῥηγῖνοι οὐκ ἐθελήσαντες ξυστρατεύειν, οὓς πρῶτον ἤρξαντο πείθειν καὶ εἰκὸς ἦν μάλιστα, Λεοντίνων τε ξυγγενεῖς ὄντας καὶ σφίσιν αἰεὶ ἐπιτηδείους. καὶ τῷ μὲν Νικίᾳ προσδεχομένῳ ἦν τὰ παρὰ τῶν Ἐγεσταίων, τοῖν δὲ ἑτέροιν καὶ ἀλογώτερα. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἐγεσταῖοι τοιόνδε τι ἐξετεχνήσαντο τότε ὅτε οἱ πρῶτοι πρέσβεις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἦλθον αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν κατασκοπὴν τῶν χρημάτων. ἔς τε τὸ ἐν Ἔρυκι ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀγαγόντες αὐτοὺς ἐπέδειξαν τὰ ἀναθήματα, φιάλας τε καὶ οἰνοχόας καὶ θυμιατήρια καὶ ἄλλην κατασκευὴν οὐκ ὀλίγην, ἃ ὄντα ἀργυρᾶ πολλῷ πλείω τὴν ὄψιν ἀπ᾽ ὀλίγης δυνάμεως χρημάτων παρείχετο: καὶ ἰδίᾳ ξενίσεις ποιούμενοι τῶν τριηριτῶν τά τε ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἐγέστης ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ ξυλλέξαντες καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς πόλεων καὶ Φοινικικῶν καὶ Ἑλληνίδων αἰτησάμενοι ἐσέφερον ἐς τὰς ἑστιάσεις ὡς οἰκεῖα ἕκαστοι. [4]

καὶ πάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρωμένων καὶ πανταχοῦ πολλῶν φαινομένων μεγάλην τὴν ἔκπληξιν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριήρων Ἀθηναίοις παρεῖχε, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας διεθρόησαν ὡς χρήματα πολλὰ ἴδοιεν. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτοί τε ἀπατηθέντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τότε πείσαντες, ἐπειδὴ διῆλθεν ὁ λόγος ὅτι οὐκ εἴη ἐν τῇ Ἐγέστῃ τὰ χρήματα, πολλὴν τὴν αἰτίαν εἶχον ὑπὸ τῶν στρατιωτῶν: οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἐβουλεύοντο.

47. καὶ Νικίου μὲν ἦν γνώμη πλεῖν ἐπὶ Σελινοῦντα πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ, ἐφ᾽ ὅπερ μάλιστα ἐπέμφθησαν, καὶ ἢν μὲν παρέχωσι χρήματα παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι Ἐγεσταῖοι, πρὸς ταῦτα βουλεύεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσίν, ὅσασπερ ᾐτήσαντο, ἀξιοῦν διδόναι αὐτοὺς τροφήν, καὶ παραμείναντας Σελινουντίους ἢ βίᾳ ἢ ξυμβάσει διαλλάξαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὕτω παραπλεύσαντας τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις καὶ ἐπιδείξαντας μὲν τὴν δύναμιν τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως, δηλώσαντας δὲ τὴν ἐς τοὺς φίλους καὶ ξυμμάχους προθυμίαν, ἀποπλεῖν οἴκαδε, ἢν μή τι δι᾽ ὀλίγου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀδοκήτου ἢ Λεοντίνους οἷοί τε ὦσιν ὠφελῆσαι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ πόλεων προσαγαγέσθαι, καὶ τῇ πόλει δαπανῶντας τὰ οἰκεῖα μὴ κινδυνεύειν.

48. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ οὐκ ἔφη χρῆναι τοσαύτῃ δυνάμει ἐκπλεύσαντας αἰσχρῶς καὶ ἀπράκτους ἀπελθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔς τε τὰς πόλεις ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι πλὴν Σελινοῦντος καὶ Συρακουσῶν τὰς ἄλλας, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι καὶ τοὺς Σικελοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀφιστάναι ἀπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα σῖτον καὶ στρατιὰν ἔχωσι, πρῶτον δὲ πείθειν Μεσσηνίους ἐν πόρῳ γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ προσβολῇ εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῆς Σικελίας, καὶ λιμένα καὶ ἐφόρμησιν τῇ στρατιᾷ ἱκανωτάτην ἔσεσθαι : προσαγαγομένους δὲ τὰς πόλεις, εἰδότας μεθ᾽ ὧν τις πολεμήσει, οὕτως ἤδη Συρακούσαις καὶ Σελινοῦντι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢν μὴ οἱ μὲν Ἐγεσταίοις ξυμβαίνωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λεοντίνους ἐῶσι κατοικίζειν.

49. Λάμαχος δὲ ἄντικρυς ἔφη χρῆναι πλεῖν ἐπὶ Συρακούσας καὶ πρὸς τῇ πόλει ὡς τάχιστα τὴν μάχην ποιεῖσθαι, ἕως ἔτι ἀπαράσκευοί τε εἰσὶ καὶ μάλιστα ἐκπεπληγμένοι. [2] τὸ γὰρ

πρῶτον πᾶν στράτευμα δεινότατον εἶναι: ἢν δὲ χρονίσῃ πρὶν ἐς ὄψιν ἐλθεῖν, τῇ γνώμῃ ἀναθαρσοῦντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ τῇ ὄψει καταφρονεῖν μᾶλλον. αἰφνίδιοι δὲ ἢν προσπέσωσιν, ἕως ἔτι περιδεεῖς προσδέχονται, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν σφεῖς περιγενέσθαι καὶ κατὰ πάντα ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκφοβῆσαι, τῇ τε ὄψει ⟨πλεῖστοι γὰρ ἂν νῦν φανῆναι⟩ καὶ τῇ προσδοκίᾳ ὧν πείσονται, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἂν τῷ αὐτίκα κινδύνῳ τῆς μάχης. [3] εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς πολλοὺς ἀποληφθῆναι ἔξω διὰ τὸ ἀπιστεῖν σφᾶς μὴ ἥξειν, καὶ ἐσκομιζομένων αὐτῶν τὴν στρατιὰν οὐκ ἀπορήσειν χρημάτων, ἢν πρὸς τῇ πόλει κρατοῦσα καθέζηται. [4] τούς τε ἄλλους Σικελιώτας οὕτως ἤδη μᾶλλον καὶ ἐκείνοις οὐ ξυμμαχήσειν καὶ σφίσι προσιέναι καὶ οὐ διαμελλήσειν περισκοποῦντας ὁπότεροι κρατήσουσιν. ναύσταθμον δὲ ἐπαναχωρήσαντας καὶ ἐφορμηθέντας Μέγαρα ἔφη χρῆναι ποιεῖσθαι, ἃ ἦν ἐρῆμα, ἀπέχοντα Συρακουσῶν οὔτε πλοῦν πολὺν οὔτε ὁδόν.

50. Λάμαχος μὲν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὅμως προσέθετο καὶ αὐτὸς τῇ Ἀλκιβιάδου γνώμῃ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Ἀλκιβιάδης τῇ αὐτοῦ νηὶ διαπλεύσας ἐς Μεσσήνην καὶ λόγους ποιησάμενος περὶ ξυμμαχίας πρὸς αὐτούς, ὡς οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπεκρίναντο πόλει μὲν ἂν οὐ δέξασθαι, ἀγορὰν δ᾽ ἔξω παρέξειν, ἀπέπλει ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον. [2] καὶ εὐθὺς ξυμπληρώσαντες ἑξήκοντα ναῦς ἐκ πασῶν οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια λαβόντες παρέπλεον ἐς Νάξον, τὴν ἄλλην στρατιὰν ἐν Ῥηγίῳ καταλιπόντες καὶ ἕνα σφῶν αὐτῶν. [3] Ναξίων δὲ δεξαμένων τῇ πόλει παρέπλεον ἐς Κατάνην. καὶ ὡς αὐτοὺς οἱ Καταναῖοι οὐκ ἐδέχοντο ⟨ἐνῆσαν γὰρ αὐτόθι ἄνδρες τὰ Συρακοσίων βουλόμενοι⟩, [4] ἐκομίσθησαν ἐπὶ τὸν Τηρίαν ποταμόν, καὶ αὐλισάμενοι τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπὶ Συρακούσας ἔπλεον ἐπὶ κέρως ἔχοντες τὰς ἄλλας ναῦς: δέκα δὲ τῶν νεῶν προύπεμψαν ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα πλεῦσαί τε καὶ κατασκέψασθαι εἴ τι ναυτικὸν ἐστι καθειλκυσμένον, καὶ κηρῦξαι ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν προσπλεύσαντας ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι ἥκουσι Λεοντίνους ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατοικιοῦντες κατὰ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ξυγγένειαν: τοὺς οὖν ὄντας ἐν Συρακούσαις Λεοντίνων ὡς παρὰ φίλους καὶ εὐεργέτας Ἀθηναίους ἀδεῶς ἀπιέναι. [5] ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐκηρύχθη καὶ

κατεσκέψαντο τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν ἐξ ἧς αὐτοῖς ὁρμωμένοις πολεμητέα ἦν, ἀπέπλευσαν πάλιν ἐς Κατάνην.

51. καὶ ἐκκλησίας γενομένης τὴν μὲν στρατιὰν οὐκ ἐδέχοντο οἱ Καταναῖοι, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγοὺς ἐσελθόντας ἐκέλευον, εἴ τι βούλονται, εἰπεῖν. καὶ λέγοντος τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τετραμμένων, οἱ στρατιῶται πυλίδα τινὰ ἐνῳκοδομημένην κακῶς ἔλαθον διελόντες, καὶ ἐσελθόντες ἠγόραζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν. [2] τῶν δὲ Καταναίων οἱ μὲν τὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων φρονοῦντες, ὡς εἶδον τὸ στράτευμα ἔνδον, εὐθὺς περιδεεῖς γενόμενοι ὑπεξῆλθον οὐ πολλοί τινες, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐψηφίσαντό τε ξυμμαχίαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα ἐκέλευον ἐκ Ῥηγίου κομίζειν. [3] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο διαπλεύσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον, πάσῃ ἤδη τῇ στρατιᾷ ἄραντες ἐς τὴν Κατάνην, ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο, κατεσκευάζοντο τὸ στρατόπεδον.

52. ἐσηγγέλλετο δὲ αὐτοῖς ἔκ τε Καμαρίνης ὡς, εἰ ἔλθοιεν, προσχωροῖεν ἄν, καὶ ὅτι Συρακόσιοι πληροῦσι ναυτικόν. ἁπάσῃ οὖν τῇ στρατιᾷ παρέπλευσαν πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ Συρακούσας: καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ηὗρον ναυτικὸν πληρούμενον, παρεκομίζοντο αὖθις ἐπὶ Καμαρίνης, καὶ σχόντες ἐς τὸν αἰγιαλὸν ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο. οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, λέγοντες σφίσι τὰ ὅρκια εἶναι μιᾷ νηὶ καταπλεόντων Ἀθηναίων δέχεσθαι, ἢν μὴ αὐτοὶ πλείους μεταπέμπωσιν. [2] ἄπρακτοι δὲ γενόμενοι ἀπέπλεον: καὶ ἀποβάντες κατά τι τῆς Συρακοσίας καὶ ἁρπαγὴν ποιησάμενοι, καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἱππέων βοηθησάντων καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν τινὰς ἐσκεδασμένους διαφθειράντων, ἀπεκομίσθησαν ἐς Κατάνην.

53. καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν Σαλαμινίαν ναῦν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἥκουσαν ἐπί τε Ἀλκιβιάδην ὡς κελεύσοντας ἀποπλεῖν ἐς ἀπολογίαν ὧν ἡ πόλις ἐνεκάλει, καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ μεμηνυμένων περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων ὡς ἀσεβούντων, τῶν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν Ἑρμῶν. [2] οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπειδὴ ἡ στρατιὰ ἀπέπλευσεν,

οὐδὲν ἧσσον ζήτησιν ἐποιοῦντο τῶν περὶ τὰ μυστήρια καὶ τῶν περὶ τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς δρασθέντων, καὶ οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτάς, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὑπόπτως ἀποδεχόμενοι, διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν πάνυ χρηστοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ξυλλαμβάνοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι βασανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὑρεῖν ἢ διὰ μηνυτοῦ πονηρίαν τινὰ καὶ χρηστὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα ἀνέλεγκτον διαφυγεῖν. [3] ἐπιστάμενος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος ἀκοῇ τὴν Πεισιστράτου καὶ τῶν παίδων τυραννίδα χαλεπὴν τελευτῶσαν γενομένην καὶ προσέτι οὐδ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν καὶ Ἁρμοδίου καταλυθεῖσαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἐφοβεῖτο αἰεὶ καὶ πάντα ὑπόπτως ἐλάμβανεν.

54. τὸ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ Ἁρμοδίου τόλμημα δι᾽ ἐρωτικὴν ξυντυχίαν ἐπεχειρήθη, ἣν ἐγὼ ἐπὶ πλέον διηγησάμενος ἀποφανῶ οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους οὔτε αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίους περὶ τῶν σφετέρων τυράννων οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενομένου ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν λέγοντας. [2] Πεισιστράτου γὰρ γηραιοῦ τελευτήσαντος ἐν τῇ τυραννίδι οὐχ Ἵππαρχος, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἀλλ᾽ Ἱππίας πρεσβύτατος ὢν ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχήν. γενομένου δὲ Ἁρμοδίου ὥρᾳ ἡλικίας λαμπροῦ Ἀριστογείτων ἀνὴρ τῶν ἀστῶν, μέσος πολίτης, ἐραστὴς ὢν εἶχεν αὐτόν. [3] πειραθεὶς δὲ ὁ Ἁρμόδιος ὑπὸ Ἱππάρχου τοῦ Πεισιστράτου καὶ οὐ πεισθεὶς καταγορεύει τῷ Ἀριστογείτονι. ὁ δὲ ἐρωτικῶς περιαλγήσας καὶ φοβηθεὶς τὴν Ἱππάρχου δύναμιν μὴ βίᾳ προσαγάγηται αὐτόν, ἐπιβουλεύει εὐθὺς ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἀξιώσεως κατάλυσιν τῇ τυραννίδι. [4] καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ Ἵππαρχος ὡς αὖθις πειράσας οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἔπειθε τὸν Ἁρμόδιον, βίαιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐβούλετο δρᾶν, ἐν τρόπῳ δέ τινι ἀφανεῖ ὡς οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ παρεσκευάζετο προπηλακιῶν αὐτόν. [5] οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἐπαχθὴς ἦν ἐς τοὺς πολλούς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνεπιφθόνως κατεστήσατο: καὶ ἐπετήδευσαν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὴ τύραννοι οὗτοι ἀρετὴν καὶ ξύνεσιν, καὶ Ἀθηναίους εἰκοστὴν μόνον πρασσόμενοι τῶν γιγνομένων τήν τε πόλιν αὐτῶν καλῶς διεκόσμησαν καὶ τοὺς πολέμους διέφερον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἱερὰ ἔθυον. [6] τὰ δὲ ἄλλα αὐτὴ ἡ πόλις τοῖς πρὶν

κειμένοις νόμοις ἐχρῆτο, πλὴν καθ᾽ ὅσον αἰεί τινα ἐπεμέλοντο σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἶναι. καὶ ἄλλοι τε αὐτῶν ἦρξαν τὴν ἐνιαύσιον Ἀθηναίοις ἀρχὴν καὶ Πεισίστρατος ὁ Ἱππίου τοῦ τυραννεύσαντος υἱός, τοῦ πάππου ἔχων τοὔνομα, ὃς τῶν δώδεκα θεῶν βωμὸν τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἄρχων ἀνέθηκε καὶ τὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐν Πυθίου. [7] καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ προσοικοδομήσας ὕστερον ὁ δῆμος Ἀθηναίων μεῖζον μῆκος τοῦ βωμοῦ ἠφάνισε τοὐπίγραμμα: τοῦ δ᾽ ἐν Πυθίου ἔτι καὶ νῦν δῆλόν ἐστιν ἀμυδροῖς γράμμασι λέγον τάδε: “μνῆμα τόδ᾽ ἧς ἀρχῆς Πεισίστρατος Ἱππίου υἱόςθῆκεν Ἀπόλλωνος Πυθίου ἐν τεμένει.”

55. ὅτι δὲ πρεσβύτατος ὢν Ἱππίας ἦρξεν, εἰδὼς μὲν καὶ ἀκοῇ ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλων ἰσχυρίζομαι, γνοίη δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ: παῖδες γὰρ αὐτῷ μόνῳ φαίνονται τῶν γνησίων ἀδελφῶν γενόμενοι, ὡς ὅ τε βωμὸς σημαίνει καὶ ἡ στήλη περὶ τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἀδικίας ἡ ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλει σταθεῖσα, ἐν ᾗ Θεσσαλοῦ μὲν οὐδ᾽ Ἱππάρχου οὐδεὶς παῖς γέγραπται, Ἱππίου δὲ πέντε, οἳ αὐτῷ ἐκ Μυρρίνης τῆς Καλλίου τοῦ Ὑπεροχίδου θυγατρὸς ἐγένοντο: εἰκὸς γὰρ ἦν τὸν πρεσβύτατον πρῶτον γῆμαι. [2] καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ στήλῃ πρῶτος γέγραπται μετὰ τὸν πατέρα, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπεοικότως διὰ τὸ πρεσβεύειν τε ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ τυραννεῦσαι. [3] οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἂν κατασχεῖν μοι δοκεῖ ποτὲ Ἱππίας τὸ παραχρῆμα ῥᾳδίως τὴν τυραννίδα, εἰ Ἵππαρχος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὢν ἀπέθανεν, αὐτὸς δὲ αὐθημερὸν καθίστατο: ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πρότερον ξύνηθες τοῖς μὲν πολίταις φοβερόν, ἐς δὲ τοὺς ἐπικούρους ἀκριβές, πολλῷ τῷ περιόντι τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς κατεκράτησε, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀδελφὸς νεώτερος ὢν ἠπόρησεν, ἐν ᾧ οὐ πρότερον ξυνεχῶς ὡμιλήκει τῇ ἀρχῇ. [4] Ἱππάρχῳ δὲ ξυνέβη τοῦ πάθους τῇ δυστυχίᾳ ὀνομασθέντα καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῆς τυραννίδος ἐς τὰ ἔπειτα προσλαβεῖν.

56. τὸν δ᾽ οὖν Ἁρμόδιον ἀπαρνηθέντα τὴν πείρασιν, ὥσπερ διενοεῖτο, προυπηλάκισεν: ἀδελφὴν γὰρ αὐτοῦ κόρην ἐπαγγείλαντες ἥκειν κανοῦν οἴσουσαν ἐν πομπῇ τινί,

ἀπήλασαν λέγοντες οὐδὲ ἐπαγγεῖλαι τὴν ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξίαν εἶναι. [2] χαλεπῶς δὲ ἐνεγκόντος τοῦ Ἁρμοδίου πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων παρωξύνετο. καὶ αὐτοῖς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς ξυνεπιθησομένους τῷ ἔργῳ ἐπέπρακτο, περιέμενον δὲ Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα, ἐν ᾗ μόνον ἡμέρᾳ οὐχ ὕποπτον ἐγίγνετο ἐν ὅπλοις τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς τὴν πομπὴν πέμψοντας ἀθρόους γενέσθαι: καὶ ἔδει ἄρξαι μὲν αὐτούς, ξυνεπαμύνειν δὲ εὐθὺς τὰ πρὸς τοὺς δορυφόρους ἐκείνους. [3] ἦσαν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ οἱ ξυνομωμοκότες ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα: ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ προειδότας, εἰ καὶ ὁποσοιοῦν τολμήσειαν, ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἔχοντάς γε ὅπλα ἐθελήσειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ξυνελευθεροῦν.

57. καὶ ὡς ἐπῆλθεν ἡ ἑορτή, Ἱππίας μὲν ἔξω ἐν τῷ Κεραμεικῷ καλουμένῳ μετὰ τῶν δορυφόρων διεκόσμει ὡς ἕκαστα ἐχρῆν τῆς πομπῆς προϊέναι, ὁ δὲ Ἁρμόδιος καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων ἔχοντες ἤδη τὰ ἐγχειρίδια ἐς τὸ ἔργον προῆσαν. [2] καὶ ὡς εἶδόν τινα τῶν ξυνωμοτῶν σφίσι διαλεγόμενον οἰκείως τῷ Ἱππίᾳ ἦν δὲ πᾶσιν εὐπρόσοδος ὁ Ἱππίας, ἔδεισαν καὶ ἐνόμισαν μεμηνῦσθαί τε καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ξυλληφθήσεσθαι. [3] τὸν λυπήσαντα οὖν σφᾶς καὶ δι᾽ ὅνπερ πάντα ἐκινδύνευον ἐβούλοντο πρότερον, εἰ δύναιντο, προτιμωρήσασθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ εἶχον ὥρμησαν ἔσω τῶν πυλῶν, καὶ περιέτυχον τῷ Ἱππάρχῳ παρὰ τὸ Λεωκόρειον καλούμενον, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀπερισκέπτως προσπεσόντες καὶ ὡς ἂν μάλιστα δι᾽ ὀργῆς ὁ μὲν ἐρωτικῆς, ὁ δὲ ὑβρισμένος, ἔτυπτον καὶ ἀποκτείνουσιν αὐτόν. [4] καὶ ὁ μὲν τοὺς δορυφόρους τὸ αὐτίκα διαφεύγει ὁ Ἀριστογείτων, ξυνδραμόντος τοῦ ὄχλου, καὶ ὕστερον ληφθεὶς οὐ ῥᾳδίως διετέθη: Ἁρμόδιος δὲ αὐτοῦ παραχρῆμα ἀπόλλυται.

58. ἀγγελθέντος δὲ Ἱππίᾳ ἐς τὸν Κεραμεικόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ γενόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοὺς πομπέας τοὺς ὁπλίτας, πρότερον ἢ αἰσθέσθαι αὐτοὺς ἄπωθεν ὄντας, εὐθὺς ἐχώρησε, καὶ ἀδήλως τῇ ὄψει πλασάμενος πρὸς τὴν ξυμφορὰν ἐκέλευσεν αὐτούς, δείξας τι χωρίον, ἀπελθεῖν ἐς αὐτὸ ἄνευ τῶν ὅπλων. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνεχώρησαν οἰόμενοί τι ἐρεῖν αὐτόν, ὁ

δὲ τοῖς ἐπικούροις φράσας τὰ ὅπλα ὑπολαβεῖν ἐξελέγετο εὐθὺς οὓς ἐπῃτιᾶτο καὶ εἴ τις ηὑρέθη ἐγχειρίδιον ἔχων: μετὰ γὰρ ἀσπίδος καὶ δόρατος εἰώθεσαν τὰς πομπὰς ποιεῖν.

59. τοιούτῳ μὲν τρόπῳ δι᾽ ἐρωτικὴν λύπην ἥ τε ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ ἡ ἀλόγιστος τόλμα ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα περιδεοῦς Ἁρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἀριστογείτονι ἐγένετο. [2] τοῖς δ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις χαλεπωτέρα μετὰ τοῦτο ἡ τυραννὶς κατέστη, καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας διὰ φόβου ἤδη μᾶλλον ὢν τῶν τε πολιτῶν πολλοὺς ἔκτεινε καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἅμα διεσκοπεῖτο, εἴ ποθεν ἀσφάλειάν τινα ὁρῴη μεταβολῆς γενομένης ὑπάρχουσάν οἱ. [3] Ἱππόκλου γοῦν τοῦ Λαμψακηνοῦ τυράννου Αἰαντίδῃ τῷ παιδὶ θυγατέρα ἑαυτοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀρχεδίκην Ἀθηναῖος ὢν Λαμψακηνῷ ἔδωκεν, αἰσθανόμενος αὐτοὺς μέγα παρὰ βασιλεῖ Δαρείῳ δύνασθαι. καὶ αὐτῆς σῆμα ἐν Λαμψάκῳ ἐστὶν ἐπίγραμμα ἔχον τόδε: “ἀνδρὸς ἀριστεύσαντος ἐν Ἑλλάδι τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦἹππίου Ἀρχεδίκην ἥδε κέκευθε κόνις,ἣ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ᾽ οὖσα τυράννωνπαίδων τ᾽ οὐκ ἤρθη νοῦν ἐς ἀτασθαλίην.” [4] τυραννεύσας δὲ ἔτη τρία Ἱππίας ἔτι Ἀθηναίων καὶ παυθεὶς ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀλκμεωνιδῶν τῶν φευγόντων, ἐχώρει ὑπόσπονδος ἔς τε Σίγειον καὶ παρ᾽ Αἰαντίδην ἐς Λάμψακον, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ὡς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον, ὅθεν καὶ ὁρμώμενος ἐς Μαραθῶνα ὕστερον ἔτει εἰκοστῷ ἤδη γέρων ὢν μετὰ Μήδων ἐστράτευσεν.

60. ὧν ἐνθυμούμενος ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μιμνῃσκόμενος ὅσα ἀκοῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἠπίστατο, χαλεπὸς ἦν τότε καὶ ὑπόπτης ἐς τοὺς περὶ τῶν μυστικῶν τὴν αἰτίαν λαβόντας, καὶ πάντα αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ὀλιγαρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ πεπρᾶχθαι. [2] καὶ ὡς αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὀργιζομένων πολλοί τε καὶ ἀξιόλογοι ἄνθρωποι ἤδη ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ἦσαν καὶ οὐκ ἐν παύλῃ ἐφαίνετο, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπεδίδοσαν μᾶλλον ἐς τὸ ἀγριώτερόν τε καὶ πλείους ἔτι ξυλλαμβάνειν, ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται εἷς τῶν δεδεμένων, ὅσπερ ἐδόκει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι, ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνδεσμωτῶν τινὸς εἴτε ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὄντα μηνῦσαι εἴτε καὶ οὔ: ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα γὰρ εἰκάζεται, τὸ δὲ σαφὲς οὐδεὶς οὔτε

τότε οὔτε ὕστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν δρασάντων τὸ ἔργον. [3] λέγων δὲ ἔπεισεν αὐτὸν ὡς χρή, εἰ μὴ καὶ δέδρακεν, αὐτόν τε ἄδειαν ποιησάμενον σῶσαι καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῆς παρούσης ὑποψίας παῦσαι: βεβαιοτέραν γὰρ αὐτῷ σωτηρίαν εἶναι ὁμολογήσαντι μετ᾽ ἀδείας ἢ ἀρνηθέντι διὰ δίκης ἐλθεῖν. [4] καὶ ὁ μὲν αὐτός τε καθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ᾽ ἄλλων μηνύει τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν: ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβών, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ σαφὲς καὶ δεινὸν ποιούμενοι πρότερον εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἴσονται, τὸν μὲν μηνυτὴν εὐθὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὅσων μὴ κατηγορήκει ἔλυσαν, τοὺς δὲ καταιτιαθέντας κρίσεις ποιήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, ὅσοι ξυνελήφθησαν, τῶν δὲ διαφυγόντων θάνατον καταγνόντες ἐπανεῖπον ἀργύριον τῷ ἀποκτείναντι. [5] κἀν τούτῳ οἱ μὲν παθόντες ἄδηλον ἦν εἰ ἀδίκως ἐτετιμώρηντο, ἡ μέντοι ἄλλη πόλις ἐν τῷ παρόντι περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο.

61. περὶ δὲ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐναγόντων τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οἵπερ καὶ πρὶν ἐκπλεῖν αὐτὸν ἐπέθεντο, χαλεπῶς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐλάμβανον: καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν ᾤοντο σαφὲς ἔχειν, πολὺ δὴ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ μυστικά, ὧν ἐπαίτιος ἦν, μετὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ξυνωμοσίας ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐδόκει πραχθῆναι. [2] καὶ γάρ τις καὶ στρατιὰ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐ πολλὴ ἔτυχε κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἐν ᾧ περὶ ταῦτα ἐθορυβοῦντο μέχρι Ἰσθμοῦ παρελθοῦσα, πρὸς Βοιωτούς τι πράσσοντες. ἐδόκει οὖν ἐκείνου πράξαντος καὶ οὐ Βοιωτῶν ἕνεκα ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος ἥκειν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔφθασαν δὴ αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὸ μήνυμα ξυλλαβόντες τοὺς ἄνδρας, προδοθῆναι ἂν ἡ πόλις. καί τινα μίαν νύκτα καὶ κατέδαρθον ἐν Θησείῳ τῷ ἐν πόλει ἐν ὅπλοις. [3] οἵ τε ξένοι τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου οἱ ἐν Ἄργει κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ὑπωπτεύθησαν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπιτίθεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς ὁμήρους τῶν Ἀργείων τοὺς ἐν ταῖς νήσοις κειμένους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τότε παρέδοσαν τῷ Ἀργείων δήμῳ διὰ ταῦτα διαχρήσασθαι. [4] πανταχόθεν τε περιειστήκει ὑποψία ἐς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην. ὥστε βουλόμενοι αὐτὸν ἐς κρίσιν ἀγαγόντες ἀποκτεῖναι, πέμπουσιν οὕτω τὴν Σαλαμινίαν ναῦν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἐπί τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ ὧν πέρι

ἄλλων ἐμεμήνυτο. [5] εἴρητο δὲ προειπεῖν αὐτῷ ἀπολογησομένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ξυλλαμβάνειν δὲ μή, θεραπεύοντες τό τε πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ στρατιώτας τε σφετέρους καὶ πολεμίους μὴ θορυβεῖν καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοὺς Μαντινέας καὶ Ἀργείους βουλόμενοι παραμεῖναι, δι᾽ ἐκείνου νομίζοντες πεισθῆναι σφίσι ξυστρατεύειν. [6] καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ναῦν καὶ οἱ ξυνδιαβεβλημένοι ἀπέπλεον μετὰ τῆς Σαλαμινίας ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας ὡς ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας: καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο ἐν Θουρίοις, οὐκέτι ξυνείποντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς νεὼς οὐ φανεροὶ ἦσαν, δείσαντες τὸ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ ἐς δίκην καταπλεῦσαι. [7] οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Σαλαμινίας τέως μὲν ἐζήτουν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ: ὡς δ᾽ οὐδαμοῦ φανεροὶ ἦσαν, ᾤχοντο ἀποπλέοντες. ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἤδη φυγὰς ὢν οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἐπὶ πλοίου ἐπεραιώθη ἐς Πελοπόννησον ἐκ τῆς Θουρίας: οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐρήμῃ δίκῃ θάνατον κατέγνωσαν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν μετ᾽ ἐκείνου.

62. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, δύο μέρη ποιήσαντες τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ λαχὼν ἑκάτερος, ἔπλεον ξύμπαντι ἐπὶ Σελινοῦντος καὶ Ἐγέστης,βουλόμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι τὰ χρήματα εἰ δώσουσιν οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι, κατασκέψασθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν Σελινουντίων τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰ διάφορα μαθεῖν τὰ πρὸς Ἐγεσταίους. [2] παραπλέοντες δ᾽ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τὴν Σικελίαν, τὸ μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὸν Τυρσηνικὸν κόλπον, ἔσχον ἐς Ἱμέραν, ἥπερ μόνη ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει τῆς Σικελίας Ἑλλὰς πόλις ἐστίν: καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἐδέχοντο αὐτούς, παρεκομίζοντο. [3] καὶ ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ αἱροῦσιν Ὕκκαρα, πόλισμα Σικανικὸν μέν, Ἐγεσταίοις δὲ πολέμιον: ἦν δὲ παραθαλασσίδιον. καὶ ἀνδραποδίσαντες τὴν πόλιν παρέδοσαν Ἐγεσταίοις παρεγένοντο γὰρ αὐτῶν ἱππῆς , αὐτοὶ δὲ πάλιν τῷ μὲν πεζῷ ἐχώρουν διὰ τῶν Σικελῶν ἕως ἀφίκοντο ἐς Κατάνην, αἱ δὲ νῆες περιέπλευσαν τὰ ἀνδράποδα ἄγουσαι. [4] Νικίας δὲ εὐθὺς ἐξ Ὑκκάρων ἐπὶ Ἐγέστης παραπλεύσας, καὶ τἆλλα χρηματίσας καὶ λαβὼν τάλαντα τριάκοντα παρῆν ἐς τὸ στράτευμα: καὶ τἀνδράποδα ἀπέδοσαν, καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ

ἑκατὸν τάλαντα. [5] καὶ ἐς τοὺς τῶν Σικελῶν ξυμμάχους περιέπλευσαν, στρατιὰν κελεύοντες πέμπειν: τῇ τε ἡμισείᾳ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἦλθον ἐπὶ Ὕβλαν τὴν Γελεᾶτιν πολεμίαν οὖσαν, καὶ οὐχ εἷλον. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

63. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς τὴν ἔφοδον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ Συρακούσας παρεσκευάζοντο, οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνους ἰόντες. [2] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν πρῶτον φόβον καὶ τὴν προσδοκίαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπέκειντο, κατά τε τὴν ἡμέραν ἑκάστην προϊοῦσαν ἀνεθάρσουν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπειδὴ πλέοντές τε τὰ ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τῆς Σικελίας πολὺ ἀπὸ σφῶν ἐφαίνοντο καὶ πρὸς τὴν Ὕβλαν ἐλθόντες καὶ πειράσαντες οὐχ εἷλον βίᾳ, ἔτι πλέον κατεφρόνησαν καὶ ἠξίουν τοὺς στρατηγούς, οἷον δὴ ὄχλος φιλεῖ θαρσήσας ποιεῖν, ἄγειν σφᾶς ἐπὶ Κατάνην, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐκεῖνοι ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἔρχονται. [3] καὶ ἱππῆς προσελαύνοντες αἰεὶ κατάσκοποι τῶν Συρακοσίων πρὸς τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐφύβριζον ἄλλα τε καὶ εἰ ξυνοικήσοντες σφίσιν αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον ἥκοιεν ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἢ Λεοντίνους ἐς τὴν οἰκείαν κατοικιοῦντες.

64. ἃ γιγνώσκοντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς ἄγειν πανδημεὶ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὅτι πλεῖστον, αὐτοὶ δὲ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐν τοσούτῳ ὑπὸ νύκτα παραπλεύσαντες στρατόπεδον καταλαμβάνειν ἐν ἐπιτηδείῳ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν, εἰδότες οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως δυνηθέντες καὶ εἰ ἐκ τῶν νεῶν πρὸς παρεσκευασμένους ἐκβιβάζοιεν ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἰόντες γνωσθεῖεν τοὺς γὰρ ἂν ψιλοὺς τοὺς σφῶν καὶ τὸν ὄχλον τῶν Συρακοσίων τοὺς ἱππέας πολλοὺς ὄντας, σφίσι δ᾽ οὐ παρόντων ἱππέων, βλάπτειν ἂν μεγάλα, οὕτω δὲ λήψεσθαι χωρίον ὅθεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων οὐ βλάψονται ἄξια λόγου: ἐδίδασκον δ᾽ αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ πρὸς τῷ Ὀλυμπιείῳ χωρίου, ὅπερ καὶ κατέλαβον, Συρακοσίων φυγάδες, οἳ ξυνείποντο, τοιόνδε τι οὖν πρὸς ἃ ἐβούλοντο οἱ στρατηγοὶ μηχανῶνται. [2] πέμπουσιν ἄνδρα σφίσι μὲν πιστόν, τοῖς δὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοῖς τῇ δοκήσει οὐχ ἧσσον ἐπιτήδειον: ἦν δὲ Καταναῖος ὁ ἀνήρ, καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης ἥκειν ἔφη ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ὀνόματα ἐγίγνωσκον καὶ

ἠπίσταντο ἐν τῇ πόλει ἔτι ὑπολοίπους ὄντας τῶν σφίσιν εὖνων. [3] ἔλεγε δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους αὐλίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ εἰ βούλονται ἐκεῖνοι πανδημεὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ ἅμα ἕῳ ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ἐλθεῖν, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἀποκλῄσειν τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐμπρήσειν, ἐκείνους δὲ ῥᾳδίως τὸ στράτευμα προσβαλόντας τῷ σταυρώματι αἱρήσειν: εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ξυνδράσοντας πολλοὺς Καταναίων καὶ ἡτοιμάσθαι ἤδη, ἀφ᾽ ὧν αὐτὸς ἥκειν.

65. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων, μετὰ τοῦ καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα θαρσεῖν καὶ εἶναι ἐν διανοίᾳ καὶ ἄνευ τούτων ἰέναι παρεσκευάσθαι ἐπὶ Κατάνην, ἐπίστευσάν τε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πολλῷ ἀπερισκεπτότερον καὶ εὐθὺς ἡμέραν ξυνθέμενοι ᾗ παρέσονται ἀπέστειλαν αὐτόν, καὶ αὐτοί ⌈ἤδη γὰρ καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Σελινούντιοι καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς παρῆσαν⌉ προεῖπον πανδημεὶ πᾶσιν ἐξιέναι Συρακοσίοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἑτοῖμα αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἦν καὶ αἱ ἡμέραι ἐν αἷς ξυνέθεντο ἥξειν ἐγγὺς ἦσαν, πορευόμενοι ἐπὶ Κατάνης ηὐλίσαντο ἐπὶ τῷ Συμαίθῳ ποταμῷ ἐν τῇ Λεοντίνῃ. [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ὡς ᾔσθοντο αὐτοὺς προσιόντας, ἀναλαβόντες τό τε στράτευμα ἅπαν τὸ ἑαυτῶν καὶ ὅσοι Σικελῶν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἄλλος τις προσεληλύθει καὶ ἐπιβιβάσαντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ πλοῖα, ὑπὸ νύκτα ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὰς Συρακούσας. [3] καὶ οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἅμα ἕῳ ἐξέβαινον ἐς τὸ κατὰ τὸ Ὀλυμπιεῖον ὡς τὸ στρατόπεδον καταληψόμενοι, καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς οἱ Συρακοσίων πρῶτοι προσελάσαντες ἐς τὴν Κατάνην καὶ αἰσθόμενοι ὅτι τὸ στράτευμα ἅπαν ἀνῆκται, ἀποστρέψαντες ἀγγέλλουσι τοῖς πεζοῖς, καὶ ξύμπαντες ἤδη ἀποτρεπόμενοι ἐβοήθουν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν.

66. ἐν τούτῳ δ᾽ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, μακρᾶς οὔσης τῆς ὁδοῦ αὐτοῖς, καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν καθῖσαν τὸ στράτευμα ἐς χωρίον ἐπιτήδειον, καὶ ἐν ᾧ μάχης τε ἄρξειν ἔμελλον ὁπότε βούλοιντο καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ λυπήσειν: τῇ μὲν γὰρ τειχία τε καὶ οἰκίαι εἶργον καὶ δένδρα καὶ λίμνη, παρὰ δὲ τὸ κρημνοί. [2] καὶ τὰ ἐγγὺς δένδρα κόψαντες καὶ

κατενεγκόντες ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν παρά τε τὰς ναῦς σταύρωμα ἔπηξαν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ Δάσκωνι ἔρυμά τι, ᾗ εὐεφοδώτατον ἦν τοῖς πολεμίοις, λίθοις λογάδην καὶ ξύλοις διὰ ταχέων ὥρθωσαν, καὶ τὴν τοῦ Ἀνάπου γέφυραν ἔλυσαν. [3] παρασκευαζομένων δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὐδεὶς ἐξιὼν ἐκώλυε, πρῶτοι δὲ οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων προσεβοήθησαν, ἔπειτα δὲ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ πεζὸν ἅπαν ξυνελέγη. καὶ προσῆλθον μὲν ἐγγὺς τοῦ στρατεύματος τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἀντιπροῄσαν αὐτοῖς, ἀναχωρήσαντες καὶ διαβάντες τὴν Ἑλωρίνην ὁδὸν ηὐλίσαντο.

67. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς ἐς μάχην, καὶ ξυνετάξαντο ὧδε. δεξιὸν μὲν κέρας Ἀργεῖοι εἶχον καὶ Μαντινῆς, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τὸ μέσον, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο οἱ ξύμμαχοι οἱ ἄλλοι. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ αὐτοῖς τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἦν τεταγμένον ἐπὶ ὀκτώ, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ ἐπὶ ταῖς εὐναῖς ἐν πλαισίῳ, ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ καὶ τοῦτο τεταγμένον: οἷς εἴρητο, ᾗ ἂν τοῦ στρατεύματός τι πονῇ μάλιστα, ἐφορῶντας παραγίγνεσθαι. καὶ τοὺς σκευοφόρους ἐντὸς τούτων τῶν ἐπιτάκτων ἐποιήσαντο. [2] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἔταξαν τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας πάντας ἐφ᾽ ἑκκαίδεκα, ὄντας πανδημεὶ Συρακοσίους καὶ ὅσοι ξύμμαχοι παρῆσαν ἐβοήθησαν δὲ αὐτοῖς Σελινούντιοι μὲν μάλιστα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ Γελῴων ἱππῆς, τὸ ξύμπαν ἐς διακοσίους, καὶ Καμαριναίων ἱππῆς ὅσον εἴκοσι καὶ τοξόται ὡς πεντήκοντα, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας ἐπετάξαντο ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ, οὐκ ἔλασσον ὄντας ἢ διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους, παρὰ δ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστάς. [3] μέλλουσι δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις προτέροις ἐπιχειρήσειν ὁ Νικίας κατά τε ἔθνη ἐπιπαριὼν ἕκαστα καὶ ξύμπασι τοιάδε παρεκελεύετο.

68. ‘Πολλῇ μὲν παραινέσει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τί δεῖ χρῆσθαι, οἳ πάρεσμεν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀγῶνα; αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ παρασκευὴ ἱκανωτέρα μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι θάρσος παρασχεῖν ἢ καλῶς λεχθέντες λόγοι μετὰ ἀσθενοῦς στρατοπέδου. [2] ὅπου γὰρ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ νησιωτῶν οἱ πρῶτοί ἐσμεν, πῶς οὐ χρὴ μετὰ τοιῶνδε καὶ τοσῶνδε ξυμμάχων

πάντα τινὰ μεγάλην τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς νίκης ἔχειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεί τε ἀμυνομένους καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς, καὶ προσέτι Σικελιώτας, οἳ ὑπερφρονοῦσι μὲν ἡμᾶς, ὑπομενοῦσι δ᾽ οὔ, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τόλμης ἥσσω ἔχειν. [3] παραστήτω δέ τινι καὶ τόδε, πολύ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ πρὸς γῇ οὐδεμιᾷ φιλίᾳ, ἥντινα μὴ αὐτοὶ μαχόμενοι κτήσεσθε. καὶ τοὐναντίον ὑπομιμνήσκω ὑμᾶς ἢ οἱ πολέμιοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι παρακελεύονται: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι περὶ πατρίδος ἔσται ὁ ἀγών, ἐγὼ δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐν πατρίδι, ἐξ ἧς κρατεῖν δεῖ ἢ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποχωρεῖν: οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς πολλοὶ ἐπικείσονται. [4] τῆς τε οὖν ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν ἀξίας μνησθέντες ἐπέλθετε τοῖς ἐναντίοις προθύμως, καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀνάγκην καὶ ἀπορίαν φοβερωτέραν ἡγησάμενοι τῶν πολεμίων.’

69. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοιαῦτα παρακελευσάμενος ἐπῆγε τὸ στρατόπεδον εὐθύς. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἀπροσδόκητοι μὲν ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ ἦσαν ὡς ἤδη μαχούμενοι, καί τινες αὐτοῖς ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως οὔσης καὶ ἀπεληλύθεσαν: οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ σπουδῆς προσβοηθοῦντες δρόμῳ ὑστέριζον μέν, ὡς δὲ ἕκαστός πῃ τοῖς πλέοσι προσμείξειε καθίσταντο. οὐ γὰρ δὴ προθυμίᾳ ἐλλιπεῖς ἦσαν οὐδὲ τόλμῃ οὔτ᾽ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μάχῃ οὔτ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν ἀνδρείᾳ οὐχ ἥσσους ἐς ὅσον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἀντέχοι, τῷ δὲ ἐλλείποντι αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν βούλησιν ἄκοντες προυδίδοσαν. ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενοι σφίσι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους προτέρους ἐπελθεῖν καὶ διὰ τάχους ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἀμύνασθαι, ἀναλαβόντες τὰ ὅπλα εὐθὺς ἀντεπῆσαν. [2] καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρων οἵ τε λιθοβόλοι καὶ σφενδονῆται καὶ τοξόται προυμάχοντο καὶ τροπὰς οἵας εἰκὸς ψιλοὺς ἀλλήλων ἐποίουν: ἔπειτα δὲ μάντεις τε σφάγια προύφερον τὰ νομιζόμενα καὶ σαλπιγκταὶ ξύνοδον ἐπώτρυνον τοῖς ὁπλίταις, [3] οἱ δ᾽ ἐχώρουν, Συρακόσιοι μὲν περί τε πατρίδος μαχούμενοι καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἕκαστος τὸ μὲν αὐτίκα σωτηρίας, τὸ δὲ μέλλον ἐλευθερίας, τῶν δ᾽ ἐναντίων Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περί τε τῆς ἀλλοτρίας οἰκείαν σχεῖν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν μὴ βλάψαι ἡσσώμενοι, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων οἱ αὐτόνομοι ξυγκτήσασθαί τε

ἐκείνοις ἐφ᾽ ἃ ἦλθον καὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν σφίσι πατρίδα νικήσαντες πάλιν ἐπιδεῖν: τὸ δ᾽ ὑπήκοον τῶν ξυμμάχων μέγιστον μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτίκα ἀνελπίστου σωτηρίας, ἢν μὴ κρατῶσι, τὸ πρόθυμον εἶχον, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐν παρέργῳ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ξυγκαταστρεψαμένοις ῥᾷον αὐτοῖς ὑπακούσεται.

70. γενομένης δ᾽ ἐν χερσὶ τῆς μάχης ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντεῖχον ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ξυνέβη βροντάς τε ἅμα τινὰς γενέσθαι καὶ ἀστραπὰς καὶ ὕδωρ πολύ, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν πρῶτον μαχομένοις καὶ ἐλάχιστα πολέμῳ ὠμιληκόσι καὶ τοῦτο ξυνεπιλαβέσθαι τοῦ φόβου, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐμπειροτέροις τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ὥρᾳ ἔτους περαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστῶτας πολὺ μείζω ἔκπληξιν μὴ νικωμένους παρέχειν. [2] ὡσαμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων πρῶτον τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς, παρερρήγνυτο ἤδη καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ἐς φυγὴν κατέστη. [3] καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν οὐκ ἐδίωξαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων πολλοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀήσσητοι εἶργον, καὶ ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τοὺς ὁπλίτας αὐτῶν, εἴ τινας προδιώκοντας ἴδοιεν, ἀνέστελλον, ἐπακολουθήσαντες δὲ ἀθρόοι ὅσον ἀσφαλῶς εἶχε πάλιν ἐπανεχώρουν καὶ τροπαῖον ἵστασαν. [4] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἀθροισθέντες ἐς τὴν Ἑλωρίνην ὁδὸν καὶ ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ξυνταξάμενοι ἔς τε τὸ Ὀλυμπιεῖον ὅμως σφῶν αὐτῶν παρέπεμψαν φυλακήν, δείσαντες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῶν χρημάτων ἃ ἦν αὐτόθι κινήσωσι, καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἐπανεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

71. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἱερὸν οὐκ ἦλθον, ξυγκομίσαντες δὲ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νεκροὺς καὶ ἐπὶ πυρὰν ἐπιθέντες ηὐλίσαντο αὐτοῦ. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις ἀπέδοσαν ὑποσπόνδους τοὺς νεκρούς ἀπέθανον δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων περὶ ἑξήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους, τῶν δὲ σφετέρων τὰ ὀστᾶ ξυνέλεξαν ἀπέθανον δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὡς πεντήκοντα, καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων σκῦλα ἔχοντες ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Κατάνην: [2] χειμών τε γὰρ ἦν, καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτόθεν ποιεῖσθαι οὔπω ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι, πρὶν ἂν ἱππέας τε μεταπέμψωσιν ἐκ τῶν

Ἀθηνῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ἀγείρωσιν, ὅπως μὴ παντάπασιν ἱπποκρατῶνται, καὶ χρήματα δὲ ἅμα αὐτόθεν τε ξυλλέξωνται καὶ παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἔλθῃ, τῶν τε πόλεών τινας προσαγάγωνται, ἃς ἤλπιζον μετὰ τὴν μάχην μᾶλλον σφῶν ὑπακούσεσθαι, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ σῖτον καὶ ὅσων δέοι παρασκευάσωνται ὡς ἐς τὸ ἔαρ ἐπιχειρήσοντες ταῖς Συρακούσαις.

72. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταύτῃ τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Νάξον καὶ Κατάνην διαχειμάσοντες, Συρακόσιοι δὲ τοὺς σφετέρους αὐτῶν νεκροὺς θάψαντες ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίουν. [2] καὶ παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς Ἑρμοκράτης ὁ Ἕρμωνος, ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐς τἆλλα ξύνεσιν οὐδενὸς λειπόμενος καὶ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐμπειρίᾳ τε ἱκανὸς γενόμενος καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐπιφανής, ἐθάρσυνέ τε καὶ οὐκ εἴα τῷ γεγενημένῳ ἐνδιδόναι: [3] τὴν μὲν γὰρ γνώμην αὐτῶν οὐχ ἡσσῆσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἀταξίαν βλάψαι. οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτόν γε λειφθῆναι ὅσον εἰκὸς εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐμπειρίᾳ ἰδιώτας ὡς εἰπεῖν χειροτέχναις ἀνταγωνισαμένους. [4] μέγα δὲ βλάψαι καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τὴν πολυαρχίαν ἦσαν γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα οἱ στρατηγοὶ αὐτοῖς τῶν τε πολλῶν τὴν ἀξύντακτον ἀναρχίαν. ἦν δὲ ὀλίγοι τε στρατηγοὶ γένωνται ἔμπειροι καὶ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ παρασκευάσωσι τὸ ὁπλιτικόν, οἷς τε ὅπλα μὴ ἔστιν ἐκπορίζοντες, ὅπως ὡς πλεῖστοι ἔσονται, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ μελέτῃ προσαναγκάζοντες, ἔφη κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς κρατήσειν σφᾶς τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀνδρείας μὲν σφίσιν ὑπαρχούσης, εὐταξίας δ᾽ ἐς τὰ ἔργα προσγενομένης: ἐπιδώσειν γὰρ ἀμφότερα αὐτά, τὴν μὲν μετὰ κινδύνων μελετωμένην, τὴν δ᾽ εὐψυχίαν αὐτὴν ἑαυτῆς μετὰ τοῦ πιστοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης θαρσαλεωτέραν ἔσεσθαι. [5] τούς τε στρατηγοὺς καὶ ὀλίγους καὶ αὐτοκράτορας χρῆναι ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὀμόσαι αὐτοῖς τὸ ὅρκιον ἦ μὴν ἐάσειν ἄρχειν ὅπῃ ἂν ἐπίστωνται: οὕτω γὰρ ἄ τε κρύπτεσθαι δεῖ μᾶλλον ἂν στέγεσθαι καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ κόσμον καὶ ἀπροφασίστως παρασκευασθῆναι.

73. καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι αὐτοῦ ἀκούσαντες ἐψηφίσαντό τε πάντα ὡς ἐκέλευε καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτόν τε εἵλοντο τὸν

Ἑρμοκράτη καὶ Ἡρακλείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου καὶ Σικανὸν τὸν Ἐξηκέστου, τούτους τρεῖς, [2] καὶ ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλαν, ὅπως ξυμμαχία τε αὐτοῖς παραγένηται καὶ τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πόλεμον βεβαιότερον πείθωσι ποιεῖσθαι ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ὑπὲρ σφῶν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἵνα ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας ἀπαγάγωσιν αὐτοὺς ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐν Σικελίᾳ στράτευμα ἧσσον ὠφελίαν ἄλλην ἐπιπέμπωσιν.

74. τὸ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Κατάνῃ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔπλευσεν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ Μεσσήνην ὡς προδοθησομένην. καὶ ἃ μὲν ἐπράσσετο οὐκ ἐγένετο: Ἀλκιβιάδης γὰρ ὅτ᾽ ἀπῄει ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἤδη μετάπεμπτος, ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι φεύξοιτο, μηνύει τοῖς τῶν Συρακοσίων φίλοις τοῖς ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ ξυνειδὼς τὸ μέλλον: οἱ δὲ τούς τε ἄνδρας διέφθειραν πρότερον καὶ τότε στασιάζοντες καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις ὄντες ἐπεκράτουν μὴ δέχεσθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ ταῦτα βουλόμενοι. [2] ἡμέρας δὲ μείναντες περὶ τρεῖς καὶ δέκα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὡς ἐχειμάζοντο καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκ εἶχον καὶ προυχώρει οὐδέν, ἀπελθόντες ἐς Νάξον καὶ ὅρια καὶ σταυρώματα περὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ποιησάμενοι αὐτοῦ διεχείμαζον: καὶ τριήρη ἀπέστειλαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπί τε χρήματα καὶ ἱππέας, ὅπως ἅμα τῷ ἦρι παραγένωνται.

75. ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δι᾽ ἐλάσσονος εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα φρούριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιείῳ ἄλλο: καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν προυσταύρωσαν πανταχῇ ᾗ ἀποβάσεις ἦσαν. [2] καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἰδότες ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ χειμάζοντας ἐστράτευσαν πανδημεὶ ἐπὶ τὴν Κατάνην, καὶ τῆς τε γῆς αὐτῶν ἔτεμον καὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων σκηνὰς καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐμπρήσαντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [3] καὶ πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐς τὴν Καμάριναν κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Λάχητος γενομένην ξυμμαχίαν πρεσβεύεσθαι, εἴ πως προσαγάγοιντο αὐτούς, ἀντεπρεσβεύοντο καὶ αὐτοί: ἦσαν γὰρ ὕποπτοι αὐτοῖς οἱ Καμαριναῖοι μὴ προθύμως σφίσι μήτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν

πρώτην μάχην πέμψαι ἃ ἔπεμψαν, ἔς τε τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ οὐκέτι βούλωνται ἀμύνειν, ὁρῶντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῇ μάχῃ εὖ πράξαντας, προσχωρῶσι δ᾽ αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν προτέραν φιλίαν πεισθέντες. [4] ἀφικομένων οὖν ἐκ μὲν Συρακουσῶν Ἑρμοκράτους καὶ ἄλλων ἐς τὴν Καμάριναν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Εὐφήμου μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων, ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης ξυλλόγου γενομένου τῶν Καμαριναίων βουλόμενος προδιαβάλλειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

76. ‘οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν δύναμιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὦ Καμαριναῖοι, μὴ αὐτὴν καταπλαγῆτε δείσαντες ἐπρεσβευσάμεθα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν λόγους, πρίν τι καὶ ἡμῶν ἀκοῦσαι, μὴ ὑμᾶς πείσωσιν. [2] ἥκουσι γὰρ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν προφάσει μὲν ᾗ πυνθάνεσθε, διανοίᾳ δὲ ἣν πάντες ὑπονοοῦμεν: καί μοι δοκοῦσιν οὐ Λεοντίνους βούλεσθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον ἐξοικίσαι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ εὔλογον τὰς μὲν ἐκεῖ πόλεις ἀναστάτους ποιεῖν, τὰς δὲ ἐνθάδε κατοικίζειν, καὶ Λεοντίνων μὲν Χαλκιδέων ὄντων κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς κήδεσθαι, Χαλκιδέας δὲ τοὺς ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ, ὧν οἵδε ἄποικοί εἰσι, δουλωσαμένους ἔχειν. [3] τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἰδέᾳ ἐκεῖνά τε ἔσχον καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νῦν πειρῶνται: ἡγεμόνες γὰρ γενόμενοι ἑκόντων τῶν τε Ἰώνων καὶ ὅσοι ἀπὸ σφῶν ἦσαν ξύμμαχοι ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ Μήδου τιμωρίᾳ, τοὺς μὲν λιποστρατίαν, τοὺς δὲ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους στρατεύειν, τοῖς δ᾽ ὡς ἑκάστοις τινὰ εἶχον αἰτίαν εὐπρεπῆ ἐπενεγκόντες κατεστρέψαντο. [4] καὶ οὐ περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἄρα οὔτε οὗτοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὔθ᾽ οἱ Ἕλληνες τῆς ἑαυτῶν τῷ Μήδῳ ἀντέστησαν, περὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν σφίσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκείνῳ καταδουλώσεως, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ δεσπότου μεταβολῇ οὐκ ἀξυνετωτέρου, κακοξυνετωτέρου δέ.

77. ‘ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων εὐκατηγόρητον οὖσαν πόλιν νῦν ἥκομεν ἀποφανοῦντες ἐν εἰδόσιν ὅσα ἀδικεῖ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς αἰτιασόμενοι ὅτι ἔχοντες παραδείγματα τῶν τ᾽ ἐκεῖ Ἑλλήνων ὡς ἐδουλώθησαν οὐκ ἀμύνοντες σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ νῦν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς ταὐτὰ παρόντα σοφίσματα, Λεοντίνων τε ξυγγενῶν κατοικίσεις καὶ Ἐγεσταίων ξυμμάχων ἐπικουρίας, οὐ

ξυστραφέντες βουλόμεθα προθυμότερον δεῖξαι αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐκ Ἴωνες τάδε εἰσὶν οὐδ᾽ Ἑλλησπόντιοι καὶ νησιῶται, οἳ δεσπότην ἢ Μῆδον ἢ ἕνα γέ τινα αἰεὶ μεταβάλλοντες δουλοῦνται, ἀλλὰ Δωριῆς ἐλεύθεροι ἀπ᾽ αὐτονόμου τῆς Πελοποννήσου τὴν Σικελίαν οἰκοῦντες. [2] ἢ μένομεν ἕως ἂν ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις ληφθῶμεν, εἰδότες ὅτι ταύτῃ μόνον ἀλωτοί ἐσμεν καὶ ὁρῶντες αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος τρεπομένους ὥστε τοὺς μὲν λόγοις ἡμῶν διιστάναι, τοὺς δὲ ξυμμάχων ἐλπίδι ἐκπολεμοῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἑκάστοις τι προσηνὲς λέγοντες δύνανται κακουργεῖν; καὶ οἰόμεθα τοῦ ἄπωθεν ξυνοίκου προαπολλυμένου οὐ καὶ ἐς αὐτόν τινα ἥξειν τὸ δεινόν, πρὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πάσχοντα καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν δυστυχεῖν;

78. καὶ εἴ τῳ ἄρα παρέστηκε τὸν μὲν Συρακόσιον, ἑαυτὸν δ᾽ οὐ πολέμιον εἶναι τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ, καὶ δεινὸν ἡγεῖται ὑπέρ γε τῆς ἐμῆς κινδυνεύειν, ἐνθυμηθήτω οὐ περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς μᾶλλον, ἐν ἴσῳ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ μαχούμενος, τοσούτῳ δὲ καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ὅσῳ οὐ προδιεφθαρμένου ἐμοῦ, ἔχων δὲ ξύμμαχον ἐμὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐρῆμος ἀγωνιεῖται: τόν τε Ἀθηναῖον μὴ τὴν τοῦ Συρακοσίου ἔχθραν κολάσασθαι, τῇ δ᾽ ἐμῇ προφάσει τὴν ἐκείνου φιλίαν οὐχ ἧσσον βεβαιώσασθαι βούλεσθαι. [2] εἴ τέ τις φθονεῖ μὲν ἢ καὶ φοβεῖται ⟦ἀμφότερα γὰρ τάδε πάσχει τὰ μείζω⟧, διὰ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰς Συρακούσας κακωθῆναι μὲν ἵνα σωφρονισθῶμεν βούλεται, περιγενέσθαι δὲ ἕνεκα τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀσφαλείας, οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνης δυνάμεως βούλησιν ἐλπίζει: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἅμα τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τῆς τύχης τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμοίως ταμίαν γενέσθαι. [3] καὶ εἰ γνώμῃ ἁμάρτοι, τοῖς αὐτοῦ κακοῖς ὀλοφυρθεὶς τάχ᾽ ἂν ἴσως καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποτὲ βουληθείη αὖθις φθονῆσαι. ἀδύνατον δὲ προεμένῳ καὶ μὴ τοὺς αὐτοὺς κινδύνους οὐ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἔργων, ἐθελήσαντι προσλαβεῖν: λόγῳ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡμετέραν δύναμιν σώζοι ἄν τις, ἔργῳ δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ σωτηρίαν. [4] καὶ μάλιστα εἰκὸς ἦν ὑμᾶς, ὦ Καμαριναῖοι, ὁμόρους ὄντας καὶ τὰ δεύτερα κινδυνεύσοντας προορᾶσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ μαλακῶς ὥσπερ νῦν ξυμμαχεῖν, αὐτοὺς δὲ πρὸς

ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον ἰόντας, ἅπερ ἂν εἰ ἐς τὴν Καμαριναίαν πρῶτον ἀφίκοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεόμενοι ἂν ἐπεκαλεῖσθε, ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ νῦν παρακελευομένους ὅπως μηδὲν ἐνδώσομεν φαίνεσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ οὔθ᾽ ὑμεῖς νῦν γέ πω οὔθ᾽ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὥρμησθε.

79. Δειλίᾳ δὲ ἴσως τὸ δίκαιον πρός τε ἡμᾶς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιόντας θεραπεύσετε, λέγοντες ξυμμαχίαν εἶναι ὑμῖν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους: ἦν γε οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἐποιήσασθε, τῶν δὲ ἐχθρῶν ἦν τις ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἴῃ, καὶ τοῖς γε Ἀθηναίοις βοηθεῖν, ὅταν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων καὶ μὴ αὐτοὶ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς πέλας ἀδικῶσιν, [2] ἐπεὶ οὐδ᾽ οἱ Ῥηγῖνοι ὄντες Χαλκιδῆς Χαλκιδέας ὄντας Λεοντίνους ἐθέλουσι ξυγκατοικίζειν. καὶ δεινὸν εἰ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τὸ ἔργον τοῦ καλοῦ δικαιώματος ὑποπτεύοντες ἀλόγως σωφρονοῦσιν, ὑμεῖς δ᾽ εὐλόγῳ προφάσει τοὺς μὲν φύσει πολεμίους βούλεσθε ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον φύσει ξυγγενεῖς μετὰ τῶν ἐχθίστων διαφθεῖραι. [3] ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δίκαιον, ἀμύνειν δὲ καὶ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὴν παρασκευὴν αὐτῶν: οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἡμεῖς ξυστῶμεν πάντες δεινή ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν, ὅπερ οὗτοι σπεύδουσι, τἀναντία διαστῶμεν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μόνους ἐλθόντες καὶ μάχῃ περιγενόμενοι ἔπραξαν ἃ ἐβούλοντο, ἀπῆλθον δὲ διὰ τάχους.

80. ὥστε οὐχ ἁθρόους γε ὄντας εἰκὸς ἀθυμεῖν, ἰέναι δὲ ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προθυμότερον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου παρεσομένης ὠφελίας, οἳ τῶνδε κρείσσους εἰσὶ τὸ παράπαν τὰ πολέμια: καὶ μὴ ἐκείνην τὴν προμηθίαν δοκεῖν τῳ ἡμῖν μὲν ἴσην εἶναι, ὑμῖν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ, τὸ μηδετέροις δὴ ὡς καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντας ξυμμάχους βοηθεῖν. [2] οὐ γὰρ ἔργῳ ἴσον ὥσπερ τῷ δικαιώματί ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ δι᾽ ὑμᾶς μὴ ξυμμαχήσαντας ὅ τε παθὼν σφαλήσεται καὶ ὁ κρατῶν περιέσται, τί ἄλλο ἢ τῇ αὐτῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τοῖς μὲν οὐκ ἠμύνατε σωθῆναι, τοὺς δὲ οὐκ ἐκωλύσατε κακοὺς γενέσθαι; καίτοι κάλλιον τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις καὶ ἅμα ξυγγενέσι προσθεμένους τήν τε κοινὴν ὠφελίαν τῇ Σικελίᾳ φυλάξαι καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους φίλους δὴ ὄντας μὴ ἐᾶσαι ἁμαρτεῖν. [3] ξυνελόντες τε λέγομεν οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐκδιδάσκειν μὲν οὐδὲν ἔργον εἶναι σαφῶς οὔτε ὑμᾶς οὔτε

τοὺς ἄλλους περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ οὐδὲν χεῖρον γιγνώσκετε: δεόμεθα δὲ καὶ μαρτυρόμεθα ἅμα, εἰ μὴ πείσομεν, ὅτι ἐπιβουλευόμεθα μὲν ὑπὸ Ἰώνων αἰεὶ πολεμίων, προδιδόμεθα δὲ ὑπὸ ὑμῶν Δωριῆς Δωριῶν. [4] καὶ εἰ καταστρέψονται ἡμᾶς Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῖς μὲν ὑμετέραις γνώμαις κρατήσουσι, τῷ δ᾽ αὐτῶν ὀνόματι τιμηθήσονται, καὶ τῆς νίκης οὐκ ἄλλον τινὰ ἆθλον ἢ τὸν τὴν νίκην παρασχόντα λήψονται: καὶ εἰ αὖ ἡμεῖς περιεσόμεθα, τῆς αἰτίας τῶν κινδύνων οἱ αὐτοὶ τὴν τιμωρίαν ὑφέξετε. [5] σκοπεῖτε οὖν καὶ αἱρεῖσθε ἤδη ἢ τὴν αὐτίκα ἀκινδύνως δουλείαν ἢ κἂν περιγενόμενοι μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν τούσδε τε μὴ αἰσχρῶς δεσπότας λαβεῖν καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχθραν μὴ ἂν βραχεῖαν γενομένην διαφυγεῖν.’

81. τοιαῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης εἶπεν. ὁ δ᾽ Εὔφημος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρεσβευτὴς μετ᾽ αὐτὸν τοιάδε.

82. ‘ἀφικόμεθα μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς πρότερον οὔσης ξυμμαχίας ἀνανεώσει, τοῦ δὲ Συρακοσίου καθαψαμένου ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰπεῖν ὡς εἰκότως ἔχομεν. [2] τὸ μὲν οὖν μέγιστον μαρτύριον αὐτὸς εἶπεν, ὅτι οἱ Ἴωνες αἰεί ποτε πολέμιοι τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν εἰσίν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ οὕτως: ἡμεῖς γὰρ Ἴωνες ὄντες Πελοποννησίοις Δωριεῦσι καὶ πλέοσιν οὖσι καὶ παροικοῦσιν ἐσκεψάμεθα ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἥκιστα αὐτῶν ὑπακουσόμεθα, [3] καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ ναῦς κτησάμενοι τῆς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἀπηλλάγημεν,οὐδὲν προσῆκον μᾶλλόν τι ἐκείνους ἡμῖν ἢ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνοις ἐπιτάσσειν, πλὴν καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐν τῷ παρόντι μεῖζον ἴσχυον, αὐτοὶ δὲ τῶν ὑπὸ βασιλεῖ πρότερον ὄντων ἡγεμόνες καταστάντες οἰκοῦμεν, νομίσαντες ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν ὑπὸ Πελοποννησίοις οὕτως εἶναι, δύναμιν ἔχοντες ᾗ ἀμυνούμεθα, καὶ ἐς τὸ ἀκριβὲς εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ ἀδίκως καταστρεψάμενοι τούς τε Ἴωνας καὶ νησιώτας, οὓς ξυγγενεῖς φασὶν ὄντας ἡμᾶς Συρακόσιοι δεδουλῶσθαι. [4] ἦλθον γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν μητρόπολιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ Μήδου καὶ οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν ἀποστάντες τὰ οἰκεῖα φθεῖραι, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ἐκλιπόντες τὴν πόλιν, δουλείαν δὲ αὐτοί τε ἐβούλοντο καὶ ἡμῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπενεγκεῖν.

83. ἀνθ᾽ ὧν ἄξιοί τε ὄντες ἅμα ἄρχομεν, ὅτι τε ναυτικὸν πλεῖστόν τε καὶ προθυμίαν ἀπροφάσιστον παρεσχόμεθα ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, καὶ διότι καὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ἑτοίμως τοῦτο δρῶντες οὗτοι ἡμᾶς ἔβλαπτον, ἅμα δὲ τῆς πρὸς Πελοποννησίους ἰσχύος ὀρεγόμενοι. [2] καὶ οὐ καλλιεπούμεθα ὡς ἢ τὸν βάρβαρον μόνοι καθελόντες εἰκότως ἄρχομεν ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῇ τῶνδε μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ξυμπάντων τε καὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ αὐτῶν κινδυνεύσαντες. πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὴν προσήκουσαν σωτηρίαν ἐκπορίζεσθαι. καὶ νῦν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα καὶ ἐνθάδε παρόντες ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὑμῖν ταὐτὰ ξυμφέροντα. [3] ἀποφαίνομεν δὲ ἐξ ὧν οἵδε τε διαβάλλουσι καὶ ὑμεῖς μάλιστα ἐπὶ τὸ φοβερώτερον ὑπονοεῖτε, εἰδότες τοὺς περιδεῶς ὑποπτεύοντάς τι λόγου μὲν ἡδονῇ τὸ παραυτίκα τερπομένους, τῇ δ᾽ ἐγχειρήσει ὕστερον τὰ ξυμφέροντα πράσσοντας. [4] τήν τε γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν εἰρήκαμεν διὰ δέος ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥκειν μετὰ τῶν φίλων ἀσφαλῶς καταστησόμενοι, καὶ οὐ δουλωσόμενοι, μὴ παθεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο κωλύσοντες.

84. ‘ὑπολάβῃ δὲ μηδεὶς ὡς οὐδὲν προσῆκον ὑμῶν κηδόμεθα, γνοὺς ὅτι σῳζομένων ὑμῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀσθενεῖς ὑμᾶς ὄντας ἀντέχειν Συρακοσίοις ἧσσον ἂν τούτων πεμψάντων τινὰ δύναμιν Πελοποννησίοις ἡμεῖς βλαπτοίμεθα. [2] καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προσήκετε ἤδη ἡμῖν τὰ μέγιστα. διόπερ καὶ τοὺς Λεοντίνους εὔλογον κατοικίζειν μὴ ὑπηκόους ὥσπερ τοὺς ξυγγενεῖς αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς δυνατωτάτους, ἵνα ἐκ τῆς σφετέρας ὅμοροι ὄντες τοῖσδε ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λυπηροὶ ὦσιν. [3] τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀρκοῦμεν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, ὃν ἀλόγως ἡμᾶς φησὶ δουλωσαμένους τοὺς ἐνθάδε ἐλευθεροῦν, ξύμφορος ἡμῖν ἀπαράσκευος ὢν καὶ χρήματα μόνον φέρων, τὰ δὲ ἐνθάδε καὶ Λεοντῖνοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι φίλοι ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτονομούμενοι.

85. ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ ἢ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὅτι ξυμφέρον οὐδ᾽ οἰκεῖον ὅτι μὴ πιστόν: πρὸς ἕκαστα δὲ δεῖ ἢ ἐχθρὸν ἢ φίλον μετὰ καιροῦ γίγνεσθαι. καὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦτο ὠφελεῖ ἐνθάδε, οὐκ ἢν τοὺς φίλους κακώσωμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢν οἱ

ἐχθροὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν φίλων ῥώμην ἀδύνατοι ὦσιν. [2] ἀπιστεῖν δὲ οὐ χρή: καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχους ὡς ἕκαστοι χρήσιμοι ἐξηγούμεθα, Χίους μὲν καὶ Μηθυμναίους νεῶν παροκωχῇ αὐτονόμους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς χρημάτων βιαιότερον φορᾷ, ἄλλους δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλευθέρως ξυμμαχοῦντας, καίπερ νησιώτας ὄντας καὶ εὐλήπτους, διότι ἐν χωρίοις ἐπικαίροις εἰσὶ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον. [3] ὥστε καὶ τἀνθάδε εἰκὸς πρὸς τὸ λυσιτελοῦν, καὶ ὃ λέγομεν, ἐς Συρακοσίους δέος καθίστασθαι. ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἐφίενται ὑμῶν καὶ βούλονται ἐπὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ ξυστήσαντες ὑμᾶς ὑπόπτῳ, βίᾳ ἢ καὶ κατ᾽ ἐρημίαν, ἀπράκτων ἡμῶν ἀπελθόντων, αὐτοὶ ἄρξαι τῆς Σικελίας. ἀνάγκη δέ, ἢν ξυστῆτε πρὸς αὐτούς: οὔτε γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι ἔσται ἰσχὺς τοσαύτη ἐς ἓν ξυστᾶσα εὐμεταχείριστος, οὔθ᾽ οἵδ᾽ ἀσθενεῖς ἂν ἡμῶν μὴ παρόντων πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἶεν.

86. καὶ ὅτῳ ταῦτα μὴ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον ἐλέγχει. τὸ γὰρ πρότερον ἡμᾶς ἐπηγάγεσθε οὐκ ἄλλον τινὰ προσείοντες φόβον ἤ, εἰ περιοψόμεθα ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ Συρακοσίοις γενέσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν. [2] καὶ νῦν οὐ δίκαιον, ᾧπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἠξιοῦτε λόγῳ πείθειν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἀπιστεῖν, οὐδ᾽ ὅτι δυνάμει μείζονι πρὸς τὴν τῶνδε ἰσχὺν πάρεσμεν ὑποπτεύεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖσδε ἀπιστεῖν. [3] ἡμεῖς μέν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν, εἴ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαίμεθα, ἀδύνατοι κατασχεῖν διὰ μῆκός τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων καὶ τῇ παρασκευῇ ἠπειρωτίδων: οἵδε δὲ οὐ στρατοπέδῳ, πόλει δὲ μείζονι τῆς ἡμετέρας παρουσίας ἐποικοῦντες ὑμῖν αἰεί τε ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ ὅταν καιρὸν λάβωσιν ἑκάστου, [4] οὐκ ἀνιᾶσιν ⟦ἔδειξαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἤδη καὶ τὰ ἐς Λεοντίνους⟧, καὶ νῦν τολμῶσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ταῦτα κωλύοντας καὶ ἀνέχοντας τὴν Σικελίαν μέχρι τοῦδε μὴ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοὺς εἶναι παρακαλεῖν ὑμᾶς ὡς ἀναισθήτους. [5] πολὺ δὲ ἐπὶ ἀληθεστέραν γε σωτηρίαν ἡμεῖς ἀντιπαρακαλοῦμεν, δεόμενοι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀμφοτέροις μὴ προδιδόναι, νομίσαι δὲ τοῖσδε μὲν καὶ ἄνευ ξυμμάχων αἰεὶ ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἑτοίμην διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι ὁδόν, ὑμῖν δ᾽ οὐ πολλάκις παρασχήσειν μετὰ τοσῆσδε

ἐπικουρίας ἀμύνασθαι: ἢν εἰ τῷ ὑπόπτῳ ἢ ἄπρακτον ἐάσετε ἀπελθεῖν ἢ καὶ σφαλεῖσαν, ἔτι βουλήσεσθε καὶ πολλοστὸν μόριον αὐτῆς ἰδεῖν, ὅτε οὐδὲν ἔτι περανεῖ παραγενόμενον ὑμῖν.

87. ‘ἀλλὰ μήτε ὑμεῖς, ὦ Καμαριναῖοι, ταῖς τῶνδε διαβολαῖς ἀναπείθεσθε μήτε οἱ ἄλλοι: εἰρήκαμεν δ᾽ ὑμῖν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὧν ὑποπτευόμεθα, καὶ ἔτι ἐν κεφαλαίοις ὑπομνήσαντες ἀξιώσομεν πείθειν. [2] φαμὲν γὰρ ἄρχειν μὲν τῶν ἐκεῖ, ἵνα μὴ ὑπακούωμεν ἄλλου, ἐλευθεροῦν δὲ τὰ ἐνθάδε, ὅπως μὴ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν βλαπτώμεθα, πολλὰ δ᾽ ἀναγκάζεσθαι πράσσειν, διότι καὶ πολλὰ φυλασσόμεθα, ξύμμαχοι δὲ καὶ νῦν καὶ πρότερον τοῖς ἐνθάδε ὑμῶν ἀδικουμένοις οὐκ ἄκλητοι, παρακληθέντες δὲ ἥκειν. [3] καὶ ὑμεῖς μήθ᾽ ὡς δικασταὶ γενόμενοι τῶν ἡμῖν ποιουμένων μήθ᾽ ὡς σωφρονισταί, ὃ χαλεπὸν ἤδη, ἀποτρέπειν πειρᾶσθε, καθ᾽ ὅσον δέ τι ὑμῖν τῆς ἡμετέρας πολυπραγμοσύνης καὶ τρόπου τὸ αὐτὸ ξυμφέρει, τούτῳ ἀπολαβόντες χρήσασθε, καὶ νομίσατε μὴ πάντας ἐν ἴσῳ βλάπτειν αὐτά, πολὺ δὲ πλείους τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ὠφελεῖν: [4] ἐν παντὶ γὰρ πᾶς χωρίῳ, καὶ ᾧ μὴ ὑπάρχομεν, ὅ τε οἰόμενος ἀδικήσεσθαι καὶ ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων διὰ τὸ ἑτοίμην ὑπεῖναι ἐλπίδα τῷ μὲν ἀντιτυχεῖν ἐπικουρίας ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν, τῷ δὲ εἰ ἥξομεν, μὴ ἀδεεῖ εἶναι κινδυνεύειν, ἀμφότεροι ἀναγκάζονται ὁ μὲν ἄκων σωφρονεῖν, ὁ δ᾽ ἀπραγμόνως σῴζεσθαι. [5] ταύτην οὖν τὴν κοινὴν τῷ τε δεομένῳ καὶ ὑμῖν νῦν παροῦσαν ἀσφάλειαν μὴ ἀπώσησθε, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξισώσαντες τοῖς ἄλλοις μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰεὶ φυλάσσεσθαι αὐτούς, καὶ ἀντεπιβουλεῦσαί ποτε ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου μεταλάβετε.’

88. τοιαῦτα δὲ ὁ Εὔφημος εἶπεν. οἱ δὲ Καμαριναῖοι ἐπεπόνθεσαν τοιόνδε. τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις εὖνοι ἦσαν, πλὴν καθ᾽ ὅσον [εἰ] τὴν Σικελίαν ᾤοντο αὐτοὺς δουλώσεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις αἰεὶ κατὰ τὸ ὅμορον διάφοροι: δεδιότες δ᾽ οὐχ ἧσσον τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἐγγὺς ὄντας μὴ καὶ ἄνευ σφῶν περιγένωνται, τό τε πρῶτον αὐτοῖς τοὺς ὀλίγους ἱππέας ἔπεμψαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ὑπουργεῖν μὲν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μᾶλλον ἔργῳ, ὡς ἂν δύνωνται

μετριώτατα, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι, ἵνα μηδὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἔλασσον δοκῶσι νεῖμαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐπικρατέστεροι τῇ μάχῃ ἐγένοντο, λόγῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἴσα ἀμφοτέροις. [2] καὶ οὕτω βουλευσάμενοι ἀπεκρίναντο, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἀμφοτέροις οὖσι ξυμμάχοις σφῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πόλεμος ὤν, εὔορκον δοκεῖν εἶναι σφίσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μηδετέροις ἀμύνειν. καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἑκατέρων ἀπῆλθον. [3]καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι τὰ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἐξηρτύοντο ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ ἐστρατοπεδευμένοι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Σικελοὺς ἔπρασσον ὅπως αὐτοῖς ὡς πλεῖστοι προσχωρήσονται. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰ πεδία μᾶλλον τῶν Σικελῶν ὑπήκοοι ὄντες τῶν Συρακοσίων οἱ πολλοὶ ἀφειστήκεσαν: τῶν δὲ τὴν μεσόγειαν ἐχόντων αὐτόνομοι οὖσαι καὶ πρότερον αἰεὶ <αἱ> οἰκήσεις εὐθὺς πλὴν ὀλίγοι μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἦσαν, καὶ σῖτόν τε κατεκόμιζον τῷ στρατεύματι καὶ εἰσὶν οἳ καὶ χρήματα. [5] ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς μὴ προσχωροῦντας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύοντες τοὺς μὲν προσηνάγκαζον, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων φρουρούς τε πεμπόντων καὶ βοηθούντων ἀπεκωλύοντο. τόν τε χειμῶνα μεθορμισάμενοι ἐκ τῆς Νάξου ἐς τὴν Κατάνην καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὃ κατεκαύθη ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων αὖθις ἀνορθώσαντες διεχείμαζον. [6] καὶ ἔπεμψαν μὲν ἐς Καρχηδόνα τριήρη περὶ φιλίας, εἰ δύναιντό τι ὠφελεῖσθαι, ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ ἐς Τυρσηνίαν, ἔστιν ὧν πόλεων ἐπαγγελλομένων καὶ αὐτῶν ξυμπολεμεῖν. περιήγγελλον δὲ καὶ τοῖς Σικελοῖς καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἔγεσταν πέμψαντες ἐκέλευον ἵππους σφίσιν ὡς πλείστους πέμπειν, καὶ τἆλλα ἐς τὸν περιτειχισμόν, πλινθία καὶ σίδηρον, ἡτοίμαζον, καὶ ὅσα ἔδει, ὡς ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ἐξόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου. [7]οἱ δ᾽ ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον καὶ Λακεδαίμονα τῶν Συρακοσίων ἀποσταλέντες πρέσβεις τούς τε Ἰταλιώτας ἅμα παραπλέοντες ἐπειρῶντο πείθειν μὴ περιορᾶν τὰ γιγνόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς καὶ ἐκείνοις ὁμοίως ἐπιβουλευόμενα, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ Κορίνθῳ ἐγένοντο, λόγους ἐποιοῦντο ἀξιοῦντες σφίσι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς βοηθεῖν. [8] καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι εὐθὺς ψηφισάμενοι αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι ὥστε πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ ἀμύνειν, καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ξυναπέστελλον

αὐτοῖς πρέσβεις, ὅπως καὶ ἐκείνους ξυναναπείθοιεν τόν τε αὐτοῦ πόλεμον σαφέστερον ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ὠφελίαν τινὰ πέμπειν. [9] καὶ οἵ τε ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου πρέσβεις παρῆσαν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης μετὰ τῶν ξυμφυγάδων περαιωθεὶς τότ᾽ εὐθὺς ἐπὶ πλοίου φορτηγικοῦ ἐκ τῆς Θουρίας ἐς Κυλλήνην τῆς Ἠλείας πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ὕστερον ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα αὐτῶν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων μεταπεμψάντων ὑπόσπονδος ἐλθών: ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν Μαντινικῶν πρᾶξιν. [10] καὶ ξυνέβη ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τούς τε Κορινθίους καὶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην δεομένους πείθειν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ διανοουμένων τῶν τε ἐφόρων καὶ τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων πρέσβεις πέμπειν ἐς Συρακούσας κωλύοντας μὴ ξυμβαίνειν Ἀθηναίοις, βοηθεῖν δὲ οὐ προθύμων ὄντων, παρελθὼν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης παρώξυνέ τε τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ ἐξώρμησε λέγων τοιάδε.

89. ‘ἀναγκαῖον περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς διαβολῆς πρῶτον ἐς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ χεῖρον τὰ κοινὰ τῷ ὑπόπτῳ μου ἀκροάσησθε. [2] τῶν δ᾽ ἐμῶν προγόνων τὴν προξενίαν ὑμῶν κατά τι ἔγκλημα ἀπειπόντων αὐτὸς ἐγὼ πάλιν ἀναλαμβάνων ἐθεράπευον ὑμᾶς ἄλλα τε καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκ Πύλου ξυμφοράν. καὶ διατελοῦντός μου προθύμου ὑμεῖς πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καταλλασσόμενοι τοῖς μὲν ἐμοῖς ἐχθροῖς δύναμιν δι᾽ ἐκείνων πράξαντες, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀτιμίαν περιέθετε. [3] καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δικαίως ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ πρός τε τὰ Μαντινέων καὶ Ἀργείων τραπομένου καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐνηντιούμην ὑμῖν ἐβλάπτεσθε: καὶ νῦν, εἴ τις καὶ τότε ἐν τῷ πάσχειν οὐκ εἰκότως ὠργίζετό μοι, μετὰ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς σκοπῶν ἀναπειθέσθω. ἢ εἴ τις, διότι καὶ τῷ δήμῳ προσεκείμην μᾶλλον, χείρω με ἐνόμιζε, μηδ᾽ οὕτως ἡγήσηται ὀρθῶς ἄχθεσθαι. [4] τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις αἰεί ποτε διάφοροί ἐσμεν πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ὠνόμασται , καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ξυμπαρέμεινεν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλήθους. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς πόλεως δημοκρατουμένης τὰ πολλὰ ἀνάγκη ἦν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἕπεσθαι. [5] τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχούσης ἀκολασίας

ἐπειρώμεθα μετριώτεροι ἐς τὰ πολιτικὰ εἶναι.ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἦσαν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πάλαι καὶ νῦν οἳ ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρότερα ἐξῆγον τὸν ὄχλον: οἵπερ καὶ ἐμὲ ἐξήλασαν. [6] ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος προέστημεν, δικαιοῦντες ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἐτύγχανε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη οὖσα καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατό τις, τοῦτο ξυνδιασῴζειν, ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν γε καὶ ἐγιγνώσκομεν οἱ φρονοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἂν χεῖρον, ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι. ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο: καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡμῖν ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι ὑμῶν πολεμίων προσκαθημένων.

90. ‘καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐς τὰς ἐμὰς διαβολὰς τοιαῦτα ξυνέβη: περὶ δὲ ὧν ὑμῖν τε βουλευτέον καὶ ἐμοί, εἴ τι πλέον οἶδα, ἐσηγητέον, μάθετε ἤδη. [2] ἐπλεύσαμεν ἐς Σικελίαν πρῶτον μέν, εἰ δυναίμεθα, Σικελιώτας καταστρεψόμενοι, μετὰ δ᾽ ἐκείνους αὖθις καὶ Ἰταλιώτας, ἔπειτα καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἀρχῆς καὶ αὐτῶν ἀποπειράσοντες. [3] εἰ δὲ προχωρήσειε ταῦτα ἢ πάντα ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείω, ἤδη τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐμέλλομεν ἐπιχειρήσειν, κομίσαντες ξύμπασαν μὲν τὴν ἐκεῖθεν προσγενομένην δύναμιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους μισθωσάμενοι καὶ Ἴβηρας καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμολογουμένως νῦν βαρβάρων μαχιμωτάτους, τριήρεις τε πρὸς ταῖς ἡμετέραις πολλὰς ναυπηγησάμενοι, ἐχούσης τῆς Ἰταλίας ξύλα ἄφθονα, αἷς τὴν Πελοπόννησον πέριξ πολιορκοῦντες καὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἅμα ἐκ γῆς ἐφορμαῖς τῶν πόλεων τὰς μὲν βίᾳ λαβόντες, τὰς δ᾽ ἐντειχισάμενοι, ῥᾳδίως ἠλπίζομεν καταπολεμήσειν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦ ξύμπαντος Ἑλληνικοῦ ἄρξειν. [4] χρήματα δὲ καὶ σῖτον, ὥστε εὐπορώτερον γίγνεσθαί τι αὐτῶν, αὐτὰ τὰ προσγενόμενα ἐκεῖθεν χωρία ἔμελλε διαρκῆ ἄνευ τῆς ἐνθένδε προσόδου παρέξειν.

91. τοιαῦτα μὲν περὶ τοῦ νῦν οἰχομένου στόλου παρὰ τοῦ τὰ ἀκριβέστατα εἰδότος ὡς διενοήθημεν ἀκηκόατε: καὶ ὅσοι ὑπόλοιποι στρατηγοί, ἢν δύνωνται, ὁμοίως αὐτὰ πράξουσιν. ὡς δέ, εἰ μὴ βοηθήσετε οὐ περιέσται τἀκεῖ, μάθετε ἤδη. [2] Σικελιῶται γὰρ ἀπειρότεροι μέν εἰσιν, ὅμως δ᾽ ἂν ξυστραφέντες ἀθρόοι καὶ νῦν ἔτι περιγένοιντο:

Συρακόσιοι δὲ μόνοι μάχῃ τε ἤδη πανδημεὶ ἡσσημένοι καὶ ναυσὶν ἅμα κατειργόμενοι ἀδύνατοι ἔσονται τῇ νῦν Ἀθηναίων ἐκεῖ παρασκευῇ ἀντισχεῖν. [3] καὶ εἰ αὕτη ἡ πόλις ληφθήσεται, ἔχεται καὶ ἡ πᾶσα Σικελία, καὶ εὐθὺς καὶ Ἰταλία: καὶ ὃν ἄρτι κίνδυνον ἐκεῖθεν προεῖπον, οὐκ ἂν διὰ μακροῦ ὑμῖν ἐπιπέσοι. [4] ὥστε μὴ περὶ τῆς Σικελίας τις οἰέσθω μόνον βουλεύειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου, εἰ μὴ ποιήσετε τάδε ἐν τάχει, στρατιάν τε ἐπὶ νεῶν πέμψετε τοιαύτην ἐκεῖσε οἵτινες αὐτερέται κομισθέντες καὶ ὁπλιτεύσουσιν εὐθύς, καὶ ὃ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἔτι χρησιμώτερον εἶναι νομίζω, ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην ἄρχοντα, ὡς ἂν τούς τε παρόντας ξυντάξῃ καὶ τοὺς μὴ ‘θέλοντας προσαναγκάσῃ: οὕτω γὰρ οἵ τε ὑπάρχοντες ὑμῖν φίλοι θαρσήσουσι μᾶλλον καὶ οἱ ἐνδοιάζοντες ἀδεέστερον προσίασιν. [5] καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε χρὴ ἅμα φανερώτερον ἐκπολεμεῖν, ἵνα Συρακόσιοί τε νομίζοντες ὑμᾶς ἐπιμέλεσθαι μᾶλλον ἀντέχωσι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἧσσον ἄλλην ἐπικουρίαν πέμπωσιν. [6] τειχίζειν τε χρὴ Δεκέλειαν τῆς Ἀττικῆς, ὅπερ Ἀθηναῖοι μάλιστα αἰεὶ φοβοῦνται, καὶ μόνου αὐτοῦ νομίζουσι τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐ διαπεπειρᾶσθαι. βεβαιότατα δ᾽ ἄν τις οὕτω τοὺς πολεμίους βλάπτοι, εἰ ἃ μάλιστα δεδιότας αὐτοὺς αἰσθάνοιτο, ταῦτα σαφῶς πυνθανόμενος ἐπιφέροι: εἰκὸς γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀκριβέστατα ἑκάστους τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν δεινὰ ἐπισταμένους φοβεῖσθαι. [7] ἃ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἐπιτειχίσει αὐτοὶ ὠφελούμενοι τοὺς ἐναντίους κωλύσετε, πολλὰ παρεὶς τὰ μέγιστα κεφαλαιώσω. οἷς τε γὰρ ἡ χώρα κατεσκεύασται, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τὰ μὲν ληφθέντα, τὰ δ᾽ αὐτόματα ἥξει: καὶ τὰς τοῦ Λαυρείου τῶν ἀργυρείων μετάλλων προσόδους καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ δικαστηρίων νῦν ὠφελοῦνται εὐθὺς ἀποστερήσονται, μάλιστα δὲ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων προσόδου ἧσσον διαφορουμένης, οἳ τὰ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν νομίσαντες ἤδη κατὰ κράτος πολεμεῖσθαι ὀλιγωρήσουσιν.

92. γίγνεσθαι δέ τι αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν τάχει καὶ προθυμότερον ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστίν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπεὶ ὥς γε δυνατά καὶ οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεσθαι οἶμαι γνώμης πάνυ θαρσῶ. [2] ’καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἀξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι, εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν

πολεμιωτάτων φιλόπολίς ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι νῦν ἐγκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι, οὐδὲ ὑποπτεύεσθαί μου ἐς τὴν φυγαδικὴν προθυμίαν τὸν λόγον. [3] φυγάς τε γάρ εἰμι τῆς τῶν ἐξελασάντων πονηρίας, καὶ οὐ τῆς ὑμετέρας, ἢν πείθησθέ μοι, ὠφελίας: καὶ πολεμιώτεροι οὐχ οἱ τοὺς πολεμίους που βλάψαντες ὑμεῖς ἢ οἱ τοὺς φίλους ἀναγκάσαντες πολεμίους γενέσθαι. [4] τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὖσαν ἔτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν ἰέναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὖσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος ὀρθῶς, οὐχ ὃς ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπίῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ὃς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν. [5] οὕτως ἐμοί τε ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐς κίνδυνον καὶ ἐς ταλαιπωρίαν πᾶσαν ἀδεῶς χρῆσθαι, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, γνόντας τοῦτον δὴ τὸν ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων προβαλλόμενον λόγον, ὡς εἰ πολέμιός γε ὢν σφόδρα ἔβλαπτον, κἂν φίλος ὢν ἱκανῶς ὠφελοίην, ὅσῳ τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων οἶδα, τὰ δ᾽ ὑμέτερα ᾔκαζον: καὶ αὐτοὺς νῦν νομίσαντας περὶ μεγίστων δὴ τῶν διαφερόντων βουλεύεσθαι μὴ ἀποκνεῖν τὴν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν τε καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν στρατείαν, ἵνα τά τε ἐκεῖ βραχεῖ μορίῳ ξυμπαραγενόμενοι μεγάλα σώσητε καὶ Ἀθηναίων τήν τε οὖσαν καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν δύναμιν καθέλητε, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα αὐτοί τε ἀσφαλῶς οἰκῆτε καὶ τῆς ἁπάσης Ἑλλάδος ἑκούσης καὶ οὐ βίᾳ, κατ᾽ εὔνοιαν δὲ ἡγῆσθε.’

93. ὁ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδης τοσαῦτα εἶπεν, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι διανοούμενοι μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ πρότερον στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας, μέλλοντες δ᾽ ἔτι καὶ περιορώμενοι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπερρώσθησαν διδάξαντος ταῦτα ἕκαστα αὐτοῦ καὶ νομίσαντες παρὰ τοῦ σαφέστατα εἰδότος ἀκηκοέναι: [2] ὥστε τῇ ἐπιτειχίσει τῆς Δεκελείας προσεῖχον ἤδη τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ παραυτίκα καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πέμπειν τινὰ τιμωρίαν. καὶ Γύλιππον τὸν Κλεανδρίδου προστάξαντες ἄρχοντα τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἐκέλευον μετ᾽ ἐκείνων καὶ τῶν Κορινθίων βουλευόμενον ποιεῖν ὅπῃ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων μάλιστα καὶ τάχιστά τις ὠφελία ἥξει τοῖς ἐκεῖ. [3] ὁ δὲ δύο μὲν ναῦς τοὺς Κορινθίους ἤδη ἐκέλευέν οἱ πέμπειν ἐς

Ἀσίνην, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς παρασκευάζεσθαι ὅσας διανοοῦνται πέμπειν καί, ὅταν καιρὸς ᾖ, ἑτοίμας εἶναι πλεῖν. ταῦτα δὲ ξυνθέμενοι ἀνεχώρουν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος. [4]ἀφίκετο δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας τριήρης τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἣν ἀπέστειλαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐπί τε χρήματα καὶ ἱππέας. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἐψηφίσαντο τήν τε τροφὴν πέμπειν τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἕβδομον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

94. ἅμα δὲ τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς ἀρχομένῳ τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους οἱ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης παρέπλευσαν ἐπὶ Μεγάρων τῶν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, οὓς ἐπὶ Γέλωνος τοῦ τυράννου, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερόν μοι εἴρηται, ἀναστήσαντες Συρακόσιοι αὐτοὶ ἔχουσι τὴν γῆν. [2] ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐδῄωσαν τούς [τε] ἀγροὺς καὶ ἐλθόντες ἐπὶ ἔρυμά τι τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες αὖθις καὶ πεζῇ καὶ ναυσὶ παρακομισθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Τηρίαν ποταμὸν τό τε πεδίον ἀναβάντες ἐδῄουν καὶ τὸν σῖτον ἐνεπίμπρασαν, καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων περιτυχόντες τισὶν οὐ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀποκτείναντές τέ τινας καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. [3] καὶ ἀποπλεύσαντες ἐς Κατάνην, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐπισιτισάμενοι, πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ Κεντόριπα, Σικελῶν πόλισμα, καὶ προσαγαγόμενοι ὁμολογίᾳ ἀπῆσαν, πιμπράντες ἅμα τὸν σῖτον τῶν τε Ἰνησσαίων καὶ τῶν Ὑβλαίων. [4] καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Κατάνην καταλαμβάνουσι τούς τε ἱππέας ἥκοντας ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους ἄνευ τῶν ἵππων μετὰ σκευῆς, ὡς αὐτόθεν ἵππων πορισθησομένων, καὶ ἱπποτοξότας τριάκοντα καὶ τάλαντα ἀργυρίου τριακόσια.

95. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἦρος καὶ ἐπ᾽ Ἄργος στρατεύσαντες Λακεδαιμόνιοι μέχρι μὲν Κλεωνῶν ἦλθον, σεισμοῦ δὲ γενομένου ἀπεχώρησαν. καὶ Ἀργεῖοι μετὰ ταῦτα ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Θυρεᾶτιν ὅμορον οὖσαν λείαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὴν ἔλαβον, ἣ ἐπράθη ταλάντων οὐκ ἔλασσον πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι. [2] καὶ ὁ Θεσπιῶν δῆμος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἐπιθέμενος τοῖς τὰς ἀρχὰς

ἔχουσιν οὐ κατέσχεν, ἀλλὰ βοηθησάντων Θηβαίων οἱ μὲν ξυνελήφθησαν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐξέπεσον Ἀθήναζε.

96. καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους, ὡς ἐπύθοντο τούς [τε] ἱππέας ἥκοντας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ μέλλοντας ἤδη ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἰέναι, νομίσαντες, ἐὰν μὴ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν κρατήσωσιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, χωρίου ἀποκρήμνου τε καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως εὐθὺς κειμένου, οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως σφᾶς, οὐδ᾽ εἰ κρατοῖντο μάχῃ, ἀποτειχισθῆναι, διενοοῦντο τὰς προσβάσεις αὐτῶν φυλάσσειν, ὅπως μὴ κατὰ ταύτας λάθωσι σφᾶς ἀναβάντες οἱ πολέμιοι: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῃ γε αὐτοὺς δυνηθῆναι. [2] ἐξήρτηται γὰρ τὸ ἄλλο χωρίον, καὶ μέχρι τῆς πόλεως ἐπικλινές τ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιφανὲς πᾶν ἔσω: καὶ ὠνόμασται ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων διὰ τὸ ἐπιπολῆς τοῦ ἄλλου εἶναι Ἐπιπολαί. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐξελθόντες πανδημεὶ ἐς τὸν λειμῶνα παρὰ τὸν Ἄναπον ποταμὸν ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐτύγχανον γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἑρμοκράτη στρατηγοὶ ἄρτι παρειληφότες τὴν ἀρχήν ἐξέτασίν τε ὅπλων ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ἑξακοσίους λογάδας τῶν ὁπλιτῶν ἐξέκριναν πρότερον, ὧν ἦρχε Διόμιλος φυγὰς ἐξ Ἄνδρου, ὅπως τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν εἶεν φύλακες, καὶ ἢν ἐς ἄλλο τι δέῃ, ταχὺ ξυνεστῶτες παραγίγνωνται.

97. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς τῇ ἐπιγιγνομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἐξητάζοντο καὶ ἔλαθον αὐτοὺς παντὶ ἤδη τῷ στρατεύματι ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης σχόντες κατὰ τὸν Λέοντα καλούμενον, ὃς ἀπέχει τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἓξ ἢ ἑπτὰ σταδίους, καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς ἀποβιβάσαντες, ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Θάψον καθορμισάμενοι: ἔστι δὲ χερσόνησος μὲν ἐν στενῷ ἰσθμῷ προύχουσα ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, τῆς δὲ Συρακοσίων πόλεως οὔτε πλοῦν οὔτε ὁδὸν πολλὴν ἀπέχει. [2] καὶ ὁ μὲν ναυτικὸς στρατὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Θάψῳ διασταυρωσάμενος τὸν ἰσθμὸν ἡσύχαζεν: ὁ δὲ πεζὸς ἐχώρει εὐθὺς δρόμῳ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς καὶ φθάνει ἀναβὰς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον πρὶν τοὺς Συρακοσίους αἰσθομένους ἐκ τοῦ λειμῶνος καὶ τῆς ἐξετάσεως παραγενέσθαι. [3] ἐβοήθουν δὲ οἵ τε ἄλλοι, ὡς ἕκαστος τάχους εἶχε, καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόμιλον ἑξακόσιοι: στάδιοι δὲ πρὶν προσμεῖξαι ἐκ τοῦ

λειμῶνος ἐγίγνοντο αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔλασσον ἢ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι. [4] προσπεσόντες οὖν αὐτοῖς τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἀτακτότερον καὶ μάχῃ νικηθέντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπὶ ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν: καὶ ὅ τε Διόμιλος ἀποθνῄσκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς τριακόσιοι. [5] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖόν τε στήσαντες καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀποδόντες τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπικαταβάντες, ὡς οὐκ ἐπεξῇσαν αὐτοῖς, ἐπαναχωρήσαντες φρούριον ἐπὶ τῷ Λαβδάλῳ ᾠκοδόμησαν, ἐπ᾽ ἄκροις τοῖς κρημνοῖς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν, ὁρῶν πρὸς τὰ Μέγαρα, ὅπως εἴη αὐτοῖς, ὁπότε προΐοιεν ἢ μαχούμενοι ἢ τειχιοῦντες, τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἀποθήκη.

98. καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον αὐτοῖς ἦλθον ἔκ τε Ἐγέστης ἱππῆς τριακόσιοι καὶ Σικελῶν καὶ Ναξίων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ὡς ἑκατόν: καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὑπῆρχον πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι, οἷς ἵππους τοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ Ἐγεσταίων καὶ Καταναίων ἔλαβον, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπρίαντο, καὶ ξύμπαντες πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑξακόσιοι ἱππῆς ξυνελέγησαν. [2] καὶ καταστήσαντες ἐν τῷ Λαβδάλῳ φυλακὴν ἐχώρουν πρὸς τὴν Συκῆν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵναπερ καθεζόμενοι ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους. καὶ ἔκπληξιν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις παρέσχον τῷ τάχει τῆς οἰκοδομίας: καὶ ἐπεξελθόντες μάχην διενοοῦντο ποιεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν. [3] καὶ ἤδη ἀντιπαρατασσομένων ἀλλήλοις οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοὶ ὡς ἑώρων σφίσι τὸ στράτευμα διεσπασμένον τε καὶ οὐ ῥᾳδίως ξυντασσόμενον, ἀνήγαγον πάλιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν πλὴν μέρους τινὸς τῶν ἱππέων: οὗτοι δὲ ὑπομένοντες ἐκώλυον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους λιθοφορεῖν τε καὶ ἀποσκίδνασθαι μακροτέραν. [4] καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυλὴ μία τῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πάντες ἐτρέψαντο τοὺς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἱππέας προσβαλόντες, καὶ ἀπέκτειναν τέ τινας καὶ τροπαῖον τῆς ἱππομαχίας ἔστησαν.

99. καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν ἐτείχιζον τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ κύκλου τεῖχος, οἱ δὲ λίθους καὶ ξύλα ξυμφοροῦντες παρέβαλλον ἐπὶ τὸν Τρωγίλον καλούμενον αἰεί, ᾗπερ βραχύτατον ἐγίγνετο αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου

λιμένος ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν τὸ ἀποτείχισμα. [2] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἑρμοκράτους τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐσηγησαμένου μάχαις μὲν πανδημεὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους οὐκέτι ἐβούλοντο διακινδυνεύειν, ὑποτειχίζειν δὲ ἄμεινον ἐδόκει εἶναι, ᾗ ἐκεῖνοι ἔμελλον ἄξειν τὸ τεῖχος καί, εἰ φθάσειαν, ἀποκλῄσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, μέρος ἀντιπέμπειν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς καὶ φθάνειν αὐτοὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντες τοῖς σταυροῖς τὰς ἐφόδους, ἐκείνους δὲ ἂν παυομένους τοῦ ἔργου πάντας ἂν πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι. [3] ἐτείχιζον οὖν ἐξελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι, κάτωθεν τοῦ κύκλου τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἄγοντες, τάς τε ἐλάας ἐκκόπτοντες τοῦ τεμένους καὶ πύργους ξυλίνους καθιστάντες. [4] αἱ δὲ νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὔπω ἐκ τῆς Θάψου περιεπεπλεύκεσαν ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐκράτουν τῶν περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, κατὰ γῆν δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Θάψου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐπήγοντο.

100. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἀρκούντως ἐδόκει ἔχειν ὅσα τε ἐσταυρώθη καὶ ᾠκοδομήθη τοῦ ὑποτειχίσματος, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἦλθον κωλύσοντες, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσι δίχα γιγνομένοις ῥᾷον μάχωνται, καὶ ἅμα τὴν καθ᾽ αὐτοὺς περιτείχισιν ἐπειγόμενοι, οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι φυλὴν μίαν καταλιπόντες φύλακα τοῦ οἰκοδομήματος ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τούς τε ὀχετοὺς αὐτῶν, οἳ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ὑπονομηδὸν ποτοῦ ὕδατος ἠγμένοι ἦσαν, διέφθειραν, καὶ τηρήσαντες τούς τε ἄλλους Συρακοσίους κατὰ σκηνὰς ὄντας ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ καί τινας καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἀποκεχωρηκότας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ σταυρώματι ἀμελῶς φυλάσσοντας, τριακοσίους μὲν σφῶν αὐτῶν λογάδας καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν τινὰς ἐκλεκτοὺς ὡπλισμένους προύταξαν θεῖν δρόμῳ ἐξαπιναίως πρὸς τὸ ὑποτείχισμα, ἡ δ᾽ ἄλλη στρατιὰ δίχα, ἡ μὲν μετὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου στρατηγοῦ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, ἐχώρουν, ἡ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου πρὸς τὸ σταύρωμα τὸ παρὰ τὴν πυλίδα. [2] καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ τριακόσιοι αἱροῦσι τὸ σταύρωμα: καὶ οἱ φύλακες αὐτὸ ἐκλιπόντες κατέφυγον ἐς τὸ προτείχισμα τὸ περὶ τὸν

Τεμενίτην. καὶ αὐτοῖς ξυνεσέπεσον οἱ διώκοντες, καὶ ἐντὸς γενόμενοι βίᾳ ἐξεκρούσθησαν πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων, καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων τινὲς αὐτόθι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐ πολλοὶ διεφθάρησαν. [3] καὶ ἐπαναχωρήσασα ἡ πᾶσα στρατιὰ τήν τε ὑποτείχισιν καθεῖλον καὶ τὸ σταύρωμα ἀνέσπασαν καὶ διεφόρησαν τοὺς σταυροὺς παρ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησαν.

101. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχιζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἕλους, ὃς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα ὁρᾷ, καὶ ᾗπερ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον ἐγίγνετο καταβᾶσι διὰ τοῦ ὁμαλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἕλους ἐς τὸν λιμένα τὸ περιτείχισμα. [2] καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτῳ ἐξελθόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπεσταύρουν αὖθις ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως διὰ μέσου τοῦ ἕλους, καὶ τάφρον ἅμα παρώρυσσον, ὅπως μὴ οἷόν τε ᾖ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης ἀποτειχίσαι. [3] οἱ δ᾽, ἐπειδὴ τὸ πρὸς τὸν κρημνὸν αὐτοῖς ἐξείργαστο, ἐπιχειροῦσιν αὖθις τῷ τῶν Συρακοσίων σταυρώματι καὶ τάφρῳ, τὰς μὲν ναῦς κελεύσαντες περιπλεῦσαι ἐκ τῆς Θάψου ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα τὸν τῶν Συρακοσίων, αὐτοὶ δὲ περὶ ὄρθρον καταβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἐς τὸ ὁμαλὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἕλους, ᾗ πηλῶδες ἦν καὶ στεριφώτατον, θύρας καὶ ξύλα πλατέα ἐπιθέντες καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν διαβαδίσαντες, αἱροῦσιν ἅμα ἕῳ τό τε σταύρωμα πλὴν ὀλίγου καὶ τὴν τάφρον, καὶ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ὑπολειφθὲν εἷλον. [4] καὶ μάχη ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνίκων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων οἱ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχοντες πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔφευγον, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν. καὶ αὐτοὺς βουλόμενοι ἀποκλῄσασθαι τῆς διαβάσεως οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τριακόσιοι λογάδες δρόμῳ ἠπείγοντο πρὸς τὴν γέφυραν. [5] δείσαντες δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ᾖσαν γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἱππέων αὐτοῖς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμόσε χωροῦσι τοῖς τριακοσίοις τούτοις, καὶ τρέπουσί τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐσβάλλουσιν ἐς τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων: καὶ προσπεσόντων αὐτῶν ξυνεφοβήθη καὶ ἡ πρώτη φυλὴ τοῦ κέρως. [6] ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Λάμαχος παρεβοήθει ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐωνύμου τοῦ ἑαυτῶν μετὰ τοξοτῶν τε οὐ πολλῶν καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους

παραλαβών, καὶ ἐπιδιαβὰς τάφρον τινὰ καὶ μονωθεὶς μετ᾽ ὀλίγων τῶν ξυνδιαβάντων ἀποθνῄσκει αὐτός τε καὶ πέντε ἢ ἓξ τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ. καὶ τούτους μὲν οἱ Συρακόσιοι εὐθὺς κατὰ τάχος φθάνουσιν ἁρπάσαντες πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλές, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐπιόντος ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου στρατεύματος τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπεχώρουν.

102. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν τὸ πρῶτον καταφυγόντες ὡς ἑώρων ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, αὐτοί τε πάλιν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀναθαρσήσαντες ἀντετάξαντο πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ σφᾶς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ μέρος τι αὐτῶν πέμπουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν κύκλον τὸν ἐπὶ ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς, ἡγούμενοι ἐρῆμον αἱρήσειν. [2] καὶ τὸ μὲν δεκάπλεθρον προτείχισμα αὐτῶν αἱροῦσι καὶ διεπόρθησαν, αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν κύκλον Νικίας διεκώλυσεν: ἔτυχε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ δι᾽ ἀσθένειαν ὑπολελειμμένος. τὰς γὰρ μηχανὰς καὶ ξύλα ὅσα πρὸ τοῦ τείχους ἦν καταβεβλημένα, ἐμπρῆσαι τοὺς ὑπηρέτας ἐκέλευσεν, ὡς ἔγνω ἀδυνάτους ἐσομένους ἐρημίᾳ ἀνδρῶν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ περιγενέσθαι. [3] καὶ ξυνέβη οὕτως: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσῆλθον οἱ Συρακόσιοι διὰ τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ ἀπεχώρουν πάλιν. καὶ γὰρ πρός τε τὸν κύκλον βοήθεια ἤδη κάτωθεν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποδιωξάντων τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐπανῄει, καὶ αἱ νῆες ἅμα αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς Θάψου, ὥσπερ εἴρητο, κατέπλεον ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα. [4] ἃ ὁρῶντες οἱ ἄνωθεν κατὰ τάχος ἀπῆσαν καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα στρατιὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐς τὴν πόλιν, νομίσαντες μὴ ἂν ἔτι ἀπὸ τῆς παρούσης σφίσι δυνάμεως ἱκανοὶ γενέσθαι κωλῦσαι τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν τειχισμόν.

103. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖον ἔστησαν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Λαμάχου καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκομίσαντο: καὶ παρόντος ἤδη σφίσι παντὸς τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ, ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν καὶ τοῦ κρημνώδους ἀρξάμενοι ἀπετείχιζον μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης τείχει διπλῷ τοὺς Συρακοσίους. [2] τὰ δ᾽ ἐπιτήδεια τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐσήγετο ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας πανταχόθεν. ἦλθον δὲ καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν πολλοὶ ξύμμαχοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, οἳ πρότερον περιεωρῶντο, καὶ ἐκ τῆς Τυρσηνίας νῆες πεντηκόντοροι τρεῖς. καὶ τἆλλα

προυχώρει αὐτοῖς ἐς ἐλπίδας. [3] καὶ γὰρ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πολέμῳ μὲν οὐκέτι ἐνόμιζον ἂν περιγενέσθαι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ὠφελία οὐδεμία ἦκε, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἔν τε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐποιοῦντο ξυμβατικοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὸν Νικίαν: οὗτος γὰρ δὴ μόνος εἶχε Λαμάχου τεθνεῶτος τὴν ἀρχήν. [4] καὶ κύρωσις μὲν οὐδεμία ἐγίγνετο, οἷα δὲ εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπορούντων καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν πολιορκουμένων, πολλὰ ἐλέγετο πρός τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ πλείω ἔτι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν. καὶ γάρ τινα καὶ ὑποψίαν ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἐς ἀλλήλους εἶχον, καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς τε ἐφ᾽ ὧν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα ξυνέβη ἔπαυσαν, ὡς ἢ δυστυχίᾳ ἢ προδοσίᾳ τῇ ἐκείνων βλαπτόμενοι, καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθείλοντο, Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Εὐκλέα καὶ Τελλίαν.

104. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Γύλιππος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κορίνθου νῆες περὶ Λευκάδα ἤδη ἦσαν, βουλόμενοι ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν διὰ τάχους βοηθῆσαι. καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγελίαι ἐφοίτων δειναὶ καὶ πᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐψευσμέναι ὡς ἤδη παντελῶς ἀποτετειχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαί εἰσι, τῆς μὲν Σικελίας οὐκέτι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν ὁ Γύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίαν βουλόμενος περιποιῆσαι αὐτὸς μὲν καὶ Πυθὴν ὁ Κορίνθιος ναυσὶ δυοῖν μὲν Λακωνικαῖν, δυοῖν δὲ Κορινθίαιν ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπεραιώθησαν τὸν Ἰόνιον ἐς Τάραντα, οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι πρὸς ταῖς σφετέραις δέκα Λευκαδίας δύο καὶ Ἀμπρακιώτιδας τρεῖς προσπληρώσαντες ὕστερον ἔμελλον πλεύσεσθαι. [2] καὶ ὁ μὲν Γύλιππος ἐκ τοῦ Τάραντος ἐς τὴν Θουρίαν πρῶτον πρεσβευσάμενος καὶ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀνανεωσάμενος πολιτείαν καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος αὐτοὺς προσαγαγέσθαι, ἄρας παρέπλει τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ ἁρπασθεὶς ὑπ᾽ ἀνέμου κατὰ τὸν Τεριναῖον κόλπον, ὃς ἐκπνεῖ ταύτῃ μέγας κατὰ βορέαν ἑστηκώς, ἀποφέρεται ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ πάλιν χειμασθεὶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα τῷ Τάραντι προσμίσγει: καὶ τὰς ναῦς, ὅσαι μάλιστα ἐπόνησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀνελκύσας ἐπεσκεύαζεν. [3] ὁ δὲ Νικίας πυθόμενος αὐτὸν προσπλέοντα ὑπερεῖδε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεῶν, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ Θούριοι ἔπαθον, καὶ λῃστικώτερον ἔδοξε

παρεσκευασμένους πλεῖν, καὶ οὐδεμίαν φυλακήν πω ἐποιεῖτο.

105. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτου τοῦ θέρους καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς τὸ Ἄργος ἐσέβαλον αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ τῆς γῆς τὴν πολλὴν ἐδῄωσαν, καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι Ἀργείοις τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐβοήθησαν: αἵπερ τὰς σπονδὰς φανερώτατα τὰς πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους αὐτοῖς ἔλυσαν. [2] πρότερον μὲν γὰρ λῃστείαις ἐκ Πύλου καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἀποβαίνοντες μετά τε Ἀργείων καὶ Μαντινέων ξυνεπολέμουν, καὶ πολλάκις Ἀργείων κελευόντων ὅσον σχόντας μόνον ξὺν ὅπλοις ἐς τὴν Λακωνικὴν καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον μετὰ σφῶν δῃώσαντας ἀπελθεῖν οὐκ ἤθελον: τότε δὲ Πυθοδώρου καὶ Λαισποδίου καὶ Δημαράτου ἀρχόντων ἀποβάντες ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον τὴν Λιμηρὰν καὶ Πρασιὰς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐδῄωσαν τῆς γῆς, καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἤδη εὐπροφάσιστον μᾶλλον τὴν αἰτίαν ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τοῦ ἀμύνεσθαι ἐποίησαν. [3] ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκ τοῦ Ἄργους ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Φλειασίαν τῆς τε γῆς αὐτῶν ἔτεμον καὶ ἀπέκτεινάν τινας, καὶ ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

Βιβλίο Ζ’

1. ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος καὶ ὁ Πυθὴν ἐκ τοῦ Τάραντος, ἐπεὶ ἐπεσκεύασαν τὰς ναῦς, παρέπλευσαν ἐς Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ἐπιζεφυρίους: καὶ πυνθανόμενοι σαφέστερον ἤδη ὅτι οὐ παντελῶς πω ἀποτετειχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαί εἰσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι οἷόν τε κατὰ τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς στρατιᾷ ἀφικομένους ἐσελθεῖν, ἐβουλεύοντο εἴτ᾽ ἐν δεξιᾷ λαβόντες τὴν Σικελίαν διακινδυνεύσωσιν ἐσπλεῦσαι, εἴτ᾽ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ ἐς Ἱμέραν πρῶτον πλεύσαντες καὶ αὐτούς τε ἐκείνους καὶ στρατιὰν ἄλλην προσλαβόντες, οὓς ἂν πείθωσι, κατὰ γῆν ἔλθωσιν. [2] καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς Ἱμέρας πλεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν τεσσάρων νεῶν οὔπω παρουσῶν ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίῳ, ἃς ὁ Νικίας ὅμως πυνθανόμενος αὐτοὺς ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶναι ἀπέστειλεν. φθάσαντες δὲ τὴν φυλακὴν ταύτην περαιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ πορθμοῦ, καὶ σχόντες Ῥηγίῳ καὶ Μεσσήνῃ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ἱμέραν. [3] ἐκεῖ δὲ ὄντες τούς τε Ἱμεραίους ἔπεισαν ξυμπολεμεῖν καὶ αὐτούς τε ἔπεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν νεῶν τῶν σφετέρων ναύταις ὅσοι μὴ εἶχον ὅπλα παρασχεῖν τὰς γὰρ ναῦς ἀνείλκυσαν ἐν Ἱμέρᾳ , καὶ τοὺς Σελινουντίους πέμψαντες ἐκέλευον ἀπαντᾶν πανστρατιᾷ ἔς τι χωρίον. [4] πέμψειν δέ τινα αὐτοῖς ὑπέσχοντο στρατιὰν οὐ πολλὴν καὶ οἱ Γελῷοι καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινές, οἳ πολὺ προθυμότερον προσχωρεῖν ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τοῦ τε Ἀρχωνίδου νεωστὶ τεθνηκότος, ὃς τῶν ταύτῃ Σικελῶν βασιλεύων τινῶν καὶ ὢν οὐκ ἀδύνατος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις φίλος ἦν,καὶ τοῦ Γυλίππου ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος προθύμως δοκοῦντος ἥκειν. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν Γύλιππος ἀναλαβὼν τῶν τε σφετέρων ναυτῶν καὶ ἐπιβατῶν τοὺς ὡπλισμένους ἑπτακοσίους μάλιστα, Ἱμεραίους δὲ ὁπλίτας καὶ ψιλοὺς ξυναμφοτέρους χιλίους καὶ ἱππέας ἑκατὸν καὶ Σελινουντίων τέ τινας ψιλοὺς καὶ ἱππέας καὶ Γελῴων ὀλίγους, Σικελῶν τε ἐς χιλίους τοὺς πάντας, ἐχώρει πρὸς τὰς Συρακούσας:

2. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος Κορίνθιοι ταῖς τε ἄλλαις ναυσὶν ὡς εἶχον τάχους ἐβοήθουν καὶ Γογγύλος, εἷς τῶν Κορινθίων

ἀρχόντων, μιᾷ νηὶ τελευταῖος ὁρμηθεὶς πρῶτος μὲν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ὀλίγον δὲ πρὸ Γυλίππου, καὶ καταλαβὼν αὐτοὺς περὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ πολέμου μέλλοντας ἐκκλησιάσειν διεκώλυσέ τε καὶ παρεθάρσυνε, λέγων ὅτι νῆές τε ἄλλαι ἔτι προσπλέουσι καὶ Γύλιππος ὁ Κλεανδρίδου Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστειλάντων ἄρχων. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ἐπερρώσθησάν τε καὶ τῷ Γυλίππῳ εὐθὺς πανστρατιᾷ ὡς ἀπαντησόμενοι ἐξῆλθον: ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγγὺς ὄντα ᾐσθάνοντο αὐτόν. [3] ὁ δὲ Ἰέτας τότε τι τεῖχος ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ τῶν Σικελῶν ἑλὼν καὶ ξυνταξάμενος ὡς ἐς μάχην ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς: καὶ ἀναβὰς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ᾗπερ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον, ἐχώρει μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐπὶ τὸ τείχισμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων. [4] ἔτυχε δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ καιροῦ ἐλθὼν ἐν ᾧ ἑπτὰ μὲν ἢ ὀκτὼ σταδίων ἤδη ἀπετετέλεστο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα διπλοῦν τεῖχος, πλὴν κατὰ βραχύ τι τὸ πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν — τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔτι ᾠκοδόμουν —, τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρωγίλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν λίθοι τε παραβεβλημένοι τῷ πλέονι ἤδη ἦσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ ἡμίεργα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξειργασμένα κατελέλειπτο. παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν αἱ Συράκουσαι ἦλθον κινδύνου.

3. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰφνιδίως τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων σφίσιν ἐπιόντων ἐθορυβήθησαν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, παρετάξαντο δέ. ὁ δὲ θέμενος τὰ ὅπλα ἐγγὺς κήρυκα προσπέμπει αὐτοῖς λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται ἐξιέναι ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας πέντε ἡμερῶν λαβόντες τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν, ἑτοῖμος εἶναι σπένδεσθαι. [2] οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ὀλιγωρίᾳ τε ἐποιοῦντο καὶ οὐδὲν ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀπέπεμψαν. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀντιπαρεσκευάζοντο ἀλλήλοις ὡς ἐς μάχην. [3] καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ὁρῶν τοὺς Συρακοσίους ταρασσομένους καὶ οὐ ῥᾳδίως ξυντασσομένους, ἐπανῆγε τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ Νικίας οὐκ ἐπῆγε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχαζε πρὸς τῷ ἑαυτῶν τείχει. ὡς δ᾽ ἔγνω ὁ Γύλιππος οὐ προσιόντας αὐτούς, ἀπήγαγε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν τὴν Τεμενῖτιν καλουμένην, καὶ αὐτοῦ ηὐλίσαντο. [4] τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἄγων τὴν μὲν πλείστην

τῆς στρατιᾶς παρέταξε πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅπως μὴ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν ἄλλοσε, μέρος δέ τι πέμψας πρὸς τὸ φρούριον τὸ Λάβδαλον αἱρεῖ, καὶ ὅσους ἔλαβεν ἐν αὐτῷ πάντας ἀπέκτεινεν: ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἐπιφανὲς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸ χωρίον. [5] καὶ τριήρης τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἁλίσκεται τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐφορμοῦσα τῷ λιμένι.

4. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐτείχιζον οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι ἄνω πρὸς τὸ * ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ μὴ δύναιντο κωλῦσαι, μηκέτι οἷοί τε ὦσιν ἀποτειχίσαι. [2] καὶ οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνεβεβήκεσαν ἤδη ἄνω, τὸ ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ τεῖχος ἐπιτελέσαντες, καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ⟨ἦν γάρ τι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοῦ τείχους ἀσθενές⟩ νυκτὸς ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπῄει πρὸς αὐτό. [3] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ⟨ἔτυχον γὰρ ἔξω αὐλιζόμενοι⟩ ὡς ᾔσθοντο, ἀντεπῆσαν: ὁ δὲ γνοὺς κατὰ τάχος ἀπήγαγε τοὺς σφετέρους πάλιν. ἐποικοδομήσαντες δὲ αὐτὸ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑψηλότερον αὐτοὶ μὲν ταύτῃ ἐφύλασσον, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ξυμμάχους κατὰ τὸ ἄλλο τείχισμα ἤδη διέταξαν, ᾗπερ ἔμελλον ἕκαστοι φρουρεῖν. [4] τῷ δὲ Νικίᾳ ἐδόκει τὸ Πλημμύριον καλούμενον τειχίσαι: ἔστι δὲ ἄκρα ἀντιπέρας τῆς πόλεως, ἥπερ προύχουσα τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος τὸ στόμα στενὸν ποιεῖ, καὶ εἰ τειχισθείη, ῥᾴων αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο ἡ ἐσκομιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔσεσθαι: δι᾽ ἐλάσσονος γὰρ πρὸς τῷ λιμένι τῷ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐφορμήσειν σφᾶς, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν ἐκ μυχοῦ τοῦ λιμένος τὰς ἐπαναγωγὰς ποιήσεσθαι, ἢν τι ναυτικῷ κινῶνται. προσεῖχέ τε ἤδη μᾶλλον τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν πολέμῳ, ὁρῶν τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς σφίσιν ἤδη, ἐπειδὴ Γύλιππος ἦκεν, ἀνελπιστότερα ὄντα. [5] διακομίσας οὖν στρατιὰν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐξετείχισε τρία φρούρια: καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τά τε σκεύη τὰ πλεῖστα ἔκειτο καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἤδη ἐκεῖ τὰ μεγάλα ὥρμει καὶ αἱ ταχεῖαι νῆες. [6] ὥστε καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων οὐχ ἥκιστα τότε πρῶτον κάκωσις ἐγένετο: τῷ τε γὰρ ὕδατι σπανίῳ χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύθεν, καὶ ἐπὶ φρυγανισμὸν ἅμα ὁπότε ἐξέλθοιεν οἱ ναῦται, ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων τῶν Συρακοσίων κρατούντων τῆς γῆς διεφθείροντο: τρίτον γὰρ μέρος τῶν ἱππέων τοῖς

Συρακοσίοις διὰ τοὺς ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ, ἵνα μὴ κακουργήσοντες ἐξίοιεν, ἐπὶ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιείῳ πολίχνῃ ἐτετάχατο. [7] ἐπυνθάνετο δὲ καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς τῶν Κορινθίων ναῦς προσπλεούσας ὁ Νικίας: καὶ πέμπει ἐς φυλακὴν αὐτῶν εἴκοσι ναῦς, αἷς εἴρητο περί τε Λοκροὺς καὶ Ῥήγιον καὶ τὴν προσβολὴν τῆς Σικελίας ναυλοχεῖν αὐτάς.

5. ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἅμα μὲν ἐτείχιζε τὸ διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τεῖχος, τοῖς λίθοις χρώμενος οὓς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προπαρεβάλοντο σφίσιν, ἅμα δὲ παρέτασσεν ἐξάγων αἰεὶ πρὸ τοῦ τειχίσματος τοὺς Συρακοσίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους: καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο. [2] ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔδοξε τῷ Γυλίππῳ καιρὸς εἶναι, ἦρχε τῆς ἐφόδου: καὶ ἐν χερσὶ γενόμενοι ἐμάχοντο μεταξὺ τῶν τειχισμάτων, ᾗ τῆς ἵππου τῶν Συρακοσίων οὐδεμία χρῆσις ἦν. [3] καὶ νικηθέντων τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀνελομένων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τροπαῖον στησάντων, ὁ Γύλιππος ξυγκαλέσας τὸ στράτευμα οὐκ ἔφη τὸ ἁμάρτημα ἐκείνων, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι: τῆς γὰρ ἵππου καὶ τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν τὴν ὠφελίαν τῇ τάξει ἐντὸς λίαν τῶν τειχῶν ποιήσας ἀφελέσθαι: νῦν οὖν αὖθις ἐπάξειν. [4] καὶ διανοεῖσθαι οὕτως ἐκέλευεν αὐτοὺς ὡς τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔξοντας, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐσόμενον εἰ μὴ ἀξιώσουσι Πελοποννήσιοί τε ὄντες καὶ Δωριῆς Ἰώνων καὶ νησιωτῶν καὶ ξυγκλύδων ἀνθρώπων κρατήσαντες ἐξελάσασθαι ἐκ τῆς χώρας.

6. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ καιρὸς ἦν, αὖθις ἐπῆγεν αὐτούς. ὁ δὲ Νικίας καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίζοντες, καὶ εἰ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ ἐθέλοιεν μάχης ἄρχειν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σφίσι μὴ περιορᾶν παροικοδομούμενον τὸ τεῖχος ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρεληλύθει τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ τείχους τελευτὴν ἡ ἐκείνων τείχισις, καί, εἰ προέλθοι, ταὐτὸν ἤδη ἐποίει αὐτοῖς νικᾶν τε μαχομένοις διὰ παντὸς καὶ μηδὲ μάχεσθαι , ἀντεπῆσαν οὖν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. [2] καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἔξω τῶν τειχῶν μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον προαγαγὼν ξυνέμισγεν αὐτοῖς, τοὺς δ᾽ ἱππέας καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς ἐκ πλαγίου τάξας τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, ᾗ τῶν

τειχῶν ἀμφοτέρων αἱ ἐργασίαι ἔληγον. [3] καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ ἱππῆς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ κέρᾳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅπερ κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἦν, ἔτρεψαν: καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα νικηθὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων κατηράχθη ἐς τὰ τειχίσματα. [4] καὶ τῇ ἐπιούσῃ νυκτὶ ἔφθασαν παροικοδομήσαντες καὶ παρελθόντες τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἰκοδομίαν, ὥστε μηκέτι μήτε αὐτοὶ κωλύεσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἐκείνους τε καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπεστερηκέναι, εἰ καὶ κρατοῖεν, μὴ ἂν ἔτι σφᾶς ἀποτειχίσαι.

7. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αἵ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα, λαθοῦσαι τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυλακήν ἦρχε δ᾽ αὐτῶν Ἐρασινίδης Κορίνθιος, καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι * τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους. [2] καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν ἐπὶ στρατιάν τε ᾤχετο, καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζὴν ξυλλέξων, καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἅμα προσαξόμενος εἴ τις ἢ μὴ πρόθυμος ἦν ἢ παντάπασιν ἔτι ἀφειστήκει τοῦ πολέμου. [3] πρέσβεις τε ἄλλοι τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων ἐς Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Κόρινθον ἀπεστάλησαν, ὅπως στρατιὰ ἔτι περαιωθῇ τρόπῳ ᾧ ἂν ἐν ὁλκάσιν ἢ πλοίοις ἢ ἄλλως ὅπως ἂν προχωρῇ, ὡς καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιμεταπεμπομένων. [4] οἵ τε Συρακόσιοι ναυτικὸν ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο ὡς καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιχειρήσοντες, καὶ ἐς τἆλλα πολὺ ἐπέρρωντο.

8. ὁ δὲ Νικίας αἰσθόμενος τοῦτο καὶ ὁρῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπιδιδοῦσαν τήν τε τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἀπορίαν, ἔπεμπε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀγγέλλων πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τῶν γιγνομένων, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τότε, νομίζων ἐν δεινοῖς τε εἶναι καί, εἰ μὴ ὡς τάχιστα ἢ σφᾶς μεταπέμψουσιν ἢ ἄλλους μὴ ὀλίγους ἀποστελοῦσιν, οὐδεμίαν εἶναι σωτηρίαν. [2] φοβούμενος δὲ μὴ οἱ πεμπόμενοι ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυνασίαν ἢ καὶ μνήμης ἐλλιπεῖς γιγνόμενοι ἢ τῷ ὄχλῳ πρὸς χάριν τι λέγοντες οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἀπαγγέλλωσιν, ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολήν, νομίζων οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην μηδὲν ἐν τῷ ἀγγέλῳ ἀφανισθεῖσαν μαθόντας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους

βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν ᾤχοντο φέροντες, οὓς ἀπέστειλε, τὰ γράμματα καὶ ὅσα ἔδει αὐτοὺς εἰπεῖν: ὁ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον διὰ φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἤδη ἔχων ἢ δι᾽ ἐκουσίων κινδύνων ἐπεμέλετο.

9. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τελευτῶντι καὶ Εὐετίων στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων μετὰ Περδίκκου στρατεύσας ἐπ᾽ Ἀμφίπολιν Θρᾳξὶ πολλοῖς τὴν μὲν πόλιν οὐχ εἶλεν, ἐς δὲ τὸν Στρυμόνα περικομίσας τριήρεις ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπολιόρκει ὁρμώμενος ἐξ Ἰμεραίου. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

10. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἥκοντες ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Νικίου ὅσα τε ἀπὸ γλώσσης εἴρητο αὐτοῖς εἶπον, καὶ εἴ τίς τι ἐπηρώτα ἀπεκρίνοντο, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπέδοσαν. ὁ δὲ γραμματεὺς ὁ τῆς πόλεως παρελθὼν ἀνέγνω τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις δηλοῦσαν τοιάδε.

11. ‘τὰ μὲν πρότερον πραχθέντα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ἴστε: νῦν δὲ καιρὸς οὐχ ἧσσον μαθόντας ὑμᾶς ἐν ᾧ ἐσμὲν βουλεύσασθαι. [2] κρατησάντων γὰρ ἡμῶν μάχαις ταῖς πλέοσι Συρακοσίους ἐφ᾽ οὓς ἐπέμφθημεν καὶ τὰ τείχη οἰκοδομησαμένων ἐν οἷσπερ νῦν ἐσμέν, ἦλθε Γύλιππος Λακεδαιμόνιος στρατιὰν ἔχων ἔκ τε Πελοποννήσου καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ πόλεων ἔστιν ὧν. καὶ μάχῃ τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ νικᾶται ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἱππεῦσί τε πολλοῖς καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς βιασθέντες ἀνεχωρήσαμεν ἐς τὰ τείχη. [3] νῦν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν παυσάμενοι τοῦ περιτειχισμοῦ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων ἡσυχάζομεν οὐδὲ γὰρ ξυμπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ δυναίμεθ᾽ ἂν χρήσασθαι ἀπανηλωκυίας τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν τειχῶν μέρος τι τοῦ ὁπλιτικοῦ : οἱ δὲ παρῳκοδομήκασιν ἡμῖν τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι ἔτι περιτειχίσαι αὐτούς, ἢν μή τις τὸ παρατείχισμα τοῦτο πολλῇ στρατιᾷ ἐπελθὼν ἕλῃ. [4] ξυμβέβηκέ τε πολιορκεῖν δοκοῦντας ἡμᾶς ἄλλους αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον, ὅσα γε κατὰ γῆν, τοῦτο πάσχειν: οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς χώρας ἐπὶ πολὺ διὰ τοὺς ἱππέας ἐξερχόμεθα.

12. ‘πεπόμφασι δὲ καὶ ἐς Πελοπόννησον πρέσβεις ἐπ᾽ ἄλλην στρατιάν, καὶ ἐς τὰς ἐν Σικελίᾳ πόλεις Γύλιππος οἴχεται, τὰς μὲν καὶ πείσων ξυμπολεμεῖν ὅσαι νῦν ἡσυχάζουσιν, ἀπὸ

δὲ τῶν καὶ στρατιὰν ἔτι πεζὴν καὶ ναυτικοῦ παρασκευήν, ἣν δύνηται, ἄξων. [2] διανοοῦνται γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, τῷ τε πεζῷ ἅμα τῶν τειχῶν ἡμῶν πειρᾶν καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [3] καὶ δεινὸν μηδενὶ ὑμῶν δόξῃ εἶναι ὅτι καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. τὸ γὰρ ναυτικὸν ἡμῶν, ὅπερ κἀκεῖνοι πυνθάνονται, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἤκμαζε καὶ τῶν νεῶν τῇ ξηρότητι καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων τῇ σωτηρίᾳ: νῦν δὲ αἵ τε νῆες διάβροχοι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἤδη θαλασσεύουσαι, καὶ τὰ πληρώματα ἔφθαρται. [4] τὰς μὲν γὰρ ναῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνελκύσαντας διαψύξαι διὰ τὸ ἀντιπάλους τῷ πλήθει καὶ ἔτι πλείους τὰς τῶν πολεμίων οὔσας αἰεὶ προσδοκίαν παρέχειν ὡς ἐπιπλεύσονται. [5] φανεραὶ δ᾽ εἰσὶν ἀναπειρώμεναι, καὶ αἱ ἐπιχειρήσεις ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις καὶ ἀποξηρᾶναι τὰς σφετέρας μᾶλλον ἐξουσία: οὐ γὰρ ἐφορμοῦσιν ἄλλοις.

13. ἡμῖν δ᾽ ἐκ πολλῆς ἂν περιουσίας νεῶν μόλις τοῦτο ὑπῆρχε καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζομένοις ὥσπερ νῦν πάσαις φυλάσσειν: εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρήσομέν τι καὶ βραχὺ τῆς τηρήσεως, τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐχ ἕξομεν, παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων πόλιν χαλεπῶς καὶ νῦν ἐσκομιζόμενοι. [2] τὰ δὲ πληρώματα διὰ τόδε ἐφθάρη τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἔτι νῦν φθείρεται, τῶν ναυτῶν [τῶν] μὲν διὰ φρυγανισμὸν καὶ ἁρπαγὴν καὶ ὑδρείαν μακρὰν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπολλυμένων: οἱ δὲ θεράποντες, ἐπειδὴ ἐς ἀντίπαλα καθεστήκαμεν, αὐτομολοῦσι, καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν,οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην ναυτικόν τε δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστῶτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι δύνανται □πολλὴ δ᾽ ἡ Σικελία□, εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἳ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμπορευόμενοι ἀνδράποδα Ὑκκαρικὰ ἀντεμβιβάσαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν πείσαντες τοὺς τριηράρχους τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἀφῄρηνται.

14. ἐπισταμένοις δ᾽ ὑμῖν γράφω ὅτι βραχεῖα ἀκμὴ πληρώματος καὶ ὀλίγοι τῶν ναυτῶν οἱ ἐξορμῶντές τε ναῦν καὶ ξυνέχοντες τὴν εἰρεσίαν. [2] τούτων δὲ πάντων

ἀπορώτατον τό τε μὴ οἷόν τε εἶναι ταῦτα ἐμοὶ κωλῦσαι τῷ στρατηγῷ χαλεπαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑμέτεραι φύσεις ἄρξαι καὶ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ὁπόθεν ἐπιπληρωσόμεθα τὰς ναῦς ἔχομεν, ὃ τοῖς πολεμίοις πολλαχόθεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἔχοντες ἤλθομεν τά τε ὄντα καὶ ἀπαναλισκόμενα γίγνεσθαι: αἱ γὰρ νῦν οὖσαι πόλεις ξύμμαχοι ἀδύνατοι Νάξος καὶ Κατάνη. [3] εἰ δὲ προσγενήσεται ἓν ἔτι τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὥστε τὰ τρέφοντα ἡμᾶς χωρία τῆς Ἰταλίας, ὁρῶντα ἐν ᾧ τ᾽ ἐσμὲν καὶ ὑμῶν μὴ ἐπιβοηθούντων, πρὸς ἐκείνους χωρῆσαι, διαπεπολεμήσεται αὐτοῖς ἀμαχεὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντων ἡμῶν [ὁ πόλεμος]. [4] ’τούτων ἐγὼ ἡδίω μὲν ἂν εἶχον ὑμῖν ἕτερα ἐπιστέλλειν, οὐ μέντοι χρησιμώτερά γε, εἰ δεῖ σαφῶς εἰδότας τὰ ἐνθάδε βουλεύσασθαι. καὶ ἅμα τὰς φύσεις ἐπιστάμενος ὑμῶν, βουλομένων μὲν τὰ ἥδιστα ἀκούειν, αἰτιωμένων δὲ ὕστερον, ἤν τι ὑμῖν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν μὴ ὁμοῖον ἐκβῇ, ἀσφαλέστερον ἡγησάμην τὸ ἀληθὲς δηλῶσαι.

15. καὶ νῦν ὡς ἐφ᾽ ἃ μὲν ἤλθομεν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ὑμῖν μὴ μεμπτῶν γεγενημένων, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε: ἐπειδὴ δὲ Σικελία τε ἅπασα ξυνίσταται καὶ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἄλλη στρατιὰ προσδόκιμος αὐτοῖς, βουλεύεσθε ἤδη ὡς τῶν γ᾽ ἐνθάδε μηδὲ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀνταρκούντων, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τούτους μεταπέμπειν δέον ἢ ἄλλην στρατιὰν μὴ ἐλάσσω ἐπιπέμπειν καὶ πεζὴν καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ χρήματα μὴ ὀλίγα, ἐμοὶ δὲ διάδοχόν τινα, ὡς ἀδύνατός εἰμι διὰ νόσον νεφρῖτιν παραμένειν. [2] ἀξιῶ δ᾽ ὑμῶν ξυγγνώμης τυγχάνειν: καὶ γὰρ ὅτ᾽ ἐρρώμην πολλὰ ἐν ἡγεμονίαις ὑμᾶς εὖ ἐποίησα. ὅτι δὲ μέλλετε, ἅμα τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς καὶ μὴ ἐς ἀναβολὰς πράσσετε, ὡς τῶν πολεμίων τὰ μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ δι᾽ ὀλίγου πορισμένων, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου σχολαίτερον μέν, ὅμως δ᾽, ἢν μὴ προσέχητε τὴν γνώμην, τὰ μὲν λήσουσιν ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, τὰ δὲ φθήσονται.’

16. ἡ μὲν τοῦ Νικίου ἐπιστολὴ τοσαῦτα ἐδήλου, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες αὐτῆς τὸν μὲν Νικίαν οὐ παρέλυσαν τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτῷ, ἕως ἂν ἕτεροι ξυνάρχοντες αἱρεθέντες ἀφίκωνται, τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖ δύο προσείλοντο

Μένανδρον καὶ Εὐθύδημον, ὅπως μὴ μόνος ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ ταλαιπωροίη, στρατιὰν δὲ ἄλλην ἐψηφίσαντο πέμπειν καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζὴν Ἀθηναίων τε ἐκ καταλόγου καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων. [2] καὶ ξυνάρχοντας αὐτῷ εἵλοντο Δημοσθένη τε τὸν Ἀλκισθένους καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους. καὶ τὸν μὲν Εὐρυμέδοντα εὐθὺς περὶ ἡλίου τροπὰς τὰς χειμερινὰς ἀποπέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν μετὰ δέκα νεῶν, ἄγοντα εἴκοσι <καὶ ἑκατὸν> τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ ἅμα ἀγγελοῦντα τοῖς ἐκεῖ ὅτι ἥξει βοήθεια καὶ ἐπιμέλεια αὐτῶν ἔσται:

17. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ὑπομένων παρεσκευάζετο τὸν ἔκπλουν ὡς ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ποιησόμενος, στρατιάν τε ἐπαγγέλλων ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ χρήματα αὐτόθεν καὶ ναῦς καὶ ὁπλίτας ἑτοιμάζων. [2] πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναῦς, ὅπως φυλάσσοιεν μηδένα ἀπὸ Κορίνθου καὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν περαιοῦσθαι. [3] οἱ γὰρ Κορίνθιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ πρέσβεις ἦκον καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ βελτίω ἤγγελλον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄκαιρον καὶ τὴν προτέραν πέμψιν τῶν νεῶν ποιήσασθαι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωντο, καὶ ἐν ὁλκάσι παρεσκευάζοντο αὐτοί τε ἀποστελοῦντες ὁπλίτας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Πελοποννήσου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ πέμψοντες: [4] ναῦς τε οἱ Κορίνθιοι πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐπλήρουν, ὅπως ναυμαχίας τε ἀποπειράσωσι πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ φυλακήν, καὶ τὰς ὁλκάδας αὐτῶν ἧσσον οἱ ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι κωλύοιεν ἀπαίρειν, πρὸς τὴν σφετέραν ἀντίταξιν τῶν τριήρων τὴν φυλακὴν ποιούμενοι.

18. παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολὴν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τε προυδέδοκτο αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων ἐναγόντων, ἐπειδὴ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὅπως δὴ ἐσβολῆς γενομένης διακωλυθῇ. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης προσκείμενος ἐδίδασκε τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχίζειν καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι τὸν πόλεμον. [2] μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐγεγένητό τις ῥώμη, διότι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐνόμιζον διπλοῦν τὸν πόλεμον ἔχοντας, πρός τε σφᾶς καὶ Σικελιώτας,

εὐκαθαιρετωτέρους ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τὰς σπονδὰς προτέρους λελυκέναι ἡγοῦντο αὐτούς: ἐν γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν, ἢν δίκας ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνόμιζον, καὶ ἐνεθυμοῦντο τήν τε περὶ Πύλον ξυμφορὰν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο. [3] ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἄργους ὁρμώμενοι Ἐπιδαύρου τέ τι καὶ Πρασιῶν καὶ ἄλλα ἐδῄωσαν καὶ ἐκ Πύλου ἅμα ἐληστεύοντο, καὶ ὁσάκις περί του διαφοραὶ γένοιντο τῶν κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς ἀμφισβητουμένων, ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οὐκ ἤθελον ἐπιτρέπειν, τότε δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι νομίσαντες τὸ παρανόμημα, ὅπερ καὶ σφίσι πρότερον ἡμάρτητο, αὖθις ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ αὐτὸ περιεστάναι, πρόθυμοι ἦσαν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον. [4] καὶ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ σίδηρόν τε περιήγγελλον κατὰ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ τἆλλα ἐργαλεῖα ἡτοίμαζον ἐς τὸν ἐπιτειχισμόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ἅμα ὡς ἀποπέμψοντες ἐν ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ἐπικουρίαν αὐτοί τε ἐπόριζον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Πελοποννησίους προσηνάγκαζον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ὄγδοον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

19. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου ἦρος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου πρωίτατα δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσέβαλον: ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἆγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῆς χώρας τὰ περὶ τὸ πεδίον ἐδῄωσαν, ἔπειτα Δεκέλειαν ἐτείχιζον, κατὰ πόλεις διελόμενοι τὸ ἔργον. [2] ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Δεκέλεια σταδίους μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεως εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ οὐ πολλῷ πλέον καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Βοιωτίας. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ πεδίῳ καὶ τῆς χώρας τοῖς κρατίστοις ἐς τὸ κακουργεῖν ᾠκοδομεῖτο τὸ τεῖχος, ἐπιφανὲς μέχρι τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεως. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐτείχιζον, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ

ἀπέστελλον περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ταῖς ὁλκάσι τοὺς ὁπλίτας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν τῶν τε Εἱλώτων ἐπιλεξάμενοι τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ τῶν νεοδαμωδῶν, ξυναμφοτέρων ἐς ἑξακοσίους ὁπλίτας,καὶ Ἔκκριτον Σπαρτιάτην ἄρχοντα, Βοιωτοὶ δὲ τριακοσίους ὁπλίτας, ὧν ἦρχον Ξένων τε καὶ Νίκων Θηβαῖοι καὶ Ἠγήσανδρος Θεσπιεύς. [4] οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι ὁρμήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ Ταινάρου τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἐς τὸ πέλαγος ἀφῆκαν: μετὰ δὲ τούτους Κορίνθιοι οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον πεντακοσίους ὁπλίτας, τοὺς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς Κορίνθου, τοὺς δὲ προσμισθωσάμενοι Ἀρκάδων, καὶ ἄρχοντα Ἀλέξαρχον Κορίνθιον προστάξαντες ἀπέπεμψαν. ἀπέστειλαν δὲ καὶ Σικυώνιοι διακοσίους ὁπλίτας ὁμοῦ τοῖς Κορινθίοις, ὧν ἦρχε Σαργεὺς Σικυώνιος. [5] αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Κορινθίων αἱ τοῦ χειμῶνος πληρωθεῖσαι ἀνθώρμουν ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ εἴκοσιν Ἀττικαῖς, ἕωσπερ αὐτοῖς οὗτοι οἱ ὁπλῖται ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀπῆραν: οὗπερ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπληρώθησαν, ὅπως μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς τὰς ὁλκάδας μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις τὸν νοῦν ἔχωσιν.

20. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἅμα τῆς Δεκελείας τῷ τειχισμῷ καὶ τοῦ ἦρος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου περί τε Πελοπόννησον ναῦς τριάκοντα ἔστειλαν καὶ Χαρικλέα τὸν Ἀπολλοδώρου ἄρχοντα, ᾧ εἴρητο καὶ ἐς Ἄργος ἀφικομένῳ κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν παρακαλεῖν Ἀργείων [τε] ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, [2] καὶ τὸν Δημοσθένη ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὥσπερ ἔμελλον, ἀπέστελλον ἑξήκοντα μὲν ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ πέντε Χίαις, ὁπλίταις δὲ ἐκ καταλόγου Ἀθηναίων διακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις, καὶ νησιωτῶν ὅσοις ἑκασταχόθεν οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν πλείστοις χρήσασθαι, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τῶν ὑπηκόων, εἴ ποθέν τι εἶχον ἐπιτήδειον ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, ξυμπορίσαντες. εἴρητο δ᾽ αὐτῷ πρῶτον μετὰ τοῦ Χαρικλέους ἅμα περιπλέοντα ξυστρατεύεσθαι περὶ τὴν Λακωνικήν. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Αἴγιναν προσπλεύσας τοῦ στρατεύματός τε εἴ τι ὑπελέλειπτο περιέμενε καὶ τὸν Χαρικλέα τοὺς Ἀργείους παραλαβεῖν.

21. ἐν δὲ τῇ Σικελίᾳ ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτου τοῦ ἦρος καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ἦκεν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἄγων ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ὧν ἔπεισε στρατιὰν ὅσην ἐκασταχόθεν πλείστην ἐδύνατο. [2] καὶ ξυγκαλέσας τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἔφη χρῆναι πληροῦν ναῦς ὡς δύνανται πλείστας καὶ ναυμαχίας ἀπόπειραν λαμβάνειν: ἐλπίζειν γὰρ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τι ἔργον ἄξιον τοῦ κινδύνου ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατεργάσεσθαι. [3] ξυνανέπειθε δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης οὐχ ἥκιστα, τοῦ ταῖς ναυσὶ μὴ ἀθυμεῖν ἐπιχειρῆσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, λέγων οὐδ᾽ ἐκείνους πάτριον τὴν ἐμπειρίαν οὐδ᾽ ἀίδιον τῆς θαλάσσης ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἠπειρώτας μᾶλλον τῶν Συρακοσίων ὄντας καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ὑπὸ Μήδων ναυτικοὺς γενέσθαι. καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας τολμηρούς, οἵους καὶ Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς ἀντιτολμῶντας χαλεπωτάτους ἂν [αὐτοῖς] φαίνεσθαι: ᾧ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς πέλας, οὐ δυνάμει ἔστιν ὅτε προύχοντες, τῷ δὲ θράσει ἐπιχειροῦντες καταφοβοῦσι, καὶ σφᾶς ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑποσχεῖν. [4] καὶ Συρακοσίους εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφη τῷ τολμῆσαι ἀπροσδοκήτως πρὸς τὸ Ἀθηναίων ναυτικὸν ἀντιστῆναι πλέον τι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκπλαγέντων αὐτῶν περιγενησομένους ἢ Ἀθηναίους τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ τὴν Συρακοσίων ἀπειρίαν βλάψοντας. ἰέναι οὖν ἐκέλευεν ἐς τὴν πεῖραν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκνεῖν. [5]καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι, τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ Ἑρμοκράτους καὶ εἴ του ἄλλου πειθόντων, ὥρμηντό τε ἐς τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρουν:

22. ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἐπειδὴ παρεσκευάσατο τὸ ναυτικόν, ἀγαγὼν ὑπὸ νύκτα πᾶσαν τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν πεζὴν αὐτὸς μὲν τοῖς ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ τείχεσι κατὰ γῆν ἔμελλε προσβαλεῖν, αἱ δὲ τριήρεις τῶν Συρακοσίων ἅμα καὶ ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος πέντε μὲν καὶ τριάκοντα ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος ἐπέπλεον, αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος, οὗ ἦν καὶ τὸ νεώριον αὐτοῖς, [καὶ] περιέπλεον βουλόμενοι πρὸς τὰς ἐντὸς προσμεῖξαι καὶ ἅμα ἐπιπλεῖν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν θορυβῶνται. [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ τάχους ἀντιπληρώσαντες ἑξήκοντα ναῦς ταῖς μὲν πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι πρὸς τὰς πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα τῶν Συρακοσίων τὰς

ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ λιμένι ἐναυμάχουν, ταῖς δ᾽ ἐπιλοίποις ἀπήντων ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νεωρίου περιπλεούσας. καὶ εὐθὺς πρὸ τοῦ στόματος τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος ἐναυμάχουν, καὶ ἀντεῖχον ἀλλήλοις ἐπὶ πολύ, οἱ μὲν βιάσασθαι βουλόμενοι τὸν ἔσπλουν, οἱ δὲ κωλύειν.

23. ἐν τούτῳ δ᾽ ὁ Γύλιππος τῶν ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν ἐπικαταβάντων καὶ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τὴν γνώμην προσεχόντων φθάνει προσπεσὼν ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ αἰφνιδίως τοῖς τείχεσι, καὶ αἱρεῖ τὸ μέγιστον πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω δύο, οὐχ ὑπομεινάντων τῶν φυλάκων, ὡς εἶδον τὸ μέγιστον ῥᾳδίως ληφθέν. [2] καὶ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου ἁλόντος χαλεπῶς οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὅσοι καὶ ἐς τὰ πλοῖα καὶ ὁλκάδα τινὰ κατέφυγον, ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐξεκομίζοντο: τῶν γὰρ Συρακοσίων ταῖς ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ λιμένι ναυσὶ κρατούντων τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ ὑπὸ τριήρους μιᾶς καὶ εὖ πλεούσης ἐπεδιώκοντο: ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ δύο τειχίσματα ἡλίσκετο, ἐν τούτῳ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐτύγχανον ἤδη νικώμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτῶν φεύγοντες ῥᾷον παρέπλευσαν. [3] αἱ γὰρ τῶν Συρακοσίων αἱ πρὸ τοῦ στόματος νῆες ναυμαχοῦσαι βιασάμεναι τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἐσέπλεον, καὶ ταραχθεῖσαι περὶ ἀλλήλας παρέδοσαν τὴν νίκην τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις: ταύτας τε γὰρ ἔτρεψαν καὶ ὑφ᾽ ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ἐνικῶντο ἐν τῷ λιμένι. [4] καὶ ἕνδεκα μὲν ναῦς τῶν Συρακοσίων κατέδυσαν, καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπέκτειναν, πλὴν ὅσον ἐκ τριῶν νεῶν οὓς ἐζώγρησαν: τῶν δὲ σφετέρων τρεῖς νῆες διεφθάρησαν. τὰ δὲ ναυάγια ἀνελκύσαντες τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τροπαῖον ἐν τῷ νησιδίῳ στήσαντες τῷ πρὸ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον.

24. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὕτως ἐπεπράγεσαν, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ τείχη εἶχον, καὶ τροπαῖα ἔστησαν αὐτῶν τρία. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τοῖν δυοῖν τειχοῖν τοῖν ὕστερον ληφθέντοιν κατέβαλον, τὰ δὲ δύο ἐπισκευάσαντες ἐφρούρουν. [2] ἄνθρωποι δ᾽ ἐν τῶν τειχῶν τῇ ἁλώσει ἀπέθανον καὶ ἐζωγρήθησαν πολλοί, καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ τὰ ξύμπαντα ἑάλω: ὥσπερ γὰρ ταμιείῳ χρωμένων

τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς τείχεσι πολλὰ μὲν ἐμπόρων χρήματα καὶ σῖτος ἐνῆν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν τριηράρχων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἱστία τεσσαράκοντα τριήρων καὶ τἆλλα σκεύη ἐγκατελήφθη καὶ τριήρεις ἀνειλκυσμέναι τρεῖς. [3] μέγιστόν τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον ἐκάκωσε τὸ στράτευμα τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λῆψις: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οὐδ᾽ οἱ ἔσπλοι ἀσφαλεῖς ἦσαν τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ▯οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι ναυσὶν αὐτόθι ἐφορμοῦντες ἐκώλυον, καὶ διὰ μάχης ἤδη ἐγίγνοντο αἱ ἐσκομιδαί▯, ἔς τε τἆλλα κατάπληξιν παρέσχε καὶ ἀθυμίαν τῷ στρατεύματι.

25. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ναῦς τε ἐκπέμπουσι δώδεκα οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ Ἀγάθαρχον ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν Συρακόσιον ἄρχοντα. καὶ αὐτῶν μία μὲν ἐς Πελοπόννησον ᾤχετο, πρέσβεις ἄγουσα οἵπερ τά τε σφέτερα φράσουσιν ὅτι ἐν ἐλπίσιν εἰσὶ καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐποτρυνοῦσι γίγνεσθαι: αἱ δ᾽ ἕνδεκα νῆες πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἔπλευσαν, πυνθανόμεναι πλοῖα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γέμοντα χρημάτων προσπλεῖν. [2] καὶ τῶν τε πλοίων ἐπιτυχοῦσαι τὰ πολλὰ διέφθειραν καὶ ξύλα ναυπηγήσιμα ἐν τῇ Καυλωνιάτιδι κατέκαυσαν, ἃ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἑτοῖμα ἦν. [3] ἔς τε Λοκροὺς μετὰ ταῦτα ἦλθον, καὶ ὁρμουσῶν αὐτῶν κατέπλευσε μία τῶν ὁλκάδων τῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἄγουσα Θεσπιῶν ὁπλίτας: [4] καὶ ἀναλαβόντες αὐτοὺς οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς παρέπλεον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. φυλάξαντες δ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναυσὶ πρὸς τοῖς Μεγάροις μίαν μὲν ναῦν λαμβάνουσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι, τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας οὐκ ἐδυνήθησαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποφεύγουσιν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας. [5]ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν σταυρῶν ἀκροβολισμὸς ἐν τῷ λιμένι, οὓς οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸ τῶν παλαιῶν νεωσοίκων κατέπηξαν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὅπως αὐτοῖς αἱ νῆες ἐντὸς ὁρμοῖεν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιπλέοντες μὴ βλάπτοιεν ἐμβάλλοντες. [6] προσαγαγόντες γὰρ ναῦν μυριοφόρον αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, πύργους τε ξυλίνους ἔχουσαν καὶ παραφράγματα, ἔκ τε τῶν ἀκάτων ὤνευον ἀναδούμενοι τοὺς σταυροὺς καὶ ἀνέκλων καὶ κατακολυμβῶντες ἐξέπριον. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἀπὸ τῶν νεωσοίκων ἔβαλλον: οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς ὁλκάδος ἀντέβαλλον, καὶ

τέλος τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν σταυρῶν ἀνεῖλον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. [7] χαλεπωτάτη δ᾽ ἦν τῆς σταυρώσεως ἡ κρύφιος: ἦσαν γὰρ τῶν σταυρῶν οὓς οὐχ ὑπερέχοντας τῆς θαλάσσης κατέπηξαν, ὥστε δεινὸν ἦν προσπλεῦσαι, μὴ οὐ προϊδών τις ὥσπερ περὶ ἕρμα περιβάλῃ τὴν ναῦν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτους κολυμβηταὶ δυόμενοι ἐξέπριον μισθοῦ. ὅμως δ᾽ αὖθις οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐσταύρωσαν. [8] πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἷον εἰκὸς τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐγγὺς ὄντων καὶ ἀντιτεταγμένων ἐμηχανῶντο καὶ ἀκροβολισμοῖς καὶ πείραις παντοίαις ἐχρῶντο. [9]ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς πόλεις πρέσβεις οἱ Συρακόσιοι Κορινθίων καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀγγέλλοντας τήν τε τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λῆψιν καὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας πέρι ὡς οὐ τῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ σφετέρᾳ ταραχῇ ἡσσηθεῖεν, τά τε ἄλλα [αὖ] δηλώσοντας ὅτι ἐν ἐλπίσιν εἰσὶ καὶ ἀξιώσοντας ξυμβοηθεῖν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ, ὡς καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσδοκίμων ὄντων ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ καί, ἢν φθάσωσιν αὐτοὶ πρότερον διαφθείραντες τὸ παρὸν στράτευμα αὐτῶν, διαπεπολεμησόμενον. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ταῦτα ἔπρασσον.

26. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης, ἐπεὶ ξυνελέγη αὐτῷ τὸ στράτευμα ὃ ἔδει ἔχοντα ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν βοηθεῖν, ἄρας ἐκ τῆς Αἰγίνης καὶ πλεύσας πρὸς τὴν Πελοπόννησον τῷ τε Χαρικλεῖ καὶ ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμίσγει, καὶ παραλαβόντες τῶν Ἀργείων ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἔπλεον ἐς τὴν Λακωνικήν: [2] καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῆς Ἐπιδαύρου τι τῆς Λιμηρᾶς ἐδῄωσαν, ἔπειτα σχόντες ἐς τὰ καταντικρὺ Κυθήρων τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἔνθα τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνός ἐστι, τῆς τε γῆς ἔστιν ἃ ἐδῄωσαν καὶ ἐτείχισαν ἰσθμῷδές τι χωρίον, ἵνα δὴ οἵ τε Εἵλωτες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων αὐτόσε αὐτομολῶσι καὶ ἅμα λῃσταὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου, ἁρπαγὴν ποιῶνται. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ξυγκατέλαβε τὸ χωρίον παρέπλει ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας, ὅπως καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ξυμμάχων παραλαβὼν τὸν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν πλοῦν ὅτι τάχιστα ποιῆται: ὁ δὲ Χαρικλῆς περιμείνας ἕως τὸ χωρίον ἐξετείχισε καὶ καταλιπὼν φυλακὴν αὐτοῦ

ἀπεκομίζετο καὶ αὐτὸς ὕστερον ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου καὶ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἅμα.

27. ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Θρᾳκῶν τῶν μαχαιροφόρων τοῦ Διακοῦ γένους ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πελτασταὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τούτῳ τριακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι, οὓς ἔδει τῷ Δημοσθένει ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ξυμπλεῖν. [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ὕστεροι ἦκον, διενοοῦντο αὐτοὺς πάλιν ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐς Θρᾴκην ἀποπέμπειν. τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας πόλεμον αὐτοὺς πολυτελὲς ἐφαίνετο: δραχμὴν γὰρ τῆς ἡμέρας ἕκαστος ἐλάμβανεν. [3] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ Δεκέλεια τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ πάσης τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ τειχισθεῖσα, ὕστερον δὲ φρουραῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων κατὰ διαδοχὴν χρόνου ἐπιούσαις τῇ χώρᾳ ἐπῳκεῖτο, πολλὰ ἔβλαπτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον χρημάτων τ᾽ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπων φθορᾷ ἐκάκωσε τὰ πράγματα. [4] πρότερον μὲν γὰρ βραχεῖαι γιγνόμεναι αἱ ἐσβολαὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον τῆς γῆς ἀπολαύειν οὐκ ἐκώλυον: τότε δὲ ξυνεχῶς ἐπικαθημένων, καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν καὶ πλεόνων ἐπιόντων, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῆς ἴσης φρουρᾶς καταθεούσης τε τὴν χώραν καὶ λῃστείας ποιουμένης, βασιλέως τε παρόντος τοῦ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων Ἄγιδος, ὃς οὐκ ἐκ παρέργου τὸν πόλεμον ἐποιεῖτο, μεγάλα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβλάπτοντο. [5] τῆς τε γὰρ χώρας ἁπάσης ἐστέρηντο, καὶ ἀνδραπόδων πλέον ἢ δύο μυριάδες ηὐτομολήκεσαν, καὶ τούτων τὸ πολὺ μέρος χειροτέχναι, πρόβατά τε πάντα ἀπωλώλει καὶ ὑποζύγια: ἵπποι τε, ὁσημέραι ἐξελαυνόντων τῶν ἱππέων πρός τε τὴν Δεκέλειαν καταδρομὰς ποιουμένων καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φυλασσόντων, οἱ μὲν ἀπεχωλοῦντο ἐν γῇ ἀποκρότῳ τε καὶ ξυνεχῶς ταλαιπωροῦντες, οἱ δ᾽ ἐτιτρώσκοντο.

28. ἥ τε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων παρακομιδὴ ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας, πρότερον ἐκ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ κατὰ γῆν διὰ τῆς Δεκελείας θάσσων οὖσα, περὶ Σούνιον κατὰ θάλασσαν πολυτελὴς ἐγίγνετο: τῶν τε πάντων ὁμοίως ἐπακτῶν ἐδεῖτο ἡ πόλις, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ πόλις εἶναι φρούριον κατέστη. [2] πρὸς γὰρ τῇ ἐπάλξει τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν κατὰ διαδοχὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι φυλάσσοντες, τὴν δὲ νύκτα καὶ ξύμπαντες πλὴν τῶν ἱππέων,

οἱ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ὅπλοις † ποιούμενοι †, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους, καὶ θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος ἐταλαιπωροῦντο. [3] μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐπίεζεν ὅτι δύο πολέμους ἅμα εἶχον, καὶ ἐς φιλονικίαν καθέστασαν τοιαύτην ἢν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἠπίστησεν ἄν τις ἀκούσας. τὸ γὰρ αὐτοὺς πολιορκουμένους ἐπιτειχισμῷ ὑπὸ Πελοποννησίων μηδ᾽ ὡς ἀποστῆναι ἐκ Σικελίας, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖ Συρακούσας τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀντιπολιορκεῖν, πόλιν οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω αὐτήν γε καθ᾽ αὐτὴν τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τὸν παράλογον τοσοῦτον ποιῆσαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τόλμης, ὅσον κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τριῶν γε ἐτῶν οὐδεὶς πλείω χρόνον ἐνόμιζον περιοίσειν αὐτούς, εἰ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐσβάλοιεν ἐς τὴν χώραν, ὥστε ἔτει ἑπτακαιδεκάτῳ μετὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐσβολὴν ἦλθον ἐς Σικελίαν ἤδη τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ πάντα τετρυχωμένοι, καὶ πόλεμον οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω προσανείλοντο τοῦ πρότερον ὑπάρχοντος ἐκ Πελοποννήσου. [4] δι᾽ ἃ καὶ τότε ὑπό τε τῆς Δεκελείας πολλὰ βλαπτούσης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναλωμάτων μεγάλων προσπιπτόντων ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο τοῖς χρήμασιν. καὶ τὴν εἰκοστὴν ὑπὸ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀντὶ τοῦ φόρου τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἐποίησαν, πλείω νομίζοντες ἂν σφίσι χρήματα οὕτω προσιέναι. αἱ μὲν γὰρ δαπάναι οὐχ ὁμοίως καὶ πρίν, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μείζους καθέστασαν, ὅσῳ καὶ μείζων ὁ πόλεμος ἦν: αἱ δὲ πρόσοδοι ἀπώλλυντο.

29. τοὺς οὖν Θρᾷκας τοὺς τῷ Δημοσθένει ὑστερήσαντας διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀπορίαν τῶν χρημάτων οὐ βουλόμενοι δαπανᾶν εὐθὺς ἀπέπεμπον, προστάξαντες κομίσαι αὐτοὺς Διειτρέφει, καὶ εἰπόντες ἅμα ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ ⟨ἐπορεύοντο γὰρ δι᾽ Εὐρίπου⟩ καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἤν τι δύνηται, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν βλάψαι. [2] ὁ δὲ ἔς τε τὴν Τάναγραν ἀπεβίβασεν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἁρπαγήν τινα ἐποιήσατο διὰ τάχους καὶ ἐκ Χαλκίδος τῆς Εὐβοίας ἀφ᾽ ἑσπέρας διέπλευσε τὸν Εὔριπον καὶ ἀποβιβάσας ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἦγεν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Μυκαλησσόν. [3] καὶ τὴν μὲν νύκτα λαθὼν πρὸς τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ ηὐλίσατο ⟨ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς Μυκαλησσοῦ ἑκκαίδεκα μάλιστα σταδίους⟩, ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ πόλει προσέκειτο οὔσῃ οὐ

μεγάλῃ, καὶ αἱρεῖ ἀφυλάκτοις τε ἐπιπεσὼν καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτοις μὴ ἄν ποτέ τινας σφίσιν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης τοσοῦτον ἐπαναβάντας ἐπιθέσθαι, τοῦ τείχους ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος καὶ ἔστιν ᾗ καὶ πεπτωκότος, τοῦ δὲ βραχέος ᾠκοδομημένου, καὶ πυλῶν ἅμα διὰ τὴν ἄδειαν ἀνεῳγμένων. [4] ἐσπεσόντες δὲ οἱ Θρᾷκες ἐς τὴν Μυκαλησσὸν τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ἐπόρθουν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐφόνευον φειδόμενοι οὔτε πρεσβυτέρας οὔτε νεωτέρας ἡλικίας, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐξῆς, ὅτῳ ἐντύχοιεν, καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας κτείνοντες, καὶ προσέτι καὶ ὑποζύγια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔμψυχα ἴδοιεν: τὸ γὰρ γένος τὸ τῶν Θρᾳκῶν ὁμοῖα τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ βαρβαρικοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἂν θαρσήσῃ, φονικώτατόν ἐστιν. [5] καὶ τότε ἄλλη τε ταραχὴ οὐκ ὀλίγη καὶ ἰδέα πᾶσα καθειστήκει ὀλέθρου, καὶ ἐπιπεσόντες διδασκαλείῳ παίδων, ὅπερ μέγιστον ἦν αὐτόθι καὶ ἄρτι ἔτυχον οἱ παῖδες ἐσεληλυθότες, κατέκοψαν πάντας: καὶ ξυμφορὰ τῇ πόλει πάσῃ οὐδεμιᾶς ἥσσων μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἀδόκητός τε ἐπέπεσεν αὕτη καὶ δεινή.

30. οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐβοήθουν, καὶ καταλαβόντες προκεχωρηκότας ἤδη τοὺς Θρᾷκας οὐ πολὺ τήν τε λείαν ἀφείλοντο καὶ αὐτοὺς φοβήσαντες καταδιώκουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν Εὔριπον καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, οὗ αὐτοῖς τὰ πλοῖα ἃ ἤγαγεν ὥρμει. [2] καὶ ἀποκτείνουσιν αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ ἐσβάσει τοὺς πλείστους οὔτε ἐπισταμένους νεῖν τῶν τε ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις, ὡς ἑώρων τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ, ὁρμισάντων ἔξω τοξεύματος τὰ πλοῖα, ἐπεὶ ἕν γε τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀναχωρήσει οὐκ ἀτόπως οἱ Θρᾷκες πρὸς τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων ἱππικόν, ὅπερ πρῶτον προσέκειτο, προεκθέοντές τε καὶ ξυστρεφόμενοι ἐν ἐπιχωρίῳ τάξει τὴν φυλακὴν ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ἐν τούτῳ διεφθάρησαν. μέρος δέ τι καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει αὐτῇ δι᾽ ἁρπαγὴν ἐγκαταληφθὲν ἀπώλετο. οἱ δὲ ξύμπαντες τῶν Θρᾳκῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι ἀπὸ τριακοσίων καὶ χιλίων ἀπέθανον. [3] διέφθειραν δὲ καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἳ ξυνεβοήθησαν ἐς εἴκοσι μάλιστα ἱππέας τε καὶ ὁπλίτας ὁμοῦ καὶ Θηβαίων τῶν βοιωταρχῶν Σκιρφώνδαν: τῶν δὲ Μυκαλησσίων μέρος τι ἀπανηλώθη. τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν

Μυκαλησσὸν πάθει χρησαμένην οὐδενὸς ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἧσσον ὀλοφύρασθαι ἀξίῳ τοιαῦτα ξυνέβη.

31. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης τότε ἀποπλέων ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Λακωνικῆς τείχισιν, ὁλκάδα ὁρμοῦσαν ἐν Φειᾷ τῇ Ἠλείων εὑρών, ἐν ᾗ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὁπλῖται ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἔμελλον περαιοῦσθαι, αὐτὴν μὲν διαφθείρει, οἱ δ᾽ ἄνδρες ἀποφυγόντες ὕστερον λαβόντες ἄλλην ἔπλεον. [2] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀφικόμενος ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Ζάκυνθον καὶ Κεφαλληνίαν ὁπλίτας τε παρέλαβε καὶ ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου τῶν Μεσσηνίων μετεπέμψατο καὶ ἐς τὴν ἀντιπέρας ἤπειρον τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας διέβη, ἐς Ἀλύζιάν τε καὶ Ἀνακτόριον, ὃ αὐτοὶ εἶχον. [3] ὄντι δ᾽ αὐτῷ περὶ ταῦτα ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ἁπαντᾷ ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας ἀποπλέων, ὃς τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος τὰ χρήματα ἄγων τῇ στρατιᾷ ἀπεπέμφθη, καὶ ἀγγέλλει τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι πύθοιτο κατὰ πλοῦν ἤδη ὢν τὸ Πλημμύριον ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἑαλωκός. [4] ἀφικνεῖται δὲ καὶ Κόνων παρ᾽ αὐτούς, ὃς ἦρχε Ναυπάκτου, ἀγγέλλων ὅτι αἱ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Κορινθίων αἱ σφίσιν ἀνθορμοῦσαι οὔτε καταλύουσι τὸν πόλεμον ναυμαχεῖν τε μέλλουσιν: πέμπειν οὖν ἐκέλευεν αὐτοὺς ναῦς, ὡς οὐχ ἱκανὰς οὔσας δυοῖν δεούσας εἴκοσι τὰς ἑαυτῶν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ναυμαχεῖν. [5] τῷ μὲν οὖν Κόνωνι δέκα ναῦς ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων τὰς ἄριστα σφίσι πλεούσας ἀφ᾽ ὧν αὐτοὶ εἶχον ξυμπέμπουσι πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ: αὐτοὶ δὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τὸν ξύλλογον ἡτοιμάζοντο, Εὐρυμέδων μὲν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πλεύσας καὶ πέντε καὶ δέκα τε ναῦς πληροῦν κελεύσας αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁπλίτας καταλεγόμενος ξυνῆρχε γὰρ ἤδη Δημοσθένει ἀποτραπόμενος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡρέθη, Δημοσθένης δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἀκαρνανίαν χωρίων σφενδονήτας τε καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς ξυναγείρων.

32. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν τότε μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Πλημμυρίου ἅλωσιν πρέσβεις οἰχόμενοι ἐς τὰς πόλεις ἐπειδὴ ἔπεισάν τε καὶ ξυναγείραντες ἔμελλον ἄξειν τὸν στρατόν, ὁ Νικίας προπυθόμενος πέμπει ἐς τῶν Σικελῶν τοὺς τὴν δίοδον ἔχοντας καὶ σφίσι ξυμμάχους, Κεντόριπάς

τε καὶ Ἀλικυαίους καὶ ἄλλους, ὅπως μὴ διαφρήσωσι τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀλλὰ ξυστραφέντες κωλύσωσι διελθεῖν: ἄλλῃ γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ πειράσειν: Ἀκραγαντῖνοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐδίδοσαν διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ὁδόν. [2] πορευομένων δ᾽ ἤδη τῶν Σικελιωτῶν οἱ Σικελοί, καθάπερ ἐδέοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐνέδραν τινὰ τριχῇ ποιησάμενοι, ἀφυλάκτοις τε καὶ ἐξαίφνης ἐπιγενόμενοι διέφθειραν ἐς ὀκτακοσίους μάλιστα καὶ τοὺς πρέσβεις πλὴν ἑνὸς τοῦ Κορινθίου πάντας: οὗτος δὲ τοὺς διαφυγόντας ἐς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους ἐκόμισεν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας.

33. καὶ περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας καὶ οἱ Καμαριναῖοι ἀφικνοῦνται αὐτοῖς βοηθοῦντες, πεντακόσιοι μὲν ὁπλῖται, τριακόσιοι δὲ ἀκοντισταὶ καὶ τοξόται τριακόσιοι. ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Γελῷοι ναυτικόν τε ἐς πέντε ναῦς καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς τετρακοσίους καὶ ἱππέας διακοσίους. [2] σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἤδη πᾶσα ἡ Σικελία πλὴν Ἀκραγαντίνων —οὗτοι δ᾽ οὐδὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων ἦσαν—, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων οἱ πρότερον περιορώμενοι ξυστάντες ἐβοήθουν. [3]καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς τὸ ἐν τοῖς Σικελοῖς πάθος ἐγένετο, ἐπέσχον τὸ εὐθέως τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν: ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων, ἑτοίμης ἤδη τῆς στρατιᾶς οὔσης ἔκ τε τῆς Κερκύρας καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἠπείρου, ἐπεραιώθησαν ξυμπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ τὸν Ἰόνιον ἐπ᾽ ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν: [4] καὶ ὁρμηθέντες αὐτόθεν κατίσχουσιν ἐς τὰς Χοιράδας νήσους Ἰαπυγίας, καὶ ἀκοντιστάς τέ τινας τῶν Ἰαπύγων πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν τοῦ Μεσσαπίου ἔθνους ἀναβιβάζονται ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τῷ Ἄρτᾳ, ὅσπερ καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς δυνάστης ὢν παρέσχετο αὐτοῖς, ἀνανεωσάμενοί τινα παλαιὰν φιλίαν ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Μεταπόντιον τῆς Ἰταλίας. [5] καὶ τοὺς Μεταποντίους πείσαντες κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν ἀκοντιστάς τε ξυμπέμπειν τριακοσίους καὶ τριήρεις δύο καὶ ἀναλαβόντες ταῦτα παρέπλευσαν ἐς Θουρίαν. καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι νεωστὶ στάσει τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐναντίους ἐκπεπτωκότας: [6] καὶ βουλόμενοι τὴν στρατιὰν αὐτόθι πᾶσαν ἀθροίσαντες εἴ τις ὑπελέλειπτο ἐξετάσαι, καὶ τοὺς Θουρίους πεῖσαι σφίσι ξυστρατεύειν τε

ὡς προθυμότατα καί, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τούτῳ τύχης εἰσί, τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις νομίζειν, περιέμενον ἐν τῇ Θουρίᾳ καὶ ἔπρασσον ταῦτα.

34. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον οἱ ἐν ταῖς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσίν, οἵπερ τῶν ὁλκάδων ἕνεκα τῆς ἐς Σικελίαν κομιδῆς ἀνθώρμουν πρὸς τὰς ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ ναῦς, παρασκευασάμενοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίᾳ καὶ προσπληρώσαντες ἔτι ναῦς ὥστε ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους εἶναι αὐτοῖς τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν, ὁρμίζονται κατὰ Ἐρινεὸν τῆς Ἀχαΐας ἐν τῇ Ῥυπικῇ. [2] καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῦ χωρίου μηνοειδοῦς ὄντος ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ὥρμουν, ὁ μὲν πεζὸς ἑκατέρωθεν προσβεβοηθηκὼς τῶν τε Κορινθίων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ ταῖς προανεχούσαις ἄκραις παρετέτακτο, αἱ δὲ νῆες τὸ μεταξὺ εἶχον ἐμφάρξασαι: ἦρχε δὲ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ Πολυάνθης Κορίνθιος. [3] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου τριάκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ τρισίν ▯ ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Δίφιλος ▯ ἐπέπλευσαν αὐτοῖς. [4] καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡσύχαζον, ἔπειτα ἀρθέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ σημείου, ἐπεὶ καιρὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐναυμάχουν. καὶ χρόνον ἀντεῖχον πολὺν ἀλλήλοις. [5] καὶ τῶν μὲν Κορινθίων τρεῖς νῆες διαφθείρονται, τῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων κατέδυ μὲν οὐδεμία ἁπλῶς, ἑπτὰ δέ τινες ἄπλοι ἐγένοντο ἀντίπρῳροι ἐμβαλλόμεναι καὶ ἀναρραγεῖσαι τὰς παρεξειρεσίας ὑπὸ τῶν Κορινθίων νεῶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παχυτέρας τὰς ἐπωτίδας ἐχουσῶν. [6] ναυμαχήσαντες δὲ ἀντίπαλα μὲν καὶ ὡς αὐτοὺς ἑκατέρους ἀξιοῦν νικᾶν, ὅμως δὲ τῶν ναυαγίων κρατησάντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων διά τε τὴν τοῦ ἀνέμου ἄπωσιν αὐτῶν ἐς τὸ πέλαγος καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων οὐκέτι ἐπαναγωγήν, διεκρίθησαν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, καὶ δίωξις οὐδεμία ἐγένετο, οὐδ᾽ ἄνδρες οὐδετέρων ἑάλωσαν: οἱ μὲν γὰρ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι πρὸς τῇ γῇ ναυμαχοῦντες ῥᾳδίως διεσῴζοντο, τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων οὐδεμία κατέδυ ναῦς. [7] ἀποπλευσάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον οἱ Κορίνθιοι εὐθὺς τροπαῖον ἔστησαν ὡς νικῶντες, ὅτι πλείους τῶν ἐναντίων ναῦς ἄπλους ἐποίησαν καὶ νομίσαντες αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἡσσᾶσθαι δι᾽ ὅπερ οὐδ᾽ οἱ ἕτεροι

νικᾶν: οἵ τε γὰρ Κορίνθιοι ἡγήσαντο κρατεῖν εἰ μὴ καὶ πολὺ ἐκρατοῦντο, οἵ τ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνόμιζον ἡσσᾶσθαι ὅτι οὐ πολὺ ἐνίκων. [8] ἀποπλευσάντων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ διαλυθέντος οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔστησαν τροπαῖον καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀχαΐᾳ ὡς νικήσαντες,ἀπέχον τοῦ Ἐρινεοῦ, ἐν ᾧ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὥρμουν, ὡς εἴκοσι σταδίους. καὶ ἡ μὲν ναυμαχία οὕτως ἐτελεύτα.

35. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων, ἐπειδὴ ξυστρατεύειν αὐτοῖς οἱ Θούριοι παρεσκευάσθησαν ἑπτακοσίοις μὲν ὁπλίταις, τριακοσίοις δὲ ἀκοντισταῖς, τὰς μὲν ναῦς παραπλεῖν ἐκέλευον ἐπὶ τῆς Κροτωνιάτιδος, αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸν πεζὸν πάντα ἐξετάσαντες πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῷ Συβάρει ποταμῷ ἦγον διὰ τῆς Θουριάδος γῆς. [2] καὶ ὡς ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῷ Ὑλίᾳ ποταμῷ καὶ αὐτοῖς οἱ Κροτωνιᾶται προσπέμψαντες εἶπον οὐκ ἂν σφίσι βουλομένοις εἶναι διὰ τῆς γῆς σφῶν τὸν στρατὸν ἰέναι, ἐπικαταβάντες ηὐλίσαντο πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ Ὑλίου: καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτοῖς ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπήντων. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀναβιβασάμενοι παρέπλεον, ἴσχοντες πρὸς ταῖς πόλεσι πλὴν Λοκρῶν, ἕως ἀφίκοντο ἐπὶ Πέτραν τῆς Ῥηγίνης.

36. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτῳ πυνθανόμενοι αὐτῶν τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὖθις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀποπειρᾶσαι ἐβούλοντο καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ τοῦ πεζοῦ, ἥνπερ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πρὶν ἐλθεῖν αὐτοὺς φθάσαι βουλόμενοι ξυνέλεγον. [2] παρεσκευάσαντο δὲ τό τε ἄλλο ναυτικὸν ὡς ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ναυμαχίας τι πλέον ἐνεῖδον σχήσοντες, καὶ τὰς πρῴρας τῶν νεῶν ξυντεμόντες ἐς ἔλασσον στεριφωτέρας ἐποίησαν, καὶ τὰς ἐπωτίδας ἐπέθεσαν ταῖς πρῴραις παχείας, καὶ ἀντηρίδας ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὑπέτειναν πρὸς τοὺς τοίχους ὡς ἐπὶ ἓξ πήχεις ἐντός τε καὶ ἔξωθεν: ᾧπερ τρόπῳ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ ναῦς ἐπισκευασάμενοι πρῴραθεν ἐναυμάχουν. [3] ἐνόμισαν γὰρ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀντινεναυπηγημένας, ἀλλὰ λεπτὰ τὰ πρῴραθεν ἐχούσας διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιπρῴροις μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐκ περίπλου ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρῆσθαι, οὐκ ἔλασσον σχήσειν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ

μεγάλῳ λιμένι ναυμαχίαν, οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ πολλαῖς ναυσὶν οὖσαν, πρὸς ἑαυτῶν ἔσεσθαι: ἀντιπρῴροις γὰρ ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρώμενοι ἀναρρήξειν τὰ πρῴραθεν αὐτοῖς, στερίφοις καὶ παχέσι πρὸς κοῖλα καὶ ἀσθενῆ παίοντες τοῖς ἐμβόλοις. [4] τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἔσεσθαι σφῶν ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ οὔτε περίπλουν οὔτε διέκπλουν, ᾧπερ τῆς τέχνης μάλιστα ἐπίστευον: αὐτοὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τὸ μὲν οὐ δώσειν διεκπλεῖν, τὸ δὲ τὴν στενοχωρίαν κωλύσειν ὥστε μὴ περιπλεῖν. [5] τῇ τε πρότερον ἀμαθίᾳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν δοκούσῃ εἶναι, τὸ ἀντίπρῳρον ξυγκροῦσαι, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὶ χρήσασθαι: πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σχήσειν: τὴν γὰρ ἀνάκρουσιν οὐκ ἔσεσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐξωθουμένοις ἄλλοσε ἢ ἐς τὴν γῆν, καὶ ταύτην δι᾽ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐς ὀλίγον, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ ἑαυτῶν: τοῦ δ᾽ ἄλλου λιμένος αὐτοὶ κρατήσειν, καὶ ξυμφερομένους αὐτούς, ἢν πῃ βιάζωνται, [6] ἐς ὀλίγον τε καὶ πάντας ἐς τὸ αὐτό, προσπίπτοντας ἀλλήλοις ταράξεσθαι ὅπερ καὶ ἔβλαπτε μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ναυμαχίαις, οὐκ οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἐς πάντα τὸν λιμένα τῆς ἀνακρούσεως, ὥσπερ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις : περιπλεῦσαι δὲ ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, σφῶν ἐχόντων τὴν ἐπίπλευσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πελάγους τε καὶ ἀνάκρουσιν, οὐ δυνήσεσθαι αὐτούς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου πολεμίου τε αὐτοῖς ἐσομένου καὶ τοῦ στόματος οὐ μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ λιμένος.

37. τοιαῦτα οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δύναμιν ἐπινοήσαντες καὶ ἅμα τεθαρσηκότες μᾶλλον ἤδη ἀπὸ τῆς προτέρας ναυμαχίας, ἐπεχείρουν τῷ τε πεζῷ ἅμα καὶ ταῖς ναυσίν. [2] καὶ τὸν μὲν πεζὸν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον τὸν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Γύλιππος προεξαγαγὼν προσῆγε τῷ τείχει τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καθ᾽ ὅσον πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῦ ἐώρα: καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου, οἵ τε ὁπλῖται ὅσοι ἐκεῖ ἦσαν καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς καὶ ἡ γυμνητεία τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα προσῄει τῷ τείχει: αἱ δὲ νῆες μετὰ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ἐπεξέπλεον τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων. [3] καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοὺς οἰόμενοι τῷ πεζῷ μόνῳ πειράσειν, ὁρῶντες δὲ καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπιφερομένας ἄφνω, ἐθορυβοῦντο,

καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη καὶ πρὸ τῶν τειχῶν τοῖς προσιοῦσιν ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου καὶ τῶν ἔξω κατὰ τάχος χωροῦντας ἱππέας τε πολλοὺς καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς ἀντεπεξῆσαν, ἄλλοι δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἅμα ἐπὶ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν παρεβοήθουν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πλήρεις ἦσαν, ἀντανῆγον πέντε καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ναῦς: καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἦσαν ὀγδοήκοντα μάλιστα.

38. τῆς δὲ ἡμέρας ἐπὶ πολὺ προσπλέοντες καὶ ἀνακρουόμενοι καὶ πειράσαντες ἀλλήλων καὶ οὐδέτεροι δυνάμενοι ἄξιόν τι λόγου παραλαβεῖν, εἰ μὴ ναῦν μίαν ἢ δύο τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ Συρακόσιοι καταδύσαντες, διεκρίθησαν: καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν ἀπῆλθεν. [2]τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ἡσύχαζον, οὐδὲν δηλοῦντες ὁποῖόν τι τὸ μέλλον ποιήσουσιν: ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἰδὼν ἀντίπαλα τὰ τῆς ναυμαχίας γενόμενα καὶ ἐλπίζων αὐτοὺς αὖθις ἐπιχειρήσειν τούς τε τριηράρχους ἠνάγκαζεν ἐπισκευάζειν τὰς ναῦς, εἴ τίς τι ἐπεπονήκει, καὶ ὁλκάδας προώρμισε πρὸ τοῦ σφετέρου σταυρώματος, ὃ αὐτοῖς πρὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀντὶ λιμένος κλῃστοῦ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἐπεπήγει. [3] διαλειπούσας δὲ τὰς ὁλκάδας ὅσον δύο πλέθρα ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων κατέστησεν, ὅπως, εἴ τις βιάζοιτο ναῦς, εἴη κατάφευξις ἀσφαλὴς καὶ πάλιν καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν ἔκπλους. παρασκευαζόμενοι δὲ ταῦτα ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν διετέλεσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μέχρι νυκτός.

39. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Συρακόσιοι τῆς μὲν ὥρας πρωίτερον, τῇ δ᾽ ἐπιχειρήσει τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦ τε πεζοῦ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ προσέμισγον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, [2] καὶ ἀντικαταστάντες ταῖς ναυσὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον αὖθις ἐπὶ πολὺ διῆγον τῆς ἡμέρας πειρώμενοι ἀλλήλων, πρὶν δὴ Ἀρίστων ὁ Πυρρίχου Κορίνθιος, ἄριστος ὢν κυβερνήτης τῶν μετὰ Συρακοσίων, πείθει τοὺς σφετέρους τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἄρχοντας, πέμψαντας ὡς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιμελομένους, κελεύειν ὅτι τάχιστα τὴν ἀγορὰν τῶν πωλουμένων παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν μεταστῆσαι κομίσαντας, καὶ ὅσα τις ἔχει ἐδώδιμα, πάντας ἐκεῖσε φέροντας ἀναγκάσαι πωλεῖν, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ἐκβιβάσαντες τοὺς ναύτας εὐθὺς παρὰ τὰς ναῦς

ἀριστοποιήσωνται, καὶ δι᾽ ὀλίγου αὖθις καὶ αὐθημερὸν ἀπροσδοκήτοις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρῶσιν.

40. καὶ οἱ μὲν πεισθέντες ἔπεμψαν ἄγγελον, καὶ ἡ ἀγορὰ παρεσκευάσθη, καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐξαίφνης πρύμναν κρουσάμενοι πάλιν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔπλευσαν καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκβάντες αὐτοῦ ἄριστον ἐποιοῦντο: [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς ἡσσημένους σφῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀνακρούσασθαι, καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν ἐκβάντες τά τε ἄλλα διεπράσσοντο καὶ τὰ ἀμφὶ τὸ ἄριστον ὡς τῆς γε ἡμέρας ταύτης οὐκέτι οἰόμενοι ἂν ναυμαχῆσαι. [3] ἐξαίφνης δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πληρώσαντες τὰς ναῦς ἐπέπλεον αὖθις: οἱ δὲ διὰ πολλοῦ θορύβου καὶ ἄσιτοι οἱ πλείους οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἐσβάντες μόλις ποτὲ ἀντανήγοντο. [4] καὶ χρόνον μέν τινα ἀπέσχοντο ἀλλήλων φυλασσόμενοι: ἔπειτα οὐκ ἐδόκει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν διαμέλλοντας κόπῳ ἁλίσκεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιχειρεῖν ὅτι τάχιστα, καὶ ἐπιφερόμενοι ἐκ παρακελεύσεως ἐναυμάχουν. [5] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι δεξάμενοι καὶ ταῖς [τε] ναυσὶν ἀντιπρῴροις χρώμενοι, ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν, τῶν ἐμβόλων τῇ παρασκευῇ ἀνερρήγνυσαν τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς παρεξειρεσίας, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων αὐτοῖς ἀκοντίζοντες μεγάλα ἔβλαπτον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι μείζω οἱ ἐν τοῖς λεπτοῖς πλοίοις περιπλέοντες τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ἔς τε τοὺς ταρσοὺς ὑποπίπτοντες τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν καὶ ἐς τὰ πλάγια παραπλέοντες καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐς τοὺς ναύτας ἀκοντίζοντες.

41. τέλος δὲ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ κατὰ κράτος ναυμαχοῦντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐνίκησαν, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τραπόμενοι διὰ τῶν ὁλκάδων τὴν κατάφευξιν ἐποιοῦντο ἐς τὸν ἑαυτῶν ὅρμον. [2] αἱ δὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων νῆες μέχρι μὲν τῶν ὁλκάδων ἐπεδίωκον: ἔπειτα αὐτοὺς αἱ κεραῖαι ὑπὲρ τῶν ἔσπλων αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁλκάδων δελφινοφόροι ἡρμέναι ἐκώλυον. [3] δύο δὲ νῆες τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐπαιρόμεναι τῇ νίκῃ προσέμειξαν αὐτῶν ἐγγὺς καὶ διεφθάρησαν, καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἑάλω. [4] καταδύσαντες δ᾽ οἱ Συρακόσιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἑπτὰ ναῦς καὶ κατατραυματίσαντες πολλὰς ἄνδρας τε τοὺς μὲν

πολλοὺς ζωγρήσαντες, τοὺς δὲ ἀποκτείναντες ἀπεχώρησαν, καὶ τροπαῖά τε ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ναυμαχιῶν ἔστησαν, καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα ἤδη ἐχυρὰν εἶχον ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ πολὺ κρείσσους εἶναι, ἐδόκουν δὲ καὶ τὸν πεζὸν χειρώσεσθαι.

42. καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα παρεσκευάζοντο αὖθις, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων ἔχοντες τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν βοήθειαν παραγίγνονται, ναῦς τε τρεῖς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα μάλιστα ξὺν ταῖς ξενικαῖς καὶ ὁπλίτας περὶ πεντακισχιλίους ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ἀκοντιστάς τε βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας οὐκ ὀλίγους, καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τοξότας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἱκανήν. [2] καὶ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις κατάπληξις ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα οὐκ ὀλίγη ἐγένετο, εἰ πέρας μηδὲν ἔσται σφίσι τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ κινδύνου, ὁρῶντες οὔτε διὰ τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχιζομένην οὐδὲν ἧσσον στρατὸν ἴσον καὶ παραπλήσιον τῷ προτέρῳ ἐπεληλυθότα τήν τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν πανταχόσε πολλὴν φαινομένην: τῷ δὲ προτέρῳ στρατεύματι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὡς ἐκ κακῶν ῥώμη τις ἐγεγένητο. [3] ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἰδὼν ὡς εἶχε τὰ πράγματα καὶ νομίσας οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι διατρίβειν οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ ὁ Νικίας ἔπαθεν ἀφικόμενος γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὁ Νικίας φοβερός, ὡς οὐκ εὐθὺς προσέκειτο ταῖς Συρακούσαις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν Κατάνῃ διεχείμαζεν, ὑπερώφθη τε καὶ ἔφθασεν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στρατιᾷ ὁ Γύλιππος ἀφικόμενος, ἢν οὐδ᾽ ἂν μετέπεμψαν οἱ Συρακόσιοι, εἰ ἐκεῖνος εὐθὺς ἐπέκειτο: ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἅμα τ᾽ ἂν ἔμαθον ἥσσους ὄντες καὶ ἀποτετειχισμένοι ἂν ἦσαν, ὥστε μηδ᾽ εἰ μετέπεμψαν ἔτι ὁμοίως ἂν αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖν, ταῦτα οὖν ἀνασκοπῶν ὁ Δημοσθένης, καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μάλιστα δεινότατός ἐστι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐβούλετο ὅτι τάχος ἀποχρήσασθαι τῇ παρούσῃ τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐκπλήξει. [4] καὶ ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἁπλοῦν ὂν καί, εἰ κρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς

στρατοπέδου, ῥᾳδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθέν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομεῖναι ἂν σφᾶς οὐδένα, [5] ἠπείγετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ πείρᾳ, καί οἱ ξυντομωτάτην ἡγεῖτο διαπολέμησιν: ἢ γὰρ κατορθώσας ἕξειν Συρακούσας, ἢ ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ οὐ τρίψεσθαι ἄλλως Ἀθηναίους τε τοὺς ξυστρατευομένους καὶ τὴν ξύμπασαν πόλιν. [6]πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τήν τε γῆν ἐξελθόντες τῶν Συρακοσίων ἔτεμον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ τὸν Ἄναπον, καὶ τῷ στρατεύματι ἐπεκράτουν ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον, τῷ τε πεζῷ καὶ ταῖς ναυσίν· οὐδὲ γὰρ καθ᾽ ἕτερα οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἀντεπεξῆσαν ὅτι μὴ τοῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου:

43. ἔπειτα μηχαναῖς ἔδοξε τῷ Δημοσθένει πρότερον ἀποπειρᾶσαι τοῦ παρατειχίσματος. ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ προσαγαγόντι κατεκαύθησάν τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ἀμυνομένων αἱ μηχαναὶ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ πολλαχῇ προσβάλλοντες ἀπεκρούοντο, οὐκέτι ἐδόκει διατρίβειν, ἀλλὰ πείσας τόν τε Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνάρχοντας, ὡς ἐπενόει, τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἐποιεῖτο. [2] καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαθεῖν προσελθόντας τε καὶ ἀναβάντας, παραγγείλας δὲ πέντε ἡμερῶν σιτία καὶ τοὺς λιθολόγους καὶ τέκτονας πάντας λαβὼν καὶ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν τοξευμάτων τε καὶ ὅσα ἔδει, ἢν κρατῶσι, τειχίζοντας ἔχειν, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπὸ πρώτου ὕπνου καὶ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Μένανδρος ἀναλαβὼν τὴν πᾶσαν στρατιὰν ἐχώρει πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς, Νικίας δὲ ἐν τοῖς τείχεσιν ὑπελέλειπτο. [3] καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο πρὸς αὐταῖς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ᾗπερ καὶ ἡ προτέρα στρατιὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνέβη, λανθάνουσί τε τοὺς φύλακας τῶν Συρακοσίων, καὶ προσβάντες τὸ τείχισμα ὃ ἦν αὐτόθι τῶν Συρακοσίων αἱροῦσι καὶ ἄνδρας τῶν φυλάκων ἀποκτείνουσιν. [4] οἱ δὲ πλείους διαφυγόντες εὐθὺς πρὸς τὰ στρατόπεδα, ἃ ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τρία ἐν προτειχίσμασιν, ἓν μὲν τῶν Συρακοσίων, ἓν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Σικελιωτῶν, ἓν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ἀγγέλλουσι τὴν ἔφοδον καὶ τοῖς ἑξακοσίοις τῶν Συρακοσίων, οἳ καὶ πρῶτοι κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν φύλακες ἦσαν, ἔφραζον. [5] οἱ δ᾽ ἐβοήθουν τ᾽

εὐθύς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐντυχόντες ἀμυνομένους προθύμως ἔτρεψαν. καὶ αὐτοὶ μὲν εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν, ὅπως τῇ παρούσῃ ὁρμῇ τοῦ περαίνεσθαι ὧν ἕνεκα ἦλθον μὴ βραδεῖς γένωνται: ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων οὐχ ὑπομενόντων τῶν φυλάκων ᾖρουν τε καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπέσυρον. [6] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθουν ἐκ τῶν προτειχισμάτων, καὶ ἀδοκήτου τοῦ τολμήματος σφίσιν ἐν νυκτὶ γενομένου προσέβαλόν τε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐκπεπληγμένοι καὶ βιασθέντες ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τὸ πρῶτον ὑπεχώρησαν. [7] προϊόντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν ἀταξίᾳ μᾶλλον ἤδη ὡς κεκρατηκότων καὶ βουλομένων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ μήπω μεμαχημένου τῶν ἐναντίων ὡς τάχιστα διελθεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἀνέντων σφῶν τῆς ἐφόδου αὖθις ξυστραφῶσιν, οἱ Βοιωτοὶ πρῶτοι αὐτοῖς ἀντέσχον καὶ προσβαλόντες ἔτρεψάν τε καὶ ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν.

44. καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ ἐγίγνοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἣν οὐδὲ πυθέσθαι ῥᾴδιον ἦν οὐδ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρων ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἕκαστα ξυνηνέχθη. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρᾳ σαφέστερα μέν, ὅμως δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα οἱ παραγενόμενοι πάντα πλὴν τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος μόλις οἶδεν: ἐν δὲ νυκτομαχίᾳ, ἣ μόνη δὴ στρατοπέδων μεγάλων ἔν γε τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ ἐγένετο, πῶς ἄν τις σαφῶς τι ᾔδει; [2] ἦν μὲν γὰρ σελήνη λαμπρά, ἑώρων δὲ οὕτως ἀλλήλους ὡς ἐν σελήνῃ εἰκὸς τὴν μὲν ὄψιν τοῦ σώματος προορᾶν, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ οἰκείου ἀπιστεῖσθαι. ὁπλῖται δὲ ἀμφοτέρων οὐκ ὀλίγοι ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ ἀνεστρέφοντο. [3] καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ μὲν ἤδη ἐνικῶντο, οἱ δ᾽ ἔτι τῇ πρώτῃ ἐφόδῳ ἀήσσητοι ἐχώρουν. πολὺ δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου στρατεύματος αὐτοῖς τὸ μὲν ἄρτι ἀνεβεβήκει, τὸ δ᾽ ἔτι προσανῄει, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἠπίσταντο πρὸς ὅτι χρὴ χωρῆσαι. ἤδη γὰρ τὰ πρόσθεν τῆς τροπῆς γεγενημένης ἐτετάρακτο πάντα καὶ χαλεπὰ ἦν ὑπὸ τῆς βοῆς διαγνῶναι. [4] οἵ τε γὰρ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὡς κρατοῦντες παρεκελεύοντό τε κραυγῇ οὐκ ὀλίγῃ χρώμενοι, ἀδύνατον ὂν ἐν νυκτὶ ἄλλῳ τῳ σημῆναι, καὶ ἅμα τοὺς

προσφερομένους ἐδέχοντο: οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἐζήτουν τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίας, καὶ εἰ φίλιον εἴη τῶν ἤδη πάλιν φευγόντων, πολέμιον ἐνόμιζον, καὶ τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι τοῦ ξυνθήματος πυκνοῖς χρώμενοι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄλλῳ τῳ γνωρίσαι σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς θόρυβον πολὺν παρεῖχον ἅμα πάντες ἐρωτῶντες καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις σαφὲς αὐτὸ κατέστησαν: [5] τὸ δ᾽ ἐκείνων οὐχ ὁμοίως ἠπίσταντο διὰ τὸ κρατοῦντας αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ διεσπασμένους ἧσσον ἀγνοεῖσθαι, ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἐντύχοιέν τισι κρείσσους ὄντες τῶν πολεμίων, διέφευγον αὐτοὺς ἅτε ἐκείνων ἐπιστάμενοι τὸ ξύνθημα, εἰ δ᾽ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἀποκρίνοιντο, διεφθείροντο. [6] μέγιστον δὲ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἔβλαψε καὶ ὁ παιανισμός: ἀπὸ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων παραπλήσιος ὢν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχεν. οἵ τε γὰρ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι καὶ ὅσον Δωρικὸν μετ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἦν, ὁπότε παιανίσειαν, φόβον παρεῖχε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, οἵ τε πολέμιοι ὁμοίως. [7] ὥστε τέλος ξυμπεσόντες αὐτοῖς κατὰ πολλὰ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, ἐπεὶ ἅπαξ ἐταράχθησαν, φίλοι τε φίλοις καὶ πολῖται πολίταις, οὐ μόνον ἐς φόβον κατέστησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἀλλήλοις ἐλθόντες μόλις ἀπελύοντο. [8] καὶ διωκόμενοι κατά τε τῶν κρημνῶν [οἱ] πολλοὶ ῥίπτοντες ἑαυτοὺς ἀπώλλυντο, στενῆς οὔσης τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν πάλιν καταβάσεως, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς τὸ ὁμαλὸν οἱ σῳζόμενοι ἄνωθεν καταβαῖεν, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν τῶν προτέρων στρατιωτῶν ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον τῆς χώρας ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον διεφύγγανον, οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἥκοντες εἰσὶν οἳ διαμαρτόντες τῶν ὁδῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἐπλανήθησαν: οὕς,ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων περιελάσαντες διέφθειραν.

45. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι δύο τροπαῖα ἔστησαν, ἐπί τε ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς ᾗ ἡ πρόσβασις καὶ κατὰ τὸ χωρίον ᾗ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ πρῶτον ἀντέστησαν, οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἐκομίσαντο. [2] ἀπέθανον δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅπλα μέντοι ἔτι πλείω ἢ κατὰ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐλήφθη: οἱ γὰρ κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν βιασθέντες ἅλλεσθαι ψιλοὶ [ἄνευ τῶν ἀσπίδων] οἱ μὲν ἀπώλλυντο, οἱ δ᾽ ἐσώθησαν.

46. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ὡς ἐπὶ ἀπροσδοκήτῳ εὐπραγίᾳ πάλιν αὖ ἀναρρωσθέντες, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ἐς μὲν Ἀκράγαντα στασιάζοντα πέντε καὶ δέκα ναυσὶ Σικανὸν ἀπέστειλαν, ὅπως ὑπαγάγοιτο τὴν πόλιν, εἰ δύναιτο: Γύλιππος δὲ κατὰ γῆν ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν ᾤχετο αὖθις, ἄξων στρατιὰν ἔτι, ὡς ἐν ἐλπίδι ὢν καὶ τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἱρήσειν βίᾳ, ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐν ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς οὕτω ξυνέβη.

47. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐβουλεύοντο πρός τε τὴν γεγενημένην ξυμφορὰν καὶ πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ κατὰ πάντα ἀρρωστίαν. τοῖς τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρήμασιν ἐώρων οὐ κατορθοῦντες καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀχθομένους τῇ μονῇ: [2] νόσῳ τε γὰρ ἐπιέζοντο κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα, τῆς τε ὥρας τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ταύτης οὔσης ἐν ᾗ ἀσθενοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι μάλιστα, καὶ τὸ χωρίον ἅμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἑλῶδες καὶ χαλεπὸν ἦν, τά τε ἄλλα ὅτι ἀνέλπιστα αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνετο. [3] τῷ οὖν Δημοσθένει οὐκ ἐδόκει ἔτι χρῆναι μένειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅπερ καὶ διανοηθεὶς ἐς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς διεκινδύνευσεν, ἐπειδὴ ἔσφαλτο, ἀπιέναι ἐψηφίζετο καὶ μὴ διατρίβειν, ἕως ἔτι τὸ πέλαγος οἷόν τε περαιοῦσθαι καὶ τοῦ στρατεύματος ταῖς γοῦν ἐπελθούσαις ναυσὶ κρατεῖν. [4] καὶ τῇ πόλει ὠφελιμώτερον ἔφη εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ σφῶν ἐπιτειχίζοντας τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖσθαι ἢ Συρακοσίους, οὓς οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον εἶναι χειρώσασθαι: οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἄλλως χρήματα πολλὰ δαπανῶντας εἰκὸς εἶναι προσκαθῆσθαι.

48. καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης τοιαῦτα ἐγίγνωσκεν: ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἐνόμιζε μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς πονηρά σφῶν τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐδ᾽ ἐμφανῶς σφᾶς ψηφιζομένους μετὰ πολλῶν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλτους γίγνεσθαι: λαθεῖν γὰρ ἄν, ὁπότε βούλοιντο, τοῦτο ποιοῦντες πολλῷ ἧσσον. [2] τὸ δέ τι καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ᾐσθάνετο αὐτῶν, ἐλπίδος τι ἔτι παρεῖχε πονηρότερα τῶν σφετέρων ἔσεσθαι, ἢν καρτερῶσι προσκαθήμενοι: χρημάτων γὰρ ἀπορίᾳ αὐτοὺς ἐκτρυχώσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον ἤδη ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ναυσὶ θαλασσοκρατούντων. καὶ ἦν γάρ τι

καὶ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰ πράγματα ἐνδοῦναι, ἐπεκηρυκεύετο ὡς αὐτὸν καὶ οὐκ εἴα ἀπανίστασθαι. [3] ἃ ἐπιστάμενος τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ ἔτι ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἔχων καὶ διασκοπῶν ἀνεῖχε, τῷ δ᾽ ἐμφανεῖ τότε λόγῳ οὐκ ἔφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν. εὖ γὰρ εἰδέναι ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι σφῶν ταῦτα οὐκ ἀποδέξονται, ὥστε μὴ αὐτῶν ψηφισαμένων ἀπελθεῖν. καὶ γὰρ οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ψηφιεῖσθαί τε περὶ σφῶν [αὐτῶν] καὶ τὰ πράγματα ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁρῶντας καὶ οὐκ ἄλλων ἐπιτιμήσει ἀκούσαντας γνώσεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις εὖ λέγων διαβάλλοι, ἐκ τούτων αὐτοὺς πείσεσθαι. [4] τῶν τε παρόντων στρατιωτῶν πολλοὺς καὶ τοὺς πλείους ἔφη, οἳ νῦν βοῶσιν ὡς ἐν δεινοῖς ὄντες, ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένους τἀναντία βοήσεσθαι ὡς ὑπὸ χρημάτων καταπροδόντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀπῆλθον. οὔκουν βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε ἐπιστάμενος τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις ἐπ᾽ αἰσχρᾷ τε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκως ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν ἰδίᾳ. [5] τά τε Συρακοσίων ἔφη ὅμως ἔτι ἥσσω τῶν σφετέρων εἶναι: καὶ χρήμασι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ξενοτροφοῦντας καὶ ἐν περιπολίοις ἅμα ἀναλίσκοντας καὶ ναυτικὸν πολὺ ἔτι ἐνιαυτὸν ἤδη βόσκοντας τὰ μὲν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ δ᾽ ἔτι ἀμηχανήσειν: δισχίλιά τε γὰρ τάλαντα ἤδη ἀνηλωκέναι καὶ ἔτι πολλὰ προσοφείλειν, ἥν τε καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἐκλίπωσι τῆς νῦν παρασκευῆς τῷ μὴ διδόναι τροφήν, φθερεῖσθαι αὐτῶν τὰ πράγματα, ἐπικουρικὰ μᾶλλον ἢ δι᾽ ἀνάγκης ὥσπερ τὰ σφέτερα ὄντα. [6] τρίβειν οὖν ἔφη χρῆναι προσκαθημένους καὶ μὴ χρήμασιν, ὧν πολὺ κρείσσους εἰσί, νικηθέντας ἀπιέναι.

49. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα λέγων ἰσχυρίζετο, αἰσθόμενος τὰ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ἀκριβῶς καὶ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἀπορίαν καὶ ὅτι ἦν αὐτόθι πολὺ τὸ βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γίγνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα καὶ ἐπικηρυκευόμενον πρὸς αὐτὸν ὥστε μὴ ἀπανίστασθαι, καὶ ἅμα ταῖς γοῦν ναυσὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ἐθάρσησε κρατήσειν. [2] ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης περὶ μὲν τοῦ προσκαθῆσθαι οὐδ᾽ ὁπωσοῦν ἐνεδέχετο: εἰ δὲ δεῖ μὴ ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιὰν ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων ψηφίσματος,

ἀλλὰ τρίβειν αὐτοῦ, ἔφη χρῆναι ἢ ἐς τὴν Θάψον ἀναστάντας τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἐς τὴν Κατάνην, ὅθεν τῷ τε πεζῷ ἐπὶ πολλὰ τῆς χώρας ἐπιόντες θρέψονται πορθοῦντες τὰ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ ἐκείνους βλάψουσι, ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐν πελάγει καὶ οὐκ ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ, ἢ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων μᾶλλόν ἐστι, τοὺς ἀγῶνας ποιήσονται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ, ἐν ᾗ τά τε τῆς ἐμπειρίας χρήσιμα σφῶν ἔσται καὶ ἀναχωρήσεις καὶ ἐπίπλους οὐκ ἐκ βραχέος καὶ περιγραπτοῦ ὁρμώμενοί τε καὶ καταίροντες ἔξουσιν. [3] τό τε ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ οἱ ἔφη ἀρέσκειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτι μένειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τάχιστα ἤδη ἐξανίστασθαι καὶ μὴ μέλλειν. καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων αὐτῷ ταῦτα ξυνηγόρευεν. [4] ἀντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου ὄκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο καὶ ἅμα ὑπόνοια μή τι καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ Νικίας ἰσχυρίζηται. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ διεμέλλησάν τε καὶ κατὰ χώραν ἔμενον.

50. ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος καὶ ὁ Σικανὸς ἐν τούτῳ παρῆσαν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ὁ μὲν Σικανὸς ἁμαρτὼν τοῦ Ἀκράγαντος ἐν Γέλᾳ γὰρ ὄντος αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἡ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις στάσις [ἐς] φιλία ἐξεπεπτώκει : ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἄλλην τε στρατιὰν πολλὴν ἔχων ἦλθεν ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου τοῦ ἦρος ἐν ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ὁπλίτας ἀποσταλέντας, ἀφικομένους ἀπὸ τῆς Λιβύης ἐς Σελινοῦντα. [2] ἀπενεχθέντες γὰρ ἐς Λιβύην, καὶ δόντων Κυρηναίων τριήρεις δύο καὶ τοῦ πλοῦ ἡγεμόνας, καὶ ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ Εὐεσπερίταις πολιορκουμένοις ὑπὸ Λιβύων ξυμμαχήσαντες καὶ νικήσαντες τοὺς Λίβυς, καὶ αὐτόθεν παραπλεύσαντες ἐς Νέαν πόλιν Καρχηδονιακὸν ἐμπόριον, ὅθενπερ Σικελία ἐλάχιστον δυοῖν ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτὸς πλοῦν ἀπέχει, καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ περαιωθέντες ἀφίκοντο ἐς Σελινοῦντα. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι εὐθὺς αὐτῶν ἐλθόντων παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα αὖθις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ: οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ὁρῶντες στρατιάν τε ἄλλην προσγεγενημένην αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἅμα οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον χωροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν τοῖς πᾶσι χαλεπώτερον ἴσχοντα, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ τῶν

ἀνθρώπων πιεζόμενα, μετεμέλοντό τε πρότερον οὐκ ἀναστάντες καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας ἔτι ὁμοίως ἐνηντιοῦτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μὴ φανερῶς γε ἀξιῶν ψηφίζεσθαι, προεῖπον ὡς ἐδύναντο ἀδηλότατα ἔκπλουν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πᾶσι, καὶ παρασκευάσασθαι ὅταν τις σημήνῃ. [4] καὶ μελλόντων αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ἀποπλεῖν ἡ σελήνη ἐκλείπει: ἐτύγχανε γὰρ πασσέληνος οὖσα. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἵ τε πλείους ἐπισχεῖν ἐκέλευον τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐνθύμιον ποιούμενοι, καὶ ὁ Νικίας ― ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκείμενος ― οὐδ᾽ ἂν διαβουλεύσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη πρίν, ὡς οἱ μάντεις ἐξηγοῦντο, τρὶς ἐννέα ἡμέρας μεῖναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινηθείη. καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις μελλήσασι διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μονὴ ἐγεγένητο.

51. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῦτο πυθόμενοι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπηρμένοι ἦσαν μὴ ἀνιέναι τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς καὶ αὐτῶν κατεγνωκότων ἤδη μηκέτι κρεισσόνων εἶναι σφῶν μήτε ταῖς ναυσὶ μήτε τῷ πεζῷ ― οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπιβουλεῦσαι ―, καὶ ἅμα οὐ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς ἄλλοσέ ποι τῆς Σικελίας καθεζομένους χαλεπωτέρους εἶναι προσπολεμεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὡς τάχιστα καὶ ἐν ᾧ σφίσι ξυμφέρει ἀναγκάσαι αὐτοὺς ναυμαχεῖν. [2] τὰς οὖν ναῦς ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο ἡμέρας ὅσαι αὐτοῖς ἐδόκουν ἱκαναὶ εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καιρὸς ἦν, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσέβαλλον, καὶ ἐπεξελθόντος μέρους τινὸς οὐ πολλοῦ καὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππέων κατά τινας πύλας ἀπολαμβάνουσί τε τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τινὰς καὶ τρεψάμενοι καταδιώκουσιν: οὔσης δὲ στενῆς τῆς ἐσόδου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἵππους τε ἑβδομήκοντα ἀπολλύασι καὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν οὐ πολλούς.

52. καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀπεχώρησεν ἡ στρατιὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων: τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐκπλέουσιν οὔσαις ἓξ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἅμα πρὸς τὰ τείχη ἐχώρουν. οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀντανῆγον ναυσὶν ἓξ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ προσμείξαντες ἐναυμάχουν. [2] καὶ τὸν Εὐρυμέδοντα ἔχοντα τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ βουλόμενον περικλῄσασθαι τὰς ναῦς τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ

ἐπεξάγοντα τῷ πλῷ πρὸς τὴν γῆν μᾶλλον, νικήσαντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὸ μέσον πρῶτον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπολαμβάνουσι κἀκεῖνον ἐν τῷ κοίλῳ καὶ μυχῷ τοῦ λιμένος καὶ αὐτόν τε διαφθείρουσι καὶ τὰς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ναῦς ἐπισπομένας: ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰς πάσας ἤδη ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατεδίωκόν τε καὶ ἐξεώθουν ἐς τὴν γῆν.

53. ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ὁρῶν τὰς ναῦς τῶν πολεμίων νικωμένας καὶ ἔξω τῶν σταυρωμάτων καὶ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν στρατοπέδου καταφερομένας, βουλόμενος διαφθείρειν τοὺς ἐκβαίνοντας καὶ τὰς ναῦς ῥᾷον τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἀφέλκειν τῆς γῆς φιλίας οὔσης, παρεβοήθει ἐπὶ τὴν χηλὴν μέρος τι ἔχων τῆς στρατιᾶς. [2] καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Τυρσηνοί — οὗτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ταύτῃ — ὁρῶντες ἀτάκτως προσφερομένους, ἐπεκβοηθήσαντες καὶ προσπεσόντες τοῖς πρώτοις τρέπουσι καὶ ἐσβάλλουσιν ἐς τὴν λίμνην τὴν Λυσιμέλειαν καλουμένην. [3] ὕστερον δὲ πλέονος ἤδη τοῦ στρατεύματος παρόντος τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιβοηθήσαντες καὶ δείσαντες περὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς μάχην τε κατέστησαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ νικήσαντες ἐπεδίωξαν καὶ ὁπλίτας τε οὐ πολλοὺς ἀπέκτειναν καὶ τὰς ναῦς τὰς μὲν πολλὰς διέσωσάν τε καὶ ξυνήγαγον κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον, δυοῖν δὲ δεούσας εἴκοσιν οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔλαβον αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας πάντας ἀπέκτειναν. [4] καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐμπρῆσαι βουλόμενοι ὁλκάδα παλαιὰν κληματίδων καὶ δᾳδὸς γεμίσαντες — ἦν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὁ ἄνεμος οὔριος — ἀφεῖσαν [τὴν ναῦν] πῦρ ἐμβαλόντες. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δείσαντες περὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀντεμηχανήσαντό τε σβεστήρια κωλύματα καὶ παύσαντες τήν τε φλόγα καὶ τὸ μὴ προσελθεῖν ἐγγὺς τὴν ὁλκάδα τοῦ κινδύνου ἀπηλλάγησαν.

54. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Συρακόσιοι μὲν τῆς τε ναυμαχίας τροπαῖον ἔστησαν καὶ τῆς ἄνω τῆς πρὸς τῷ τείχει ἀπολήψεως τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, ὅθεν καὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἔλαβον, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἧς τε οἱ Τυρσηνοὶ τροπῆς ἐποιήσαντο τῶν πεζῶν ἐς τὴν λίμνην καὶ ἧς αὐτοὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατοπέδῳ.

55. γεγενημένης δὲ τῆς νίκης τοῖς Συρακοσίοις λαμπρᾶς ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ —πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ἐφοβοῦντο τὰς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ναῦς ἐπελθούσας— οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας ἦσαν καὶ ὁ παράλογος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἔτι τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετάμελος. [2] πόλεσι γὰρ ταύταις μόναις ἤδη ὁμοιοτρόποις ἐπελθόντες, δημοκρατουμέναις τε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ ναῦς καὶ ἵππους καὶ μεγέθη ἐχούσαις, οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπενεγκεῖν οὔτ᾽ ἐκ πολιτείας τι μεταβολῆς τὸ διάφορον αὐτοῖς, ᾧ προσήγοντο ἄν, οὔτ᾽ ἐκ παρασκευῆς πολλῷ κρείσσονος, σφαλλόμενοι δὲ τὰ πλείω, τά τε πρὸ αὐτῶν ἠπόρουν, καὶ ἐπειδή γε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκρατήθησαν, ὃ οὐκ ἂν ᾠόντο, πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἔτι.

56. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τόν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς παρέπλεον ἀδεῶς καὶ τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ διενοοῦντο κλῄσειν, ὅπως μηκέτι, μηδ᾽ εἰ βούλοιντο, λάθοιεν αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκπλεύσαντες. [2] οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοὶ σωθῆναι μόνον ἔτι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως ἐκείνους κωλύσουσι, νομίζοντες ὅπερ ἦν, ἀπό τε τῶν παρόντων πολὺ σφῶν καθυπέρτερα τὰ πράγματα εἶναι καί, εἰ δύναιντο κρατῆσαι Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, καλὸν σφίσιν ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὸ ἀγώνισμα φανεῖσθαι: τούς τε γὰρ ἄλλους Ἕλληνας εὐθὺς τοὺς μὲν ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, τοὺς δὲ φόβου ἀπολύεσθαι —οὐ γὰρ ἔτι δυνατὴν ἔσεσθαι τὴν ὑπόλοιπον Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν τὸν ὕστερον ἐπενεχθησόμενον πόλεμον ἐνεγκεῖν—, καὶ αὐτοὶ δόξαντες αὐτῶν αἴτιοι εἶναι ὑπό τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔπειτα πολὺ θαυμασθήσεσθαι. [3] καὶ ἦν δὲ ἄξιος ὁ ἀγὼν κατά τε ταῦτα καὶ ὅτι οὐχὶ Ἀθηναίων μόνον περιεγίγνοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλῶν ξυμμάχων, καὶ οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὶ αὖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ξυμβοηθησάντων σφίσιν, ἡγεμόνες τε γενόμενοι μετὰ Κορινθίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τὴν σφετέραν πόλιν ἐμπαρασχόντες προκινδυνεῦσαί τε καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ μέγα μέρος προκόψαντες. [4] ἔθνη γὰρ πλεῖστα δὴ ἐπὶ μίαν πόλιν ταύτην ξυνῆλθε, πλήν γε δὴ τοῦ ξύμπαντος λόγου τοῦ ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τὴν Ἀθηναίων τε πόλιν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων.

57. τοσοίδε γὰρ ἑκάτεροι ἐπὶ Σικελίαν τε καὶ περὶ Σικελίας, τοῖς μὲν ξυγκτησόμενοι τὴν χώραν ἐλθόντες, τοῖς δὲ ξυνδιασώσοντες, ἐπὶ Συρακούσας ἐπολέμησαν, οὐ κατὰ δίκην τι μᾶλλον οὐδὲ κατὰ ξυγγένειαν μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων στάντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἑκάστοις τῆς ξυντυχίας ἢ κατὰ τὸ ξυμφέρον ἢ ἀνάγκῃ ἔσχεν. [2] Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν αὐτοὶ Ἴωνες ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς Συρακοσίους ἑκόντες ἦλθον, καὶ αὐτοῖς τῇ αὐτῇ φωνῇ καὶ νομίμοις ἔτι χρώμενοι Λήμνιοι καὶ Ἴμβριοι καὶ Αἰγινῆται, οἳ τότε Αἴγιναν εἶχον, καὶ ἔτι Ἑστιαιῆς οἱ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ Ἑστίαιαν οἰκοῦντες ἄποικοι ὄντες ξυνεστράτευσαν. [3] τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων οἱ μὲν ὑπήκοοι,οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἳ μισθοφόροι ξυνεστράτευον. [4] καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑπηκόων καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῶν Ἐρετριῆς καὶ Χαλκιδῆς καὶ Στυρῆς καὶ Καρύστιοι ἀπ᾽ Εὐβοίας ἦσαν, ἀπὸ δὲ νήσων Κεῖοι καὶ Ἄνδριοι καὶ Τήνιοι, ἐκ δ᾽ Ἰωνίας Μιλήσιοι καὶ Σάμιοι καὶ Χῖοι. τούτων Χῖοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ὄντες φόρου, ναῦς δὲ παρέχοντες αὐτόνομοι ξυνέσποντο. καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον Ἴωνες ὄντες οὗτοι πάντες καὶ ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων πλὴν Καρυστίων □οὗτοι δ᾽ εἰσὶ Δρύοπες□, ὑπήκοοι δ᾽ ὄντες καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ὅμως Ἴωνές γε ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς ἠκολούθουν. [5] πρὸς δ᾽ αὐτοῖς Αἰολῆς, Μηθυμναῖοι μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ οὐ φόρῳ ὑπήκοοι, Τενέδιοι δὲ καὶ Αἴνιοι ὑποτελεῖς. οὗτοι δὲ Αἰολῆς Αἰολεῦσι τοῖς κτίσασι Βοιωτοῖς <τοῖς > μετὰ Συρακοσίων κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἐμάχοντο, Πλαταιῆς δὲ καταντικρὺ Βοιωτοὶ Βοιωτοῖς μόνοι εἰκότως κατὰ τὸ ἔχθος. [6] Ῥόδιοι δὲ καὶ Κυθήριοι Δωριῆς ἀμφότεροι, οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄποικοι Κυθήριοι ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους τοὺς ἅμα Γυλίππῳ μετ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ὅπλα ἔφερον, Ῥόδιοι δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γένος Συρακοσίοις μὲν Δωριεῦσι, Γελῴοις δὲ καὶ ἀποίκοις ἑαυτῶν οὖσι μετὰ Συρακοσίων στρατευομένοις ἠναγκάζοντο πολεμεῖν. [7] τῶν τε περὶ Πελοπόννησον νησιωτῶν Κεφαλλῆνες μὲν καὶ Ζακύνθιοι αὐτόνομοι μέν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ νησιωτικὸν μᾶλλον κατειργόμενοι, ὅτι θαλάσσης ἐκράτουν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ξυνείποντο: Κερκυραῖοι δὲ οὐ μόνον Δωριῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ Κορίνθιοι σαφῶς ἐπὶ Κορινθίους τε καὶ Συρακοσίους, τῶν μὲν ἄποικοι ὄντες, τῶν δὲ ξυγγενεῖς,

ἀνάγκῃ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ εὐπρεποῦς, βουλήσει δὲ κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Κορινθίων οὐχ ἧσσον εἵποντο. [8] καὶ οἱ Μεσσήνιοι νῦν καλούμενοι ἐκ Ναυπάκτου καὶ ἐκ Πύλου τότε ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐχομένης ἐς τὸν πόλεμον παρελήφθησαν. καὶ ἔτι Μεγαρέων φυγάδες οὐ πολλοὶ Μεγαρεῦσι Σελινουντίοις οὖσι κατὰ ξυμφορὰν ἐμάχοντο. [9] τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἑκούσιος μᾶλλον ἡ στρατεία ἐγίγνετο ἤδη. Ἀργεῖοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων τε ἔχθρας καὶ τῆς παραυτίκα ἕκαστοι ἰδίας ὠφελίας Δωριῆς ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων Ἰώνων ἠκολούθουν, Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀρκάδων μισθοφόροι ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰεὶ πολεμίους σφίσιν ἀποδεικνυμένους ἰέναι εἰωθότες καὶ τότε τοὺς μετὰ Κορινθίων ἐλθόντας Ἀρκάδας οὐδὲν ἧσσον διὰ κέρδος ἡγούμενοι πολεμίους, Κρῆτες δὲ καὶ Αἰτωλοὶ μισθῷ καὶ οὗτοι πεισθέντες: ξυνέβη δὲ τοῖς Κρησὶ τὴν Γέλαν Ῥοδίοις ξυγκτίσαντας μὴ ξὺν τοῖς ἀποίκοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀποίκους ἑκόντας μετὰ μισθοῦ ἐλθεῖν. [10] καὶ Ἀκαρνάνων τινὲς ἅμα μὲν κέρδει, τὸ δὲ πλέον Δημοσθένους φιλίᾳ καὶ Ἀθηναίων εὐνοίᾳ ξύμμαχοι ὄντες ἐπεκούρησαν. [11] καὶ οἵδε μὲν τῷ Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ ὁριζόμενοι: Ἰταλιωτῶν δὲ Θούριοι καὶ Μεταπόντιοι ἐν τοιαύταις ἀνάγκαις τότε στασιωτικῶν καιρῶν κατειλημμένοι ξυνεστράτευον, καὶ Σικελιωτῶν Νάξιοι καὶ Καταναῖοι, βαρβάρων δὲ Ἐγεσταῖοί τε, οἵπερ ἐπηγάγοντο, καὶ Σικελῶν τὸ πλέον, καὶ τῶν ἔξω Σικελίας Τυρσηνῶν τέ τινες κατὰ διαφορὰν Συρακοσίων καὶ Ἰάπυγες μισθοφόροι. τοσάδε μὲν μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ἔθνη ἐστράτευον.

58. Συρακοσίοις δὲ ἀντεβοήθησαν Καμαριναῖοι μὲν ὅμοροι ὄντες καὶ Γελῷοι οἰκοῦντες μετ᾽ αὐτούς, ἔπειτα Ἀκραγαντίνων ἡσυχαζόντων ἐν τῷ ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ἱδρυμένοι Σελινούντιοι. [2] καὶ οἵδε μὲν τῆς Σικελίας τὸ πρὸς Λιβύην μέρος τετραμμένον νεμόμενοι, Ἱμεραῖοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν Τυρσηνικὸν πόντον μορίου, ἐν ᾧ καὶ μόνοι Ἕλληνες οἰκοῦσιν: οὗτοι δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνοι ἐβοήθησαν. [3] καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ μὲν ἔθνη τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ τοσάδε, Δωριῆς τε καὶ [οἱ] αὐτόνομοι πάντες, ξυνεμάχουν, βαρβάρων δὲ Σικελοὶ μόνοι ὅσοι μὴ ἀφέστασαν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους: τῶν δ᾽ ἔξω

Σικελίας Ἑλλήνων Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἡγεμόνα Σπαρτιάτην παρεχόμενοι, νεοδαμώδεις δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ Εἵλωτας [δύναται δὲ τὸ νεοδαμῶδες ἐλεύθερον ἤδη εἶναι], Κορίνθιοι δὲ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ μόνοι παραγενόμενοι καὶ Λευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές, ἐκ δὲ Ἀρκαδίας μισθοφόροι ὑπὸ Κορινθίων ἀποσταλέντες καὶ Σικυώνιοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες, καὶ τῶν ἔξω Πελοποννήσου Βοιωτοί. [4] πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐπελθόντας τούτους οἱ Σικελιῶται αὐτοὶ πλῆθος πλέον κατὰ πάντα παρέσχοντο ἅτε μεγάλας πόλεις οἰκοῦντες: καὶ γὰρ ὁπλῖται πολλοὶ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ἄφθονος ξυνελέγη. καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας αὖθις ὡς εἰπεῖν τοὺς ἄλλους Συρακόσιοι αὐτοὶ πλείω ἐπορίσαντο διὰ μέγεθός τε πόλεως καὶ ὅτι ἐν μεγίστῳ κινδύνῳ ἦσαν.

59. καὶ αἱ μὲν ἑκατέρων ἐπικουρίαι τοσαίδε ξυνελέγησαν, καὶ τότε ἤδη πᾶσαι ἀμφοτέροις παρῆσαν καὶ οὐκέτι οὐδὲν οὐδετέροις ἐπῆλθεν. [2]οἱ δ᾽ οὖν Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι εἰκότως ἐνόμισαν καλὸν ἀγώνισμα σφίσιν εἶναι ἐπὶ τῇ γεγενημένῃ νίκῃ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἑλεῖν τε τὸ στρατόπεδον ἅπαν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοσοῦτον ὄν, καὶ μηδὲ καθ᾽ ἕτερα αὐτούς, μήτε διὰ θαλάσσης μήτε τῷ πεζῷ, διαφυγεῖν. [3] ἔκλῃον οὖν τόν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς τὸν μέγαν, ἔχοντα τὸ στόμα ὀκτὼ σταδίων μάλιστα, τριήρεσι πλαγίαις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἀκάτοις ἐπ᾽ ἀγκυρῶν ὁρμίζοντες, καὶ τἆλλα, ἢν ἔτι ναυμαχεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τολμήσωσι, παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ ὀλίγον οὐδὲν ἐς οὐδὲν ἐπενόουν.

60. τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις τήν τε ἀπόκλῃσιν ὁρῶσι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην διάνοιαν αὐτῶν αἰσθομένοις βουλευτέα ἐδόκει. [2] καὶ ξυνελθόντες οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ταξίαρχοι πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἀπορίαν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ὅτι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὔτε αὐτίκα ἔτι εἶχον προπέμψαντες γὰρ ἐς Κατάνην ὡς ἐκπλευσόμενοι ἀπεῖπον μὴ ἐπάγειν οὔτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἔμελλον ἕξειν, εἰ μὴ ναυκρατήσουσιν, ἐβουλεύσαντο τὰ μὲν τείχη τὰ ἄνω ἐκλιπεῖν, πρὸς δ᾽ αὐταῖς ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀπολαβόντες διατειχίσματι ὅσον οἷόν τε ἐλάχιστον τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν ἱκανὸν γενέσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν φρουρεῖν, ἀπὸ

δὲ τοῦ ἄλλου πεζοῦ τὰς ναῦς ἁπάσας, ὅσαι ἦσαν καὶ δυναταὶ καὶ ἁπλοώτεραι, πάντα τινὰ ἐσβιβάζοντες πληρῶσαι, καὶ διαναυμαχήσαντες, ἢν μὲν νικῶσιν, ἐς Κατάνην κομίζεσθαι, ἢν δὲ μή, ἐμπρήσαντες τὰς ναῦς πεζῇ ξυνταξάμενοι ἀποχωρεῖν ᾗ ἂν τάχιστα μέλλωσί τινος χωρίου ἢ βαρβαρικοῦ ἢ Ἑλληνικοῦ φιλίου ἀντιλήψεσθαι. [3] καὶ οἱ μέν, ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ ἐποίησαν: ἔκ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄνω τειχῶν ὑποκατέβησαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρωσαν πάσας, ἀναγκάσαντες ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἐδόκει ἡλικίας μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι. [4] καὶ ξυνεπληρώθησαν νῆες αἱ πᾶσαι δέκα μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν: τοξότας τε ἐπ᾽ αὐτὰς πολλοὺς καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς τῶν τε Ἀκαρνάνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων ἐσεβίβαζον, καὶ τἆλλα ὡς οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν ἐξ ἀναγκαίου τε καὶ τοιαύτης διανοίας ἐπορίσαντο. [5] ὁ δὲ Νικίας, ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ὁρῶν τοὺς στρατιώτας τῷ τε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς πολὺ ταῖς ναυσὶ κρατηθῆναι ἀθυμοῦντας καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων σπάνιν ὡς τάχιστα βουλομένους διακινδυνεύειν, ξυγκαλέσας ἅπαντας παρεκελεύσατό τε πρῶτον καὶ ἔλεξε τοιάδε.

61. ‘Ἄνδρες στρατιῶται Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων, ὁ μὲν ἀγὼν ὁ μέλλων ὁμοίως κοινὸς ἅπασιν ἔσται περί τε σωτηρίας καὶ πατρίδος ἑκάστοις οὐχ ἧσσον ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις: ἢν γὰρ κρατήσωμεν νῦν ταῖς ναυσίν, ἔστι τῳ τὴν ὑπάρχουσάν που οἰκείαν πόλιν ἐπιδεῖν. [2] ἀθυμεῖν δὲ οὐ χρὴ οὐδὲ πάσχειν ὅπερ οἱ ἀπειρότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ τοῖς πρώτοις ἀγῶσι σφαλέντες ἔπειτα διὰ παντὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ φόβου ὁμοίαν ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἔχουσιν. [3] ἀλλ᾽ ὅσοι τε Ἀθηναίων πάρεστε, πολλῶν ἤδη πολέμων ἔμπειροι ὄντες, καὶ ὅσοι τῶν ξυμμάχων, ξυστρατευόμενοι αἰεί, μνήσθητε τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις παραλόγων, καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης κἂν μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐλπίσαντες στῆναι καὶ ὡς ἀναμαχούμενοι ἀξίως τοῦδε τοῦ πλήθους, ὅσον αὐτοὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐφορᾶτε, παρασκευάζεσθε.

62. ‘Ἃ δὲ ἀρωγὰ ἐνείδομεν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λιμένος στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ὄχλον τῶν νεῶν ἔσεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων παρασκευήν, οἷς

πρότερον ἐβλαπτόμεθα, πάντα καὶ ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκ τῶν παρόντων μετὰ τῶν κυβερνητῶν ἐσκεμμένα ἡτοίμασται. [2] καὶ γὰρ τοξόται πολλοὶ καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ἐπιβήσονται καὶ ὅχλος, ᾧ ναυμαχίαν μὲν ποιούμενοι ἐν πελάγει οὐκ ἂν ἐχρώμεθα διὰ τὸ βλάπτειν ἂν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῇ βαρύτητι τῶν νεῶν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐνθάδε ἠναγκασμένῃ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζομαχίᾳ πρόσφορα ἔσται. [3] ηὕρηται δ᾽ ἡμῖν ὅσα χρὴ ἀντιναυπηγῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐπωτίδων αὐτοῖς παχύτητας, ᾗπερ δὴ μάλιστα ἐβλαπτόμεθα, χειρῶν σιδηρῶν ἐπιβολαί, αἳ σχήσουσι τὴν πάλιν ἀνάκρουσιν τῆς προσπεσούσης νεώς, ἢν τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις οἱ ἐπιβάται ὑπουργῶσιν. [4] ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἠναγκάσμεθα ὥστε πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἀνακρούεσθαι μήτ᾽ ἐκείνους ἐᾶν ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς γῆς, πλὴν ὅσον ἂν ὁ πεζὸς ἡμῶν ἐπέχῃ, πολεμίας οὔσης.

63. ‘ὧν χρὴ μεμνημένους διαμάχεσθαι ὅσον ἂν δύνησθε καὶ μὴ ἐξωθεῖσθαι ἐς αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ ξυμπεσούσης νηὶ νεὼς μὴ πρότερον ἀξιοῦν ἀπολύεσθαι ἢ τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ πολεμίου καταστρώματος ὁπλίτας ἀπαράξητε. [2] καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ὁπλίταις οὐχ ἧσσον τῶν ναυτῶν παρακελεύομαι, ὅσῳ τῶν ἄνωθεν μᾶλλον τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο: ὑπάρχει δ᾽ ἡμῖν ἔτι νῦν γε τὰ πλείω τῷ πεζῷ ἐπικρατεῖν. [3] τοῖς δὲ ναύταις παραινῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῷδε καὶ δέομαι μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαί τι ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἄγαν, τήν τε παρασκευὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων βελτίω νῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τὰς ναῦς πλείους, ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι, οἳ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ἡμῶν τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι ἔς τε τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλέον μετείχετε. [4] ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνοι ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες δικαίως [ἂν] αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδοτε, καταφρονήσαντες δὲ Κορινθίων τε, οὓς πολλάκις νενικήκατε, καὶ Σικελιωτῶν, ὧν οὐδ᾽ ἀντιστῆναι οὐδεὶς ἔως

ἥκμαζε τὸ ναυτικὸν ἡμῖν ἠξίωσεν, ἀμύνασθε αὐτούς, καὶ δείξατε ὅτι καὶ μετ᾽ ἀσθενείας καὶ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ὑμετέρα ἐπιστήμη κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἑτέρας εὐτυχούσης ῥώμης.

64. τούς τε Ἀθηναίους ὑμῶν πάλιν αὖ καὶ τάδε ὑπομιμνῄσκω, ὅτι οὔτε ναῦς ἐν τοῖς νεωσοίκοις ἄλλας ὁμοίας ταῖσδε οὔτε ὁπλιτῶν ἡλικίαν ὑπελίπετε, εἴ τε ξυμβήσεταί τι ἄλλο ἢ τὸ κρατεῖν ὑμῖν, τούς τε ἐνθάδε πολεμίους εὐθὺς ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα πλευσομένους καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ ὑπολοίπους ἡμῶν ἀδυνάτους ἐσομένους τούς τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἐπελθόντας ἀμύνασθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἂν ὑπὸ Συρακοσίοις εὐθὺς γίγνοισθε, οἷς αὐτοὶ ἴστε οἵᾳ γνώμῃ ἐπήλθετε, οἱ δὲ ἐκεῖ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίοις. [2] ὥστε ἐν ἐνὶ τῷδε ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγῶνι καθεστῶτες καρτερήσατε, εἴπερ ποτέ, καὶ ἐνθυμεῖσθε καθ᾽ ἑκάστους τε καὶ ξύμπαντες ὅτι οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὑμῶν νῦν ἐσόμενοι καὶ πεζοὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰσὶ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις καὶ τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, περὶ ὧν, εἴ τίς τι ἕτερος ἑτέρου προφέρει ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ εὐψυχίᾳ, οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἀποδειξάμενος αὐτός τε αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμος γένοιτο καὶ τοῖς ξύμπασι σωτήριος.’

65. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα παρακελευσάμενος εὐθὺς ἐκέλευε πληροῦν τὰς ναῦς. τῷ δὲ Γυλίππῳ καὶ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις παρῆν μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁρῶσι καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν παρασκευήν, ὅτι ναυμαχήσουσιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, προηγγέλθη δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡ ἐπιβολὴ τῶν σιδηρῶν χειρῶν, [2] καὶ πρός τε τἆλλα ἐξηρτύσαντο ὡς ἕκαστα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο: τὰς γὰρ πρῴρας καὶ τῆς νεὼς ἄνω ἐπὶ πολὺ κατεβύρσωσαν, ὅπως ἂν ἀπολισθάνοι καὶ μὴ ἔχοι ἀντιλαβὴν ἡ χεὶρ ἐπιβαλλομένη. [3] καὶ ἐπειδὴ πάντα ἑτοῖμα ἦν, παρεκελεύσαντο ἐκείνοις οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ Γύλιππος καὶ ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.

66. ‘ὅτι μὲν καλὰ τὰ προειργασμένα καὶ ὑπὲρ καλῶν τῶν μελλόντων ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται, ὦ Συρακόσιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, οἵ τε πολλοὶ δοκεῖτε ἡμῖν εἰδέναι ▯οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως αὐτῶν προθύμως ἀντελάβεσθε▯, καὶ εἴ τις μὴ ἐπὶ ὅσον δεῖ ᾔσθηται, σημανοῦμεν. [2] Ἀθηναίους γὰρ ἐς τὴν χώραν τήνδε ἐλθόντας πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Σικελίας καταδουλώσει, ἔπειτ᾽, εἰ

κατορθώσειαν, καὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος, καὶ ἀρχὴν τὴν ἤδη μεγίστην τῶν τε πρὶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν νῦν κεκτημένους, πρῶτοι ἀνθρώπων ὑποστάντες τῷ ναυτικῷ, ᾧπερ πάντα κατέσχον, τὰς μὲν νενικήκατε ἤδη ναυμαχίας, τὴν δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος νῦν νικήσετε. [3] ἄνδρες γὰρ ἐπειδὰν ᾧ ἀξιοῦσι προύχειν κολουθῶσι, τό γ᾽ ὑπόλοιπον αὐτῶν τῆς δόξης ἀσθενέστερον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ εἰ μηδ᾽ ᾠήθησαν τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ τῷ παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα τοῦ αὐχήματος σφαλλόμενοι καὶ παρὰ ἰσχὺν τῆς δυνάμεως ἐνδιδόασιν: ὃ νῦν Ἀθηναίους εἰκὸς πεπονθέναι.

67. ἡμῶν δὲ τό τε ὑπάρχον πρότερον, ᾧπερ καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονες ἔτι ὄντες ἀπετολμήσαμεν, βεβαιότερον νῦν, καὶ τῆς δοκήσεως προσγεγενημένης αὐτῷ, τὸ κρατίστους εἶναι εἰ τοὺς κρατίστους ἐνικήσαμεν, διπλασία ἑκάστου ἡ ἐλπίς: τὰ δὲ πολλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιχειρήσεις ἡ μεγίστη ἐλπὶς μεγίστην καὶ τὴν προθυμίαν παρέχεται. [2]᾽τά τε τῆς ἀντιμιμήσεως αὐτῶν τῆς παρασκευῆς ἡμῶν τῷ μὲν ἡμετέρῳ τρόπῳ ξυνήθη τέ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀνάρμοστοι πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐσόμεθα: οἱ δ᾽, ἐπειδὰν πολλοὶ μὲν ὁπλῖται ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ὦσι, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ χερσαῖοι ὡς εἰπεῖν Ἀκαρνᾶνές τε καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ ναῦς ἀναβάντες, οἳ οὐδ᾽ ὅπως καθεζομένους χρὴ τὸ βέλος ἀφεῖναι εὑρήσουσι, πῶς οὐ σφαλοῦσί τε τὰς ναῦς καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς πάντες οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν τρόπῳ κινούμενοι ταράξονται; [3] ἐπεὶ καὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ὠφελήσονται, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ὑμῶν, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσαις ναυμαχήσει, πεφόβηται: ἐν ὀλίγῳ γὰρ πολλαὶ ἀργότεραι μὲν ἐς τὸ δρᾶν τι ὧν βούλονται ἔσονται, ῥᾷσται δὲ ἐς τὸ βλάπτεσθαι ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἡμῖν παρεσκεύασται. [4] τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθέστατον γνῶτε ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς οἰόμεθα σαφῶς πεπύσθαι: ὑπερβαλλόντων γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν κακῶν καὶ βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἀπορίας ἐς ἀπόνοιαν καθεστήκασιν οὐ παρασκευῆς πίστει μᾶλλον ἢ τύχης ἀποκινδυνεῦσαι οὕτως ὅπως δύνανται, ἵν᾽ ἢ βιασάμενοι ἐκπλεύσωσιν ἢ κατὰ γῆν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ποιῶνται, ὡς τῶν γε παρόντων οὐκ ἂν πράξαντες χεῖρον.

68. πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην καὶ τύχην ἀνδρῶν ἑαυτὴν παραδεδωκυῖαν πολεμιωτάτων ὀργῇ προσμείξωμεν, καὶ νομίσωμεν ἅμα μὲν νομιμώτατον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους οἳ ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τοῦ προσπεσόντος δικαιώσωσιν ἀποπλῆσαι τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, ἅμα δὲ ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνασθαι ἐκγενησόμενον ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ λεγόμενόν που ἥδιστον εἶναι. [2] ὡς δὲ ἐχθροὶ καὶ ἔχθιστοι, πάντες ἴστε, οἵ γε ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἦλθον δουλωσόμενοι, ἐν ᾧ, εἰ κατώρθωσαν, ἀνδράσι μὲν ἂν τἆλγιστα προσέθεσαν, παισὶ δὲ καὶ γυναιξὶ τὰ ἀπρεπέστατα, πόλει δὲ τῇ πάσῃ τὴν αἰσχίστην ἐπίκλησιν. [3] ἀνθ᾽ ὧν μὴ μαλακισθῆναί τινα πρέπει μηδὲ τὸ ἀκινδύνως ἀπελθεῖν αὐτοὺς κέρδος νομίσαι. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐὰν κρατήσωσιν ὁμοίως δράσουσιν: τὸ δὲ πραξάντων ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος ἃ βουλόμεθα τούσδε τε κολασθῆναι καὶ τῇ πάσῃ Σικελίᾳ καρπουμένῃ καὶ πρὶν ἐλευθερίαν βεβαιοτέραν παραδοῦναι, καλὸς ὁ ἀγών. καὶ κινδύνων οὗτοι σπανιώτατοι οἳ ἂν ἐλάχιστα ἐκ τοῦ σφαλῆναι βλάπτοντες πλεῖστα διὰ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ὠφελῶσιν.’

69. καὶ οἱ μὲν τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοὶ καὶ Γύλιππος τοιαῦτα καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς σφετέροις στρατιώταις παρακελευσάμενοι ἀντεπλήρουν τὰς ναῦς εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ᾐσθάνοντο. [2] ὁ δὲ Νικίας ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ ὁρῶν οἷος ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ ὡς ἐγγὺς ἤδη [ἦν], ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνάγεσθαι, καὶ νομίσας, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀγῶσι, πάντα τε ἔργῳ ἔτι σφίσιν ἐνδεᾶ εἶναι καὶ λόγῳ αὐτοῖς οὔπω ἱκανὰ εἰρῆσθαι, αὖθις τῶν τριηράρχων ἕνα ἕκαστον ἀνεκάλει, πατρόθεν τε ἐπονομάζων καὶ αὐτοὺς ὀνομαστὶ καὶ φυλήν, ἀξιῶν τό τε καθ᾽ ἑαυτόν, ᾧ ὑπῆρχε λαμπρότητός τι, μὴ προδιδόναι τινὰ καὶ τὰς πατρικὰς ἀρετάς, ὧν ἐπιφανεῖς ἦσαν οἱ πρόγονοι, μὴ ἀφανίζειν, πατρίδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομιμνήσκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας, ἄλλα τε λέγων ὅσα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἤδη τοῦ καιροῦ ὄντες ἄνθρωποι οὐ πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν τινὶ ἀρχαιολογεῖν φυλαξάμενοι εἴποιεν ἄν, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων παραπλήσια ἔς τε γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ

θεοὺς πατρῴους προφερόμενα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῇ παρούσῃ ἐκπλήξει ὠφέλιμα νομίζοντες ἐπιβοῶνται. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν οὐχ ἱκανὰ μᾶλλον ἢ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα νομίσας παρῃνῆσθαι, ἀποχωρήσας ἦγε τὸν πεζὸν πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ παρέταξεν ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐδύνατο, ὅπως ὅτι μεγίστη τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὠφελία ἐς τὸ θαρσεῖν γίγνοιτο: [4] ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Μένανδρος καὶ Εὐθύδημος οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐπέβησαν ἅραντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν στρατοπέδου εὐθὺς ἔπλεον πρὸς τὸ ζεῦγμα τοῦ λιμένος καὶ τὸν παραλειφθέντα διέκπλουν, βουλόμενοι βιάσασθαι ἐς τὸ ἔξω.

70. προεξαγαγόμενοι δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ναυσὶ παραπλησίαις τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πρότερον, κατά τε τὸν ἔκπλουν μέρει αὐτῶν ἐφύλασσον καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον κύκλῳ λιμένα, ὅπως πανταχόθεν ἅμα προσπίπτοιεν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα αὐτοῖς παρεβοήθει ᾗπερ καὶ αἱ νῆες κατίσχοιεν. ἦρχον δὲ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις Σικανὸς μὲν καὶ Ἀγάθαρχος, κέρας ἑκάτερος τοῦ παντὸς ἔχων, Πυθὴν δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι τὸ μέσον. [2] ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι προσέμισγον τῷ ζεύγματι, τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ ῥύμῃ ἐπιπλέοντες ἐκράτουν τῶν τεταγμένων νεῶν πρὸς αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπειρῶντο λύειν τὰς κλῄσεις: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πανταχόθεν σφίσι τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων ἐπιφερομένων οὐ πρὸς τῷ ζεύγματι ἔτι μόνον ἡ ναυμαχία, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ἦν καρτερὰ καὶ οἵα οὐχ ἑτέρα τῶν προτέρων. [3] πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἑκατέροις προθυμία ἀπὸ τῶν ναυτῶν ἐς τὸ ἐπιπλεῖν ὁπότε κελευσθείη ἐγίγνετο, πολλὴ δὲ ἡ ἀντιτέχνησις τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἀγωνισμὸς πρὸς ἀλλήλους: οἵ τε ἐπιβάται ἐθεράπευον, ὁπότε προσπέσοι ναῦς νηί, μὴ λείπεσθαι τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ καταστρώματος τῆς ἄλλης τέχνης: πᾶς τέ τις ἐν ᾧ προσετέτακτο αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἠπείγετο πρῶτος φαίνεσθαι. [4] ξυμπεσουσῶν δὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλῶν νεῶν πλεῖσται γὰρ δὴ αὗται ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ ἐναυμάχησαν: βραχὺ γὰρ ἀπέλιπον ξυναμφότεραι διακόσιαι γενέσθαι αἱ μὲν ἐμβολαὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀνακρούσεις καὶ διέκπλους ὀλίγαι ἐγίγνοντο, αἱ δὲ

προσβολαί, ὡς τύχοι ναῦς νηὶ προσπεσοῦσα ἢ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν ἢ ἄλλῃ ἐπιπλέουσα, πυκνότεραι ἦσαν. [5] καὶ ὅσον μὲν χρόνον προσφέροιτο ναῦς, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων τοῖς ἀκοντίοις καὶ τοξεύμασι καὶ λίθοις ἀφθόνως ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐχρῶντο: ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσμείξειαν, οἱ ἐπιβάται ἐς χεῖρας ἰόντες ἐπειρῶντο ταῖς ἀλλήλων ναυσὶν ἐπιβαίνειν. [6] ξυνετύγχανέ τε πολλαχοῦ διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν τὰ μὲν ἄλλοις ἐμβεβληκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐμβεβλῆσθαι, δύο τε περὶ μίαν καὶ ἔστιν ᾗ καὶ πλείους ναῦς κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ξυνηρτῆσθαι, καὶ τοῖς κυβερνήταις τῶν μὲν φυλακήν, τῶν δ᾽ ἐπιβουλήν, μὴ καθ᾽ ἓν ἕκαστον, κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ πανταχόθεν, περιεστάναι, καὶ τὸν κτύπον μέγαν ἀπὸ πολλῶν νεῶν ξυμπιπτουσῶν ἔκπληξίν τε ἅμα καὶ ἀποστέρησιν τῆς ἀκοῆς ὧν οἱ κελευσταὶ φθέγγοιντο παρέχειν. [7] πολλὴ γὰρ δὴ ἡ παρακέλευσις καὶ βοὴ ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων τοῖς κελευσταῖς κατά τε τὴν τέχνην καὶ πρὸς τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις βιάζεσθαί τε τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπιβοῶντες καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐς τὴν πατρίδα σωτηρίας νῦν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις, προθύμως ἀντιλαβέσθαι, τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις καλὸν εἶναι κωλῦσαί τε αὐτοὺς διαφυγεῖν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν ἑκάστους πατρίδα νικήσαντας ἐπαυξῆσαι. [8] καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ προσέτι ἑκατέρων, εἴ τινά που ὁρῷεν μὴ κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην πρύμναν κρουόμενον, ἀνακαλοῦντες ὀνομαστὶ τὸν τριήραρχον ἡρώτων, οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι εἰ τὴν πολεμιωτάτην γῆν οἰκειοτέραν ἤδη τῆς οὐ δι᾽ ὀλίγου πόνου κεκτημένης θαλάσσης ἡγούμενοι ὑποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι εἰ οὓς σαφῶς ἴσασι προθυμουμένους Ἀθηναίους παντὶ τρόπῳ διαφυγεῖν, τούτους αὐτοὶ φεύγοντας φεύγουσιν.

71. ὅ τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς πεζὸς ἀμφοτέρων ἰσορρόπου τῆς ναυμαχίας καθεστηκυίας πολὺν τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ ξύστασιν τῆς γνώμης εἶχε, φιλονικῶν μὲν ὁ αὐτόθεν περὶ τοῦ πλέονος ἤδη καλοῦ, δεδιότες δὲ οἱ ἐπελθόντες μὴ τῶν παρόντων ἔτι χείρω πράξωσιν. [2] πάντων γὰρ δὴ ἀνακειμένων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὰς ναῦς ὅ τε φόβος ἦν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐδενὶ ἐοικώς, καὶ διὰ τὸ <ἀνώμαλον> τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀνώμαλον καὶ τὴν ἔποψιν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἠναγκάζοντο ἔχειν. [3]

δι᾽ ὀλίγου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς θέας καὶ οὐ πάντων ἅμα ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ σκοπούντων, εἰ μέν τινες ἴδοιέν πῃ τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσησάν τε ἂν καὶ πρὸς ἀνάκλησιν θεῶν μὴ στερῆσαι σφᾶς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐτρέποντο, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ ἡσσώμενον βλέψαντες ὀλοφυρμῷ τε ἅμα μετὰ βοῆς ἐχρῶντο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν δρωμένων τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τὴν γνώμην μᾶλλον τῶν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐδουλοῦντο: ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀντίπαλόν τι τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀπιδόντες, διὰ τὸ ἀκρίτως ξυνεχὲς τῆς ἀμίλλης καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτοῖς ἴσα τῇ δόξῃ περιδεῶς ξυναπονεύοντες ἐν τοῖς χαλεπώτατα διῆγον: αἰεὶ γὰρ παρ᾽ ὀλίγον ἢ διέφευγον ἢ ἀπώλλυντο. [4] ἦν τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρατεύματι τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἕως ἀγχώμαλα ἐναυμάχουν, πάντα ὁμοῦ ἀκοῦσαι, ὀλοφυρμὸς βοή, νικῶντες κρατούμενοι, ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν μεγάλῳ κινδύνῳ μέγα στρατόπεδον πολυειδῆ ἀναγκάζοιτο φθέγγεσθαι. [5] παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν αὐτοῖς ἔπασχον, πρίν γε δὴ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντισχούσης τῆς ναυμαχίας ἔτρεψάν τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐπικείμενοι λαμπρῶς, πολλῇ κραυγῇ καὶ διακελευσμῷ χρώμενοι, κατεδίωκον ἐς τὴν γῆν. [6] τότε δὲ ὁ μὲν ναυτικὸς στρατὸς ἄλλος ἄλλῃ, ὅσοι μὴ μετέωροι ἑάλωσαν, κατενεχθέντες ἐξέπεσον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον: ὁ δὲ πεζὸς οὐκέτι διαφόρως, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ μιᾶς ὁρμῆς οἰμωγῇ τε καὶ στόνῳ πάντες δυσανασχετοῦντες τὰ γιγνόμενα, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς παρεβοήθουν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ τείχους ἐς φυλακήν, ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι ἤδη περὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὅπῃ σωθήσονται διεσκόπουν. [7] ἦν τε ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα οὐδεμιᾶς δὴ τῶν ξυμπασῶν ἐλάσσων ἔκπληξις. παραπλήσιά τε ἐπεπόνθεσαν καὶ ἔδρασαν αὐτοὶ ἐν Πύλῳ: διαφθαρεισῶν γὰρ τῶν νεῶν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις προσαπώλλυντο αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἄνδρες διαβεβηκότες, καὶ τότε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀνέλπιστον ἦν τὸ κατὰ γῆν σωθήσεσθαι, ἢν μή τι παρὰ λόγον γίγνηται.

72. γενομένης δ᾽ ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ναυμαχίας καὶ πολλῶν νεῶν ἀμφοτέροις καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπολομένων οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπικρατήσαντες τά τε ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς

ἀνείλοντο, καὶ ἀποπλεύσαντες πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τροπαῖον ἔστησαν, [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπὸ μεγέθους τῶν παρόντων κακῶν νεκρῶν μὲν πέρι ἢ ναυαγίων οὐδὲ ἐπενόουν αἰτῆσαι ἀναίρεσιν, τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐβουλεύοντο εὐθὺς ἀναχωρεῖν. [3] Δημοσθένης δὲ Νικίᾳ προσελθὼν γνώμην ἐποιεῖτο πληρώσαντας ἔτι τὰς λοιπὰς τῶν νεῶν βιάσασθαι, ἢν δύνωνται, ἅμα ἕῳ τὸν ἔκπλουν, λέγων ὅτι πλείους ἔτι αἱ λοιπαί εἰσι νῆες χρήσιμαι σφίσιν ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις: ἦσαν γὰρ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις περίλοιποι ὡς ἑξήκοντα, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐναντίοις ἐλάσσους ἢ πεντήκοντα. [4] καὶ ξυγχωροῦντος Νικίου τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ βουλομένων πληροῦν αὐτῶν οἱ ναῦται οὐκ ἤθελον ἐσβαίνειν διὰ τὸ καταπεπλῆχθαί τε τῇ ἥσσῃ καὶ μὴ ἂν ἔτι οἴεσθαι κρατῆσαι.

73. καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς κατὰ γῆν ἀναχωρήσοντες ἤδη ξύμπαντες τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, Ἑρμοκράτης δὲ ὁ Συρακόσιος ὑπονοήσας αὐτῶν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ νομίσας δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ τοσαύτη στρατιὰ κατὰ γῆν ὑποχωρήσασα καὶ καθεζομένη ποι τῆς Σικελίας βουλήσεται αὖθις σφίσι τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖσθαι, ἐσηγεῖται ἐλθὼν τοῖς ἐν τέλει οὖσιν ὡς οὐ χρεὼν ἀποχωρῆσαι τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτοὺς περιιδεῖν, λέγων ταῦτα ἃ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει, ἀλλὰ ἐξελθόντας ἤδη πάντας Συρακοσίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τάς τε ὁδοὺς ἀποικοδομῆσαι καὶ τὰ στενόπορα τῶν χωρίων προδιαλαβόντας φυλάσσειν. [2] οἱ δὲ ξυνεγίγνωσκον μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ταῦτα ἐκείνου, καὶ ἐδόκει ποιητέα εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἄρτι ἀσμένους ἀπὸ ναυμαχίας τε μεγάλης ἀναπεπαυμένους καὶ ἅμα ἑορτῆς οὔσης ἔτυχε γὰρ αὐτοῖς Ἡρακλεῖ ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν θυσία οὖσα οὐ δοκεῖν ἂν ῥᾳδίως ἐθελῆσαι ὑπακοῦσαι: ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ περιχαροῦς τῆς νίκης πρὸς πόσιν τετράφθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ, καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἐλπίζειν ἂν σφῶν πείθεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἢ ὅπλα λαβόντας ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐξελθεῖν. [3] ὡς δὲ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ταῦτα λογιζομένοις ἐφαίνετο ἄπορα καὶ οὐκέτι ἔπειθεν αὐτοὺς ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης, αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τούτοις τάδε μηχανᾶται, δεδιὼς μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν προφθάσωσιν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ διελθόντες τὰ χαλεπώτατα τῶν χωρίων. πέμπει τῶν ἑταίρων τινὰς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μετὰ ἱππέων

πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, ἡνίκα ξυνεσκόταζεν: οἳ προσελάσαντες ἐξ ὅσου τις ἔμελλεν ἀκούσεσθαι καὶ ἀνακαλεσάμενοί τινας ὡς ὄντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτήδειοι ἦσαν γάρ τινες τῷ Νικίᾳ διάγγελοι τῶν ἔνδοθεν ἐκέλευον φράζειν Νικίᾳ μὴ ἀπάγειν τῆς νυκτὸς τὸ στράτευμα ὡς Συρακοσίων τὰς ὁδοὺς φυλασσόντων, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν τῆς ἡμέρας παρασκευασάμενον ἀποχωρεῖν. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰπόντες ἀπῆλθον, καὶ οἱ ἀκούσαντες διήγγειλαν τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων:

74. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἄγγελμα ἐπέσχον τὴν νύκτα, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἀπάτην εἶναι. καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὡς οὐκ εὐθὺς ὥρμησαν, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν περιμεῖναι, ὅπως ξυσκευάσαιντο ὡς ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν οἱ στρατιῶται ὅτι χρησιμώτατα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα καταλιπεῖν, ἀναλαβόντες δὲ αὐτὰ ὅσα περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐς δίαιταν ὑπῆρχεν ἐπιτήδεια ἀφορμᾶσθαι. [2] Συρακόσιοι δὲ καὶ Γύλιππος τῷ μὲν πεζῷ προεξελθόντες τάς τε ὁδοὺς τὰς κατὰ τὴν χώραν, ᾗ εἰκὸς ἦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰέναι, ἀπεφάργνυσαν καὶ τῶν ῥείθρων καὶ [τῶν] ποταμῶν τὰς διαβάσεις ἐφύλασσον καὶ ἐς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ στρατεύματος ὡς κωλύσοντες ᾗ ἐδόκει ἐτάσσοντο: ταῖς δὲ ναυσὶ προσπλεύσαντες τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ ἀφεῖλκον ἐνέπρησαν δέ τινας ὀλίγας, ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι , τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν οὐδενὸς κωλύοντος ὡς ἑκάστην ποι ἐκπεπτωκυῖαν ἀναδησάμενοι ἐκόμιζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

75. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐδόκει τῷ Νικίᾳ καὶ τῷ Δημοσθένει ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι, καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις ἤδη τοῦ στρατεύματος τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἀπὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐγίγνετο. [2] δεινὸν οὖν ἦν οὐ καθ᾽ ἓν μόνον τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅτι τάς τε ναῦς ἀπολωλεκότες πάσας ἀπεχώρουν καὶ ἀντὶ μεγάλης ἐλπίδος καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡ πόλις κινδυνεύοντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀπολείψει τοῦ στρατοπέδου ξυνέβαινε τῇ τε ὄψει ἑκάστῳ ἀλγεινὰ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ αἰσθέσθαι. [3] τῶν τε γὰρ νεκρῶν ἀτάφων ὄντων, ὁπότε τις ἴδοι τινὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων κείμενον, ἐς λύπην μετὰ φόβου καθίστατο, καὶ οἱ ζῶντες καταλειπόμενοι τραυματίαι τε καὶ ἀσθενεῖς πολὺ τῶν

τεθνεώτων τοῖς ζῶσι λυπηρότεροι ἦσαν καὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἀθλιώτεροι. [4] πρὸς γὰρ ἀντιβολίαν καὶ ὀλοφυρμὸν τραπόμενοι ἐς ἀπορίαν καθίστασαν, ἄγειν τε σφᾶς ἀξιοῦντες καὶ ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐπιβοώμενοι, εἴ τινά πού τις ἴδοι ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ οἰκείων, τῶν τε ξυσκήνων ἤδη ἀπιόντων ἐκκρεμαννύμενοι καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦντες ἐς ὅσον δύναιντο, εἴ τῳ δὲ προλίποι ἡ ῥώμη καὶ τὸ σῶμα, οὐκ ἄνευ ὀλίγων ἐπιθειασμῶν καὶ οἰμωγῆς ὑπολειπόμενοι, ὥστε δάκρυσι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα πλησθὲν καὶ ἀπορίᾳ τοιαύτῃ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀφορμᾶσθαι, καίπερ ἐκ πολεμίας τε καὶ μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα τὰ μὲν πεπονθότας ἤδη, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφανεῖ δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσιν. [5] κατήφειά τέ τις ἅμα καὶ κατάμεμψις σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλὴ ἦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένῃ ἐῴκεσαν ὑποφευγούσῃ, καὶ ταύτῃ οὐ σμικρᾷ: μυριάδες γὰρ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ὄχλου οὐκ ἐλάσσους τεσσάρων ἅμα ἐπορεύοντο. καὶ τούτων οἵ τε ἄλλοι πάντες ἔφερον ὅτι τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος χρήσιμον, καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς αὐτοὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν σιτία ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις, οἱ μὲν ἀπορίᾳ ἀκολούθων, οἱ δὲ ἀπιστίᾳ: ἀπηυτομολήκεσαν γὰρ πάλαι τε καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι παραχρῆμα. ἔφερον δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανά: σῖτος γὰρ οὐκέτι ἦν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ. [6] καὶ μὴν ἡ ἄλλη αἰκία καὶ ἡ ἰσομοιρία τῶν κακῶν, ἔχουσά τινα ὅμως τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν κούφισιν, οὐδ᾽ ὡς ῥᾳδία ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐδοξάζετο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ οἵας λαμπρότητος καὶ αὐχήματος τοῦ πρώτου ἐς οἵαν τελευτὴν καὶ ταπεινότητα ἀφῖκτο. [7] μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τὸ διάφορον τοῦτο [τῷ] Ἑλληνικῷ στρατεύματι ἐγένετο, οἷς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἄλλους δουλωσομένους ἥκειν αὐτοὺς τοῦτο μᾶλλον δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσι ξυνέβη ἀπιέναι, ἀντὶ δ᾽ εὐχῆς τε καὶ παιάνων, μεθ᾽ ὧν ἐξέπλεον, πάλιν τούτων τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐπιφημίσμασιν ἀφορμᾶσθαι,πεζούς τε ἀντὶ ναυβατῶν πορευομένους καὶ ὁπλιτικῷ προσέχοντας μᾶλλον ἢ ναυτικῷ. ὅμως δὲ ὑπὸ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐπικρεμαμένου ἔτι κινδύνου πάντα ταῦτα αὐτοῖς οἰστὰ ἐφαίνετο.

76. ὁρῶν δὲ ὁ Νικίας τὸ στράτευμα ἀθυμοῦν καὶ ἐν μεγάλῃ μεταβολῇ ὄν, ἐπιπαριὼν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων

ἐθάρσυνέ τε καὶ παρεμυθεῖτο, βοῇ τε χρώμενος ἔτι μᾶλλον ἑκάστοις καθ᾽ οὓς γίγνοιτο ὑπὸ προθυμίας καὶ βουλόμενος ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον γεγωνίσκων ὠφελεῖν τι.

77. ‘καὶ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἐλπίδα χρὴ ἔχειν ⟨ἤδη τινὲς καὶ ἐκ δεινοτέρων ἢ τοιῶνδε ἐσώθησαν⟩, μηδὲ καταμέμφεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἄγαν αὐτοὺς μήτε ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μήτε ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν νῦν κακοπαθίαις. [2] κἀγώ τοι οὐδενὸς ὑμῶν οὔτε ῥώμῃ προφέρων ⟨ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾶτε δὴ ὡς διάκειμαι ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου⟩ οὔτ᾽ εὐτυχίᾳ δοκῶν που ὕστερός του εἶναι κατά τε τὸν ἴδιον βίον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα, νῦν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κινδύνῳ τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις αἰωροῦμαι: καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα δεδιήτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα. [3] ἀνθ᾽ ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐλπὶς ὅμως θρασεῖα τοῦ μέλλοντος, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσιν. τάχα δὲ ἂν καὶ λωφήσειαν: ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις ηὐτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τῳ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα. [4] ἦλθον γάρ που καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἤδη ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρους, καὶ ἀνθρώπεια δράσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἔπαθον. καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν τά τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐλπίζειν ἡπιώτερα ἔξειν ⟨οἴκτου γὰρ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἤδη ἐσμὲν ἢ φθόνου⟩, καὶ ὁρῶντες ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἷοι ὁπλῖται ἅμα καὶ ὅσοι ξυντεταγμένοι χωρεῖτε μὴ καταπέπληχθε ἄγαν, λογίζεσθε δὲ ὅτι αὐτοί τε πόλις εὐθύς ἐστε ὅποι ἂν καθέζησθε καὶ ἄλλη οὐδεμία ὑμᾶς τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐπιόντας δέξαιτο ῥᾳδίως οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἱδρυθέντας που ἐξαναστήσειεν. [5] τὴν δὲ πορείαν ὥστ᾽ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ εὔτακτον εἶναι αὐτοὶ φυλάξατε, μὴ ἄλλο τι ἡγησάμενος ἕκαστος ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀναγκασθῇ χωρίῳ μάχεσθαι, τοῦτο καὶ πατρίδα καὶ τεῖχος κρατήσας ἕξειν. [6] σπουδὴ δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν ἔσται τῆς ὁδοῦ: τὰ γὰρ ἐπιτήδεια βραχέα ἔχομεν, καὶ ἢν ἀντιλαβώμεθά του φιλίου χωρίου τῶν Σικελῶν ⟨οὗτοι γὰρ ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ Συρακοσίων δέος ἔτι βέβαιοι εἰσίν⟩, ἤδη νομίζετε ἐν τῷ ἐχυρῷ εἶναι. προπέπεμπται δ᾽ ὡς αὐτούς, καὶ ἀπαντᾶν εἰρημένον καὶ σιτία ἄλλα κομίζειν. [7] ‘τό τε ξύμπαν γνῶτε, ὦ ἄνδρες στρατιῶται, ἀναγκαῖόν τε ὂν ὑμῖν ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς

γίγνεσθαι ὡς μὴ ὄντος χωρίου ἐγγὺς ὅποι ἂν μαλακισθέντες σωθείητε καί, ἢν νῦν διαφύγητε τοὺς πολεμίους, οἵ τε ἄλλοι τευξόμενοι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖτέ που ἐπιδεῖν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν μεγάλην δύναμιν τῆς πόλεως καίπερ πεπτωκυῖαν ἐπανορθώσοντες: ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί.’

78. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοιάδε παρακελευόμενος ἅμα ἐπῄει τὸ στράτευμα, καὶ εἴ πῃ ὁρῴη διεσπασμένον καὶ μὴ ἐν τάξει χωροῦν ξυνάγων καὶ καθιστάς, καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης οὐδὲν ἧσσον τοῖς καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν τοιαῦτά τε καὶ παραπλήσια λέγων. [2] τὸ δὲ ἐχώρει ἐν πλαισίῳ τεταγμένον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡγούμενον τὸ Νικίου, ἐφεπόμενον δὲ τὸ Δημοσθένους: τοὺς δὲ σκευοφόρους καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον ὄχλον ἐντὸς εἶχον οἱ ὁπλῖται. [3] καὶ ἐπειδή [τε] ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῇ διαβάσει τοῦ Ἀνάπου ποταμοῦ, ηὗρον ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ παρατεταγμένους τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων, καὶ τρεψάμενοι αὐτοὺς καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ πόρου ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν: οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι παριππεύοντές τε προσέκειντο καὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες οἱ ψιλοί. [4]καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ προελθόντες σταδίους ὡς τεσσαράκοντα ηὐλίσαντο πρὸς λόφῳ τινὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι: τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ πρὼ ἐπορεύοντο καὶ προῆλθον ὡς εἴκοσι σταδίους, καὶ κατέβησαν ἐς χωρίον ἄπεδόν τι καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, βουλόμενοι ἔκ τε τῶν οἰκιῶν λαβεῖν τι ἐδώδιμον ⌈ᾠκεῖτο γὰρ ὁ χῶρος⌉ καὶ ὕδωρ μετὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν φέρεσθαι αὐτόθεν: ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια, ᾗ ἔμελλον ἰέναι, οὐκ ἄφθονον ἦν. [5] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτῳ προελθόντες τὴν δίοδον τὴν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπετείχιζον: ἦν δὲ λόφος καρτερὸς καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν αὐτοῦ χαράδρα κρημνώδης, ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ Ἀκραῖον λέπας. [6]τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προῆσαν, καὶ οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων αὐτοὺς ἱππῆς καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ὄντες πολλοὶ ἑκατέρωθεν ἐκώλυον καὶ ἐσηκόντιζόν τε καὶ παρίππευον. καὶ χρόνον μὲν πολὺν ἐμάχοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔπειτα ἀνεχώρησαν πάλιν ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον. καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκέτι ὁμοίως εἶχον: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀποχωρεῖν οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων.

79. πρῲ δὲ ἄραντες ἐπορεύοντο αὖθις, καὶ ἐβιάσαντο πρὸς τὸν λόφον ἐλθεῖν τὸν ἀποτετειχισμένον, καὶ ηὗρον πρὸ ἑαυτῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποτειχίσματος τὴν πεζὴν στρατιὰν παρατεταγμένην οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγων ἀσπίδων: στενὸν γὰρ ἦν τὸ χωρίον. [2] καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐτειχομάχουν, καὶ βαλλόμενοι ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου ἐπάντους ὄντος διικνοῦντο γὰρ ῥᾷον οἱ ἄνωθεν καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι βιάσασθαι ἀνεχώρουν πάλιν καὶ ἀνεπαύοντο. [3] ἔτυχον δὲ καὶ βρονταί τινες ἅμα γενόμεναι καὶ ὕδωρ, οἷα τοῦ ἔτους πρὸς μετόπωρον ἤδη ὄντος φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι: ἀφ᾽ ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἔτι ἠθύμουν καὶ ἐνόμιζον ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι. [4] ἀναπαυομένων δ᾽ αὐτῶν ὁ Γύλιππος καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πέμπουσι μέρος τι τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀποτειχιοῦντας αὖ ἐκ τοῦ ὄπισθεν αὐτοὺς ᾗ προεληλύθεσαν: ἀντιπέμψαντες δὲ κἀκεῖνοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τινὰς διεκώλυσαν. [5] καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ἀναχωρήσαντες πρὸς τὸ πεδίον μᾶλλον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ηὐλίσαντο. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ προυχώρουν, καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι προσέβαλλόν τε πανταχῇ αὐτοῖς κύκλῳ καὶ πολλοὺς κατετραυμάτιζον, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐπίοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑπεχώρουν, εἰ δ᾽ ἀναχωροῖεν, ἐπέκειντο, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ὑστάτοις προσπίπτοντες, εἴ πως κατὰ βραχὺ τρεψάμενοι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα φοβήσειαν. [6] καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἀντεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔπειτα προελθόντες πέντε ἢ ἓξ σταδίους ἀνεπαύοντο ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ: ἀνεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐς τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον.

80. τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς τῷ Νικίᾳ καὶ Δημοσθένει ἐδόκει, ἐπειδὴ κακῶς σφίσι τὸ στράτευμα εἶχε τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων πάντων ἀπορίᾳ ἤδη, καὶ κατατετραυματισμένοι ἦσαν πολλοὶ ἐν πολλαῖς προσβολαῖς τῶν πολεμίων γεγενημέναις, πυρὰ καύσαντας ὡς πλεῖστα ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιάν, μηκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ᾗ διενοήθησαν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἢ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐτήρουν, πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν. [2] ἦν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα ὁδὸς αὕτη οὐκ ἐπὶ Κατάνης τῷ στρατεύματι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τῆς Σικελίας τὸ πρὸς Καμάριναν καὶ Γέλαν καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ πόλεις καὶ Ἑλληνίδας καὶ βαρβάρους. [3]

καύσαντες οὖν πυρὰ πολλὰ ἐχώρουν ἐν τῇ νυκτί. καὶ αὐτοῖς, οἷον φιλεῖ καὶ πᾶσι στρατοπέδοις, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς μεγίστοις, φόβοι καὶ δείματα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν νυκτί τε καὶ διὰ πολεμίας καὶ ἀπὸ πολεμίων οὐ πολὺ ἀπεχόντων ἰοῦσιν, ἐμπίπτει ταραχή: [4] καὶ τὸ μὲν Νικίου στράτευμα,ὥσπερ ἡγεῖτο, ξυνέμενέ τε καὶ προύλαβε πολλῷ, τὸ δὲ Δημοσθένους, τὸ ἥμισυ μάλιστα καὶ πλέον, ἀπεσπάσθη τε καὶ ἀτακτότερον ἐχώρει. [5] ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἕῳ ἀφικνοῦνται ὅμως πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐσβάντες ἐς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν Ἑλωρίνην καλουμένην ἐπορεύοντο, ὅπως, ἐπειδὴ γένοιντο ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ τῷ Κακυπάρει, παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἴοιεν ἄνω διὰ μεσογείας: ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ τοὺς Σικελοὺς ταύτῃ οὓς μετεπέμψαντο ἀπαντήσεσθαι. [6] ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ, ηὗρον καὶ ἐνταῦθα φυλακήν τινα τῶν Συρακοσίων ἀποτειχίζουσάν τε καὶ ἀποσταυροῦσαν τὸν πόρον. καὶ βιασάμενοι αὐτὴν διέβησάν τε τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ ἐχώρουν αὖθις πρὸς ἄλλον ποταμὸν τὸν Ἐρινεόν: ταύτῃ γὰρ οἱ ἡγεμόνες ἐκέλευον.

81. ἐν τούτῳ δ᾽ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, ὡς ἥ τε ἡμέρα ἐγένετο καὶ ἔγνωσαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπεληλυθότας, ἐν αἰτίᾳ τε οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν Γύλιππον εἶχον ἑκόντα ἀφεῖναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ κατὰ τάχος διώκοντες, ᾗ οὐ χαλεπῶς ᾐσθάνοντο κεχωρηκότας, καταλαμβάνουσι περὶ ἀρίστου ὥραν. [2] καὶ ὡς προσέμειξαν τοῖς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ὑστέροις τ᾽ οὖσι καὶ σχολαίτερον καὶ ἀτακτότερον χωροῦσιν, ὡς τῆς νυκτὸς τότε ξυνεταράχθησαν, εὐθὺς προσπεσόντες ἐμάχοντο, καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐκυκλοῦντό τε ῥᾷον αὐτοὺς δίχα δὴ ὄντας καὶ ξυνῆγον ἐς ταὐτό. [3] τὸ δὲ Νικίου στράτευμα ἀπεῖχεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν καὶ πεντήκοντα σταδίους: θᾶσσόν τε γὰρ ὁ Νικίας ἦγε, νομίζων οὐ τὸ ὑπομένειν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἑκόντας εἶναι καὶ μάχεσθαι σωτηρίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς τάχιστα ὑποχωρεῖν, τοσαῦτα μαχομένους ὅσα ἀναγκάζονται. [4] ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἐτύγχανέ τε τὰ πλείω ἐν πόνῳ ξυνεχεστέρῳ ὢν διὰ τὸ ὑστέρῳ ἀναχωροῦντι αὐτῷ πρώτῳ ἐπικεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τότε γνοὺς τοὺς Συρακοσίους διώκοντας οὐ προυχώρει

μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο, ἕως ἐνδιατρίβων κυκλοῦταί τε ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν πολλῷ θορύβῳ αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν: ἀνειληθέντες γὰρ ἔς τι χωρίον ᾧ κύκλῳ μὲν τειχίον περιῆν, ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν [τε] καὶ ἔνθεν, ἐλάας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβάλλοντο περισταδόν. [5] τοιαύταις δὲ προσβολαῖς καὶ οὐ ξυσταδὸν μάχαις οἱ Συρακόσιοι εἰκότως ἐχρῶντο: τὸ γὰρ ἀποκινδυνεύειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀπονενοημένους οὐ πρὸς ἐκείνων μᾶλλον ἦν ἔτι ἢ πρὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἅμα φειδώ τέ τις ἐγίγνετο ἐπ᾽ εὐπραγίᾳ ἤδη σαφεῖ μὴ προαναλωθῆναί τῳ, καὶ ἐνόμιζον καὶ ὡς ταύτῃ τῇ ἰδέᾳ καταδαμασάμενοι λήψεσθαι αὐτούς.

82. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ οὖν δι᾽ ἡμέρας βάλλοντες πανταχόθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ξυμμάχους ἑώρων ἤδη τεταλαιπωρημένους τοῖς τε τραύμασι καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ κακώσει, κήρυγμα ποιοῦνται Γύλιππος καὶ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρῶτον μὲν τῶν νησιωτῶν εἴ τις βούλεται ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ ὡς σφᾶς ἀπιέναι: καὶ ἀπεχώρησάν τινες πόλεις οὐ πολλαί. [2] ἔπειτα δ᾽ ὕστερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μετὰ Δημοσθένους ὁμολογία γίγνεται ὥστε ὅπλα τε παραδοῦναι καὶ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν μηδένα μήτε βιαίως μήτε δεσμοῖς μήτε τῆς ἀναγκαιοτάτης ἐνδείᾳ διαίτης. [3] καὶ παρέδοσαν οἱ πάντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑξακισχίλιοι, καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ὃ εἶχον ἅπαν κατέθεσαν ἐσβαλόντες ἐς ἀσπίδας ὑπτίας, καὶ ἐνέπλησαν ἀσπίδας τέσσαρας. καὶ τούτους μὲν εὐθὺς ἀπεκόμιζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν: Νικίας δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Ἐρινεόν, καὶ διαβὰς πρὸς μετέωρόν τι καθῖσε τὴν στρατιάν.

83. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ καταλαβόντες αὐτὸν ἔλεγον ὅτι οἱ μετὰ Δημοσθένους παραδεδώκοιεν σφᾶς αὐτούς, κελεύοντες κἀκεῖνον τὸ αὐτὸ δρᾶν: ὁ δ᾽ ἀπιστῶν σπένδεται ἱππέα πέμψαι σκεψόμενον. [2] ὡς δ᾽ οἰχόμενος ἀπήγγειλε πάλιν παραδεδωκότας, ἐπικηρυκεύεται Γυλίππῳ καὶ Συρακοσίοις εἶναι ἑτοῖμος ὑπὲρ Ἀθηναίων ξυμβῆναι, ὅσα ἀνήλωσαν χρήματα Συρακόσιοι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, ταῦτα ἀποδοῦναι, ὥστε τὴν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ στρατιὰν ἀφεῖναι αὐτούς: μέχρι οὗ δ᾽ ἂν τὰ χρήματα ἀποδοθῇ, ἄνδρας δώσειν

Ἀθηναίων ὁμήρους, ἕνα κατὰ τάλαντον. [3] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ Γύλιππος οὐ προσεδέχοντο τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ προσπεσόντες καὶ περιστάντες πανταχόθεν ἔβαλλον καὶ τούτους μέχρι ὀψέ. [4] εἶχον δὲ καὶ οὗτοι πονηρῶς σίτου τε καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀπορίᾳ. ὅμως δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς φυλάξαντες τὸ ἡσυχάζον ἔμελλον πορεύσεσθαι. καὶ ἀναλαμβάνουσί τε τὰ ὅπλα καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι αἰσθάνονται καὶ ἐπαιάνισαν. [5] γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτι οὐ λανθάνουσι, κατέθεντο πάλιν πλὴν τριακοσίων μάλιστα ἀνδρῶν: οὗτοι δὲ διὰ τῶν φυλάκων βιασάμενοι ἐχώρουν τῆς νυκτὸς ᾗ ἐδύναντο.

84. Νικίας δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο ἦγε τὴν στρατιάν: οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι προσέκειντο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πανταχόθεν βάλλοντές τε καὶ κατακοντίζοντες. [2] καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἠπείγοντο πρὸς τὸν Ἀσσίναρον ποταμόν, ἅμα μὲν βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς πανταχόθεν προσβολῆς ἱππέων τε πολλῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ὄχλου, οἰόμενοι ῥᾷόν τι σφίσιν ἔσεσθαι, ἢν διαβῶσι τὸν ποταμόν, ἅμα δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς ταλαιπωρίας καὶ τοῦ πιεῖν ἐπιθυμίᾳ. [3] ὡς δὲ γίγνονται ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ἐσπίπτουσιν οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἔτι, ἀλλὰ πᾶς τέ τις διαβῆναι αὐτὸς πρῶτος βουλόμενος καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι ἐπικείμενοι χαλεπὴν ἤδη τὴν διάβασιν ἐποίουν: ἀθρόοι γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενοι χωρεῖν ἐπέπιπτόν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ κατεπάτουν, περί τε τοῖς δορατίοις καὶ σκεύεσιν οἱ μὲν εὐθὺς διεφθείροντο, οἱ δὲ ἐμπαλασσόμενοι κατέρρεον. [4] ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερά τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ παραστάντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι ― ἦν δὲ κρημνῶδες ― ἔβαλλον ἄνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ ποταμῷ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταρασσομένους. [5] οἵ τε Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπικαταβάντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ μάλιστα ἔσφαζον. καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ εὐθὺς διέφθαρτο, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπίνετό τε ὁμοῦ τῷ πηλῷ ᾑματωμένον καὶ περιμάχητον ἦν τοῖς πολλοῖς.

85. τέλος δὲ νεκρῶν τε πολλῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ἤδη κειμένων ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ καὶ διεφθαρμένου τοῦ στρατεύματος τοῦ μὲν κατὰ τὸν ποταμόν, τοῦ δὲ καί, εἴ τι

διαφύγοι, ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων, Νικίας Γυλίππῳ ἑαυτὸν παραδίδωσι, πιστεύσας μᾶλλον αὐτῷ ἢ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις: καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν χρήσασθαι ἐκέλευεν ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ὅτι βούλονται, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους στρατιώτας παύσασθαι φονεύοντας. [2] καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος μετὰ τοῦτο ζωγρεῖν ἤδη ἐκέλευεν: καὶ τούς τε λοιποὺς ὅσους μὴ ἀπεκρύψαντο — πολλοὶ δὲ οὗτοι ἐγένοντο — ξυνεκόμισαν ζῶντας, καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τριακοσίους, οἳ τὴν φυλακὴν διεξῆλθον τῆς νυκτός, πέμψαντες τοὺς διωξομένους ξυνέλαβον. [3] τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀθροισθὲν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐς τὸ κοινὸν οὐ πολὺ ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ διακλαπὲν πολύ, καὶ διεπλήσθη πᾶσα Σικελία αὐτῶν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ὥσπερ τῶν μετὰ Δημοσθένους ληφθέντων. [4] μέρος δέ τι οὐκ ὀλίγον καὶ ἀπέθανεν: πλεῖστος γὰρ δὴ φόνος οὗτος καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐλάσσων τῶν ἐν τῷ [Σικελικῷ] πολέμῳ τούτῳ ἐγένετο. καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις προσβολαῖς ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πορείαν συχναῖς γενομέναις οὐκ ὀλίγοι ἐτεθνήκεσαν. πολλοὶ δὲ ὅμως καὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παραυτίκα, οἱ δὲ καὶ δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ὕστερον: τούτοις δ᾽ ἦν ἀναχώρησις ἐς Κατάνην.

86. ξυναθροισθέντες δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, τῶν τε αἰχμαλώτων ὅσους ἐδύναντο πλείστους καὶ τὰ σκῦλα ἀναλαβόντες, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν. [2] καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὁπόσους ἔλαβον κατεβίβασαν ἐς τὰς λιθοτομίας, ἀσφαλεστάτην εἶναι νομίσαντες τήρησιν, Νικίαν δὲ καὶ Δημοσθένη ἄκοντος τοῦ Γυλίππου ἀπέσφαξαν. ὁ γὰρ Γύλιππος καλὸν τὸ ἀγώνισμα ἐνόμιζέν οἱ εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοὺς ἀντιστρατήγους κομίσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις. [3] ξυνέβαινε δὲ τὸν μὲν πολεμιώτατον αὐτοῖς εἶναι, Δημοσθένη, διὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ Πύλῳ, τὸν δὲ διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδειότατον: τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὁ Νικίας προυθυμήθη, σπονδὰς πείσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ποιήσασθαι, ὥστε ἀφεθῆναι. [4] ἀνθ᾽ ὧν οἵ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἦσαν αὐτῷ προσφιλεῖς κἀκεῖνος οὐχ ἥκιστα διὰ τοῦτο πιστεύσας ἑαυτὸν τῷ Γυλίππῳ παρέδωκεν. ἀλλὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων

τινές, ὡς ἐλέγετο, οἱ μὲν δείσαντες, ὅτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκεκοινολόγηντο, μὴ βασανιζόμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο ταραχὴν σφίσιν ἐν εὐπραγίᾳ ποιήσῃ, ἄλλοι δέ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ Κορίνθιοι, μὴ χρήμασι δὴ πείσας τινάς, ὅτι πλούσιος ἦν, ἀποδρᾷ καὶ αὖθις σφίσι νεώτερόν τι ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ γένηται, πείσαντες τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀπέκτειναν αὐτόν. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτῃ ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων αἰτίᾳ ἐτεθνήκει, ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ᾽ ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν.

87. τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς λιθοτομίαις οἱ Συρακόσιοι χαλεπῶς τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους μετεχείρισαν. ἐν γὰρ κοίλῳ χωρίῳ ὄντας καὶ ὀλίγῳ πολλοὺς οἵ τε ἥλιοι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ πνῖγος ἔτι ἐλύπει διὰ τὸ ἀστέγαστον καὶ αἱ νύκτες ἐπιγιγνόμεναι τοὐναντίον μετοπωριναὶ καὶ ψυχραὶ τῇ μεταβολῇ ἐς ἀσθένειαν ἐνεωτέριζον, [2] πάντα τε ποιούντων αὐτῶν διὰ στενοχωρίαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ προσέτι τῶν νεκρῶν ὁμοῦ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ξυννενημένων, οἳ ἔκ τε τῶν τραυμάτων καὶ διὰ τὴν μεταβολὴν καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπέθνῃσκον, καὶ ὀσμαὶ ἦσαν οὐκ ἀνεκτοί, καὶ λιμῷ ἅμα καὶ δίψῃ ἐπιέζοντο ⌈ἐδίδοσαν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἑκάστῳ ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ μῆνας κοτύλην ὕδατος καὶ δύο κοτύλας σίτου⌉, ἄλλα τε ὅσα εἰκὸς ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ ἐμπεπτωκότας κακοπαθῆσαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπεγένετο αὐτοῖς: [3] καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἑβδομήκοντά τινας οὕτω διῃτήθησαν ἀθρόοι: ἔπειτα πλὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἴ τινες Σικελιωτῶν ἢ Ἰταλιωτῶν ξυνεστράτευσαν, τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπέδοντο. [4] ἐλήφθησαν δὲ οἱ ξύμπαντες, ἀκριβείᾳ μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐξειπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἑπτακισχιλίων. [5] ξυνέβη τε ἔργον τοῦτο [Ἑλληνικὸν] τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε μέγιστον γενέσθαι, δοκεῖν δ᾽ ἔμοιγε καὶ ὧν ἀκοῇ Ἑλληνικῶν ἴσμεν, καὶ τοῖς τε κρατήσασι λαμπρότατον καὶ τοῖς διαφθαρεῖσι δυστυχέστατον: [6] κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως νικηθέντες καὶ οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδὲν κακοπαθήσαντες πανωλεθρίᾳ δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ πεζὸς καὶ νῆες καὶ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπώλετο,

καὶ ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀπενόστησαν. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Σικελίαν γενόμενα.

Βιβλίο Η’

1. ἐς δὲ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπειδὴ ἠγγέλθη, ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἠπίστουν καὶ τοῖς πάνυ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου διαπεφευγόσι καὶ σαφῶς ἀγγέλλουσι, μὴ οὕτω γε ἄγαν πανσυδὶ διεφθάρθαι: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς ξυμπροθυμηθεῖσι τῶν ῥητόρων τὸν ἔκπλουν, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισάμενοι, ὠργίζοντο δὲ καὶ τοῖς χρησμολόγοις τε καὶ μάντεσι καὶ ὁπόσοι τι τότε αὐτοὺς θειάσαντες ἐπήλπισαν ὡς λήψονται Σικελίαν. [2] πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει τε καὶ περιειστήκει ἐπὶ τῷ γεγενημένῳ φόβος τε καὶ κατάπληξις μεγίστη δή. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ στερόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ πόλις ὁπλιτῶν τε πολλῶν καὶ ἱππέων καὶ ἡλικίας οἵαν οὐχ ἑτέραν ἑώρων ὑπάρχουσαν ἐβαρύνοντο: ἅμα δὲ ναῦς οὐχ ὁρῶντες ἐν τοῖς νεωσοίκοις ἱκανὰς οὐδὲ χρήματα ἐν τῷ κοινῷ οὐδ᾽ ὑπηρεσίας ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀνέλπιστοι ἦσαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι σωθήσεσθαι, τούς τε ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας πολεμίους εὐθὺς σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον τῷ ναυτικῷ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ πλευσεῖσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοσοῦτον κρατήσαντας, καὶ τοὺς αὐτόθεν πολεμίους τότε δὴ καὶ διπλασίως πάντα παρεσκευασμένους κατὰ κράτος ἤδη καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἐπικείσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους σφῶν μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀποστάντας. [3] ὅμως δὲ ὡς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐδόκει χρῆναι μὴ ἐνδιδόναι, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ ναυτικόν, ὅθεν ἂν δύνωνται ξύλα ξυμπορισαμένους, καὶ χρήματα, καὶ τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς ἀσφάλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τὴν Εὔβοιαν, τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι, καὶ ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἑλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ προβουλεύσουσιν. [4] πάντα τε πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεές, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν. καὶ ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐποίουν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

2. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας τῶν Ἀθηναίων μεγάλην κακοπραγίαν εὐθὺς οἱ

Ἕλληνες πάντες ἐπηρμένοι ἦσαν, οἱ μὲν μηδετέρων ὄντες ξύμμαχοι, ὡς, ἤν τις καὶ μὴ παρακαλῇ σφᾶς, οὐκ ἀποστατέον ἔτι τοῦ πολέμου εἴη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐθελοντὶ ἰτέον ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, νομίσαντες κἂν ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἕκαστοι ἐλθεῖν αὐτούς, εἰ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ κατώρθωσαν, καὶ ἅμα βραχὺν ἔσεσθαι τὸν λοιπὸν πόλεμον, οὗ μετασχεῖν καλὸν εἶναι, οἱ δ᾽ αὖ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοι ξυμπροθυμηθέντες ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ πρὶν ἀπαλλάξεσθαι διὰ τάχους πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας. [2] μάλιστα δὲ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἀφίστασθαι διὰ τὸ ὀργῶντες κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα καὶ μηδ᾽ ὑπολείπειν λόγον αὐτοῖς ὡς τό γ᾽ ἐπιὸν θέρος οἷοί τ᾽ ἔσονται περιγενέσθαι. [3] ἡ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις πᾶσί τε τούτοις ἐθάρσει καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας αὐτοῖς ξύμμαχοι πολλῇ δυνάμει, κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἤδη τοῦ ναυτικοῦ προσγεγενημένου, ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ὡς εἰκὸς παρέσεσθαι ἔμελλον. [4] πανταχόθεν τε εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀπροφασίστως ἅπτεσθαι διενοοῦντο τοῦ πολέμου, λογιζόμενοι καλῶς τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ κινδύνων τε τοιούτων ἀπηλλάχθαι ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν οἷος καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων περιέστη ἂν αὐτούς, εἰ τὸ Σικελικὸν προσέλαβον, καὶ καθελόντες ἐκείνους αὐτοὶ τῆς πάσης Ἑλλάδος ἤδη ἀσφαλῶς ἡγήσεσθαι.

3. εὐθὺς οὖν Ἆγις μὲν ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ ὁρμηθεὶς στρατῷ τινὶ ἐκ Δεκελείας τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων ἠργυρολόγησεν ἐς τὸ ναυτικὸν καὶ τραπόμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ Μηλιῶς κόλπου Οἰταίων τε κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ἔχθραν τῆς λείας τὴν πολλὴν ἀπολαβὼν χρήματα ἐπράξατο, καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς τοὺς Φθιώτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ταύτῃ Θεσσαλῶν ὑπηκόους μεμφομένων καὶ ἀκόντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ὁμήρους τέ τινας ἠνάγκασε δοῦναι καὶ χρήματα, καὶ κατέθετο τοὺς ὁμήρους ἐς Κόρινθον, ἔς τε τὴν ξυμμαχίαν ἐπειρᾶτο προσάγειν. [2] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσταξιν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκατὸν νεῶν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ἑαυτοῖς μὲν καὶ Βοιωτοῖς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἑκατέροις ἔταξαν, Φωκεῦσι δὲ καὶ Λοκροῖς πέντε καὶ δέκα, καὶ Κορινθίοις πέντε καὶ δέκα, Ἀρκάσι δὲ καὶ Πελληνεῦσι

καὶ Σικυωνίοις δέκα, Μεγαρεῦσι δὲ καὶ Τροιζηνίοις καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίοις καὶ Ἑρμιονεῦσι δέκα: τά τε ἄλλα παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς εὐθὺς πρὸς τὸ ἔαρ ἐξόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου.

4. παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ τήν τε ναυπηγίαν, ξύλα ξυμπορισάμενοι, καὶ Σούνιον τειχίσαντες, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ἀσφάλεια ταῖς σιταγωγοῖς ναυσὶν εἴη τοῦ περίπλου, καὶ τό τε ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ τείχισμα ἐκλιπόντες ὃ ἐνῴκοδόμησαν παραπλέοντες ἐς Σικελίαν, καὶ τἆλλα, εἴ πού τι ἐδόκει ἀχρεῖον ἀναλίσκεσθαι, ξυστελλόμενοι ἐς εὐτέλειαν, μάλιστα δὲ τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων διασκοποῦντες ὅπως μὴ σφῶν ἀποστήσονται.

5. πρασσόντων δὲ ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρων καὶ ὄντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων ἐν κατασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου, πρῶτοι Εὐβοῆς ὡς Ἆγιν περὶ ἀποστάσεως τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπρεσβεύσαντο ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ. ὁ δὲ προσδεξάμενος τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν μεταπέμπεται ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος Ἀλκαμένη τὸν Σθενελαΐδου καὶ Μέλανθον ἄρχοντας ὡς ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν: οἱ δ᾽ ἦλθον ἔχοντες τῶν νεοδαμωδῶν ὡς τριακοσίους, καὶ παρεσκεύαζεν αὐτοῖς τὴν διάβασιν. [2] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ καὶ Λέσβιοι ἦλθον βουλόμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀποστῆναι: καὶ ξυμπρασσόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀναπείθεται Ἆγις ὥστε Εὐβοίας μὲν πέρι ἐπισχεῖν, τοῖς δὲ Λεσβίοις παρεσκεύαζε τὴν ἀπόστασιν, Ἀλκαμένη τε ἁρμοστὴν διδούς, ὃς ἐς Εὔβοιαν πλεῖν ἔμελλε, καὶ δέκα μὲν Βοιωτοὶ ναῦς ὑπέσχοντο, δέκα δὲ Ἆγις. [3] καὶ ταῦτα ἄνευ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πόλεως ἐπράσσετο: ὁ γὰρ Ἆγις, ὅσον χρόνον ἦν περὶ Δεκέλειαν ἔχων τὴν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν, κύριος ἦν καὶ ἀποστέλλειν εἴ ποί τινα ἐβούλετο στρατιὰν καὶ ξυναγείρειν καὶ χρήματα πράσσειν. καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὡς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν αὐτοῦ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὑπήκουον [ἢ] τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει Λακεδαιμονίων: δύναμιν γὰρ ἔχων αὐτὸς εὐθὺς ἐκασταχόσε δεινὸς παρῆν. [4]καὶ ὁ μὲν τοῖς Λεσβίοις ἔπρασσε, Χῖοι δὲ καὶ Ἐρυθραῖοι ἀποστῆναι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες πρὸς μὲν Ἆγιν οὐκ ἐτράποντο, ἐς δὲ τὴν

Λακεδαίμονα. καὶ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνους, ὃς βασιλεῖ Δαρείῳ τῷ Ἀρταξέρξου στρατηγὸς ἦν τῶν κάτω, πρεσβευτὴς ἅμα μετ᾽ αὐτῶν παρῆν. [5] ἐπήγετο γὰρ καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς Πελοποννησίους καὶ ὑπισχνεῖτο τροφὴν παρέξειν. ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένος τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσεσθαι ἐπωφείλησεν: τούς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἅμα βασιλεῖ ξυμμάχους Λακεδαιμονίους ποιήσειν, καὶ Ἀμόργην τὸν Πισσούθνου υἱὸν νόθον, ἀφεστῶτα περὶ Καρίαν, ὥσπερ αὐτῷ προσέταξε βασιλεύς, ἢ ζῶντα ἄξειν ἢ ἀποκτενεῖν.

6. οἱ μὲν οὖν Χῖοι καὶ Τισσαφέρνης κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔπρασσον, Καλλίγειτος δὲ ὁ Λαοφῶντος Μεγαρεὺς καὶ Τιμαγόρας ὁ Ἀθηναγόρου Κυζικηνός, φυγάδες τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀμφότεροι παρὰ Φαρναβάζῳ τῷ Φαρνάκου κατοικοῦντες, ἀφικνοῦνται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πέμψαντος Φαρναβάζου, ὅπως ναῦς κομίσειαν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ αὐτός, εἰ δύναιτο, ἅπερ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης προυθυμεῖτο, τάς τε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις ἀποστήσειε τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τοὺς φόρους καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ποιήσειεν. [2]πρασσόντων δὲ ταῦτα χωρὶς ἑκατέρων, τῶν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ Φαρναβάζου καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους, πολλὴ ἅμιλλα ἐγίγνετο τῶν ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι, ὅπως οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ Χίον, οἱ δ᾽ ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον πρότερον ναῦς καὶ στρατιὰν πείσουσι πέμπειν. [3] οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ τῶν Χίων καὶ Τισσαφέρνους παρὰ πολὺ προσεδέξαντο μᾶλλον: ξυνέπρασσε γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Ἐνδίῳ ἐφορεύοντι πατρικὸς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ξένος ὤν, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα Λακωνικὸν ἡ οἰκία αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ξενίαν ἔσχεν: Ἔνδιος γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐκαλεῖτο. [4] ὅμως δ᾽ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρῶτον κατάσκοπον ἐς τὴν Χίον πέμψαντες Φρῦνιν ἄνδρα περίοικον, εἰ αἵ τε νῆες αὐτοῖς εἰσὶν ὅσασπερ ἔλεγον καὶ τἆλλα εἰ ἡ πόλις ἱκανή ἐστι πρὸς τὴν λεγομένην δόξαν, ἀπαγγείλαντος αὐτοῖς ὡς εἴη ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ἅπερ ἤκουον,

τούς τε Χίους καὶ τοὺς Ἐρυθραίους εὐθὺς ξυμμάχους ἐποιήσαντο καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς ἐψηφίσαντο αὐτοῖς πέμπειν, ὡς ἐκεῖ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἢ ἑξήκοντα ἀφ᾽ ὧν οἱ Χῖοι ἔλεγον ὑπαρχουσῶν. [5] καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον δέκα τούτων αὐτοὶ ἔμελλον πέμψειν, καὶ Μελαγχρίδαν, ὃς αὐτοῖς ναύαρχος ἦν: ἔπειτα σεισμοῦ γενομένου ἀντὶ τοῦ Μελαγχρίδου Χαλκιδέα ἔπεμπον καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν δέκα νεῶν πέντε παρεσκευάζοντο ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα καὶ ἐνὸς δέον εἰκοστὸν ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

7. ἅμα δὲ τῷ ἦρι τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς ἐπειγομένων τῶν Χίων ἀποστεῖλαι τὰς ναῦς καὶ δεδιότων μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ πρασσόμενα αἴσθωνται πάντες γὰρ κρύφα αὐτῶν ἐπρεσβεύοντο , ἀποπέμπουσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς Κόρινθον ἄνδρας Σπαρτιάτας τρεῖς, ὅπως ἀπὸ τῆς ἑτέρας θαλάσσης ὡς τάχιστα ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἀθήνας ὑπερενεγκόντες τὰς ναῦς τὸν Ἰσθμὸν κελεύσωσι πλεῖν ἐς Χίον πάσας, καὶ ἃς ὁ Ἄγις παρεσκεύαζεν ἐς τὴν Λέσβον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας: ἦσαν δὲ αἱ ξύμπασαι τῶν ξυμμαχίδων νῆες αὐτόθι μιᾶς δέουσαι τεσσαράκοντα.

8. ὁ μὲν οὖν Καλλίγειτος καὶ Τιμαγόρας ὑπὲρ τοῦ Φαρναβάζου οὐκ ἐκοινοῦντο τὸν στόλον ἐς τὴν Χίον, οὐδὲ τὰ χρήματα ἐδίδοσαν ἃ ἦλθον ἔχοντες ἐς τὴν ἀποστολὴν πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι τάλαντα, ἀλλ᾽ ὕστερον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν διενοοῦντο ἄλλῳ στόλῳ πλεῖν: [2] ὁ δὲ Ἄγις ἐπειδὴ ἑώρα τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐς τὴν Χίον πρῶτον ὡρμημένους, οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἄλλο τι ἐγίγνωσκεν, ἀλλὰ ξυνελθόντες ἐς Κόρινθον οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐβουλεύοντο, καὶ ἔδοξε πρῶτον ἐς Χίον αὐτοῖς πλεῖν ἄρχοντα ἔχοντας Χαλκιδέα, ὃς ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ τὰς πέντε ναῦς παρεσκεύαζεν, ἔπειτα ἐς Λέσβον καὶ Ἀλκαμένη ἄρχοντα, ὅνπερ καὶ Ἄγις διενοεῖτο, τὸ τελευταῖον δὲ ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἀφικέσθαι προσετέτακτο δὲ ἐς αὐτὸν ἄρχων Κλέαρχος ὁ Ῥαμφίου , [3] διαφέρειν δὲ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν τὰς ἡμισείας τῶν νεῶν πρῶτον, καὶ εὐθὺς ταύτας ἀποπλεῖν, ὅπως μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς τὰς ἀφορμωμένας μᾶλλον τὸν νοῦν ἔχωσιν ἢ τὰς ὕστερον ἐπιδιαφερομένας. [4] καὶ γὰρ τὸν

πλοῦν ταύτῃ ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐποιοῦντο, καταφρονήσαντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀδυνασίαν, ὅτι ναυτικὸν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν πολύ πω ἐφαίνετο. ὡς δὲ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ διεκόμισαν εὐθὺς μίαν καὶ εἴκοσι ναῦς.

9. οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι, ἐπειγομένων αὐτῶν τὸν πλοῦν, οὐ προυθυμήθησαν ξυμπλεῖν πρὶν τὰ Ἴσθμια, ἃ τότε ἦν, διεορτάσωσιν. Ἄγις δὲ αὐτοῖς ἑτοῖμος ἦν ἐκείνους μὲν μὴ λύειν δὴ τὰς Ἰσθμιάδας σπονδάς, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ τὸν στόλον ἴδιον ποιήσασθαι. [2] οὐ ξυγχωρούντων δὲ τῶν Κορινθίων, ἀλλὰ διατριβῆς ἐγγιγνομένης, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ᾐσθάνοντο τὰ τῶν Χίων μᾶλλον, καὶ πέμψαντες ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν Ἀριστοκράτη ἐπῃτιῶντο αὐτούς, καὶ ἀρνουμένων τῶν Χίων τὸ πιστὸν ναῦς σφίσι ξυμπέμπειν ἐκέλευον ἐς τὸ ξυμμαχικόν: οἱ δ᾽ ἔπεμψαν ἑπτά. [3] αἴτιον δ᾽ ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα, οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ξυνειδότες τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοί πω πολέμιον ἔχειν, πρίν τι καὶ ἰσχυρὸν λάβωσι, καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι προσδεχόμενοι ἥξειν, ὅτι διέτριβον.

10. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὰ Ἴσθμια ἐγίγνετο, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπηγγέλθησαν γάρ ἐθεώρουν ἐς αὐτά, καὶ κατάδηλα μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς τὰ τῶν Χίων ἐφάνη. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀνεχώρησαν, παρεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς ὅπως μὴ λήσουσιν αὐτοὺς αἱ νῆες ἐκ τῶν Κεγχρειῶν ἀφορμηθεῖσαι. [2] οἱ δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν ἀνήγοντο μιᾷ καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Χίον, ἄρχοντα Ἀλκαμένη ἔχοντες. καὶ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον ἴσαις ναυσὶ προσπλεύσαντες ὑπῆγον ἐς τὸ πέλαγος. ὡς δ᾽ ἐπὶ πολὺ οὐκ ἐπηκολούθησαν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπετράποντο, ἐπανεχώρησαν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι: τὰς γὰρ τῶν Χίων ἑπτὰ ναῦς ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ μετὰ σφῶν ἔχοντες οὐ πιστὰς ἐνόμιζον, [3] ἀλλ᾽ ὕστερον ἄλλας προσπληρώσαντες ἐς ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα παραπλέοντας αὐτοὺς καταδιώκουσιν ἐς Σπείραιον τῆς Κορινθίας: ἔστι δὲ λιμὴν ἐρῆμος καὶ ἔσχατος πρὸς τὰ μεθόρια τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας. καὶ μίαν μὲν ναῦν ἀπολλύασι μετέωρον οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ξυναγαγόντες ὁρμίζουσιν. [4] καὶ προσβαλόντων τῶν

Ἀθηναίων καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀποβάντων θόρυβός τε ἐγένετο πολὺς καὶ ἄτακτος, καὶ τῶν τε νεῶν τὰς πλείους κατατραυματίζουσιν ἐν τῇ γῇ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα Ἀλκαμένη ἀποκτείνουσιν: καὶ αὐτῶν τινὲς ἀπέθανον.

11. διακριθέντες δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὰς πολεμίας ναῦς ἐπέταξαν ἐφορμεῖν ἱκανάς, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς ἐς τὸ νησίδιον ὁρμίζονται ἐν ᾧ οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχοντι ἑστρατοπεδεύοντο, καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπὶ βοήθειαν ἔπεμπον. [2] παρῆσαν γὰρ καὶ τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἵ τε Κορίνθιοι βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πρόσχωροι. καὶ ὁρῶντες τὴν φυλακὴν ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ ἐπίπονον οὖσαν ἠπόρουν, καὶ ἐπενόησαν μὲν κατακαῦσαι τὰς ναῦς, ἔπειτα δὲ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἀνελκύσαι καὶ τῷ πεζῷ προσκαθημένους φυλακὴν ἔχειν, ἕως ἄν τις παρατύχῃ διαφυγὴ ἐπιτηδεία. ἔπεμψε δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἆγις αἰσθόμενος ταῦτα ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην Θέρμωνα. [3] τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις πρῶτον μὲν ἠγγέλθη ὅτι αἱ νῆες ἀνηγμέναι εἰσὶν ἐκ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ ⸀εἴρητο γάρ, ὅταν γένηται τοῦτο, Ἀλκαμένει ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἱππέα πέμψαι⸁, καὶ εὐθὺς τὰς παρὰ σφῶν πέντε ναῦς καὶ Χαλκιδέα ἄρχοντα καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐβούλοντο πέμπειν: ἔπειτα ὡρμημένων αὐτῶν τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ Σπειραίῳ τῶν νεῶν καταφυγὴν ἠγγέλθη, καὶ ἀθυμήσαντες, ὅτι πρῶτον ἁπτόμενοι τοῦ Ἰωνικοῦ πολέμου ἔπταισαν, τὰς ναῦς τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν οὐκέτι διενοοῦντο πέμπειν, ἀλλὰ καί τινας προανηγμένας μετακαλεῖν.

12. γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης πείθει αὖθις Ἔνδιον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐφόρους μὴ ἀποκνῆσαι τὸν πλοῦν, λέγων ὅτι φθήσονταί τε πλεύσαντες πρὶν τὴν τῶν νεῶν ξυμφορὰν Χίους αἰσθέσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ὅταν προσβάλῃ Ἰωνίᾳ, ῥᾳδίως πείσειν τὰς πόλεις ἀφίστασθαι τήν τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων λέγων ἀσθένειαν καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων προθυμίαν: πιστότερος γὰρ ἄλλων φανεῖσθαι. [2] Ἐνδίῳ τε αὐτῷ ἰδίᾳ ἔλεγε καλὸν εἶναι δι᾽ ἐκείνου ἀποστῆσαί τε Ἰωνίαν καὶ βασιλέα ξύμμαχον ποιῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ μὴ Ἄγιδος τὸ ἀγώνισμα τοῦτο γενέσθαι: ἐτύγχανε γὰρ τῷ Ἄγιδι αὐτὸς

διάφορος ὤν. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν πείσας τούς τε ἄλλους ἐφόρους καὶ Ἔνδιον ἀνήγετο ταῖς πέντε ναυσὶ μετὰ Χαλκιδέως τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου, καὶ διὰ τάχους τὸν πλοῦν ἐποιοῦντο.

13. ἀνεκομίζοντο δὲ ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας Πελοποννησίων ἑκκαίδεκα νῆες αἱ μετὰ Γυλίππου ξυνδιαπολεμήσασαι: καὶ περὶ τὴν Λευκάδα ἀποληφθεῖσαι καὶ κοπεῖσαι ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι νεῶν, ὧν ἦρχεν Ἱπποκλῆς Μενίππου φυλακὴν ἔχων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας νεῶν, αἱ λοιπαὶ πλὴν μιᾶς διαφυγοῦσαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους κατέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον.

14. ὁ δὲ Χαλκιδεὺς καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλέοντες ὅσοις τε ἐπιτύχοιεν ξυνελάμβανον τοῦ μὴ ἐξάγγελτοι γενέσθαι, καὶ προσβαλόντες πρῶτον Κωρύκῳ τῆς ἠπείρου καὶ ἀφέντες ἐνταῦθα αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ μὲν προξυγγενόμενοι τῶν ξυμπρασσόντων Χίων τισὶ καὶ κελευόντων καταπλεῖν μὴ προειπόντας ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφικνοῦνται αἰφνίδιοι τοῖς Χίοις. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐν θαύματι ἦσαν καὶ ἐκπλήξει: τοῖς δ᾽ ὀλίγοις παρεσκεύαστο ὥστε βουλήν [τε] τυχεῖν ξυλλεγομένην, καὶ γενομένων λόγων ἀπό τε τοῦ Χαλκιδέως καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου ὡς ἄλλαι [τε] νῆες πολλαὶ προσπλέουσι καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιορκίας τῶν ἐν τῷ Σπειραίῳ νεῶν οὐ δηλωσάντων, ἀφίστανται Χῖοι καὶ αὖθις Ἐρυθραῖοι Ἀθηναίων. [3] καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τρισὶ ναυσὶ πλεύσαντες καὶ Κλαζομενὰς ἀφιστᾶσιν. διαβάντες τε εὐθὺς οἱ Κλαζομένιοι ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον τὴν Πολίχναν ἐτείχιζον, εἴ τι δέοι, σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς νησῖδος ἐν ᾗ οἰκοῦσι πρὸς ἀναχώρησιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀφεστῶτες ἐν τειχισμῷ τε πάντες ἦσαν καὶ παρασκευῇ πολέμου:

15. ἐς δὲ τὰς Ἀθήνας ταχὺ ἀγγελία τῆς Χίου ἀφικνεῖται: καὶ νομίσαντες μέγαν ἤδη καὶ σαφῆ τὸν κίνδυνον σφᾶς περιεστάναι, καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ξυμμάχους οὐκ ἐθελήσειν τῆς μεγίστης πόλεως μεθεστηκυίας ἡσυχάζειν, τά τε χίλια τάλαντα, ὧν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου ἐγλίχοντο μὴ ἅψασθαι, εὐθὺς ἔλυσαν τὰς ἐπικειμένας ζημίας τῷ εἰπόντι ἢ ἐπιψηφίσαντι ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἐκπλήξεως, καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο κινεῖν καὶ ναῦς πληροῦν οὐκ ὀλίγας, τῶν τε ἐν τῷ Σπειραίῳ

ἐφορμουσῶν τὰς μὲν ὀκτὼ ἤδη πέμπειν, αἳ ἀπολιποῦσαι τὴν φυλακὴν τὰς μετὰ Χαλκιδέως διώξασαι καὶ οὐ καταλαβοῦσαι ἀνεκεχωρήκεσαν ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Στρομβιχίδης Διοτίμου, ἄλλας δὲ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον βοηθεῖν δώδεκα μετὰ Θρασυκλέους, ἀπολιπούσας καὶ ταύτας τὴν ἐφόρμησιν. [2] τάς τε τῶν Χίων ἑπτὰ ναῦς, αἳ αὐτοῖς ξυνεπολιόρκουν τὰς ἐν τῷ Σπειραίῳ, ἀπαγαγόντες τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐξ αὐτῶν ἠλευθέρωσαν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐλευθέρους κατέδησαν. ἑτέρας δὲ <δέκα> ἀντὶ πασῶν τῶν ἀπελθουσῶν νεῶν ἐς τὴν ἐφόρμησιν τῶν Πελοποννησίων διὰ τάχους πληρώσαντες ἀντέπεμψαν καὶ ἄλλας διενοοῦντο τριάκοντα πληροῦν. καὶ πολλὴ ἦν ἡ προθυμία καὶ ὀλίγον ἐπράσσετο οὐδὲν ἐς τὴν βοήθειαν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Χίον.

16. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Στρομβιχίδης ταῖς ὀκτὼ ναυσὶν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Σάμον, καὶ προσλαβὼν Σαμίαν μίαν ἔπλευσεν ἐς Τέων καὶ ἡσυχάζειν ἠξίου αὐτούς. ἐκ δὲ τῆς Χίου ἐς τὴν Τέων καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς μετὰ τριῶν καὶ εἴκοσι νεῶν ἐπέπλει καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα ὁ τῶν Κλαζομενίων καὶ Ἐρυθραίων παρῆει. [2] προαισθόμενος δὲ ὁ Στρομβιχίδης ἐξανήγετο καὶ μετεωρισθεὶς ἐν τῷ πελάγει ὡς ἑώρα τὰς ναῦς πολλὰς τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς Χίου, φυγὴν ἐποιεῖτο ἐπὶ τῆς Σάμου: αἱ δὲ ἐδίωκον. [3] τὸν δὲ πεζὸν οἱ Τήιοι τὸ πρῶτον οὐκ ἐσδεχόμενοι, ὡς ἔφυγον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐσηγάγοντο. καὶ ἐπέσχον μὲν οἱ πεζοὶ καὶ Χαλκιδέα ἐκ τῆς διώξεως περιμένοντες: ὡς δὲ ἐχρόνιζε, καθῄρουν αὐτοί τε τὸ τεῖχος ὃ ἀνῳκοδόμησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς Τηίων πόλεως τὸ πρὸς ἤπειρον, ξυγκαθῄρουν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπελθόντες οὐ πολλοί, ὧν ἦρχε Στάγης ὕπαρχος Τισσαφέρνους.

17. Χαλκιδεὺς δὲ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ὡς κατεδίωξαν ἐς Σάμον Στρομβιχίδην, ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου νεῶν τοὺς ναύτας ὁπλίσαντες ἐν Χίῳ καταλιμπάνουσιν, ἀντιπληρώσαντες δὲ ταύτας τε ἐκ Χίου καὶ ἄλλας εἴκοσιν ἔπλεον ἐς Μίλητον ὡς ἀποστήσοντες: [2] ἐβούλετο γὰρ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὢν ἐπιτήδειος τοῖς προεστῶσι τῶν Μιλησίων, φθάσαι τάς τε ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ναῦς προσαγαγόμενος αὐτοὺς καὶ τοῖς Χίοις καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ

Χαλκιδεῖ καὶ τῷ ἀποστείλαντι Ἐνδίῳ, ὥσπερ ὑπέσχετο, τὸ ἀγώνισμα προσθεῖναι, ὅτι πλείστας τῶν πόλεων μετὰ τῆς Χίων δυνάμεως καὶ Χαλκιδέως ἀποστήσας. [3] λαθόντες οὖν τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ πλοῦ καὶ φθάσαντες οὐ πολὺ τόν τε Στρομβιχίδην καὶ τὸν Θρασυκλέα, ὃς ἔτυχεν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν δώδεκα ναυσὶν ἄρτι παρὼν καὶ ξυνδιώκων, ἀφιστᾶσι τὴν Μίλητον. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ πόδας μιᾶς δεούσαις εἴκοσι ναυσὶν ἐπιπλεύσαντες, ὡς αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐδέχοντο οἱ Μιλήσιοι, ἐν Λάδῃ τῇ ἐπικειμένῃ νήσῳ ἐφώρμουν. [4] καὶ ἡ πρὸς βασιλέα ξυμμαχία Λακεδαιμονίοις ἡ πρώτη Μιλησίων εὐθὺς ἀποστάντων διὰ Τισσαφέρνους καὶ Χαλκιδέως ἐγένετο ἥδε.

18. ‘ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς βασιλέα καὶ Τισσαφέρνην Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι. ὁπόσην χώραν καὶ πόλεις βασιλεὺς ἔχει καὶ οἱ πατέρες οἱ βασιλέως εἶχον, βασιλέως ἔστω: καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν πόλεων ὁπόσα Ἀθηναίοις ἐφοίτα χρήματα ἢ ἄλλο τι, κωλυόντων κοινῇ βασιλεὺς καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὅπως μήτε χρήματα λαμβάνωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι μήτε ἄλλο μηδέν. [2] καὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους κοινῇ πολεμούντων βασιλεὺς καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι: καὶ κατάλυσιν τοῦ πολέμου πρὸς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐξέστω ποιεῖσθαι, ἢν μὴ ἀμφοτέροις δοκῇ, βασιλεῖ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. [3] ἢν δέ τινες ἀφιστῶνται ἀπὸ βασιλέως, πολέμιοι ὄντων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις: καὶ ἤν τινες ἀφιστῶνται ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, πολέμιοι ὄντων βασιλεῖ κατὰ ταὐτά.’

19. ἡ μὲν ξυμμαχία αὕτη ἐγένετο: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ Χῖοι εὐθὺς δέκα ἑτέρας πληρώσαντες ναῦς ἔπλευσαν ἐς Ἄναια, βουλόμενοι περί τε τῶν ἐν Μιλήτῳ πυθέσθαι καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἅμα ἀφιστάναι. [2] καὶ ἐλθούσης παρὰ Χαλκιδέως ἀγγελίας αὐτοῖς ἀποπλεῖν πάλιν, καὶ ὅτι Ἀμόργης παρέσται κατὰ γῆν στρατιᾷ, ἔπλευσαν ἐς Διὸς ἱερόν: καὶ καθορῶσιν ἑκκαίδεκα ναῦς, ἃς ὕστερον ἔτι Θρασυκλέους Διομέδων ἔχων ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν προσέπλει. [3] καὶ ὡς εἶδον, ἔφευγον μιᾷ μὲν νηὶ ἐς Ἔφεσον, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Τέω. καὶ τέσσαρας μὲν κενὰς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι λαμβάνουσι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐς τὴν γῆν φθασάντων:

αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι ἐς τὴν Τηίων πόλιν καταφεύγουσιν. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τῆς Σάμου ἀπέπλευσαν, οἱ δὲ Χῖοι ταῖς λοιπαῖς ναυσὶν ἀναγαγόμενοι καὶ ὁ πεζὸς μετ᾽ αὐτῶν Λέβεδον ἀπέστησαν καὶ αὖθις Αἰράς. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἕκαστοι ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀπεκομίσθησαν, καὶ ὁ πεζὸς καὶ αἱ νῆες.

20. ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους αἱ ἐν τῷ Σπειραίῳ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Πελοποννησίων, καταδιωχθεῖσαι τότε καὶ ἐφορμούμεναι ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ἐπέκπλουν ποιησάμεναι αἰφνίδιον καὶ κρατήσασαι ναυμαχίᾳ τέσσαράς τε ναῦς λαμβάνουσι τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἀποπλεύσασαι ἐς Κεγχρειὰς τὸν ἐς τὴν Χίον καὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν πλοῦν αὖθις παρεσκευάζοντο. καὶ ναύαρχος αὐτοῖς ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος Ἀστύοχος ἐπῆλθεν, ᾧπερ ἐγίγνετο ἤδη πᾶσα ἡ ναυαρχία. [2]ἀναχωρήσαντος δὲ τοῦ ἐκ τῆς Τέω πεζοῦ καὶ Τισσαφέρνης αὐτὸς στρατιᾷ παραγενόμενος καὶ ἐπικαθελὼν τὸ ἐν τῇ Τέῳ τεῖχος, εἴ τι ὑπελείφθη, ἀνεχώρησεν. καὶ Διομέδων ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον δέκα ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφικόμενος ἐσπείσατο Τηίοις ὥστε δέχεσθαι καὶ σφᾶς. καὶ παραπλεύσας ἐπὶ Αἰρὰς καὶ προσβαλών, ὡς οὐκ ἐλάμβανε τὴν πόλιν, ἀπέπλευσεν.

21. ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων, οἳ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ παρόντες. καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων ἐς διακοσίους μέν τινας τοὺς πάντας τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀπέκτεινε, τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκίας νειμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς βεβαίοις ἤδη ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διῴκουν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς γεωμόροις μετεδίδοσαν οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ᾽ ἀγαγέσθαι παρ᾽ ἐκείνων οὐδ᾽ ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἔτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν.

22. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους οἱ Χῖοι, ὥσπερ ἤρξαντο, οὐδὲν ἀπολείποντες προθυμίας, ἄνευ τε Πελοποννησίων πλήθει παρόντες ἀποστῆσαι τὰς πόλεις καὶ βουλόμενοι ἅμα ὡς πλείστους σφίσι ξυγκινδυνεύειν, στρατεύονται αὐτοί τε τρισκαίδεκα ναυσὶν ἐπὶ τὴν Λέσβον, ὥσπερ εἴρητο ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δεύτερον ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν

ἰέναι καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων παρῄει ἐπὶ Κλαζομενῶν τε καὶ Κύμης: ἦρχε δ᾽ αὐτοῦ Εὐάλας Σπαρτιάτης, τῶν δὲ νεῶν Δεινιάδας περίοικος. [2] καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆες καταπλεύσασαι Μήθυμναν πρῶτον ἀφιστᾶσι, καὶ καταλείπονται τέσσαρες νῆες ἐν αὐτῇ: καὶ αὖθις αἱ λοιπαὶ Μυτιλήνην ἀφιστᾶσιν.

23. Ἀστύοχος δὲ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ναύαρχος τέσσαρσι ναυσίν, ὥσπερ ὥρμητο, πλέων ἐκ τῶν Κεγχρειῶν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Χίον. καὶ τρίτην ἡμέραν αὐτοῦ ἥκοντος αἱ Ἀττικαὶ νῆες πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔπλεον ἐς Λέσβον, ὧν ἦρχε Λέων καὶ Διομέδων: Λέων γὰρ ὕστερον δέκα ναυσὶ προσεβοήθησεν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν. [2] ἀναγαγόμενος δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀστύοχος τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐς ὀψὲ καὶ προσλαβὼν Χίαν ναῦν μίαν ἔπλει ἐς τὴν Λέσβον, ὅπως ὠφελοίη, εἴ τι δύναιτο. καὶ ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὴν Πύρραν, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐς Ἔρεσον, ἔνθα πυνθάνεται ὅτι ἡ Μυτιλήνη ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων αὐτοβοεὶ ἑάλωκεν: [3] οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ὥσπερ ἔπλεον ἀπροσδόκητοι κατασχόντες ἐς τὸν λιμένα τῶν τε Χίων νεῶν ἐκράτησαν καὶ ἀποβάντες τοὺς ἀντιστάντας μάχῃ νικήσαντες τὴν πόλιν ἔσχον. [4] ἃ πυνθανόμενος ὁ Ἀστύοχος τῶν τε Ἐρεσίων καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Μηθύμνης μετ᾽ Εὐβούλου Χίων νεῶν, αἳ τότε καταλειφθεῖσαι καὶ ὡς ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἑάλω φεύγουσαι περιέτυχον αὐτῷ τρεῖς [μία γὰρ ἑάλω ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων], οὐκέτι ἐπὶ τὴν Μυτιλήνην ὥρμησεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Ἔρεσον ἀποστήσας καὶ ὁπλίσας, καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ νεῶν ὁπλίτας πεζῇ παραπέμπει ἐπὶ τὴν Ἄντισσαν καὶ Μήθυμναν ἄρχοντα Ἐτεόνικον προστάξας: καὶ αὐτὸς ταῖς τε μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ναυσὶ καὶ ταῖς τρισὶ ταῖς Χίαις παρέπλει, ἐλπίζων τοὺς Μηθυμναίους θαρσήσειν τε ἰδόντας σφᾶς καὶ ἐμμενεῖν τῇ ἀποστάσει. [5] ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ τὰ ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ πάντα ἠναντιοῦτο, ἀπέπλευσε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ στρατὸν πεζὸν ἀναλαβὼν ἐς τὴν Χίον. ἀπεκομίσθη δὲ πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ὁ τῶν ξυμμάχων πεζός, ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐμέλλησεν ἰέναι. καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Κεγχρειᾷ ξυμμαχίδων Πελοποννησίων νεῶν ἀφικνοῦνται αὐτοῖς ἓξ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐς τὴν Χίον. [6] οἱ δὲ

Ἀθηναῖοι τά τ᾽ ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ πάλιν κατεστήσαντο καὶ πλεύσαντες ἐξ αὐτῆς Κλαζομενίων τὴν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Πολίχναν τειχιζομένην ἑλόντες διεκόμισαν πάλιν αὐτοὺς ἐς τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πόλιν, πλὴν τῶν αἰτίων τῆς ἀποστάσεως: οὗτοι δὲ ἐς Δαφνοῦντα ἀπῆλθον. καὶ αὖθις Κλαζομεναὶ προσεχώρησαν Ἀθηναίοις.

24. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους οἵ τ᾽ ἐπὶ Μιλήτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσὶν ἐν τῇ Λάδῃ ἐφορμοῦντες ἀπόβασιν ποιησάμενοι ἐς Πάνορμον τῆς Μιλησίας Χαλκιδέα τε τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον ἄρχοντα μετ᾽ ὀλίγων παραβοηθήσαντα ἀποκτείνουσι καὶ τροπαῖον τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ὕστερον διαπλεύσαντες ἔστησαν, ὃ οἱ Μιλήσιοι ὡς οὐ μετὰ κράτους τῆς γῆς σταθὲν ἀνεῖλον: [2] καὶ Λέων καὶ Διομέδων ἔχοντες τὰς ἐκ Λέσβου Ἀθηναίων ναῦς, ἔκ τε Οἰνουσσῶν τῶν πρὸ Χίου νήσων καὶ ἐκ Σιδούσσης καὶ ἐκ Πτελεοῦ, ἃ ἐν τῇ Ἐρυθραίᾳ εἶχον τείχη, καὶ ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου ὁρμώμενοι τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Χίους πόλεμον ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἐποιοῦντο: εἶχον δ᾽ ἐπιβάτας τῶν ὁπλιτῶν ἐκ καταλόγου ἀναγκαστούς. [3] καὶ ἔν τε Καρδαμύλῃ ἀποβάντες καὶ ἐν Βολίσκῳ τοὺς προσβοηθήσαντας τῶν Χίων μάχῃ νικήσαντες καὶ πολλοὺς διαφθείραντες ἀνάστατα ἐποίησαν τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία, καὶ ἐν Φάναις αὖθις ἄλλῃ μάχῃ ἐνίκησαν καὶ τρίτῃ ἐν Λευκωνίῳ. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἤδη οὐκέτι ἐπεξῆσαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν χώραν καλῶς κατεσκευασμένην καὶ ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε διεπόρθησαν. [4] Χῖοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους ὧν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ηὐδαιμόνησάν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἐπεδίδου ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, τόσῳ δὲ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον. [5] καὶ οὐδ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀπόστασιν, εἰ τοῦτο δοκοῦσι παρὰ τὸ ἀσφαλέστερον πρᾶξαι, πρότερον ἐτόλμησαν ποιήσασθαι ἢ μετὰ πολλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων ἔμελλον ξυγκινδυνεύσειν καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ᾐσθάνοντο οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας ἔτι μετὰ τὴν Σικελικὴν ξυμφορὰν ὡς οὐ πάνυ πονηρά σφῶν [βεβαίως] τὰ πράγματα εἴη: εἰ δέ τι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπείοις τοῦ βίου παραλόγοις ἐσφάλησαν, μετὰ πολλῶν οἷς ταὐτὰ ἔδοξε, τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ταχὺ

ξυναναιρεθήσεσθαι, τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ξυνέγνωσαν. [6] εἰργομένοις οὖν αὐτοῖς τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ κατὰ γῆν πορθουμένοις ἐνεχείρησάν τινες πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἀγαγεῖν τὴν πόλιν: οὓς αἰσθόμενοι οἱ ἄρχοντες αὐτοὶ μὲν ἡσύχασαν, Ἀστύοχον δὲ ἐξ Ἐρυθρῶν τὸν ναύαρχον μετὰ τεσσάρων νεῶν, αἳ παρῆσαν αὐτῷ, κομίσαντες ἐσκόπουν ὅπως μετριώτατα ἢ ὁμήρων λήψει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τρόπῳ καταπαύσουσι τὴν ἐπιβουλήν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα ἔπρασσον.

25. ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος χίλιοι ὁπλῖται Ἀθηναίων καὶ πεντακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι Ἀργείων τοὺς γὰρ πεντακοσίους τῶν Ἀργείων ψιλοὺς ὄντας ὥπλισαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ χίλιοι τῶν ξυμμάχων ναυσὶ δυοῖν δεούσαις πεντήκοντα, ὧν ἦσαν καὶ ὁπλιταγωγοί, Φρυνίχου καὶ Ὀνομακλέους καὶ Σκιρωνίδου στρατηγούντων κατέπλευσαν ἐς Σάμον, καὶ διαβάντες ἐς Μίλητον ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. [2] Μιλήσιοι δὲ ἐξελθόντες αὐτοί τε, ὀκτακόσιοι ὁπλῖται, καὶ οἱ μετὰ Χαλκιδέως ἐλθόντες Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ Τισσαφέρνους τι [ξενικὸν] ἐπικουρικόν, καὶ αὐτὸς Τισσαφέρνης παρὼν καὶ ἡ ἵππος αὐτοῦ, ξυνέβαλον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι τῷ σφετέρῳ αὐτῶν κέρᾳ προεξάξαντες καὶ καταφρονήσαντες, ὡς ἐπ᾽ Ἴωνάς τε καὶ οὐ δεξομένους ἀτακτότερον χωροῦντες, νικῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν Μιλησίων καὶ διαφθείρονται αὐτῶν ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τριακοσίων ἀνδρῶν: [4] Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τούς τε Πελοποννησίους πρώτους νικήσαντες καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ὄχλον ὡσάμενοι, τοῖς Μιλησίοις οὐ ξυμμείξαντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὑποχωρησάντων αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Ἀργείων τροπῆς ἐς τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἑώρων τὸ ἄλλο σφῶν ἡσσώμενον, πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν τῶν Μιλησίων κρατοῦντες ἤδη τὰ ὅπλα τίθενται. [5] καὶ ξυνέβη ἐν τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ τοὺς Ἴωνας ἀμφοτέρωθεν τῶν Δωριῶν κρατῆσαι: τούς τε γὰρ κατὰ σφᾶς Πελοποννησίους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνίκων καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους οἱ Μιλήσιοι. στήσαντες δὲ τροπαῖον τὸν περιτειχισμὸν ἰσθμώδους ὄντος τοῦ χωρίου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρεσκευάζοντο, νομίζοντες, εἰ προσαγάγοιντο Μίλητον, ῥᾳδίως ἂν σφίσι καὶ τἆλλα προσχωρῆσαι.

26. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ περὶ δείλην ἤδη ὀψίαν ἀγγέλλεται αὐτοῖς τὰς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ Σικελίας πέντε καὶ πεντήκοντα ναῦς ὅσον οὐ παρεῖναι. τῶν τε γὰρ Σικελιωτῶν, Ἑρμοκράτους τοῦ Συρακοσίου μάλιστα ἐνάγοντος ξυνεπιλαβέσθαι καὶ τῆς ὑπολοίπου Ἀθηναίων καταλύσεως, εἴκοσι νῆες Συρακοσίων ἦλθον καὶ Σελινούντιαι δύο, αἵ τε ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, ἃς παρεσκευάζοντο, ἑτοῖμαι ἤδη οὖσαι: καὶ Θηριμένει τῷ Λακεδαιμονίῳ ξυναμφότεραι ὡς Ἀστύοχον τὸν ναύαρχον προσταχθεῖσαι κομίσαι, κατέπλευσαν ἐς Λέρον πρῶτον τὴν πρὸ Μιλήτου νῆσον: [2] ἔπειτα ἐκεῖθεν αἰσθόμενοι ἐπὶ Μιλήτῳ ὄντας Ἀθηναίους ἐς τὸν Ἰασικὸν κόλπον πρότερον πλεύσαντες ἐβούλοντο εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ τῆς Μιλήτου. [3] ἐλθόντος δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἵππῳ ἐς Τειχιοῦσσαν τῆς Μιλησίας, οἷπερ τοῦ κόλπου πλεύσαντες ηὐλίσαντο, πυνθάνονται τὰ περὶ τῆς μάχης παρῆν γὰρ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ ξυνεμάχετο τοῖς Μιλησίοις καὶ Τισσαφέρνει, καὶ αὐτοῖς παρῄνει, εἰ μὴ βούλονται τά τε ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ καὶ τὰ ξύμπαντα πράγματα διολέσαι, ὡς τάχιστα βοηθεῖν Μιλήτῳ καὶ μὴ περιιδεῖν ἀποτειχισθεῖσαν.

27. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ἔμελλον βοηθήσειν: Φρύνιχος δὲ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς Λέρου ἐπύθετο τὰ τῶν νεῶν σαφῶς, βουλομένων τῶν ξυναρχόντων ὑπομείναντας διαναυμαχεῖν, οὐκ ἔφη οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς ποιήσειν τοῦτο οὔτ᾽ ἐκείνοις οὐδ᾽ ἄλλῳ οὐδενὶ ἐς δύναμιν ἐπιτρέψειν. [2] ὅπου γὰρ [ἔξεστιν] ἐν ὑστέρῳ σαφῶς εἰδότας πρὸς ὁπόσας τε ναῦς πολεμίας καὶ ὅσαις πρὸς αὐτὰς ταῖς σφετέραις ἱκανῶς καὶ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν παρασκευασαμένοις ἔσται ἀγωνίσασθαι, οὐδέποτε τῷ αἰσχρῷ ὀνείδει εἴξας ἀλόγως διακινδυνεύσειν. [3] οὐ γὰρ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι Ἀθηναίους ναυτικῷ μετὰ καιροῦ ὑποχωρῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ ὁτουοῦν τρόπου αἴσχιον ξυμβήσεσθαι ἢν ἡσσηθῶσιν: καὶ τὴν πόλιν οὐ μόνον τῷ αἰσχρῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μεγίστῳ κινδύνῳ περιπίπτειν, ᾗ μόλις ἐπὶ ταῖς γεγενημέναις ξυμφοραῖς ἐνδέχεσθαι μετὰ βεβαίου παρασκευῆς καθ᾽ ἑκουσίαν, ἢ πάνυ γε ἀνάγκῃ, προτέρᾳ ποι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ που δὴ μὴ βιαζομένῃ γε πρὸς αὐθαιρέτους κινδύνους ἰέναι. [4] ὡς

τάχιστα δὲ ἐκέλευε τούς τε τραυματίας ἀναλαβόντας καὶ τὸν πεζὸν καὶ τῶν σκευῶν ὅσα ἦλθον ἔχοντες, ἃ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας εἰλήφασι καταλιπόντας ὅπως κοῦφαι ὦσιν αἱ νῆες, ἀποπλεῖν ἐς Σάμον, κἀκεῖθεν ἤδη ξυναγαγόντας πάσας τὰς ναῦς τοὺς ἐπίπλους, ἤν που καιρὸς ᾖ, ποιεῖσθαι. [5] ὡς δὲ ἔπεισε, καὶ ἔδρασε ταῦτα: καὶ ἔδοξεν οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα μᾶλλον ἢ ὕστερον, οὐκ ἐς τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς ὅσα ἄλλα Φρύνιχος κατέστη, οὐκ ἀξύνετος εἶναι. [6] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἀφ᾽ ἑσπέρας εὐθὺς τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀτελεῖ τῇ νίκῃ ἀπὸ τῆς Μιλήτου ἀνέστησαν, καὶ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι κατὰ τάχος καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἀπέπλευσαν ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἐπ᾽ οἴκου:

28. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ἐκ τῆς Τειχιούσσης ἄραντες ἐπικατάγονται, καὶ μείναντες ἡμέραν μίαν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ καὶ τὰς Χίας ναῦς προσλαβόντες τὰς μετὰ Χαλκιδέως τὸ πρῶτον ξυγκαταδιωχθείσας ἐβούλοντο πλεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὰ σκεύη ἃ ἐξείλοντο ἐς Τειχιοῦσσαν πάλιν. [2] καὶ ὡς ἦλθον, Τισσαφέρνης τῷ πεζῷ παρελθὼν πείθει αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Ἴασον, ἐν ᾗ Ἀμόργης πολέμιος ὢν κατεῖχε, πλεῦσαι. καὶ προσβαλόντες τῇ Ἰάσῳ αἰφνίδιοι καὶ οὐ προσδεχομένων ἀλλ᾽ ἢ Ἀττικὰς τὰς ναῦς εἶναι αἱροῦσιν: καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπῃνέθησαν. [3] καὶ τόν τε Ἀμόργην ζῶντα λαβόντες, Πισσούθνου νόθον υἱόν, ἀφεστῶτα δὲ βασιλέως, παραδιδόασιν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι Τισσαφέρνει ἀπαγαγεῖν, εἰ βούλεται, βασιλεῖ, ὥσπερ αὐτῷ προσέταξε, καὶ τὴν Ἴασον διεπόρθησαν καὶ χρήματα πάνυ πολλὰ ἡ στρατιὰ ἔλαβεν: παλαιόπλουτον γὰρ ἦν τὸ χωρίον. [4] τούς τ᾽ ἐπικούρους τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀμόργην παρὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κομίσαντες καὶ οὐκ ἀδικήσαντες ξυνέταξαν, ὅτι ἦσαν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐκ Πελοποννήσου: τό τε πόλισμα Τισσαφέρνει παραδόντες καὶ τὰ ἀνδράποδα πάντα καὶ δοῦλα καὶ ἐλεύθερα, ὧν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον στατῆρα Δαρεικὸν παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ξυνέβησαν λαβεῖν, ἔπειτα ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν Μίλητον. [5] καὶ Πεδάριτόν τε τὸν Λέοντος ἐς τὴν Χίον ἄρχοντα Λακεδαιμονίων πεμψάντων ἀποστέλλουσι πεζῇ μέχρι Ἐρυθρῶν ἔχοντα τὸ παρὰ Ἀμόργου ἐπικουρικόν, καὶ

ἐς τὴν Μίλητον αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον καθιστᾶσιν. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

29. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος, ἐπειδὴ τὴν Ἴασον κατεστήσατο ὁ Τισσαφέρνης ἐς φυλακήν, παρῆλθεν ἐς τὴν Μίλητον, καὶ μηνὸς μὲν τροφήν, ὥσπερ ὑπέστη ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι, ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἑκάστῳ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριώβολον διδόναι, ἕως ἂν βασιλέα ἐπέρηται: ἢν δὲ κελεύῃ, δώσειν ἔφη ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχμήν. [2] Ἑρμοκράτους δὲ ἀντειπόντος τοῦ Συρακοσίου στρατηγοῦ ὁ γὰρ Θηριμένης οὐ ναύαρχος ὤν, ἀλλ᾽ Ἀστυόχῳ παραδοῦναι τὰς ναῦς ξυμπλέων μαλακὸς ἦν περὶ τοῦ μισθοῦ ὅμως δὲ παρὰ πέντε ναῦς πλέον ἀνδρὶ ἑκάστῳ ἢ τρεῖς ὀβολοὶ ὡμολογήθησαν. ἐς γὰρ πέντε ναῦς καὶ πεντήκοντα τριάκοντα τάλαντα ἐδίδου τοῦ μηνός: καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσῳ πλείους νῆες ἦσαν τούτου τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἐδίδοτο.

30. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ Ἀθηναίοις προσαφιγμέναι γὰρ ἦσαν καὶ οἴκοθεν ἄλλαι νῆες πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ στρατηγοὶ Χαρμῖνος καὶ Στρομβιχίδης καὶ Εὐκτήμων, καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ Χίου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας ξυναγαγόντες ἐβούλοντο διακληρωσάμενοι ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ Μιλήτῳ τῷ ναυτικῷ ἐφορμεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν Χίον καὶ ναυτικὸν καὶ πεζὸν πέμψαι. [2] καὶ ἐποίησαν οὕτως: Στρομβιχίδης μὲν γὰρ καὶ Ὀνομακλῆς καὶ Εὐκτήμων τριάκοντα ναῦς ἔχοντες καὶ τῶν ἐς Μίλητον ἐλθόντων χιλίων ὁπλιτῶν μέρος ἄγοντες ἐν ναυσὶν ὁπλιταγωγοῖς ἐπὶ Χίον λαχόντες ἔπλεον, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἐν Σάμῳ μένοντες τέσσαρσι καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ναυσὶν ἐθαλασσοκράτουν καὶ ἐπίπλους τῇ Μιλήτῳ ἐποιοῦντο.

31. ὁ δ᾽ Ἀστύοχος ὡς τότε ἐν τῇ Χίῳ ἔτυχε διὰ τὴν προδοσίαν τοὺς ὁμήρους καταλεγόμενος τούτου μὲν ἐπέσχεν,ἐπειδὴ ᾔσθετο τάς τε μετὰ Θηριμένους ναῦς ἡκούσας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν βελτίω ὄντα, λαβὼν δὲ ναῦς τάς τε Πελοποννησίων δέκα καὶ Χίας δέκα ἀνάγεται, [2] καὶ προσβαλὼν Πτελεῷ καὶ οὐχ ἑλὼν παρέπλευσεν ἐπὶ Κλαζομενὰς καὶ ἐκέλευεν αὐτῶν τοὺς τὰ Ἀθηναίων

φρονοῦντας ἀνοικίζεσθαι ἐς τὸν Δαφνοῦντα καὶ προσχωρεῖν σφίσιν: ξυνεκέλευε δὲ καὶ Τάμως Ἰωνίας ὕπαρχος ὤν. [3] ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐσήκουον, προσβολὴν ποιησάμενος τῇ πόλει οὔσῃ ἀτειχίστῳ καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος ἑλεῖν, ἀπέπλευσεν ἀνέμῳ μεγάλῳ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐς Φώκαιαν καὶ Κύμην, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι νῆες κατῆραν ἐς τὰς ἐπικειμένας ταῖς Κλαζομεναῖς νήσους, Μαραθοῦσσαν καὶ Πήλην καὶ Δρυμοῦσσαν. [4] καὶ ὅσα ὑπεξέκειτο αὐτόθι τῶν Κλαζομενίων, ἡμέρας ἐμμείναντες διὰ τοὺς ἀνέμους ὀκτὼ τὰ μὲν διήρπασαν καὶ ἀνήλωσαν, τὰ δὲ ἐσβαλόμενοι ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Φώκαιαν καὶ Κύμην ὡς Ἀστύοχον.

32. ὄντος δ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐνταῦθα Λεσβίων ἀφικνοῦνται πρέσβεις βουλόμενοι αὖθις ἀποστῆναι: καὶ αὐτὸν μὲν πείθουσιν, ὡς δ᾽ οἵ τε Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ἀπρόθυμοι ἦσαν διὰ τὸ πρότερον σφάλμα, ἄρας ἔπλει ἐπὶ τῆς Χίου. καὶ χειμασθεισῶν τῶν νεῶν ὕστερον ἀφικνοῦνται ἄλλαι ἄλλοθεν ἐς τὴν Χίον. [2] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο Πεδάριτος, τότε παριὼν πεζῇ ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου, γενόμενος ἐν Ἐρυθραῖς διαπεραιοῦται αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ ἐς Χίον: ὑπῆρχον δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῶν πέντε νεῶν στρατιῶται ὑπὸ Χαλκιδέως ἐς πεντακοσίους ξὺν ὅπλοις καταλειφθέντες. [3] ἐπαγγελλομένων δέ τινων Λεσβίων τὴν ἀπόστασιν, προσφέρει τῷ τε Πεδαρίτῳ καὶ τοῖς Χίοις ὁ Ἀστύοχος τὸν λόγον ὡς χρὴ παραγενομένους ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀποστῆσαι τὴν λέσβον: ἢ γὰρ ξυμμάχους πλείους σφᾶς ἕξειν, ἢ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἤν τι σφάλλωνται,κακώσειν. οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐσήκουον, οὐδὲ τὰς ναῦς ὁ Πεδάριτος ἔφη τῶν Χίων αὐτῷ προήσειν.

33. κἀκεῖνος λαβὼν τάς τε τῶν Κορινθίων πέντε καὶ ἕκτην Μεγαρίδα καὶ μίαν Ἑρμιονίδα καὶ ἃς αὐτὸς Λακωνικὰς ἔχων ἦλθεν, ἔπλει ἐπὶ τῆς Μιλήτου πρὸς τὴν ναυαρχίαν, πολλὰ ἀπειλήσας τοῖς Χίοις ἢ μὴν μὴ ἐπιβοηθήσειν, ἤν τι δέωνται. [2] καὶ προσβαλὼν Κωρύκῳ τῆς Ἐρυθραίας ἐνηυλίσατο. οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς Σάμου Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τὴν Χίον πλέοντες τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα λόφου διείργοντο καὶ καθωρμίσαντο καὶ ἐλελήθεσαν ἀλλήλους. [3] ἐλθούσης δὲ παρὰ Πεδαρίτου ὑπὸ νύκτα ἐπιστολῆς ὡς Ἐρυθραίων

ἄνδρες αἰχμάλωτοι ἐκ Σάμου ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ ἐς Ἐρυθρὰς ἥκουσιν ἀφειμένοι, ἀνάγεται ὁ Ἀστύοχος εὐθὺς ἐς τὰς Ἐρυθρὰς πάλιν, καὶ παρὰ τοσοῦτον ἐγένετο αὐτῷ μὴ περιπεσεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. [4] διαπλεύσας δὲ καὶ ὁ Πεδάριτος πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἀναζητήσαντες τὰ περὶ τῶν δοκούντων προδιδόναι, ὡς ηὗρον ἅπαν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ τῆς Σάμου προφασισθέν, ἀπολύσαντες τῆς αἰτίας ἀπέπλευσαν ὁ μὲν ἐς τὴν Χίον, ὁ δὲ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον ἐκομίσθη, ὥσπερ διενοεῖτο.

34. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατιὰ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκ τοῦ Κωρύκου περιπλέουσα κατ᾽ Ἀργῖνον ἐπιτυγχάνει τρισὶ ναυσὶ τῶν Χίων μακραῖς, καὶ ὡς εἶδον, ἐδίωκον: καὶ χειμών τε μέγας ἐπιγίγνεται καὶ αἱ μὲν τῶν Χίων μόλις καταφεύγουσιν ἐς τὸν λιμένα, αἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἱ μὲν μάλιστα ὁρμήσασαι τρεῖς διαφθείρονται καὶ ἐκπίπτουσι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τῶν Χίων, καὶ ἄνδρες οἱ μὲν ἁλίσκονται, οἱ δ᾽ ἀποθνῄσκουσιν, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι καταφεύγουσιν ἐς τὸν ὑπὸ τῷ Μίμαντι λιμένα Φοινικοῦντα καλούμενον. ἐντεῦθεν δ᾽ ὕστερον ἐς τὴν Λέσβον καθορμισάμενοι παρεσκευάζοντο ἐς τὸν τειχισμόν.

35. ἐκ δὲ τῆς Πελοποννήσου τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐκπλεύσας δέκα μὲν Θουρίαις ναυσίν, ὧν ἦρχε Δωριεὺς ὁ Διαγόρου τρίτος αὐτός, μιᾷ δὲ Λακωνικῇ, μιᾷ δὲ Συρακοσίᾳ, καταπλεῖ ἐς Κνίδον: ἡ δ᾽ ἀφειστήκει ἤδη ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνους. [2] καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ, ὡς ἤσθοντο, ἐκέλευον ταῖς μὲν ἡμισείαις τῶν νεῶν Κνίδον φυλάσσειν, ταῖς δὲ περὶ Τριόπιον οὔσαις τὰς ἀπ᾽ Αἰγύπτου ὁλκάδας προσβαλλούσας ξυλλαμβάνειν: ἔστι δὲ τὸ Τριόπιον ἄκρα τῆς Κνιδίας προύχουσα, Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερόν. [3] πυθόμενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ πλεύσαντες ἐκ τῆς Σάμου λαμβάνουσι τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ Τριοπίῳ φρουρούσας ἓξ ναῦς: οἱ δ᾽ ἄνδρες ἀποφεύγουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐς τὴν Κνίδον καταπλεύσαντες καὶ προσβαλόντες τῇ πόλει ἀτειχίστῳ οὔσῃ ὀλίγου εἷλον. [4] τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ αὖθις προσέβαλλον, καὶ ὡς ἄμεινον φαρξαμένων αὐτῶν ὑπὸ νύκτα καὶ ἐπεσελθόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Τριοπίου ἐκ τῶν

νεῶν διαφυγόντων οὐκέθ᾽ ὁμοίως ἔβλαπτον, ἀπελθόντες καὶ δῃώσαντες τὴν τῶν Κνιδίων γῆν ἐς τὴν Σάμον ἀπέπλευσαν.

36. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον Ἀστυόχου ἥκοντος ἐς τὴν Μίλητον ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι εὐπόρως ἔτι εἶχον ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον: καὶ γὰρ μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ἀρκούντως καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Ἰάσου μεγάλα χρήματα διαρπασθέντα ὑπῆν τοῖς στρατιώταις, οἵ τε Μιλήσιοι προθύμως τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἔφερον. [2] πρὸς δὲ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ἐδόκουν ὅμως τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις αἱ πρῶται ξυνθῆκαι αἱ πρὸς Χαλκιδέα γενόμεναι ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι καὶ οὐ πρὸς σφῶν μᾶλλον, καὶ ἄλλας ἔτι Θηριμένους παρόντος ἐποίουν: καὶ εἰσὶν αἵδε.

37. ‘ξυνθῆκαι Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον καὶ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρνην, σπονδὰς εἶναι καὶ φιλίαν κατὰ τάδε. [2] ὁπόση χώρα καὶ πόλεις βασιλέως εἰσὶ Δαρείου ἢ τοῦ πατρὸς ἦσαν ἢ τῶν προγόνων, ἐπὶ ταύτας μὴ ἰέναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ μηδὲ κακῷ μηδενὶ μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων, μηδὲ φόρους πράσσεσθαι ἐκ τῶν πόλεων τούτων μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων: μηδὲ Δαρεῖον βασιλέα μηδὲ ὧν βασιλεὺς ἄρχει ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἰέναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ μηδὲ κακῷ μηδενί. [3] ἢν δέ τι δέωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἢ οἱ ξύμμαχοι βασιλέως ἢ βασιλεὺς Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅτι ἂν πείθωσιν ἀλλήλους, τοῦτο ποιοῦσι καλῶς ἔχειν. [4] τὸν δὲ πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους πολεμεῖν: ἢν δὲ κατάλυσιν ποιῶνται, κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους ποιεῖσθαι. ὁπόση δ᾽ ἂν στρατιὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ τῇ βασιλέως ᾖ μεταπεμψαμένου βασιλέως, τὴν δαπάνην βασιλέα παρέχειν. [5] ἢν δέ τις τῶν πόλεων ὁπόσαι ξυνέθεντο βασιλεῖ ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλέως ἴῃ χώραν, τοὺς ἄλλους κωλύειν καὶ ἀμύνειν βασιλεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: καὶ ἤν τις τῶν ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ ἢ ὅσης βασιλεὺς ἄρχει ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἴῃ ἢ

τῶν ξυμμάχων, βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω καὶ ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.’

38. μετὰ δὲ ταύτας τὰς ξυνθήκας Θηριμένης μὲν παραδοὺς Ἀστυόχῳ τὰς ναῦς ἀποπλέων ἐν κέλητι ἀφανίζεται, [2] οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου Ἀθηναῖοι ἤδη διαβεβηκότες ἐς τὴν Χίον τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ κρατοῦντες καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης Δελφίνιον ἐτείχιζον, χωρίον ἄλλως τε ἐκ γῆς καρτερὸν καὶ λιμένας ἔχον καὶ τῆς τῶν Χίων πόλεως οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχον. [3] οἱ δὲ Χῖοι ἐν πολλαῖς ταῖς πρὶν μάχαις πεπληγμένοι, καὶ ἄλλως ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς οὐ πάνυ εὖ διακείμενοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν μετὰ Τυδέως τοῦ Ἴωνος ἤδη ὑπὸ Πεδαρίτου ἐπ᾽ ἀττικισμῷ τεθνεώτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἐς ὀλίγους κατεχομένης ὑπόπτως διακείμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἡσύχαζον, καὶ οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ διὰ ταῦτα οὔθ᾽ οἱ μετὰ Πεδαρίτου ἐπίκουροι ἀξιόμαχοι αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνοντο. [4] ἐς μέντοι τὴν Μίλητον ἔπεμπον κελεύοντες σφίσι τὸν Ἀστύοχον βοηθεῖν: ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐσήκουεν, ἐπιστέλλει περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ὁ Πεδάριτος ὡς ἀδικοῦντος. [5] καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Χίῳ ἐς τοῦτο καθειστήκει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις: αἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου νῆες αὐτοῖς ἐπίπλους μὲν ἐποιοῦντο ταῖς ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ, ἐπεὶ δὲ μὴ ἀντανάγοιεν, ἀναχωροῦντες πάλιν ἐς τὴν Σάμον ἡσύχαζον.

39. ἐκ δὲ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι αἱ τῷ Φαρναβάζῳ [ὑπὸ] Καλλιγείτου τοῦ Μεγαρέως καὶ Τιμαγόρου τοῦ Κυζικηνοῦ πρασσόντων παρασκευασθεῖσαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες ἄρασαι ἔπλεον ἐπὶ Ἰωνίας περὶ ἡλίου τροπάς, καὶ ἄρχων ἐπέπλει αὐτῶν Ἀντισθένης Σπαρτιάτης. [2] ξυνέπεμψαν δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἕνδεκα ἄνδρας Σπαρτιατῶν ξυμβούλους Ἀστυόχῳ, ὧν εἷς ἦν Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου: καὶ εἴρητο αὐτοῖς ἐς Μίλητον ἀφικομένους τῶν τε ἄλλων ξυνεπιμέλεσθαι ᾗ μέλλει ἄριστα ἕξειν, καὶ τὰς ναῦς ταύτας ἢ αὐτὰς ἢ πλείους ἢ καὶ ἐλάσσους ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ὡς Φαρνάβαζον, ἢν δοκῇ, ἀποπέμπειν, Κλέαρχον τὸν Ῥαμφίου, ὃς ξυνέπλει, ἄρχοντα προστάξαντας, καὶ Ἀστύοχον, ἢν δοκῇ τοῖς ἕνδεκα ἀνδράσι, παύειν τῆς ναυαρχίας, Ἀντισθένη δὲ καθιστάναι: πρὸς γὰρ

τὰς τοῦ Πεδαρίτου ἐπιστολὰς ὑπώπτευον αὐτόν. [3] πλέουσαι οὖν αἱ νῆες ἀπὸ Μαλέας πελάγιαι Μήλῳ προσέβαλον, καὶ περιτυχόντες ναυσὶ δέκα Ἀθηναίων τὰς τρεῖς λαμβάνουσι κενὰς καὶ κατακαίουσιν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο δεδιότες μὴ αἱ διαφυγοῦσαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκ τῆς Μήλου νῆες, ὅπερ ἐγένετο, μηνύσωσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὐτῶν, πρὸς τὴν Κρήτην πλεύσαντες καὶ πλείω τὸν πλοῦν διὰ φυλακῆς ποιησάμενοι ἐς τὴν Καῦνον τῆς Ἀσίας κατῆραν. [4] ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ὡς ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ ὄντες ἀγγελίαν ἔπεμπον ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ ναῦς τοῦ ξυμπαρακομισθῆναι.

40. οἱ δὲ Χῖοι καὶ Πεδάριτος κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον οὐδὲν ἧσσον, καίπερ διαμέλλοντα, τὸν Ἀστύοχον πέμποντες ἀγγέλους ἠξίουν σφίσι πολιορκουμένοις βοηθῆσαι ἁπάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ μὴ περιιδεῖν τὴν μεγίστην τῶν ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ ξυμμαχίδων πόλεων ἔκ τε θαλάσσης εἰργομένην καὶ κατὰ γῆν λῃστείαις πορθουμένην. [2] οἱ γὰρ οἰκέται τοῖς Χίοις πολλοὶ ὄντες καὶ μιᾷ γε πόλει πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πλεῖστοι γενόμενοι καὶ ἅμα διὰ τὸ πλῆθος χαλεπωτέρως ἐν ταῖς ἀδικίαις κολαζόμενοι, ὡς ἡ στρατιὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βεβαίως ἔδοξε μετὰ τείχους ἱδρῦσθαι, εὐθὺς αὐτομολίᾳ τε ἐχώρησαν οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κακὰ ἐπιστάμενοι τὴν χώραν οὗτοι ἔδρασαν. [3] ἔφασαν οὖν χρῆναι οἱ Χῖοι, ἕως ἔτι ἐλπὶς καὶ δυνατὸν κωλῦσαι, τειχιζομένου τοῦ Δελφινίου καὶ ἀτελοῦς ὄντος καὶ στρατοπέδῳ καὶ ναυσὶν ἐρύματος μείζονος προσπεριβαλλομένου, βοηθῆσαι σφίσιν. ὁ δὲ Ἀστύοχος καίπερ οὐ διανοούμενος διὰ τὴν τότε ἀπειλήν, ὡς ἑώρα καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους προθύμους ὄντας, ὥρμητο ἐς τὸ βοηθεῖν.

41. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Καύνου παραγίγνεται ἀγγελία ὅτι αἱ ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες καὶ οἱ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμβουλοι πάρεισιν: καὶ νομίσας πάντα ὕστερα εἶναι τἆλλα πρὸς τὸ ναῦς τε, ὅπως θαλασσοκρατοῖεν μᾶλλον, τοσαύτας ξυμπαρακομίσαι, καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, οἳ ἦκον κατάσκοποι αὐτοῦ, ἀσφαλῶς περαιωθῆναι, εὐθὺς ἀφεὶς τὸ ἐς τὴν Χίον ἔπλει ἐς τὴν Καῦνον. [2] καὶ ἐς Κῶν τὴν Μεροπίδα ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ ἀποβὰς τήν τε πόλιν ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν καὶ

ὑπὸ σεισμοῦ, ὃς αὐτοῖς ἔτυχε μέγιστός γε δὴ ὧν μεμνήμεθα γενόμενος, ξυμπεπτωκυῖαν ἐκπορθεῖ, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐς τὰ ὄρη πεφευγότων, καὶ τὴν χώραν καταδρομαῖς λείαν ἐποιεῖτο, πλὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων: τούτους δὲ ἀφίει. [3] ἐκ δὲ τῆς Κῶ ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Κνίδον νυκτὸς ἀναγκάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν Κνιδίων παραινούντων μὴ ἐκβιβάσαι τοὺς ναύτας, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἶχε πλεῖν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς εἴκοσιν, ἃς ἔχων Χαρμῖνος εἷς τῶν ἐκ Σάμου στρατηγῶν ἐφύλασσε ταύτας τὰς ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι ναῦς ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου προσπλεούσας, ἐφ᾽ ἅσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἀστύοχος παρέπλει. [4] ἐπύθοντο δὲ οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ἐκ τῆς Μήλου τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ τῷ Χαρμίνῳ περὶ τὴν Σύμην καὶ Χάλκην καὶ Ῥόδον καὶ περὶ τὴν Λυκίαν ἦν: ἤδη γὰρ ᾐσθάνετο καὶ ἐν τῇ Καύνῳ οὔσας αὐτάς.

42. ἐπέπλει οὖν ὥσπερ εἶχε πρὸς τὴν Σύμην ὁ Ἀστύοχος πρὶν ἔκπυστος γενέσθαι, εἴ πως περιλάβοι που μετεώρους τὰς ναῦς. καὶ αὐτῷ ὑετός τε καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ξυννέφελα ὄντα πλάνησιν τῶν νεῶν ἐν τῷ σκότει καὶ ταραχὴν παρέσχεν. [2] καὶ ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ διεσπασμένου τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ μὲν φανεροῦ ἤδη ὄντος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοῦ εὐωνύμου κέρως, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου περὶ τὴν νῆσον ἔτι πλανωμένου, ἐπανάγονται κατὰ τάχος ὁ Χαρμῖνος καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐλάσσοσιν ἢ ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσί, νομίσαντες ἅσπερ ἐφύλασσον ναῦς τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς Καύνου ταύτας εἶναι. [3] καὶ προσπεσόντες εὐθὺς κατέδυσάν τε τρεῖς καὶ κατετραυμάτισαν ἄλλας, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐπεκράτουν, μέχρι οὗ ἐπεφάνησαν αὐτοῖς παρὰ δόξαν αἱ πλείους τῶν νεῶν καὶ πανταχόθεν ἀπεκλῄοντο. [4] ἔπειτα δὲ ἐς φυγὴν καταστάντες ἓξ μὲν ναῦς ἀπολλύασι, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς καταφεύγουσιν ἐς τὴν Τευτλοῦσσαν νῆσον, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἐς Ἁλικαρνασσόν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς Κνίδον κατάραντες καὶ ξυμμιγεισῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς Καύνου ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι νεῶν αὐτοῖς ξυμπάσαις πλεύσαντες καὶ τροπαῖον ἐν τῇ Σύμῃ στήσαντες πάλιν ἐς τὴν Κνίδον καθωρμίσαντο:

43. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ναυσὶ πάσαις, ὡς ᾐσθοντο τὰ τῆς ναυμαχίας, πλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Σύμην καὶ

ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ ἐν τῇ Κνίδῳ ναυτικὸν οὐχ ὁρμήσαντες, οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνους, λαβόντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σύμῃ σκεύη τῶν νεῶν καὶ Λωρύμοις τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ προσβαλόντες ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Σάμον. [2]ἅπασαι δ᾽ ἤδη οὖσαι ἅμα ἐν τῇ Κνίδῳ αἱ τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἐπεσκευάζοντό τε εἴ τι ἔδει καὶ πρὸς τὸν Τισσαφέρνην παρεγένετο γάρ λόγους ἐποιοῦντο οἱ ἕνδεκα ἄνδρες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων περί τε τῶν ἤδη πεπραγμένων, εἴ τι μὴ ἤρεσκεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος πολέμου, ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἄριστα καὶ ξυμφορώτατα ἀμφοτέροις πολεμήσεται. [3] μάλιστα δὲ ὁ Λίχας ἐσκόπει τὰ ποιούμενα, καὶ τὰς σπονδὰς οὐδετέρας, οὔτε τὰς Χαλκιδέως οὔτε τὰς Θηριμένους, ἔφη καλῶς ξυγκεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ χώρας ὅσης βασιλεὺς καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι ἦρξαν πρότερον, ταύτης καὶ νῦν ἀξιώσει κρατεῖν: ἐνεῖναι γὰρ καὶ νήσους ἁπάσας πάλιν δουλεύειν καὶ Θεσσαλίαν καὶ Λοκροὺς καὶ τὰ μέχρι Βοιωτῶν, καὶ ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθερίας ἂν Μηδικὴν ἀρχὴν τοῖς Ἕλλησι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους περιθεῖναι. [4] ἑτέρας οὖν ἐκέλευε βελτίους σπένδεσθαι, ἢ ταύταις γε οὐ χρήσεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῆς τροφῆς ἐπὶ τούτοις δεῖσθαι οὐδέν. ἀγανακτῶν δὲ ὁ μὲν Τισσαφέρνης ἀπεχώρησεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν δι᾽ ὀργῆς καὶ ἄπρακτος,

44. οἱ δ᾽ ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον ἐπικηρυκευομένων ἀπὸ τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν τὴν γνώμην εἶχον πλεῖν, ἐλπίζοντες νῆσόν τε οὐκ ἀδύνατον καὶ ναυβατῶν πλήθει καὶ πεζῷ προσάξεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα ἡγούμενοι αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ξυμμαχίας δυνατοὶ ἔσεσθαι Τισσαφέρνην μὴ αἰτοῦντες χρήματα τρέφειν τὰς ναῦς. [2] πλεύσαντες οὖν εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι ἐκ τῆς Κνίδου καὶ προσβαλόντες Καμείρῳ τῆς Ῥοδίας πρῶτον ναυσὶ τέσσαρσι καὶ ἐνενήκοντα ἐξεφόβησαν μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς οὐκ εἰδότας τὰ πρασσόμενα, καὶ ἔφευγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτειχίστου οὔσης τῆς πόλεως: εἶτα ξυγκαλέσαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τούτους τε καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τοῖν δυοῖν πολέοιν, Λίνδου καὶ Ἰηλυσοῦ, Ῥοδίους ἔπεισαν ἀποστῆναι Ἀθηναίων: καὶ προσεχώρησε Ῥόδος Πελοποννησίοις. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ταῖς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ναυσὶν αἰσθόμενοι ἔπλευσαν μὲν

βουλόμενοι φθάσαι καὶ ἐπεφάνησαν πελάγιοι, ὑστερήσαντες δὲ οὐ πολλῷ τὸ μὲν παραχρῆμα ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Χάλκην, ἐντεῦθεν δ᾽ ἐς Σάμον, ὕστερον δὲ ἐκ τῆς Χάλκης καὶ ἐκ τῆς Κῶ [καὶ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου] τοὺς ἐπίπλους ποιούμενοι ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥόδον ἐπολέμουν. [4] οἱ δὲ χρήματα μὲν ἐξέλεξαν ἐς δύο καὶ τριάκοντα τάλαντα οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι παρὰ τῶν Ῥοδίων, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα ἡσύχαζον ἡμέρας ὀγδοήκοντα, ἀνελκύσαντες τὰς ναῦς.

45. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον αὐτοὺς ἀναστῆναι, τάδε ἐπράσσετο. Ἀλκιβιάδης μετὰ τὸν Χαλκιδέως θάνατον καὶ τὴν ἐν Μιλήτῳ μάχην τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις ὕποπτος ὤν, καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀφικομένης ἐπιστολῆς πρὸς Ἀστύοχον ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος ὥστ᾽ ἀποκτεῖναι ⸀ἦν γὰρ καὶ τῷ Ἄγιδι ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἄλλως ἄπιστος ἐφαίνετο⸁, πρῶτον μὲν ὑποχωρεῖ δείσας παρὰ Τισσαφέρνην, ἔπειτα ἐκάκου πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅσον ἐδύνατο μάλιστα τῶν Πελοποννησίων τὰ πράγματα, [2] καὶ διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόμενος τήν τε μισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεμεν, ἀντὶ δραχμῆς Ἀττικῆς ὥστε τριώβολον καὶ τοῦτο μὴ ξυνεχῶς δίδοσθαι, λέγειν κελεύων τὸν Τισσαφέρνην πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου ἐπιστήμονες ὄντες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν, οὐ τοσοῦτον πενίᾳ ὅσον ἵνα αὐτῶν μὴ οἱ ναῦται ἐκ περιουσίας ὑβρίζοντες οἱ μὲν τὰ σώματα χείρω ἔχωσι δαπανῶντες ἐς τοιαῦτα ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἡ ἀσθένεια ξυμβαίνει, οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἀπολείπωσιν οὐχ ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ὁμηρείαν τὸν προσοφειλόμενον μισθόν: [3] καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων ἐδίδασκεν [ὥστε] δόντα χρήματα αὐτὸν πεῖσαι, ὥστε ξυγχωρῆσαι ταῦτα ἑαυτῷ πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων: τούτων δὲ Ἑρμοκράτης ἠναντιοῦτο μόνος ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς ξυμμαχικοῦ. [4] τάς τε πόλεις δεομένας χρημάτων ἀπήλασεν αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους ὡς οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἀναίσχυντοι εἶεν πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐπικουρίᾳ δ᾽ ὅμως σῳζόμενοι ἀξιοῦσι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἄλλους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίας κινδυνεύειν: [5] τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας πόλεις ἔφη ἀδικεῖν, αἳ ἐς

Ἀθηναίους πρότερον ἢ ἀποστῆναι ἀνήλουν, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ ἔτι πλείω ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐθελήσουσιν ἐσφέρειν. [6] τόν τε Τισσαφέρνην ἀπέφαινε νῦν μέν, τοῖς ἰδίοις χρήμασι πολεμοῦντα, εἰκότως φειδόμενον, ἢν δέ ποτε τροφὴ καταβῇ παρὰ βασιλέως, ἐντελῆ αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν τὸν μισθὸν καὶ τὰς πόλεις τὰ εἰκότα ὠφελήσειν.

46. παρῄνει δὲ καὶ τῷ Τισσαφέρνει μὴ ἄγαν ἐπείγεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον διαλῦσαι, μηδὲ βουληθῆναι κομίσαντα ἢ ναῦς Φοινίσσας ἅσπερ παρεσκευάζετο ἢ Ἕλλησι πλέοσι μισθὸν πορίζοντα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τῆς τε γῆς καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης τὸ κράτος δοῦναι, ἔχειν δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρους ἐᾶν δίχα τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ βασιλεῖ ἐξεῖναι αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτῷ λυπηροὺς τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐπάγειν. [2] γενομένης δ᾽ ἂν καθ᾽ ἓν τῆς ἐς γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν ἀρχῆς ἀπορεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν οἷς τοὺς κρατοῦντας ξυγκαθαιρήσει, ἢν μὴ αὐτὸς βούληται μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ καὶ κινδύνῳ ἀναστάς ποτε διαγωνίσασθαι. εὐτελέστερα δὲ τάδ᾽ εἶναι, βραχεῖ μορίῳ τῆς δαπάνης καὶ ἅμα μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀσφαλείας αὐτοὺς περὶ ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς Ἕλληνας κατατρῖψαι. [3] ἐπιτηδειοτέρους τε ἔφη τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἶναι κοινωνοὺς αὐτῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς: ἧσσον γὰρ τῶν κατὰ γῆν ἐφίεσθαι, τὸν λόγον τε ξυμφορώτατον καὶ τὸ ἔργον ἔχοντας πολεμεῖν: τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ξυγκαταδουλοῦν ἂν σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης μέρος καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὅσοι ἐν τῇ βασιλέως Ἕλληνες οἰκοῦσι, τοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐλευθερώσοντας ἥκειν, καὶ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπὸ μὲν σφῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθεροῦν νῦν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἀπὸ δ᾽ ἐκείνων [τῶν βαρβάρων], ἢν μή ποτε αὐτοὺς μὴ ἐξέλωσι, μὴ ἐλευθερῶσαι. [4] τρίβειν οὖν ἐκέλευε πρῶτον ἀμφοτέρους, καὶ ἀποτεμόμενον ὡς μέγιστα ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔπειτ᾽ ἤδη τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ἀπαλλάξαι ἐκ τῆς χώρας. [5] καὶ διενοεῖτο τὸ πλέον οὕτως ὁ Τισσαφέρνης, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ τῶν ποιουμένων ἦν εἰκάσαι. τῷ γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς εὖ περὶ τούτων παραινοῦντι προσθεὶς ἑαυτὸν ἐς πίστιν τήν τε τροφὴν κακῶς ἐπόριζε τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις καὶ ναυμαχεῖν οὐκ εἴα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας φάσκων ναῦς ἥξειν καὶ ἐκ περιόντος ἀγωνιεῖσθαι ἔφθειρε τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν

τοῦ ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν ἀφείλετο γενομένην καὶ πάνυ ἰσχυράν, τά τε ἄλλα καταφανέστερον ἢ ὥστε λανθάνειν οὐ προθύμως ξυνεπολέμει.

47. ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν τῷ Τισσαφέρνει καὶ [τῷ] βασιλεῖ, ὧν παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις, ἄριστα εἶναι νομίζων παρῄνει, ἅμα δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κάθοδον ἐς τὴν πατρίδα ἐπιθεραπεύων, εἰδώς, εἰ μὴ διαφθερεῖ αὐτήν, ὅτι ἔσται ποτὲ αὐτῷ πείσαντι κατελθεῖν: πεῖσαι δ᾽ ἂν ἐνόμιζε μάλιστα ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου, εἰ Τισσαφέρνης φαίνοιτο αὐτῷ ἐπιτήδειος ὤν: ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο. [2] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ᾔσθοντο αὐτὸν ἰσχύοντα παρ᾽ αὐτῷ οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ Ἀθηναίων στρατιῶται, τὰ μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου προσπέμψαντος λόγους ἐς τοὺς δυνατωτάτους αὐτῶν ἄνδρας ὥστε μνησθῆναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐς τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ βούλεται καὶ οὐ πονηρίᾳ οὐδὲ δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ αὐτὸν ἐκβαλούσῃ κατελθὼν καὶ παρασχὼν Τισσαφέρνην φίλον αὐτοῖς ξυμπολιτεύειν, τὸ δὲ πλέον καὶ ἀπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τριήραρχοί τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ δυνατώτατοι ὥρμηντο ἐς τὸ καταλῦσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν.

48. καὶ ἐκινήθη πρότερον ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐντεῦθεν ὕστερον ἦλθεν. τῷ τε Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διαβάντες τινὲς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἐς λόγους ἦλθον, καὶ ὑποτείνοντος αὐτοῦ Τισσαφέρνην μὲν πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ βασιλέα φίλον ποιήσειν, εἰ μὴ δημοκρατοῖντο ‘οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πιστεῦσαι μᾶλλον βασιλέα’, πολλὰς ἐλπίδας εἶχον αὐτοί θ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς οἱ δυνατώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ πράγματα, οἵπερ καὶ ταλαιπωροῦνται μάλιστα, ἐς ἑαυτοὺς περιποιήσειν καὶ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπικρατήσειν. [2] ἔς τε τὴν Σάμον ἐλθόντες ξυνίστασάν τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους ἐς ξυνωμοσίαν καὶ ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς φανερῶς ἔλεγον ὅτι βασιλεὺς σφίσι φίλος ἔσοιτο καὶ χρήματα παρέξοι Ἀλκιβιάδου τε κατελθόντος καὶ μὴ δημοκρατουμένων. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν ὅχλος, εἰ καί τι παραυτίκα ἤχθετο τοῖς πρασσομένοις, διὰ τὸ εὔπορον τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ παρὰ βασιλέως μισθοῦ ἡσύχαζεν: οἱ δὲ ξυνιστάντες τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐπειδὴ τῷ πλήθει ἐκοίνωσαν, αὖθις κἀν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῦ

ἑταιρικοῦ τῷ πλέονι τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐσκόπουν. [4] καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἐφαίνετο εὔπορα καὶ πιστά, Φρυνίχῳ δὲ στρατηγῷ ἔτι ὄντι οὐδὲν ἤρεσκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅ τε Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὅπερ καὶ ἦν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας δεῖσθαι ἐδόκει αὐτῷ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τι σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος κόσμου τὴν πόλιν μεταστήσας ὑπὸ τῶν ἑταίρων παρακληθεὶς κάτεισι, σφίσι δὲ περιοπτέον εἶναι τοῦτο μάλιστα, ὅπως μὴ στασιάσωσιν: [τῷ] βασιλεῖ τε οὐκ εὔπορον εἶναι καὶ Πελοποννησίων ἤδη ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὄντων καὶ πόλεις ἐχόντων ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρχῇ οὐ τὰς ἐλαχίστας, Ἀθηναίοις προσθέμενον, οἷς οὐ πιστεύει, πράγματα ἔχειν, ἐξὸν Πελοποννησίους, ὑφ᾽ ὧν κακὸν οὐδέν πω πέπονθε, φίλους ποιήσασθαι. [5] τάς τε ξυμμαχίδας πόλεις, αἷς ὑπεσχῆσθαι δὴ σφᾶς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅτι δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δημοκρατήσονται, εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφη ὅτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον σφίσιν οὔθ᾽ αἱ ἀφεστηκυῖαι προσχωρήσονται οὔθ᾽ αἱ ὑπάρχουσαι βεβαιότεραι ἔσονται: οὐ γὰρ βουλήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας δουλεύειν μᾶλλον ἢ μεθ᾽ ὁποτέρου ἂν τύχωσι τούτων ἐλευθέρους εἶναι: [6] τούς τε καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους οὐκ ἐλάσσω αὐτοὺς νομίζειν σφίσι πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου, ποριστὰς ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητὰς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι: καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις εἶναι καὶ ἄκριτοι ἂν καὶ βιαιότερον ἀποθνῄσκειν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστήν. [7] καὶ ταῦτα παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμένας τὰς πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτὸς εἰδέναι ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσιν. οὔκουν ἑαυτῷ γε τῶν ἀπ᾽ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πρασσομένων ἀρέσκειν οὐδέν.

49. οἱ δὲ ξυλλεγέντες τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυνωμοσίᾳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει, τά τε παρόντα ἐδέχοντο καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρέσβεις Πείσανδρον καὶ ἄλλους παρεσκευάζοντο πέμπειν, ὅπως περί τε τῆς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου καθόδου πράσσοιεν καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἐκεῖ δήμου καταλύσεως καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην φίλον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ποιήσειαν.

50. γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Φρύνιχος ὅτι ἔσοιτο περὶ τῆς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου καθόδου λόγος καὶ ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνδέξονται αὐτήν, δείσας πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν τῶν ὑφ᾽ αὐτοῦ λεχθέντων μή, ἢν κατέλθῃ, ὡς κωλυτὴν ὄντα κακῶς δρᾷ, τρέπεται ἐπὶ τοιόνδε τι. [2] πέμπει ὡς τὸν Ἀστύοχον τὸν Λακεδαιμονίων ναύαρχον ἔτι ὄντα τότε περὶ τὴν Μίλητον κρύφα ἐπιστείλας ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης αὐτῶν τὰ πράγματα φθείρει Τισσαφέρνην Ἀθηναίοις φίλον ποιῶν, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα σαφῶς ἐγγράψας: ξυγγνώμην δὲ εἶναι ἑαυτῷ περὶ ἀνδρὸς πολεμίου καὶ μετὰ τοῦ τῆς πόλεως ἀξυμφόρου κακόν τι βουλεύειν. [3] ὁ δὲ Ἀστύοχος τὸν μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἄλλως τε καὶ οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐς χεῖρας ἰόντα οὐδὲ διενοεῖτο τιμωρεῖσθαι, ἀνελθὼν δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐς Μαγνησίαν καὶ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνην ἅμα λέγει τε αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐπισταλέντα ἐκ τῆς Σάμου καὶ γίγνεται αὐτὸς μηνυτής, προσέθηκέ τε, ὡς ἐλέγετο, ἐπὶ ἰδίοις κέρδεσι Τισσαφέρνει ἑαυτὸν καὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινοῦσθαι: διόπερ καὶ [περὶ] τῆς μισθοφορᾶς οὐκ ἐντελοῦς οὔσης μαλακωτέρως ἀνθήπτετο. [4] ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης εὐθὺς πέμπει κατὰ Φρυνίχου γράμματα ἐς τὴν Σάμον πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τέλει ὄντας οἷα δέδρακε, καὶ ἀξιῶν αὐτὸν ἀποθνῄσκειν. [5] θορυβούμενος δὲ ὁ Φρύνιχος καὶ πάνυ ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ κινδύνῳ ὢν διὰ τὸ μήνυμα ἀποστέλλει αὖθις πρὸς τὸν Ἀστύοχον, τά τε πρότερα μεμφόμενος ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἐκρύφθη καὶ νῦν ὅτι ὅλον τὸ στράτευμα τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἑτοῖμος εἴη τὸ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ παρασχεῖν αὐτοῖς διαφθεῖραι, γράψας καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, ἀτειχίστου οὔσης Σάμου, ᾧ ἂν τρόπῳ αὐτὰ πράξειε, καὶ ὅτι ἀνεπίφθονόν οἱ ἤδη εἴη περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δι᾽ ἐκείνους κινδυνεύοντι καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν δρᾶσαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθίστων αὐτὸν διαφθαρῆναι. ὁ δὲ Ἀστύοχος μηνύει καὶ ταῦτα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ.

51. καὶ ὡς προῄσθετο αὐτὸν ὁ Φρύνιχος ἀδικοῦντα καὶ ὅσον οὐ παροῦσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου περὶ τούτων ἐπιστολήν, αὐτὸς προφθάσας τῷ στρατεύματι ἐξάγγελος γίγνεται ὡς οἱ πολέμιοι μέλλουσιν ἀτειχίστου οὔσης τῆς Σάμου καὶ ἅμα τῶν νεῶν οὐ πασῶν ἔνδον ὁρμουσῶν

ἐπιθήσεσθαι τῷ στρατοπέδῳ, καὶ ταῦτα σαφῶς πεπυσμένος εἴη, καὶ χρῆναι τειχίζειν τε Σάμον ὡς τάχιστα καὶ τἆλλα ἐν φυλακῇ ἔχειν: ἐστρατήγει δὲ καὶ κύριος ἦν αὐτὸς πράσσων ταῦτα. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸν τειχισμόν τε παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου, καὶ ὡς μέλλουσα, Σάμος θᾶσσον ἐτειχίσθη: αἱ δὲ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐπιστολαὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἦκον ὅτι προδίδοταί τε τὸ στράτευμα ὑπὸ Φρυνίχου καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι μέλλουσιν ἐπιθήσεσθαι. [3] δόξας δὲ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης οὐ πιστὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων προειδὼς τῷ Φρυνίχῳ ὡς ξυνειδότι κατ᾽ ἔχθραν ἀνατιθέναι, οὐδὲν ἔβλαψεν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξυνεμαρτύρησε μᾶλλον ταὐτὰ ἐσαγγείλας.

52. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Ἀλκιβιάδης μὲν Τισσαφέρνην παρεσκεύαζε καὶ ἀνέπειθεν ὅπως φίλος ἔσται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, δεδιότα μὲν τοὺς Πελοποννησίους, ὅτι πλέοσι ναυσὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρῆσαν, βουλόμενον δὲ ὅμως, εἰ δύναιτό πως, πεισθῆναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἐν τῇ Κνίδῳ διαφορὰν περὶ τῶν Θηριμένους σπονδῶν ᾔσθετο τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἤδη γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἐν τῇ Ῥόδῳ ὄντων αὐτῶν ἐγεγένητο: ἐν ᾗ τὸν τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου λόγον πρότερον εἰρημένον περὶ τοῦ ἐλευθεροῦν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὰς ἁπάσας πόλεις ἐπηλήθευσεν ὁ Λίχας, οὐ φάσκων ἀνεκτὸν εἶναι ξυγκεῖσθαι κρατεῖν βασιλέα τῶν πόλεων ὧν ποτὲ καὶ πρότερον ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ οἱ πατέρες ἦρχον. καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἅτε περὶ μεγάλων ἀγωνιζόμενος, προθύμως τὸν Τισσαφέρνην θεραπεύων προσέκειτο:

53. οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου πρέσβεις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποσταλέντες ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας λόγους ἐποιοῦντο ἐν τῷ δήμῳ κεφαλαιοῦντες ἐκ πολλῶν, μάλιστα δὲ ὡς ἐξείη αὐτοῖς Ἀλκιβιάδην καταγαγοῦσι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δημοκρατουμένοις βασιλέα τε ξύμμαχον ἔχειν καὶ Πελοποννησίων περιγενέσθαι. [2] ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων περὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδου ἅμα ἐχθρῶν διαβοώντων ὡς δεινὸν εἴη εἰ τοὺς νόμους βιασάμενος κάτεισι, καὶ Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ Κηρύκων περὶ τῶν μυστικῶν δι᾽ ἅπερ ἔφυγε μαρτυρομένων καὶ

ἐπιθειαζόντων μὴ κατάγειν, ὁ Πείσανδρος παρελθὼν πρὸς πολλὴν ἀντιλογίαν καὶ σχετλιασμὸν ἡρώτα ἕνα ἕκαστον παράγων τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων, εἴ τινα ἐλπίδα ἔχει σωτηρίας τῇ πόλει, Πελοποννησίων ναῦς τε οὐκ ἐλάσσους σφῶν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἀντιπρῴρους ἐχόντων καὶ πόλεις ξυμμαχίδας πλείους, βασιλέως τε αὐτοῖς καὶ Τισσαφέρνους χρήματα παρεχόντων, σφίσι τε οὐκέτι ὄντων, εἰ μή τις πείσει βασιλέα μεταστῆναι παρὰ σφᾶς. [3] ὁπότε δὲ μὴ φαῖεν ἐρωτώμενοι, ἐνταῦθα δὴ σαφῶς ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς ὅτι ‘τοῦτο τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ πολιτεύσομεν τε σωφρονέστερον καὶ ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον τὰς ἀρχὰς ποιήσομεν, ἵνα πιστεύῃ ἡμῖν βασιλεύς, καὶ μὴ περὶ πολιτείας τὸ πλέον βουλεύσομεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἢ περὶ σωτηρίας ὕστερον γὰρ ἐξέσται ἡμῖν καὶ μεταθέσθαι, ἢν μή τι ἀρέσκῃ, Ἀλκιβιάδην τε κατάξομεν, ὃς μόνος τῶν νῦν οἷός τε τοῦτο κατεργάσασθαι.’

54. ὁ δὲ δῆμος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀκούων χαλεπῶς ἔφερε τὸ περὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας: σαφῶς δὲ διδασκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου μὴ εἶναι ἄλλην σωτηρίαν, δείσας καὶ ἅμα ἐπελπίζων ὡς καὶ μεταβαλεῖται, ἐνέδωκεν. [2] καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο πλεύσαντα τὸν Πείσανδρον καὶ δέκα ἄνδρας μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ πράσσειν ὅπῃ [ἂν] αὐτοῖς δοκοίη ἄριστα ἔξειν τά τε πρὸς τὸν Τισσαφέρνην καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην. [3] ἅμα τε διαβαλόντος καὶ Φρύνιχον τοῦ Πεισάνδρου παρέλυσεν ὁ δῆμος τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τὸν ξυνάρχοντα Σκιρωνίδην, ἀντέπεμψαν δὲ στρατηγοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς Διομέδοντα καὶ Λέοντα. τὸν δὲ Φρύνιχον ὁ Πείσανδρος φάσκων Ἴασον προδοῦναι καὶ Ἀμόργην διέβαλεν, οὐ νομίζων ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι τοῖς πρὸς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην πρασσομένοις. [4] καὶ ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τάς τε ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἁπάσας ἐπελθὼν καὶ παρακελευσάμενος ὅπως ξυστραφέντες καὶ κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι καταλύσουσι τὸν δῆμον, καὶ τἆλλα παρασκευάσας ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν ὥστε μηκέτι διαμέλλεσθαι, αὐτὸς μετὰ τῶν δέκα ἀνδρῶν τὸν πλοῦν ὡς τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ποιεῖται.

55. ὁ δὲ Λέων καὶ ὁ Διομέδων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι ἀφιγμένοι ἤδη ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς ἐπίπλουν τῇ Ῥόδῳ ἐποιήσαντο. καὶ τὰς μὲν ναῦς καταλαμβάνουσιν ἀνειλκυσμένας τῶν Πελοποννησίων, ἐς δὲ τὴν γῆν ἀπόβασίν τινα ποιησάμενοι καὶ τοὺς προσβοηθήσαντας Ῥοδίων νικήσαντες μάχῃ ἀπεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν Χάλκην, καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐντεῦθεν μᾶλλον <ἢ> ἐκ τῆς Κῶ ἐποιοῦντο: εὐφυλακτότερα γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐγίγνετο, εἴ ποι ἀπαίροι τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναυτικόν. [2]ἦλθε δ᾽ ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον καὶ Ξενοφαντίδας Λάκων παρὰ Πεδαρίτου ἐκ Χίου, λέγων ὅτι τὸ τεῖχος τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἤδη ἐπιτετέλεσται, καὶ εἰ μὴ βοηθήσουσι πάσαις ταῖς ναυσίν, ἀπολεῖται τὰ ἐν Χίῳ πράγματα. οἱ δὲ διενοοῦντο βοηθήσειν. [3] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ὁ Πεδάριτος αὐτός τε καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ἐπικουρικὸν ἔχων καὶ τοὺς Χίους πανστρατιᾷ προσβαλὼν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τῷ περὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐρύματι αἱρεῖ τέ τι αὐτοῦ καὶ νεῶν τινῶν ἀνειλκυσμένων ἐκράτησεν: ἐπεκβοηθησάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τρεψαμένων τοὺς Χίους πρώτους νικᾶται καὶ τὸ ἄλλο τὸ περὶ τὸν Πεδάριτον, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀποθνῄσκει καὶ τῶν Χίων πολλοὶ καὶ ὅπλα ἐλήφθη πολλά.

56. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἔκ τε γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ἐπολιορκοῦντο καὶ ὁ λιμὸς αὐτόθι ἦν μέγας: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἀφικόμενοι ὡς τὸν Τισσαφέρνην λόγους ποιοῦνται περὶ τῆς ὁμολογίας. [2] Ἀλκιβιάδης δέ οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ πάνυ τὰ ἀπὸ Τισσαφέρνους βέβαια ἦν, φοβουμένου τοὺς Πελοποννησίους μᾶλλον καὶ ἔτι βουλομένου, καθάπερ καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐδιδάσκετο, τρίβειν ἀμφοτέρους τρέπεται ἐπὶ τοιόνδε εἶδος ὥστε τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ὡς μέγιστα αἰτοῦντα παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μὴ ξυμβῆναι. [3] δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τὸ αὐτὸ βουληθῆναι, αὐτὸς μὲν διὰ τὸ δέος, ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἐπειδὴ ἑώρα ἐκεῖνον καὶ ὡς οὐ ξυμβησείοντα, δοκεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐβούλετο μὴ ἀδύνατος εἶναι πεῖσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς πεπεισμένῳ Τισσαφέρνει καὶ βουλομένῳ προσχωρῆσαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἱκανὰ διδόναι. [4] ᾔτει γὰρ τοσαῦτα ὑπερβάλλων ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, λέγων αὐτὸς

ὑπὲρ παρόντος τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους, ὥστε τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καίπερ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὅτι αἰτοίη ξυγχωρούντων, ὅμως αἴτιον γενέσθαι: Ἰωνίαν τε γὰρ πᾶσαν ἠξίου δίδοσθαι καὶ αὖθις νήσους τε τὰς ἐπικειμένας καὶ ἄλλα, οἷς οὐκ ἐναντιουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων τέλος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ ἤδη ξυνόδῳ, δείσας μὴ πάνυ φωραθῇ ἀδύνατος ὤν, ναῦς ἠξίου ἐᾶν βασιλέα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γῆν ὅπῃ ἂν καὶ ὅσαις ἂν βούληται. ἐνταῦθα δὴ οὐκέτι ... ἀλλ᾽ ἄπορα νομίσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐξηπατῆσθαι, δι᾽ ὀργῆς ἀπελθόντες κομίζονται ἐς τὴν Σάμον.

57. Τισσαφέρνης δὲ εὐθὺς μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι παρέρχεται ἐς τὴν Καῦνον, βουλόμενος τοὺς Πελοποννησίους πάλιν τε κομίσαι ἐς τὴν Μίλητον καὶ ξυνθήκας ἔτι ἄλλας ποιησάμενος, ἃς ἂν δύνηται, τροφήν τε παρέχειν καὶ μὴ παντάπασιν ἐκπεπολεμῶσθαι, δεδιὼς μή, ἢν ἀπορῶσι πολλαῖς ναυσὶ τῆς τροφῆς, ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀναγκασθέντες ναυμαχεῖν ἡσσηθῶσιν ἢ κενωθεισῶν τῶν νεῶν ἄνευ ἑαυτοῦ γένηται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἃ βούλονται. ἔτι δὲ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα μὴ τῆς τροφῆς ζητήσει πορθήσωσι τὴν ἤπειρον. [2] πάντων οὖν τούτων λογισμῷ καὶ προνοίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐβούλετο ἐπανισοῦν τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρὸς ἀλλήλους, μεταπεμψάμενος οὖν τοὺς Πελοποννησίους τροφήν τε αὐτοῖς δίδωσι καὶ σπονδὰς τρίτας τάσδε σπένδεται.

58. ‘τρίτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει Δαρείου βασιλεύοντος, ἐφορεύοντος δὲ Ἀλεξιππίδα ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, ξυνθῆκαι ἐγένοντο ἐν Μαιάνδρου πεδίῳ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς Τισσαφέρνην καὶ Ἱεραμένη καὶ τοὺς Φαρνάκου παῖδας περὶ τῶν βασιλέως πραγμάτων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων. [2] χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστί, βασιλέως εἶναι: καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται. [3] Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μὴ ἰέναι ἐπὶ χώραν τὴν βασιλέως ἐπὶ κακῷ μηδενί, μηδὲ βασιλέα ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων χώραν μηδὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ κακῷ μηδενί. [4] ἢν δέ τις Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ κακῷ ἴῃ ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλέως χώραν, Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους

κωλύειν: καὶ ἤν τις ἐκ τῆς βασιλέως ἴῃ ἐπὶ κακῷ ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ἢ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω. [5] τροφὴν δὲ ταῖς ναυσὶ ταῖς νῦν παρούσαις Τισσαφέρνην παρέχειν κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα μέχρι ἂν αἱ νῆες αἱ βασιλέως ἔλθωσιν: [6] Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ἐπὴν αἱ βασιλέως νῆες ἀφίκωνται, τὰς ἑαυτῶν ναῦς, ἢν βούλωνται, τρέφειν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι. ἢν δὲ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνους λαμβάνειν ἐθέλωσι τὴν τροφήν, Τισσαφέρνην παρέχειν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τελευτῶντος τοῦ πολέμου τὰ χρήματα Τισσαφέρνει ἀποδοῦναι ὁπόσα ἂν λάβωσιν. [7] ἐπὴν δὲ αἱ βασιλέως νῆες ἀφίκωνται, αἵ τε Λακεδαιμονίων νῆες καὶ αἱ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αἱ βασιλέως κοινῇ τὸν πόλεμον πολεμούντων καθ᾽ ὅτι ἂν Τισσαφέρνει δοκῇ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. ἢν δὲ καταλύειν βούλωνται πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν ὁμοίῳ καταλύεσθαι.’

59. αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ αὗται ἐγένοντο, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα παρεσκευάζετο Τισσαφέρνης τάς τε Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἄξων, ὥσπερ εἴρητο, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσαπερ ὑπέσχετο, καὶ ἐβούλετο παρασκευαζόμενος γοῦν δῆλος εἶναι:

60. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ τελευτῶντος ἤδη τοῦ χειμῶνος Ὠρωπὸν εἷλον προδοσίᾳ, Ἀθηναίων ἐμφρουρούντων. ξυνέπραξαν δὲ Ἐρετριῶν τε ἄνδρες καὶ αὐτῶν Ὠρωπίων, ἐπιβουλεύοντες ἀπόστασιν τῆς Εὐβοίας: ἐπὶ γὰρ τῇ Ἐρετρίᾳ τὸ χωρίον ὂν ἀδύνατα ἦν Ἀθηναίων ἐχόντων μὴ οὐ μεγάλα βλάπτειν καὶ Ἐρέτριαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Εὔβοιαν. [2] ἔχοντες οὖν ἤδη τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ῥόδον οἱ Ἐρετριῆς, ἐπικαλούμενοι ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν τοὺς Πελοποννησίους. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῆς Χίου κακουμένης βοήθειαν μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο, καὶ ἅραντες πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκ τῆς Ῥόδου ἔπλεον. [3] καὶ γενόμενοι περὶ τὸ Τριόπιον καθορῶσι τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς πελαγίας ἀπὸ τῆς Χάλκης πλεούσας: καὶ ὡς οὐδέτεροι ἀλλήλοις ἐπέπλεον, ἀφικνοῦνται οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Σάμον, οἱ δὲ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον, καὶ ἑώρων οὐκέτι ἄνευ ναυμαχίας οἷόν τε εἶναι ἐς τὴν Χίον βοηθῆσαι. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα οὗτος, καὶ

εἰκοστὸν ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

61. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους ἅμα τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς ἀρχομένῳ Δερκυλίδας τε ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιάτης στρατιὰν ἔχων οὐ πολλὴν παρεπέμφθη πεζῇ ἐφ᾽ Ἑλλησπόντου Ἄβυδον ἀποστήσων [εἰσὶ δὲ Μιλησίων ἄποικοι], καὶ οἱ Χῖοι, ἐν ὅσῳ αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἀστύοχος ἠπόρει ὅπως βοηθήσοι, ναυμαχῆσαι πιεζόμενοι τῇ πολιορκίᾳ ἠναγκάσθησαν. [2] ἔτυχον δὲ ἔτι ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὄντος Ἀστυόχου ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου Λέοντά τε ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην, ὃς Ἀντισθένει ἐπιβάτης ξυνεξῆλθε, τοῦτον κεκομισμένοι μετὰ τὸν Πεδαρίτου θάνατον ἄρχοντα καὶ ναῦς δώδεκα, αἳ ἔτυχον φύλακες Μιλήτου οὖσαι, ὧν ἦσαν Θούριαι πέντε καὶ Συρακόσιαι τέσσαρες καὶ μία Ἀναιῖτις καὶ μία Μιλησία καὶ Λέοντος μία. [3] ἐπεξελθόντων δὲ τῶν Χίων πανδημεὶ καὶ καταλαβόντων τι ἐρυμνὸν χωρίον καὶ τῶν νεῶν αὐτοῖς ἅμα ἓξ καὶ τριάκοντα ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύο καὶ τριάκοντα ἀναγαγομένων ἐναυμάχησαν: καὶ καρτερᾶς γενομένης ναυμαχίας οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ οἱ Χῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι [ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὀψὲ ἦν] ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

62. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο εὐθὺς τοῦ Δερκυλίδου πεζῇ ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου παρεξελθόντος Ἄβυδος ἐν τῷ Ἑλλησπόντῳ ἀφίσταται πρὸς Δερκυλίδαν καὶ Φαρνάβαζον, καὶ Λάμψακος δυοῖν ἡμέραιν ὕστερον. [2] Στρομβιχίδης δὲ ἐκ τῆς Χίου πυθόμενος κατὰ τάχος βοηθήσας ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων τέσσαρσι καὶ εἴκοσιν, ὧν καὶ στρατιώτιδες ἦσαν ὁπλίτας ἄγουσαι, ἐπεξελθόντων τῶν Λαμψακηνῶν μάχῃ κρατήσας καὶ αὐτοβοεὶ Λάμψακον ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν ἑλών, καὶ σκεύη μὲν καὶ ἀνδράποδα ἁρπαγὴν ποιησάμενος, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐλευθέρους πάλιν κατοικίσας, ἐπ᾽ Ἄβυδον ἦλθεν. [3] καὶ ὡς οὔτε προσεχώρουν οὔτε προσβάλλων ἐδύνατο ἑλεῖν, ἐς τὸ ἀντιπέρας τῆς Ἀβύδου ἀποπλεύσας Σηστὸν πόλιν τῆς Χερσονήσου, ἥν ποτε Μῆδοι εἶχον, καθίστατο φρούριον καὶ φυλακὴν τοῦ παντὸς Ἑλλησπόντου.

63. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Χῖοί τε θαλασσοκράτορες μᾶλλον ἐγένοντο καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ καὶ ὁ Ἀστύοχος πυθόμενος τὰ

περὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας καὶ τὸν Στρομβιχίδην καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀπεληλυθότα ἐθάρσησεν. [2] καὶ παραπλεύσας δυοῖν νεοῖν Ἀστύοχος ἐς Χίον κομίζει αὐτόθεν τὰς ναῦς καὶ ξυμπάσαις ἤδη ἐπίπλουν ποιεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν Σάμον: καὶ ὡς αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ ἀλλήλοις ὑπόπτως ἔχειν οὐκ ἀντανήγοντο, ἀπέπλευσε πάλιν ἐς τὴν Μίλητον. [3]ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον καὶ ἔτι πρότερον ἡ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις δημοκρατία κατελέλυτο. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οἱ περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον πρέσβεις παρὰ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους ἐς τὴν Σάμον ἦλθον, τά τε ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ἔτι βεβαιότερον κατέλαβον καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν Σαμίων προυτρέψαντο τοὺς δυνατωτάτους ὥστε πειρᾶσθαι μετὰ σφῶν ὀλιγαρχηθῆναι, καίπερ ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται: [4] καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἅμα οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κοινολογούμενοι ἐσκέψαντο Ἀλκιβιάδην μέν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ βούλεται, ἐᾶν καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐλθεῖν, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἤδη καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὁρᾶν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ μὴ ἀνεθήσεται τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἅμα ἀντέχειν καὶ ἐσφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων οἴκων προθύμως χρήματα καὶ ἤν τι ἄλλο δέῃ, ὡς οὐκέτι ἄλλοις ἢ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταλαιπωροῦντας.

64. παρακελευσάμενοι οὖν τοιαῦτα τὸν μὲν Πείσανδρον εὐθὺς τότε καὶ τῶν πρέσβεων τοὺς ἡμίσεις ἀπέστελλον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου πράξοντας τἀκεῖ, καὶ εἴρητο αὐτοῖς τῶν ὑπηκόων πόλεων αἷς ἂν προσσχῶσιν ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστάναι: τοὺς δ᾽ ἡμίσεις ἐς τἄλλα τὰ ὑπήκοα χωρία ἄλλους ἄλλῃ διέπεμπον, [2] καὶ Διειτρέφη ὄντα περὶ Χίον, ᾗρημένον δὲ ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἄρχειν, ἀπέστελλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Θάσον τὸν δῆμον κατέλυσεν. [3] καὶ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ οἱ Θάσιοι δευτέρῳ μηνὶ μάλιστα τὴν πόλιν ἐτείχιζον, ὡς τῆς μὲν μετ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἀριστοκρατίας οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεόμενοι, τὴν δ᾽ ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐλευθερίαν ὁσημέραι προσδεχόμενοι: [4] καὶ γὰρ καὶ φυγὴ αὐτῶν ἔξω ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρὰ τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις, καὶ αὕτη μετὰ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιτηδείων κατὰ κράτος ἔπρασσε ναῦς τε κομίσαι καὶ τὴν Θάσον ἀποστῆσαι. ξυνέβη οὖν αὐτοῖς μάλιστα ἃ

ἐβούλοντο, τὴν πόλιν τε ἀκινδύνως ὀρθοῦσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐναντιωσόμενον δῆμον καταλελύσθαι. [5] περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν Θάσον τἀναντία τοῖς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστᾶσι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγένετο, δοκεῖν δέ μοι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς τῶν ὑπηκόων: σωφροσύνην γὰρ λαβοῦσαι αἱ πόλεις καὶ ἄδειαν τῶν πρασσομένων ἐχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπούλου εὐνομίας οὐ προτιμήσαντες.

65. οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον παραπλέοντές τε, ὥσπερ ἐδέδοκτο, τοὺς δήμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κατέλυον, καὶ ἅμα ἔστιν ἀφ᾽ ὧν χωρίων καὶ ὁπλίτας ἔχοντες σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξυμμάχους ἦλθον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. [2] καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς ἑταίροις προειργασμένα. καὶ γὰρ Ἀνδροκλέα τέ τινα τοῦ δήμου μάλιστα προεστῶτα ξυστάντες τινὲς τῶν νεωτέρων κρύφα ἀποκτείνουσιν, ὅσπερ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐξήλασε, καὶ αὐτὸν κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα, τῆς τε δημαγωγίας ἕνεκα καὶ οἰόμενοι τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ὡς κατιόντι καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην φίλον ποιήσοντι χαριεῖσθαι, μᾶλλόν τι διέφθειραν: καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἀνεπιτηδείους τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ κρύφα ἀνήλωσαν. [3] λόγος τε ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ προείργαστο αὐτοῖς ὡς οὔτε μισθοφορητέον εἴη ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς στρατευομένους οὔτε μεθεκτέον τῶν πραγμάτων πλέοσιν ἢ πεντακισχιλίοις, καὶ τούτοις οἳ ἂν μάλιστα τοῖς τε χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ὠφελεῖν οἷοί τε ὦσιν.

66. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἔξειν γε τὴν πόλιν οἵπερ καὶ μεθίστασαν ἔμελλον. δῆμος μέντοι ὅμως ἔτι καὶ βουλὴ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάμου ξυνελέγετο: ἐβούλευον δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι μὴ τοῖς ξυνεστῶσι δοκοίη, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ λέγοντες ἐκ τούτων ἦσαν καὶ τὰ ῥηθησόμενα πρότερον αὐτοῖς προύσκεπτο. [2] ἀντέλεγέ τε οὐδεὶς ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων, δεδιὼς καὶ ὁρῶν πολὺ τὸ ξυνεστηκός: εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀντείποι, εὐθὺς ἐκ τρόπου τινὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἐτεθνήκει, καὶ τῶν δρασάντων οὔτε ζήτησις οὔτ᾽ εἰ ὑποπτεύοιντο δικαίωσις ἐγίγνετο, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν ὁ δῆμος καὶ κατάπληξιν τοιαύτην ὥστε κέρδος ὁ μὴ πάσχων τι βίαιον, εἰ καὶ σιγῴη, ἐνόμιζεν. [3] καὶ τὸ ξυνεστηκὸς πολὺ πλέον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι ἢ

ὅσον ἐτύγχανεν ὂν ἡσσῶντο ταῖς γνώμαις, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν αὐτὸ ἀδύνατοι ὄντες διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀγνωσίαν οὐκ εἶχον [αὐτοὶ ἐξευρεῖν]. [4] κατὰ δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ προσολοφύρασθαί τινι ἀγανακτήσαντα, ὥστε ἀμύνασθαι ἐπιβουλεύσαντα, ἀδύνατον ἦν: ἢ γὰρ ἀγνῶτα ἂν ηὗρεν ᾧ ἐρεῖ ἢ γνώριμον ἄπιστον. [5] ἀλλήλοις γὰρ ἅπαντες ὑπόπτως προσῇσαν οἱ τοῦ δήμου, ὡς μετέχοντά τινα τῶν γιγνομένων. ἐνῆσαν γὰρ καὶ οὓς οὐκ ἄν ποτέ τις ᾤετο ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τραπέσθαι: καὶ τὸ ἄπιστον οὗτοι μέγιστον πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν καὶ πλεῖστα ἐς τὴν τῶν ὀλίγων ἀσφάλειαν ὠφέλησαν, βέβαιον τὴν ἀπιστίαν τῷ δήμῳ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καταστήσαντες.

67. ἐν τούτῳ οὖν τῷ καιρῷ οἱ περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον ἐλθόντες εὐθὺς τῶν λοιπῶν εἴχοντο. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὸν δῆμον ξυλλέξαντες εἶπον γνώμην δέκα ἄνδρας ἑλέσθαι ξυγγραφέας αὐτοκράτορας, τούτους δὲ ξυγγράψαντας γνώμην ἐσενεγκεῖν ἐς τὸν δῆμον ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν καθ᾽ ὅτι ἄριστα ἡ πόλις οἰκήσεται: [2] ἔπειτα ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐφῆκε, ξυνέκλῃσαν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐς τὸν Κολωνόν ⸀ἔστι δὲ ἱερὸν Ποσειδῶνος ἔξω πόλεως ἀπέχον σταδίους μάλιστα δέκα⸁, καὶ ἐσήνεγκαν οἱ ξυγγραφῆς ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξεῖναι μὲν Ἀθηναίων ἀνατεὶ εἰπεῖν γνώμην ἣν ἄν τις βούληται: ἢν δέ τις τὸν εἰπόντα ἢ γράψηται παρανόμων ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τρόπῳ βλάψῃ, μεγάλας ζημίας ἐπέθεσαν. [3] ἐνταῦθα δὴ λαμπρῶς ἐλέγετο ἤδη μήτε ἀρχὴν ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κόσμου μήτε μισθοφορεῖν προέδρους τε ἑλέσθαι πέντε ἄνδρας, τούτους δὲ ἑλέσθαι ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας, καὶ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἕκαστον πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τρεῖς: ἐλθόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς τετρακοσίους ὄντας ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον ἄρχειν ὅπῃ ἂν ἄριστα γιγνώσκωσιν αὐτοκράτορας, καὶ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους δὲ ξυλλέγειν ὁπόταν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ.

68. ἦν δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν γνώμην ταύτην εἰπὼν Πείσανδρος, καὶ τἆλλα ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς προθυμότατα ξυγκαταλύσας τὸν δῆμον: ὁ μέντοι ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα ξυνθεὶς ὅτῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη ἐς τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ πλείστου ἐπιμεληθεὶς Ἀντιφῶν ἦν

ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἀρετῇ τε οὐδενὸς ὕστερος καὶ κράτιστος ἐνθυμηθῆναι γενόμενος καὶ ἃ γνοίη εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐς μὲν δῆμον οὐ παριὼν οὐδ᾽ ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἑκούσιος οὐδένα, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ πλεῖστα εἷς ἀνήρ, ὅστις ξυμβουλεύσαιτό τι, δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν. [2] καὶ αὐτός τε, ἐπειδὴ † μετέστη ἡ δημοκρατία καὶ ἐς ἀγῶνας κατέστη † τὰ τῶν τετρακοσίων ἐν ὑστέρῳ μεταπεσόντα ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐκακοῦτο †, ἄριστα φαίνεται τῶν μέχρι ἐμοῦ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τούτων αἰτιαθείς, ὡς ξυγκατέστησε, θανάτου δίκην ἀπολογησάμενος. [3] παρέσχε δὲ καὶ ὁ Φρύνιχος ἑαυτὸν πάντων διαφερόντως προθυμότατον ἐς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δεδιὼς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ ἐπιστάμενος εἰδότα αὐτὸν ὅσα ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ πρὸς τὸν Ἀστύοχον ἔπραξε, νομίζων οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὑπ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίας κατελθεῖν: πολύ τε πρὸς τὰ δεινά, ἐπειδήπερ ὑπέστη, φερεγγυώτατος ἐφάνη. [4] καὶ Θηραμένης ὁ τοῦ Ἄγνωνος ἐν τοῖς ξυγκαταλύουσι τὸν δῆμον πρῶτος ἦν, ἀνὴρ οὔτε εἰπεῖν οὔτε γνῶναι ἀδύνατος. ὥστε ἀπ᾽ ἀνδρῶν πολλῶν καὶ ξυνετῶν πραχθὲν τὸ ἔργον οὐκ ἀπεικότως καίπερ μέγα ὂν προυχώρησεν: χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἦν τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ἐπ᾽ ἔτει ἑκατοστῷ μάλιστα ἐπειδὴ οἱ τύραννοι κατελύθησαν ἐλευθερίας παῦσαι, καὶ οὐ μόνον μὴ ὑπήκοον ὄντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου αὐτὸν ἄλλων ἄρχειν εἰωθότα.

69. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ ἐκκλησία οὐδενὸς ἀντειπόντος, ἀλλὰ κυρώσασα ταῦτα διελύθη, τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἤδη ὕστερον τρόπῳ τοιῷδε ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον ἐσήγαγον. ἦσαν [δ᾽] Ἀθηναῖοι πάντες αἰεὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τείχει, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τάξει, τῶν ἐν Δεκελείᾳ πολεμίων ἕνεκα ἐφ᾽ ὅπλοις: [2] τῇ οὖν ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ τοὺς μὲν μὴ ξυνειδότας εἴασαν ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν ἀπελθεῖν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ξυνωμοσίᾳ εἴρητο ἡσυχῇ μὴ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὅπλοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἄπωθεν περιμένειν, καὶ ἤν τις ἐνιστῆται τοῖς ποιουμένοις, λαβόντας τὰ ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν. [3] ἦσαν δὲ καὶ Ἄνδριοι καὶ Τήνιοι καὶ Καρυστίων τριακόσιοι καὶ Αἰγινητῶν τῶν ἐποίκων, οὓς Ἀθηναῖοι ἔπεμψαν οἰκήσοντας, ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ

τοῦτο ἥκοντες ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ὅπλοις, οἷς ταὐτὰ προείρητο. [4] τούτων δὲ διατεταγμένων οὕτως ἐλθόντες οἱ τετρακόσιοι μετὰ ξιφιδίου ἀφανοῦς ἕκαστος, καὶ οἱ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν μετ᾽ αὐτῶν [Ἕλληνες] νεανίσκοι, οἷς ἐχρῶντο εἴ τί που δέοι χειρουργεῖν, ἐπέστησαν τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάμου βουλευταῖς οὖσιν ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ καὶ εἶπον αὐτοῖς ἐξιέναι λαβοῦσι τὸν μισθόν: ἔφερον δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῦ ὑπολοίπου χρόνου παντὸς αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐξιοῦσιν ἐδίδοσαν.

70. ὡς δὲ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥ τε βουλὴ οὐδὲν ἀντειποῦσα ὑπεξῆλθε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται οὐδὲν ἐνεωτέριζον, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχαζον, οἱ [δὲ] τετρακόσιοι ἐσελθόντες ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον τότε μὲν πρυτάνεις τε σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀπεκλήρωσαν καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐχαῖς καὶ θυσίαις καθιστάμενοι ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐχρήσαντο, ὕστερον δὲ πολὺ μεταλλάξαντες τῆς τοῦ δήμου διοικήσεως πλὴν τοὺς φεύγοντας οὐ κατῆγον τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἕνεκα τά τε ἄλλα ἔνεμον κατὰ κράτος τὴν πόλιν. [2] καὶ ἄνδρας τέ τινας ἀπέκτειναν οὐ πολλούς, οἳ ἐδόκουν ἐπιτήδειοι εἶναι ὑπεξαιρεθῆναι, καὶ ἄλλους ἔδησαν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ μετεστήσαντο: πρός τε Ἄγιν τὸν Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέα ὄντα ἐν τῇ Δεκελείᾳ ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο, λέγοντες διαλλαγῆναι βούλεσθαι καὶ εἰκὸς εἶναι αὐτὸν σφίσι καὶ οὐκέτι τῷ ἀπίστῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον ξυγχωρεῖν.

71. ὁ δὲ νομίζων τὴν πόλιν οὐχ ἡσυχάζειν, οὐδ᾽ εὐθὺς οὕτω τὸν δῆμον τὴν παλαιὰν ἐλευθερίαν παραδώσειν, εἴ τε στρατιὰν πολλὴν ἴδοι σφῶν, οὐκ ἂν ἡσυχάζειν, οὐδ᾽ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πάνυ τι πιστεύων μὴ οὐκέτι ταράσσεσθαι αὐτούς, τοῖς μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων ἐλθοῦσιν οὐδὲν ξυμβατικὸν ἀπεκρίνατο, προσμεταπεμψάμενος δὲ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου στρατιὰν πολλὴν οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον καὶ αὐτὸς τῇ ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας φρουρᾷ μετὰ τῶν ἐλθόντων κατέβη πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐλπίσας ἢ ταραχθέντας αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἂν χειρωθῆναι σφίσιν ᾗ βούλονται ἢ καὶ αὐτοβοεὶ ἂν διὰ τὸν ἔνδοθέν τε καὶ ἔξωθεν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γενησόμενον θόρυβον: τῶν γὰρ μακρῶν τειχῶν διὰ τὴν κατ᾽ αὐτὰ ἐρημίαν λήψεως οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτεῖν. [2] ὡς δὲ

προσέμειξέ τε ἐγγὺς καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ μὲν ἔνδοθεν οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν ἐκίνησαν, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας ἐκπέμψαντες καὶ μέρος τι τῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ ψιλῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν ἄνδρας τε κατέβαλον αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς προσελθεῖν καὶ ὅπλων τινῶν καὶ νεκρῶν ἐκράτησαν, οὕτω δὴ γνοὺς ἀπήγαγε πάλιν τὴν στρατιάν. [3] καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ κατὰ χώραν ἐν τῇ Δεκελείᾳ ἔμενον, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπελθόντας ὀλίγας τινὰς ἡμέρας ἐν τῇ γῇ μείναντας ἀπέπεμψεν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο παρά τε τὸν Ἄγιν ἐπρεσβεύοντο οἱ τετρακόσιοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον, κἀκείνου μᾶλλον ἤδη προσδεχομένου καὶ παραινοῦντος ἐκπέμπουσι καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα περὶ ξυμβάσεως πρέσβεις, βουλόμενοι διαλλαγῆναι.

72. πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Σάμον δέκα ἄνδρας παραμυθησομένους τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ διδάξοντας ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ ὀλιγαρχία κατέστη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ξυμπάντων πραγμάτων, πεντακισχίλιοί τε ὅτι εἶεν καὶ οὐ τετρακόσιοι μόνον οἱ πράσσοντες: καίτοι οὐ πώποτε Ἀθηναίους διὰ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὴν ὑπερόριον ἀσχολίαν ἐς οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα οὕτω μέγα ἐλθεῖν βουλεύσοντας ἐν ᾧ πεντακισχιλίους ξυνελθεῖν. [2] ἄλλα τ᾽ ἐπιστείλαντες τὰ πρέποντα εἰπεῖν ἀπέπεμψαν αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατάστασιν, δείσαντες μή, ὅπερ ἐγένετο, ναυτικὸς ὄχλος οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς μένειν ἐν τῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ κόσμῳ ἐθέλῃ, σφᾶς τε μὴ ἐκεῖθεν ἀρξαμένου τοῦ κακοῦ μεταστήσωσιν.

73. ἐν γὰρ τῇ Σάμῳ ἐνεωτερίζετο ἤδη τὰ περὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ ξυνέβη τοιάδε γενέσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ὅνπερ οἱ τετρακόσιοι ξυνίσταντο. [2] οἱ γὰρ τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις καὶ πεισθέντες ὑπό τε τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, ὅτε ἦλθε, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ξυνεστώτων Ἀθηναίων ἐγένοντό τε ἐς τριακοσίους ξυνωμόται καὶ ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς δήμῳ ὄντι ἐπιθήσεσθαι. [3] καὶ Ὑπέρβολόν τέ τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως, ἀποκτείνουσι μετὰ

Χαρμίνου τε ἑνὸς τῶν στρατηγῶν καί τινων τῶν παρὰ σφίσιν Ἀθηναίων, πίστιν διδόντες αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἄλλα μετ᾽ αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, τοῖς τε πλέοσιν ὥρμηντο ἐπιτίθεσθαι. [4] οἱ δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τῶν τε στρατηγῶν Λέοντι καὶ Διομέδοντι —οὗτοι γὰρ οὐχ ἑκόντες διὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἔφερον τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν— τὸ μέλλον σημαίνουσι καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ καὶ Θρασύλῳ, τῷ μὲν τριηραρχοῦντι, τῷ δὲ ὁπλιτεύοντι, καὶ ἄλλοις οἳ ἐδόκουν αἰεὶ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦσθαι τοῖς ξυνεστῶσιν: καὶ οὐκ ἠξίουν περιιδεῖν αὐτοὺς σφᾶς τε διαφθαρέντας καὶ Σάμον Ἀθηναίοις ἀλλοτριωθεῖσαν, δι᾽ ἣν μόνον [μέχρι νῦν] ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτοῖς ἐς τοῦτο ξυνέμεινεν. [5] οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες τῶν τε στρατιωτῶν ἕνα ἕκαστον μετῇσαν μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοὺς Παράλους, ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίους τε καὶ ἐλευθέρους πάντας ἐν τῇ νηὶ πλέοντας καὶ αἰεὶ δήποτε ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ μὴ παρούσῃ ἐπικειμένους: ὅ τε Λέων καὶ ὁ Διομέδων αὐτοῖς ναῦς τινάς, ὁπότε ποι πλέοιεν, κατέλειπον φύλακας. [6] ὥστε ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς ἐπετίθεντο οἱ τριακόσιοι, βοηθησάντων πάντων τούτων, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν Παράλων, περιεγένοντο οἱ τῶν Σαμίων πλέονες, καὶ τριάκοντα μέν τινας ἀπέκτειναν τῶν τριακοσίων, τρεῖς δὲ τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους φυγῇ ἐζημίωσαν: τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις οὐ μνησικακοῦντες δημοκρατούμενοι τὸ λοιπὸν ξυνεπολίτευον.

74. τὴν δὲ Πάραλον ναῦν καὶ Χαιρέαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς τὸν Ἀρχεστράτου, ἄνδρα Ἀθηναῖον, γενόμενον ἐς τὴν μετάστασιν πρόθυμον, ἀποπέμπουσιν οἵ τε Σάμιοι καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται κατὰ τάχος ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀπαγγελοῦντα τὰ γεγενημένα: οὐ γὰρ ᾔδεσάν πω τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἄρχοντας. [2] καὶ καταπλευσάντων αὐτῶν εὐθέως τῶν μὲν Παράλων τινὰς οἱ τετρακόσιοι δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἔδησαν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀφελόμενοι τὴν ναῦν καὶ μετεμβιβάσαντες ἐς ἄλλην στρατιῶτιν ναῦν ἔταξαν φρουρεῖν περὶ Εὔβοιαν. [3] ὁ δὲ Χαιρέας εὐθὺς διαλαθών πως, ὡς εἶδε τὰ παρόντα, πάλιν ἐς τὴν Σάμον ἐλθὼν ἀγγέλλει τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον πάντα δεινώσας τὰ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, ὡς πληγαῖς τε πάντας ζημιοῦσι καὶ ἀντειπεῖν ἔστιν οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας τὴν

πολιτείαν, καὶ ὅτι αὐτῶν καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ παῖδες ὑβρίζονται, καὶ διανοοῦνται, ὁπόσοι ἐν Σάμῳ στρατεύονται μὴ ὄντες τῆς σφετέρας γνώμης, τούτων πάντων τοὺς προσήκοντας λαβόντες εἴρξειν, ἵνα, ἢν μὴ ὑπακούσωσι, τεθνήκωσιν: καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἐπικαταψευδόμενος ἔλεγεν.

75. οἱ δὲ ἀκούοντες ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μάλιστα ποιήσαντας καὶ ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς μετασχόντας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὥρμησαν βάλλειν, ἔπειτα μέντοι ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ μέσου κωλυθέντες καὶ διδαχθέντες μὴ τῶν πολεμίων ἀντιπρῴρων ἐγγὺς ἐφορμούντων ἀπολέσωσι τὰ πράγματα, ἐπαύσαντο. [2] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο λαμπρῶς ἤδη ἐς δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι μεταστῆσαι τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ὅ τε Θρασύβουλος ὁ τοῦ Λύκου καὶ Θράσυλος οὗτοι γὰρ μάλιστα προειστήκεσαν τῆς μεταβολῆς ὥρκωσαν πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγίστους ὅρκους, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα, ἦ μὴν δημοκρατήσεσθαί τε καὶ ὁμονοήσειν καὶ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμον προθύμως διοίσειν καὶ τοῖς τετρακοσίοις πολέμιοί τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπικηρυκεύσεσθαι. [3] ξυνώμνυσαν δὲ καὶ Σαμίων πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, καὶ τὰ πράγματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ἀποβησόμενα ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων ξυνεκοινώσαντο οἱ στρατιῶται τοῖς Σαμίοις, νομίζοντες οὔτε ἐκείνοις ἀποστροφὴν σωτηρίας οὔτε σφίσιν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽, ἐάν τε οἱ τετρακόσιοι κρατήσωσιν ἐάν τε οἱ ἐκ Μιλήτου πολέμιοι, διαφθαρήσεσθαι.

76. ἐς φιλονικίαν τε καθέστασαν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον οἱ μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἀναγκάζοντες δημοκρατεῖσθαι, οἱ δὲ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι. [2] ἐποίησαν δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησίαν εὐθὺς οἱ στρατιῶται, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς μὲν προτέρους στρατηγούς, καὶ εἴ τινα τῶν τριηράρχων ὑπώπτευον, ἔπαυσαν, ἄλλους δὲ ἀνθείλοντο καὶ τριηράρχους καὶ στρατηγούς, ὧν Θρασύβουλός τε καὶ Θράσυλος ὑπῆρχον. [3] καὶ παραινέσεις ἄλλας τε ἐποιοῦντο ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενοι καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν ὅτι ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἀφέστηκεν: τοὺς γὰρ ἐλάσσους ἀπὸ σφῶν τῶν πλεόνων καὶ ἐς πάντα πορειμωτέρων μεθεστάναι. [4] ἐχόντων γὰρ σφῶν τὸ πᾶν

ναυτικόν, τάς τε ἄλλας πόλεις ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἀναγκάσειν τὰ χρήματα ὁμοίως διδόναι καὶ εἰ ἐκεῖθεν ὡρμῶντο πόλιν τε γὰρ σφίσιν ὑπάρχειν Σάμον οὐκ ἀσθενῆ, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ παρ᾽ ἐλάχιστον δὴ ἦλθε τὸ Ἀθηναίων κράτος τῆς θαλάσσης, ὅτε ἐπολέμησεν, ἀφελέσθαι, τούς τε πολεμίους ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χωρίου ἀμυνεῖσθαι οὖπερ καὶ πρότερον, καὶ δυνατώτεροι εἶναι σφεῖς ἔχοντες τὰς ναῦς πορίζεσθαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. [5] καὶ δι᾽ ἑαυτοὺς δὲ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ προκαθημένους καὶ πρότερον αὐτοὺς κρατεῖν τοῦ ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἔσπλου, καὶ νῦν ἐς τοιοῦτον καταστήσονται μὴ βουλομένων σφίσι πάλιν τὴν πολιτείαν ἀποδοῦναι, ὥστε αὐτοὶ δυνατώτεροι εἶναι εἴργειν ἐκείνους τῆς θαλάσσης ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων εἴργεσθαι. [6] βραχύ τέ τι εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον ὃ πρὸς τὸ περιγίγνεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων ἡ πόλις σφίσι χρήσιμος ἦν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπολωλεκέναι, οἵ γε μήτε ἀργύριον εἶχον ἔτι πέμπειν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἐπορίζοντο οἱ στρατιῶται, μήτε βούλευμα χρηστόν, οὗπερ ἕνεκα πόλις στρατοπέδων κρατεῖ: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοὺς μὲν ἡμαρτηκέναι τοὺς πατρίους νόμους καταλύσαντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ σῴζειν καὶ ἐκείνους πειράσεσθαι προσαναγκάζειν, ὥστε οὐδὲ τούτους, οἵπερ ἂν βουλεύοιέν τι χρηστόν, παρὰ σφίσι χείρους εἶναι. [7] Ἀλκιβιάδην τε, ἢν αὐτῷ ἄδειάν τε καὶ κάθοδον ποιήσωσιν, ἄσμενον τὴν παρὰ βασιλέως ξυμμαχίαν παρέξειν. τό τε μέγιστον, ἢν ἁπάντων σφάλλωνται, εἶναι αὐτοῖς τοσοῦτον ἔχουσι ναυτικὸν πολλὰς τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις ἐν αἷς καὶ πόλεις καὶ γῆν εὑρήσουσιν.

77. τοιαῦτα ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐκκλησιάσαντες καὶ παραθαρσύναντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου παρεσκευάζοντο οὐδὲν ἧσσον. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων πεμφθέντες ἐς τὴν Σάμον [οἱ δέκα πρεσβευταὶ] ὡς ταῦτα ἐν τῇ Δήλῳ ἤδη ὄντες ᾐσθάνοντο, ἡσύχαζον αὐτοῦ.

78. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἐν τῷ ναυτικῷ στρατιῶται κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διεβόων ὡς ὑπό τε Ἀστυόχου καὶ Τισσαφέρνους φθείρεται τὰ πράγματα, τοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλοντος οὔτε πρότερον ναυμαχεῖν, ἕως ἔτι αὐτοί τε ἔρρωντο μᾶλλον καὶ

τὸ ναυτικὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὀλίγον ἦν, οὔτε νῦν, ὅτε στασιάζειν τε λέγονται καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτῶν οὐδέπω ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ τὰς παρὰ Τισσαφέρνους Φοινίσσας ναῦς μένοντες, ἄλλως ὄνομα καὶ οὐκ ἔργον, κινδυνεύσειν διατριβῆναι: τὸν δ᾽ αὖ Τισσαφέρνην τάς τε ναῦς ταύτας οὐ κομίζειν, καὶ τροφὴν ὅτι οὐ ξυνεχῶς οὐδ᾽ ἐντελῆ διδοὺς κακοῖ τὸ ναυτικόν. οὔκουν ἔφασαν χρῆναι μέλλειν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ διαναυμαχεῖν.

79. καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐνῆγον. αἰσθόμενοι δὲ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ ὁ Ἀστύοχος τὸν θροῦν, καὶ δόξαν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ ξυνόδου ὥστε διαναυμαχεῖν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐσηγγέλλετο αὐτοῖς ἡ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ταραχή, ἄραντες ταῖς ναυσὶ πάσαις οὔσαις δώδεκα καὶ ἑκατὸν καὶ τοὺς Μιλησίους πεζῇ κελεύσαντες ἐπὶ τῆς Μυκάλης παριέναι ἔπλεον ὡς πρὸς τὴν Μυκάλην. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς ἐκ Σάμου ναυσὶ δυοῖν καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα, αἳ ἔτυχον ἐν Γλαύκῃ τῆς Μυκάλης ὁρμοῦσαι διέχει δὲ ὀλίγον ταύτῃ ἡ Σάμος τῆς ἠπείρου πρὸς τὴν Μυκάλην, ὡς εἶδον τὰς τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναῦς προσπλεούσας, ὑπεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν Σάμον, οὐ νομίσαντες τῷ πλήθει διακινδυνεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἱκανοὶ εἶναι. [3] καὶ ἅμα προῄσθοντο γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου ναυμαχησείοντας προσεδέχοντο καὶ τὸν Στρομβιχίδην ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου σφίσι ταῖς ἐκ τῆς Χίου ναυσὶν ἐπ᾽ Ἀβύδου ἀφικομέναις προσβοηθήσειν: προυπέπεμπτο γὰρ αὐτῷ ἄγγελος. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν οὕτως ἐπὶ τῆς Σάμου ἀνεχώρησαν, οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι καταπλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τῆς Μυκάλης ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, καὶ τῶν Μιλησίων καὶ τῶν πλησιοχώρων ὁ πεζός. [5] καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μελλόντων αὐτῶν ἐπιπλεῖν τῇ Σάμῳ ἀγγέλλεται ὁ Στρομβιχίδης ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου ναυσὶν ἀφιγμένος: καὶ εὐθὺς ἀπέπλεον πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς Μιλήτου. [6] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι προσγενομένων σφίσι τῶν νεῶν ἐπίπλουν αὐτοὶ ποιοῦνται τῇ Μιλήτῳ ναυσὶν ὀκτὼ καὶ ἑκατὸν βουλόμενοι διαναυμαχῆσαι: καὶ ὡς οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς ἀντανήγετο, ἀπέπλευσαν πάλιν ἐς τὴν Σάμον.

80. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει μετὰ τοῦτο εὐθὺς οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ ἀθρόαις ταῖς ναυσὶν οὐκ ἀξιόμαχοι

νομίσαντες εἶναι οὐκ ἀντανήγοντο, ἀπορήσαντες ὁπόθεν τοσαύταις ναυσὶ χρήματα ἕξουσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ Τισσαφέρνους κακῶς διδόντος, ἀποστέλλουσιν ὡς τὸν Φαρνάβαζον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου προσετάχθη, Κλέαρχον τὸν Ῥαμφίου ἔχοντα ναῦς τεσσαράκοντα. [2] ἐπεκαλεῖτό τε γὰρ αὐτοὺς ὁ Φαρνάβαζος καὶ τροφὴν ἑτοῖμος ἦν παρέχειν, καὶ ἅμα καὶ τὸ Βυζάντιον ἐπεκηρυκεύετο αὐτοῖς ἀποστῆναι. [3] καὶ αἱ μὲν τῶν Πελοποννησίων αὗται νῆες ἀπάρασαι ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, ὅπως λάθοιεν ἐν τῷ πλῷ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, χειμασθεῖσαι, καὶ αἱ μὲν Δήλου λαβόμεναι αἱ πλείους μετὰ Κλεάρχου καὶ ὕστερον πάλιν ἐλθοῦσαι ἐς Μίλητον ▯Κλέαρχος δὲ κατὰ γῆν αὖθις ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον κομισθεὶς ἦρχεν▯, αἱ δὲ μετὰ Ἐλίξου τοῦ Μεγαρέως στρατηγοῦ δέκα ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον διασωθεῖσαι Βυζάντιον ἀφιστᾶσιν. [4] καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πέμπουσιν αἰσθόμενοι νεῶν βοήθειαν καὶ φυλακὴν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καί τις καὶ ναυμαχία βραχεῖα γίγνεται πρὸ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ναυσὶν ὀκτὼ πρὸς ὀκτώ.

81. οἱ δὲ προεστῶτες ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ καὶ μάλιστα Θρασύβουλος, αἰεί γε τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἐχόμενος, ἐπειδὴ μετέστησε τὰ πράγματα, ὥστε κατάγειν Ἀλκιβιάδην, [καὶ] τέλος ἀπ᾽ ἐκκλησίας ἔπεισε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν, καὶ ψηφισαμένων αὐτῶν Ἀλκιβιάδῃ κάθοδον καὶ ἄδειαν πλεύσας ὡς τὸν Τισσαφέρνην κατῆγεν ἐς τὴν Σάμον τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, νομίζων μόνην σωτηρίαν εἰ Τισσαφέρνην αὐτοῖς μεταστήσειεν ἀπὸ Πελοποννησίων. [2] γενομένης δὲ ἐκκλησίας τήν τε ἰδίαν ξυμφορὰν τῆς φυγῆς ἐπῃτιάσατο καὶ ἀνωλοφύρατο ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, καὶ περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἐς ἐλπίδας τε αὐτοὺς οὐ σμικρὰς τῶν μελλόντων καθίστη, καὶ ὑπερβάλλων ἐμεγάλυνε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν παρὰ τῷ Τισσαφέρνει, ἵνα οἵ τε οἴκοι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἔχοντες φοβοῖντο αὐτὸν καὶ μᾶλλον αἱ ξυνωμοσίαι διαλυθεῖεν καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τιμιώτερόν τε αὐτὸν ἄγοιεν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ πλέον θαρσοῖεν, οἵ τε πολέμιοι τῷ Τισσαφέρνει ὡς μάλιστα διαβάλλοιντο καὶ [ἀπὸ] τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν ἐλπίδων ἐκπίπτοιεν. [3] ὑπισχνεῖτο δ᾽ οὖν τάδε μέγιστα

ἐπικομπῶν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὡς Τισσαφέρνης αὐτῷ ὑπεδέξατο ἦ μήν, ἕως ἄν τι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ λείπηται, ἢν Ἀθηναίοις πιστεύσῃ, μὴ ἀπορήσειν αὐτοὺς τροφῆς, οὐδ᾽ ἢν δέῃ τελευτῶντα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ στρωμνὴν ἐξαργυρῶσαι, τάς τε ἐν Ἀσπένδῳ ἤδη οὔσας Φοινίκων ναῦς κομιεῖν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ οὐ Πελοποννησίοις: πιστεῦσαι δ᾽ ἂν μόνως Ἀθηναίοις, εἰ σῶς αὐτὸς κατελθὼν αὐτῷ ἀναδέξαιτο.

82. οἱ δὲ ἀκούοντες ταῦτά τε καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ στρατηγόν τε αὐτὸν εὐθὺς εἵλοντο μετὰ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τὰ πράγματα πάντα ἀνετίθεσαν, τήν τε παραυτίκα ἐλπίδα ἕκαστος τῆς τε σωτηρίας καὶ τῆς τῶν τετρακοσίων τιμωρίας οὐδενὸς ἂν ἡλλάξαντο, καὶ ἑτοῖμοι ἤδη ἦσαν διὰ τὸ αὐτίκα τούς τε παρόντας πολεμίους ἐκ τῶν λεχθέντων καταφρονεῖν καὶ πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ. [2] ὁ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ πλεῖν τοὺς ἐγγυτέρω πολεμίους ὑπολιπόντας καὶ πάνυ διεκώλυσε, πολλῶν ἐπειγομένων, τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου πρῶτον ἔφη, ἐπειδὴ καὶ στρατηγὸς ᾑρητο, πλεύσας ὡς Τισσαφέρνην πράξειν. [3] καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐκκλησίας εὐθὺς ᾤχετο, ἵνα δοκῇ πάντα μετ᾽ ἐκείνου κοινοῦσθαι, καὶ ἅμα βουλόμενος αὐτῷ τιμιώτερός τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνδείκνυσθαι ὅτι καὶ στρατηγὸς ἤδη ᾑρηται καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς οἷός τέ ἐστιν αὐτὸν [ἤδη] ποιεῖν. ξυνέβαινε δὲ τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ μὲν Τισσαφέρνει τοὺς Ἀθηναίους φοβεῖν, ἐκείνοις δὲ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην.

83. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ πυνθανόμενοι τὴν τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου κάθοδον, καὶ πρότερον τῷ Τισσαφέρνει ἀπιστοῦντες πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἔτι διεβέβληντο. [2] ξυνηνέχθη γὰρ αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν Μίλητον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπίπλουν, ὡς οὐκ ἠθέλησαν ἀνταναγαγόντες ναυμαχῆσαι, πολλῷ ἐς τὴν μισθοδοσίαν τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ἀρρωστότερον γενόμενον καὶ ἐς τὸ μισεῖσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν πρότερον ἔτι τούτων διὰ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐπιδεδωκέναι. [3] καὶ ξυνιστάμενοι κατ᾽ ἀλλήλους οἷάπερ καὶ πρότερον οἱ στρατιῶται ἀνελογίζοντο καί τινες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἀνθρώπων καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸ στρατιωτικόν, ὡς οὔτε μισθὸν ἐντελῆ πώποτε λάβοιεν, τό τε διδόμενον βραχὺ

καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ξυνεχῶς: καὶ εἰ μή τις ἢ διαναυμαχήσει ἢ ἀπαλλάξεται ὅθεν τροφὴν ἕξει, ἀπολείψειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰς ναῦς: πάντων τε Ἀστύοχον εἶναι αἴτιον ἐπιφέροντα ὀργὰς Τισσαφέρνει διὰ ἴδια κέρδη.

84. ὄντων δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐν τοιούτῳ ἀναλογισμῷ ξυνηνέχθη καὶ τοιόσδε τις θόρυβος περὶ τὸν Ἀστύοχον. [2] τῶν γὰρ Συρακοσίων καὶ Θουρίων ὅσῳ μάλιστα καὶ ἐλεύθεροι ἦσαν τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ναῦται, τοσούτῳ καὶ θρασύτατα προσπεσόντες τὸν μισθὸν ἀπῄτουν. ὁ δὲ αὐθαδέστερόν τέ τι ἀπεκρίνατο καὶ ἠπείλησε καὶ τῷ γε Δωριεῖ ξυναγορεύοντι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ναύταις καὶ ἐπανήρατο τὴν βακτηρίαν. [3] τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὡς εἶδον, οἷα δὴ ναῦται, ὥρμησαν ἐκραγέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀστύοχον ὥστε βάλλειν: ὁ δὲ προϊδὼν καταφεύγει ἐπὶ βωμόν τινα. οὐ μέντοι ἐβλήθη γε, ἀλλὰ διελύθησαν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων. [4] ἔλαβον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ ἐνῳκοδομημένον τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους φρούριον οἱ Μιλήσιοι λάθρᾳ ἐπιπεσόντες, καὶ τοὺς ἐνόντας φύλακας αὐτοῦ ἐκβάλλουσιν: ξυνεδόκει δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις ταῦτα καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. [5] ὁ μέντοι Λίχας οὔτε ἠρέσκετο αὐτοῖς ἔφη τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρνει καὶ δουλεύειν Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ βασιλέως τὰ μέτρια καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν, ἕως ἂν τὸν πόλεμον εὖ θῶνται. οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι ὠργίζοντό τε αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλα τοιουτότροπα καὶ νόσῳ ὕστερον ἀποθανόντα αὐτὸν οὐκ εἴασαν θάψαι οὗ ἐβούλοντο οἱ παρόντες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

85. κατὰ δὴ τοιαύτην διαφορὰν ὄντων αὐτοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων πρός τε τὸν Ἀστύοχον καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην Μίνδαρος διάδοχος τῆς Ἀστυόχου ναυαρχίας ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος ἐπῆλθε καὶ παραλαμβάνει τὴν ἀρχήν: ὁ δὲ Ἀστύοχος ἀπέπλει. [2] ξυνέπεμψε δὲ καὶ Τισσαφέρνης αὐτῷ πρεσβευτὴν τῶν παρ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, Γαυλίτην ὄνομα, Κᾶρα δίγλωσσον, κατηγορήσοντα τῶν τε Μιλησίων περὶ τοῦ φρουρίου καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἅμα ἀπολογησόμενον, εἰδὼς τούς τε Μιλησίους πορευομένους ἐπὶ καταβοῇ τῇ αὐτοῦ μάλιστα καὶ τὸν Ἑρμοκράτη μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, ὃς ἔμελλε τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ἀποφαίνειν φθείροντα τῶν Πελοποννησίων τὰ πράγματα

μετὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα. [3] ἔχθρα δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἦν αὐτῷ αἰεί ποτε περὶ τοῦ μισθοῦ τῆς ἀποδόσεως: καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα φυγόντος ἐκ Συρακουσῶν τοῦ Ἑρμοκράτους καὶ ἑτέρων ἡκόντων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐς τὴν Μίλητον στρατηγῶν, Ποτάμιδος καὶ Μύσκωνος καὶ Δημάρχου, ἐνέκειτο ὁ Τισσαφέρνης φυγάδι ὄντι ἤδη τῷ Ἑρμοκράτει πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον καὶ κατηγόρει ἄλλα τε καὶ ὡς χρήματά ποτε αἰτήσας αὐτὸν καὶ οὐ τυχὼν τὴν ἔχθραν οἱ προθοῖτο. [4] ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀστύοχος καὶ οἱ Μιλήσιοι καὶ ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα. ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης διεβεβήκει πάλιν ἤδη παρὰ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους ἐς τὴν Σάμον.

86. καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Δήλου ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων [πρεσβευταί], οὓς τότε ἔπεμψαν παραμυθησομένους καὶ ἀναδιδάξοντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ, ἀφικνοῦνται παρόντος τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, καὶ ἐκκλησίας γενομένης λέγειν ἐπεχείρουν. [2] οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐκ ἤθελον ἀκούειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποκτείνειν ἐβόων τοὺς τὸν δῆμον καταλύοντας, ἔπειτα μέντοι μόλις ἡσυχάσαντες ἤκουσαν. [3] οἱ δ᾽ ἀπήγγελλον ὡς οὔτε ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῆς πόλεως ἡ μετάστασις γίγνοιτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ, οὔθ᾽ ἵνα τοῖς πολεμίοις παραδοθῇ ▯ ἐξεῖναι γάρ, ὅτε ἐσέβαλον ἤδη σφῶν ἀρχόντων, τοῦτο ποιῆσαι ▯, τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν, οἵ τε οἰκεῖοι αὐτῶν οὔθ᾽ ὑβρίζονται, ὥσπερ Χαιρέας διαβάλλων ἀπήγγειλεν, οὔτε κακὸν ἔχουσιν οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς σφετέροις αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι κατὰ χώραν μένουσιν. [4] ἄλλα τε πολλὰ εἰπόντων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐσήκουον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐχαλέπαινον καὶ γνώμας ἄλλοι ἄλλας ἔλεγον, μάλιστα δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ πλεῖν. καὶ δοκεῖ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρῶτον τότε καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔλασσον τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῆσαι: ὡρμημένων γὰρ τῶν ἐν Σάμῳ Ἀθηναίων πλεῖν ἐπὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς, ἐν ᾧ σαφέστατα Ἰωνίαν καὶ Ἑλλήσποντον εὐθὺς εἶχον οἱ πολέμιοι, κωλυτὴς γενέσθαι. [5] καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε ἄλλος μὲν οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἱκανὸς ἐγένετο κατασχεῖν τὸν ὄχλον, ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοῦ τ᾽ ἐπίπλου ἔπαυσε καὶ τοὺς ἰδίᾳ τοῖς πρέσβεσιν ὀργιζομένους λοιδορῶν ἀπέτρεπεν. [6] αὐτὸς δὲ ἀποκρινάμενος αὐτοῖς

ἀπέπεμπεν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν πεντακισχιλίους οὐ κωλύοι ἄρχειν, τοὺς μέντοι τετρακοσίους ἀπαλλάσσειν ἐκέλευεν αὐτοὺς καὶ καθιστάναι τὴν βουλὴν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, τοὺς πεντακοσίους: εἰ δὲ ἐς εὐτέλειάν τι ξυντέτμηται ὥστε τοὺς στρατευομένους μᾶλλον ἔχειν τροφήν, πάνυ ἐπαινεῖν. [7] καὶ τἆλλα ἐκέλευεν ἀντέχειν καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς πολεμίοις: πρὸς μὲν γὰρ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς σῳζομένης τῆς πόλεως πολλὴν ἐλπίδα εἶναι καὶ ξυμβῆναι, εἰ δὲ ἅπαξ τὸ ἕτερον σφαλήσεται, ἢ τὸ ἐν Σάμῳ ἢ ἐκεῖνοι, οὐδ᾽ ὅτῳ διαλλαγήσεταί τις ἔτι ἔσεσθαι. [8]παρῆσαν δὲ καὶ Ἀργείων πρέσβεις, ἐπαγγελλόμενοι τῷ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ ὥστε βοηθεῖν: ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς καὶ εἰπὼν ὅταν τις καλῇ παρεῖναι οὕτως ἀπέπεμπεν. [9] ἀφίκοντο δὲ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι μετὰ τῶν Παράλων, οἳ τότε ἐτάχθησαν ἐν τῇ στρατιώτιδι νηὶ ὑπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων περιπλεῖν Εὔβοιαν, καὶ ἄγοντες Ἀθηναίων ἐς Λακεδαίμονα ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων [πεμπτοὺς] πρέσβεις, Λαισποδίαν καὶ Ἀριστοφῶντα καὶ Μελησίαν, [οἳ] ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο πλέοντες κατ᾽ Ἄργος, τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις ξυλλαβόντες τοῖς Ἀργείοις παρέδοσαν ὡς τῶν οὐχ ἥκιστα καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον ὄντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀφίκοντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἄγοντες ἐκ τοῦ Ἄργους ἐς τὴν Σάμον τοὺς πρέσβεις ἀφικνοῦνται ᾗπερ εἶχον τριήρει.

87. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους Τισσαφέρνης, κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα διά τε τἆλλα καὶ διὰ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου κάθοδον ἦχθοντο αὐτῷ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ὡς φανερῶς ἤδη ἀττικίζοντι, βουλόμενος, ὡς ἐδόκει δή, ἀπολύεσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὰς διαβολάς, παρεσκευάζετο πορεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἐς Ἄσπενδον, καὶ τὸν Λίχαν ξυμπορεύεσθαι ἐκέλευεν: τῇ δὲ στρατιᾷ προστάξειν ἔφη Τάμων ἑαυτοῦ ὕπαρχον, ὥστε τροφὴν ἐν ὅσῳ ἂν αὐτὸς ἀπῇ διδόναι. [2] λέγεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτό, οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον εἰδέναι τίνι γνώμῃ παρῆλθεν ἐς τὴν Ἄσπενδον καὶ παρελθὼν οὐκ ἦγαγε τὰς ναῦς. [3] ὅτι μὲν γὰρ αἱ Φοίνισσαι νῆες ἑπτὰ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μέχρι Ἀσπένδου ἀφίκοντο σαφές ἐστι, διότι δὲ οὐκ ἦλθον πολλαχῇ εἰκάζεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἵνα

διατρίβῃ ἀπελθών, ὥσπερ καὶ διενοήθη, τὰ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ▯τροφὴν γοῦν οὐδὲν βέλτιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ χεῖρον ὁ Τάμως, ᾧ προσετάχθη, παρεῖχεν▯, οἱ δὲ ἵνα τοὺς Φοίνικας προαγαγὼν ἐς τὴν Ἄσπενδον ἐκχρηματίσαιτο ἀφείς ▯καὶ γὰρ ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔμελλε χρήσεσθαι▯, ἄλλοι δ᾽ ὡς καταβοῆς ἕνεκα τῆς ἐς Λακεδαίμονα, τοῦ λέγεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σαφῶς οἴχεται ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀληθῶς πεπληρωμένας. [4] ἐμοὶ μέντοι δοκεῖ σαφέστατον εἶναι διατριβῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνοκωχῆς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τὸ ναυτικὸν οὐκ ἀγαγεῖν, φθορᾶς μέν, ἐν ὅσῳ παρῄει ἐκεῖσε καὶ διέμελλεν, ἀνισώσεως δέ, ὅπως μηδετέροις προσθέμενος ἰσχυροτέρους ποιήσῃ, ἐπεί, εἴ γε ἐβουλήθη, διαπολεμῆσαι <ἂν> ἐπιφανεὶς δήπου οὐκ ἐνδοιαστῶς: κομίσας γὰρ ἂν Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν νίκην κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἔδωκεν, οἵ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀντιπάλως μᾶλλον ἢ ὑποδεεστέρως τῷ ναυτικῷ ἀνθώρμουν. [5] καταφωρᾷ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ἣν εἶπε πρόφασιν οὐ κομίσας τὰς ναῦς. ἔφη γὰρ αὐτὰς ἐλάσσους ἢ ὅσας βασιλεὺς ἔταξε ξυλλεγῆναι: ὁ δὲ χάριν ἂν δήπου ἐν τούτῳ μείζω ἔτι ἔσχεν, οὔτ᾽ ἀναλώσας πολλὰ τῶν βασιλέως τά τε αὐτὰ ἀπ᾽ ἐλασσόνων πράξας. [6] ἐς δ᾽ οὖν τὴν Ἄσπενδον ᾗτινιδὴ γνώμῃ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης ἀφικνεῖται καὶ τοῖς Φοίνιξι ξυγγίγνεται: καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔπεμψαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς κελεύσαντος αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον ἄνδρα Λακεδαιμόνιον δύο τριήρεσιν.

88. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ᾔσθετο παριόντα ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσπένδου, ἔπλει καὶ αὐτὸς λαβὼν τρεῖς καὶ δέκα ναῦς, ὑποσχόμενος τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ μεγάλην χάριν ▯ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἄξειν Ἀθηναίοις τὰς Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἢ Πελοποννησίοις γε κωλύσειν ἐλθεῖν▯, εἰδώς, ὡς εἰκός, ἐκ πλέονος τὴν Τισσαφέρνους γνώμην ὅτι οὐκ ἄξειν ἔμελλε, καὶ βουλόμενος αὐτὸν τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ Ἀθηναίων φιλίαν ὡς μάλιστα διαβάλλειν, ὅπως μᾶλλον δι᾽ αὐτὸ σφίσιν ἀναγκάζοιτο προσχωρεῖν.καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄρας εὐθὺ τῆς Φασήλιδος καὶ Καύνου ἄνω τὸν πλοῦν ἐποιεῖτο.

89. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων πεμφθέντες πρέσβεις ἐπειδὴ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀπήγγειλαν τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς κελεύει τε ἀντέχειν καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐλπίδας τε ὅτι πολλὰς ἔχει κἀκείνοις τὸ στράτευμα διαλλάξειν καὶ Πελοποννησίων περιέσεσθαι, ἀχθομένους καὶ πρότερον τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ἡδέως ἂν ἀπαλλαγέντας πῃ ἀσφαλῶς τοῦ πράγματος πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωσαν. [2] καὶ ξυνίσταντό τε ἤδη καὶ τὰ πράγματα διεμέμφοντο, ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνας τῶν πάνυ [στρατηγῶν] τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἐν ἀρχαῖς ὄντων, οἷον Θηραμένη τε τὸν Ἄγνωνος καὶ Ἀριστοκράτη τὸν Σκελίου καὶ ἄλλους, οἳ μετέσχον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι τῶν πραγμάτων, φοβούμενοι δέ, ὡς ἔφασαν, τό τε ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ στράτευμα καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην σπουδῇ πάνυ, τούς τε ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πρεσβευομένους [ἔπεμπον], μή τι ἄνευ τῶν πλεόνων κακὸν δράσωσι τὴν πόλιν, οὐ τὸ † ἀπαλλαξείειν τοῦ ἄγαν ἐς ὀλίγους ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἔργῳ καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι χρῆναι ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἰσαιτέραν καθιστάναι. [3] ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς, κατ᾽ ἰδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσέκειντο, ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπόλλυται: πάντες γὰρ αὐθημερὸν ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι: ἐκ δὲ δημοκρατίας αἱρέσεως γιγνομένης ῥᾷον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει. [4] σαφέστατα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐπῆρε τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἰσχυρὰ ὄντα καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐδόκει μόνιμον τὸ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔσεσθαι: ἠγωνίζετο οὖν εἷς ἕκαστος αὐτὸς πρῶτος προστάτης τοῦ δήμου γενέσθαι.

90. οἱ δὲ τῶν τετρακοσίων μάλιστα ἐναντίοι ὄντες τῷ τοιούτῳ εἴδει καὶ προεστῶτες Φρύνιχός τε, ὃς καὶ στρατηγήσας ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ [ποτὲ] τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τότε διηνέχθη, καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐκ πλείστου ἐναντίος τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ Πείσανδρος καὶ Ἀντιφῶν καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ δυνατώτατοι, πρότερόν τε, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα

κατέστησαν καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ σφῶν ἐς δημοκρατίαν ἀπέστη, πρέσβεις τε ἀπέστελλον σφῶν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ τὴν ὁμολογίαν προυθυμοῦντο καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἠετιωνείᾳ καλουμένῃ τεῖχος ἐποιοῦντο, πολλῷ τε μᾶλλον ἔτι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πρέσβεις σφῶν ἦλθον, ὁρῶντες τούς τε πολλοὺς καὶ σφῶν τοὺς δοκοῦντας πρότερον πιστοὺς εἶναι μεταβαλλομένους. [2] καὶ ἀπέστειλαν μὲν Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Φρύνιχον καὶ ἄλλους δέκα κατὰ τάχος, φοβούμενοι καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου, ἐπιστείλαντες παντὶ τρόπῳ ὅστις καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἀνεκτὸς ξυναλλαγῆναι πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, [3] ᾠκοδόμουν δὲ ἔτι προθυμότερον τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἠετιωνείᾳ τεῖχος. ἦν δὲ τοῦ τείχους ἡ γνώμη αὕτη, ὡς ἔφη Θηραμένης καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἵνα τοὺς ἐν Σάμῳ, ἢν βίᾳ ἐπιπλέωσι, μὴ δέξωνται ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα τοὺς πολεμίους μᾶλλον, ὅταν βούλωνται, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ δέξωνται. [4] χηλὴ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἡ Ἠετιωνεία, καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτὴν εὐθὺς ὁ ἔσπλους ἐστίν. ἐτειχίζετο οὖν οὕτω ξὺν τῷ πρότερον πρὸς ἤπειρον ὑπάρχοντι τείχει, ὥστε καθεζομένων ἐς αὐτὸ ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγων ἄρχειν τοῦ ἔσπλου:ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν γὰρ τὸν ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ λιμένος στενοῦ ὄντος τὸν ἕτερον πύργον ἐτελεύτα τό τε παλαιὸν τὸ πρὸς ἤπειρον καὶ τὸ ἐντὸς τὸ καινὸν τεῖχος τειχιζόμενον πρὸς θάλασσαν. [5] διῳκοδόμησαν δὲ καὶ στοάν, ἥπερ ἦν μεγίστη καὶ ἐγγύτατα τούτου εὐθὺς ἐχομένη ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ, καὶ ἦρχον αὐτοὶ αὐτῆς, ἐς ἣν καὶ τὸν σῖτον ἠνάγκαζον πάντας τὸν ὑπάρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν ἐσπλέοντα ἐξαιρεῖσθαι καὶ ἐντεῦθεν προαιροῦντας πωλεῖν.

91. ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐκ πλέονός τε ὁ Θηραμένης διεθρόει καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος πρέσβεις οὐδὲν πράξαντες ἀνεχώρησαν τοῖς ξύμπασι ξυμβατικόν, φάσκων κινδυνεύσειν τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο καὶ τὴν πόλιν διαφθεῖραι. [2] ἅμα γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐτύγχανον Εὐβοέων ἐπικαλουμένων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον δύο καὶ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες, ὧν ἦσαν καὶ ἐκ Τάραντος καὶ Λοκρῶν Ἰταλιώτιδες καὶ Σικελικαί τινες, ὁρμοῦσαι ἤδη ἐπὶ Λᾷ τῆς

Λακωνικῆς καὶ παρασκευαζόμεναι τὸν ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν πλοῦν ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀγησανδρίδας Ἀγησάνδρου Σπαρτιάτης: ἃς ἔφη Θηραμένης οὐκ Εὐβοίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τειχίζουσι τὴν Ἠετιωνείαν προσπλεῖν, καὶ εἰ μή τις ἤδη φυλάξεται, λήσειν διαφθαρέντας. [3] ἦν δέ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀπὸ τῶν τὴν κατηγορίαν ἐχόντων, καὶ οὐ πάνυ διαβολὴ μόνον τοῦ λόγου. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ μάλιστα μὲν ἐβούλοντο ὀλιγαρχούμενοι ἄρχειν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, εἰ δὲ μή, τάς τε ναῦς καὶ τὰ τείχη ἔχοντες αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἐξειργόμενοι δὲ καὶ τούτου μὴ οὖν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου γε αὖθις γενομένου αὐτοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων μάλιστα διαφθαρῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐσαγαγόμενοι ἄνευ τειχῶν καὶ νεῶν ξυμβῆναι καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχειν, εἰ τοῖς γε σώμασι σφῶν ἄδεια ἔσται.

92. διόπερ καὶ τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο καὶ πυλίδας ἔχον καὶ ἐσόδους καὶ ἐπεσαγωγὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐτείχιζόν τε προθύμως καὶ φθῆναι ἐβούλοντο ἐξεργασάμενοι. [2] πρότερον μὲν οὖν κατ᾽ ὀλίγους τε καὶ κρύφα μᾶλλον τὰ λεγόμενα ἦν: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ Φρύνιχος ἥκων ἐκ τῆς ἐς Λακεδαίμονα πρεσβείας πληγεὶς ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρὸς τῶν περιπόλων τινὸς ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ καὶ οὐ πολὺ ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου ἀπελθὼν ἀπέθανε παραχρῆμα, καὶ ὁ μὲν πατάξας διέφυγεν, ὁ δὲ ξυνεργὸς Ἀργεῖος ἄνθρωπος ληφθεὶς καὶ βασανιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων οὐδενὸς ὄνομα τοῦ κελεύσαντος εἶπεν οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι εἰδείη πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἐς τοῦ περιπολάρχου καὶ ἄλλοσε κατ᾽ οἰκίας ξυνιόντας, τότε δὴ οὐδενὸς γεγενημένου ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ νεωτέρου καὶ ὁ Θηραμένης ἤδη θρασύτερον καὶ Ἀριστοκράτης καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τῶν τετρακοσίων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἦσαν ὁμογνώμονες ἦσαν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα. [3] ἅμα γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Λᾶς αἱ νῆες ἤδη περιπεπλευκυῖαι καὶ ὁρμισάμεναι ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον τὴν Αἴγιναν κατεδεδραμήκεσαν: καὶ οὐκ ἔφη ὁ Θηραμένης εἰκὸς εἶναι ἐπ᾽ Εὔβοιαν πλεούσας αὐτὰς ἐς Αἴγιναν κατακολπίσαι καὶ πάλιν ἐν Ἐπιδαύρῳ ὁρμεῖν, εἰ μὴ παρακληθεῖσαι ἥκοιεν ἐφ᾽ οἵσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς αἰεὶ κατηγόρει: οὐκέτι οὖν οἷόν τε εἶναι ἡσυχάζειν. [4] τέλος δὲ πολλῶν καὶ στασιωτικῶν λόγων καὶ

ὑποψιῶν προσγενομένων καὶ ἔργῳ ἤδη ἥπτοντο τῶν πραγμάτων: οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ τὸ τῆς Ἠετιωνείας τεῖχος ὁπλῖται οἰκοδομοῦντες, ἐν οἷς καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοκράτης ἦν ταξιαρχῶν καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φυλὴν ἔχων, ξυλλαμβάνουσιν Ἀλεξικλέα στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους τετραμμένον, καὶ ἐς οἰκίαν ἀγαγόντες εἶρξαν. [5] ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ αὐτοῖς ἅμα καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ Ἕρμων τις τῶν περιπόλων τῶν Μουνιχίασι τεταγμένων ἄρχων: τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τὸ στῖφος ταῦτα ἐβούλετο. [6] ὡς δὲ ἐσηγγέλθη τοῖς τετρακοσίοις [ἔτυχον δὲ ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ ξυγκαθήμενοι], εὐθύς, πλὴν ὅσοις μὴ βουλομένοις ταῦτ᾽ ἦν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν ἐς τὰ ὅπλα ἰέναι καὶ τῷ Θηραμένει καὶ τοῖς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἠπείλουν. ὁ δὲ ἀπολογούμενος ἑτοῖμος ἔφη εἶναι ξυναφαιρησόμενος ἰέναι ἤδη. καὶ παραλαβὼν ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν ὃς ἦν αὐτῷ ὁμογνώμων ἐχώρει ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ: ἐβοήθει δὲ καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ τῶν ἱππέων νεανίσκοι. [7] ἦν δὲ θόρυβος πολὺς καὶ ἐκπληκτικός: οἵ τε γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἤδη ᾠοντο τόν τε Πειραιᾶ κατειλῆφθαι καὶ τὸν ξυνειλημμένον τεθνάναι, οἵ τε ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ὅσον οὔπω ἐπὶ σφᾶς παρεῖναι. [8] μόλις δὲ τῶν τε πρεσβυτέρων διακωλυόντων τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἄστει διαθέοντας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα φερομένους καὶ Θουκυδίδου τοῦ Φαρσαλίου τοῦ προξένου τῆς πόλεως παρόντος καὶ προθύμως ἐμποδών τε ἑκάστοις γιγνομένου καὶ ἐπιβοωμένου μὴ ἐφεδρευόντων ἐγγὺς τῶν πολεμίων ἀπολέσαι τὴν πατρίδα, ἡσύχασάν τε καὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀπέσχοντο. [9] καὶ ὁ μὲν Θηραμένης ἐλθὼν ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ [ἦν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς στρατηγός], ὅσον καὶ ἀπὸ βοῆς ἕνεκα, ὠργίζετο τοῖς ὁπλίταις: ὁ δὲ Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ οἱ ἐναντίοι τῷ ἀληθεῖ ἐχαλέπαινον. [10] οἱ δὲ ὁπλῖται ὁμόσε τε ἐχώρουν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῷ ἔργῳ καὶ οὐ μετεμέλοντο, καὶ τὸν Θηραμένη ἠρώτων εἰ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ τὸ τεῖχος οἰκοδομεῖσθαι καὶ εἰ ἄμεινον εἶναι καθαιρεθέν. ὁ δέ, εἴπερ καὶ ἐκείνοις δοκεῖ καθαιρεῖν, καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἔφη ξυνδοκεῖν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν εὐθὺς ἀναβάντες οἵ τε ὁπλῖται καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἀνθρώπων κατέσκαπτον τὸ τείχισμα. [11] ἦν δὲ

πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον ἡ παράκλησις ὡς χρή, ὅστις τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους βούλεται ἄρχειν ἀντὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων, ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον. ἐπεκρύπτοντο γὰρ ὅμως ἔτι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ ἄντικρυς δῆμον ὅστις βούλεται ἄρχειν ὀνομάζειν, φοβούμενοι μὴ τῷ ὄντι ὦσι καὶ πρός τινα εἰπών τίς τι ἀγνοίᾳ σφαλῇ. καὶ οἱ τετρακόσιοι διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἤθελον τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ ὄντας δήλους εἶναι, τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους ἄντικρυς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ ἀφανὲς φόβον ἐς ἀλλήλους παρέξειν.

93. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν τετρακόσιοι ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον ὅμως καὶ τεθορυβημένοι ξυνελέγοντο: οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ὁπλῖται τόν τε Ἀλεξικλέα ὃν ξυνέλαβον ἀφέντες καὶ τὸ τείχισμα καθελόντες ἐς τὸ πρὸς τῇ Μουνιχίᾳ Διονυσιακὸν θέατρον ἐλθόντες καὶ θέμενοι τὰ ὅπλα ἐξεκλησίασαν, καὶ δόξαν αὐτοῖς εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ ἔθεντο αὖ ἐν τῷ Ἀνακείῳ τὰ ὅπλα. [2] ἐλθόντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων τινὲς ᾑρημένοι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ διελέγοντό τε καὶ ἔπειθον οὓς ἴδοιεν ἀνθρώπους ἐπιεικεῖς αὐτούς τε ἡσυχάζειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακατέχειν, λέγοντες τούς τε πεντακισχιλίους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει ᾗ ἂν τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις δοκῇ τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἔσεσθαι, τέως δὲ τὴν πόλιν μηδενὶ τρόπῳ διαφθείρειν μηδ᾽ ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀνῶσαι. [3] τὸ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθος τῶν ὁπλιτῶν ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς λόγων γιγνομένων ἠπιώτερον ἦν ἢ πρότερον καὶ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πολιτικοῦ: ξυνεχώρησάν τε ὥστε ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας.

94. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπῆλθεν ἡ [ἐν Διονύσου] ἐκκλησία καὶ ὅσον οὐ ξυνειλεγμένοι ἦσαν, ἀγγέλλονται αἱ δύο καὶ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες καὶ ὁ Ἀγησανδρίδας ἀπὸ τῶν Μεγάρων τὴν Σαλαμῖνα παραπλεῖν: καὶ πᾶς τις [τῶν πολλῶν ὁπλιτῶν] αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ πάλαι λεγόμενον ὑπὸ Θηραμένους καὶ τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἐς τὸ τείχισμα ἔπλεον αἱ νῆες, καὶ χρησίμως ἐδόκει καταπεπτωκέναι. [2] ὁ δὲ Ἀγησανδρίδας τάχα μέν τι καὶ ἀπὸ ξυγκειμένου λόγου περί

τε τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον καὶ ταύτῃ ἀνεστρέφετο, εἰκὸς δ᾽ αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸν παρόντα στασιασμὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, δι᾽ ἐλπίδος ὡς κἂν ἐς δέον παραγένοιτο, ταύτῃ ἀνέχειν. [3] οἱ δ᾽ αὖ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἠγγέλθη αὐτοῖς, εὐθὺς δρόμῳ ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ πανδημεὶ ἐχώρουν, ὡς τοῦ ἰδίου πολέμου μείζονος [ἢ] ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων οὐχ ἑκάς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ λιμένι ὄντος. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὰς παρούσας ναῦς ἐσέβαινον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλας καθεῖλκον, οἱ δέ τινες ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ λιμένος παρεβοήθουν.

95. αἱ δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες παραπλεύσασαι καὶ περιβαλοῦσαι Σούνιον ὁρμίζονται μεταξὺ Θορικοῦ τε καὶ Πρασιῶν, ὕστερον δὲ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ὠρωπόν. [2] Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κατὰ τάχος καὶ ἀξυγκροτήτοις πληρώμασιν ἀναγκασθέντες χρήσασθαι, οἷα πόλεώς τε στασιαζούσης καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου ἐν τάχει βουλόμενοι βοηθῆσαι [Εὔβοια γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀποκεκλῃμένης τῆς Ἀττικῆς πάντα ἦν], πέμπουσι Θυμοχάρη στρατηγὸν καὶ ναῦς ἐς Ἐρετρίαν, [3] ὧν ἀφικομένων ξὺν ταῖς πρότερον ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ οὔσαις ἓξ καὶ τριάκοντα ἐγένοντο. καὶ εὐθὺς ναυμαχεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο: ὁ γὰρ Ἀγησανδρίδας ἀριστοποιησάμενος ἐκ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ ἀνήγαγε τὰς ναῦς: ἀπέχει δὲ μάλιστα ὁ Ὠρωπὸς τῆς τῶν Ἐρετριῶν πόλεως θαλάσσης μέτρον ἑξήκοντα σταδίους. [4] ὡς οὖν ἐπέπλει, εὐθὺς ἐπλήρουν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰς ναῦς, οἰόμενοι σφίσι παρὰ ταῖς ναυσὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας εἶναι: οἱ δὲ ἔτυχον οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἄριστον ἐπισιτιζόμενοι [οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπωλεῖτο ἀπὸ προνοίας τῶν Ἐρετριῶν], ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἐπ᾽ ἔσχατα τοῦ ἄστεως οἰκιῶν, ὅπως σχολῇ πληρουμένων φθάσειαν οἱ πολέμιοι προσπεσόντες καὶ ἐξαναγκάσειαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὕτως ὅπως τύχοιεν ἀνάγεσθαι. σημεῖον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐς τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἐρετρίας, ὁπότε χρὴ ἀνάγεσθαι, ἤρθη. [5] διὰ τοιαύτης δὴ παρασκευῆς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀναγαγόμενοι καὶ ναυμαχήσαντες ὑπὲρ τοῦ λιμένος τῶν Ἐρετριῶν ὀλίγον μέν τινα χρόνον ὅμως καὶ ἀντέσχον, ἔπειτα ἐς φυγὴν τραπόμενοι καταδιώκονται ἐς τὴν γῆν. [6] καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἐρετριῶν ὡς φιλίαν καταφεύγουσι, χαλεπώτατα ἔπραξαν φονευόμενοι ὑπ᾽

αὐτῶν: οἳ δὲ ἐς τὸ τείχισμα τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἐρετρίᾳ, ὃ εἶχον αὐτοί, περιγίγνονται καὶ ὅσαι ἐς Χαλκίδα ἀφικνοῦνται τῶν νεῶν. [7] λαβόντες δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι δύο καὶ εἴκοσι ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἄνδρας τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείναντες, τοὺς δὲ ζωγρήσαντες τροπαῖον ἔστησαν. καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ Εὔβοιάν [τε] ἅπασαν ἀποστήσαντες πλὴν Ὠρεοῦ ταύτην δὲ αὐτοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν καθίσταντο.

96. τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ὡς ἦλθε τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν γεγενημένα, ἔκπληξις μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὶν παρέστη. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ξυμφορά, καίπερ μεγάλη τότε δόξασα εἶναι, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν πω οὕτως ἐφόβησεν. [2] ὅπου γὰρ στρατοπέδου τε τοῦ ἐν Σάμῳ ἀφεστηκότος ἄλλων τε νεῶν οὐκ οὐσῶν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐσβησομένων αὐτῶν τε στασιαζόντων καὶ ἄδηλον ὂν ὁπότε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξυρράξουσι, τοσαύτη ἡ ξυμφορὰ ἐπεγεγένητο, ἐν ᾗ ναῦς τε καὶ τὸ μέγιστον Εὔβοιαν ἀπωλωλέκεσαν, ἐξ ἧς πλείω ἢ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὠφελοῦντο, πῶς οὐκ εἰκότως ἠθύμουν; [3] μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ δι᾽ ἐγγυτάτου ἐθορύβει, εἰ οἱ πολέμιοι τολμήσουσι νενικηκότες εὐθὺ σφῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἐρῆμον ὄντα νεῶν πλεῖν: καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἐνόμιζον αὐτοὺς παρεῖναι. [4] ὅπερ ἄν, εἰ τολμηρότεροι ἦσαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐποίησαν, καὶ ἢ διέστησαν ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν ἐφορμοῦντες ἤ, εἰ ἐπολιόρκουν μένοντες, καὶ τὰς ἀπ᾽ Ἰωνίας ναῦς ἠνάγκασαν ἂν καίπερ πολεμίας οὔσας τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τοῖς σφετέροις οἰκείοις καὶ τῇ ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βοηθῆσαι: καὶ ἐν τούτῳ Ἑλλήσποντός τε ἂν ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἰωνία καὶ αἱ νῆσοι καὶ τὰ μέχρι Εὐβοίας καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἡ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχὴ πᾶσα. [5] ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίοις πάντων δὴ ξυμφορώτατοι προσπολεμῆσαι ἐγένοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς: διάφοροι γὰρ πλεῖστον ὄντες τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀξεῖς, οἱ δὲ βραδεῖς, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπιχειρηταί, οἱ δὲ ἄτολμοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ναυτικῇ πλεῖστα ὠφέλουν. ἔδειξαν δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι: μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμοιότροποι γενόμενοι ἄριστα καὶ προσεπολέμησαν.

97. ἐπὶ δ᾽ οὖν τοῖς ἠγγελμένοις οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ναῦς τε εἴκοσιν ὅμως ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ξυνέλεγον, μίαν μὲν

εὐθὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Πύκνα καλουμένην, οὗπερ καὶ ἄλλοτε εἰώθεσαν, ἐν ᾗπερ καὶ τοὺς τετρακοσίους καταπαύσαντες τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδοῦναι εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται καὶ μισθὸν μηδένα φέρειν μηδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ: εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπάρατον ἐποιήσαντο. [2] ἐγίγνοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὕστερον πυκναὶ ἐκκλησίαι, ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ νομοθέτας καὶ τἆλλα ἐψηφίσαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες: μετρία γὰρ ἥ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν. [3] ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ ἄλλους μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ κατιέναι καὶ παρά τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἐν Σάμῳ στρατόπεδον πέμψαντες διεκελεύοντο ἀνθάπτεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων.

98. ἐν δὲ τῇ μεταβολῇ ταύτῃ εὐθὺς οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον καὶ Ἀλεξικλέα καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα ὑπεξέρχονται ἐς τὴν Δεκέλειαν: Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ αὐτῶν μόνος ἔτυχε γὰρ καὶ στρατηγῶν λαβὼν κατὰ τάχος τοξότας τινὰς τοὺς βαρβαρωτάτους ἐχώρει πρὸς τὴν Οἰνόην. [2] ἦν δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Βοιωτίας τεῖχος, ἐπολιόρκουν δ᾽ αὐτὸ διὰ ξυμφορὰν σφίσιν ἐκ τῆς Οἰνόης γενομένην ἀνδρῶν ἐκ Δεκελείας ἀναχωρούντων διαφθορᾶς οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐθελοντηδόν, προσπαρακαλέσαντες τοὺς Βοιωτούς. [3] κοινολογησάμενος οὖν αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος ἀπατᾷ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Οἰνόῃ, λέγων ὡς καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει τἆλλα ξυμβεβήκασι Λακεδαιμονίοις, κἀκείνους δεῖ Βοιωτοῖς τὸ χωρίον παραδοῦναι: ἐπὶ τούτοις γὰρ ξυμβεβάσθαι. οἱ δὲ πιστεύσαντες ὡς ἀνδρὶ στρατηγῷ καὶ οὐκ εἰδότες οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ πολιορκεῖσθαι ὑπόσπονδοι ἐξέρχονται. [4] τούτῳ μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ Οἰνόην τε ληφθεῖσαν Βοιωτοὶ κατέλαβον καὶ ἡ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις ὀλιγαρχία καὶ στάσις ἐπαύσατο.

99. ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τούτου καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ Πελοποννήσιοι, ὡς τροφήν τε οὐδεὶς ἐδίδου τῶν ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνους τότε [ὅτε ἐπὶ τὴν Ἄσπενδον παρῄει]

προσταχθέντων, καὶ αἱ Φοίνισσαι νῆες οὐδὲ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τέως που ἦκον, ὅ τε Φίλιππος ὁ ξυμπεμφθεὶς αὐτῷ ἐπεστάλκει Μινδάρῳ τῷ ναυάρχῳ καὶ ἄλλος Ἱπποκράτης, ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιάτης καὶ ὢν ἐν Φασήλιδι, ὅτι οὔτε αἱ νῆες παρέσοιντο πάντα τε ἀδικοῖντο ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνους, Φαρνάβαζός τε ἐπεκαλεῖτο αὐτοὺς καὶ ἦν πρόθυμος κομίσας τὰς ναῦς καὶ αὐτὸς τὰς λοιπὰς ἔτι πόλεις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς ἀποστῆσαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης, ἐλπίζων πλέον τι σχήσειν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, οὕτω δὴ ὁ Μίνδαρος πολλῷ κόσμῳ καὶ ἀπὸ παραγγέλματος αἰφνιδίου, ὅπως λάθοι τοὺς ἐν Σάμῳ, ἄρας ἀπὸ τῆς Μιλήτου ναυσὶ τρισὶ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔπλει ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον πρότερον δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τῷδε ἑκκαίδεκα ἐς αὐτὸν νῆες ἐσέπλευσαν, αἳ καὶ τῆς Χερσονήσου τι μέρος κατέδραμον : χειμασθεὶς δὲ ἀνέμῳ καὶ ἀναγκασθεὶς καταίρει ἐς τὴν Ἴκαρον, καὶ μείνας ἐν αὐτῇ ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας πέντε ἢ ἓξ ἡμέρας ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὴν Χίον.

100. ὁ δὲ Θράσυλος ἐκ τῆς Σάμου, ἐπειδὴ ἐπύθετο αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου ἀπηρκότα, ἔπλει καὶ αὐτὸς ναυσὶν εὐθὺς πέντε καὶ πεντήκοντα, ἐπειγόμενος μὴ φθάσῃ ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐσπλεύσας. [2] αἰσθόμενος δὲ ὅτι ἐν τῇ Χίῳ εἴη καὶ νομίσας αὐτὸν καθέξειν αὐτοῦ, σκοποὺς μὲν κατεστήσατο καὶ ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας ἠπείρῳ, εἰ ἄρα ποι κινοῖντο αἱ νῆες, ὅπως μὴ λάθοιεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐς τὴν Μήθυμναν παραπλεύσας ἄλφιτά τε καὶ τἆλλα ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν ἐκέλευεν ὡς, ἢν πλείων χρόνος γίγνηται, ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου τοὺς ἐπίπλους τῇ Χίῳ ποιησόμενος. [3] ἅμα δὲ Ἔρεσος γὰρ τῆς Λέσβου ἀφειστήκει ἐβούλετο ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν πλεύσας, εἰ δύναιτο, ἐξελεῖν. Μηθυμναίων γὰρ οὐχ οἱ ἀδυνατώτατοι φυγάδες διακομίσαντες ἔκ τε τῆς Κύμης προσεταιριστοὺς ὁπλίτας ὡς πεντήκοντα καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου μισθωσάμενοι, ξύμπασιν ὡς τριακοσίοις, Ἀναξάνδρου Θηβαίου κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς ἡγουμένου, προσέβαλον πρῶτον Μηθύμνῃ, καὶ ἀποκρουσθέντες τῆς πείρας διὰ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Μυτιλήνης Ἀθηναίων φρουροὺς προελθόντας αὖθις ἔξω μάχῃ ἀπωσθέντες καὶ διὰ τοῦ

ὄρους κομισθέντες ἀφιστᾶσι τὴν Ἔρεσον. [4] πλεύσας οὖν ὁ Θράσυλος ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διενοεῖτο προσβολὴν ποιεῖσθαι: προαφιγμένος δὲ αὐτόσε ἦν καὶ ὁ Θρασύβουλος πέντε ναυσὶν ἐκ τῆς Σάμου, ὡς ἠγγέλθη αὐτοῖς ἡ τῶν φυγάδων αὖτη διάβασις: ὑστερήσας δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἔρεσον ἐφώρμει ἐλθών. [5] προσεγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου τινὲς δύο νῆες ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀνακομιζόμεναι καὶ Μηθυμναῖαι <πέντε>: καὶ αἱ πᾶσαι νῆες παρῆσαν ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑξήκοντα, ἀφ᾽ ὧν τῷ στρατεύματι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς κατὰ κράτος μηχαναῖς τε καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἢν δύνωνται, αἱρήσοντες τὴν Ἔρεσον.

101. ὁ δὲ Μίνδαρος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Χίου τῶν Πελοποννησίων αἱ νῆες ἐπισιτισάμεναι δυοῖν ἡμέραιν καὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Χίων τρεῖς τεσσαρακοστὰς ἕκαστος Χίας τῇ τρίτῃ διὰ ταχέων ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου <οὐ> πελάγιαι, ἵνα μὴ περιτύχωσι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ἐρέσῳ ναυσίν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἤπειρον. [2] καὶ προσβαλόντες τῆς Φωκαΐδος ἐς τὸν ἐν Καρτερίοις λιμένα καὶ ἀριστοποιησάμενοι, παραπλεύσαντες τὴν Κυμαίαν δειπνοποιοῦνται ἐν Ἀργινούσαις τῆς ἠπείρου, ἐν τῷ ἀντιπέρας τῆς Μυτιλήνης. [3] ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἔτι πολλῆς νυκτὸς παραπλεύσαντες καὶ ἀφικόμενοι τῆς ἠπείρου ἐς Ἀρματοῦντα καταντικρὺ Μηθύμνης, ἀριστοποιησάμενοι διὰ ταχέων παραπλεύσαντες Λεκτὸν καὶ Λάρισαν καὶ Ἀμαξιτὸν καὶ τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ῥοίτειον ἤδη τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πρωίτερον μέσων νυκτῶν. εἰσὶ δ᾽ αἳ τῶν νεῶν καὶ ἐς Σίγειον κατῆραν καὶ ἄλλοσε τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων.

102. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Σηστῷ δυοῖν δεούσαις εἴκοσι ναυσὶν ὄντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἵ τε φρυκτωροὶ ἐσήμαινον καὶ ᾐσθάνοντο τὰ πυρὰ ἐξαίφνης πολλὰ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ φανέντα, ἔγνωσαν ὅτι ἐσπλέουσιν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι. καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης νυκτὸς ὡς εἶχον τάχους ὑπομείξαντες τῇ Χερσονήσῳ παρέπλεον ἐπ᾽ Ἐλαιοῦντος, βουλόμενοι ἐκπλεῦσαι ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς. [2] καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἑκκαίδεκα ναῦς ἔλαθον, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἢν

ἐκπλέωσιν: τὰς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Μινδάρου ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ κατιδόντες, τὴν δίωξιν εὐθὺς ποιουμένων οὐ φθάνουσι πάσαις, ἀλλ᾽ αἱ μὲν πλείους ἐπὶ τῆς Ἴμβρου καὶ Λήμνου διέφυγον, τέσσαρες δὲ τῶν νεῶν αἱ ὕσταται πλέουσαι καταλαμβάνονται παρὰ τὸν Ἐλαιοῦντα. [3] καὶ μίαν μὲν ἐποκείλασαν κατὰ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Πρωτεσιλάου αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι λαμβάνουσι, δύο δὲ ἑτέρας ἄνευ τῶν ἀνδρῶν: τὴν δὲ μίαν πρὸς τῇ Ἴμβρῳ κενὴν κατακαίουσιν.

103. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ταῖς τε ἐξ Ἀβύδου ξυμμιγείσαις καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ξυμπάσαις ἓξ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα πολιορκήσαντες Ἐλαιοῦντα ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν, ὡς οὐ προσεχώρει, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Ἄβυδον. [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ψευσθέντες τῶν σκοπῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενοι σφᾶς λαθεῖν τὸν παράπλουν τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν τειχομαχοῦντες, ὡς ᾔσθοντο, εὐθὺς ἀπολιπόντες τὴν Ἔρεσον κατὰ τάχος ἐβοήθουν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον: [3] καὶ δύο τε ναῦς τῶν Πελοποννησίων αἱροῦσιν, αἳ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τότε θρασύτερον ἐν τῇ διώξει ἀπάρασαι περιέπεσον αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἡμέρᾳ ὕστερον ἀφικόμενοι ὁρμίζονται ἐς τὸν Ἐλαιοῦντα καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς Ἴμβρου ὅσαι κατέφυγον κομίζονται καὶ ἐς τὴν ναυμαχίαν πέντε ἡμέρας παρεσκευάζοντο.

104. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐναυμάχουν τρόπῳ τοιῷδε. οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρέπλεον ἐπὶ κέρως ταξάμενοι παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν γῆν ἐπὶ τῆς Σηστοῦ, οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐκ τῆς Ἀβύδου ἀντανῆγον καὶ αὐτοί. [2] καὶ ὡς ἔγνωσαν ναυμαχήσοντες, παρέτειναν τὸ κέρας οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι παρὰ τὴν Χερσόνησον, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ Ἰδάκου μέχρι Ἀρριανῶν, νῆες ἓξ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα, οἱ δ᾽ αὖ Πελοποννήσιοι ἀπὸ Ἀβύδου μέχρι Δαρδάνου, νῆες ἓξ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα. [3] κέρας δὲ τοῖς μὲν Πελοποννησίοις εἶχον τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν Συρακόσιοι, τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον αὐτὸς Μίνδαρος καὶ τῶν νεῶν αἱ ἄριστα πλέουσαι, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀριστερὸν Θράσυλος, ὁ δὲ Θρασύβουλος τὸ δεξιόν: οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ ὡς ἕκαστοι διετάξαντο. [4] ἐπειγομένων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων πρότερόν τε ξυμμεῖξαι, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπερσχόντες αὐτοὶ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ ἀποκλῇσαι τοῦ

ἔξω αὐτοὺς ἔκπλου, εἰ δύναιντο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέσον ἐξῶσαι πρὸς τὴν γῆν οὐχ ἑκὰς οὖσαν, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι γνόντες, ᾗ μὲν ἐβούλοντο ἀποφάρξασθαι αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐναντίοι, ἀντεπεξῆγον καὶ περιεγίγνοντο τῷ πλῷ, [5] τὸ δ᾽ εὐώνυμον αὐτοῖς ὑπερεβεβλήκει ἤδη τὴν ἄκραν ἣ Κυνὸς σῆμα καλεῖται. τῷ δὲ μέσῳ, τοιούτου ξυμβαίνοντος, ἀσθενέσι καὶ διεσπασμέναις ταῖς ναυσὶ καθίσταντο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐλάσσοσι χρώμενοι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τοῦ χωρίου τοῦ περὶ τὸ Κυνὸς σῆμα ὀξεῖαν καὶ γωνιώδη τὴν περιβολὴν ἔχοντος, ὥστε τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐπέκεινα αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα μὴ κάτοπτα εἶναι.

105. προσπεσόντες οὖν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι κατὰ τὸ μέσον ἐξέωσάν τε ἐς τὸ ξηρὸν τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐπεξέβησαν, τῷ ἔργῳ πολὺ περισχόντες. [2] ἀμῦναι δὲ τῷ μέσῳ οὔθ᾽ οἱ περὶ τὸν Θρασύβουλον ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ ὑπὸ πλήθους τῶν ἐπικειμένων νεῶν ἐδύναντο οὔθ᾽ οἱ περὶ τὸν Θράσυλον ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐωνύμου ἀφανές τε γὰρ ἦν διὰ τὴν ἄκραν τὸ Κυνὸς σῆμα, καὶ ἅμα οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἐπιτεταγμένοι εἶργον αὐτούς , πρὶν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι διὰ τὸ κρατήσαντες ἀδεῶς ἄλλοι ἄλλην ναῦν διώκειν ἤρξαντο μέρει τινὶ σφῶν ἀτακτότεροι γενέσθαι. [3] γνόντες δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Θρασύβουλον τὰς ἐπὶ σφίσι ναῦς ἐπεχούσας παυσάμενοι τῆς ἐπεξαγωγῆς ἤδη τοῦ κέρως καὶ ἐπαναστρέψαντες εὐθὺς ἠμύναντό τε καὶ τρέπουσι, καὶ τὰς κατὰ τὸ νικῆσαν τῶν Πελοποννησίων μέρος ὑπολαβόντες πεπλανημένας ἔκοπτόν τε καὶ ἐς φόβον τὰς πλείους ἀμαχεὶ καθίστασαν. οἵ τε Συρακόσιοι ἐτύγχανον καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤδη τοῖς περὶ τὸν Θράσυλον ἐνδεδωκότες καὶ μᾶλλον ἐς φυγὴν ὁρμήσαντες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἑώρων.

106. γεγενημένης δὲ τῆς τροπῆς καὶ καταφυγόντων τῶν Πελοποννησίων πρὸς τὸν Μείδιον μάλιστα ποταμὸν τὸ πρῶτον, ὕστερον δὲ ἐς Ἄβυδον, ναῦς μὲν ὀλίγας ἔλαβον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι — στενὸς γὰρ ὢν ὁ Ἑλλήσποντος βραχείας τὰς ἀποφυγὰς τοῖς ἐναντίοις παρεῖχε —, τὴν μέντοι νίκην ταύτην τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐπικαιροτάτην δὴ ἔσχον. [2] φοβούμενοι γὰρ τέως τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναυτικὸν διά τε τὰ κατὰ βραχὺ σφάλματα καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ξυμφοράν, ἀπηλλάγησαν τοῦ σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καταμέμφεσθαι καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἔτι ἀξίους του ἐς τὰ ναυτικὰ νομίζειν. [3] ναῦς μέντοι τῶν ἐναντίων λαμβάνουσι Χίας μὲν ὀκτώ, Κορινθίας δὲ πέντε, Ἀμπρακιώτιδας δὲ δύο καὶ Βοιωτίας δύο, Λευκαδίων δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Συρακοσίων καὶ Πελληνέων μίαν ἑκάστων: αὐτοὶ δὲ πέντε καὶ δέκα ναῦς ἀπολλύασιν. [4] στήσαντες δὲ τροπαῖον ἐπὶ τῇ ἄκρᾳ οὗ τὸ Κυνὸς σῆμα καὶ τὰ ναυάγια προσαγαγόμενοι καὶ νεκροὺς τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑποσπόνδους ἀποδόντες ἀπέστειλαν καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας τριήρη ἄγγελον τῆς νίκης. [5] οἱ δὲ ἀφικομένης τῆς νεὼς καὶ ἀνέλπιστον τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἀκούσαντες ἐπί τε ταῖς περὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἄρτι ξυμφοραῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν στάσιν γεγενημέναις πολὺ ἐπερρώσθησαν καὶ ἐνόμισαν σφίσιν ἔτι δυνατὰ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ἢν προθύμως ἀντιλαμβάνωνται, περιγενέσθαι.

107. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἡμέρᾳ τετάρτῃ ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἐπισκευάσαντες τὰς ναῦς οἱ ἐν τῇ Σηστῷ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔπλεον ἐπὶ Κύζικον ἀφεστηκυῖαν: καὶ κατιδόντες κατὰ Ἀρπάγιον καὶ Πρίαπον τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ὀκτὼ ναῦς ὁρμούσας, ἐπιπλεύσαντες καὶ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς ἐν τῇ γῇ ἔλαβον τὰς ναῦς. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν Κύζικον ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν προσηγάγοντο πάλιν καὶ χρήματα ἀνέπραξαν. [2] ἔπλευσαν δὲ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐκ τῆς Ἀβύδου ἐπὶ τὸν Ἐλαιοῦντα καὶ τῶν σφετέρων νεῶν τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ὅσαι ἦσαν ὑγιεῖς ἐκομίσαντο — τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἐλαιούσιοι κατέκαυσαν —, καὶ ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἀπέπεμψαν Ἱπποκράτη καὶ Ἐπικλέα κομιοῦντας τὰς ἐκεῖθεν ναῦς.

108. κατέπλευσε δὲ ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτους καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης ταῖς τρισὶ καὶ δέκα ναυσὶν ἀπὸ τῆς Καύνου καὶ Φασήλιδος ἐς τὴν Σάμον, ἀγγέλλων ὅτι τάς τε Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἀποστρέψειε Πελοποννησίοις ὥστε μὴ ἐλθεῖν καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ὅτι φίλον πεποιήκοι μᾶλλον Ἀθηναίοις ἢ πρότερον. [2] καὶ πληρώσας ναῦς ἐννέα πρὸς αἷς εἶχεν Ἁλικαρνασσέας τε πολλὰ χρήματα ἐξέπραξε καὶ Κῶν ἐτείχισεν. ταῦτα δὲ πράξας καὶ ἄρχοντα ἐν τῇ Κῷ καταστήσας πρὸς τὸ μετόπωρον ἤδη ἐς τὴν Σάμον κατέπλευσεν. [3]καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσπένδου, ὡς ἐπύθετο τὰς τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναῦς ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον πεπλευκυίας, ἀναζεύξας ἤλαυνεν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰωνίας. [4] ὄντων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἐν τῷ Ἑλλησπόντῳ, Ἀντάνδριοι εἰσὶ δὲ Αἰολῆς παρακομισάμενοι ἐκ τῆς Ἀβύδου πεζῇ διὰ τῆς Ἴδης τοῦ ὄρους ὁπλίτας ἐσηγάγοντο ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ὑπὸ Ἀρσάκου τοῦ Πέρσου Τισσαφέρνους ὑπάρχου ἀδικούμενοι, ὅσπερ καὶ Δηλίους τοὺς Ἀτραμύττιον κατοικήσαντας ὅτε ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων Δήλου καθάρσεως ἕνεκα ἀνέστησαν, ἔχθραν προσποιησάμενος ἄδηλον καὶ ἐπαγγείλας στρατιὰν αὐτῶν τοῖς βελτίστοις, ἐξαγαγὼν ὡς ἐπὶ φιλίᾳ καὶ ξυμμαχίᾳ, τηρήσας ἀριστοποιουμένους καὶ περιστήσας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ κατηκόντισεν. [5] φοβούμενοι οὖν αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον μήποτε καὶ περὶ σφᾶς τι παρανομήσῃ, καὶ ἄλλα ἐπιβάλλοντος αὐτοῦ ἃ φέρειν οὐκ ἐδύναντο, ἐκβάλλουσι τοὺς φρουροὺς αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως.

109. ὁ δὲ Τισσαφέρνης αἰσθόμενος καὶ τοῦτο τῶν Πελοποννησίων τὸ ἔργον καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ καὶ Κνίδῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐξεπεπτώκεσαν οἱ φρουροί, διαβεβλῆσθαί τε νομίσας αὐτοῖς σφόδρα καὶ δείσας μὴ καὶ ἄλλο τι ἔτι βλάπτωσι, καὶ ἅμα ἀχθόμενος εἰ Φαρνάβαζος ἐξ ἐλάσσονος χρόνου καὶ δαπάνης δεξάμενος αὐτοὺς κατορθώσει τι μᾶλλον τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πορεύεσθαι διενοεῖτο πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, ὅπως μέμψηταί τε τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἄντανδρον γεγενημένων καὶ τὰς διαβολὰς καὶ περὶ τῶν Φοινισσῶν νεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

ὡς εὐπρεπέστατα ἀπολογήσηται. καὶ ἀφικόμενος πρῶτον ἐς Ἔφεσον θυσίαν ἐποιήσατο τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι. [2] [ὅταν ὁ μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ θέρος χειμὼν τελευτήσῃ, ἓν καὶ εἰκοστὸν ἔτος πληροῦται.]

Dual Text



Ruins at ancient Thrace. It is believed that Thucydides' family owned a large estate in Thrace, which contained gold mines, allowing the family considerable and lasting wealth.

DUAL GREEK AND ENGLISH TEXT

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

In this section, readers can view a paragraph by paragraph text, alternating between Thucydides' Greek and Jowett's English translation.

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Βιβλίο Α’ — BOOK I

1. Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς καθισταμένου καὶ ἐλπίσας μέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων, τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι ἀκμάζοντές τε ᾖσαν ἐς αὐτὸν ἀμφότεροι παρασκευῇ τῇ πάσῃ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ὁρῶν ξυνιστάμενον πρὸς ἑκατέρους, τὸ μὲν εὐθύς, τὸ δὲ καὶ διανοούμενον. [2] κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο καὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡς δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων. [3] τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔτι παλαίτερα σαφῶς μὲν εὑρεῖν διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἀδύνατα ἦν, ἐκ δὲ τεκμηρίων ὧν ἐπὶ μακρότατον σκοποῦντί μοι πιστεῦσαι ξυμβαίνει οὐ μεγάλα νομίζω γενέσθαι οὔτε κατὰ τοὺς πολέμους οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἄλλα.

[1] THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war in which the Peloponnesians and the Athenians fought against one another. He began to write when they first took up arms, believing that it would be great and memorable above any previous war. For he argued that both states were then at the full height of their military power, and he saw the rest of the Hellenes either siding or intending to side with one or other of them. No movement ever stirred Hellas more deeply than this; it was shared by many of the Barbarians, and might be said even to affect the world at large. The character of the events which preceded, whether immediately or in more remote antiquity, owing to the lapse of time cannot be made out with certainty. But, judging from the evidence which I am able to trust after most careful enquiry, I should imagine that former ages were not great either in their wars or in anything else.

2. φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ νῦν Ἑλλὰς καλουμένη οὐ πάλαι βεβαίως οἰκουμένη, ἀλλὰ μεταναστάσεις τε οὖσαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἕκαστοι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπολείποντες βιαζόμενοι ὑπό

τινων αἰεὶ πλειόνων. [2] τῆς γὰρ ἐμπορίας οὐκ οὔσης, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιμειγνύντες ἀδεῶς ἀλλήλοις οὔτε κατὰ γῆν οὔτε διὰ θαλάσσης, νεμόμενοί τε τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι ὅσον ἀποζῆν καὶ περιουσίαν χρημάτων οὐκ ἔχοντες οὐδὲ γῆν φυτεύοντες, ἄδηλον ὂν ὁπότε τις ἐπελθὼν καὶ ἀτειχίστων ἅμα ὄντων ἄλλος ἀφαιρήσεται, τῆς τε καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς πανταχοῦ ἂν ἡγούμενοι ἐπικρατεῖν, οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπανίσταντο, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ οὔτε μεγέθει πόλεων ἴσχυον οὔτε τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ. [3] μάλιστα δὲ τῆς γῆς ἡ ἀρίστη αἰεὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν οἰκητόρων εἶχεν, ἥ τε νῦν Θεσσαλία καλουμένη καὶ Βοιωτία Πελοποννήσου τε τὰ πολλὰ πλὴν Ἀρκαδίας, τῆς τε ἄλλης ὅσα ἦν κράτιστα. [4] διὰ γὰρ ἀρετὴν γῆς αἵ τε δυνάμεις τισὶ μείζους ἐγγιγνόμεναι στάσεις ἐνεποίουν ἐξ ὧν ἐφθείροντο, καὶ ἅμα ὑπὸ ἀλλοφύλων μᾶλλον ἐπεβουλεύοντο. [5] τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον διὰ τὸ λεπτόγεων ἀστασίαστον οὖσαν ἄνθρωποι ᾤκουν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεί. [6] καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι: ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος οἱ πολέμῳ ἢ στάσει ἐκπίπτοντες παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους οἱ δυνατώτατοι ὡς βέβαιον ὂν ἀνεχώρουν, καὶ πολῖται γιγνόμενοι εὐθὺς ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ μείζω ἔτι ἐποίησαν πλήθει ἀνθρώπων τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε καὶ ἐς Ἰωνίαν ὕστερον ὡς οὐχ ἱκανῆς οὔσης τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψαν.

[2] The country which is now called Hellas was not regularly settled in ancient times. The people were migratory, and readily left their homes whenever they were overpowered by numbers. There was no commerce, and they could not safely hold intercourse with one another either by land or sea. The several tribes cultivated their own soil just enough to obtain a maintenance from it. But they had no accumulations of wealth and did not plant the ground; for, being without walls, they were never sure that an invader might not come and despoil them. Living in this manner and knowing that they could anywhere obtain a bare subsistence, they were always ready to migrate; so that they had neither great

cities nor any considerable resources. The richest districts were most constantly changing their inhabitants; for example, the countries which are now called Thessaly and Boeotia, the greater part of the Peloponnesus with the exception of Arcadia, and all the best parts of Hellas. For the productiveness of the land increased the power of individuals; this in turn was a source of quarrels by which communities were ruined, while at the same time they were more exposed to attacks from without. Certainly Attica, of which the soil was poor and thin, enjoyed a long freedom from civil strife, and therefore retained its original inhabitants. And a striking confirmation of my argument is afforded by the fact that Attica through immigration increased in population more than any other region. For the leading men of Hellas, when driven out of their own country by war or revolution, sought an asylum at Athens; and from the very earliest times, being admitted to rights of citizenship, so greatly increased the number of inhabitants that Attica became incapable of containing them, and was at last obliged to send out colonies to Ionia.

3. δηλοῖ δέ μοι καὶ τόδε τῶν παλαιῶν ἀσθένειαν οὐχ ἥκιστα: πρὸ γὰρ τῶν Τρωικῶν οὐδὲν φαίνεται πρότερον κοινῇ ἐργασαμένη ἡ Ἑλλάς: [2] δοκεῖ δέ μοι, οὐδὲ τοὔνομα τοῦτο ξύμπασά πω εἶχεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸ Ἕλληνος τοῦ Δευκαλίωνος καὶ πάνυ οὐδὲ εἶναι ἡ ἐπίκλησις αὕτη, κατὰ ἔθνη δὲ ἄλλα τε καὶ τὸ Πελασγικὸν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν παρέχεσθαι, Ἕλληνος δὲ καὶ τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ Φθιώτιδι ἰσχυσάντων, καὶ ἐπαγομένων αὐτοὺς ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ ἐς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, καθ᾽ ἑκάστους μὲν ἤδη τῇ ὁμιλίᾳ μᾶλλον καλεῖσθαι Ἕλληνας, οὐ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε χρόνου [ἐδύνατο] καὶ ἅπασιν ἐκνικῆσαι. [3] τεκμηριοῖ δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος: πολλῷ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔτι καὶ τῶν Τρωικῶν γενόμενος οὐδαμοῦ τοὺς ξύμπαντας ὠνόμασεν, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς μετ᾽ Ἀχιλλέως ἐκ τῆς Φθιώτιδος, οἵπερ καὶ πρῶτοι Ἕλληνες ἦσαν, Δαναοὺς δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι καὶ Ἀργείους καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς ἀνακαλεῖ. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ βαρβάρους εἴρηκε διὰ τὸ

μηδὲ Ἕλληνάς πω, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἀντίπαλον ἐς ἓν ὄνομα ἀποκεκρίσθαι. [4] οἱ δ᾽ οὖν ὡς ἕκαστοι Ἕλληνες κατὰ πόλεις τε ὅσοι ἀλλήλων ξυνίεσαν καὶ ξύμπαντες ὕστερον κληθέντες οὐδὲν πρὸ τῶν Τρωικῶν δι᾽ ἀσθένειαν καὶ ἀμειξίαν ἀλλήλων ἀθρόοι ἔπραξαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτην τὴν στρατείαν θαλάσσῃ ἤδη πλείω χρώμενοι ξυνεξῆλθον.

[3] The feebleness of antiquity is further proved to me by the circumstance that there appears to have been no common action in Hellas before the Trojan War. And I am inclined to think that the very name was not as yet given to the whole country, and in fact did not exist at all before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion; the different tribes, of which the Pelasgian was the most widely spread, gave their own names to different districts. But when Hellen and his sons became powerful in Phthiotis, their aid was invoked by other cities, and those who associated with them gradually began to be called Hellenes, though a long time elapsed before the name prevailed over the whole country. Of this Homer affords the best evidence; for he, although he lived long after the Trojan War, nowhere uses this name collectively, but confines it to the followers of Achilles from Phthiotis, who were the original Hellenes; when speaking of the entire host he calls them Danaäns, or Argives, or Achaeans. Neither is there any mention of Barbarians in his poems, clearly because there were as yet no Hellenes opposed to them by a common distinctive name. Thus the several Hellenic tribes (and I mean by the term Hellenes those who, while forming separate communities, had a common language, and were afterwards called by a common name), owing to their weakness and isolation, were never united in any great enterprise before the Trojan War. And they only made the expedition against Troy after they had gained considerable experience of the sea.

4. Μίνως γὰρ παλαίτατος ὧν ἀκοῇ ἴσμεν ναυτικὸν ἐκτήσατο καὶ τῆς νῦν Ἑλληνικῆς θαλάσσης ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐκράτησε καὶ τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἦρξέ τε καὶ οἰκιστὴς

πρῶτος τῶν πλείστων ἐγένετο, Κᾶρας ἐξελάσας καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ἡγεμόνας ἐγκαταστήσας: τό τε λῃστικόν, ὡς εἰκός, καθῄρει ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐδύνατο, τοῦ τὰς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἰέναι αὐτῷ.

[4] Minos is the first to whom tradition ascribes the possession of a navy. He made himself master of a great part of what is now termed the Hellenic sea; he conquered the Cyclades, and was the first coloniser of most of them, expelling the Carians and appointing his own sons to govern in them. Lastly, it was he who, from a natural desire to protect his growing revenues, sought, as far as he was able, to clear the sea of pirates.

5. οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες τὸ πάλαι καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων οἵ τε ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ παραθαλάσσιοι καὶ ὅσοι νήσους εἶχον, ἐπειδὴ ἤρξαντο μᾶλλον περαιοῦσθαι ναυσὶν ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους, ἐτράποντο πρὸς λῃστείαν, ἡγουμένων ἀνδρῶν οὐ τῶν ἀδυνατωτάτων κέρδους τοῦ σφετέρου αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσι τροφῆς, καὶ προσπίπτοντες πόλεσιν ἀτειχίστοις καὶ κατὰ κώμας οἰκουμέναις ἥρπαζον καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιοῦντο, οὐκ ἔχοντός πω αἰσχύνην τούτου τοῦ ἔργου, φέροντος δέ τι καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον: [2] δηλοῦσι δὲ τῶν τε ἠπειρωτῶν τινὲς ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἷς κόσμος καλῶς τοῦτο δρᾶν, καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰς πύστεις τῶν καταπλεόντων πανταχοῦ ὁμοίως ἐρωτῶντες εἰ λῃσταί εἰσιν, ὡς οὔτε ὧν πυνθάνονται ἀπαξιούντων τὸ ἔργον, οἷς τε ἐπιμελὲς εἴη εἰδέναι οὐκ ὀνειδιζόντων. [3] ἐλῄζοντο δὲ καὶ κατ᾽ ἤπειρον ἀλλήλους.καὶ μέχρι τοῦδε πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ νέμεται περί τε Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ὀζόλας καὶ Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ τὴν ταύτῃ ἤπειρον. τό τε σιδηροφορεῖσθαι τούτοις τοῖς ἠπειρώταις ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς λῃστείας ἐμμεμένηκεν:

[5] For in ancient times both the Hellenes, and those Barbarians, whose homes were on the coast of the mainland or in islands, when they began to find their way to one another by sea had recourse to piracy. They were commanded by powerful chiefs, who took this means of

increasing their wealth and providing for their poorer followers. They would fall upon the unwalled and straggling towns, or rather villages, which they plundered, and maintained themselves chiefly by the plunder of them; for, as yet, such an occupation was held to be honourable and not disgraceful. This is proved by the practice of certain tribes on the mainland who, to the present day, glory in piratical exploits, and by the witness of the ancient poets, in whose verses the question is invariably asked of newly-arrived voyagers, whether they are pirates; which implies that neither those who are questioned disclaim, nor those who are interested in knowing censure the occupation. On land also neighbouring communities plundered each other; and there are many parts of Hellas in which the old practices still continue, as for example among the Ozolian Locrians, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and the adjacent regions of the continent. The fashion of wearing arms among these continental tribes is a relic of their old predatory habits. For in ancient times all Hellenes carried weapons because their homes were undefended and intercourse was unsafe; like the Barbarians they went armed in their every-day life. And the continuance of the custom in certain parts of the country indicates that it once prevailed everywhere.

6. πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐσιδηροφόρει διὰ τὰς ἀφάρκτους τε οἰκήσεις καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐφόδους, καὶ ξυνήθη τὴν δίαιταν μεθ᾽ ὅπλων ἐποιήσαντο ὥσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι. [2] σημεῖον δ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔτι οὕτω νεμόμενα τῶν ποτὲ καὶ ἐς πάντας ὁμοίων διαιτημάτων. [3]ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τόν τε σίδηρον κατέθεντο καὶ ἀνειμένῃ τῇ διαίτῃ ἐς τὸ τρυφερώτερον μετέστησαν. καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων διὰ τὸ ἀβροδίαιτον οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐπειδὴ χιτῶνάς τε λινοῦς ἐπαύσαντο φοροῦντες καὶ χρυσῶν τεττίγων ἐνέρσει κρωβύλον ἀναδούμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τριχῶν: ἀφ᾽ οὗ καὶ Ἰώνων τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς ἐπὶ πολὺ αὕτη ἡ σκευὴ κατέσχεν. [4] μετρίᾳ δ᾽ αὖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ἐς τὸν νῦν

τρόπον πρῶτοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐχρήσαντο καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ τὰ μείζω κεκτημένοι ἰσοδίαιτοι μάλιστα κατέστησαν. [5] ἐγυμνώθησάν τε πρῶτοι καὶ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν ἀποδύντες λίπα μετὰ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι ἠλείψαντο: τὸ δὲ πάλαι καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ ἀγῶνι διαζώματα ἔχοντες περὶ τὰ αἰδοῖα οἱ ἀθληταὶ ἠγωνίζοντο, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἔτη ἐπειδὴ πέπαυται. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἔστιν οἷς νῦν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς Ἀσιανοῖς, πυγμῆς καὶ πάλης ἆθλα τίθεται, καὶ διεζωμένοι τοῦτο δρῶσιν. [6] πολλὰ δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄλλα τις ἀποδείξειε τὸ παλαιὸν Ἑλληνικὸν ὁμοιότροπα τῷ νῦν βαρβαρικῷ διαιτώμενον.

[6] The Athenians were the first who laid aside arms and adopted an easier and more luxurious way of life. Quite recently the old-fashioned refinement of dress still lingered among the elder men of their richer class, who wore under-garments of linen, and bound back their hair in a knot with golden clasps in the form of grasshoppers; and the same customs long survived among the elders of Ionia, having been derived from their Athenian ancestors. On the other hand, the simple dress which is now common was first worn at Sparta; and there, more than anywhere else, the life of the rich was assimilated to that of the people. The Lacedaemonians too were the first who in their athletic exercises stripped naked and rubbed themselves over with oil. But this was not the ancient custom; athletes formerly, even when they were contending at Olympia, wore girdles about their loins, a practice which lasted until quite lately, and still prevails among Barbarians, especially those of Asia, where the combatants in boxing and wrestling matches wear girdles. And many other customs which are now confined to the Barbarians might be shown to have existed formerly in Hellas.

7. τῶν δὲ πόλεων ὅσαι μὲν νεώτατα ᾠκίσθησαν καὶ ἤδη πλωιμωτέρων ὄντων, περιουσίας μᾶλλον ἔχουσαι χρημάτων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς τείχεσιν ἐκτίζοντο καὶ τοὺς ἰσθμοὺς ἀπελάμβανον ἐμπορίας τε ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς

προσοίκους ἕκαστοι ἰσχύος: αἱ δὲ παλαιαὶ διὰ τὴν λῃστείαν ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντίσχουσαν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ᾠκίσθησαν, αἵ τε ἐν ταῖς νήσοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἠπείροις ἔφερον γὰρ ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ὄντες οὐ θαλάσσιοι κάτω ᾤκουν, καὶ μέχρι τοῦδε ἔτι ἀνῳκισμένοι εἰσίν.

[7] In later times, when navigation had become general and wealth was beginning to accumulate, cities were built upon the sea-shore and fortified; peninsulas too were occupied and walled-off with a view to commerce and defence against the neighbouring tribes. But the older towns both in the islands and on the continent, in order to protect themselves against the piracy which so long prevailed, were built inland; and there they remain to this day. For the piratical tribes plundered, not only one another, but all those who, without being seamen, lived on the sea-coast.

8. καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον λῃσταὶ ἦσαν οἱ νησιῶται, Κᾶρές τε ὄντες καὶ Φοίνικες: οὗτοι γὰρ δὴ τὰς πλείστας τῶν νήσων ᾤκησαν. μαρτύριον δέ: Δήλου γὰρ καθαιρομένης ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ τῶν θηκῶν ἀναιρεθεισῶν ὅσαι ἦσαν τῶν τεθνεώτων ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ Κᾶρες ἐφάνησαν, γνωσθέντες τῇ τε σκευῇ τῶν ὅπλων ξυντεθαμμένῃ καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧ νῦν ἔτι θάπτουσιν. [2] καταστάντος δὲ τοῦ Μίνω ναυτικοῦ πλωιμώτερα ἐγένετο παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους οἱ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νήσων κακοῦργοι ἀνέστησαν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὅτεπερ καὶ τὰς πολλὰς αὐτῶν κατῴκιζε, [3] καὶ οἱ παρὰ θάλασσαν ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ἤδη τὴν κτῆσιν τῶν χρημάτων ποιούμενοι βεβαιότερον ᾤκουν, καί τινες καὶ τείχη περιεβάλλοντο ὡς πλουσιώτεροι ἑαυτῶν γιγνόμενοι: ἐφιέμενοι γὰρ τῶν κερδῶν οἵ τε ἥσσους ὑπέμενον τὴν τῶν κρεισσόνων δουλείαν, οἵ τε δυνατώτεροι περιουσίας ἔχοντες προσεποιοῦντο ὑπηκόους τὰς ἐλάσσους πόλεις. [4] καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ μᾶλλον ἤδη ὄντες ὕστερον χρόνῳ ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἐστράτευσαν.

[8] The islanders were even more addicted to piracy than the inhabitants of the mainland. They were mostly Carian or Phoenician settlers. This is proved by the fact that when the

Athenians purified Delos during the Peloponnesian War and the tombs of the dead were opened, more than half of them were found to be Carians. They were known by the fashion of their arms which were buried with them, and by their mode of burial, the same which is still practised among them.After Minos had established his navy, communication by sea became more general. For, he having expelled the marauders when he colonised the greater part of the islands, the dwellers on the sea-coast began to grow richer and to live in a more settled manner; and some of them, finding their wealth increase beyond their expectations, surrounded their towns with walls. The love of gain made the weaker willing to serve the stronger, and the command of wealth enabled the more powerful to subjugate the lesser cities. This was the state of society which was beginning to prevail at the time of the Trojan War.

9. Ἀγαμέμνων τέ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν τότε δυνάμει προύχων καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον τοῖς Τυνδάρεω ὅρκοις κατειλημμένους τοὺς Ἑλένης μνηστῆρας ἄγων τὸν στόλον ἀγεῖραι. [2] λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σαφέστατα Πελοποννησίων μνήμῃ παρὰ τῶν πρότερον δεδεγμένοι Πέλοπά τε πρῶτον πλήθει χρημάτων, ἃ ἦλθεν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας ἔχων ἐς ἀνθρώπους ἀπόρους, δύναμιν περιποιησάμενον τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τῆς χώρας ἔπηλυν ὄντα ὅμως σχεῖν, καὶ ὕστερον τοῖς ἐκγόνοις ἔτι μείζω ξυνενεχθῆναι,Εὐρυσθέως μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὑπὸ Ἡρακλειδῶν ἀποθανόντος, Ἀτρέως δὲ μητρὸς ἀδελφοῦ ὄντος αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐπιτρέψαντος Εὐρυσθέως, ὅτ᾽ ἐστράτευε, Μυκήνας τε καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον Ἀτρεῖ τυγχάνειν δὲ αὐτὸν φεύγοντα τὸν πατέρα διὰ τὸν Χρυσίππου θάνατον, καὶ ὡς οὐκέτι ἀνεχώρησεν Εὐρυσθεύς, βουλομένων καὶ τῶν Μυκηναίων φόβῳ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν καὶ ἅμα δυνατὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τεθεραπευκότα τῶν Μυκηναίων τε καὶ ὅσων Εὐρυσθεὺς ἦρχε τὴν βασιλείαν Ἀτρέα παραλαβεῖν, καὶ τῶν Περσειδῶν τοὺς Πελοπίδας μείζους καταστῆναι. [3] ἅ μοι δοκεῖ Ἀγαμέμνων παραλαβὼν καὶ ναυτικῷ [τε] ἅμα ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ἰσχύσας, τὴν

στρατείαν οὐ χάριτι τὸ πλέον ἢ φόβῳ ξυναγαγὼν ποιήσασθαι. [4] φαίνεται γὰρ ναυσί τε πλείσταις αὐτὸς ἀφικόμενος καὶ Ἀρκάσι προσπαρασχών, ὡς Ὅμηρος τοῦτο δεδήλωκεν, εἴ τῳ ἱκανὸς τεκμηριῶσαι. καὶ ἐν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἅμα τῇ παραδόσει εἴρηκεν αὐτὸν”πολλῆσι νήσοισι καὶ Ἄργεϊ παντὶ ἀνάσσειν:”Hom. Il. 2.108οὐκ ἂν οὖν νήσων ἔξω τῶν περιοικίδων αὗται δὲ οὐκ ἂν πολλαὶ εἶεν ἠπειρώτης ὢν ἐκράτει, εἰ μή τι καὶ ναυτικὸν εἶχεν. εἰκάζειν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ στρατείᾳ οἷα ἦν τὰ πρὸ αὐτῆς.

[9] I am inclined to think that Agamemnon succeeded in collecting the expedition, not because the suitors of Helen had bound themselves by oath to Tyndareus, but because he was the most powerful king of his time. Those Peloponnesians who possess the most accurate traditions say that originally Pelops gained his power by the great wealth which he brought with him from Asia into a poor country, whereby he was enabled, although a stranger, to give his name to the Peloponnesus; and that still greater fortune attended his descendants after the death of Eurystheus, king of Mycenae, who was slain in Attica by the Heraclidae. For Atreus the son of Pelops was the maternal uncle of Eurystheus, who, when he went on the expedition, naturally committed to his charge the kingdom of Mycenae. Now Atreus had been banished by his father on account of the murder of Chrysippus. But Eurystheus never returned; and the Mycenaeans, dreading the Heraclidae, were ready to welcome Atreus, who was considered a powerful man and had ingratiated himself with the multitude. So he succeeded to the throne of Mycenae and the other dominions of Eurystheus. Thus the house of Pelops prevailed over that of Perseus.And it was, as I believe, because Agamemnon inherited this power and also because he was the greatest naval potentate of his time that he was able to assemble the expedition; and the other princes followed him, not from good-will, but from fear. Of the chiefs who came to Troy, he, if the witness of Homer be accepted, brought the greatest

number of ships himself, besides supplying the Arcadians with them. In the ‘Handing down of the Sceptre’ he is described as ‘The king of many islands, and of all Argos.’ But, living on the mainland, he could not have ruled over any except the adjacent islands (which would not be ‘many’) unless he had possessed a considerable navy. From this expedition we must form our conjectures about the character of still earlier times.

10. καὶ ὅτι μὲν Μυκῆναι μικρὸν ἦν, ἢ εἴ τι τῶν τότε πόλισμα νῦν μὴ ἀξιόχρεων δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀκριβεῖ ἄν τις σημείῳ χρώμενος ἀπιστοίη μὴ γενέσθαι τὸν στόλον τοσοῦτον ὅσον οἵ τε ποιηταὶ εἰρήκασι καὶ ὁ λόγος κατέχει. [2] Λακεδαιμονίων γὰρ εἰ ἡ πόλις ἐρημωθείη, λειφθείη δὲ τά τε ἱερὰ καὶ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὰ ἐδάφη, πολλὴν ἂν οἶμαι ἀπιστίαν τῆς δυνάμεως προελθόντος πολλοῦ χρόνου τοῖς ἔπειτα πρὸς τὸ κλέος αὐτῶν εἶναι καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοίρας νέμονται, τῆς τε ξυμπάσης ἡγοῦνται καὶ τῶν ἔξω ξυμμάχων πολλῶν: ὅμως δὲ οὔτε ξυνοικισθείσης πόλεως οὔτε ἱεροῖς καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένης, κατὰ κώμας δὲ τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθείσης, φαίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ὑποδεεστέρα , Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παθόντων διπλασίαν ἂν τὴν δύναμιν εἰκάζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς φανερᾶς ὄψεως τῆς πόλεως ἢ ἔστιν. [3] οὔκουν ἀπιστεῖν εἰκός, οὐδὲ τὰς ὄψεις τῶν πόλεων μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὰς δυνάμεις, νομίζειν δὲ τὴν στρατείαν ἐκείνην μεγίστην μὲν γενέσθαι τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς, λειπομένην δὲ τῶν νῦν, τῇ Ὁμήρου αὖ ποιήσει εἴ τι χρὴ κἀνταῦθα πιστεύειν, ἣν εἰκὸς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον μὲν ποιητὴν ὄντα κοσμῆσαι, ὅμως δὲ φαίνεται καὶ οὕτως ἐνδεεστέρα. [4] πεποίηκε γὰρ χιλίων καὶ διακοσίων νεῶν τὰς μὲν Βοιωτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ἀνδρῶν, τὰς δὲ Φιλοκτήτου πεντήκοντα, δηλῶν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰς μεγίστας καὶ ἐλαχίστας: ἄλλων γοῦν μεγέθους πέρι ἐν νεῶν καταλόγῳ οὐκ ἐμνήσθη. αὐτερέται δὲ ὅτι ἦσαν καὶ μάχιμοι πάντες, ἐν ταῖς Φιλοκτήτου ναυσὶ δεδήλωκεν: τοξότας γὰρ πάντας πεποίηκε τοὺς προσκώπους. περίνεως δὲ οὐκ εἰκὸς πολλοὺς

ξυμπλεῖν ἔξω τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τῶν μάλιστα ἐν τέλει, ἄλλως τε καὶ μέλλοντας πέλαγος περαιώσεσθαι μετὰ σκευῶν πολεμικῶν, οὐδ᾽ αὖ τὰ πλοῖα κατάφαρκτα ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ λῃστικώτερον παρεσκευασμένα. [5] πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας δ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἐλαχίστας ναῦς τὸ μέσον σκοποῦντι οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἀπὸ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος κοινῇ πεμπόμενοι.

[10] When it is said that Mycenae was but a small place, or that any other city which existed in those days is inconsiderable in our own, this argument will hardly prove that the expedition was not as great as the poets relate and as is commonly imagined. Suppose the city of Sparta to be deserted, and nothing left but the temples and the ground-plan, distant ages would be very unwilling to believe that the power of the Lacedaemonians was at all equal to their fame. And yet they own two-fifths of the Peloponnesus, and are acknowledged leaders of the whole, as well as of numerous allies in the rest of Hellas. But their city is not built continuously, and has no splendid temples or other edifices; it rather resembles a group of villages like the ancient towns of Hellas, and would therefore make a poor show. Whereas, if the same fate befell the Athenians, the ruins of Athens would strike the eye, and we should infer their power to have been twice as great as it really is. We ought not then to be unduly sceptical. The greatness of cities should be estimated by their real power and not by appearances. And we may fairly suppose the Trojan expedition to have been greater than any which preceded it, although according to Homer, if we may once more appeal to his testimony, not equal to those of our own day. He was a poet, and may therefore be expected to exaggerate; yet, even upon his showing, the expedition was comparatively small. For it numbered, as he tells us, twelve hundred ships, those of the Boeotians carrying one hundred and twenty men each, those of Philoctetes fifty; and by these numbers he may be presumed to indicate the largest and the smallest

ships; else why in the catalogue is nothing said about the size of any others? That the crews were all fighting men as well as rowers he clearly implies when speaking of the ships of Philoctetes; for he tells us that all the oarsmen were likewise archers. And it is not to be supposed that many who were not sailors would accompany the expedition, except the kings and principal officers; for the troops had to cross the sea, bringing with them the materials of war, in vessels without decks, built after the old piratical fashion. Now if we take a mean between the crews, the invading forces will appear not to have been very numerous when we remember that they were drawn from the whole of Hellas.

11. αἴτιον δ᾽ ἦν οὐχ ἡ ὀλιγανθρωπία τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἡ ἀχρηματία. τῆς γὰρ τροφῆς ἀπορίᾳ τόν τε στρατὸν ἐλάσσω ἤγαγον καὶ ὅσον ἤλπιζον αὐτόθεν πολεμοῦντα βιοτεύσειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν □δῆλον δέ: τὸ γὰρ ἔρυμα τῷ στρατοπέδῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐτειχίσαντο□, φαίνονται δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐνταῦθα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει χρησάμενοι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γεωργίαν τῆς Χερσονήσου τραπόμενοι καὶ λῃστείαν τῆς τροφῆς ἀπορίᾳ. ᾗ καὶ μᾶλλον οἱ Τρῶες αὐτῶν διεσπαρμένων τὰ δέκα ἔτη ἀντεῖχον βίᾳ, τοῖς αἰεὶ ὑπολειπομένοις ἀντίπαλοι ὄντες. [2] περιουσίαν δὲ εἰ ἦλθον ἔχοντες τροφῆς καὶ ὄντες ἀθρόοι ἄνευ λῃστείας καὶ γεωργίας ξυνεχῶς τὸν πόλεμον διέφερον, ῥᾳδίως ἂν μάχῃ κρατοῦντες εἷλον, οἵ γε καὶ οὐχ ἀθρόοι, ἀλλὰ μέρει τῷ αἰεὶ παρόντι ἀντεῖχον, πολιορκίᾳ δ᾽ ἂν προσκαθεζόμενοι ἐν ἐλάσσονί τε χρόνῳ καὶ ἀπονώτερον τὴν Τροίαν εἷλον. ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἀχρηματίαν τά τε πρὸ τούτων ἀσθενῆ ἦν καὶ αὐτά γε δὴ ταῦτα, ὀνομαστότατα τῶν πρὶν γενόμενα, δηλοῦται τοῖς ἔργοις ὑποδεέστερα ὄντα τῆς φήμης καὶ τοῦ νῦν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τοὺς ποιητὰς λόγου κατεσχηκότος:

[11] The cause of the inferiority was not so much the want of men as the want of money; the invading army was limited, by the difficulty of obtaining supplies, to such a number as might be expected to live on the country in which they were to fight. After their arrival at Troy, when they had won a

battle (as they clearly did, for otherwise they could not have fortified their camp), even then they appear not to have used the whole of their force, but to have been driven by want of provisions to the cultivation of the Chersonese and to pillage. And in consequence of this dispersion of their forces, the Trojans were enabled to hold out against them during the whole ten years, being always a match for those who remained on the spot. Whereas if the besieging army had brought abundant supplies, and, instead of betaking themselves to agriculture or pillage, had carried on the war persistently with all their forces, they would easily have been masters of the field and have taken the city; since, even divided as they were, and with only a part of their army available at any one time, they held their ground. Or, again, they might have regularly invested Troy, and the place would have been captured in less time and with less trouble. Poverty was the real reason why the achievements of former ages were insignificant, and why the Trojan War, the most celebrated of them all, when brought to the test of facts, falls short of its fame and of the prevailing traditions to which the poets have given authority.

12. ἐπεὶ καὶ μετὰ τὰ Τρωικὰ ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἔτι μετανίστατό τε καὶ κατῳκίζετο, ὥστε μὴ ἡσυχάσασαν αὐξηθῆναι. [2] ἥ τε γὰρ ἀναχώρησις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξ Ἰλίου χρονία γενομένη πολλὰ ἐνεόχμωσε, καὶ στάσεις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐγίγνοντο, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐκπίπτοντες τὰς πόλεις ἔκτιζον. [3] Βοιωτοί τε γὰρ οἱ νῦν ἐξηκοστῷ ἔτει μετὰ Ἰλίου ἅλωσιν ἐξ Ἄρνης ἀναστάντες ὑπὸ Θεσσαλῶν τὴν νῦν μὲν Βοιωτίαν, πρότερον δὲ Καδμηίδα γῆν καλουμένην ᾤκισαν ▯ ἦν δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποδασμὸς πρότερον ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ, ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ ἐς Ἴλιον ἐστράτευσαν ▯, Δωριῆς τε ὀγδοηκοστῷ ἔτει ξὺν Ἡρακλείδαις Πελοπόννησον ἔσχον. [4] μόλις τε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἡσυχάσασα ἡ Ἑλλὰς βεβαίως καὶ οὐκέτι ἀνισταμένη ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψε, καὶ Ἴωνας μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ νησιωτῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ᾤκισαν, Ἰταλίας δὲ καὶ Σικελίας τὸ πλεῖστον

Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς τε ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἔστιν ἃ χωρία. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὕστερον τῶν Τρωικῶν ἐκτίσθη.

[12] Even in the age which followed the Trojan War, Hellas was still in process of ferment and settlement, and had no time for peaceful growth. The return of the Hellenes from Troy after their long absence led to many changes: quarrels too arose in nearly every city, and those who were expelled by them went and founded other cities. Thus in the the sixtieth year after the fall of Troy, the Boeotian people, having been expelled from Arnè by the Thessalians, settled in the country formerly called Cadmeis, but now Boeotia: a portion of the tribe already dwelt there, and some of these had joined in the Trojan expedition. In the eightieth year after the war, the Dorians led by the Heraclidae conquered the Peloponnesus. A considerable time elapsed before Hellas became finally settled; after a while, however, she recovered tranquillity and began to send out colonies. The Athenians colonised Ionia and most of the islands; the Peloponnesians the greater part of Italy and Sicily, and various places in Hellas. These colonies were all founded after the Trojan War.

13. δυνατωτέρας δὲ γιγνομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτῆσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιουμένης τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο, τῶν προσόδων μειζόνων γιγνομένων πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι, ναυτικά τε ἐξηρτύετο ἡ Ἑλλάς, καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ἀντείχοντο. [2] πρῶτοι δὲ Κορίνθιοι λέγονται ἐγγύτατα τοῦ νῦν τρόπου μεταχειρίσαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τριήρεις ἐν Κορίνθῳ πρῶτον τῆς Ἑλλάδος ναυπηγηθῆναι. [3] φαίνεται δὲ καὶ Σαμίοις Ἀμεινοκλῆς Κορίνθιος ναυπηγὸς ναῦς ποιήσας τέσσαρας: ἔτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ μάλιστα τριακόσια ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ὅτε Ἀμεινοκλῆς Σαμίοις ἦλθεν. [4] ναυμαχία τε παλαιτάτη ὧν ἴσμεν γίγνεται Κορινθίων πρὸς Κερκυραίους: ἔτη δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ταύτῃ ἑξήκοντα καὶ διακόσιά ἐστι μέχρι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρόνου. [5] οἰκοῦντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ αἰεὶ δή ποτε ἐμπόριον εἶχον, τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸ

πάλαι κατὰ γῆν τὰ πλείω ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, τῶν τε ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῶν ἔξω, διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐπιμισγόντων, χρήμασί τε δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ποιηταῖς δεδήλωται: ἀφνειὸν γὰρ ἐπωνόμασαν τὸ χωρίον. ἐπειδή τε οἱ Ἕλληνες μᾶλλον ἔπλῳζον, τὰς ναῦς κτησάμενοι τὸ λῃστικὸν καθῄρουν, καὶ ἐμπόριον παρέχοντες ἀμφότερα δυνατὴν ἔσχον χρημάτων προσόδῳ τὴν πόλιν. [6] καὶ Ἴωσιν ὕστερον πολὺ γίγνεται ναυτικὸν ἐπὶ Κύρου Περσῶν πρώτου βασιλεύοντος καὶ Καμβύσου τοῦ υἱέος αὐτοῦ, τῆς τε καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς θαλάσσης Κύρῳ πολεμοῦντες ἐκράτησάν τινα χρόνον. καὶ Πολυκράτης Σάμου τυραννῶν ἐπὶ Καμβύσου ναυτικῷ ἰσχύων ἄλλας τε τῶν νήσων ὑπηκόους ἐποιήσατο καὶ Ῥήνειαν ἑλὼν ἀνέθηκε τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Δηλίῳ. Φωκαῆς τε Μασσαλίαν οἰκίζοντες Καρχηδονίους ἐνίκων ναυμαχοῦντες:

[13] As Hellas grew more powerful and the acquisition of wealth became more and more rapid, the revenues of her cities increased, and in most of them tyrannies were established; they had hitherto been ruled by hereditary kings, having fixed prerogatives. The Hellenes likewise began to build navies and to make the sea their element. The Corinthians are said to have first adopted something like the modern style of marine, and the oldest Hellenic triremes to have been constructed at Corinth. A Corinthian ship-builder, Ameinocles, appears to have built four ships for the Samians; he went to Samos about three hundred years before the end of the Peloponnesian War. And the earliest naval engagement on record is that between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans which occurred about forty years later. Corinth, being seated on an isthmus, was naturally from the first a centre of commerce; for the Hellenes within and without the Peloponnese in the old days, when they communicated chiefly by land, had to pass through her territory in order to reach one another. Her wealth too was a source of power, as the ancient poets testify, who speak of ‘Corinth the rich.’ When navigation grew more common, the

Corinthians, having already acquired a fleet, were able to put down piracy; they offered a market both by sea and land, and with the increase of riches the power of their city increased yet more. Later, in the time of Cyrus, the first Persian king, and of Cambyses his son, the Ionians had a large navy; they fought with Cyrus, and were for a time masters of the sea around their own coasts. Polycrates, too, who was a tyrant of Samos in the reign of Cambyses, had a powerful navy and subdued several of the islands, among them Rhenea, which he dedicated to the Delian Apollo. And the Phocaeans, when they were colonising Massalia, defeated the Carthaginians on the sea.

14. δυνατώτατα γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ναυτικῶν ἦν. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα πολλαῖς γενεαῖς ὕστερα γενόμενα τῶν Τρωικῶν τριήρεσι μὲν ὀλίγαις χρώμενα, πεντηκοντόροις δ᾽ ἔτι καὶ πλοίοις μακροῖς ἐξηρτυμένα ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνα. [2] ὀλίγον τε πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν καὶ τοῦ Δαρείου θανάτου, ὃς μετὰ Καμβύσην Περσῶν ἐβασίλευσε, τριήρεις περί τε Σικελίαν τοῖς τυράννοις ἐς πλῆθος ἐγένοντο καὶ Κερκυραίοις: ταῦτα γὰρ τελευταῖα πρὸ τῆς Ξέρξου στρατείας ναυτικὰ ἀξιόλογα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι κατέστη. [3] Αἰγινῆται γὰρ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι, βραχέα ἐκέκτηντο, καὶ τούτων τὰ πολλὰ πεντηκοντόρους: ὀψέ τε ἀφ᾽ οὗ Ἀθηναίους Θεμιστοκλῆς ἔπεισεν Αἰγινήταις πολεμοῦντας, καὶ ἅμα τοῦ βαρβάρου προσδοκίμου ὄντος, τὰς ναῦς ποιήσασθαι αἵσπερ καὶ ἐναυμάχησαν: καὶ αὗται οὔπω εἶχον διὰ πάσης καταστρώματα.

[14] These were the most powerful navies, and even these, which came into existence many generations after the Trojan Warr, appear to have consisted chiefly of fifty-oared vessels and galleys of war, as in the days of Troy; as yet triremes were not common. But a little before the Persian War and the death of Darius, who succeeded Cambyses, the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans had them in considerable numbers. No other maritime powers of any consequence arose in Hellas before the expedition of Xerxes. The

Aeginetans, Athenians, and a few more had small fleets, and these mostly consisted of fifty-oared vessels. Even the ships which the Athenians built quite recently at the instigation of Themistocles, when they were at war with the Aeginetans and in expectation of the Barbarian, even these ships with which they fought at Salamis were not completely decked.

15. τὰ μὲν οὖν ναυτικὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοιαῦτα ἦν, τά τε παλαιὰ καὶ τὰ ὕστερον γενόμενα. ἰσχὺν δὲ περιεποιήσαντο ὅμως οὐκ ἐλαχίστην οἱ προσσχόντες αὐτοῖς χρημάτων τε προσόδῳ καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχῇ: ἐπιπλέοντες γὰρ τὰς νήσους κατεστρέφοντο, καὶ μάλιστα ὅσοι μὴ διαρκῆ εἶχον χώραν. [2] κατὰ γῆν δὲ πόλεμος, ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο, οὐδεὶς ξυνέστη: πάντες δὲ ἦσαν, ὅσοι καὶ ἐγένοντο, πρὸς ὁμόρους τοὺς σφετέρους ἑκάστοις, καὶ ἐκδήμους στρατείας πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων καταστροφῇ οὐκ ἐξῆσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες. οὐ γὰρ ξυνειστήκεσαν πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις ὑπήκοοι, οὐδ᾽ αὖ αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης κοινὰς στρατείας ἐποιοῦντο, κατ᾽ ἀλλήλους δὲ μᾶλλον ὡς ἕκαστοι οἱ ἀστυγείτονες ἐπολέμουν. [3] μάλιστα δὲ ἐς τὸν πάλαι ποτὲ γενόμενον πόλεμον Χαλκιδέων καὶ Ἐρετριῶν καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν ἑκατέρων διέστη.

[15] So inconsiderable were the Hellenic navies in recent as well as in more ancient times. And yet those who applied their energies to the sea obtained a great accession of strength by the increase of their revenues and the extension of their dominion. For they attacked and subjugated the islands, especially when the pressure of population was felt by them. Whereas by land, no conflict of any kind which brought increase of power ever occurred; what wars they had were mere border feuds. Foreign and distant expeditions of conquest the Hellenes never undertook; for they were not as yet ranged under the command of the great states, nor did they form voluntary leagues or make expeditions on an equal footing. Their wars were only the wars of the several neighbouring tribes with one another. The conflict in which the rest of Hellas was most divided, allying itself with one

side or the other, was the ancient war between the Chalcidians and Eretrians.

16. ἐπεγένετο δὲ ἄλλοις τε ἄλλοθι κωλύματα μὴ αὐξηθῆναι, καὶ Ἴωσι προχωρησάντων ἐπὶ μέγα τῶν πραγμάτων Κῦρος καὶ ἡ Περσικὴ βασιλεία Κροῖσον καθελοῦσα καὶ ὅσα ἐντὸς Ἅλυος ποταμοῦ πρὸς θάλασσαν ἐπεστράτευσε καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ πόλεις ἐδούλωσε, Δαρεῖός τε ὕστερον τῷ Φοινίκων ναυτικῷ κρατῶν καὶ τὰς νήσους.

[16] There were different impediments to the progress of the different states. The Ionians had attained great prosperity when Cyrus and the Persians, having overthrown Croesus and subdued the countries between the river Halys and the sea, made war against them and enslaved the cities on the mainland. Some time afterwards, Darius, strong in the possession of the Phoenician fleet, conquered the islands also.

17. τύραννοί τε ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς πόλεσι,τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν μόνον προορώμενοι ἔς τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐς τὸ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον αὔξειν δι᾽ ἀσφαλείας ὅσον ἐδύναντο μάλιστα τὰς πόλεις ᾤκουν, ἐπράχθη δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀξιόλογον, εἰ μὴ εἴ τι πρὸς περιοίκους τοὺς αὐτῶν ἑκάστοις: οἱ γὰρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως. οὕτω πανταχόθεν ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον κατείχετο μήτε κοινῇ φανερὸν μηδὲν κατεργάζεσθαι, κατὰ πόλεις τε ἀτολμοτέρα εἶναι.

[17] Nor again did the tyrants of the Hellenic cities extend their thoughts beyond their own interest, that is, the security of their persons, and the aggrandisement of themselves and their families. They were extremely cautious in the administration of their government, and nothing considerable was ever effected by them; except in wars with their neighbours, as in Sicily, where their power attained its greatest height. Thus for a long time everything conspired to prevent Hellas from uniting in any great action and to paralyse enterprise in the individual states.

18. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἵ τε Ἀθηναίων τύραννοι καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ πρὶν τυραννευθείσης οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κατελύθησαν ἡ γὰρ Λακεδαίμων μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν τῶν νῦν ἐνοικούντων αὐτὴν Δωριῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ὧν ἴσμεν χρόνον στασιάσασα ὅμως ἐκ παλαιτάτου καὶ ηὐνομήθη καὶ αἰεὶ ἀτυράννευτος ἦν: ἔτη γάρ ἐστι μάλιστα τετρακόσια καὶ ὀλίγῳ πλείω ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ἀφ᾽ οὗ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῇ αὐτῇ πολιτείᾳ χρῶνται, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ δυνάμενοι καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι καθίστασαν, μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον καὶ ἡ ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχη Μήδων πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐγένετο. [2] δεκάτῳ δὲ ἔτει μετ᾽ αὐτὴν αὖθις ὁ βάρβαρος τῷ μεγάλῳ στόλῳ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα δουλωσόμενος ἦλθεν. καὶ μεγάλου κινδύνου ἐπικρεμασθέντος οἵ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν ξυμπολεμησάντων Ἑλλήνων ἡγήσαντο δυνάμει προύχοντες, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιόντων τῶν Μήδων διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβάντες ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο. κοινῇ τε ἀπωσάμενοι τὸν βάρβαρον, ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ διεκρίθησαν πρός τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους οἵ τε ἀποστάντες βασιλέως Ἕλληνες καὶ οἱ ξυμπολεμήσαντες. δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα μέγιστα διεφάνη: ἴσχυον γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ναυσίν. [3] καὶ ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον ξυνέμεινεν ἡ ὁμαιχμία, ἔπειτα διενεχθέντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς ἀλλήλους: καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων εἴ τινές που διασταῖεν, πρὸς τούτους ἤδη ἐχώρουν. ὥστε ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε αἰεὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὰ μὲν σπενδόμενοι, τὰ δὲ πολεμοῦντες ἢ ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυμμάχοις ἀφισταμένοις εὖ παρεσκευάσαντο τὰ πολέμια καὶ ἐμπειρότεροι ἐγένοντο μετὰ κινδύνων τὰς μελέτας ποιούμενοι.

[18] At length the tyrants both at Athens and in the rest of Hellas (which had been under their dominion long before Athens), at least the greater number of them, and with the

exception of the Sicilian the last who ever ruled, were put down by the Lacedaemonians. For although Lacedaemon, after the conquest of the country by the Dorians who now inhabit it, remained long unsettled, and indeed longer than any country which we know, nevertheless she obtained good laws at an earlier period than any other, and has never been subject to tyrants; she has preserved the same form of government for rather more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the Peloponnesian War. It was the excellence of her constitution which gave her power, and thus enabled her to regulate the affairs of other states. Not long after the overthrow of the tyrants by the Lacedaemonians, the battle of Marathon was fought between the Athenians and the Persians; ten years later, the Barbarian returned with the vast armament which was to enslave Hellas. In the greatness of the impending danger, the Lacedaemonians, who were the most powerful state in Hellas, assumed the lead of the confederates, while the Athenians, as the Persian host advanced, resolved to forsake their city, broke up their homes, and, taking to their ships, became seamen. The Barbarian was repelled by a common effort; but soon the Hellenes, as well those who had revolted from the King as those who formed the original confederacy, took different sides and became the allies either of the Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians; for these were now the two leading powers, the one strong by land and the other by sea. The league between them was of short duration; they speedily quarrelled and, with their respective allies, went to war. Any of the other Hellenes who had differences of their own now resorted to one or other of them. So that from the Persian to the Peloponnesian War, the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians were perpetually fighting or making peace, either with one another or with their own revolted allies; thus they attained military efficiency, and learned experience in the school of danger.

19. καὶ οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἡγοῦντο, κατ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ναῦς τε τῶν πόλεων τῷ χρόνῳ παραλαβόντες πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων, καὶ χρήματα τοῖς πᾶσι τάξαντες φέρειν. καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραιφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἤνθησαν.

[19] The Lacedaemonians did not make tributaries of those who acknowledged their leadership, but took care that they should be governed by oligarchies in the exclusive interest of Sparta. The Athenians, on the other hand, after a time deprived the subject cities of their ships and made all of them pay a fixed tribute, except Chios and Lesbos. And the single power of Athens at the beginning of this war was greater than that of Athens and Sparta together at their greatest, while the confederacy remained intact.

20. τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τοιαῦτα ηὗρον, χαλεπὰ ὄντα παντὶ ἐξῆς τεκμηρίῳ πιστεῦσαι. οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν προγεγενημένων, καὶ ἢν ἐπιχώρια σφίσιν ᾖ, ὁμοίως ἀβασανίστως παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων δέχονται. [2] Ἀθηναίων γοῦν τὸ πλῆθος Ἵππαρχον οἴονται ὑφ᾽ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος τύραννον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν ὅτι Ἱππίας μὲν πρεσβύτατος ὢν ἦρχε τῶν Πεισιστράτου υἱέων, Ἵππαρχος δὲ καὶ Θεσσαλὸς ἀδελφοὶ ἦσαν αὐτοῦ, ὑποτοπήσαντες δέ τι ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ παραχρῆμα Ἁρμόδιος καὶ Ἀριστογείτων ἐκ τῶν ξυνειδότων σφίσιν Ἱππίᾳ μεμηνῦσθαι τοῦ μὲν ἀπέσχοντο ὡς προειδότος, βουλόμενοι δὲ πρὶν ξυλληφθῆναι δράσαντές τι καὶ κινδυνεῦσαι, τῷ Ἱππάρχῳ περιτυχόντες περὶ τὸ Λεωκόρειον καλούμενον τὴν Παναθηναϊκὴν πομπὴν διακοσμοῦντι ἀπέκτειναν. [3] πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὄντα καὶ οὐ χρόνῳ ἀμνηστούμενα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται, ὥσπερ τούς τε Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέας μὴ μιᾷ ψήφῳ προστίθεσθαι ἑκάτερον, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν, καὶ τὸν Πιτανάτην λόχον αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὃς οὐδ᾽ ἐγένετο πώποτε.

οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα μᾶλλον τρέπονται.

[20] Such are the results of my enquiries, though the early history of Hellas is of a kind which forbids implicit reliance on every particular of the evidence. Men do not discriminate, and are too ready to receive ancient traditions about their own as well as about other countries. For example, most Athenians think that Hipparchus was actually tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton; they are not aware that Hippias was the eldest of the sons of Peisistratus, and succeeded him, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were only his brothers. At the last moment, Harmodius and Aristogeiton suddenly suspected that Hippias had been forewarned by some of their accomplices. They therefore abstained from attacking him, but, wishing to do something before they were seized, and not to risk their lives in vain, they slew Hipparchus, with whom they fell in near the temple called Leocorium as he was marshalling the Panathenaic procession. There are many other matters, not obscured by time, but contemporary, about which the other Hellenes are equally mistaken. For example, they imagine that the kings of Lacedaemon in their council have not one but two votes each, and that in the army of the Lacedaemonians there is a division called the Pitanate division; whereas they never had anything of the sort. So little trouble do men take in the search after truth; so readily do they accept whatever comes first to hand.

21. ἑκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τεκμηρίων ὅμως τοιαῦτα ἄν τις νομίζων μάλιστα ἃ διῆλθον οὐχ ἁμαρτάνοι, καὶ οὔτε ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον κοσμοῦντες μᾶλλον πιστεύων, οὔτε ὡς λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον, ὄντα ἀνεξέλεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνενικηκότα, ηὑρῆσθαι δὲ ἡγησάμενος ἑκ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων σημείων ὡς παλαιὰ εἶναι ἀποχρώντως. [2] καὶ ὁ πόλεμος οὗτος, καίπερ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἂν

πολεμῶσι τὸν παρόντα αἰεὶ μέγιστον κρινόντων, παυσαμένων δὲ τὰ ἀρχαῖα μᾶλλον θαυμαζόντων, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων σκοποῦσι δηλώσει ὅμως μείζων γεγενημένος αὐτῶν.

[21] Yet any one who upon the grounds which I have given arrives at some such conclusion as my own about those ancient times, would not be far wrong. He must not be misled by the exaggerated fancies of the poets, or by the tales of chroniclers who seek to please the ear rather than to speak the truth. Their accounts cannot be tested by him; and most of the facts in the lapse of ages have passed into the region of romance. At such a distance of time he must make up his mind to be satisfied with conclusions resting upon the clearest evidence which can be had. And, though men will always judge any war in which they are actually fighting to be the greatest at the time, but, after it is over, revert to their admiration of some other which has preceded, still the Peloponnesian, if estimated by the actual facts, will certainly prove to have been the greatest ever known.

22. καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἕκαστοι ἢ μέλλοντες πολεμήσειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη ὄντες, χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεῦσαι ἦν ἐμοί τε ὧν αὐτὸς ἤκουσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν: ὡς δ᾽ ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ᾽ εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται. [2] τὰ δ᾽ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος ἠξίωσα γράφειν, οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ᾽ οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου ἐπεξελθών. [3] ἐπιπόνως δὲ ηὑρίσκετο, διότι οἱ παρόντες τοῖς ἔργοις ἑκάστοις οὐ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔλεγον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἑκατέρων τις εὐνοίας ἢ μνήμης ἔχοι. [4] καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται: ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ

παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἕξει. κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται.

[22] As to the speeches which were made either before or during the war, it was hard for me, and for others who reported them to me, to recollect the exact words. I have therefore put into the mouth of each speaker the sentiments proper to the occasion, expressed as I thought he would be likely to express them, while at the same time I endeavoured, as nearly as I could, to give the general purport of what was actually said. Of the events of the war I have not ventured to speak from any chance information, nor according to any notion of my own; I have described nothing but what I either saw myself, or learned from others of whom I made the most careful and particular enquiry. The task was a laborious one, because eye-witnesses of the same occurrences gave different accounts of them, as they remembered or were interested in the actions of one side or the other. And very likely the strictly historical character of my narrative may be disappointing to the ear. But if he who desires to have before his eyes a true picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen hereafter in the order of human things, shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied. My history is an everlasting possession, not a prize composition which is heard and forgotten.

23. τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἔργων μέγιστον ἐπράχθη τὸ Μηδικόν, καὶ τοῦτο ὅμως δυοῖν ναυμαχίαιν καὶ πεζομαχίαιν ταχεῖαν τὴν κρίσιν ἔσχεν. τούτου δὲ τοῦ πολέμου μῆκός τε μέγα προύβη, παθήματά τε ξυνηνέχθη γενέσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ Ἑλλάδι οἷα οὐχ ἕτερα ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ. [2] οὔτε γὰρ πόλεις τοσαίδε ληφθεῖσαι ἠρημώθησαν, αἱ μὲν ὑπὸ βαρβάρων, αἱ δ᾽ ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιπολεμούντων εἰσὶ δ᾽ αἳ καὶ οἰκήτορας μετέβαλον ἁλισκόμεναι , οὔτε φυγαὶ τοσαίδε ἀνθρώπων καὶ φόνος, ὁ μὲν κατ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν πόλεμον, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν. [3] τά τε πρότερον ἀκοῇ μὲν λεγόμενα,

ἔργῳ δὲ σπανιώτερον βεβαιούμενα οὐκ ἄπιστα κατέστη, σεισμῶν τε πέρι, οἳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἅμα μέρος γῆς καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐπέσχον, ἡλίου τε ἐκλείψεις, αἳ πυκνότεραι παρὰ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ πρὶν χρόνου μνημονευόμενα ξυνέβησαν, αὐχμοί τε ἔστι παρ᾽ οἷς μεγάλοι καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ λιμοὶ καὶ ἡ οὐχ ἥκιστα βλάψασα καὶ μέρος τι φθείρασα ἡ λοιμώδης νόσος: ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα μετὰ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ἅμα ξυνεπέθετο. [4] ἤρξαντο δὲ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι λύσαντες τὰς τριακοντούτεις σπονδὰς αἳ αὐτοῖς ἐγένοντο μετὰ Εὐβοίας ἄλωσιν. [5] διότι δ᾽ ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρῶτον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, τοῦ μή τινα ζητῆσαί ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοσοῦτος πόλεμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατέστη. [6] τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν: αἱ δ᾽ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἵδ᾽ ἦσαν ἑκατέρων, ἀφ᾽ ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν.

[23] The greatest achievement of former times was the Persian War; yet even this was speedily decided in two battles by sea and two by land. But the Peloponnesian War was a protracted struggle, and attended by calamities such as Hellas had never known within a like period of time. Never were so many cities captured and depopulated — some by Barbarians, others by Hellenes themselves fighting against one another; and several of them after their capture were repeopled by strangers. Never were exile and slaughter more frequent, whether in the war or brought about by civil strife. And traditions which had often been current before, but rarely verified by fact, were now no longer doubted. For there were earthquakes unparalleled in their extent and fury, and eclipses of the sun more numerous than are recorded to have happened in any former age; there were also in some places great droughts causing famines, and lastly the plague which did immense harm and destroyed numbers of the people. All these calamities fell upon Hellas

simultaneously with the war, which began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians violated the thirty years' truce concluded by them after the recapture of Euboea. Why they broke it and what were the grounds of quarrel I will first set forth, that in time to come no man may be at a loss to know what was the origin of this great war. The real though unavowed cause I believe to have been the growth of the Athenian power, which terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war; but the reasons publicly alleged on either side were as follows.

24. Ἐπίδαμνός ἐστι πόλις ἐν δεξιᾷ ἐσπλέοντι ἐς τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον: προσοικοῦσι δ᾽ αὐτὴν Ταυλάντιοι βάρβαροι, Ἰλλυρικὸν ἔθνος. [2] ταύτην ἀπῴκισαν μὲν Κερκυραῖοι, οἰκιστὴς δ᾽ ἐγένετο Φαλίος Ἐρατοκλείδου Κορίνθιος γένος τῶν ἀφ᾽ Ἡρακλέους, κατὰ δὴ τὸν παλαιὸν νόμον ἐκ τῆς μητροπόλεως κατακληθείς. ξυνῴκισαν δὲ καὶ Κορινθίων τινὲς καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου Δωρικοῦ γένους. [3] προελθόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου ἐγένετο ἡ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων δύναμις μεγάλη καὶ πολυάνθρωπος: [4] στασιάσαντες δὲ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἔτη πολλά, ὡς λέγεται, ἀπὸ πολέμου τινὸς τῶν προσοίκων βαρβάρων ἐφθάρησαν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς πολλῆς ἐστερήθησαν. [5] τὰ δὲ τελευταῖα πρὸ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν ἐξεδίωξε τοὺς δυνατούς, οἱ δὲ ἐπελθόντες μετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐλῄζοντο τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [6] οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει ὄντες Ἐπιδάμνιοι ἐπειδὴ ἐπιέζοντο, πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πρέσβεις ὡς μητρόπολιν οὖσαν, δεόμενοι μὴ σφᾶς περιορᾶν φθειρομένους, ἀλλὰ τούς τε φεύγοντας ξυναλλάξαι σφίσι καὶ τὸν τῶν βαρβάρων πόλεμον καταλῦσαι. [7] ταῦτα δὲ ἱκέται καθεζόμενοι ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον ἐδέοντο. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν ἱκετείαν οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμψαν.

[24] The city of Epidamnus is situated on the right hand as you sail up the Ionian Gulf. The neighbouring inhabitants are the Taulantians, a barbarian tribe of the Illyrian race. The place was colonised by Corcyraeans, but under the leadership of a Corinthian, Phalius, son of Eratocleides, who

was of the lineage of Heracles; he was invited, according to ancient custom, from the mother city, and Corinthians and other Dorians joined in the colony. In process of time Epidamnus became great and populous, but there followed a long period of civil commotion, and the city is said to have been brought low in a war against the neighbouring barbarians, and to have lost her ancient power. At last, shortly before the Peloponnesian War, the notables were overthrown and driven out by the people; the exiles went over to the barbarians, and, uniting with them, plundered the remaining inhabitants both by sea and land. These, finding themselves hard pressed, sent an embassy to the mother-city Corcyra, begging the Corcyraeans not to leave them to their fate, but to reconcile them to the exiles and settle the war with the barbarians. The ambassadors came, and sitting as suppliants in the temple of Herè preferred their request; but the Corcyraeans would not listen to them, and they returned without success.

25. γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἐπιδάμνιοι οὐδεμίαν σφίσιν ἀπὸ Κερκύρας τιμωρίαν οὖσαν ἐν ἀπόρῳ εἴχοντο θέσθαι τὸ παρόν, καὶ πέμψαντες ἐς Δελφοὺς τὸν θεὸν ἐπήροντο εἰ παραδοῖεν Κορινθίοις τὴν πόλιν ὡς οἰκισταῖς καὶ τιμωρίαν τινὰ πειρῶντ᾽ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἀνεῖλε παραδοῦναι καὶ ἡγεμόνας ποιεῖσθαι. [2] ἐλθόντες δὲ οἱ Ἐπιδάμνιοι ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον κατὰ τὸ μαντεῖον παρέδοσαν τὴν ἀποικίαν, τόν τε οἰκιστὴν ἀποδεικνύντες σφῶν ἐκ Κορίνθου ὄντα καὶ τὸ χρηστήριον δηλοῦντες, ἐδέοντό τε μὴ σφᾶς περιορᾶν φθειρομένους, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπαμῦναι. [3] Κορίνθιοι δὲ κατά τε τὸ δίκαιον ὑπεδέξαντο τὴν τιμωρίαν, νομίζοντες οὐχ ἧσσον ἑαυτῶν εἶναι τὴν ἀποικίαν ἢ Κερκυραίων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ μίσει τῶν Κερκυραίων, ὅτι αὐτῶν παρημέλουν ὄντες ἄποικοι: [4] οὔτε γὰρ ἐν πανηγύρεσι ταῖς κοιναῖς διδόντες γέρα τὰ νομιζόμενα οὔτε Κορινθίῳ ἀνδρὶ προκαταρχόμενοι τῶν ἱερῶν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι, περιφρονοῦντες δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ χρημάτων δυνάμει ὄντες κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὁμοῖα τοῖς Ἑλλήνων πλουσιωτάτοις καὶ τῇ ἐς

πόλεμον παρασκευῇ δυνατώτεροι, ναυτικῷ δὲ καὶ πολὺ προύχειν ἔστιν ὅτε ἐπαιρόμενοι καὶ κατὰ τὴν Φαιάκων προενοίκησιν τῆς Κερκύρας κλέος ἐχόντων τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς ▯ῇ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξηρτύοντο τὸ ναυτικὸν καὶ ἦσαν οὐκ ἀδύνατοι: τριήρεις γὰρ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ὑπῆρχον αὐτοῖς ὅτε ἤρχοντο πολεμεῖν▯,

[25] The Epidamnians, finding that they had no hope of assistance from Corcyra, knew not what to do, and sending to Delphi enquired of the God whether they should deliver up the city to their original founders, the Corinthians, and endeavour to obtain aid from them. The God replied that they should, and bade them place themselves under the leadership of the Corinthians. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth, and informing the Corinthians of the answer which the oracle had given, delivered up the city to them. They reminded them that the original leader of the colony was a citizen of Corinth; and implored the Corinthians to come and help them, and not leave them to their fate. The Corinthians took up their cause, partly in vindication of their own rights (for they considered that Epidamnus belonged to them quite as much as to the Corcyraeans), partly too because they hated the Corcyraeans, who were their own colony but slighted them. In their common festivals they would not allow them the customary privileges of founders, and at their sacrifices denied to a Corinthian the right of receiving first the lock of hair cut from the head of the victim, an honour usually granted by colonies to a representative of the mother-country. In fact they despised the Corinthians, for they were more than a match for them in military strength, and as rich as any state then existing in Hellas. They would often boast that on the sea they were very far superior to them, and would appropriate to themselves the naval renown of the Phaeacians, who were the ancient inhabitants of the island. Such feelings led them more and more to strengthen their navy, which was by no means

despicable; for they had a hundred and twenty triremes when the war broke out.

26. πάντων οὖν τούτων ἐγκλήματα ἔχοντες οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔπεμπον ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον ἄσμενοι τὴν ὠφελίαν, οἰκήτορά τε τὸν βουλόμενον ἰέναι κελεύοντες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων καὶ ἑαυτῶν φρουρούς. [2] ἐπορεύθησαν δὲ πεζῇ ἐς Ἀπολλωνίαν, Κορινθίων οὖσαν ἀποικίαν, δέει τῶν Κερκυραίων μὴ κωλύωνται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν περαιούμενοι. [3]Κερκυραῖοι δὲ ἐπειδὴ ᾔσθοντο τούς τε οἰκήτορας καὶ φρουροὺς ἥκοντας ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον τήν τε ἀποικίαν Κορινθίοις δεδομένην, ἐχαλέπαινον: καὶ πλεύσαντες εὐθὺς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσὶ καὶ ὕστερον ἑτέρῳ στόλῳ τούς τε φεύγοντας ἐκέλευον κατ᾽ ἐπήρειαν δέχεσθαι αὐτούς ▯ ἦλθον γὰρ ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν οἱ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων φυγάδες, τάφους τε ἀποδεικνύντες καὶ ξυγγένειαν, ἣν προϊσχόμενοι ἐδέοντο σφᾶς κατάγειν▯ τούς τε φρουροὺς οὓς Κορίνθιοι ἔπεμψαν καὶ τοὺς οἰκήτορας ἀποπέμπειν. [4] οἱ δὲ Ἐπιδάμνιοι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὑπήκουσαν, ἀλλὰ στρατεύουσιν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ μετὰ τῶν φυγάδων ὡς κατάξοντες, καὶ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς προσλαβόντες. [5] προσκαθεζόμενοι δὲ τὴν πόλιν προεῖπον Ἐπιδαμνίων τε τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ τοὺς ξένους ἀπαθεῖς ἀπιέναι: εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς πολεμίοις χρήσεσθαι. ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπείθοντο, οἱ μὲν Κερκυραῖοι ▯ἔστι δ᾽ ἰσθμὸς τὸ χωρίον▯ ἐπολιόρκουν τὴν πόλιν,

[26] Irritated by these causes of offence, the Corinthians were too happy to assist Epidamnus; accordingly they invited any one who was willing to settle there, and for the protection of the colonists despatched with them Ambracian and Leucadian troops and a force of their own. All these they sent by land as far as Apollonia, which is a colony of theirs, fearing that if they went by sea the Corcyraeans might oppose their passage. Great was the rage of the Corcyraeans when they discovered that the settlers and the troops had entered Epidamnus and that the colony had been given up to the Corinthians. They immediately set sail with five and

twenty ships, followed by a second fleet, and in insulting terms bade the Epidamnians receive the exiled oligarchs, who had gone to Corcyra and implored the Corcyraeans to restore them, appealing to the tie of kindred and pointing to the sepulchres of their common ancestors. They also bade them send away the troops and the new settlers. But the Epidamnians would not listen to their demands. Whereupon the Corcyraeans attacked them with forty ships. They were accompanied by the exiles whom they were to restore, and had the assistance of the native Illyrian troops. They sat down before the city, and made proclamation that any Epidamnian who chose, and the foreigners, might depart in safety, but that all who remained would be treated as enemies. This had no effect, and the Corcyraeans proceeded to invest the city, which is built upon an isthmus.

27. Κορίνθιοι δ᾽, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς Ἐπιδάμνου ἦλθον ἄγγελοι ὅτι πολιορκοῦνται, παρεσκευάζοντο στρατείαν, καὶ ἅμα ἀποικίαν ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον ἐκήρυσσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ τὸν βουλόμενον ἰέναι: εἰ δέ τις τὸ παραυτίκα μὲν μὴ ἐθέλει ξυμπλεῖν, μετέχειν δὲ βούλεται τῆς ἀποικίας, πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς καταθέντα Κορινθίας μένειν. ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ πλέοντες πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ τἀργύριον καταβάλλοντες. [2] ἐδεήθησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν Μεγαρέων ναυσὶ σφᾶς ξυμπροπέμψαι, εἰ ἄρα κωλύοιντο ὑπὸ Κερκυραίων πλεῖν: οἱ δὲ παρεσκευάζοντο αὐτοῖς ὀκτὼ ναυσὶ ξυμπλεῖν, καὶ Παλῆς Κεφαλλήνων τέσσαρσιν. καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίων ἐδεήθησαν, οἳ παρέσχον πέντε, Ἑρμιονῆς δὲ μίαν καὶ Τροιζήνιοι δύο, Λευκάδιοι δὲ δέκα καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται ὀκτώ. Θηβαίους δὲ χρήματα ᾔτησαν καὶ Φλειασίους, Ἠλείους δὲ ναῦς τε κενὰς καὶ χρήματα. αὐτῶν δὲ Κορινθίων νῆες παρεσκευάζοντο τριάκοντα καὶ τρισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται.

[27] When the news reached the Corinthians that Epidamnus was besieged, they equipped an army and proclaimed that a colony was to be sent thither; all who wished might go and enjoy equal rights of citizenship; but any one who was unwilling to sail at once might remain at Corinth, and, if he

made a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmae, might still have a share in the colony.Many sailed, and many deposited the money. The Corinthians also sent and requested the Megarians to assist them with a convoy in case the Corcyraeans should intercept the colonists on their voyage. The Megarians accordingly provided eight ships, and the Cephallenians of Palè four; the Epidaurians, of whom they made a similar request, five; the Hermionians one; the Troezenians two; the Leucadians ten; and the Ambraciots eight. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they begged money, and of the Eleans money, and ships without crews. On their own account they equipped thirty ships and three thousand hoplites.

28. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπύθοντο οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν παρασκευήν, ἐλθόντες ἐς Κόρινθον μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Σικυωνίων πρέσβεων, οὓς παρέλαβον, ἐκέλευον Κορινθίους τοὺς ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ φρουρούς τε καὶ οἰκήτορας ἀπάγειν, ὡς οὐ μετὸν αὐτοῖς Ἐπιδάμνου. [2] εἰ δέ τι ἀντιποιοῦνται, δίκας ἤθελον δοῦναι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ παρὰ πόλεσιν αἷς ἂν ἀμφότεροι ξυμβῶσιν: ὁποτέρων δ᾽ ἂν δικασθῇ εἶναι τὴν ἀποικίαν, τούτους κρατεῖν. ἤθελον δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς μαντείῳ ἐπιτρέψαι. [3] πόλεμον δὲ οὐκ εἴων ποιεῖν: εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναγκασθήσεσθαι ἔφασαν, ἐκείνων βιαζομένων, φίλους ποιεῖσθαι οὓς οὐ βούλονται ἑτέρους τῶν νῦν ὄντων μᾶλλον ὠφελίας ἕνεκα. [4] οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι ἀπεκρίναντο αὐτοῖς, ἢν τάς τε ναῦς καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀπὸ Ἐπιδάμνου ἀπαγάγωσι, βουλεύσεσθαι: πρότερον δ᾽ οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν τοὺς μὲν πολιορκεῖσθαι, αὐτοὺς δὲ δικάζεσθαι. [5] Κερκυραῖοι δὲ ἀντέλεγον, ἢν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ ἀπαγάγωσι, ποιήσειν ταῦτα: ἑτοῖμοι δὲ εἶναι καὶ ὥστε ἀμφοτέρους μένειν κατὰ χώραν, σπονδὰς δὲ ποιήσασθαι ἕως ἂν ἡ δίκη γένηται.

[28] When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to Corinth, taking with them Lacdaemonian and Sicyonian envoys, and summoned the Corinthians to withdraw the troops and the colonists, telling them that they

had nothing to do with Epidamnus. If they made any claim to it, the Corcyraeans expressed themselves willing to refer the cause for arbitration to such Peloponnesian states as both parties should agree upon, and their decision was to be final; or, they were willing to leave the matter in the hands of the Delphian oracle. But they deprecated war, and declared that, if war there must be, they would be compelled by the Corinthians in self-defence to discard their present friends and seek others whom they would rather not, for help they must have. The Corinthians replied that if the Corcyraeans would withdraw the ships and the barbarian troops they would consider the matter, but that it would not do for them to be litigating while Epidamnus and the colonists were in a state of siege. The Corcyraeans rejoined that they would consent to this proposal if the Corinthians on their part would withdraw their forces from Epidamnus: or again, they were willing that both parties should remain on the spot, and that a truce should be made until the decision was given.

29. Κορίνθιοι δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων ὑπήκουον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ πλήρεις αὐτοῖς ἦσαν αἱ νῆες καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι παρῆσαν, προπέμψαντες κήρυκα πρότερον πόλεμον προεροῦντα Κερκυραίοις, ἄραντες ἑβδομήκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ πέντε δισχιλίοις τε ὁπλίταις ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον Κερκυραίοις ἐναντία πολεμήσοντες: [2] ἐστρατήγει δὲ τῶν μὲν νεῶν Ἀριστεὺς ὁ Πελλίχου καὶ Καλλικράτης ὁ Καλλίου καὶ Τιμάνωρ ὁ Τιμάνθους, τοῦ δὲ πεζοῦ Ἀρχέτιμός τε ὁ Εὐρυτίμου καὶ Ἰσαρχίδας ὁ Ἰσάρχου. [3] ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐγένοντο ἐν Ἀκτίῳ τῆς Ἀνακτορίας γῆς, οὗ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνός ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, οἱ Κερκυραῖοι κήρυκά τε προύπεμψαν αὐτοῖς ἐν ἀκατίῳ ἀπεροῦντα μὴ πλεῖν ἐπὶ σφᾶς καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἅμα ἐπλήρουν, ζεύξαντές τε τὰς παλαιὰς ὥστε πλωίμους εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκευάσαντες. [4] ὡς δὲ ὁ κῆρύξ τε ἀπήγγειλεν οὐδὲν εἰρηναῖον παρὰ τῶν Κορινθίων καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτοῖς ἐπεπλήρωντο οὖσαι ὀγδοήκοντα τεσσαράκοντα γὰρ

Ἐπίδαμνον ἐπολιόρκουν , ἀνταναγαγόμενοι καὶ παραταξάμενοι ἐναυμάχησαν: [5] καὶ ἐνίκησαν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι παρὰ πολὺ καὶ ναῦς πέντε καὶ δέκα διέφθειραν τῶν Κορινθίων. τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ αὐτοῖς ξυνέβη καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον πολιορκοῦντας παραστήσασθαι ὁμολογίᾳ ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐπήλυδας ἀποδόσθαι, Κορινθίους δὲ δήσαντας ἔχειν ἕως ἂν ἄλλο τι δόξῃ.

[29] The Corinthians turned a deaf ear to all these overtures, and, when their vessels were manned and their allies had arrived, they sent a herald before them to declare war, and set sail for Epidamnus with seventy-five ships and two thousand hoplites, intending to give battle to the Corcyraeans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristeus the son of Pellichus, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes; the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. When they arrived at Actium in the territory of Anactorium, at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, where the temple of Apollo stands, the Corcyraeans sent a herald to meet them in a small boat forbidding them to come on. Meanwhile their crews got on board; they had previously put their fleet in repair, and strengthened the old ships with cross-timbers, so as to make them serviceable. The herald brought back no message of peace from the Corinthians. The Corcyraean ships, numbering eighty (for forty out of the hundred and twenty were engaged in the blockade of Epidamnus), were now fully manned; these sailed out against the Corinthians and, forming line, fought and won a complete victory over them, and destroyed fifteen of their ships. On the very same day the forces besieging Epidamnus succeeded in compelling the city to capitulate, the terms being that the Corinthians until their fate was determined should be imprisoned and the strangers sold.

30. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ τῆς Κερκυραίας ἀκρωτηρίῳ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους οὓς ἔλαβον αἰχμαλώτους ἀπέκτειναν,

Κορινθίους δὲ δήσαντες εἶχον. [2] ὕστερον δέ, ἐπειδὴ οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἡσσημένοι ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, τῆς θαλάσσης ἀπάσης ἐκράτουν τῆς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὰ χωρία οἱ Κερκυραῖοι, καὶ πλεύσαντες ἐς Λευκάδα τὴν Κορινθίων ἀποικίαν τῆς γῆς ἔτεμον καὶ Κυλλήνην τὸ Ἠλείων ἐπίνειον ἐνέπρησαν, ὅτι ναῦς καὶ χρήματα παρέσχον Κορινθίοις. [3] τοῦ τε χρόνου τὸν πλεῖστον μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἐπεκράτουν τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τοὺς τῶν Κορινθίων ξυμμάχους ἐπιπλέοντες ἔφθειρον, μέχρι οὗ Κορίνθιοι περιιόντι τῷ θέρει πέμψαντες ναῦς καὶ στρατιάν, ἐπεὶ σφῶν οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπόνουν, ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἐπὶ Ἀκτίῳ καὶ περὶ τὸ Χειμέριον τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος φυλακῆς ἕνεκα τῆς τε Λευκάδος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ὅσαι σφίσι φίλιαι ἦσαν. [4] ἀντεστρατοπεδεύοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ ναυσί τε καὶ πεζῷ. ἐπέπλεον δὲ οὐδέτεροι ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ θέρος τοῦτο ἀντικαθεζόμενοι χειμῶνος ἤδη ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἑκάτεροι.

[30] After the sea-fight the Corcyraeans raised a trophy on Leucimnè, a promontory of Corcyra, and put to death all their prisoners with the exception of the Corinthians, whom they kept in chains. The defeated Corinthians and their allies then returned home, and the Corcyraeans (who were now masters of the Ionian sea), sailing to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, devastated the country. They also burnt Cyllenè, where the Eleans had their docks, because they had supplied the Corinthians with money and ships. And, during the greater part of the summer after the battle, they retained the command of the sea and sailed about plundering the allies of the Corinthians. But, before the season was over, the Corinthians, perceiving that their allies were suffering, sent out a fleet and took up a position at Actium and near the promontory of Cheimerium in Thesprotia, that they might protect Leucas and other friendly places. The Corcyraeans with their fleet and army stationed themselves on the opposite coast at Leucimnè.

Neither party attacked the other, but during the remainder of the summer they maintained their respective stations, and at the approach of winter returned home.

31. τὸν δ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν πάντα τὸν μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὸν ὕστερον οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὀργῇ φέροντες τὸν πρὸς Κερκυραίους πόλεμον ἐναυπηγοῦντο καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο τὰ κράτιστα νεῶν στόλον, ἔκ τε αὐτῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀγείροντες καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐρέτας, μισθῷ πείθοντες. [2] πυνθανόμενοι δὲ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν παρασκευὴν αὐτῶν ἐφοβοῦντο, καί ἦσαν γὰρ οὐδενὸς Ἑλλήνων ἔνσπονδοι οὐδὲ ἐσεγράψαντο ἑαυτοὺς οὔτε ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδὰς οὔτε ἐς τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἐλθοῦσιν ὡς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι καὶ ὠφελίαν τινὰ πειρᾶσθαι ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν εὑρίσκεσθαι. [3] οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι πυθόμενοι ταῦτα ἦλθον καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρεσβευσόμενοι, ὅπως μὴ σφίσι πρὸς τῷ Κερκυραίων ναυτικῷ καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν προσγενόμενον ἐμπόδιον γένηται θέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον ᾗ βούλονται. [4] καταστάσης δὲ ἐκκλησίας ἐς ἀντιλογίαν ἦλθον, καὶ οἱ μὲν Κερκυραῖοι ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.

[31] For the whole year after the battle and for a year after that, the Corinthians, exasperated by the war with Corcyra, were busy in building ships. They took the utmost pains to create a great navy: rowers were collected from the Peloponnesus and from the rest of Hellas by the attraction of pay. The Corcyraeans were alarmed at the report of their preparations. They reflected that they had not enrolled themselves in the league either of the Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians, and that allies in Hellas they had none. They determined to go to Athens, join the Athenian alliance, and get what help they could from them. The Corinthians, hearing of their intentions, also sent ambassadors to Athens, fearing lest the combination of the Athenian and Corcyraean navies might prevent them from bringing the war to a satisfactory termination. Accordingly an assembly was held

at which both parties came forward to plead their respective causes; and first the Corcyraeans spoke as follows:

32. ‘Δίκαιον, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς μήτε εὐεργεσίας μεγάλης μήτε ξυμμαχίας προυφειλομένης ἥκοντας παρὰ τοὺς πέλας ἐπικουρίας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς νῦν, δεησομένους ἀναδιδάξαι πρῶτον, μάλιστα μὲν ὡς καὶ ξύμφορα δέονται, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι γε οὐκ ἐπιζήμια, ἔπειτα δὲ ὡς καὶ τὴν χάριν βέβαιον ἕξουσιν: εἰ δὲ τούτων μηδὲν σαφὲς καταστήσουσι, μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢν ἀτυχῶσιν. [2] Κερκυραῖοι δὲ μετὰ τῆς ξυμμαχίας τῆς αἰτήσεως καὶ ταῦτα πιστεύοντες ἐχυρὰ ὑμῖν παρέξεσθαι ἀπέστειλαν ἡμᾶς. [3] τετύχηκε δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιτήδευμα πρός τε ὑμᾶς ἐς τὴν χρείαν ἡμῖν ἄλογον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀξύμφορον. [4] ξύμμαχοί τε γὰρ οὐδενός πω ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνῳ ἑκούσιοι γενόμενοι νῦν ἄλλων τοῦτο δεησόμενοι ἥκομεν, καὶ ἅμα ἐς τὸν παρόντα πόλεμον Κορινθίων ἐρῆμοι δι᾽ αὐτὸ καθέσταμεν. καὶ περιέστηκεν ἡ δοκοῦσα ἡμῶν πρότερον σωφροσύνη, τὸ μὴ ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ξυμμαχίᾳ τῇ τοῦ πέλας γνώμῃ ξυγκινδυνεύειν, νῦν ἀβουλία καὶ ἀσθένεια φαινομένη. [5] τὴν μὲν οὖν γενομένην ναυμαχίαν αὐτοὶ κατὰ μόνας ἀπεωσάμεθα Κορινθίους: ἐπειδὴ δὲ μείζονι παρασκευῇ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς ὥρμηνται καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατοι ὁρῶμεν ὄντες τῇ οἰκείᾳ μόνον δυνάμει περιγενέσθαι, καὶ ἅμα μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος εἰ ἐσόμεθα ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῖς, ἀνάγκη καὶ ὑμῶν καὶ ἄλλου παντὸς ἐπικουρίας δεῖσθαι, καὶ ξυγγνώμη εἰ μὴ μετὰ κακίας, δόξης δὲ μᾶλλον ἁμαρτίᾳ τῇ πρότερον ἀπραγμοσύνῃ ἐναντία τολμῶμεν.

[32] ‘Men of Athens, those who, like ourselves, come to others who are not their allies and to whom they have never rendered any considerable service and ask help of them, are bound to show, in the first place, that the granting of their request is expedient, or at any rate not inexpedient, and, secondly, that their gratitude will be lasting. If they fulfil neither requirement they have no right to complain of a refusal. Now the Corcyraeans, when they sent us hither to ask for an alliance, were confident that they could establish

to your satisfaction both these points. But, unfortunately, we have had a practice alike inconsistent with the request which we are about to make and contrary to our own interest at the present moment: — Inconsistent; for hitherto we have never, if we could avoid it, been the allies of others, and now we come and ask you to enter into an alliance with us; — Contrary to our interest; for through this practice we find ourselves isolated in our war with the Corinthians. The policy of not making alliances lest they should endanger us at another's bidding, instead of being wisdom, as we once fancied, has now unmistakably proved to be weakness and folly. True, in the last naval engagement we repelled the Corinthians single-handed. But now they are on the point of attacking us with a much greater force which they have drawn together from the Peloponnesus and from all Hellas. We know that we are too weak to resist them unaided, and may expect the worst if we fall into their hands. We are therefore compelled to ask assistance of you and of all the world; and you must not be hard upon us if now, renouncing our indolent neutrality which was an error but not a crime, we dare to be inconsistent.

33. 'γενήσεται δὲ ὑμῖν πειθομένοις καλὴ ἡ ξυντυχία κατὰ πολλὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας χρείας, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἀδικουμένοις καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρους βλάπτουσι τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ποιήσεσθε, ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων κινδυνεύοντας δεξάμενοι ὡς ἂν μάλιστα μετ᾽ αἰειμνήστου μαρτυρίου τὴν χάριν καταθήσεσθε: ναυτικόν τε κεκτήμεθα πλὴν τοῦ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν πλεῖστον. [2] καὶ σκέψασθε: τίς εὐπραξία σπανιωτέρα ἢ τίς τοῖς πολεμίοις λυπηροτέρα, εἰ ἦν ὑμεῖς ἂν πρὸ πολλῶν χρημάτων καὶ χάριτος ἐτιμήσασθε δύναμιν ὑμῖν προσγενέσθαι, αὕτη πάρεστιν αὐτεπάγγελτος ἄνευ κινδύνων καὶ δαπάνης διδοῦσα ἑαυτήν, καὶ προσέτι φέρουσα ἐς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀρετήν, οἷς δὲ ἐπαμυνεῖτε χάριν, ὑμῖν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἰσχύν: ἃ ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγοις δὴ ἅμα πάντα ξυνέβη, καὶ ὀλίγοι ξυμμαχίας δεόμενοι οἷς ἐπικαλοῦνται ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον οὐχ ἧσσον διδόντες ἢ

ληψόμενοι παραγίγνονται. [3] τὸν δὲ πόλεμον, δι᾽ ὅνπερ χρήσιμοι ἂν εἶμεν, εἴ τις ὑμῶν μὴ οἴεται ἔσεσθαι, γνώμης ἁμαρτάνει καὶ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πολεμησείοντας καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους δυναμένους παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν ἐχθροὺς ὄντας καὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντας ἡμᾶς νῦν ἐς τὴν ὑμετέραν ἐπιχείρησιν, ἵνα μὴ τῷ κοινῷ ἔχθει κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων στῶμεν μηδὲ δυοῖν φθάσαι ἁμάρτωσιν, ἢ κακῶσαι ἡμᾶς ἢ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βεβαιώσασθαι. [4] ἡμέτερον δέ γ᾽ αὖ ἔργον προτερῆσαι, τῶν μὲν διδόντων, ὑμῶν δὲ δεξαμένων τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, καὶ προεπιβουλεύειν αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἀντεπιβουλεύειν.

[33] ‘To you at this moment the request which we are making offers a glorious opportunity. In the first place, you will assist the oppressed and not the oppressors; secondly, you will admit us to your alliance at a time when our dearest interests are at stake, and will lay up a treasure of gratitude in our memories which will have the most abiding of all records. Lastly, we have a navy greater than any but your own. Reflect; what good fortune can be more extraordinary, what more annoying to your enemies than the voluntary accession of a power for whose alliance you would have given any amount of money and could never have been too thankful? This power now places herself at your disposal; you are to incur no danger and no expense, and she brings you a good name in the world, gratitude from those who seek your aid, and an increase of your own strength. Few have ever had all these advantages offered them at once; equally few when they come asking an alliance are able to give in the way of security and honour as much as they hope to receive.’And if any one thinks that the war in which our services may be needed will never arrive, he is mistaken. He does not see that the Lacedaemonians, fearing the growth of your empire, are eager to take up arms, and that the Corinthians, who are your enemies, are all-powerful with them. They begin with us, but they will go on to you, that we

may not stand united against them in the bond of a common enmity; they will not miss the chance of weakening us or strengthening themselves. And it is our business to strike first, we offering and you accepting our alliance, and to forestall their designs instead of waiting to counteract them.

34. ‘ἢν δὲ λέγωσιν ὡς οὐ δίκαιον τοὺς σφετέρους ἀποίκους ὑμᾶς δέχεσθαι, μαθόντων ὡς πᾶσα ἀποικία εὖ μὲν πάσχουσα τιμᾷ τὴν μητρόπολιν, ἀδικουμένη δὲ ἀλλοτριοῦται: οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ δοῦλοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοῖοι τοῖς λειπομένοις εἶναι ἐκπέμπονται. [2] ὡς δὲ ἠδίκουν σαφές ἐστιν: προκληθέντες γὰρ περὶ Ἐπιδάμνου ἐς κρίσιν πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐβουλήθησαν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μετελθεῖν. [3] καὶ ὑμῖν ἔστω τι τεκμήριον ἃ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ξυγγενεῖς δρῶσιν, ὥστε ἀπάτῃ τε μὴ παράγεσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν δεομένοις τε ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέος μὴ ὑπουργεῖν: ὁ γὰρ ἐλαχίστας τὰς μεταμελείας ἐκ τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις λαμβάνων ἀσφαλέστατος ἂν διατελοίη.

[34] ‘If they say that we are their colony and that therefore you have no right to receive us, they should be made to understand that all colonies honour their mother-city when she treats them well, but are estranged from her by injustice. For colonists are not meant to be the servants but the equals of those who remain at home. And the injustice of their conduct to us is manifest: for we proposed an arbitration in the matter of Epidamnus, but they insisted on prosecuting their quarrel by arms and would not hear of a legal trial.. When you see how they treat us who are their own kinsmen, take warning: if they try deception, do not be misled by them; and if they make a direct request of you, refuse. For he passes through life most securely who has least reason to reproach himself with complaisance to his enemies.

35. λύσετε δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων σπονδὰς δεχόμενοι ἡμᾶς μηδετέρων ὄντας ξυμμάχους: [2] εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν αὐταῖς, τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων ἥτις μηδαμοῦ ξυμμαχεῖ,ἐξεῖναι παρ᾽ ὁποτέρους ἂν ἀρέσκηται ἐλθεῖν. [3]

καὶ δεινὸν εἰ τοῖσδε μὲν ἀπό τε τῶν ἐνσπόνδων ἔσται πληροῦν τὰς ναῦς καὶ προσέτι καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑπηκόων, ἡμᾶς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς προκειμένης τε ξυμμαχίας εἴρξουσι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ὠφελίας, εἶτα ἐν ἀδικήματι θήσονται πεισθέντων ὑμῶν ἃ δεόμεθα. [4] πολὺ δὲ ἐν πλέονι αἰτίᾳ ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες ὑμᾶς ἕξομεν: ἡμᾶς μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύοντας καὶ οὐκ ἐχθροὺς ὄντας ἀπώσεσθε, τῶνδε δὲ οὐχ ὅπως κωλυταὶ ἐχθρῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐπιόντων γενήσεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀρχῆς δύναμιν προσλαβεῖν περιόψεσθε: ἢν οὐ δίκαιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κἀκείνων κωλύειν τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὑμετέρας μισθοφόρους ἢ καὶ ἡμῖν πέμπειν καθ᾽ ὅτι ἂν πεισθῆτε ὠφελίαν, μάλιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς δεξαμένους βοηθεῖν. [5] πολλὰ δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὑπείπομεν, τὰ ξυμφέροντα ἀποδείκνυμεν, καὶ μέγιστον ὅτι οἵ τε αὐτοὶ πολέμιοι ἡμῖν ἦσαν, ὅπερ σαφεστάτη πίστις, καὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ἀσθενεῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἱκανοὶ τοὺς μεταστάντας βλάψαι: καὶ ναυτικῆς καὶ οὐκ ἠπειρώτιδος τῆς ξυμμαχίας διδομένης οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀλλοτρίωσις, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μέν, εἰ δύνασθε, μηδένα ἄλλον ἐᾶν κεκτῆσθαι ναῦς, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅστις ἐχυρώτατος, τοῦτον φίλον ἔχειν.

[35] ‘But again, you will not break the treaty with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us: for we are not allies either of you or of them. What says the treaty?— “Any Hellenic city which is the ally of no one may join whichever league it pleases.” And how monstrous, that they should man their ships, not only from their own confederacy, but from Hellas in general, nay, even from your subjects, while they would debar us from the alliance which naturally offers and from every other, and will denounce it as a crime if you accede to our request. With far better reason shall we complain of you if you refuse. For you will be thrusting away us who are not your enemies and are in peril; and, far from restraining the enemy and the aggressor, you will be allowing him to gather fresh forces out of your own dominions. How unjust is this! Surely if you would be impartial you should either prevent

the Corinthians from hiring soldiers in your dominions, or send to us also such help as you can be induced to send; but it would be best of all if you would openly receive and assist us. Many, as we have already intimated, are the advantages which we offer. Above all, our enemies are your enemies, which is the best guarantee of fidelity in an ally; and they are not weak but well able to injure those who secede from them. Again, when the proffered alliance is that of a maritime and not of an inland power, it is a far more serious matter to refuse. You should, if possible, allow no one to have a fleet but yourselves; or, if this is impossible, whoever is strongest at sea; make him your friend.

36. ‘καὶ ὅτῳ τάδε ξυμφέροντα μὲν δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, φοβεῖται δὲ μὴ δι᾽ αὐτὰ πειθόμενος τὰς σπονδὰς λύσῃ, γνώτω τὸ μὲν δεδιὸς αὐτοῦ ἰσχὺν ἔχον τοὺς ἐναντίους μᾶλλον φοβῆσον, τὸ δὲ θαρσοῦν μὴ δεξαμένου ἀσθενὲς ὂν πρὸς ἰσχύοντας τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀδεέστερον ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἅμα οὐ περὶ τῆς Κερκύρας νῦν τὸ πλέον ἢ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν βουλευόμενος, καὶ οὐ τὰ κράτιστα αὐταῖς προνοῶν, ὅταν ἐς τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντα πόλεμον τὸ αὐτίκα περισκοπῶν ἐνδοιάζῃ χωρίον προσλαβεῖν ὃ μετὰ μεγίστων καιρῶν οἰκειοῦταί τε καὶ πολεμοῦται. [2] τῆς τε γὰρ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλου κεῖται, ὥστε μήτε ἐκεῖθεν ναυτικὸν ἐᾶσαι Πελοποννησίοις ἐπελθεῖν τό τε ἐνθένδε πρὸς τἀκεῖ παραπέμψαι, καὶ ἐς τἆλλα ξυμφορώτατόν ἐστιν. [3] βραχυτάτῳ δ᾽ ἂν κεφαλαίῳ, τοῖς τε ξύμπασι καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, τῷδ᾽ ἂν μὴ προέσθαι ἡμᾶς μάθοιτε: τρία μὲν ὄντα λόγου ἄξια τοῖς Ἕλλησι ναυτικά, τὸ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον καὶ τὸ Κορινθίων: τούτων δὲ εἰ περιόψεσθε τὰ δύο ἐς ταὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν καὶ Κορίνθιοι ἡμᾶς προκαταλήψονται, Κερκυραίοις τε καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἅμα ναυμαχήσετε, δεξάμενοι δὲ ἡμᾶς ἕξετε πρὸς αὐτοὺς πλείοσι ναυσὶ ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἀγωνίζεσθαι.’ [4] τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι εἶπον: οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς τοιάδε.

[36] ‘Some one may think that the course which we recommend is expedient, but he may be afraid that if he is

convinced by our arguments he will break the treaty. To him we reply, that as long as he is strong he may make a present of his fears to the enemy, but that if he reject the alliance he will be weak, and then his confidence, however reassuring to himself, will be anything but terrifying to enemies who are strong. It is Athens about which he is advising, and not Corcyra: will he be providing for her best interests if, when war is imminent and almost at the door, he is so anxious about the chances of the hour that he hesitates to attach to him a state which cannot be made a friend or enemy without momentous consequences? Corcyra, besides offering many other advantages, is conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily; it stands in the way of any fleet coming from thence to the Peloponnesus, and can also protect a fleet on its way to Sicily. One word more, which is the sum of all and everything we have to say, and should convince you that you must not abandon us. Hellas has only three considerable navies: — there is ours, and there is yours, and there is the Corinthian. Now, if the Corinthians get hold of ours, and you allow the two to become one, you will have to fight against the united navies of Corcyra and the Peloponnesus. But, if you make us your allies, you will have our navy in addition to your own ranged at your side in the impending conflict.’Thus spoke the Corcyraeans: the Corinthians replied as follows:

37. ‘ἀναγκαῖον Κερκυραίων τῶνδε οὐ μόνον περὶ τοῦ δέξασθαι σφᾶς τὸν λόγον ποιησαμένων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς τε ἀδικοῦμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐκ εἰκότως πολεμοῦνται, μνησθέντας πρῶτον καὶ ἡμᾶς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄλλον λόγον ἰέναι, ἵνα τὴν ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν τε ἀξίωσιν ἀσφαλέστερον προειδῆτε καὶ τὴν τῶνδε χρείαν μὴ ἀλογίστως ἀπώσησθε. [2]’φασὶ δὲ ξυμμαχίαν διὰ τὸ σῶφρον οὐδενός πω δέξασθαι: τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ κακουργίᾳ καὶ οὐκ ἀρετῇ ἐπετήδευσαν, ξύμμαχόν τε οὐδένα βουλόμενοι πρὸς τἀδικήματα οὐδὲ μάρτυρα ἔχειν οὔτε παρακαλοῦντες αἰσχύνεσθαι. [3] καὶ ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἅμα αὐτάρκη θέσιν

κειμένη παρέχει αὐτοὺς δικαστὰς ὧν βλάπτουσί τινα μᾶλλον ἢ κατὰ ξυνθήκας γίγνεσθαι, διὰ τὸ ἥκιστα ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλας ἐκπλέοντας μάλιστα τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνάγκῃ καταίροντας δέχεσθαι. [4] καὶ τοῦτο τὸ εὐπρεπὲς ἄσπονδον οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ξυναδικῶσιν ἑτέροις προβέβληνται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως κατὰ μόνας ἀδικῶσι καὶ ὅπως ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἂν κρατῶσι βιάζωνται, οὗ δ᾽ ἂν λάθωσι πλέον ἔχωσιν, ἢν δέ πού τι προσλάβωσιν ἀναισχυντῶσιν: [5] καίτοι εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες,ὥσπερ φασίν, ἀγαθοί, ὅσῳ ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν τοῖς πέλας, τόσῳ δὲ φανερωτέραν ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν διδοῦσι καὶ δεχομένοις τὰ δίκαια δεικνύναι.

[37] ‘Since these Corcyraeans have chosen to speak, not only of their reception into your alliance, but of our misdoings and of the unjust war which has been forced upon them by us, we too must touch on these two points before we proceed to our main argument, that you may be better prepared to appreciate our claim upon you, and may have a good reason for rejecting their petition. They pretend that they have hitherto refused to make alliances from a wise moderation, but they really adopted this policy from a mean and not from a high motive. They did not want to have an ally who might go and tell of their crimes, and who would put them to the blush whenever they called him in. Their insular position makes them judges of their own offences against others, and they can therefore afford to dispense with judges appointed under treaties; for they hardly ever visit their neighbours, but foreign ships are constantly driven to their shores by stress of weather. And all the time they screen themselves under the specious name of neutrality, making believe that they are unwilling to be the accomplices of other men’s crimes. But the truth is that they wish to keep their own criminal courses to themselves: where they are strong, to oppress; where they cannot be found out, to defraud; and whatever they may contrive to appropriate, never to be ashamed. If they were really upright men, as they profess to be, the greater their immunity from

attack the more clearly they might have made their honesty appear by a willingness to submit differences to arbitration.

38. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους οὔτε ἐς ἡμᾶς τοιοίδε εἰσίν, ἄποικοι δ᾽ ὄντες ἀφεστᾶσί τε διὰ παντὸς καὶ νῦν πολεμοῦσι, λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κακῶς πάσχειν ἐκπεμφθεῖεν. [2] ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ αὐτοί φαμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβρίζεσθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι. [3] αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποίκων στεργόμεθα: [4] καὶ δῆλον ὅτι, εἰ τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀρέσκοντές ἐσμεν, τοῖσδ᾽ ἂν μόνοις οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαρέσκοιμεν, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστρατεύομεν ἐκπρεπῶς μὴ καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἀδικούμενοι. [5] καλὸν δ᾽ ἦν, εἰ καὶ ἡμαρτάνομεν, τοῖσδε μὲν εἶξαι τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ὀργῇ, ἡμῖν δὲ αἰσχρὸν βιάσασθαι τὴν τούτων μετριότητα: ὕβρει δὲ καὶ ἐξουσίᾳ πλούτου πολλὰ ἐς ἡμᾶς ἄλλα τε ἡμαρτήκασι καὶ Ἐπίδαμνον ἡμετέραν οὖσαν κακουμένην μὲν οὐ προσεποιοῦντο, ἐλθόντων δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ ἑλόντες βίᾳ ἔχουσιν.

[38] ‘But such they have not shown themselves either towards us or towards others. Although they are our colony they have always stood aloof from us, and now they are fighting against us on the plea that they were not sent out to be ill used. To which we rejoin that we did not send them out to be insulted by them, but that we might be recognised as their leaders and receive proper respect. Our other colonies at any rate honour us; no city is more beloved by her colonies than Corinth. That we are popular with the majority proves that the Corcyraeans have no reason to dislike us; and, if it seems extraordinary that we should go to war with them, our defence is that the injury which they are doing us is unexampled. Even if we had been misled by passion, it would have been honourable in them to make allowance for us, and dishonourable in us to use violence when they showed moderation. But they have wronged us over and over again in their insolence and pride of wealth; and now there is our colony of Epidamnus which they would

not acknowledge in her distress, but, when we came to her rescue, they seized and are now holding by force.

39. ‘καὶ φασὶ δὴ δίκῃ πρότερον ἐθελῆσαι κρίνεσθαι, ἤν γε οὐ τὸν προύχοντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς προκαλούμενον λέγειν τι δοκεῖν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐς ἴσον τά τε ἔργα ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς λόγους πρὶν διαγωνίζεσθαι καθιστάντα. [2] οὗτοι δὲ οὐ πρὶν πολιορκεῖν τὸ χωρίον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἡγήσαντο ἡμᾶς οὐ περιόψεσθαι, τότε καὶ τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τῆς δίκης παρέσχοντο. καὶ δεῦρο ἥκουσιν οὐ τἀκεῖ μόνον αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς νῦν ἀξιοῦντες οὐ ξυμμαχεῖν, ἀλλὰ ξυναδικεῖν καὶ διαφόρους ὄντας ἡμῖν δέχεσθαι σφᾶς: [3] οὓς χρῆν, ὅτε ἀσφαλέστατοι ἦσαν, τότε προσιέναι, καὶ μὴ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἠδικήμεθα, οὗτοι δὲ κινδυνεύουσι, μηδ᾽ ἐν ᾧ ὑμεῖς τῆς τε δυνάμεως αὐτῶν τότε οὐ μεταλαβόντες τῆς ὠφελίας νῦν μεταδώσετε καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἀπογενόμενοι τῆς ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν αἰτίας τὸ ἴσον ἕξετε, πάλαι δὲ κοινώσαντας τὴν δύναμιν κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἔχειν.

[39] ‘They pretend that they first offered to have the matter decided by arbitration. The appeal to justice might have some meaning in the mouth of one who before he had recourse to arms acted honourably, as he now talks fairly, but not when it is made from a position of security and advantage. Whereas these men began by laying siege to Epidamnus, and not until they feared our vengeance did they put forward their specious offer of arbitration. And as if the wrong which they have themselves done at Epidamnus were not enough, they now come hither and ask you to be, not their allies, but their accomplices in crime, and would have you receive them when they are at enmity with us. But they ought to have come when they were out of all danger, not at a time when we are smarting under an injury and they have good reason to be afraid. You have never derived any benefit from their power, but they will now be benefited by yours, and, although innocent of their crimes, you will equally be held responsible by us. If you were to have

shared the consequences with them, they ought long ago to have shared the power with you.

40. ‘ὡς μὲν οὖν αὐτοί τε μετὰ προσηκόντων ἐγκλημάτων ἐρχόμεθα καὶ οἵδε βίαιοι καὶ πλεονέκται εἰσὶ δεδήλωται: ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δικαίως αὐτοὺς δέχοισθε μαθεῖν χρή. [2] εἰ γὰρ εἴρηται ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς ἐξεῖναι παρ᾽ ὁποτέρους τις βούλεται τῶν ἀγράφων πόλεων ἐλθεῖν, οὐ τοῖς ἐπὶ βλάβῃ ἑτέρων ἰοῦσιν ἡ ξυνθήκη ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις μὴ ἄλλου ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερῶν ἀσφαλείας δεῖται καὶ ὅστις μὴ τοῖς δεξαμένοις, εἰ σωφρονοῦσι, πόλεμον ἀντ᾽ εἰρήνης ποιήσει: ὃ νῦν ὑμεῖς μὴ πειθόμενοι ἡμῖν πάθοιτε ἄν. [3] οὐ γὰρ τοῖσδε μόνον ἐπίκουροι ἂν γένοισθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμῖν ἀντὶ ἐνσπόνδων πολέμιοι: ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ ἴτε μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἀμύνεσθαι μὴ ἄνευ ὑμῶν τούτους. [4] καίτοι δίκαιοί γ᾽ ἐστὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐκποδὼν στῆναι ἀμφοτέροις, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὐναντίον ἐπὶ τούτους μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἰέναι Κορινθίοις μέν γε ἔνσπονδοί ἐστε, Κερκυραίοις δὲ οὐδὲ δι᾽ ἀνοκωχῆς πώποτ᾽ ἐγένεσθε, καὶ τὸν νόμον μὴ καθιστάναι ὥστε τοὺς ἑτέρων ἀφισταμένους δέχεσθαι. [5] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σαμίων ἀποστάντων ψῆφον προσεθέμεθα ἐναντίαν ὑμῖν, τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων δίχα ἐψηφισμένων εἰ χρὴ αὐτοῖς ἀμύνειν, φανερῶς δὲ ἀντείπομεν τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν. [6] εἰ γὰρ τοὺς κακόν τι δρῶντας δεχόμενοι τιμωρήσετε, φανεῖται καὶ ἃ τῶν ὑμετέρων οὐκ ἐλάσσω ἡμῖν πρόσεισι, καὶ τὸν νόμον ἐφ᾽ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν θήσετε.

[40] ‘We have proved that our complaints are justified and that our adversaries are tyrannical and dishonest; we will now show you that you have no right to receive them. Admitting that the treaty allows any unenrolled cities to join either league, this provision does not apply to those who have in view the injury of others, but only to him who is in need of protection, — certainly not to one who forsakes his allegiance and who will bring war instead of peace to those who receive him, or rather, if they are wise, will not receive him on such terms. And war the Corcyraeans will bring to

you if you listen to them and not to us. For if you become the allies of the Corcyraeans you will be no longer at peace with us, but will be converted into enemies; and we must, if you take their part, in defending ourselves against them, defend ourselves against you. But you ought in common justice to stand aloof from both; or, if you must join either, you should join us and go to war with them; to Corinth you are at all events bound by treaty, but with Corcyra you never even entered into a temporary negotiation. And do not set the precedent of receiving the rebellious subjects of others. At the revolt of Samos, when the other Peloponnesians were divided upon the question of giving aid to the rebels, we voted in your favour and expressly maintained “that every one should be allowed to chastise his own allies.” If you mean to receive and assist evil-doers, we shall assuredly gain as many allies of yours as you will of ours; and you will establish a principle which will tell against yourselves more than against us.

41. ‘δικαιώματα μὲν οὖν τάδε πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔχομεν ἱκανὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἑλλήνων νόμους, παραίνεσιν δὲ καὶ ἀξίωσιν χάριτος τοιάνδε, ἢν οὐκ ἐχθροὶ ὄντες ὥστε βλάπτειν οὐδ᾽ αὖ φίλοι ὥστ᾽ ἐπιχρῆσθαι, ἀντιδοθῆναι ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι φαμὲν χρῆναι. [2] νεῶν γὰρ μακρῶν σπανίσαντές ποτε πρὸς τὸν Αἰγινητῶν ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικὰ πόλεμον παρὰ Κορινθίων εἴκοσι ναῦς ἐλάβετε: καὶ ἡ εὐεργεσία αὕτη τε καὶ ἡ ἐς Σαμίους, τὸ δι᾽ ἡμᾶς Πελοποννησίους αὐτοῖς μὴ βοηθῆσαι, παρέσχεν ὑμῖν Αἰγινητῶν μὲν ἐπικράτησιν, Σαμίων δὲ κόλασιν, καὶ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις ἐγένετο οἷς μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι ἐπ᾽ ἐχθροὺς τοὺς σφετέρους ἰόντες τῶν ἀπάντων ἀπερίοπτοί εἰσι παρὰ τὸ νικᾶν: [3] φίλον τε γὰρ ἡγοῦνται τὸν ὑπουργοῦντα, ἢν καὶ πρότερον ἐχθρὸς ᾖ, πολέμιόν τε τὸν ἀντιστάντα, ἢν καὶ τύχῃ φίλος ὤν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα χεῖρον τίθενται φιλονικίας ἕνεκα τῆς αὐτίκα.

[41] ‘Such are the grounds of right which we urge; and they are sufficient according to Hellenic law. And may we venture to recall to your minds an obligation of which we claim the

repayment in our present need, we and you being not enemies who seek one another's hurt, nor yet friends who freely give and take? There was a time before the Persian invasion when you were in want of ships for the Aeginetan war, and we Corinthians lent you twenty: the service which we then rendered to you gave you the victory over the Aeginetans, as the other, which prevented the Peloponnesians from aiding the Samians, enabled you to punish Samos. Both benefits were conferred on one of those critical occasions when men in the act of attacking their enemies are utterly regardless of everything but victory, and deem him who assists them a friend though he may have previously been a foe, him who opposes them a foe, even though he may happen to be a friend; nay, they will often neglect their own interests in the excitement of the struggle.

42. ‘ὧν ἐνθυμηθέντες καὶ νεώτερός τις παρὰ πρεσβυτέρου αὐτὰ μαθὼν ἀξιούτω τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἡμᾶς ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ νομίσῃ δίκαια μὲν τάδε λέγεσθαι, ξύμφορα δέ, εἰ πολεμήσει, ἄλλα εἶναι. [2] τό τε γὰρ ξυμφέρον ἐν ᾧ ἄν τις ἐλάχιστα ἁμαρτάνῃ μάλιστα ἕπεται, καὶ τὸ μέλλον τοῦ πολέμου ᾧ φοβοῦντες ὑμᾶς Κερκυραῖοι κελεύουσιν ἀδικεῖν ἐν ἀφανεῖ ἔτι κεῖται, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπαρθέντας αὐτῷ φανερὰν ἔχθραν ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλουσαν πρὸς Κορινθίους κτήσασθαι, τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχούσης πρότερον διὰ Μεγαρέας ὑποψίας σῶφρον ὑφελεῖν μᾶλλον ἡ γὰρ τελευταία χάρις καιρὸν ἔχουσα, [3] κἂν ἐλάσσων ᾖ, δύναται μεῖζον ἔγκλημα λῦσαι , [4] μηδ᾽ ὅτι ναυτικοῦ ξυμμαχίαν μεγάλην διδόασι, τούτῳ ἐφέλκεσθαι: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐχυρωτέρα δύναμις ἢ τῷ αὐτίκα φανερῷ ἐπαρθέντας διὰ κινδύνων τὸ πλέον ἔχειν.

[42] ‘Think of these things; let the younger be informed of them by their elders, and resolve all of you to render like for like. Do not say to yourselves that this is just, but that in the event of war something else is expedient; for the true path of expediency is the path of right. The war with which the Corcyraeans would frighten you into doing wrong is distant,

and may never come; is it worth while to be so carried away by the prospect of it, that you bring upon yourselves the hatred of the Corinthians which is both near and certain? Would you not be wiser in seeking to mitigate the ill-feeling which your treatment of the Megarians has already inspired? The later kindness done in season, though small in comparison, may cancel a greater previous offence. And do not be attracted by their offer of a great naval alliance; for to do no wrong to a neighbour is a surer source of strength than to gain a perilous advantage under the influence of a momentary illusion.

43. ἡμεῖς δὲ περιπεπτωκότες οἷς ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι αὐτοὶ προείπομεν, τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους αὐτόν τινα κολάζειν, νῦν παρ᾽ ὑμῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀξιοῦμεν κομίζεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψήφῳ ὠφεληθέντας τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ἡμᾶς βλάψαι. [2] τὸ δὲ ἴσον ἀνταπόδοτε, γνόντες τοῦτον ἐκεῖνον εἶναι τὸν καιρὸν ἐν ᾧ ὅ τε ὑπουργῶν φίλος μάλιστα καὶ ὁ ἀντιστὰς ἐχθρός. [3] καὶ Κερκυραίους τούσδε μήτε ξυμμάχους δέχεσθε βίᾳ ἡμῶν μήτε ἀμύνετε αὐτοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν. [4] καὶ τάδε ποιοῦντες τὰ προσήκοντά τε δράσετε καὶ τὰ ἄριστα βουλεύσεσθε ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς.’

[43] ‘We are now ourselves in the same situation in which you were, when we declared at Sparta that every one so placed should be allowed to chastise his own allies; and we claim to receive the same measure at your hands. You were profited by our vote, and we ought not to be injured by yours. Pay what you owe, knowing that this is our time of need, in which a man’s best friend is he who does him a service, he who opposes him, his worst enemy. Do not receive these Corcyraeans into alliance in despite of us, and do not support them in injustice. In acting thus you will act rightly, and will consult your own true interests.’Such were the words of the Corinthians.

44. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἀμφοτέρων, γενομένης καὶ δὶς ἐκκλησίας, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἧσσον τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς

λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγνωσαν Κερκυραίοις ξυμμαχίαν μὲν μὴ ποιήσασθαι ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ Κόρινθον ἐκέλευον σφίσιν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ξυμπλεῖν, ἐλύοντ᾽ ἂν αὐτοῖς αἱ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους σπονδαί , ἐπιμαχίαν δ᾽ ἐποιήσαντο τῇ ἀλλήλων βοηθεῖν, ἐάν τις ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἴῃ ἢ Ἀθήνας ἢ τοὺς τούτων ξυμμάχους. [2] ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμος καὶ ὡς ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ἐβούλοντο μὴ προέσθαι τοῖς Κορινθίοις ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν τοσοῦτον, ξυγκρούειν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις, ἵνα ἀσθενεστέροις οὖσιν, ἤν τι δέῃ, Κορινθίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ναυτικὸν ἔχουσιν ἐς πόλεμον καθιστῶνται. [3] ἅμα δὲ τῆς τε Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς ἡ νῆσος ἐν παράπλῳ κεῖσθαι.

[44] The Athenians heard both sides, and they held two assemblies; in the first of them they were more influenced by the words of the Corinthians, but in the second they changed their minds and inclined towards the Corcyraeans. They would not go so far as to make an alliance both offensive and defensive with them; for then, if the Corcyraeans had required them to join in an expedition against Corinth, the treaty with the Peloponnesians would have been broken. But they concluded a defensive league, by which the two states promised to aid each other if an attack were made on the territory or on the allies of either. For they knew that in any case the war with Peloponnesus was inevitable, and they had no mind to let Corcyra and her navy fall into the hands of the Corinthians. Their plan was to embroil them more and more with one another, and then, when the war came, the Corinthians and the other naval powers would be weaker. They also considered that Corcyra was conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily.

45. τοιαύτῃ μὲν γνώμῃ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς Κερκυραίους προσεδέξαντο, καὶ τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπελθόντων οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον δέκα ναῦς αὐτοῖς ἀπέστειλαν βοηθούς: [2]

ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Λακεδαιμόνιός τε ὁ Κίμωνος καὶ Διότιμος ὁ Στρομβίχου καὶ Πρωτέας ὁ Ἐπικλέους. [3] προεῖπον δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ ναυμαχεῖν Κορινθίοις, ἢν μὴ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλέωσι καὶ μέλλωσιν ἀποβαίνειν ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίων: οὕτω δὲ κωλύειν κατὰ δύναμιν. προεῖπον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ μὴ λύειν ἕνεκα τὰς σπονδάς.

[45] Under the influence of these feelings, they received the Corcyraeans into alliance; the Corinthians departed; and the Athenians now despatched to Corcyra ten ships commanded by Lacedaemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles. The commanders received orders not to engage with the Corinthians unless they sailed against Corcyra or to any place belonging to the Corcyraeans, and attempted to land there, in which case they were to resist them to the utmost. These orders were intended to prevent a breach of the treaty.

46. αἱ μὲν δὴ νῆες ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν, οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς παρεσκεύαστο, ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ναυσὶ πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν. ἦσαν δὲ Ἠλείων μὲν δέκα, Μεγαρέων δὲ δώδεκα καὶ Λευκαδίων δέκα, Ἀμπρακιωτῶν δὲ ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι καὶ Ἀνακτορίων μία, αὐτῶν δὲ Κορινθίων ἐνενήκοντα: [2] στρατηγοὶ δὲ τούτων ἦσαν μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἑκάστων, Κορινθίων δὲ Ξενοκλείδης ὁ Εὐθυκλέους πέμπτος αὐτός. [3] ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσέμειξαν τῇ κατὰ Κέρκυραν ἠπείρῳ ἀπὸ Λευκάδος πλέοντες, ὁρμίζονται ἐς Χειμέριον τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος γῆς. [4] ἔστι δὲ λιμήν, καὶ πόλις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κεῖται ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐν τῇ Ἐλαιάτιδι τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος Ἐφύρη. ἐξίησι δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτὴν Ἀχερουσία λίμνη ἐς θάλασσαν: διὰ δὲ τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος Ἀχέρων ποταμὸς ῥέων ἐσβάλλει ἐς αὐτήν, ἀφ᾽ οὗ καὶ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει. ῥεῖ δὲ καὶ Θύαμις ποταμός, ὁρίζων τὴν Θεσπρωτίδα καὶ Κεστρίνην, ὧν ἐντὸς ἡ ἄκρα ἀνέχει τὸ Χειμέριον. [5] οἱ μὲν οὖν Κορίνθιοι τῆς ἠπείρου ἐνταῦθα ὁρμίζονταί τε καὶ στρατόπεδον ἐποιήσαντο.

[46] The Corinthians, when their preparations were completed, sailed against Corcyra with a hundred and fifty ships, — ten Elean, twelve Megarian, ten Leucadian, twenty-seven Ambraciot, one from Anactorium, and ninety of their own. The contingents of the several cities were commanded by their own generals. The Corinthian commander was Xenocleides the son of Euthycles, with four others. The fleet sailed from Leucas, and, arriving at the mainland opposite Corcyra, came to anchor at Cheimerium in the country of Thesprotia. Cheimerium is only a harbour; above it, at some distance from the sea, in that part of Thesprotia called Eleatis, lies the city of Ephyrè, near which the Acherusian lake finds a way out to the sea; the river Acheron, whence the name is derived, flows through Thesprotia and falls into the lake. Another river, the Thyamis, forms the boundary of Thesprotia and Cestrinè, and the promontory of Cheimerium runs out between these two rivers. Here the Corinthians anchored and formed a camp.

47. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι ὡς ᾔσθοντο αὐτοὺς προσπλέοντας, πληρώσαντες δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν ναῦς, ὧν ἦρχε Μικιάδης καὶ Αἰσιμίδης καὶ Εὐρύβατος, ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἐν μιᾷ τῶν νήσων αἳ καλοῦνται Σύβοτα: καὶ αἱ Ἀττικαὶ δέκα παρῆσαν. [2] ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ αὐτοῖς τῷ ἀκρωτηρίῳ ὁ πεζὸς ἦν καὶ Ζακυνθίων χίλιοι ὁπλῖται βεβοηθηκότες. [3] ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς Κορινθίοις ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων παραβεβοηθηκότες: οἱ γὰρ ταύτῃ ἠπειρῶται αἰεί ποτε αὐτοῖς φίλοι εἰσίν.

[47] The Corcyraeans, observing their approach, manned a hundred and ten ships. These, which were placed under the command of Meiciades, Aesimides, and Eurybatus, took up a position off one of the islands called Sybota; the ten Athenian ships accompanied them. The land forces occupied the promontory of Leucimnè, whither a thousand Zacynthians had come to the aid of Corcyra. The Corinthians on their part were supported by a large force of barbarians,

which collected on the mainland; for the inhabitants of this region have always been well disposed towards them.

48. ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο τοῖς Κορινθίοις, λαβόντες τριῶν ἡμερῶν σιτία ἀνήγοντο ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ Χειμερίου νυκτός, [2] καὶ ἅμα ἕῳ πλέοντες καθορῶσι τὰς τῶν Κερκυραίων ναῦς μετεώρους τε καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς πλεούσας. [3] ὡς δὲ κατεῖδον ἀλλήλους, ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο, ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας Κερκυραίων αἱ Ἀττικαὶ νῆες, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπεῖχον τρία τέλη ποιήσαντες τῶν νεῶν, ὧν ἦρχε <τῶν> τριῶν στρατηγῶν ἑκάστου εἷς. [4] οὕτω μὲν Κερκυραῖοι ἐτάξαντο, Κορινθίοις δὲ τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας αἱ Μεγαρίδες νῆες εἶχον καὶ αἱ Ἀμπρακιώτιδες, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέσον οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ὡς ἕκαστοι: εὐώνυμον δὲ κέρας αὐτοὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ταῖς ἄριστα τῶν νεῶν πλεούσαις κατὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν Κερκυραίων εἶχον.

[48] The Corinthians had now made their preparations, and, taking with them three days' provisions, put off by night from Cheimerium, intending to give battle: at break of day they descried the Corcyraean fleet, which had also put out to sea and was sailing to meet them. As soon as they saw one another, they ranged themselves in order of battle. On the right Corcyraean wing were the Athenian ships. The Corcyraeans themselves occupied the centre and the left wing, and were drawn up in three divisions, each under the command of one of the generals. On the right wing of the Corinthians were the Megarian and Ambraciot ships, in the centre the contingents of their other allies; they themselves with their swiftest vessels formed the left wing, which was opposed to the Athenians and to the right division of the Corcyraeans.

49. ξυμμείξαντες δέ, ἐπειδὴ τὰ σημεῖα ἑκατέροις ἤρθη, ἐναυμάχουν, πολλοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἔχοντες ἀμφότεροι ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων, πολλοὺς δὲ τοξότας τε καὶ ἀκοντιστάς, τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ ἀπειρότερον ἔτι παρεσκευασμένοι. [2] ἦν τε ἡ ναυμαχία καρτερά, τῇ μὲν τέχνῃ οὐχ ὁμοίως, πεζομαχίᾳ δὲ τὸ πλέον προσφερὴς οὖσα.

[3] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ προσβάλοιεν ἀλλήλοις, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἀπελύοντο ὑπό τε τοῦ πλήθους καὶ ὄχλου τῶν νεῶν, καὶ μᾶλλόν τι πιστεύοντες τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος ὁπλίταις ἐς τὴν νίκην, οἳ καταστάντες ἐμάχοντο ἡσυχαζουσῶν τῶν νεῶν: διέκπλοι δ᾽ οὐκ ἦσαν, ἀλλὰ θυμῷ καὶ ῥώμῃ τὸ πλέον ἐναυμάχουν ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ. [4] πανταχῇ μὲν οὖν πολὺς θόρυβος καὶ ταραχώδης ἦν ἡ ναυμαχία, ἐν ᾗ αἱ Ἀττικαὶ νῆες παραγιγνόμεναι τοῖς Κερκυραίοις, εἴ πῃ πιέζοιντο, φόβον μὲν παρεῖχον τοῖς ἐναντίοις, μάχης δὲ οὐκ ἦρχον δεδιότες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν πρόρρησιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων. [5] μάλιστα δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Κορινθίων ἐπόνει: οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι εἴκοσι ναυσὶν αὐτοὺς τρεψάμενοι καὶ καταδιώξαντες σποράδας ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον καὶ μέχρι τοῦ στρατοπέδου πλεύσαντες αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπεκβάντες ἐνέπρησάν τε τὰς σκηνὰς ἐρήμους καὶ τὰ χρήματα διήρπασαν. [6] ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἡσσῶντό [τε] καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐπεκράτουν: ᾗ δὲ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν οἱ Κορίνθιοι, ἐπὶ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ, πολὺ ἐνίκων, τοῖς Κερκυραίοις τῶν εἴκοσι νεῶν ἀπὸ ἐλάσσονος πλήθους ἐκ τῆς διώξεως οὐ παρουσῶν. [7] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁρῶντες τοὺς Κερκυραίους πιεζομένους μᾶλλον ἤδη ἀπροφασίστως ἐπεκούρουν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπεχόμενοι ὥστε μὴ ἐμβάλλειν τινί: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ τροπὴ ἐγίγνετο λαμπρῶς καὶ ἐνέκειντο οἱ Κορίνθιοι, τότε δὴ ἔργου πᾶς εἴχετο ἤδη καὶ διεκέκριτο οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ ξυνέπεσεν ἐς τοῦτο ἀνάγκης ὥστε ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἀλλήλοις τοὺς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἀθηναίους.

[49] The standards were now raised on both sides, and the two fleets met and fought. The decks of both were crowded with heavy infantry, with archers and with javelin-men; for their naval arrangements were still of the old clumsy sort. The engagement was obstinate, but more courage than skill was displayed, and it had almost the appearance of a battle by land. When two ships once charged one another it was hardly possible to part company, for the throng of vessels was dense, and the hopes of victory lay chiefly in the heavy-armed, who maintained a steady fight upon the decks, the

ships meanwhile remaining motionless. There were no attempts to break the enemy's line. Brute force and rage made up for the want of tactics. Everywhere the battle was a scene of tumult and confusion. At any point where they saw the Corcyraeans distressed, the Athenians appeared and kept the enemy in check; but the generals, who were afraid of disobeying their instructions, would not begin the attack themselves. The Corinthians suffered most on their right wing. For the Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them, drove them in disorder to the shore, and sailed right up to their encampment; there landing, they plundered and burnt the deserted tents. So in this part of the battle the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans prevailed. But the left wing of the Corinthians, where their own ships were stationed, had greatly the advantage, because the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were originally inferior, had now twenty vessels detached in the pursuit. When the Athenians saw the distress of the Corcyraeans, they began to assist them more openly. At first they had abstained from actual collision, but when the Corcyraeans fled outright and the Corinthians pressed them hard, then every man fell to work; all distinctions were forgotten;-the time had arrived when Corinthian and Athenian were driven to attack one another.

50. τῆς δὲ τροπῆς γενομένης οἱ Κορίνθιοι τὰ σκάφη μὲν οὐχ εἷλκον ἀναδούμενοι τῶν νεῶν ἂς καταδύσειαν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐτράποντο φονεύειν διεκπλέοντες μᾶλλον ἢ ζωγρεῖν, τούς τε αὐτῶν φίλους, οὐκ ᾐσθημένοι ὅτι ἥσσηντο οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ κέρᾳ, ἀγνοοῦντες ἔκτεινον. [2] πολλῶν γὰρ νεῶν οὐσῶν ἀμφοτέρων καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπεχουσῶν, ἐπειδὴ ξυνέμειξαν ἀλλήλοις, οὐ ῥᾳδίως τὴν διάγνωσιν ἐποιοῦντο ὁποῖοι ἐκράτουν ἢ ἐκρατοῦντο: ναυμαχία γὰρ αὕτη Ἕλλησι πρὸς Ἕλληνας νεῶν πλήθει μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς γεγένηται. [3] ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατεδίωξαν τοὺς Κερκυραίους οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐς τὴν γῆν, πρὸς τὰ ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς σφετέρους

ἐτράποντο, καὶ τῶν πλείστων ἐκράτησαν ὥστε προσκομίσαι πρὸς τὰ Σύβοτα, οἷ αὐτοῖς ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς τῶν βαρβάρων προσεβεβοηθήκει: ἔστι δὲ τὰ Σύβοτα τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος λιμὴν ἐρῆμος. τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσαντες αὖθις ἀθροισθέντες ἐπέπλεον τοῖς Κερκυραίοις. [4] οἱ δὲ ταῖς πλωίμοις καὶ ὅσαι ἦσαν λοιπαὶ μετὰ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντεπέπλεον, δείσαντες μὴ ἐς τὴν γῆν σφῶν πειρῶσιν ἀποβαίνειν. [5] ἤδη δὲ ἦν ὀψὲ καὶ ἐπεπαιάνιστο αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐς ἐπίπλουν, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐξαπίνης πρύμναν ἐκρούοντο κατιδόντες εἴκοσι ναῦς Ἀθηναίων προσπλεούσας, ἃς ὕστερον τῶν δέκα βοηθοὺς ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, δείσαντες, ὅπερ ἐγένετο, μὴ νικηθῶσιν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι καὶ αἱ σφέτεραι δέκα νῆες ὀλίγαι ἀμύνειν ὦσιν.

[50] The Corinthians, having put to flight their enemies, never stopped to take in tow the hulls of the vessels which they had disabled, but fell upon the men; they rowed up and down and slew them, giving no quarter, and unintentionally killing their own friends; for they were not aware that their right wing had been defeated. There were so many ships on one side and on the other, and they covered so great an extent of water, that, when the engagement had once begun, it was hard among conquerors and conquered to distinguish friend from foe. For never before had two Hellenic navies so numerous met in battle.When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore, they turned their attention to their own wrecks and the bodies of their dead. Most of these were recovered by them and conveyed to Sybota, a desert harbour of Thesprotia, whither their barbarian allies had come to support them. They then formed afresh and once more made a movement towards the Corcyraeans, who, taking such vessels as had not been disabled, and any others which they had in their docks, together with the Athenian ships, put out to meet them, dreading a descent upon Corcyra. It was now late in the day and the Paean had been already sounded for the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly began to row astern. They

had descried sailing towards them twenty vessels which the Athenians had sent to reinforce the former ten, fearing what had actually happened, that the Corcyraeans would he defeated, and that the original squadron would be insufficient to protect them.

51. ταύτας οὖν προϊδόντες οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ ὑποτοπήσαντες ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν εἶναι οὐχ ὅσας ἑώρων ἀλλὰ πλείους ὑπανεχώρουν. [2] τοῖς δὲ Κερκυραίοις ἐπέπλεον γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς οὐχ ἑωρῶντο, καὶ ἐθαύμαζον τοὺς Κορινθίους πρύμναν κρουομένους, πρίν τινες ἰδόντες εἶπον ὅτι νῆες ἐκεῖναι ἐπιπλέουσιν. τότε δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀνεχώρουν: ξυνεσκόταζε γὰρ ἤδη, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἀποτραπόμενοι τὴν διάλυσιν ἐποιήσαντο. [3] οὕτω μὲν ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἐγένετο ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἡ ναυμαχία ἐτελεύτα ἐς νύκτα. [4] τοῖς δὲ Κερκυραίοις στρατοπεδευομένοις ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμμῃ αἱ εἴκοσι νῆες αἱ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὖται, ὧν ἦρχε Γλαύκων τε ὁ Λεάγρου καὶ † Ἀνδοκίδης ὁ Λεωγόρου †, διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκομισθεῖσαι κατέπλεον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἢ ὤφθησαν. [5] οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι ⌊ἦν γὰρ νύξ⌋ ἐφοβήθησαν μὴ πολέμιαι ὦσιν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἔγνωσαν: καὶ ὡρμίσαντο.

[51] The Corinthians, who had the first view of these vessels, suspecting that they were Athenian and that there were more of them than they saw, were beginning to retreat. The Corcyraeans, owing to their position, could not see them, and they wondered why the Corinthians rowed astern. At length some of them who spied the advancing fleet exclaimed, ‘Yonder are ships coming up;’ and then the Corcyraeans, as it was getting dark, likewise retired, and the Corinthians turned about and sailed away. Thus the two fleets separated after a battle which lasted until nightfall. The twenty ships which came from Athens under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus, and Andocides the son of Leogoras, made their way through the wrecks and corpses and sailed into the Corcyraean station at Leucimnè almost as soon as they were sighted. At first in the darkness

the Corcyraeans feared that they were enemies, but they soon recognised them and the Athenian vessels came to anchor.

52. τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀναγαγόμεναι αἵ τε Ἀττικαὶ τριάκοντα νῆες καὶ τῶν Κερκυραίων ὅσαι πλώιμοι ἦσαν ἐπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς Συβότοις λιμένα, ἐν ᾧ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὥρμουν, βουλόμενοι εἰδέναι εἰ ναυμαχήσουσιν. [2] οἱ δὲ τὰς μὲν ναῦς ἄραντες ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ παραταξάμενοι μετεώρους ἡσύχαζον, ναυμαχίας οὐ διανοούμενοι ἄρχειν ἑκόντες ὁρῶντες προσγεγενημένας τε ναῦς ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἀκραιφνεῖς καὶ σφίσι πολλὰ τὰ ἄπορα ξυμβεβηκότα, αἰχμαλώτων τε περὶ φυλακῆς οὓς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν εἶχον, καὶ ἐπισκευὴν οὐκ οὖσαν τῶν νεῶν ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ: [3] τοῦ δὲ οἴκαδε πλοῦ μᾶλλον διεσκόπουν ὅπῃ κομισθήσονται, δεδιότες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδάς, διότι ἐς χεῖρας ἦλθον, οὐκ ἐῶσι σφᾶς ἀποπλεῖν.

[52] On the next day the thirty Athenian and all the Corcyraean ships which were fit for service, wanting to ascertain whether the Corinthians would fight, sailed to the harbour at Sybota where their fleet lay. The Corinthians, putting out into deep water, drew up their ships in line and so remained, but they did not intend to begin the battle. For they saw that fresh ships, which had received no damage in the action, had arrived from Athens, and their own position was one of great difficulty. They had to guard the prisoners in their vessels, and there were no means of refitting in such a desert place. They were more disposed to consider how they should get home than to fight. For they feared that the Athenians, deeming the peace, now that blows had been exchanged, to be already broken, would intercept their return.

53. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς ἄνδρας ἐς κελήτιον ἐσβιβάσαντας ἄνευ κηρυκείου προσπέμψαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ πεῖραν ποιήσασθαι. πέμψαντές τε ἔλεγον τοιάδε. [2] ‘ἀδικεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολέμου ἄρχοντες καὶ σπονδὰς λύοντες: ἡμῖν γὰρ πολεμίους τοὺς ἡμετέρους τιμωρουμένοις

ἐμποδὼν ἵστασθε ὅπλα ἀνταιρόμενοι. εἰ δ᾽ ὑμῖν γνώμη ἐστὶ κωλύειν τε ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἢ ἄλλοσε εἴ ποι βουλόμεθα πλεῖν καὶ τὰς σπονδὰς λύετε, ἡμᾶς τούσδε πρώτους λαβόντες χρήσασθε ὡς πολεμίοις.’ [3] οἱ μὲν δὴ τοιαῦτα εἶπον: τῶν δὲ Κερκυραίων τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον ὅσον ἐπήκουσεν ἀνεβόησεν εὐθὺς λαβεῖν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τοιάδε ἀπεκρίναντο. [4] ‘οὔτε ἄρχομεν πολέμου, ὦ ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, οὔτε τὰς σπονδὰς λύομεν, Κερκυραίοις δὲ τοῖσδε ξυμμάχοις οὖσι βοηθοὶ ἤλθομεν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοσέ ποι βούλεσθε πλεῖν, οὐ κωλύομεν: εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλευσεῖσθε ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίων, οὐ περιοψόμεθα κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.’

[53] They therefore determined to send a few men in a boat without a flag of truce to the Athenians, and so test their intentions. The men were to deliver the following message: ‘You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war and violate the treaty. We were only chastising our enemies, and you come with a hostile force and place yourselves between us and them. If it is your intention to hinder us from sailing to Corcyra, or whithersoever we choose, and you are going to break the treaty, take us first and deal with us as enemies.’ Whereupon all the Corcyraeans who were within hearing cried out ‘Take and kill them.’ But the Athenians replied ‘Men of Peloponnesus, we are not beginning war, and we are not violating the treaty; we are only aiding the Corcyraeans here, who are our allies. If you mean to sail against Corcyra or any place belonging to the Corcyraeans, we will do our utmost to prevent you, but, if you want to go anywhere else, you may.’

54. τοιαῦτα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποκριναμένων οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι τόν τε πλοῦν τὸν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησαν ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Συβότοις: οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι τά τε ναυάγια καὶ νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο τὰ κατὰ σφᾶς ἐξενεχθέντα ὑπό τε τοῦ ῥοῦ καὶ ἀνέμου, ὃς γενόμενος τῆς νυκτὸς διεσκέδασεν αὐτὰ πανταχῇ, καὶ τροπαῖον ἀντέστησαν ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Συβότοις ὡς νενικηκότες. [2]

γνώμῃ δὲ τοιᾷδε ἑκάτεροι τὴν νίκην προσεποιήσαντο: Κορίνθιοι μὲν κρατήσαντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ μέχρι νυκτός, ὥστε καὶ ναυάγια πλεῖστα καὶ νεκροὺς προσκομίσασθαι, καὶ ἄνδρας ἔχοντες αἰχμαλώτους οὐκ ἐλάσσους χιλίων ναῦς τε καταδύσαντες περὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔστησαν τροπαῖον: Κερκυραῖοι δὲ τριάκοντα ναῦς μάλιστα διαφθείραντες, καὶ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦλθον, ἀνελόμενοι τὰ κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ναυάγια καὶ νεκρούς, καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς τῇ τε προτεραίᾳ πρύμναν κρουόμενοι ὑπεχώρησαν οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἰδόντες τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναῦς, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἦλθον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐκ ἀντεπέπλεον ἐκ τῶν Συβότων, διὰ ταῦτα τροπαῖον ἔστησαν.

[54] Reassured by this reply, the Corinthians prepared to sail home, first setting up a trophy at the Sybota which is on the mainland. The Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead bodies which were carried towards them, the current and the wind which had risen during the night having scattered them in all directions. They then set up a rival trophy on the island of Sybota. Both parties claimed the victory, but on different grounds. The Corinthians had retained the advantage in the seafight until nightfall, and had thus secured a greater number of wrecks and dead bodies; they had taken not less than a thousand prisoners and had disabled about seventy ships. The Corcyraeans, on the other hand, had destroyed some thirty sail, and when reinforced by the Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead bodies which had drifted in their direction; whereas the enemy on the evening of the battle had rowed astern at sight of the Athenian ships, and after their arrival had not come out against them from Sybota. Upon these grounds both sides raised trophies and claimed the victory.

55. οὕτω μὲν ἑκάτεροι νικᾶν ἠξίουν: οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι ἀποπλέοντες ἐπ᾽ οἴκου Ἀνακτόριον, ὅ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, εἷλον ἀπάτῃ ἦν δὲ κοινὸν Κερκυραίων καὶ ἐκείνων καὶ καταστήσαντες ἐν αὐτῷ Κορινθίους οἰκήτορας ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, καὶ τῶν Κερκυραίων ὀκτακοσίους μὲν οἳ ἦσαν δοῦλοι ἀπέδοντο, πεντήκοντα δὲ καὶ διακοσίους δήσαντες ἐφύλασσον καὶ ἐν θεραπείᾳ εἶχον πολλῇ, ὅπως αὐτοῖς τὴν Κέρκυραν ἀναχωρήσαντες προσποιήσειαν: ἐτύγχανον δὲ καὶ δυνάμει αὐτῶν οἱ πλείους πρῶτοι ὄντες τῆς πόλεως. [2] ἡ μὲν οὖν Κέρκυρα οὕτω περιγίγνεται τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν Κορινθίων, καὶ αἱ νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀνεχώρησαν ἐξ αὐτῆς: αἰτία δὲ αὕτη πρώτη ἐγένετο τοῦ πολέμου τοῖς Κορινθίοις ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὅτι σφίσιν ἐν σπονδαῖς μετὰ Κερκυραίων ἐναυμάχουν.

[55] On their homeward voyage the Corinthians took by stratagem Anactorium, a town situated at the mouth of the

Ambracian Gulf, which they and the Corcyraeans held in common; there they settled colonists of their own, and returned to Corinth. Of their Corcyraean captives eight hundred who were slaves they sold, but two hundred and fifty they detained in prison, treating them with much consideration, in the hope that, when they returned, they would win over Corcyra to the Corinthian interest: it so happened that the majority of them were among the most influential men of the state. Thus the war ended to the advantage of Corcyra, and the Athenian fleet returned home. This was the first among the causes of the Peloponnesian War, the Corinthians alleging that the Athenian fleet had taken part with the Corcyraeans and had fought against them in a time of truce.

56. μετὰ ταῦτα δ᾽ εὐθὺς καὶ τάδε ξυνέβη γενέσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις διάφορα ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν. [2] τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων πρασσόντων ὅπως τιμωρήσονται αὐτούς, ὑποτοπήσαντες τὴν ἔχθραν αὐτῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Ποτειδεάτας, οἳ οἰκοῦσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἰσθμῷ τῆς Παλλήνης, Κορινθίων ἀποίκους, ἑαυτῶν δὲ ξυμμάχους φόρου ὑποτελεῖς, ἐκέλευον τὸ ἐς Παλλήνην τεῖχος καθελεῖν καὶ ὁμήρους δοῦναι, τούς τε ἐπιδημιουργοὺς ἐκπέμπειν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ δέχεσθαι οὓς κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον Κορίνθιοι ἔπεμπον, δείσαντες μὴ ἀποστῶσιν ὑπό τε Περδίκκου πειθόμενοι καὶ Κορινθίων, τούς τε ἄλλους τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ξυναποστήσωσι ξυμμάχους.

[56] There soon arose another cause of quarrel between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. Potidaea, which is situated on the isthmus of Pallenè, was originally a Corinthian colony, although at this time the tributary and ally of Athens. Now the Corinthians were forming plans of vengeance, and the Athenians, who suspected their intentions, commanded the Potidaeans to raze their walls on the side of Pallenè and give hostages; also to send away and not to receive for the future the magistrates whom the Corinthians annually sent to them. For they were afraid lest the Potidaeans might be

persuaded by the Corinthians and Perdiccas to revolt, and might induce the rest of Chalcidicè to follow their example.

57. ταῦτα δὲ περὶ τοὺς Ποτειδεάτας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προπαρεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ναυμαχίαν: [2] οἵ τε γὰρ Κορίνθιοι φανερῶς ἤδη διάφοροι ἦσαν, Περδίκκας τε ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς ἐπεπολέμωτο ξύμμαχος πρότερον καὶ φίλος ὤν. [3] ἐπολεμώθη δὲ ὅτι Φιλίππῳ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδελφῷ καὶ Δέρδᾳ κοινῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐναντιουμένοις οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο. [4] δεδιώς τε ἔπρασσεν ἔς τε τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πέμπων ὅπως πόλεμος γένηται αὐτοῖς πρὸς Πελοποννησίους, καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους προσεποιεῖτο τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἕνεκα ἀποστάσεως: [5] προσέφερε δὲ λόγους καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης Χαλκιδεῦσι καὶ Βοττιαίοις ξυναποστῆναι, νομίζων, εἰ ξύμμαχα ταῦτα ἔχοι ὅμορα ὄντα τὰ χωρία, ῥᾷον ἂν τὸν πόλεμον μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι. [6] ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰσθόμενοι καὶ βουλόμενοι προκαταλαμβάνειν τῶν πόλεων τὰς ἀποστάσεις ἔτυχον γὰρ τριάκοντα ναῦς ἀποστέλλοντες καὶ χιλίους ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ, Ἀρχεστράτου τοῦ Λυκομήδους μετ᾽ ἄλλων † δέκα † στρατηγοῦντος ἐπιστέλλουσι τοῖς ἄρχουσι τῶν νεῶν Ποτειδεατῶν τε ὁμήρους λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ τεῖχος καθελεῖν, τῶν τε πλησίον πόλεων φυλακὴν ἔχειν ὅπως μὴ ἀποστήσονται.

[57] These measures of precaution were taken by the Athenians immediately after the sea-fight off Corcyra. The hostility of the Corinthians was no longer doubtful, and Perdiccas, king of Macedon, the son of Alexander, hitherto the friend and ally of Athens, had now become an enemy. He had quarrelled with the Athenians because they had made an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, who were leagued against him. Alarmed by their attitude, he sent envoys to Sparta and did all he could to stir up a war between Athens and the Peloponnese. He also sought the alliance of Corinth, for he had an eye to the revolt of Potidaea; and he proposed to the Chalcidians and to the

Bottiaeans that they should join in the revolt, thinking, that if he had the assistance of the neighbouring peoples, the difficulties of the war would be diminished. The Athenians became aware of his designs and resolved to forestall the revolt of the cities. They were already intending to send against Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under the command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes, and ten others, and they told their admirals to take hostages from the Potidaeans and to demolish their wall. They were also to keep a watch over the towns in the neighbourhood and prevent any attempt at rebellion.

58. Ποτειδεᾶται δὲ πέμψαντες μὲν καὶ παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους πρέσβεις, εἴ πως πείσειαν μὴ σφῶν πέρι νεωτερίζειν μηδέν, ἐλθόντες δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα μετὰ Κορινθίων, [ἔπρασσον] ὅπως ἑτοιμάσαιντο τιμωρίαν, ἢν δέῃ, ἐπειδὴ ἔκ τε Ἀθηνῶν ἐκ πολλοῦ πράσσοντες οὐδὲν ηὔροντο ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλ᾽ αἱ νῆες αἱ ἐπὶ Μακεδονίαν καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς ὁμοίως ἔπλεον, καὶ τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπέσχετο αὐτοῖς, ἢν ἐπὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἴωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβαλεῖν, τότε δὴ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἀφίστανται μετὰ Χαλκιδέων καὶ Βοττιαίων κοινῇ ξυνομόσαντες. [2] καὶ Περδίκκας πείθει Χαλκιδέας τὰς ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πόλεις ἐκλιπόντας καὶ καταβαλόντας ἀνοικίσασθαι ἐς Ὄλυνθον μίαν τε πόλιν ταύτην ἰσχυρὰν ποιήσασθαι: τοῖς τ᾽ ἐκλιποῦσι τούτοις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γῆς τῆς Μυγδονίας περὶ τὴν Βόλβην λίμνην ἔδωκε νέμεσθαι, ἕως ἂν ὁ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πόλεμος ᾖ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνῳκίζοντό τε καθαιροῦντες τὰς πόλεις καὶ ἐς πόλεμον παρεσκευάζοντο:

[58] Meanwhile the Potidaeans sent envoys to the Athenians in the hope of persuading them to take no strong measures; but at the same time other envoys of theirs accompanied a Corinthian embassy to Lacedaemon and exerted themselves to procure assistance in case of need. A long negotiation was carried on at Athens which came to no satisfactory result; the ships destined for Macedonia were also sent against Potidaea. But at Lacedaemon they were promised by the

magistrates that if the Athenians attacked Potidaea they would invade Attica. So they seized the opportunity and revolted: the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans swore alliance with them and joined in the revolt. Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull down their towns on the sea-coast, and settling at Olynthus inland, there to form one strong city. On their removal he gave them part of his own territory of Mygdonia about the lake Bolbè to cultivate while the contest lasted. So, dismantling their cities, they settled up the country and made preparation for war.

59. αἱ δὲ τριάκοντα νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τήν τε Ποτείδαιαν καὶ τἆλλα ἀφεστηκότα. [2] νομίσαντες δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀδύνατα εἶναι πρός τε Περδίκκαν πολεμεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ δυνάμει καὶ τὰ ξυναφεστῶτα χωρία τρέπονται ἐπὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν, ἐφ᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐξεπέμποντο, καὶ καταστάντες ἐπολέμουν μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν Δέρδου ἀδελφῶν ἄνωθεν στρατιᾷ ἐσβεβληκότων.

[59] The Athenians, when the thirty ships arrived in Chalcidicè, found that Potidaea and the other cities had already revolted. Whereupon the generals, thinking that they were not able without a stronger force to act against all the rebels as well as against Perdiccas, directed their attention to Macedonia, which was their original destination, and there carried on a regular campaign in concert with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the country from the interior.

60. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Κορίνθιοι, τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἀφεστηκυίας καὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν περὶ Μακεδονίαν οὐσῶν, δεδιότες περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ καὶ οἰκεῖον τὸν κίνδυνον ἡγούμενοι πέμπουσιν ἐαυτῶν τε ἐθελοντὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων μισθῷ πείσαντες ἑξακοσίους καὶ χιλίους τοὺς πάντας ὁπλίτας καὶ ψιλοὺς τετρακοσίους. [2] ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀριστεὺς ὁ Ἀδειμάντου, κατὰ φιλίαν τε αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐκ Κορίνθου στρατιῶται ἐθελονταὶ ξυνέσποντο: ἦν γὰρ τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις αἰεί ποτε

ἐπιτήδειος. [3] καὶ ἀφικνοῦνται τεσσαρακοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὕστερον ἐπὶ Θράκης ἣ Ποτείδαια ἀπέστη.

[60] Now that Potidaea had revolted and the Athenian ships were on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians grew anxious about the town; they felt that the danger came home to them, and despatched thither volunteers of their own and other troops whom they attracted by pay from various parts of the Peloponnese, numbering in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed. Their commander was Aristeus the son of Adeimantus, who had always been a great friend of the Potidaeans; it was mainly out of regard for him that most of the Corinthian soldiers volunteered on the expedition. They arrived in Chalcidicè forty days after the revolt of Potidaea.

61. ἦλθε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εὐθὺς ἡ ἀγγελία τῶν πόλεων ὅτι ἀφεστᾶσι, καὶ πέμπουσιν, ὡς ᾔσθοντο καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽ Ἀριστέως ἐπιπαριόντας, δισχιλίους ἑαυτῶν ὁπλίτας καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς πρὸς τὰ ἀφεστῶτα, καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου πέμπτον αὐτὸν στρατηγόν, [2] οἳ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Μακεδονίαν πρῶτον καταλαμβάνουσι τοὺς προτέρους χιλίους Θέρμην ἄρτι ᾑρηκότας καὶ Πύδναν πολιορκοῦντας. [3] προσκαθεζόμενοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν Πύδναν ἐπολιόρκησαν μέν, ἔπειτα δὲ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκαν, ὡς αὐτοὺς κατήπειγεν ἡ Ποτείδαια καὶ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς παρεληλυθώς, ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, [4] καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν κἀκεῖθεν ἐπὶ Στρέψαν καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν, τρισχιλίοις μὲν ὁπλίταις ἑαυτῶν, χωρὶς δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων πολλοῖς, ἱππεῦσι δὲ ἑξακοσίοις Μακεδόνων τοῖς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Παυσανίου: ἅμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἑβδομήκοντα. [5] κατ᾽ ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο.

[61] The news of the revolt in Chalcidicè quickly reached Athens, and the Athenians, when they heard that Aristeus had come with reinforcements, sent against the revolted

towns forty ships and two thousand of their own hoplites under the command of Callias the son of Calliades, and four others. The expedition, sailing first of all to Macedonia, found that the former thousand had just taken Thermè and were blockading Pydna; they joined in the siege themselves; but before long the Athenian army were constrained to come to an understanding and make an alliance with Perdiccas. For Potidaea, now that Aristeus had arrived, urgently demanded their presence; so they prepared to quit Macedonia. They first marched out of their way to Beroea, which they attempted to take without success. Returning to their route, they moved on by land towards Potidaea with three thousand hoplites of their own and a large force of allies; they had also six hundred Macedonian horse, who fought under Philip and Pausanias; meanwhile their ships, in number seventy, sailed along the coast. Proceeding by slow marches, they arrived on the third day at Gigonus and there encamped.

62. Ποτειδεᾶται δὲ καὶ οἱ μετὰ Ἀριστέως Πελοποννήσιοι προσδεχόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο πρὸς Ὀλύνθου ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ, καὶ ἀγορὰν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐπεποίηντο. [2] στρατηγὸν μὲν οὖν τοῦ πεζοῦ παντὸς οἱ ξύμμαχοι ᾑρηντο Ἀριστέα, τῆς δὲ ἵππου Περδίκκαν: ἀπέστη γὰρ εὐθὺς πάλιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ξυνεμάχει τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις, Ἰόλαον ἀνθ᾽ αὐτοῦ καταστήσας ἄρχοντα. [3] ἦν δὲ ἡ γνώμη τοῦ Ἀριστέως τὸ μὲν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ στρατόπεδον ἔχοντι ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ ἐπιτηρεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἢν ἐπίωσι, Χαλκιδέας δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἔξω ἰσθμοῦ ξυμμάχους καὶ τὴν παρὰ Περδίκκου διακοσίαν ἵππον ἐν Ὀλύνθῳ μένειν, καὶ ὅταν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ σφᾶς χωρῶσι, κατὰ νώτου βοηθοῦντας ἐν μέσῳ ποιεῖν αὐτῶν τοὺς πολεμίους. [4] Καλλίας δ᾽ αὖ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς καὶ οἱ ξυνάρχοντες τοὺς μὲν Μακεδόνας ἱππέας καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὀλίγους ἐπὶ Ὀλύνθου ἀποπέμπουσιν, ὅπως εἴργωσι τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιβοηθεῖν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀναστήσαντες τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν Ποτείδαιαν. [5] καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τῷ ἰσθμῷ ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον

τοὺς ἐναντίους παρασκευαζομένους ὡς ἐς μάχην, ἀντικαθίσταντο καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ξυνέμισγον. [6] καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ τοῦ Ἀριστέως κέρας καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ἐκεῖνον ἦσαν Κορινθίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων λογάδες ἔτρεψαν τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ἐπεξῆλθον διώκοντες ἐπὶ πολύ: τὸ δὲ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον Ποτειδεατῶν καὶ Πελοποννησίων ἡσσᾶτο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἐς τὸ τεῖχος κατέφυγεν.

[62] The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesian force under Aristeus had now taken up a position at the isthmus on the side towards Olynthus, where they awaited the coming of the Athenians; they held their market outside the walls of Potidaea. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry, and of the cavalry Perdiccas, for he had no sooner joined than he again deserted the Athenians and was now fighting on the side of the Potidaeans, having appointed Iolaus to be his lieutenant at home. The plan of Aristeus was as follows: — His own army was to remain on the isthmus and watch for the approach of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians, their allies from beyond the isthmus, and the two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas were stationed at Olynthus; and as soon as the Athenians attacked Aristeus himself and his army, they were to fall upon them in the rear; thus the enemy would be assailed on both sides. But Callias the Athenian general and his colleagues sent the Macedonian horse and a few of the allied troops towards Olynthus that they might check any movement in that quarter, while they themselves, quitting their position, marched against Potidaea. When they had reached the isthmus and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they did the same. The two armies soon closed. The wing led by Aristeus, which was composed of his Corinthian followers and other picked troops, routed their opponents and chased them far away; but the rest of the army, both Potidaeans and Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenians and fled into the city.

63. ἐπαναχωρῶν δὲ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς ἀπὸ τῆς διώξεως, ὡς ὁρᾷ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα ἡσσημένον, ἠπόρησε μὲν ὁποτέρωσε διακινδυνεύσῃ χωρήσας, ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς Ὀλύνθου ἢ ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν: ἔδοξε δ᾽ οὖν ξυναγαγόντι τοὺς μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ ὡς ἐς ἐλάχιστον χωρίον δρόμῳ βιάσασθαι ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν, καὶ παρῆλθε παρὰ τὴν χηλὴν διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης βαλλόμενός τε καὶ χαλεπῶς, ὀλίγους μέν τινας ἀποβαλών, τοὺς δὲ πλείους σώσας. [2] οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς Ὀλύνθου τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις βοηθοί ἀπέχει δὲ ἑξήκοντα μάλιστα σταδίους καὶ ἔστι καταφανές, ὡς ἡ μάχη ἐγίγνετο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἤρθη, βραχὺ μέν τι προῆλθον ὡς βοηθήσοντες, καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες ἱππῆς ἀντιπαρετάξαντο ὡς κωλύσοντες: ἐπειδὴ δὲ διὰ τάχους ἡ νίκη τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγίγνετο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα κατεσπάσθη, πάλιν ἐπανεχώρουν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος καὶ οἱ Μακεδόνες παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους: ἱππῆς δ᾽ οὐδετέροις παρεγένοντο. [3] μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην τροπαῖον ἔστησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις: ἀπέθανον δὲ Ποτειδεατῶν μὲν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τριακοσίων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ αὐτῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν καὶ Καλλίας ὁ στρατηγός.

[63] Aristeus, when he returned from the pursuit and perceived that the other wing of his army was defeated, hesitated whether he should make for Olynthus or return to Potidaea. Both courses were hazardous; but at last he determined to contract his troops into the smallest compass and force his way at full speed into Potidaea. Harassed by the missiles of the enemy he pushed forward through the water along the bank in front of the sea-wall, not without loss; but he contrived to save the greater part of his men. When the battle began, the allies of the Potidaeans in Olynthus, which is only about seven miles distant, and is visible from Potidaea, seeing the signals raised, came out a little way to support their friends; and the Macedonian horse drew up in order of battle to oppose them. But victory quickly declared for the Athenians; and when the signals were torn down the Olynthian auxiliaries retired within the

walls, and the Macedonians rejoined the Athenians: thus on neither side did the cavalry take any part in the action. The Athenians raised a trophy and granted the Potidaeans a truce for the burial of their dead. Of the Potidaeans and their allies, there fell somewhat less than three hundred; of the Athenians, a hundred and fifty, and their general Callias.

64. τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ [τεῖχος] εὐθὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποτειχίσαντες ἐφρούρουν: τὸ δ᾽ ἐς τὴν Παλλήνην ἀτείχιστον ἦν: οὐ γὰρ ἱκανοὶ ἐνόμιζον εἶναι ἔν τε τῷ ἰσθμῷ φρουρεῖν καὶ ἐς τὴν Παλλήνην διαβάντες τειχίζειν, δεδιότες μὴ σφίσιν οἱ Ποτειδεᾶται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι γενομένοις δίχα ἐπίθωνται. [2] καὶ πυνθανόμενοι οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν Παλλήνην ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν, χρόνῳ ὕστερον πέμπουσιν ἑξακοσίους καὶ χιλίους ὁπλίτας ἑαυτῶν καὶ Φορμίωνα τὸν Ἀσωπίου στρατηγόν: ὃς ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Παλλήνην καὶ ἐξ Ἀφύτιος ὁρμώμενος προσήγαγε τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ τὸν στρατὸν κατὰ βραχὺ προϊὼν καὶ κείρων ἅμα τὴν γῆν, ὡς δὲ οὐδεὶς ἐπεξῄει ἐς μάχην, ἀπετείχισε τὸ ἐκ τῆς Παλλήνης [τεῖχος]. [3] καὶ οὕτως ἤδη κατὰ κράτος ἡ Ποτείδαια ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐπολιορκεῖτο καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ναυσὶν ἅμα ἐφορμούσαις.

[64] The Athenians instantly blockaded the town on the side towards the isthmus, raising a wall, which they guarded; but the side towards Pallenè was left open. They were conscious that they were too weak both to guard the isthmus and, crossing over to Pallenè, there to build another wall; they feared that their forces if divided would be attacked by the Potidaeans and their allies. Afterwards, when the Athenians at home heard that on the side towards Pallenè Potidaea was not invested, they sent out sixteen hundred hoplites of their own under the command of Phormio the son of Asopius. On his arrival in Pallenè he made Aphytis his head-quarters, and brought his army by slow marches up to Potidaea, wasting the country as he went along. No one came out to meet him, and so he built a wall towards Pallenè. Potidaea was now

closely invested on both sides, while the Athenian ships, lying off the city, cut off all communication from the sea.

65. Ἀριστεὺς δὲ ἀποτειχισθείσης αὐτῆς καὶ ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν ἔχων σωτηρίας, ἢν μή τι ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἢ ἄλλο παρὰ λόγον γίγνηται, ξυνεβούλευε μὲν πλὴν πεντακοσίων ἄνεμον τηρήσασι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκπλεῦσαι, ὅπως ἐπὶ πλέον ὁ σῖτος ἀντίσχῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελε τῶν μενόντων εἶναι: ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἔπειθε, βουλόμενος τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις παρασκευάζειν καὶ ὅπως τὰ ἔξωθεν ἔξει ὡς ἄριστα, ἔκπλουν ποιεῖται λαθὼν τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων. [2] καὶ παραμένων ἐν Χαλκιδεῦσι τά τε ἄλλα ξυνεπολέμει καὶ Σερμυλιῶν λοχήσας πρὸς τῇ πόλει πολλοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἔς τε τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἔπρασσεν ὅπῃ ὠφελία τις γενήσεται. μετὰ δὲ τῆς Ποτειδαίας τὴν ἀποτείχισιν Φορμίων μὲν ἔχων τοὺς ἑξακοσίους καὶ χιλίους τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν καὶ Βοττικὴν ἐδῄου καὶ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ πολίσματα εἶλεν.

[65] Aristeus despaired of saving the place unless aid came from Peloponnesus or he was relieved in some unforeseen manner. Being anxious to husband provisions, he proposed to the garrison that they should avail themselves of the first favourable wind and sail away, leaving behind five hundred men, of whom he offered to be one. But they would not listen to him; so, wanting to do the best he could, and to further the Peloponnesian interests beyond the walls, he sailed out undiscovered by the Athenian guard-ships. He did not leave the country, but assisted the Chalcidians in carrying on the war. He succeeded in cutting off a large force of Sermylians by an ambuscade which he laid near their city; he also exerted himself to obtain aid from Peloponnesus. Phormio with his sixteen hundred hoplites, now that Potidaea was invested, ravaged Chalcidicè and Botticè, and captured several places.

66. τοῖς δ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις αἰτίαι μὲν αὗται προυγεγένηντο ἐς ἀλλήλους, τοῖς μὲν Κορινθίοις ὅτι τὴν Ποτείδαιαν ἑαυτῶν οὖσαν ἀποικίαν καὶ ἄνδρας Κορινθίων τε καὶ Πελοποννησίων ἐν αὐτῇ ὄντας ἐπολιόρκουν, τοῖς δὲ

Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ὅτι ἑαυτῶν τε πόλιν ξυμμαχίδα καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῆ ἀπέστησαν, καὶ ἐλθόντες σφίσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐμάχοντο μετὰ Ποτειδεατῶν. οὐ μέντοι ὅ γε πόλεμός πω ξυνερρώγει, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἀνοκωχὴ ἦν: ἰδίᾳ γὰρ ταῦτα οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔπραξαν.

[66] Such were the causes of ill-feeling which at this time existed between the Athenians and Peloponnesians: the Corinthians complaining that the Athenians were blockading their colony of Potidaea, and a Corinthian and Peloponnesian garrison in it; the Athenians rejoining that a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy had excited to revolt a state which was an ally and tributary of theirs, and that they had now openly joined the Potidaeans, and were fighting on their side. The Peloponnesian war, however, had not yet broken out; the peace still continued; for thus far the Corinthians had acted alone.

67. πολιορκουμένης δὲ τῆς Ποτειδαίας οὐχ ἡσύχαζον, ἀνδρῶν τε σφίσιν ἐνόντων καὶ ἅμα περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ δεδιότες: παρεκάλουν τε εὐθὺς ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ κατεβόων ἐλθόντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅτι σπονδάς τε λελυκότες εἶεν καὶ ἀδικοῖεν τὴν Πελοπόννησον. [2] Αἰγινῆταί τε φανερῶς μὲν οὐ πρεσβευόμενοι, δεδιότες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, κρύφα δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐνῆγον τὸν πόλεμον, λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς σπονδάς. [3] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προσπαρακαλέσαντες τῶν ξυμμάχων τε καὶ εἴ τίς τι ἄλλο ἔφη ἠδικῆσθαι ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ξύλλογον σφῶν αὐτῶν ποιήσαντες τὸν εἰωθότα λέγειν ἐκέλευον. [4] καὶ ἄλλοι τε παριόντες ἐγκλήματα ἐποιοῦντο ὡς ἕκαστοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διάφορα, μάλιστα δὲ λιμένων τε εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀγορᾶς παρὰ τὰς σπονδάς. [5] παρελθόντες δὲ τελευταῖοι Κορίνθιοι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐάσαντες πρῶτον παροξῦναι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεῖπον τοιάδε.

[67] But now, seeing Potidaea besieged, they bestirred themselves in earnest. Corinthian troops were shut up within the walls, and they were afraid of losing the town; so without

delay they invited the allies to meet at Sparta. There they inveighed against the Athenians, whom they affirmed to have broken the treaty and to be wronging the Peloponnese. The Aeginetans did not venture to send envoys openly, but secretly they acted with the Corinthians, and were among the chief instigators of the war, declaring that they had been robbed of the independence which the treaty guaranteed them. The Lacedaemonians themselves then proceeded to summon any of the allies who had similar charges to bring against the Athenians, and calling their own ordinary assembly told them to speak. Several of them came forward and stated their wrongs: The Megarians alleged, among other grounds of complaint, that they were excluded from all harbours within the Athenian dominion and from the Athenian market, contrary to the treaty. The Corinthians waited until the other allies had stirred up the Lacedaemonians; at length they came forward, and, last of all, spoke as follows:

68. ‘τὸ πιστὸν ὑμᾶς, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τῆς καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς πολιτείας καὶ ὁμιλίας ἀπιστοτέρους ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους ἤν τι λέγωμεν καθίστησιν: καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ σωφροσύνην μὲν ἔχετε, ἀμαθίᾳ δὲ πλέονι πρὸς τὰ ἔξω πράγματα χρῆσθε. [2] πολλάκις γὰρ προαγορευόντων ἡμῶν ἃ ἐμέλλομεν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων βλάπτεσθαι, οὐ περὶ ὧν ἐδιδάσκομεν ἑκάστοτε τὴν μάθησιν ἐποιεῖσθε, ἀλλὰ τῶν λεγόντων μᾶλλον ὑπενοεῖτε ὡς ἕνεκα τῶν αὐτοῖς ἰδίᾳ διαφόρων λέγουσιν: καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ οὐ πρὶν πάσχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐσμέν, τοὺς ξυμμάχους τούσδε παρεκαλέσατε, ἐν οἷς προσήκει ἡμᾶς οὐχ ἥκιστα εἰπεῖν, ὅσῳ καὶ μέγιστα ἐγκλήματα ἔχομεν ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ὑβριζόμενοι, ὑπὸ δὲ ὑμῶν ἀμελούμενοι. [3] ’καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀφανεῖς που ὄντες ἠδίκουν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, διδασκαλίας ἂν ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσι προσέδει: νῦν δὲ τί δεῖ μακρηγορεῖν, ὧν τοὺς μὲν δεδουλωμένους ὁρᾶτε, τοῖς δὲ ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτούς, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῖς ἡμετέροις ξυμμάχοις, καὶ ἐκ πολλοῦ προπαρεσκευασμένους, εἴ ποτε ἄρα πολεμήσονται; [4] οὐ γὰρ ἂν Κέρκυράν τε ὑπολαβόντες

βίᾳ ἡμῶν εἶχον καὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἐπολιόρκουν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐπικαιρότατον χωρίον πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἀποχρῆσθαι, ἡ δὲ ναυτικὸν ἂν μέγιστον παρέσχε Πελοποννησίοις.

[68] ‘The spirit of trust, Lacedaemonians, which animates your own political and social life, makes you distrust others who, like ourselves, have something unpleasant to say, and this temper of mind, though favourable to moderation, too often leaves you in ignorance of what is going on outside your own country. Time after time we have warned you of the mischief which the Athenians would do to us, but instead of taking our words to heart, you chose to suspect that we only spoke from interested motives. And this is the reason why you have brought the allies to Sparta too late, not before but after the injury has been inflicted, and when they are smarting under the sense of it. Which of them all has a better right to speak than ourselves, who have the heaviest accusations to make, outraged as we are by the Athenians, and neglected by you? If the crimes which they are committing against Hellas were being done in a corner, then you might be ignorant, and we should have to inform you of them: but now, what need of many words? Some of us, as you see, have been already enslaved; they are at this moment intriguing against others, notably against allies of ours; and long ago they had made all their preparations in the prospect of war. Else why did they seduce from her allegiance Corcyra, which they still hold in defiance of us, and why are they blockading Potidaea, the latter a most advantageous post for the command of the Thracian peninsula, the former a great naval power which might have assisted the Peloponnesians?

69. καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι, τό τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στῆσαι τείχη,ἐς τόδε τε αἰεὶ ἀποστεροῦντες οὐ μόνον τοὺς ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων δεδουλωμένους ἐλευθερίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἤδη ξυμμάχους: οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δυνάμενος μὲν παῦσαι περιορῶν δὲ

ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾷ, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται. [2] μόλις δὲ νῦν γε ξυνήλθομεν καὶ οὐδὲ νῦν ἐπὶ φανεροῖς. χρῆν γὰρ οὐκ εἰ ἀδικούμεθα ἔτι σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ὅτι ἀμυνούμεθα: οἱ γὰρ δρῶντες βεβουλευμένοι πρὸς οὐ διεγνωκότας ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντες ἐπέρχονται. [3] καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα οἵᾳ ὁδῷ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὅτι κατ᾽ ὀλίγον χωροῦσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλας. καὶ λανθάνειν μὲν οἰόμενοι διὰ τὸ ἀναίσθητον ὑμῶν ἧσσον θαρσοῦσι, γνόντες δὲ εἰδότας περιορᾶν ἰσχυρῶς ἐγκείσονται. [4] ἡσυχάζετε γάρ, μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινά, ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν διπλασιουμένην δὲ καταλύοντες. [5] καίτοι ἐλέγεσθε ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι, ὧν ἄρα ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἐκράτει. τόν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν ἐκ περάτων γῆς πρότερον ἐπὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα ἢ τὰ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἀξίως προαπαντῆσαι, καὶ νῦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἑκάς, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγγὺς ὄντας περιορᾶτε, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπελθεῖν αὐτοὶ ἀμύνεσθαι βούλεσθε μᾶλλον ἐπιόντας, καὶ ἐς τύχας πρὸς πολλῷ δυνατωτέρους ἀγωνιζόμενοι καταστῆναι, ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὑτῷ τὰ πλείω σφαλέντα, καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἤδη τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἀφ᾽ ὑμῶν τιμωρίᾳ περιγεγενημένους, ἐπεὶ αἵ γε ὑμέτεραι ἐλπίδες ἤδη τινάς που καὶ ἀπαρασκεύους διὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι ἔφθειραν. [6] καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐπ᾽ ἔχθρᾳ τὸ πλέον ἢ αἰτίᾳ νομίσῃ τάδε λέγεσθαι: αἰτία μὲν γὰρ φίλων ἀνδρῶν ἐστὶν ἁμαρτανόντων, κατηγορία δὲ ἐχθρῶν ἀδικησάντων.

[69] ‘And the blame of all this rests on you; for you who originally allowed them to fortify their city after the Persian War, and afterwards to build their Long Walls; and to this hour you have gone on defrauding of liberty their unfortunate subjects, and are now beginning to take it away from your own allies. For the true enslaver of a people is he who can put an end to their slavery but has no care about it; and all the more, if he be reputed the champion of liberty in

Hellas. — And so we have met at last, but with what difficulty! and even now we have no definite object. By this time we ought to have been considering, not whether we are wronged, but how we are to be revenged. The aggressor is not now threatening, but advancing; he has made up his mind, while we are resolved about nothing. And we know too well how by slow degrees and with stealthy steps the Athenians encroach upon their neighbours. While they think that you are too dull to observe them, they are more careful, but, when they know that you wilfully overlook their aggressions, they will strike and not spare. Of all Hellenes, Lacedaemonians, you are the only people who never do anything: on the approach of an enemy you are content to defend yourselves against him, not by acts, but by intentions, and seek to overthrow him, not in the infancy but in the fulness of his strength. How came you to be considered safe? That reputation of yours was never justified by facts. We all know that the Persian made his way from the ends of the earth against Peloponnesus before you encountered him in a worthy manner; and now you are blind to the doings of the Athenians, who are not at a distance as he was, but close at hand. Instead of attacking your enemy, you wait to be attacked, and take the chances of a struggle which has been deferred until his power is doubled. And you know that the Barbarian miscarried chiefly through his own errors; and that we have oftener been delivered from these very Athenians by blunders of their own, than by any aid from you. Some have already been ruined by the hopes which you inspired in them; for so entirely did they trust you that they took no precautions themselves. These things we say in no accusing or hostile spirit — let that be understood — but by way of expostulation. For men expostulate with erring friends, they bring accusation against enemies who have done them a wrong.

70. ‘καὶ ἅμα, εἴπερ τινὲς καὶ ἄλλοι, ἄξιοι νομίζομεν εἶναι τοῖς πέλας ψόγον ἐπενεγκεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ μεγάλων τῶν

διαφερόντων καθεστώτων, περὶ ὧν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡμῖν γε δοκεῖτε, οὐδ᾽ ἐκλογίσασθαι πώποτε πρὸς οἵους ὑμῖν Ἀθηναίους ὄντας καὶ ὅσον ὑμῶν καὶ ὡς πᾶν διαφέροντας ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται. [2] οἱ μέν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν: ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σῴζειν καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. [3] αὖθις δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες: τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον τῆς τε δυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ πρᾶξαι τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. [4] καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους: οἴονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἄν τι κτᾶσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι. [5] κρατοῦντές τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐξέρχονται καὶ νικώμενοι ἐπ᾽ ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτουσιν. [6] ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς. [7] καὶ ἃ μὲν ἂν ἐπινοήσαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων στέρεσθαι ἡγοῦνται, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν ἐπελθόντες κτήσωνται, ὀλίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες. ἢν δ᾽ ἄρα του καὶ πείρᾳ σφαλῶσιν, ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρείαν: μόνοι γὰρ ἔχουσί τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν ἃ ἂν ἐπινοήσωσι διὰ τὸ ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν γνῶσιν. [8] καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι᾽ ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἑορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι ξυμφοράν τε οὐχ ἧσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον: [9] ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι.

[70] ‘And surely we have a right to find fault with our neighbours, if any one ever had. There are important interests at stake to which, as far as we can see, you are insensible. And you have never considered what manner of men are these Athenians with whom you will have to fight,

and how utterly unlike yourselves. They are revolutionary, equally quick in the conception and in the execution of every new plan; while you are conservative — careful only to keep what you have, originating nothing, and not acting even when action is most urgent. They are bold beyond their strength; they run risks which prudence would condemn; and in the midst of misfortune they are full of hope. Whereas it is your nature, though strong, to act feebly; when your plans are most prudent, to distrust them; and when calamities come upon you, to think that you will never be delivered from them. They are impetuous, and you are dilatory; they are always abroad, and you are always at home. For they hope to gain something by leaving their homes; but you are afraid that any new enterprise may imperil what you have already. When conquerors, they pursue their victory to the utmost; when defeated, they fall back the least. Their bodies they devote to their country as though they belonged to other men; their true self is their mind, which is most truly their own when employed in her service. When they do not carry out an intention which they have formed, they seem to themselves to have sustained a personal bereavement; when an enterprise succeeds, they have gained a mere instalment of what is to come; but if they fail, they at once conceive new hopes and so fill up the void. With them alone to hope is to have, for they lose not a moment in the execution of an idea. This is the lifelong task, full of danger and toil, which they are always imposing upon themselves. None enjoy their good things less, because they are always seeking for more. To do their duty is their only holiday, and they deem the quiet of inaction to be as disagreeable as the most tiresome business. If a man should say of them, in a word, that they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to allow peace to other men, he would simply speak the truth.

71. ‘ταύτης μέντοι τοιαύτης ἀντικαθεστηκυίας πόλεως, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, διαμέλλετε καὶ οἴεσθε τὴν ἡσυχίαν οὐ

τούτοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀρκεῖν οἳ ἂν τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ δίκαια πράσσωσι, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ, ἣν ἀδικῶνται, δῆλοι ὦσι μὴ ἐπιτρέψοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τε τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμυνόμενοι μὴ βλάπτεσθαι τὸ ἴσον νέμετε. [2] μόλις δ᾽ ἂν πόλει ὁμοίᾳ παροικοῦντες ἐτυγχάνετε τούτου: νῦν δ᾽, ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐδηλώσαμεν, ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. [3] ἀνάγκη δὲ ὥσπερ τέχνης αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν: καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ. δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τῆς πολυπειρίας ἐπὶ πλέον ὑμῶν κεκαίνωται. [4] μέχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦδε ὡρίσθω ὑμῶν ἡ βραδυτής: νῦν δὲ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ Ποτειδεάταις, ὥσπερ ὑπεδέξασθε, βοηθήσατε κατὰ τάχος ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνδρας τε φίλους καὶ ξυγγενεῖς τοῖς ἐχθίστοις προῆσθε καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀθυμίᾳ πρὸς ἑτέραν τινὰ ξυμμαχίαν τρέψητε. [5] δρῷμεν δ᾽ ἂν ἄδικον οὐδὲν οὔτε πρὸς θεῶν τῶν ὁρκίων οὔτε πρὸς ἀνθρώπων τῶν αἰσθανομένων: λύουσι γὰρ σπονδὰς οὐχ οἱ δι᾽ ἐρημίαν ἄλλοις προσιόντες, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὴ βοηθοῦντες οἷς ἂν ξυνομόσωσιν. [6] βουλομένων δὲ ὑμῶν προθύμων εἶναι μενοῦμεν: οὔτε γὰρ ὅσια ἂν ποιοῖμεν μεταβαλλόμενοι οὔτε ξυνηθεστέρους ἂν ἄλλους εὕροιμεν. [7] πρὸς τάδε βουλεύεσθε εὖ καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πειρᾶσθε μὴ ἐλάσσω ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ οἱ πατέρες ὑμῖν παρέδοσαν.’

[71] ‘In the face of such an enemy, Lacedaemonians, you persist in doing nothing. You do not see that peace is best secured by those who use their strength justly, but whose attitude shows that they have no intention of submitting to wrong. Justice with you seems to consist in giving no annoyance to others and in defending yourselves only against positive injury. But this policy would hardly be successful, even if your neighbours were like yourselves; and in the present case, as we pointed out just now, your ways compared with theirs are old-fashioned. And, as in the arts, so also in politics, the new must always prevail over the

old. In settled times the traditions of government should be observed: but when circumstances are changing and men are compelled to meet them, much originality is required. The Athenians have had a wider experience, and therefore the administration of their state unlike yours has been greatly reformed. But here let your procrastination end; send an army at once into Attica and assist your allies, especially the Potidaeans, to whom your word is pledged. Do not betray friends and kindred into the hands of their worst enemies; or drive us in despair to seek the alliance of others; in taking such a course we should be doing nothing wrong either before the Gods who are the witnesses of our oaths, or before men whose eyes are upon us. For the true breakers of treaties are not those who, when forsaken, turn to others, but those who forsake allies whom they have sworn to defend. We will remain your friends if you choose to bestir yourselves; for we should be guilty of an impiety if we deserted you without cause; and we shall not easily find allies equally congenial to us. Take heed then: you have inherited from your fathers the leadership of Peloponnesus; see that her greatness suffers no diminution at your hands.’

72. τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον. τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἔτυχε γὰρ πρεσβεία πρότερον ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι περὶ ἄλλων παροῦσα, καὶ ὡς ᾔσθοντο τῶν λόγων, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς παριτητέα ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ἐγκλημάτων πέρι μηδὲν ἀπολογησομένους ὧν αἱ πόλεις ἐνεκάλουν,δηλῶσαι δὲ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ὡς οὐ ταχέως αὐτοῖς βουλευτέον εἴη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν πλέονι σκεπτέον. καὶ ἅμα τὴν σφετέραν πόλιν ἐβούλοντο σημῆναι ὅση εἴη δύναμιν, καὶ ὑπόμνησιν ποιήσασθαι τοῖς τε πρεσβυτέροις ὧν ἤδεσαν καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἐξήγησιν ὧν ἄπειροι ἦσαν, νομίζοντες μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν λόγων πρὸς τὸ ἡσυχάζειν τραπέσθαι ἢ πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν. [2] προσελθόντες οὖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔφασαν βούλεσθαι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐς τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι μὴ ἀποκωλύοι. οἱ δὲ ἐκέλευόν τε παριέναι, καὶ παρελθόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

[72] Thus spoke the Corinthians. Now there happened to be staying at Lacedaemon an Athenian embassy which had come on other business, and when the envoys heard what the Corinthians had said, they felt bound to go before the Lacedaemonian assembly, not with the view of answering the accusations brought against them by the cities, but they wanted to put the whole question before the Lacedaemonians, and make them understand that they should take time to deliberate and not be rash. They also desired to set forth the greatness of their city, reminding the elder men of what they knew, and informing the younger of what lay beyond their experience. They thought that their words would sway the Lacedaemonians in the direction of peace. So they came and said that, if they might be allowed, they too would like to address the people. The Lacedaemonians invited them to come forward, and they spoke as follows:

73. ‘ἡ μὲν πρέσβευσις ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐς ἀντιλογίαν τοῖς ὑμετέροις ξυμμάχοις ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἡ πόλις ἔπεμψεν: αἰσθανόμενοι δὲ καταβοὴν οὐκ ὀλίγην οὖσαν ἡμῶν παρήλθομεν οὐ τοῖς ἐγκλήμασι τῶν πόλεων ἀντεροῦντες οὐ γὰρ παρὰ δικασταῖς ὑμῖν οὔτε ἡμῶν οὔτε τούτων οἱ λόγοι ἂν γίγνοιντο, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ ῥᾳδίως περὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων τοῖς ξυμμάχοις πειθόμενοι χεῖρον βουλεύσησθε, καὶ ἅμα βουλόμενοι περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λόγου τοῦ ἐς ἡμᾶς καθεστῶτος δηλῶσαι ὡς οὔτε ἀπεικότως ἔχομεν ἃ κεκτήμεθα, ἥ τε πόλις ἡμῶν ἀξία λόγου ἐστίν. [2]’καὶ τὰ μὲν πάνυ παλαιὰ τί δεῖ λέγειν, ὧν ἀκοαὶ μᾶλλον λόγων μάρτυρες ἢ ὄψις τῶν ἀκουσομένων; τὰ δὲ Μηδικὰ καὶ ὅσα αὐτοὶ ξύνιστε, εἰ καὶ δι᾽ ὄχλου μᾶλλον ἔσται αἰεὶ προβαλλομένοις, ἀνάγκη λέγειν: καὶ γὰρ ὅτε ἐδρῶμεν, ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ ἐκινδυνεύετο, ἧς τοῦ μὲν ἔργου μέρος μετέσχετε, τοῦ δὲ λόγου μὴ παντός, εἴ τι ὠφελεῖ, στερισκώμεθα. [3] ῥηθήσεται δὲ οὐ παραιτήσεως μᾶλλον ἕνεκα ἢ μαρτυρίου καὶ δηλώσεως πρὸς οἵαν ὑμῖν πόλιν μὴ εὖ βουλευομένοις ὁ ἀγὼν καταστήσεται. [4] φαμὲν γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι

προκινδυνεῦσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ καὶ ὅτε τὸ ὕστερον ἦλθεν, οὐχ ἱκανοὶ ὄντες κατὰ γῆν ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς πανδημεὶ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ξυνναυμαχῆσαι, ὅπερ ἔσχε μὴ κατὰ πόλεις αὐτὸν ἐπιπλέοντα τὴν Πελοπόννησον πορθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων ἂν ὄντων πρὸς ναῦς πολλὰς ἀλλήλοις ἐπιβοηθεῖν. [5] τεκμήριον δὲ μέγιστον αὐτὸς ἐποίησεν: νικηθεὶς γὰρ ταῖς ναυσὶν ὡς οὐκέτι αὐτῷ ὁμοίας οὔσης τῆς δυνάμεως κατὰ τάχος τῷ πλέονι τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀνεχώρησεν.

[73] ‘We were not sent here to argue with your allies, but on a special mission; observing, however, that no small outcry has arisen against us, we have come forward, not to answer the accusations which they bring (for you are not judges before whom either we or they have to plead), but to prevent you from lending too ready an ear to their bad advice and so deciding wrongly about a very serious question. We propose also, in reply to the wider charges which are raised against us, to show that what we have acquired we hold rightfully and that our city is not to be despised.’Of the ancient deeds handed down by tradition and which no eye of any one who hears us ever saw, why should we speak? But of the Persian War, and other events which you yourselves remember, speak we must, although we have brought them forward so often that the repetition of them is disagreeable to us. When we faced those perils we did so for the common benefit: in the solid good you shared, and of the glory, whatever good there may be in that, we would not be wholly deprived. Our words are not designed to deprecate hostility, but to set forth in evidence the character of the city with which, unless you are very careful, you will soon be involved in war. We tell you that we, first and alone, dared to engage with the Barbarian at Marathon, and that when he came again, being too weak to defend ourselves by land, we and our whole people embarked on shipboard and shared with the other Hellenes in the victory of Salamis. Thereby he was prevented from sailing to the Peloponnesus and ravaging city after city; for against so

mighty a fleet how could you have helped one another? He himself is the best witness of our words; for when he was once defeated at sea, he felt that his power was gone and quickly retreated with the greater part of his army.

74. τοιούτου μέντοι τούτου ξυμβάντος, καὶ σαφῶς δηλωθέντος ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πράγματα ἐγένετο, τρία τὰ ὠφελιμώτατα ἐς αὐτὸ παρεσχόμεθα, ἀριθμόν τε νεῶν πλεῖστον καὶ ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν ξυνετώτατον καὶ προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην: ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ ἄρχοντα, ὃς αἰτιώτατος ἐν τῷ στενῷ ναυμαχῆσαι ἐγένετο, ὅπερ σαφέστατα ἔσωσε τὰ πράγματα, καὶ αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦτο ὑμεῖς ἐτιμήσατε μάλιστα δὴ ἄνδρα ξένον τῶν ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐλθόντων: [2] προθυμίαν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τολμηροτάτην ἐδείξαμεν, οἵ γε, ἐπειδὴ ἡμῖν κατὰ γῆν οὐδεὶς ἐβοήθει, τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη μέχρι ἡμῶν δουλευόντων ἠξιώσαμεν ἐκλιπόντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα διαφθείραντες μηδ᾽ ὣς τὸ τῶν περιλοίπων ξυμμάχων κοινὸν προλιπεῖν μηδὲ σκεδασθέντες ἀχρεῖοι αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς κινδυνεῦσαι καὶ μὴ ὀργισθῆναι ὅτι ἡμῖν οὐ προυτιμωρήσατε. [3] ὥστε φαμὲν οὐχ ἧσσον αὐτοὶ ὠφελῆσαι ὑμᾶς ἢ τυχεῖν τούτου. ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπό τε οἰκουμένων τῶν πόλεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ λοιπὸν νέμεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἐδείσατε ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ οὐχ ἡμῶν τὸ πλέον, ἐβοηθήσατε ὅτε γοῦν ἦμεν ἔτι σῶοι, οὐ παρεγένεσθε : ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπό τε τῆς οὐκ οὔσης ἔτι ὁρμώμενοι καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐν βραχείᾳ ἐλπίδι οὔσης κινδυνεύοντες ξυνεσώσαμεν ὑμᾶς τε τὸ μέρος καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. [4] εἰ δὲ προσεχωρήσαμεν πρότερον τῷ Μήδῳ δείσαντες, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι, περὶ τῇ χώρᾳ, ἢ μὴ ἐτολμήσαμεν ὕστερον ἐσβῆναι ἐς τὰς ναῦς ὡς διεφθαρμένοι, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει ἔτι ὑμᾶς μὴ ἔχοντας ναῦς ἱκανὰς ναυμαχεῖν,ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν ἂν αὐτῷ προυχώρησε τὰ πράγματα ᾗ ἐβούλετο.

[74] ‘The event proved undeniably that the fate of Hellas depended on her navy. And the three chief elements of

success were contributed by us; namely, the greatest number of ships, the ablest general, the most devoted patriotism. The ships in all numbered four hundred, and of these, our own contingent amounted to nearly two-thirds. To the influence of Themistocles our general it was chiefly due that we fought in the strait, which was confessedly our salvation; and for this service you yourselves honoured him above any stranger who ever visited you. Thirdly, we displayed the most extraordinary courage and devotion; there was no one to help us by land; for up to our frontier those who lay in the enemy's path were already slaves; so we determined to leave our city and sacrifice our homes. Even in that extremity we did not choose to desert the cause of the allies who still resisted, or by dispersing ourselves to become useless to them; but we embarked and fought, taking no offence at your failure to assist us sooner. We maintain then that we rendered you a service at least as great as you rendered us. The cities from which you came to help us were still inhabited and you might hope to return to them; your concern was for yourselves and not for us; at any rate you remained at a distance while we had anything to lose. But we went forth from a city which was no more, and fought for one of which there was small hope; and yet we saved ourselves, and bore our part in saving you. If, in order to preserve our land, like other states, we had gone over to the Persians at first, or afterwards had not ventured to embark because our ruin was already complete, it would have been useless for you with your weak navy to fight at sea, but everything would have gone quietly just as the Persian desired.

75. ‘Ἆρ᾽ ἄξιοί ἐσμεν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ προθυμίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώμης ξυνέσεως ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχομεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι; [2] καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελησάντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν

δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι: [3] ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας. [4] καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ἔτι ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθημένους, καί τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων κατεστραμμένων, ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνέντας κινδυνεύειν: καὶ γὰρ ἂν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐγίγνοντο. [5] πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ξυμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων πέρι κινδύνων εὖ τίθεσθαι.

[75] ‘Considering, Lacedaemonians, the energy and sagacity which we then displayed, do we deserve to be so bitterly hated by the other Hellenes merely because we have an empire? That empire was not acquired by force; but you would not stay and make an end of the Barbarian, and the allies came of their own accord and asked us to be their leaders. The subsequent development of our power was originally forced upon us by circumstances; fear was our first motive; afterwards honour, and then interest stepped in. And when we had incurred the hatred of most of our allies; when some of them had already revolted and been subjugated, and you were no longer the friends to us which you once had been, but suspicious and ill-disposed, how could we without great risk relax our hold? For the cities as fast as they fell away from us would have gone over to you. And no man is to be reproached who seizes every possible advantage when the danger is so great.

76. ὑμεῖς γοῦν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὰς ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεις ἐπὶ τὸ ὑμῖν ὠφέλιμον καταστησάμενοι ἐξηγεῖσθε: καὶ εἰ τότε ὑπομείναντες διὰ παντὸς ἀπήχθεσθε ἐν τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, εὖ ἴσμεν μὴ ἂν ἧσσον ὑμᾶς λυπηροὺς γενομένους τοῖς ξυμμάχοις καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ἂν ἢ ἄρχειν ἐγκρατῶς ἢ αὐτοὺς κινδυνεύειν. [2] οὕτως οὐδ᾽ ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου, εἰ ἀρχήν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνεῖμεν ὑπὸ <τριῶν> τῶν μεγίστων νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ

δέους καὶ ὠφελίας, οὐδ᾽ αὖ πρῶτοι τοῦ τοιούτου ὑπάρξαντες, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι, ἄξιοί τε ἅμα νομίζοντες εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν δοκοῦντες μέχρι οὗ τὰ ξυμφέροντα λογιζόμενοι τῷ δικαίῳ λόγῳ νῦν χρῆσθε, ὃν οὐδείς πω παρατυχὸν ἰσχύι τι κτήσασθαι προθεὶς τοῦ μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπετο. [3] ἐπαινεῖσθαί τε ἄξιοι οἵτινες χρησάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει ὥστε ἑτέρων ἄρχειν δικαιότεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν γένωνται. [4] ἄλλους γ᾽ ἂν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἴ τι μετριάζομεν: ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἀδοξία τὸ πλέον ἢ ἔπαινος οὐκ εἰκότως περιέστη.

[76] ‘At all events, Lacedaemonians, we may retort that you, in the exercise of your supremacy, manage the cities of Peloponnesus to suit your own views; and that if you, and not we, had persevered in the command of the allies long enough to be hated, you would have been quite as intolerable to them as we are, and would have been compelled, for the sake of your own safety, to rule with a strong hand. An empire was offered to us: can you wonder that, acting as human nature always will, we accepted it and refused to give it up again, constrained by three all-powerful motives, honour, fear, interest? We are not the first who have aspired to rule; the world has ever held that the weaker must be kept down by the stronger. And we think that we are worthy of power; and there was a time when you thought so too; but now, when you mean expediency you talk about justice. Did justice ever deter any one from taking by force whatever he could? Men who indulge the natural ambition of empire deserve credit if they are in any degree more careful of justice than they need be. How moderate we are would speedily appear if others took our place; indeed our very moderation, which should be our glory, has been unjustly converted into a reproach.

77. ‘καὶ ἐλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις

νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν. [2] καὶ οὐδεὶς σκοπεῖ αὐτῶν τοῖς καὶ ἄλλοθί που ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι καὶ ἧσσον ἡμῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπηκόους μετρίοις οὖσι διότι τοῦτο οὐκ ὀνειδίζεται: βιάζεσθαι γὰρ οἷς ἂν ἐξῇ, δικάζεσθαι οὐδὲν προσδέονται. [3] οἱ δὲ εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλεῖν, ἤν τι παρὰ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι χρῆναι ἢ γνώμῃ ἢ δυνάμει τῇ διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἐλασσωθῶσιν, οὐ τοῦ πλέονος μὴ στερισκόμενοι χάριν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς χαλεπώτερον φέρουσιν ἢ εἰ ἀπὸ πρώτης ἀποθέμενοι τὸν νόμον φανερῶς ἐπλεονεκτοῦμεν. ἐκείνως δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἀντέλεγον ὡς οὐ χρεὼν τὸν ἧσσω τῷ κρατοῦντι ὑποχωρεῖν. [4] ἀδικούμενοί τε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται ἢ βιαζόμενοι: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου δοκεῖ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι, τὸ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος καταναγκάζεσθαι. [5] ὑπὸ γοῦν τοῦ Μήδου δεινότερα τούτων πάσχοντες ἠνείχοντο, ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἀρχὴ χαλεπὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰκότως: τὸ παρὸν γὰρ αἰεὶ βαρὺ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις. [6] ὑμεῖς γ᾽ ἂν οὖν εἰ καθελόντες ἡμᾶς ἄρξαιτε, τάχα ἂν τὴν εὔνοιαν ἣν διὰ τὸ ἡμέτερον δέος εἰλήφατε μεταβάλοιτε, εἴπερ οἷα καὶ τότε πρὸς τὸν Μῆδον δι᾽ ὀλίγου ἡγησάμενοι ὑπεδείξατε, ὁμοῖα καὶ νῦν γνώσεσθε. ἄμεικτα γὰρ τά τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε καὶ προσέτι εἷς ἕκαστος ἐξιὼν οὔτε τούτοις χρῆται οὔθ᾽ οἷς ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς νομίζει.

[77] ‘For because in our suits with our allies, regulated by treaty, we do not even stand upon our rights, but have instituted the practice of deciding them at Athens and by Athenian law, we are supposed to be litigious. None of our opponents observe why others, who exercise dominion elsewhere and are less moderate than we are in their dealings with their subjects, escape this reproach. Why is it? Because men who practise violence have no longer any need of law. But we are in the habit of meeting our allies on terms of equality, and, therefore, if through some legal decision of ours, or exercise of our imperial power, contrary to their own ideas of right, they suffer ever so little, they are

not grateful for our moderation in leaving them so much, but are far more offended at their trifling loss than if we had from the first plundered them in the face of day, laying aside all thought of law. For then they would themselves have admitted that the weaker must give way to the stronger. Mankind resent injustice more than violence, because the one seems to be an unfair advantage taken by an equal, the other is the irresistible force of a superior. They were patient under the yoke of the Persian, who inflicted on them far more grievous wrongs; but now our dominion is odious in their eyes. And no wonder: the ruler of the day is always detested by his subjects. And should your empire supplant ours, may not you lose the good-will which you owe to the fear of us? Lose it you certainly will, if you mean again to exhibit the temper of which you gave a specimen when, for a short time, you led the confederacy against the Persian. For the institutions under which you live are incompatible with those of foreign states; and further, when any of you goes abroad, he respects neither these nor any other Hellenic customs.

78. ‘βουλεύεσθε οὖν βραδέως ὡς οὐ περὶ βραχέων, καὶ μὴ ἀλλοτρίαις γνώμαις καὶ ἐγκλήμασι πεισθέντες οἰκεῖον πόνον πρόσθησθε. τοῦ δὲ πολέμου τὸν παράλογον, ὅσος ἐστί, πρὶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι προδιάγνωτε: [2] μηκυνόμενος γὰρ φιλεῖ ἐς τύχας τὰ πολλὰ περιίστασθαι, ὧν ἴσον τε ἀπέχομεν καὶ ὁποτέρως ἔσται ἐν ἀδήλῳ κινδυνεύεται. [3] ἰόντες τε οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους τῶν ἔργων πρότερον ἔχονται, ἃ χρῆν ὕστερον δρᾶν, κακοπαθοῦντες δὲ ἤδη τῶν λόγων ἅπτονται. [4] ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ πω τοιαύτῃ ἁμαρτίᾳ ὄντες οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ οὔθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντες λέγομεν ὑμῖν, ἕως ἔτι αὐθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἡ εὐβουλία, σπονδὰς μὴ λύειν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρκους, τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκῃ λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνθήκην. εἰ δὲ μή, θεοὺς τοὺς ὁρκίους μάρτυρας ποιούμενοι πειρασόμεθα ἀμύνεσθαι πολέμου ἄρχοντας ταύτῃ ᾗ ἂν ὑφηγῆσθε.’

[78] ‘Do not then be hasty in deciding a question which is serious; and do not, by listening to representations and complaints which concern others, bring trouble upon yourselves. Realise, while there is time, the inscrutable nature of war; and how when protracted it generally ends in becoming a mere matter of chance, over which neither of us can have any control, the event being equally unknown and equally hazardous to both. The misfortune is that in their hurry to go to war, men begin with blows, and when a reverse comes upon them, then have recourse to words. But neither you, nor we, have as yet committed this mistake; and therefore while both of us can still choose the prudent part, we tell you not to break the peace or violate your oaths. Let our differences be determined by arbitration, according to the treaty. If you refuse we call to witness the Gods, by whom your oaths were sworn, that you are the authors of the war; and we will do our best to strike in return.’

79. τοιαῦτα δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶπον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν τε ξυμμάχων ἤκουσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ ἐγκλήματα τὰ ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἃ ἔλεξαν, μεταστησάμενοι πάντας ἐβουλεύοντο κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ τῶν παρόντων. [2] καὶ τῶν μὲν πλεόνων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἱ γνῶμαι ἔφερον, ἀδικεῖν τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἤδη καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι ἐν τάχει: παρελθὼν δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν, ἀνὴρ καὶ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων, ἔλεξε τοιάδε.

[79] When the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges brought by the allies against the Athenians, and their rejoinder, they ordered everybody but themselves to withdraw, and deliberated alone. The majority were agreed that there was now a clear case against the Athenians, and that they must fight at once. But Archidamus their king, who was held to be both an able and a prudent man, came forward and spoke as follows:

80. ‘καὶ αὐτὸς πολλῶν ἤδη πολέμων ἔμπειρός εἰμι, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ ὑμῶν τοὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὁρῶ, ὥστε μήτε ἀπειρίᾳ ἐπιθυμῆσαί τινα τοῦ ἔργου, ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ πάθοιεν, μήτε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀσφαλὲς νομίσαντα. [2] εὕροιτε δ᾽ ἂν τόνδε περὶ οὗ νῦν βουλεύεσθε οὐκ ἂν ἐλάχιστον γενόμενον, εἰ σωφρόνως τις αὐτὸν ἐκλογίζοιτο. [3] πρὸς μὲν γὰρ Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας παρόμοιος ἡμῶν ἡ ἀλκή, καὶ διὰ ταχέων οἷόν τε ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστα ἐλθεῖν: πρὸς δὲ ἄνδρας οἳ γῆν τε ἑκὰς ἔχουσι καὶ προσέτι θαλάσσης ἐμπειρότατοί εἰσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἄριστα ἐξήρτυνται, πλούτῳ τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ ὄχλῳ ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἑνί γε χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῷ ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ξυμμάχους πολλοὺς φόρου ὑποτελεῖς ἔχουσι, πῶς χρὴ πρὸς τούτους ῥᾳδίως πόλεμον ἄρασθαι καὶ τίνι πιστεύσαντας ἀπαρασκεύους ἐπειχθῆναι; [4] πότερον ταῖς ναυσίν; ἀλλ᾽ ἥσσους ἐσμέν: εἰ δὲ μελετήσομεν καὶ ἀντιπαρασκευασόμεθα, χρόνος ἐνέσται. ἀλλὰ τοῖς χρήμασιν; ἀλλὰ πολλῷ πλέον ἔτι τούτου ἐλλείπομεν καὶ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν οὔτε ἑτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν.

[80] ‘At my age, Lacedaemonians, I have had experience of many wars, and I see several of you who are as old as I am, and who will not, as men too often do, desire war because they have never known it, or in the belief that it is either a good or a safe thing. Any one who calmly reflects will find that the war about which you are now deliberating is likely to be a very great one. When we encounter our neighbours in the Peloponnese, their mode of fighting is like ours, and they are all within a short march. But when we have to do with men whose country is a long way off, and who are most skilful seamen and thoroughly provided with the means of war, — having wealth, private and public, ships, horses, infantry, and a population larger than is to be found in any single Hellenic territory, not to speak of the numerous allies who pay them tribute, — is this a people against whom we can lightly take up arms or plunge into a contest unprepared? To what do we trust? To our navy? There we are

inferior; and to exercise and train ourselves until we are a match for them, will take time. To our money? Nay, but in that we are weaker still; we have none in a common treasury, and we are never willing to contribute out of our private means.

81. τάχ᾽ ἄν τις θαρσοίη ὅτι τοῖς ὅπλοις αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ πλήθει ὑπερφέρομεν, ὥστε τὴν γῆν δῃοῦν ἐπιφοιτῶντες. [2] τοῖς δὲ ἄλλη γῆ ἐστὶ πολλὴ ἧς ἄρχουσι, καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ὧν δέονται ἐπάξονται. [3] εἰ δ᾽ αὖ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀφιστάναι πειρασόμεθα, δεήσει καὶ τούτοις ναυσὶ βοηθεῖν τὸ πλέον οὖσι νησιώταις. [4] τίς οὖν ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ πόλεμος; εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἢ ναυσὶ κρατήσομεν ἢ τὰς προσόδους ἀφαιρήσομεν ἀφ᾽ ὧν τὸ ναυτικὸν τρέφουσι, βλαψόμεθα τὰ πλείω. [5] κἀν τούτῳ οὐδὲ καταλύεσθαι ἔτι καλόν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ δόξομεν ἄρξαι μᾶλλον τῆς διαφορᾶς. [6] μὴ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνῃ γε τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαιρώμεθα ὡς ταχὺ παυσθήσεται ὁ πόλεμος, ἢν τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν τέμωμεν. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτὸν ὑπολίπωμεν: οὕτως εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίους φρονήματι μήτε τῇ γῇ δουλεῦσαι μήτε ὥσπερ ἀπείρους καταπλαγῆναι τῷ πολέμῳ.

[81] ‘Perhaps some one may be encouraged by the superior equipment and numbers of our infantry, which will enable us regularly to invade and ravage their lands. But their empire extends to distant countries, and they will be able to introduce supplies by sea. Or, again, we may try to stir up revolts among their allies. But these are mostly islanders, and we shall have to employ a fleet in their defence, as well as in our own. How then shall we carry on the war? For if we can neither defeat them at sea, nor deprive them of the revenues by which their navy is maintained, we shall get the worst of it. And having gone so far, we shall no longer be able even to make peace with honour, especially if we are believed to have begun the quarrel. We must not for one moment flatter ourselves that if we do but ravage their country the war will be at an end. Nay, I fear that we shall bequeath it to our children; for the Athenians with their high

spirit will never barter their liberty to save their land, or be terrified like novices at the sight of war.

82. ‘οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀναισθήτως αὐτοὺς κελεύω τούς τε ξυμμάχους ἡμῶν ἐᾶν βλάπτειν καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας μὴ καταφωρᾶν, ἀλλὰ ὅπλα μὲν μήπω κινεῖν, πέμπειν δὲ καὶ αἰτιᾶσθαι μήτε πόλεμον ἄγαν δηλοῦντας μήθ᾽ ὡς ἐπιτρέψομεν, κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, εἴ ποθέν τινα ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα ἀνεπίφθονον δέ, ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι , καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἅμα ἐκποριζώμεθα. [2] καὶ ἢν μὲν ἐσακούωσί τι πρεσβευομένων ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἄριστα: ἢν δὲ μή, διελθόντων ἐτῶν δύο καὶ τριῶν ἄμεινον ἤδη, ἢν δοκῇ, πεφραγμένοι ἴμεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς. [3] καὶ ἴσως ὁρῶντες ἡμῶν ἤδη τήν τε παρασκευὴν καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῇ ὁμοῖα ὑποσημαίνοντας μᾶλλον ἂν εἴκοιεν, καὶ γῆν ἔτι ἄτμητον ἔχοντες καὶ περὶ παρόντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὔπω ἐφθαρμένων βουλευόμενοι. [4] μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι νομίσητε τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἐξείργασται: ἧς φείδεσθαι χρὴ ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, καὶ μὴ ἐς ἀπόνοιαν καταστήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἀληπτοτέρους ἔχειν. [5] εἰ γὰρ ἀπαράσκευοι τοῖς τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐγκλήμασιν ἐπειχθέντες τεμοῦμεν αὐτήν, ὁρᾶτε ὅπως μὴ αἴσχιον καὶ ἀπορώτερον τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πράξομεν. [6] ἐγκλήματα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν οἷόν τε καταλῦσαι: πόλεμον δὲ ξύμπαντας ἀραμένους ἕνεκα τῶν ἰδίων, ὃν οὐχ ὑπάρχει εἰδέναι καθ᾽ ὅτι χωρήσει, οὐ ῥᾴδιον εὐπρεπῶς θέσθαι.

[82] ‘Not that I would have you shut your eyes to their designs and abstain from unmasking them, or tamely suffer them to injure our allies. But do not take up arms yet. Let us first send and remonstrate with them: we need not let them know positively whether we intend to go to war or not. In the meantime our own preparations may be going forward; we may seek for allies wherever we can find them, whether in Hellas or among the Barbarians, who will supply our

deficiencies in ships and money. Those who, like ourselves, are exposed to Athenian intrigue cannot be blamed if in self-defence they seek the aid not of Hellenes only, but of Barbarians. And we must develop our own resources to the utmost. If they listen to our ambassadors, well and good; but, if not, in two or three years' time we shall be in a stronger position, should we then determine to attack them. Perhaps too when they begin to see that we are getting ready, and that our words are to be interpreted by our actions, they may be more likely to yield; for their fields will be still untouched and their goods undespoiled, and it will be in their power to save them by their decision. Think of their land simply in the light of a hostage, all the more valuable in proportion as it is better cultivated; you should spare it as long as you can, and not by reducing them to despair make their resistance more obstinate. For if we allow ourselves to be stung into premature action by the reproaches of our allies, and waste their country before we are ready, we shall only involve Peloponnesus in more and more difficulty and disgrace. Charges brought by cities or persons against one another can be satisfactorily arranged; but when a great confederacy, in order to satisfy private grudges, undertakes a war of which no man can foresee the issue, it is not easy to terminate it with honour.

83. 'καὶ ἀνανδρία μηδενὶ πολλοὺς μιᾷ πόλει μὴ ταχὺ ἐπελθεῖν δοκείτω εἶναι. [2] εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἐλάσσους χρήματα φέροντες ξύμμαχοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ πόλεμος οὐχ ὅπλων τὸ πλέον ἀλλὰ δαπάνης, δι' ἣν τὰ ὅπλα ὠφελεῖ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἠπειρώταις πρὸς θαλασσίους. [3] πορισώμεθα οὖν πρῶτον αὐτήν, καὶ μὴ τοῖς τῶν ξυμμάχων λόγοις πρότερον ἐπαιρώμεθα, οἵπερ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων τὸ πλέον ἐπ' ἀμφότερα τῆς αἰτίας ἔξομεν, οὗτοι καὶ καθ' ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν προΐδωμεν.

[83] 'And let no one think that there is any want of courage in cities so numerous hesitating to attack a single one. The allies of the Athenians are not less numerous; they pay them

tribute too; and war is not an affair of arms, but of money which gives to arms their use, and which is needed above all things when a continental is fighting against a maritime power: let us find money first, and then we may safely allow our minds to be excited by the speeches of our allies. We, on whom the future responsibility, whether for good or evil, will chiefly fall, should calmly reflect on the consequences which may follow.

84. καὶ τὸ βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον, ὃ μέμφονται μάλιστα ἡμῶν, μὴ αἰσχύνεσθε. σπεύδοντές τε γὰρ σχολαίτερον ἂν παύσαισθε διὰ τὸ ἀπαράσκευοι ἐγχειρεῖν, καὶ ἅμα ἐλευθέραν καὶ εὐδοξοτάτην πόλιν διὰ παντὸς νεμόμεθα. [2] καὶ δύναται μάλιστα σωφροσύνη ἔμφρων τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι: μόνοι γὰρ δι᾽ αὐτὸ εὐπραγίαις τε οὐκ ἐξυβρίζομεν καὶ ξυμφοραῖς ἧσσον ἑτέρων εἴκομεν: τῶν τε ξὺν ἐπαίνῳ ἐξοτρυνόντων ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὰ δεινὰ παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐπαιρόμεθα ἡδονῇ, καὶ ἤν τις ἄρα ξὺν κατηγορίᾳ παροξύνῃ, οὐδὲν δὴ μᾶλλον ἀχθεσθέντες ἀνεπείσθημεν. [3] πολεμικοί τε καὶ εὔβουλοι διὰ τὸ εὔκοσμον γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν ὅτι αἰδὼς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία, εὔβουλοι δὲ ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι καὶ ξὺν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν, καὶ μὴ τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ἄγαν ὄντες τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ ἐπεξιέναι, νομίζειν δὲ τάς τε διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίους εἶναι καὶ τὰς προσπιπτούσας τύχας οὐ λόγῳ διαιρετάς. [4] αἰεὶ δὲ ὡς πρὸς εὖ βουλευομένους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἔργῳ παρασκευαζόμεθα: καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐκείνων ὡς ἁμαρτησομένων ἔχειν δεῖ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς προνοουμένων. πολύ τε διαφέρειν οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ὅστις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις παιδεύεται.

[84] ‘Do not be ashamed of the slowness and procrastination with which they are so fond of charging you; if you begin the war in haste, you will end it at your leisure, because you took up arms without sufficient preparation. Remember that

we have always been citizens of a free and most illustrious state, and that for us the policy which they condemn may well be the truest good sense and discretion. It is a policy which has saved us from growing insolent in prosperity or giving way under adversity, like other men. We are not stimulated by the allurements of flattery into dangerous courses of which we disapprove; nor are we goaded by offensive charges into compliance with any man's wishes. Our habits of discipline make us both brave and wise; brave, because the spirit of loyalty quickens the sense of honour, and the sense of honour inspires courage; wise, because we are not so highly educated that we have learned to despise the laws, and are too severely trained and of too loyal a spirit to disobey them. We have not acquired that useless over-intelligence which makes a man an excellent critic of an enemy's plans, but paralyses him in the moment of action. We think that the wits of our enemies are as good as our own, and that the element of fortune cannot be forecast in words. Let us assume that they have common prudence, and let our preparations be, not words, but deeds. Our hopes ought not to rest on the probability of their making mistakes, but on our own caution and foresight. We should remember that one man is much the same as another, and that he is best who is trained in the severest school.

85. 'ταύτας οὖν ἃς οἱ πατέρες τε ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν μελέτας καὶ αὐτοὶ διὰ παντὸς ὠφελούμενοι ἔχομεν μὴ παρῶμεν, μηδὲ ἐπειχθέντες ἐν βραχεῖ μορίῳ ἡμέρας περὶ πολλῶν σωμάτων καὶ χρημάτων καὶ πόλεων καὶ δόξης βουλεύσωμεν, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν. ἔξεστι δ᾽ ἡμῖν μᾶλλον ἑτέρων διὰ ἰσχύν. [2] καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πέμπετε μὲν περὶ τῆς Ποτειδαίας, πέμπετε δὲ περὶ ὧν οἱ ξύμμαχοί φασιν ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων αὐτῶν δίκας δοῦναι: ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν διδόντα οὐ πρότερον νόμιμον ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀδικοῦντα ἰέναι. παρασκευάζεσθε δὲ τὸν πόλεμον ἅμα. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ κράτιστα βουλεύσεσθε καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις φοβερώτατα.' [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀρχίδαμος τοιαῦτα εἶπεν:

παρελθὼν δὲ Σθενελαΐδας τελευταῖος, εἷς τῶν ἐφόρων τότε ὤν, ἔλεξεν [τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις] ὧδε.

[85] ‘These are principles which our fathers have handed down to us, and we maintain to our lasting benefit; we must not lose sight of them, and when many lives and much wealth, many cities and a great name are at stake, we must not be hasty, or make up our minds in a few short hours; we must take time. We can afford to wait, when others cannot, because we are strong. And now, send to the Athenians and remonstrate with them about Potidaea first, and also about the other wrongs of which your allies complain. They say that they are willing to have the matter tried; and against one who offers to submit to justice you must not proceed as against a criminal until his cause has been heard. In the meantime prepare for war. This decision will be the best for yourselves and the most formidable to your enemies.’Thus spoke Archidamus. Last of all, Sthenelaidas, at that time one of the Ephors, came forward and addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows:

86. ‘τοὺς μὲν λόγους τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐ γιγνώσκω: ἐπαινέσαντες γὰρ πολλὰ ἑαυτοὺς οὐδαμοῦ ἀντεῖπον ὡς οὐκ ἀδικοῦσι τοὺς ἡμετέρους ξυμμάχους καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον: καίτοι εἰ πρὸς τοὺς Μήδους ἐγένοντο ἀγαθοὶ τότε, πρὸς δ᾽ ἡμᾶς κακοὶ νῦν, διπλασίας ζημίας ἄξιοί εἰσιν, ὅτι ἀντ᾽ ἀγαθῶν κακοὶ γεγένηνται. [2] ἡμεῖς δὲ ὁμοῖοι καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἐσμέν, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ περιοψόμεθα ἀδικουμένους οὐδὲ μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν: οἱ δ᾽ οὐκέτι μέλλουσι κακῶς πάσχειν. [3] ἄλλοις μὲν γὰρ χρήματά ἐστι πολλὰ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἵπποι, ἡμῖν δὲ ξύμμαχοι ἀγαθοί, οὓς οὐ παραδοτέα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δίκαις καὶ λόγοις διακριτέα μὴ λόγῳ καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους, ἀλλὰ τιμωρητέα ἐν τάχει καὶ παντὶ σθένει. [4] καὶ ὡς ἡμᾶς πρέπει βουλεύεσθαι ἀδικουμένους μηδεὶς διδασκέτω, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον πρέπει πολὺν χρόνον βουλεύεσθαι. [5] ψηφίζεσθε οὖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἀξίως τῆς Σπάρτης τὸν

πόλεμον, καὶ μήτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐᾶτε μείζους γίγνεσθαι μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους καταπροδιδῶμεν, ἀλλὰ ξὺν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπίωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας.’

[86] ‘I do not know what the long speeches of the Athenians mean. They have been loud in their own praise, but they do not pretend to say that they are dealing honestly with our allies and with the Peloponnesus. If they behaved well in the Persian War and are now behaving badly to us they ought to be punished twice over, because they were once good men and have become bad. But we are the same now as we were then, and we shall not do our duty if we allow our allies to be ill-used, and put off helping them, for they cannot put off their troubles. Others may have money and ships and horses, but we have brave allies and we must not betray them to the Athenians. If they were suffering in word only, by words and legal processes their wrongs might be redressed; but now there is not a moment to be lost, and we must help them with all our might. Let no one tell us that we should take time to think when we are suffering injustice. Nay, we reply, those who mean to do injustice should take a long time to think. Wherefore, Lacedaemonians, prepare for war as the honour of Sparta demands. Withstand the advancing power of Athens. Do not let us betray our allies, but, with the Gods on our side, let us attack the evil-doer.’

87. τοιαῦτα λέξας ἐπεψήφιζεν αὐτὸς ἔφορος ὢν ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. [2] ὁ δέ κρίνουσι γὰρ βοῇ καὶ οὐ ψήφῳ οὐκ ἔφη διαγιγνώσκειν τὴν βοὴν ὁποτέρα μείζων, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς φανερῶς ἀποδεικνυμένους τὴν γνώμην ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ὁρμῆσαι ἔλεξεν ‘ὅτῳ μὲν ὑμῶν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, δοκοῦσι λελύσθαι αἱ σπονδαὶ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀδικεῖν, ἀναστήτω ἐς ἐκεῖνο τὸ χωρίον,’ δείξας τι χωρίον αὐτοῖς, ‘ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ δοκοῦσιν, ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερα.’ ἀναστάντες δὲ διέστησαν, [3] καὶ πολλῷ πλείους ἐγένοντο οἷς ἐδόκουν αἱ σπονδαὶ λελύσθαι. [4] προσκαλέσαντές τε τοὺς ξυμμάχους εἶπον ὅτι σφίσι μὲν δοκοῖεν ἀδικεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, βούλεσθαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πάντας ξυμμάχους

παρακαλέσαντες ψῆφον ἐπαγαγεῖν, ὅπως κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ποιῶνται, ἢν δοκῇ. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου διαπραξάμενοι ταῦτα, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ὕστερον ἐφ᾽ ἅπερ ἦλθον χρηματίσαντες: [6] ἡ δὲ διαγνώμη αὕτη τῆς ἐκκλησίας, τοῦ τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι, ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει τῶν τριακοντουτίδων σπονδῶν προκεχωρηκυιῶν, αἳ ἐγένοντο μετὰ τὰ Εὐβοϊκά.

[87] When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken he, being Ephor, himself put the question to the Lacedaemonian assembly. Their custom is to signify their decision by cries and not by voting. But he professed himself unable to tell on which side was the louder cry, and wishing to call forth a demonstration which might encourage the warlike spirit, he said, ‘Whoever of you, Lacedaemonians, thinks that the treaty has been broken and that the Athenians are in the wrong, let him rise and go yonder’ (pointing to a particular spot), ‘and those who think otherwise to the other side.’ So the assembly rose and divided, and it was determined by a large majority that the treaty had been broken. The Lacedaemonians then recalled the allies and told them that in their judgment the Athenians were guilty, but that they wished to hold a general assembly of the allies and take a vote from them all; then the war, if they approved of it, might be undertaken by common consent. Having accomplished their purpose, the allies returned home; and the Athenian envoys, when their errand was done, returned likewise. Thirteen years of the thirty years’ peace which was concluded after the recovery of Euboea had elapsed and the fourteenth year had begun when the Lacedaemonian assembly decided that the treaty had been broken.

88. ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις ὅσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐπὶ μεῖζον δυνηθῶσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑποχείρια ἤδη ὄντα.

[88] In arriving at this decision and resolving to go to war, the Lacedaemonians were influenced, not so much by the speeches of their allies, as by the fear of the Athenians and of their increasing power. For they saw the greater part of Hellas already subject to them.

89. οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι τρόπῳ τοιῷδε ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐν οἷς ηὐξήθησαν. [2] ἐπειδὴ Μῆδοι ἀνεχώρησαν ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης νικηθέντες καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων καὶ οἱ καταφυγόντες αὐτῶν ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς Μυκάλην διεφθάρησαν, Λεωτυχίδης μὲν ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅσπερ ἡγεῖτο τῶν ἐν Μυκάλῃ Ἑλλήνων, ἀπεχώρησεν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἔχων τοὺς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ξυμμάχους, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου ξύμμαχοι ἤδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως ὑπομείναντες Σηστὸν ἐπολιόρκουν Μήδων ἐχόντων, καὶ ἐπιχειμάσαντες εἶλον αὐτὴν ἐκλιπόντων τῶν βαρβάρων, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπέπλευσαν ἐξ Ἑλλησπόντου ὡς ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις. [3] Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ κοινόν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ βάρβαροι ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀπῆλθον, διεκομίζοντο εὐθὺς ὅθεν ὑπεξέθεντο παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν περιοῦσαν κατασκευήν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνοικοδομεῖν παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ τὰ τείχη: τοῦ τε γὰρ περιβόλου βραχέα εἱστήκει καὶ οἰκίαι αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ ἐπεπτώκεσαν, ὀλίγαι δὲ περιῆσαν, ἐν αἷς αὐτοὶ ἐσκήνωσαν οἱ δυνατοὶ τῶν Περσῶν.

[89] How the Athenians attained the position in which they rose to greatness I will now proceed to describe. When the Persians, defeated by the Hellenes on sea and land, had retreated from Europe, and the remnant of the fleet, which had taken refuge at Mycalè, had there perished, Leotychides, the Lacedaemonian king, who had commanded the Hellenes in the battle, returned home with the allies from Peloponnesus. But the Athenians and their allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, who had now revolted from the king, persevered and besieged Sestos, at that time still in the hands of the Persians. Remaining there through the winter they took the place, which the Barbarians deserted.

The allies then sailed back from the Hellespont to their respective homes. Meanwhile the Athenian people, now quit of the Barbarians, fetched their wives, their children, and the remains of their property from the places in which they had been deposited, and set to work, rebuilding the city and the walls. Of the old line of wall but a small part was left standing. Most of the houses were in ruins, a few only remaining in which the chief men of the Persians had lodged.

90. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τὸ μέλλον ἦλθον πρεσβείᾳ, τὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἥδιον ἂν ὁρῶντες μήτ᾽ ἐκείνους μήτ᾽ ἄλλον μηδένα τεῖχος ἔχοντα, τὸ δὲ πλέον τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐξοτρυνόντων καὶ φοβουμένων τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὃ πρὶν οὐχ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον τόλμαν γενομένην. [2] ἠξίουν τε αὐτοὺς μὴ τειχίζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἔξω Πελοποννήσου μᾶλλον ὅσοις εἰστήκει ξυγκαθελεῖν μετὰ σφῶν τοὺς περιβόλους, τὸ μὲν βουλόμενον καὶ ὕποπτον τῆς γνώμης οὐ δηλοῦντες ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὡς δὲ τοῦ βαρβάρου, εἰ αὖθις ἐπέλθοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοντος ἀπὸ ἐχυροῦ ποθέν, ὥσπερ νῦν ἐκ τῶν Θηβῶν, ὁρμᾶσθαι: τήν τε Πελοπόννησον πᾶσιν ἔφασαν ἀναχώρησίν τε καὶ ἀφορμὴν ἱκανὴν εἶναι. [3] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι Θεμιστοκλέους γνώμῃ τοὺς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους ταῦτ᾽ εἰπόντας ἀποκρινάμενοι ὅτι πέμψουσιν ὡς αὐτοὺς πρέσβεις περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν εὐθὺς ἀπήλλαξαν: ἑαυτὸν δ᾽ ἐκέλευεν ἀποστέλλειν ὡς τάχιστα ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα, ἄλλους δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτῷ ἑλομένους πρέσβεις μὴ εὐθὺς ἐκπέμπειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπισχεῖν μέχρι τοσούτου ἕως ἂν τὸ τεῖχος ἱκανὸν ἄρωσιν ὥστε ἀπομάχεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀναγκαιοτάτου ὕψους: τειχίζειν δὲ πάντας πανδημεὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει [καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας], φειδομένους μήτε ἰδίου μήτε δημοσίου οἰκοδομήματος ὅθεν τις ὠφελία ἔσται ἐς τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καθαιροῦντας πάντα. [4] καὶ ὁ μὲν ταῦτα διδάξας καὶ ὑπειπὼν τἆλλα ὅτι αὐτὸς τἀκεῖ πράξοι ᾤχετο. [5] καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν οὐ προσῄει πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ διῆγε καὶ προυφασίζετο. καὶ ὁπότε

τις αὐτὸν ἔροιτο τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέρχεται ἐπὶ τὸ κοινόν, ἔφη τοὺς ξυμπρέσβεις ἀναμένειν, ἀσχολίας δέ τινος οὔσης αὐτοὺς ὑπολειφθῆναι, προσδέχεσθαι μέντοι ἐν τάχει ἥξειν καὶ θαυμάζειν ὡς οὔπω πάρεισιν.

[90] The Lacedaemonians knew what would happen and sent an embassy to Athens. They would rather themselves have seen neither the Athenians nor any one else protected by a wall; but their main motive was the importunity of their allies, who dreaded not only the Athenian navy, which had until lately been quite small, but also the spirit which had animated them in the Persian War. So the Lacedaemonians requested them not to restore their walls, but on the contrary to join with them in razing the fortifications of other towns outside the Peloponnesus which had them standing. They did not reveal their real wishes or the suspicion which they entertained of the Athenians, but argued that the Barbarian, if he again attacked them, would then have no strong place which he could make his head-quarters as he had lately made Thebes. Peloponnesus would be a sufficient retreat for all Hellas and a good base of operations. To this the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, replied, that they would send an embassy of their own to discuss the matter, and so got rid of the Spartan envoys. He then proposed that he should himself start at once for Sparta, and that they should give him colleagues who were not to go immediately, but were to wait until the wall reached the lowest height which could possibly be defended. The whole people, who were in the city, men, women, and children, should join in the work, and they must spare no building, private or public, which could be of use, but demolish them all. Having given these instructions and intimated that he would manage affairs at Sparta, he departed. On his arrival he did not at once present himself officially to the magistrates, but delayed and made excuses; and when any of them asked him ‘why he did not appear before the assembly,’ he said ‘that he was waiting for his colleagues,

who had been detained by some engagement; he was daily expecting them, and wondered that they had not appeared.’

91. οἱ δὲ ἀκούοντες τῷ μὲν Θεμιστοκλεῖ ἐπείθοντο διὰ φιλίαν αὐτοῦ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀφικνουμένων καὶ σαφῶς κατηγορούντων ὅτι τειχίζεταί τε καὶ ἤδη ὕψος λαμβάνει, οὐκ εἶχον ὅπως χρὴ ἀπιστῆσαι. [2] γνοὺς δὲ ἐκεῖνος κελεύει αὐτοὺς μὴ λόγοις μᾶλλον παράγεσθαι ἢ πέμψαι σφῶν αὐτῶν ἄνδρας οἵτινες χρηστοὶ καὶ πιστῶς ἀναγγελοῦσι σκεψάμενοι. [3] ἀποστέλλουσιν οὖν, καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κρύφα πέμπει κελεύων ὡς ἥκιστα ἐπιφανῶς κατασχεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀφεῖναι πρὶν ἂν αὐτοὶ πάλιν κομισθῶσιν ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἦκον αὐτῷ οἱ ξυμπρέσβεις, Ἀβρώνιχός τε ὁ Λυσικλέους καὶ Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου, ἀγγέλλοντες ἔχειν ἱκανῶς τὸ τεῖχος ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ μὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι σφᾶς, ὁπότε σαφῶς ἀκούσειαν, οὐκέτι ἀφῶσιν. [4] οἵ τε οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς πρέσβεις, ὥσπερ ἐπεστάλη, κατεῖχον, καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐπελθὼν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐνταῦθα δὴ φανερῶς εἶπεν ὅτι ἡ μὲν πόλις σφῶν τετείχισται ἤδη ὥστε ἱκανὴ εἶναι σῴζειν τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας, εἰ δέ τι βούλονται Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἢ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρεσβεύεσθαι παρὰ σφᾶς, ὡς πρὸς διαγιγνώσκοντας τὸ λοιπὸν ἰέναι τά τε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξύμφορα καὶ τὰ κοινά. [5] τήν τε γὰρ πόλιν ὅτε ἐδόκει ἐκλιπεῖν ἄμεινον εἶναι καὶ ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβῆναι, ἄνευ ἐκείνων ἔφασαν γνόντες τολμῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα αὖ μετ᾽ ἐκείνων βουλεύεσθαι, οὐδενὸς ὕστεροι γνώμῃ φανῆναι. [6] δοκεῖν οὖν σφίσι καὶ νῦν ἄμεινον εἶναι τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν τεῖχος ἔχειν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ τοῖς πολίταις καὶ ἐς τοὺς πάντας ξυμμάχους ὠφελιμώτερον ἔσεσθαι: [7] οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι μὴ ἀπὸ ἀντιπάλου παρασκευῆς ὁμοῖόν τι ἢ ἴσον ἐς τὸ κοινὸν βουλεύεσθαι. ἢ πάντας οὖν ἀτειχίστους ἔφη χρῆναι ξυμμαχεῖν ἢ καὶ τάδε νομίζειν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.

[91] The friendship of the Lacedaemonian magistrates for Themistocles induced them to believe him; but when everybody who came from Athens declared positively that the wall was building and had already reached a

considerable height, they knew not what to think. He, aware of their suspicions, desired them not to be misled by reports, but to send to Athens men whom they could trust out of their own number who would see for themselves and bring back word. They agreed; and he at the same time privately instructed the Athenians to detain the envoys as quietly as they could, and not let them go until he and his colleagues had got safely home. For by this time Habronichus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, who were joined with him in the embassy, had arrived, bringing the news that the wall was of sufficient height; and he was afraid that the Lacedaemonians, when they heard the truth, might not allow them to return. So the Athenians detained the envoys, and Themistocles, coming before the Lacedaemonians, at length declared in so many words that Athens was now provided with walls and could protect her citizens; henceforward, if the Lacedaemonians or their allies wished at any time to negotiate, they must deal with the Athenians as with men who knew quite well what was for their own and the common good. When they boldly resolved to leave their city and go on board ship, they did not first ask the advice of the Lacedaemonians, and, when the two states met in council, their own judgment had been as good as that of any one. And now they had arrived at an independent opinion that it was better far, and would be more advantageous both for themselves and for the whole body of the allies, that their city should have a wall; when any member of a confederacy had not equal military advantages, his counsel could not be of equal weight or worth. Either all the allies should pull down their walls, or they should acknowledge that the Athenians were in the right.

92. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀκούσαντες ὀργὴν μὲν φανερὰν οὐκ ἐποιοῦντο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ κωλύμῃ, ἀλλὰ γνώμης παραινέσει δῆθεν τῷ κοινῷ ἐπρεσβεύσαντο, ἅμα δὲ καὶ προσφιλεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ τότε διὰ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μῆδον

προθυμίαν τὰ μάλιστ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐτύγχανον , τῆς μέντοι βουλήσεως ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδήλως ἤχθοντο. οἵ τε πρέσβεις ἑκατέρων ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀνεπικλήτως.

[92] On hearing these words the Lacedaemonians did not openly quarrel with the Athenians; for they professed that the embassy had been designed, not to interfere with them, but to offer a suggestion for the public good; besides at that time the patriotism which the Athenians had displayed in the Persian War had created a warm feeling of friendliness between the two cities. They were annoyed at the failure of their purpose, but they did not show it. And the envoys on either side returned home without any formal complaint.

93. τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν πόλιν ἐτείχισαν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. [2] καὶ δήλη ἡ οἰκοδομία ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ὅτι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐγένετο: οἱ γὰρ θεμέλιοι παντοίων λίθων ὑπόκεινται καὶ οὐ ξυνειργασμένων ἔστιν ᾗ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἕκαστόν ποτε προσέφερον, πολλαί τε στῆλαι ἀπὸ σημάτων καὶ λίθοι εἰργασμένοι ἐγκατελέγησαν. μείζων γὰρ ὁ περίβολος πανταχῇ ἐξήχθη τῆς πόλεως, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντα ὁμοίως κινοῦντες ἠπείγοντο. [3] ἔπεισε δὲ καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ λοιπὰ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν ὑπῆρκτο δ᾽ αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς ἧς κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίοις ἦρξε νομίζων τό τε χωρίον καλὸν εἶναι, λιμένας ἔχον τρεῖς αὐτοφυεῖς, καὶ αὐτοὺς ναυτικοὺς γεγενημένους μέγα προφέρειν ἐς τὸ [4] κτήσασθαι δύναμιν τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστί, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατεσκεύαζεν. [5] καὶ ᾠκοδόμησαν τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ τὸ πάχος τοῦ τείχους ὅπερ νῦν ἔτι δῆλόν ἐστι περὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ: δύο γὰρ ἅμαξαι ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις τοὺς λίθους ἐπῆγον. ἐντὸς δὲ οὔτε χάλιξ οὔτε πηλὸς ἦν, ἀλλὰ ξυνῳκοδομημένοι μεγάλοι λίθοι καὶ ἐντομῇ ἐγγώνιοι, σιδήρῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὰ ἔξωθεν καὶ μολύβδῳ δεδεμένοι. τὸ δὲ ὕψος ἥμισυ μάλιστα ἐτελέσθη οὗ διενοεῖτο. [6] ἐβούλετο γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει ἀφιστάναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλάς, ἀνθρώπων τε ἐνόμιζεν ὀλίγων καὶ τῶν ἀχρειοτάτων ἀρκέσειν τὴν φυλακήν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἐς τὰς

ναῦς ἐσβήσεσθαι. [7] ταῖς γὰρ ναυσὶ μάλιστα προσέκειτο, ἰδών, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς βασιλέως στρατιᾶς τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἔφοδον εὐπορωτέραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν οὖσαν: τόν τε Πειραιᾶ ὠφελιμώτερον ἐνόμιζε τῆς ἄνω πόλεως, καὶ πολλάκις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρῄνει, ἢν ἄρα ποτὲ κατὰ γῆν βιασθῶσι, καταβάντας ἐς αὐτὸν ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθίστασθαι. [8] Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐτειχίσθησαν καὶ τἆλλα κατεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν Μήδων ἀναχώρησιν.

[93] In such hurried fashion did the Athenians build the walls of their city. To this day the structure shows evidence of haste. The foundations are made up of all sorts of stones, in some places unwrought, and laid just as each worker brought them; there were many columns too, taken from sepulchres, and many old stones already cut, inserted in the work. The circuit of the city was extended in every direction, and the citizens, in their ardour to complete the design, spared nothing.Themistocles also persuaded the Athenians to finish the Piraeus, of which he had made a beginning in his year of office as Archon. The situation of the place, which had three natural havens, was excellent; and now that the Athenians had become seamen, he thought that they had great advantage for the attainment of empire. For he first dared to say that ‘they must make the sea their domain,’ and he lost no time in laying the foundations of their empire. By his advice, they built the wall of such a width that two waggons carrying the stones could meet and pass on the top; this width may still be traced at the Piraeus; inside there was no rubble or mortar, but the whole wall was made up of large stones hewn square, which were clamped on the outer face with iron and lead. The height was not more than half what he had originally intended; he had hoped by the very dimensions of the wall to paralyse the designs of an enemy, and he thought that a handful of the least efficient citizens would suffice for its defence, while the rest might man the fleet. His mind was turned in this direction, as I conceive, from observing that the King’s armament had met

with fewer obstacles by sea than by land. The Piraeus appeared to him to be of more real consequence than the upper city. He was fond of telling the Athenians that if ever they were hard pressed on land they should go down to the Piraeus and fight the world at sea.Thus the Athenians built their walls and restored their city immediately after the retreat of the Persians.

94. Παυσανίας δὲ ὁ Κλεομβρότου ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξεπέμφθη μετὰ εἴκοσι νεῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου: ξυνέπλεον δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τριάκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων πλῆθος. [2] καὶ ἐστράτευσαν ἐς Κύπρον καὶ αὐτῆς τὰ πολλὰ κατεστρέψαντο, καὶ ὕστερον ἐς Βυζάντιον Μήδων ἐχόντων, καὶ ἐξεπολιόρκησαν ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ.

[94] Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus was now sent from Peloponnesus with twenty ships in command of the Hellenic forces; thirty Athenian ships and a number of the allies sailed with him. They first made an expedition against Cyprus, of which they subdued the greater part; and afterwards against Byzantium, which was in the hands of the Persians, and was taken while he was still in command.

95. ἤδη δὲ βιαίου ὄντος αὐτοῦ οἵ τε ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἤχθοντο καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ Ἴωνες καὶ ὅσοι ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεωστὶ ἠλευθέρωντο: φοιτῶντές τε πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠξίουν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ Παυσανίᾳ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, ἤν που βιάζηται. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐδέξαντό τε τοὺς λόγους καὶ προσεῖχον τὴν γνώμην ὡς οὐ περιοψόμενοι τἆλλά τε καταστησόμενοι ᾗ φαίνοιτο ἄριστα αὐτοῖς. [3] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μετεπέμποντο Παυσανίαν ἀνακρινοῦντες ὧν πέρι ἐπυνθάνοντο: καὶ γὰρ ἀδικία πολλὴ κατηγορεῖτο αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἀφικνουμένων, καὶ τυραννίδος μᾶλλον ἐφαίνετο μίμησις ἢ στρατηγία. [4] ξυνέβη τε αὐτῷ καλεῖσθαί τε ἅμα καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τῷ ἐκείνου ἔχθει παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους μετατάξασθαι πλὴν τῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου στρατιωτῶν. [5] ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐς Λακεδαίμονα τῶν μὲν ἰδίᾳ πρός

τινα ἀδικημάτων ηὐθύνθη, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα ἀπολύεται μὴ ἀδικεῖν: κατηγορεῖτο δὲ αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἥκιστα μηδισμὸς καὶ ἐδόκει σαφέστατον εἶναι. [6] καὶ ἐκεῖνον μὲν οὐκέτι ἐκπέμπουσιν ἄρχοντα, Δόρκιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ στρατιὰν ἔχοντας οὐ πολλήν: οἷς οὐκέτι ἐφίεσαν οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. [7] οἱ δὲ αἰσθόμενοι ἀπῆλθον, καὶ ἄλλους οὐκέτι ὕστερον ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσιν οἱ ἐξιόντες χείρους γίγνωνται, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ Παυσανίᾳ ἐνεῖδον, ἀπαλλαξείοντες δὲ καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους νομίζοντες ἱκανοὺς ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ σφίσιν ἐν τῷ τότε παρόντι ἐπιτηδείους.

[95] He had already begun to be oppressive, and the allies were offended with him, especially the Ionians and others who had been recently emancipated from the King. So they had recourse to their kinsmen the Athenians and begged them to be their leaders, and to protect them against Pausanias, if he attempted to oppress them. The Athenians took the matter up and prepared to interfere, being fully resolved to manage the confederacy in their own way. In the meantime the Lacedaemonians summoned Pausanias to Sparta, intending to investigate certain reports which had reached them; for he was accused of numerous crimes by Hellenes returning from the Hellespont, and appeared to exercise his command more after the fashion of a tyrant than of a general. His recall occurred at the very time when the hatred which he inspired had induced the allies, with the exception of the Peloponnesians, to transfer themselves to the Athenians. On arriving at Lacedaemon he was punished for the wrongs which he had done to particular persons, but he had been also accused of conspiring with the Persians, and of this, which was the principal charge and was generally believed to be proven, he was acquitted. The government however did not continue him in his command, but sent in his place Dorcis and certain others with a small force. To these the allies refused allegiance, and Dorcis, seeing the state of affairs, returned home. Henceforth the

Lacedaemonians sent out no more commanders, for they were afraid that those whom they appointed would be corrupted, as they had found to be the case with Pausanias; they had had enough of the Persian War; and they thought that the Athenians were fully able to lead, and at that time believed them to be their friends.

96. παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ τὸ Παυσανίου μῖσος, ἔταξαν ἅς τε ἔδει παρέχειν τῶν πόλεων χρήματα πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον καὶ ἃς ναῦς: πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν ἀμύνεσθαι ὧν ἔπαθον δῃοῦντας τὴν βασιλέως χώραν. [2] καὶ Ἑλληνοταμίαι τότε πρῶτον Ἀθηναίοις κατέστη ἀρχή, οἳ ἐδέχοντο τὸν φόρον: οὕτω γὰρ ὠνομάσθη τῶν χρημάτων ἡ φορά. ἦν δ᾽ ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεὶς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἑξήκοντα. ταμιεῖόν τε Δῆλος ἦν αὐτοῖς, καὶ αἱ ξύνοδοι ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐγίγνοντο.

[96] Thus the Athenians by the good-will of the allies, who detested Pausanias, obtained the leadership. They immediately fixed which of the cities should supply money and which of them ships for the war against the Barbarians, the avowed object being to compensate themselves and the allies for their losses by devastating the King’s country. Then was first instituted at Athens the office of Hellenic treasurers (Hellenotamiae), who received the tribute, for so the contributions were termed. The amount was originally fixed at 460 talents. The island of Delos was the treasury, and the meetings of the allies were held in the temple.

97. ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ, ἃ ἐγένετο πρός τε τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους νεωτερίζοντας καὶ Πελοποννησίων τοὺς αἰεὶ προστυγχάνοντας ἐν ἑκάστῳ. [2] ἔγραψα δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐποιησάμην διὰ τόδε, ὅτι τοῖς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἅπασιν ἐκλιπὲς τοῦτο ἦν τὸ χωρίον καὶ ἢ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν Ἑλληνικὰ ξυνετίθεσαν ἢ

αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά: τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ καὶ ἥψατο ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ξυγγραφῇ Ἑλλάνικος, βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν οἵῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη.

[97] At first the allies were independent and deliberated in a common assembly under the leadership of Athens. But in the interval between the Persian and the Peloponnesian Wars, by their military success and by policy in dealing with the Barbarian, with their own rebellious allies and with the Peloponnesians who came across their path from time to time, the Athenians made immense strides in power. I have gone out of my way to speak of this period because the writers who have preceded me treat either of Hellenic affairs previous to the Persian invasion or of that invasion itself; the intervening portion of history has been omitted by all of them, with the exception of Hellanicus; and he, where he has touched upon it in his Attic history, is very brief, and inaccurate in his chronology. The narrative will also serve to explain how the Athenian empire grew up.

98. πρῶτον μὲν Ἠιόνα τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι Μήδων ἐχόντων πολιορκίᾳ εἷλον καὶ ἠνδραπόδισαν, Κίμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγοῦντος. [2] ἔπειτα Σκῦρον τὴν ἐν τῷ Αἰγαίῳ νῆσον, ἣν ᾤκουν Δόλοπες, ἠνδραπόδισαν καὶ ᾤκισαν αὐτοί. [3] πρὸς δὲ Καρυστίους αὐτοῖς ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων Εὐβοέων πόλεμος ἐγένετο, καὶ χρόνῳ ξυνέβησαν καθ᾽ ὁμολογίαν. [4] Ναξίοις δὲ ἀποστᾶσι μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπολέμησαν καὶ πολιορκίᾳ παρεστήσαντο, πρώτη τε αὕτη πόλις ξυμμαχὶς παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ἐδουλώθη, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἑκάστῃ ξυνέβη.

[98] First of all under the leadership of Cimon, the son of Miltiades, the Athenians besieged and took Eion upon the Strymon, then in the hands of the Persians, and sold the inhabitants into slavery. The same fate befell Scyros, an island in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopes; this they colonised themselves. They also made war on the Carystians of Euboea, who, after a time, capitulated; the other

Euboeans took no part in the war. Then the Naxians revolted, and the Athenians made war against them and reduced them by blockade. This was the first of the allied cities which was enslaved contrary to Hellenic right; the turn of the others came later.

99. αἰτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι τε ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστάσεων καὶ μέγισται αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἔκδειαι καὶ λιποστράτιον εἴ τῳ ἐγένετο: οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον καὶ λυπηροὶ ἦσαν οὐκ εἰωθόσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες τὰς ἀνάγκας. [2] ἦσαν δέ πως καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὔτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ῥᾴδιόν τε προσάγεσθαι ἦν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀφισταμένους. [3] ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἐγένοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι: διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκνησιν ταύτην τῶν στρατειῶν οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ᾽ οἴκου ὦσι, χρήματα ἐτάξαντο ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἱκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ηὔξετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἣν ἐκεῖνοι ξυμφέροιεν, αὐτοὶ δέ, ὁπότε ἀποσταῖεν, ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἄπειροι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο.

[99] The causes which led to the defections of the allies were of different kinds, the principal being their neglect to pay the tribute or to furnish ships, and, in some cases, failure of military service. For the Athenians were exacting and oppressive, using coercive measures towards men who were neither willing nor accustomed to work hard. And for various reasons they soon began to prove less agreeable leaders than at first. They no longer fought upon an equality with the rest of the confederates, and they had no difficulty in reducing them when they revolted. Now the allies brought all this upon themselves; for the majority of them disliked military service and absence from home, and so they agreed to contribute their share of the expense instead of ships. Whereby the Athenian navy was proportionally increased, while they themselves were always untrained and unprepared for war when they revolted.

100. ἐγένετο δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἐπ᾽ Εὐρυμέδοντι ποταμῷ ἐν Παμφυλίᾳ πεζομαχία καὶ ναυμαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς Μήδους, καὶ ἐνίκων τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀμφότερα Ἀθηναῖοι Κίμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ εἷλον τριήρεις Φοινίκων καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς πάσας ἐς διακοσίας. [2] χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον ξυνέβη Θασίους αὐτῶν ἀποστῆναι, διενεχθέντας περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας Θρᾴκῃ ἐμπορίων καὶ τοῦ μετάλλου ἃ ἐνέμοντο. καὶ ναυσὶ μὲν ἐπὶ Θάσον πλεύσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ναυμαχίᾳ ἐκράτησαν καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀπέβησαν, [3] ἐπὶ δὲ Στρυμόνα πέμψαντες μυρίους οἰκήτορας αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ὡς οἰκιοῦντες τὰς τότε καλουμένας Ἐννέα ὁδούς, νῦν δὲ Ἀμφίπολιν, τῶν μὲν Ἐννέα ὁδῶν αὐτοὶ ἐκράτησαν, ἃς εἶχον Ἠδωνοί, προελθόντες δὲ τῆς Θρᾴκης ἐς μεσόγειαν διεφθάρησαν ἐν Δραβησκῷ τῇ Ἠδωνικῇ ὑπὸ τῶν Θρᾳκῶν ξυμπάντων, οἷς πολέμιον ἦν τὸ χωρίον [αἱ Ἐννέα ὁδοὶ] κτιζόμενον.

[100] A little later the Athenians and their allies fought two battles, one by land and the other by sea, against the Persians, at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia. The Athenians, under the command of Cimon the son of Miltiades, on the same day conquered in both, and took and destroyed all the Phoenician triremes numbering two hundred. After a while the Thasians revolted; a quarrel had arisen between them and the Athenians about the Thracian markets and the mine on the Thracian coast opposite, of which the Thasians received the profits. The Athenians sailed to Thasos and, gaining a victory at sea, landed upon the island. About the same time they sent ten thousand of their own people and of their allies to the Strymon, intending to colonise the place then called the Nine Ways and now Amphipolis. They gained possession of the Nine Ways, which were inhabited by the Edoni, but, advancing into the interior of Thrace, they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the united Thracians, whose country was threatened by the new settlement.

101. Θάσιοι δὲ νικηθέντες μάχῃ καὶ πολιορκούμενοι Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεκαλοῦντο καὶ ἐπαμύνειν ἐκέλευον ἐσβαλόντας ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν. [2] οἱ δὲ ὑπέσχοντο μὲν κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἔμελλον, διεκωλύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ, ἐν ᾧ καὶ οἱ Εἵλωτες αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν περιοίκων Θουριᾶταί τε καὶ Αἰθαιῆς ἐς Ἰθώμην ἀπέστησαν. πλεῖστοι δὲ τῶν Εἱλώτων ἐγένοντο οἱ τῶν παλαιῶν Μεσσηνίων τότε δουλωθέντων ἀπόγονοι: ᾗ καὶ Μεσσήνιοι ἐκλήθησαν οἱ πάντες. [3] πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν Ἰθώμῃ πόλεμος καθειστήκει Λακεδαιμονίοις, Θάσιοι δὲ τρίτῳ ἔτει πολιορκούμενοι ὡμολόγησαν Ἀθηναίοις τεῖχός τε καθελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες, χρήματά τε ὅσα ἔδει ἀποδοῦναι αὐτίκα ταξάμενοι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν φέρειν, τήν τε ἤπειρον καὶ τὸ μέταλλον ἀφέντες.

[101] The Thasians, now blockaded after several defeats, had recourse to the Lacedaemonians and entreated them to invade Attica. Unknown to the Athenians they agreed, and were on the point of setting out when the great earthquake occurred and was immediately followed by the revolt of the Helots and with them the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea, who seized Ithomè. These Helots were mostly the descendants of the Messenians who had been enslaved in ancient times, and hence all the insurgents were called Messenians.While the Lacedaemonians were thus engaged, the Thasians, who had now been blockaded for more than two years, came to terms with the Athenians; they pulled down their walls and surrendered their ships; they also agreed to pay what was required of them whether in the shape of immediate indemnity or of tribute for the future; and they gave up their claim to the mainland and to the mine.

102. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δέ, ὡς αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἰθώμῃ ἐμηκύνετο ὁ πόλεμος, ἄλλους τε ἐπεκαλέσαντο ξυμμάχους καὶ Ἀθηναίους: οἱ δ᾽ ἦλθον Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος πλήθει οὐκ ὀλίγῳ. [2] μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐπεκαλέσαντο ὅτι τειχομαχεῖν ἐδόκουν δυνατοὶ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκίας

μακρᾶς καθεστηκυίας τούτου ἐνδεᾶ ἐφαίνετο: βίᾳ γὰρ ἂν εἷλον τὸ χωρίον. [3] καὶ διαφορὰ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς στρατείας πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις φανερὰ ἐγένετο. οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ χωρίον βίᾳ οὐχ ἡλίσκετο, δείσαντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ τολμηρὸν καὶ τὴν νεωτεροποιίαν, καὶ ἀλλοφύλους ἅμα ἡγησάμενοι, μή τι, ἢν παραμείνωσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰθώμῃ πεισθέντες νεωτερίσωσι, μόνους τῶν ξυμμάχων ἀπέπεμψαν, τὴν μὲν ὑποψίαν οὐ δηλοῦντες, εἰπόντες δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν προσδέονται αὐτῶν ἔτι. [4] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔγνωσαν οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίονι λόγῳ ἀποπεμπόμενοι, ἀλλά τινος ὑπόπτου γενομένου, καὶ δεινὸν ποιησάμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἀξιώσαντες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τοῦτο παθεῖν, εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀνεχώρησαν, ἀφέντες τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἀργείοις τοῖς ἐκείνων πολεμίοις ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς Θεσσαλοὺς ἅμα ἀμφοτέροις οἱ αὐτοὶ ὅρκοι καὶ ξυμμαχία κατέστη.

[102] The siege of Ithomè proved tedious, and the Lacedaemonians called in, among other allies, the Athenians, who sent to their aid a considerable force under Cimon. The Athenians were specially invited because they were reputed to be skilful in siege operations, and the length of the blockade proved to the Lacedaemonians their own deficiency in that sort of warfare; else why had they not taken the place by assault? This expedition of the Athenians led to the first open quarrel between them and the Lacedaemonians. For the Lacedaemonians, not succeeding in storming the place, took alarm at the bold and original spirit of the Athenians. They reflected that they were aliens in race, and fearing that, if they were allowed to remain, they might be tempted by the Helots in Ithomè to change sides, they dismissed them, while they retained the other allies. But they concealed their mistrust, and merely said that they no longer needed their services. Now the Athenians saw that their dismissal was due to some suspicion which had arisen and not to the less offensive reason which was openly avowed; they felt keenly that such

a slight ought not to have been offered them by the Lacedaemonians; and so, on their return home, they forthwith abandoned the alliance which they had made with them against the Persians and went over to their Argive enemies. At the same time both Argos and Athens bound themselves to Thessaly by a common oath of alliance.

103. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν Ἰθώμῃ δεκάτῳ ἔτει, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐδύναντο ἀντέχειν, ξυνέβησαν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἐξίασιν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπόσπονδοι καὶ μηδέποτε ἐπιβήσονται αὐτῆς: ἢν δέ τις ἁλίσκηται, τοῦ λαβόντος εἶναι δοῦλον. [2] ἦν δέ τι καὶ χρηστήριον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις Πυθικὸν πρὸ τοῦ, τὸν ἱκέτην τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ἰθωμήτα ἀφιέναι. [3] ἐξῆλθον δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες, καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεξάμενοι κατ᾽ ἔχθος ἤδη τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐς Ναύπακτον κατῴκισαν, ἣν ἔτυχον ἡρηκότες νεωστὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἐχόντων. [4] προσεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς ξυμμαχίαν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστάντες, ὅτι αὐτοὺς Κορίνθιοι περὶ γῆς ὅρων πολέμῳ κατεῖχον: καὶ ἔσχον Ἀθηναῖοι Μέγαρα καὶ Πηγάς, καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ᾠκοδόμησαν Μεγαρεῦσι τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐς Νίσαιαν καὶ ἐφρούρουν αὐτοί. καὶ Κορινθίοις μὲν οὐχ ἥκιστα ἀπὸ τοῦδε τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος ἤρξατο πρῶτον ἐς Ἀθηναίους γενέσθαι.

[103] In the tenth year of the siege the defenders of Ithomè were unable to hold out any longer, and capitulated to the Lacedaemonians. The terms were as follows: They were to leave Peloponnesus under a safe-conduct, and were never again to return; if any of them were taken on Peloponnesian soil, he was to be the slave of his captor. Now an ancient oracle of Delphi was current among the Lacedaemonians, bidding them let the suppliant of Ithomaean Zeus go free. So the Messenians left Ithomè with their wives and children; and the Athenians, who were now the avowed enemies of Sparta, gave them a home at Naupactus, a place which they had lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians.The Athenians obtained the alliance of the Megarians, who revolted from the Lacedaemonians because the Corinthians were pressing

them hard in a war arising out of a question of frontiers. Thus they gained both Megara and Pegae; and they built for the Megarians the long walls, extending from the city to the port of Nisaea, which they garrisoned themselves. This was the original and the main cause of the intense hatred which the Corinthians entertained towards the Athenians.

104. Ἰνάρως δὲ ὁ Ψαμμητίχου, Λίβυς, βασιλεὺς Λιβύων τῶν πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ, ὁρμώμενος ἐκ Μαρείας τῆς ὑπὲρ Φάρου πόλεως ἀπέστησεν Αἰγύπτου τὰ πλείω ἀπὸ βασιλέως Ἀρταξέρξου, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρχων γενόμενος Ἀθηναίους ἐπηγάγετο. [2] οἱ δέ ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐς Κύπρον στρατευόμενοι ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἦλθον ἀπολιπόντες τὴν Κύπρον, καὶ ἀναπλεύσαντες ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐς τὸν Νεῖλον τοῦ τε ποταμοῦ κρατοῦντες καὶ τῆς Μέμφιδος τῶν δύο μερῶν πρὸς τὸ τρίτον μέρος ὃ καλεῖται Λευκὸν τεῖχος ἐπολέμουν: ἐνῆσαν δὲ αὐτόθι Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων οἱ καταφυγόντες καὶ Αἰγυπτίων οἱ μὴ ξυναποστάντες.

[104] Meanwhile Inaros the son of Psammetichus, king of the Libyans who border on Egypt, had induced the greater part of Egypt to revolt from King Artaxerxes. He began the rebellion at Mareia, a city opposite the island of Pharos, and, having made himself ruler of the country, called in the Athenians. They were just then engaged in an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies; and, quitting the island, they went to his aid. They sailed from the sea into the Nile, and, making themselves masters of the river and of two-thirds of Memphis, proceeded to attack the remaining part called the White Castle, in which some of the Persians and Medes had taken refuge, and with them such Egyptians as had not joined in the revolt.

105. Ἀθηναίοις δὲ ναυσὶν ἀποβᾶσιν ἐς Ἁλιᾶς πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους μάχη ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐνίκων Κορίνθιοι. καὶ ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι ἐναυμάχησαν ἐπὶ Κεκρυφαλείᾳ Πελοποννησίων ναυσί, καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι. [2]

πολέμου δὲ καταστάντος πρὸς Αἰγινήτας Ἀθηναίοις μετὰ ταῦτα ναυμαχία γίγνεται ἐπ᾽ Αἰγίνῃ μεγάλη Ἀθηναίων καὶ Αἰγινητῶν, καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἑκατέροις παρῆσαν, καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ναῦς ἑβδομήκοντα λαβόντες αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀπέβησαν καὶ ἐπολιόρκουν, Λεωκράτους τοῦ Στροίβου στρατηγοῦντος. [3] ἔπειτα Πελοποννήσιοι ἀμύνειν βουλόμενοι Αἰγινήταις ἐς μὲν τὴν Αἴγιναν τριακοσίους ὁπλίτας πρότερον Κορινθίων καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίων ἐπικούρους διεβίβασαν, τὰ δὲ ἄκρα τῆς Γερανείας κατέλαβον καὶ ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα κατέβησαν Κορίνθιοι μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων, νομίζοντες ἀδυνάτους ἔσεσθαι Ἀθηναίους βοηθεῖν τοῖς Μεγαρεῦσιν ἔν τε Αἰγίνῃ ἀπούσης στρατιᾶς πολλῆς καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ: ἢν δὲ καὶ βοηθῶσιν, ἀπ᾽ Αἰγίνης ἀναστήσεσθαι αὐτούς. [4] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ μὲν πρὸς Αἰγίνῃ στράτευμα οὐκ ἐκίνησαν, τῶν δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπολοίπων οἵ τε πρεσβύτατοι καὶ οἱ νεώτατοι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ Μέγαρα Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος. [5] καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἰσορρόπου πρὸς Κορινθίους διεκρίθησαν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐνόμισαν αὐτοὶ ἑκάτεροι οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ. [6] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκράτησαν γὰρ ὅμως μᾶλλον ἀπελθόντων τῶν Κορινθίων τροπαῖον ἔστησαν: οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι κακιζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων καὶ παρασκευασάμενοι, ἡμέραις ὕστερον δώδεκα μάλιστα ἐλθόντες ἀνθίστασαν τροπαῖον καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς νικήσαντες. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκβοηθήσαντες ἐκ τῶν Μεγάρων τούς τε τὸ τροπαῖον ἱστάντας διαφθείρουσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβαλόντες ἐκράτησαν.

[105] An Athenian fleet made a descent upon Halieis, where a battle took place against some Corinthian and Epidaurian troops; the Athenians gained the victory. Soon afterwards the Athenians fought at sea off Cecryphaleia with a Peloponnesian fleet, which they defeated. A war next broke out between the Aeginetans and the Athenians, and a great battle was fought off the coast of Aegina, in which the allies of both parties joined; the Athenians were victorious, and captured seventy of the enemy’s ships; they then landed on

Aegina and, under the command of Leocrates the son of Stroebus, besieged the town. Thereupon the Peloponnesians sent over to the assistance of the Aeginetans three hundred hoplites who had previously been assisting the Corinthians and Epidaurians. The Corinthians seized on the heights of Geraneia, and thence made a descent with their allies into the Megarian territory, thinking that the Athenians, who had so large a force absent in Aegina and in Egypt, would be unable to assist the Megarians; or, if they did; would be obliged to raise the siege of Aegina. But the Athenians, without moving their army from Aegina, sent to Megara under the command of Myronides a force consisting of their oldest and youngest men, who had remained at home. A battle was fought, which hung equally in the balance; and when the two armies separated, they both thought that they had gained the victory. The Athenians, who did however get rather the better, on the departure of the Corinthians erected a trophy. And then the Corinthians, irritated by the reproaches of the aged men in the city, after about twelve days' preparation came out again, and, claiming the victory, raised another trophy. Hereupon the Athenians sallied out of Megara, killed those who were erecting the trophy, and charged and defeated the rest of the army.

106. οἱ δὲ νικώμενοι ὑπεχώρουν, καί τι αὐτῶν μέρος οὐκ ὀλίγον προσβιασθὲν καὶ διαμαρτὸν τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐσέπεσεν ἔς του χωρίον ἰδιώτου, ᾧ ἔτυχεν ὄρυγμα μέγα περιεῖργον καὶ οὐκ ἦν ἔξοδος. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι γνόντες κατὰ πρόσωπόν τε εἶργον τοῖς ὁπλίταις καὶ περιστήσαντες κύκλῳ τοὺς ψιλοὺς κατέλευσαν πάντας τοὺς ἐσελθόντας, καὶ πάθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίοις ἐγένετο. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἀπεχώρησεν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

[106] The Corinthians now retreated, but a considerable number of them were hard pressed, and missing their way got into an enclosure belonging to a private person, which was surrounded by a great ditch and had no exit. The Athenians, perceiving their situation, closed the entrance in

front with heavy-armed troops, and, placing their light troops in a circle round, stoned all who had entered the enclosure. This was a great blow to the Corinthians. The main body of their army returned home.

107. ἤρξαντο δὲ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς θάλασσαν οἰκοδομεῖν, τό τε Φαληρόνδε καὶ τὸ ἐς Πειραιᾶ. [2] καὶ Φωκέων στρατευσάντων ἐς Δωριᾶς τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων μητρόπολιν, Βοιὸν καὶ Κυτίνιον καὶ Ἐρινεόν, καὶ ἑλόντων ἓν τῶν πολισμάτων τούτων, οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Νικομήδους τοῦ Κλεομβρότου ὑπὲρ Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου βασιλέως νέου ὄντος ἔτι ἡγουμένου ἐβοήθησαν τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν ἑαυτῶν τε πεντακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις ὁπλίταις καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων μυρίοις, καὶ τοὺς Φωκέας ὁμολογίᾳ ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ἀπεχώρουν πάλιν. [3] καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν μὲν αὐτούς, διὰ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου εἰ βούλοιντο περαιοῦσθαι, Ἀθηναῖοι ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες ἔμελλον κωλύσειν: διὰ δὲ τῆς Γερανείας οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνετο Ἀθηναίων ἐχόντων Μέγαρα καὶ Πηγὰς πορεύεσθαι. δύσοδός τε γὰρ ἡ Γερανεία καὶ ἐφρουρεῖτο αἰεὶ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τότε ᾐσθάνοντο αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας καὶ ταύτῃ κωλύσειν. [4] ἔδοξε δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς περιμείνασι σκέψασθαι ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἀσφαλέστατα διαπορεύσονται. τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄνδρες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπῆγον αὐτοὺς κρύφα, ἐλπίσαντες δῆμόν τε καταπαύσειν καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη οἰκοδομούμενα. [5] ἐβοήθησαν δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεὶ καὶ Ἀργείων χίλιοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων ὡς ἕκαστοι: ξύμπαντες δὲ ἐγένοντο τετρακισχίλιοι καὶ μύριοι. [6] νομίσαντες δὲ ἀπορεῖν ὅπῃ διέλθωσιν ἐπεστράτευσαν αὐτοῖς, καί τι καὶ τοῦ δήμου καταλύσεως ὑποψίᾳ. [7] ἦλθον δὲ καὶ Θεσσαλῶν ἱππῆς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν, οἳ μετέστησαν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ παρὰ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.

[107] About this time the Athenians began to build their Long Walls extending to the sea, one to the harbour of Phalerum, and the other to the Piraeus. The Phocians made an expedition against the Dorians, who inhabit Boeum,

Cytinium, and Erineum, and are the mother people of the Lacedaemonians; one of these towns they took. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians under the command of Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus, who was general in the place of the king Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias (he being at that time a minor), came to the assistance of the Dorians with fifteen hundred hoplites of their own, and, of their allies, ten thousand, and compelled the Phocians to make terms and to restore the town. They then thought of returning; but there were difficulties. Either they might go by sea across the Crisaean Gulf, in which case the Athenian fleet would be sure to sail round and intercept them, or they might march over Mount Geraneia; but this seemed dangerous when the Athenians were holding Megara and Pegae. The pass was not easy, and was always guarded by the Athenians, who were obviously intending to stop them by that route also. So they determined to remain in Boeotia and consider how they could best get home. They had another motive : — Certain Athenians were privately making overtures to them, in the hope that they would put an end to the democracy and the building of the Long Walls. But the Athenians were aware of their embarrassment, and they also suspected their design against the democracy. So they went out to meet them with their whole force, together with a thousand Argives and contingents from the other allies; they numbered in all fourteen thousand men. Among them were some Thessalian cavalry, who came to their aid in accordance with the treaty, but these deserted to the Lacedaemonians during the engagement.

108. γενομένης δὲ μάχης ἐν Τανάγρᾳ τῆς Βοιωτίας ἐνίκων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, καὶ φόνος ἐγένετο ἀμφοτέρων πολύς. [2] καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα ἐλθόντες καὶ δενδροτομήσαντες πάλιν ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου διὰ Γερανείας καὶ Ἰσθμοῦ: Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ δευτέρᾳ καὶ ἑξηκοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐστράτευσαν ἐς Βοιωτοὺς Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος, [3] καὶ μάχῃ ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις τοὺς

Βοιωτοὺς νικήσαντες τῆς τε χώρας ἐκράτησαν τῆς Βοιωτίας καὶ Φωκίδος καὶ Ταναγραίων τὸ τεῖχος περιεῖλον καὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀπουντίων ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας ὁμήρους τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους ἔλαβον, τά τε τείχη ἑαυτῶν τὰ μακρὰ ἀπετέλεσαν. [4] ὡμολόγησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Αἰγινῆται μετὰ ταῦτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τείχη τε περιελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες φόρον τε ταξάμενοι ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. [5] καὶ Πελοπόννησον περιέπλευσαν Ἀθηναῖοι Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμαίου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ τὸ νεώριον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐνέπρησαν καὶ Χαλκίδα Κορινθίων πόλιν εἶλον καὶ Σικυωνίους ἐν ἀποβάσει τῆς γῆς μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν.

[108] The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, after great slaughter on both sides, gained the victory. They then marched into the Megarian territory, and, cutting down the fruit-trees; returned home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the Athenians made another expedition into Boeotia under the command of Myronides, and there was a battle at Oenophyta, in which they defeated the Boeotians and became masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They pulled down the walls of Tanagra and took as hostages from the Opuntian Locrians a hundred of their richest citizens. They then completed their own Long Walls. Soon afterwards the Aeginetans came to terms with the Athenians, dismantling their walls, surrendering their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute for the future. The Athenians, under the command of Tolmides, the son of Tolmaeus, sailed round Peloponnesus and burnt the Lacedaemonian dockyard. They also took the Corinthian town of Chalcis, and, making a descent upon Sicyon, defeated a Sicyonian force.

109. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπέμενον, καὶ αὐτοῖς πολλαὶ ἰδέαι πολέμων κατέστησαν. [2] τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐκράτουν τῆς Αἰγύπτου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ βασιλεὺς πέμπει ἐς Λακεδαίμονα Μεγάβαζον ἄνδρα Πέρσην χρήματα ἔχοντα, ὅπως ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβαλεῖν πεισθέντων τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἀπ᾽ Αἰγύπτου ἀπαγάγοι Ἀθηναίους. [3] ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ προυχώρει καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἄλλως ἀνηλοῦτο, ὁ μὲν Μεγάβαζος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν χρημάτων πάλιν ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀνεκομίσθη, Μεγάβυζον δὲ τὸν Ζωπύρου πέμπει ἄνδρα Πέρσην μετὰ στρατιᾶς πολλῆς: [4] ὃς ἀφικόμενος κατὰ γῆν τούς τε Αἰγυπτίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μάχῃ ἐκράτησε καὶ ἐκ τῆς Μέμφιδος ἐξήλασε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ τέλος ἐς Προσωπίτιδα τὴν νῆσον κατέκλῃσε καὶ ἐπολιόρκει ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ ἓξ μῆνας, μέχρι οὗ ξηράνας τὴν διώρυχα καὶ παρατρέψας ἄλλῃ τὸ ὕδωρ τάς τε ναῦς ἐπὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ ἐποίησε καὶ τῆς νήσου τὰ πολλὰ ἤπειρον, καὶ διαβὰς εἶλε τὴν νῆσον πεζῇ.

[109] The Athenians and their allies were still in Egypt, where they carried on the war with varying fortune. At first they were masters of the country. The King sent to Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian, who was well supplied with money, in the hope that he might persuade the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and so draw off the Athenians from Egypt. He had no success; the money was being spent and nothing done; so, with what remained of it, he found his way back to Asia. The King then sent into Egypt Megabyzus the son of Zopyrus, a Persian, who marched overland with a large army and defeated the Egyptians and their allies. He drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and finally shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he blockaded them for eighteen months. At length he drained the canal and diverted the water, thus leaving their ships high and dry and joining nearly the whole island to the mainland. He then crossed over with a land force, and took the island.

110. οὕτω μὲν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πράγματα ἐφθάρη ἓξ ἔτη πολεμήσαντα: καὶ ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν πορευόμενοι διὰ τῆς

Λιβύης ἐς Κυρήνην ἐσώθησαν, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι ἀπώλοντο. [2] Αἴγυπτος δὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ βασιλέα ἐγένετο πλὴν Ἀμυρταίου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἕλεσι βασιλέως: τοῦτον δὲ διὰ μέγεθός τε τοῦ ἕλους οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν, καὶ ἅμα μαχιμώτατοί εἰσι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων οἱ ἕλειοι. [3] Ἰνάρως δὲ ὁ Λιβύων βασιλεύς, ὃς τὰ πάντα ἔπραξε περὶ τῆς Αἰγύπτου, προδοσίᾳ ληφθεὶς ἀνεσταυρώθη. [4] ἑκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ξυμμαχίδος πεντήκοντα τριήρεις διάδοχοι πλέουσαι ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἔσχον κατὰ τὸ Μενδήσιον κέρας, οὐκ εἰδότες τῶν γεγονότων οὐδέν: καὶ αὐτοῖς ἔκ τε γῆς ἐπιπεσόντες πεζοὶ καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης Φοινίκων ναυτικὸν διέφθειραν τὰς πολλὰς τῶν νεῶν, αἱ δ᾽ ἐλάσσους διέφυγον πάλιν. τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην στρατείαν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς Αἴγυπτον οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

[110] Thus, after six years' fighting, the cause of the Hellenes in Egypt was lost. A few survivors of their great army found their way through Libya to Cyrenè; by far the larger number perished. Egypt again became subject to the Persians, although Amyrtaeus, the king in the fens, still held out. He escaped capture owing to the extent of the fens and the bravery of their inhabitants, who are the most warlike of all the Egyptians. Inaros, the king of Libya, the chief author of the revolt, was betrayed and impaled. Fifty additional triremes, which had been sent by the Athenians and their allies to relieve their other forces, in ignorance of what had happened, sailed into the Mendesian mouth of the Nile. But they were at once attacked both from the land and from the sea, and the greater part of them destroyed by the Phoenician fleet, a few ships only escaping. Thus ended the great Egyptian expedition of the Athenians and their allies.

111. ἑκ δὲ Θεσσαλίας Ὀρέστης ὁ Ἐχεκρατίδου υἱὸς τοῦ Θεσσαλῶν βασιλέως φεύγων ἔπεισεν Ἀθηναίους ἑαυτὸν κατάγειν: καὶ παραλαβόντες Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Φωκέας ὄντας ξυμμάχους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευσαν τῆς Θεσσαλίας ἐπὶ Φάρσαλον. καὶ τῆς μὲν γῆς ἐκράτουν ὅσα μὴ προϊόντες πολὺ ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων □οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εἶργον□,

τὴν δὲ πόλιν οὐχ εἷλον, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο προυχώρει αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ὧν ἕνεκα ἐστράτευσαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπεχώρησαν πάλιν Ὀρέστην ἔχοντες ἄπρακτοι. [2] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον χίλιοι Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τὰς ἐν Πηγαῖς ἐπιβάντες ⸀εἶχον δ᾽ αὐτοὶ τὰς Πηγάς⸁ παρέπλευσαν ἐς Σικυῶνα Περικλέους τοῦ Ξανθίππου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ ἀποβάντες Σικυωνίων τοὺς προσμείξαντας μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν. [3] καὶ εὐθὺς παραλαβόντες Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ διαπλεύσαντες πέραν τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας ἐς Οἰνιάδας ἐστράτευσαν καὶ ἐπολιόρκουν, οὐ μέντοι εἶλόν γε, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

[111] About this time Orestes, the exiled son of the Thessalian king Echecratides, persuaded the Athenians to restore him: Taking with them a force of the Boeotians and Phocians, who were now their allies, they marched against Pharsalus in Thessaly. They made themselves masters of the country in the neighbourhood of their camp, but the Thessalian cavalry stopped any further advance. They could not take the place, and none of their plans prospered; so they returned unsuccessful and brought back Orestes.A short time afterwards a thousand Athenians, under the command of Pericles the son of Xanthippus, embarking on board the fleet which they had at Pegae, now in their possession, coasted along to Sicyon, and there landing, defeated the Sicyonians who came out to meet them. With the least possible delay taking on board Achaean troops and sailing to the opposite coast, they attacked and besieged Oeniadae, a town of Acarnania; but failing to reduce it, they returned home.

112. ὕστερον δὲ διαλιπόντων ἐτῶν τριῶν σπονδαὶ γίγνονται Πελοποννησίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πεντέτεις. [2] καὶ Ἑλληνικοῦ μὲν πολέμου ἔσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐς δὲ Κύπρον ἐστρατεύοντο ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος. [3] καὶ ἑξήκοντα μὲν νῆες ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἔπλευσαν, Ἀμυρταίου μεταπέμποντος τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἕλεσι βασιλέως, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι Κίτιον ἐπολιόρκουν. [4] Κίμωνος δὲ ἀποθανόντος καὶ λιμοῦ

γενομένου ἀπεχώρησαν ἀπὸ Κιτίου, καὶ πλεύσαντες ὑπὲρ Σαλαμῖνος τῆς ἐν Κύπρῳ Φοίνιξι καὶ Κυπρίοις καὶ Κίλιξιν ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ ἐπεζομάχησαν ἅμα, καὶ νικήσαντες ἀμφότερα ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου καὶ αἱ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου νῆες πάλιν [αἱ] ἐλθοῦσαι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν. [5] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν ἱερὸν καλούμενον πόλεμον ἐστράτευσαν, καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱεροῦ παρέδοσαν Δελφοῖς: καὶ αὖθις ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποχωρησάντων αὐτῶν στρατεύσαντες καὶ κρατήσαντες παρέδοσαν Φωκεῦσιν.

[112] After an interval of three years a five years’ truce was concluded between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. The Athenians now abstained from war in Hellas itself, but made an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty ships were detached from the armament and sailed to Egypt, at the request of Amyrtaeus the king in the fens; the remainder proceeded to blockade Citium. Here Cimon died, and a famine arose in the country; so the fleet quitted Citium. Arriving off Salamis in Cyprus they fought at sea and also on land with Phoenician and Cilician forces. Gaining a victory in both engagements, they returned home, accompanied by the ships which had gone out with them and had now come back from Egypt. After this the Lacedaemonians engaged in the so-called Sacred War and gained possession of the temple of Delphi, which they handed over to the Delphians. But no sooner had they retired than the Athenians sent an expedition and recovered the temple, which they handed over to the Phocians.

113. καὶ χρόνου ἐγγενομένου μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι, Βοιωτῶν τῶν φευγόντων ἐχόντων Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ Χαιρώνειαν καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα χωρία τῆς Βοιωτίας, ἐστράτευσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν χιλίοις ὁπλίταις, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ὡς ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα πολέμια ὄντα, Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμαίου στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἑλόντες καὶ ἀνδραποδίσαντες ἀπεχώρουν φυλακὴν καταστήσαντες. [2] πορευομένοις δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐν Κορωνείᾳ

ἐπιτίθενται οἵ τε ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχομενοῦ φυγάδες Βοιωτῶν καὶ Λοκροὶ μετ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ Εὐβοέων φυγάδες καὶ ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν, καὶ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς μὲν διέφθειραν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἔλαβον. [3] καὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐξέλιπον Ἀθηναῖοι πᾶσαν, σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιοῦνται. [4] καὶ οἱ φεύγοντες Βοιωτῶν κατελθόντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες αὐτόνομοι πάλιν ἐγένοντο.

[113] Some time afterwards the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides the son of Tolmaeus, with a thousand hoplites of their own and contingents of their allies, made an expedition against Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and certain other places in Boeotia which were in the hands of oligarchical exiles from different Boeotian towns, and so were hostile to them. They took Chaeronea, and leaving a garrison there, departed. But while they were on their march, the exiles who had occupied Orchomenus, some Locrians, some Euboean exiles and others of the same party, set upon them at Coronea and defeated them, killing many and taking many prisoners. The Athenians then agreed to evacuate the whole of Boeotia upon condition that the prisoners should be restored. And so the Boeotian exiles returned to their homes, and all the Boeotians regained their independence.

114. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον Εὔβοια ἀπέστη ἀπὸ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐς αὐτὴν διαβεβηκότος ἤδη Περικλέους στρατιᾷ Ἀθηναίων ἠγγέλθη αὐτῷ ὅτι Μέγαρα ἀφέστηκε καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι μέλλουσιν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ οἱ φρουροὶ Ἀθηναίων διεφθαρμένοι εἰσὶν ὑπὸ Μεγαρέων, πλὴν ὅσοι ἐς Νίσαιαν ἀπέφυγον: ἐπαγαγόμενοι δὲ Κορινθίους καὶ Σικυωνίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους ἀπέστησαν οἱ Μεγαρῆς. ὁ δὲ Περικλῆς πάλιν κατὰ τάχος ἐκόμιζε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας. [2] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ Θριῶζε ἐσβαλόντες ἐδῄωσαν Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου βασιλέως Λακεδαιμονίων ἡγουμένου, καὶ τὸ πλέον οὐκέτι προελθόντες ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [3] καὶ

Ἀθηναῖοι πάλιν ἐς Εὔβοιαν διαβάντες Περικλέους στρατηγοῦντος κατεστρέψαντο πᾶσαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ὁμολογίᾳ κατεστήσαντο, Ἑστιαιᾶς δὲ ἐξοικίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν ἔσχον.

[114] Not long afterwards Euboea revolted from Athens. Pericles had just arrived in the island with an Athenian army when the news came that Megara had likewise revolted, that the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attica, and that the Megarians had slaughtered the Athenian garrison, of whom a few only had escaped to Nisaea. The Megarians had introduced a force of Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the city, and by their help had effected the revolt. Pericles in haste withdrew his army from Euboea. The Peloponnesians then invaded Attica under the command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, the Lacedaemonian king. They advanced as far as Eleusis and Thria but no further, and after ravaging the country, returned home. Thereupon the Athenians under the command of Pericles again crossed over to Euboea and reduced the whole country; the Hestiaeans they ejected from their homes and appropriated their territory; the rest of the island they settled by agreement.

115. ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἀπ᾽ Εὐβοίας οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τριακοντούτεις, ἀποδόντες Νίσαιαν καὶ Πηγὰς καὶ Τροιζῆνα καὶ Ἀχαΐαν: ταῦτα γὰρ εἶχον Ἀθηναῖοι Πελοποννησίων. [2]ἔκτῳ δὲ ἔτει Σαμίοις καὶ Μιλησίοις πόλεμος ἐγένετο περὶ Πριήνης, καὶ οἱ Μιλήσιοι ἐλασσούμενοι τῷ πολέμῳ παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἐλθόντες κατεβόων τῶν Σαμίων. ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς Σάμου ἄνδρες ἰδιῶται νεωτερίσαι βουλόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν. [3] πλεύσαντες οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς Σάμον ναυσὶ τεσσαράκοντα δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν, καὶ ὁμήρους ἔλαβον τῶν Σαμίων πεντήκοντα μὲν παῖδας, ἴσους δὲ ἄνδρας, καὶ κατέθεντο ἐς Λῆμνον, καὶ φρουρὰν ἐγκαταλιπόντες ἀνεχώρησαν. [4] τῶν δὲ Σαμίων ἦσαν γάρ τινες οἳ οὐχ ὑπέμειναν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔφυγον ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον,

ξυνθέμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τοῖς δυνατωτάτοις καὶ Πισσούθνῃ τῷ Ὑστάσπου ξυμμαχίαν, ὃς εἶχε Σάρδεις τότε, ἐπικούρους τε ξυλλέξαντες ἐς ἑπτακοσίους διέβησαν ὑπὸ νύκτα ἐς τὴν Σάμον, [5] καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν πλείστων, ἔπειτα τοὺς ὁμήρους ἐκκλέψαντες ἐκ Λήμνου τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν, καὶ τοὺς φρουροὺς τοὺς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας οἳ ἦσαν παρὰ σφίσιν ἐξέδοσαν Πισσούθνῃ, ἐπί τε Μίλητον εὐθὺς παρεσκευάζοντο στρατεύειν. ξυναπέστησαν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ Βυζάντιοι.

[115] Soon after their return from Euboea they made a truce for thirty years with the Laeedaemonians and their allies, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen and Achaia, which were the places held by them in Peloponnesus. Six years later the Samians and Milesians went to war about the possession of Prienè, and the Milesians, who were getting worsted, came to Athens and complained loudly of the Samians. Some private citizens of Samos, who wanted to overthrow the government, supported their complaint. Whereupon the Athenians, sailing to Samos with forty ships, established a democracy, and taking as hostages fifty boys and fifty men whom they deposited at Lemnos, they returned leaving a garrison. But certain of the Samians who had quitted the island and fled to the mainland entered into an alliance with the principal oligarchs who remained in the city, and with Pissuthnes the son of Hystaspes, then governor of Sardis, and collecting troops to the number of seven hundred they crossed over by night to Samos. First of all they attacked the victorious populace and got most of them into their power; then they stole away their hostages from Lemnos, and finally revolted from Athens. The garrison of the Athenians and the officials who were in their power were delivered by them into the hands of Pissuthnes. They at once prepared to make an expedition against Miletus. The Byzantians joined in their revolt.

116. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὡς ᾔσθοντο, πλεύσαντες ναυσὶν ἑξήκοντα ἐπὶ Σάμου ταῖς μὲν ἑκκαίδεκα τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχρήσαντο ἔτυχον γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ Καρίας ἐς προσκοπὴν τῶν Φοινισσῶν νεῶν οἰχόμεναι, αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου περιαγγέλλουσαι βοηθεῖν , τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ναυσὶ καὶ τέσσαρσι Περικλέους δεκάτου αὐτοῦ στρατηγοῦντος ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς Τραγίᾳ τῇ νήσῳ Σαμίων ναυσὶν ἑβδομήκοντα, ὧν ἦσαν αἱ εἴκοσι στρατιώτιδες ἔτυχον δὲ αἱ πᾶσαι ἀπὸ Μιλήτου πλέουσαι , καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι. [2] ὕστερον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐβοήθησαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν νῆες τεσσαράκοντα καὶ Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι, καὶ ἀποβάντες καὶ κρατοῦντες τῷ πεζῷ ἐπολιόρκουν τρισὶ τείχεσι τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἅμα. [3] Περικλῆς δὲ λαβὼν ἑξήκοντα ναῦς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐφορμουσῶν ᾤχετο κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ Καύνου καὶ Καρίας, ἐσαγγελθέντων ὅτι Φοίνισσαι νῆες ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς πλέουσιν: ᾤχετο γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πέντε ναυσὶ Στησαγόρας καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας.

[116] When the Athenians heard of the insurrection they sailed for Samos with sixty ships. But of this number they sent away sixteen, some towards Caria to keep a look out for the Phoenician fleet, others to summon aid from Chios and Lesbos. With the remaining forty-four ships they fought at sea under the command of Pericles and nine others, near the island of Tragia, against seventy Samian vessels, all sailing from Miletus, of which twenty were transports; the Athenians gained the victory. After receiving a reinforcement of forty ships from Athens and of twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos they disembarked, and their infantry proving superior, invested the city with three walls; they also blockaded it by sea. At the same time Pericles took sixty ships of the blockading force and sailed hastily towards Caunus in Caria, news having arrived that a Phoenician fleet was approaching; Stesagoras and others had already gone with five ships from Samos to fetch it.

117. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Σάμιοι ἐξαπιναίως ἔκπλουν ποιησάμενοι ἀφάρκτῳ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἐπιπεσόντες τάς τε

προφυλακίδας ναῦς διέφθειραν καὶ ναυμαχοῦντες τὰς ἀνταναγομένας ἐνίκησαν, καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης τῆς καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκράτησαν ἡμέρας περὶ τέσσαρας καὶ δέκα, καὶ ἐσεκομίσαντο καὶ ἐξεκομίσαντο ἃ ἐβούλοντο. [2] ἐλθόντος δὲ Περικλέους πάλιν ταῖς ναυσὶ κατεκλῄσθησαν. καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ὕστερον προσεβοήθησαν τεσσαράκοντα μὲν αἱ μετὰ Θουκυδίδου καὶ Ἄγνωνος καὶ Φορμίωνος νῆες, εἴκοσι δὲ αἱ μετὰ Τληπολέμου καὶ Ἀντικλέους, ἐκ δὲ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου τριάκοντα. [3] καὶ ναυμαχίαν μέν τινα βραχεῖαν ἐποιήσαντο οἱ Σάμιοι, ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες ἀντίσχειν ἐξεπολιορκήθησαν ἐνάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογίᾳ, τεῖχός τε καθελόντες καὶ ὁμήρους δόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες καὶ χρήματα τὰ ἀναλωθέντα ταξάμενοι κατὰ χρόνους ἀποδοῦναι. ξυνέβησαν δὲ καὶ Βυζάντιοι ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον ὑπήκοοι εἶναι.

[117] Meanwhile the Samians made a sudden sally, and attacking the naval station of the Athenians which was unprotected, destroyed the guard-ships and engaged and defeated the other vessels which put out to meet them. During some fourteen days they were masters of the sea about their own coasts, and carried in and out whatever they pleased. But when Pericles returned, they were again closely blockaded; and there soon arrived from Athens forty additional ships under Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio, twenty more under Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. The Samians made a feeble attempt at a sea-fight, but soon they were unable to resist, and after nine months were forced to surrender. The terms of capitulation were as follows: — They were to raze their walls, give hostages, surrender their ships, and pay a full indemnity by regular instalments. The Byzantians too made terms and became subjects as before.

118. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη γίγνεται οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον τὰ προειρημένα, τά τε Κερκυραϊκὰ καὶ τὰ Ποτειδεατικὰ καὶ ὅσα πρόφασις τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου κατέστη. [2] ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα ὅσα ἔπραξαν οἱ Ἕλληνες

πρός τε ἀλλήλους καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον ἐγένετο ἐν ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ξέρξου ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου: ἐν οἷς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τήν τε ἀρχὴν ἐγκρατεστέραν κατεστήσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι οὔτε ἐκώλυον εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ βραχύ, ἡσύχαζόν τε τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου, ὄντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἰέναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, ἢν μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται, τὸ δέ τι καὶ πολέμοις οἰκείοις ἐξειργόμενοι, πρὶν δὴ ἡ δύναμις τῶν Ἀθηναίων σαφῶς ἤρετο καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας αὐτῶν ἥπτοντο. τότε δὲ οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιχειρητέα ἐδόκει εἶναι πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ καὶ καθαιρετέα ἡ ἰσχύς, ἣν δύνωνται, ἀραμένοις τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον. [3] αὐτοῖς μὲν οὖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις διέγνωστο λελύσθαι τε τὰς σπονδὰς καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀδικεῖν, πέμψαντες δὲ ἐς Δελφοὺς ἐπηρώτων τὸν θεὸν εἰ πολεμοῦσιν ἄμεινον ἔσται: ὁ δὲ ἀνεῖλεν αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, κατὰ κράτος πολεμοῦσι νίκην ἔσεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔφη ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἄκλητος.

[118] Not long afterwards occurred the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, which have been already narrated, and the various other circumstances which led to the Peloponnesian War. Fifty years elapsed between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of the war; during these years took place all those operations of the Hellenes against one another and against the Barbarian which I have been describing. The Athenians acquired a firmer hold over their empire and the city itself became a great power. The Lacedaemonians saw what was going on, but during most of the time they remained inactive and hardly attempted to interfere. They had never been of a temper prompt to take the field unless they were compelled; and they were in some degree embarrassed by wars near home. But the Athenians were growing too great to be ignored and were laying hands on their allies. They could now bear it no longer: they made up their minds that they must put out all their strength and overthrow the Athenian power by force of arms. And therefore they

commenced the Peloponnesian War. They had already voted in their own assembly that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were guilty; they now sent to Delphi and asked the God if it would be for their advantage to make war. He is reported to have answered that, if they did their best, they would be conquerors, and that he himself, invited or uninvited, would take their part.

119. αὖθις δὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους παρακαλέσαντες ψῆφον ἐβούλοντο ἐπαγαγεῖν εἰ χρὴ πολεμεῖν. καὶ ἐλθόντων τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπὸ τῆς ξυμμαχίας καὶ ξυνόδου γενομένης οἵ τε ἄλλοι εἶπον ἃ ἐβούλοντο, κατηγοροῦντες οἱ πλείους τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀξιοῦντες γίγνεσθαι, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι δεηθέντες μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις πρότερον ἑκάστων ἰδίᾳ ὥστε ψηφίσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον, δεδιότες περὶ τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ μὴ προδιαφθαρῇ, παρόντες δὲ καὶ τότε καὶ τελευταῖοι ἐπελθόντες ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

[119] So they again summoned the allies, intending to put to them the question of war or peace. When their representatives arrived, an assembly was held; and the allies said what they had to say, most of them complaining of the Athenians and demanding that the war should proceed. The Corinthians had already gone the round of the cities and entreated them privately to vote for war; they were afraid that they would be too late to save Potidaea. At the assembly they came forward last of all and spoke as follows:

120. ‘τοὺς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι αἰτιασαίμεθα ὡς οὐ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐψηφισμένοι τὸν πόλεμόν εἰσι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐς τοῦτο νῦν ξυνήγαγον. χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τὰ ἴδια ἐξ ἴσου νέμοντας τὰ κοινὰ προσκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐκ πάντων προτιμῶνται. [2] ἡμῶν δὲ ὅσοι μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ἤδη ἐνηλλάγησαν οὐχὶ διδαχῆς δέονται ὥστε φυλάξασθαι αὐτούς: τοὺς δὲ τὴν μεσόγειαν μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ ἐν πόρῳ κατῳκημένους εἰδέναι χρὴ ὅτι, τοῖς κάτω ἢν μὴ ἀμύνωσι, χαλεπωτέραν ἕξουσι τὴν κατακομιδὴν τῶν ὡραίων καὶ πάλιν ἀντίληψιν ὧν ἡ θάλασσα τῇ ἠπείρῳ

δίδωσι, καὶ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων μὴ κακοὺς κριτὰς ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων εἶναι, προσδέχεσθαι δέ ποτε, εἰ τὰ κάτω πρόοιντο, κἂν μέχρι σφῶν τὸ δεινὸν προελθεῖν, καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐχ ἧσσον νῦν βουλεύεσθαι. [3] δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ μὴ ὀκνεῖν δεῖ αὐτοὺς τὸν πόλεμον ἀντ᾽ εἰρήνης μεταλαμβάνειν. ἀνδρῶν γὰρ σωφρόνων μέν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖντο, ἡσυχάζειν, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ἀδικουμένους ἐκ μὲν εἰρήνης πολεμεῖν, εὖ δὲ παρασχὸν ἐκ πολέμου πάλιν ξυμβῆναι, καὶ μήτε τῇ κατὰ πόλεμον εὐτυχίᾳ ἐπαίρεσθαι μήτε τῷ ἡσύχῳ τῆς εἰρήνης ἡδόμενον ἀδικεῖσθαι. [4] ὅ τε γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὀκνῶν τάχιστ᾽ ἂν ἀφαιρεθείη τῆς ῥᾳστώνης τὸ τερπνὸν δι᾽ ὅπερ ὀκνεῖ, εἰ ἡσυχάζοι, ὅ τε ἐν πολέμῳ εὐτυχίᾳ πλεονάζων οὐκ ἐντεθύμηται θράσει ἀπίστῳ ἐπαιρόμενος. [5] πολλὰ γὰρ κακῶς γνωσθέντα ἀβουλοτέρων τῶν ἐναντίων τυχόντα κατωρθώθη, καὶ ἔτι πλείω καλῶς δοκοῦντα βουλευθῆναι ἐς τοὐναντίον αἰσχρῶς περιέστη: ἐνθυμεῖται γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὁμοῖα τῇ πίστει καὶ ἔργῳ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀλλὰ μετ᾽ ἀσφαλείας μὲν δοξάζομεν, μετὰ δέους δὲ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐλλείπομεν.

[120] ‘Fellow allies, we can no longer find fault with the Lacedaemonians; they have themselves resolved upon war and have brought us hither to confirm their decision. And they have done well; for the leaders of a confederacy, while they do not neglect the interests of their own state, should look to the general weal: as they are first in honour, they should be first in the fulfilment of their duties. Now those among us who have ever had dealings with the Athenians, do not require to be warned against them; but such as live inland and not on any maritime highway should clearly understand that, if they do not protect the sea-board, they will find it more difficult to carry their produce to the sea, or to receive in return the goods which the sea gives to the land. They should not lend a careless ear to our words, for they nearly concern them; they should remember that, if they desert the cities on the sea-shore, the danger may some day reach them, and that they are consulting for their own interests quite as much as for ours. And therefore let no

one hesitate to accept war in exchange for peace. Wise men refuse to move until they are wronged, but brave men as soon as they are wronged go to war, and when there is a good opportunity make peace again. They are not intoxicated by military success; but neither will they tolerate injustice from a love of peace and ease. For he whom pleasure makes a coward will quickly lose, if he continues inactive, the delights of ease which he is so unwilling to renounce; and he whose arrogance is stimulated by victory does not see how hollow is the confidence which elates him. Many schemes which were ill-advised have succeeded through the still greater folly which possessed the enemy, and yet more, which seemed to be wisely contrived, have ended in foul disaster. The execution of an enterprise is never equal to the conception of it in the confident mind of its promoter; for men are safe while they are forming plans, but, when the time of action comes, then they lose their presence of mind and fail.

121. ‘ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν καὶ ἀδικούμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ἐγείρομεν καὶ ἱκανὰ ἔχοντες ἐγκλήματα, καὶ ὅταν ἀμυνώμεθα Ἀθηναίους, καταθησόμεθα αὐτὸν ἐν καιρῷ. [2] κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατῆσαι, πρῶτον μὲν πλήθει προύχοντας καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῇ, ἔπειτα ὁμοίως πάντας ἐς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἰόντας, [3] ναυτικόν τε, ᾧ ἰσχύουσιν, ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης τε ἑκάστοις οὐσίας ἐξαρτυσόμεθα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳ χρημάτων: δάνεισμα γὰρ ποιησάμενοι ὑπολαβεῖν οἷοί τ᾽ ἐσμὲν μισθῷ μείζονι τοὺς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας. ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία: ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἧσσον ἂν τοῦτο πάθοι, τοῖς σώμασι τὸ πλέον ἰσχύουσα ἢ τοῖς χρήμασιν. [4] μιᾷ τε νίκῃ ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἁλίσκονται: εἰ δ᾽ ἀντίσχοιεν, μελετήσομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν πλέονι χρόνῳ τὰ ναυτικά, καὶ ὅταν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐς τὸ ἴσον καταστήσωμεν, τῇ γε εὐψυχίᾳ δήπου περιεσόμεθα. ὃ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν φύσει ἀγαθόν, ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο διδαχῇ: ὃ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἐπιστήμῃ προύχουσι, καθαιρετὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μελέτῃ. [5]

χρήματα δὲ ὥστε ἔχειν ἐς αὐτά, οἴσομεν: ἢ δεινὸν ἂν εἴη εἰ οἱ μὲν ἐκείνων ξύμμαχοι ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν φέροντες οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ τιμωρούμενοι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἅμα σῴζεσθαι οὐκ ἄρα δαπανήσομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων αὐτὰ ἀφαιρεθέντες αὐτοῖς τούτοις κακῶς πάσχειν.

[121] ‘We, however, do not make war upon the Athenians in a spirit of vain-glory, but from a sense of wrong; there is ample justification, and when we obtain redress, we will put up the sword. For every reason we are likely to succeed. First, because we are superior in numbers and in military skill; secondly, because we all obey as one man the orders given to us. They are doubtless strong at sea, but we too will provide a navy, for which the means can be supplied partly by contributions from each state, partly out of the funds at Delphi and Olympia. A loan will be granted to us, and by the offer of higher pay we can draw away their foreign sailors. The Athenian power consists of mercenaries, and not of their own citizens; but our soldiers are not mercenaries, and therefore cannot so be bought, for we are strong in men if poor in money. Let them be beaten in a single naval engagement and they are probably conquered at once; but suppose they hold out, we shall then have more time in which to practise at sea. As soon as we have brought our skill up to the level of theirs our courage will surely give us the victory. For that is a natural gift which they cannot learn, but their superior skill is a thing acquired, which we must attain by practice.And the money which is required for the war, we will provide by a contribution. What! shall their allies never fail in paying the tribute which is to enslave them, and shall we refuse to give freely in order to save ourselves and be avenged on our enemies, or rather to prevent the money which we refused to give from being taken from us by them and used to our destruction?

122. ὑπάρχουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὁδοὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἡμῖν, ξυμμάχων τε ἀπόστασις, μάλιστα παραίρεσις οὖσα τῶν

προσόδων αἷς ἰσχύουσι, καὶ ἐπιτειχισμὸς τῇ χώρᾳ, ἄλλα τε ὅσα οὐκ ἄν τις νῦν προΐδοι. ἥκιστα γὰρ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφ᾽ αὐτοῦ τὰ πολλὰ τεχνᾶται πρὸς τὸ παρατυγχάνον: ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν εὐοργήτως αὐτῷ προσομιλήσας βεβαιότερος, ὁ δ᾽ ὀργισθεὶς περὶ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐλάσσω πταίει. [2] ᾽ἐνθυμώμεθα δὲ καὶ ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἡμῶν ἦσαν ἑκάστοις πρὸς ἀντιπάλους περὶ γῆς ὅρων αἱ διαφοραί, οἰστὸν ἂν ἦν: νῦν δὲ πρὸς ξύμπαντάς τε ἡμᾶς Ἀθηναῖοι ἱκανοὶ καὶ κατὰ πόλιν ἔτι δυνατώτεροι, ὥστε εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀθρόοι καὶ κατὰ ἔθνη καὶ ἕκαστον ἄστυ μιᾷ γνώμῃ ἀμυνούμεθα αὐτούς, δίχα γε ὄντας ἡμᾶς ἀπόνως χειρώσονται. καὶ τὴν ἦσσαν, εἰ καὶ δεινόν τῳ ἀκοῦσαι, ἴστω οὐκ ἄλλο τι φέρουσαν ἢ ἄντικρυς δουλείαν: [3] ὃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐνδοιασθῆναι αἰσχρὸν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ πόλεις τοσάσδε ὑπὸ μιᾶς κακοπαθεῖν. ἐν ᾧ ἢ δικαίως δοκοῖμεν ἂν πάσχειν ἢ διὰ δειλίαν ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τῶν πατέρων χείρους φαίνεσθαι, οἳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἠλευθέρωσαν, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς βεβαιοῦμεν αὐτό, τύραννον δὲ ἐῶμεν ἐγκαθεστάναι πόλιν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν μιᾷ μονάρχους ἀξιοῦμεν καταλύειν. [4] καὶ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅπως τάδε τριῶν τῶν μεγίστων ξυμφορῶν ἀπήλλακται, ἀξυνεσίας ἢ μαλακίας ἢ ἀμελείας. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πεφευγότες αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὴν πλείστους δὴ βλάψασαν καταφρόνησιν κεχωρήκατε, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πολλοὺς σφάλλειν τὸ ἐναντίον ὄνομα ἀφροσύνη μετωνόμασται.

[122] ‘These are some of the means by which the war may be carried on; but there are others. We may induce their allies to revolt, — a sure mode of cutting off the revenues in which the strength of Athens consists; or we may plant a fort in their country; and there are many expedients which will hereafter suggest themselves. For war, least of all things, conforms to prescribed rules; it strikes out a path for itself when the moment comes. And therefore he who has his temper under control in warfare is safer far, but he who gets into a passion is, through his own fault, liable to the greater fall.’If this were merely a quarrel between one of us and our neighbours about a boundary line it would not matter; but reflect: the truth is that the Athenians are a match for us all,

and much more than a match for any single city. And if we allow ourselves to be divided or are not united against them heart and soul — the whole confederacy and every nation and city in it — they will easily overpower us. It may seem a hard saying, but you may be sure that defeat means nothing but downright slavery, and the bare mention of such a possibility is a disgrace to the Peloponnese: — shall so many states suffer at the hands of one? Men will say, some that we deserve our fate, others that we are too cowardly to resist: and we shall seem a degenerate race. For our fathers were the liberators of Hellas, but we cannot secure even our own liberty; and while we make a point of overthrowing the rule of a single man in this or that city, we allow a city which is a tyrant to be set up in the midst of us. Are we not open to one of three most serious charges — folly, cowardice, or carelessness? For you certainly do not escape such imputations by wrapping yourselves in that contemptuous wisdom which has so often brought men to ruin, as in the end to be pronounced contemptible folly.

123. τὰ μὲν οὖν προγεγενημένα τί δεῖ μακρότερον ἢ ἐς ὅσον τοῖς νῦν ξυμφέρει αἰτιᾶσθαι; περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔπειτα μελλόντων τοῖς παροῦσι βοηθοῦντας χρὴ ἐπιταλαιπωρεῖν πάτριον γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐκ τῶν πόνων τὰς ἀρετὰς κτᾶσθαι, καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἔθος, εἰ ἄρα πλούτῳ τε νῦν καὶ ἐξουσίᾳ ὀλίγον προφέρετε οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον ἃ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐκτήθη τῇ περιουσίᾳ ἀπολέσθαι, ἀλλὰ θαρσοῦντας ἰέναι κατὰ πολλὰ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, τοῦ τε θεοῦ χρήσαντος καὶ αὐτοῦ ὑποσχομένου ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἁπάσης ξυναγωνιουμένης, τὰ μὲν φόβῳ, τὰ δὲ ὠφελίᾳ. [2] σπονδάς τε οὐ λύσετε πρότεροι, ἅς γε καὶ ὁ θεὸς κελεύων πολεμεῖν νομίζει παραβεβάσθαι, ἠδικημέναις δὲ μᾶλλον βοηθήσετε: λύουσι γὰρ οὐχ οἱ ἀμυνόμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πρότεροι ἐπιόντες.

[123] ‘But why should we dwell reproachfully upon the past, except in the interest of the present? We should rather, looking to the future, devote our energies to the task which we have immediately in hand. By labour to win virtue, —

that is the lesson which we have learnt from our fathers, and which you ought not to unlearn, because you chance to have some trifling advantage over them in wealth and power; for men should not lose in the time of their wealth what was gained by them in their time of want. There are many reasons why you may advance with confidence. The God has spoken and has promised to take our part himself. All Hellas will fight at our side, from motives either of fear or of interest. And you will not break the treaty, — the God in bidding you go to war pronounces it to have been already broken, — but you will avenge the violation of it. For those who attack others, not those who defend themselves, are the real violators of treaties.

124. ‘ὥστε πανταχόθεν καλῶς ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν πολεμεῖν καὶ ἡμῶν κοινῇ τάδε παραινούντων, εἴπερ βεβαιότατον τὸ ταὐτὰ ξυμφέροντα καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις εἶναι, μὴ μέλλετε Ποτειδεάταις τε ποιεῖσθαι τιμωρίαν οὖσι Δωριεῦσι καὶ ὑπὸ Ἰώνων πολιορκουμένοις, οὗ πρότερον ἦν τοὐναντίον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετελθεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐνδέχεται περιμένοντας τοὺς μὲν ἤδη βλάπτεσθαι, τοὺς δ᾽, εἰ γνωσθησόμεθα ξυνελθόντες μέν, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ οὐ τολμῶντες, μὴ πολὺ ὕστερον τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν: [2] ἀλλὰ νομίσαντες ἐς ἀνάγκην ἀφῖχθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, καὶ ἅμα τάδε ἄριστα λέγεσθαι, ψηφίσασθε τὸν πόλεμον μὴ φοβηθέντες τὸ αὐτίκα δεινόν, τῆς δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ διὰ πλείονος εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμήσαντες: ἐκ πολέμου μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνη μᾶλλον βεβαιοῦται, ἀφ᾽ ἡσυχίας δὲ μὴ πολεμῆσαι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκίνδυνον. [3] καὶ τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι πόλιν τύραννον ἡγησάμενοι ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως καθεστάναι, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἤδη ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ διανοεῖσθαι,παραστησώμεθα ἐπελθόντες, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀκινδύνως τὸ λοιπὸν οἰκῶμεν καὶ τοὺς νῦν δεδουλωμένους Ἕλληνας ἐλευθερώσωμεν.’ τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον.

[124] ‘On every ground you will be right in going to war: it is our united advice; and if you believe community of interests to be the surest ground of strength both to states and

individuals, send speedy aid to the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and now besieged by Ionians (for times have changed), and recover the liberties which the rest of the allies have lost. We cannot go on as we are: for some of us are already suffering, and if it is known that we have met, but do not dare to defend ourselves, others will soon share their fate. Acknowledging then, allies, that there is no alternative, and that we are advising you for the best, vote for war; and be not afraid of the immediate danger, but fix your thoughts on the durable peace which will follow. For by war peace is assured, but to remain at peace when you should be going to war may be often very dangerous. The tyrant city which has been set up in Hellas is a standing menace to all alike; she rules over some of us already, and would fain rule over others. Let us attack and subdue her, that we may ourselves live safely for the future and deliver the Hellenes whom she has enslaved.’Such were the words of the Corinthians.

125. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπειδὴ ἀφ᾽ ἁπάντων ἤκουσαν γνώμην, ψῆφον ἐπήγαγον τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἅπασιν ὅσοι παρῆσαν ἑξῆς, καὶ μείζονι καὶ ἐλάσσονι πόλει: καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμεῖν. [2] δεδογμένον δὲ αὐτοῖς εὐθὺς μὲν ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀπαρασκεύοις οὖσιν, ἐκπορίζεσθαι δὲ ἐδόκει ἑκάστοις ἃ πρόσφορα ἦν καὶ μὴ εἶναι μέλλησιν. ὅμως δὲ καθισταμένοις ὧν ἔδει ἐνιαυτὸς μὲν οὐ διετρίβη, ἔλασσον δέ, πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἄρασθαι φανερῶς.

[125] The Lacedaemonians, having heard the opinions of all the allies, put the question to them all, one after the other, great and small alike, and the majority voted for war. But, although they had come to this decision, they were not ready, and could not take up arms at once; so they determined to make the necessary preparations, each for themselves, with the least possible delay. Still nearly a whole year was passed in preparation before they invaded Attica and commenced open hostilities.

126. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐπρεσβεύοντο τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι, ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ἢν μή τι ἐσακούωσιν. [2]καὶ πρῶτον μὲν πρέσβεις πέμψαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ ἄγος ἐλαύνειν τῆς θεοῦ: τὸ δὲ ἄγος ἦν τοιόνδε. [3] Κύλων ἦν Ἀθηναῖος ἀνὴρ Ὀλυμπιονίκης τῶν πάλαι εὐγενής τε καὶ δυνατός, ἐγεγαμήκει δὲ θυγατέρα Θεαγένους Μεγαρέως ἀνδρός, ὃς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐτυράννει Μεγάρων. [4] χρωμένῳ δὲ τῷ Κύλωνι ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεὸς ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τῇ μεγίστῃ ἑορτῇ καταλαβεῖν τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἀκρόπολιν. [5] ὁ δὲ παρά τε τοῦ Θεαγένους δύναμιν λαβὼν καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἀναπείσας, ἐπειδὴ ἐπῆλθεν Ὀλύμπια τὰ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, κατέλαβε τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ὡς ἐπὶ τυραννίδι, νομίσας ἑορτήν τε τοῦ Διὸς μεγίστην εἶναι καὶ ἑαυτῷ τι προσήκειν Ὀλύμπια νενικηκότι. [6] εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἡ μεγίστη ἑορτὴ εἴρητο, οὔτε ἐκεῖνος ἔτι κατενόησε τό τε μαντεῖον οὐκ ἐδήλου ἔστι γὰρ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις Διάσια ἃ καλεῖται Διὸς ἑορτὴ Μειλιχίου μεγίστη ἔξω τῆς πόλεως, ἐν ᾗ πανδημεὶ θύουσι πολλὰ οὐχ ἱερεῖα, ἀλλ᾽ <ἁγνὰ> θύματα ἐπιχώρια , δοκῶν δὲ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν ἐπεχείρησε τῷ ἔργῳ. [7] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐβοήθησάν τε πανδημεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ προσκαθεζόμενοι ἐπολιόρκουν. [8] χρόνου δὲ ἐγγιγνομένου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τρυχόμενοι τῇ προσεδρίᾳ ἀπῆλθον οἱ πολλοί, ἐπιτρέψαντες τοῖς ἐννέα ἄρχουσι τήν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτοκράτορσι διαθεῖναι ᾗ ἂν ἄριστα διαγιγνώσκωσιν: τότε δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ἔπρασσον. [9] οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Κύλωνος πολιορκούμενοι φλαύρως εἶχον σίτου τε καὶ ὕδατος ἀπορίᾳ. [10] ὁ μὲν οὖν Κύλων καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἐκδιδράσκουσιν: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ὡς ἐπιέζοντο καί τινες καὶ ἀπέθνῃσκον ὑπὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ, καθίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν ἱκέται τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει. [11] ἀναστήσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακήν, ὡς ἑώρων ἀποθνῄσκοντας ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιήσουσιν, ἀπαγαγόντες ἀπέκτειναν: καθεζομένους δέ τινας καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σεμνῶν

θεῶν τοῖς βωμοῖς ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ ἀπεχρήσαντο. καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐναγεῖς καὶ ἀλιτήριοι τῆς θεοῦ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἐκαλοῦντο καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων. [12] ἤλασαν μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς ἐναγεῖς τούτους, ἤλασε δὲ καὶ Κλεομένης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ὕστερον μετὰ Ἀθηναίων στασιαζόντων, τούς τε ζῶντας ἐλαύνοντες καὶ τῶν τεθνεώτων τὰ ὀστᾶ ἀνελόντες ἐξέβαλον: κατῆλθον μέντοι ὕστερον, καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἔτι ἐν τῇ πόλει.

[126] During this interval they sent embassies to Athens and made various complaints that their grounds for going to war might be all the stronger in case the Athenians refused to listen. The first ambassadors desired the Athenians to drive out ‘the curse of the Goddess.’ The curse to which they referred was as follows: — In the days of old there was an Athenian named Cylon, who had been an Olympic victor; he was powerful and of noble birth; and he had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian who was at that time tyrant of Megara. In answer to an enquiry which Cylon made at Delphi, the God told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens at the greatest festival of Zeus. Thereupon he obtained forces from Theagenes, and, persuading his friends to join him, when the time of the Olympic festival in Peloponnesus came round, he took possession of the Acropolis, intending to make himself tyrant. He thought that this was the greatest festival of Zeus, and, having been an Olympic victor, he seemed to have a special interest in it. But whether the greatest festival spoken of was in Attica or in some other part of Hellas was a question which never entered into his mind, and the oracle said nothing about it. (For the Athenians also have a greatest festival of Zeus — the festival of Zeus the Gracious, or Diasia, as it is called — this is held outside the city and the whole people sacrifice at it, some, ordinary victims, others, a kind of offering peculiar to the country.) However, Cylon thought that his interpretation was right, and made the attempt at the Olympic festival. The Athenians, when they saw what had

happened, came in a body from the fields and invested the Acropolis. After a time they grew tired of the siege and most of them went away, committing the guard to the nine Archons, and giving them full powers to do what they thought best in the whole matter; for in those days public affairs were chiefly administered by the nine Archons.. Cylon and his companions were in great distress from want of food and water. So he and his brother made their escape; the rest, being hard pressed, and some of them ready to die of hunger, sat as suppliants at the altar which is in the Acropolis. When the Athenians, to whose charge the guard had been committed, saw them dying in the temple, they bade them rise, promising to do them no harm, and then led them away and put them to death. They even slew some of them in the very presence of the awful Goddesses at whose altars, in passing by, they had sought refuge. The murderers and their descendants are held to be accursed, and offenders against the Goddess. These accursed persons were banished by the Athenians; and Cleomenes, the Lacedaemonian king, again banished them from Athens in a time of civil strife by the help of the opposite faction, expelling the living and disinterring and casting forth the bones of the dead. Nevertheless they afterwards returned, and to this day their race still survives in the city.

127. τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἄγος οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευον ἐλαύνειν δῆθεν τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες, εἰδότες δὲ Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου προσεχόμενον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μητέρα καὶ νομίζοντες ἐκπεσόντος αὐτοῦ ῥᾷον <ἂν> σφίσι προχωρεῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. [2] οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἤλπιζον παθεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν τοῦτο ὅσον διαβολὴν οἴσειν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὡς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ξυμφορὰν τὸ μέρος ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος. [3] ὢν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν ἠναντιοῦτο πάντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ οὐκ εἴα ὑπείκειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ὥρμα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.

[127] The Lacedaemonians desired the Athenians to drive away this curse, as if the honour of the Gods were their first object, but in reality because they knew that the curse attached to Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, by his mother's side, and they thought that if he were banished they would find the Athenians more manageable. They did not really expect that he would be driven into exile, but they hoped to discredit him with the citizens and make them believe that his misfortune was to a certain extent the cause of the war. For he was the leader of the state and the most powerful man of his day, and his policy was utterly opposed to the Lacedaemonians. He would not suffer the Athenians to give way, but was always urging upon them the necessity of war.

128. ἀντεκέλευον δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὸ ἀπὸ Ταινάρου ἄγος ἐλαύνειν: οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀναστήσαντές ποτε ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος [ἀπὸ Ταινάρου] τῶν Εἱλώτων ἱκέτας ἀπαγαγόντες διέφθειραν, δι᾽ ὃ δὴ καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς νομίζουσι τὸν μέγαν σεισμὸν γενέσθαι ἐν Σπάρτῃ. [2] ἐκέλευον δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Χαλκιοίκου ἄγος ἐλαύνειν αὐτούς: ἐγένετο δὲ τοιόνδε. [3] ἐπειδὴ Παυσανίας ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος τὸ πρῶτον μεταπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Σπαρτιατῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ καὶ κριθεὶς ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀπελύθη μὴ ἀδικεῖν, δημοσίᾳ μὲν οὐκέτι ἐξεπέμφθη, ἰδίᾳ δὲ αὐτὸς τριήρη λαβὼν Ἑρμιονίδα ἄνευ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἑλλήσποντον, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν πόλεμον, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ τὰ πρὸς βασιλέα πράγματα πράσσειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησεν, ἐφιέμενος τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀρχῆς. [4] εὐεργεσίαν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦδε πρῶτον ἐς βασιλέα κατέθετο καὶ τοῦ παντὸς πράγματος ἀρχὴν ἐποιήσατο: [5] Βυζάντιον γὰρ ἑλὼν τῇ προτέρᾳ παρουσίᾳ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ Κύπρου ἀναχώρησιν ⸮εἶχον δὲ Μῆδοι αὐτὸ καὶ βασιλέως προσήκοντές τινες καὶ ξυγγενεῖς οἳ ἑάλωσαν ἐν αὐτῷ⸮ τότε τούτους οὓς ἔλαβεν ἀποπέμπει βασιλεῖ κρύφα τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ἀπέδρασαν αὐτόν. [6] ἔπρασσε δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ Γογγύλου τοῦ Ἐρετριῶς, ᾧπερ ἐπέτρεψε τό τε Βυζάντιον καὶ τοὺς

αἰχμαλώτους. ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ ἐπιστολὴν τὸν Γόγγυλον φέροντα αὐτῷ: ἐνεγέγραπτο δὲ τάδε ἐν αὐτῇ, ὡς ὕστερον ἀνηυρέθη: [7] ‘Παυσανίας ὁ ἡγεμὼν τῆς Σπάρτης τούσδε τέ σοι χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος ἀποπέμπει δορὶ ἑλών,καὶ γνώμην ποιοῦμαι, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ, θυγατέρα τε τὴν σὴν γῆμαι καί σοι Σπάρτην τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα ὑποχείριον ποιῆσαι. δυνατὸς δὲ δοκῶ εἶναι ταῦτα πρᾶξαι μετὰ σοῦ βουλευόμενος. εἰ οὖν τί σε τούτων ἀρέσκει, πέμπε ἄνδρα πιστὸν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν δι᾽ οὗ τὸ λοιπὸν τοὺς λόγους ποιησόμεθα.’

[128] The Athenians retaliated by demanding that the Lacedaemomans should drive away the curse of Taenarus. They referred to the murder of certain Helots who had taken refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus; these the Lacedaemonians, having first raised by the hand, had then led away and slain. The Lacedaemonians themselves believe this act of theirs to have been the cause of the great earthquake which visited Sparta. The Athenians also bade them drive out the curse of Athenè of the Brazen House. The story is as follows: — When Pausanias the Lacedaemonian was originally summoned by the Spartans to give an account of his command at the Hellespont, and had been tried and acquitted, he was no longer sent out in a public capacity, but he hired a trireme of Hermionè on his own account and sailed to the Hellespont, pretending that he had gone thither to fight in the cause of the Hellenes. In reality he wanted to prosecute an intrigue with the King, by which he hoped to obtain the empire of Hellas. He had already taken the first steps after the return from Cyprus, when he captured Byzantium The city was at that time held by the Persians and by certain relatives and kinsmen of the King, who were taken prisoners. These he restored to the King without the knowledge of the allies, to whom he declared that they had made their escape. This act was the beginning of the whole affair, and thereby he originally placed the King under an obligation to him. His accomplice

was Gongylus the Eretrian, to whose care he had entrusted Byzantium and the captives. To this same Gongylus he also gave a letter addressed to the King, of which, as was afterwards discovered, the terms were as follows:'Pausanias, the Spartan commander, desiring to do you a service, sends you back these captives of his spear. And I propose, if you have no objection, to marry your daughter, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Hellas under your sway. I think that I can accomplish this if you and I take counsel together. Should you approve of my proposal, send a trusty person to the sea and through him we will negotiate.' Thus far the letter.

129. τοσαῦτα μὲν ἡ γραφὴ ἐδήλου, Ξέρξης δὲ ἥσθη τε τῇ ἐπιστολῇ καὶ ἀποστέλλει Ἀρτάβαζον τὸν Φαρνάκου ἐπὶ θάλασσαν καὶ κελεύει αὐτὸν τήν τε Δασκυλῖτιν σατραπείαν παραλαβεῖν Μεγαβάτην ἀπαλλάξαντα, ὃς πρότερον ἦρχε, καὶ παρὰ Παυσανίαν ἐς Βυζάντιον ἐπιστολὴν ἀντεπετίθει αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα διαπέμψαι καὶ τὴν σφραγῖδα ἀποδεῖξαι, καὶ ἤν τι αὐτῷ Παυσανίας παραγγέλλῃ περὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πραγμάτων, πράσσειν ὡς ἄριστα καὶ πιστότατα. [2] ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος τά τε ἄλλα ἐποίησεν ὥσπερ εἴρητο καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν διέπεμψεν: [3] ἀντενεγέγραπτο δὲ τάδε: 'ὧδε λέγει βασιλεὺς Ξέρξης Παυσανίῃ. καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὕς μοι πέραν θαλάσσης ἐκ Βυζαντίου ἔσωσας κείσεταί σοι εὐεργεσία ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ ἐς αἰεὶ ἀνάγραπτος, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρέσκομαι. καί σε μήτε νὺξ μήθ᾽ ἡμέρα ἐπισχέτω ὥστε ἀνεῖναι πράσσειν τι ὧν ἐμοὶ ὑπισχνῇ, μηδὲ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου δαπάνῃ κεκωλύσθω μηδὲ στρατιᾶς πλήθει, εἴ ποι δεῖ παραγίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετ᾽ Ἀρταβάζου ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ὅν σοι ἔπεμψα, πρᾶσσε θαρσῶν καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ σὰ ὅπῃ κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα ἔξει ἀμφοτέροις.'

[129] Xerxes was pleased, and sent Artabazus the son of Pharnaces to the sea, commanding him to assume the government of the satrapy of Dascylium in the room of Megabates. An answer was entrusted to him, which he was to send as quickly as possible to Pausanias at Byzantium; he

was to show him at the same time the royal seal. If Pausanias gave him any order about his own affairs, he was to execute it with all diligence and fidelity. Artabazus came down to the sea, as he was desired, and transmitted the letter. The answer of the King was as follows:'Thus saith Xerxes, the King, to Pausanias. The benefit which thou hast done me in saving the captives who were taken at Byzantium beyond the sea is recorded in my house for ever, and thy words please me. Let neither day nor night hinder thee from fulfilling diligently the promise which thou hast made to me; spare not gold or silver, and take as large an army as thou wilt, wheresoever of it may be required. I have sent to thee Artabazus, a good man; act with him for my honour and welfare, and for thine own, and be of good courage.'

130. ταῦτα λαβὼν ὁ Παυσανίας τὰ γράμματα, ὢν καὶ πρότερον ἐν μεγάλῳ ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν Πλαταιᾶσιν ἡγεμονίαν, πολλῷ τότε μᾶλλον ἦρτο καὶ οὐκέτι ἐδύνατο ἐν τῷ καθεστῶτι τρόπῳ βιοτεύειν, ἀλλὰ σκευάς τε Μηδικὰς ἐνδυόμενος ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ἐξήει καὶ διὰ τῆς Θρᾴκης πορευόμενον αὐτὸν Μῆδοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι ἐδορυφόρουν, τράπεζάν τε Περσικὴν παρετίθετο καὶ κατέχειν τὴν διάνοιαν οὐκ ἐδύνατο,ἀλλ᾽ ἔργοις βραχέσι προυδήλου ἃ τῇ γνώμῃ μειζόνως ἐς ἔπειτα ἔμελλε πράξειν. [2] δυσπρόσοδόν τε αὐτὸν παρεῖχε καὶ τῇ ὀργῇ οὕτω χαλεπῇ ἐχρῆτο ἐς πάντας ὁμοίως ὥστε μηδένα δύνασθαι προσιέναι: δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἥκιστα ἡ ξυμμαχία μετέστη.

[130] Pausanias received the letter. He had already acquired a high reputation among the Hellenes when in command at Plataea, and now he was so great that he could no longer contain himself or live like other men. Whenever he marched out of Byzantium he wore Persian apparel. On his way through Thrace he was always attended by a body-guard of Medes and Egyptians, and he had his table served after the Persian fashion. He could not conceal his ambition, but indicated by little things the greater designs which he

was meditating. He made himself difficult of access, and displayed such a violent temper towards everybody that no one could come near him; and this was one of the chief reasons why the confederacy transferred themselves to the Athenians.

131. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι τό τε πρῶτον δι᾽ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀνεκάλεσαν αὐτόν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ τῇ Ἑρμιονίδι νηὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἐκπλεύσας οὐ κελευσάντων αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα ἐφαίνετο ποιῶν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου βίᾳ ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐκπολιορκηθεὶς ἐς μὲν τὴν Σπάρτην οὐκ ἐπανεχώρει, ἐς δὲ Κολωνὰς τὰς Τρῳάδας ἱδρυθεὶς πράσσων τε ἐσηγγέλλετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ τὴν μονὴν ποιούμενος, οὕτω δὴ οὐκέτι ἐπέσχον, ἀλλὰ πέμψαντες κήρυκα οἱ ἔφοροι καὶ σκυτάλην εἶπον τοῦ κήρυκος μὴ λείπεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, πόλεμον αὐτῷ Σπαρτιάτας προαγορεύειν. [2] ὁ δὲ βουλόμενος ὡς ἥκιστα ὕποπτος εἶναι καὶ πιστεύων χρήμασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολὴν ἀνεχώρει τὸ δεύτερον ἐς Σπάρτην. καὶ ἐς μὲν τὴν εἱρκτὴν ἐσπίπτει τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἔξεστι δὲ τοῖς ἐφόροις τὸν βασιλέα δρᾶσαι τοῦτο , ἔπειτα διαπραξάμενος ὕστερον ἐξῆλθε καὶ καθίστησιν ἑαυτὸν ἐς κρίσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ αὐτῶν ἐλέγχειν.

[131] The news of his behaviour soon reached the Lacedaemonians; who had recalled him in the first instance on this ground. And now, when he had sailed away in the ship of Hermionè without leave, and was evidently carrying on the same practices; when he had been forced out of Byzantium and the gates had been shut against him by the Athenians; and when, instead of returning to Sparta, he settled at Colonae in Troas, and was reported to the Ephors to be negotiating with the Barbarians, and to be staying there for no good purpose, then at last they made up their minds to act. They sent a herald to him with a despatch rolled on a scytalè, commanding him to follow the officer home, and saying that, if he refused, Sparta would declare war against him. He, being desirous as far as he could to

avoid suspicion and believing that he could dispose of the accusations by bribery, returned for the second time to Sparta. On his return he was at once thrown into prison by the Ephors, who have the power to imprison the king himself. But after a time he contrived to come out, and challenged any one who asserted his guilt to bring him to trial.

132. καὶ φανερὸν μὲν εἶχον οὐδὲν οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται σημεῖον, οὔτε οἱ ἐχθροὶ οὔτε ἡ πᾶσα πόλις, ὅτῳ ἂν πιστεύσαντες βεβαίως ἐτιμωροῦντο ἄνδρα γένους τε τοῦ βασιλείου ὄντα καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τιμὴν ἔχοντα Πλείσταρχον γὰρ τὸν Λεωνίδου ὄντα βασιλέα καὶ νέον ἔτι ἀνεψιὸς ὢν ἐπετρόπευεν , [2] ὑποψίας δὲ πολλὰς παρεῖχε τῇ τε παρανομίᾳ καὶ ζηλώσει τῶν βαρβάρων μὴ ἴσος βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοῖς παροῦσι, τά τε ἄλλα αὐτοῦ ἀνεσκόπουν, εἴ τί που ἐξεδεδιήτητο τῶν καθεστώτων νομίμων, καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸν τρίποδά ποτε τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, ὃν ἀνέθεσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀπὸ τῶν Μήδων ἀκροθίνιον, ἠξίωσεν ἐπιγράψασθαι αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ τὸ ἐλεγεῖον τόδε:”Ἑλλήνων ἀρχηγὸς ἐπεὶ στρατὸν ὤλεσε Μήδων,Παυσανίας Φοίβῳ μνῆμ᾽ ἀνέθηκε τόδε.” [3] τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐλεγεῖον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐξεκόλαψαν εὐθὺς τότε ἀπὸ τοῦ τρίποδος τοῦτο καὶ ἐπέγραψαν ὀνομαστὶ τὰς πόλεις ὅσαι ξυγκαθελοῦσαι τὸν βάρβαρον ἔστησαν τὸ ἀνάθημα: τοῦ μέντοι Παυσανίου ἀδίκημα καὶ τότ᾽ ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπεί γε δὴ ἐν τούτῳ καθειστήκει, πολλῷ μᾶλλον παρόμοιον πραχθῆναι ἐφαίνετο τῇ παρούσῃ διανοίᾳ. [4] ἐπυνθάνοντο δὲ καὶ ἐς τοὺς Εἵλωτας πράσσειν τι αὐτόν, καὶ ἦν δὲ οὕτως: ἐλευθέρωσίν τε γὰρ ὑπισχνεῖτο αὐτοῖς καὶ πολιτείαν, ἢν ξυνεπαναστῶσι καὶ τὸ πᾶν ξυγκατεργάσωνται. [5] ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ὡς οὐδὲ τῶν Εἱλώτων μηνυταῖς τισὶ πιστεύσαντες ἠξίωσαν νεώτερόν τι ποιεῖν ἐς αὐτόν, χρώμενοι τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ εἰώθασιν ἐς σφᾶς αὐτούς, μὴ ταχεῖς εἶναι περὶ ἀνδρὸς Σπαρτιάτου ἄνευ ἀναμφισβητήτων τεκμηρίων βουλεῦσαί τι ἀνήκεστον, πρίν γε δὴ αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, ὁ μέλλων τὰς τελευταίας βασιλεῖ ἐπιστολὰς πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον κομιεῖν, ἀνὴρ Ἀργίλιος, παιδικά ποτε ὢν αὐτοῦ καὶ πιστότατος

ἐκείνῳ, μηνυτὴς γίγνεται, δείσας κατὰ ἐνθύμησίν τινα ὅτι οὐδείς πω τῶν πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἀγγέλων πάλιν ἀφίκετο, καὶ παρασημηνάμενος σφραγῖδα, ἵνα, ἢν ψευσθῇ τῆς δόξης ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνός τι μεταγράψαι αἰτήσῃ, μὴ ἐπιγνῷ, λύει τὰς ἐπιστολάς, ἐν αἷς ὑπονοήσας τι τοιοῦτον προσεπεστάλθαι καὶ αὐτὸν ηὗρεν ἐγγεγραμμένον κτείνειν.

[132] As yet however neither his enemies among the citizens nor the Spartan government had any trustworthy evidence such as would have justified them in inflicting punishment upon a member of the royal family holding royal office at the time. For he was the guardian as well as cousin of the king, Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, who was still a minor. But his disregard of propriety and affectation of Barbarian fashions made them strongly suspect that he was dissatisfied with his position in the state. They examined into any violation of established usage which they could find in his previous life; and they remembered among other things how in past times he had presumed on his own authority to inscribe on the tripod at Delphi, which the Hellenes dedicated as the first fruits of their victory over the Persians, this elegiac couplet:’Pausanias, captain of the Hellenes, having destroyed the Persian host,Made this offering to Phoebus for a memorial.’The Lacedaemonians had at once effaced the lines and inscribed on the tripod the names of the cities which took part in the overthrow of the Barbarian and in the dedication of the offering. But still this act of Pausanias gave offence at the time, and, now that he had again fallen under suspicion, seemed to receive a new light from his present designs. They were also informed that he was intriguing with the Helots; and this was true, for he had promised them emancipation and citizenship if they would join him in an insurrection and help to carry out his whole design. Still the magistrates would not take decided measures; they even refused to believe the distinct testimony which certain Helots brought against him; their habit having always been to be slow in taking an irrevocable decision against a

Spartan without incontestable proof. At last a certain man of Argilus, who had been a favourite and was still a confidential servant of Pausanias, turned informer. He had been commissioned by him to carry to Artabazus the last letters for the King, but the thought struck him that no previous messenger had ever returned; he took alarm, and so, having counterfeited the seal of Pausanias in order to avoid discovery if he were mistaken, or if Pausanias, wanting to make some alteration, should ask him for the letter, he opened it, and among the directions given in it found written, as he had partly suspected, an order for his own death.

133. τότε δὴ οἱ ἔφοροι δείξαντος αὐτοῦ τὰ γράμματα μᾶλλον μὲν ἐπίστευσαν, αὐτήκοοι δὲ βουληθέντες ἔτι γενέσθαι αὐτοῦ Παυσανίου τι λέγοντος, ἀπὸ παρασκευῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ Ταίναρον ἱκέτου οἰχομένου καὶ σκηνησαμένου διπλῆν διαφράγματι καλύβην, ἐς ἣν τῶν [τε] ἐφόρων ἐντός τινας ἔκρυψε, καὶ Παυσανίου ὡς αὐτὸν ἐλθόντος καὶ ἐρωτῶντος τὴν πρόφασιν τῆς ἱκετείας ᾔσθοντο πάντα σαφῶς, αἰτιωμένου τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τά τε περὶ αὐτοῦ γραφέντα καὶ τἆλλ᾽ ἀποφαίνοντος καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ὡς οὐδὲν πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς βασιλέα διακονίαις παραβάλοιτο, προτιμηθείη δ᾽ ἐν ἴσῳ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν διακόνων ἀποθανεῖν, κἀκείνου αὐτά τε ταῦτα ξυνομολογοῦντος καὶ περὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἐῶντος ὀργίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πίστιν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ διδόντος τῆς ἀναστάσεως καὶ ἀξιοῦντος ὡς τάχιστα πορεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὰ πρασσόμενα διακωλύειν.

[133] He showed the letter to the Ephors, who were now more inclined to believe, but still they wanted to hear something from Pausanias' own mouth, and so, according to a plan preconcerted with them, the man went to Taenarus as a suppliant and there put up a hut divided by a partition. In the inner part of the hut he placed some of the Ephors, and when Pausanias came to him and asked him why he was a suppliant, the whole truth was at once revealed to them.

There was the man reproaching Pausanias with the directions which he had found in the letter, and going into minute details about the whole affair; he protested that never on any occasion had he brought him into any trouble when sent on his service in this matter to the King: why then should he share the fate of the other messengers, and be rewarded with death? And there was Pausanias, admitting the truth of his words, and telling him not to be angry at what had happened, offering to raise him by the hand that he might safely leave the temple, and bidding him start at once and not make difficulties.

134. ἀκούσαντες δὲ ἀκριβῶς τότε μὲν ἀπῆλθον οἱ ἔφοροι, βεβαίως δὲ ἤδη εἰδότες ἐν τῇ πόλει τὴν ξύλληψιν ἐποιοῦντο. λέγεται δ᾽ αὐτὸν μέλλοντα ξυλληφθήσεσθαι ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ, ἑνὸς μὲν τῶν ἐφόρων τὸ πρόσωπον προσιόντος ὡς εἶδε, γνῶναι ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἐχώρει, ἄλλου δὲ νεύματι ἀφανεῖ χρησαμένου καὶ δηλώσαντος εὐνοίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Χαλκιοίκου χωρῆσαι δρόμῳ καὶ προκαταφυγεῖν: ἦν δ᾽ ἐγγὺς τὸ τέμενος. καὶ ἐς οἴκημα οὐ μέγα ὃ ἦν τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐσελθών, ἵνα μὴ ὑπαίθριος ταλαιπωροίη, ἡσύχαζεν. [2] οἱ δὲ τὸ παραυτίκα μὲν ὑστέρησαν τῇ διώξει, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ τε οἰκήματος τὸν ὄροφον ἀφεῖλον καὶ τὰς θύρας ἔνδον ὄντα τηρήσαντες αὐτὸν καὶ ἀπολαβόντες ἔσω ἀπῳκοδόμησαν, προσκαθεζόμενοί τε ἐξεπολιόρκησαν λιμῷ. [3] καὶ μέλλοντος αὐτοῦ ἀποψύχειν ὥσπερ εἶχεν ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι, αἰσθόμενοι ἐξάγουσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἔτι ἔμπνουν ὄντα, καὶ ἐξαχθεὶς ἀπέθανε παραχρῆμα. [4] καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέλλησαν μὲν ἐς τὸν Καιάδαν [οὗπερ τοὺς κακούργους] ἐσβάλλειν: ἔπειτα ἔδοξε πλησίον που κατορύξαι. ὁ δὲ θεὸς ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς τόν τε τάφον ὕστερον ἔχρησε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις μετενεγκεῖν οὗπερ ἀπέθανε καὶ νῦν κεῖται ἐν τῷ προτεμενίσματι, ὃ γραφῇ στῆλαι δηλοῦσι καὶ ὡς ἄγος αὐτοῖς ὂν τὸ πεπραγμένον δύο σώματα ἀνθ᾽ ἑνὸς τῇ Χαλκιοίκῳ ἀποδοῦναι. οἱ δὲ ποιησάμενοι χαλκοῦς ἀνδριάντας δύο ὡς ἀντὶ Παυσανίου ἀνέθεσαν.

[134] The Ephors, who had heard every word, went away for the present, intending, now that they had certain knowledge, to take Pausanias in the city. It is said that he was on the point of being arrested in the street, when the face of one of them as they approached revealed to him their purpose, and another who was friendly warned him by a hardly perceptible nod. Whereupon he ran and fled to the temple of Athenè of the Brazen House and arrived before them, for the precinct was not far off. There, entering into a small chamber which belonged to the temple, that he might not suffer from exposure to the weather, he remained. His pursuers, failing to overtake him, afterwards unroofed the building, and watching when he was within, and preventing him from getting out, they built up the doors, and, investing the place, starved him to death. He was on the point of expiring in the chamber where he lay, when they; observing his condition, brought him out; he was still breathing, but as soon as he was brought out he died. The Spartans were going to cast his body into the Caeadas, a chasm into which they throw malefactors, but they changed their minds and buried him somewhere in the neighbourhood. The God of Delphi afterwards commanded them to transfer him to the place where he died, and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, as the inscription on the column testifies. The oracle also told them that they had brought a curse upon themselves, and must offer two bodies for one to Athenè of the Brazen House. Whereupon they made two brazen statues, which they dedicated, intending them to be an expiation for Pausanias.

135. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄγος κρίναντος, ἀντεπέταξαν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐλαύνειν αὐτό. [2]τοῦ δὲ μηδισμοῦ τοῦ Παυσανίου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρέσβεις πέμψαντες παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ξυνεπῃτιῶντο καὶ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα, ὡς ηὕρισκον ἐκ τῶν περὶ Παυσανίαν ἐλέγχων, ἠξίουν τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς κολάζεσθαι αὐτόν. [3] οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες ἔτυχε γὰρ ὠστρακισμένος καὶ ἔχων δίαιταν μὲν ἐν Ἄργει,

ἐπιφοιτῶν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον πέμπουσι μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἑτοίμων ὄντων ξυνδιώκειν ἄνδρας οἷς εἴρητο ἄγειν ὅπου ἂν περιτύχωσιν.

[135] To this judgment of the God himself the Athenians referred when they retorted on the Lacedaemonians, telling them to banish the curse.Now the evidence which proved that Pausanias was in league with Persia implicated Themistocles; and the Lacedaemonians sent ambassadors to the Athenians charging him likewise with treason, and demanding that he should receive the same punishment. The Athenians agreed, but having been ostracised he was living at the time in Argos, whence he used to visit other parts of the Peloponnese. The Lacedaemonians were very ready to join in the pursuit; so they and the Athenians sent officers, who were told to arrest him wherever they should find him.

136. ὁ δὲ Θεμιστοκλῆς προαισθόμενος φεύγει ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἐς Κέρκυραν, ὧν αὐτῶν εὐεργέτης. δεδιέναι δὲ φασκόντων Κερκυραίων ἔχειν αὐτὸν ὥστε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἀπεχθέσθαι, διακομίζεται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον τὴν καταντικρύ. [2] καὶ διωκόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν προστεταγμένων κατὰ πύστιν ᾗ χωροίη, ἀναγκάζεται κατά τι ἄπορον παρὰ Ἄδμητον τὸν Μολοσσῶν βασιλέα ὄντα αὐτῷ οὐ φίλον καταλῦσαι. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἔτυχεν ἐπιδημῶν, ὁ δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς ἱκέτης γενόμενος διδάσκεται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς τὸν παῖδα σφῶν λαβὼν καθέζεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἑστίαν. [4] καὶ ἐλθόντος οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον τοῦ Ἀδμήτου δηλοῖ τε ὅς ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀξιοῖ, εἴ τι ἄρα αὐτὸς ἀντεῖπεν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναίων δεομένῳ, φεύγοντα τιμωρεῖσθαι: καὶ γὰρ ἂν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου πολλῷ ἀσθενεστέρου ἐν τῷ παρόντι κακῶς πάσχειν, γενναῖον δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου τιμωρεῖσθαι. καὶ ἅμα αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκείνῳ χρείας τινὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὸ σῶμα σῴζεσθαι ἐναντιωθῆναι, ἐκεῖνον δ᾽ ἄν, εἰ ἐκδοίη αὐτόν εἰπὼν ὑφ᾽ ὧν καὶ ἐφ᾽ ᾧ διώκεται, σωτηρίας ἂν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποστερῆσαι.

[136] Themistocles received information of their purpose, and fled from the Peloponnesus to the Corcyraeans, who were under an obligation to him. The Corcyraeans said that they were afraid to keep him, lest they should incur the enmity of Athens and Lacedaemon; so they conveyed him to the neighbouring continent, whither he was followed by the officers, who constantly enquired in which direction he had gone and pursued him everywhere. Owing to an accident he was compelled to stop at the house of Admetus, king of the Molossians, who was not his friend.He chanced to be absent from home, but Themistocles presented himself as a suppliant to his wife, and was instructed by her to take their child and sit at the hearth. Admetus soon returned, and then Themistocles told him who he was, adding that if in past times he had opposed any request which Admetus had made to the Athenians, he ought not to retaliate on an exile. He was now in such extremity that a far weaker adversary than he could do him a mischief; but a noble nature should not be revenged by taking at a disadvantage one as good as himself. Themistocles further argued that he had opposed Admetus in some matter of business, and not when life was at stake; but that, if Admetus delivered him up, he would be consigning him to death. At the same time he told him who his pursuers were and what was the charge against him.

137. ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας ἀνίστησί τε αὐτὸν μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ υἱέος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔχων αὐτὸν ἐκαθέζετο, καὶ μέγιστον ἦν ἱκέτευμα τοῦτο, καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ τοῖς τε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἐλθοῦσι καὶ πολλὰ εἰποῦσιν οὐκ ἐκδίδωσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποστέλλει βουλόμενον ὡς βασιλέα πορευθῆναι ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν πεζῇ ἐς Πύδναν τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου. [2] ἐν ᾗ ὁλκάδος τυχὼν ἀναγομένης ἐπ᾽ Ἰωνίας καὶ ἐπιβὰς καταφέρεται χειμῶνι ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, ὃ ἐπολιόρκει Νάξον. καί □ἦν γὰρ ἀγνὼς τοῖς ἐν τῇ νηί□ δείσας φράζει τῷ ναυκλήρῳ ὅστις ἐστὶ καὶ δι᾽ ἃ φεύγει, καὶ εἰ μὴ σώσει αὐτόν, ἔφη ἐρεῖν ὅτι χρήμασι πεισθεὶς αὐτὸν ἄγει: τὴν δὲ ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι μηδένα ἐκβῆναι

ἐκ τῆς νεὼς μέχρι πλοῦς γένηται: πειθομένῳ δ᾽ αὐτῷ χάριν ἀπομνήσεσθαι ἀξίαν. ὁ δὲ ναύκληρος ποιεῖ τε ταῦτα καὶ ἀποσαλεύσας ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα ὑπὲρ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ὕστερον ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἔφεσον. [3] καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐκεῖνόν τε ἐθεράπευσε χρημάτων δόσει ἦλθε γὰρ αὐτῷ ὕστερον ἔκ τε Ἀθηνῶν παρὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐξ Ἄργους ἃ ὑπεξέκειτο καὶ μετὰ τῶν κάτω Περσῶν τινὸς πορευθεὶς ἄνω ἐσπέμπει γράμματα πρὸς βασιλέα Ἀρταξέρξην τὸν Ξέρξου νεωστὶ βασιλεύοντα. [4] ἐδήλου δὲ ἡ γραφὴ ὅτι ‘Θεμιστοκλῆς ἥκω παρὰ σέ, ὃς κακὰ μὲν πλεῖστα Ἑλλήνων εἴργασμαι τὸν ὑμέτερον οἶκον, ὅσον χρόνον τὸν σὸν πατέρα ἐπιόντα ἐμοὶ ἀνάγκη ἠμυνόμην, πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι πλείω ἀγαθά, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ μὲν ἐμοί, ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἐν ἐπικινδύνῳ πάλιν ἡ ἀποκομιδὴ ἐγίγνετο. καί μοι εὐεργεσία ὀφείλεται γράψας τήν τε ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος προάγγελσιν τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν, ἣν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο, τότε δι᾽ αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν, καὶ νῦν ἔχων σε μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ δρᾶσαι πάρειμι διωκόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν σὴν φιλίαν. βούλομαι δ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπισχὼν αὐτός σοι περὶ ὧν ἥκω δηλῶσαι.’

[137] Admetus, hearing his words, raised him up, together with his own son, from the place where he sat holding the child in his arms, which was the most solemn form of supplication. Not long afterwards the Athenians and Lacedaemonians came and pressed him to give up the fugitive, but he refused; and as Themistocles wanted to go to the King, sent him on foot across the country to the sea at Pydna (which was in the kingdom of Alexander). There he found a merchant vessel sailing to Ionia, in which he embarked; it was driven, however, by a storm to the station of the Athenian fleet which was blockading Naxos. He was unknown to his fellow passengers, but, fearing what might happen, he told the captain who he was and why he fled, threatening if he did not save his life to say that he had been bribed to take him on board. The only hope was that no one should be allowed to leave the ship while they had to

remain off Naxos; if he complied with his request, the obligation should be abundantly repaid. The captain agreed, and after anchoring in a rough sea for a day and a night off the Athenian station, he at length arrived at Ephesus. Themistocles rewarded him with a liberal present; for he received soon afterwards from his friends the property which they had in their keeping at Athens, and which he had deposited at Argos. He then went up the country in the company of one of the Persians who dwelt on the coast, and sent a letter to Artaxerxes the son Xerxes, who had just succeeded to the throne. The letter was in the following words:— 'I, Themistocles, have come to you, I who of all Hellenes did your house the greatest injuries so long as I was compelled to defend myself against your father; but still greater benefits when I was in safety and he in danger during his retreat. And there is a debt of gratitude due to me' (here he noted how he had forewarned Xerxes at Salamis of the resolution of the Hellenes to withdraw, and how through his influence, as he pretended, they had refrained from breaking down the bridges). 'Now I am here, able to do you many other services, and persecuted by the Hellenes for your sake. Let me wait a year, and then I will myself explain why I have come.'

138. βασιλεὺς δέ, ὡς λέγεται, ἐθαύμασέ τε αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ἐκέλευε ποιεῖν οὕτως. ὁ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν ἐπέσχε τῆς τε Περσίδος γλώσσης ὅσα ἐδύνατο κατενόησε καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τῆς χώρας: [2] ἀφικόμενος δὲ μετὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν γίγνεται παρ᾽ αὐτῷ μέγας καὶ ὅσος οὐδείς πω Ἑλλήνων διά τε τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν ἀξίωσιν καὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἐλπίδα, ἣν ὑπετίθει αὐτῷ δουλώσειν, μάλιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πεῖραν διδοὺς ξυνετὸς φαίνεσθαι. [3]ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάσαι: οἰκείᾳ γὰρ ξυνέσει καὶ οὔτε προμαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὔτ᾽ ἐπιμαθών, τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δι᾽ ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνώμων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ

γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής: καὶ ἃ μὲν μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἷός τε, ὧν δ᾽ ἄπειρος εἴη, κρῖναι ἱκανῶς οὐκ ἀπήλλακτο: τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα. καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο. [4] νοσήσας δὲ τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον: λέγουσι δέ τινες καὶ ἑκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτόν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ ἃ ὑπέσχετο. [5] μνημεῖον μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ ἐν Μαγνησίᾳ ἐστὶ τῇ Ἀσιανῇ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ: ταύτης γὰρ ἦρχε τῆς χώρας, δόντος βασιλέως αὐτῷ Μαγνησίαν μὲν ἄρτον, ἢ προσέφερε πεντήκοντα τάλαντα τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, Λάμψακον δὲ οἶνον ⟦ἐδόκει γὰρ πολυοινότατον τῶν τότε εἶναι⟧, Μυοῦντα δὲ ὄψον. [6] τὰ δὲ ὀστᾶ φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσήκοντες οἴκαδε κελεύσαντος ἐκείνου καὶ τεθῆναι κρύφα Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ: οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν θάπτειν ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ φεύγοντος. τὰ μὲν κατὰ Παυσανίαν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον, λαμπροτάτους γενομένους τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς Ἑλλήνων, οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

[138] The King is said to have been astonished at the boldness of his character, and told him to wait a year as he proposed. In the interval he made himself acquainted, as far as he could, with the Persian language and the manners of the country. When the year was over, he arrived at the court and became a greater man there than any Hellene had ever been before. This was due partly to his previous reputation, and partly to the hope which he inspired in the King’s mind that he would enslave Hellas to him; above all, his ability had been tried and not found wanting. For Themistocles was a man whose natural force was unmistakeable; this was the quality for which he was distinguished above all other men; from his own native acuteness, and without any study either before or at the time, he was the ablest judge of the course to be pursued in a sudden emergency, and could best divine what was likely to happen in the remotest future. Whatever he had in hand he had the power of explaining to others,

and even where he had no experience he was quite competent to form a sufficient judgment; no one could foresee with equal clearness the good or evil event which was hidden in the future. In a word, Themistocles, by natural power of mind and with the least preparation, was of all men the best able to extemporise the right thing to be done. A sickness put an end to his life, although some say that he poisoned himself because he felt that he could not accomplish what he had promised to the King. There is a monument of him in the agora of the Asiatic Magnesia, where he was governor — the King assigning to him, for bread, Magnesia, which produced a revenue of fifty talents in the year; for wine, Lampsacus, which was considered to be the richest in wine of any district then known; and Myus for meat. His family say that his remains were carried home at his own request and buried in Attica, but secretly; for he had been accused of treason and had fled from his country, and he could not lawfully be interred there. Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, the two most famous Hellenes of their day.

139. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς πρώτης πρεσβείας τοιαῦτα ἐπέταξάν τε καὶ ἀντεκελεύσθησαν περὶ τῶν ἐναγῶν τῆς ἐλάσεως: ὕστερον δὲ φοιτῶντες παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους Ποτειδαίας τε ἀπανίστασθαι ἐκέλευον καὶ Αἴγιναν αὐτόνομον ἀφιέναι, καὶ μάλιστά γε πάντων καὶ ἐνδηλότατα προύλεγον τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθελοῦσι μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι πόλεμον, ἐν ᾧ εἴρητο αὐτοὺς μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς λιμέσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ μηδὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἀγορᾷ. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι οὔτε τἆλλα ὑπήκουον οὔτε τὸ ψήφισμα καθῄρουν, ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἀφισταμένων. [3] τέλος δὲ ἀφικομένων τῶν τελευταίων πρέσβεων ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος, Ῥαμφίου τε καὶ Μελησίππου καὶ Ἀγησάνδρου, καὶ λεγόντων ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ὧν πρότερον εἰώθεσαν, αὐτὰ δὲ τάδε ὅτι ‘Λακεδαιμόνιοι βούλονται τὴν εἰρήνην εἶναι, εἴη δ᾽ ἂν εἰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτονόμους

ἀφεῖτε,’ ποιήσαντες ἐκκλησίαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι γνώμας σφίσιν αὐτοῖς προυτίθεσαν, καὶ ἐδόκει ἅπαξ περὶ ἁπάντων βουλευσαμένους ἀποκρίνασθαι. [4] καὶ παριόντες ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ ἔλεγον ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα γιγνόμενοι ταῖς γνώμαις καὶ ὡς χρὴ πολεμεῖν καὶ ὡς μὴ ἐμπόδιον εἶναι τὸ ψήφισμα εἰρήνης, ἀλλὰ καθελεῖν, καὶ παρελθὼν Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου, ἀνὴρ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος, παρῄνει τοιάδε.

[139] Thus the demand for the banishment of the accursed made by the Lacedaemonians on the occasion of their first embassy was met by a counter demand on the part of Athens. They came again and again, and told the Athenians that they must raise the siege of Potidaea and restore Aegina to independence. Above all, and in the plainest terms, they insisted that if they wanted to avert war, they must rescind the decree which excluded the Megarians from the market of Athens and the harbours in the Athenian dominions. But the Athenians would not listen to them, nor rescind the decree; alleging in reply that the Megarians had tilled the holy ground and the neutral borderland, and had received their runaway slaves. Finally, there came from Sparta an embassy, consisting of Rhamphias, Melesippus, and Hegesander, who said nothing of all this, but only, ‘The Lacedaemonians desire to maintain peace; and peace there may be, if you will restore independence to the Hellenes.’ Whereupon the Athenians called an assembly and held a discussion; it seemed best to them to make up their minds and to give a complete and final answer. Many came forward to speak, and much was said on both sides, some affirming that they ought to go to war, and others that this decree about the Megarians should be rescinded and not stand in the way of peace. At last Pericles the son of Xanthippus, who was the first man of his day at Athens, and the greatest orator and statesman, came forward and advised as follows:

140. ‘τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι, μὴ εἴκειν Πελοποννησίοις, καίπερ εἰδὼς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ ὀργῇ ἀναπειθομένους τε πολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ πράσσοντας, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ξυμφορὰς καὶ τὰς γνώμας τρεπομένους. ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁμοῖα καὶ παραπλήσια ξυμβουλευτέα μοι ὄντα, καὶ τοὺς ἀναπειθομένους ὑμῶν δικαιῶ τοῖς κοινῇ δόξασιν, ἢν ἄρα τι καὶ σφαλλώμεθα, βοηθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲ κατορθοῦντας τῆς ξυνέσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἧσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ, εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι. [2]’Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πρότερόν τε δῆλοι ἦσαν ἐπιβουλεύοντες ἡμῖν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἥκιστα. εἰρημένον γὰρ δίκας μὲν τῶν διαφορῶν ἀλλήλοις διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, ἔχειν δὲ ἑκατέρους ἃ ἔχομεν, οὔτε αὐτοὶ δίκας πω ᾔτησαν οὔτε ἡμῶν διδόντων δέχονται, βούλονται δὲ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγοις τὰ ἐγκλήματα διαλύεσθαι, καὶ ἐπιτάσσοντες ἤδη καὶ οὐκέτι αἰτιώμενοι πάρεισιν. [3] Ποτειδαίας τε γὰρ ἀπανίστασθαι κελεύουσι καὶ Αἴγιναν αὐτόνομον ἀφιέναι καὶ τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθαιρεῖν: οἱ δὲ τελευταῖοι οἵδε ἥκοντες καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας προαγορεύουσιν αὐτονόμους ἀφιέναι. [4] ὑμῶν δὲ μηδεὶς νομίσῃ περὶ βραχέος ἂν πολεμεῖν, εἰ τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα μὴ καθέλοιμεν, ὅπερ μάλιστα προύχονται, εἰ καθαιρεθείη, μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον, μηδὲ ἐν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ὑπολίπησθε ὡς διὰ μικρὸν ἐπολεμήσατε. [5] τὸ γὰρ βραχύ τι τοῦτο πᾶσαν ὑμῶν ἔχει τὴν βεβαίωσιν καὶ πεῖραν τῆς γνώμης. οἷς εἰ ξυγχωρήσετε, καὶ ἄλλο τι μεῖζον εὐθὺς ἐπιταχθήσεσθε ὡς φόβῳ καὶ τοῦτο ὑπακούσαντες: ἀπισχυρισάμενοι δὲ σαφὲς ἂν καταστήσαιτε αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὑμῖν μᾶλλον προσφέρεσθαι.

[140] ‘Athenians, I say, as I always have said, that we must never yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are persuaded to go to war in one temper of mind, and act when the time comes in another, and that their resolutions change with the changes of fortune. But I see that I must

give you the same or nearly the same advice which I gave before, and I call upon those whom my words may convince to maintain our united determination, even if we should not escape disaster; or else, if our sagacity be justified by success, to claim no share of the credit. The movement of events is often as wayward and incomprehensible as the course of human thought; and this is why we ascribe to chance whatever belies our calculation.’For some time past the designs of the Lacedaemonians have been clear enough, and they are still clearer now. Our agreement says that when differences arise, the two parties shall refer them to arbitration, and in the mean time both are to retain what they have. But for arbitration they never ask; and when it is offered by us, they refuse it. They want to redress their grievances by arms and not by argument; and now they come to us, using the language, no longer of expostulation, but of command. They tell us to quit Potidaea, to leave Aegina independent, and to rescind the decree respecting the Megarians. These last ambassadors go further still, and announce that we must give the Hellenes independence. I would have none of you imagine that he will be fighting for a small matter if we refuse to annul the Megarian decree, of which they make so much, telling us that its revocation would prevent the war. You should have no lingering uneasiness about this; you are not really going to war for a trifle. For in the seeming trifle is involved the trial and confirmation of your whole purpose. If you yield to them in a small matter, they will think that you are afraid, and will immediately dictate some more oppressive condition; but if you are firm, you will prove to them that they must treat you as their equals.

141. αὐτόθεν δὴ διανοήθητε ἢ ὑπακούειν πρίν τι βλαβῆναι, ἢ εἰ πολεμήσομεν, ὥσπερ ἔμοιγε ἄμεινον δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μεγάλῃ καὶ ἐπὶ βραχείᾳ ὁμοίως προφάσει μὴ εἴξοντες μηδὲ ξὺν φόβῳ ἔξοντες ἃ κεκτήμεθα: τὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν δύναται δούλωσιν ἥ τε μεγίστη καὶ ἐλαχίστη

δικαίωσις ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων πρὸ δίκης τοῖς πέλας ἐπιτασσομένη. [2]’τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῶν ἑκατέροις ὑπαρχόντων ὡς οὐκ ἀσθενέστερα ἔξομεν γνῶτε καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀκούοντες. [3] αὐτουργοί τε γάρ εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτ᾽ ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα χρονίων πολέμων καὶ διαποντίων ἄπειροι διὰ τὸ βραχέως αὐτοὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους ὑπὸ πενίας ἐπιφέρειν. [4] καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὔτε ναῦς πληροῦντες οὔτε πεζὰς στρατιὰς πολλάκις ἐκπέμπειν δύνανται, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τε ἅμα ἀπόντες καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν δαπανῶντες καὶ προσέτι καὶ θαλάσσης εἰργόμενοι: [5] αἱ δὲ περιουσίαι τοὺς πολέμους μᾶλλον ἢ αἱ βίαιοι ἐσφοραὶ ἀνέχουσιν. σώμασί τε ἑτοιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ χρήμασι πολεμεῖν, τὸ μὲν πιστὸν ἔχοντες ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων κἂν περιγενέσθαι, τὸ δὲ οὐ βέβαιον μὴ οὐ προαναλώσειν, ἄλλως τε κἂν παρὰ δόξαν, ὅπερ εἰκός, ὁ πόλεμος αὐτοῖς μηκύνηται. [6] μάχῃ μὲν γὰρ μιᾷ πρὸς ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας δυνατοὶ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀντισχεῖν, πολεμεῖν δὲ μὴ πρὸς ὁμοίαν ἀντιπαρασκευὴν ἀδύνατοι, ὅταν μήτε βουλευτηρίῳ ἑνὶ χρώμενοι παραχρῆμά τι ὀξέως ἐπιτελῶσι πάντες τε ἰσόψηφοι ὄντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμόφυλοι τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος σπεύδῃ: ἐξ ὧν φιλεῖ μηδὲν ἐπιτελὲς γίγνεσθαι. [7] καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὡς μάλιστα τιμωρήσασθαί τινα βούλονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἥκιστα τὰ οἰκεῖα φθεῖραι. χρόνιοί τε ξυνιόντες ἐν βραχεῖ μὲν μορίῳ σκοποῦσί τι τῶν κοινῶν, τῷ δὲ πλέονι τὰ οἰκεῖα πράσσουσι, καὶ ἕκαστος οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν οἴεται βλάψειν, μέλειν δέ τινι καὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ τι προϊδεῖν, ὥστε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπὸ ἁπάντων ἰδίᾳ δοξάσματι λανθάνειν τὸ κοινὸν ἀθρόον φθειρόμενον.

[141] ‘Wherefore make up your minds once for all, either to give way while you are still unharmed, or, if we are going to war, as in my judgment is best, then on no plea small or great to give way at all; we will not condescend to possess our own in fear. Any claim, the smallest as well as the greatest, imposed on a neighbour and an equal when there has been no legal award can mean nothing but slavery.’That

our resources are equal to theirs, and that we shall be as strong in the war, I will now prove to you in detail. The Peloponnesians cultivate their own lands, and they have no wealth either public or private. Nor have they any experience of long wars in countries beyond the sea; their poverty prevents them from fighting, except in person against each other, and that for a short time only. Such men cannot be often manning fleets or sending out armies. They would be at a distance from their own properties, upon which they must nevertheless draw, and they will be kept off the sea by us. Now wars are supported out of accumulated wealth, and not out of forced contributions. And men who cultivate their own lands are more ready to serve with their persons than with their property; they do not despair of their lives, but they soon grow anxious lest their money should all be spent, especially if the war in which they are engaged is protracted beyond their calculation, as may well be the case. In a single pitched battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are a match for all Hellas, but they are not able to maintain a war against a power different in kind from their own; they have no regular general assembly, and therefore cannot execute their plans with speed and decision. The confederacy is made up of many races; all the representatives have equal votes, and press their several interests. There follows the usual result, that nothing is ever done properly. For some are all anxiety to be revenged on an enemy, while others only want to get off with as little loss as possible. The members of such a confederacy are slow to meet, and when they do meet, they give little time to the consideration of any common interest, and a great deal to schemes which further the interest of their particular state. Every one fancies that his own neglect will do no harm, but that it is somebody else’s business to keep a look-out for him, and this idea, cherished alike by each, is the secret ruin of all.

142. ‘μέγιστον δέ, τῇ τῶν χρημάτων σπάνει κωλύσονται, ὅταν σχολῇ αὐτὰ οριζόμενοι διαμέλλωσιν: τοῦ δὲ πολέμου οἱ καιροὶ οὐ μενετοί. [2] καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἐπιτείχισις οὐδὲ τὸ ναυτικὸν αὐτῶν ἄξιον φοβηθῆναι. [3] τὴν μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόλιν ἀντίπαλον κατασκευάσασθαι, ἦ που δὴ ἐν πολεμίᾳ τε καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ἐκείνοις ἡμῶν ἀντεπιτετειχισμένων: [4] φρούριον δ᾽ εἰ ποιήσονται, τῆς μὲν γῆς βλάπτοιεν ἄν τι μέρος καταδρομαῖς καὶ αὐτομολίαις, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανόν γε ἔσται ἐπιτειχίζειν τε κωλύειν ἡμᾶς πλεύσαντας ἐς τὴν ἐκείνων καί, ᾗπερ ἰσχύομεν, ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀμύνεσθαι: [5] πλέον γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν τοῦ κατὰ γῆν ἐκ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκεῖνοι ἐκ τοῦ κατ᾽ ἤπειρον ἐς τὰ ναυτικά. [6] τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας γενέσθαι οὐ ῥᾳδίως αὐτοῖς προσγενήσεται. [7] οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς μελετῶντες αὐτὸ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐξείργασθέ πω: πῶς δὴ ἄνδρες γεωργοὶ καὶ οὐ θαλάσσιοι, καὶ προσέτι οὐδὲ μελετῆσαι ἐασόμενοι διὰ τὸ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν πολλαῖς ναυσὶν αἰεὶ ἐφορμεῖσθαι, ἄξιον ἄν τι δρῷεν; [8] πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγας ἐφορμούσας κἂν διακινδυνεύσειαν πλήθει τὴν ἀμαθίαν θρασύνοντες, πολλαῖς δὲ εἰργόμενοι ἡσυχάσουσι καὶ ἐν τῷ μὴ μελετῶντι ἀξυνετώτεροι ἔσονται καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ ὀκνηρότεροι. [9] τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸν τέχνης ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἐκ παρέργου μελετᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μηδὲν ἐκείνῳ πάρεργον ἄλλο γίγνεσθαι.

[142] ‘Their greatest difficulty will be want of money, which they can only provide slowly; delay will thus occur, and war waits for no man. Further, no fortified place which they can raise against us is to be feared any more than their navy. As to the first, even in time of peace it would be hard for them to build a city able to compete with Athens; and how much more so when they are in an enemy’s country, and our walls will be a menace to them quite as much as theirs to us! Or, again, if they simply raise a fort in our territory, they may do mischief to some part of our lands by sallies, and the slaves may desert to them; but that will not prevent us from sailing

to the Peloponnese and there raising forts against them, and defending ourselves there by the help of our navy, which is our strong arm. For we have gained more experience of fighting on land from warfare at sea than they of naval affairs from warfare on land. And they will not easily acquire the art of seamanship; even you yourselves, who have been practising ever since the Persian War, are not yet perfect. How can they, who are not sailors, but tillers of the soil, do much? They will not even be permitted to practise, because a large fleet will constantly be lying in wait for them. If they were watched by a few ships only, they might run the risk, trusting to their numbers and forgetting their inexperience; but if they are kept off the sea by our superior strength, their want of practice will make them unskilful, and their want of skill timid. Maritime skill is like skill of other kinds, not a thing to be cultivated by the way or at chance times; it is jealous of any other pursuit which distracts the mind for an instant from itself.

143. ‘εἴ τε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυμπίασιν ἢ Δελφοῖς χρημάτων μισθῷ μείζονι πειρῷντο ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν, μὴ ὄντων μὲν ἡμῶν ἀντιπάλων ἐσβάντων αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν μετοίκων δεινὸν ἂν ἦν: νῦν δὲ τόδε τε ὑπάρχει, καί, ὅπερ κράτιστον, κυβερνήτας ἔχομεν πολίτας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν πλείους καὶ ἀμείνους ἢ ἅπασα ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς. [2] καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ κινδύνῳ οὐδεὶς ἂν δέξαιτο τῶν ξένων τήν τε αὐτοῦ φεύγειν καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἥσσονος ἅμα ἐλπίδος ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν ἕνεκα μεγάλου μισθοῦ δόσεως ἐκείνοις ξυναγωνίζεσθαι. [3]’καὶ τὰ μὲν Πελοποννησίων ἔμοιγε τοιαῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια δοκεῖ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἡμέτερα τούτων τε ὧνπερ ἐκείνοις ἐμεμψάμην ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μεγάλα ἔχειν. [4] ἤν τε ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἡμῶν πεζῇ ἴωσιν, ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνων πλευσούμεθα, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἔσται Πελοποννήσου τε μέρος τι τμηθῆναι καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἅπασαν: οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕξουσιν ἄλλην ἀντιλαβεῖν ἀμαχεί,ἡμῖν δ᾽ ἐστὶ γῆ πολλὴ καὶ ἐν νήσοις καὶ κατ᾽ ἤπειρον: [5] μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς

θαλάσσης κράτος. σκέψασθε δέ: εἰ γὰρ ἦμεν νησιῶται, τίνες ἂν ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν; καὶ νῦν χρὴ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτου διανοηθέντας τὴν μὲν γῆν καὶ οἰκίας ἀφεῖναι, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης καὶ πόλεως φυλακὴν ἔχειν, καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὀργισθέντας πολλῷ πλέοσι μὴ διαμάχεσθαι κρατήσαντές τε γὰρ αὖθις οὐκ ἐλάσσοσι μαχούμεθα καὶ ἢν σφαλῶμεν, τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅθεν ἰσχύομεν, προσαπόλλυται: οὐ γὰρ ἡσυχάσουσι μὴ ἱκανῶν ἡμῶν ὄντων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς στρατεύειν, τήν τε ὀλόφυρσιν μὴ οἰκιῶν καὶ γῆς ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν σωμάτων: οὐ γὰρ τάδε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἄνδρες ταῦτα κτῶνται. καὶ εἰ ᾤμην πείσειν ὑμᾶς, αὐτοὺς ἂν ἐξελθόντας ἐκέλευον αὐτὰ δῃῶσαι καὶ δεῖξαι Πελοποννησίοις ὅτι τούτων γε ἕνεκα οὐχ ὑπακούσεσθε.

[143] ‘Suppose, again, that they lay hands on the treasures at Olympia and Delphi, and tempt our mercenary sailors with the offer of higher pay, there might be serious danger, if we and our metics embarking alone were not still a match for them. But we are a match for them: and, best of all, our pilots are taken from our own citizens, while no sailors are to be found so good or so numerous as ours in all the rest of Hellas. None of our mercenaries will choose to fight on their side for the sake of a few days’ high pay, when he will not only be an exile, but will incur greater danger, and will have less hope of victory.’Such I conceive to be the prospects of the Peloponnesians. But we ourselves are free from the defects which I have noted in them; and we have great advantages. If they attack our country by land, we shall attack theirs by sea; and the devastation, even of part of Peloponnesus, will be a very different thing from that of all Attica. For they, if they want fresh territory, must take it by arms, whereas we have abundance of land both in the islands and on the continent; such is the power which the empire of the sea gives. Reflect, if we were islanders, who would be more invulnerable? Let us imagine that we are, and acting in that spirit let us give up land and houses, but

keep a watch over the city and the sea. We should not under any irritation at the loss of our property give battle to the Peloponnesians, who far outnumber us. If we conquer, we shall have to fight over again with as many more; and if we fail, besides the defeat, our confederacy, which is our strength, will be lost to us; for our allies will rise in revolt when we are no longer capable of making war upon them. Mourn not for houses and lands, but for men; men may gain these, but these will not gain men. If I thought that you would listen to me, I would say to you, “Go yourselves and destroy them, and thereby prove to the Peloponnesians that none of these things will move you.”

144. ‘πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι, ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι: μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας. [2] ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνα μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ἅμα τοῖς ἔργοις δηλωθήσεται: νῦν δὲ τούτοις ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν, Μεγαρέας μὲν ὅτι ἐάσομεν ἀγορᾷ καὶ λιμέσι χρῆσθαι, ἢν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ξενηλασίας μὴ ποιῶσι μήτε ἡμῶν μήτε τῶν ἡμετέρων ξυμμάχων οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνο κωλύει ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς οὔτε τόδε , τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι μὴ σφίσι [τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις] ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις ὡς βούλονται: δίκας τε ὅτι ἐθέλομεν δοῦναι κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας, πολέμου δὲ οὐκ ἄρξομεν, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἀμυνούμεθα. ταῦτα γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πρέποντα ἅμα τῇδε τῇ πόλει ἀποκρίνασθαι. [3] εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη πολεμεῖν, ἢν δὲ ἑκούσιοι μᾶλλον δεχώμεθα, ἧσσον ἐγκεισομένους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἕξομεν, ἔκ τε τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων ὅτι καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώτῃ μέγισται τιμαὶ περιγίγνονται. [4] οἱ γοῦν πατέρες ἡμῶν ὑποστάντες Μήδους καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοσῶνδε ὁρμώμενοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐκλιπόντες, γνώμῃ τε πλέονι ἢ τύχῃ καὶ τόλμῃ μείζονι ἢ δυνάμει τόν τε βάρβαρον ἀπεώσαντο καὶ ἐς τάδε

προήγαγον αὐτά. ὧν οὐ χρὴ λείπεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούς τε ἐχθροὺς παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις πειρᾶσθαι αὐτὰ μὴ ἐλάσσω παραδοῦναι.’

[144] ‘I have many other reasons for believing that you will conquer, but you must not be extending your empire while you are at war, or run into unnecessary dangers. I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemies’ designs. But of all this I will speak again when the time of action comes; for the present, let us send the ambassadors away, giving them this answer: “That we will not exclude the Megarians from our markets and harbours, if the Lacedaemonians will cease to expel foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies, from Sparta; for the treaty no more forbids the one than the other. That we will concede independence to the cities, if they were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon as the Lacedaemonians allow their allied states a true independence, not for the interest of Lacedaemon, but everywhere for their own. Also that we are willing to offer arbitration according to the treaty. And that we do not want to begin a war, but intend to defend ourselves if attacked.” This answer will be just, and befits the dignity of the city. We must be aware however that war will come; and the more willing we are to accept the situation, the less ready will our enemies be to lay hands upon us. Remember that where dangers are greatest, there the greatest honours are to be won by men and states. Our fathers, when they withstood the Persian, had no such power as we have; what little they had they forsook: not by good fortune but by wisdom, and not by power but by courage, they drove the Barbarian away and raised us to our present height of greatness. We must be worthy of them, and resist our enemies to the utmost, that we may hand down our empire unimpaired to posterity.’

145. ὁ μὲν Περικλῆς τοιαῦτα εἶπεν, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες ἄριστα σφίσι παραινεῖν αὐτὸν ἐψηφίσαντο ἃ ἐκέλευε, καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀπεκρίναντο τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ, καθ᾽ ἕκαστά τε ὡς ἔφρασε καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν, οὐδὲν

κελευόμενοι ποιήσειν, δίκῃ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας ἑτοῖμοι εἶναι διαλύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἐπὶ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου καὶ οὐκέτι ὕστερον ἐπρεσβεύοντο:

[145] Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, approving, voted as he told them, and on his motion answered the Laeedaemonians in detail as he had suggested, and on the whole question to the effect ‘that they would do nothing upon compulsion, but were ready to settle their differences by arbitration upon fair terms according to the treaty.’ So the ambassadors went home and came no more.

146. αἰτίαι δὲ αὗται καὶ διαφοραὶ ἐγένοντο ἀμφοτέροις πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου, ἀρξάμεναι εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ καὶ Κερκύρᾳ: ἐπεμείγνυντο δὲ ὅμως ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων ἀκηρύκτως μέν, ἀνυπόπτως δὲ οὔ: σπονδῶν γὰρ ξύγχυσις τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν καὶ πρόφασις τοῦ πολεμεῖν.

[146] These were the causes of offence alleged on either side before the war began. The quarrel arose immediately out of the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra. But, although the contest was imminent, the contending parties still kept up intercourse and visited each other, without a herald, but not with entire confidence. For the situation was really an abrogation of the treaty, and might at any time lead to war.

Βιβλίο Β’ — BOOK II

1. ἄρχεται δὲ ὁ πόλεμος ἐνθένδε ἤδη Ἀθηναίων καὶ Πελοποννησίων καὶ τῶν ἑκατέροις ξυμμάχων, ἐν ᾧ οὔτε ἐπεμείγνυντο ἔτι ἀκηρυκτεὶ παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους καταστάντες τε ξυνεχῶς ἐπολέμουν: γέγραπται δὲ ἐξῆς ὡς ἕκαστα ἐγίγνετο κατὰ θέρος καὶ χειμῶνα.

[1] And now the war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies of both actually began. Henceforward the struggle was uninterrupted, and they communicated with one another only by heralds. The narrative is arranged according to summers and winters and follows the order of events.

2. τέσσαρα μὲν γὰρ καὶ δέκα ἔτη ἐνέμειναν αἱ τριακοντούτεις σπονδαὶ αἳ ἐγένοντο μετ᾽ Εὐβοίας ἅλωσιν: τῷ δὲ πέμπτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει, ἐπὶ Χρυσίδος ἐν Ἄργει τότε πεντήκοντα δυοῖν δέοντα ἔτη ἱερωμένης καὶ Αἰνησίου ἐφόρου ἐν Σπάρτῃ καὶ Πυθοδώρου ἔτι δύο μῆνας ἄρχοντος Ἀθηναίοις, μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ μάχην μηνὶ ἕκτῳ καὶ ἅμα ἦρι ἀρχομένῳ Θηβαίων ἄνδρες ὀλίγῳ πλείους τριακοσίων ἡγοῦντο δὲ αὐτῶν βοιωταρχοῦντες Πυθάγγελός τε ὁ Φυλείδου καὶ Διέμπορος ὁ Ὀνητορίδου ἐσῆλθον περὶ πρῶτον ὕπνον ξὺν ὅπλοις ἐς Πλάταιαν τῆς Βοιωτίας οὖσαν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίδα. [2] ἐπηγάγοντο δὲ καὶ ἀνέῳξαν τὰς πύλας Πλαταιῶν ἄνδρες, Ναυκλείδης τε καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, βουλόμενοι ἰδίας ἕνεκα δυνάμεως ἄνδρας τε τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς σφίσιν ὑπεναντίους διαφθεῖραι καὶ τὴν πόλιν Θηβαίοις προσποιῆσαι. [3] ἔπραξαν δὲ ταῦτα δι᾽ Εὐρυμάχου τοῦ Λεοντιάδου, ἀνδρὸς Θηβαίων δυνατωτάτου. προϊδόντες γὰρ οἱ Θηβαῖοι ὅτι ἔσοιτο ὁ πόλεμος ἐβούλοντο τὴν Πλάταιαν αἰεὶ σφίσι διάφορον οὖσαν ἔτι ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ τοῦ πολέμου μήπω φανεροῦ καθεστῶτος προκαταλαβεῖν. ᾗ καὶ ῥᾷον ἔλαθον ἐσελθόντες, φυλακῆς οὐ προκαθεστηκυίας. [4] θέμενοι δὲ ἐς τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ ὅπλα τοῖς μὲν ἐπαγαγομένοις οὐκ ἐπείθοντο ὥστε εὐθὺς ἔργου ἔχεσθαι καὶ ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὰς

οἰκίας τῶν ἐχθρῶν, γνώμην δ᾽ ἐποιοῦντο κηρύγμασί τε χρήσασθαι ἐπιτηδείοις καὶ ἐς ξύμβασιν μᾶλλον καὶ φιλίαν τὴν πόλιν ἀγαγεῖν καὶ ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κῆρυξ, εἴ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχεῖν, τίθεσθαι παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα, νομίζοντες σφίσι ῥᾳδίως τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τὴν πόλιν.

[2] For fourteen years the thirty years' peace which was concluded after the recovery of Euboea remained unbroken. But in the fifteenth year, when Chrysis the high-priestess of Argos was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood, Aenesias being Ephor at Sparta, and at Athens Pythodorus having two months of his archonship to run, in the sixth month after the engagement at Potidaea and at the beginning of spring, about the first watch of the night an armed force of somewhat more than three hundred Thebans entered Plataea, a city of Boeotia, which was an ally of Athens, under the command of two Boeotarchs, Pythangelus the son of Phyleides, and Diemporus the son of Onetorides. They were invited by Naucleides, a Plataean, and his partisans, who opened the gates to them. These men wanted to kill certain citizens of the opposite faction and to make over the city to the Thebans, in the hope of getting the power into their own hands. The intrigue had been conducted by Eurymachus the son of Leontiades, one of the chief citizens of Thebes. There was an old quarrel between the two cities, and the Thebans, seeing that war was inevitable, were anxious to surprise the place while the peace lasted and before hostilities had actually broken out. No watch had been set; and so they were enabled to enter the city unperceived. They grounded their arms in the Agora, but instead of going to work at once and making their way into the houses of their enemies, as those who invited them suggested, they resolved to issue a conciliatory proclamation and try to make friends with the citizens. The herald announced that if any one wished to become their ally and return to the ancient constitution of Boeotia, he

should join their ranks. In this way they thought that the inhabitants would easily be induced to come over to them.

3. οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς ὡς ᾐσθοντο ἔνδον τε ὄντας τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ ἐξαπιναίως κατειλημμένην τὴν πόλιν, καταδείσαντες καὶ νομίσαντες πολλῷ πλείους ἐσεληλυθέναι οὐ γὰρ ἐώρων ἐν τῇ νυκτί πρὸς ξύμβασιν ἐχώρησαν καὶ τοὺς λόγους δεξάμενοι ἡσύχαζον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς οὐδένα οὐδὲν ἐνεωτέριζον. [2] πράσσοντες δέ πως ταῦτα κατενόησαν οὐ πολλοὺς τοὺς Θηβαίους ὄντας καὶ ἐνόμισαν ἐπιθέμενοι ῥᾳδίως κρατήσειν: τῷ γὰρ πλήθει τῶν Πλαταιῶν οὐ βουλομένῳ ἦν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφίστασθαι. [3] ἐδόκει οὖν ἐπιχειρητέα εἶναι, καὶ ξυνελέγοντο διορύσσοντες τοὺς κοινοὺς τοίχους παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους, ὅπως μὴ διὰ τῶν ὁδῶν φανεροὶ ὦσιν ἰόντες, ἁμάξας τε ἄνευ τῶν ὑποζυγίων ἐς τὰς ὁδοὺς καθίστασαν, ἵνα ἀντὶ τείχους ᾖ, καὶ τἆλλα ἐξήρτυον ᾗ ἕκαστον ἐφαίνετο πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ξύμφορον ἔσεσθαι. [4] ἐπεὶ δὲ ὡς ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ἑτοῖμα ἦν, φυλάξαντες ἔτι νύκτα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ περίορθρον ἐχώρουν ἐκ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς, ὅπως μὴ κατὰ φῶς θαρσαλεωτέροις οὖσι προσφέροιντο καὶ σφίσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου γίγνωνται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν νυκτὶ φοβερώτεροι ὄντες ἥσσους ὦσι τῆς σφετέρας ἐμπειρίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν. προσέβαλόν τε εὐθὺς καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ᾖσαν κατὰ τάχος.

[3] The Plataeans, when they found that the city had been surprised and taken and that the Thebans were within their walls, were panic-stricken. In the darkness they were unable to see them and greatly over-estimated their numbers. So they came to terms, and accepting the proposals which were made to them, remained quiet, the more readily since the Thebans offered violence to no one. But in the course of the negotiations they somehow discovered that their enemies were not so numerous as they had supposed, and concluded that they could easily attack and master them. They determined to make the attempt, for the commons at Plataea were strongly attached to the Athenian alliance. They began to collect inside the houses, breaking through

the party-walls that they might not be seen going along the streets; they likewise raised barricades of waggons (without the beasts which drew them), and took other measures suitable to the emergency. When they had done all which could be done under the circumstances, they sallied forth from their houses, choosing the time of night just before daybreak, lest, if they put off the attack until dawn, the enemy might be more confident and more a match for them. While darkness lasted they would be timid, and at a disadvantage, not knowing the streets so well as themselves. So they fell upon them at once hand to hand.

4. οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἔγνωσαν ἐξηπατημένοι, ξυνεστρέφοντό τε ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰς προσβολὰς ᾗ προσπίπτοιεν ἀπεωθοῦντο. [2] καὶ δὶς μὲν ἢ τρὶς ἀπεκρούσαντο, ἔπειτα πολλῷ θορύβῳ αὐτῶν τε προσβαλόντων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν ἅμα ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν κραυγῇ τε καὶ ὀλολυγῇ χρωμένων λίθοις τε καὶ κεράμῳ βαλλόντων, καὶ ὑετοῦ ἅμα διὰ νυκτὸς πολλοῦ ἐπιγενομένου, ἐφοβήθησαν καὶ τραπόμενοι ἔφευγον διὰ τῆς πόλεως, ἄπειροι μὲν ὄντες οἱ πλείους ἐν σκότῳ καὶ πηλῷ τῶν διόδων ᾗ χρὴ σωθῆναι καὶ γὰρ τελευτῶντος τοῦ μηνὸς τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν , ἐμπείρους δὲ ἔχοντες τοὺς διώκοντας τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν, ὥστε διεφθείροντο οἱ πολλοί. [3] τῶν δὲ Πλαταιῶν τις τὰς πύλας ᾗ ἐσῆλθον καὶ αἵπερ ἦσαν μόναι ἀνεῳγμέναι ἔκλῃσε στυρακίῳ ἀκοντίου ἀντὶ βαλάνου χρησάμενος ἐς τὸν μοχλόν, ὥστε μηδὲ ταύτῃ ἔξοδον ἔτι εἶναι. [4] διωκόμενοι δὲ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οἱ μέν τινες αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀναβάντες ἔρριψαν ἑς τὸ ἔξω σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ διεφθάρησαν οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πύλας ἐρήμους γυναικὸς δούσης πέλεκυν λαθόντες καὶ διακόψαντες τὸν μοχλὸν ἐξῆλθον οὐ πολλοί αἴσθησις γὰρ ταχεῖα ἐπεγένετο, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλῃ τῆς πόλεως σποράδες ἀπώλλυντο. [5] τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον καὶ ὅσον μάλιστα ἦν ξυνεστραμμένον ἐσπίπτουσιν ἐς οἴκημα μέγα, ὃ ἦν τοῦ τείχους καὶ αἱ θύραι ἀνεῳγμέναι ἔτυχον αὐτοῦ, οἰόμενοι πύλας τὰς θύρας τοῦ οἰκήματος εἶναι καὶ ἄντικρυς δίοδον ἐς τὸ ἔξω. [6] ὁρῶντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ Πλαταιῆς

ἀπειλημμένους ἐβουλεύοντο εἴτε κατακαύσωσιν ὥσπερ ἔχουσιν, ἐμπρήσαντες τὸ οἴκημα, εἴτε τι ἄλλο χρήσωνται. [7] τέλος δὲ οὗτοί τε καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τῶν Θηβαίων περιῆσαν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν πλανώμενοι, ξυνέβησαν τοῖς Πλαταιεῦσι παραδοῦναι σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ὅπλα χρήσασθαι ὅτι ἂν βούλωνται. [8] οἱ μὲν δὴ ἐν τῇ Πλαταίᾳ οὕτως ἐπεπράγεσαν:

[4] When the Thebans found that they had been deceived they closed their ranks and resisted their assailants on every side. Two or three times they drove them back. But when at last the Plataeans charged them, and the women and slaves on the housetops screamed and yelled and pelted them with stones and tiles, the confusion, which was aggravated by the rain which had been falling heavily during the night, became too much for them, and they turned and fled in terror through the city. Hardly any of them knew the way out, and the streets were dark as well as muddy, for the affair happened at the end of the month when there was no moon; whereas their pursuers knew well enough how to prevent their escape; and thus many of them perished. The gates by which they entered were the only ones open, and these a Plataean fastened with the spike of a javelin, which he thrust into the bar instead of the pin. So this exit too was closed and they were chased up and down the city. Some of them mounted upon the wall and cast themselves down into the open. Most of these were killed. Others got out by a deserted gate, cutting through the bar unperceived with an axe which a woman gave them; but only a few, for they were soon found out. Others lost themselves in different parts of the city, and were put to death. But the greater number kept together and took refuge in a large building abutting upon the wall, of which the doors on the near side chanced to be open, they thinking them to be the gates of the city, and expecting to find a way through them into the country. The Plataeans, seeing that they were in a trap, began to consider whether they should not set the building on fire, and burn them where they were. At last they and the other Thebans

who were still alive, and were wandering about the city, agreed to surrender themselves and their arms unconditionally. Thus fared the Thebans in Plataea.

5. οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι Θηβαῖοι, οὓς ἔδει ἔτι τῆς νυκτὸς παραγενέσθαι πανστρατιᾷ, εἴ τι ἄρα μὴ προχωροίη τοῖς ἐσεληλυθόσι, τῆς ἀγγελίας ἅμα καθ᾽ ὁδὸν αὐτοῖς ῥηθείσης περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων ἐπεβοήθουν. [2] ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Πλάταια τῶν Θηβῶν σταδίους ἑβδομήκοντα, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ γενόμενον τῆς νυκτὸς ἐποίησε βραδύτερον αὐτοὺς ἐλθεῖν: ὁ γὰρ Ἀσωπὸς ποταμὸς ἐρρύη μέγας καὶ οὐ ῥᾳδίως διαβατὸς ἦν. [3] πορευόμενοί τε ἐν ὑετῷ καὶ τὸν ποταμὸν μόλις διαβάντες ὕστερον παρεγένοντο, ἤδη τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν μὲν διεφθαρμένων, τῶν δὲ ζώντων ἐχομένων. [4] ὡς δ᾽ ᾔσθοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι τὸ γεγενημένον, ἐπεβούλευον τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πόλεως τῶν Πλαταιῶν: ἦσαν γὰρ καὶ ἄνθρωποι κατὰ τοὺς ἀγροὺς καὶ κατασκευή, οἷα ἀπροσδοκήτου κακοῦ ἐν εἰρήνῃ γενομένου: ἐβούλοντο γὰρ σφίσιν, εἴ τινα λάβοιεν, ὑπάρχειν ἀντὶ τῶν ἔνδον, ἢν ἄρα τύχωσί τινες ἐζωγρημένοι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα διενοοῦντο, [5] οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς ἔτι διαβουλευομένων αὐτῶν ὑποτοπήσαντες τοιοῦτόν τι ἔσεσθαι καὶ δείσαντες περὶ τοῖς ἔξω κήρυκα ἐξέπεμψαν παρὰ τοὺς Θηβαίους, λέγοντες ὅτι οὔτε τὰ πεποιημένα ὅσια δράσειαν ἐν σπονδαῖς σφῶν πειράσαντες καταλαβεῖν τὴν πόλιν, τά τε ἔξω ἔλεγον αὐτοῖς μὴ ἀδικεῖν: εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔφασαν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀποκτενεῖν οὓς ἔχουσι ζῶντας: ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ πάλιν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀποδώσειν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄνδρας. [6] Θηβαῖοι μὲν ταῦτα λέγουσι καὶ ἐπομόσαι φασὶν αὐτούς: Πλαταιῆς δ᾽ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσι τοὺς ἄνδρας εὐθὺς ὑποσχέσθαι ἀποδώσειν, ἀλλὰ λόγων πρῶτον γενομένων ἤν τι ξυμβαίνωσι, καὶ ἐπομόσαι οὔ φασιν. [7] ἐκ δ᾽ οὖν τῆς γῆς ἀνεχώρησαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι οὐδὲν ἀδικήσαντες: οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας κατὰ τάχος ἐσεκομίσαντο, ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς ἄνδρας εὐθύς. ἦσαν δὲ ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν οἱ ληφθέντες, καὶ Εὐρύμαχος εἷς αὐτῶν ἦν, πρὸς ὃν ἔπραξαν οἱ προδιδόντες.

[5] The main body of the Theban army, which should have come during the night to the support of the party entering the city in case of a reverse, having on their march heard of the disaster, were now hastening to the rescue. Plataea is about eight miles distant from Thebes, and the heavy rain which had fallen in the night delayed their arrival; for the river Asopus had swollen, and was not easily fordable. Marching in the rain, and with difficulty crossing the river, they came up too late, some of their friends being already slain and others captives. When the Thebans became aware of the state of affairs, they resolved to lay hands on what was outside the walls; for there were men and property left in the fields, as would naturally happen when a sudden blow was struck in time of peace. They meant to keep any one whom they caught as a hostage and exchange him for one of their own men, if any of them were still alive. But before they had executed their plan, the Plataeans, suspecting their intentions, and fearing for their friends outside, sent a herald to the Thebans protesting against the crime of which they had been guilty in trying to seize their city during peace, and warning them not to touch anything which was outside the walls. If they persisted they threatened in return to kill the prisoners; but if they retired, they would give them up. This is the Theban account, and they add that the Plataeans took an oath. The Plataeans do not admit that they ever promised to restore the captives at once, but only if they could agree after negotiations; and they deny that they took an oath. However this may have been, the Thebans withdrew, leaving the Plataean territory unhurt; but the Plataeans had no sooner got in their property from the country than they put the prisoners to death. Those who were taken were a hundred and eighty in number, and Eurymachus, with whom the betrayers of the city had negotiated, was one of them.

6. τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσαντες ἔς τε τὰς Ἀθήνας ἄγγελον ἔπεμπον καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν τοῖς

Θηβαίοις, τά τε ἐν τῇ πόλει καθίσταντο πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ᾗ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς. [2] τοῖς δ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις ἠγγέλθη εὐθὺς τὰ περὶ τῶν Πλαταιῶν γεγενημένα, καὶ Βοιωτῶν τε παραχρῆμα ξυνέλαβον ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πλάταιαν ἔπεμψαν κήρυκα, κελεύοντες εἰπεῖν μηδὲν νεώτερον ποιεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὓς ἔχουσι Θηβαίων, πρὶν ἄν τι καὶ αὐτοὶ βουλεύσωσι περὶ αὐτῶν: [3] οὐ γὰρ ἠγγέλθη αὐτοῖς ὅτι τεθνηκότες εἶεν. ἅμα γὰρ τῇ ἐσόδῳ γιγνομένῃ τῶν Θηβαίων ὁ πρῶτος ἄγγελος ἐξῄει, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος ἄρτι νενικημένων τε καὶ ξυνειλημμένων: καὶ τῶν ὕστερον οὐδὲν ᾔδεσαν. οὕτω δὴ οὐκ εἰδότες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπέστελλον: ὁ δὲ κῆρυξ ἀφικόμενος ηὗρε τοὺς ἄνδρας διεφθαρμένους. [4] καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύσαντες ἐς Πλάταιαν σῖτόν τε ἐσήγαγον καὶ φρουροὺς ἐγκατέλιπον, τῶν τε ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἀχρειοτάτους ξὺν γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν ἐξεκόμισαν.

[6] When they had killed their prisoners, they sent a messenger to Athens and gave back the dead to the Thebans under a flag of truce; they then took the necessary measures for the security of the city. The news had already reached Athens, and the Athenians had instantly seized any Boeotians who were in Attica, and sent a herald to Plataea bidding them do no violence to the Theban prisoners, but wait for instructions from Athens. The news of their death had not arrived. For the first messenger had gone out when the Thebans entered, and the second when they were just defeated and captured; but of what followed the Athenians knew nothing; they sent the message in ignorance, and the herald, when he arrived, found the prisoners dead. The Athenians next despatched an army to Plataea, and brought in supplies. Then leaving a small force in the place they conveyed away the least serviceable of the citizens, together with the women and children.

7. γεγενημένου δὲ τοῦ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἔργου καὶ λελυμένων λαμπρῶς τῶν σπονδῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς πολεμήσοντες, παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, πρεσβείας τε μέλλοντες πέμπειν παρὰ βασιλέα

καὶ ἄλλοσε πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, εἴ ποθέν τινα ὠφελίαν ἥλπιζον ἑκάτεροι προσλήψεσθαι, πόλεις τε ξυμμαχίδας ποιούμενοι ὅσαι ἦσαν ἐκτὸς τῆς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεως. [2] καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν πρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχούσαις ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τἀκείνων ἑλομένοις ναῦς ἐπετάχθη ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἐς τὸν πάντα ἀριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἐσομένων, καὶ ἀργύριον ῥητὸν ἑτοιμάζειν, τά τε ἄλλα ἡσυχάζοντας καὶ Ἀθηναίους δεχομένους μιᾷ νηὶ ἕως ἂν ταῦτα παρασκευασθῇ. [3] Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τήν τε ὑπάρχουσαν ξυμμαχίαν ἐξήταζον καὶ ἐς τὰ περὶ Πελοπόννησον μᾶλλον χωρία ἐπρεσβεύοντο, Κέρκυραν καὶ Κεφαλληνίαν καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ Ζάκυνθον, ὁρῶντες, εἰ σφίσι φίλια ταῦτ᾽ εἴη βεβαίως, πέριξ τὴν Πελοπόννησον καταπολεμήσοντες.

[7] The affair of Plataea was a glaring violation of the thirty years’ truce, and the Athenians now made preparations for war. The Lacedaemonians and their allies made similar preparations. Both they and the Athenians meditated sending embassies to the King, and to the other Barbarian potentates from whom either party might hope to obtain aid; they likewise sought the alliance of independent cities outside their own dominion. The Lacedaemonians ordered their friends in Italy and Sicily to build others in number proportioned to the size of their cities, in addition to the ships which they had on the spot; for they intended to raise the Peloponnesian navy to a total of five hundred. The cities were also required to furnish a fixed sum of money; they were not to receive more than one ship of the Athenians at a time, but were to take no further measures until these preparations had been completed. The Athenians reviewed their confederacy, and sent ambassadors to the places immediately adjacent to Peloponnesus — Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus. They perceived that if they could only rely upon the friendship of these states, they might completely encircle Peloponnesus with war.

8. ὀλίγον τε ἐπενόουν οὐδὲν ἀμφότεροι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔρρωντο ἐς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἀπεικότως: ἀρχόμενοι γὰρ πάντες ὀξύτερον ἀντιλαμβάνονται, τότε δὲ καὶ νεότης πολλὴ μὲν οὖσα ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ, πολλὴ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις οὐκ ἀκουσίως ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἥπτετο τοῦ πολέμου, ἥ τε ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς ἅπασα μετέωρος ἦν ξυνιουσῶν τῶν πρώτων πόλεων. [2] καὶ πολλὰ μὲν λόγια ἐλέγετο, πολλὰ δὲ χρησμολόγοι ᾖδον ἔν τε τοῖς μέλλουσι πολεμήσειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν. [3] ἔτι δὲ Δῆλος ἐκινήθη ὀλίγον πρὸ τούτων, πρότερον οὔπω σεισθεῖσα ἀφ᾽ οὗ Ἕλληνες μέμνηνται: ἐλέγετο δὲ καὶ ἐδόκει ἐπὶ τοῖς μέλλουσι γενήσεσθαι σημῆναι. εἴ τέ τι ἄλλο τοιουτότροπον ξυνέβη γενέσθαι, πάντα ἀνεζητεῖτο. [4] ἡ δὲ εὔνοια παρὰ πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν. ἔρρωτό τε πᾶς καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις εἴ τι δύναιτο καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ξυνεπιλαμβάνειν αὐτοῖς: ἐν τούτῳ τε κεκωλῦσθαι ἐδόκει ἑκάστῳ τὰ πράγματα ᾧ μή τις αὐτὸς παρέσται. [5] οὕτως <ἐν> ὀργῇ εἶχον οἱ πλείους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οἱ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπολυθῆναι βουλόμενοι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀρχθῶσι φοβούμενοι.

[8] On neither side were there any mean thoughts; they were both full of enthusiasm: and no wonder, for all men are energetic when they are making a beginning. At that time the youth of Peloponnesus and the youth of Athens were numerous; they had never seen war, and were therefore very willing to take up arms. All Hellas was excited by the coming conflict between her two chief cities. Many were the prophecies circulated and many the oracles chanted by diviners, not only in the cities about to engage in the struggle, but throughout Hellas. Quite recently the island of Delos had been shaken by an earthquake for the first time within the memory of the Hellenes; this was interpreted and generally believed to be a sign of coming events. And everything of the sort which occurred was curiously noted.

9. παρασκευῇ μὲν οὖν καὶ γνώμῃ τοιαύτῃ ὥρμηντο, πόλεις δὲ ἑκάτεροι τάσδε ἔχοντες ξυμμάχους ἐς τὸν

πόλεμον καθίσταντο. [2] Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν οἵδε ξύμμαχοι: Πελοποννήσιοι μὲν οἱ ἐντὸς Ἰσθμοῦ πάντες πλὴν Ἀργείων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν τούτοις δὲ ἐς ἀμφοτέρους φιλία ἦν: Πελληνῆς δὲ Ἀχαιῶν μόνοι ξυνεπολέμουν τὸ πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ ὕστερον καὶ ἅπαντες , ἔξω δὲ Πελοποννήσου Μεγαρῆς, Βοιωτοί, Λοκροί, Φωκῆς, Ἀμπρακιῶται, Λευκάδιοι, Ἀνακτόριοι. [3] τούτων ναυτικὸν παρείχοντο Κορίνθιοι, Μεγαρῆς, Σικυώνιοι, Πελληνῆς, Ἠλεῖοι, Ἀμπρακιῶται, Λευκάδιοι, ἱππέας δὲ Βοιωτοί, Φωκῆς, Λοκροί: αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι πόλεις πεζὸν παρεῖχον. αὕτη μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμαχία: [4] Ἀθηναίων δὲ Χῖοι, Λέσβιοι, Πλαταιῆς, Μεσσήνιοι οἱ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ, Ἀκαρνάνων οἱ πλείους, Κερκυραῖοι, Ζακύνθιοι, καὶ ἄλλαι πόλεις αἱ ὑποτελεῖς οὖσαι ἐν ἔθνεσι τοσοῖσδε, Καρία ἡ ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ, Δωριῆς Καρσὶ πρόσοικοι, Ἰωνία, Ἑλλήσποντος, τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, νῆσοι ὅσαι ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου καὶ Κρήτης πρὸς ἥλιον ἀνίσχοντα, πᾶσαι αἱ Κυκλάδες πλὴν Μήλου καὶ Θήρας. [5] τούτων ναυτικὸν παρείχοντο Χῖοι, Λέσβιοι, Κερκυραῖοι, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πεζὸν καὶ χρήματα. [6] ξυμμαχία μὲν αὕτη ἑκατέρων καὶ παρασκευὴ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἦν.

[9] The feeling of mankind was strongly on the side of the Lacedaemonians; for they professed to be the liberators of Hellas. Cities and individuals were eager to assist them to the utmost, both by word and deed; and where a man could not hope to be present, there it seemed to him that all things were at a stand. For the general indignation against the Athenians was intense; some were longing to be delivered from them, others fearful of falling under their sway.Such was the temper which animated the Hellenes, and such were the preparations made by the two powers for the war. Their respective allies were as follows: — The Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the Peloponnesians with the exception of the Argives and the Achaeans — they were both neutral; only the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the Lacedaemonians at first; afterwards all the Achaeans joined them. Beyond the borders of the

Peloponnese, the Megarians, Phocians, Locrians, Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians were their allies. Of these the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians provided a navy, the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry, the other states only infantry. The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania, Corcyra, Zacynthus, and cities in many other countries which were their tributaries. There was the maritime region of Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, the islands that lie to the east within the line of Peloponnesus and Crete, including all the Cyclades with the exception of Melos and Thera. Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra furnished a navy; the rest, land forces and money. Thus much concerning the two confederacies, and the character of their respective forces.

10. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς εὐθὺς περιήγγελλον κατὰ τὴν Πελοπόννησον καὶ τὴν ἔξω ξυμμαχίδα στρατιὰν παρασκευάζεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι τά τε ἐπιτήδεια οἷα εἰκὸς ἐπὶ ἔξοδον ἔκδημον ἔχειν, ὡς ἐσβαλοῦντες ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν. [2] ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἑκάστοις ἑτοῖμα γίγνοιτο, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸν εἰρημένον ξυνῆσαν τὰ δύο μέρη ἀπὸ πόλεως ἑκάστης ἐς τὸν Ἰσθμόν. [3] καὶ ἐπειδὴ πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα ξυνειλεγμένον ἦν, Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅσπερ ἡγεῖτο τῆς ἐξόδου ταύτης, ξυγκαλέσας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων πασῶν καὶ τοὺς μάλιστα ἐν τέλει καὶ ἀξιολογωτάτους παρῄνει τοιάδε.

[10] Immediately after the affair at Plataea the Lacedaemonians sent round word to their Peloponnesian and other allies, bidding them equip troops and provide all things necessary for a foreign expedition, with the object of invading Attica. The various states made their preparations as fast as they could, and at the appointed time, with contingents numbering two-thirds of the forces of each, met at the Isthmus. When the whole army was assembled, Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, and the leader

of the expedition, called together the generals of the different states and their chief officers and most distinguished men, and spoke as follows:

11. ‘ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, καὶ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν πολλὰς στρατείας καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ ἔξω ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι οὐκ ἄπειροι πολέμων εἰσίν: ὅμως δὲ τῆσδε οὔπω μείζονα παρασκευὴν ἔχοντες ἐξήλθομεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πόλιν δυνατωτάτην νῦν ἐρχόμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ πλεῖστοι καὶ ἄριστοι στρατεύοντες. [2] δίκαιον οὖν ἡμᾶς μήτε τῶν πατέρων χείρους φαίνεσθαι μήτε ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῆς δόξης ἐνδεεστέρους. ἡ γὰρ Ἑλλὰς πᾶσα τῇδε τῇ ὁρμῇ ἐπῆρται καὶ προσέχει τὴν γνώμην, εὔνοιαν ἔχουσα διὰ τὸ Ἀθηναίων ἔχθος πρᾶξαι ἡμᾶς ἃ ἐπινοοῦμεν. [3] οὔκουν χρή, εἴ τῳ καὶ δοκοῦμεν πλήθει ἐπιέναι καὶ ἀσφάλεια πολλὴ εἶναι μὴ ἂν ἐλθεῖν τοὺς ἐναντίους ἡμῖν διὰ μάχης, τούτων ἕνεκα ἀμελέστερόν τι παρεσκευασμένους χωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεως ἑκάστης ἡγεμόνα καὶ στρατιώτην τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν αἰεὶ προσδέχεσθαι ἐς κίνδυνόν τινα ἥξειν. [4] ἄδηλα γὰρ τὰ τῶν πολέμων, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου τὰ πολλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ὀργῆς αἱ ἐπιχειρήσεις γίγνονται: πολλάκις τε τὸ ἔλασσον πλῆθος δεδιὸς ἄμεινον ἡμύνατο τοὺς πλέονας διὰ τὸ καταφρονοῦντας ἀπαρασκεύους γενέσθαι. [5] χρὴ δὲ αἰεὶ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ θαρσαλέους στρατεύειν, τῷ δ᾽ ἔργῳ δεδιότας παρεσκευάσθαι: οὕτω γὰρ πρός τε τὸ ἐπιέναι τοῖς ἐναντίοις εὐψυχότατοι ἂν εἶεν πρός τε τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖσθαι ἀσφαλέστατοι. [6] ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ ἀδύνατον ἀμύνεσθαι οὕτω πόλιν ἐρχόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἄριστα παρεσκευασμένην, ὥστε χρὴ καὶ πάνυ ἐλπίζειν διὰ μάχης ἰέναι αὐτούς, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν ὥρμηνται ἐν ᾧ οὔπω πάρεσμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἐν τῇ γῇ ὁρῶσιν ἡμᾶς δῃοῦντάς τε καὶ τἀκείνων φθείροντας. [7] πᾶσι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ὁρᾶν πάσχοντάς τι ἄηθες ὀργὴ προσπίπτει: καὶ οἱ λογισμῷ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι θυμῷ πλεῖστα ἐς ἔργον καθίστανται. [8] Ἀθηναίους δὲ καὶ πλέον τι τῶν ἄλλων εἰκὸς τοῦτο δρᾶσαι, οἳ ἄρχειν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιοῦσι καὶ ἐπιόντες τὴν τῶν πέλας

δῃοῦν μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν αὐτῶν ὁρᾶν. [9] ὡς οὖν ἐπὶ τοσαύτην πόλιν στρατεύοντες καὶ μεγίστην δόξαν οἰσόμενοι τοῖς τε προγόνοις καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, ἕπεσθ᾽ ὅπῃ ἄν τις ἡγῆται, κόσμον καὶ φυλακὴν περὶ παντὸς ποιούμενοι καὶ τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ὀξέως δεχόμενοι: κάλλιστον γὰρ τόδε καὶ ἀσφαλέστατον, πολλοὺς ὄντας ἑνὶ κόσμῳ χρωμένους φαίνεσθαι.’

[11] ‘Men of Peloponnesus, and you, allies, many are the expeditions which our fathers made both within and without the Peloponnese, and the veterans among ourselves are experienced in war; and yet we never went forth with a greater army than this. But then we should remember that, whatever may be our numbers or our valour, we are going against a most powerful city. And we are bound to show ourselves worthy of our fathers, and not wanting to our own reputation. For all Hellas is stirred by our enterprise, and her eyes are fixed upon us: she is friendly and would have us succeed because she hates the Athenians. Now although some among you, surveying this great host, may think that there is very little risk of the enemy meeting us in the field, we ought not on that account to advance heedlessly; but the general and the soldier of every state should be always expecting that his own division of the army will be the one first in danger. War is carried on in the dark; attacks are generally sudden and furious, and often the smaller army, animated by a proper fear, has been more than a match for a larger force which, disdaining their opponent, were taken unprepared by him. When invading an enemy’s country, men should always be confident in spirit, but they should fear too, and take measures of precaution; and thus they will be at once most valorous in attack and impregnable in defence.’And the city which we are attacking is not so utterly powerless against an invader, but is in the best possible state of preparation, and for this reason our enemies may be quite expected to meet us in the field. Even if they have no such intention beforehand, yet as soon as

they see us in Attica, wasting and destroying their property, they will certainly change their mind. For all men are angry when they not only suffer but see, and some strange form of calamity strikes full upon the eye; the less they reflect the more ready they are to fight; above all men the Athenians, who claim imperial power, and are more disposed to invade and waste their neighbour’s land than to look on while their own is being wasted. Remembering how great this city is which you are attacking, and what a fame you will bring on your ancestors and yourselves for good or evil according to the result, follow whithersoever you are led; maintain discipline and caution above all things, and be on the alert to obey the word of command. It is both the noblest and the safest thing for a great army to be visibly animated by one spirit.’

12. τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν καὶ διαλύσας τὸν ξύλλογον ὁ Ἀρχίδαμος Μελήσιππον πρῶτον ἀποστέλλει ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας τὸν Διακρίτου ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην, εἴ τι ἄρα μᾶλλον ἐνδοῖεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁρῶντες σφᾶς ἤδη ἐν ὁδῷ ὄντας. [2] οἱ δὲ οὐ προσεδέξαντο αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν πόλιν οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ κοινόν: ἦν γὰρ Περικλέους γνώμη πρότερον νενικηκυῖα κήρυκα καὶ πρεσβείαν μὴ προσδέχεσθαι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐξεστρατευμένων: ἀποπέμπουσιν οὖν αὐτὸν πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἐκέλευον ἐκτὸς ὅρων εἶναι αὐθημερόν, τό τε λοιπὸν ἀναχωρήσαντας ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν, ἤν τι βούλωνται, πρεσβεύεσθαι. ξυμπέμπουσί τε τῷ Μελησίππῳ ἀγωγούς, ὅπως μηδενὶ ξυγγένηται. [3] ὁ δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁρίοις ἐγένετο καὶ ἔμελλε διαλύσεσθαι, τοσόνδε εἰπὼν ἐπορεύετο ὅτι ‘ἥδε ἡ ἡμέρα τοῖς Ἕλλησι μεγάλων κακῶν ἄρξει.’ [4] ὡς δὲ ἀφίκετο ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ ἔγνω ὁ Ἀρχίδαμος ὅτι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδέν πω ἐνδώσουσιν, οὕτω δὴ ἄρας τῷ στρατῷ προυχώρει ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν. [5] Βοιωτοὶ δὲ μέρος μὲν τὸ σφέτερον καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας παρείχοντο Πελοποννησίοις ξυστρατεύειν, τοῖς δὲ λειπομένοις ἐς Πλάταιαν ἐλθόντες τὴν γῆν ἐδῄουν.

[12] Having thus spoken, Archidamus dismissed the assembly. His first step was to send Melesippus, the son of Diaeritus, a Spartan, to Athens in the hope that the Athenians might after all give way, when they saw their enemies actually on the march. But they would not admit him to the assembly, nor even into the city. For Pericles had already carried a motion to the effect that they would have nothing to do with herald or embassy while the Lacedaemonians were in the field. So Melesippus was sent away without a hearing and told that he must cross the frontier before sunset; if the Lacedaemonians wanted to hold any parley with the Athenians, they must go home first. He was attended by an escort in order to prevent his communicating with any one. When he arrived at the Athenian frontier, and was about to leave them, he uttered these words: 'This day will be to the Hellenes the beginning of great sorrows.' On the return of the herald to the camp Archidamus learned that the Athenians were not as yet at all in the mood to yield; so at last he moved forward his army and prepared to enter Attica. The Boeotians who had sent their contingent of two-thirds, including their cavalry, to the Peloponnesian army, marched to Plataea with the remainder of their forces and wasted the country.

13. ἔτι δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ξυλλεγομένων τε ἐς τὸν Ἰσθμὸν καὶ ἐν ὁδῷ ὄντων, πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν, Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου στρατηγὸς ὢν Ἀθηναίων δέκατος αὐτός, ὡς ἔγνω τὴν ἐσβολὴν ἐσομένην, ὑποτοπήσας, ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ξένος ὢν ἐτύγχανε, μὴ πολλάκις ἢ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ βουλόμενος χαρίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγροὺς αὐτοῦ παραλίπῃ καὶ μὴ δῃώσῃ, ἢ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων κελευσάντων ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γένηται τοῦτο, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄγη ἐλαύνειν προεῖπον ἕνεκα ἐκείνου, προηγόρευε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μέν οἱ ξένος εἴη, οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ κακῷ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο, τοὺς δὲ ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οἰκίας ἢν ἄρα μὴ δῃώσωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀφίησιν αὐτὰ δημόσια εἶναι καὶ

μηδεμίαν οἱ ὑποψίαν κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι. [2] παρῄνει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἅπερ καὶ πρότερον, παρασκευάζεσθαί τε ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐσκομίζεσθαι, ἔς τε μάχην μὴ ἐπεξιέναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐσελθόντας φυλάσσειν, καὶ τὸ ναυτικόν, ᾗπερ ἰσχύουσιν, ἐξαρτύεσθαι, τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν, λέγων τὴν ἰσχὺν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι τῶν χρημάτων τῆς προσόδου, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμῃ καὶ χρημάτων περιουσίᾳ κρατεῖσθαι. [3] θαρσεῖν τε ἐκέλευε προσιόντων μὲν ἑξακοσίων ταλάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φόρου κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων τῇ πόλει ἄνευ τῆς ἄλλης προσόδου, ὑπαρχόντων δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει ἔτι τότε ἀργυρίου ἐπισήμου ἑξακισχιλίων ταλάντων — τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστα τριακοσίων ἀποδέοντα μύρια ἐγένετο, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἔς τε τὰ προπύλαια τῆς ἀκροπόλεως καὶ τἆλλα οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἐς Ποτείδαιαν ἀπανηλώθη —, [4] χωρὶς δὲ χρυσίου ἀσήμου καὶ ἀργυρίου ἔν τε ἀναθήμασιν ἰδίοις καὶ δημοσίοις καὶ ὅσα ἱερὰ σκεύη περί τε τὰς πομπὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ σκῦλα Μηδικὰ καὶ εἴ τι τοιουτότροπον, οὐκ ἐλάσσονος [ἦν] ἢ πεντακοσίων ταλάντων. [5] ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἱερῶν προσετίθει χρήματα οὐκ ὀλίγα, οἷς χρήσεσθαι αὐτούς, καὶ ἢν πάνυ ἐξείργωνται πάντων, καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς θεοῦ τοῖς περικειμένοις χρυσίοις: ἀπέφαινε δ᾽ ἔχον τὸ ἄγαλμα τεσσαράκοντα τάλαντα σταθμὸν χρυσίου ἀπέφθου, καὶ περιαιρετὸν εἶναι ἅπαν. χρησαμένους τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἔφη χρῆναι μὴ ἐλάσσω ἀντικαταστῆσαι πάλιν. [6] χρήμασι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐθάρσυνεν αὐτούς, ὁπλίτας δὲ τρισχιλίους καὶ μυρίους εἶναι ἄνευ τῶν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις καὶ τῶν παρ᾽ ἔπαλξιν ἑξακισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων. [7] τοσοῦτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσον τὸ πρῶτον ὁπότε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐσβάλοιεν, ἀπό τε τῶν πρεσβυτάτων καὶ τῶν νεωτάτων, καὶ μετοίκων ὅσοι ὁπλῖται ἦσαν. τοῦ τε γὰρ Φαληρικοῦ τείχους στάδιοι ἦσαν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα πρὸς τὸν κύκλον τοῦ ἄστεως, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τὸ φυλασσόμενον τρεῖς καὶ τεσσαράκοντα — ἔστι δὲ αὐτοῦ ὃ καὶ ἀφύλακτον ἦν, τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε μακροῦ καὶ τοῦ Φαληρικοῦ —, τὰ δὲ μακρὰ τείχη πρὸς τὸν Πειραιᾶ τεσσαράκοντα σταδίων, ὧν τὸ

ἔξωθεν ἐτηρεῖτο: καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς ξὺν Μουνιχίᾳ ἑξήκοντα μὲν σταδίων ὁ ἅπας περίβολος, τὸ δ᾽ ἐν φυλακῇ ὂν ἥμισυ τούτου. [8] ἱππέας δὲ ἀπέφαινε διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους ξὺν ἱπποτοξόταις, ἑξακοσίους δὲ καὶ χιλίους τοξότας, καὶ τριήρεις τὰς πλωίμους τριακοσίας. [9] ταῦτα γὰρ ὑπῆρχεν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ οὐκ ἐλάσσω ἕκαστα τούτων, ὅτε ἡ ἐσβολὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἔμελλε Πελοποννησίων ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο. ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα οἷάπερ εἰώθει Περικλῆς ἐς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέσεσθαι τῷ πολέμῳ.

[13] While the Peloponnesians were gathering at the Isthmus, and were still on their way, but before they entered Attica, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, who was one of the ten Athenian generals, knowing that the invasion was inevitable, and suspecting that Archidamus in wasting the country might very likely spare his lands, either out of courtesy and because he happened to be his friend, or by the order of the Lacedaemonian authorities (who had already attempted to raise a prejudice against him when they demanded the expulsion of the polluted family, and might take this further means of injuring him in the eyes of the Athenians), openly declared in the assembly that Archidamus was his friend; but was not so to the injury of the state, and that supposing the enemy did not destroy his lands and buildings like the rest, he would make a present of them to the public; and he desired that the Athenians would have no suspicion of him on that account. As to the general situation, he repeated his previous advice; they must prepare for war and bring their property from the country into the city; they must defend their walls but not go out to battle; they should also equip for service the fleet in which lay their strength. Their allies should be kept well in hand, for their power depended on the revenues which they derived from them; military successes were generally gained by a wise policy and command of money. The state of their finances was encouraging; they had on an average six hundred talents of tribute coming in annually from their

allies, to say nothing of their other revenue; and there were still remaining in the Acropolis six thousand talents of coined silver. (The whole amount had once been as much as nine thousand seven hundred talents, but from this had to be deducted a sum of three thousand seven hundred expended on various buildings, such as the Propylaea of the Acropolis, and also on the siege of Potidaea.) Moreover there was uncoined gold and silver in the form of private and public offerings, sacred vessels used in processions and games, the Persian spoil and other things of the like nature, worth at least five hundred talents more. There were also at their disposal, besides what they had in the Acropolis, considerable treasures in various temples. If they were reduced to the last extremity they could even take off the plates of gold with which the image of the goddess was overlaid; these, as he pointed out, weighed forty talents, and were of refined gold, which was all removeable. They might use this treasure in self-defence, but they were bound to replace all that they had taken. By this estimate of their wealth he strove to encourage them. He added that they had thirteen thousand hoplites, besides the sixteen thousand who occupied the fortresses or who manned the walls of the city. For this was the number engaged on garrison duty at the beginning of the war, whenever the enemy invaded Attica; they were made up of the elder and younger men, and of such metics as bore heavy arms. The Phaleric wall extended four miles from Phalerum to the city walls: the portion of the city wall which was guarded was somewhat less than five miles; that between the Long Wall and the Phaleric requiring no guard. The Long Walls running down to the Piraeus were rather more than four and a half miles in length; the outer only was guarded. The whole circuit of the Piraeus and of Munychia was not quite seven miles, of which half required a guard. The Athenian cavalry, so Pericles pointed out, numbered twelve hundred, including mounted archers; the foot-archers, sixteen hundred; of

triremes fit for service the city had three hundred. — The forces of various kinds which Athens possessed at the commencement of the war, when the first Peloponnesian invasion was impending, cannot be estimated at less. — To these Pericles added other arguments, such as he was fond of using, which were intended to prove to the Athenians that victory was certain.

14. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἀνεπείθοντό τε καὶ ἐσεκομίζοντο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην κατασκευὴν ᾗ κατ᾽ οἶκον ἐχρῶντο, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν οἰκιῶν καθαιροῦντες τὴν ξύλωσιν: πρόβατα δὲ καὶ ὑποζύγια ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν διεπέμψαντο καὶ ἐς τὰς νήσους τὰς ἐπικειμένας. [2] χαλεπῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ εἰωθέναι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς διαιτᾶσθαι ἡ ἀνάστασις ἐγίγνετο.

[14] The citizens were persuaded, and brought into the city their children and wives, their household goods, and even the wood-work of their houses, which they took down. Their flocks and beasts of burden they conveyed to Euboea and the adjacent islands.The removal of the inhabitants was painful; for the Athenians had always been accustomed to reside in the country.

15. ξυνεβεβήκει δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάνυ ἀρχαίου ἑτέρων μᾶλλον Ἀθηναίοις τοῦτο. ἐπὶ γὰρ Κέκροπος καὶ τῶν πρώτων βασιλέων ἡ Ἀττικὴ ἐς Θησέα αἰεὶ κατὰ πόλεις ᾠκεῖτο πρυτανεῖά τε ἐχούσας καὶ ἄρχοντας, καὶ ὁπότε μή τι δείσειαν, οὐ ξυνῇσαν βουλευσόμενοι ὡς τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἕκαστοι ἐπολίτευον καὶ ἐβουλεύοντο: καί τινες καὶ ἐπολέμησάν ποτε αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐλευσίνιοι μετ᾽ Εὐμόλπου πρὸς Ἐρεχθέα. [2] ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς τά τε ἄλλα διεκόσμησε τὴν χώραν καὶ καταλύσας τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τά τε βουλευτήρια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐς τὴν νῦν πόλιν οὖσαν, ἓν βουλευτήριον ἀποδείξας καὶ πρυτανεῖον, ξυνῴκισε πάντας, καὶ νεμομένους τὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάστους ἅπερ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἠνάγκασε μιᾷ πόλει ταύτῃ χρῆσθαι, ἣ ἁπάντων ἤδη ξυντελούντων ἐς αὐτὴν μεγάλη γενομένη παρεδόθη ὑπὸ

Θησέως τοῖς ἔπειτα: καὶ ξυνοίκια ἐξ ἐκείνου Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτι καὶ νῦν τῇ θεῷ ἑορτὴν δημοτελῆ ποιοῦσιν. [3] τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἡ ἀκρόπολις ἡ νῦν οὖσα πόλις ἦν, καὶ τὸ ὑπ᾽ αὐτὴν πρὸς νότον μάλιστα τετραμμένον. [4] τεκμήριον δέ: τὰ γὰρ ἱερὰ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει † καὶ ἄλλων θεῶν ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἔξω πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς πόλεως μᾶλλον ἵδρυται, τό τε τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου καὶ τὸ Πύθιον καὶ τὸ τῆς Γῆς καὶ τὸ <τοῦ> ἐν Λίμναις Διονύσου, ᾧ τὰ ἀρχαιότερα Διονύσια [τῇ δωδεκάτῃ] ποιεῖται ἐν μηνὶ Ἀνθεστηριῶνι, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων Ἴωνες ἔτι καὶ νῦν νομίζουσιν. ἵδρυται δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἱερὰ ταύτῃ ἀρχαῖα. [5] καὶ τῇ κρήνῃ τῇ νῦν μὲν τῶν τυράννων οὕτω σκευασάντων Ἐννεακρούνῳ καλουμένῃ, τὸ δὲ πάλαι φανερῶν τῶν πηγῶν οὐσῶν Καλλιρρόῃ ὠνομασμένῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε ἐγγὺς οὔσῃ τὰ πλείστου ἄξια ἐχρῶντο, καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχαίου πρό τε γαμικῶν καὶ ἐς ἄλλα τῶν ἱερῶν νομίζεται τῷ ὕδατι χρῆσθαι: [6] καλεῖται δὲ διὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ταύτῃ κατοίκησιν καὶ ἡ ἀκρόπολις μέχρι τοῦδε ἔτι ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων πόλις.

[15] Such a life had been characteristic of them, more than of any other Hellenic people, from very early times. In the days of Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign of’ Theseus, Attica was divided into communes, having their own town halls and magistrates. Except in case of alarm the whole people did not assemble in council under the king, but administered their own affairs, and advised together in their several townships. Some of them at times even went to war with him, as the Eleusinians under Eumolpus with Erectheus. But when Theseus came to the throne, he, being a powerful as well as a wise ruler, among other improvements in the administration of the country, dissolved the councils and separate governments, and united all the inhabitants of Attica in the present city, establishing one council and town hall. They continued to live on their own lands, but he compelled them to resort to Athens as their metropolis, and henceforward they were all inscribed in the roll of her citizens. A great city thus arose

which was handed down by Theseus to his descendants, and from his day to this the Athenians have regularly celebrated the national festival of the Synoecia, or ‘union of the communes’ in honour of the Goddess Athene.Before his time, what is now the Acropolis and the ground lying under it to the south was the city. Many reasons may be urged in proof of this statement: The temples of Athenè and of other divinities are situated in the Acropolis itself, and those which are not lie chiefly thereabouts; the temples of Olympian Zeus, for example, and of the Pythian Apollo, and the temple of Earth and of Dionysus in the Marshes, in honour of whom the more ancient Dionysia are celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Anthesterion, a festival which also continues to be observed by the Ionian descendants of the Athenians. In the same quarter are other ancient temples, and not far off is the fountain now called Enneacrounos, or the Nine Conduits, from the form given to it by the tyrants, but originally, before the springs were covered in, Callirrhoè, or the Fair Stream. The water of this fountain was used by the ancient Athenians on great occasions, it being near the original city; and at marriage rites and other ceremonies the custom is still retained. To this day the Acropolis or Citadel is called by the Athenians *Polis*, or City, because that neighbourhood was first inhabited.

16. τῇ τε οὖν ἐπὶ πολὺ κατὰ τὴν χώραν αὐτονόμῳ οἰκήσει μετεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ξυνῳκίσθησαν, διὰ τὸ ἔθος ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς ὅμως οἱ πλείους τῶν τε ἀρχαίων καὶ τῶν ὕστερον μέχρι τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου γενόμενοί τε καὶ οἰκήσαντες οὐ ῥᾳδίως πανοικεσίᾳ τὰς μεταναστάσεις ἐποιοῦντο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄρτι ἀνειληφότες τὰς κατασκευὰς μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά: [2] ἐβαρύνοντο δὲ καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔφερον οἰκίας τε καταλείποντες καὶ ἱερὰ ἃ διὰ παντὸς ἦν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πολιτείας πάτρια δίαιτάν τε μέλλοντες μεταβάλλειν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολείπων ἕκαστος.

[16] Thus for a long time the ancient Athenians enjoyed a country life in self-governing communities; and although they were now united in a single city, they and their descendants, down to the time of this war, from old habit generally resided with their households in the country where they had been born. For this reason, and also because they had recently restored their country-houses and estates after the Persian War, they had a disinclination to move. They were depressed at the thought of forsaking their homes and the temples which had come down to them from their fathers and were the abiding memorials of their early constitution. They were going to change their manner of life, and in leaving their villages were in fact each of them going into exile.

17. ἐπειδή τε ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὸ ἄστυ, ὀλίγοις μέν τισιν ὑπῆρχον οἰκήσεις καὶ παρὰ φίλων τινὰς ἢ οἰκείων καταφυγή, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τά τε ἐρῆμα τῆς πόλεως ᾤκησαν καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ ἡρῷα πάντα πλὴν τῆς ἀκροπόλεως καὶ τοῦ Ἐλευσινίου καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο βεβαίως κληστὸν ἦν: τό τε Πελαργικὸν καλούμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὃ καὶ ἐπάρατόν τε ἦν μὴ οἰκεῖν καί τι καὶ Πυθικοῦ μαντείου ἀκροτελεύτιον τοιόνδε διεκώλυε, λέγον ὡς ‘τὸ Πελαργικὸν ἀργὸν ἄμεινον,’ ὅμως ὑπὸ τῆς παραχρῆμα ἀνάγκης ἐξῳκήθη. [2] καί μοι δοκεῖ τὸ μαντεῖον τοὐναντίον ξυμβῆναι ἢ προσεδέχοντο: οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν παράνομον ἐνοίκησιν αἱ ξυμφοραὶ γενέσθαι τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἀνάγκη τῆς οἰκήσεως, ὃν οὐκ ὀνομάζον τὸ μαντεῖον προῄδει μὴ ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ ποτὲ αὐτὸ κατοικισθησόμενον. [3] κατεσκευάσαντο δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πύργοις τῶν τειχῶν πολλοὶ καὶ ὡς ἕκαστός που ἐδύνατο: οὐ γὰρ ἐχώρησε ξυνελθόντας αὐτοὺς ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ᾽ ὕστερον δὴ τά τε μακρὰ τείχη ᾤκησαν κατανειμάμενοι καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ πολλά. [4] ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἥπτοντο, ξυμμάχους τε ἀγείροντες καὶ τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἑκατὸν νεῶν ἐπίπλουν ἐξαρτύοντες. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τούτῳ παρασκευῆς ἦσαν.

[17] When they came to Athens, only a few of them had houses or could find homes among friends or kindred. The majority took up their abode in the vacant spaces of the city, and in the temples and shrines of heroes, with the exception of those on the Acropolis, the Eleusinium, and any other precinct which could be securely closed. The Pelasgian ground, as it was called, which lay at the foot of the citadel, was under a curse forbidding its occupation. There was also a half-line of a Pythian oracle to the same effect:'Better the Pelasgian ground left waste.'Yet even this was filled under the sudden pressure of necessity. And to my mind the oracle came true in a sense exactly contrary to the popular expectation; for the unlawful occupation to which men were driven was not the cause of the calamities which befell the city, but the war was the cause of the occupation; and the oracle without mentioning the war foresaw that the place would be inhabited some day for no good. Many also established themselves in the turrets of the walls, or in any other place which they could find; for the city could not contain them when they first came in. But afterwards they divided among them the Long Walls and the greater part of the Piraeus. At the same time the Athenians applied themselves vigorously to the war, summoning their allies, and preparing an expedition of a hundred ships against the Peloponnese.

18. ὁ δὲ στρατὸς τῶν Πελοποννησίων προϊὼν ἀφίκετο τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Οἰνόην πρῶτον, ᾗπερ ἔμελλον ἐσβαλεῖν. καὶ ὡς ἐκαθέζοντο, προσβολὰς παρεσκευάζοντο τῷ τείχει ποιησόμενοι μηχαναῖς τε καὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ: [2] ἡ γὰρ Οἰνόη οὖσα ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ Βοιωτίας ἐτετείχιστο, καὶ αὐτῷ φρουρίῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐχρῶντο ὁπότε πόλεμος καταλάβοι. τάς τε οὖν προσβολὰς ηὐτρεπίζοντο καὶ ἄλλως ἐνδιέτριψαν χρόνον περὶ αὐτήν. [3] αἰτίαν τε οὐκ ἐλαχίστην Ἀρχίδαμος ἔλαβεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, δοκῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ξυναγωγῇ τοῦ πολέμου μαλακὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτήδειος, οὐ παραινῶν προθύμως πολεμεῖν: ἐπειδή τε ξυνελέγετο ὁ

στρατός, ἥ τε ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ἐπιμονὴ γενομένη καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην πορείαν ἡ σχολαιότης διέβαλεν αὐτόν, μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐν τῇ Οἰνόῃ ἐπίσχεσις. [4] οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐσεκομίζοντο ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, καὶ ἐδόκουν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπελθόντες ἂν διὰ τάχους πάντα ἔτι ἔξω καταλαβεῖν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου μέλλησιν. [5] ἐν τοιαύτῃ μὲν ὀργῇ ὁ στρατὸς τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον ἐν τῇ καθέδρᾳ εἶχεν. ὁ δὲ προσδεχόμενος, ὡς λέγεται, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς γῆς ἔτι ἀκεραίου οὔσης ἐνδώσειν τι καὶ κατοκνήσειν περιιδεῖν αὐτὴν τμηθεῖσαν, ἀνεῖχεν.

[18] While they were thus engaged, the Peloponnesian army was advancing: it arrived first of all at Oenoè, a fortress on the confines of Attica and Boeotia, which was garrisoned by the Athenians whenever war broke out, and was the point at which the Peloponnesians intended to enter the enemy’s country. There they encamped and prepared to assault the walls by means of engines and siege works. But these and other measures took up time and detained them in the neighbourhood. Archidamus was severely blamed for the delay; he was also thought not to have been energetic enough in levying war, and to have done the Athenians good service by discouraging vigorous action. After the muster of the forces he had been accused of delay at the isthmus, and of loitering on the march. But his reputation was most affected by his halt at Oenoè. For the Athenians employed the interval in getting away their property; and the Peloponnesians fancied that, if they had advanced quickly and he had not lingered, they could have seized everything before it was conveyed within the walls. Such were the feelings entertained towards Archidamus by his troops during the halt. He is said to have held back in the belief that the Athenians, while their lands were still unravaged, would yield, and that the thought of allowing them to be devastated would be too much for them.

19. ἐπειδὴ μέντοι προσβαλόντες τῇ Οἰνόῃ καὶ πᾶσαν ἰδέαν πειράσαντες οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν, οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν

ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο, οὕτω δὴ ὁρμήσαντες ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλαταίᾳ [τῶν ἐσελθόντων Θηβαίων] γενόμενα ἡμέρᾳ ὀγδοηκοστῇ μάλιστα, θέρους καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἀκμάζοντος, ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν: ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. [2] καὶ καθεζόμενοι ἔτεμνον πρῶτον μὲν Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ τὸ Θριάσιον πεδίον καὶ τροπήν τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἱππέων περὶ τοὺς Ῥείτους καλουμένους ἐποιήσαντο: ἔπειτα προυχώρουν ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ Αἰγάλεων ὄρος διὰ Κρωπιᾶς, ἕως ἀφίκοντο ἐς Ἀχαρνάς, χωρίον μέγιστον τῆς Ἀττικῆς τῶν δήμων καλουμένων, καὶ καθεζόμενοι ἐς αὐτὸ στρατόπεδόν τε ἐποιήσαντο χρόνον τε πολὺν ἐμμείναντες ἔτεμνον.

[19] But when they had assaulted Oenoè, and after leaving no means untried were unable to take it, and no herald came from the Athenians, at last they marched on, and about the eightieth day after the entry of the Thebans into Plataea, in the middle of the summer, when the corn was in full ear, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus the Lacedaemonian king. They encamped and ravaged, first of all, Eleusis and the plain of Thria, where they put to flight some Athenian horse near the streams called Rheiti; they then advanced, keeping Mount Aegaleos on the right hand, through the district of Kropeia until they reached Acharnae, which is the largest of the Athenian townships or demes, as they are called; and at Acharnae they encamped, and remained there a considerable time ravaging the country.

20. γνώμῃ δὲ τοιᾷδε λέγεται τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον περί τε τὰς Ἀχαρνὰς ὡς ἐς μάχην ταξάμενον μεῖναι καὶ ἐς τὸ πεδίον ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἐσβολῇ οὐ καταβῆναι: [2] τοὺς γὰρ Ἀθηναίους ἤλπιζεν, ἀκμάζοντάς τε νεότητι πολλῇ καὶ παρεσκευασμένους ἐς πόλεμον ὡς οὔπω πρότερον, ἴσως ἂν ἐπεξελθεῖν καὶ τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἂν περιιδεῖν τμηθῆναι. [3] ἐπειδὴ οὖν αὐτῷ ἐς Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ τὸ Θριάσιον πεδίον οὐκ ἀπήντησαν, πεῖραν ἐποιεῖτο περὶ τὰς Ἀχαρνὰς καθήμενος εἰ ἐπεξίασιν: [4] ἅμα μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ χῶρος ἐπιτήδειος

ἐφαίνετο ἐνστρατοπεδεῦσαι, ἅμα δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀχαρνῆς μέγα μέρος ὄντες τῆς πόλεως τρισχίλιοι γὰρ ὁπλῖται ἐγένοντο οὐ περιόψεσθαι ἐδόκουν τὰ σφέτερα διαφθαρέντα, ἀλλ᾽ ὁρμήσειν καὶ τοὺς πάντας ἐς μάχην. εἴ τε καὶ μὴ ἐπεξέλθοιεν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἐσβολῇ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδεέστερον ἤδη ἐς τὸ ὕστερον τό τε πεδίον τεμεῖν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν χωρήσεσθαι: τοὺς γὰρ Ἀχαρνέας ἐστερημένους τῶν σφετέρων οὐχ ὁμοίως προθύμους ἔσεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων κινδυνεύειν, στάσιν δ᾽ ἐνέσεσθαι τῇ γνώμῃ. [5] τοιαύτῃ μὲν διανοίᾳ ὁ Ἀρχίδαμος περὶ τὰς Ἀχαρνὰς ἦν.

[20] In this first invasion Archidamus is said to have lingered about Acharnae with his army ready for battle, instead of descending into the plain, in the hope that the Athenians, who were now flourishing in youth and numbers and provided for war as they had never been before, would perhaps meet them in the field rather than allow their lands to be ravaged. When therefore they did not appear at Eleusis or in the plain of Thria, he tried once more whether by encamping in the neighbourhood of Acharnae he could induce them to come out. The situation appeared to be convenient, and the Acharnians, being a considerable section of the city and furnishing three thousand hoplites, were likely to be impatient at the destruction of their property, and would communicate to the whole people a desire to fight. Or if the Athenians did not come out to meet him during this invasion, he could henceforward ravage the plain with more confidence, and march right up to the walls of the city. The Acharnians, having lost their own possessions, would be less willing to hazard their lives on behalf of their neighbours, and so there would be a division in the Athenian counsels. Such was the motive of Archidamus in remaining at Acharnae.

21. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ μέχρι μὲν οὗ περὶ Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ τὸ Θριάσιον πεδίον ὁ στρατὸς ἦν, καί τινα ἐλπίδα εἶχον ἐς τὸ ἐγγυτέρω αὐτοὺς μὴ προϊέναι, μεμνημένοι καὶ Πλειστοάνακτα τὸν Παυσανίου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέα, ὅτε

ἐσβαλὼν τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Ἐλευσῖνα καὶ Θριῶζε στρατῷ Πελοποννησίων πρὸ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου τέσσαρσι καὶ δέκα ἔτεσιν ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐς τὸ πλέον οὐκέτι προελθών· διὸ δὴ καὶ ἡ φυγὴ αὐτῷ ἐγένετο ἐκ Σπάρτης δόξαντι χρήμασι πεισθῆναι [τὴν ἀναχώρησιν]·· [2] ἐπειδὴ δὲ περὶ Ἀχαρνὰς εἶδον τὸν στρατὸν ἑξήκοντα σταδίους τῆς πόλεως ἀπέχοντα, οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῖς, ὡς εἰκός, γῆς τεμνομένης ἐν τῷ ἐμφανεῖ, ὃ οὔπω ἑοράκεσαν οἵ γε νεώτεροι, οὐδ᾽ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πλὴν τὰ Μηδικά, δεινὸν ἐφαίνετο καὶ ἐδόκει τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ μάλιστα τῇ νεότητι ἐπεξιέναι καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν. [3] κατὰ ξυστάσεις τε γιγνόμενοι ἐν πολλῇ ἔριδι ἦσαν, οἱ μὲν κελεύοντες ἐπεξιέναι, οἱ δέ τινες οὐκ ἐῶντες. χρησμολόγοι τε ᾖδον χρησμοὺς παντοίους, ὧν ἀκροᾶσθαι ὡς ἕκαστος ὥρμητο. οἵ τε Ἀχαρνῆς οἰόμενοι παρὰ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐλαχίστην μοῖραν εἶναι Ἀθηναίων, ὡς αὐτῶν ἡ γῆ ἐτέμνετο, ἐνῆγον τὴν ἔξοδον μάλιστα. παντί τε τρόπῳ ἀνηρέθιστο ἡ πόλις, καὶ τὸν Περικλέα ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον, καὶ ὧν παρῄνεσε πρότερον ἐμέμνηντο οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι, αἴτιόν τε σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον πάντων ὧν ἔπασχον.

[21] The Athenians, so long as the Lacedaemonians were in the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the plain of Thria, entertained a hope that they would come no further. They remembered how, fourteen years before, the Lacedaemonian king, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army, and how after advancing as far as Eleusis and Thria he came no further, but retreated. And indeed this retreat was the cause of his exile; for he was thought to have been bribed. But when they saw the army in the neighbourhood of Acharnae, and barely seven miles from the city, they felt the presence of the invader to be intolerable. The devastation of their country before their eyes, which the younger men had never seen at all, nor the elder except in the Persian invasion, naturally appeared to them a horrible thing, and the whole people, the young men especially, were anxious to go forth and put a stop to it.

Knots were formed in the streets, and there were loud disputes, some eager to go out, a minority resisting. Soothsayers were repeating oracles of the most different kinds, which all found in some one or other enthusiastic listeners. The Acharnians, who in their own estimation were no small part of the Athenian state, seeing their land ravaged, strongly insisted that they should go out and fight. The excitement in the city was universal; the people were furious with Pericles, and, forgetting all his previous warnings, they abused him for not leading them to battle, as their general should, and laid all their miseries to his charge.

22. Περικλῆς δὲ ὁρῶν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ οὐ τὰ ἄριστα φρονοῦντας, πιστεύων δὲ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι, ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα, τοῦ μὴ ὀργῇ τι μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν, τήν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε καὶ δι᾽ ἡσυχίας μάλιστα ὅσον ἐδύνατο εἶχεν. [2] ἱππέας μέντοι ἐξέπεμπεν αἰεὶ τοῦ μὴ προδρόμους ἀπὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐσπίπτοντας ἐς τοὺς ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν: καὶ ἱππομαχία τις ἐγένετο βραχεῖα ἐν Φρυγίοις τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων τέλει ἑνὶ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ Θεσσαλοῖς μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς Βοιωτῶν ἱππέας, ἐν ᾗ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Θεσσαλοί, μέχρι οὗ προσβοηθησάντων τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τροπὴ ἐγένετο αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπέθανον τῶν Θεσσαλῶν καὶ Ἀθηναίων οὐ πολλοί: ἀνείλοντο μέντοι αὐτοὺς αὐθημερὸν ἀσπόνδους. [3] καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τροπαῖον τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἔστησαν. ἡ δὲ βοήθεια αὕτη τῶν Θεσσαλῶν κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν ξυμμαχικὸν ἐγένετο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ἀφίκοντο παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς Λαρισαῖοι, Φαρσάλιοι, [Παράσιοι], Κραννώνιοι, Πυράσιοι, Γυρτώνιοι, Φεραῖοι. ἡγοῦντο δὲ αὐτῶν ἐκ μὲν Λαρίσης Πολυμήδης καὶ Ἀριστόνους, ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως ἑκάτερος, ἐκ δὲ Φαρσάλου Μένων: ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ πόλεις ἄρχοντες.

[22] But he, seeing that they were overcome by the irritation of the moment and inclined to evil counsels, and confident that he was right in refusing to go out, would not summon

an assembly or meeting of any kind, lest, coming together more in anger than in prudence, they might take some false step. He maintained a strict watch over the city, and sought to calm the irritation as far as he could. Meanwhile he sent out horsemen from time to time to prevent flying parties finding their way into the fields near the city and doing mischief. A skirmish took place at Phrygia between one of the divisions of the Athenian horse assisted by their Thessalian allies on the one hand, and the Boeotian cavalry on the other, in which the Athenians and Thessalians were at least a match for their opponents, until, the Boeotian infantry coming up to support the horse, they were compelled to fly. The Athenians and Thessalians lost a few men, but recovered their bodies on the same day without asking for a truce. On the morrow the Peloponnesians raised a trophy. The forces which the Thessalians brought to the aid of the Athenians, according to the terms of their old alliance, consisted of Larissaeans, Pharsalians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. The leaders of the Larissaeans were Polymedes and Aristonous, one from each of the two leading factions of their city; the Pharsalians were commanded by Meno. The forces of the other cities had likewise generals of their own.

23. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐπεξῆσαν αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς μάχην, ἄραντες ἐκ τῶν Ἀχαρνῶν ἐδῄουν τῶν δήμων τινὰς ἄλλους τῶν μεταξὺ Πάρνηθος καὶ Βριλησσοῦ ὄρους. [2] ὄντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέστειλαν τὰς ἑκατὸν ναῦς περὶ Πελοπόννησον ἅσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ χιλίους ὁπλίτας ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ τοξότας τετρακοσίους: ἐστρατήγει δὲ Καρκίνος τε ὁ Ξενοτίμου καὶ Πρωτέας ὁ Ἐπικλέους καὶ Σωκράτης ὁ Ἀντιγένους. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄραντες τῇ παρασκευῇ ταύτῃ περιέπλεον, οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι χρόνον ἐμμείναντες ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὅσου εἶχον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἀνεχώρησαν διὰ Βοιωτῶν, οὐχ ᾗπερ ἐσέβαλον: παριόντες δὲ Ὠρωπὸν τὴν γῆν τὴν Γραϊκὴν καλουμένην, ἣν νέμονται

Ὠρώπιοι Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι, ἐδῄωσαν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς Πελοπόννησον διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις ἕκαστοι.

[23] When the Peloponnesians found that the Athenians did not come out to meet them, they moved their army from Acharnae, and ravaged some of the townships which lie between Mount Parnes and Mount Brilessus. While they were still in the country, the Athenians sent the fleet of a hundred ships which they had been equipping on an expedition round the Peloponnese. These ships carried on board a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers; they were under the command of Carcinus the son of Xenotimus, Proteas the son of Epicles, and Socrates the son of Antigenes. After the departure of the fleet the Peloponnesians remained in Attica as long as their provisions lasted, and then, taking a new route, retired through Boeotia. In passing by Oropus they wasted the country called Peiraïkè, inhabited by the Oropians, who are subjects of the Athenians. On their return to Peloponnesus the troops dispersed to their several cities.

24. ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι φυλακὰς κατεστήσαντο κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ὥσπερ δὴ ἔμελλον διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου φυλάξειν: καὶ χίλια τάλαντα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει χρημάτων ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἐξαίρετα ποιησαμένοις χωρὶς θέσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀναλοῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολεμεῖν: ἢν δέ τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ κινεῖν τὰ χρήματα ταῦτα ἐς ἄλλο τι, ἢν μὴ οἱ πολέμιοι νηίτῃ στρατῷ ἐπιπλέωσι τῇ πόλει καὶ δέῃ ἀμύνασθαι, θάνατον ζημίαν ἐπέθεντο. [2] τριήρεις τε μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐξαιρέτους ἑκατὸν ἐποιήσαντο κατὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἕκαστον τὰς βελτίστας, καὶ τριηράρχους αὐταῖς, ὧν μὴ χρῆσθαι μηδεμιᾷ ἐς ἄλλο τι ἢ μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κινδύνου, ἢν δέῃ.

[24] When they had retreated, the Athenians posted guards to keep watch both by land and sea, a precaution which they maintained throughout the war. They then passed a decree reserving of the treasure in the Acropolis a thousand

talents: this sum was set apart and was not to be expended unless the enemy attacked the city with a fleet and they had to defend it. In any other case, he who brought forward or put to the vote a proposal to touch the money was to be punished with death. They also resolved to set apart yearly a hundred triremes, the finest of the year, and to appoint trierarchs for them; these they were only to use at the same time with the money, and in the same emergency.

25. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Κερκυραῖοι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πεντήκοντα ναυσὶ προσβεβοηθηκότες καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχων ἄλλα τε ἐκάκουν περιπλέοντες καὶ ἐς Μεθώνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἀποβάντες τῷ τείχει προσέβαλον ὄντι ἀσθενεῖ καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἐνόντων. [2] ἔτυχε δὲ περὶ τοὺς χώρους τούτους Βρασίδας ὁ Τέλλιδος ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιάτης φρουρὰν ἔχων, καὶ αἰσθόμενος ἐβοήθει τοῖς ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ μετὰ ὁπλιτῶν ἑκατόν. διαδραμὼν δὲ τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον ἐσκεδασμένον κατὰ τὴν χώραν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος τετραμμένον ἐσπίπτει ἐς τὴν Μεθώνην καὶ ὀλίγους τινὰς ἐν τῇ ἐσδρομῇ ἀπολέσας τῶν μεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ τήν τε πόλιν περιεποίησε καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ τολμήματος πρῶτος τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπῃνέθη ἐν Σπάρτῃ. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄραντες παρέπλεον, καὶ σχόντες τῆς Ἠλείας ἐς Φειὰν ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν ἐπὶ δύο ἡμέρας καὶ προσβοηθήσαντας τῶν ἐκ τῆς κοίλης Ἤλιδος τριακοσίους λογάδας καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ἐκ τῆς περιοικίδος Ἠλείων μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν. [4] ἀνέμου δὲ κατιόντος μεγάλου χειμαζόμενοι ἐν ἀλιμένῳ χωρίῳ, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐπέβησαν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ περιέπλεον τὸν Ἰχθῦν καλούμενον τὴν ἄκραν ἐς τὸν ἐν τῇ Φειᾷ λιμένα, οἱ δὲ Μεσσήνιοι ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς οἱ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπιβῆναι κατὰ γῆν χωρήσαντες τὴν Φειὰν αἱροῦσιν. [5] καὶ ὕστερον αἵ τε νῆες περιπλεύσασαι ἀναλαμβάνουσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐξανάγονται ἐκλιπόντες Φειάν, καὶ τῶν Ἠλείων ἡ πολλὴ ἤδη στρατιὰ προσεβεβοηθήκει. παραπλεύσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ ἄλλα χωρία ἐδῄουν.

[25] The Athenian forces, which had lately been dispatched to Peloponnesus in the hundred vessels, and were assisted by the Corcyraeans with fifty ships and by some of the allies from the same region, did considerable damage on the Peloponnesian coast. They also disembarked and attacked Methonè, a fortress in Laconia, which was weak and had no regular garrison. Now Brasidas the son of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in those parts in command of a force, and, seeing the danger, he came to the aid of the inhabitants with a hundred hoplites. He dashed through the scattered parties of Athenian troops, whose attention was occupied with the fortress, and threw himself into Methonè, suffering a slight loss; he thus saved the place. The exploit was publicly acknowledged at Sparta, Brasidas being the first Spartan who obtained this distinction in the war. The Athenians, proceeding on their voyage, ravaged the territory of Pheia in Elis for two days, and defeated three hundred chosen men from the vale of Elis, as well as some Elean perioeci from the neighbourhood of Pheia who came to the rescue. But a violent storm arose, and there was no harbour in which the fleet could find shelter; so the greater part of the army re-embarked and sailed round the promontory called Ichthys towards the harbour of Pheia. Meanwhile the Messenians and others who were unable to get on board marched by land and captured Pheia. The fleet soon sailed into the harbour and took them up; they then evacuated Pheia and put to sea. By this time the main army of the Eleans had arrived; whereupon the Athenians proceeded on their way to other places, which they ravaged.

26. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον Ἀθηναῖοι τριάκοντα ναῦς ἐξέπεμψαν περὶ τὴν Λοκρίδα καὶ Εὐβοίας ἅμα φυλακήν: ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Κλεόπομπος ὁ Κλεινίου. [2] καὶ ἀποβάσεις ποιησάμενος τῆς τε παραθαλασσίου ἔστιν ἃ ἐδῄωσε καὶ Θρόνιον εἷλεν, ὁμήρους τε ἔλαβεν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν Ἀλόπῃ τοὺς βοηθήσαντας Λοκρῶν μάχῃ ἐκράτησεν.

[26] About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise off Locris, having an eye also to the safety of Euboea. Cleopompus the son of Cleinias was their commander. He made descents on the Locrian coast and ravaged various places. He also captured Thronium, taking hostages of the inhabitants, and at Alopè defeated the Locrians who came to defend the place.

27. ἀνέστησαν δὲ καὶ Αἰγινήτας τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τούτῳ ἐξ Αἰγίνης Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐτούς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας, ἐπικαλέσαντες οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῦ πολέμου σφίσιν αἰτίους εἶναι: καὶ τὴν Αἴγιναν ἀσφαλέστερον ἐφαίνετο τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐπικειμένην αὐτῶν πέμψαντας ἐποίκους ἔχειν. καὶ ἐξέπεμψαν ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ ἐς αὐτὴν τοὺς οἰκήτορας. [2] ἐκπεσοῦσι δὲ τοῖς Αἰγινήταις οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔδοσαν Θυρέαν οἰκεῖν καὶ τὴν γῆν νέμεσθαι, κατά τε τὸ Ἀθηναίων διάφορον καὶ ὅτι σφῶν εὐεργέται ἦσαν ὑπὸ τὸν σεισμὸν καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων τὴν ἐπανάστασιν. ἡ δὲ Θυρεᾶτις γῆ μεθορία τῆς Ἀργείας καὶ Λακωνικῆς ἐστίν, ἐπὶ θάλασσαν καθήκουσα. καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα ᾤκησαν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐσπάρησαν κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα.

[27] In the same summer the Athenians expelled the Aeginetans and their families from Aegina, alleging that they had been the main cause of the war. The island lies close to Peloponnesus, and they thought it safer to send thither settlers of their own, an intention which they shortly afterwards carried out. The Lacedaemonians gave the Aeginetan exiles the town of Thyrea to occupy and the adjoining country to cultivate, partly in order to annoy the Athenians, partly out of gratitude to the Aeginetans, who had done them good service at the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The Thyrean territory is a strip of land coming down to the sea on the borders of Argolis and Laconia. There some of them found a home; others dispersed over Hellas.

28. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους νουμηνίᾳ κατὰ σελήνην, ὥσπερ καὶ μόνον δοκεῖ εἶναι γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ὁ ἥλιος ἐξέλιπε

μετὰ μεσημβρίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀνεπληρώθη, γενόμενος μηνοειδὴς καὶ ἀστέρων τινῶν ἐκφανέντων.

[28] During the same summer, at the beginning of the lunar month (apparently the only time when such an event is possible), and in the afternoon, there was an eclipse of the sun, which took the form of a crescent, and then became full again; during the eclipse a few stars were visible.

29. καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει Νυμφόδωρον τὸν Πύθεω ἄνδρα Ἀβδηρίτην, οὗ εἶχε τὴν ἀδελφὴν Σιτάλκης, δυνάμενον παρ᾽ αὐτῷ μέγα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρότερον πολέμιον νομίζοντες πρόξενον ἐποιήσαντο καὶ μετεπέμψαντο, βουλόμενοι Σιτάλκην σφίσι τὸν Τήρεω, Θρᾳκῶν βασιλέα, ξύμμαχον γενέσθαι. [2] ὁ δὲ Τήρης οὗτος ὁ τοῦ Σιτάλκου πατὴρ πρῶτος Ὀδρύσαις τὴν μεγάλην βασιλείαν ἐπὶ πλέον τῆς ἄλλης Θρᾴκης ἐποίησεν: πολὺ γὰρ μέρος καὶ αὐτόνομόν ἐστι Θρᾳκῶν. [3] Τηρεῖ δὲ τῷ Πρόκνην τὴν Πανδίονος ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν σχόντι γυναῖκα προσήκει ὁ Τήρης οὗτος οὐδέν, οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῆς Θρᾴκης ἐγένοντο, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἐν Δαυλίᾳ τῆς Φωκίδος νῦν καλουμένης γῆς [ὁ Τηρεὺς] ᾤκει, τότε ὑπὸ Θρᾳκῶν οἰκουμένης, καὶ τὸ ἔργον τὸ περὶ τὸν Ἴτυν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ ἔπραξαν □πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ἀηδόνος μνήμῃ Δαυλιὰς ἡ ὄρνις ἐπωνόμασται □, εἰκός τε καὶ τὸ κῆδος Πανδίονα ξυνάψασθαι τῆς θυγατρὸς διὰ τοσούτου ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ἐς Ὀδρύσας ὁδοῦ. Τήρης δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα ἔχων βασιλεύς [τε] πρῶτος ἐν κράτει Ὀδρυσῶν ἐγένετο. [4] οὗ δὴ ὄντα τὸν Σιτάλκην οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξύμμαχον ἐποιοῦντο, βουλόμενοι σφίσι τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία καὶ Περδίκκαν ξυνεξελεῖν αὐτόν. [5] ἐλθών τε ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ὁ Νυμφόδωρος τήν τε τοῦ Σιτάλκου ξυμμαχίαν ἐποίησε καὶ Σάδοκον τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖον τόν τε ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης πόλεμον ὑπεδέχετο καταλύσειν: πείσειν γὰρ Σιτάλκην πέμπειν στρατιὰν Θρᾳκίαν Ἀθηναίοις ἱππέων τε καὶ πελταστῶν. [6] ξυνεβίβασε δὲ καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Θέρμην αὐτῷ ἔπεισεν ἀποδοῦναι: ξυνεστράτευσέ τε εὐθὺς Περδίκκας ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας μετὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Φορμίωνος. [7] οὕτω μὲν

Σιτάλκης τε ὁ Τήρεω Θρᾳκῶν βασιλεὺς ξύμμαχος ἐγένετο Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Περδίκκας ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου Μακεδόνων βασιλεύς.

[29] In the same summer, Nymphodorus the son of Pythes, a native of Abdera and a man of great influence with Sitalces who had married his sister, was made by the Athenians their proxenus at that place and invited by them to Athens. He had formerly been considered their enemy, but now they hoped that he would gain over to their alliance Sitalces, who was the son of Teres and king of Thrace.This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first founder of the great Odrysian empire, which he extended over a large part of Thrace, although many of the Thracian tribes are still independent. He has no connexion with Tereus who took to wife from Athens Procnè, the daughter of Pandion; they do not even belong to the same Thrace. For Tereus dwelt in Daulia, a part of the region which is now called Phocis but in those days was inhabited by Thracians, and in that country Itys suffered at the hands of the women Procnè and Philomela. Many of the poets when they make mention of the nightingale (Philomela) apply to the bird the epithet Daulian. Further, Pandion would surely have formed a marriage connexion for his daughter among his neighbours with a view to mutual protection, and not at a distance of so many days’ journey, among the Odrysian Thracians. And the Teres of whom I am speaking, and who was the first powerful king of the Odrysae, has not even the same name.Now Sitalces, whom the Athenians made their ally, was the son of this Teres; they wanted him to assist them in the conquest of Chalcidicè and of Perdiccas. So Nymphodorus came to Athens, negotiated the alliance with Sitalces, and got his son Sadocus enrolled an Athenian citizen. He also undertook to terminate the war in Chalcidicè, promising that he would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians an army of Thracian horsemen and targeteers. He further reconciled Perdiccas with the Athenians, and persuaded them to restore Thermè to him.

Whereupon Perdiccas joined the Athenian army under Phormio, and with him fought against the Chalcidians. Thus Sitalces the son of Teres king of Thrace, and Perdiccas son of Alexander king of Macedonia, entered into the Athenian alliance.

30. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσὶν Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτι ὄντες περὶ Πελοπόννησον Σόλλιόν τε Κορινθίων πόλισμα αἱροῦσι καὶ παραδιδόασι Παλαιρεῦσιν Ἀκαρνάνων μόνοις τὴν γῆν καὶ πόλιν νέμεσθαι: καὶ Ἀστακόν, ἧς Εὔαρχος ἐτυράννει, λαβόντες κατὰ κράτος καὶ ἐξελάσαντες αὐτὸν τὸ χωρίον ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προσεποιήσαντο. [2] ἐπί τε Κεφαλληνίαν τὴν νῆσον προσπλεύσαντες προσηγάγοντο ἄνευ μάχης: κεῖται δὲ ἡ Κεφαλληνία κατὰ Ἀκαρνανίαν καὶ Λευκάδα τετράπολις οὖσα, Παλῆς, Κράνιοι, Σαμαῖοι, Προννᾶιοι. ὕστερον δ᾽ οὐ πολλῷ ἀνεχώρησαν αἱ νῆες ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας.

[30] The Athenians, in the hundred ships which were still cruising about Peloponnesus, took Sollium, a town belonging to the Corinthians, which they handed over to the Palaereans of Acarnania, giving to them alone of the Acarnanians the right of occupying the city and country. They also stormed the town of Astacus, and driving out Evarchus who was tyrant there, added it to the Athenian confederacy. They next sailed to the island of Cephallenia, which they gained over without fighting. The island lies over against Acarnania and Leucas, and contains four cities inhabited by the Paleans, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronnaeans. Soon afterwards the fleet proceeded on its voyage homewards.

31. περὶ δὲ τὸ φθινόπωρον τοῦ θέρους τούτου Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεί, αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι, ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα Περικλέους τοῦ Ξανθίππου στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ οἱ περὶ Πελοπόννησον Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσίν ⸢ἔτυχον γὰρ ἤδη ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ὄντες ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀνακομιζόμενοι⸣ ὡς ᾔσθοντο τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πανστρατιᾷ ἐν Μεγάροις ὄντας, ἔπλευσαν παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ ξυνεμείχθησαν. [2] στρατόπεδόν τε μέγιστον δὴ τοῦτο ἀθρόον Ἀθηναίων ἐγένετο,

ἀκμαζούσης ἔτι τῆς πόλεως καὶ οὔπω νενοσηκυίας: μυρίων γὰρ ὁπλιτῶν οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἦσαν αὐτοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι χωρὶς δὲ αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ τρισχίλιοι ἦσαν , μέτοικοι δὲ ξυνεσέβαλον οὐκ ἐλάσσους τρισχιλίων ὁπλιτῶν, χωρὶς δὲ ὁ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ψιλῶν οὐκ ὀλίγος. δῃώσαντες δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῆς γῆς ἀνεχώρησαν. [3] ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὕστερον ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον ἐσβολαὶ Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα καὶ ἱππέων καὶ πανστρατιᾷ, μέχρι οὗ Νίσαια ἑάλω ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων.

[31] About the end of the summer the entire Athenian force, including the metics, invaded the territory of Megara, under the command of Pericles the son of Xanthippus. The Athenian fleet had reached Aegina on its way home, and when the commanders heard that the whole armed force of the city was in Megara, they sailed thither and joined them. This was the largest army which the Athenians ever had in one place; for the city was still in her full strength, and had not as yet suffered from the plague. The Athenians themselves numbered not less than ten thousand hoplites, exclusive of the remaining three thousand who were engaged at Potidaea. A force of metic hoplites amounting to at least three thousand took part in the invasion, and also a large number of light-armed troops. After ravaging the greater part of the country they retired. They repeated the invasion, sometimes with cavalry, sometimes with the whole Athenian army, every year during the war until Nisaea was taken.

32. ἐτειχίσθη δὲ καὶ Ἀταλάντη ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων φρούριον τοῦ θέρους τούτου τελευτῶντος, ἡ ἐπὶ Λοκροῖς τοῖς Ὀπουντίοις νῆσος ἐρήμη πρότερον οὖσα, τοῦ μὴ λῃστὰς ἐκπλέοντας ἐξ Ὀποῦντος καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Λοκρίδος κακουργεῖν τὴν Εὔβοιαν.ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ μετὰ τὴν Πελοποννησίων ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀναχώρησιν ἐγένετο.

[32] At the end of this summer the island of Atalantè, which lies off the coast of the Opuntian Locrians and had hitherto been uninhabited, was fortified and made a guard-station by

the Athenians. They wanted to prevent pirates sailing from Opus and other places in Locris and plundering Euboea. Such were the events which occurred during the remainder of the summer after the Peloponnesians had retired from Attica.

33. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Εὔαρχος ὁ Ἀκαρνὰν βουλόμενος ἐς τὴν Ἀστακὸν κατελθεῖν πείθει Κορινθίους τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ πεντακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἑαυτὸν κατάγειν πλεύσαντας, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικούρους τινὰς προσεμισθώσατο: ἦρχον δὲ τῆς στρατιᾶς Εὐφαμίδας τε ὁ Ἀριστωνύμου καὶ Τιμόξενος ὁ Τιμοκράτους καὶ Εὔμαχος ὁ Χρύσιδος. [2] καὶ πλεύσαντες κατήγαγον: καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἀκαρνανίας τῆς περὶ θάλασσαν ἔστιν ἃ χωρία βουλόμενοι προσποιήσασθαι καὶ πειραθέντες, ὡς οὐκ ἐδύναντο, ἀπέπλεον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [3] σχόντες δ᾽ ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ ἐς Κεφαλληνίαν καὶ ἀπόβασιν ποιησάμενοι ἐς τὴν Κρανίων γῆν, ἀπατηθέντες ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐξ ὁμολογίας τινὸς ἄνδρας τε ἀποβάλλουσι σφῶν αὐτῶν, ἐπιθεμένων ἀπροσδοκήτοις τῶν Κρανίων, καὶ βιαιότερον ἀναγαγόμενοι ἐκομίσθησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

[33] During the following winter, Evarchus the Acarnanian, desiring to be restored to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen hundred hoplites and reinstate him, he himself hiring some mercenaries. Of this expedition Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus the son of Timocrates, and Eumachus the son of Chrysis, were the commanders. They sailed to Astacus, and restored Evarchus; they then tried to gain over certain other towns on the coast of Acarnania; but, failing in their attempt, they proceeded homewards. Touching at Cephallenia on their voyage, they made a descent on the country of the Cranians, but being entrapped by means of a pretended agreement, and then unexpectedly attacked, they lost a part of their forces; at length, not without a severe struggle, they put to sea again and returned home.

34. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι Ἀθηναῖοι τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ χρώμενοι δημοσίᾳ ταφὰς ἐποιήσαντο τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ πρώτων ἀποθανόντων τρόπῳ τοιῷδε. [2] τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ προτίθενται τῶν ἀπογενομένων πρότριτα σκηνὴν ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἐπιφέρει τῷ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος ἤν τι βούληται: [3] ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ ἐκφορὰ ᾖ, λάρνακας κυπαρισσίνας ἄγουσιν ἅμαξαι, φυλῆς ἑκάστης μίαν: ἔνεστι δὲ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἧς ἕκαστος ἦν φυλῆς. μία δὲ κλίνη κενὴ φέρεται ἐστρωμένη τῶν ἀφανῶν, οἳ ἂν μὴ εὑρεθῶσιν ἐς ἀναίρεσιν. [4] ξυνεκφέρει δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων, καὶ γυναῖκες πάρεισιν αἱ προσήκουσαι ἐπὶ τὸν τάφον ὀλοφυρόμεναι. [5] τιθέασιν οὖν ἐς τὸ δημόσιον σῆμα, ὅ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ καλλίστου προαστείου τῆς πόλεως, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν αὐτῷ θάπτουσι τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων, πλήν γε τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι: ἐκείνων δὲ διαπρεπῆ τὴν ἀρετὴν κρίναντες αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐποίησαν. [6] ἐπειδὰν δὲ κρύψωσι γῇ, ἀνὴρ ᾑρημένος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃς ἂν γνώμῃ τε δοκῇ μὴ ἀξύνετος εἶναι καὶ ἀξιώσει προήκῃ, λέγει ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔπαινον τὸν πρέποντα: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀπέρχονται. [7] ὧδε μὲν θάπτουσιν: καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου, ὁπότε ξυμβαίη αὐτοῖς, ἐχρῶντο τῷ νόμῳ. [8] ἐπὶ δ᾽ οὖν τοῖς πρώτοις τοῖσδε Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου ᾑρέθη λέγειν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ καιρὸς ἐλάμβανε, προελθὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ σήματος ἐπὶ βῆμα ὑψηλὸν πεποιημένον, ὅπως ἀκούοιτο ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ ὁμίλου, ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

[34] During the same winter, in accordance with an old national custom, the funeral of those who first fell in this war was celebrated by the Athenians at the public charge. The ceremony is as follows: Three days before the celebration they erect a tent in which the bones of the dead are laid out, and every one brings to his own dead any offering which he pleases. At the time of the funeral the bones are placed in chests of cypress wood, which are conveyed on hearses; there is one chest for each tribe. They also carry a single empty litter decked with a pall for all whose bodies are missing, and cannot be recovered after the battle. The procession is accompanied by any one who chooses,

whether citizen or stranger, and the female relatives of the deceased are present at the place of interment and make lamentation. The public sepulchre is situated in the most beautiful spot outside the walls; there they always bury those who fall in war; only after the battle of Marathon the dead, in recognition of their pre-eminent valour, were interred on the field. When the remains have been laid in the earth, some man of known ability and high reputation, chosen by the city, delivers a suitable oration over them; after which the people depart. Such is the manner of interment; and the ceremony was repeated from time to time throughout the war. Over those who were the first buried Pericles was chosen to speak. At the fitting moment he advanced from the sepulchre to a lofty stage, which had been erected in order that he might be heard as far as possible by the multitude, and spoke as follows:

35. ‘οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἤδη εἰρηκότων ἐπαινοῦσι τὸν προσθέντα τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον τόνδε, ὡς καλὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων θαπτομένοις ἀγορεύεσθαι αὐτόν. ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀρκοῦν ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργῳ γενομένων ἔργῳ καὶ δηλοῦσθαι τὰς τιμάς, οἷα καὶ νῦν περὶ τὸν τάφον τόνδε δημοσίᾳ παρασκευασθέντα ὁρᾶτε, καὶ μὴ ἐν ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ πολλῶν ἀρετὰς κινδυνεύεσθαι εὖ τε καὶ χεῖρον εἰπόντι πιστευθῆναι. [2] χαλεπὸν γὰρ τὸ μετρίως εἰπεῖν ἐν ᾧ μόλις καὶ ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας βεβαιοῦται. ὅ τε γὰρ ξυνειδὼς καὶ εὔνους ἀκροατὴς τάχ᾽ ἄν τι ἐνδεεστέρως πρὸς ἃ βούλεταί τε καὶ ἐπίσταται νομίσειε δηλοῦσθαι, ὅ τε ἄπειρος ἔστιν ἃ καὶ πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον, εἴ τι ὑπὲρ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀκούοι. μέχρι γὰρ τοῦδε ἀνεκτοὶ οἱ ἔπαινοί εἰσι περὶ ἑτέρων λεγόμενοι, ἐς ὅσον ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος οἴηται ἱκανὸς εἶναι δρᾶσαί τι ὧν ἤκουσεν: τῷ δὲ ὑπερβάλλοντι αὐτῶν φθονοῦντες ἤδη καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν. [3] ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς πάλαι οὕτως ἐδοκιμάσθη ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν, χρὴ καὶ ἐμὲ ἑπόμενον τῷ νόμῳ πειρᾶσθαι ὑμῶν τῆς ἑκάστου βουλήσεώς τε καὶ δόξης τυχεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον.

[35] FUNERAL SPEECH. ‘Most of those who have spoken here before me have commended the lawgiver who added this oration to our other funeral customs; it seemed to them a worthy thing that such an honour should be given at their burial to the dead who have fallen on the field of battle. But I should have preferred that, when men’s deeds have been brave, they should be honoured in deed only, and with such an honour as this public funeral, which you are now witnessing. Then the reputation of many would not have been imperilled on the eloquence or want of eloquence of one, and their virtues believed or not as he spoke well or ill. For it is difficult to say neither too little nor too much; and even moderation is apt not to give the impression of truthfulness. The friend of the dead who knows the facts is likely to think that the words of the speaker fall short of his knowledge and of his wishes; another who is not so well informed, when he hears of anything which surpasses his own powers, will be envious and will suspect exaggeration. Mankind are tolerant of the praises of others so long as each hearer thinks that he can do as well or nearly as well himself, but, when the speaker rises above him, jealousy is aroused and he begins to be incredulous. However, since our ancestors have set the seal of their approval upon the practice, I must obey, and to the utmost of my power shall endeavour to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of all who hear me.

36. ‘ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων πρῶτον: δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ πρέπον δὲ ἅμα ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην τῆς μνήμης δίδοσθαι. τὴν γὰρ χώραν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ οἰκοῦντες διαδοχῇ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων μέχρι τοῦδε ἐλευθέραν δι᾽ ἀρετὴν παρέδοσαν. [2] καὶ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνου καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν: κτησάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξαντο ὅσην ἔχομεν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπόνως ἡμῖν τοῖς νῦν προσκατέλιπον. [3] τὰ δὲ πλείω αὐτῆς αὐτοὶ ἡμεῖς οἵδε οἱ νῦν ἔτι ὄντες μάλιστα ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυίᾳ ἡλικίᾳ ἐπηυξήσαμεν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς πᾶσι παρεσκευάσαμεν καὶ

ἐς πόλεμον καὶ ἐς εἰρήνην αὐταρκεστάτην. [4] ὧν ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν κατὰ πολέμους ἔργα, οἷς ἕκαστα ἐκτήθη, ἢ εἴ τι αὐτοὶ ἢ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν βάρβαρον ἢ Ἕλληνα πολέμιον ἐπιόντα προθύμως ἠμυνάμεθα, μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἐάσω: ἀπὸ δὲ οἵας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλθομεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὰ καὶ μεθ᾽ οἵας πολιτείας καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οἵων μεγάλα ἐγένετο, ταῦτα δηλώσας πρῶτον εἶμι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τῶνδε ἔπαινον, νομίζων ἐπί τε τῷ παρόντι οὐκ ἂν ἀπρεπῆ λεχθῆναι αὐτὰ καὶ τὸν πάντα ὅμιλον καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ξύμφορον εἶναι ἐπακοῦσαι αὐτῶν.

[36] I will speak first of our ancestors, for it is right and seemly that now, when we are lamenting the dead, a tribute should be paid to their memory. There has never been a time when they did not inhabit this land, which by their valour they have handed down from generation to generation, and we have received from them a free state. But if they were worthy of praise, still more were our fathers, who added to their inheritance, and after many a struggle transmitted to us their sons this great empire. And we ourselves assembled here to-day, who are still most of us in the vigour of life, have carried the work of improvement further, and have richly endowed our city with all things, so that she is sufficient for herself both in peace and war. Of the military exploits by which our various possessions were acquired, or of the energy with which we or our fathers drove back the tide of war, Hellenic or Barbarian, I will not speak; for the tale would be long and is familiar to you. But before I praise the dead, I should like to point out by what principles of action we rose to power, and under what institutions and through what manner of life our empire became great. For I conceive that such thoughts are not unsuited to the occasion, and that this numerous assembly of citizens and strangers may profitably listen to them.

37. ‘χρώμεθα γὰρ πολιτείᾳ οὐ ζηλούσῃ τοὺς τῶν πέλας νόμους, παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ ὄντες τισὶν ἢ μιμούμενοι ἑτέρους. καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους

ἀλλ᾽ ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται: μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀξίωσιν, ὡς ἕκαστος ἔν τῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ, οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ πλέον ἐς τὰ κοινὰ ἢ ἀπ᾽ ἀρετῆς προτιμᾶται, οὐδ᾽ αὖ κατὰ πενίαν, ἔχων γέ τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν πόλιν, ἀξιώματος ἀφανείᾳ κεκώλυται. [2] ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι᾽ ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ᾽ ἡδονήν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μέν, λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὄψει ἀχθηδόνας προστιθέμενοι. [3] ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν.

[37] ‘Our form of government does not enter into rivalry with the institutions of others. We do not copy our neighbours, but are an example to them. It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few. But while the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognised; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as the reward of merit. Neither is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country whatever be the obscurity of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbour if he does what he likes; we do not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, are not pleasant. While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts; we are prevented from doing wrong by respect for the authorities and for the laws, having an especial regard to those which are ordained for the protection of the injured as well as to those unwritten laws which bring upon the

transgressor of them the reprobation of the general sentiment.

38. ‘καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν πόνων πλείστας ἀναπαύλας τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπορισάμεθα, ἀγῶσι μέν γε καὶ θυσίαις διετησίοις νομίζοντες, ἰδίαις δὲ κατασκευαῖς εὐπρεπέσιν, ὧν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἡ τέρψις τὸ λυπηρὸν ἐκπλήσσει. [2] ἐπεσέρχεται δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ἐκ πάσης γῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν μηδὲν οἰκειοτέρᾳ τῇ ἀπολαύσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καρποῦσθαι ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.

[38] ‘And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from toil; we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year; our homes are beautiful and elegant; and the delight which we daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy. Because of the greatness of our city the fruits of the whole earth flow in upon us; so that we enjoy the goods of other countries as freely as of our own.

39. ‘διαφέρομεν δὲ καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολεμικῶν μελέταις τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖσδε. τήν τε γὰρ πόλιν κοινὴν παρέχομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε ξενηλασίαις ἀπείργομέν τινα ἢ μαθήματος ἢ θεάματος, ὃ μὴ κρυφθὲν ἄν τις τῶν πολεμίων ἰδὼν ὠφεληθείη, πιστεύοντες οὐ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς τὸ πλέον καὶ ἀπάταις ἢ τῷ ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐς τὰ ἔργα εὐψύχῳ: καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν. [2] τεκμήριον δέ: οὔτε γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καθ᾽ ἑαυτούς, μεθ᾽ ἁπάντων δὲ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν στρατεύουσι, τήν τε τῶν πέλας αὐτοὶ ἐπελθόντες οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ τοὺς περὶ τῶν οἰκείων ἀμυνομένους μαχόμενοι τὰ πλείω κρατοῦμεν. [3] ἀθρόᾳ τε τῇ δυνάμει ἡμῶν οὐδείς πω πολέμιος ἐνέτυχε διὰ τὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τε ἅμα ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπίπεμψιν: ἢν δέ που μορίῳ τινὶ προσμείξωσι, κρατήσαντές τέ τινας ἡμῶν πάντας αὐχοῦσιν ἀπεῶσθαι καὶ νικηθέντες ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων ἠσσῆσθαι.

[4] καίτοι εἰ ῥᾳθυμίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ πόνων μελέτῃ καὶ μὴ μετὰ νόμων τὸ πλέον ἢ τρόπων ἀνδρείας ἐθέλομεν κινδυνεύειν, περιγίγνεται ἡμῖν τοῖς τε μέλλουσιν ἀλγεινοῖς μὴ προκάμνειν, καὶ ἐς αὐτὰ ἐλθοῦσι μὴ ἀτολμοτέρους τῶν αἰεὶ μοχθούντων φαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔν τε τούτοις τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἄλλοις.

[39] ‘Then, again, our military training is in many respects superior to that of our adversaries. Our city is thrown open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him. We rely not upon management or trickery, but upon our own hearts and hands. And in the matter of education, whereas they from early youth are always undergoing laborious exercises which are to make them brave, we live at ease, and yet are equally ready to face the perils which they face. And here is the proof. The Lacedaemonians come into Attica not by themselves, but with their whole confederacy following; we go alone into a neighbour’s country; and although our opponents are fighting for their homes and we on a foreign soil, we have seldom any difficulty in overcoming them. Our enemies have never yet felt our united strength; the care of a navy divides our attention, and on land we are obliged to send our own citizens everywhere. But they, if they meet and defeat a part of our army, are as proud as if they had routed us all, and when defeated they pretend to have been vanquished by us all.’If then we prefer to meet danger with a light heart but without laborious training, and with a courage which is gained by habit and not enforced by law, are we not greatly the gainers? Since we do not anticipate the pain, although, when the hour comes, we can be as brave as those who never allow themselves to rest; and thus too our city is equally admirable in peace and in war.

40. ‘φιλοκαλοῦμέν τε γὰρ μετ᾽ εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας: πλούτῳ τε ἔργου μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἢ λόγου κόμπῳ χρώμεθα, καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ

ὁμολογεῖν τινὶ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἴσχιον. [2] ἔνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια, καὶ ἑτέροις πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι: μόνοι γὰρ τόν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν, καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομέν γε ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. [3] διαφερόντως γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν ὥστε τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι: ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει. κράτιστοι δ᾽ ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν δικαίως κριθεῖεν οἱ τά τε δεινὰ καὶ ἡδέα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὴ ἀποτρεπόμενοι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων. [4] καὶ τὰ ἐς ἀρετὴν ἐνηντιώμεθα τοῖς πολλοῖς: οὐ γὰρ πάσχοντες εὖ, ἀλλὰ δρῶντες κτώμεθα τοὺς φίλους. βεβαιότερος δὲ ὁ δράσας τὴν χάριν ὥστε ὀφειλομένην δι᾽ εὐνοίας ᾧ δέδωκε σῴζειν: ὁ δὲ ἀντοφείλων ἀμβλύτερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ ἐς χάριν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς ὀφείλημα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδώσων. [5] καὶ μόνοι οὐ τοῦ ξυμφέροντος μᾶλλον λογισμῷ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῷ ἀδεῶς τινὰ ὠφελοῦμεν.

[40] For we are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there is a real use for it. To avow poverty with us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household; and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless; but as a useless character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy. The great impediment to action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action. For we have a peculiar power of thinking before we act and of acting too, whereas

other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection. And they are surely to be esteemed the bravest spirits who, having the clearest sense both of the pains and pleasures of life, do not on that account shrink from danger. In doing good, again, we are unlike others; we make our friends by conferring, not by receiving favours. Now he who confers a favour is the firmer friend, because he would fain by kindness keep alive the memory of an obligation; but the recipient is colder in his feelings, because he knows that in requiting another's generosity he will not be winning gratitude but only paying a debt. We alone do good to our neighbours not upon a calculation of interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank and fearless spirit.

41. ‘ξυνελών τε λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἄν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν εἴδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὔταρκες παρέχεσθαι. [2] καὶ ὡς οὐ λόγων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κόμπος τάδε μᾶλλον ἢ ἔργων ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια, αὐτὴ ἡ δύναμις τῆς πόλεως, ἣν ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν τρόπων ἐκτησάμεθα, σημαίνει. [3] μόνη γὰρ τῶν νῦν ἀκοῆς κρείσσων ἐς πεῖραν ἔρχεται, καὶ μόνη οὔτε τῷ πολεμίῳ ἐπελθόντι ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει ὑφ᾽ οἵων κακοπαθεῖ οὔτε τῷ ὑπηκόῳ κατάμεμψιν ὡς οὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἀξίων ἄρχεται. [4] μετὰ μεγάλων δὲ σημείων καὶ οὐ δή τοι ἀμάρτυρόν γε τὴν δύναμιν παρασχόμενοι τοῖς τε νῦν καὶ τοῖς ἔπειτα θαυμασθησόμεθα, καὶ οὐδὲν προσδεόμενοι οὔτε Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτου οὔτε ὅστις ἔπεσι μὲν τὸ αὐτίκα τέρψει, τῶν δ᾽ ἔργων τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἡ ἀλήθεια βλάψει, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ γῆν ἐσβατὸν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τόλμῃ καταναγκάσαντες γενέσθαι, πανταχοῦ δὲ μνημεῖα κακῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἀίδια ξυγκατοικίσαντες. [5] περὶ τοιαύτης οὖν πόλεως οἵδε τε γενναίως δικαιοῦντες μὴ ἀφαιρεθῆναι αὐτὴν μαχόμενοι ἐτελεύτησαν, καὶ τῶν λειπομένων πάντα τινὰ εἰκὸς ἐθέλειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς κάμνειν.

[41] To sum up: I say that Athens is the school of Hellas, and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems to

have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace. This is no passing and idle word, but truth and fact; and the assertion is verified by the position to which these qualities have raised the state. For in the hour of trial Athens alone among her contemporaries is superior to the report of her. No enemy who comes against her is indignant at the reverses which he sustains at the hands of such a city; no subject complains that his masters are unworthy of him. And we shall assuredly not be without witnesses; there are mighty monuments of our power which will make us the wonder of this and of succeeding ages; we shall not need the praises of Homer or of any other panegyrist whose poetry may please for the moment, although his representation of the facts will not bear the light of day. For we have compelled every land and every sea to open a path for our valour, and have everywhere planted eternal memorials of our friendship and of our enmity. Such is the city for whose sake these men nobly fought and died; they could not bear the thought that she might be taken from them; and every one of us who survive should gladly toil on her behalf.

42. ‘δι᾽ ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐμήκυνα τὰ περὶ τῆς πόλεως, διδασκαλίαν τε ποιούμενος μὴ περὶ ἴσου ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ οἷς τῶνδε μηδὲν ὑπάρχει ὁμοίως, καὶ τὴν εὐλογίαν ἅμα ἐφ᾽ οἷς νῦν λέγω φανερὰν σημείοις καθιστάς. [2] καὶ εἴρηται αὐτῆς τὰ μέγιστα: ἃ γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ὕμνησα, αἱ τῶνδε καὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀρεταὶ ἐκόσμησαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἰσόρροπος ὥσπερ τῶνδε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἔργων φανείη. δοκεῖ δέ μοι δηλοῦν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν πρώτη τε μηνύουσα καὶ τελευταία βεβαιοῦσα ἡ νῦν τῶνδε καταστροφή. [3] καὶ γὰρ τοῖς τἆλλα χείροσι δίκαιον τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολέμους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἀνδραγαθίαν προτίθεσθαι: ἀγαθῷ γὰρ κακὸν ἀφανίσαντες κοινῶς μᾶλλον ὠφέλησαν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔβλαψαν. [4] τῶνδε δὲ οὔτε πλούτου τις τὴν ἔτι ἀπόλαυσιν προτιμήσας ἐμαλακίσθη οὔτε πενίας ἐλπίδι, ὡς κἂν ἔτι διαφυγὼν αὐτὴν

πλουτήσειεν, ἀναβολὴν τοῦ δεινοῦ ἐποιήσατο: τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τιμωρίαν ποθεινοτέραν αὐτῶν λαβόντες καὶ κινδύνων ἅμα τόνδε κάλλιστον νομίσαντες ἐβουλήθησαν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοὺς μὲν τιμωρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ ἐφίεσθαι, ἐλπίδι μὲν τὸ ἀφανὲς τοῦ κατορθώσειν ἐπιτρέψαντες, ἔργῳ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἤδη ὁρωμένου σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀξιοῦντες πεποιθέναι, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἡγησάμενοι ἢ [τὸ] ἐνδόντες σῴζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν αἰσχρὸν τοῦ λόγου ἔφυγον, τὸ δ᾽ ἔργον τῷ σώματι ὑπέμειναν καὶ δι᾽ ἐλαχίστου καιροῦ τύχης ἅμα ἀκμῇ τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ δέους ἀπηλλάγησαν.

[42] ‘I have dwelt upon the greatness of Athens because I want to show you that we are contending for a higher prize than those who enjoy none of these privileges, and to establish by manifest proof the merit of these men whom I am now commemorating. Their loftiest praise has been already spoken. For in magnifying the city I have magnified them, and men like them whose virtues made her glorious. And of how few Hellenes can it be said as of them, that their deeds when weighed in the balance have been found equal to their fame! Methinks that a death such as theirs has been gives the true measure of a man’s worth; it may be the first revelation of his virtues, but is at any rate their final seal. For even those who come short in other ways may justly plead the valour with which they have fought for their country; they have blotted out the evil with the good, and have benefited the state more by their public services than they have injured her by their private actions. None of these men were enervated by wealth or hesitated to resign the pleasures of life; none of them put off the evil day in the hope, natural to poverty, that a man, though poor, may one day become rich. But, deeming that the punishment of their enemies was sweeter than any of these things, and that they could fall in no nobler cause, they determined at the hazard of their lives to be honourably avenged, and to leave the rest. They resigned to hope their unknown chance of

happiness; but in the face of death they resolved to rely upon themselves alone. And when the moment came they were minded to resist and suffer, rather than to fly and save their lives; they ran away from the word of dishonour, but on the battle-field their feet stood fast, and in an instant, at the height of their fortune, they passed away from the scene, not of their fear, but of their glory.

43. ‘καὶ οἵδε μὲν προσηκόντως τῇ πόλει τοιοίδε ἐγένοντο: τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς χρὴ ἀσφαλεστέραν μὲν εὔχεσθαι, ἀτολμοτέραν δὲ μηδὲν ἀξιοῦν τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους διάνοιαν ἔχειν, σκοποῦντας μὴ λόγῳ μόνῳ τὴν ὠφελίαν, ἢν ἄν τις πρὸς οὐδὲν χεῖρον αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς εἰδότας μηκύνοι, λέγων ὅσα ἐν τῷ τοὺς πολεμίους ἀμύνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἔνεστιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι,ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὁπότε καὶ πείρᾳ του σφαλεῖεν, οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὴν πόλιν γε τῆς σφετέρας ἀρετῆς ἀξιοῦντες στερίσκειν, κάλλιστον δὲ ἔρανον αὐτῇ προϊέμενοι. [2] κοινῇ γὰρ τὰ σώματα διδόντες ἰδίᾳ τὸν ἀγήρων ἔπαινον ἐλάμβανον καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐπισημότατον, οὐκ ἐν ᾧ κεῖνται μᾶλλον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ᾧ ἡ δόξα αὐτῶν παρὰ τῷ ἐντυχόντι αἰεὶ καὶ λόγου καὶ ἔργου καιρῷ αἰείμνηστος καταλείπεται. [3] ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος, καὶ οὐ στηλῶν μόνον ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ σημαίνει ἐπιγραφή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ μὴ προσηκούσῃ ἄγραφος μνήμη παρ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τῆς γνώμης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ἔργου ἐνδιαιτᾶται. [4] οὓς νῦν ὑμεῖς ζηλώσαντες καὶ τὸ εὔδαιμον τὸ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δ᾽ ἐλεύθερον τὸ εὔψυχον κρίναντες μὴ περιορᾶσθε τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους. [5] οὐ γὰρ οἱ κακοπραγοῦντες δικαιότερον ἀφειδοῖεν ἂν τοῦ βίου, οἷς ἐλπὶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ οἷς ἡ ἐναντία μεταβολὴ ἐν τῷ ζῆν ἔτι κινδυνεύεται καὶ ἐν οἷς μάλιστα μεγάλα τὰ διαφέροντα, ἤν τι πταίσωσιν. [6] ἀλγεινοτέρα γὰρ ἀνδρί γε φρόνημα ἔχοντι ἡ μετὰ τοῦ [ἐν τῷ] μαλακισθῆναι κάκωσις ἢ

ὁ μετὰ ῥώμης καὶ κοινῆς ἐλπίδος ἅμα γιγνόμενος ἀναίσθητος θάνατος.

[43] ‘Such was the end of these men; they were worthy of Athens, and the living need not desire to have a more heroic spirit, although they may pray for a less fatal issue. The value of such a spirit is not to be expressed in words. Any one can discourse to you for ever about the advantages of a brave defence, which you know already. But instead of listening to him I would have you day by day fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until you become filled with the love of her; and when you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of conflict had the fear of dishonour always present to them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow their virtues to be lost to their country, but freely gave their lives to her as the fairest offering which they could present at her feast. The sacrifice which they collectively made was individually repaid to them; for they received again each one for himself a praise which grows not old, and the noblest of all sepulchres — I speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but of that in which their glory survives, and is proclaimed always and on every fitting occasion both in word and deed. For the whole earth is the sepulchre of famous men; not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven not on stone but in the hearts of men. Make them your examples, and, esteeming courage to be freedom and freedom to be happiness, do not weigh too nicely the perils of war. The unfortunate who has no hope of a change for the better has less reason to throw away his life than the prosperous who, if he survive, is always liable to a change for the worse, and to whom any accidental fall makes the most serious difference. To a man of spirit, cowardice and disaster coming together are far

more bitter than death striking him unperceived at a time when he is full of courage and animated by the general hope.

44. ‘διʼ ὅπερ καὶ τοὺς τῶνδε νῦν τοκέας, ὅσοι πάρεστε, οὐκ ὀλοφύρομαι μᾶλλον ἢ παραμυθήσομαι. ἐν πολυτρόποις γὰρ ξυμφοραῖς ἐπίστανται τραφέντες: τὸ δʼ εὐτυχές, οἳ ἂν τῆς εὐπρεπεστάτης λάχωσιν, ὥσπερ οἵδε μὲν νῦν, τελευτῆς, ὑμεῖς δὲ λύπης, καὶ οἷς ἐνευδαιμονῆσαί τε ὁ βίος ὁμοίως καὶ ἐντελευτῆσαι ξυνεμετρήθη. [2] χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν οἶδα πείθειν ὅν, ὧν καὶ πολλάκις ἔξετε ὑπομνήματα ἐν ἄλλων εὐτυχίαις, αἷς ποτὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἠγάλλεσθε: καὶ λύπη οὐχ ὧν ἄν τις μὴ πειρασάμενος ἀγαθῶν στερίσκηται, ἀλλʼ οὗ ἂν ἐθὰς γενόμενος ἀφαιρεθῇ. [3] καρτερεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ἄλλων παίδων ἐλπίδι,οἷς ἔτι ἡλικία τέκνωσιν ποιεῖσθαι: ἰδίᾳ τε γὰρ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων λήθη οἱ ἐπιγιγνόμενοί τισιν ἔσονται, καὶ τῇ πόλει διχόθεν, ἔκ τε τοῦ μὴ ἐρημοῦσθαι καὶ ἀσφαλείᾳ, ξυνοίσει: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἴσον τι ἢ δίκαιον βουλεύεσθαι οἳ ἂν μὴ καὶ παῖδας ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου παραβαλλόμενοι κινδυνεύωσιν. [4] ὅσοι δʼ αὖ παρηβήκατε, τόν τε πλέονα κέρδος ὃν ηὐτυχεῖτε βίον ἡγεῖσθε καὶ τόνδε βραχὺν ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τῇ τῶνδε εὐκλείᾳ κουφίζεσθε. τὸ γὰρ φιλότιμον ἀγήρων μόνον, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀχρείῳ τῆς ἡλικίας τὸ κερδαίνειν, ὥσπερ τινές φασι, μᾶλλον τέρπει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι.

[44] Wherefore I do not now commiserate the parents of the dead who stand here; I would rather comfort them. You know that your life has been passed amid manifold vicissitudes; and that they may be deemed fortunate who have gained most honour, whether an honourable death like theirs, or an honourable sorrow like yours, and whose days have been so ordered that the term of their happiness is likewise the term of their life. I know how hard it is to make you feel this, when the good fortune of others will too often remind you of the gladness which once lightened your hearts. And sorrow is felt at the want of those blessings, not which a man never knew, but which were a part of his life before they were

taken from him. Some of you are of an age at which they may hope to have other children, and they ought to bear their sorrow better; not only will the children who may hereafter be born make them forget their own lost ones, but the city will be doubly a gainer. She will not be left desolate, and she will be safer. For a man’s counsel cannot have equal weight or worth, when he alone has no children to risk in the general danger. To those of you who have passed their prime, I say: “Congratulate yourselves that you have been happy during the greater part of your days; remember that your life of sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the glory of those who are gone. For the love of honour alone is ever young, and not riches, as some say, but honour is the delight of men when they are old and useless.”

45. παισὶ δ᾽ αὖ ὅσοι τῶνδε πάρεστε ἢ ἀδελφοῖς ὁρῶ μέγαν τὸν ἀγῶνα τὸν γὰρ οὐκ ὄντα ἅπας εἴωθεν ἐπαινεῖν, καὶ μόλις ἂν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς οὐχ ὁμοῖοι, ἀλλ᾽ ὀλίγῳ χείρους κριθεῖτε. φθόνος γὰρ τοῖς ζῶσι πρὸς τὸ ἀντίπαλον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐμποδὼν ἀνανταγωνίστῳ εὐνοίᾳ τετίμηται. [2] εἰ δέ με δεῖ καὶ γυναικείας τι ἀρετῆς, ὅσαι νῦν ἐν χηρείᾳ ἔσονται, μνησθῆναι, βραχείᾳ παραινέσει ἅπαν σημανῶ. τῆς τε γὰρ ὑπαρχούσης φύσεως μὴ χείροσι γενέσθαι ὑμῖν μεγάλη ἡ δόξα καὶ ἧς ἂν ἐπ᾽ ἐλάχιστον ἀρετῆς πέρι ἢ ψόγου ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλέος ᾖ.

[45] ‘To you who are the sons and brothers of the departed, I see that the struggle to emulate them will be an arduous one. For all men praise the dead, and, however preeminent your virtue may be, hardly will you be thought, I do not say to equal, but even to approach them. The living have their rivals and detractors, but when a man is out of the way, the honour and good-will which he receives is unalloyed. And, if I am to speak of womanly virtues to those of you who will henceforth be widows, let me sum them up in one short admonition: To a woman not to show more weakness than is natural to her sex is a great glory, and not to be talked about for good or for evil among men.

46. ‘εἴρηται καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγῳ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ὅσα εἶχον πρόσφορα, καὶ ἔργῳ οἱ θαπτόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἤδη κεκόσμηνται, τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν τοὺς παῖδας τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε δημοσίᾳ ἡ πόλις μέχρι ἥβης θρέψει, ὠφέλιμον στέφανον τοῖσδέ τε καὶ τοῖς λειπομένοις τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀγώνων προτιθεῖσα: ἆθλα γὰρ οἷς κεῖται ἀρετῆς μέγιστα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἄνδρες ἄριστοι πολιτεύουσιν. [2] νῦν δὲ ἀπολοφυράμενοι ὃν προσήκει ἑκάστῳ ἄπιτε.’

[46] ‘I have paid the required tribute, in obedience to the law, making use of such fitting words as I had. The tribute of deeds has been paid in part; for the dead have been honourably interred, and it remains only that their children should be maintained at the public charge until they are grown up: this is the solid prize with which, as with a garland, Athens crowns her sons living and dead, after a struggle like theirs. For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there the noblest citizens are enlisted in the service of the state. And now, when you have duly lamented, every one his own dead, you may depart.’

47. τοιόσδε μὲν ὁ τάφος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ: καὶ διελθόντος αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἔτος τοῦ πολέμου τοῦδε ἐτελεύτα. [2] τοῦ δὲ θέρους εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὰ δύο μέρη ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς, καὶ καθεζόμενοι ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν. [3] καὶ ὄντων αὐτῶν οὐ πολλάς πω ἡμέρας ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἡ νόσος πρῶτον ἤρξατο γενέσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, λεγόμενον μὲν καὶ πρότερον πολλαχόσε ἐγκατασκῆψαι καὶ περὶ Λῆμνον καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις χωρίοις, οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτός γε λοιμὸς οὐδὲ φθορὰ οὕτως ἀνθρώπων οὐδαμοῦ ἐμνημονεύετο γενέσθαι. [4] οὔτε γὰρ ἰατροὶ ἤρκουν τὸ πρῶτον θεραπεύοντες ἀγνοίᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα ἔθνῃσκον ὅσῳ καὶ μάλιστα προσῇσαν, οὔτε ἄλλη ἀνθρωπεία τέχνη οὐδεμία: ὅσα τε πρὸς ἱεροῖς ἱκέτευσαν ἢ μαντείοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐχρήσαντο, πάντα ἀνωφελῆ ἦν, τελευτῶντές τε αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ νικώμενοι.

[47] Such was the order of the funeral celebrated in this winter, with the end of which ended the first year of the PeloponnesianWar. As soon as summer returned, the Peloponnesian army, comprising as before two-thirds of the force of each confederate state, under the command of the Lacedaemonian king Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, invaded Attica, where they established themselves and ravaged the country. They had not been there many days when the plague broke out at Athens for the first time. A similar disorder is said to have previously smitten many places, particularly Lemnos, but there is no record of such a pestilence occurring elsewhere, or of so great a destruction of human life. For a while physicians, in ignorance of the nature of the disease, sought to apply remedies; but it was in vain, and they themselves were among the first victims, because they oftenest came into contact with it. No human art was of any avail, and as to supplications in temples, enquiries of oracles, and the like, they were utterly useless, and at last men were overpowered by the calamity and gave them all up.

48. ἤρξατο δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡς λέγεται, ἐξ Αἰθιοπίας τῆς ὑπὲρ Αἰγύπτου, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς Αἴγυπτον καὶ Λιβύην κατέβη καὶ ἐς τὴν βασιλέως γῆν τὴν πολλήν. [2] ἐς δὲ τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν ἐξαπιναίως ἐσέπεσε, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἥψατο τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ ἐλέχθη ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὡς οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι φάρμακα ἐσβεβλήκοιεν ἐς τὰ φρέατα: κρῆναι γὰρ οὔπω ἦσαν αὐτόθι. ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλιν ἀφίκετο, καὶ ἔθνῃσκον πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἤδη. [3] λεγέτω μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἕκαστος γιγνώσκει καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ ἰδιώτης, ἀφ᾽ ὅτου εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι αὐτό, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἅστινας νομίζει τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς ἱκανὰς εἶναι δύναμιν ἐς τὸ μεταστῆσαι σχεῖν: ἐγὼ δὲ οἷόν τε ἐγίγνετο λέξω, καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἄν τις σκοπῶν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις ἐπιπέσοι, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἔχοι τι προειδὼς μὴ ἀγνοεῖν, ταῦτα δηλώσω αὐτός τε νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλους πάσχοντας.

[48] The disease is said to have begun south of Egypt in Aethiopia; thence it descended into Egypt and Libya, and after spreading over the greater part of the Persian empire, suddenly fell upon Athens. It first attacked the inhabitants of the Piraeus, and it was supposed that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns, no conduits having as yet been made there. It afterwards reached the upper city, and then the mortality became far greater. As to its probable origin or the causes which might or could have produced such a disturbance of nature, every man, whether a physician or not, will give his own opinion. But I shall describe its actual course, and the symptoms by which any one who knows them beforehand may recognise the disorder should it ever reappear. For I was myself attacked, and witnessed the sufferings of others.

49. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτος, ὡς ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ πάντων μάλιστα δὴ ἐκεῖνο ἄνοσον ἐς τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθενείας ἐτύγχανεν ὄν: εἰ δέ τις καὶ προύκαμνέ τι, ἐς τοῦτο πάντα ἀπεκρίθη. [2] τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀπ᾽ οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξαίφνης ὑγιεῖς ὄντας πρῶτον μὲν τῆς κεφαλῆς θέρμαι ἰσχυραὶ καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθήματα καὶ φλόγωσις ἐλάμβανε, καὶ τὰ ἐντός, ἥ τε φάρυγξ καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα, εὐθὺς αἱματώδη ἦν καὶ πνεῦμα ἄτοπον καὶ δυσῶδες ἠφίει: [3] ἔπειτα ἐξ αὐτῶν πταρμὸς καὶ βράγχος ἐπεγίγνετο, καὶ ἐν οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατέβαινεν ἐς τὰ στήθη ὁ πόνος μετὰ βηχὸς ἰσχυροῦ: καὶ ὁπότε ἐς τὴν καρδίαν στηρίξειεν, ἀνέστρεφέ τε αὐτὴν καὶ ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πᾶσαι ὅσαι ὑπὸ ἰατρῶν ὠνομασμέναι εἰσὶν ἐπῆσαν, καὶ αὗται μετὰ ταλαιπωρίας μεγάλης. [4] λύγξ τε τοῖς πλέοσιν ἐνέπιπτε κενή, σπασμὸν ἐνδιδοῦσα ἰσχυρόν, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ ταῦτα λωφήσαντα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ πολλῷ ὕστερον. [5] καὶ τὸ μὲν ἔξωθεν ἁπτομένῳ σῶμα οὔτ᾽ ἄγαν θερμὸν ἦν οὔτε χλωρόν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπέρυθρον, πελιτνόν, φλυκταίναις μικραῖς καὶ ἕλκεσιν ἐξηνθηκός: τὰ δὲ ἐντὸς οὕτως ἐκάετο ὥστε μήτε τῶν πάνυ λεπτῶν ἱματίων καὶ σινδόνων τὰς ἐπιβολὰς μηδ᾽ ἄλλο τι ἢ γυμνοὶ ἀνέχεσθαι, ἥδιστά τε ἂν ἐς ὕδωρ ψυχρὸν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ῥίπτειν. καὶ

πολλοὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἠμεληµένων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἔδρασαν ἐς φρέατα, τῇ δίψῃ ἀπαύστῳ ξυνεχόµενοι: καὶ ἐν τῷ ὁµοίῳ καθειστήκει τό τε πλέον καὶ ἔλασσον ποτόν. [6] καὶ ἡ ἀπορία τοῦ µὴ ἡσυχάζειν καὶ ἡ ἀγρυπνία ἐπέκειτο διὰ παντός. καὶ τὸ σῶµα, ὅσονπερ χρόνον καὶ ἡ νόσος ἀκµάζοι, οὐκ ἐµαραίνετο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀντεῖχε παρὰ δόξαν τῇ ταλαιπωρίᾳ, ὥστε ἢ διεφθείροντο οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐναταῖοι καὶ ἑβδοµαῖοι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντὸς καύµατος, ἔτι ἔχοντές τι δυνάµεως, ἢ εἰ διαφύγοιεν, ἐπικατιόντος τοῦ νοσήµατος ἐς τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ ἑλκώσεώς τε αὐτῇ ἰσχυρᾶς ἐγγιγνοµένης καὶ διαρροίας ἅµα ἀκράτου ἐπιπιπτούσης οἱ πολλοὶ ὕστερον δι᾽ αὐτὴν ἀσθενείᾳ διεφθείροντο. [7] διεξῄει γὰρ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώµατος ἄνωθεν ἀρξάµενον τὸ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ πρῶτον ἱδρυθὲν κακόν, καὶ εἴ τις ἐκ τῶν µεγίστων περιγένοιτο, τῶν γε ἀκρωτηρίων ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ ἐπεσήµαινεν. [8] κατέσκηπτε γὰρ ἐς αἰδοῖα καὶ ἐς ἄκρας χεῖρας καὶ πόδας, καὶ πολλοὶ στερισκόµενοι τούτων διέφευγον, εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἳ καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλµῶν. τοὺς δὲ καὶ λήθη ἐλάµβανε παραυτίκα ἀναστάντας τῶν πάντων ὁµοίως, καὶ ἠγνόησαν σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους.

[49] The season was admitted to have been remarkably free from ordinary sickness; and if anybody was already ill of any other disease, it was absorbed in this. Many who were in perfect health, all in a moment, and without any apparent reason, were seized with violent heats in the head and with redness and inflammation of the eyes. Internally the throat and the tongue were quickly suffused with blood, and the breath became unnatural and fetid. There followed sneezing and hoarseness; in a short time the disorder, accompanied by a violent cough, reached the chest; then fastening lower down, it would move the stomach and bring on all the vomits of bile to which physicians have ever given names; and they were very distressing. An ineffectual retching producing violent convulsions attacked most of the sufferers; some as soon as the previous symptoms had abated, others not until long afterwards. The body externally

was not so very hot to the touch, nor yet pale; it was of a livid colour inclining to red, and breaking out in pustules and ulcers. But the internal fever was intense; the sufferers could not bear to have on them even the finest linen garment; they insisted on being naked, and there was nothing which they longed for more eagerly than to throw themselves into cold water. And many of those who had no one to look after them actually plunged into the cisterns, for they were tormented by unceasing thirst, which was not in the least assuaged whether they drank little or much. They could not sleep; a restlessness which was intolerable never left them. While the disease was at its height the body, instead of wasting away, held out amid these sufferings in a marvellous manner, and either they died on the seventh or ninth day, not of weakness, for their strength was not exhausted, but of internal fever, which was the end of most; or, if they survived, then the disease descended into the bowels and there produced violent ulceration; severe diarrhoea at the same time set in, and at a later stage caused exhaustion, which finally with few exceptions carried them off. For the disorder which had originally settled in the head passed gradually through the whole body, and, if a person got over the worst, would often seize the extremities and leave its mark, attacking the privy parts and the fingers and the toes; and some escaped with the loss of these, some with the loss of their eyes. Some again had no sooner recovered than they were seized with a forgetfulness of all things and knew neither themselves nor their friends.

50. γενόμενον γὰρ κρεῖσσον λόγου τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου τά τε ἄλλα χαλεπωτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν προσέπιπτεν ἑκάστῳ καὶ ἐν τῷδε ἐδήλωσε μάλιστα ἄλλο τι ὂν ἢ τῶν ξυντρόφων τι: τὰ γὰρ ὄρνεα καὶ τετράποδα ὅσα ἀνθρώπων ἅπτεται, πολλῶν ἀτάφων γιγνομένων ἢ οὐ προσῄει ἢ γευσάμενα διεφθείρετο. [2] τεκμήριον δέ: τῶν μὲν τοιούτων ὀρνίθων ἐπίλειψις σαφὴς ἐγένετο, καὶ οὐχ ἑωρῶντο οὔτε ἄλλως οὔτε περὶ τοιοῦτον οὐδέν: οἱ δὲ κύνες

μᾶλλον αἴσθησιν παρεῖχον τοῦ ἀποβαίνοντος διὰ τὸ ξυνδιαιτᾶσθαι.

[50] The general character of the malady no words can describe, and the fury with which it fastened upon each sufferer was too much for human nature to endure. There was one circumstance in particular which distinguished it from ordinary diseases. The birds and animals which feed on human flesh, although so many bodies were lying unburied, either never came near them, or died if they touched them. This was proved by a remarkable disappearance of the birds of prey, which were not to be seen either about the bodies or anywhere else; while in the case of the dogs the result was even more obvious, because they live with man.

51. τὸ μὲν οὖν νόσημα, πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα παραλιπόντι ἀτοπίας, ὡς ἑκάστῳ ἐτύγχανέ τι διαφερόντως ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον γιγνόμενον, τοιοῦτον ἦν ἐπὶ πᾶν τὴν ἰδέαν. καὶ ἄλλο παρελύπει κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον οὐδὲν τῶν εἰωθότων: ὃ δὲ καὶ γένοιτο, ἐς τοῦτο ἐτελεύτα. [2] ἔθνῃσκον δὲ οἱ μὲν ἀμελείᾳ, οἱ δὲ καὶ πάνυ θεραπευόμενοι. ἕν τε οὐδὲ ἓν κατέστη ἴαμα ὡς εἰπεῖν ὅτι χρῆν προσφέροντας ὠφελεῖν: τὸ γάρ τῳ ξυνενεγκὸν ἄλλον τοῦτο ἔβλαπτεν. [3] σῶμά τε αὔταρκες ὂν οὐδὲν διεφάνη πρὸς αὐτὸ ἰσχύος πέρι ἢ ἀσθενείας, ἀλλὰ πάντα ξυνῄρει καὶ τὰ πάσῃ διαίτῃ θεραπευόμενα. [4] δεινότατον δὲ παντὸς ἦν τοῦ κακοῦ ἥ τε ἀθυμία ὁπότε τις αἴσθοιτο κάμνων □πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀνέλπιστον εὐθὺς τραπόμενοι τῇ γνώμῃ πολλῷ μᾶλλον προΐεντο σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐκ ἀντεῖχον □ , καὶ ὅτι ἕτερος ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου θεραπείας ἀναπιμπλάμενοι ὥσπερ τὰ πρόβατα ἔθνῃσκον: καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον φθόρον τοῦτο ἐνεποίει. [5] εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ‘θέλοιεν δεδιότες ἀλλήλοις προσιέναι, ἀπώλλυντο ἐρῆμοι, καὶ οἰκίαι πολλαὶ ἐκενώθησαν ἀπορίᾳ τοῦ θεραπεύσοντος: εἴτε προσίοιεν, διεφθείροντο, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀρετῆς τι μεταποιούμενοι: αἰσχύνῃ γὰρ ᾐφείδουν σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐσιόντες παρὰ τοὺς φίλους, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰς ὀλοφύρσεις τῶν ἀπογιγνομένων τελευτῶντες καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι ἐξέκαμνον ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ κακοῦ νικώμενοι. [6] ἐπὶ πλέον δ᾽ ὅμως οἱ

διαπεφευγότες τόν τε θνῄσκοντα καὶ τὸν πονούμενον ᾠκτίζοντο διὰ τὸ προειδέναι τε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤδη ἐν τῷ θαρσαλέῳ εἶναι: δὶς γὰρ τὸν αὐτόν, ὥστε καὶ κτείνειν, οὐκ ἐπελάμβανεν. καὶ ἐμακαρίζοντό τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ αὐτοὶ τῷ παραχρῆμα περιχαρεῖ καὶ ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἐλπίδος τι εἶχον κούφης μηδ᾽ ἂν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου νοσήματός ποτε ἔτι διαφθαρῆναι.

[51] Such was the general nature of the disease: I omit many strange peculiarities which characterised individual cases. None of the ordinary sicknesses attacked any one while it lasted, or, if they did, they ended in the plague. Some of the sufferers died from want of care, others equally who were receiving the greatest attention. No single remedy could be deemed a specific; for that which did good to one did harm to another. No constitution was of itself strong enough to resist or weak enough to escape the attacks; the disease carried off all alike and defied every mode of treatment. Most appalling was the despondency which seized upon any one who felt himself sickening; for he instantly abandoned his mind to despair and, instead of holding out, absolutely threw away his chance of life. Appalling too was the rapidity with which men caught the infection; dying like sheep if they attended on one another; and this was the principal cause of mortality. When they were afraid to visit one another, the sufferers died in their solitude, so that many houses were empty because there had been no one left to take care of the sick; or if they ventured they perished, especially those who aspired to heroism. For they went to see their friends without thought of themselves and were ashamed to leave them, at a time when the very relations of the dying were at last growing weary and ceased even to make lamentations, overwhelmed by the vastness of the calamity. But whatever instances there may have been of such devotion, more often the sick and the dying were tended by the pitying care of those who had recovered, because they knew the course of the disease and were themselves free from apprehension. For no one was ever attacked a second time, or not with a fatal result. All men congratulated them, and they themselves, in the excess of their joy at the moment, had an innocent fancy that they could not die of any other sickness.

52. ἐπίεσε δ᾽ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον πρὸς τῷ ὑπάρχοντι πόνῳ καὶ ἡ ξυγκομιδὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τοὺς

ἐπελθόντας. [2] οἰκιῶν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπαρχουσῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν καλύβαις πνιγηραῖς ὥρᾳ ἔτους διαιτωμένων ὁ φθόρος ἐγίγνετο οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νεκροὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ἀποθνῄσκοντες ἔκειντο καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλινδοῦντο καὶ περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἁπάσας ἡμιθνῆτες τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιθυμίᾳ. [3] τά τε ἱερὰ ἐν οἷς ἐσκήνηντο νεκρῶν πλέα ἦν, αὐτοῦ ἐναποθνῃσκόντων: ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅτι γένωνται, ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων ὁμοίως. [4] νόμοι τε πάντες ξυνεταράχθησαν οἷς ἐχρῶντο πρότερον περὶ τὰς ταφάς, ἔθαπτον δὲ ὡς ἕκαστος ἐδύνατο. καὶ πολλοὶ ἐς ἀναισχύντους θήκας ἐτράποντο σπάνει τῶν ἐπιτηδείων διὰ τὸ συχνοὺς ἤδη προτεθνάναι σφίσιν: ἐπὶ πυρὰς γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας φθάσαντες τοὺς νήσαντας οἱ μὲν ἐπιθέντες τὸν ἑαυτῶν νεκρὸν ὑφῆπτον, οἱ δὲ καιομένου ἄλλου ἐπιβαλόντες ἄνωθεν ὃν φέροιεν ἀπῇσαν.

[52] The crowding of the people out of the country into the city aggravated the misery; and the newly-arrived suffered most. For, having no houses of their own, but inhabiting in the height of summer stifling huts, the mortality among them was dreadful, and they perished in wild disorder. The dead lay as they had died, one upon another, while others hardly alive wallowed in the streets and crawled about every fountain craving for water. The temples in which they lodged were full of the corpses of those who died in them; for the violence of the calamity was such that men, not knowing where to turn, grew reckless of all law, human and divine. The customs which had hitherto been observed at funerals were universally violated, and they buried their dead each one as best he could. Many, having no proper appliances, because the deaths in their household had been so numerous already, lost all shame in the burial of the dead. When one man had raised a funeral pile, others would come, and throwing on their dead first, set fire to it; or when some other corpse was already burning, before they could be stopped, would throw their own dead upon it and depart.

53. πρῶτόν τε ἦρξε καὶ ἐς τἆλλα τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ πλέον ἀνομίας τὸ νόσημα. ῥᾷον γὰρ ἐτόλμα τις ἃ πρότερον ἀπεκρύπτετο μὴ καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν, ἀγχίστροφον τὴν μεταβολὴν ὁρῶντες τῶν τε εὐδαιμόνων καὶ αἰφνιδίως θνῃσκόντων καὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρότερον κεκτημένων, εὐθὺς δὲ τἀκείνων ἐχόντων. [2] ὥστε ταχείας τὰς ἐπαυρέσεις καὶ πρὸς τὸ τερπνὸν ᾐξίουν ποιεῖσθαι, ἐφήμερα τά τε σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ὁμοίως ἡγούμενοι. [3] καὶ τὸ μὲν προσταλαιπωρεῖν τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ οὐδεὶς πρόθυμος ἦν, ἄδηλον νομίζων εἰ πρὶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ ἐλθεῖν διαφθαρήσεται: ὅτι δὲ ἤδη τε ἡδὺ πανταχόθεν τε ἐς αὐτὸ κερδαλέον, τοῦτο καὶ καλὸν καὶ χρήσιμον κατέστη. [4] θεῶν δὲ φόβος ἢ ἀνθρώπων νόμος οὐδεὶς ἀπεῖργε, τὸ μὲν κρίνοντες ἐν ὁμοίῳ καὶ σέβειν καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὁρᾶν ἐν ἴσῳ ἀπολλυμένους, τῶν δὲ ἁμαρτημάτων οὐδεὶς ἐλπίζων μέχρι τοῦ δίκην γενέσθαι βιοὺς ἂν τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀντιδοῦναι, πολὺ δὲ μείζω τὴν ἤδη κατεψηφισμένην σφῶν ἐπικρεμασθῆναι, ἣν πρὶν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰκὸς εἶναι τοῦ βίου τι ἀπολαῦσαι.

[53] There were other and worse forms of lawlessness which the plague introduced at Athens. Men who had hitherto concealed what they took pleasure in, now grew bolder. For, seeing the sudden change, — how the rich died in a moment, and those who had nothing immediately inherited their property, — they reflected that life and riches were alike transitory, and they resolved to enjoy themselves while they could, and to think only of pleasure. Who would be willing to sacrifice himself to the law of honour when he knew not whether he would ever live to be held in honour? The pleasure of the moment and any sort of thing which conduced to it took the place both of honour and of expediency. No fear of Gods or law of man deterred a criminal. Those who saw all perishing alike, thought that the worship or neglect of the Gods made no difference. For offences against human law no punishment was to be feared; no one would live long enough to be called to account. Already a far heavier sentence had been passed

and was hanging over a man’s head; before that fell, why should he not take a little pleasure?

54. τοιούτῳ μὲν πάθει οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περιπεσόντες ἐπιέζοντο, ἀνθρώπων τ᾽ ἔνδον θνῃσκόντων καὶ γῆς ἔξω δῃουμένης. [2] ἐν δὲ τῷ κακῷ οἷα εἰκὸς ἀνεμνήσθησαν καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους, φάσκοντες οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πάλαι ᾄδεσθαι “‘ἥξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος καὶ λοιμὸς ἅμ᾽ αὐτῷ.’” [3] ἐγένετο μὲν οὖν ἔρις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ λοιμὸν ὠνομάσθαι ἐν τῷ ἔπει ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀλλὰ λιμόν, ἐνίκησε δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἰκότως λοιμὸν εἰρῆσθαι: οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἔπασχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιοῦντο. ἢν δέ γε οἶμαί ποτε ἄλλος πόλεμος καταλάβῃ Δωρικὸς τοῦδε ὕστερος καὶ ξυμβῇ γενέσθαι λιμόν, κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς οὕτως ᾄσονται. [4] μνήμη δὲ ἐγένετο καὶ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίων χρηστηρίου τοῖς εἰδόσιν, ὅτε ἐπερωτῶσιν αὐτοῖς τὸν θεὸν εἰ χρὴ πολεμεῖν ἀνεῖλε κατὰ κράτος πολεμοῦσι νίκην ἔσεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔφη ξυλλήψεσθαι. [5] περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ χρηστηρίου τὰ γιγνόμενα �😉καζον ὁμοῖα εἶναι: ἐσβεβληκότων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἡ νόσος ἤρξατο εὐθύς, καὶ ἐς μὲν Πελοπόννησον οὐκ ἐσῆλθεν, ὅτι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, ἐπενείματο δὲ Ἀθήνας μὲν μάλιστα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τὰ πολυανθρωπότατα. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ κατὰ τὴν νόσον γενόμενα.

[54] Such was the grievous calamity which now afflicted the Athenians; within the walls their people were dying, and without, their country was being ravaged. In their troubles they naturally called to mind a verse which the elder men among them declared to have been current long ago:A Dorian war will come and a plague with it.’There was a dispute about the precise expression; some saying that *limos*, a famine, and not *loimos*, a plague, was the original word. Nevertheless, as might have been expected, for men’s memories reflected their sufferings, the argument in favour of *loimos* prevailed at the time. But if ever in future years another Dorian war arises which happens to be accompanied by a famine, they will probably repeat the verse in the other form. The answer of the oracle to the Lacedaemonians when

the God was asked ‘whether they should go to war or not,’ and he replied ‘that if they fought with all their might, they would conquer, and that he himself would take their part,’ was not forgotten by those who had heard of it, and they quite imagined that they were witnessing the fulfilment of his words. The disease certainly did set in immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians, and did not spread into Peloponnesus in any degree worth speaking of, while Athens felt its ravages most severely, and next to Athens the places which were most populous. Such was the history of the plague.

55. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπειδὴ ἔτεμον τὸ πεδίον, παρῆλθον ἐς τὴν Πάραλον γῆν καλουμένην μέχρι Λαυρείου, οὗ τὰ ἀργύρεια μέταλλά ἐστιν Ἀθηναίοις. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἔτεμον ταύτην ᾗ πρὸς Πελοπόννησον ὁρᾷ, ἔπειτα δὲ τὴν πρὸς Εὔβοιάν τε καὶ Ἄνδρον τετραμμένην. [2] Περικλῆς δὲ στρατηγὸς ὢν καὶ τότε περὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην εἶχεν ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐσβολῇ.

[55] After the Peloponnesians had wasted the plain they entered what are called the coast lands (Paralus) and penetrated as far as Laurium, where are the silver mines belonging to the Athenians. First they ravaged that part of the coast which looks towards Peloponnesus, and afterwards that situated towards Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, who was still general, continued to insist, as in the former invasion, that the Athenians should remain within their walls.

56. ἔτι δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ ὄντων, πρὶν ἐς τὴν παραλίαν ἐλθεῖν, ἑκατὸν νεῶν ἐπίπλουν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ παρεσκευάζετο, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ἀνήγετο. [2] ἦγε δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν ὁπλίτας Ἀθηναίων τετρακισχιλίους καὶ ἱππέας τριακοσίους ἐν ναυσὶν ἱππαγωγοῖς πρῶτον τότε ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν νεῶν ποιηθείσαις: ξυνεστρατεύοντο δὲ καὶ Χῖοι καὶ Λέσβιοι πεντήκοντα ναυσίν. [3] ὅτε δὲ ἀνήγετο ἡ στρατιὰ αὕτη Ἀθηναίων, Πελοποννησίους κατέλιπον τῆς Ἀττικῆς

ὄντας ἐν τῇ παραλίᾳ. [4] ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἔτεμον τῆς γῆς τὴν πολλήν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν προσβαλόντες ἐς ἐλπίδα μὲν ἦλθον τοῦ ἑλεῖν, οὐ μέντοι προυχώρησέ γε. [5] ἀναγαγόμενοι δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἐπιδαύρου ἔτεμον τήν τε Τροιζηνίδα γῆν καὶ Ἁλιάδα καὶ Ἑρμιονίδα: ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιθαλάσσια τῆς Πελοποννήσου. [6] ἄραντες δὲ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀφίκοντο ἐς Πρασιὰς τῆς Λακωνικῆς πόλισμα ἐπιθαλάσσιον, καὶ τῆς τε γῆς ἔτεμον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πόλισμα εἷλον καὶ ἐπόρθησαν. ταῦτα δὲ ποιήσαντες ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀνεχώρησαν. τοὺς δὲ Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι κατέλαβον ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὄντας, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνακεχωρηκότας.

[56] Before, however, the Peloponnesians had left the plain and moved forward into the coast lands he had begun to equip an expedition of a hundred ships against Peloponnesus. When all was ready he put to sea, having on board four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry conveyed in horse transports which the Athenians then constructed for the first time out of their old ships. The Chians and Lesbians joined them with fifty vessels. The expedition did not actually put to sea until the Peloponnesians had reached the coast lands. Arriving at Epidaurus in Peloponnesus the Athenians devastated most of the country and attacked the city, which at one time they were in hopes of taking, but did not quite succeed. Setting sail again they ravaged the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermionè, which are all places on the coast of Peloponnesus. Again putting off they came to Prasiae, a small town on the coast of Laconia, ravaged the country, and took and plundered the place. They then returned home and found that the Peloponnesians had also returned and were no longer in Attica.

57. ὅσον δὲ χρόνον οἵ τε Πελοποννήσιοι ἦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευον ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν, ἡ νόσος ἔν τε τῇ στρατιᾷ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔφθειρε καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὥστε καὶ ἐλέχθη τοὺς Πελοποννησίους δείσαντας τὸ

νόσημα, ὡς ἐπυνθάνοντο τῶν αὐτομόλων ὅτι ἐν τῇ πόλει εἴη καὶ θάπτοντας ἅμα ᾐσθάνοντο, θᾶσσον ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐξελθεῖν. [2] τῇ δὲ ἐσβολῇ ταύτῃ πλεῖστόν τε χρόνον ἐνέμειναν καὶ τὴν γῆν πᾶσαν ἔτεμον: ἡμέρας γὰρ τεσσαράκοντα μάλιστα ἐν τῇ γῇ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἐγένοντο.

[57] All the time during which the Peloponnesians remained in the country and the armament of the Athenians continued at sea the plague was raging both among the troops and in the city. The fear which it inspired was said to have induced the enemy to leave Attica sooner than they intended; for they heard from deserters that the disease was in the city, and likewise saw the burning of the dead. Still in this invasion the whole country was ravaged by them, and they remained about forty days, which was the longest stay they ever made.

58. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους Ἅγνων ὁ Νικίου καὶ Κλεόπομπος ὁ Κλεινίου, ξυστράτηγοι ὄντες Περικλέους, λαβόντες τὴν στρατιὰν ᾗπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐχρήσατο ἐστράτευσαν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης καὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἔτι πολιορκουμένην, ἀφικόμενοι δὲ μηχανάς τε τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ προσέφερον καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπειρῶντο ἑλεῖν. [2] προυχώρει δὲ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἡ αἵρεσις τῆς πόλεως οὔτε τἆλλα τῆς παρασκευῆς ἀξίως: ἐπιγενομένη γὰρ ἡ νόσος ἐνταῦθα δὴ πάνυ ἐπίεσε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, φθείρουσα τὴν στρατιάν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς προτέρους στρατιώτας νοσῆσαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τῆς ξὺν Ἄγνωνι στρατιᾶς, ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνῳ ὑγιαίνοντας. Φορμίων δὲ καὶ οἱ ἑξακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι οὐκέτι ἦσαν περὶ Χαλκιδέας. [3] ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἅγνων ἀνεχώρησε ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἀπὸ τετρακισχιλίων ὁπλιτῶν χιλίους καὶ πεντήκοντα τῇ νόσῳ ἀπολέσας ἐν τεσσαράκοντα μάλιστα ἡμέραις: οἱ δὲ πρότεροι στρατιῶται κατὰ χώραν μένοντες ἐπολιόρκουν τὴν Ποτείδαιαν.

[58] In the same summer, Hagnon the son of Nicias, and Cleopompus the son of Cleinias, who were colleagues of Pericles in his military command, took the fleet which he had employed and sailed forthwith against the Thracian

Chalcidians and against Potidaea, which still held out. On their arrival they brought engines up to the walls, and tried every means of taking the town. But they did not succeed; nor did the result by any means correspond to the magnitude of their armament; for thither too the plague came and made dreadful havoc among the Athenian troops. Even the soldiers who were previously there and had been in good health caught the infection from the forces under Hagnon. But the army of Phormio escaped; for he and his sixteen hundred troops had left Chalcidicè. And so Hagnon returned with his fleet to Athens, having lost by the plague out of four thousand hoplites a thousand and fifty men in about forty days. But the original armament remained and prosecuted the siege.

59. μετὰ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἐσβολὴν τῶν Πελοποννησίων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἥ τε γῆ αὐτῶν ἐτέτμητο τὸ δεύτερον καὶ ἡ νόσος ἐπέκειτο ἅμα καὶ ὁ πόλεμος, ἠλλοίωντο τὰς γνώμας, [2] καὶ τὸν μὲν Περικλέα ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶχον ὡς πείσαντα σφᾶς πολεμεῖν καὶ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς περιπεπτωκότες,πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ὥρμηντο ξυγχωρεῖν: καὶ πρέσβεις τινὰς πέμψαντες ὡς αὐτοὺς ἄπρακτοι ἐγένοντο. πανταχόθεν τε τῇ γνώμῃ ἄποροι καθεστηκότες ἐνέκειντο τῷ Περικλεῖ. [3] ὁ δὲ ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὰ παρόντα χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἤλπιζε, ξύλλογον ποιήσας ἔτι δ᾽ ἐστρατήγει ἐβούλετο θαρσῦναί τε καὶ ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης πρὸς τὸ ἡπιώτερον καὶ ἀδεέστερον καταστῆσαι: παρελθὼν δὲ ἔλεξε τοιάδε.

[59] After the second Peloponnesian invasion, now that Attica had been once more ravaged, and the war and the plague together lay heavy upon the Athenians, a change came over their spirit. They blamed Pericles because he had persuaded them to go to war, declaring that he was the author of their troubles; and they were anxious to come to terms with the Lacedaemonians. Accordingly envoys were despatched to Sparta, but they met with no success. And

now, being completely at their wits' end, they turned upon Pericles. He saw that they were exasperated by their misery and were behaving just as he had always anticipated that they would. And so, being still general, he called an assembly, wanting to encourage them and to convert their angry feelings into a gentler and more hopeful mood. At this assembly he came forward and spoke as follows:

60. 'καὶ προσδεχομένῳ μοι τὰ τῆς ὀργῆς ὑμῶν ἔς με γεγένηται αἰσθάνομαι γὰρ τὰς αἰτίας καὶ ἐκκλησίαν τούτου ἕνεκα ξυνήγαγον, ὅπως ὑπομνήσω καὶ μέμψωμαί εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς ἢ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνετε ἢ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς εἴκετε. [2] ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἀθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην. [3] καλῶς μὲν γὰρ φερόμενος ἀνὴρ τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν διαφθειρομένης τῆς πατρίδος οὐδὲν ἧσσον ξυναπόλλυται, κακοτυχῶν δὲ ἐν εὐτυχούσῃ πολλῷ μᾶλλον διασῴζεται. [4] ὁπότε οὖν πόλις μὲν τὰς ἰδίας ξυμφορὰς οἵα τε φέρειν, εἷς δ᾽ ἕκαστος τὰς ἐκείνης ἀδύνατος, πῶς οὐ χρὴ πάντας ἀμύνειν αὐτῇ, καὶ μὴ ὃ νῦν ὑμεῖς δρᾶτε: ταῖς κατ᾽ οἶκον κακοπραγίαις ἐκπεπληγμένοι τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας ἀφίεσθε, καὶ ἐμέ τε τὸν παραινέσαντα πολεμεῖν καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἳ ξυνέγνωτε δι᾽ αἰτίας ἔχετε. [5] καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε ὃς οὐδενὸς ἥσσων οἶομαι εἶναι γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων. [6] ὅ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη: ὅ τε ἔχων ἀμφότερα, τῇ δὲ πόλει δύσνους, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως τι οἰκείως φράζοι: προσόντος δὲ καὶ τοῦδε, χρήμασι δὲ νικωμένου, τὰ ξύμπαντα τούτου ἑνὸς ἂν πωλοῖτο. [7] ὥστ᾽ εἴ μοι καὶ μέσως ἡγούμενοι μᾶλλον ἑτέρων προσεῖναι αὐτὰ πολεμεῖν ἐπείσθητε, οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως νῦν τοῦ γε ἀδικεῖν αἰτίαν φεροίμην.

[60] 'I was expecting this outburst of indignation; the causes of it are not unknown to me. And I have summoned an assembly that I may remind you of your resolutions and reprove you for your inconsiderate anger against me, and

want of fortitude in misfortune. In my judgment it would be better for individuals themselves that the citizens should suffer and the state flourish than that the citizens should flourish and the state suffer. A private man, however successful in his own dealings, if his country perish is involved in her destruction; but if he be an unprosperous citizen of a prosperous city he is much more likely to recover. Seeing then that states can bear the misfortunes of individuals, but individuals cannot bear the misfortunes of the state, let us all stand by our country and not do what you are doing now, who because you are stunned by your private calamities are letting go the hope of saving the state, and condemning not only me who advised, but yourselves who consented to, the war. Yet I with whom you are so angry venture to say of myself, that I am as capable as any one of devising and explaining a sound policy; and that I am a lover of my country, and incorruptible. Now a man may have a policy which he cannot clearly expound, and then he might as well have none at all; or he may possess both ability and eloquence, but if he is disloyal to his country he cannot, like a true man, speak in her interest; or again he may be unable to resist a bribe, and then all his other good qualities will be sold for money. If, when you determined to go to war, you believed me to have somewhat more of the statesman in me than others, it is not fair that I should now be charged with anything like crime.

61. ‘καὶ γὰρ οἷς μὲν αἵρεσις γεγένηται τἆλλα εὐτυχοῦσι, πολλὴ ἄνοια πολεμῆσαι: εἰ δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἢ εἴξαντας εὐθὺς τοῖς πέλας ὑπακοῦσαι ἢ κινδυνεύσαντας περιγενέσθαι, ὁ φυγὼν τὸν κίνδυνον τοῦ ὑποστάντος μεμπτότερος. [2] καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι: ὑμεῖς δὲ μεταβάλλετε, ἐπειδὴ ξυνέβη ὑμῖν πεισθῆναι μὲν ἀκεραίοις, μεταμέλειν δὲ κακουμένοις, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον ἐν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἀσθενεῖ τῆς γνώμης μὴ ὀρθὸν φαίνεσθαι, διότι τὸ μὲν λυποῦν ἔχει ἤδη τὴν αἴσθησιν ἑκάστῳ, τῆς δὲ ὠφελίας ἄπεστιν ἔτι ἡ δήλωσις ἅπασι, καὶ μεταβολῆς

μεγάλης, καὶ ταύτης ἐξ ὀλίγου, ἐμπεσούσης ταπεινὴ ὑμῶν ἡ διάνοια ἐγκαρτερεῖν ἃ ἔγνωτε. [3] δουλοῖ γὰρ φρόνημα τὸ αἰφνίδιον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ τὸ πλείστῳ παραλόγῳ ξυμβαῖνον: ὃ ὑμῖν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐχ ἥκιστα καὶ κατὰ τὴν νόσον γεγένηται. [4] ὅμως δὲ πόλιν μεγάλην οἰκοῦντας καὶ ἐν ἤθεσιν ἀντιπάλοις αὐτῇ τεθραμμένους χρεὼν καὶ ξυμφοραῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις ἐθέλειν ὑφίστασθαι καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν μὴ ἀφανίζειν ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δικαιοῦσι τῆς τε ὑπαρχούσης δόξης αἰτιᾶσθαι ὅστις μαλακίᾳ ἐλλείπει καὶ τῆς μὴ προσηκούσης μισεῖν τὸν θρασύτητι ὀρεγόμενον , ἀπαλγήσαντας δὲ τὰ ἴδια τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι.

[61] ‘I allow that for men who are in prosperity and free to choose it is great folly to make war. But when they must either submit and at once surrender independence, or strike and be free, then he who shuns and not he who meets the danger is deserving of blame. For my own part, I am the same man and stand where I did. But you are changed; for you have been driven by misfortune to recall the consent which you gave when you were yet unhurt, and to think that my advice was wrong because your own characters are weak. The pain is present and comes home to each of you, but the good is as yet unrealised by any one; and your minds have not the strength to persevere in your resolution, now that a great reverse has overtaken you unawares. Anything which is sudden and unexpected and utterly beyond calculation, such a disaster for instance as this plague coming upon other misfortunes, enthralls the spirit of a man. Nevertheless, being the citizens of a great city and educated in a temper of greatness, you should not succumb to calamities however overwhelming, or darken the lustre of your fame. For if men hate the presumption of those who claim a reputation to which they have no right, they equally condemn the faint-heartedness of those who fall below the glory which is their own. You should lose the sense of your private sorrows and cling to the deliverance of the state.

62. ‘τὸν δὲ πόνον τὸν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, μὴ γένηταί τε πολὺς καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον περιγενώμεθα, ἀρκείτω μὲν ὑμῖν καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐν οἷς ἄλλοτε πολλάκις γε δὴ ἀπέδειξα οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸν ὑποπτευόμενον, δηλώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε, ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους πέρι ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις: οὐδ᾽ ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἑώρων. [2] οἴεσθε μὲν γὰρ τῶν ξυμμάχων μόνων ἄρχειν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποφαίνω δύο μερῶν τῶν ἐς χρῆσιν φανερῶν, γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης, τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμᾶς παντὸς κυριωτάτους ὄντας, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον τε νῦν νέμεσθε καὶ ἦν ἐπὶ πλέον βουληθῆτε: καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις τῇ ὑπαρχούσῃ παρασκευῇ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ πλέοντας ὑμᾶς οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἔθνος τῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κωλύσει. [3] ὥστε οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῶν οἰκιῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς χρείαν, ὧν μεγάλων νομίζετε ἐστερῆσθαι, αὕτη ἡ δύναμις φαίνεται: οὐδ᾽ εἰκὸς χαλεπῶς φέρειν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ κηπίον καὶ ἐγκαλλώπισμα πλούτου πρὸς ταύτην νομίσαντας ὀλιγωρῆσαι, καὶ γνῶναι ἐλευθερίαν μέν, ἣν ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι αὐτῆς διασώσωμεν, ῥᾳδίως ταῦτα ἀναληψομένην, ἄλλων δὲ ὑπακούσασι καὶ τὰ προκεκτημένα φιλεῖν ἐλασσοῦσθαι, τῶν τε πατέρων μὴ χείρους κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα φανῆναι, οἳ μετὰ πόνων καὶ οὐ παρ᾽ ἄλλων δεξάμενοι κατέσχον τε καὶ προσέτι διασώσαντες παρέδοσαν ὑμῖν αὐτά αἴσχιον δὲ ἔχοντας ἀφαιρεθῆναι ἢ κτωμένους ἀτυχῆσαι , ἰέναι δὲ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὁμόσε μὴ φρονήματι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταφρονήματι. [4] αὔχημα μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀμαθίας εὐτυχοῦς καὶ δειλῷ τινὶ ἐγγίγνεται, καταφρόνησις δὲ ὃς ἂν καὶ γνώμῃ πιστεύῃ τῶν ἐναντίων προύχειν, ὃ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. [5] καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ἀπὸ τῆς ὁμοίας τύχης ἡ ξύνεσις ἐκ τοῦ ὑπέρφρονος ἐχυρωτέραν παρέχεται, ἐλπίδι τε ἧσσον πιστεύει, ἧς ἐν τῷ ἀπόρῳ ἡ ἰσχύς, γνώμῃ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἧς βεβαιοτέρα ἡ πρόνοια.

[62] ‘As to your sufferings in the war, if you fear that they may be very great and after all fruitless, I have shown you already over and over again that such a fear is groundless. If

you are still unsatisfied I will indicate one element of your superiority which appears to have escaped you, although it nearly touches your imperial greatness. I too have never mentioned it before, nor would I now, because the claim may seem too arrogant, if I did not see that you are unreasonably depressed. You think that your empire is confined to your allies, but I say that of the two divisions of the world accessible to man, the land and the sea, there is one of which you are absolute masters, and have or may have, the dominion to any extent which you please. Neither the great King nor any nation on earth can hinder a navy like yours from penetrating whithersoever you choose to sail. When we reflect on this great power, houses and lands, of which the loss seems so dreadful to you, are as nothing. We ought not to be troubled about them or to think much of them in comparison; they are only the garden of the house, the superfluous ornament of wealth; and you may be sure that if we cling to our freedom and preserve that, we shall soon enough recover all the rest. But, if we are the servants of others, we shall be sure to lose not only freedom, but all that freedom gives. And where your ancestors doubly succeeded, you will doubly fail. For their empire was not inherited by them from others but won by the labour of their hands, and by them preserved and bequeathed to us. And to be robbed of what you have is a greater disgrace than to attempt a conquest and fail. Meet your enemies therefore not only with spirit but with disdain. A coward or a fortunate fool may brag and vaunt, but he only is capable of disdain whose conviction that he is stronger than his enemy rests, like our own, on grounds of reason. Courage fighting in a fair field is fortified by the intelligence which looks down upon an enemy; an intelligence relying, not on hope, which is the strength of helplessness, but on that surer foresight which is given by reason and observation of facts.

63. τῆς τε πόλεως ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχειν, ᾧπερ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθε, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν

τοὺς πόνους ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν: μηδὲ νομίσαι περὶ ἑνὸς μόνου, δουλείας ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθερίας, ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχῆς στερήσεως καὶ κινδύνου ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἀπήχθεσθε. [2] ἧς οὐδ᾽ ἐκστῆναι ἔτι ὑμῖν ἔστιν, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιὼς ἀπραγμοσύνῃ ἀνδραγαθίζεται: ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον. [3] τάχιστ᾽ ἄν τε πόλιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑτέρους τε πείσαντες ἀπολέσειαν καὶ εἴ που ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν αὐτόνομοι οἰκήσειαν: τὸ γὰρ ἄπραγμον οὐ σῴζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγμένον, οὐδὲ ἐν ἀρχούσῃ πόλει ξυμφέρει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὑπηκόῳ, ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν.

[63] ‘Once more, you are bound to maintain the imperial dignity of your city in which you all take pride; for you should not covet the glory unless you will endure the toil. And do not imagine that you are fighting about a simple issue, freedom or slavery; you have an empire to lose, and there is the danger to which the hatred of your imperial rule has exposed you. Neither can you resign your power, if, at this crisis, any timorous or inactive spirit is for thus playing the honest man. For by this time your empire has become a tyranny which in the opinion of mankind may have been unjustly gained, but which cannot be safely surrendered. The men of whom I was speaking, if they could find followers, would soon ruin a city, and if they were to go and found a state of their own, would equally ruin that. For inaction is secure only when arrayed by the side of activity; nor is it expedient or safe for a sovereign, but only for a subject state, to be a servant.

64. ‘ὑμεῖς δὲ μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶνδε πολιτῶν παράγεσθε μήτε ἐμὲ δι᾽ ὀργῆς ἔχετε, ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ ξυνδιέγνωτε πολεμεῖν, εἰ καὶ ἐπελθόντες οἱ ἐναντίοι ἔδρασαν ἅπερ εἰκὸς ἦν μὴ ἐθελησάντων ὑμῶν ὑπακούειν, ἐπιγεγένηταί τε πέρα ὧν προσεδεχόμεθα ἡ νόσος ἥδε, πρᾶγμα μόνον δὴ τῶν πάντων ἐλπίδος κρεῖσσον γεγενημένον. καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὴν οἶδ᾽ ὅτι μέρος τι μᾶλλον ἔτι μισοῦμαι, οὐ δικαίως, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὅταν

παρὰ λόγον τι εὖ πράξητε ἐμοὶ ἀναθήσετε. [2] φέρειν δὲ χρὴ τά τε δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως τά τε ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνδρείως: ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἔθει τῇδε τῇ πόλει πρότερόν τε ἦν νῦν τε μὴ ἐν ὑμῖν κωλυθῇ. [3] γνῶτε δὲ ὄνομα μέγιστον αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν ἐν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὸ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μὴ εἴκειν, πλεῖστα δὲ σώματα καὶ πόνους ἀνηλωκέναι πολέμῳ, καὶ δύναμιν μεγίστην δὴ μέχρι τοῦδε κεκτημένην, ἧς ἐς ἀΐδιον τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις, ἢν καὶ νῦν ὑπενδῶμέν ποτε πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι , μνήμη καταλελείψεται, Ἑλλήνων τε ὅτι Ἕλληνες πλείστων δὴ ἤρξαμεν, καὶ πολέμοις μεγίστοις ἀντέσχομεν πρός τε ξύμπαντας καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους, πόλιν τε τοῖς πᾶσιν εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μεγίστην ᾠκήσαμεν. [4] καίτοι ταῦτα ὁ μὲν ἀπράγμων μέμψαιτ᾽ ἄν, ὁ δὲ δρᾶν τι καὶ αὐτὸς βουλόμενος ζηλώσει: εἰ δέ τις μὴ κέκτηται, φθονήσει. [5] τὸ δὲ μισεῖσθαι καὶ λυπηροὺς εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι πᾶσι μὲν ὑπῆρξε δὴ ὅσοι ἕτεροι ἑτέρων ἠξίωσαν ἄρχειν: ὅστις δὲ ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τὸ ἐπίφθονον λαμβάνει, ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται. μῖσος μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντέχει, ἡ δὲ παραυτίκα τε λαμπρότης καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα δόξα αἰείμνηστος καταλείπεται. [6] ὑμεῖς δὲ ἔς τε τὸ μέλλον καλὸν προγνόντες ἔς τε τὸ αὐτίκα μὴ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἤδη προθύμῳ ἀμφότερα κτήσασθε, καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μήτε ἐπικηρυκεύεσθε μήτε ἔνδηλοι ἔστε τοῖς παροῦσι πόνοις βαρυνόμενοι, ὡς οἵτινες πρὸς τὰς ξυμφορὰς γνώμῃ μὲν ἥκιστα λυποῦνται, ἔργῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἀντέχουσιν, οὗτοι καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν κράτιστοί εἰσιν.’

[64] ‘You must not be led away by the advice of such citizens as these, nor be angry with me; for the resolution in favour of war was your own as much as mine. What if the enemy has come and done what he was certain to do when you refused to yield? What too if the plague followed? That was an unexpected blow, but we might have foreseen all the rest. I am well aware that your hatred of me is aggravated by it. But how unjustly, unless to me you also ascribe the credit of any extraordinary success which may befall you! The visitations of heaven should be borne with resignation, the

sufferings inflicted by an enemy with manliness. This has always been the spirit of Athens, and should not die out in you. Know that our city has the greatest name in all the world because she has never yielded to misfortunes, but has sacrificed more lives and endured severer hardships in war than any other; wherefore also she has the greatest power of any state up to this day; and the memory of her glory will always survive. Even if we should be compelled at last to abate somewhat of our greatness (for all things have their times of growth and decay), yet will the recollection live, that, of all Hellenes, we ruled over the greatest number of Hellenic subjects; that we withstood our enemies, whether single or united, in the most terrible wars, and that we were the inhabitants of a city endowed with every sort of wealth and greatness. The indolent may indeed find fault, but the man of action will seek to rival us, and he who is less fortunate will envy us. To be hateful and offensive has ever been at the time the fate of those who have aspired to empire. But he judges well who accepts unpopularity in a great cause. Hatred does not last long, and, besides the immediate splendour of great actions, the renown of them endures for ever in men’s memories. Looking forward to such future glory and present avoidance of dishonour, make an effort now and secure both. Let no herald be sent to the Lacedaemonians, and do not let them know that you are depressed by your sufferings. For those are the greatest states and the greatest men, who, when misfortunes come, are the least depressed in spirit and the most resolute in action.’

65. τοιαῦτα ὁ Περικλῆς λέγων ἐπειρᾶτο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς τε ἐς αὐτὸν ὀργῆς παραλύειν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἀπάγειν τὴν γνώμην. [2] οἱ δὲ δημοσίᾳ μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἀνεπείθοντο καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτι ἔπεμπον ἔς τε τὸν πόλεμον μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐλυποῦντο, ὁ μὲν δῆμος ὅτι ἀπ᾽ ἐλασσόνων ὁρμώμενος ἐστέρητο καὶ τούτων, οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ

κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πόλεμον ἀντ᾽ εἰρήνης ἔχοντες. [3] οὐ μέντοι πρότερόν γε οἱ ξύμπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ ἔχοντες αὐτὸν πρὶν ἐζημίωσαν χρήμασιν. [4] ὕστερον δ᾽ αὖθις οὐ πολλῷ, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ὅμιλος ποιεῖν, στρατηγὸν εἵλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν, ὧν μὲν περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕκαστος ἤλγει ἀμβλύτεροι ἤδη ὄντες, ὧν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις προσεδεῖτο πλείστου ἄξιον νομίζοντες εἶναι. [5] ὅσον τε γὰρ χρόνον προύστη τῆς πόλεως ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ, μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διεφύλαξεν αὐτήν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνου μεγίστη, ἐπειδή τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προγνοὺς τὴν δύναμιν. [6] ἐπεβίω δὲ δύο ἔτη καὶ ἓξ μῆνας: καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀπέθανεν, ἐπὶ πλέον ἔτι ἐγνώσθη ἡ πρόνοια αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον. [7] ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχάζοντάς τε καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν θεραπεύοντας καὶ ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἔφη περιέσεσθαι: οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τοὐναντίον ἔπραξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἴδια κέρδη κακῶς ἔς τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπολίτευσαν, ἃ κατορθούμενα μὲν τοῖς ἰδιώταις τιμὴ καὶ ὠφελία μᾶλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο. [8] αἴτιον δ᾽ ἦν ὅτι ἐκεῖνος μὲν δυνατὸς ὢν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὐ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονήν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχων ἐπ᾽ ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὀργήν τι ἀντειπεῖν. [9] ὁπότε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. [10] οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρῶτος ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἐτράποντο καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι. [11] ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλά, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ

πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς, ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῇσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. [12] σφαλέντες δὲ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἄλλῃ τε παρασκευῇ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τῷ πλέονι μορίῳ καὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἤδη ἐν στάσει ὄντες ὅμως † τρία † μὲν ἔτη ἀντεῖχον τοῖς τε πρότερον ὑπάρχουσι πολεμίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σικελίας μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἔτι τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀφεστηκόσι, Κύρῳ τε ὕστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, ὃς παρεῖχε χρήματα Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὸ ναυτικόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐν σφίσι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς περιπεσόντες ἐσφάλησαν. [13] τοσοῦτον τῷ Περικλεῖ ἐπερίσσευσε τότε ἀφ᾽ ὧν αὐτὸς προέγνω καὶ πάνυ ἂν ῥᾳδίως περιγενέσθαι τὴν πόλιν Πελοποννησίων αὐτῶν τῷ πολέμῳ.

[65] By these and similar words Pericles endeavoured to appease the anger of the Athenians against himself, and to divert their minds from their terrible situation. In the conduct of public affairs they took his advice, and sent no more embassies to Sparta; they were again eager to prosecute the war. Yet in private they felt their sufferings keenly; the common people had been deprived even of the little which they possessed, while the upper class had lost fair estates in the country with all their houses and rich furniture. Worst of all, instead of enjoying peace, they were now at war. The popular indignation was not pacified until they had fined Pericles; but, soon, afterwards, with the usual fickleness of a multitude, they elected him general and committed all their affairs to his charge. Their private sorrows were beginning to be less acutely felt, and for a time of public need they thought that there was no man like him. During the peace while he was at the head of affairs he ruled with prudence; under his guidance Athens was safe, and

reached the height of her greatness in his time. When the war began he showed that here too he had formed a true estimate of the Athenian power. He survived the commencement of hostilities two years and six months; and, after his death, his foresight was even better appreciated than during his life. For he had told the Athenians that if they would be patient and would attend to their navy, and not seek to enlarge their dominion while the war was going on, nor imperil the existence of the city, they would be victorious; but they did all that he told them not to do, and in matters which seemingly had nothing to do with the war, from motives of private ambition and private interest they adopted a policy which had disastrous effects in respect both of themselves and of their allies; their measures, had they been successful, would only have brought honour and profit to individuals, and, when unsuccessful, crippled the city in the conduct of the war. The reason of the difference was that he, deriving authority from his capacity and acknowledged worth, being also a man of transparent integrity, was able to control the multitude in a free spirit; he led them rather than was led by them; for, not seeking power by dishonest arts, he had no need to say pleasant things, but, on the strength of his own high character, could venture to oppose and even to anger them. When he saw them unseasonably elated and arrogant, his words humbled and awed them; and, when they were depressed by groundless fears, he sought to reanimate their confidence. Thus Athens, though still in name a democracy, was in fact ruled by her greatest citizen, But his successors were more on an equality with one another, and, each one struggling to be first himself, they were ready to sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the people. Such weakness in a great and imperial city led to many errors, of which the greatest was the Sicilian expedition; not that the Athenians miscalculated their enemy’s power, but they themselves, instead of consulting for the interests of the

expedition which they had sent out, were occupied in intriguing against one another for the leadership of the democracy, and not only hampered the operations of the army, but became embroiled, for the first time, at home. And yet after they had lost in the Sicilian expedition the greater part of their fleet and army, and were now distracted by revolution, still they held out three years not only against their former enemies, but against the Sicilians who had combined with them, and against most of their own allies who had risen in revolt. Even when Cyrus the son of the King joined in the war and supplied the Peloponnesian fleet with money, they continued to resist, and were at last overthrown, not by their enemies, but by themselves and their own internal dissensions. So that at the time Pericles was more than justified in the conviction at which his foresight had arrived, that the Athenians would win an easy victory over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians.

66. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐστράτευσαν ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν ἐς Ζάκυνθον τὴν νῆσον, ἣ κεῖται ἀντιπέρας Ἤλιδος: εἰσὶ δὲ Ἀχαιῶν τῶν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἄποικοι καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ξυνεμάχουν. [2] ἐπέπλεον δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων χίλιοι ὁπλῖται καὶ Κνῆμος Σπαρτιάτης ναύαρχος. ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐδῄωσαν τὰ πολλά. καὶ ἐπειδὴ οὐ ξυνεχώρουν, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

[66] During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies sent a fleet of a hundred ships against the island of Zacynthus, which lies opposite Elis. The Zacynthians are colonists of the Peloponnesian Achaeans, and were allies of the Athenians. There were on board the fleet a thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites, under the command of Cnemus the Spartan admiral. They disembarked and ravaged the greater part of the country; but as the inhabitants would not come to terms, they sailed away home.

67. καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος Ἀριστεὺς Κορίνθιος καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις Ἀνήριστος καὶ Νικόλαος καὶ Πρατόδαμος καὶ Τεγεάτης Τιμαγόρας καὶ

Ἀργεῖος ἰδίᾳ Πόλλις, πορευόμενοι ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ὡς βασιλέα, εἴ πως πείσειαν αὐτὸν χρήματά τε παρασχεῖν καὶ ξυμπολεμεῖν, ἀφικνοῦνται ὡς Σιτάλκην πρῶτον τὸν Τήρεω ἐς Θρᾴκην, βουλόμενοι πεῖσαί τε αὐτόν, εἰ δύναιντο, μεταστάντα τῆς Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίας στρατεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ποτείδαιαν, οὗ ἦν στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων πολιορκοῦν, καὶ ᾗπερ ὥρμηντο, δι᾽ ἐκείνου πορευθῆναι πέραν τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου ὡς Φαρνάκην τὸν Φαρναβάζου, ὃς αὐτοὺς ἔμελλεν ὡς βασιλέα ἀναπέμψειν. [2] παρατυχόντες δὲ Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις Λέαρχος Καλλιμάχου καὶ Ἀμεινιάδης Φιλήμονος παρὰ τῷ Σιτάλκῃ πείθουσι τὸν Σάδοκον τὸν γεγενημένον Ἀθηναῖον, Σιτάλκου υἱόν, τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγχειρίσαι σφίσιν, ὅπως μὴ διαβάντες ὡς βασιλέα τὴν ἐκείνου πόλιν τὸ μέρος βλάψωσιν. [3] ὁ δὲ πεισθεὶς πορευομένους αὐτοὺς διὰ τῆς Θρᾴκης ἐπὶ τὸ πλοῖον ᾧ ἔμελλον τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον περαιώσειν, πρὶν ἐσβαίνειν ξυλλαμβάνει, ἄλλους ξυμπέμψας μετὰ τοῦ Λεάρχου καὶ Ἀμεινιάδου, καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἐκείνοις παραδοῦναι: οἱ δὲ λαβόντες ἐκόμισαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. [4] ἀφικομένων δὲ αὐτῶν δείσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν Ἀριστέα μὴ αὖθις σφᾶς ἔτι πλείω κακουργῇ διαφυγών, ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τούτων τὰ τῆς Ποτειδαίας καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης πάντα ἐφαίνετο πράξας, ἀκρίτους καὶ βουλομένους ἔστιν ἃ εἰπεῖν αὐθημερὸν ἀπέκτειναν πάντας καὶ ἐς φάραγγα ἐσέβαλον, δικαιοῦντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀμύνεσθαι οἷσπερ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπῆρξαν, τοὺς ἐμπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐν ὁλκάσι περὶ Πελοπόννησον πλέοντας ἀποκτείναντες καὶ ἐς φάραγγας ἐσβαλόντες. πάντας γὰρ δὴ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὅσους λάβοιεν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὡς πολεμίους διέφθειρον, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ξυμπολεμοῦντας καὶ τοὺς μηδὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων.

[67] At the end of the same summer, Aristeus the Corinthian, the Lacedaemonian ambassadors Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, Timagoras of Tegea, and Pollis of Argos who had no public mission, were on their way to Asia in the hope of persuading the King to give them money and join in the

war. They went first of all to Sitalces son of Teres, in Thrace, wishing if possible to detach him from the Athenians, and induce him to lead an army to the relief of Potidaea, which was still blockaded by Athenian forces; they also wanted him to convey them across the Hellespont on their intended journey to Pharnaces, the son of Pharnabazus, who was to send them on to the King. At the time of their arrival two Athenian envoys, Learchus the son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, chanced to be at the court of Sitalces; and they entreated his son Sadocus, who had been made an Athenian citizen, to deliver the envoys into their hands, that they might not find their way to the King and so injure a city which was in some degree his own. He consented, and, sending a body of men with Learchus and Ameiniades, before they embarked, as they were on their way through Thrace to the vessel in which they were going to cross the Hellespont, seized them; they were then, in accordance with the orders of Sadocus, handed over to the Athenian envoys, who conveyed them to Athens. On the very day of their arrival the Athenians, fearing that Aristeus, whom they considered to be the cause of all their troubles at Potidaea and in Chalcidicè, would do them still further mischief if he escaped, put them all to death without trial and without hearing what they wanted to say; they then threw their bodies down precipices. They considered that they had a right to retaliate on the Lacedaemonians, who had begun by treating in the same way the traders of the Athenians and their allies when they caught their vessels off the coast of Peloponnesus. For at the commencement of the war, all whom the Lacedaemonians captured at sea were treated by them as enemies and indiscriminately slaughtered, whether they were allies of the Athenians or neutrals.

68. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους, τοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος, καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται αὐτοί τε καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων πολλοὺς ἀναστήσαντες ἐστράτευσαν ἐπ᾽ Ἄργος τὸ

Ἀμφιλοχικὸν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἀμφιλοχίαν. [2] ἔχθρα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους ἀπὸ τοῦδε αὐτοῖς ἤρξατο πρῶτον γενέσθαι. [3] Ἄργος τὸ Ἀμφιλοχικὸν καὶ Ἀμφιλοχίαν τὴν ἄλλην ἔκτισε μὲν μετὰ τὰ Τρωικὰ οἴκαδε ἀναχωρήσας καὶ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος τῇ ἐν Ἄργει καταστάσει Ἀμφίλοχος ὁ Ἀμφιάρεω ἐν τῷ Ἀμπρακικῷ κόλπῳ, ὁμώνυμον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδι Ἄργος ὀνομάσας [4] καὶ ἦν ἡ πόλις αὕτη μεγίστη τῆς Ἀμφιλοχίας καὶ τοὺς δυνατωτάτους εἶχεν οἰκήτορας, [5] ὑπὸ ξυμφορῶν δὲ πολλαῖς γενεαῖς ὕστερον πιεζόμενοι Ἀμπρακιώτας ὁμόρους ὄντας τῇ Ἀμφιλοχικῇ ξυνοίκους ἐπηγάγοντο, καὶ ἡλληνίσθησαν τὴν νῦν γλῶσσαν τότε πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ξυνοικησάντων: οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἀμφίλοχοι βάρβαροί εἰσιν. [6] ἐκβάλλουσιν οὖν τοὺς Ἀργείους οἱ Ἀμπρακιῶται χρόνῳ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἴσχουσι τὴν πόλιν. [7] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀμφίλοχοι γενομένου τούτου διδόασιν ἑαυτοὺς Ἀκαρνᾶσι, καὶ προσπαρακαλέσαντες ἀμφότεροι Ἀθηναίους, οἳ αὐτοῖς Φορμίωνά τε στρατηγὸν ἔπεμψαν καὶ ναῦς τριάκοντα, ἀφικομένου [δὲ] τοῦ Φορμίωνος αἱροῦσι κατὰ κράτος Ἄργος καὶ τοὺς Ἀμπρακιώτας ἠνδραπόδισαν, κοινῇ τε ᾤκισαν αὐτὸ Ἀμφίλοχοι καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνες. [8] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἡ ξυμμαχία πρῶτον ἐγένετο Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶσιν. [9] οἱ δὲ Ἀμπρακιῶται τὴν μὲν ἔχθραν ἐς τοὺς Ἀργείους ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ σφῶν αὐτῶν πρῶτον ἐποιήσαντο, ὕστερον δὲ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τήνδε τὴν στρατείαν ποιοῦνται αὐτῶν τε καὶ Χαόνων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν πλησιοχώρων βαρβάρων: ἐλθόντες τε πρὸς τὸ Ἄργος τῆς μὲν χώρας ἐκράτουν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡς οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν προσβαλόντες, ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ ἔθνη. τοσαῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ θέρει ἐγένετο.

[68] About the end of the same summer the Ambraciots, with a large Barbarian force which they had called out, made war upon the Amphilochian Argos and upon Amphilochia. The original cause of their enmity against the Argives was as follows: — The Amphilochian territory had been occupied and the city founded by Amphilochus the son of Amphiaraus, who on returning home after the Trojan War

was dissatisfied at the state of Argos. He fixed the site on the shore of the Ambracian Gulf, and called the new city by the name of his native place; it was the greatest city in that region, and its inhabitants were the most powerful community. Many generations afterwards, these Amphilochians in a time of distress invited their neighbours the Ambraciots to join in the settlement, and from them they first learned the Hellenic language which they now speak; the other Amphilochians are Barbarians. After a while the Ambraciots drove out the Amphilochian Argives and themselves took possession of the city. The expelled Amphilochians placed themselves under the protection of the Acarnanians, and both together called in the Athenians, who sent them a fleet of thirty ships under the command of Phormio. When Phormio arrived, they stormed Argos, and sold the Ambraciots into slavery; and the Amphilochians and Acarnanians dwelt together in the place. The alliance between the Acarnanians and Athenians then first began. The hatred of the Ambraciots towards the Amphilochian Argives commenced with the enslavement of their countrymen; and now when the war offered an opportunity they invaded their territory, accompanied by the Chaonians and some others of the neighbouring Barbarians. They came as far as Argos and made themselves masters of the country; but not being able to take the city by assault they returned, and the several tribes dispersed to their own homes. Such were the events of the summer.

69. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Ἀθηναῖοι ναῦς ἔστειλαν εἴκοσι μὲν περὶ Πελοπόννησον καὶ Φορμίωνα στρατηγόν, ὃς ὁρμώμενος ἐκ Ναυπάκτου φυλακὴν εἶχε μήτ᾽ ἐκπλεῖν ἐκ Κορίνθου καὶ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου μηδένα μήτ᾽ ἐσπλεῖν, ἑτέρας δὲ ἓξ ἐπὶ Καρίας καὶ Λυκίας καὶ Μελήσανδρον στρατηγόν, ὅπως ταῦτά τε ἀργυρολογῶσι καὶ τὸ λῃστικὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων μὴ ἐῶσιν αὐτόθεν ὁρμώμενον βλάπτειν τὸν πλοῦν τῶν ὁλκάδων τῶν ἀπὸ Φασήλιδος καὶ Φοινίκης καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖθεν ἠπείρου. [2] ἀναβὰς

δὲ στρατιᾷ Ἀθηναίων τε τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς τὴν Λυκίαν ὁ Μελήσανδρος ἀποθνῄσκει καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς μέρος τι διέφθειρε νικηθεὶς μάχῃ.

[69] In the following winter the Athenians sent twenty ships on an expedition round Peloponnesus. These were placed under the command of Phormio, who, stationing himself at Naupactus, guarded the straits and prevented any one from sailing either out of or into Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf. Six other vessels were sent to collect tribute in Lycia and Caria; they were under the command of Melesander, who was to see that Peloponnesian privateers did not establish themselves in those parts, and damage merchant vessels coming from Phaselis and Phoenicia and all that region. But he, going up the country into Lycia with an army composed of Athenians taken from the crews and of allied troops, was defeated, and himself and a part of his forces slain.

70. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος οἱ Ποτειδεᾶται ἐπειδὴ οὐκέτι ἐδύναντο πολιορκούμενοι ἀντέχειν, ἀλλ᾽ αἵ τε ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολαὶ Πελοποννησίων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀπανίστασαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὅ τε σῖτος ἐπελελοίπει, καὶ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἐπεγεγένητο αὐτόθι ἤδη βρώσεως πέρι ἀναγκαίας καί τινες καὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγέγευντο, οὕτω δὴ λόγους προσφέρουσι περὶ ξυμβάσεως τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς ἐπὶ σφίσι τεταγμένοις, Ξενοφῶντί τε τῷ Εὐριπίδου καὶ Ἑστιοδώρῳ τῷ Ἀριστοκλείδου καὶ Φανομάχῳ τῷ Καλλιμάχου. [2] οἱ δὲ προσεδέξαντο, ὁρῶντες μὲν τῆς στρατιᾶς τὴν ταλαιπωρίαν ἐν χωρίῳ χειμερινῷ, ἀνηλωκυίας δὲ ἤδη τῆς πόλεως δισχίλια τάλαντα ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν. [3] ἐπὶ τοῖσδε οὖν ξυνέβησαν, ἐξελθεῖν αὐτοὺς καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς ἐπικούρους ξὺν ἑνὶ ἱματίῳ, γυναῖκας δὲ ξὺν δυοῖν, καὶ ἀργύριόν τι ῥητὸν ἔχοντας ἐφόδιον. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν ὑπόσπονδοι ἐξῆλθον ἔς τε τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν καὶ ᾗ ἕκαστος ἐδύνατο: Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τούς τε στρατηγοὺς ἐπῃτιάσαντο ὅτι ἄνευ αὐτῶν ξυνέβησαν ⟦ἐνόμιζον γὰρ ἂν κρατῆσαι τῆς πόλεως ᾗ ἐβούλοντο⟧, καὶ ὕστερον ἐποίκους ἔπεμψαν ἑαυτῶν ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν καὶ

κατῴκισαν. ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι ἐγένετο, καὶ [τὸ] δεύτερον ἔτος ἐτελεύτα τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[70] In the same winter the Potidaeans, who were still blockaded, found themselves unable to hold out; for the Peloponnesian invasions of Attica did not make the Athenians withdraw; and they had no more food. When they had been reduced to such straits as actually in some cases to feed on human flesh, they entered into communications with the Athenian generals, Xenophon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus the son of Callimachus, to whom the siege had been entrusted. They, seeing that the army was suffering from the exposed situation, and considering that the city had already spent two thousand talents on the siege, accepted the terms proposed. The Potidaeans, with their wives and their children, and likewise the foreign troops, were to come out of the city, the men with one garment, the women with two, and they were allowed a certain fixed sum of money for their journey. So they came out under a safe-conduct, and went into Chalcidicè, or wherever they could find a home. But the Athenians blamed the generals for coming to terms without their authority, thinking that they could have made the city surrender at discretion. Soon afterwards they sent thither colonists of their own. Such were the events of the winter. And so ended the second year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

71. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐς μὲν τὴν Ἀττικὴν οὐκ ἐσέβαλον, ἐστράτευσαν δὲ ἐπὶ Πλάταιαν: ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. καὶ καθίσας τὸν στρατὸν ἔμελλε δῃώσειν τὴν γῆν: οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς εὐθὺς πρέσβεις πέμψαντες πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔλεγον τοιάδε: [2] ‘Ἀρχίδαμε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ δίκαια ποιεῖτε οὐδ᾽ ἄξια οὔτε ὑμῶν οὔτε πατέρων ὧν ἐστέ, ἐς γῆν τὴν Πλαταιῶν στρατεύοντες. Παυσανίας γὰρ ὁ Κλεομβρότου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐλευθερώσας τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀπὸ

τῶν Μήδων μετὰ Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἐθελησάντων ξυνάρασθαι τὸν κίνδυνον τῆς μάχης ἢ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, θύσας ἐν τῇ Πλαταιῶν ἀγορᾷ ἱερὰ Διὶ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ξυγκαλέσας πάντας τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀπεδίδου Πλαταιεῦσι γῆν καὶ πόλιν τὴν σφετέραν ἔχοντας αὐτονόμους οἰκεῖν, στρατεῦσαί τε μηδένα ποτὲ ἀδίκως ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς μηδ᾽ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ: εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμύνειν τοὺς παρόντας ξυμμάχους κατὰ δύναμιν. [3] τάδε μὲν ἡμῖν πατέρες οἱ ὑμέτεροι ἔδοσαν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ προθυμίας τῆς ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς κινδύνοις γενομένης, ὑμεῖς δὲ τἀναντία δρᾶτε: μετὰ γὰρ Θηβαίων τῶν ἡμῖν ἐχθίστων ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἥκετε. [4] μάρτυρας δὲ θεοὺς τούς τε ὁρκίους τότε γενομένους ποιούμενοι καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους πατρῴους καὶ ἡμετέρους ἐγχωρίους, λέγομεν ὑμῖν γῆν τὴν Πλαταιίδα μὴ ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρκους, ἐᾶν δὲ οἰκεῖν αὐτονόμους καθάπερ Παυσανίας ἐδικαίωσεν.’

[71] In the following summer the Peloponnesians and their allies under the command of Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, instead of invading Attica, made an expedition against Plataea. There he encamped and was about to ravage the country, when the Plataeans sent envoys to him bearing the following message:’Archidamus, and you Lacedaemonians, in making war upon Plataea you are acting unjustly, and in a manner unworthy of yourselves and of your ancestors. Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedaemonian, when he and such Hellenes as were willing to share the danger with him fought a battle in our land and liberated Hellas from the Persian, offered up sacrifice in the Agora of Plataea to Zeus the God of Freedom, and in the presence of all the confederates then and there restored to the Plataeans their country and city to be henceforth independent; no man was to make unjust war upon them at any time or to seek to enslave them; and if they were attacked, the allies who were present promised that they would defend them to the utmost of their power. These privileges your fathers granted to us as a reward for the courage and devotion which we displayed in that time of

danger. But you are acting in an opposite spirit; for you have joined the Thebans, our worst enemies, and have come hither to enslave us. Wherefore, calling to witness the Gods to whom we all then swore, and also the Gods of your race and the Gods who dwell in our country, we bid you do no harm to the land of Plataea. Do not violate your oaths, but allow the Plataeans to be independent, and to enjoy the rights which Pausanias granted to them.'

72. τοσαῦτα εἰπόντων τῶν Πλαταιῶν Ἀρχίδαμος ὑπολαβὼν εἶπεν: 'δίκαια λέγετε, ὦ ἄνδρες Πλαταιῆς, ἢν ποιῆτε ὁμοῖα τοῖς λόγοις. καθάπερ γὰρ Παυσανίας ὑμῖν παρέδωκεν, αὐτοί τε αὐτονομεῖσθε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνελευθεροῦτε, ὅσοι μετασχόντες τῶν τότε κινδύνων ὑμῖν τε ξυνώμοσαν καὶ εἰσὶ νῦν ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις, παρασκευή τε τοσήδε καὶ πόλεμος γεγένηται αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθερώσεως. ἧς μάλιστα μὲν μετασχόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμμείνατε τοῖς ὅρκοις: εἰ δὲ μή, ἄπερ καὶ πρότερον ἤδη προυκαλεσάμεθα, ἡσυχίαν ἄγετε νεμόμενοι τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν, καὶ ἔστε μηδὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων, δέχεσθε δὲ ἀμφοτέρους φίλους, ἐπὶ πολέμῳ δὲ μηδετέρους. καὶ τάδε ἡμῖν ἀρκέσει.' [2] ὁ μὲν Ἀρχίδαμος τοσαῦτα εἶπεν: οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῶν πρέσβεις ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα ἐσῆλθον ἐς τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῷ πλήθει τὰ ῥηθέντα κοινώσαντες ἀπεκρίναντο αὐτῷ ὅτι ἀδύνατα σφίσιν εἴη ποιεῖν ἃ προκαλεῖται ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων παῖδες γὰρ σφῶν καὶ γυναῖκες παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις εἶεν, δεδιέναι δὲ καὶ περὶ τῇ πάσῃ πόλει μὴ ἐκείνων ἀποχωρησάντων Ἀθηναῖοι ἐλθόντες σφίσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρέπωσιν, ἢ Θηβαῖοι, ὡς ἔνορκοι ὄντες κατὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρους δέχεσθαι, αὖθις σφῶν τὴν πόλιν πειράσωσι καταλαβεῖν. [3] ὁ δὲ θαρσύνων αὐτοὺς πρὸς ταῦτα ἔφη: 'ὑμεῖς δὲ πόλιν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας ἡμῖν παράδοτε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ γῆς ὅρους ἀποδείξατε καὶ δένδρα ἀριθμῷ τὰ ὑμέτερα καὶ ἄλλο εἴ τι δυνατὸν ἐς ἀριθμὸν ἐλθεῖν: αὐτοὶ δὲ μεταχωρήσατε ὅποι βούλεσθε, ἕως ἂν ὁ πόλεμος ᾖ: ἐπειδὰν δὲ παρέλθῃ, ἀποδώσομεν ὑμῖν ἃ ἂν παραλάβωμεν. μέχρι δὲ τοῦδε ἕξομεν παρακαταθήκην,

ἐργαζόμενοι καὶ φορὰν φέροντες ἢ ἂν ὑμῖν μέλλῃ ἱκανὴ ἔσεσθαι.’

[72] To this appeal Archidamus rejoined:’What you say, Plataeans, is just, but your acts should correspond to your words. Enjoy the independence which Pausanias granted to you, but also assist us in freeing the other Hellenes who were your sworn confederates in that time of danger and are now in subjection to the Athenians. With a view to the emancipation of them and of the other subject states, this great war has been undertaken and all these preparations made. It would be best for you to join with us, and observe the oaths yourselves which you would have us observe. But if you prefer to be neutral, a course which we have already once proposed to you, retain possession of your lands, and receive both sides in peace, but neither for the purposes of war; and we shall be satisfied.’The Plataean ambassadors then returned to the city and reported these words of Archidamus to the people, who made answer that they that they could not do what they were asked without the sanction of the Athenians, in whose power they had left their wives and children, and that they also feared for the very existence of their state. When the Lacedaemonians were gone the Athenians might come and not allow them to carry out the treaty; or the Thebans, who would be included in the clause requiring them ‘to receive both sides,’ might again attempt to seize their town. To this Archidamus, wanting to reassure them, made the following answer:’Then deliver over your city and houses to the Lacedaemonians; mark the boundaries of your land, and number your fruit-trees and anything else which can be counted. Go yourselves whithersoever you please, while the war lasts, and on the return of peace we will give back to you all that we have received. Until then we will hold your property in trust, and will cultivate your ground, paying you such a rent as will content you.’

73. οἱ δ᾽ ἀκούσαντες ἐσῆλθον αὖθις ἐς τὴν πόλιν, καὶ βουλευσάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους ἔλεξαν ὅτι βούλονται ἃ προκαλεῖται Ἀθηναίοις κοινῶσαι πρῶτον, καὶ ἢν πείθωσιν αὐτούς, ποιεῖν ταῦτα: μέχρι δὲ τούτου σπείσασθαι σφίσιν ἐκέλευον καὶ τὴν γῆν μὴ δῃοῦν. ὁ δὲ ἡμέρας τε ἐσπείσατο ἐν αἷς εἰκὸς ἦν κομισθῆναι, καὶ τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἔτεμνεν. [2] ἐλθόντες δὲ οἱ [Πλαταιῆς] πρέσβεις ὡς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ βουλευσάμενοι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πάλιν ἦλθον ἀπαγγέλλοντες τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει τοιάδε: [3] ‘οὔτ᾽ ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνῳ, ὦ ἄνδρες Πλαταιῆς, ἀφ᾽ οὗ ξύμμαχοι ἐγενόμεθα, Ἀθηναῖοί φασιν ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑμᾶς προέσθαι ἀδικουμένους οὔτε νῦν περιόψεσθαι, βοηθήσειν δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν. ἐπισκήπτουσί τε ὑμῖν πρὸς τῶν ὅρκων οὓς οἱ πατέρες ὤμοσαν μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν περὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν.’

[73] Upon hearing these words the envoys again returned into the city, and, after holding a consultation with the people, told Archidamus that they wished first to communicate his proposals to the Athenians, and if they could get their consent they would do as he advised; in the meantime they desired him to make a truce with them, and not to ravage their land. So he made a truce which allowed sufficient time for their ambassadors to return from Athens; and meanwhile he spared their land. The Plataean envoys came to Athens, and after advising with the Athenians they brought back the following message to their fellow-citizens:’Plataeans, the Athenians say that never at any time since you first became their allies have they suffered any one to do you wrong, and that they will not forsake you now, but will assist you to the utmost of their power; and they adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to forsake the Athenian alliance.’

74. τοιαῦτα τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπαγγειλάντων οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἐβουλεύσαντο Ἀθηναίους μὴ προδιδόναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ γῆν τεμνομένην, εἰ δεῖ, ὁρῶντας καὶ ἄλλο πάσχοντας ὅτι ἂν ξυμβαίνῃ: ἐξελθεῖν τε μηδένα ἔτι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι ἀδύνατα σφίσι ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἃ

Λακεδαιμόνιοι προκαλοῦνται. [2] ὡς δὲ ἀπεκρίναντο, ἐντεῦθεν δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐς ἐπιμαρτυρίαν καὶ θεῶν καὶ ἡρώων τῶν ἐγχωρίων Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς κατέστη, λέγων ὧδε: ‘θεοὶ ὅσοι γῆν τὴν Πλαταιίδα ἔχετε καὶ ἥρωες, ξυνίστορές ἐστε ὅτι οὔτε τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδίκως, ἐκλιπόντων δὲ τῶνδε προτέρων τὸ ξυνώμοτον, ἐπὶ γῆν τήνδε ἤλθομεν, ἐν ᾗ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν εὐξάμενοι ὑμῖν Μήδων ἐκράτησαν καὶ παρέσχετε αὐτὴν εὐμενῆ ἐναγωνίσασθαι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, οὔτε νῦν, ἤν τι ποιῶμεν, ἀδικήσομεν: προκαλεσάμενοι γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ εἰκότα οὐ τυγχάνομεν. ξυγγνώμονες δὲ ἔστε τῆς μὲν ἀδικίας κολάζεσθαι τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι προτέροις, τῆς δὲ τιμωρίας τυγχάνειν τοῖς ἐπιφέρουσι νομίμως.’

[74] When the answer came, the Plataeans resolved not to desert the Athenians, but patiently to look on, if they must, while the Lacedaemonians wasted their country, and to endure the worst. No one was henceforward to leave the town, but answer was to be made from the walls that they could not possibly consent to the Lacedaemonian proposal. King Archidamus, as soon as he received the reply, before proceeding to action, fell to calling upon the Gods and heroes of the country in the following words:’O ye Gods and heroes who possess the land of Plataea, be our witnesses that our invasion of this land in which our fathers prayed to you when they conquered the Persians, and which you made a propitious battle-field to the Hellenes, has thus far been justified, for the Plataeans first deserted the alliance; and that if we go further we shall be guilty of no crime, for we have again and again made them fair proposals and they have not listened to us. Be gracious to us and grant that the real authors of the iniquity may be punished, and that they may obtain revenge who lawfully seek it.’

75. τοσαῦτα ἐπιθειάσας καθίστη ἐς πόλεμον τὸν στρατόν, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν περιεσταύρωσαν αὐτοὺς τοῖς δένδρεσιν ἃ ἔκοψαν, τοῦ μηδένα ἐπεξιέναι, ἔπειτα χῶμα ἔχουν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἐλπίζοντες ταχίστην αἵρεσιν ἔσεσθαι αὐτῶν στρατεύματος τοσούτου ἐργαζομένου. [2] ξύλα μὲν οὖν

τέμνοντες ἐκ τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος παρῳκοδόμουν ἑκατέρωθεν, φορμηδὸν ἀντὶ τοίχων τιθέντες, ὅπως μὴ διαχέοιτο ἐπὶ πολὺ τὸ χῶμα: ἐφόρουν δὲ ὕλην ἐς αὐτὸ καὶ λίθους καὶ γῆν καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀνύτειν μέλλοι ἐπιβαλλόμενον. [3] ἡμέρας δὲ ἔχουν † ἑβδομήκοντα † καὶ νύκτας ξυνεχῶς, διῃρημένοι κατ᾽ ἀναπαύλας, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν φέρειν, τοὺς δὲ ὕπνον τε καὶ σῖτον αἱρεῖσθαι: Λακεδαιμονίων τε οἱ ξεναγοὶ ἑκάστης πόλεως ξυνεφεστῶτες ἠνάγκαζον ἐς τὸ ἔργον. [4] οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς ὁρῶντες τὸ χῶμα αἰρόμενον, ξύλινον τεῖχος ξυνθέντες καὶ ἐπιστήσαντες τῷ ἑαυτῶν τείχει ᾗ προσεχοῦτο, ἐσῳκοδόμουν ἐς αὐτὸ πλίνθους ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς οἰκιῶν καθαιροῦντες. [5] ξύνδεσμος δ᾽ ἦν αὐτοῖς τὰ ξύλα, τοῦ μὴ ὑψηλὸν γιγνόμενον ἀσθενὲς εἶναι τὸ οἰκοδόμημα, καὶ προκαλύμματα εἶχε δέρσεις καὶ διφθέρας, ὥστε τοὺς ἐργαζομένους καὶ τὰ ξύλα μήτε πυρφόροις οἰστοῖς βάλλεσθαι ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ τε εἶναι. [6] ᾔρετο δὲ τὸ ὕψος τοῦ τείχους μέγα, καὶ τὸ χῶμα οὐ σχολαίτερον ἀντανῄει αὐτῷ. καὶ οἱ Πλαταιῆς τοιόνδε τι ἐπινοοῦσιν: διελόντες τοῦ τείχους ᾗ προσέπιπτε τὸ χῶμα ἐσεφόρουν τὴν γῆν.

[75] After this appeal to the Gods he began military operations. In the first place, the soldiers felled the fruit-trees and surrounded the city with a stockade, that henceforth no one might get out. They then began to raise a mound against it, thinking that with so large an army at work this would be the speediest way of taking the place. So they cut timber from Cithaeron and built on either side of the intended mound a frame of logs placed cross-wise in order that the material might not scatter. Thither they carried wood, stones, earth, and anything which would fill up the vacant space. They continued raising the mound seventy days and seventy nights without intermission; the army was divided into relays, and one party worked while the other slept and ate. The Lacedaemonian officers who commanded the contingents of the allies stood over them and kept them at work. The Plataeans, seeing the mound rising, constructed a wooden frame, which they set upon the

top of their own wall opposite the mound; in this they inserted bricks, which they took from the neighbouring houses; the wood served to strengthen and bind the structure together as it increased in height; they also hung curtains of skins and hides in front; these were designed to protect the wood-work and the workers, and shield them against blazing arrows. The wooden wall rose high, but the mound rose quickly too. Then the Plataeans had a new device; — they made a hole in that part of the wall against which the mound pressed and drew in the earth.

76. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐν ταρσοῖς καλάμου πηλὸν ἐνίλλοντες ἐσέβαλλον ἐς τὸ διῃρημένον, ὅπως μὴ διαχεόμενον ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ φοροῖτο. [2] οἱ δὲ ταύτῃ ἀποκλῃόμενοι τοῦτο μὲν ἐπέσχον, ὑπόνομον δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὀρύξαντες καὶ ξυντεκμηράμενοι ὑπὸ τὸ χῶμα ὑφεῖλκον αὖθις παρὰ σφᾶς τὸν χοῦν: καὶ ἐλάνθανον ἐπὶ πολὺ τοὺς ἔξω, ὥστε ἐπιβάλλοντας ἧσσον ἀνύτειν ὑπαγομένου αὐτοῖς κάτωθεν τοῦ χώματος καὶ ἰζάνοντος αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ κενούμενον. [3] δεδιότες δὲ μὴ οὐδ᾽ οὕτω δύνωνται ὀλίγοι πρὸς πολλοὺς ἀντέχειν, προσεπεξηῦρον τόδε: τὸ μὲν μέγα οἰκοδόμημα ἐπαύσαντο ἐργαζόμενοι τὸ κατὰ τὸ χῶμα, ἔνθεν δὲ καὶ ἔνθεν αὐτοῦ ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ βραχέος τείχους ἐκ τοῦ ἐντὸς μηνοειδὲς ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐσῳκοδόμουν, ὅπως, εἰ τὸ μέγα τεῖχος ἁλίσκοιτο, τοῦτ᾽ ἀντέχοι, καὶ δέοι τοὺς ἐναντίους αὖθις πρὸς αὐτὸ χοῦν καὶ προχωροῦντας ἔσω διπλάσιόν τε πόνον ἔχειν καὶ ἐν ἀμφιβόλῳ μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι. [4] ἅμα δὲ τῇ χώσει καὶ μηχανὰς προσῆγον οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τῇ πόλει, μίαν μὲν ἣ τοῦ μεγάλου οἰκοδομήματος κατὰ τὸ χῶμα προσαχθεῖσα ἐπὶ μέγα τε κατέσεισε καὶ τοὺς Πλαταιᾶς ἐφόβησεν, ἄλλας δὲ ἄλλῃ τοῦ τείχους, ἃς βρόχους τε περιβάλλοντες ἀνέκλων οἱ Πλαταιῆς, καὶ δοκοὺς μεγάλας ἀρτήσαντες ἁλύσεσι μακραῖς σιδηραῖς ἀπὸ τῆς τομῆς ἑκατέρωθεν ἀπὸ κεραιῶν δύο ἐπικεκλιμένων καὶ ὑπερτεινουσῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τείχους ἀνελκύσαντες ἐγκαρσίας, ὁπότε προσπεσεῖσθαί πῃ μέλλοι ἡ μηχανή, ἀφίεσαν τὴν δοκὸν χαλαραῖς ταῖς ἁλύσεσι καὶ οὐ

διὰ χειρὸς ἔχοντες, ἡ δὲ ῥύμῃ ἐμπίπτουσα ἀπεκαύλιζε τὸ προῦχον τῆς ἐμβολῆς.

[76] The Peloponnesians discovered what they were doing, and threw into the gap clay packed in wattles of reed, which could not scatter and like the loose earth be carried away. Whereupon the Plataeans, baffled in one plan, resorted to another. Calculating the direction, they dug a mine from the city to the mound and again drew the earth inward. For a long time their assailants did not find them out, and so what the Peloponnesians threw on was of little use, since the mound was always being drawn off below and settling into the vacant space. But in spite of all their efforts, the Plataeans were afraid that their numbers would never hold out against so great an army; and they devised yet another expedient. They left off working at the great building opposite the mound, and beginning at both ends, where the city wall returned to its original lower height, they built an inner wall projecting inwards in the shape of a crescent, that if the first wall were taken the other might still be defensible. The enemy would be obliged to begin again and carry the mound right up to it, and as they advanced inwards would have their trouble all over again, and be exposed to missiles on both flanks. While the mound was rising the Peloponnesians brought battering engines up to the wall; one which was moved forward on the mound itself shook a great part of the raised building, to the terror of the Plataeans. They brought up others too at other points of the wall. But the Plataeans dropped nooses over the ends of these engines and drew them up; they also let down huge beams suspended at each end by long iron chains from two poles leaning on the wall and projecting over it. These beams they drew up at right angles to the advancing battering-ram, and whenever at any point it was about to attack them they slackened their hold of the chains and let go the beam, which fell with great force and snapped off the head of the ram.

77. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ὡς αἵ τε μηχαναὶ οὐδὲν ὠφέλουν καὶ τῷ χώματι τὸ ἀντιτείχισμα ἐγίγνετο, νομίσαντες ἄπορον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἑλεῖν τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὴν περιτείχισιν παρεσκευάζοντο. [2] πρότερον δὲ πυρὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς πειρᾶσαι εἰ δύναιντο πνεύματος γενομένου ἐπιφλέξαι τὴν πόλιν οὖσαν οὐ μεγάλην: πᾶσαν γὰρ δὴ ἰδέαν ἐπενόουν, εἴ πως σφίσιν ἄνευ δαπάνης καὶ πολιορκίας προσαχθείη. [3] φοροῦντες δὲ ὕλης φακέλους παρέβαλον ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος ἐς τὸ μεταξὺ πρῶτον τοῦ τείχους καὶ τῆς προσχώσεως, ταχὺ δὲ πλήρους γενομένου διὰ πολυχειρίαν ἐπιπαρένησαν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως ὅσον ἐδύναντο ἀπὸ τοῦ μετεώρου πλεῖστον ἐπισχεῖν, ἐμβαλόντες δὲ πῦρ ξὺν θείῳ καὶ πίσσῃ ἧψαν τὴν ὕλην. [4] καὶ ἐγένετο φλὸξ τοσαύτη ὅσην οὐδείς πω ἔς γε ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον χειροποίητον εἶδεν: ἤδη γὰρ ἐν ὄρεσιν ὕλη τριφθεῖσα ὑπ᾽ ἀνέμων πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου πῦρ καὶ φλόγα ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀνῆκεν. [5] τοῦτο δὲ μέγα τε ἦν καὶ τοὺς Πλαταιᾶς τἆλλα διαφυγόντας ἐλαχίστου ἐδέησε διαφθεῖραι: ἐντὸς γὰρ πολλοῦ χωρίου τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἦν πελάσαι, πνεῦμά τε εἰ ἐπεγένετο αὐτῇ ἐπίφορον, ὅπερ καὶ ἤλπιζον οἱ ἐναντίοι, οὐκ ἂν διέφυγον. [6] νῦν δὲ καὶ τόδε λέγεται ξυμβῆναι, ὕδωρ [ἐξ οὐρανοῦ] πολὺ καὶ βροντὰς γενομένας σβέσαι τὴν φλόγα καὶ οὕτω παυσθῆναι τὸν κίνδυνον.

[77] At length the Peloponnesians, finding that their engines were useless, and that the new wall was rising opposite to the mound, and perceiving that they could not without more formidable means of attack hope to take the city, made preparations for a blockade. But first of all they resolved to try whether, the wind favouring, the place, which was but small, could not be set on fire; they were anxious not to incur the expense of a regular siege, and devised all sorts of plans in order to avoid it. So they brought faggots and threw them down from the mound along the space between it and the wall, which was soon filled up when so many hands were at work; then they threw more faggots one upon another into the city as far as they could reach from the top of the

mound, and casting in lighted brands with brimstone and pitch, set them all on fire. A flame arose of which the like had never before been made by the hand of man; I am not speaking of fires in the mountains, when the forest has spontaneously blazed up from the action of the wind and mutual attrition. There was a great conflagration, and the Plataeans, who had thus far escaped, were all but destroyed; a considerable part of the town was unapproachable, and if a wind had come on and carried the flame that way, as the enemy hoped, they could not have been saved. It is said that there was also a violent storm of thunder and rain, which quenched the flames and put an end to the danger.

78. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπειδὴ καὶ τούτου διήμαρτον, μέρος μέν τι καταλιπόντες τοῦ στρατοῦ, τὸ δὲ πλέον ἀφέντες περιετείχιζον τὴν πόλιν κύκλῳ, διελόμενοι κατὰ πόλεις τὸ χωρίον: τάφρος δὲ ἐντός τε ἦν καὶ ἔξωθεν ἐξ ἧς ἐπλινθεύσαντο. [2] καὶ ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἐξείργαστο περὶ ἀρκτούρου ἐπιτολάς, καταλιπόντες φυλακὰς τοῦ ἡμίσεος τείχους τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ Βοιωτοὶ ἐφύλασσον ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ στρατῷ καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις. [3] Πλαταιῆς δὲ παῖδας μὲν καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους τε καὶ πλῆθος τὸ ἀχρεῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρότερον ἐκκεκομισμένοι ἦσαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ἐγκαταλελειμμένοι τετρακόσιοι, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὀγδοήκοντα, γυναῖκες δὲ δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν σιτοποιοί. [4] τοσοῦτοι ἦσαν οἱ ξύμπαντες ὅτε ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν καθίσταντο, καὶ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἦν ἐν τῷ τείχει οὔτε δοῦλος οὔτ᾽ ἐλεύθερος. τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ Πλαταιῶν πολιορκία κατεσκευάσθη.

[78] The Peloponnesians, having failed in this, as in their former attempts, sent away a part of their army but retained the rest, and dividing the task among the contingents of the several cities, surrounded Plataea with a wall. Trenches, out of which they took clay for the bricks, were formed both on the inner and the outer side of the wall. About the rising of Arcturus all was completed. They then drew off their army, leaving a guard on one half of the wall, while the other half

was guarded by the Boeotians; the disbanded troops returned to their homes. The Plataeans had already conveyed to Athens their wives, children, and old men, with the rest of their unserviceable population. Those who remained during the siege were four hundred Plataeans, eighty Athenians, and a hundred and ten women to make bread. These were their exact numbers when the siege began. There was no one else, slave or freeman, within the walls. In such sort was the blockade of Plataea completed.

79. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους καὶ ἅμα τῇ τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἐπιστρατείᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι δισχιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἱππεῦσι διακοσίοις ἐπεστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης καὶ Βοττιαίους ἀκμάζοντος τοῦ σίτου: ἐστρατήγει δὲ Ξενοφῶν ὁ Εὐριπίδου τρίτος αὐτός. [2] ἐλθόντες δὲ ὑπὸ Σπάρτωλον τὴν Βοττικὴν τὸν σῖτον διέφθειραν. ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ προσχωρήσειν ἡ πόλις ὑπό τινων ἔνδοθεν πρασσόντων. προσπεμψάντων δὲ ἐς Ὄλυνθον τῶν οὐ ταὐτὰ βουλομένων ὁπλῖταί τε ἦλθον καὶ στρατιὰ ἐς φυλακήν: ἧς ἐπεξελθούσης ἐκ τῆς Σπαρτώλου ἐς μάχην καθίστανται οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν ὁπλῖται τῶν Χαλκιδέων καὶ ἐπίκουροί τινες μετ᾽ αὐτῶν νικῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐς τὴν Σπάρτωλον, οἱ δὲ ἱππῆς τῶν Χαλκιδέων καὶ ψιλοὶ νικῶσι τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἱππέας καὶ ψιλούς: [4] εἶχον δέ τινας οὐ πολλοὺς πελταστὰς ἐκ τῆς Κρουσίδος γῆς καλουμένης. ἄρτι δὲ τῆς μάχης γεγενημένης ἐπιβοηθοῦσιν ἄλλοι πελτασταὶ ἐκ τῆς Ὀλύνθου. [5] καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σπαρτώλου ψιλοὶ ὡς εἶδον, θαρσήσαντες τοῖς τε προσγιγνομένοις καὶ ὅτι πρότερον οὐχ ἥσσηντο, ἐπιτίθενται αὖθις μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδέων ἱππέων καὶ τῶν προσβοηθησάντων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις: καὶ ἀναχωροῦσι πρὸς τὰς δύο τάξεις ἃς κατέλιπον παρὰ τοῖς σκευοφόροις. [6] καὶ ὁπότε μὲν ἐπίοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐνεδίδοσαν, ἀναχωροῦσι δ᾽ ἐνέκειντο καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον. οἵ τε ἱππῆς τῶν Χαλκιδέων προσιππεύοντες ᾗ δοκοίη προσέβαλλον, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα φοβήσαντες ἔτρεψαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐπεδίωξαν ἐπὶ πολύ. [7] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν

καταφεύγουσι, καὶ ὕστερον τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους κομισάμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀναχωροῦσι τῷ περιόντι τοῦ στρατοῦ: ἀπέθανον δὲ αὐτῶν τριάκοντα καὶ τετρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ πάντες. οἱ δὲ Χαλκιδῆς καὶ Βοττιαῖοι τροπαῖόν τε ἔστησαν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀνελόμενοι διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

[79] During the same summer, when the corn was in full ear, and about the time of the attack on Plataea, the Athenians sent an expedition against the Chalcidians of Thrace and against the Bottiaeans, consisting of two thousand heavy-armed troops of their own and two hundred horsemen under the command of Xenophon the son of Euripides, and two others. They came close up to the Bottian Spartolus and destroyed the crops. They expected that the place would be induced to yield to them by a party within the walls. But the opposite party sent to Olynthus and obtained from thence a garrison, partly composed of hoplites, which sallied out of Spartolus and engaged with the Athenians under the walls of the town. The Chalcidian hoplites and with them certain auxiliaries were defeated and retreated into Spartolus, but their cavalry and light-armed troops had the advantage over those of the Athenians. They were assisted by a few targeteers, who came from the district called Crusis. The engagement was scarcely over when another body of targeteers from Olynthus came up to their aid. Encouraged by the reinforcement and their previous success, and supported by the Chalcidian horse and the newly-arrived troops, the light-armed again attacked the Athenians, who began to fall back upon the two companies which they had left with their baggage: as often as the Athenians charged, the enemy retired; but when the Athenians continued their retreat, they pressed upon them and hurled darts at them. The Chalcidian cavalry too rode up, and wherever they pleased charged the Athenians, who now fled utterly disconcerted and were pursued to a considerable distance. At length they escaped to Potidaea, and having recovered

their dead under a flag of truce, returned to Athens with the survivors of their army, out of which they had lost four hundred and thirty men and all their generals. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, having set up a trophy and carried off their dead, disbanded and dispersed to their several cities.

80. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους, οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον τούτων, Ἀμπρακιῶται καὶ Χάονες βουλόμενοι Ἀκαρνανίαν τὴν πᾶσαν καταστρέψασθαι καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἀποστῆσαι πείθουσι Λακεδαιμονίους ναυτικόν τε παρασκευάσασθαι ἐκ τῆς ξυμμαχίδος καὶ ὁπλίτας χιλίους πέμψαι ἐπ᾽ Ἀκαρνανίαν, λέγοντες ὅτι, ἢν ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ἅμα μετὰ σφῶν ἔλθωσιν, ἀδυνάτων ὄντων ξυμβοηθεῖν τῶν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης Ἀκαρνάνων ῥᾳδίως Ἀκαρνανίαν σχόντες καὶ τῆς Ζακύνθου καὶ Κεφαλληνίας κρατήσουσι, καὶ ὁ περίπλους οὐκέτι ἔσοιτο Ἀθηναίοις ὁμοίως περὶ Πελοπόννησον: ἐλπίδα δ᾽ εἶναι καὶ Ναύπακτον λαβεῖν. [2] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πεισθέντες Κνῆμον μὲν ναύαρχον ἔτι ὄντα καὶ τοὺς ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ ναυσὶν ὀλίγαις εὐθὺς πέμπουσι, τῷ δὲ ναυτικῷ περιήγγειλαν παρασκευασαμένῳ ὡς τάχιστα πλεῖν ἐς Λευκάδα. [3] ἦσαν δὲ Κορίνθιοι ξυμπροθυμούμενοι μάλιστα τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ἀποίκοις οὖσιν. καὶ τὸ μὲν ναυτικὸν ἔκ τε Κορίνθου καὶ Σικυῶνος καὶ τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ Λευκάδος καὶ Ἀνακτορίου καὶ Ἀμπρακίας πρότερον ἀφικόμενον ἐν Λευκάδι περιέμενεν. [4] Κνῆμος δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ χίλιοι ὁπλῖται ἐπειδὴ ἐπεραιώθησαν λαθόντες Φορμίωνα, ὃς ἦρχε τῶν εἴκοσι νεῶν τῶν Ἀττικῶν αἳ περὶ Ναύπακτον ἐφρούρουν, εὐθὺς παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν κατὰ γῆν στρατείαν. [5] καὶ αὐτῷ παρῆσαν Ἑλλήνων μὲν Ἀμπρακιῶται καὶ Λευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀνακτόριοι καὶ οὓς αὐτὸς ἔχων ἦλθε χίλιοι Πελοποννησίων, βάρβαροι δὲ Χάονες χίλιοι ἀβασίλευτοι, ὧν ἡγοῦντο ἐπετησίῳ προστατείᾳ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους Φώτιος καὶ Νικάνωρ. ξυνεστρατεύοντο δὲ μετὰ Χαόνων καὶ Θεσπρωτοὶ ἀβασίλευτοι. [6] Μολοσσοὺς δὲ ἦγε καὶ Ἀτιντᾶνας Σαβύλινθος ἐπίτροπος ὢν Θάρυπος τοῦ βασιλέως ἔτι παιδὸς ὄντος, καὶ Παραυαίους Ὄροιδος

βασιλεύων. Ὀρέσται δὲ χίλιοι, ὧν ἐβασίλευεν Ἀντίοχος, μετὰ Παραυαίων ξυνεστρατεύοντο Ὀροίδῳ Ἀντιόχου ἐπιτρέψαντος. [7] ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων χιλίους Μακεδόνων, οἳ ὕστερον ἦλθον. [8] τούτῳ τῷ στρατῷ ἐπορεύετο Κνῆμος οὐ περιμείνας τὸ ἀπὸ Κορίνθου ναυτικόν, καὶ διὰ τῆς Ἀργείας ἰόντες Λιμναίαν, κώμην ἀτείχιστον, ἐπόρθησαν. ἀφικνοῦνταί τε ἐπὶ Στράτον, πόλιν μεγίστην τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας, νομίζοντες, εἰ ταύτην πρώτην λάβοιεν, ῥᾳδίως σφίσι τἆλλα προσχωρήσειν.

[80] In the same summer, not long afterwards, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, designing to subjugate the whole of Acarnania and detach it from the Athenian alliance, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to equip a fleet out of the confederate forces, and to send into that region a thousand hoplites. They said that if the Lacedaemonians would join with them and attack the enemy both by sea and land, the Acarnanians on the sea-coast would be unable to assist the inland tribes, and they might easily conquer Acarnania. Zacynthus and Cephallenia would then fall into their hands, and the Athenian fleet would not so easily sail round Peloponnesus. They might even hope to take Naupactus. The Lacedaemonians agreed, and at once despatched Cnemus, who was still admiral, with the thousand hoplites in a few ships; they ordered the rest of the allied navy to get ready and at once sail to Leucas. The interests of the Ambraciots were zealously supported by Corinth, their mother city. The fleet which was to come from Corinth, Sicyon, and the adjacent places was long in preparation; but the contingent from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia was soon equipped, and waited at Leucas. Undiscovered by Phormio, the commander of the twenty Athenian ships which were keeping guard at Naupactus, Cnemus and his thousand hoplites crossed the sea and began to make preparations for the land expedition. Of Hellenes he had in his army Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians whom he brought with him, — of Barbarians

a thousand Chaonians, who, having no king, were led by Photyus and Nicanor, both of the governing family and holding the presidency for a year. With the Chaonians came the Thesprotians, who, like them, have no king. A Molossian and Atintanian force was led by Sabylinthus, the guardian of Tharypas the king, who was still a minor; the Paravaeans were led by their king Oroedus, and were accompanied by a thousand Orestians placed at the disposal of Oroedus by their king Antiochus. Perdiccas also, unknown to the Athenians, sent a thousand Macedonians, who arrived too late. With this army Cnemus, not waiting for the ships from Corinth, began his march. They passed through the Argive territory and plundered Limnaea, an unwalled village. At length they approached Stratus, which is the largest city in Acarnania, thinking that, if they could take it, the other places would soon come over to them.

81. Ἀκαρνᾶνες δὲ αἰσθόμενοι κατά τε γῆν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἐσβεβληκυῖαν ἔκ τε θαλάσσης ναυσὶν ἅμα τοὺς πολεμίους παρεσομένους, οὔτε ξυνεβοήθουν ἐφύλασσόν τε τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι, παρά τε Φορμίωνα ἔπεμπον κελεύοντες ἀμύνειν: ὁ δὲ ἀδύνατος ἔφη εἶναι ναυτικοῦ ἐκ Κορίνθου μέλλοντος ἐκπλεῖν Ναύπακτον ἐρήμην ἀπολιπεῖν. [2] οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τρία τέλη ποιήσαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐχώρουν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Στρατίων πόλιν, ὅπως ἐγγὺς στρατοπεδευσάμενοι, εἰ μὴ λόγοις πείθοιεν, ἔργῳ πειρῷντο τοῦ τείχους. [3] καὶ μέσον μὲν ἔχοντες προσῇσαν Χάονες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι βάρβαροι, ἐκ δεξιᾶς δ᾽ αὐτῶν Λευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀνακτόριοι καὶ οἱ μετὰ τούτων, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δὲ Κνῆμος καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται: διεῖχον δὲ πολὺ ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε οὐδὲ ἑωρῶντο. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες τεταγμένοι τε προσῇσαν καὶ διὰ φυλακῆς ἔχοντες, ἕως ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἐν ἐπιτηδείῳ: οἱ δὲ Χάονες σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς πιστεύοντες καὶ ἀξιούμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκείνῃ ἠπειρωτῶν μαχιμώτατοι εἶναι οὔτε ἐπέσχον τὸ στρατόπεδον καταλαβεῖν, χωρήσαντές τε ῥύμῃ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων βαρβάρων ἐνόμισαν αὐτοβοεὶ ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἑλεῖν καὶ

αὐτῶν τὸ ἔργον γενέσθαι. [5] γνόντες δ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ Στράτιοι ἔτι προσιόντας καὶ ἡγησάμενοι, μεμονωμένων εἰ κρατήσειαν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι σφίσι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὁμοίως προσελθεῖν, προλοχίζουσι δὴ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐνέδραις, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ἦσαν, ἔκ τε τῆς πόλεως ὁμόσε χωρήσαντες καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεδρῶν προσπίπτουσιν. [6] καὶ ἐς φόβον καταστάντων διαφθείρονταί τε πολλοὶ τῶν Χαόνων, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι βάρβαροι ὡς εἶδον αὐτοὺς ἐνδόντας, οὐκέτι ὑπέμειναν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν. [7] τῶν δὲ Ἑλληνικῶν στρατοπέδων οὐδέτερον ᾔσθετο τῆς μάχης διὰ τὸ πολὺ προελθεῖν αὐτοὺς καὶ στρατόπεδον οἰηθῆναι καταληψομένους ἐπείγεσθαι. [8] ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐνέκειντο φεύγοντες οἱ βάρβαροι, ἀνελάμβανόν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ξυναγαγόντες τὰ στρατόπεδα ἡσύχαζον αὐτοῦ τὴν ἡμέραν, ἐς χεῖρας μὲν οὐκ ἰόντων σφίσι τῶν Στρατίων διὰ τὸ μήπω τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀκαρνᾶνας ξυμβεβοηθηκέναι, ἄπωθεν δὲ σφενδονώντων καὶ ἐς ἀπορίαν καθιστάντων: οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ ὅπλων κινηθῆναι. δοκοῦσι δὲ οἱ Ἀκαρνᾶνες κράτιστοι εἶναι τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

[81] The Acarnanians, seeing that a great army had invaded their territory, and that the enemy was threatening them by sea as well as by land, did not attempt any united action, but guarded their several districts, and sent to Phormio for aid. He replied that a fleet of the enemy was about to sail from Corinth, and that he could not leave Naupactus unguarded. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians and their allies marched in three divisions towards Stratus, intending to encamp near and try negotiations; if these failed, they would take stronger measures and assault the wall. The Chaonians and the other Barbarians advanced in the centre; on the right wing were the Leucadians, Anactorians, and their auxiliaries; on the left was Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots. The three divisions were a long way apart, and at times not even in sight of one another. The Hellenic troops maintained order on the march and kept a look out, until at length they found a suitable place in which to encamp; the Chaonians, confident in

themselves, and having a great military reputation in that part of the country, would not stop to encamp, but they and the other Barbarians rushed on at full speed, hoping to take the place by storm and appropriate to themselves the glory of the action. The Stratians perceiving their approach in time, and thinking that, if they could overcome them before the others arrived, the Hellenic forces would not be so ready to attack them, set ambuscades near the city. When they were quite close, the troops came out of the city and from the ambuscades and fell upon them hand to hand. Whereupon the Chaonians were seized with a panic and many of them perished; the other Barbarians, seeing them give way, no longer stood their ground, but took to flight. Neither of the Hellenic divisions knew of the battle; the Chaonians were far in advance of them, and were thought to have hurried on because they wanted to choose a place for their camp. At length the Barbarians in their flight broke in upon their lines; they received them, and the two divisions uniting during that day remained where they were, the men of Stratus not coming to close quarters with them, because the other Acarnanians had not as yet arrived, but slinging at them from a distance and distressing them greatly. For they could not move a step without their armour. Now the Acarnanians are famous for their skill in slinging.

82. ἐπειδὴ δὲ νὺξ ἐγένετο, ἀναχωρήσας ὁ Κνῆμος τῇ στρατιᾷ κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄναπον ποταμόν, ὃς ἀπέχει σταδίους ὀγδοήκοντα Στράτου, τούς τε νεκροὺς κομίζεται τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ὑποσπόνδους, καὶ Οἰνιαδῶν ξυμπαραγενομένων κατὰ φιλίαν ἀναχωρεῖ παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς πρὶν τὴν ξυμβοήθειαν ἐλθεῖν. κἀκεῖθεν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀπῆλθον ἕκαστοι. οἱ δὲ Στράτιοι τροπαῖον ἔστησαν τῆς μάχης τῆς πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους.

[82] When night came on, Cnemus withdrew his army in haste to the river Anapus, which is rather more than nine miles from Stratus, and on the following day carried off his dead under a flag of truce. The people of Oeniadae were friendly and had joined him; to their city therefore he

retreated before the Acarnanians had collected their forces. From Oeniadae all the Peloponnesian troops returned home. The Stratians erected a trophy of the battle in which they had defeated the Barbarians.

83. τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου ναυτικόν, ὃ ἔδει παραγενέσθαι τῷ Κνήμῳ, ὅπως μὴ ξυμβοηθῶσιν οἱ ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἄνω Ἀκαρνᾶνες, οὐ παραγίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἠναγκάσθησαν περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας τῆς ἐν Στράτῳ μάχης ναυμαχῆσαι πρὸς Φορμίωνα καὶ τὰς εἴκοσι ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἳ ἐφρούρουν ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ. [2] ὁ γὰρ Φορμίων παραπλέοντας αὐτοὺς ἔξω τοῦ κόλπου ἐτήρει, βουλόμενος ἐν τῇ εὐρυχωρίᾳ ἐπιθέσθαι. [3] οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔπλεον μὲν οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίᾳ, ἀλλὰ στρατιωτικώτερον παρεσκευασμένοι ἐς τὴν Ἀκαρνανίαν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἑπτὰ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς τὰς σφετέρας τολμῆσαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἴκοσι ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ναυμαχίαν ποιήσασθαι: ἐπειδὴ μέντοι ἀντιπαραπλέοντάς τε ἑώρων αὐτούς, παρὰ γῆν σφῶν κομιζομένων, καὶ ἐκ Πατρῶν τῆς Ἀχαΐας πρὸς τὴν ἀντιπέρας ἤπειρον διαβάλλοντες ἐπ᾽ Ἀκαρνανίας κατεῖδον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Εὐήνου ποταμοῦ προσπλέοντας σφίσι καὶ οὐκ ἔλαθον νυκτὸς ἀφορμισάμενοι, οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκάζονται ναυμαχεῖν κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν. [4] στρατηγοὶ δὲ ἦσαν μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἑκάστων οἳ παρεσκευάζοντο, Κορινθίων δὲ Μαχάων καὶ Ἰσοκράτης καὶ Ἀγαθαρχίδας. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν Πελοποννήσιοι ἐτάξαντο κύκλον τῶν νεῶν ὡς μέγιστον οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν μὴ διδόντες διέκπλουν, τὰς πρῴρας μὲν ἔξω, ἔσω δὲ τὰς πρύμνας, καὶ τά τε λεπτὰ πλοῖα ἃ ξυνέπλει ἐντὸς ποιοῦνται καὶ πέντε ναῦς τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως ἐκπλέοιεν διὰ βραχέος παραγιγνόμενοι, εἴ πῃ προσπίπτοιεν οἱ ἐναντίοι.

[83] The fleet from Corinth and the other allied cities on the Crisaean Gulf, which was intended to support Cnemus and to prevent the Acarnanians on the sea-coast from assisting their friends in the interior of the country, never arrived, but was compelled, almost on the day of the battle of Stratus, to

fight with Phormio and the twenty Athenian ships which were stationed at Naupactus. As they sailed by into the open sea, Phormio was watching them, preferring to make his attack outside the gulf. Now the Corinthians and their allies were not equipped for a naval engagement, but for the conveyance of troops into Acarnania, and they never imagined that the Athenians with twenty ships would venture to engage their own forty-seven. But, as they were coasting along the southern shore, they saw the Athenian fleet following their movements on the northern; they then attempted to cross the sea from Patrae in Achaea to the opposite continent in the direction of Acarnania, when they again observed the enemy bearing down upon them from Chalcis and the mouth of the river Evenus. They had previously endeavoured to anchor under cover of night, but had been detected. So at last they were compelled to fight in the middle of the channel. The ships were commanded by generals of the cities which had furnished them; the Corinthian squadron by Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians arranged their ships in such a manner as to make the largest possible circle without leaving space to break through, turning their prows outwards and their sterns inwards; within the circle they placed the smaller craft which accompanied them, and five of their swiftest ships that they might be close at hand and row out at whatever point the enemy charged them.

84. οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ μίαν ναῦν τεταγμένοι περιέπλεον αὐτοὺς κύκλῳ καὶ ξυνῆγον ἐς ὀλίγον, ἐν χρῷ αἰεὶ παραπλέοντες καὶ δόκησιν παρέχοντες αὐτίκα ἐμβαλεῖν: προείρητο δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ Φορμίωνος μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸς σημήνῃ. [2] ἤλπιζε γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐ μενεῖν τὴν τάξιν, ὥσπερ ἐν γῇ πεζήν, ἀλλὰ ξυμπεσεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ταραχὴν παρέξειν, εἴ τ᾽ ἐκπνεύσειεν ἐκ τοῦ κόλπου τὸ πνεῦμα, ὅπερ ἀναμένων τε περιέπλει καὶ εἰώθει γίγνεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἕω, οὐδένα χρόνον ἡσυχάσειν αὐτούς: καὶ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι,

ὁπόταν βούληται, τῶν νεῶν ἄμεινον πλεουσῶν, καὶ τότε καλλίστην γίγνεσθαι. [3] ὡς δὲ τό τε πνεῦμα κατῄει καὶ αἱ νῆες ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἤδη οὖσαι ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ τε ἀνέμου τῶν τε πλοίων, ἅμα προσκειμένων ἐταράσσοντο, καὶ ναῦς τε νηὶ προσέπιπτε καὶ τοῖς κοντοῖς διεωθοῦντο, βοῇ τε χρώμενοι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀντιφυλακῇ τε καὶ λοιδορίᾳ οὐδὲν κατήκουον οὔτε τῶν παραγγελλομένων οὔτε τῶν κελευστῶν, καὶ τὰς κώπας ἀδύνατοι ὄντες ἐν κλύδωνι ἀναφέρειν ἄνθρωποι ἄπειροι τοῖς κυβερνήταις ἀπειθεστέρας τὰς ναῦς παρεῖχον, τότε δὴ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον σημαίνει, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προσπεσόντες πρῶτον μὲν καταδύουσι τῶν στρατηγίδων νεῶν μίαν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ᾗ χωρήσειαν διέφθειρον, καὶ κατέστησαν ἐς ἀλκὴν μὲν μηδένα τρέπεσθαι αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ταραχῆς, φεύγειν δὲ ἐς Πάτρας καὶ Δύμην τῆς Ἀχαΐας. [4] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καταδιώξαντες καὶ ναῦς δώδεκα λαβόντες τούς τε ἄνδρας ἐξ αὐτῶν τοὺς πλείστους ἀνελόμενοι ἐς Μολύκρειον ἀπέπλεον, καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ῥίῳ καὶ ναῦν ἀναθέντες τῷ Ποσειδῶνι ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς Ναύπακτον. [5] παρέπλευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι εὐθὺς ταῖς περιλοίποις τῶν νεῶν ἐκ τῆς Δύμης καὶ Πατρῶν ἐς Κυλλήνην τὸ Ἠλείων ἐπίνειον: καὶ ἀπὸ Λευκάδος Κνῆμος καὶ αἱ ἐκείνων νῆες, ἃς ἔδει ταύταις ξυμμεῖξαι, ἀφικνοῦνται μετὰ τὴν ἐν Στράτῳ μάχην ἐς τὴν Κυλλήνην.

[84] The Athenians ranged their ships in a single line and sailed round and round the Peloponnesian fleet, which they drove into a narrower and narrower space, almost touching as they passed, and leading the crews to suppose that they were on the point of charging. But they had been warned by Phormio not to begin until he gave the signal, for he was hoping that the enemy’s ships, not having the steadiness of an army on land, would soon fall into disorder and run foul of one another; they would be embarrassed by the small craft, and if the usual morning breeze, for which he continued waiting as he sailed round them, came down from the gulf, they would not be able to keep still for a moment. He could

attack whenever he pleased, because his ships were better sailers; and he knew that this would be the right time. When the breeze began to blow, the ships, which were by this time crowded into a narrow space and were distressed at once by the force of the wind and by the small craft which were knocking up against them, fell into confusion; ship dashed against ship, and they kept pushing one another away with long poles; there were cries of `keep off' and noisy abuse, so that nothing could be heard either of the word of command or of the coxswains' giving the time; and the difficulty which unpractised rowers had in clearing the water in a heavy sea made the vessels disobedient to the helm. At that moment Phormio gave the signal; the Athenians, falling upon the enemy, began by sinking one of the admirals' vessels, and then wherever they went made havoc of them; at last such was the disorder that no one any longer thought of resisting, but the whole fleet fled away to Patrae and Dymè in Achaea. The Athenians pursued them, captured twelve ships, and taking on board most of their crews, sailed away to Molycrium. They set up a trophy on Rhium, and having there dedicated a ship to Poseidon, retired to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians likewise, with the remainder of their fleet, proceeded quickly along the coast from Dymè and Patrae to Cyllenè, where the Eleans have their docks. Cnemus with the ships from Leucas, which should have been joined by these, arrived after the battle of Stratus at Cyllenè.

85. πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῷ Κνήμῳ ξυμβούλους ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς Τιμοκράτη καὶ Βρασίδαν καὶ Λυκόφρονα, κελεύοντες ἄλλην ναυμαχίαν βελτίω παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὑπ᾽ ὀλίγων νεῶν εἴργεσθαι τῆς θαλάσσης. [2] ἐδόκει γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως τε καὶ πρῶτον ναυμαχίας πειρασαμένοις πολὺς ὁ παράλογος εἶναι, καὶ οὐ τοσούτῳ ᾤοντο σφῶν τὸ ναυτικὸν λείπεσθαι, γεγενῆσθαι δέ τινα μαλακίαν, οὐκ ἀντιτιθέντες τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐμπειρίαν τῆς σφετέρας δι᾽ ὀλίγου μελέτης. ὀργῇ οὖν ἀπέστελλον. [3] οἱ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ Κνήμου ναῦς τε

προσπεριήγγειλαν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ τὰς προϋπαρχούσας ἐξηρτύοντο ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν. [4] πέμπει δὲ καὶ ὁ Φορμίων ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας τήν τε παρασκευὴν αὐτῶν ἀγγελοῦντας καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἣν ἐνίκησαν φράσοντας, καὶ κελεύων αὐτῷ ναῦς ὅτι πλείστας διὰ τάχους ἀποστεῖλαι, ὡς καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἑκάστην ἐλπίδος οὔσης αἰεὶ ναυμαχήσειν. [5] οἱ δὲ ἀποπέμπουσιν εἴκοσι ναῦς αὐτῷ, τῷ δὲ κομίζοντι αὐτὰς προσεπέστειλαν ἐς Κρήτην πρῶτον ἀφικέσθαι. Νικίας γὰρ Κρὴς Γορτύνιος πρόξενος ὢν πείθει αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Κυδωνίαν πλεῦσαι, φάσκων προσποιήσειν αὐτὴν οὖσαν πολεμίαν: ἐπῆγε δὲ Πολιχνίταις χαριζόμενος ὁμόροις τῶν Κυδωνιατῶν. [6] καὶ ὁ μὲν λαβὼν τὰς ναῦς ᾤχετο ἐς Κρήτην, καὶ μετὰ τῶν Πολιχνιτῶν ἐδῄου τὴν γῆν τῶν Κυδωνιατῶν, καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἀνέμων καὶ ἀπλοίας ἐνδιέτριψεν οὐκ ὀλίγον χρόνον:

[85] The Lacedaemonians at home now sent to the fleet three commissioners, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, to advise Cnemus. He was told that he must contrive to fight again and be more successful; he should not allow a few ships to keep him off the sea. The recent sea-fight had been the first attempt of the Lacedaemonians, and they were quite amazed and could not imagine that their own fleet was so inferior to that of the enemy. They suspected that there had been cowardice, not considering that the Athenians were old sailors and that they were only beginners. So they despatched the commissioners in a rage. On their arrival they and Cnemus sent round to the allied cities for ships, and equipped for action those which were on the spot. Phormio likewise sent home messengers to announce the victory, and at the same time to inform the Athenians of the preparations which the enemy were making. He told them to send him immediately as large a reinforcement as possible, for he might have to fight any day. They sent him twenty ships, but ordered the commander of them to go to Crete first; for Nicias of Gortys in Crete, who was the proxenus of the Athenians, had induced them to send a fleet against Cydonia, a hostile town which he promised to reduce. But he

really invited them to please the Polichnitae, who are neighbours of the Cydoniatae. So the Athenian commander took the ships, went to Crete, and joined the Polichnitae in ravaging the lands of the Cydoniatae; there, owing to contrary winds and bad weather, a considerable time was wasted.

86. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Κυλλήνῃ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐν τούτῳ ἐν ᾧ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ Κρήτην κατείχοντο, παρεσκευασμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν παρέπλευσαν ἐς Πάνορμον τὸν Ἀχαϊκόν, οὗπερ αὐτοῖς ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς τῶν Πελοποννησίων προσεβεβοηθήκει. [2] παρέπλευσε δὲ καὶ ὁ Φορμίων ἐπὶ τὸ Ῥίον τὸ Μολυκρικὸν καὶ ὡρμίσατο ἔξω αὐτοῦ ναυσὶν εἴκοσιν, αἷσπερ καὶ ἐναυμάχησεν. [3] ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ Ῥίον φίλιον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον Ῥίον ἐστὶν ἀντιπέρας, τὸ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ: διέχετον δὲ ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων σταδίους μάλιστα ἑπτὰ τῆς θαλάσσης, τοῦ δὲ Κρισαίου κόλπου στόμα τοῦτό ἐστιν. [4] ἐπὶ οὖν τῷ Ῥίῳ τῷ Ἀχαϊκῷ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἀπέχοντι οὐ πολὺ τοῦ Πανόρμου, ἐν ᾧ αὐτοῖς ὁ πεζὸς ἦν, ὡρμίσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ναυσὶν ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἶδον. [5] καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ἓξ ἢ ἑπτὰ ἡμέρας ἀνθώρμουν ἀλλήλοις μελετῶντές τε καὶ παρασκευαζόμενοι τὴν ναυμαχίαν, γνώμην ἔχοντες οἱ μὲν μὴ ἐκπλεῖν ἔξω τῶν Ῥίων ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, φοβούμενοι τὸ πρότερον πάθος, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐσπλεῖν ἐς τὰ στενά, νομίζοντες πρὸς ἐκείνων εἶναι τὴν ἐν ὀλίγῳ ναυμαχίαν. [6] ἔπειτα ὁ Κνῆμος καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν Πελοποννησίων στρατηγοί, βουλόμενοι ἐν τάχει τὴν ναυμαχίαν ποιῆσαι πρίν τι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβοηθῆσαι, ξυνεκάλεσαν τοὺς στρατιώτας πρῶτον, καὶ ὁρῶντες αὐτῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς διὰ τὴν προτέραν ἧσσαν φοβουμένους καὶ οὐ προθύμους ὄντας παρεκελεύσαντο καὶ ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.

[86] While the Athenians were detained in Crete the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, equipped for a naval engagement, coasted along to Panormus in Achaia, whither the Peloponnesian army had gone to co-operate with them. Phormio also coasted along to the Molycrian Rhium and

anchored outside the gulf with the twenty ships which had fought in the previous engagement. This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians; there is another Rhium on the opposite coast in Peloponnesus; the space between them, which is rather less than a mile, forms the mouth of the Crisaean Gulf. When the Peloponnesians saw that the Athenians had come to anchor, they likewise anchored with seventy-seven ships at the Rhium which is in Achaia, not far from Panormus where their land forces were stationed. For six or seven days the two fleets lay opposite one another, and were busy in practising and getting ready for the engagement — the one resolved not to sail into the open sea, fearing a recurrence of their disaster, the other not to sail into the strait, because the confined space was favourable to their enemies. At length Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian generals determined to bring on an engagement at once, and not wait until the Athenians too received their reinforcements. So they assembled their soldiers and, seeing that they were generally dispirited at their former defeat and reluctant to fight, encouraged them in the following words:

87. ‘ἡ μὲν γενομένη ναυμαχία, ὦ ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, εἴ τις ἄρα δι᾽ αὐτὴν ὑμῶν φοβεῖται τὴν μέλλουσαν, οὐχὶ δικαίαν ἔχει τέκμαρσιν τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι. [2] τῇ τε γὰρ παρασκευῇ ἐνδεὴς ἐγένετο, ὥσπερ ἴστε, καὶ οὐχὶ ἐς ναυμαχίαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐπλέομεν: ξυνέβη δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης οὐκ ὀλίγα ἐναντιωθῆναι, καί πού τι καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία πρῶτον ναυμαχοῦντας ἔσφηλεν. [3] ὥστε οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν κακίαν τὸ ἡσσᾶσθαι προσεγένετο, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τῆς γνώμης τὸ μὴ κατὰ κράτος νικηθέν, ἔχον δέ τινα ἐν αὐτῷ ἀντιλογίαν, τῆς γε ξυμφορᾶς τῷ ἀποβάντι ἀμβλύνεσθαι, νομίσαι δὲ ταῖς μὲν τύχαις ἐνδέχεσθαι σφάλλεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους,ταῖς δὲ γνώμαις τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ ὀρθῶς ἀνδρείους εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἀνδρείου παρόντος προβαλλομένους εἰκότως ἂν ἕν τινι κακοὺς γενέσθαι. [4] ὑμῶν δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἡ ἀπειρία τοσοῦτον λείπεται ὅσον

τόλμῃ προύχετε: τῶνδε δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἢν μάλιστα φοβεῖσθε, ἀνδρείαν μὲν ἔχουσα καὶ μνήμην ἕξει ἐν τῷ δεινῷ ἐπιτελεῖν ἃ ἔμαθεν, ἄνευ δὲ εὐψυχίας οὐδεμία τέχνη πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους ἰσχύει. φόβος γὰρ μνήμην ἐκπλήσσει, τέχνη δὲ ἄνευ ἀλκῆς οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ. [5] πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐμπειρότερον αὐτῶν τὸ τολμηρότερον ἀντιτάξασθε, πρὸς δὲ τὸ διὰ τὴν ἧσσαν δεδιέναι τὸ ἀπαράσκευοι τότε τυχεῖν. [6] περιγίγνεται δὲ ὑμῖν πλῆθός τε νεῶν καὶ πρὸς τῇ γῇ οἰκείᾳ οὔσῃ ὁπλιτῶν παρόντων ναυμαχεῖν: τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τῶν πλεόνων καὶ ἄμεινον παρεσκευασμένων τὸ κράτος ἐστίν. [7] ὥστε οὐδὲ καθ᾽ ἓν εὑρίσκομεν εἰκότως ἂν ἡμᾶς σφαλλομένους: καὶ ὅσα ἡμάρτομεν πρότερον, νῦν αὐτὰ ταῦτα προσγενόμενα διδασκαλίαν παρέξει. [8] θαρσοῦντες οὖν καὶ κυβερνῆται καὶ ναῦται τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος ἕπεσθε, χώραν μὴ προλείποντες ᾗ ἄν τις προσταχθῇ. [9] τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἡγεμόνων οὐ χεῖρον τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμεῖς παρασκευάσομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδώσομεν πρόφασιν οὐδενὶ κακῷ γενέσθαι: ἢν δέ τις ἄρα καὶ βουληθῇ, κολασθήσεται τῇ πρεπούσῃ ζημίᾳ, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τιμήσονται τοῖς προσήκουσιν ἄθλοις τῆς ἀρετῆς.’

[87] ‘The late sea-fight, Peloponnesians, may have made some of you anxious about the one which is impending, but it really affords no just ground for alarm. In that battle we were, as you know, ill-prepared, and our whole expedition had a military and not a naval object. Fortune was in many ways unpropitious to us, and this being our first sea-fight we may possibly have suffered a little from inexperience. The defeat which ensued was not the result of cowardice; nor should the unconquerable quality which is inherent in our minds, and refuses to acknowledge the victory of mere force, be depressed by the accident of the event. For though fortune may sometimes bring disaster, yet the spirit of a brave man is always the same, and while he retains his courage he will never allow inexperience to be an excuse for misbehaviour. And whatever be your own inexperience, it is more than compensated by your superiority in valour. The

skill of your enemies which you so greatly dread, if united with courage, may be able in the moment of danger to remember and execute the lesson which it has learned, but without courage no skill can do anything at such a time. For fear makes men forget, and skill which cannot fight is useless. And therefore against their greater skill set your own greater valour, and against the defeat which so alarms you set the fact that you were unprepared. But now you have a larger fleet; this turns the balance in your favour; and you will fight close to a friendly shore under the protection of heavy-armed troops. Victory is generally on the side of those who are more numerous and better equipped. So that we have absolutely no reason for anticipating failure. Even our mistakes will be an additional advantage, because they will be a lesson to us. Be of good courage, then, and let every one of you, pilot or sailor, do his own duty and maintain the post assigned to him. We will order the attack rather better than your old commanders, and so give nobody an excuse for cowardice. But, if any one should be inclined to waver, he shall be punished as he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with the due rewards of their valour.’

88. τοιαῦτα μὲν τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεκελεύσαντο. ὁ δὲ Φορμίων δεδιὼς καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὀρρωδίαν καὶ αἰσθόμενος ὅτι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεῶν κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ξυνιστάμενοι ἐφοβοῦντο, ἐβούλετο ξυγκαλέσας θαρσῦναί τε καὶ παραίνεσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ποιήσασθαι. [2] πρότερον μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ αὐτοῖς ἔλεγε καὶ προπαρεσκεύαζε τὰς γνώμας ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς πλῆθος νεῶν τοσοῦτον, ἢν ἐπιπλέῃ, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπομενετέον ἐστί, καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀξίωσιν ταύτην εἰλήφεσαν, μηδένα ὄχλον Ἀθηναῖοι ὄντες Πελοποννησίων νεῶν ὑποχωρεῖν: [3] τότε δὲ πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ὄψιν ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς ἀθυμοῦντας ἐβούλετο ὑπόμνησιν ποιήσασθαι τοῦ θαρσεῖν, καὶ ξυγκαλέσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

[88] Such were the words of encouragement addressed to the Peloponnesians by their commanders. Phormio too, fearing that his sailors might be frightened, and observing that they were gathering in knots and were evidently apprehensive of the enemy’s numbers, resolved to call them together and inspirit them by a suitable admonition. He had always been in the habit of telling them and training their minds to believe that no superiority of hostile forces could justify them in retreating. And it had long been a received opinion among the sailors that, as Athenians, they were bound to face any quantity of Peloponnesian ships. When, however, he found them dispirited by the sight which met their eyes, he determined to revive their drooping courage, and, having assembled them together, he spoke as follows:

89. ‘ὁρῶν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες στρατιῶται, πεφοβημένους τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων ξυνεκάλεσα, οὐκ ἀξιῶν τὰ μὴ δεινὰ ἐν ὀρρωδίᾳ ἔχειν. [2] οὗτοι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ προνενικῆσθαι καὶ μηδ᾽ αὐτοὶ οἴεσθαι ὁμοῖοι ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου παρεσκευάσαντο: ἔπειτα ᾧ μάλιστα πιστεύοντες προσέρχονται, ὡς προσῆκον σφίσιν ἀνδρείοις εἶναι, οὐ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι θαρσοῦσιν ἢ διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ πεζῷ ἐμπειρίαν τὰ πλείω κατορθοῦντες, καὶ οἴονται σφίσι καὶ ἐν τῷ ναυτικῷ ποιήσειν τὸ αὐτό. [3] τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου ἡμῖν μᾶλλον νῦν περιέσται, εἴπερ καὶ τούτοις ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἐπεὶ εὐψυχίᾳ γε οὐδὲν προφέρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἑκάτεροί τι εἶναι ἐμπειρότεροι θρασύτεροί ἐσμεν. [4] Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε ἡγούμενοι αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν σφετέραν δόξαν ἄκοντας προσάγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐς τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐνεχείρησαν ἡσσηθέντες παρὰ πολὺ αὖθις ναυμαχεῖν. [5] μὴ δὴ αὐτῶν τὴν τόλμαν δείσητε. πολὺ δὲ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνοις πλείω φόβον παρέχετε καὶ πιστότερον κατά τε τὸ προνενικηκέναι καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῦνται μὴ μέλλοντάς τι ἄξιον τοῦ παρὰ πολὺ πράξειν ἀνθίστασθαι ὑμᾶς. [6] ἀντίπαλοι μὲν γὰρ οἱ πλείους, ὥσπερ οὗτοι, τῇ δυνάμει τὸ πλέον πίσυνοι ἢ τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπέρχονται: οἱ δὲ ἐκ πολλῷ ὑποδεεστέρων, καὶ ἅμα οὐκ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, μέγα τι τῆς διανοίας τὸ βέβαιον

ἔχοντες ἀντιτολμῶσιν. ἃ λογιζόμενοι οὗτοι τῷ οὐκ εἰκότι πλέον πεφόβηνται ἡμᾶς ἢ τῇ κατὰ λόγον παρασκευῇ. [7] πολλὰ δὲ καὶ στρατόπεδα ἤδη ἔπεσεν ὑπ᾽ ἐλασσόνων τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ, ἔστι δὲ ἃ καὶ τῇ ἀτολμίᾳ: ὧν οὐδετέρου ἡμεῖς νῦν μετέχομεν. [8] τὸν δὲ ἀγῶνα οὐκ ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ ἑκὼν εἶναι ποιήσομαι οὐδ᾽ ἐσπλεύσομαι ἐς αὐτόν. ὁρῶ γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς πολλὰς ναῦς ἀνεπιστήμονας ὀλίγαις ναυσὶν ἐμπείροις καὶ ἄμεινον πλεούσαις ἡ στενοχωρία οὐ ξυμφέρει. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἐπιπλεύσειέ τις ὡς χρὴ ἐς ἐμβολήν, μὴ ἔχων τὴν πρόσοψιν τῶν πολεμίων ἐκ πολλοῦ, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἀποχωρήσειεν ἐν δέοντι πιεζόμενος: διέκπλοι τε οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδ᾽ ἀναστροφαί, ἅπερ νεῶν ἄμεινον πλεουσῶν ἔργα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη ἂν εἴη τὴν ναυμαχίαν πεζομαχίαν καθίστασθαι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ αἱ πλείους νῆες κρείσσους γίγνονται. [9] τούτων μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἔξω τὴν πρόνοιαν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: ὑμεῖς δὲ εὔτακτοι παρὰ ταῖς ναυσὶ μένοντες τά τε παραγγελλόμενα ὀξέως δέχεσθε, ἄλλως τε καὶ δι᾽ ὀλίγου τῆς ἐφορμήσεως οὔσης, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ κόσμον καὶ σιγὴν περὶ πλείστου ἡγεῖσθε, ὃ ἔς τε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολεμίων ξυμφέρει καὶ ναυμαχίᾳ οὐχ ἥκιστα, ἀμύνεσθέ τε τούσδε ἀξίως τῶν προειργασμένων. [10] ὁ δὲ ἀγὼν μέγας ὑμῖν, ἢ καταλῦσαι Πελοποννησίων τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἢ ἐγγυτέρω καταστῆσαι Ἀθηναίοις τὸν φόβον περὶ τῆς θαλάσσης. [11] ἀναμιμνῄσκω δ᾽ αὖ ὑμᾶς ὅτι νενικήκατε αὐτῶν τοὺς πολλούς: ἡσσημένων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν αἱ γνῶμαι πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς κινδύνους ὁμοῖαι εἶναι.’

[89] ‘Soldiers, I have summoned you because I see that you are alarmed at the numbers of the enemy, and I would not have you dismayed when there is nothing to fear. In the first place, the reason why they have provided a fleet so disproportionate is because we have defeated them already, and they can see themselves that they are no match for us; next, as to the courage which they suppose to be native to them and which is the ground of their confidence when they attack us, that reliance is merely inspired by the success which their experience on land usually gives them, and will,

as they fancy, equally ensure them by sea. But the superiority which we allow to them on land we may justly claim for ourselves at sea; for in courage at least we are their equals, and the superior confidence of either of us is really based upon greater experience. The Lacedaemonians lead the allies for their own honour and glory; the majority of them are dragged into battle against their will; if they were not compelled they would never have ventured after so great a defeat to fight again at sea. So that you need not fear their valour; they are far more afraid of you and with better reason, not only because you have already defeated them, but because they cannot believe that you would oppose them at all if you did not mean to do something worthy of that great victory. For most men when, like these Peloponnesians, they are a match for their enemies rely more upon their strength than upon their courage; but those who go into battle against far superior numbers and under no constraint must be inspired by some extraordinary force of resolution. Our enemies are well aware of this, and are more afraid of our surprising boldness than they would be if our forces were less out of proportion to their own. Many an army before now has been overthrown by smaller numbers owing to want of experience; some too through cowardice; and from both these faults we are certainly free. If I can help I shall not give battle in the gulf, or even sail into it. For I know that where a few vessels which are skilfully handled and are better sailers engage with a larger number which are badly managed the confined space is a disadvantage. Unless the captain of a ship see his enemy a good way off he cannot come on or strike properly; nor can he retreat when he is pressed hard. The manoeuvres suited to fast-sailing vessels, such as breaking of the line or returning to the charge, cannot be practised in a narrow space. The sea-fight must of necessity be reduced to a land-fight in which numbers tell. For all this I shall do my best to provide. Do you meanwhile keep order and remain close to your ships.

Be prompt in taking your instructions, for the enemy is near at hand and watching us. In the moment of action remember the value of silence and order, which are always important in war, especially at sea. Repel the enemy in a spirit worthy of your former exploits. There is much at stake; for you will either destroy the rising hope of the Peloponnesian navy, or bring home to Athens the fear of losing the sea. Once more I remind you that you have beaten most of the enemy's fleet already; and, once defeated, men do not meet the same dangers with their old spirit.' Thus did Phormio encourage his sailors.

90. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ὁ Φορμίων παρεκελεύσατο. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενά, βουλόμενοι ἄκοντας ἔσω προαγαγεῖν αὐτούς, ἀναγαγόμενοι ἅμα ἕῳ ἔπλεον, ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξιῷ κέρᾳ ἡγουμένῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὥρμουν: [2] ἐπὶ δ᾽ αὐτῷ εἴκοσιν ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτῃ παραπλέοι, μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, ἀλλ᾽ αὖται αἱ νῆες περικλῄσειαν. [3] ὁ δέ, ὅπερ ἐκεῖνοι προσεδέχοντο, φοβηθεὶς περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ ὄντι, ὡς ἑώρα ἀναγομένους αὐτούς, ἄκων καὶ κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐμβιβάσας ἔπλει παρὰ τὴν γῆν: καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα τῶν Μεσσηνίων παρεβοήθει. [4] ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι κατὰ μίαν ἐπὶ κέρως παραπλέοντας καὶ ἤδη ὄντας ἐντὸς τοῦ κόλπου τε καὶ πρὸς τῇ γῇ, ὅπερ ἐβούλοντο μάλιστα, ἀπὸ σημείου ἑνὸς ἄφνω ἐπιστρέψαντες τὰς ναῦς μετωπηδὸν ἔπλεον, ὡς εἶχε τάχους ἕκαστος, ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἤλπιζον πάσας τὰς ναῦς ἀπολήψεσθαι. [5] τῶν δὲ ἔνδεκα μέν τινες αἵπερ ἡγοῦντο ὑπεκφεύγουσι τὸ κέρας τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν: τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας ἐπικαταλαβόντες ἐξέωσάν τε πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὑποφευγούσας καὶ διέφθειραν, ἄνδρας τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπέκτειναν ὅσοι μὴ ἐξένευσαν αὐτῶν. [6] καὶ τῶν νεῶν τινὰς

ἀναδούμενοι εἶλκον κενάς μίαν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶλον ἤδη , τὰς δέ τινας οἱ Μεσσήνιοι παραβοηθήσαντες καὶ ἐπεσβαίνοντες ξὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐπιβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων μαχόμενοι ἀφείλοντο ἑλκομένας ἤδη.

[90] The Peloponnesians, when they found that the Athenians would not enter the straits or the gulf, determined to draw them in against their will. So they weighed anchor early in the morning, and, ranging their ships four deep, stood in towards the gulf along their own coast, keeping the order in which they were anchored. The right wing, consisting of twenty of their fastest vessels, took the lead. These were intended to close upon the Athenians and prevent them from eluding their attack and getting beyond the wing in case Phormio, apprehending an attack upon Naupactus, should sail along shore to its aid. He, when he saw them weighing anchor, was alarmed, as they anticipated, for the safety of the town, which was undefended. Against his will and in great haste he embarked and sailed along the shore; the land forces of the Messenians followed. The Peloponnesians, seeing that the enemy were in single file and were already within the gulf and close to land, which was exactly what they wanted, at a given signal suddenly brought their ships round, and the whole line faced the Athenians and bore down upon them, every ship rowing at the utmost speed, for they hoped to cut off all the Athenian fleet. Eleven vessels which were in advance evaded the sudden turn of the Peloponnesians, and rowed past their right wing into the open water; but they caught the rest, forced them aground, and disabled them. All the sailors who did not swim out of them were slain. Some of the empty ships they fastened to their own and began to tow away; one they had already taken with the crew, but others were saved by the Messenians, who came to the rescue, dashed armed as they were into the sea, boarded

them, and, fighting from their decks when they were being already towed away, finally recovered them.

91. ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐκράτουν τε καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναῦς: αἱ δὲ εἴκοσι νῆες αὐτῶν αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως ἐδίωκον τὰς ἔνδεκα ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἵπερ ὑπεξέφυγον τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν. καὶ φθάνουσιν αὐτοὺς πλὴν μιᾶς νεὼς προκαταφυγοῦσαι ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον, καὶ σχοῦσαι ἀντίπρῳροι κατὰ τὸ Ἀπολλώνιον παρεσκευάζοντο ἀμυνούμενοι, ἢν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐπὶ σφᾶς πλέωσιν. [2] οἱ δὲ παραγενόμενοι ὕστερον ἐπαιάνιζόν τε ἅμα πλέοντες ὡς νενικηκότες, καὶ τὴν μίαν ναῦν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὴν ὑπόλοιπον ἐδίωκε Λευκαδία ναῦς μία πολὺ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων. [3] ἔτυχε δὲ ὁλκὰς ὁρμοῦσα μετέωρος, περὶ ἣν ἡ Ἀττικὴ ναῦς φθάσασα καὶ περιπλεύσασα τῇ Λευκαδίᾳ διωκούσῃ ἐμβάλλει μέσῃ καὶ καταδύει. [4] τοῖς μὲν οὖν Πελοποννησίοις γενομένου τούτου ἀπροσδοκήτου τε καὶ παρὰ λόγον φόβος ἐμπίπτει, καὶ ἅμα ἀτάκτως διώκοντες διὰ τὸ κρατεῖν αἱ μέν τινες τῶν νεῶν καθεῖσαι τὰς κώπας ἐπέστησαν τοῦ πλοῦ, ἀξύμφορον δρῶντες πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ὀλίγου ἀντεφόρμησιν, βουλόμενοι τὰς πλείους περιμεῖναι, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς βράχεα ἀπειρίᾳ χωρίων ὤκειλαν.

[91] While in this part of the engagement the Lacedaemonians had the victory and routed the Athenian ships, their twenty vessels on the right wing were pursuing the eleven of the Athenians which had escaped from their attack into the open water of the gulf. These fled and, with the exception of one, arrived at Naupactus before their pursuers. They stopped off the temple of Apollo, and, turning their beaks outward, prepared to defend themselves in case the enemy followed them to the land. The Peloponnesians soon came up; they were singing a paean of victory as they rowed, and one Leucadian ship far in advance of the rest was chasing the single Athenian ship which had been left behind. There chanced to be anchored in the deep water a merchant vessel, round which the

Athenian ship rowed just in time, struck the Leucadian amidships, and sank her. At this sudden and unexpected feat the Peloponnesians were dismayed; they had been carrying on the pursuit in disorder because of their success. And some of them, dropping the blades of their oars, halted, intending to await the rest, which was a foolish thing to do when the enemy were so near and ready to attack them. Others, not knowing the coast, ran aground.

92. τοὺς δ᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἰδόντας ταῦτα γιγνόμενα θάρσος τε ἔλαβε, καὶ ἀπὸ ἑνὸς κελεύσματος ἐμβοήσαντες ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὥρμησαν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀταξίαν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον ὑπέμειναν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐτράποντο ἐς τὸν Πάνορμον, ὅθενπερ ἀνηγάγοντο. [2] ἐπιδιώκοντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τάς τε ἐγγὺς οὔσας μάλιστα ναῦς ἔλαβον ἓξ καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀφείλοντο, ἃς ἐκεῖνοι πρὸς τῇ γῇ διαφθείραντες τὸ πρῶτον ἀνεδήσαντο: ἄνδρας τε τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τινὰς δὲ καὶ ἐζώγρησαν. [3] ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Λευκαδίας νεώς, ἣ περὶ τὴν ὁλκάδα κατέδυ, Τιμοκράτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος πλέων, ὡς ἡ ναῦς διεφθείρετο, ἔσφαξεν ἑαυτόν, καὶ ἐξέπεσεν ἐς τὸν Ναυπακτίων λιμένα. [4] ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖον ἔστησαν, ὅθεν ἀναγαγόμενοι ἐκράτησαν, καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τὰ ναυάγια ὅσα πρὸς τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἦν ἀνείλοντο, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τὰ ἐκείνων ὑπόσπονδα ἀπέδοσαν. [5] ἔστησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τροπαῖον ὡς νενικηκότες τῆς τροπῆς, ἃς πρὸς τῇ γῇ διέφθειραν ναῦς: καὶ ἥνπερ ἔλαβον ναῦν, ἀνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Ῥίον τὸ Ἀχαϊκὸν παρὰ τὸ τροπαῖον. [6] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα φοβούμενοι τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν ὑπὸ νύκτα ἐσέπλευσαν ἐς τὸν κόλπον τὸν Κρισαῖον καὶ Κόρινθον ἅπαντες πλὴν Λευκαδίων. [7] καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Κρήτης Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσίν, αἷς ἔδει πρὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας τῷ Φορμίωνι παραγενέσθαι, οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως τῶν νεῶν ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[92] When the Athenians saw what was going on their hopes revived, and at a given signal they charged their enemies

with a shout. The Lacedaemonians did not long resist, for they had made mistakes and were all in confusion, but fled to Panormus, whence they had put to sea. The Athenians pursued them, took six of their ships which were nearest to them, and recovered their own ships which the Peloponnesians had originally disabled and taken in tow near the shore. The crews of the captured vessels were either slain or made prisoners. Timocrates the Lacedaemonian was on board the Leucadian ship which went down near the merchant vessel; when he saw the ship sinking he killed himself; the body was carried into the harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians then retired and raised a trophy on the place from which they had just sailed out to their victory. They took up the bodies and wrecks which were floating near their own shore, and gave back to the enemy, under a flag of truce, those which belonged to them. The Lacedaemonians also set up a trophy of the victory which they had gained over the ships destroyed by them near the shore; the single ship which they took they dedicated on the Achaean Rhium, close to the trophy. Then, fearing the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements, they sailed away at nightfall to the Crisaean Gulf and to Corinth, all with the exception of the Leucadians. And not long after their retreat the twenty Athenian ships from Crete, which ought to have come to the assistance of Phormio before the battle, arrived at Naupactus. So the summer ended.

93. πρὶν δὲ διαλῦσαι τὸ ἐς Κόρινθόν τε καὶ τὸν Κρισαῖον κόλπον ἀναχωρῆσαν ναυτικόν, ὁ Κνῆμος καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄρχοντες τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἀρχομένου τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐβούλοντο διδαξάντων Μεγαρέων ἀποπειρᾶσαι τοῦ Πειραιῶς τοῦ λιμένος τῶν Ἀθηναίων: ἦν δὲ ἀφύλακτος καὶ ἄκλῃστος εἰκότως διὰ τὸ ἐπικρατεῖν πολὺ τῷ ναυτικῷ. [2] ἐδόκει δὲ λαβόντα τῶν ναυτῶν ἕκαστον τὴν κώπην καὶ τὸ ὑπηρέσιον καὶ τὸν τροπωτῆρα πεζῇ ἰέναι ἐκ Κορίνθου ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἀθήνας θάλασσαν καὶ ἀφικομένους κατὰ τάχος ἐς Μέγαρα καθελκύσαντας ἐκ Νισαίας τοῦ νεωρίου αὐτῶν τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς, αἳ ἔτυχον αὐτόθι οὖσαι, πλεῦσαι εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ: [3] οὔτε γὰρ ναυτικὸν ἦν προφυλάσσον ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδὲν οὔτε προσδοκία οὐδεμία μὴ ἄν ποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐξαπιναίως οὕτως ἐπιπλεύσειαν, ἐπεὶ οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς τολμῆσαι ἂν καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν, οὐδ᾽ εἰ διενοοῦντο, μὴ οὐκ ἂν προαισθέσθαι. [4] ὡς δὲ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐχώρουν εὐθύς: καὶ ἀφικόμενοι νυκτὸς καὶ καθελκύσαντες ἐκ τῆς Νισαίας τὰς ναῦς ἔπλεον ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Πειραιᾶ οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ διενοοῦντο, καταδείσαντες τὸν κίνδυνον καί τις καὶ ἄνεμος αὐτοὺς λέγεται κωλῦσαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Σαλαμῖνος τὸ ἀκρωτήριον τὸ πρὸς Μέγαρα ὁρῶν: καὶ φρούριον ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἦν καὶ νεῶν τριῶν φυλακὴ τοῦ μὴ ἐσπλεῖν Μεγαρεῦσι μηδὲ ἐκπλεῖν μηδέν. τῷ τε φρουρίῳ προσέβαλον καὶ τὰς τριήρεις ἀφείλκυσαν κενάς, τήν τε ἄλλην Σαλαμῖνα ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἐπιπεσόντες ἐπόρθουν.

[93] Before breaking up the fleet which had returned to Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, it being now the beginning of winter, wished to make an attempt, suggested by some Megarians, on Piraeus, the harbour of Athens. The entrance was unclosed and unguarded; as was natural, since the Athenians were complete masters of the sea. Each sailor was to carry his cushion and his oar with its thong, and cross on foot with all haste from Corinth to the Athenian side of the Isthmus; they were to go to Megara and from Nisaea, the harbour of Megara, to launch forty ships which happened to

be lying in the docks; thence they were to sail straight for the Piraeus. No guard ships were stationed there, for no one ever expected that the enemy would attempt a surprise of this kind. As to an open and deliberate attack, how was he likely to venture on that? and if he even entertained such a design, would he not have been found out in time?The plan was immediately carried out. Arriving at night, they launched the ships from Nisaea and sailed away, but not to the Piraeus; the danger seemed too great, and also the wind is said to have been unfavourable. So they gave up their original idea and made for the projecting point of Salamis which looks towards Megara; here there was a fort, and three ships were stationed in order to prevent anything being conveyed by sea into or out of Megara. This fort they assailed, towed away the ships without their crews, and ravaged the rest of Salamis which was unprepared for their attack.

94. ἐς δὲ τὰς Ἀθήνας φρυκτοί τε ᾔροντο πολέμιοι καὶ ἔκπληξις ἐγένετο οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐλάσσων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ᾤοντο τοὺς πολεμίους ἐσπεπλευκέναι ἤδη, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ τήν τε Σαλαμῖνα ᾑρῆσθαι καὶ παρὰ σφᾶς ὅσον οὐκ ἐσπλεῖν αὐτούς: ὅπερ ἄν, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν μὴ κατοκνῆσαι, ῥᾳδίως ἐγένετο, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄνεμος ἐκώλυσεν. [2] βοηθήσαντες δὲ ἅμ᾽ ἡμέρᾳ πανδημεὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ναῦς τε καθεῖλκον καὶ ἐσβάντες κατὰ σπουδὴν καὶ πολλῷ θορύβῳ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶν ἐπὶ τὴν Σαλαμῖνα ἔπλεον, τῷ πεζῷ δὲ φυλακὰς τοῦ Πειραιῶς καθίσταντο. [3] οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ὡς ᾔσθοντο τὴν βοήθειαν, καταδραμόντες τῆς Σαλαμῖνος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λείαν λαβόντες καὶ τὰς τρεῖς ναῦς ἐκ τοῦ Βουδόρου τοῦ φρουρίου κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τῆς Νισαίας ἀπέπλεον: ἔστι γὰρ ὅτι καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτοὺς διὰ χρόνου καθελκυσθεῖσαι καὶ οὐδὲν στέγουσαι ἐφόβουν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς τὰ Μέγαρα πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς Κορίνθου ἀπεχώρησαν πεζῇ: [4] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι καταλαβόντες πρὸς τῇ Σαλαμῖνι ἀπέπλευσαν καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο φυλακὴν ἤδη τοῦ

Πειραιῶς μᾶλλον τὸ λοιπὸν ἐποιοῦντο λιμένων τε κλῄσει καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπιμελείᾳ.

[94] By this time fire-signals had carried the alarm to Athens. Nothing which happened in the war caused a greater panic. The inhabitants of the city thought that the enemy had already sailed into the Piraeus; the belief in the Piraeus was that Salamis had been taken and that the enemy were on the point of sailing into the harbour, which, if they had been bolder, they might easily have done, and no wind would have prevented them. But as soon as day dawned, the Athenians, coming down with the whole strength of the city to the Piraeus, launched their ships and, embarking in tumultuous haste, sailed to Salamis, while their land-forces remained and guarded the Piraeus. When the Peloponnesians saw the fleet coming they sailed quickly back to Nisaea, but not until they had ravaged the greater part of Salamis and taken many prisoners and much spoil, as well as the three ships which lay off the fort of Budorum. There was some apprehension about their own ships; for they had long been lain up and were not sea-worthy. Arriving at Megara they marched back again to Corinth, and the Athenians, having failed to overtake them in Salamis, sailed back likewise. Henceforth they kept more careful watch over the Piraeus, among other precautions closing the entrance to the harbour.

95. ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους, τοῦ χειμῶνος τούτου ἀρχομένου, Σιτάλκης ὁ Τήρεω Ὀδρύσης Θρᾳκῶν βασιλεὺς ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Περδίκκαν τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου Μακεδονίας βασιλέα καὶ ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, δύο ὑποσχέσεις τὴν μὲν βουλόμενος ἀναπρᾶξαι, τὴν δὲ αὐτὸς ἀποδοῦναι. [2] ὅ τε γὰρ Περδίκκας αὐτῷ ὑποσχόμενος, εἰ Ἀθηναίοις τε διαλλάξειεν ἑαυτὸν κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τῷ πολέμῳ πιεζόμενον καὶ Φίλιππον τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ πολέμιον ὄντα μὴ καταγάγοι ἐπὶ βασιλείᾳ, ἃ ὑπεδέξατο οὐκ ἐπετέλει: τοῖς τε Ἀθηναίοις αὐτὸς ὡμολογήκει, ὅτε τὴν ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιεῖτο, τὸν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης Χαλκιδικὸν πόλεμον καταλύσειν. [3]

ἀμφοτέρων οὖν ἕνεκα τὴν ἔφοδον ἐποιεῖτο καὶ τόν τε Φιλίππου υἱὸν Ἀμύνταν ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλείᾳ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἦγε καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις, οἳ ἔτυχον παρόντες τούτων ἕνεκα, καὶ ἡγεμόνα Ἄγνωνα: ἔδει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ναυσί τε καὶ στρατιᾷ ὡς πλείστῃ ἐπὶ τοὺς Χαλκιδέας παραγενέσθαι.

[95] About the same time, at the beginning of winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, the son of Teres, king of Thrace, made war upon Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, king of Macedon, and upon the Thracian Chalcidians. There were two promises, of which he wished to perform one, and exact fulfilment of the other. The promise of which he claimed fulfilment had been made to him by Perdiccas, when, being hard pressed at the beginning of the war, he wanted Sitalces to reconcile him to the Athenians, and not to restore and place on the throne his brother Philip, who was his enemy; but Perdiccas did not keep his word. The other was a promise which Sitalces had himself made to the Athenians when he entered into alliance with them, that he would put an end to their war with the Chalcidians. For these two reasons he invaded the country, taking with him Amyntas the son of Philip, whom he intended to make king of Macedon, and also certain Athenian envoys who had just come to remind him of his engagement, and an Athenian commander Hagnon. For the Athenians on their part were bound to assist him against the Chalcidians with ships and with as large an army as they could provide.

96. ἀνίστησιν οὖν ἐκ τῶν Ὀδρυσῶν ὁρμώμενος πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ἐντὸς τοῦ Αἵμου τε ὄρους καὶ τῆς Ῥοδόπης Θρᾳκας, ὅσων ἦρχε μέχρι θαλάσσης [ἐς τὸν Εὔξεινόν τε πόντον καὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον], ἔπειτα τοὺς ὑπερβάντι Αἷμον Γέτας καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα μέρη ἐντὸς τοῦ Ἴστρου ποταμοῦ πρὸς θάλασσαν μᾶλλον τὴν τοῦ Εὐξείνου πόντου κατῴκητο: εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἱ Γέται καὶ οἱ ταύτῃ ὅμοροί τε τοῖς Σκύθαις καὶ ὁμόσκευοι, πάντες ἱπποτοξόται. [2] παρεκάλει δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρεινῶν Θρᾳκῶν πολλοὺς τῶν αὐτονόμων καὶ

μαχαιροφόρων, οἳ Δῖοι καλοῦνται, τὴν Ῥοδόπην οἱ πλεῖστοι οἰκοῦντες: καὶ τοὺς μὲν μισθῷ ἔπειθεν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐθελονταὶ ξυνηκολούθουν. [3] ἀνίστη δὲ καὶ Ἀγριᾶνας καὶ Λαιαίους καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα ἔθνη Παιονικὰ ὧν ἦρχε καὶ ἔσχατοι τῆς ἀρχῆς οὗτοι ἦσαν: μέχρι γὰρ Λαιαίων Παιόνων καὶ τοῦ Στρυμόνος ποταμοῦ, ὃς ἐκ τοῦ Σκόμβρου ὄρους δι᾽ Ἀγριάνων καὶ Λαιαίων ῥεῖ, [οὗ] ὡρίζετο ἡ ἀρχὴ τὰ πρὸς Παίονας αὐτονόμους ἤδη. [4] τὰ δὲ πρὸς Τριβαλλούς, καὶ τούτους αὐτονόμους, Τρῆρες ὥριζον καὶ Τιλαταῖοι: οἰκοῦσι δ᾽ οὗτοι πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ Σκόμβρου ὄρους καὶ παρήκουσι πρὸς ἡλίου δύσιν μέχρι τοῦ Ὀσκίου ποταμοῦ. ῥεῖ δ᾽ οὗτος ἐκ τοῦ ὄρους ὅθενπερ καὶ ὁ Νέστος καὶ ὁ Ἕβρος: ἔστι δὲ ἐρῆμον τὸ ὄρος καὶ μέγα, ἐχόμενον τῆς Ῥοδόπης.

[96] Accordingly Sitalces, beginning with the Odrysae, made a levy of all his Thracian subjects dwelling between Mount Haemus and Mount Rhodopè as far as the shores of the Euxine and of the Hellespont. Beyond the Haemus he made a levy of the Getae and of all the tribes lying more towards the Euxine on this side of the Ister. Now the Getae and their neighbours border on the Scythians, and are equipped like them, for they are all horse-archers. He also summoned to his standard many of the highland Thracians, who are independent and carry dirks; they are called Dii, and most of them inhabit Mount Rhodope; of these some were attracted by pay, while others came as volunteers. He further called out the Agrianians, the Laeaeans, and the other Paeonian nations who were his subjects. These tribes were the last within his empire; they extended as far as the Graaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which rises in Mount Scombrus and flows through the country of the Graaeans and Laeaeans; there his dominion ended and the independent Paeonians began. In the direction of the Triballi, who are likewise independent, the Treres and the Tilataeans formed his boundary. These tribes dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and reach westward as far as the Oscius. This river rises in the same mountains as the Nestus

and the Hebrus, an uninhabited and extensive range which adjoins Rhodopè.

97. ἐγένετο δὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ Ὀδρυσῶν μέγεθος ἐπὶ μὲν θάλασσαν καθήκουσα ἀπὸ Ἀβδήρων πόλεως ἐς τὸν Εὔξεινον πόντον μέχρι Ἴστρου ποταμοῦ: αὕτη περίπλους ἐστὶν ἡ γῆ τὰ ξυντομώτατα, ἢν αἰεὶ κατὰ πρύμναν ἱστῆται τὸ πνεῦμα, νηὶ στρογγύλῃ τεσσάρων ἡμερῶν καὶ ἴσων νυκτῶν: ὁδῷ δὲ τὰ ξυντομώτατα ἐξ Ἀβδήρων ἐς Ἴστρον ἀνὴρ εὖζωνος ἐνδεκαταῖος τελεῖ. [2] τὰ μὲν πρὸς θάλασσαν τοσαύτη ἦν, ἐς ἤπειρον δὲ ἀπὸ Βυζαντίου ἐς Λαιαίους καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Στρυμόνα ταύτῃ γὰρ διὰ πλείστου ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἄνω ἐγίγνετο ἡμερῶν ἀνδρὶ εὐζώνῳ τριῶν καὶ δέκα ἀνύσαι. [3] φόρος τε ἐκ πάσης τῆς βαρβάρου καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ὅσον προσῆξαν ἐπὶ Σεύθου, ὃς ὕστερον Σιτάλκου βασιλεύσας πλεῖστον δὴ ἐποίησε, τετρακοσίων ταλάντων ἀργυρίου μάλιστα δύναμις, ἃ χρυσὸς καὶ ἄργυρος ᾖει: καὶ δῶρα οὐκ ἐλάσσω τούτων χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου προσεφέρετο, χωρὶς δὲ ὅσα ὑφαντά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευή, καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς παραδυναστεύουσί τε καὶ γενναίοις Ὀδρυσῶν. [4] κατεστήσαντο γὰρ τοὐναντίον τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας τὸν νόμον, ὄντα μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Θρᾳξί, λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἢ διδόναι καὶ αἴσχιον ἦν αἰτηθέντα μὴ δοῦναι ἢ αἰτήσαντα μὴ τυχεῖν, ὅμως δὲ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῷ ἐχρήσαντο: οὐ γὰρ ἦν πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν μὴ διδόντα δῶρα. ὥστε ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ βασιλεία ἦλθεν ἰσχύος. [5] τῶν γὰρ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ὅσαι μεταξὺ τοῦ Ἰονίου κόλπου καὶ τοῦ Εὐξείνου πόντου μεγίστη ἐγένετο χρημάτων προσόδῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἰσχύι δὲ μάχης καὶ στρατοῦ πλήθει πολὺ δευτέρα μετὰ τὴν Σκυθῶν. [6] ταύτῃ δὲ ἀδύνατα ἐξισοῦσθαι οὐχ ὅτι τὰ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ἔθνος ἓν πρὸς ἓν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι δυνατὸν Σκύθαις ὁμογνωμονοῦσι πᾶσιν ἀντιστῆναι. οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην εὐβουλίαν καὶ ξύνεσιν περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἐς τὸν βίον ἄλλοις ὁμοιοῦνται.

[97] The empire of the Odrysae measured by the coast-line reaches from the city of Abdera to the mouth of the Ister in

the Euxine. The voyage round can be made by a merchant vessel, if the wind is favourable the whole way, at the quickest in four days and as many nights. Or an expeditious traveller going by land from Abdera to the mouth of the Ister, if he takes the shortest route, will accomplish the journey in eleven days. Such was the extent of the Odrysian empire towards the sea: up the country the land journey from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and to the Strymon, this being the longest line which can be drawn from the sea into the interior, may be accomplished by an expeditious traveller in thirteen days. The tribute which was collected from the Hellenic cities and from all the barbarous nations in the reign of Seuthes, the successor of Sitalces, under whom the amount was greatest, was valued at about four hundred talents of coined money, reckoning only gold and silver. Presents of gold and silver equal in value to the tribute, besides stuffs embroidered or plain and other articles, were also brought, not only to the king himself, but to the inferior chiefs and nobles of the Odrysae. For their custom was the opposite of that which prevailed in the Persian kingdom; they were more ready to receive than to give; and he who asked and was refused was not so much discredited as he who refused when he was asked. The same custom prevailed among the other Thracians in a less degree, but among the Odrysae, who were richer, more extensively; nothing could be done without presents. By these means the kingdom became very powerful, and in revenue and general prosperity exceeded all the nations of Europe which lie between the Ionian Sea and the Euxine; in the size and strength of their army being second only, though far inferior, to the Scythians. For if the Scythians were united, there is no nation which could compare with them, or would be capable of resisting them; I do not say in Europe, but even in Asia — not that they are at all on a level with other nations in sense, or in that intelligence which uses to advantage the ordinary means of life.

98. Σιτάλκης μὲν οὖν χώρας τοσαύτης βασιλεύων παρεσκευάζετο τὸν στρατόν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ἄρας ἐπορεύετο ἐπὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς, ἔπειτα διὰ Κερκίνης ἐρήμου ὄρους, ὅ ἐστι μεθόριον Σιντῶν καὶ Παιόνων: ἐπορεύετο δὲ δι᾽ αὐτοῦ τῇ ὁδῷ ἣν πρότερον αὐτὸς ἐποιήσατο τεμὼν τὴν ὕλην, ὅτε ἐπὶ Παίονας ἐστράτευσεν. [2] τὸ δὲ ὄρος ἐξ Ὀδρυσῶν διιόντες ἐν δεξιᾷ μὲν εἶχον Παίονας, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δὲ Σιντοὺς καὶ Μαιδούς. διελθόντες δὲ αὐτὸ ἀφίκοντο ἐς Δόβηρον τὴν Παιονικήν. [3] πορευομένῳ δὲ αὐτῷ ἀπεγίγνετο μὲν οὐδὲν τοῦ στρατοῦ εἰ μή τι νόσῳ, προσεγίγνετο δέ: πολλοὶ γὰρ τῶν αὐτονόμων Θρᾳκῶν ἀπαράκλητοι ἐφ᾽ ἁρπαγὴν ἠκολούθουν, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος λέγεται οὐκ ἔλασσον πέντε καὶ δέκα μυριάδων γενέσθαι: [4] καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν πλέον πεζὸν ἦν, τριτημόριον δὲ μάλιστα ἱππικόν. τοῦ δ᾽ ἱππικοῦ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοὶ Ὀδρύσαι παρείχοντο καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς Γέται. τοῦ δὲ πεζοῦ οἱ μαχαιροφόροι μαχιμώτατοι μὲν ἦσαν οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ῥοδόπης αὐτόνομοι καταβάντες, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ξύμμεικτος πλήθει φοβερώτατος ἠκολούθει.

[98] Such was the great country over which Sitalces ruled. When he had collected his army and his preparations were complete he marched into Macedonia, passing first of all through his own territory, and then through Cercinè, a desert mountain which lies between the Sinti and the Paeonians. He went by the road which he had himself constructed when he made his expedition against the Paeonians and cut down the forest. As he left the Odrysian territory in going through the mountain he had on the right hand the Paeonians and on the left hand the Sinti and Maedi; on quitting the mountain he arrived at Doberus in Paeonia. He lost no part of his army on the march, except by sickness, but rather increased it; for many of the independent Thracian tribes followed him of their own accord in hopes of plunder. The whole number of his forces was estimated at a hundred and fifty thousand, of which about two-thirds were infantry and the rest cavalry. The

largest part of the cavalry was furnished by the Odrysae themselves, and the next largest by the Getae. Of the infantry, those armed with dirks who came from the independent tribes of Mount Rhodopè were the most warlike. The remainder of the army was a mixed multitude, chiefly formidable from its numbers.

99. ξυνηθροίζοντο οὖν ἐν τῇ Δοβήρῳ καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο, ὅπως κατὰ κορυφὴν ἐσβαλοῦσιν ἐς τὴν κάτω Μακεδονίαν, ἧς ὁ Περδίκκας ἦρχεν. [2] τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ Ἐλιμιῶται καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη ἐπάνωθεν, ἃ ξύμμαχα μέν ἐστι τούτοις καὶ ὑπήκοα, βασιλείας δ᾽ ἔχει καθ᾽ αὑτά. [3] τὴν δὲ παρὰ θάλασσαν νῦν Μακεδονίαν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Περδίκκου πατὴρ καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι αὐτοῦ, Τημενίδαι τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄντες ἐξ Ἄργους, πρῶτοι ἐκτήσαντο καὶ ἐβασίλευσαν ἀναστήσαντες μάχῃ ἐκ μὲν Πιερίας Πίερας, οἳ ὕστερον ὑπὸ τὸ Πάγγαιον πέραν Στρυμόνος ᾤκησαν Φάγρητα καὶ ἄλλα χωρία καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πιερικὸς κόλπος καλεῖται ἡ ὑπὸ τῷ Παγγαίῳ πρὸς θάλασσαν γῆ, ἐκ δὲ τῆς Βοττίας καλουμένης Βοττιαίους, οἳ νῦν ὅμοροι Χαλκιδέων οἰκοῦσιν: [4] τῆς δὲ Παιονίας παρὰ τὸν Ἀξιὸν ποταμὸν στενήν τινα καθήκουσαν ἄνωθεν μέχρι Πέλλης καὶ θαλάσσης ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ πέραν Ἀξιοῦ μέχρι Στρυμόνος τὴν Μυγδονίαν καλουμένην Ἠδῶνας ἐξελάσαντες νέμονται. [5] ἀνέστησαν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς νῦν Ἐορδίας καλουμένης Ἐορδούς, ὧν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐφθάρησαν, βραχὺ δέ τι αὐτῶν περὶ Φύσκαν κατῴκηται, καὶ ἐξ Ἀλμωπίας Ἄλμωπας. [6] ἐκράτησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν οἱ Μακεδόνες οὗτοι, ἃ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔχουσι, τόν τε Ἀνθεμοῦντα καὶ Κρηστωνίαν καὶ Βισαλτίαν καὶ Μακεδόνων αὐτῶν πολλήν. τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν Μακεδονία καλεῖται, καὶ Περδίκκας Ἀλεξάνδρου βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν ἦν ὅτε Σιτάλκης ἐπῄει.

[99] Having mustered at Doberus, they made ready to descend over the heights into the plains of Macedonia, which were the territory of Perdiccas. There is an upper Macedonia, which is inhabited by Lyncestians, Elimiots, and

other tribes; these are the allies and tributaries of the lower Macedonians, but have kings of their own. The maritime country which we now call Macedonia was conquered and formed into a kingdom by Alexander the father of Perdiccas and his ancestors the Temenidae, who originally came from Argos. They defeated and drove out of Pieria the Pierians, who afterwards settled in Phagres and other places at the foot of Mount Pangaeus, beyond the Strymon; the land which lies under Mount Pangaeus towards the sea is still called the Pierian vale. They also drove out of Bottia, as it is called, the Bottiaeans, who are now the neighbours of the Chalcidians, and they acquired a narrow strip of Paeonia by the river Axius, reaching down to Pella and the sea. Beyond the Axius they possess the country called Mygdonia reaching to the Strymon, out of which they have driven the Edonians. They expelled from the country still called Eordia the Eordians, of whom the greater part perished, but a small remnant of them settled in the neighbourhood of Physca; and from Almopia the Almopians. They and their subjects further subdued and still hold various places belonging to other tribes, Anthemus, Grestonia, Bisaltia, and a great part of the original Macedonia. But the whole of this country is now called Macedonia, and was under the rule of Perdiccas the son of Alexander at the time of the invasion of Sitalces.

100. καὶ οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες οὗτοι ἐπιόντος πολλοῦ στρατοῦ ἀδύνατοι ὄντες ἀμύνεσθαι ἔς τε τὰ καρτερὰ καὶ τὰ τείχη, ὅσα ἦν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, ἐσεκομίσθησαν. [2] ἦν δὲ οὐ πολλά, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Περδίκκου υἱὸς βασιλεὺς γενόμενος τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ᾠκοδόμησε καὶ ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε καὶ τἆλλα διεκόσμησε τά [τε] κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ κρείσσονι ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι βασιλῆς ὀκτὼ οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι. [3] ὁ δὲ στρατὸς τῶν Θρᾳκῶν ἐκ τῆς Δοβήρου ἐσέβαλε πρῶτον μὲν ἐς τὴν Φιλίππου πρότερον οὖσαν ἀρχήν, καὶ εἷλεν Εἰδομενὴν μὲν κατὰ κράτος, Γορτυνίαν δὲ καὶ Ἀταλάντην καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα χωρία ὁμολογίᾳ διὰ τὴν Ἀμύντου

φιλίαν προσχωροῦντα τοῦ Φιλίππου υἱέος παρόντος: Εὐρωπὸν δὲ ἐπολιόρκησαν μέν, ἑλεῖν δὲ οὐκ ἐδύναντο. [4] ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Μακεδονίαν προυχώρει τὴν ἐν ἀριστερᾷ Πέλλης καὶ Κύρρου. ἔσω δὲ τούτων ἐς τὴν Βοττιαίαν καὶ Πιερίαν οὐκ ἀφίκοντο,ἀλλὰ τήν τε Μυγδονίαν καὶ Κρηστωνίαν καὶ Ἀνθεμοῦντα ἐδῄουν. [5] οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες πεζῷ μὲν οὐδὲ διενοοῦντο ἀμύνεσθαι, ἵππους δὲ προσμεταπεμψάμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω ξυμμάχων, ὅπῃ δοκοίη, ὀλίγοι πρὸς πολλοὺς ἐσέβαλλον ἐς τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Θρᾳκῶν. καὶ ᾗ μὲν προσπέσοιεν, οὐδεὶς ὑπέμενεν ἄνδρας ἱππέας τε ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τεθωρακισμένους, ὑπὸ δὲ πλήθους περικλῃόμενοι αὐτοὺς πολλαπλασίῳ τῷ ὁμίλῳ ἐς κίνδυνον καθίστασαν, ὥστε τέλος ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, οὐ νομίζοντες ἱκανοὶ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πλέον κινδυνεύειν.

[100] The Macedonians were unable to defend themselves against the onset of so vast a host; they therefore retired into their strongholds and forts, which at that time were few. For those which now exist were built by Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, who, when he became king, made straight roads and in various ways improved the country. In his force of cavalry and infantry and in his military resources generally he surpassed all the eight kings who preceded him.The Thracian army, leaving Doberus, invaded first of all the country which had formerly been the principality of Philip, and took Eidomenè by storm. Gortynia, Atalantè, and some other towns came to terms out of regard for Amyntas the son of Philip, who accompanied the expedition. They also besieged but failed to take Europus; they next advanced into that part of Macedonia which lay on the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. Farther south into Bottiaea and Pieria they did not penetrate, but were content to ravage the territory of Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians had no idea of facing them with infantry, but sent for additional cavalry from their allies in the upper part of the country, and, although a handful of men, dashed in amongst the great Thracian host wherever they pleased. No one

withstood their onset; for they were excellent horsemen and well protected with coats of mail. But hemmed in as they continually were by a multitude many times their own number, they ran into great danger. At last, feeling that they were not strong enough to encounter such superiority of force, they desisted.

101. ὁ δὲ Σιτάλκης πρός τε τὸν Περδίκκαν λόγους ἐποιεῖτο ὧν ἕνεκα ἐστράτευσε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ παρῆσαν ταῖς ναυσίν, ἀπιστοῦντες αὐτὸν μὴ ἥξειν, δῶρα δὲ καὶ πρέσβεις ἔπεμψαν αὐτῷ, ἔς τε τοὺς Χαλκιδέας καὶ Βοττιαίους μέρος τι τοῦ στρατοῦ πέμπει, καὶ τειχήρεις ποιήσας ἐδῄου τὴν γῆν. [2] καθημένου δ᾽ αὐτοῦ περὶ τοὺς χώρους τούτους οἱ πρὸς νότον οἰκοῦντες Θεσσαλοὶ καὶ Μάγνητες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὑπήκοοι Θεσσαλῶν καὶ οἱ μέχρι Θερμοπυλῶν Ἕλληνες ἐφοβήθησαν μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς ὁ στρατὸς χωρήσῃ, καὶ ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦσαν. [3] ἐφοβήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ πέραν Στρυμόνος πρὸς βορέαν Θρᾷκες, ὅσοι πεδία εἶχον, Παναῖοι καὶ Ὀδόμαντοι καὶ Δρῶοι καὶ Δερσαῖοι: αὐτόνομοι δ᾽ εἰσὶ πάντες. [4] παρέσχε δὲ λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πολεμίους Ἕλληνας, μὴ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀγόμενοι κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς χωρήσωσιν. [5] ὁ δὲ τήν τε Χαλκιδικὴν καὶ Βοττικὴν καὶ Μακεδονίαν ἅμα ἐπέχων ἔφθειρε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ οὐδὲν ἐπράσσετο ὧν ἕνεκα ἐσέβαλε καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ σῖτόν τε οὐκ εἶχεν αὐτῷ καὶ ὑπὸ χειμῶνος ἐταλαιπώρει, ἀναπείθεται ὑπὸ Σεύθου τοῦ Σπαραδόκου, ἀδελφιδοῦ ὄντος καὶ μέγιστον μεθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν δυναμένου, ὥστ᾽ ἐν τάχει ἀπελθεῖν. τὸν δὲ Σεύθην κρύφα Περδίκκας ὑποσχόμενος ἀδελφὴν ἑαυτοῦ δώσειν καὶ χρήματα ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ προσποιεῖται. [6] καὶ ὁ μὲν πεισθεὶς καὶ μείνας τριάκοντα τὰς πάσας ἡμέρας, τούτων δὲ ὀκτὼ ἐν Χαλκιδεῦσιν, ἀνεχώρησε τῷ στρατῷ κατὰ τάχος ἐπ᾽ οἴκου: Περδίκκας δὲ ὕστερον Στρατονίκην τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδελφὴν δίδωσι Σεύθῃ, ὥσπερ ὑπέσχετο. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Σιτάλκου στρατείαν οὕτως ἐγένετο.

[101] Sitalces now held a conference with Perdiccas touching the matters which gave occasion to the war. The fleet which

the Athenians had promised never arrived; for not believing that Sitalces would come, they only sent gifts and envoys to him. After waiting for them in vain he despatched a part of his army against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and, driving them within their walls, devastated the country. While he was encamped in these parts, the Thessalians, who lie towards the south, the Magnesians and other dependants of the Thessalians, and all the Hellenes as far as Thermopylae were afraid that his army would move on them, and took measures of precaution. Those independent Thracian tribes to the north beyond the Strymon who dwelt in the plains, namely the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and Dersaeans, were also in great alarm. A belief arose, which spread far and wide among the enemies of Athens, that the Athenians meant to lead their Odrysian allies against the rest of Hellas. Meanwhile Sitalces overran and ravaged Chalcidicè, Botticè, and Macedonia, but could not effect his objects; and, his army being without food and suffering from the winter, he was persuaded by his nephew, who next to himself had the greatest authority, Seuthes the son of Spardacus, to return home at once. Now Perdiccas had secretly gained over Seuthes, promising to give him his sister in marriage, with a portion. And so Sitalces and his army, having remained thirty days in all, of which eight were passed among the Chalcidians, returned home in haste. Perdiccas in fulfilment of his promise gave his sister Stratonicè in marriage to Seuthes. Thus ended the expedition of Sitalces.

102. οἱ δὲ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναυτικὸν διελύθη, Φορμίωνος ἡγουμένου ἐστράτευσαν, παραπλεύσαντες ἐπ᾽ Ἀστακοῦ καὶ ἀποβάντες, ἐς τὴν μεσόγειαν τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας τετρακοσίοις μὲν ὁπλίταις Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, τετρακοσίοις δὲ Μεσσηνίων, καὶ ἔκ τε Στράτου καὶ Κορόντων καὶ ἄλλων χωρίων ἄνδρας οὐ δοκοῦντας βεβαίους εἶναι ἐξήλασαν, καὶ Κύνητα τὸν Θεολύτου ἐς

Κόροντα καταγαγόντες ἀνεχώρησαν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. [2] ἐς γὰρ Οἰνιάδας αἰεί ποτε πολεμίους ὄντας μόνους Ἀκαρνάνων οὐκ ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι χειμῶνος ὄντος στρατεύειν: ὁ γὰρ Ἀχελῷος ποταμὸς ῥέων ἐκ Πίνδου ὄρους διὰ Δολοπίας καὶ Ἀγραίων καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων καὶ διὰ τοῦ Ἀκαρνανικοῦ πεδίου, ἄνωθεν μὲν παρὰ Στράτον πόλιν, ἐς θάλασσαν δ᾽ ἐξιεὶς παρ᾽ Οἰνιάδας καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς περιλιμνάζων, ἄπορον ποιεῖ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν χειμῶνι στρατεύειν. [3] κεῖνται δὲ καὶ τῶν νήσων τῶν Ἐχινάδων αἱ πολλαὶ καταντικρὺ Οἰνιαδῶν τοῦ Ἀχελῴου τῶν ἐκβολῶν οὐδὲν ἀπέχουσαι, ὥστε μέγας ὢν ὁ ποταμὸς προσχοῖ αἰεὶ καὶ εἰσὶ τῶν νήσων αἳ ἠπείρωνται, ἐλπὶς δὲ καὶ πάσας οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ ἂν χρόνῳ τοῦτο παθεῖν: [4] τό τε γὰρ ῥεῦμά ἐστι μέγα καὶ πολὺ καὶ θολερόν, αἵ τε νῆσοι πυκναί, καὶ ἀλλήλαις τῆς προσχώσεως [τῷ μὴ σκεδάννυσθαι] ξύνδεσμοι γίγνονται, παραλλὰξ καὶ οὐ κατὰ στοῖχον κείμεναι, οὐδ᾽ ἔχουσαι εὐθείας διόδους τοῦ ὕδατος ἐς τὸ πέλαγος. [5] ἐρῆμοι δ᾽ εἰσὶ καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀλκμέωνι τῷ Ἀμφιάρεω, ὅτε δὴ ἀλᾶσθαι αὐτὸν μετὰ τὸν φόνον τῆς μητρός, τὸν Ἀπόλλω ταύτην τὴν γῆν χρῆσαι οἰκεῖν, ὑπειπόντα οὐκ εἶναι λύσιν τῶν δειμάτων πρὶν ἂν εὑρὼν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ χώρᾳ κατοικίσηται ἥτις ὅτε ἔκτεινε τὴν μητέρα μήπω ὑπὸ ἡλίου ἑωρᾶτο μηδὲ γῇ ἦν, ὡς τῆς γε ἄλλης αὐτῷ μεμιασμένης. [6] ὁ δ᾽ ἀπορῶν, ὥς φασι, μόλις κατενόησε τὴν πρόσχωσιν ταύτην τοῦ Ἀχελῴου, καὶ ἐδόκει αὐτῷ ἱκανὴ ἂν κεχῶσθαι δίαιτα τῷ σώματι ἀφ᾽ οὗπερ κτείνας τὴν μητέρα οὐκ ὀλίγον χρόνον ἐπλανᾶτο. καὶ κατοικισθεὶς ἐς τοὺς περὶ Οἰνιάδας τόπους ἐδυνάστευσέ τε καὶ ἀπὸ Ἀκαρνᾶνος παιδὸς ἑαυτοῦ τῆς χώρας τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐγκατέλιπεν. τὰ μὲν περὶ Ἀλκμέωνα τοιαῦτα λεγόμενα παρελάβομεν.

[102] During the same winter the Athenian forces at Naupactus, after the Peloponnesian fleet had dispersed, made an expedition under the command of Phormio into the centre of Acarnania with four hundred hoplites of their own taken from the fleet and four hundred Messenian hoplites.

They first coasted along towards Astacus and disembarked. From Stratus, Coronta, and other places they expelled those of the inhabitants whom they distrusted, and restoring Cynes the son of Theolytus to Coronta, they returned to their ships. Oeniadae, of which the inhabitants, unlike the rest of the Acarnanians, were their persistent enemies, was unapproachable in winter. For the town is in the midst of a marsh formed by the river Achelous, which, rising in Mount Pindus and passing first through the territory of the Dolopians, Agraeans, and Amphilochians, and then through the Acarnanian plain, at some distance from its mouth flows by the city of Stratus and finds an exit into the sea near Oeniadae: an expedition in winter is thus rendered impossible by the water. Most of the islands called Echinades are situated opposite to Oeniadae and close to the mouth of the Achelous. The consequence is that the river, which is large, is always silting up: some of the islands have been already joined to the mainland, and very likely, at no distant period, they may all be joined to it. The stream is wide and strong and full of mud; and the islands are close together and serve to connect the deposits made by the river, not allowing them to dissolve in the water. For, lying irregularly and not one behind the other, they prevent the river from finding a straight channel into the sea. These islands are small and uninhabited. The story is that when Alcmaeon the son of Amphiaraus was wandering over the earth after the murder of his mother, he was told by Apollo that here he should find a home, the oracle intimating that he would never obtain deliverance from his terrors until he discovered some country which was not yet in existence and not seen by the sun at the time when he slew his mother; there he might settle, but the rest of the earth was accursed to him. He knew not what to do, until at last, according to the story, he spied the deposit of earth made by the Achelous, and he thought that a place sufficient to support life must have accumulated in the long time during which

he had been wandering since his mother’s death. There, near Oeniadae, he settled, and, becoming ruler, left to the country the name of his son Acarnan. Such is the tradition which has come down to us concerning Alcmaeon.

103. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὁ Φορμίων ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον ἅμα ἦρι κατέπλευσαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, τούς τε ἐλευθέρους τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἐκ τῶν ναυμαχιῶν ἄγοντες, οἳ ἀνὴρ ἀντ᾽ ἀνδρὸς ἐλύθησαν, καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἃς εἶλον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα οὗτος, καὶ τρίτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[103] The Athenians under Phormio sailed back from Acarnania to Naupactus, and later at the beginning of spring returned to Athens, bringing with them the ships which they had captured, besides the prisoners of free birth whom they had taken in the naval engagements. These were exchanged man for man. And so the winter ended, and with it the third year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

Βιβλίο Γ’ — BOOK III

1. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἅμα τῷ σίτῳ ἀκμάζοντι ἐστράτευσαν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν: ἡγεῖτο δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. [2] καὶ ἐγκαθεζόμενοι ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν: καὶ προσβολαί, ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, ἐγίγνοντο τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἱππέων ὅπῃ παρείκοι, καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον ὅμιλον τῶν ψιλῶν εἶργον τὸ μὴ προεξιόντας τῶν ὅπλων τὰ ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν. [3] ἐμμείναντες δὲ χρόνον οὗ εἶχον τὰ σιτία ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

[1] IN the following summer, when the corn was in full ear, the Peloponnesians and their allies, under the command of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, invaded Attica, and encamping wasted the country. The Athenian cavalry as usual attacked them whenever an opportunity offered, and prevented the great body of the light-armed troops from going beyond their lines and injuring the lands near the city. The invaders remained until their supplies were exhausted; they were then disbanded, and returned to their several homes.

2. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἐσβολὴν τῶν Πελοποννησίων εὐθὺς Λέσβος πλὴν Μηθύμνης ἀπέστη ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων, βουληθέντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ προσεδέξαντο, ἀναγκασθέντες δὲ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπόστασιν πρότερον ἢ διενοοῦντο ποιήσασθαι. [2] τῶν τε γὰρ λιμένων τὴν χῶσιν καὶ τειχῶν οἰκοδόμησιν καὶ νεῶν ποίησιν ἐπέμενον τελεσθῆναι, καὶ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου ἔδει ἀφικέσθαι, τοξότας τε καὶ σῖτον, καὶ ἃ μεταπεμπόμενοι ἦσαν. [3] Τενέδιοι γὰρ ὄντες αὐτοῖς διάφοροι καὶ Μηθυμναῖοι καὶ αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν, πρόξενοι Ἀθηναίων, μηνυταὶ γίγνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ξυνοικίζουσί τε τὴν Λέσβον ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην βίᾳ καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἅπασαν μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν

ξυγγενῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει ἐπείγονται: καὶ εἰ μή τις προκαταλήψεται ἤδη, στερήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς Λέσβου.

[2] No sooner had the Peloponnesians quitted Attica than the whole people of Lesbos, with the exception of the Methymnaeans, revolted from Athens. They had entertained the design before the war began, but the Lacedaemonians gave them no encouragement. And now they were not ready, and were compelled to revolt sooner than they had intended. For they were waiting until they had completed the work of closing their harbours, raising walls, and building ships, and they had not as yet received from Pontus the force of archers, the corn and the other supplies for which they had sent. But the inhabitants of Tenedos, who were not on good terms with them, and the Methymnaeans, and individual citizens who were of the opposite faction and were proxeni of Athens, turned informers and told the Athenians that the Mytilenaeans were forcibly making Mytilenè the centre of government for the whole island; that the preparations which they were pressing forward had been throughout undertaken by them in concert with the Lacedaemonians and with their Boeotian kinsmen, and meant revolt; and that if something were not immediately done, Lesbos would be lost to Athens.

3. οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ᾖσαν γὰρ τεταλαιπωρημένοι ὑπό τε τῆς νόσου καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἄρτι καθισταμένου καὶ ἀκμάζοντος μέγα μὲν ἔργον ἡγοῦντο εἶναι Λέσβον προσπολεμώσασθαι ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν καὶ δύναμιν ἀκέραιον, καὶ οὐκ ἀπεδέχοντο τὸ πρῶτον τὰς κατηγορίας, μεῖζον μέρος νέμοντες τῷ μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀληθῆ εἶναι: ἐπειδὴ μέντοι καὶ πέμψαντες πρέσβεις οὐκ ἔπειθον τοὺς Μυτιληναίους τήν τε ξυνοίκισιν καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν διαλύειν, δείσαντες προκαταλαβεῖν ἐβούλοντο. [2] καὶ πέμπουσιν ἐξαπιναίως τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς αἳ ἔτυχον περὶ Πελοπόννησον παρεσκευασμέναι πλεῖν: Κλεϊππίδης δὲ ὁ Δεινίου τρίτος αὐτὸς ἐστρατήγει. [3] ἐσηγγέλθη γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὡς εἴη Ἀπόλλωνος Μαλόεντος ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἑορτή, ἐν ᾗ

πανδημεὶ Μυτιληναῖοι ἑορτάζουσι, καὶ ἐλπίδα εἶναι ἐπειχθέντας ἐπιπεσεῖν ἄφνω, καὶ ἢν μὲν ξυμβῇ ἡ πεῖρα: εἰ δὲ μή, Μυτιληναίοις εἰπεῖν ναῦς τε παραδοῦναι καὶ τείχη καθελεῖν, μὴ πειθομένων δὲ πολεμεῖν. [4] καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆες ᾠχοντο: τὰς δὲ τῶν Μυτιληναίων δέκα τριήρεις, αἳ ἔτυχον βοηθοὶ παρὰ σφᾶς κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν παροῦσαι, κατέσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐς φυλακὴν ἐποιήσαντο. [5] τοῖς δὲ Μυτιληναίοις ἀνὴρ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν διαβὰς ἐς Εὔβοιαν καὶ πεζῇ ἐπὶ Γεραιστὸν ἐλθών, ὁλκάδος ἀναγομένης ἐπιτυχών, πλῷ χρησάμενος καὶ τριταῖος ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἐς Μυτιλήνην ἀφικόμενος ἀγγέλλει τὸν ἐπίπλουν. οἱ δὲ οὔτε ἐς τὸν Μαλόεντα ἐξῆλθον, τά τε ἄλλα τῶν τειχῶν καὶ λιμένων περὶ τὰ ἡμιτέλεστα φαρξάμενοι ἐφύλασσον.

[3] The Athenians, who were suffering severely from the plague and from the war, of which they had begun to feel the full effects, reflected that it was a serious matter to bring upon themselves a second war with a naval power like Lesbos, whose resources were unimpaired; and so, mainly because they wished that the charges might not be true, they at first refused to listen to them. But, when they had sent envoys to Mytilenè and found that the Mytilenaeans, in spite of remonstrances, continued their preparations and persisted in the attempt to concentrate the government in Mytilenè, they took alarm and determined to be beforehand with them. Without losing a moment, they sent to Lesbos, under the command of Cleïppides the son of Deinias, and two others, forty ships which had been intended to cruise about Peloponnesus. They had heard that there was a festival of Apollo Maloeis held outside the walls in which the whole population took part, and that if they made haste they might hope to surprise them. The attempt would very likely succeed; but, if not, they might bid the Mytilenaeans give up their fleet and dismantle their walls, and in case they refused they might go to war with them. So the ships sailed; and as there happened to be at Athens ten Mytilenaean triremes, serving in accordance with the terms

of the alliance, the Athenians seized them and threw their crews into prison. But the Mytilenaeans were warned by a messenger from Athens, who crossed to Euboea and went on foot to Geraestus; there he found a merchant vessel just about to sail; he took ship, and arriving at Mytilenè on the third day after he left Athens, announced the coming of the Athenian fleet. Whereupon the Mytilenaeans abstained from going out to the temple of Apollo Maloeis. They also kept good watch about their walls and harbours, and barricaded the unfinished works.

4. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον καταπλεύσαντες ὡς ἑώρων, ἀπήγγειλαν μὲν οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα, οὐκ ἐσακουόντων δὲ τῶν Μυτιληναίων ἐς πόλεμον καθίσταντο. [2] ἀπαράσκευοι δὲ οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ ἐξαίφνης ἀναγκασθέντες πολεμεῖν ἔκπλουν μέν τινα ἐποιήσαντο τῶν νεῶν ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ λιμένος, ἔπειτα καταδιωχθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν λόγους ἤδη προσέφερον τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, βουλόμενοι τὰς ναῦς τὸ παραυτίκα, εἰ δύναιντο, ὁμολογίᾳ τινὶ ἐπιεικεῖ ἀποπέμψασθαι. [3] καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπεδέξαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ οὐχ ἱκανοὶ ὦσι Λέσβῳ πάσῃ πολεμεῖν. [4] καὶ ἀνοκωχὴν ποιησάμενοι πέμπουσιν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι τῶν τε διαβαλλόντων ἕνα, ᾧ μετέμελεν ἤδη, καὶ ἄλλους, εἴ πως πείσειαν τὰς ναῦς ἀπελθεῖν ὡς σφῶν οὐδὲν νεωτεριούντων. [5] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἀποστέλλουσι καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις τριήρει, λαθόντες τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναυτικόν, οἳ ὥρμουν ἐν τῇ Μαλέᾳ πρὸς βορέαν τῆς πόλεως: οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστευον τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προχωρήσειν. [6] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ταλαιπώρως διὰ τοῦ πελάγους κομισθέντες αὐτοῖς ἔπρασσον ὅπως τις βοήθεια ἥξει:

[4] Soon afterwards the Athenians arrived. The commanders of the fleet, seeing that they were foiled, delivered the message entrusted to them; the city refused to yield and they commenced hostilities. Taken by surprise, and unprepared for the war which was forced upon them, the

Mytilenaeans came out once and made a show of fighting a little in front of the harbour; but they were soon driven back by the Athenian ships, and then they began to parley with the generals, in the hope of obtaining tolerable terms of some kind, and getting rid of the fleet for the time. The Athenian generals accepted their proposals, they too fearing that they were not strong enough to make war against the whole island. Having got the armistice, the Mytilenaeans sent envoys to Athens; one of them was a person who had given information against his fellow-citizens, but was now repentant. They had a faint hope that the Athenians would be induced to withdraw their ships and believe in their good intentions. But as they did not really expect to succeed in their Athenian mission, they also sent an embassy to Lacedaemon, unperceived by the Athenian fleet, which was stationed at Malea to the north of the city. After a troublesome voyage through the open sea, the envoys arrived at Lacedaemon and solicited aid for their countrymen.

5. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν πρέσβεις ὡς οὐδὲν ἦλθον πράξαντες, ἐς πόλεμον καθίσταντο οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Λέσβος πλὴν Μηθύμνης: οὗτοι δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐβεβοηθήκεσαν, καὶ Ἴμβριοι καὶ Λήμνιοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγοι τινὲς ξυμμάχων. [2] καὶ ἔξοδον μέν τινα πανδημεὶ ἐποιήσαντο οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, καὶ μάχη ἐγένετο, ἐν ᾗ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι οὔτε ἐπηυλίσαντο οὔτε ἐπίστευσαν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνεχώρησαν: ἔπειτα οἱ μὲν ἡσύχαζον, ἐκ Πελοποννήσου καὶ μετ᾽ ἄλλης παρασκευῆς βουλόμενοι εἰ προσγένοιτό τι κινδυνεύειν: καὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς Μελέας Λάκων ἀφικνεῖται καὶ Ἑρμαιώνδας Θηβαῖος, οἳ προαπεστάλησαν μὲν τῆς ἀποστάσεως, φθάσαι δὲ οὐ δυνάμενοι τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπίπλουν κρύφα μετὰ τὴν μάχην ὕστερον ἐσπλέουσι τριήρει, καὶ παρῄνουν πέμπειν τριήρη ἄλλην καὶ πρέσβεις μεθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν: καὶ ἐκπέμπουσιν.

[5] The other envoys who had been sent to Athens met with no success. When they returned, the Mytilenaeans and the rest of Lesbos, with the exception of Methymna, commenced hostilities; the Methymnaeans, with the Imbrians, Lemnians, and a few of the allies, had come to the support of the Athenians. The Mytilenaeans with their whole force sallied out against the Athenian camp, and a battle took place, in which they got the better; but they had no confidence in themselves, and, instead of encamping on the field, retired. They then remained quiet, being unwilling to risk an engagement without the additional help which they were expecting from Peloponnesus and elsewhere. For Meleas a Lacedaemonian, and Hermaeondas a Theban, had now arrived at Mytilenè; they had been sent before the revolt, but the Athenian fleet anticipated them, and they sailed in by stealth after the battle in a single trireme. The envoys recommended the Mytilenaeans to send an embassy of their own in another trireme to accompany them on their return to Sparta; which they accordingly did.

6. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πολὺ ἐπιρρωσθέντες διὰ τὴν τῶν Μυτιληναίων ἡσυχίαν ξυμμάχους τε προσεκάλουν, οἳ πολὺ θᾶσσον παρῆσαν ὁρῶντες οὐδὲν ἰσχυρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Λεσβίων, καὶ περιορμισάμενοι τὸ πρὸς νότον τῆς πόλεως ἐτείχισαν στρατόπεδα δύο ἑκατέρωθεν τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τοὺς ἐφόρμους ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς λιμέσιν ἐποιοῦντο. [2] καὶ τῆς μὲν θαλάσσης εἶργον μὴ χρῆσθαι τοὺς Μυτιληναίους, τῆς δὲ γῆς τῆς μὲν ἄλλης ἐκράτουν οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Λέσβιοι προσβεβοηθηκότες ἤδη, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα οὐ πολὺ κατεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ναύσταθμον δὲ μᾶλλον ἦν αὐτοῖς πλοίων καὶ ἀγορὰ ἡ Μαλέα. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Μυτιλήνην οὕτως ἐπολεμεῖτο.

[6] The Athenians, greatly encouraged by the inactivity of their adversaries, summoned their allies, who came all the more readily because they saw that the Lesbians displayed no energy. They then anchored the fleet round the south of the city, and having fortified two camps, one on either side

of it, they established a blockade of both the harbours. Thus they excluded the Mytilenaeans from the sea. They likewise held the country in the immediate neighbourhood of their two camps; but the Mytilenaeans and the other Lesbians, who had now taken up arms, were masters of the rest of the island. At Malea the Athenians had, not a camp, but a station for their ships and for their market.

7. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦ θέρους τούτου Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον ναῦς ἀπέστειλαν τριάκοντα καὶ Ἀσώπιον τὸν Φορμίωνος στρατηγόν, κελευσάντων Ἀκαρνάνων τῶν Φορμίωνός τινα σφίσι πέμψαι ἢ υἱὸν ἢ ξυγγενῆ ἄρχοντα. [2] καὶ παραπλέουσαι αἱ νῆες τῆς Λακωνικῆς τὰ ἐπιθαλάσσια χωρία ἐπόρθησαν. [3] ἔπειτα τὰς μὲν πλείους ἀποπέμπει τῶν νεῶν πάλιν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ὁ Ἀσώπιος, αὐτὸς δ᾽ ἔχων δώδεκα ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ναύπακτον, καὶ ὕστερον Ἀκαρνᾶνας ἀναστήσας πανδημεὶ στρατεύει ἐπ᾽ Οἰνιάδας, καὶ ταῖς τε ναυσὶ κατὰ τὸν Ἀχελῷον ἔπλευσε καὶ ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς ἐδῄου τὴν χώραν. [4] ὡς δ᾽ οὐ προσεχώρουν, τὸν μὲν πεζὸν ἀφίησιν, αὐτὸς δὲ πλεύσας ἐς Λευκάδα καὶ ἀπόβασιν ἐς Νήρικον ποιησάμενος ἀναχωρῶν διαφθείρεται αὐτός τε καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τι μέρος ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτόθεν τε ξυμβοηθησάντων καὶ φρουρῶν τινῶν ὀλίγων. [5] καὶ ὕστερον ὑποσπόνδους τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀποπλεύσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρὰ τῶν Λευκαδίων ἐκομίσαντο.

[7] Such was the course of the war in Lesbos. In the same summer, and about the same time, the Athenians sent thirty ships to Peloponnesus; they were placed under the command of Asopius, the son of Phormio; for the Acarnanians had desired them to send out a son or relation of Phormio to be their leader. The ships in passing ravaged the coast of Laconia, and then Asopius sent most of them home, but kept twelve, with which he sailed to Naupactus. Next he made a general levy of the Acarnanians and led his forces against Oeniadae, his ships sailing up the river Achelous, while his army ravaged the country by land. As the inhabitants refused to yield, he disbanded his land-

forces, but himself sailed to Leucas and made a descent upon Nericus, where he and part of his army in returning to their ships were slain by the inhabitants, assisted by a few Peloponnesian guards. The Athenians then put to sea, and received their dead from the Leucadians under a flag of truce.

8. οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης νεὼς ἐκπεμφθέντες Μυτιληναίων πρέσβεις, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εἶπον Ὀλυμπίαζε παρεῖναι, ὅπως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ἀκούσαντες βουλεύσωνται, ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν Ὀλυμπίαν: ἦν δὲ Ὀλυμπιὰς ᾗ Δωριεὺς Ῥόδιος τὸ δεύτερον ἐνίκα. [2] καὶ ἐπειδὴ μετὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν κατέστησαν ἐς λόγους, εἶπον τοιάδε.

[8] The envoys whom the Mytilenaeans had sent out in their first vessel were told by the Lacedaemonians to come to the Olympic festival, in order that the allies, as well as themselves, might hear them and determine what should be done. So they went to Olympia. The Olympiad was that in which the Rhodian Dorieus won his second victory. When the festival was over, the allies met in council, and the ambassadors spoke as follows:

9. ‘τὸ μὲν καθεστὸς τοῖς Ἕλλησι νόμιμον, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἴσμεν: τοὺς γὰρ ἀφισταμένους ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις καὶ ξυμμαχίαν τὴν πρὶν ἀπολείποντας οἱ δεξάμενοι, καθ᾽ ὅσον μὲν ὠφελοῦνται, ἐν ἡδονῇ ἔχουσι, νομίζοντες δὲ εἶναι προδότας τῶν πρὸ τοῦ φίλων χείρους ἡγοῦνται. [2] καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος αὕτη ἡ ἀξίωσίς ἐστιν, εἰ τύχοιεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἵ τε ἀφιστάμενοι καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν διακρίνοιντο ἴσοι μὲν τῇ γνώμῃ ὄντες καὶ εὐνοίᾳ, ἀντίπαλοι δὲ τῇ παρασκευῇ καὶ δυνάμει, πρόφασίς τε ἐπιεικὴς μηδεμία ὑπάρχοι τῆς ἀποστάσεως: ὃ ἡμῖν καὶ Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἦν. [3] μηδέ τῳ χείρους δόξωμεν εἶναι εἰ ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ τιμώμενοι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀφιστάμεθα.

[9] ‘We know, Lacedaemonians and allies, that all Hellenes entertain a fixed sentiment against those who in time of war revolt and desert an old alliance. Their new allies are delighted with them in as far as they profit by their aid; but

they do not respect them, for they deem them traitors to their former friends. And this opinion is reasonable enough; but only when the rebels, and those from whom they sever themselves, are naturally united by the same interests and feelings and equally matched in power and resources, and when there is no reasonable excuse for a revolt. But our relation to the Athenians was of another sort, and no one should be severe upon us for deserting them in the hour of danger although we were honoured by them in time of peace.

10. ‘περὶ γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀρετῆς πρῶτον ἄλλως τε καὶ ξυμμαχίας δεόμενοι τοὺς λόγους ποιησόμεθα, εἰδότες οὔτε φιλίαν ἰδιώταις βέβαιον γιγνομένην οὔτε κοινωνίαν πόλεσιν ἐς οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ μετ᾽ ἀρετῆς δοκούσης ἐς ἀλλήλους γίγνοιντο καὶ τἆλλα ὁμοιότροποι εἶεν: ἐν γὰρ τῷ διαλλάσσοντι τῆς γνώμης καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν ἔργων καθίστανται. [2] ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ξυμμαχία ἐγένετο πρῶτον ἀπολιπόντων μὲν ὑμῶν ἐκ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου, παραμεινάντων δὲ ἐκείνων πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων. [3] ξύμμαχοι μέντοι ἐγενόμεθα οὐκ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. [4] καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἡγοῦντο, προθύμως εἱπόμεθα: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἑωρῶμεν αὐτοὺς τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων δούλωσιν ἐπαγομένους, οὐκ ἀδεεῖς ἔτι ἦμεν. [5] ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες καθ᾽ ἓν γενόμενοι διὰ πολυψηφίαν ἀμύνασθαι οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐδουλώθησαν πλὴν ἡμῶν καὶ Χίων: ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν. [6] καὶ πιστοὺς οὐκέτι εἴχομεν ἡγεμόνας Ἀθηναίους, παραδείγμασι τοῖς προγιγνομένοις χρώμενοι: οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοὺς οὓς μὲν μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐνσπόνδους ἐποιήσαντο καταστρέψασθαι, τοὺς δὲ ὑπολοίπους, εἴ ποτε ἄρα ἐδυνήθησαν, μὴ δρᾶσαι τοῦτο.

[10] ‘Since an alliance is our object, we will first address ourselves to the question of justice and honour. We know that no friendship between man and man, no league

between city and city, can ever be permanent unless the friends or allies have a good opinion of each other's honesty, and are similar in general character. For the diversity in men's minds makes the difference in their actions.'Now our alliance with the Athenians first began when you ceased to take part in the Persian War, and they remained to complete the work. But we were never the allies of the Athenians in their design of subjugating Hellas; we were really the allies of the Hellenes, whom we sought to liberate from the Persians. And while in the exercise of their command they claimed no supremacy, we were very ready to follow them, But our fears began to be aroused when we saw them relaxing their efforts against the Persians and imposing the yoke of their dominion upon the allies, who could not unite and defend themselves, for their interests were too various. And so they were all enslaved, except ourselves and the Chians. We forsooth were independent allies, free men — that was the word — who fought at their side. But, judging from previous examples, how could we any longer have confidence in our leaders? For they had subjugated others to whom, equally with ourselves, their faith was pledged; and how could we who survived expect to be spared if ever they had the power to destroy us?

11. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτόνομοι ἔτι ἦμεν ἅπαντες, βεβαιότεροι ἂν ἡμῖν ἦσαν μηδὲν νεωτεριεῖν: ὑποχειρίους δὲ ἔχοντες τοὺς πλείους, ἡμῖν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλοῦντες, χαλεπώτερον εἰκότως ἔμελλον οἴσειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ πλέον ἤδη εἶκον τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἔτι μόνου ἀντισουμένου, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅσῳ δυνατώτεροι αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐρημότεροι. [2] τὸ δὲ ἀντίπαλον δέος μόνον πιστὸν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν: ὁ γὰρ παραβαίνειν τι βουλόμενος τῷ μὴ προύχων ἂν ἐπελθεῖν ἀποτρέπεται. [3] αὐτόνομοί τε ἐλείφθημεν οὐ δι᾽ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐπρεπείᾳ τε λόγου καὶ γνώμης μᾶλλον ἐφόδῳ ἢ ἰσχύος τὰ πράγματα ἐφαίνετο καταληπτά. [4] ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο μὴ ἂν τούς γε ἰσοψήφους ἄκοντας, εἰ μή τι ἠδίκουν

οἷς ἐπῆσαν, ξυστρατεύειν: ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ τὰ κράτιστα ἐπί τε τοὺς ὑποδεεστέρους πρώτους ξυνεπῆγον καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα λιπόντες τοῦ ἄλλου περιῃρημένου ἀσθενέστερα ἔμελλον ἔξειν. [5] εἰ δὲ ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν ἤρξαντο, ἐχόντων ἔτι τῶν πάντων αὐτῶν τε ἰσχὺν καὶ πρὸς ὅτι χρὴ στῆναι, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως ἐχειρώσαντο. [6] τό τε ναυτικὸν ἡμῶν παρεῖχέ τινα φόβον μή ποτε καθ᾽ ἓν γενόμενον ἢ ὑμῖν ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ προσθέμενον κίνδυνον σφίσι παράσχῃ. [7] τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ θεραπείας τοῦ τε κοινοῦ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν αἰεὶ προεστώτων περιεγιγνόμεθα. [8] οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ πολύ γ᾽ ἂν ἐδοκοῦμεν δυνηθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ὁ πόλεμος ὅδε κατέστη, παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τοῖς ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους.

[11] ‘Had all the allies retained their independence,we should have had better assurance that they would leave us as we were; but when the majority had been subjugated by them, they might naturally be expected to take offence at our footing of equality; they would contrast us who alone maintained this equality with the majority who had submitted to them; they would also observe that in proportion as their strength was increasing, our isolation was increasing too. Mutual fear is the only solid basis of alliance; for he who would break faith is deterred from aggression by the consciousness of inferiority. And why were we left independent? Only because they thought that to gain an empire they must use fair words and win their way by policy and not by violence. On the one hand, our position was a witness to their character. For, having an equal vote with them, we could not be supposed to have fought in their wars against our will, but those whom they attacked must have been in the wrong. On the other hand, they were thus enabled to use the powerful against the weak; they thought that they would leave us to the last; when the lesser states were removed, the stronger would fall an easier prey. But if they had begun with us while the power of the allies was still intact, and we might have afforded a rallying-point, they would not so easily have mastered them. Besides, our navy

caused them some apprehension; they were afraid that we might join you, or some other great power, and that the union would be dangerous to them. For a time, too, we saved ourselves by paying court to the people and to the popular leaders of the day. But we were not likely to have survived long, judging by the conduct of the Athenians towards others, if this war had not arisen.

12. τίς οὖν αὕτη ἢ φιλία ἐγίγνετο ἢ ἐλευθερία πιστή, ἐν ᾗ παρὰ γνώμην ἀλλήλους ὑπεδεχόμεθα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες ἐθεράπευον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνους ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐποιοῦμεν: ὅ τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μάλιστα εὔνοια πίστιν βεβαιοῖ, ἡμῖν τοῦτο ὁ φόβος ἐχυρὸν παρεῖχε, δέει τε τὸ πλέον ἢ φιλίᾳ κατεχόμενοι ξύμμαχοι ἦμεν: καὶ ὁποτέροις θᾶσσον παράσχοι ἀσφάλεια θάρσος,οὗτοι πρότεροί τι καὶ παραβήσεσθαι ἔμελλον. [2] ὥστε εἴ τῳ δοκοῦμεν ἀδικεῖν προαποστάντες διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων μέλλησιν τῶν ἐς ἡμᾶς δεινῶν, αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἀνταναμείναντες σαφῶς εἰδέναι εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἔσται, οὐκ ὀρθῶς σκοπεῖ. [3] εἰ γὰρ δυνατοὶ ἦμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ἀντεπιβουλεῦσαι καὶ ἀντιμελλῆσαι, τί ἔδει ἡμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις εἶναι; ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις δὲ ὄντος αἰεὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἶναι δεῖ τὸ προαμύνασθαι.

[12] ‘What trust then could we repose in such a friendship or such a freedom as this? The civility which we showed to one another was at variance with our real feelings. They courted us in time of war because they were afraid of us, and we in time of peace paid a like attention to them. And the faith which is generally assured by mutual good-will had with us no other bond but mutual fear; from fear, and not from love, we were constrained to maintain the alliance, and whichever of us first thought that he could safely venture would assuredly have been the first to break it. And therefore if any one imagines that we do wrong in striking first, because they delay the blow which we dread, and thinks that we should wait and make quite sure of their intentions, he is mistaken. If we were really on an equality with them and in a position to counteract their designs and imitate their

threatening attitude, how was it consistent with this equality that we had still to be at their mercy? The power of attack is always in their hands, and the power of anticipating attack should always be in ours.

13. ‘τοιαύτας ἔχοντες προφάσεις καὶ αἰτίας, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἀπέστημεν, σαφεῖς μὲν τοῖς ἀκούουσι γνῶναι ὡς εἰκότως ἐδράσαμεν, ἱκανὰς δὲ ἡμᾶς ἐκφοβῆσαι καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειάν τινα τρέψαι, βουλομένους μὲν καὶ πάλαι, ὅτε ἔτι ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἐπέμψαμεν ὡς ὑμᾶς περὶ ἀποστάσεως, ὑμῶν δὲ οὐ προσδεξαμένων κωλυθέντας: νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ Βοιωτοὶ προυκαλέσαντο εὐθὺς ὑπηκούσαμεν, καὶ ἐνομίζομεν ἀποστήσεσθαι διπλῆν ἀπόστασιν, ἀπό τε τῶν Ἑλλήνων μὴ ξὺν κακῶς ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἀλλὰ ξυνελευθεροῦν, ἀπό τε Ἀθηναίων μὴ αὐτοὶ διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων ἐν ὑστέρῳ ἀλλὰ προποιῆσαι. [2] ἡ μέντοι ἀπόστασις ἡμῶν θᾶσσον γεγένηται καὶ ἀπαράσκευος: ᾗ καὶ μᾶλλον χρὴ ξυμμάχους δεξαμένους ἡμᾶς διὰ ταχέων βοήθειαν ἀποστέλλειν, ἵνα φαίνησθε ἀμύνοντές τε οἷς δεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοὺς πολεμίους βλάπτοντες. [3] καιρὸς δὲ ὡς οὔπω πρότερον. νόσῳ τε γὰρ ἐφθάραται Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ χρημάτων δαπάνῃ, νῆές τε αὐτοῖς αἱ μὲν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν εἰσίν, αἱ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν τετάχαται. [4] ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς αὐτοὺς περιουσίαν νεῶν ἔχειν, ἢν ὑμεῖς ἐν τῷ θέρει τῷδε ναυσί τε καὶ πεζῷ ἅμα ἐπεσβάλητε τὸ δεύτερον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὑμᾶς οὐκ ἀμυνοῦνται ἐπιπλέοντας ἢ ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ἀποχωρήσονται. [5] νομίσῃ τε μηδεὶς ἀλλοτρίας γῆς πέρι οἰκεῖον κίνδυνον ἕξειν. ᾧ γὰρ δοκεῖ μακρὰν ἀπεῖναι ἡ Λέσβος, τὴν ὠφελίαν αὐτῷ ἐγγύθεν παρέξει. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος, ὥς τις οἴεται, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἣν ἡ Ἀττικὴ ὠφελεῖται. [6] ἔστι δὲ τῶν χρημάτων ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἡ πρόσοδος, καὶ ἔτι μείζων ἔσται, εἰ ἡμᾶς καταστρέψονται: οὔτε γὰρ ἀποστήσεται ἄλλος τά τε ἡμέτερα προσγενήσεται, πάθοιμέν τ᾽ ἂν δεινότερα ἢ οἱ πρὶν δουλεύοντες. [7] βοηθησάντων δὲ ὑμῶν προθύμως πόλιν τε προσλήψεσθε ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν μέγα, οὗπερ ὑμῖν μάλιστα προσδεῖ, καὶ Ἀθηναίους ῥᾷον καθαιρήσετε ὑφαιροῦντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ξυμμάχους

θρασύτερον γὰρ πᾶς τις προσχωρήσεται, τήν τε αἰτίαν ἀποφεύξεσθε ἣν εἴχετε μὴ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις. ἢν δ᾽ ἐλευθεροῦντες φαίνησθε, τὸ κράτος τοῦ πολέμου βεβαιότερον ἕξετε.

[13] ‘These were the reasons, Lacedaemonians and allies, and the grievances which led us to revolt. They were clear enough to prove to all hearers the justice of our cause, and strong enough to alarm us and drive us to seek some deliverance. We have acted from no sudden impulse; long ago, before the war began, we sent envoys to you, and proposed to revolt. But we could not, because you refused our request. Now, however, when the Boeotians have invited us, we have at once obeyed the call. We were intending to make a double severance of ourselves, from the Hellenes and from the Athenians; from the guilt, that is, of oppressing the Hellenes, in concert with the Athenians, instead of aiding in their liberation, and from the ruin which the Athenians were sooner or later sure to bring upon us, unless we anticipated them. But the step has been taken hastily and without due preparation; hence you are the more bound to receive us into alliance and to send us speedy help, thereby showing that you are ready to protect those who have claims upon you and to strike a blow at your enemies. Never was there such an opportunity before. The Athenians are exhausted by pestilence and by a costly war; some of their ships are cruising about your shores; the remainder are threatening us; so that they are not likely to have many to spare if you, in the course of this summer, make a second attack upon them by land and by sea. They will not be able to meet you at sea; or, if they do, they will have to withdraw their forces both from Lesbos and from Peloponnesus. And let no one say to himself that he is going to incur a danger which will be his own on behalf of a country which is not his own. He may think that Lesbos is a long way off; but he will find that the help which we bring will be very near him. For the war will not be fought in Attica, as might be imagined;

but in those countries by which Attica is supported. The revenues of the Athenians are derived from their allies, and, if they subdue us, will be greater than ever; no one will revolt again, and our resources will be added to theirs; and we shall suffer worse things than those who have been enslaved already. But, if you assist us heartily, you will gain the alliance of a great naval power, and a navy is your chief want; you will draw away the allies of the Athenians, who will fearlessly come over to you; thus you will more easily overthrow the power of Athens. And you will no longer incur, as in times past, the reproach of deserting those who revolt. If you come forward as their liberators your final triumph will be assured.

14. ‘αἰσχυνθέντες οὖν τάς τε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐς ὑμᾶς ἐλπίδας καὶ Δία τὸν Ὀλύμπιον, ἐν οὗ τῷ ἱερῷ ἴσα καὶ ἱκέται ἐσμέν, ἐπαμύνατε Μυτιληναίοις ξύμμαχοι γενόμενοι, καὶ μὴ προῆσθε ἡμᾶς ἴδιον μὲν τὸν κίνδυνον τῶν σωμάτων παραβαλλομένους, κοινὴν δὲ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ κατορθῶσαι ὠφελίαν ἅπασι δώσοντας, ἔτι δὲ κοινοτέραν τὴν βλάβην, εἰ μὴ πεισθέντων ὑμῶν σφαλησόμεθα. [2] γίγνεσθε δὲ ἄνδρες οἵουσπερ ὑμᾶς οἵ τε Ἕλληνες ἀξιοῦσι καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον δέος βούλεται.’

[14] ‘Do not then for very shame frustrate the hopes which the Hellenes rest on you, or dishonour the name of Olympian Zeus in whose temple we are in a manner suppliants, but be our allies and helpers. Do not betray us; we, the people of Mytilenè, risk our lives alone in the common cause of Hellas: universal will be the benefit which we confer if we succeed, and still more universal the ruin if you are inflexible and we fall. Wherefore prove yourselves worthy of your reputation in Hellas, and be such as we in our fear would have you.’These were the words of the Mytilenaeans.

15. τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Μυτιληναῖοι εἶπον. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπειδὴ ἤκουσαν, προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς λόγους ξυμμάχους τε τοὺς Λεσβίους ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολὴν τοῖς τε ξυμμάχοις παροῦσι κατὰ

τάχος ἔφραζον ἰέναι ἐς τὸν Ἰσθμὸν τοῖς δύο μέρεσιν ὡς ποιησόμενοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι ἀφίκοντο, καὶ ὁλκοὺς παρεσκεύαζον τῶν νεῶν ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ὡς ὑπεροίσοντες ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου ἐς τὴν πρὸς Ἀθήνας θάλασσαν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ἅμα ἐπιόντες. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν προθύμως ταῦτα ἔπρασσον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι βραδέως τε ξυνελέγοντο καὶ ἐν καρποῦ ξυγκομιδῇ ἦσαν καὶ ἀρρωστίᾳ τοῦ στρατεύειν.

[15] The Lacedaemonians and the allies immediately accepted their proposals and took the Lesbians into alliance. The confederates, who were present at Olympia, were told to make ready quickly for another expedition into Attica, and to assemble at the isthmus, bringing the usual contingent of two-thirds. The Lacedaemonians arrived first, and at once set to work making machines for hauling ships over the isthmus, from Corinth to the Saronic Gulf. For they intended to attack the Athenians both by sea and land. But although they were energetic themselves, the other allies assembled slowly; they were gathering in their fruits and in no mood for war.

16. αἰσθόμενοι δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ κατάγνωσιν ἀσθενείας σφῶν παρασκευαζομένους, δηλῶσαι βουλόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐγνώκασιν ἀλλ᾽ οἷοί τέ εἰσι μὴ κινοῦντες τὸ ἐπὶ Λέσβῳ ναυτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἐπιὸν ῥᾳδίως ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐπλήρωσαν ναῦς ἑκατὸν ἐσβάντες αὐτοί τε πλὴν ἱππέων καὶ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι, καὶ παρὰ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ἀναγαγόντες ἐπίδειξίν τε ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ἀποβάσεις τῆς Πελοποννήσου ᾗ δοκοίη αὐτοῖς. [2] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὁρῶντες πολὺν τὸν παράλογον τά τε ὑπὸ τῶν Λεσβίων ῥηθέντα ἡγοῦντο οὐκ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἄπορα νομίζοντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἅμα οὐ παρῆσαν καὶ ἠγγέλλοντο καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον τριάκοντα νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὴν περιοικίδα αὐτῶν πορθοῦσαι, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [3] ὕστερον δὲ ναυτικὸν παρεσκεύαζον ὅτι πέμψουσιν ἐς τὴν Λέσβον, καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἐπήγγελλον τεσσαράκοντα νεῶν πλῆθος καὶ ναύαρχον προσέταξαν

Ἀλκίδαν, ὃς ἔμελλεν ἐπιπλεύσεσθαι. [4] ἀνεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσίν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνους εἶδον.

[16] The Athenians, perceiving that the activity of the Lacedaemonians was due to a conviction of their weakness, determined to show them their mistake, and to prove that, without moving the fleet from Lesbos, they were fully able to repel this new force which threatened them. They manned a hundred ships, in which they embarked, both metics and citizens, all but the highest class and the Knights; they then set sail, and, after displaying their strength along the shores of the isthmus, made descents upon the Peloponnesian coast wherever they pleased. The Lacedaemonians were astounded, and thought that the Lesbians had told them what was not true. Their allies too had not yet arrived, and they heard that the Athenians in the thirty ships which had been sent to cruise around Peloponnesus were wasting their country districts; and so, not knowing what else to do, they returned home. However, they afterwards prepared a fleet to go to Lesbos, and ordered the allies to equip forty ships: these they placed under the command of Alcidas, who was to take them out. When the Athenians saw that the Peloponnesians had gone home, they and their fleet of a hundred ships did the same.

17. [καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ὃν αἱ νῆες ἔπλεον ἐν τοῖς πλεῖσται δὴ νῆες ἅμ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοὶ † κάλλει ἐγένοντο, παραπλήσιαι δὲ καὶ ἔτι πλείους ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου. [2] τήν τε γὰρ Ἀττικὴν καὶ Εὔβοιαν καὶ Σαλαμῖνα ἑκατὸν ἐφύλασσον, καὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον ἕτεραι ἑκατὸν ἦσαν, χωρὶς δὲ αἱ περὶ Ποτείδαιαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις χωρίοις, ὥστε αἱ πᾶσαι ἅμα ἐγίγνοντο ἐν ἑνὶ θέρει διακόσιαι καὶ πεντήκοντα. [3] καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦτο μάλιστα ὑπανήλωσε μετὰ Ποτειδαίας. [4] τήν τε γὰρ Ποτείδαιαν δίδραχμοι ὁπλῖται ἐφρούρουν αὐτῷ γὰρ καὶ ὑπηρέτῃ δραχμὴν ἐλάμβανε τῆς ἡμέρας , τρισχίλιοι μὲν οἱ πρῶτοι, ὧν οὐκ ἐλάσσους διεπολιόρκησαν, ἑξακόσιοι δὲ καὶ χίλιοι μετὰ Φορμίωνος, οἳ προαπῆλθον: νῆές τε αἱ πᾶσαι τὸν αὐτὸν

μισθὸν ἔφερον. τὰ μὲν οὖν χρήματα οὕτως ὑπανηλώθη τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ νῆες τοσαῦται δὴ πλεῖσται ἐπληρώθησαν.]

[17] At the time when the fleet was at sea, the Athenians had the largest number of ships which they ever had all together, effective and in good trim, although the mere number was as large or even larger at the commencement of the war. For then there were a hundred which guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis, and another hundred which were cruising off Peloponnesus, not including the ships employed in blockading Potidaea and at other places; so that in one and the same summer their fleet in all numbered two hundred and fifty. This and the money spent in the war against Potidaea was the chief call upon their treasury. Every one of the hoplites engaged in the siege received two drachmae a day, one for himself, and one for his servant; the original force amounted to three thousand, and this number was maintained as long as the siege lasted. Sixteen hundred more came with Phormio, but went away before the end. The sailors in the fleet all received the same pay as the soldiers. So great was the drain on the resources of the Athenians in the early part of the war, and such was the largest number of ships which they ever manned.

18. Μυτιληναῖοι δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ὃν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι περὶ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ἦσαν ἐπὶ Μήθυμναν ὡς προδιδομένην ἐστράτευσαν κατὰ γῆν αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ἐπίκουροι: καὶ προσβαλόντες τῇ πόλει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ προυχώρει ᾗ προσεδέχοντο, ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ Ἀντίσσης καὶ Πύρρας καὶ Ἐρέσου, καὶ καταστησάμενοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ταύταις βεβαιότερα καὶ τείχη κρατύναντες διὰ τάχους ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [2] ἐστράτευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Μηθυμναῖοι ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν ἐπ᾽ Ἄντισσαν: καὶ ἐκβοηθείας τινὸς γενομένης πληγέντες ὑπό τε τῶν Ἀντισσαίων καὶ τῶν ἐπικούρων ἀπέθανόν τε πολλοὶ καὶ ἀνεχώρησαν οἱ λοιποὶ κατὰ τάχος. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα, τούς τε Μυτιληναίους τῆς γῆς κρατοῦντας καὶ τοὺς σφετέρους στρατιώτας οὐχ ἱκανοὺς ὄντας εἴργειν, πέμπουσι περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον ἤδη

ἀρχόμενον Πάχητα τὸν Ἐπικούρου στρατηγὸν καὶ χιλίους ὁπλίτας ἑαυτῶν. [4] οἱ δὲ αὐτερέται πλεύσαντες τῶν νεῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ περιτειχίζουσι Μυτιλήνην ἐν κύκλῳ ἁπλῷ τείχει: φρούρια δ᾽ ἔστιν ᾗ ἐπὶ τῶν καρτερῶν ἐγκατῳκοδόμηται. [5] καὶ ἡ μὲν Μυτιλήνη κατὰ κράτος ἤδη ἀμφοτέρωθεν καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης εἴργετο, καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἤρχετο γίγνεσθαι.

[18] While the Lacedaemonians were at the isthmus, the Mytilenaeans and their auxiliaries marched against Methymna, which they expected to be betrayed to them, but, making an assault, and finding that they were mistaken, they went off to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus; and, having strengthened the walls of these places and established their interest in them, they hastily returned. As soon as they had retired, the Methymnaeans retaliated by making an expedition against Antissa; but the people of Antissa and their auxiliaries sallied out and defeated them with heavy loss; the survivors made a hasty retreat. The Athenians heard that the Mytilenaeans were masters of the country, and that their own troops in Lesbos were not sufficient to confine them within the walls. So about the beginning of autumn they sent to Mytilenè, under the command of Paches the son of Epicurus, a thousand Athenian hoplites who handled the oars themselves. On arriving, they surrounded the town with a single line of wall; and in some strong places forts were erected which formed part of the wall. Thus Mytilenè was effectually blockaded both by sea and by land. The winter now began to set in.

19. προσδεόμενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι χρημάτων ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσενεγκόντες τότε πρῶτον ἐσφορὰν διακόσια τάλαντα, ἐξέπεμψαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀργυρολόγους ναῦς δώδεκα καὶ Λυσικλέα πέμπτον αὐτὸν στρατηγόν. [2] ὁ δὲ ἄλλα τε ἠργυρολόγει καὶ περιέπλει, καὶ τῆς Καρίας ἐκ Μυοῦντος ἀναβὰς διὰ τοῦ Μαιάνδρου πεδίου μέχρι τοῦ Σανδίου λόφου, ἐπιθεμένων τῶν Καρῶν καὶ

Ἀναιιτῶν αὐτός τε διαφθείρεται καὶ τῆς ἄλλης στρατιᾶς πολλοί.

[19] The Athenians, being in want of money to carry on the siege, raised among themselves for the first time a property-tax of two hundred talents, and sent out twelve ships to collect tribute among the allies, under the command of Lysicles and four others. He sailed to various places and exacted tribute; but as he was going up from Myus in Caria, through the plain of the Maeander, he was attacked at the hill of Sandius by the Carians and the Samians of Anaea, and, with a great part of his army, perished.

20. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἔτι γὰρ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ὑπὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἐπειδὴ τῷ τε σίτῳ ἐπιλείποντι ἐπιέζοντο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν οὐδεμία ἐλπὶς ἦν τιμωρίας οὐδὲ ἄλλη σωτηρία ἐφαίνετο, ἐπιβουλεύουσιν αὐτοί τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων οἱ ξυμπολιορκούμενοι πρῶτον μὲν πάντες ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ὑπερβῆναι τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεμίων, ἢν δύνωνται βιάσασθαι, ἐσηγησαμένων τὴν πεῖραν αὐτοῖς Θεαινέτου τε τοῦ Τολμίδου ἀνδρὸς μάντεως καὶ Εὐπομπίδου τοῦ Δαϊμάχου, ὃς καὶ ἐστρατήγει: [2] ἔπειτα οἱ μὲν ἡμίσεις ἀπώκνησάν πως τὸν κίνδυνον μέγαν ἡγησάμενοι, ἐς δὲ ἄνδρας διακοσίους καὶ εἴκοσι μάλιστα ἐνέμειναν τῇ ἐξόδῳ ἐθελονταὶ τρόπῳ τοιῷδε. [3] κλίμακας ἐποιήσαντο ἴσας τῷ τείχει τῶν πολεμίων: ξυνεμετρήσαντο δὲ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τῶν πλίνθων, ᾗ ἔτυχε πρὸς σφᾶς οὐκ ἐξαληλιμμένον τὸ τεῖχος αὐτῶν. ἠριθμοῦντο δὲ πολλοὶ ἅμα τὰς ἐπιβολάς, καὶ ἔμελλον οἱ μέν τινες ἁμαρτήσεσθαι οἱ δὲ πλείους τεύξεσθαι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λογισμοῦ, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλάκις ἀριθμοῦντες καὶ ἅμα οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχοντες, ἀλλὰ ῥᾳδίως καθορωμένου ἐς ὃ ἐβούλοντο τοῦ τείχους. [4] τὴν μὲν οὖν ξυμμέτρησιν τῶν κλιμάκων οὕτως ἔλαβον, ἐκ τοῦ πάχους τῆς πλίνθου εἰκάσαντες τὸ μέτρον.

[20] During the same winter the Plataeans, who were still besieged by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, began to suffer from the failure of provisions. They had no hope of

assistance from Athens and no other chance of deliverance. So they and the Athenians who were shut up with them contrived a plan of forcing their way over the enemy’s walls. The idea was suggested by Theaenetus the son of Tolmides, a diviner, and Eupompidas, the son of Daïmachus, one of their generals. At first they were all desirous of joining, but afterwards half of them somehow lost heart, thinking the danger too great, and only two hundred and twenty agreed to persevere. They first made ladders equal in length to the height of the enemy’s wall, which they calculated by the help of the layers of bricks on the side facing the town, at a place where the wall had accidentally not been plastered. A great many counted at once, and, although some might make mistakes, the calculation would be oftener right than wrong; for they repeated the process again and again, and, the distance not being great, they could see the wall distinctly enough for their purpose. In this manner they ascertained the proper length of the ladders, taking as a measure the thickness of the bricks.

21. τὸ δὲ τεῖχος ἦν τῶν Πελοποννησίων τοιόνδε τῇ οἰκοδομήσει. εἶχε μὲν δύο τοὺς περιβόλους, πρός τε Πλαταιῶν καὶ εἴ τις ἔξωθεν ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν ἐπίοι, διεῖχον δὲ οἱ περίβολοι ἑκκαίδεκα πόδας μάλιστα ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων. [2] τὸ οὖν μεταξὺ τοῦτο [οἱ ἑκκαίδεκα πόδες] τοῖς φύλαξιν οἰκήματα διανενεμημένα ᾠκοδόμητο, καὶ ἦν ξυνεχῆ ὥστε ἓν φαίνεσθαι τεῖχος παχὺ ἐπάλξεις ἔχον ἀμφοτέρωθεν. [3] διὰ δέκα δὲ ἐπάλξεων πύργοι ἦσαν μεγάλοι καὶ ἰσοπλατεῖς τῷ τείχει, διήκοντες ἔς τε τὸ ἔσω μέτωπον αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὸ ἔξω, ὥστε πάροδον μὴ εἶναι παρὰ πύργον, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ αὐτῶν μέσων διῆσαν. [4] τὰς οὖν νύκτας, ὁπότε χειμὼν εἴη νοτερός, τὰς μὲν ἐπάλξεις ἀπέλειπον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πύργων ὄντων δι᾽ ὀλίγου καὶ ἄνωθεν στεγανῶν τὴν φυλακὴν ἐποιοῦντο. τὸ μὲν οὖν τεῖχος ᾧ περιεφρουροῦντο οἱ Πλαταιῆς τοιοῦτον ἦν.

[21] The Peloponnesian wall was double, and consisted of an inner circle looking towards Plataea, and an outer intended

to guard against an attack from Athens; they were at a distance of about sixteen feet from one another. This interval of sixteen feet was partitioned off into lodgings for the soldiers, by which the two walls were joined together, so that they appeared to form one thick wall with battlements on both sides. At every tenth battlement there were large towers, filling up the space between the walls, and extending both to the inner and outer face; there was no way at the side of the towers, but only through the middle of them. During the night, whenever there was storm and rain, the soldiers left the battlements and kept guard from the towers, which were not far from each other and were covered overhead. Such was the plan of the wall with which Plataea was invested.

22. οἱ δ᾽, ἐπειδὴ παρεσκεύαστο αὐτοῖς, τηρήσαντες νύκτα χειμέριον ὕδατι καὶ ἀνέμῳ καὶ ἅμ᾽ ἀσέληνον ἐξῆσαν: ἡγοῦντο δὲ οἵπερ καὶ τῆς πείρας αἴτιοι ἦσαν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν τάφρον διέβησαν ἣ περιεῖχεν αὐτούς, ἔπειτα προσέμειξαν τῷ τείχει τῶν πολεμίων λαθόντες τοὺς φύλακας, ἀνὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν μὲν οὐ προϊδόντων αὐτῶν, ψόφῳ δὲ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ προσιέναι αὐτοὺς ἀντιπαταγοῦντος τοῦ ἀνέμου οὐ κατακουσάντων: [2] ἅμα δὲ καὶ διέχοντες πολὺ ἦσαν, ὅπως τὰ ὅπλα μὴ κρουόμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα αἴσθησιν παρέχοι. ἦσαν δὲ εὐσταλεῖς τε τῇ ὁπλίσει καὶ τὸν ἀριστερὸν μόνον πόδα ὑποδεδεμένοι ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα τῆς πρὸς τὸν πηλόν. [3] κατὰ οὖν μεταπύργιον προσέμισγον πρὸς τὰς ἐπάλξεις, εἰδότες ὅτι ἐρῆμοί εἰσι, πρῶτον μὲν οἱ τὰς κλίμακας φέροντες, καὶ προσέθεσαν: ἔπειτα ψιλοὶ δώδεκα ξὺν ξιφιδίῳ καὶ θώρακι ἀνέβαινον, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Ἀμμέας ὁ Κοροίβου καὶ πρῶτος ἀνέβη: μετὰ δὲ αὐτὸν οἱ ἑπόμενοι, ἓξ ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερον τῶν πύργων, ἀνέβαινον. ἔπειτα ψιλοὶ ἄλλοι μετὰ τούτους ξὺν δορατίοις ἐχώρουν, οἷς ἕτεροι κατόπιν τὰς ἀσπίδας ἔφερον, ὅπως ἐκεῖνοι ῥᾷον προσβαίνοιεν, καὶ ἔμελλον δώσειν ὁπότε πρὸς τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶεν. [4] ὡς δὲ ἄνω πλείους ἐγένοντο, ᾐσθοντο οἱ ἐκ τῶν πύργων φύλακες: κατέβαλε γάρ τις τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἀπὸ

τῶν ἐπάλξεων κεραμίδα, ἢ πεσοῦσα δοῦπον ἐποίησεν. [5] καὶ αὐτίκα βοὴ ἦν, τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος ὥρμησεν: οὐ γὰρ ᾔδει ὅτι ἦν τὸ δεινὸν σκοτεινῆς νυκτὸς καὶ χειμῶνος ὄντος, καὶ ἅμα οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν Πλαταιῶν ὑπολελειμμένοι ἐξελθόντες προσέβαλον τῷ τείχει τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἐκ τοὔμπαλιν ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες αὐτῶν ὑπερέβαινον, ὅπως ἥκιστα πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὸν νοῦν ἔχοιεν. [6] ἐθορυβοῦντο μὲν οὖν κατὰ χώραν μένοντες, βοηθεῖν δὲ οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμα ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φυλακῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἦσαν εἰκάσαι τὸ γιγνόμενον. [7] καὶ οἱ τριακόσιοι αὐτῶν, οἷς ἐτέτακτο παραβοηθεῖν εἴ τι δέοι, ἐχώρουν ἔξω τοῦ τείχους πρὸς τὴν βοήν. φρυκτοί τε ᾔροντο ἐς τὰς Θήβας πολέμιοι: [8] παρανῖσχον δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Πλαταιῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους φρυκτοὺς πολλοὺς πρότερον παρεσκευασμένους ἐς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅπως ἀσαφῆ τὰ σημεῖα τῆς φρυκτωρίας τοῖς πολεμίοις ᾖ καὶ μὴ βοηθοῖεν, ἄλλο τι νομίσαντες τὸ γιγνόμενον εἶναι ἢ τὸ ὄν, πρὶν σφῶν οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἐξιόντες διαφύγοιεν καὶ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς ἀντιλάβοιντο.

[22] When the Plataeans had completed their preparations they took advantage of a night on which there was a storm of wind and rain and no moon, and sallied forth. They were led by the authors of the attempt. First of all they crossed the ditch which surrounded the town; then they came right up to the wall of the enemy. The guard did not discover them, for the night was so dark that they could not be seen, while the clatter of the storm drowned the noise of their approach. They marched a good way apart from each other, that the clashing of their arms might not betray them; and they were lightly equipped, having the right foot bare that they might be less liable to slip in the mud. They now set about scaling the battlements, which they knew to be deserted, choosing a space between two of the towers. Those who carried the ladders went first and placed them against the wall; they were followed by twelve others, armed only with sword and breastplate, under the command of Ammeas the son of Coroebus: he was the first to mount;

after him came the twelve, ascending the wall and proceeding to the towers on the right and left, six to each. To these succeeded more men lightly armed with short spears, others following who bore their shields, that they might have less difficulty in mounting the wall; the shields were to be handed to them as soon as they were near the enemy. A considerable number had ascended, when they were discovered by the guards in the towers. One of the Plataeans, taking hold of the battlements, threw down a tile which made a noise in falling: immediately a shout was raised and the army rushed out upon the wall; for in the dark and stormy night they did not know what the alarm meant. At the same time, in order to distract their attention, the Plataeans who were left in the city made a sally against the Peloponnesian wall on the side opposite to the place at which their friends were getting over. The besiegers were in great excitement, but every one remained at his own post, and dared not stir to give assistance, being at a loss to imagine what was happening. The three hundred who were appointed to act in any sudden emergency marched along outside the walls towards the spot from which the cry proceeded; and fire-signals indicating danger were raised towards Thebes. But the Plataeans in the city had numerous counter signals ready on the wall, which they now lighted and held up, thereby hoping to render the signals of the enemy unintelligible, that so the Thebans, misunderstanding the true state of affairs, might not arrive until the men had escaped and were in safety.

23. οἱ δ᾽ ὑπερβαίνοντες τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς οἱ πρῶτοι αὐτῶν ἀνεβεβήκεσαν καὶ τοῦ πύργου ἑκατέρου τοὺς φύλακας διαφθείραντες ἐκεκρατήκεσαν, τάς τε διόδους τῶν πύργων ἐνστάντες αὐτοὶ ἐφύλασσον μηδένα δι᾽ αὐτῶν ἐπιβοηθεῖν, καὶ κλίμακας προσθέντες ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους τοῖς πύργοις καὶ ἐπαναβιβάσαντες ἄνδρας πλείους, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων τοὺς ἐπιβοηθοῦντας καὶ κάτωθεν καὶ ἄνωθεν εἶργον βάλλοντες, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ πλείους πολλὰς

προσθέντες κλίμακας ἅμα καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπώσαντες διὰ τοῦ μεταπυργίου ὑπερέβαινον. [2] ὁ δὲ διακομιζόμενος αἰεὶ ἵστατο ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους τῆς τάφρου καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐτόξευόν τε καὶ ἠκόντιζον, εἴ τις παραβοηθῶν παρὰ τὸ τεῖχος κωλυτὴς γίγνοιτο τῆς διαβάσεως. [3] ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες διεπεπεραίωντο, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν πύργων χαλεπῶς οἱ τελευταῖοι καταβαίνοντες ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν τάφρον, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ τριακόσιοι αὐτοῖς ἐπεφέροντο λαμπάδας ἔχοντες. [4] οἱ μὲν οὖν Πλαταιῆς ἐκείνους ἑώρων μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ σκότους ἑστῶτες ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους τῆς τάφρου, καὶ ἐτόξευόν τε καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον ἐς τὰ γυμνά, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ὄντες ἧσσον διὰ τὰς λαμπάδας καθεωρῶντο, ὥστε φθάνουσι τῶν Πλαταιῶν καὶ οἱ ὕστατοι διαβάντες τὴν τάφρον, χαλεπῶς δὲ καὶ βιαίως: [5] κρύσταλλός τε γὰρ ἐπεπήγει οὐ βέβαιος ἐν αὐτῇ ὥστ᾽ ἐπελθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷος ἀπηλιώτου [ἢ βορέου] ὑδατώδης μᾶλλον, καὶ ἡ νὺξ τοιούτῳ ἀνέμῳ ὑπονειφομένη πολὺ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεποιήκει, ὃ μόλις ὑπερέχοντες ἐπεραιώθησαν. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ ἡ διάφευξις αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον διὰ τοῦ χειμῶνος τὸ μέγεθος.

[23] Meanwhile the Plataeans were scaling the walls. The first party had mounted, and, killing the sentinels, had gained possession of the towers on either side. Their followers now began to occupy the passages, lest the enemy should come through and fall upon them. Some of them placed ladders upon the wall against the towers, and got up more men. A shower of missiles proceeding both from the upper and lower parts of the towers kept off all assailants. Meanwhile the main body of the Plataeans, who were still below, applied to the wall many ladders at once, and, pushing down the battlements, made their way over through the space between the towers. As each man got to the other side he halted upon the edge of the ditch, whence they shot darts and arrows at any one who came along under the wall and attempted to impede their passage. When they had all passed over, those who had occupied the towers came down, the last of them not without great difficulty, and

proceeded towards the ditch. By this time the three hundred were upon them; they had lights, and the Plataeans, standing on the edge of the ditch, saw them all the better out of the darkness, and shot arrows and threw darts at them where their bodies were exposed; they themselves were concealed by the darkness, while the enemy were dazed by their own lights. And so the Plataeans, down to the last man of them all, got safely over the ditch, though with great exertion and only after a hard struggle; for the ice in it was not frozen hard enough to bear, but was half water, as is commonly the case when the wind is from the east and not from the north. And the snow which the east wind brought in the night had greatly swollen the water, so that they could scarcely accomplish the passage. It was the violence of the storm, however, which enabled them to escape at all.

24. ὁρμήσαντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τάφρου οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἐχώρουν ἀθρόοι τὴν ἐς Θήβας φέρουσαν ὁδόν, ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἡρῷον, νομίζοντες ἥκιστ᾽ <ἂν> σφᾶς ταύτην αὐτοὺς ὑποτοπῆσαι τραπέσθαι τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους: καὶ ἅμα ἑώρων τοὺς Πελοποννησίους τὴν πρὸς Κιθαιρῶνα καὶ Δρυὸς κεφαλὰς τὴν ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν φέρουσαν μετὰ λαμπάδων διώκοντας. [2] καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ἓξ ἢ ἑπτὰ σταδίους οἱ Πλαταιῆς τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν Θηβῶν ἐχώρησαν, ἔπειθ᾽ ὑποστρέψαντες ᾖσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄρος φέρουσαν ὁδὸν ἐς Ἐρύθρας καὶ Ὑσιάς, καὶ λαβόμενοι τῶν ὀρῶν διαφεύγουσιν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἄνδρες δώδεκα καὶ διακόσιοι ἀπὸ πλειόνων: εἰσὶ γάρ τινες αὐτῶν οἳ ἀπετράποντο ἐς τὴν πόλιν πρὶν ὑπερβαίνειν, εἷς δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῇ ἔξω τάφρῳ τοξότης ἐλήφθη. [3] οἱ μὲν οὖν Πελοποννήσιοι κατὰ χώραν ἐγένοντο τῆς βοηθείας παυσάμενοι: οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Πλαταιῆς τῶν μὲν γεγενημένων εἰδότες οὐδέν, τῶν δὲ ἀποτραπομένων σφίσιν ἀπαγγειλάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς περίεστι, κήρυκα ἐκπέμψαντες, ἐπεὶ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, ἐσπένδοντο ἀναίρεσιν τοῖς νεκροῖς, μαθόντες δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπαύσαντο. οἱ μὲν δὴ τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἄνδρες οὕτως ὑπερβάντες ἐσώθησαν.

[24] From the ditch the Plataeans, leaving on the right hand the shrine of Androcrates, ran all together along the road to Thebes. They made sure that no one would ever suspect them of having fled in the direction of their enemies. On their way they saw the Peloponnesians pursuing them with torches on the road which leads to Athens by Cithaeron and Dryoscephalae. For nearly a mile the Plataeans continued on the Theban road; they then turned off and went by the way up the mountain leading to Erythrae and Hysiae, and so, getting to the hills, they escaped to Athens. Their number was two hundred and twelve, though they had been originally more, for some of them went back to the city and never got over the wall; one who was an archer was taken at the outer ditch. The Peloponnesians at length gave up the pursuit and returned to their lines. But the Plataeans in the city, knowing nothing of what had happened, for those who had turned back had informed them that not one was left alive, sent out a herald at daybreak, wanting to make a truce for the burial of the dead ; they then discovered the truth and returned. Thus the Plataeans scaled the wall and escaped.

25. ἐκ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος τελευτῶντος ἐκπέμπεται Σάλαιθος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐς Μυτιλήνην τριήρει. καὶ πλεύσας ἐς Πύρραν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς πεζῇ κατὰ χαράδραν τινά, ᾗ ὑπερβατὸν ἦν τὸ περιτείχισμα, διαλαθὼν ἐσέρχεται ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην, καὶ ἔλεγε τοῖς προέδροις ὅτι ἐσβολή τε ἅμα ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἔσται καὶ αἱ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες παρέσονται ἃς ἔδει βοηθῆσαι αὐτοῖς, προαποπεμφθῆναί τε αὐτὸς τούτων ἕνεκα καὶ ἅμα τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελησόμενος. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν Μυτιληναῖοι ἐθάρσουν τε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἧσσον εἶχον τὴν γνώμην ὥστε ξυμβαίνειν. ὅ τε χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα οὗτος, καὶ τέταρτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[25] At the end of the same winter Salaethus the Lacedaemonian was despatched in a trireme from Lacedaemon to Mytilenè. He sailed to Pyrrha, and thence,

proceeding on foot, made his way, by the channel of a torrent at a place where the line of the Athenian wall could be crossed, undiscovered into Mytilenè. He told the government that there was to be an invasion of Attica, and that simultaneously the forty ships which were coming to their assistance would arrive at Lesbos; he himself had been sent in advance to bring the news and take charge of affairs. Whereupon the Mytilenaeans recovered their spirits, and were less disposed to make terms with the Athenians. So the winter ended, and with it the fourth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

26. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπειδὴ τὰς ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην δύο καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς ἀπέστειλαν ἄρχοντα Ἀλκίδαν, ὃς ἦν αὐτοῖς ναύαρχος, προστάξαντες, αὐτοὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐσέβαλον, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν θορυβούμενοι ἧσσον ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην καταπλεούσαις ἐπιβοηθήσωσιν. [2] ἡγεῖτο δὲ τῆς ἐσβολῆς ταύτης Κλεομένης ὑπὲρ Παυσανίου τοῦ Πλειστοάνακτος υἱέος βασιλέως ὄντος καὶ νεωτέρου ἔτι, πατρὸς δὲ ἀδελφὸς ὤν. [3] ἐδῄωσαν δὲ τῆς Ἀττικῆς τά τε πρότερον τετμημένα [καὶ] εἴ τι ἐβεβλαστήκει καὶ ὅσα ἐν ταῖς πρὶν ἐσβολαῖς παρελέλειπτο: καὶ ἡ ἐσβολὴ αὕτη χαλεπωτάτη ἐγένετο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις μετὰ τὴν δευτέραν. [4] ἐπιμένοντες γὰρ αἰεὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Λέσβου τι πεύσεσθαι τῶν νεῶν ἔργον ὡς ἤδη πεπεραιωμένων ἐπεξῆλθον τὰ πολλὰ τέμνοντες. ὡς δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἀπέβαινεν αὐτοῖς ὧν προσεδέχοντο κὰ ἐπελελοίπει ὁ σῖτος, ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

[26] With the return of summer the Peloponnesians despatched the two and forty ships which they intended for Mytilenè in charge of Alcidas, the Lacedaemonian admiral. They and their allies then invaded Attica, in order that the Athenians, embarrassed both by sea and land, might have their attention distracted from the ships sailing to Mytilenè. Cleomenes led the invasion. He was acting in the place of his nephew, the king Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, who was

still a minor. All the country which they had previously overrun, wherever anything had grown up again, they ravaged afresh, and devastated even those districts which they had hitherto spared. This invasion caused greater distress to the Athenians than any, except the second. For the Peloponnesians, who were daily expecting to hear from Lesbos of some action on the part of the fleet, which they supposed by this time to have crossed the sea, pursued their ravages far and wide. But when none of their expectations were realised, and their food was exhausted, they retired and dispersed to their several cities.

27. οἱ δὲ Μυτιληναῖοι ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς αἵ τε νῆες αὐτοῖς οὐχ ἥκον ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀλλὰ ἐνεχρόνιζον καὶ ὁ σῖτος ἐπελελοίπει, ἀναγκάζονται ξυμβαίνειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διὰ τάδε. [2] ὁ Σάλαιθος καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ προσδεχόμενος ἔτι τὰς ναῦς ὁπλίζει τὸν δῆμον πρότερον ψιλὸν ὄντα ὡς ἐπεξιὼν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις: [3] οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἔλαβον ὅπλα, οὔτε ἠκροῶντο ἔτι τῶν ἀρχόντων, κατὰ ξυλλόγους τε γιγνόμενοι ἢ τὸν σῖτον ἐκέλευον τοὺς δυνατοὺς φέρειν ἐς τὸ φανερὸν καὶ διανέμειν ἅπασιν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ξυγχωρήσαντες πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἔφασαν παραδώσειν τὴν πόλιν.

[27] Meanwhile the Mytilenaeans, finding as time went on that the ships from Peloponnesus never came, and that their provisions had run short, were obliged to make terms with the Athenians. The immediate cause was as follows: Salaethus himself began to despair of the arrival of the ships, and therefore he put into the hands of the common people (who had hitherto been light-armed) shields and spears, intending to lead them out against the Athenians. But, having once received arms, they would no longer obey their leaders; they gathered into knots and insisted that the nobles should bring out the corn and let all share alike; if not, they would themselves negotiate with the Athenians and surrender the city.

28. γνόντες δὲ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν οὔτ᾽ ἀποκωλύειν δυνατοὶ ὄντες, εἴ τ᾽ ἀπομονωθήσονται τῆς ξυμβάσεως

κινδυνεύσοντες, ποιοῦνται κοινῇ ὁμολογίαν πρός τε Πάχητα καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, ὥστε Ἀθηναίοις μὲν ἐξεῖναι βουλεῦσαι περὶ Μυτιληναίων ὁποῖον ἄν τι βούλωνται καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν ἐς τὴν πόλιν δέχεσθαι αὐτούς, πρεσβείαν δὲ ἀποστέλλειν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας Μυτιληναίους περὶ ἑαυτῶν: ἐν ὅσῳ δ᾽ ἂν πάλιν ἔλθωσι, Πάχητα μήτε δῆσαι Μυτιληναίων μηδένα μηδὲ ἀνδραποδίσαι μήτε ἀποκτεῖναι. [2] ἡ μὲν ξύμβασις αὕτη ἐγένετο, οἱ δὲ πράξαντες πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μάλιστα τῶν Μυτιληναίων περιδεεῖς ὄντες, ὡς ἡ στρατιὰ ἐσῆλθεν, οὐκ ἠνέσχοντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοὺς βωμοὺς ὅμως καθίζουσιν: Πάχης δ᾽ ἀναστήσας αὐτοὺς ὥστε μὴ ἀδικῆσαι, κατατίθεται ἐς Τένεδον μέχρι οὗ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τι δόξῃ. [3] πέμψας δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἄντισσαν τριήρεις προσεκτήσατο καὶ τἆλλα τὰ περὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον καθίστατο ᾗ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει.

[28] The magistrates, knowing that they were helpless, and that they would be in peril of their lives if they were left out of the convention, concluded a general agreement with Paches and his army, stipulating that the fate of the Mytilenaeans should be left in the hands of the Athenians at home. They were to receive him and his forces into the city; but might send an embassy to Athens on their own behalf. Until the envoys returned, Paches was not to bind, enslave, or put to death any Mytilenaean. These were the terms of the capitulation. Nevertheless, when the army entered, those Mytilenaeans who had been principally concerned with the Lacedaemonians were in an agony of fear, and could not be satisfied until they had taken refuge at the altars. Paches raised them up, and promising not to hurt them, deposited them at Tenedos until the Athenians should come to a decision. He also sent triremes to Antissa, of which he gained possession, and took such other military measures as he deemed best.

29. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ Πελοποννήσιοι, οὓς ἔδει ἐν τάχει παραγενέσθαι, πλέοντες περί τε αὐτὴν τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐνδιέτριψαν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον πλοῦν σχολαῖοι κομισθέντες τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Ἀθηναίους

λανθάνουσι, πρὶν δὴ τῇ Δήλῳ ἔσχον, προσμείξαντες δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς τῇ Ἰκάρῳ καὶ Μυκόνῳ πυνθάνονται πρῶτον ὅτι ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἑάλωκεν. [2] βουλόμενοι δὲ τὸ σαφὲς εἰδέναι κατέπλευσαν ἐς Ἔμβατον τῆς Ἐρυθραίας: ἡμέραι δὲ μάλιστα ἦσαν τῇ Μυτιλήνῃ ἑαλωκυίᾳ ἑπτὰ ὅτε ἐς τὸ Ἔμβατον κατέπλευσαν. πυθόμενοι δὲ τὸ σαφὲς ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, καὶ ἔλεξεν αὐτοῖς Τευτίαπλος ἀνὴρ Ἠλεῖος τάδε.

[29] The forty ships of the Peloponnesians, which should have gone at once to Mytilenè, lost time about the Peloponnese, and proceeded very leisurely on their voyage. They arrived safely at Delos, before they were heard of at Athens; but on touching at Icarus and Myconus they found, too late, that Mytilenè was taken. Wanting to obtain certain information, they sailed to Embatum near Erythrae, which they reached, but not until seven days after the fall of Mytilenè. Having now made sure of the fact, they consulted as to what measures should next be taken, and Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows:

30. ‘Ἀλκίδα καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὅσοι πάρεσμεν ἄρχοντες τῆς στρατιᾶς, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πλεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Μυτιλήνην πρὶν ἐκπύστους γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἔχομεν. [2] κατὰ γὰρ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀνδρῶν νεωστὶ πόλιν ἐχόντων πολὺ τὸ ἀφύλακτον εὑρήσομεν, κατὰ μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ πάνυ, ᾗ ἐκεῖνοί τε ἀνέλπιστοι ἐπιγενέσθαι ἄν τινα σφίσι πολέμιον καὶ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀλκὴ τυγχάνει μάλιστα οὖσα: εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ τὸ πεζὸν αὐτῶν κατ᾽ οἰκίας ἀμελέστερον ὡς κεκρατηκότων διεσπάρθαι. [3] εἰ οὖν προσπέσοιμεν ἄφνω τε καὶ νυκτός, ἐλπίζω μετὰ τῶν ἔνδον, εἴ τις ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ὑπόλοιπος εὔνους, καταληφθῆναι ἂν τὰ πράγματα. [4] καὶ μὴ ἀποκνήσωμεν τὸν κίνδυνον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ κενὸν τοῦ πολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ εἴ τις στρατηγὸς ἔν τε αὐτῷ φυλάσσοιτο καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐνορῶν ἐπιχειροίη, πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοῖτο.’

[30] ‘My opinion, Alcidas, and you, my fellow-commanders of the Peloponnesian forces, is that we should attack Mytilenè

at once, just as we are, before our arrival is known. In all probability we shall find that men who have recently gained possession of a city will be much off their guard, and entirely so at sea, on which element they do not fear the attack of an enemy, and where at this moment we can strike with effect. Probably too their land forces, in the carelessness of victory, will be scattered up and down among the houses of the city. If we were to fall upon them suddenly by night, with the help of our friends inside, should there be any left, I have no doubt that Mytilenè would be ours. The danger should not deter us; for we should consider that the execution of a military surprise is always dangerous, and that the general who is never taken off his guard himself, and never loses an opportunity of striking at an unguarded foe, will be most likely to succeed in war.’

31. ὁ μὲν τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἔπειθε τὸν Ἀλκίδαν. ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν ἀπ᾽ Ἰωνίας φυγάδων καὶ οἱ Λέσβιοι <οἱ> ξυμπλέοντες παρῄνουν, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον φοβεῖται, τῶν ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ πόλεων καταλαβεῖν τινὰ ἢ Κύμην τὴν Αἰολίδα, ὅπως ἐκ πόλεως ὁρμώμενοι τὴν Ἰωνίαν ἀποστήσωσιν ἐλπίδα δ᾽ εἶναι: οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἀκουσίως ἀφῖχθαι καὶ τὴν πρόσοδον ταύτην μεγίστην οὖσαν Ἀθηναίων [ἢν] ὑφέλωσι, καὶ ἅμα, ἢν ἐφορμῶσι σφίσιν, αὐτοῖς δαπάνη γίγνηται: πείσειν τε οἴεσθαι καὶ Πισσούθνην ὥστε ξυμπολεμεῖν. [2] ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐνεδέχετο, ἀλλὰ τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς γνώμης εἶχεν, ἐπειδὴ τῆς Μυτιλήνης ὑστερήκει, ὅτι τάχιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πάλιν προσμεῖξαι.

[31] His words failed to convince Alcidas; whereupon some Ionian exiles and the Lesbians who were on board the fleet recommended that, if this enterprise appeared too hazardous, he should occupy one of the Ionian towns or the Aeolian Cymè: having thus established their head-quarters in a city, the Peloponnesians might raise the standard of revolt in Ionia. There was a good chance of success, for every one was glad of his arrival; they might cut off a main source of Athenian revenue; and although they themselves

would incur expense, for the Athenians would blockade them, the attempt was worth making. Pissuthnes might very likely be persuaded to co-operate. But Alcidas objected to this proposal equally with the last; his only idea was, now that he had failed in saving Mytilenè, to get back as fast as he could to Peloponnesus.

32. ἄρας δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Ἐμβάτου παρέπλει, καὶ προσσχὼν Μυοννήσῳ τῇ Τηίων τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους οὓς κατὰ πλοῦν εἰλήφει ἀπέσφαξε τοὺς πολλούς. [2] καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἔφεσον καθορμισαμένου αὐτοῦ Σαμίων τῶν ἐξ Ἀναίων ἀφικόμενοι πρέσβεις ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτόν, εἰ ἄνδρας διέφθειρεν οὔτε χεῖρας ἀνταιρομένους οὔτε πολεμίους, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ξυμμάχους: εἴ τε μὴ παύσεται, ὀλίγους μὲν αὐτὸν τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐς φιλίαν προσάξεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ πλείους τῶν φίλων πολεμίους ἕξειν. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐπείσθη τε καὶ Χίων ἄνδρας ὅσους εἶχεν ἔτι ἀφῆκε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινάς: ὁρῶντες γὰρ τὰς ναῦς οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἔφευγον, ἀλλὰ προσεχώρουν μᾶλλον ὡς Ἀττικαῖς καὶ ἐλπίδα οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην εἶχον μή ποτε Ἀθηναίων τῆς θαλάσσης κρατούντων ναῦς Πελοποννησίων ἐς Ἰωνίαν παραβαλεῖν.

[32] Accordingly he sailed from Embatum along the coast, touching at Myonnesus in the territory of Teos; he there slew most of the captives whom he had taken on his voyage. He then put into harbour at Ephesus, where a deputation from the Samians of Anaea came to him. They told him that it was an ill-manner of liberating Hellas, to have put to death men who were not his enemies and were not lifting a hand against him, but were allies of Athens from necessity: if he went on in this way he would convert few of his enemies into friends, and many of his friends into enemies. He was convinced by them, and allowed such of the Chian prisoners as he had not yet put to death and some others to go free. They had been easily taken, because, when people saw the ships, instead of flying, they came close up to them under the idea that they were Athenian; the thought never entered

into their minds that while the Athenians were masters of the sea, Peloponnesian ships would find their way across the Aegean to the coast of Ionia.

33. ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Ἐφέσου ὁ Ἀλκίδας ἔπλει κατὰ τάχος καὶ φυγὴν ἐποιεῖτο: ὤφθη γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς Σαλαμινίας καὶ Παράλου ἔτι περὶ Κλάρον ὁρμῶν αἱ δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν ἔτυχον πλέουσαι, καὶ δεδιὼς τὴν δίωξιν ἔπλει διὰ τοῦ πελάγους ὡς γῇ ἑκούσιος οὐ σχήσων ἄλλῃ ἢ Πελοποννήσῳ. [2]τῷ δὲ Πάχητι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἦλθε μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐρυθραίας ἀγγελία, ἀφικνεῖτο δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν: ἀτειχίστου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς Ἰωνίας μέγα τὸ δέος ἐγένετο μὴ παραπλέοντες οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, εἰ καὶ ὡς μὴ διενοοῦντο μένειν, πορθῶσιν ἅμα προσπίπτοντες τὰς πόλεις. αὐτάγγελοι δ᾽ αὐτὸν ἰδοῦσαι ἐν τῇ Κλάρῳ ἥ τε Πάραλος καὶ ἡ Σαλαμινία ἔφρασαν. [3] ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἐποιεῖτο τὴν δίωξιν: καὶ μέχρι μὲν Πάτμου τῆς νήσου ἐπεδίωξεν, ὡς δ᾽ οὐκέτι ἐν καταλήψει ἐφαίνετο, ἐπανεχώρει. κέρδος δὲ ἐνόμισεν, ἐπειδὴ οὐ μετεώροις περιέτυχεν, ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ ἐγκαταληφθεῖσαι ἠναγκάσθησαν στρατόπεδόν τε ποιεῖσθαι καὶ φυλακὴν σφίσι καὶ ἐφόρμησιν παρασχεῖν.

[33] From Ephesus Alcidas sailed away in haste, or rather fled; for while he was at anchor near Clarus he had been sighted by the Athenian sacred vessels, Paralus and Salaminia, which happened to be on a voyage from Athens. In fear of pursuit he hurried through the open sea, determined to stop nowhere, if he could help it, until he reached Peloponnesus. News of him and his fleet was brought to Paches from the country of Erythrae, and indeed kept coming in from all sides. For Ionia not being fortified, there was great apprehension lest the Peloponnesians, as they sailed along the coast, might fall upon the cities and plunder them, even though they had no intention of remaining. And the Paralus and Salaminia reported that they had themselves seen him at Clarus. Paches eagerly gave chase and pursued him as far as the island of Patmos, but, seeing that he was no longer within reach, he returned. Not

having come up with the fleet of the Peloponnesians upon the open sea, he congratulated himself that they had not been overtaken somewhere near land, where they would have been forced to put in and fortify themselves on shore, and the Athenians would have had the trouble of watching and blockading them.

34. παραπλέων δὲ πάλιν ἔσχε καὶ ἐς Νότιον τὸ Κολοφωνίων, οὗ κατῴκηντο Κολοφώνιοι τῆς ἄνω πόλεως ἐαλωκυίας ὑπὸ Ἰταμάνους καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων κατὰ στάσιν ἰδίαν ἐπαχθέντων: ἐάλω δὲ μάλιστα αὕτη ὅτε ἡ δευτέρα Πελοποννησίων ἐσβολὴ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐγίγνετο. [2] ἐν οὖν τῷ Νοτίῳ οἱ καταφυγόντες καὶ κατοικήσαντες αὐτόθι αὖθις στασιάσαντες, οἱ μὲν παρὰ Πισσούθνου ἐπικούρους Ἀρκάδων τε καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπαγαγόμενοι ἐν διατειχίσματι εἶχον, καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἄνω πόλεως Κολοφωνίων οἱ μηδίσαντες ξυνεσελθόντες ἐπολίτευον, οἱ δὲ ὑπεξελθόντες τούτους καὶ ὄντες φυγάδες τὸν Πάχητα ἐπάγονται. [3] ὁ δὲ προκαλεσάμενος ἐς λόγους Ἱππίαν τῶν ἐν τῷ διατειχίσματι Ἀρκάδων ἄρχοντα, ὥστε, ἢν μηδὲν ἀρέσκον λέγῃ, πάλιν αὐτὸν καταστήσειν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος σῶν καὶ ὑγιᾶ, ὁ μὲν ἐξῆλθε παρ᾽ αὐτόν, ὁ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἐν φυλακῇ ἀδέσμῳ εἶχεν, αὐτὸς δὲ προσβαλὼν τῷ τειχίσματι ἐξαπιναίως καὶ οὐ προσδεχομένων αἱρεῖ, τούς τε Ἀρκάδας καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ὅσοι ἐνῆσαν διαφθείρει: καὶ τὸν Ἱππίαν ὕστερον ἐσαγαγὼν ὥσπερ ἐσπείσατο, ἐπειδὴ ἔνδον ἦν, ξυλλαμβάνει καὶ κατατοξεύει. [4] Κολοφωνίοις δὲ Νότιον παραδίδωσι πλὴν τῶν μηδισάντων. καὶ ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι οἰκιστὰς πέμψαντες κατὰ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νόμους κατῴκισαν τὸ Νότιον, ξυναγαγόντες πάντας ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, εἴ πού τις ἦν Κολοφωνίων.

[34] As he was sailing along the coast on his return he touched at Notium, the port of Colophon. Here some inhabitants of the upper town had taken up their abode; for it had been captured by Itamenes and the Barbarians, who had been invited into the city by a certain local faction. The capture took place about the time of the second invasion of

Attica. The refugees who settled in Notium again quarrelled among themselves. The one party, having introduced Arcadian and Barbarian auxiliaries whom they had obtained, from Pissuthnes, stationed them in a fortified quarter of the town; the Persian faction from the upper city of Colophon joined them and were living with them. The other party had retired from the city, and being now in exile, called in Paches. He proposed to Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in the fortress, that they should hold a conference, undertaking, if they could not agree, to put him back in the fort, safe and sound. So he came out, and Paches kept him in custody without fetters. In the meantime he made an attack upon the unsuspecting garrison, took the fortress, and slaughtered all the Arcadians and Barbarians whom he found within. He then conducted Hippias into the fort, according to the agreement, and when he was inside seized him and shot him to death with arrows. He next handed over Notium to the Colophonians, excluding the Persian party. The Athenians afterwards gathered together all the Colophonians who could be found in the neighbouring cities and colonised the place, to which they gave laws like their own, under new founders whom they sent out from Athens.

35. ὁ δὲ Πάχης ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην τήν τε Πύρραν καὶ Ἔρεσον παρεστήσατο, καὶ Σάλαιθον λαβὼν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον κεκρυμμένον ἀποπέμπει ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Τενέδου Μυτιληναίων ἄνδρας ἅμα οὓς κατέθετο καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὐτῷ αἴτιος ἐδόκει εἶναι τῆς ἀποστάσεως: [2] ἀποπέμπει δὲ καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τὸ πλέον, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ὑπομένων καθίστατο τὰ περὶ τὴν Μυτιλήνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Λέσβον ᾗ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει.

[35] On returning to Lesbos, Paches reduced Pyrrha and Eresus, and finding Salaethus, the Lacedaemonian governor, concealed in Mytilenè, sent him to Athens. He also sent thither the Mytilenaeans whom he had deposited in Tenedos, and any others who seemed to have been implicated in the revolt. He then dismissed the greater part of his army, and,

by the aid of the remainder, settled as seemed best to him the affairs of Mytilenè and Lesbos.

36. ἀφικομένων δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ Σαλαίθου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν μὲν Σάλαιθον εὐθὺς ἀπέκτειναν, ἔστιν ἃ παρεχόμενον τά τ᾽ ἄλλα καὶ ἀπὸ Πλαταιῶν ἔτι γὰρ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ἀπάξειν Πελοποννησίους: [2] περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γνώμας ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς οὐ τοὺς παρόντας μόνον ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἅπαντας Μυτιληναίους ὅσοι ἡβῶσι, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἀνδραποδίσαι, ἐπικαλοῦντες τήν τε ἄλλην ἀπόστασιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀρχόμενοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ προσξυνελάβοντο οὐκ ἐλάχιστον τῆς ὁρμῆς αἱ Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἐς Ἰωνίαν ἐκείνοις βοηθοὶ τολμήσασαι παρακινδυνεῦσαι: οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ βραχείας διανοίας ἐδόκουν τὴν ἀπόστασιν ποιήσασθαι. [3] πέμπουσιν οὖν τριήρη ὡς Πάχητα ἄγγελον τῶν δεδογμένων, κατὰ τάχος κελεύοντες διαχρήσασθαι Μυτιληναίους. [4] καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετάνοιά τις εὐθὺς ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς ὠμὸν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγνῶσθαι, πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους. [5] ὡς δ᾽ ᾔσθοντο τοῦτο τῶν Μυτιληναίων οἱ παρόντες πρέσβεις καὶ οἱ αὐτοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμπράσσοντες, παρεσκεύασαν τοὺς ἐν τέλει ὥστε αὖθις γνώμας προθεῖναι: καὶ ἔπεισαν ῥᾷον, διότι καὶ ἐκείνοις ἔνδηλον ἦν βουλόμενον τὸ πλέον τῶν πολιτῶν αὖθίς τινας σφίσιν ἀποδοῦναι βουλεύσασθαι. [6] καταστάσης δ᾽ εὐθὺς ἐκκλησίας ἄλλαι τε γνῶμαι ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστων ἐλέγοντο καὶ Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ὅσπερ καὶ τὴν προτέραν ἐνενικήκει ὥστε ἀποκτεῖναι, ὢν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος, παρελθὼν αὖθις ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

[36] When the captives arrived at Athens the Athenians instantly put Salaethus to death, although he made various offers, and among other things promised to procure the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Plataea which was still blockaded. Concerning the other captives a discussion was held, and in their indignation the Athenians determined

to put to death not only the men then at Athens, but all the grown-up citizens of Mytilenè, and to enslave the women and children; the act of the Mytilenaeans appeared inexcusable, because they were not subjects like the other states which had revolted, but free. That Peloponnesian ships should have had the audacity to find their way to Ionia and assist the rebels contributed to increase their fury; and the action showed that the revolt was a long premeditated affair. So they sent a trireme to Paches announcing their determination, and bidding him put the Mytilenaeans to death at once. But on the following day a kind of remorse seized them; they began to reflect that a decree which doomed to destruction not only the guilty, but a whole city, was cruel and monstrous. The Mytilenaean envoys who were at Athens perceived the change of feeling, and they and the Athenians who were in their interest prevailed on the magistrates to bring the question again before the people; this they were the more willing to do, because they saw themselves that the majority of the citizens were anxious to have an opportunity given them of reconsidering their decision. An assembly was again summoned, and different opinions were expressed by different speakers. In the former assembly, Cleon the son of Cleaenetus had carried the decree condemning the Mytilenaeans to death. He was the most violent of the citizens, and at that time exercised by far the greatest influence over the people. And now he came forward a second time and spoke as follows: —

37. ‘πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλοτε ἔγνων δημοκρατίαν ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἑτέρων ἄρχειν, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐν τῇ νῦν ὑμετέρᾳ περὶ Μυτιληναίων μεταμελείᾳ. [2] διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχετε, καὶ ὅτι ἂν ἢ λόγῳ πεισθέντες ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἁμάρτητε ἢ οἴκτῳ ἐνδῶτε, οὐκ ἐπικινδύνως ἡγεῖσθε ἐς ὑμᾶς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὴν τῶν ξυμμάχων χάριν μαλακίζεσθαι, οὐ σκοποῦντες ὅτι τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄκοντας

ἀρχομένους, οἳ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν χαρίζησθε βλαπτόμενοι αὐτοὶ ἀκροῶνται ὑμῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐκείνων εὐνοίᾳ περιγένησθε. [3] πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ βέβαιον ἡμῖν μηδὲν καθεστήξει ὧν ἂν δόξῃ πέρι, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χείροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις, ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφροσύνης ὠφελιμώτερον ἢ δεξιότης μετὰ ἀκολασίας, οἵ τε φαυλότεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς ξυνετωτέρους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον ἄμεινον οἰκοῦσι τὰς πόλεις. [4] οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι τῶν τε αἰεὶ λεγομένων ἐς τὸ κοινὸν περιγίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις μείζοσιν οὐκ ἂν δηλώσαντες τὴν γνώμην, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις: οἱ δ᾽ ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἐξ αὐτῶν ξυνέσει ἀμαθέστεροι μὲν τῶν νόμων ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀδυνατώτεροι δὲ τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος μέμψασθαι λόγον, κριταὶ δὲ ὄντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγωνισταὶ ὀρθοῦνται τὰ πλείω. [5] ὣς οὖν χρὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς ποιοῦντας μὴ δεινότητι καὶ ξυνέσεως ἀγῶνι ἐπαιρομένους παρὰ δόξαν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει παραινεῖν.

[37] ‘I have remarked again and again that a democracy cannot manage an empire, but never more than now, when I see you regretting your condemnation of the Mytilenaeans. Having no fear or suspicion of one another in daily life, you deal with your allies upon the same principle, and you do not consider that whenever you yield to them out of pity or are misled by their specious tales, you are guilty of a weakness dangerous to yourselves, and receive no thanks from them. You should remember that your empire is a despotism exercised over unwilling subjects, who are always conspiring against you; they do not obey in return for any kindness which you do them to your own injury, but in so far as you are their masters; they have no love of you, but they are held down by force. Besides, what can be more detestable than to be perpetually changing our minds? We forget that a state in which the laws, though imperfect, are inviolable, is better off than one in which the laws are good

but ineffective. Dullness and modesty are a more useful combination than cleverness and licence; and the more simple sort generally make better citizens than the more astute. For the latter desire to be thought wiser than the laws; they want to be always getting their own way in public discussions; they think that they can nowhere have a finer opportunity of displaying their intelligence, and their folly generally ends in the ruin of their country; whereas the others, mistrusting their own capacity, admit that the laws are wiser than themselves: they do not pretend to criticise the arguments of a great speaker; and being impartial judges, not ambitious rivals, they hit the mark. That is the spirit in which we should act; not suffering ourselves to be so excited by our own cleverness in a war of wits as to advise the Athenian people contrary to our own better judgment.

38. ‘ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ θαυμάζω μὲν τῶν προθέντων αὖθις περὶ Μυτιληναίων λέγειν καὶ χρόνου διατριβὴν ἐμποιησάντων, ὅ ἐστι πρὸς τῶν ἠδικηκότων μᾶλλον ·ὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι ἀμβλυτέρᾳ τῇ ὀργῇ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ τῷ παθεῖν ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω κείμενον ἀντίπαλον ὂν μάλιστα τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀναλαμβάνει·, θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ ὅστις ἔσται ὁ ἀντερῶν καὶ ἀξιώσων ἀποφαίνειν τὰς μὲν Μυτιληναίων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὠφελίμους οὔσας, τὰς δ᾽ ἡμετέρας ξυμφορὰς τοῖς ξυμμάχοις βλάβας καθισταμένας. [2] καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἢ τῷ λέγειν πιστεύσας τὸ πάνυ δοκοῦν ἀνταποφῆναι ὡς οὐκ ἔγνωσταιἀγωνίσαιτ᾽ ἄν, ἢ κέρδει ἐπαιρόμενος τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου ἐκπονήσας παράγειν πειράσεται. [3] ἡ δὲ πόλις ἐκ τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀγώνων τὰ μὲν ἆθλα ἑτέροις δίδωσιν, αὐτὴ δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους ἀναφέρει. [4] αἴτιοι δ᾽ ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες, οἵτινες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι, ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων, τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἔργα ἀπὸ τῶν εὖ εἰπόντων σκοποῦντες ὡς δυνατὰ γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πεπραγμένα ἤδη, οὐ τὸ δρασθὲν πιστότερον ὄψει λαβόντες ἢ τὸ ἀκουσθέν, ἀπὸ τῶν λόγῳ καλῶς ἐπιτιμησάντων: [5] καὶ μετὰ καινότητος μὲν

λόγου ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι, μετὰ δεδοκιμασμένου δὲ μὴ ξυνέπεσθαι ἐθέλειν, δοῦλοι ὄντες τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων, ὑπερόπται δὲ τῶν εἰωθότων, [6] καὶ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος βουλόμενος δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι τοῖς τοιαῦτα λέγουσι μὴ ὕστεροι ἀκολουθῆσαι δοκεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ, ὀξέως δέ τι λέγοντος προεπαινέσαι, καὶ προαισθέσθαι τε πρόθυμοι εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ προνοῆσαι βραδεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποβησόμενα, [7] ζητοῦντές τε ἄλλο τι ὡς εἰπεῖν ἢ ἐν οἷς ζῶμεν, φρονοῦντες δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἱκανῶς: ἁπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ ἡσσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πόλεως βουλευομένοις.

[38] ‘I myself think as I did before, and I wonder at those who have brought forward the case of the Mytilenaeans again, thus interposing a delay which is in the interest of the evil-doer. For after a time the anger of the sufferer waxes dull, and he pursues the offender with less keenness; but the vengeance which follows closest upon the wrong is most adequate to it and exacts the fullest retribution. And again I wonder who will answer me, and whether he will attempt to show that the crimes of the Mytilenaeans are a benefit to us, or that when we suffer, our allies suffer with us. Clearly he must be some one who has such confidence in his powers of speech as to contend that you never adopted what was most certainly your resolution; or else he must be some one who, under the inspiration of a bribe, elaborates a sophistical speech in the hope of diverting you from the point. In such rhetorical contests the city gives away the prizes to others, while she takes the risk upon herself. And you are to blame, for you order these contests amiss. When speeches are to be heard, you are too fond of using your eyes, but, where actions are concerned, you trust your ears; you estimate the possibility of future enterprises from the eloquence of an orator, but as to accomplished facts, instead of accepting ocular demonstration, you believe only what ingenious critics tell you. No men are better dupes, sooner deceived by

novel notions, or slower to follow approved advice. You despise what is familiar, while you are worshippers of every new extravagance. Not a man of you but would be an orator if he could; when he cannot, he will not yield the palm to a more successful rival: he would fain show that he does not let his wits come limping after, but that he can praise a sharp remark before it is well out of another's mouth; he would like to be as quick in anticipating what is said, as he is slow in foreseeing its consequences. You are always hankering after an ideal state, but you do not give your minds even to what is straight before you. In a word, you are at the mercy of your own ears, and sit like spectators attending a performance of sophists, but very unlike counsellors of a state.

39. 'ὧν ἐγὼ πειρώμενος ἀποτρέπειν ὑμᾶς ἀποφαίνω Μυτιληναίους μάλιστα δὴ μίαν πόλιν ἠδικηκότας ὑμᾶς. [2] ἐγὼ γάρ, οἵτινες μὲν μὴ δυνατοὶ φέρειν τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀρχὴν ἢ οἵτινες ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀναγκασθέντες ἀπέστησαν, ξυγγνώμην ἔχω: νῆσον δὲ οἵτινες ἔχοντες μετὰ τειχῶν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν μόνον φοβούμενοι τοὺς ἡμετέρους πολεμίους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ τριήρων παρασκευῇ οὐκ ἄφαρκτοι ἦσαν πρὸς αὐτούς, αὐτόνομοί τε οἰκοῦντες καὶ τιμώμενοι ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ὑπὸ ἡμῶν τοιαῦτα εἰργάσαντο, τί ἄλλο οὗτοι ἢ ἐπεβούλευσάν τε καὶ ἐπανέστησαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπέστησαν ἀπόστασις μέν γε τῶν βίαιόν τι πασχόντων ἐστίν, ἐζήτησάν τε μετὰ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων ἡμᾶς στάντες διαφθεῖραι; καίτοι δεινότερόν ἐστιν ἢ εἰ καθ᾽ αὐτοὺς δύναμιν κτώμενοι ἀντεπολέμησαν. [3] παράδειγμα δὲ αὐτοῖς οὔτε αἱ τῶν πέλας ξυμφοραὶ ἐγένοντο, ὅσοι ἀποστάντες ἤδη ἡμῶν ἐχειρώθησαν, οὔτε ἡ παροῦσα εὐδαιμονία παρέσχεν ὅκνον μὴ ἐλθεῖν ἐς τὰ δεινά: γενόμενοι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον θρασεῖς καὶ ἐλπίσαντες μακρότερα μὲν τῆς δυνάμεως, ἐλάσσω δὲ τῆς βουλήσεως, πόλεμον ἤραντο, ἰσχὺν ἀξιώσαντες τοῦ δικαίου προθεῖναι: ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ᾠήθησαν περιέσεσθαι, ἐπέθεντο ἡμῖν οὐκ ἀδικούμενοι. [4] εἴωθε δὲ τῶν πόλεων αἷς ἂν μάλιστα καὶ δι᾽ ἐλαχίστου ἀπροσδόκητος

εὐπραγία ἔλθῃ, ἐς ὕβριν τρέπειν: τὰ δὲ πολλὰ κατὰ λόγον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐτυχοῦντα ἀσφαλέστερα ἢ παρὰ δόξαν, καὶ κακοπραγίαν ὡς εἰπεῖν ῥᾷον ἀπωθοῦνται ἢ εὐδαιμονίαν διασῴζονται. [5] χρῆν δὲ Μυτιληναίους καὶ πάλαι μηδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν τετιμῆσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐς τόδε ἐξύβρισαν: πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος τὸ μὲν θεραπεῦον ὑπερφρονεῖν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὑπεῖκον θαυμάζειν. [6] κολασθέντων δὲ καὶ νῦν ἀξίως τῆς ἀδικίας, καὶ μὴ τοῖς μὲν ὀλίγοις ἡ αἰτία προστεθῇ, τὸν δὲ δῆμον ἀπολύσητε. πάντες γὰρ ὑμῖν γε ὁμοίως ἐπέθεντο, οἷς γ᾽ ἐξῆν ὡς ἡμᾶς τραπομένοις νῦν πάλιν ἐν τῇ πόλει εἶναι: ἀλλὰ τὸν μετὰ τῶν ὀλίγων κίνδυνον ἡγησάμενοι βεβαιότερον ξυναπέστησαν. [7] τῶν τε ξυμμάχων σκέψασθε εἰ τοῖς τε ἀναγκασθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τοῖς ἑκοῦσιν ἀποστᾶσι τὰς αὐτὰς ζημίας προσθήσετε, τίνα οἴεσθε ὄντινα οὐ βραχείᾳ προφάσει ἀποστήσεσθαι, ὅταν ἢ κατορθώσαντι ἐλευθέρωσις ᾖ ἢ σφαλέντι μηδὲν παθεῖν ἀνήκεστον; [8] ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς ἑκάστην πόλιν ἀποκεκινδυνεύσεται τά τε χρήματα καὶ αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ τυχόντες μὲν πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην παραλαβόντες τῆς ἔπειτα προσόδου, δι᾽ ἣν ἰσχύομεν, τὸ λοιπὸν στερήσεσθε, σφαλέντες δὲ πολεμίους πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξομεν, καὶ ὃν χρόνον τοῖς νῦν καθεστηκόσι δεῖ ἐχθροῖς ἀνθίστασθαι, τοῖς οἰκείοις ξυμμάχοις πολεμήσομεν.

[39] ‘I want you to put aside this trifling, and therefore I say to you that no single city has ever injured us so deeply as Mytilenè. I can excuse those who find our rule too heavy to bear, or who have revolted because the enemy has compelled them. But islanders who had walls, and were unassailable by our enemies, except at sea, and on that element were sufficiently protected by a fleet of their own, who were independent and treated by us with the highest regard, when they act thus, they have not revolted (that word would imply that they were oppressed), but they have rebelled; and entering the ranks of our bitterest enemies have conspired with them to seek our ruin. And surely this is far more atrocious than if they had been led by motives of

ambition to take up arms against us on their own account. They learned nothing from the misfortunes of their neighbours who had already revolted and been subdued by us, nor did the happiness of which they were in the enjoyment make them hesitate to court destruction. They trusted recklessly to the future, and cherishing hopes which, if less than their wishes, were greater than their powers, they went to war, preferring might to right. No sooner did they seem likely to win than they set upon us, although we were doing them no wrong. Too swift and sudden a rise is apt to make cities insolent and, in general, ordinary good-fortune is safer than extraordinary. Mankind apparently find it easier to drive away adversity than to retain prosperity. We should from the first have made no difference between the Mytilenaeans and the rest of our allies, and then their insolence would never have risen to such a height; for men naturally despise those who court them, but respect those who do not give way to them. Yet it is not too late to punish them as their crimes deserve. And do not absolve the people while you throw the blame upon the nobles. For they were all of one mind when we were to be attacked. Had the people deserted the nobles and come over to us, they might at this moment have been reinstated in their city; but they considered that their safety lay in sharing the dangers of the oligarchy, and therefore they joined in the revolt. Reflect: if you impose the same penalty upon those of your allies who wilfully rebel and upon those who are constrained by the enemy, which of them will not revolt upon any pretext however trivial, seeing that, if he succeed, he will be free, and, if he fail, no irreparable evil will follow? We in the meantime shall have to risk our lives and our fortunes against every one in turn. When conquerors we shall recover only a ruined city, and, for the future, the revenues which are our strength will be lost to us. But if we fail, the number of our adversaries will be increased. And when we ought to be employed in repelling the enemies with whom we have to

do, we shall be wasting time in fighting against our own allies.

40. ‘οὔκουν δεῖ προθεῖναι ἐλπίδα οὔτε λόγῳ πιστὴν οὔτε χρήμασιν ὠνητήν, ὡς ξυγγνώμην ἁμαρτεῖν ἀνθρωπίνως λήψονται. ἄκοντες μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔβλαψαν, εἰδότες δὲ ἐπεβούλευσαν: ξύγγνωμον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον. [2] ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε πρῶτον καὶ νῦν διαμάχομαι μὴ μεταγνῶναι ὑμᾶς τὰ προδεδογμένα, μηδὲ τρισὶ τοῖς ἀξυμφορωτάτοις τῇ ἀρχῇ, οἴκτῳ καὶ ἡδονῇ λόγων καὶ ἐπιεικείᾳ, ἁμαρτάνειν. [3] ἔλεός τε γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους δίκαιος ἀντιδίδοσθαι, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς οὔτ᾽ ἀντοικτιοῦντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καθεστῶτας αἰεὶ πολεμίους: οἵ τε τέρποντες λόγῳ ῥήτορες ἔξουσι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐλάσσοσιν ἀγῶνα, καὶ μὴ ἐν ᾧ ἡ μὲν πόλις βραχέα ἡσθεῖσα μεγάλα ζημιώσεται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εὖ εἰπεῖν τὸ παθεῖν εὖ ἀντιλήψονται: καὶ ἡ ἐπιείκεια πρὸς τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐπιτηδείους καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσεσθαι μᾶλλον δίδοται ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους τε καὶ οὐδὲν ἧσσον πολεμίους ὑπολειπομένους. [4] ἔν τε ξυνελὼν λέγω: πειθόμενοι μὲν ἐμοὶ τά τε δίκαια ἐς Μυτιληναίους καὶ τὰ ξύμφορα ἅμα ποιήσετε, ἄλλως δὲ γνόντες τοῖς μὲν οὐ χαριεῖσθε, ὑμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον δικαιώσεσθε. εἰ γὰρ οὗτοι ὀρθῶς ἀπέστησαν, ὑμεῖς ἂν οὐ χρεὼν ἄρχοιτε. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ οὐ προσῆκον ὅμως ἀξιοῦτε τοῦτο δρᾶν, παρὰ τὸ εἰκός τοι καὶ τούσδε ξυμφόρως δεῖ κολάζεσθαι, ἢ παύεσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι. [5] τῇ τε αὐτῇ ζημίᾳ ἀξιώσατε ἀμύνασθαι καὶ μὴ ἀναλγητότεροι οἱ διαφεύγοντες τῶν ἐπιβουλευσάντων φανῆναι, ἐνθυμηθέντες ἃ εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι κρατήσαντας ὑμῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ προϋπάρξαντας ἀδικίας. [6] μάλιστα δὲ οἱ μὴ ξὺν προφάσει τινὰ κακῶς ποιοῦντες ἐπεξέρχονται καὶ διολλύναι, τὸν κίνδυνον ὑφορώμενοι τοῦ ὑπολειπομένου ἐχθροῦ: ὁ γὰρ μὴ ξὺν ἀνάγκῃ τι παθὼν χαλεπώτερος διαφυγὼν τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἐχθροῦ. [7]’μὴ οὖν προδόται γένησθε ὑμῶν αὐτῶν, γενόμενοι δ᾽ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ὡς πρὸ παντὸς ἂν ἐτιμήσασθε αὐτοὺς χειρώσασθαι, νῦν ἀνταπόδοτε μὴ μαλακισθέντες πρὸς τὸ παρὸν αὐτίκα μηδὲ τοῦ

ἐπικρεμασθέντος ποτὲ δεινοῦ ἀμνημονοῦντες. κολάσατε δὲ ἀξίως τούτους τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις παράδειγμα σαφὲς καταστήσατε, ὃς ἂν ἀφιστῆται, θανάτῳ ζημιωσόμενον. τόδε γὰρ ἦν γνῶσιν, ἧσσον τῶν πολεμίων ἀμελήσαντες τοῖς ὑμετέροις αὐτῶν μαχεῖσθε ξυμμάχοις.’

[40] ‘Do not then hold out a hope, which eloquence can secure or money buy, that they are to be excused and that their error is to be deemed human and venial. Their attack was not unpremeditated; that might have been an excuse for them; but they knew what they were doing. This was my original contention, and I still maintain that you should abide by your former decision, and not be misled either by pity, or by the charm of words, or by a too forgiving temper. There are no three things more prejudicial to your power. Mercy should be reserved for the merciful, and not thrown away upon those who will have no compassion on us, and who must by the force of circumstances always be our enemies. And our charming orators will still have an arena, but one in which the questions at stake will not be so grave, and the city will not pay so dearly for her brief pleasure in listening to them, while they for a good speech get a good fee. Lastly, forgiveness is naturally shown to those who, being reconciled, will continue friends, and not to those who will always remain what they were, and will abate nothing of their enmity. In one word, if you do as I say, you will do what is just to the Mytilenaeans, and also what is expedient for yourselves; but, if you take the opposite course, they will not be grateful to you, and you will be self-condemned. For, if they were right in revolting, you must be wrong in maintaining your empire. But if, right or wrong, you are resolved to rule, then rightly or wrongly they must be chastised for your good. Otherwise you must give up your empire, and, when virtue is no longer dangerous, you may be as virtuous as you please. Punish them as they would have punished you; let not those who have escaped appear to have less feeling than those who conspired against them.

Consider: what might not they have been expected to do if they had conquered? — especially since they were the aggressors. For those who wantonly attack others always rush into extremes, and sometimes, like these Mytilenaeans, to their own destruction. They know the fate which is reserved for them by an enemy who is spared: when a man is injured wantonly he is more dangerous if he escape than the enemy who has only suffered what he has inflicted. Be true then to yourselves, and recall as vividly as you can what you felt at the time; think how you would have given the world to crush your enemies, and now take your revenge. Do not be soft-hearted at the sight of their distress, but remember the danger which was once hanging over your heads. Chastise them as they deserve, and prove by an example to your other allies that rebellion will be punished with death. If this is made quite clear to them, your attention will no longer be diverted from your enemies by wars against your own allies.'

41. τοιαῦτα μὲν ὁ Κλέων εἶπεν: μετὰ δ᾽ αὐτὸν Διόδοτος ὁ Εὐκράτους, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀντέλεγε μάλιστα μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι Μυτιληναίους, παρελθὼν καὶ τότε ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

[41] Such were the words of Cleon; and after him Diodotus the son of Eucrates, who in the previous assembly had been the chief opponent of the decree which condemned the Mytilenaeans, came forward again and spoke as follows:

42. 'οὔτε τοὺς προθέντας τὴν διαγνώμην αὖθις περὶ Μυτιληναίων αἰτιῶμαι, οὔτε τοὺς μεμφομένους μὴ πολλάκις περὶ τῶν μεγίστων βουλεύεσθαι ἐπαινῶ, νομίζω δὲ δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εὐβουλίᾳ εἶναι, τάχος τε καὶ ὀργήν, ὧν τὸ μὲν μετὰ ἀνοίας φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ἀπαιδευσίας καὶ βραχύτητος γνώμης. [2] τούς τε λόγους ὅστις διαμάχεται μὴ διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμάτων γίγνεσθαι, ἢ ἀξύνετός ἐστιν ἢ ἰδίᾳ τι αὐτῷ διαφέρει: ἀξύνετος μέν, εἰ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἡγεῖται περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐμφανοῦς φράσαι, διαφέρει δ᾽ αὐτῷ, εἰ βουλόμενός τι αἰσχρὸν πεῖσαι εὖ μὲν

εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἂν ἡγεῖται περὶ τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ δύνασθαι, εὖ δὲ διαβαλὼν ἐκπλῆξαι ἂν τούς τε ἀντεροῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους. [3] χαλεπώτατοι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ χρήμασι προσκατηγοροῦντες ἐπίδειξίν τινα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμαθίαν κατῃτιῶντο, ὁ μὴ πείσας ἀξυνετώτερος ἂν δόξας εἶναι ἢ ἀδικώτερος ἀπεχώρει: ἀδικίας δ᾽ ἐπιφερομένης πείσας τε ὕποπτος γίγνεται καὶ μὴ τυχὼν μετὰ ἀξυνεσίας καὶ ἄδικος. [4] ἥ τε πόλις οὐκ ὠφελεῖται ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε: φόβῳ γὰρ ἀποστερεῖται τῶν ξυμβούλων. καὶ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοῖτο ἀδυνάτους λέγειν ἔχουσα τοὺς τοιούτους τῶν πολιτῶν: ἐλάχιστα γὰρ ἂν πεισθεῖεν ἁμαρτάνειν. [5] χρὴ δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην μὴ ἐκφοβοῦντα τοὺς ἀντεροῦντας, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου φαίνεσθαι ἄμεινον λέγοντα, τὴν δὲ σώφρονα πόλιν τῷ τε πλεῖστα εὖ βουλεύοντι μὴ προστιθέναι τιμήν, ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἐλασσοῦν τῆς ὑπαρχούσης, καὶ τὸν μὴ τυχόντα γνώμης οὐχ ὅπως ζημιοῦν ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἀτιμάζειν. [6] οὕτω γὰρ ὅ τε κατορθῶν ἥκιστα ἂν ἐπὶ τῷ ἔτι μειζόνων ἀξιοῦσθαι παρὰ γνώμην τι καὶ πρὸς χάριν λέγοι, ὅ τε μὴ ἐπιτυχὼν ὀρέγοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ χαριζόμενός τι καὶ αὐτὸς προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος.

[42] ‘I am far from blaming those who invite us to reconsider our sentence upon the Mytilenaeans, nor do I approve of the censure which has been cast on the practice of deliberating more than once about matters so critical. In my opinion the two things most adverse to good counsel are haste and passion; the former is generally a mark of folly, the latter of vulgarity and narrowness of mind. When a man insists that words ought not to be our guides in action, he is either wanting in sense or wanting in honesty: he is wanting in sense if he does not see that there is no other way in which we can throw light on the unknown future; and he is not honest if, seeking to carry a discreditable measure, and knowing that he cannot speak well in a bad cause, he reflects that he can slander well and terrify his opponents and his audience by the audacity of his calumnies. Worst of all are those who, besides other topics of abuse, declare that

their opponent is hired to make an eloquent speech. If they accused him of stupidity only, when he failed in producing an impression he might go his way having lost his reputation for sense but not for honesty; whereas he who is accused of dishonesty, even if he succeed, is viewed with suspicion, and, if he fail, is thought to be both fool and rogue. And so the city suffers; for she is robbed of her counsellors by fear. Happy would she be if such citizens could not speak at all, for then the people would not be misled. The good citizen should prove his superiority as a speaker, not by trying to intimidate those who are to follow him in debate, but by fair argument; and the wise city ought not to give increased honour to her best counsellor, any more than she will deprive him of that which he has; while he whose proposal is rejected not only ought to receive no punishment, but should be free from all reproach. Then he who succeeds will not say pleasant things contrary to his better judgment in order to gain a still higher place in popular favour, and he who fails will not be striving to attract the multitude to himself by like compliances.

43. ‘ὧν ἡμεῖς τἀναντία δρῶμεν, καὶ προσέτι ἤν τις καὶ ὑποπτεύηται κέρδους μὲν ἕνεκα τὰ βέλτιστα δὲ ὅμως λέγειν, φθονήσαντες τῆς οὐ βεβαίου δοκήσεως τῶν κερδῶν τὴν φανερὰν ὠφελίαν τῆς πόλεως ἀφαιρούμεθα. [2] καθέστηκε δὲ τἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐθέος λεγόμενα μηδὲν ἀνυποπτότερα εἶναι τῶν κακῶν, ὥστε δεῖν ὁμοίως τόν τε τὰ δεινότατα βουλόμενον πεῖσαι ἀπάτῃ προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνω λέγοντα ψευσάμενον πιστὸν γενέσθαι. [3] μόνην τε πόλιν διὰ τὰς περινοίας εὖ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς μὴ ἐξαπατήσαντα ἀδύνατον: ὁ γὰρ διδοὺς φανερῶς τι ἀγαθὸν ἀνθυποπτεύεται ἀφανῶς πῃ πλέον ἔξειν. [4] χρὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε ἀξιοῦν τι ἡμᾶς περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας λέγειν ὑμῶν τῶν δι᾽ ὀλίγου σκοπούντων, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὑπεύθυνον τὴν παραίνεσιν ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀνεύθυνον τὴν ὑμετέραν ἀκρόασιν. [5] εἰ γὰρ ὅ τε πείσας καὶ ὁ ἐπισπόμενος ὁμοίως ἐβλάπτοντο,

σωφρονέστερον ἂν ἐκρίνετε: νῦν δὲ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἥντινα τύχητε ἔστιν ὅτε σφαλέντες τὴν τοῦ πείσαντος μίαν γνώμην ζημιοῦτε καὶ οὐ τὰς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν, εἰ πολλαὶ οὖσαι ξυνεξήμαρτον.

[43] ‘But we take an opposite course; and still worse. Even when we know a man to be giving the wisest counsel, a suspicion of corruption is set on foot; and from a jealousy which is perhaps groundless we allow the state to lose an undeniable advantage. It has come to this, that the best advice when offered in plain terms is as much distrusted as the worst; and not only he who wishes to lead the multitude into the most dangerous courses must deceive them, but he who speaks in the cause of right must make himself believed by lying. In this city, and in this city only, to do good openly and without deception is impossible, because you are too clever; and, when a man confers an unmistakeable benefit on you, he is rewarded by a suspicion that, in some underhand manner, he gets more than he gives. But, whatever you may suspect, when great interests are at stake, we who advise ought to look further and weigh our words more carefully than you whose vision is limited. And you should remember that we are accountable for our advice to you, but you who listen are accountable to nobody. If he who gave and he who followed evil counsel suffered equally, you would be more reasonable in your ideas; but now, whenever you meet with a reverse, led away by the passion of the moment you punish the individual who is your adviser for his error of judgment, and your own error you condone, if the judgments of many concurred in it.

44. ‘ἐγὼ δὲ παρῆλθον οὔτε ἀντερῶν περὶ Μυτιληναίων οὔτε κατηγορήσων. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐβουλίας. [2] ἤν τε γὰρ ἀποφήνω πάνυ ἀδικοῦντας αὐτούς, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι κελεύσω, εἰ μὴ ξυμφέρον, ἤν τε καὶ ἔχοντάς τι ξυγγνώμης † εἶεν †, εἰ τῇ πόλει μὴ ἀγαθὸν φαίνοιτο. [3] νομίζω δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον βουλεύεσθαι ἢ

τοῦ παρόντος. καὶ τοῦτο ὃ μάλιστα Κλέων ἰσχυρίζεται, ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν ξυμφέρον ἔσεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἧσσον ἀφίστασθαι θάνατον ζημίαν προθεῖσι, καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τοῦ ἐς τὸ μέλλον καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀντισχυριζόμενος τἀναντία γιγνώσκω. [4] καὶ οὐκ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς τῷ εὐπρεπεῖ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου τὸ χρήσιμον τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἀπώσασθαι. δικαιότερος γὰρ ὢν αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὴν νῦν ὑμετέραν ὀργὴν ἐς Μυτιληναίους τάχ᾽ ἂν ἐπισπάσαιτο: ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικαζόμεθα πρὸς αὐτούς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως χρησίμως ἕξουσιν.

[44] ‘I do not come forward either as an advocate of the Mytilenaeans or as their accuser; the question for us rightly considered is not, what are their crimes? but, what is for our interest? If I prove them ever so guilty, I will not on that account bid you put them to death, unless it is expedient. Neither, if perchance there be some degree of excuse for them, would I have you spare them, unless it be clearly for the good of the state. For I conceive that we are now concerned, not with the present, but with the future. When Cleon insists that the infliction of death will be expedient and will secure you against revolt in time to come, I, like him taking the ground of future expediency, stoutly maintain the contrary position; and I would not have you be misled by the apparent fairness of his proposal, and reject the solid advantages of mine. You are angry with the Mytilenaeans, and the superior justice of his argument may for the moment attract you; but we are not at law with them, and do not want to be told what is just; we are considering a question of policy, and desire to know how we can turn them to account.

45. ‘ἐν οὖν ταῖς πόλεσι πολλῶν θανάτου ζημίαι πρόκεινται, καὶ οὐκ ἴσων τῷδε, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλασσόνων ἁμαρτημάτων: ὅμως δὲ τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαιρόμενοι κινδυνεύουσι, καὶ οὐδείς πω καταγνοὺς ἑαυτοῦ μὴ περιέσεσθαι τῷ ἐπιβουλεύματι ἦλθεν ἐς τὸ δεινόν. [2] πόλις τε ἀφισταμένη τίς πω ἥσσω τῇ δοκήσει ἔχουσα τὴν παρασκευὴν ἢ οἰκείαν ἢ ἄλλων ξυμμαχίᾳ τούτῳ ἐπεχείρησεν; [3] πεφύκασί τε

ἅπαντες καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἁμαρτάνειν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος ὅστις ἀπείρξει τούτου, ἐπεὶ διεξεληλύθασί γε διὰ πασῶν τῶν ζημιῶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι προστιθέντες, εἴ πως ἧσσον ἀδικοῖντο ὑπὸ τῶν κακούργων. καὶ εἰκὸς τὸ πάλαι τῶν μεγίστων ἀδικημάτων μαλακωτέρας κεῖσθαι αὐτάς, παραβαινομένων δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐς τὸν θάνατον αἱ πολλαὶ ἀνήκουσιν: καὶ τοῦτο ὅμως παραβαίνεται. [4] ἢ τοίνυν δεινότερόν τι τούτου δέος εὑρετέον ἐστὶν ἢ τόδε γε οὐδὲν ἐπίσχει, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκῃ τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δ᾽ ἐξουσία ὕβρει τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὀργῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἑκάστη τις κατέχεται ὑπ᾽ ἀνηκέστου τινὸς κρείσσονος ἐξάγουσιν ἐς τοὺς κινδύνους. [5] ἥ τε ἐλπὶς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἡγούμενος, ἡ δ᾽ ἐφεπομένη, καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν ἐκφροντίζων, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα, πλεῖστα βλάπτουσι, καὶ ὄντα ἀφανῆ κρείσσω ἐστὶ τῶν ὁρωμένων δεινῶν. [6] καὶ ἡ τύχη ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔλασσον ξυμβάλλεται ἐς τὸ ἐπαίρειν: ἀδοκήτως γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε παρισταμένη καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων κινδυνεύειν τινὰ προάγει, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τὰς πόλεις, ὅσῳ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων τε, ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς, καὶ μετὰ πάντων ἕκαστος ἀλογίστως ἐπὶ πλέον τι αὐτὸν ἐδόξασεν. [7] ἁπλῶς τε ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐηθείας,ὅστις οἴεται τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὀρμωμένης προθύμως τι πρᾶξαι ἀποτροπήν τινα ἔχειν ἢ νόμων ἰσχύι ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ δεινῷ.

[45] ‘To many offences less than theirs states have affixed the punishment of death; nevertheless, excited by hope, men still risk their lives. No one when venturing on a perilous enterprise ever yet passed a sentence of failure on himself. And what city when entering on a revolt ever imagined that the power which she had, whether her own or obtained from her allies, did not justify the attempt? All are by nature prone to err both in public and in private life, and no law will prevent them. Men have gone through the whole catalogue of penalties in the hope that, by increasing their severity, they may suffer less at the hands of evil-doers. In

early ages the punishments, even of the worst offences, would naturally be milder; but as time went on and mankind continued to transgress, they seldom stopped short of death. And still there are transgressors. Some greater terror then has yet to be discovered; certainly death is no deterrent. For poverty inspires necessity with daring; and wealth engenders avarice in pride and insolence; and the various conditions of human life, as they severally fall under the sway of some mighty and fatal power, lure men through their passions to destruction. Desire and hope are never wanting, the one leading, the other following, the one devising the enterprise, the other suggesting that fortune will be kind; and they are the most ruinous, for, being unseen, they far outweigh the dangers which are seen. Fortune too assists the illusion, for she often presents herself unexpectedly, and induces states as well as individuals to run into peril, however inadequate their means; and states even more than individuals, because they are throwing for a higher stake, freedom or empire, and because when a man has a whole people acting with him, he magnifies himself out of all reason. In a word then, it is impossible and simply absurd to suppose that human nature when bent upon some favourite project can be restrained either by the strength of law or by any other terror.

46. ‘οὔκουν χρὴ οὔτε τοῦ θανάτου τῇ ζημίᾳ ὡς ἐχεγγύῳ πιστεύσαντας χεῖρον βουλεύσασθαι οὔτε ἀνέλπιστον καταστῆσαι τοῖς ἀποστᾶσιν ὡς οὐκ ἔσται μεταγνῶναι καὶ ὅτι ἐν βραχυτάτῳ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καταλῦσαι. [2] σκέψασθε γὰρ ὅτι νῦν μέν, ἤν τις καὶ ἀποστᾶσα πόλις γνῷ μὴ περιεσομένη, ἔλθοι ἂν ἐς ξύμβασιν δυνατὴ οὖσα ἔτι τὴν δαπάνην ἀποδοῦναι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ὑποτελεῖν: ἐκείνως δὲ τίνα οἴεσθε ἤντινα οὐκ ἄμεινον μὲν ἢ νῦν παρασκευάσεσθαι, πολιορκίᾳ δὲ παρατενεῖσθαι ἐς τοὔσχατον, εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ δύναται σχολῇ καὶ ταχὺ ξυμβῆναι; [3] ἡμῖν τε πῶς οὐ βλάβη δαπανᾶν καθημένοις διὰ τὸ ἀξύμβατον καί, ἢν ἕλωμεν, πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην παραλαβεῖν καὶ τῆς προσόδου τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπ᾽

αὐτῆς στέρεσθαι; ἰσχύομεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους τῷδε. [4] ὥστε οὐ δικαστὰς ὄντας δεῖ ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον τῶν ἐξαμαρτανόντων ἀκριβεῖς βλάπτεσθαι ἢ ὁρᾶν ὅπως ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον μετρίως κολάζοντες ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔξομεν ἐς χρημάτων λόγον ἰσχυούσαις χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων τῆς δεινότητος ἀξιοῦν ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἐπιμελείας. [5] οὗ νῦν τοὐναντίον δρῶντες, ἤν τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ βίᾳ ἀρχόμενον εἰκότως πρὸς αὐτονομίαν ἀποστάντα χειρωσώμεθα, χαλεπῶς οἰόμεθα χρῆναι τιμωρεῖσθαι. [6] χρὴ δὲ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους οὐκ ἀφισταμένους σφόδρα κολάζειν, ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἀποστῆναι σφόδρα φυλάσσειν καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν ὅπως μηδ᾽ ἐς ἐπίνοιαν τούτου ἴωσι, κρατήσαντάς τε ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ἐλάχιστον τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέρειν.

[46] ‘We ought not therefore to act hastily out of a mistaken reliance on the security which the penalty of death affords. Nor should we drive our rebellious subjects to despair; they must not think that there is no place for repentance, or that they may not at any moment give up their mistaken policy. Consider: at present, although a city may actually have revolted, when she becomes conscious of her weakness she will capitulate while still able to defray the cost of the war and to pay tribute for the future; but if we are too severe, will not the citizens make better preparations, and, when besieged, resist to the last, knowing that it is all the same whether they come to terms early or late? Shall not we ourselves suffer? For we shall waste our money by sitting down before a city which refuses to surrender; when the place is taken it will be a mere wreck, and we shall in future lose the revenues derived from it; and in these revenues lies our military strength. Do not then weigh offences with the severity of a judge, when you will only be injuring yourselves, but have an eye to the future; let the penalties which you impose on rebellious cities be moderate, and then their wealth will be undiminished and at your service. Do not hope to find a safeguard in the severity of your laws, but

only in the vigilance of your administration. At present we do just the opposite; a free people under a strong government will always revolt in the hope of independence; and when we have put them down we think that they cannot be punished too severely. But instead of inflicting extreme penalties on free men who revolt, we should practise extreme vigilance before they revolt, and never allow such a thought to enter their minds. When however they have been once put down we ought to extenuate their crimes as much as possible.

47. ‘ὑμεῖς δὲ σκέψασθε ὅσον ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ἁμαρτάνοιτε Κλέωνι πειθόμενοι. [2] νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν ὁ δῆμος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν εὔνους ἐστί, καὶ ἢ οὐ ξυναφίσταται τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἤ, ἐὰν βιασθῇ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασι πολέμιος εὐθύς, καὶ τῆς ἀντικαθισταμένης πόλεως τὸ πλῆθος ξύμμαχον ἔχοντες ἐς πόλεμον ἐπέρχεσθε. [3] εἰ δὲ διαφθερεῖτε τὸν δῆμον τὸν Μυτιληναίων, ὃς οὔτε μετέσχε τῆς ἀποστάσεως, ἐπειδή τε ὅπλων ἐκράτησεν, ἑκὼν παρέδωκε τὴν πόλιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδικήσετε τοὺς εὐεργέτας κτείνοντες, ἔπειτα καταστήσετε τοῖς δυνατοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὃ βούλονται μάλιστα: ἀφιστάντες γὰρ τὰς πόλεις τὸν δῆμον εὐθὺς ξύμμαχον ἕξουσι, προδειξάντων ὑμῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ζημίαν τοῖς τε ἀδικοῦσιν ὁμοίως κεῖσθαι καὶ τοῖς μή. [4] δεῖ δέ, καὶ εἰ ἠδίκησαν, μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι, ὅπως ὃ μόνον ἡμῖν ἔτι ξύμμαχόν ἐστι μὴ πολέμιον γένηται. [5] καὶ τοῦτο πολλῷ ξυμφορώτερον ἡγοῦμαι ἐς τὴν κάθεξιν τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἑκόντας ἡμᾶς ἀδικηθῆναι ἢ δικαίως οὓς μὴ δεῖ διαφθεῖραι: καὶ τὸ Κλέωνος τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον καὶ ξύμφορον τῆς τιμωρίας οὐχ εὑρίσκεται ἐν αὐτῷ δυνατὸν ὂν ἅμα γίγνεσθαι.

[47] ‘Think of another great error into which you would fall if you listened to Cleon. At present the popular party are everywhere our friends; either they do not join with the oligarchs, or, if compelled to do so, they are always ready to turn against the authors of the revolt; and so in going to war with a rebellious state you have the multitude on your side.

But, if you destroy the people of Mytilenè who took no part in the revolt, and who voluntarily surrendered the city as soon as they got arms into their hands; in the first place they were your benefactors, and to slay them would be a crime; in the second place you will play into the hands of the oligarchic parties, who henceforward, in fomenting a revolt, will at once have the people on their side; for you will have proclaimed to all that the innocent and the guilty will share the same fate. Even if they were guilty you should wink at their conduct, and not allow the only friends whom you have left to be converted into enemies. Far more conducive to the maintenance of our empire would it be to suffer wrong willingly, than for the sake of justice to put to death those whom we had better spare. Cleon may speak of a punishment which is just and also expedient, but you will find that, in any proposal like his, the two cannot be combined.

48. ‘ὑμεῖς δὲ γνόντες ἀμείνω τάδε εἶναι καὶ μήτε οἴκτῳ πλέον νείμαντες μήτ᾽ ἐπιεικείᾳ, οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγὼ ἐῶ προσάγεσθαι, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παραινουμένων πείθεσθέ μοι Μυτιληναίων οὓς μὲν Πάχης ἀπέπεμψεν ὡς ἀδικοῦντας κρῖναι καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἐᾶν οἰκεῖν. [2] τάδε γὰρ ἔς τε τὸ μέλλον ἀγαθὰ καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἤδη φοβερά: ὅστις γὰρ εὖ βουλεύεται πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ μετ᾽ ἔργων ἰσχύος ἀνοίᾳ ἐπιών.’

[48] ‘Assured then that what I advise is for the best, and yielding neither to pity nor to lenity, for I am as unwilling as Cleon can be that you should be influenced by any such motives, but simply weighing the arguments which I have urged, accede to my proposal: Pass sentence at your leisure on the Mytilenaeans whom Paches, deeming them guilty, has sent hither; but leave the rest of the inhabitants where they are. This will be good policy for the future, and will strike present terror into your enemies. For wise counsel is really more formidable to an enemy than the severity of unreasoning violence.’

49. τοιαῦτα δὲ ὁ Διόδοτος εἶπεν. ῥηθεισῶν δὲ τῶν γνωμῶν τούτων μάλιστα ἀντιπάλων πρὸς ἀλλήλας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦλθον μὲν ἐς ἀγῶνα ὅμως τῆς δόξης καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ ἀγχώμαλοι, ἐκράτησε δὲ ἡ τοῦ Διοδότου. [2] καὶ τριήρη εὐθὺς ἄλλην ἀπέστελλον κατὰ σπουδήν, ὅπως μὴ φθασάσης τῆς προτέρας εὕρωσι διεφθαρμένην τὴν πόλιν: προεῖχε δὲ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ νυκτὶ μάλιστα. [3] παρασκευασάντων δὲ τῶν Μυτιληναίων πρέσβεων τῇ νηὶ οἶνον καὶ ἄλφιτα καὶ μεγάλα ὑποσχομένων, εἰ φθάσειαν, ἐγένετο σπουδὴ τοῦ πλοῦ τοιαύτη ὥστε ἥσθιόν τε ἅμα ἐλαύνοντες οἴνῳ καὶ ἐλαίῳ ἄλφιτα πεφυραμένα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὕπνον ἡροῦντο κατὰ μέρος, οἱ δὲ ἤλαυνον. [4] κατὰ τύχην δὲ πνεύματος οὐδενὸς ἐναντιωθέντος καὶ τῆς μὲν προτέρας νεὼς οὐ σπουδῇ πλεούσης ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον, ταύτης δὲ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἐπειγομένης, ἡ μὲν ἔφθασε τοσοῦτον ὅσον Πάχητα ἀνεγνωκέναι τὸ ψήφισμα καὶ μέλλειν δράσειν τὰ δεδογμένα, ἡ δ᾽ ὑστέρα αὐτῆς ἐπικατάγεται καὶ διεκώλυσε μὴ διαφθεῖραι. παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἦλθε κινδύνου.

[49] Thus spoke Diodotus, and such were the proposals on either side which most nearly represented the opposing parties. In spite of the reaction there was a struggle between the two opinions; the show of hands was very near, but the motion of Diodotus prevailed. The Athenians instantly despatched another trireme, hoping that, if the second could overtake the first, which had a start of about twenty-four hours, it might be in time to save the city. The Mytilenaean envoys provided wine and barley for the crew, and promised them great rewards if they arrived first. And such was their energy that they continued rowing whilst they ate their barley, kneaded with wine and oil, and slept and rowed by turns. Fortunately no adverse wind sprang up, and, the first of the two ships sailing in no great hurry on her untoward errand, and the second hastening as I have described, the one did indeed arrive sooner than the other, but not much sooner. Paches had read the decree and was about to put it

into execution, when the second appeared and arrested the fate of the city.So near was Mytilenè to destruction.

50. τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἄνδρας οὓς ὁ Πάχης ἀπέπεμψεν ὡς αἰτιωτάτους ὄντας τῆς ἀποστάσεως Κλέωνος γνώμῃ διέφθειραν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ▯ἦσαν δὲ ὀλίγῳ πλείους χιλίων▯, καὶ Μυτιληναίων τείχη καθεῖλον καὶ ναῦς παρέλαβον. [2] ὕστερον δὲ φόρον μὲν οὐκ ἔταξαν Λεσβίοις, κλήρους δὲ ποιήσαντες τῆς γῆς πλὴν τῆς Μηθυμναίων τρισχιλίους τριακοσίους μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἱεροὺς ἐξεῖλον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους σφῶν αὐτῶν κληρούχους τοὺς λαχόντας ἀπέπεμψαν: οἷς ἀργύριον Λέσβιοι ταξάμενοι τοῦ κλήρου ἑκάστου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύο μνᾶς φέρειν αὐτοὶ εἰργάζοντο τὴν γῆν. [3] παρέλαβον δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ πολίσματα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅσων Μυτιληναῖοι ἐκράτουν, καὶ ὑπήκουον ὕστερον Ἀθηναίων. τὰ μὲν κατὰ Λέσβον οὕτως ἐγένετο.

[50] The captives whom Paches had sent to Athens as being the most guilty numbered about a thousand, or rather more; these the Athenians, upon the motion of Cleon, put to death. They razed the walls of the Mytilenaeans and took away their fleet. Then, instead of imposing tribute on them, they divided the whole island, exclusive of the territory of Methymna, into three thousand portions, of which they dedicated three hundred to the Gods; the remainder they let out to cleruchi taken from their own citizens, whom they chose by lot and sent to Lesbos. The Lesbians undertook to pay them a yearly rent of two minae for each portion and cultivated the land themselves. The Athenians also took possession of the towns on the continent which the Mytilenaeans held, and these henceforward were subject to Athens.Thus ended the revolt of Lesbos.

51. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει μετὰ τὴν Λέσβου ἅλωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Νικίου τοῦ Νικηράτου στρατηγοῦντος ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Μινῴαν τὴν νῆσον, ἣ κεῖται πρὸ Μεγάρων: ἐχρῶντο δὲ αὐτῇ πύργον ἐνοικοδομήσαντες οἱ Μεγαρῆς φρουρίῳ. [2] ἐβούλετο δὲ Νικίας τὴν φυλακὴν αὐτόθεν δι᾽ ἐλάσσονος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ Βουδόρου καὶ τῆς

Σαλαμῖνος εἶναι, τούς τε Πελοποννησίους, ὅπως μὴ ποιῶνται ἔκπλους αὐτόθεν λανθάνοντες τριήρων τε, οἷον καὶ τὸ πρὶν γενόμενον, καὶ λῃστῶν ἐκπομπαῖς, τοῖς τε Μεγαρεῦσιν ἅμα μηδὲν ἐσπλεῖν. [3] ἑλὼν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς Νισαίας πρῶτον δύο πύργω προύχοντε μηχαναῖς ἐκ θαλάσσης καὶ τὸν ἔσπλουν ἐς τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς νήσου ἐλευθερώσας ἀπετείχιζε καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου, ᾗ κατὰ γέφυραν διὰ τενάγους ἐπιβοήθεια ἦν τῇ νήσῳ οὐ πολὺ διεχούσῃ τῆς ἠπείρου. [4] ὡς δὲ τοῦτο ἐξειργάσαντο ἐν ἡμέραις ὀλίγαις, ὕστερον δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ τεῖχος ἐγκαταλιπὼν καὶ φρουρὰν ἀνεχώρησε τῷ στρατῷ.

[51] During the same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos, the Athenians, under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus, made an expedition against the island of Minoa, which lies in front of Megara; the Megarians had built a fort there and used the island as a military station. But Nicias wanted the Athenians to keep a watch over Megara, not as hitherto from Budorum in Salamis, but from this spot, which was nearer, the Peloponnesians would then be no longer able to send out triremes, as they had already done on one occasion, or privateers from the harbour unobserved, and nothing could be brought in by sea to Megara. First of all he took two projecting towers on the side of the island towards Nisaea by the help of engines from the sea, and, having thus freed a way into the channel dividing Minoa from the coast of Megara, he fortified the point nearest the mainland, where, by a bridge through a lagoon, aid could be brought by the enemy to the island, lying as it did at that point close to the shore. The work was completed in a few days. Nicias then proceeded to build a fort on the island, and, leaving a garrison, returned with the rest of his army.

52. ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τούτου καὶ οἱ Πλαταιῆς οὐκέτι ἔχοντες σῖτον οὐδὲ δυνάμενοι πολιορκεῖσθαι ξυνέβησαν τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις τοιῷδε τρόπῳ. [2] προσέβαλλον αὐτῶν τῷ τείχει, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἀμύνεσθαι. γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἄρχων τὴν ἀσθένειαν

αὐτῶν βίᾳ μὲν οὐκ ἐβούλετο ἑλεῖν □εἰρημένον γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος, ὅπως, εἰ σπονδαὶ γίγνοιντό ποτε πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ξυγχωροῖεν ὅσα πολέμῳ χωρία ἔχουσιν ἑκάτεροι ἀποδίδοσθαι, μὴ ἀνάδοτος εἴη ἡ Πλάταια ὡς αὐτῶν ἑκόντων προσχωρησάντων□, προσπέμπει δὲ αὐτοῖς κήρυκα λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ἑκόντες τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ δικασταῖς ἐκείνοις χρήσασθαι, τούς τε ἀδίκους κολάζειν, παρὰ δίκην δὲ οὐδένα. [3] τοσαῦτα μὲν ὁ κῆρυξ εἶπεν: οἱ δέ □ἦσαν γὰρ ἤδη ἐν τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ□ παρέδοσαν τὴν πόλιν. καὶ τοὺς Πλαταιᾶς ἔτρεφον οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἡμέρας τινάς, ἐν ὅσῳ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος δικασταὶ πέντε ἄνδρες ἀφίκοντο. [4] ἐλθόντων δὲ αὐτῶν κατηγορία μὲν οὐδεμία προυτέθη, ἠρώτων δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐπικαλεσάμενοι τοσοῦτον μόνον, εἴ τι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ καθεστῶτι ἀγαθόν [τι] εἰργασμένοι εἰσίν. [5] οἱ δ᾽ ἔλεγον αἰτησάμενοι μακρότερα εἰπεῖν καὶ προτάξαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν Ἀστύμαχόν τε τὸν Ἀσωπολάου καὶ Λάκωνα τὸν Αἰειμνήστου πρόξενον ὄντα Λακεδαιμονίων: καὶ ἐπελθόντες ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

[52] In this summer and about the same time the Plataeans, who had exhausted their food and could no longer hold out, capitulated to the Peloponnesians. The enemy had assaulted their wall and they were unable to defend themselves. But the Lacedaemonian commander knew their weakness, and was desirous that the place should be surrendered and not stormed; he had instructions from home to this effect, the intention being that if some day a treaty of peace were concluded, and both parties agreed to give up all the places which they had taken by force of arms, Plataea might be excepted on the ground that the inhabitants had come to terms of their own accord. So he sent a herald to enquire whether they would surrender the place to the Lacedaemonians and submit to their decision; the guilty were to be punished, but no one without a just cause. The Plataeans, now in the last stage of weakness, surrendered the city; and for a few days, until the five men who were appointed judges came from Lacedaemon, the Peloponnesians supplied them with food. On the arrival of the judges no accusation was brought against them; they were simply asked one by one, Whether they had done any kind of service to the Lacedaemonians or to their allies in the present war. Before making their reply they requested leave to speak at length, and appointed two of their number, Astymachus the son of Asopolaus, and Lacon the son of Aeimnestus, who was the Lacedaemonian proxenus, to be their advocates. They came forward and spoke as follows: —

53. ‘τὴν μὲν παράδοσιν τῆς πόλεως, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πιστεύσαντες ὑμῖν ἐποιησάμεθα, οὐ τοιάνδε δίκην οἰόμενοι ὑφέξειν, νομιμωτέραν δέ τινα ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ἐν δικασταῖς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοις δεξάμενοι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐσμέν, γενέσθαι [ἢ ὑμῖν], ἡγούμενοι τὸ ἴσον μάλιστ᾽ ἂν φέρεσθαι. [2] νῦν δὲ φοβούμεθα μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἅμα ἡμαρτήκαμεν: τόν τε γὰρ ἀγῶνα περὶ τῶν δεινοτάτων εἶναι εἰκότως ὑποπτεύομεν καὶ ὑμᾶς μὴ οὐ κοινοὶ ἀποβῆτε, τεκμαιρόμενοι προκατηγορίας τε ἡμῶν οὐ προγεγενημένης ᾗ χρὴ ἀντειπεῖν ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ λόγον

ᾐτησάμεθα· τό τε ἐπερώτημα βραχὺ ὄν, ᾧ τὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐναντία γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ ἔλεγχον ἔχει. [3] πανταχόθεν δὲ ἄποροι καθεστῶτες ἀναγκαζόμεθα καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον δοκεῖ εἶναι εἰπόντας τι κινδυνεύειν: καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὴ ῥηθεὶς λόγος τοῖς ὦδ᾽ ἔχουσιν αἰτίαν ἂν παράσχοι ὡς, εἰ ἐλέχθη, σωτήριος ἂν ἦν. [4] χαλεπῶς δὲ ἔχει ἡμῖν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἡ πειθώ. ἀγνῶτες μὲν γὰρ ὄντες ἀλλήλων ἐπεσενεγκάμενοι μαρτύρια ὧν ἄπειροι ἦτε ὠφελούμεθ᾽ ἄν: νῦν δὲ πρὸς εἰδότας πάντα λελέξεται, καὶ δέδιμεν οὐχὶ μὴ προκαταγνόντες ἡμῶν τὰς ἀρετὰς ἥσσους εἶναι τῶν ὑμετέρων ἔγκλημα αὐτὸ ποιῆτε, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄλλοις χάριν φέροντες ἐπὶ διεγνωσμένην κρίσιν καθιστώμεθα.

[53] ‘Men of Lacedaemon, we surrendered our city because we had confidence in you; we were under the impression that the trial to which we submitted would be legal, and of a very different kind from this; and when we accepted you and you alone to be our judges, which indeed you are, we thought that at your hands we had the best hope of obtaining justice. But we fear that we are doubly mistaken, having too much reason to suspect that in this trial our lives are at stake, and that you will turn out to be partial judges. So we must infer, because no accusation has been preferred against us calling for a defence, but we speak at our own request; and because your question is a short one, to which the answer, if true, condemns us, and, if false, is exposed at once. In the extremity of our helplessness, our only and our safest course is to say something, whatever may be our fate; for men in our condition are sure to reproach themselves with their silence, and to fancy that the unuttered word, if spoken, would have saved them.’But by what arguments can we ever convince you? If we were unacquainted with one another we might with advantage adduce in evidence matters of which you were ignorant, but now you know all that we can say; and we are afraid, not that we are criminals in your eyes because you have decided that we fall short of your own standard of virtue, but that we are being sacrificed

to please others, and that the cause which we plead is already prejudged.

54. παρεχόμενοι δὲ ὅμως ἃ ἔχομεν δίκαια πρός τε τὰ Θηβαίων διάφορα καὶ ἐς ὑμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, τῶν εὖ δεδραμένων ὑπόμνησιν ποιησόμεθα καὶ πείθειν πειρασόμεθα. [2] ’φαμὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ἐρώτημα τὸ βραχύ, εἴ τι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε ἀγαθὸν πεποιήκαμεν, εἰ μὲν ὡς πολεμίους ἐρωτᾶτε, οὐκ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς μὴ εὖ παθόντας, φίλους δὲ νομίζοντας αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον τοὺς ἡμῖν ἐπιστρατεύσαντας. [3] τὰ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸν Μῆδον ἀγαθοὶ γεγενήμεθα, τὴν μὲν οὐ λύσαντες νῦν πρότεροι, τῷ δὲ ξυνεπιθέμενοι τότε ἐς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος μόνοι Βοιωτῶν. [4] καὶ γὰρ ἠπειρῶταί τε ὄντες ἐναυμαχήσαμεν ἐπ᾽ Ἀρτεμισίῳ, μάχῃ τε τῇ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ γῇ γενομένῃ παρεγενόμεθα ὑμῖν τε καὶ Παυσανίᾳ: εἴ τέ τι ἄλλο κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο ἐπικίνδυνον τοῖς Ἕλλησι, πάντων παρὰ δύναμιν μετέσχομεν. [5] καὶ ὑμῖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἰδίᾳ, ὅτεπερ δὴ μέγιστος φόβος περιέστη τὴν Σπάρτην μετὰ τὸν σεισμὸν τῶν ἐς Ἰθώμην Εἱλώτων ἀποστάντων, τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐξεπέμψαμεν ἐς ἐπικουρίαν: ὧν οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀμνημονεῖν.

[54] ‘Still we may urge our claims of justice against our Theban enemies, and our claims of gratitude upon you and the other Hellenes; the recollection of our good deeds may perhaps move you. To your short question, “Whether in this war we have done any service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies,” we reply that “if we are enemies you are not wronged, because you have received no good from us; and if you deem us friends, you who have made war upon us, and not we, are to blame.” During the late peace and in the Persian War our conduct was irreproachable; we were not the first to violate the peace, and we were the only Boeotians who took part in repelling the Persian invader and in the liberation of Hellas. Although we are an inland city, we joined in the sea-fight off Artemisium; we were at your side when you fought in our land under Pausanias, and, whatever

dangers the Hellenes underwent in those days, we took a share beyond our strength in all of them. And you, Lacedaemonians, more especially should remember how at the time when Sparta was panic-stricken by the rebellion of the Helots, who seized Ithomè after the earthquake, we sent a third part of our own citizens to your aid; these are things not to be forgotten.

55. ‘καὶ τὰ μὲν παλαιὰ καὶ μέγιστα τοιοῦτοι ἠξιώσαμεν εἶναι, πολέμιοι δὲ ἐγενόμεθα ὕστερον. ὑμεῖς δὲ αἴτιοι: δεομένων γὰρ ξυμμαχίας ὅτε Θηβαῖοι ἡμᾶς ἐβιάσαντο, ὑμεῖς ἀπεώσασθε καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκελεύετε τραπέσθαι ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντας, ὑμῶν δὲ μακρὰν ἀποικούντων. [2] ἐν μέντοι τῷ πολέμῳ οὐδὲν ἐκπρεπέστερον ὑπὸ ἡμῶν οὔτε ἐπάθετε οὔτε ἐμελλήσατε. [3] εἰ δ᾽ ἀποστῆναι Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἠθελήσαμεν ὑμῶν κελευσάντων, οὐκ ἠδικοῦμεν: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ἐβοήθουν ἡμῖν ἐναντία Θηβαίοις ὅτε ὑμεῖς ἀπωκνεῖτε, καὶ προδοῦναι αὐτοὺς οὐκέτι ἦν καλόν, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὓς εὖ παθών τις καὶ αὐτὸς δεόμενος προσηγάγετο ξυμμάχους καὶ πολιτείας μετέλαβεν, ἰέναι δὲ ἐς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα εἰκὸς ἦν προθύμως. [4] ἃ δὲ ἑκάτεροι ἐξηγεῖσθε τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, οὐχ οἱ ἐπόμενοι αἴτιοι εἴ τι μὴ καλῶς ἑδρᾶτο, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ τὰ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντα.

[55] ‘Such was the spirit which animated us in the great days of old; not until later did we become your enemies, and that was originally your own fault. For when we sought your help against the violence of the Thebans, you had rejected us and had bade us turn to the Athenians, who were near, whereas you were at a distance. Yet even in this war you have neither suffered nor were ever likely to suffer anything very atrocious at our hands. If we refused to revolt from the Athenians at your bidding, we were quite right; for they assisted us against the Thebans when you shrank from the task; and after this it would have been dishonourable to betray them. They had been our benefactors; we had been at our own request admitted to their alliance, and we shared the rights of citizenship with them. How could we refuse to

respond loyally to their call? When you or they in the exercise of your supremacy have acted, it may be, wrongly and led your allies into evil courses, the leaders and not the followers are to be blamed.

56. ‘Θηβαῖοι δὲ πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα ἡμᾶς ἠδίκησαν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον αὐτοὶ ξύνιστε, δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τάδε πάσχομεν. [2] πόλιν γὰρ αὐτοὺς τὴν ἡμετέραν καταλαμβάνοντας ἐν σπονδαῖς καὶ προσέτι ἱερομηνίᾳ ὀρθῶς τε ἐτιμωρησάμεθα κατὰ τὸν πᾶσι νόμον καθεστῶτα, τὸν ἐπιόντα πολέμιον ὅσιον εἶναι ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ νῦν οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως δι᾽ αὐτοὺς βλαπτοίμεθα. [3] εἰ γὰρ τῷ αὐτίκα χρησίμῳ ὑμῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνων πολεμίῳ τὸ δίκαιον λήψεσθε, τοῦ μὲν ὀρθοῦ φανεῖσθε οὐκ ἀληθεῖς κριταὶ ὄντες, τὸ δὲ ξυμφέρον μᾶλλον θεραπεύοντες. [4] καίτοι εἰ νῦν ὑμῖν ὠφέλιμοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πολὺ καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες μᾶλλον τότε ὅτε ἐν μείζονι κινδύνῳ ἦτε. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἑτέροις ὑμεῖς ἐπέρχεσθε δεινοί, ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ καιρῷ, ὅτε πᾶσι δουλείαν ἐπέφερεν ὁ βάρβαρος, οἵδε μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἦσαν. [5] καὶ δίκαιον ἡμῶν τῆς νῦν ἁμαρτίας, εἰ ἄρα ἡμάρτηταί τι, ἀντιθεῖναι τὴν τότε προθυμίαν: καὶ μείζω τε πρὸς ἐλάσσω εὑρήσετε καὶ ἐν καιροῖς οἷς σπάνιον ἦν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τινὰ ἀρετὴν τῇ Ξέρξου δυνάμει ἀντιτάξασθαι, ἐπῃνοῦντό τε μᾶλλον οἱ μὴ τὰ ξύμφορα πρὸς τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτοῖς ἀσφαλείᾳ πράσσοντες, ἐθέλοντες δὲ τολμᾶν μετὰ κινδύνων τὰ βέλτιστα. [6] ὧν ἡμεῖς γενόμενοι καὶ τιμηθέντες ἐς τὰ πρῶτα νῦν ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέδιμεν μὴ διαφθαρῶμεν, Ἀθηναίους ἑλόμενοι δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ ὑμᾶς κερδαλέως. [7] καίτοι χρὴ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁμοίως φαίνεσθαι γιγνώσκοντας, καὶ τὸ ξυμφέρον μὴ ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὅταν αἰεὶ βέβαιον τὴν χάριν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔχωσι καὶ τὸ παραυτίκα που ὑμῖν ὠφέλιμον καθιστῆται.

[56] ‘The Thebans have inflicted many injuries upon us, and their latest crime, as you are well aware, is the cause of our present misfortunes. They came not only in time of peace, but at a holy season and attempted to seize our city; we righteously and in accordance with univeral law defended

ourselves and punished the aggressor; and there is no reason why we should now suffer for their satisfaction. If you take your own present advantage and their present hatred to be the measure of justice, you will prove yourselves, not upright and impartial judges, but the slaves of expediency. The Thebans may appear serviceable now, but of far greater service to you were we and the other Hellenes when you were in far greater danger. For now you invade and menace others, but in those days the Barbarian was threatening to enslave us all, and they were on his side. May we not fairly set our former patriotism against our present offence, if indeed we have offended? You will find that the one more than outweighs the other; for our service to you was performed at a time when very few Hellenes opposed their courage to the power of Xerxes; they were then held in honour, not who, looking to their own advantage, made terms with the invader and were safe, but who, in the face of danger, dared the better part. Of that number were we, and there was a time when we received the highest honour at your hands, but now we fear that these same principles, which have led us to prefer a just alliance with the Athenians to an interested alliance with you, will be our destruction. Yet when men have been consistent in their conduct, others should show themselves consistent in their judgment of it. For true expediency is only this — to have an enduring sense of gratitude towards good allies for their services, while we do not neglect our own immediate interest.

57. ‘προσκέψασθέ τε ὅτι νῦν μὲν παράδειγμα τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀνδραγαθίας νομίζεσθε: εἰ δὲ περὶ ἡμῶν γνώσεσθε μὴ τὰ εἰκότα οὐ γὰρ ἀφανῆ κρινεῖτε τὴν δίκην τήνδε, ἐπαινούμενοι δὲ περὶ οὐδ᾽ ἡμῶν μεμπτῶν, ὁρᾶτε ὅπως μὴ οὐκ ἀποδέξωνται ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρι αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ὄντας ἀπρεπές τι ἐπιγνῶναι, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἱεροῖς τοῖς κοινοῖς σκῦλα ἀπὸ ἡμῶν τῶν εὐεργετῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνατεθῆναι. [2] δεινὸν δὲ δόξει εἶναι Πλάταιαν

Λακεδαιμονίους πορθῆσαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πατέρας ἀναγράψαι ἐς τὸν τρίποδα τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς δι᾽ ἀρετὴν τὴν πόλιν, ὑμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ πανοικεσίᾳ διὰ Θηβαίους ἐξαλεῖψαι. [3] ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ξυμφορᾶς προκεχωρήκαμεν, οἵτινες Μήδων τε κρατησάντων ἀπωλλύμεθα καὶ νῦν ἐν ὑμῖν τοῖς πρὶν φιλτάτοις Θηβαίων ἡσσώμεθα καὶ δύο ἀγῶνας τοὺς μεγίστους ὑπέστημεν, τότε μέν, τὴν πόλιν εἰ μὴ παρέδομεν, λιμῷ διαφθαρῆναι, νῦν δὲ θανάτου δίκῃ κρίνεσθαι. [4] καὶ περιεώσμεθα ἐκ πάντων Πλαταιῆς οἱ παρὰ δύναμιν πρόθυμοι ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐρῆμοι καὶ ἀτιμώρητοι: καὶ οὔτε τῶν τότε ξυμμάχων ὠφελεῖ οὐδείς, ὑμεῖς τε, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἡ μόνη ἐλπίς, δέδιμεν μὴ οὐ βέβαιοι ἦτε.

[57] ‘Consider, before you act, that hitherto you have been generally esteemed among Hellenes to be a pattern of nobility; if you decide unjustly (and this judgment cannot be hidden, for you, the judges, are famous, and we, who are judged by you, are of good repute), mankind will be indignant at the strange and disgraceful sentence which will have been passed against good men by men still better. They will not endure to see spoils taken from us, the benefactors of Hellas, dedicated by our enemies in the common temples. Will it not be deemed a monstrous thing that the Lacedaemonians should desolate Plataea; that they, whose fathers inscribed the name of the city on the tripod at Delphi in token of her valour, should for the sake of the Thebans blot out the whole people from the Hellenic world? For to this we have come at last. When the Persians conquered our land, we were all but ruined; and now, when we plead before you, who were once our dearest friends, the Thebans have prevailed against us. We have had to meet two terrible trials, the danger first of starvation, if we had not given up the city; and secondly, of condemnation to death. The Plataeans, who were zealous in the cause of Hellas even beyond their strength, are now friendless, spurned and rejected by all. None of our old allies will help

us, and we fear that you, O Lacedaemonians, our only hope, are not to be depended upon.

58. ‘καίτοι ἀξιοῦμέν γε καὶ θεῶν ἕνεκα τῶν ξυμμαχικῶν ποτὲ γενομένων καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας καμφθῆναι ὑμᾶς καὶ μεταγνῶναι εἴ τι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων ἐπείσθητε, τήν τε δωρεὰν ἀνταπαιτῆσαι αὐτοὺς μὴ κτείνειν οὓς μὴ ὑμῖν πρέπει, σώφρονά τε ἀντὶ αἰσχρᾶς κομίσασθαι χάριν, καὶ μὴ ἡδονὴν δόντας ἄλλοις κακίαν αὐτοὺς ἀντιλαβεῖν: [2] βραχὺ γὰρ τὸ τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα διαφθεῖραι, ἐπίπονον δὲ τὴν δύσκλειαν αὐτοῦ ἀφανίσαι. οὐκ ἐχθροὺς γὰρ ἡμᾶς εἰκότως τιμωρήσεσθε, ἀλλ᾽ εὔνους, κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην πολεμήσαντας. [3] ὥστε καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἄδειαν ποιοῦντες ὅσια ἂν δικάζοιτε καὶ προνοοῦντες ὅτι ἑκόντας τε ἐλάβετε καὶ χεῖρας προϊσχομένους ὁ δὲ νόμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ κτείνειν τούτους, ἔτι δὲ καὶ εὐεργέτας γεγενημένους διὰ παντός. [4] ἀποβλέψατε γὰρ ἐς πατέρων τῶν ὑμετέρων θήκας, οὓς ἀποθανόντας ὑπὸ Μήδων καὶ ταφέντας ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐτιμῶμεν κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον δημοσίᾳ ἐσθήμασί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, ὅσα τε ἡ γῆ ἡμῶν ἀνεδίδου ὡραῖα, πάντων ἀπαρχὰς ἐπιφέροντες, εὖνοι μὲν ἐκ φιλίας χώρας, ξύμμαχοι δὲ ὁμαίχμοις ποτὲ γενομένοις. ὧν ὑμεῖς τοὐναντίον ἂν δράσαιτε μὴ ὀρθῶς γνόντες. [5] σκέψασθέ τε: Παυσανίας μὲν γὰρ ἔθαπτεν αὐτοὺς νομίζων ἐν γῇ τε φιλίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνδράσι τοιούτοις: ὑμεῖς δὲ εἰ κτενεῖτε ἡμᾶς καὶ χώραν τὴν Πλαταιίδα Θηβαΐδα ποιήσετε, τί ἄλλο ἢ ἐν πολεμίᾳ τε καὶ παρὰ τοῖς αὐθένταις πατέρας τοὺς ὑμετέρους καὶ ξυγγενεῖς ἀτίμους γερῶν ὧν νῦν ἴσχουσι καταλείψετε; πρὸς δὲ καὶ γῆν ἐν ᾗ ἠλευθερώθησαν οἱ Ἕλληνες δουλώσετε, ἱερά τε θεῶν οἷς εὐξάμενοι Μήδων ἐκράτησαν ἐρημοῦτε καὶ θυσίας τὰς πατρίους τῶν ἐσσαμένων καὶ κτισάντων ἀφαιρήσεσθε.

[58] ‘Yet once more for the sake of those Gods in whose name we made a league of old, and for our services to the cause of Hellas, relent and change your minds, if the Thebans have at all influenced you: in return for the wicked request which they make of you, ask of them the righteous boon that you

should not slay us to your own dishonour. Do not bring upon yourselves an evil name merely to gratify others. For, although you may quickly take our lives, you will not so easily obliterate the infamy of the deed. We are not enemies whom you might justly punish, but friends who were compelled to go to war with you; and therefore piety demands that you should spare our lives. Before you pass judgment, consider that we surrendered ourselves, and stretched out our hands to you; the custom of Hellas does not allow the suppliant to be put to death. Remember too that we have ever been your benefactors: Cast your eyes upon the sepulchres of your fathers slain by the Persians and buried in our land, whom we have honoured by a yearly public offering of garments, and other customary gifts. We were their friends, and we gave them the first fruits in their season of that friendly land in which they rest; we were their allies too, who in times past had fought at their side; and if you now pass an unjust sentence, will not your conduct strangely contrast with ours? Reflect: when Pausanias buried them here, he thought that he was laying them among friends and in friendly earth. But if you put us to death, and make Plataea one with Thebes, are you not robbing your fathers and kindred of the honour which they enjoy, and leaving them in a hostile land inhabited by their murderers? Nay more, you will enslave the land in which the Hellenes won their liberty; you bring desolation upon the temples in which they prayed when they conquered the Persians; and you will take away the sacrifices which our fathers instituted from the city which ordained and established them.

59. ‘οὐ πρὸς τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τάδε, οὔτε ἐς τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμιμα καὶ ἐς τοὺς προγόνους ἁμαρτάνειν οὔτε ἡμᾶς τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἀλλοτρίας ἕνεκα ἔχθρας μὴ αὐτοὺς ἀδικηθέντας διαφθεῖραι, φείσασθαι δὲ καὶ ἐπικλασθῆναι τῇ γνώμῃ οἴκτῳ σώφρονι λαβόντας, μὴ ὧν πεισόμεθα μόνον δεινότητα κατανοοῦντας, ἀλλ᾽ οἷοί τε ἂν ὄντες πάθοιμεν καὶ ὡς

ἀστάθμητον τὸ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ᾧτινί ποτ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἀναξίῳ ξυμπέσοι. [2] ἡμεῖς τε, ὡς πρέπον ἡμῖν καὶ ὡς ἡ χρεία προάγει, αἰτούμεθα ὑμᾶς, θεοὺς τοὺς ὁμοβωμίους καὶ κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπιβοώμενοι, πεῖσαι τάδε: προφερόμενοι ὅρκους οὓς οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ὤμοσαν μὴ ἀμνημονεῖν ἱκέται γιγνόμεθα ὑμῶν τῶν πατρῴων τάφων καὶ ἐπικαλούμεθα τοὺς κεκμηκότας μὴ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Θηβαίοις μηδὲ τοῖς ἐχθίστοις φίλτατοι ὄντες παραδοθῆναι. ἡμέρας τε ἀναμιμνῄσκομεν ἐκείνης ᾗ τὰ λαμπρότατα μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πράξαντες νῦν ἐν τῇδε τὰ δεινότατα κινδυνεύομεν παθεῖν. [3] ὅπερ δὲ ἀναγκαῖόν τε καὶ χαλεπώτατον τοῖς ὧδε ἔχουσι, λόγου τελευτᾶν, διότι καὶ τοῦ βίου ὁ κίνδυνος ἐγγὺς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, παυόμενοι λέγομεν ἤδη ὅτι οὐ Θηβαίοις παρέδομεν τὴν πόλιν εἱλόμεθα γὰρ ἂν πρό γε τούτου τῷ αἰσχίστῳ ὀλέθρῳ λιμῷ τελευτῆσαι , ὑμῖν δὲ πιστεύσαντες προσήλθομεν καὶ δίκαιον, εἰ μὴ πείθομεν, ἐς τὰ αὐτὰ καταστήσαντας τὸν ξυντυχόντα κίνδυνον ἐᾶσαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑλέσθαι, [4] ἐπισκήπτομέν τε ἅμα μὴ Πλαταιῆς ὄντες οἱ προθυμότατοι περὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας γενόμενοι Θηβαίοις τοῖς ἡμῖν ἐχθίστοις ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων χειρῶν καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας πίστεως ἱκέται ὄντες,ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, παραδοθῆναι, γενέσθαι δὲ σωτῆρας ἡμῶν καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας ἐλευθεροῦντας ἡμᾶς διολέσαι.’

[59] ‘These things, O Lacedaemonians, would not be for your honour. They would be an offence against the common feeling of Hellas and against your ancestors. You should be ashamed to put us to death, who are your benefactors and have never done you any wrong, in order that you may gratify the enmity of another. Spare us, and let your heart be softened towards us; be wise, and have mercy upon us, considering not only how terrible will be our fate, but who the sufferers are; think too of the uncertainty of fortune, which may strike any one how ever innocent. We implore you, as is becoming and natural in our hour of need, by the Gods whom the Hellenes worship at common altars, to listen to our prayers. We appeal to the oaths which your fathers

swore, and entreat you not to forget them. We kneel at your fathers' tombs, and we call upon the dead not to let us be betrayed into the hands of the Thebans, their dearest friends to their bitterest enemies. We remind you of the day on which we shared in their glorious deeds — we who on this day are in danger of meeting a fearful doom. And now we say no more; to men in our case, though we must, there is nothing harder than to make an end; for with the end comes the decisive hour. Our last word is that we did not surrender Plataea to the Thebans, — far rather would we have perished from hunger, the most miserable of deaths, — but to you, in whom we trusted, and, if you will not listen to us, you ought at least to replace us in the same position, and allow us to choose our destiny, whatever it may be. We adjure you not to deliver us, the Plataeans, who were so loyal to the cause of Hellas, and who are now suppliants to you, O Lacedaemonians, out of your own hands and your own good faith, into the hands of the Thebans, our worst enemies. Be our saviours. You are liberating the other Hellenes; do not destroy us.'

60. τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Πλαταιῆς εἶπον. οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι δείσαντες πρὸς τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν μὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοί τι ἐνδῶσι, παρελθόντες ἔφασαν καὶ αὐτοὶ βούλεσθαι εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνοις παρὰ γνώμην τὴν αὐτῶν μακρότερος λόγος ἐδόθη τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐρώτημα ἀποκρίσεως. ὡς δ᾽ ἐκέλευσαν, ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

[60] Such were the words of the Plataeans; whereupon the Thebans, fearing that the Lacedaemonians might give way, came forward and said that since, against their judgment, the Plataeans had been allowed, instead of answering the question, to make a long defence, they too wished to speak. Permission was granted, and they spoke as follows:

61. 'τοὺς μὲν λόγους οὐκ ἂν ᾐτησάμεθα εἰπεῖν, εἰ καὶ αὐτοὶ βραχέως τὸ ἐρωτηθὲν ἀπεκρίναντο καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ ἡμᾶς τραπόμενοι κατηγορίαν ἐποιήσαντο καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ἔξω τῶν προκειμένων καὶ ἅμα οὐδὲ ᾐτιαμένων πολλὴν τὴν

ἀπολογίαν καὶ ἔπαινον ὧν οὐδεὶς ἐμέμψατο. νῦν δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀντειπεῖν δεῖ, τῶν δὲ ἔλεγχον ποιήσασθαι, ἵνα μήτε ἡ ἡμετέρα αὐτοὺς κακία ὠφελῇ μήτε ἡ τούτων δόξα, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἀκούσαντες κρίνητε. [2]᾽ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς διάφοροι ἐγενόμεθα πρῶτον ὅτι ἡμῶν κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὕστερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ᾽ αὐτῆς, ἃ ξυμμείκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἔσχομεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι, ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια, ἐπειδὴ προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἔβλαπτον, ἀνθ᾽ ὧν καὶ ἀντέπασχον.

[61] ‘We should never have asked to speak, if the Plataeans had briefly answered the question which was put to them, and had not turned upon us and arraigned us while they made a long and irrelevant defence of their own doings, excusing themselves from charges which nobody brought against them, and praising what nobody blamed. We must answer their accusations of us, and look a little closely into their glorification of themselves, that neither our baseness nor their superior reputation may benefit them, and that, before you judge, you may hear the truth both about us and them. Our quarrel with them arose thus: — Some time after our first occupation of Boeotia we settled Plataea and other places, out of which we drove a mixed multitude. But the Plataeans refused to acknowledge our leadership according to the original agreement, and, separating themselves from the other Boeotians, deserted the traditions of their ancestors. When force was applied to them they went over to the Athenians, and, assisted by them, did us a great deal of mischief; and we retaliated.

62. ‘ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ὁ βάρβαρος ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, φασὶ μόνοι Βοιωτῶν οὐ μηδίσαι, καὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα αὐτοί τε ἀγάλλονται καὶ ἡμᾶς λοιδοροῦσιν. [2] ἡμεῖς δὲ μηδίσαι μὲν αὐτοὺς οὔ φαμεν διότι οὐδ᾽ Ἀθηναίους, τῇ μέντοι αὐτῇ ἰδέᾳ ὕστερον ἰόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας μόνους αὖ

Βοιωτῶν ἀττικίσαι. [3] καίτοι σκέψασθε ἐν οἵῳ εἴδει ἑκάτεροι ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἔπραξαν. ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις τότε ἐτύγχανεν οὔτε κατ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον πολιτεύουσα οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν: ὅπερ δέ ἐστι νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τυράννου, δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν εἶχε τὰ πράγματα. [4] καὶ οὗτοι ἰδίας δυνάμεις ἐλπίσαντες ἔτι μᾶλλον σχήσειν εἰ τὰ τοῦ Μήδου κρατήσειε, κατέχοντες ἰσχύι τὸ πλῆθος ἐπηγάγοντο αὐτόν: καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις οὐκ αὐτοκράτωρ οὖσα ἑαυτῆς τοῦτ᾽ ἔπραξεν, οὐδ᾽ ἄξιον αὐτῇ ὀνειδίσαι ὧν μὴ μετὰ νόμων ἥμαρτεν. [5] ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ὅ τε Μῆδος ἀπῆλθε καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔλαβε, σκέψασθαι χρή, Ἀθηναίων ὕστερον ἐπιόντων τήν τε ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν χώραν πειρωμένων ὑφ᾽ αὐτοῖς ποιεῖσθαι καὶ κατὰ στάσιν ἤδη ἐχόντων αὐτῆς τὰ πολλά, εἰ μαχόμενοι ἐν Κορωνείᾳ καὶ νικήσαντες αὐτοὺς ἠλευθερώσαμεν τὴν Βοιωτίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νῦν προθύμως ξυνελευθεροῦμεν, ἵππους τε παρέχοντες καὶ παρασκευὴν ὅσην οὐκ ἄλλοι τῶν ξυμμάχων.

[62] ‘They say that when the Barbarian invaded Hellas they were the only Boeotians who did not join the Persian; and this is their great glory, and our great reproach. But we say that if they did not side with Persians, it was only because the Athenians did not; and on the same principle, they alone of all the Boeotians afterwards sided with the Athenians when the liberties of Hellas were attacked by them. But, consider how different were the circumstances in which we and they acted. In those days our state was not governed by an oligarchy which granted equal justice to all, nor yet by a democracy; the power was in the hands of a small cabal, than which nothing is more opposed to law or to true political order, or more nearly resembles a tyranny. The rulers of the state, hoping to strengthen their private interest if the Persian won, kept the people down and brought him in. The city at large, when she acted thus, was not her own mistress; and she cannot be fairly blamed for an error which she committed when she had no constitution.

After the Persian departed and she obtained a constitution, you may see how we fought against the Athenians when they became aggressive and endeavoured to subjugate us as well as the rest of Hellas. Owing to our divisions they actually conquered the greater part of the country; but we defeated them at Coronea, and liberated Boeotia; and at this moment we are zealously co-operating in the liberation of Hellas, providing cavalry and munitions of war more largely than any of the allies. Thus much in answer to the charge respecting our Persian tendencies.

63. ‘καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐς τὸν μηδισμὸν τοσαῦτα ἀπολογούμεθα: ὡς δὲ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλόν τε ἠδικήκατε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ ἀξιώτεροί ἐστε πάσης ζημίας, πειρασόμεθα ἀποφαίνειν. [2] ἐγένεσθε ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τιμωρίᾳ, ὡς φατέ, Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι καὶ πολῖται. οὐκοῦν χρῆν τὰ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μόνον ὑμᾶς ἐπάγεσθαι αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ξυνεπιέναι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἄλλοις, ὑπάρχον γε ὑμῖν, εἴ τι καὶ ἄκοντες προσήγεσθε ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων, τῆς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τῶνδε ἤδη ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξυμμαχίας γεγενημένης, ἣν αὐτοὶ μάλιστα προβάλλεσθε: ἱκανή γε ἦν ἡμᾶς τε ὑμῶν ἀποτρέπειν, καί, τὸ μέγιστον, ἀδεῶς παρέχειν βουλεύεσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ ἑκόντες καὶ οὐ βιαζόμενοι ἔτι εἵλεσθε μᾶλλον τὰ Ἀθηναίων. [3] καὶ λέγετε ὡς αἰσχρὸν ἦν προδοῦναι τοὺς εὐεργέτας: πολὺ δέ γε αἴσχιον καὶ ἀδικώτερον τοὺς πάντας Ἕλληνας καταπροδοῦναι, οἷς ξυνωμόσατε, ἢ Ἀθηναίους μόνους, τοὺς μὲν καταδουλουμένους τὴν Ἑλλάδα, τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθεροῦντας. [4] καὶ οὐκ ἴσην αὐτοῖς τὴν χάριν ἀνταπέδοτε οὐδὲ αἰσχύνης ἀπηλλαγμένην: ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀδικούμενοι αὐτούς, ὡς φατέ, ἐπηγάγεσθε, τοῖς δὲ ἀδικοῦσιν ἄλλους ξυνεργοὶ κατέστητε. καίτοι τὰς ὁμοίας χάριτας μὴ ἀντιδιδόναι αἰσχρὸν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς μετὰ δικαιοσύνης μὲν ὀφειληθείσας, ἐς ἀδικίαν δὲ ἀποδιδομένας.

[63] ‘And now we will proceed to show that you, and not we, have done the greater wrong to Hellas, and are deserving of every sort of punishment. You say that you became allies and citizens of Athens in order that you might be protected

against us. If so, you ought to have invited their aid only against us, and not to have assisted them in their attacks upon others; such a course was certainly open to you: even if you had been in some degree constrained against your will by the Athenians, you had previously made the alliance with the Lacedaemonians against the Persians, to which you are so fond of appealing. That alliance would at any rate have restrained our hands, and above all would have secured to you freedom of deliberation. But you acted willingly, and were no longer under compulsion when you made common cause with the Athenians. Your allegation is that they were your benefactors and that you could not honourably betray them; but how far more dishonourable and wicked to betray all the Hellenes with whom you had sworn alliance, than the Athenians only, the one the liberators, the other the enslavers of Hellas! The return which you made to them is unequal, nay, infamous; you say that you invited them to assist you because you were wronged, and then you became their accomplices in wronging others. Surely ingratitude is shown in refusing to return an honourable kindness, when it can be done honourably, not in refusing to return a kindness which, however justly due, cannot be repaid without a crime.

64. δῆλόν τε ἐποιήσατε οὐδὲ τότε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕνεκα μόνοι οὐ μηδίσαντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τοῖς μὲν ταὐτὰ βουλόμενοι ποιεῖν, τοῖς δὲ τἀναντία. [2] καὶ νῦν ἀξιοῦτε, ἀφ᾽ ὧν δι᾽ ἑτέρους ἐγένεσθε ἀγαθοί, ἀπὸ τούτων ὠφελεῖσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰκός: ὥσπερ δὲ Ἀθηναίους εἵλεσθε, τούτοις ξυναγωνίζεσθε, καὶ μὴ προφέρετε τὴν τότε γενομένην ξυνωμοσίαν ὡς χρὴ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς νῦν σῴζεσθαι. [3] ἀπελίπετε γὰρ αὐτὴν καὶ παραβάντες ξυγκατεδουλοῦσθε μᾶλλον Αἰγινήτας καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν ξυνομοσάντων ἢ διεκωλύετε, καὶ ταῦτα οὔτε ἄκοντες ἔχοντές τε τοὺς νόμους οὕσπερ μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο καὶ οὐδενὸς ὑμᾶς βιασαμένου ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς. τὴν τελευταίαν τε πρὶν περιτειχίζεσθαι πρόκλησιν ἐς ἡσυχίαν ἡμῶν, ὥστε μηδετέροις ἀμύνειν, οὐκ ἐδέχεσθε. [4] τίνες ἂν οὖν ὑμῶν

δικαιότερον πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι μισοῖντο, οἵτινες ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκείνων κακῷ ἀνδραγαθίαν προύθεσθε; καὶ ἃ μέν ποτε χρηστοὶ ἐγένεσθε, ὡς φατέ, οὐ προσήκοντα νῦν ἐπεδείξατε, ἃ δὲ ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ ἐβούλετο, ἐξηλέγχθη ἐς τὸ ἀληθές: μετὰ γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ἄδικον ὁδὸν ἰόντων ἐχωρήσατε. [5]᾽τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐς τὸν ἡμέτερόν τε ἀκούσιον μηδισμὸν καὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον ἑκούσιον ἀττικισμὸν τοιαῦτα ἀποφαίνομεν:

[64] ‘You have thus made it plain that, when you alone among the Boeotians refused to join the Persian cause, this was not out of any love for Hellas, but because the Athenians did not; and that you wanted to act with them and not with us; and now you claim the benefit of the virtue which others inspired in you. But this is not reasonable; having once chosen the Athenians, fight on their side, and do not at the last moment be saying that the old alliance ought to save you. For you have abandoned it, and by the violation of it, instead of striving to prevent, have aided in the enslavement of the Aeginetans and of other members of the alliance. And you were not, like us, under compulsion, but free, living under your ancient laws. Moreover, you persisted in refusing that last offer of peace and neutrality which we made to you before the siege began. Who more thoroughly than you deserve the hatred of the Hellenes? than you who have only displayed your virtues to their injury? You have given proof that the merit which you claim for your former actions does not properly belong to you! Your true nature and constant desire are now revealed in the light of day; for you have followed the Athenians in the path of injustice. Thus much we have to say as to our involuntary dealings with the Persians, and your voluntary dealings with the Athenians.

65. ἃ δὲ τελευταῖά φατε ἀδικηθῆναι, παρανόμως γὰρ ἐλθεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐν σπονδαῖς καὶ ἱερομηνίᾳ ἐπὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν πόλιν, οὐ νομίζομεν οὐδ᾽ ἐν τούτοις ὑμῶν μᾶλλον ἁμαρτεῖν. [2] εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ πρός τε τὴν πόλιν ἐλθόντες ἐμαχόμεθα καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐδῃοῦμεν ὡς πολέμιοι, ἀδικοῦμεν: εἰ

δὲ ἄνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει, βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας ὑμᾶς παῦσαι, ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἑκόντες, τί ἀδικοῦμεν; οἱ γὰρ ἄγοντες παρανομοῦσι μᾶλλον τῶν ἑπομένων. [3] ἀλλ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι, ὡς ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν, οὔτε ἡμεῖς: πολῖται δὲ ὄντες ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς καὶ πλείω παραβαλλόμενοι, τὸ ἑαυτῶν τεῖχος ἀνοίξαντες καὶ ἐς τὴν αὐτῶν πόλιν φιλίως, οὐ πολεμίως κομίσαντες ἐβούλοντο τούς τε ὑμῶν χείρους μηκέτι μᾶλλον γενέσθαι τούς τε ἀμείνους τὰ ἄξια ἔχειν, σωφρονισταὶ ὄντες τῆς γνώμης καὶ τῶν σωμάτων τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἀλλοτριοῦντες ἀλλ᾽ ἐς τὴν ξυγγένειαν οἰκειοῦντες, ἐχθροὺς οὐδενὶ καθιστάντες, ἅπασι δ᾽ ὁμοίως ἐνσπόνδους.

[65] ‘The last offence which you lay to our charge is that we unlawfully assailed your city in time of peace, and at a holy season; even in that affair we do not think ourselves more in fault than you. We do not deny that we were wrong if of our own mere motion we went to your city, fought with you, and ravaged your land. But when certain of the noblest and richest of your citizens, who wished to withdraw you from a foreign alliance and to bring you back to the national institutions of Boeotia, came and invited us, wherein are we to blame? As you say yourselves, the leaders rather than the followers are the transgressors. But in our opinion, neither we nor they were really guilty. Like yourselves they were citizens, and they had a greater stake in the country than you have; they opened their own gates and received us into their native city, not as her enemies but as her friends. They desired that the bad among you should not grow worse, and that the good should have their reward. They wanted to reform the principles of your citizens, and not to banish their persons; they would have brought them back into a natural union with their kindred, that Plataea might be at peace with all and the enemy of none.

66. τεκμήριον δὲ ὡς οὐ πολεμίως ἐπράσσομεν: οὔτε γὰρ ἠδικήσαμεν οὐδένα, προείπομέν τε τὸν βουλόμενον κατὰ τὰ

τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια πολιτεύειν ἰέναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. [2] καὶ ὑμεῖς ἄσμενοι χωρήσαντες καὶ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡσυχάζετε, ὕστερον δὲ κατανοήσαντες ἡμᾶς ὀλίγους ὄντας, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἐδοκοῦμέν τι ἀνεπιεικέστερον πρᾶξαι οὐ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους ὑμῶν ἐσελθόντες, τὰ μὲν ὁμοῖα οὐκ ἀνταπέδοτε ἡμῖν, μήτε νεωτερίσαι ἔργῳ λόγοις τε πείθειν ὥστε ἐξελθεῖν, ἐπιθέμενοι δὲ παρὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν, οὓς μὲν ἐν χερσὶν ἀπεκτείνατε, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλγοῦμεν □κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δή τινα ἔπασχον□, οὓς δὲ χεῖρας προϊσχομένους καὶ ζωγρήσαντες ὑποσχόμενοί τε ἡμῖν ὕστερον μὴ κτενεῖν παρανόμως διεφθείρατε, πῶς οὐ δεινὰ εἴργασθε; [3] καὶ ταῦτα τρεῖς ἀδικίας ἐν ὀλίγῳ πράξαντες, τήν τε λυθεῖσαν ὁμολογίαν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὸν ὕστερον θάνατον καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν μὴ κτενεῖν ψευσθεῖσαν ὑπόσχεσιν, ἢν τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς ὑμῖν μὴ ἀδικῶμεν, ὅμως φατὲ ἡμᾶς παρανομῆσαι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀξιοῦτε μὴ ἀντιδοῦναι δίκην. οὔκ, ἤν γε οὗτοι τὰ ὀρθὰ γιγνώσκωσιν: πάντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα κολασθήσεσθε.

[66] ‘And the proof that we acted in no hostile spirit is that we did no harm to any one, but made a proclamation that whoever wished to live under the national institutions of Boeotia should join us. You came to us gladly, and, entering into an agreement, for a time offered no opposition; but afterwards, when you discovered that we were few, you turned upon us. Even allowing that we did act somewhat inconsiderately in entering your town without the consent of your whole people, still how different was your conduct and ours! For if you had followed our example you would have used no violence, but thought only of getting us out by persuasion, whereas you broke the agreement and attacked us. Now we do not so much complain of the fate of those whom you slew in battle — for they indeed suffered by a kind of law — but there were others who stretched out their hands to you; and although you gave them quarter, and then promised to us that you would spare them, in utter defiance of law you took their lives — was not that a cruel

act? Here are three crimes which you committed within a few hours; the breach of the agreement, the slaughter of the prisoners which followed, and the lying promise which you made to us that you would not slay them if we did no injury to your property in the fields; and yet you insist that we are the criminals, and that you ought to be acquitted. Not so; if the Lacedaemonians give just judgment: but for all these offences you shall suffer.

67. ‘καὶ ταῦτα, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τούτου ἕνεκα ἐπεξήλθομεν καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ ἡμῶν, ἵνα ὑμεῖς μὲν εἰδῆτε δικαίως αὐτῶν καταγνωσόμενοι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔτι ὁσιώτερον τετιμωρημένοι. [2] καὶ μὴ παλαιὰς ἀρετάς, εἴ τις ἄρα καὶ ἐγένετο, ἀκούοντες ἐπικλασθῆτε, ἃς χρὴ τοῖς μὲν ἀδικουμένοις ἐπικούρους εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ αἰσχρόν τι δρῶσι διπλασίας ζημίας, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ προσηκόντων ἁμαρτάνουσιν. μηδὲ ὀλοφυρμῷ καὶ οἴκτῳ ὠφελείσθων, πατέρων τε τάφους τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐπιβοώμενοι καὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἐρημίαν. [3] καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἀνταποφαίνομεν πολλῷ δεινότερα παθοῦσαν τὴν ὑπὸ τούτων ἡλικίαν ἡμῶν διεφθαρμένην, ὧν πατέρες οἱ μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἄγοντες ἀπέθανον ἐν Κορωνείᾳ, οἱ δὲ πρεσβῦται λελειμμένοι καὶ οἰκίαι ἐρῆμοι πολλῷ δικαιοτέραν ὑμῶν ἱκετείαν ποιοῦνται τούσδε τιμωρήσασθαι. [4] οἴκτου τε ἀξιώτεροι τυγχάνειν οἱ ἀπρεπές τι πάσχοντες τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἱ δὲ δικαίως, ὥσπερ οἵδε, τὰ ἐναντία ἐπίχαρτοι εἶναι. [5] καὶ τὴν νῦν ἐρημίαν δι᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἔχουσιν: τοὺς γὰρ ἀμείνους ξυμμάχους ἑκόντες ἀπεώσαντο. παρενόμησάν τε οὐ προπαθόντες ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, μίσει δὲ πλέον ἢ δίκῃ κρίναντες καὶ οὐκ ἀνταποδόντες νῦν τὴν ἴσην τιμωρίαν: ἔννομα γὰρ πείσονται καὶ οὐχὶ ἐκ μάχης χεῖρας προϊσχόμενοι, ὥσπερ φασίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ἐς δίκην σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παραδόντες. [6] ἀμύνατε οὖν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τῷ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νόμῳ ὑπὸ τῶνδε παραβαθέντι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἄνομα παθοῦσιν ἀνταπόδοτε χάριν δικαίαν ὧν πρόθυμοι γεγενήμεθα, καὶ μὴ τοῖς τῶνδε λόγοις περιωσθῶμεν ἐν ὑμῖν, ποιήσατε δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησι παράδειγμα οὐ λόγων τοὺς ἀγῶνας προθήσοντες ἀλλ᾽ ἔργων, ὧν ἀγαθῶν μὲν ὄντων

βραχεῖα ἡ ἀπαγγελία ἀρκεῖ, ἁμαρτανομένων δὲ λόγοι ἔπεσι κοσμηθέντες προκαλύμματα γίγνονται. [7] ἀλλ᾽ ἢν οἱ ἡγεμόνες, ὥσπερ νῦν ὑμεῖς, κεφαλαιώσαντες πρὸς τοὺς ξύμπαντας διαγνώμας ποιήσησθε, ἧσσόν τις ἐπ᾽ ἀδίκοις ἔργοις λόγους καλοὺς ζητήσει.’

[67] ‘We have entered into particulars, Lacedaemonians, both for your sakes and for our own, that you may know the sentence which you are going to pass on them to be just, and still more righteous the vengeance which we have taken. Do not let your hearts be softened by tales about their ancient virtues, if they had any; such virtues might plead for the injured, but should bring a double penalty on the authors of a base deed, because they are false to their own character. Let them gain nothing by their pitiful lamentations, or by appealing to your fathers’ tombs and their own desolate condition. We tell you that a far sadder fate was inflicted by them on our murdered youth, of whose fathers some fell at Coronea in the act of bringing Boeotia to join you, while others are left in their old age by their solitary hearths, and entreat you, with far better reason, to punish the Plataeans. Men who suffer an unworthy fate are indeed to be pitied, but there should be joy over those who suffer justly, as these do. For their present desolation they may thank themselves; they might have chosen the worthier alliance, but they wilfully renounced it. They sinned against us though we had never injured them; the spirit of hatred and not of justice possessed them, and even now they are not punished half enough. For they are going to suffer by a lawful sentence, not, as they pretend, stretching out their suppliant hands on the field of battle, but delivering themselves up to justice under the terms of a capitulation. Maintain then, Lacedaemonians, the common Hellenic law which they have outraged, and give to us, who have suffered contrary to law, the just recompense of our zeal in your cause. Do not be moved by their words to spurn and reject us, but show Hellas by example that, when a cause is

tried at your tribunal, deeds and not words will prevail. If the deeds be good, a brief statement of them is enough; if they be evil, speeches full of fine sentiments do but veil them. If all persons in authority were like you, and would sum up a case in a short question, and pass sentence upon all the offenders at once, men would be less tempted to seek out fair words in order to excuse foul deeds.’

68. τοιαῦτα δὲ οἱ Θηβαῖοι εἶπον. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δικασταὶ νομίζοντες τὸ ἐπερώτημα σφίσιν ὀρθῶς ἔξειν, εἴ τι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸν πεπόνθασι, διότι τόν τε ἄλλον χρόνον ἠξίουν δῆθεν αὐτοὺς κατὰ τὰς παλαιὰς Παυσανίου μετὰ τὸν Μῆδον σπονδὰς ἡσυχάζειν καὶ ὅτε ὕστερον ἃ πρὸ τοῦ περιτειχίζεσθαι προείχοντο αὐτοῖς, κοινοὺς εἶναι κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα, ὡς οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἡγούμενοι τῇ ἑαυτῶν δικαίᾳ βουλήσει ἔκσπονδοι ἤδη ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν κακῶς πεπονθέναι, αὖθις τὸ αὐτὸ ἕνα ἕκαστον παραγαγόντες καὶ ἐρωτῶντες, εἴ τι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀγαθὸν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδρακότες εἰσίν, ὁπότε μὴ φαῖεν, ἀπάγοντες ἀπέκτεινον καὶ ἐξαίρετον ἐποιήσαντο οὐδένα. [2] διέφθειραν δὲ Πλαταιῶν μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐλάσσους διακοσίων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν, οἳ ξυνεπολιορκοῦντο: γυναῖκας δὲ ἠνδραπόδισαν. [3] τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐνιαυτὸν μέν τινα [Θηβαῖοι] Μεγαρέων ἀνδράσι κατὰ στάσιν ἐκπεπτωκόσι καὶ ὅσοι τὰ σφέτερα φρονοῦντες Πλαταιῶν περιῆσαν ἔδοσαν ἐνοικεῖν: ὕστερον δὲ καθελόντες αὐτὴν ἐς ἔδαφος πᾶσαν ἐκ τῶν θεμελίων ᾠκοδόμησαν πρὸς τῷ Ἡραίῳ καταγώγιον διακοσίων ποδῶν πανταχῇ, κύκλῳ οἰκήματα ἔχον κάτωθεν καὶ ἄνωθεν, καὶ ὀροφαῖς καὶ θυρώμασι τοῖς τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἃ ἦν ἐν τῷ τείχει ἔπιπλα, χαλκὸς καὶ σίδηρος, κλίνας κατασκευάσαντες ἀνέθεσαν τῇ Ἥρᾳ, καὶ νεὼν ἑκατόμπεδον λίθινον ᾠκοδόμησαν αὐτῇ. τὴν δὲ γῆν δημοσιώσαντες ἀπεμίσθωσαν ἐπὶ δέκα ἔτη, καὶ ἐνέμοντο Θηβαῖοι. [4] σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν περὶ Πλαταιῶν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὕτως ἀποτετραμμένοι ἐγένοντο Θηβαίων ἕνεκα, νομίζοντες ἐς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὺς ἄρτι τότε

καθιστάμενον ὠφελίμους εἶναι. [5] καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ Πλάταιαν ἔτει τρίτῳ καὶ ἐνενηκοστῷ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

[68] Thus spoke the Thebans. The Lacedaemonian judges thought that no objection could be made to their question, whether the Plataeans had done them any service in the war. For they pretended to have expected neutrality from them in the times before the war, on the strength of the original treaty concluded with Pausanias after the defeat of the Persians. And just before the siege they had made to them a proposal of neutrality in accordance with the terms of the same treaty; but the Plataeans had refused. Considering that they had been wronged by them, after their own fair proposals had released them from the obligations of the treaty, they again brought up the Plataeans one after another, and asked each of them separately, Whether he had done any service to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in the war? When he said No, they took him away and slew him; no one was spared. They put to death not less than two hundred Plataeans, as well as twenty-five Athenians who had shared with them in the siege; and made slaves of the women. For about a year the Thebans gave possession of the city to certain Megarians, who had been driven out by a revolution, and to any surviving Plataeans who were of their own party; but they afterwards razed the whole place to the very foundations, and built near the precinct of Herè an inn forming a square of two hundred feet; it had two stories, and chambers all round. They used the roofs and the doors of the Plataeans; and of the brass and iron articles of furniture found within the walls they made couches, which they dedicated to Herè; they also built in her honour a stone temple a hundred feet long. The Plataean territory they converted into public land, and let it out for terms of ten years; some of their own citizens occupied it. Throughout the whole affair the severity shown by the Lacedaemonians

to the Plataeans was mainly promoted by a desire to gratify the Thebans, who seemed likely to be useful allies to them in the war then just beginning. Such was the fate of Plataea, which was overthrown in the ninety-third year after the Plataeans entered into alliance with Athens.

69. αἱ δὲ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες τῶν Πελοποννησίων αἱ Λεσβίοις βοηθοὶ ἐλθοῦσαι, ὡς τότε φεύγουσαι διὰ τοῦ πελάγους ἔκ τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιδιωχθεῖσαι καὶ πρὸς τῇ Κρήτῃ χειμασθεῖσαι καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς σποράδες πρὸς τὴν Πελοπόννησον κατηνέχθησαν, καταλαμβάνουσιν ἐν τῇ Κυλλήνῃ τρεῖς καὶ δέκα τριήρεις Λευκαδίων καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Βρασίδαν τὸν Τέλλιδος ξύμβουλον Ἀλκίδᾳ ἐπεληλυθότα. [2] ἐβούλοντο γὰρ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὡς τῆς Λέσβου ἡμαρτήκεσαν, πλέον τὸ ναυτικὸν ποιήσαντες ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πλεῦσαι στασιάζουσαν, δώδεκα μὲν ναυσὶ μόναις παρόντων Ἀθηναίων περὶ Ναύπακτον, πρὶν δὲ πλέον τι ἐπιβοηθῆσαι ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ναυτικόν, ὅπως προφθάσωσι, καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο ὅ τε Βρασίδας καὶ ὁ Ἀλκίδας πρὸς ταῦτα.

[69] The forty Peloponnesian ships which had been sent to the aid of Lesbos, as they fled through the open sea pursued bythe Athenians, were caught in a storm near Crete, and, making their way in a straggling condition from Crete to the Peloponnesus, found at Cyllene thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot triremes, and Brasidas the son of Tellis, who had been sent out as a commissioner to advise Alcidas. The Lacedaemonians at home, after the failure of their attempt on Lesbos, had determined to increase their navy and sail to Corcyra, which was in a state of revolution. The Athenian squadron at Naupactus consisted of twelve ships only, and the Lacedaemonians wanted to reach the island before any more vessels could arrive from Athens. Brasidas and Alcidas made their preparations accordingly.

70. οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι ἐστασίαζον, ἐπειδὴ οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι ἦλθον αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐκ τῶν περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον ναυμαχιῶν ὑπὸ Κορινθίων ἀφεθέντες, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ὀκτακοσίων ταλάντων

τοῖς προξένοις διηγγυημένοι, ἔργῳ δὲ πεπεισμένοι Κορινθίοις Κέρκυραν προσποιῆσαι. καὶ ἔπρασσον οὗτοι, ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν μετιόντες, ὅπως ἀποστήσωσιν Ἀθηναίων τὴν πόλιν. [2] καὶ ἀφικομένης Ἀττικῆς τε νεὼς καὶ Κορινθίας πρέσβεις ἀγουσῶν καὶ ἐς λόγους καταστάντων ἐψηφίσαντο Κερκυραῖοι Ἀθηναίοις μὲν ξύμμαχοι εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα, Πελοποννησίοις δὲ φίλοι ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον. [3] καὶ ἦν γὰρ Πειθίας ἐθελοπρόξενός τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοῦ δήμου προειστήκει ὑπάγουσιν αὐτὸν οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἐς δίκην, λέγοντες Ἀθηναίοις τὴν Κέρκυραν καταδουλοῦν. [4] ὁ δὲ ἀποφυγὼν ἀνθυπάγει αὐτῶν τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους πέντε ἄνδρας, φάσκων τέμνειν χάρακας ἐκ τοῦ τε Διὸς τοῦ τεμένους καὶ τοῦ Ἀλκίνου: ζημία δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην χάρακα ἐπέκειτο στατήρ. [5] ὀφλόντων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ ἱκετῶν καθεζομένων διὰ πλῆθος τῆς ζημίας, ὅπως ταξάμενοi ἀποδῶσιν, ὁ Πειθίας ἐτύγχανε γὰρ καὶ βουλῆς ὤν πείθει ὥστε τῷ νόμῳ χρήσασθαι. [6] οἱ δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ τῷ τε νόμῳ ἐξείργοντο καὶ ἅμα ἐπυνθάνοντο τὸν Πειθίαν, ἕως ἔτι βουλῆς ἐστί, μέλλειν τὸ πλῆθος ἀναπείσειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις φίλους τε καὶ ἐχθροὺς νομίζειν, ξυνίσταντό τε καὶ λαβόντες ἐγχειρίδια ἐξαπιναίως ἐς τὴν βουλὴν ἐσελθόντες τόν τε Πειθίαν κτείνουσι καὶ ἄλλους τῶν τε βουλευτῶν καὶ ἰδιωτῶν ἐς ἑξήκοντα: οἱ δέ τινες τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης τῷ Πειθίᾳ ὀλίγοι ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν τριήρη κατέφυγον ἔτι παροῦσαν.

[70] Now Corcyra had been in an unsettled state ever since the return of the prisoners who were taken at sea in the Epidamnian war, and afterwards released by the Corinthians. They were nominally let out on bail for a sum of eight hundred talents on the security of their proxeni, but in reality they had been induced to try and gain over Corcyra to the Corinthian interest. They went from one citizen to another, and did their best with them to bring about a revolt from Athens. On the arrival of an Athenian and also of a Corinthian vessel conveying ambassadors, there was a discussion in the assembly, and the Corcyraeans voted that

they would continue allies of Athens according to their agreement, but would renew their former friendship with the Peloponnesians. A certain Peithias, who voluntarily acted as the proxenus of the Athenians and was the popular leader, was summoned by the partisans of the Peloponnesians to take his trial, they affirming that he wanted to bring Corcyra under the yoke of Athens. He was acquitted, and then he in turn summoned their five richest men, declaring that they were in the habit of cutting poles for vines in the sacred precinct of Zeus and Alcinous; now for each pole the penalty was fixed at a stater. They were condemned; but the fine was so excessive that they went and sat as suppliants in the temple of Zeus and Alcinous, begging that they might pay the money by instalments. Peithias, who happened to be a member of the senate as well as the popular leader, persuaded the senators to put the law in execution. The culprits, knowing that the law was against them, and perceiving that Peithias as long as he remained in the senate would try to induce the people to make an alliance offensive and defensive with Athens, conspired together, and, rushing into the council chamber with daggers in their hands, slew him and others to the number of sixty, as well private persons as senators. A few who were of the same party with him took refuge in the Athenian trireme, which had not yet left.

71. δράσαντες δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ξυγκαλέσαντες Κερκυραίους εἶπον ὅτι ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστα εἴη καὶ ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν δουλωθεῖεν ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων, τό τε λοιπὸν μηδετέρους δέχεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μιᾷ νηὶ ἡσυχάζοντας, τὸ δὲ πλέον πολέμιον ἡγεῖσθαι. ὡς δὲ εἶπον, καὶ ἐπικυρῶσαι ἠνάγκασαν τὴν γνώμην. [2] πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας εὐθὺς πρέσβεις περί τε τῶν πεπραγμένων διδάξοντας ὡς ξυνέφερε καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ καταπεφευγότας πείσοντας μηδὲν ἀνεπιτήδειον πράσσειν, ὅπως μή τις ἐπιστροφὴ γένηται.

[71] The next step taken by the conspirators was to assemble the people and tell them that they had acted for the best,

and in order to secure them against the tyranny of Athens. For the future they should receive neither Athenians nor Peloponnesians, unless they came peaceably with one ship; to bring more should be deemed the act of an enemy; and this proposal they compelled the people to ratify. They also sent envoys to Athens, who were to put the most favourable colour on the affair, and to dissuade the refugees who had fled thither from taking any inconvenient step which might lead to a counter-revolution.

72. ἐλθόντων δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τούς τε πρέσβεις ὡς νεωτερίζοντας ξυλλαβόντες, καὶ ὅσους ἔπεισαν, κατέθεντο ἐς Αἴγιναν. [2]ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῶν Κερκυραίων οἱ ἔχοντες τὰ πράγματα ἐλθούσης τριήρους Κορινθίας καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεων ἐπιτίθενται τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ μαχόμενοι ἐνίκησαν. [3]ἀφικομένης δὲ νυκτὸς ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὰ μετέωρα τῆς πόλεως καταφεύγει καὶ αὐτοῦ ξυλλεγεὶς ἱδρύθη, καὶ τὸν Ὑλλαϊκὸν λιμένα εἶχον: οἱ δὲ τήν τε ἀγορὰν κατέλαβον, οὗπερ οἱ πολλοὶ ᾤκουν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸν λιμένα τὸν πρὸς αὐτῇ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἤπειρον.

[72] When the envoys arrived, the Athenians arrested them as disturbers of the peace, and deposited them in Aegina, together with any of the refugees whom they had gained over. In the meantime, the Corcyraean oligarchs who were now in power, on the arrival of a Corinthian trireme and Lacedaemonian envoys, attacked and defeated the people, who at nightfall took refuge in the Acropolis and the higher parts of the city, and there concentrated their forces. They also held the Hyllaic harbour; the other party seized the Agora, where most of them lived, and the adjacent harbour which looked towards the continent.

73. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἠκροβολίσαντό τε ὀλίγα καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἀγροὺς περιέπεμπον ἀμφότεροι, τοὺς δούλους παρακαλοῦντές τε καὶ ἐλευθερίαν ὑπισχνούμενοι: καὶ τῷ μὲν δήμῳ τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸ πλῆθος παρεγένετο ξύμμαχον, τοῖς δ᾽ ἑτέροις ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου ἐπίκουροι ὀκτακόσιοι.

[73] On the following day they skirmished a little, and both parties sent messengers round the country inviting the slaves to join them, and promising them liberty; the greater number came to the aid of the people, while the other faction was reinforced by eight hundred auxiliaries from the mainland.

74. διαλιπούσης δ᾽ ἡμέρας μάχη αὖθις γίγνεται καὶ νικᾷ ὁ δῆμος χωρίων τε ἰσχύι καὶ πλήθει προύχων: αἵ τε γυναῖκες αὐτοῖς τολμηρῶς ξυνεπελάβοντο βάλλουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν τῷ κεράμῳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπομένουσαι τὸν θόρυβον. [2] γενομένης δὲ τῆς τροπῆς περὶ δείλην ὀψίαν, δείσαντες οἱ ὀλίγοι μὴ αὐτοβοεὶ ὁ δῆμος τοῦ τε νεωρίου κρατήσειεν ἐπελθὼν καὶ σφᾶς διαφθείρειεν, ἐμπιπρᾶσι τὰς οἰκίας τὰς ἐν κύκλῳ τῆς ἀγορᾶς καὶ τὰς ξυνοικίας, ὅπως μὴ ᾖ ἔφοδος, φειδόμενοι οὔτε οἰκείας οὔτε ἀλλοτρίας, ὥστε καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ ἐμπόρων κατεκαύθη καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐκινδύνευσε πᾶσα διαφθαρῆναι, εἰ ἄνεμος ἐπεγένετο τῇ φλογὶ ἐπίφορος ἐς αὐτήν. [3]καὶ οἱ μὲν παυσάμενοι τῆς μάχης ὡς ἑκάτεροι ἡσυχάσαντες τὴν νύκτα ἐν φυλακῇ ἦσαν: καὶ ἡ Κορινθία ναῦς τοῦ δήμου κεκρατηκότος ὑπεξανήγετο, καὶ τῶν ἐπικούρων οἱ πολλοὶ ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον λαθόντες διεκομίσθησαν.

[74] After resting a day they fought again, and the people, who had the advantage in numbers and in the strength of their positions, gained the victory. Their women joined vigorously in the fray, hurling tiles from the housetops, and showing amid the uproar a fortitude beyond their sex. The conflict was decided towards evening; the oligarchy, fearing lest the people should take the arsenal with a sudden rush and so make an end of them, set fire to the private houses which surrounded the Agora, as well as to the larger blocks of buildings, sparing neither their own property nor that of any one else in their determination to stop them. Much merchandise was burnt, and the whole city would have been destroyed if the wind had carried the flame in that direction. Both parties now left off fighting, and kept watch in their

own positions during the night. When the popular cause triumphed, the Corinthian vessel stole away and most of the auxiliaries crossed over unobserved to the continent.

75. τῇ δὲ ἐπιγιγνομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ Νικόστρατος ὁ Διειτρέφους Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς παραγίγνεται βοηθῶν ἐκ Ναυπάκτου δώδεκα ναυσὶ καὶ Μεσσηνίων πεντακοσίοις ὁπλίταις: ξύμβασίν τε ἔπρασσε καὶ πείθει ὥστε ξυγχωρῆσαι ἀλλήλοις δέκα μὲν ἄνδρας τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους κρῖναι, οἳ οὐκέτι ἔμειναν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους οἰκεῖν σπονδὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιησαμένους καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν. [2] καὶ ὁ μὲν ταῦτα πράξας ἔμελλεν ἀποπλεύσεσθαι: οἱ δὲ τοῦ δήμου προστάται πείθουσιν αὐτὸν πέντε μὲν ναῦς τῶν αὐτοῦ σφίσι καταλιπεῖν, ὅπως ἧσσόν τι ἐν κινήσει ὦσιν οἱ ἐναντίοι, ἴσας δὲ αὐτοὶ πληρώσαντες ἐκ σφῶν αὐτῶν ξυμπέμψειν. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν ξυνεχώρησεν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κατέλεγον ἐς τὰς ναῦς. δείσαντες δὲ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀποπεμφθῶσι καθίζουσιν ἐς τὸ τῶν Διοσκόρων ἱερόν. [4] Νικόστρατος δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀνίστη τε καὶ παρεμυθεῖτο. ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ὁ δῆμος ὁπλισθεὶς ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει ταύτῃ, ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὑγιὲς διανοουμένων τῇ τοῦ μὴ ξυμπλεῖν ἀπιστίᾳ, τά τε ὅπλα αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἔλαβε καὶ αὐτῶν τινὰς οἷς ἐπέτυχον, εἰ μὴ Νικόστρατος ἐκώλυσε, διέφθειραν ἄν. [5] ὁρῶντες δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι τὰ γιγνόμενα καθίζουσιν ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον ἱκέται καὶ γίγνονται οὐκ ἐλάσσους τετρακοσίων. ὁ δὲ δῆμος δείσας μή τι νεωτερίσωσιν ἀνίστησί τε αὐτοὺς πείσας καὶ διακομίζει ἐς τὴν πρὸ τοῦ Ἡραίου νῆσον, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐκεῖσε αὐτοῖς διεπέμπετο.

[75] On the following day, Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes, an Athenian general, arrived from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred Messenian hoplites. He tried to effect a reconciliation between the two parties, and on his suggestion they agreed to bring to trial ten of the most guilty persons, who immediately fled. The rest were to live together, and to make peace with one another, and with Athens an alliance offensive and defensive. Having

accomplished his purpose he was about to sail away, when the leaders of the people induced him to leave five of his own vessels, that the enemy might be less inclined to stir, promising to man five ships of their own and send them with him. He agreed, and they selected the crews of the ships out of the opposite faction. But the men were afraid of being sent to Athens, and sat as suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri. Nicostratus sought to raise them up and reassure them, but they would not trust him; whereupon the people armed themselves, arguing that their mistrust and unwillingness to sail was a proof of their evil designs. They took their enemies' arms out of their houses, and some of them whom they chanced to meet would have been slain if Nicostratus had not interfered. The rest, to the number of about four hundred, when they saw what was going on, took refuge afresh in the temple of Herè. But the people, fearing that they would resort to violence, persuaded them to rise and conveyed them at once to the island that lies in front of the temple of Herè, whither provisions were regularly sent to them.

76. τῆς δὲ στάσεως ἐν τούτῳ οὔσης τετάρτῃ ἢ πέμπτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μετὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐς τὴν νῆσον διακομιδὴν αἱ ἐκ τῆς Κυλλήνης Πελοποννησίων νῆες, μετὰ τὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἰωνίας πλοῦν ἔφορμοι οὖσαι, παραγίγνονται τρεῖς καὶ πεντήκοντα: ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀλκίδας, ὅσπερ καὶ πρότερον, καὶ Βρασίδας αὐτῷ ξύμβουλος ἐπέπλει. ὁρμισάμενοι δὲ ἐς Σύβοτα λιμένα τῆς ἠπείρου ἅμα ἕῳ ἐπέπλεον τῇ Κερκύρᾳ.

[76] At this stage of the revolution, on the fourth or fifth day after the suppliants had been conveyed to the island, the Peloponnesian ships from Cyllene, which since the expedition to Ionia had been in harbour there, arrived on the scene, fifty-three in number, still under the command of Alcidas. Brasidas his adviser was on board. They anchored for the night at Sybota, a harbour on the mainland, and when the morning broke they sailed upon Corcyra.

77. οἱ δὲ πολλῷ θορύβῳ καὶ πεφοβημένοι τά τ᾽ ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὸν ἐπίπλουν παρεσκευάζοντό τε ἅμα ἑξήκοντα ναῦς καὶ τὰς αἰεὶ πληρουμένας ἐξέπεμπον πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους, παραινούντων Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς τε ἐᾶσαι πρῶτον ἐκπλεῦσαι καὶ ὕστερον πάσαις ἅμα ἐκείνους ἐπιγενέσθαι. [2] ὡς δὲ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοῖς πολεμίοις ἦσαν σποράδες αἱ νῆες, δύο μὲν εὐθὺς ηὐτομόλησαν, ἐν ἑτέραις δὲ ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἐμπλέοντες ἐμάχοντο, ἦν δὲ οὐδεὶς κόσμος τῶν ποιουμένων. [3] ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τὴν ταραχὴν εἴκοσι μὲν ναυσὶ πρὸς τοὺς Κερκυραίους ἐτάξαντο, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς πρὸς τὰς δώδεκα ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὧν ἦσαν αἱ δύο Σαλαμινία καὶ Πάραλος.

[77] The whole place was in an uproar; the people dreaded their enemies within the city no less than the Peloponnesian fleet. They hastened to equip sixty ships, and as fast as they were manned sent them out against the Peloponnesians, although the Athenians entreated to be allowed to sail out first, leaving them to follow as soon as they had got their fleet together. But when in this straggling fashion their ships approached the enemy, two of them at once deserted; in others the crews were fighting with one another, and everything was in disorder. The Peloponnesians, seeing the confusion, employed twenty ships only against the Corcyraeans, and opposed the remainder of their fleet to the twelve Athenian ships, of which two were the Salaminia and Paralus.

78. καὶ οἱ μὲν Κερκυραῖοι κακῶς τε καὶ κατ᾽ ὀλίγας προσπίπτοντες ἐταλαιπώρουν τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτούς: οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι φοβούμενοι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν περικύκλωσιν ἀθρόαις μὲν οὐ προσέπιπτον οὐδὲ κατὰ μέσον ταῖς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς τεταγμέναις, προσβαλόντες δὲ κατὰ κέρας καταδύουσι μίαν ναῦν. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα κύκλον ταξαμένων αὐτῶν περιέπλεον καὶ ἐπειρῶντο θορυβεῖν. [2] γνόντες δὲ οἱ πρὸς τοῖς Κερκυραίοις καὶ δείσαντες μὴ ὅπερ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ γένοιτο, ἐπιβοηθοῦσι, καὶ γενόμεναι ἀθρόαι αἱ νῆες ἅμα τὸν ἐπίπλουν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐποιοῦντο. [3] οἱ δ᾽ ὑπεχώρουν ἤδη

πρύμναν κρουόμενοι καὶ ἅμα τὰς τῶν Κερκυραίων ἐβούλοντο προκαταφυγεῖν ὅτι μάλιστα, ἑαυτῶν σχολῇ τε ὑποχωρούντων καὶ πρὸς σφᾶς τεταγμένων τῶν ἐναντίων. [4]ἡ μὲν οὖν ναυμαχία τοιαύτη γενομένη ἐτελεύτα ἐς ἡλίου δύσιν,

[78] The Corcyraeans, coming up few at a time and in this disorderly fashion, had trouble enough among themselves. The Athenians, afraid of being surrounded by superior numbers, did not attack the main body nor the centre of those opposed to them, but fell upon the wings and sank a single ship; then, the enemy forming in a circle, they sailed round them and endeavoured to throw them into confusion. But those who were opposed to the Corcyraeans, seeing this movement and fearing a repetition of what happened at Naupactus, came to the rescue, and the united fleet charged the Athenians. Thereupon they rowed astern, hoping that by retreating very leisurely they might give the Corcyraeans time to escape, especially as the attack of the enemy was now directed against themselves. The naval engagement ended at sunset.

79. καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι δείσαντες μὴ σφίσιν ἐπιπλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ὡς κρατοῦντες οἱ πολέμιοι ἢ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἀναλάβωσιν ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι νεωτερίσωσι, τούς τε ἐκ τῆς νήσου πάλιν ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον διεκόμισαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐφύλασσον. [2] οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν πλεῦσαι κρατοῦντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ, τρεῖς δὲ καὶ δέκα ναῦς ἔχοντες τῶν Κερκυραίων ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον, ὅθενπερ ἀνηγάγοντο. [3] τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐπέπλεον, καίπερ ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ καὶ φόβῳ ὄντας καὶ Βρασίδου παραινοῦντος, ὡς λέγεται, Ἀλκίδᾳ, ἰσοψήφου δὲ οὐκ ὄντος: ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Λευκίμμην τὸ ἀκρωτήριον ἀποβάντες ἐπόρθουν τοὺς ἀγρούς.

[79] The Corcyraeans, who were afraid that the victorious enemy would sail to the city and have recourse to some decisive measure, such as taking on board the prisoners in the island, conveyed them back to the temple of Herè and

guarded the city. But the Peloponnesians, although they had won the battle, did not venture to attack the city, but returned to their station on the mainland with thirteen Corcyraean ships which they had taken. On the next day they still hesitated, although there was great panic and confusion among the inhabitants. It is said that Brasidas advised Alcidas to make the attempt, but he had not an equal vote with him. So they only disembarked at the promontory of Leucimnè and ravaged the country.

80. ὁ δὲ δῆμος τῶν Κερκυραίων ἐν τούτῳ περιδεὴς γενόμενος μὴ ἐπιπλεύσωσιν αἱ νῆες, τοῖς τε ἱκέταις ᾖσαν ἐς λόγους καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅπως σωθήσεται ἡ πόλις, καί τινας αὐτῶν ἔπεισαν ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβῆναι: ἐπλήρωσαν γὰρ ὅμως τριάκοντα προσδεχόμενοι τὸν ἐπίπλουν. [2] οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι μέχρι μέσου ἡμέρας δῃώσαντες τὴν γῆν ἀπέπλευσαν, καὶ ὑπὸ νύκτα αὐτοῖς ἐφρυκτωρήθησαν ἑξήκοντα νῆες Ἀθηναίων προσπλέουσαι ἀπὸ Λευκάδος: ἃς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πυνθανόμενοι τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὰς μετ᾽ Ἀλκίδου ναῦς ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν μελλούσας πλεῖν ἀπέστειλαν καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους στρατηγόν.

[80] Meanwhile the people of Corcyra, dreading that the fleet of the Peloponnesians would attack them, held a parley with the other faction, especially with the suppliants, in the hope of saving the city; they even persuaded some of them to go on board the fleet; for the Corcyraeans still contrived to man thirty ships. But the Peloponnesians, after devastating the land till about midday, retired. And at nightfall the approach of sixty Athenian vessels was signalled to them from Leucas. These had been sent by the Athenians under the command of Eurymedon the son of Thucles, when they heard of the revolution and of the intended expedition of Alcidas to Corcyra.

81. οἱ μὲν οὖν Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς νυκτὸς εὐθὺς κατὰ τάχος ἐκομίζοντο ἐπ᾽ οἴκου παρὰ τὴν γῆν: καὶ ὑπερενεγκόντες τὸν Λευκαδίων ἰσθμὸν τὰς ναῦς, ὅπως μὴ περιπλέοντες ὀφθῶσιν, ἀποκομίζονται. [2] Κερκυραῖοι δὲ

αἰσθόμενοι τάς τε Ἀττικὰς ναῦς προσπλεούσας τάς τε τῶν πολεμίων οἰχομένας, λαβόντες τούς τε Μεσσηνίους ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἤγαγον πρότερον ἔξω ὄντας, καὶ τὰς ναῦς περιπλεῦσαι κελεύσαντες ἃς ἐπλήρωσαν ἐς τὸν Ὑλλαϊκὸν λιμένα, ἐν ὅσῳ περιεκομίζοντο, τῶν ἐχθρῶν εἴ τινα λάβοιεν, ἀπέκτεινον: καὶ ἐκ τῶν νεῶν ὅσους ἔπεισαν ἐσβῆναι ἐκβιβάζοντες ἀπεχρῶντο, ἐς τὸ Ἥραιόν τε ἐλθόντες τῶν ἱκετῶν ὡς πεντήκοντα ἄνδρας δίκην ὑποσχεῖν ἔπεισαν καὶ κατέγνωσαν πάντων θάνατον. [3] οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἱκετῶν, ὅσοι οὐκ ἐπείσθησαν, ὡς ἑώρων τὰ γιγνόμενα, διέφθειρον αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐκ τῶν δένδρων τινὲς ἀπήγχοντο, οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐδύναντο ἀνηλοῦντο. [4] ἡμέρας τε ἑπτά, ἃς ἀφικόμενος ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ παρέμεινε, Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ἐφόνευον, τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέροντες τοῖς τὸν δῆμον καταλύουσιν, ἀπέθανον δέ τινες καὶ ἰδίας ἔχθρας ἕνεκα, καὶ ἄλλοι χρημάτων σφίσιν ὀφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων: [5] πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου, καὶ οἷον φιλεῖ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ ξυνέβη καὶ ἔτι περαιτέρω. καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ παῖδα ἀπέκτεινε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀπεσπῶντο καὶ πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἐκτείνοντο, οἱ δέ τινες καὶ περιοικοδομηθέντες ἐν τοῦ Διονύσου τῷ ἱερῷ ἀπέθανον.

[81] The Peloponnesians set out that very night on their way home, keeping close to the land, and transporting the ships over the Leucadian isthmus, that they might not be seen sailing round. When the Corcyraeans perceived that the Athenian fleet was appoaching, while that of the enemy had disappeared, they took the Messenian troops, who had hitherto been outside the walls, into the city, and ordered the ships which they had manned to sail round into the Hyllaic harbour. These proceeded on their way. Meanwhile they killed any of their enemies whom they caught in the city. On the arrival of the ships they disembarked those whom they had induced to go on board, and despatched them; they also went to the temple of Herè, and persuading about fifty of the suppliants to stand their trial condemned

them all to death. The majority would not come out, and, when they saw what was going on, destroyed one another in the enclosure of the temple where they were, except a few who hung themselves on trees, or put an end to their own lives in any other way which they could. And, during the seven days which Eurymedon after his arrival remained with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans continued slaughtering those of their fellow-citizens whom they deemed their enemies; they professed to punish them for their designs against the democracy, but in fact some were killed from motives of personal enmity, and some because money was owing to them, by the hands of their debtors. Every form of death was to be seen; and everything, and more than everything, that commonly happens in revolutions, happened then. The father slew the son, and the suppliants were torn from the temples and slain near them; some of them were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus, and there perished. To such extremes of cruelty did revolution go; and this seemed to be the worst of revolutions, because it was the first.

82. οὕτως ὠμὴ <ἡ> στάσις προυχώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη, διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἐκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ᾽ ἑτοίμων παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμουμένων δὲ καὶ ξυμμαχίας ἅμα ἑκατέροις τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥᾳδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγαὶ τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλομένοις ἐπορίζοντο. [2] καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται. ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας

πίπτειν: ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ. [3] ἐστασίαζέ τε οὖν τὰ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύστει τῶν προγενομένων πολὺ ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ᾽ ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπίᾳ. [4] καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν: τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπλήκτως ὀξὺ ἀνδρὸς μοίρᾳ προσετέθη, ἀσφαλείᾳ δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὔλογος. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεί, ὁ δ᾽ ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὕποπτος. ἐπιβουλεύσας δέ τις τυχὼν ξυνετὸς καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος: προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μηδὲν αὐτῶν δεήσει, τῆς τε ἑταιρίας διαλυτὴς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένος. ἁπλῶς δὲ ὁ φθάσας τὸν μέλλοντα κακόν τι δρᾶν ἐπῃνεῖτο, καὶ ὁ ἐπικελεύσας τὸν μὴ διανοούμενον. [6] καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ ἑτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν: οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίας αἱ τοιαῦται ξύνοδοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας πλεονεξίᾳ. καὶ τὰς ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πίστεις οὐ τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ἢ τῷ κοινῇ τι παρανομῆσαι. [7] τά τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων καλῶς λεγόμενα ἐνεδέχοντο ἔργων φυλακῇ, εἰ προύχοιεν, καὶ οὐ γενναιότητι. ἀντιτιμωρήσασθαί τέ τινα περὶ πλείονος ἦν ἢ αὐτὸν μὴ προπαθεῖν. καὶ ὅρκοι εἴ που ἄρα γένοιντο ξυναλλαγῆς, ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα πρὸς τὸ ἄπορον ἑκατέρῳ διδόμενοι ἴσχυον οὐκ ἐχόντων ἄλλοθεν δύναμιν: ἐν δὲ τῷ παρατυχόντι ὁ φθάσας θαρσῆσαι, εἰ ἴδοι ἄφαρκτον, ἥδιον διὰ τὴν πίστιν ἐτιμωρεῖτο ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς, καὶ τό τε ἀσφαλὲς ἐλογίζετο καὶ ὅτι ἀπάτῃ περιγενόμενος ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα προσελάμβανεν. ῥᾷον δ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ κακοῦργοι ὄντες δεξιοὶ κέκληνται ἢ ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοί, καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται. [8] πάντων δ᾽ αὐτῶν

αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν: ἐκ δ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον. οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες μετὰ ὀνόματος ἑκάτεροι εὐπρεποῦς, πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει, τὰ μὲν κοινὰ λόγῳ θεραπεύοντες ἆθλα ἐποιοῦντο, παντὶ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ἀλλήλων περιγίγνεσθαι ἐτόλμησάν τε τὰ δεινότατα ἐπεξῆσάν τε τὰς τιμωρίας ἔτι μείζους, οὐ μέχρι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῇ πόλει ξυμφόρου προτιθέντες, ἐς δὲ τὸ ἑκατέροις που αἰεὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ὁρίζοντες, καὶ ἢ μετὰ ψήφου ἀδίκου καταγνώσεως ἢ χειρὶ κτώμενοι τὸ κρατεῖν ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν ἐκπιμπλάναι. ὥστε εὐσεβείᾳ μὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόμιζον, εὐπρεπείᾳ δὲ λόγου οἷς ξυμβαίη ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι, ἄμεινον ἤκουον. τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο.

[82] For not long afterwards nearly the whole Hellenic world was in commotion; in every city the chiefs of the democracy and of the oligarchy were struggling, the one to bring in the Athenians, the other the Lacedaemonians. Now in time of peace, men would have had no excuse for introducing either, and no desire to do so; but, when they were at war, the introduction of a foreign alliance on one side or the other to the hurt of their enemies and the advantage of themselves was easily effected by the dissatisfied party. And revolution brought upon the cities of Hellas many terrible calamities, such as have been and always will be while human nature remains the same, but which are more or less aggravated and differ in character with every new combination of circumstances. In peace and prosperity both states and individuals are actuated by higher motives, because they do not fall under the dominion of imperious necessities; but war, which takes away the comfortable provision of daily life, is a hard master and tends to assimilate men’s characters to their conditions.When troubles had once begun in the cities, those who followed

carried the revolutionary spirit further and further, and determined to outdo the report of all who had preceded them by the ingenuity of their enterprises and the atrocity of their revenges. The meaning of words had no longer the same relation to things, but was changed by them as they thought proper. Reckless daring was held to be loyal courage; prudent delay was the excuse of a coward; moderation was the disguise of unmanly weakness; to know everything was to do nothing. Frantic energy was the true quality of a man. A conspirator who wanted to be safe was a recreant in disguise. The lover of violence was always trusted, and his opponent suspected. He who succeeded in a plot was deemed knowing, but a still greater master in craft was he who detected one. On the other hand, he who plotted from the first to have nothing to do with plots was a breaker up of parties and a poltroon who was afraid of the enemy. In a word, he who could outstrip another in a bad action was applauded, and so was he who encouraged to evil one who had no idea of it. The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood, because a partisan was more ready to dare without asking why. (For party associations are not based upon any established law, nor do they seek the public good; they are formed in defiance of the laws and from self-interest.) The seal of good faith was not divine law, but fellowship in crime. If an enemy when he was in the ascendant offered fair words, the opposite party received them not in a generous spirit, but by a jealous watchfulness of his actions. Revenge was dearer than self-preservation. Any agreements sworn to by either party, when they could do nothing else, were binding as long as both were powerless. But he who on a favourable opportunity first took courage, and struck at his enemy when he saw him off his guard, had greater pleasure in a perfidious than he would have had in an open act of revenge; he congratulated himself that he had taken the safer course, and also that he had overreached his enemy and gained the prize of superior

ability. In general the dishonest more easily gain credit for cleverness than the simple for goodness; men take a pride in the one, but are ashamed of the other.The cause of all these evils was the love of power, originating in avarice and ambition, and the party-spirit which is engendered by them when men are fairly embarked in a contest. For the leaders on either side used specious names, the one party professing to uphold the constitutional equality of the many, the other the wisdom of an aristocracy, while they made the public interests, to which in name they were devoted, in reality their prize. Striving in every way to overcome each other, they committed the most monstrous crimes; yet even these were surpassed by the magnitude of their revenges which they pursued to the very utmost, neither party observing any definite limits either of justice or public expediency, but both alike making the caprice of the moment their law. Either by the help of an unrighteous sentence, or grasping power with the strong hand, they were eager to satiate the impatience of party-spirit. Neither faction cared for religion; but any fair pretence which succeeded in effecting some odious purpose was greatly lauded. And the citizens who were of neither party fell a prey to both; either they were disliked because they held aloof, or men were jealous of their surviving.

83. οὕτω πᾶσα ἰδέα κατέστη κακοτροπίας διὰ τὰς στάσεις τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ, καὶ τὸ εὔηθες, οὗ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη, τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπίστως ἐπὶ πολὺ διήνεγκεν: [2] οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὁ διαλύσων οὔτε λόγος ἐχυρὸς οὔτε ὅρκος φοβερός, κρείσσους δὲ ὄντες ἅπαντες λογισμῷ ἐς τὸ ἀνέλπιστον τοῦ βεβαίου μὴ παθεῖν μᾶλλον προυσκόπουν ἢ πιστεῦσαι ἐδύναντο. [3] καὶ οἱ φαυλότεροι γνώμην ὡς τὰ πλείω περιεγίγνοντο: τῷ γὰρ δεδιέναι τό τε αὐτῶν ἐνδεὲς καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ξυνετόν, μὴ λόγοις τε ἥσσους ὦσι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πολυτρόπου αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης φθάσωσι προεπιβουλευόμενοι, τολμηρῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἐχώρουν. [4] οἱ

δὲ καταφρονοῦντες κἂν προαισθέσθαι καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲν σφᾶς δεῖν λαμβάνειν ἃ γνώμῃ ἔξεστιν, ἄφαρκτοι μᾶλλον διεφθείροντο.

[83] Thus revolution gave birth to every form of wickedness in Hellas. The simplicity which is so large an element in a noble nature was laughed to scorn and disappeared. An attitude of perfidious antagonism everywhere prevailed; for there was no word binding enough, nor oath terrible enough to reconcile enemies. Each man was strong only in the conviction that nothing was secure; he must look to his own safety, and could not afford to trust others. Inferior intellects generally succeeded best. For, aware of their own deficiencies, and fearing the capacity of their opponents, for whom they were no match in powers of speech, and whose subtle wits were likely to anticipate them in contriving evil, they struck boldly and at once. But the cleverer sort, presuming in their arrogance that they would be aware in time, and disdaining to act when they could think, were taken off their guard and easily destroyed.

84. [ἐν δ᾽ οὖν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν προυτολμήθη, καὶ ὁπόσα ὕβρει μὲν ἀρχόμενοι τὸ πλέον ἢ σωφροσύνῃ ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν τιμωρίαν παρασχόντων οἱ ἀνταμυνόμενοι δράσειαν, πενίας δὲ τῆς εἰωθυίας ἀπαλλαξείοντές τινες, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἂν διὰ πάθους, ἐπιθυμοῦντες τὰ τῶν πέλας ἔχειν, παρὰ δίκην γιγνώσκοιεν, οἵ τε μὴ ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, ἀπὸ ἴσου δὲ μάλιστα ἐπιόντες ἀπαιδευσίᾳ ὀργῆς πλεῖστον ἐκφερόμενοι ὠμῶς καὶ ἀπαραιτήτως ἐπέλθοιεν. [2] ξυνταραχθέντος τε τοῦ βίου ἐς τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον τῇ πόλει καὶ τῶν νόμων κρατήσασα ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις, εἰωθυῖα καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀδικεῖν, ἀσμένη ἐδήλωσεν ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὀργῆς οὖσα, κρείσσων δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, πολεμία δὲ τοῦ προύχοντος: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦ τε ὁσίου τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι προυτίθεσαν τοῦ τε μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὸ κερδαίνειν, ἐν ᾧ μὴ βλάπτουσαν ἰσχὺν εἶχε τὸ φθονεῖν. [3] ἀξιοῦσί τε τοὺς κοινοὺς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων οἱ ἄνθρωποι νόμους, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἅπασιν ἐλπὶς ὑπόκειται σφαλεῖσι κἂν αὐτοὺς διασῴζεσθαι,

ἐν ἄλλων τιμωρίαις προκαταλύειν καὶ μὴ ὑπολείπεσθαι, εἴ ποτε ἄρα τις κινδυνεύσας τινὸς δεήσεται αὐτῶν.]

[84] Now in Corcyra most of these deeds were perpetrated, and for the first time. There was every crime which men could commit in revenge who had been governed not wisely, but tyrannically, and now had the oppressor at their mercy. There were the dishonest designs of others who were longing to be relieved from their habitual poverty, and were naturally animated by a passionate desire for their neighbour’s goods; and there were crimes of another class which men commit, not from covetousness, but from the enmity which equals foster towards one another until they are carried away by their blind rage into the extremes of pitiless cruelty. At such a time the life of the city was all in disorder, and human nature, which is always ready to transgress the laws, having now trampled them underfoot, delighted to show that her passions were ungovernable, that she was stronger than justice, and the enemy of everything above her. If malignity had not exercised a fatal power, how could any one have preferred revenge to piety, and gain to innocence? But, when men are retaliating upon others, they are reckless of the future, and do not hesitate to annul those common laws of humanity to which every individual trusts for his own hope of deliverance should he ever be overtaken by calamity; they forget that in their own hour of need they will look for them in vain.

85. οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν Κερκυραῖοι τοιαύταις ὀργαῖς ταῖς πρώταις ἐς ἀλλήλους ἐχρήσαντο, καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέπλευσαν ταῖς ναυσίν: [2] ὕστερον δὲ οἱ φεύγοντες τῶν Κερκυραίων διεσώθησαν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐς πεντακοσίους τείχη τε λαβόντες, ἃ ἦν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ, ἐκράτουν τῆς πέραν οἰκείας γῆς καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ὁρμώμενοι ἐλῄζοντο τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ πολλὰ ἔβλαπτον, καὶ λιμὸς ἰσχυρὸς ἐγένετο ἐν τῇ πόλει. [3] ἐπρεσβεύοντο δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Κόρινθον περὶ καθόδου: καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἐπράσσετο, ὕστερον χρόνῳ πλοῖα καὶ

ἐπικούρους παρασκευασάμενοι διέβησαν ἐς τὴν νῆσον ἑξακόσιοι μάλιστα οἱ πάντες, καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἐμπρήσαντες, ὅπως ἀπόγνοια ᾖ τοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ κρατεῖν τῆς γῆς, ἀναβάντες ἐς τὸ ὄρος τὴν Ἰστώνην, τεῖχος ἐνοικοδομησάμενοι ἔφθειρον τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τῆς γῆς ἐκράτουν.

[85] Such were the passions which the citizens of Corcyra first of all Hellenes displayed towards one another. After the departure of Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet the surviving oligarchs, who to the number of five hundred had escaped, seized certain forts on the mainland, and thus became masters of the territory on the opposite coast which belonged to Corcyra. Thence issuing forth, they plundered the Corcyraeans in the island, and did much harm, so that there was a great famine in the city. They also sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon and Corinth, begging that they might be restored, but, failing of their object, they procured boats and auxiliaries, and passed over to Corcyra about six hundred in all; then, burning their boats, that they might have no hope but in the conquest of the island, they went into Mount Istonè, and building a fort there, became masters of the country to the ruin of the inhabitants of the city.

86. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναῦς ἔστειλαν ἐς Σικελίαν καὶ Λάχητα τὸν Μελανώπου στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν καὶ Χαροιάδην τὸν Εὐφιλήτου. [2] οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι καὶ Λεοντῖνοι ἐς πόλεμον ἀλλήλοις καθέστασαν. ξύμμαχοι δὲ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις ἦσαν πλὴν Καμαριναίων αἱ ἄλλαι Δωρίδες πόλεις, αἵπερ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου ξυμμαχίαν ἐτάχθησαν, οὐ μέντοι ξυνεπολέμησάν γε, τοῖς δὲ Λεοντίνοις αἱ Χαλκιδικαὶ πόλεις καὶ Καμάρινα: τῆς δὲ Ἰταλίας Λοκροὶ μὲν Συρακοσίων ἦσαν, Ῥηγῖνοι δὲ κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς Λεοντίνων. [3] ἐς οὖν τὰς Ἀθήνας πέμψαντες οἱ τῶν Λεοντίνων ξύμμαχοι κατά τε παλαιὰν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ὅτι Ἴωνες ἦσαν πείθουσι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πέμψαι σφίσι ναῦς: ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν Συρακοσίων τῆς τε γῆς εἴργοντο καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης. [4] καὶ ἔπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς μὲν οἰκειότητος

προφάσει, βουλόμενοι δὲ μήτε σῖτον ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἄγεσθαι αὐτόθεν πρόπειράν τε ποιούμενοι εἰ σφίσι δυνατὰ εἴη τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ὑποχείρια γενέσθαι. [5] καταστάντες οὖν ἐς Ῥήγιον τῆς Ἰταλίας τὸν πόλεμον ἐποιοῦντο μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[86] At the end of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty ships to Sicily under the command of Laches the son of Melanopus, and Charoeades the son of Euphiletus. Syracuse and Leontini were now at war with one another. All the Dorian cities, except Camarina, were in alliance with Syracuse; they were the same which at the beginning of the war were reckoned in the Lacedaemonian confederacy, but they had taken no active part. The allies of the Leontines were the Chalcidian cities and Camarina. In Italy the Locrians sided with the Syracusans, and the Rhegians with the Leontines, who were their kinsmen. The Leontines and their allies sent to Athens, and on the ground, partly of an old alliance, partly of their Ionian descent, begged the Athenians to send them ships, for they were driven off both sea and land by their Syracusan enemies. The Athenians sent the ships, professedly on the ground of relationship, but in reality because they did not wish the Peloponnesians to obtain corn from Sicily. Moreover they meant to try what prospect they had of getting the affairs of Sicily into their hands. So the commanders of the fleet came to Rhegium in Italy, where they established themselves, and carried on the war in concert with their allies. Thus the summer ended.

87. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἡ νόσος τὸ δεύτερον ἐπέπεσε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἐκλιποῦσα μὲν οὐδένα χρόνον τὸ παντάπασιν, ἐγένετο δέ τις ὅμως διοκωχή. [2] παρέμεινε δὲ τὸ μὲν ὕστερον οὐκ ἔλασσον ἐνιαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ δύο ἔτη, ὥστε Ἀθηναίους γε μὴ εἶναι ὅτι μᾶλλον τούτου ἐπίεσε καὶ ἐκάκωσε τὴν δύναμιν: [3] τετρακοσίων γὰρ ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τετρακισχιλίων οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἀπέθανον ἐκ τῶν τάξεων καὶ τριακοσίων ἱππέων, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου ὄχλου ἀνεξεύρετος ἀριθμός. [4] ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ σεισμοὶ

τότε τῆς γῆς, ἔν τε Ἀθήναις καὶ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ καὶ ἐν Βοιωτοῖς καὶ μάλιστα ἐν Ὀρχομενῷ τῷ Βοιωτίῳ.

[87] In the following winter the plague, which had never entirely disappeared, although abating for a time, again attacked the Athenians. It continued on this second occasion not less than a year, having previously lasted for two years. To the power of Athens certainly nothing was more ruinous; not less than four thousand four hundred Athenian hoplites who were on the roll died, and also three hundred horsemen; how many of the common people could never be ascertained. This too was the time when the frequent earthquakes occurred at Athens, in Euboea, and in Boeotia, especially at Orchomenos.

88. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Ῥηγῖνοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος τριάκοντα ναυσὶ στρατεύουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰόλου νήσους καλουμένας: θέρους γὰρ δι᾽ ἀνυδρίαν ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐπιστρατεύειν. [2] νέμονται δὲ Λιπαραῖοι αὐτάς, Κνιδίων ἄποικοι ὄντες. οἰκοῦσι δ᾽ ἐν μιᾷ τῶν νήσων οὐ μεγάλῃ, καλεῖται δὲ Λιπάρα: τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐκ ταύτης ὁρμώμενοι γεωργοῦσι, Διδύμην καὶ Στρογγύλην καὶ Ἱεράν. [3] νομίζουσι δὲ οἱ ἐκείνῃ ἄνθρωποι ἐν τῇ Ἱερᾷ ὡς ὁ Ἥφαιστος χαλκεύει, ὅτι τὴν νύκτα φαίνεται πῦρ ἀναδιδοῦσα πολὺ καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν καπνόν. κεῖνται δὲ αἱ νῆσοι αὗται κατὰ τὴν Σικελῶν καὶ Μεσσηνίων γῆν, ξύμμαχοι δ᾽ ἦσαν Συρακοσίων. [4] τεμόντες δ᾽ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν γῆν, ὡς οὐ προσεχώρουν, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ πέμπτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[88] During the same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty ships against the islands of Aeolus, as they are called, which in summer time cannot be attacked owing to the want of water. These islands belong to the Liparaeans, who are colonists of the Cnidians: they inhabit one of them, which is not large, and is called Lipara; from this they go and cultivate the rest, Didymè, Strongylè, and Hiera. The inhabitants believe that

the forge of Hephaestus is in Hiera, because the island sends up a blaze of fire in the night-time and clouds of smoke by day. The Aeolian islands lie off the territory of the Sicels and Messenians; they were in alliance with Syracuse. The Athenians wasted the country, but finding that the inhabitants would not yield, sailed back to Rhegium. And so ended the winter, and with it the fifth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

89. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ ἦλθον ὡς ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβαλοῦντες, Ἄγιδος τοῦ Ἀρχιδάμου ἡγουμένου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως, σεισμῶν δὲ γενομένων πολλῶν ἀπετράποντο πάλιν καὶ οὐκ ἐγένετο ἐσβολή. [2] καὶ περὶ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους, τῶν σεισμῶν κατεχόντων, τῆς Εὐβοίας ἐν Ὀροβίαις ἡ θάλασσα ἐπανελθοῦσα ἀπὸ τῆς τότε οὔσης γῆς καὶ κυματωθεῖσα ἐπῆλθε τῆς πόλεως μέρος τι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κατέκλυσε,τὸ δ᾽ ὑπενόστησε, καὶ θάλασσα νῦν ἐστὶ πρότερον οὖσα γῆ: καὶ ἀνθρώπους διέφθειρεν ὅσοι μὴ ἐδύναντο φθῆναι πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἀναδραμόντες. [3] καὶ περὶ Ἀταλάντην τὴν ἐπὶ Λοκροῖς τοῖς Ὀπουντίοις νῆσον παραπλησία γίγνεται ἐπίκλυσις, καὶ τοῦ τε φρουρίου τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεῖλε καὶ δύο νεῶν ἀνειλκυσμένων τὴν ἑτέραν κατέαξεν. [4] ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ ἐν Πεπαρήθῳ κύματος ἐπαναχώρησίς τις, οὐ μέντοι ἐπέκλυσέ γε: καὶ σεισμὸς τοῦ τείχους τι κατέβαλε καὶ τὸ πρυτανεῖον καὶ ἄλλας οἰκίας ὀλίγας. [5] αἴτιον δ᾽ ἔγωγε νομίζω τοῦ τοιούτου, ᾗ ἰσχυρότατος ὁ σεισμὸς ἐγένετο, κατὰ τοῦτο ἀποστέλλειν τε τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐξαπίνης πάλιν ἐπισπωμένην βιαιότερον τὴν ἐπίκλυσιν ποιεῖν: ἄνευ δὲ σεισμοῦ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτο ξυμβῆναι γενέσθαι.

[89] In the ensuing summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, came as far as the isthmus. They intended to invade Attica, but were deterred from proceeding by numerous earthquakes, and no invasion took place in this year. About the time when these earthquakes

prevailed, the sea at Orobiae in Euboea, retiring from what was then the line of coast and rising in a great wave, overflowed a part of the city; and although it subsided in some places, yet in others the inundation was permanent, and that which was formerly land is now sea. All the people who could not escape to the high ground perished. A similar inundation occurred in the neighbourhood of Atalantè, an island on the coast of the Opuntian Locri, which carried away a part of the Athenian fort, and dashed in pieces one of two ships which were drawn up on the beach. At Peparethus also the sea retired, but no inundation followed; an earthquake, however, overthrew a part of the wall, the Prytaneum, and a few houses. I conceive that, where the force of the earthquake was greatest, the sea was driven back, and the suddenness of the recoil made the inundation more violent; and I am of opinion that this was the cause of the phenomenon, which would never have taken place if there had been no earthquake.

90. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐπολέμουν μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι, ὡς ἑκάστοις ξυνέβαινεν, ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ Σικελιῶται ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους στρατεύοντες καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξὺν τοῖς σφετέροις ξυμμάχοις: ἃ δὲ λόγου μάλιστα ἄξια ἢ μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔπραξαν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ ἀντιπόλεμοι, τούτων μνησθήσομαι. [2] Χαροιάδου γὰρ ἤδη τοῦ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦ τεθνηκότος ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων πολέμῳ Λάχης ἅπασαν ἔχων τῶν νεῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐστράτευσε μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ Μυλὰς τὰς Μεσσηνίων. ἔτυχον δὲ δύο φυλαὶ ἐν ταῖς Μυλαῖς τῶν Μεσσηνίων φρουροῦσαι καί τινα καὶ ἐνέδραν πεποιημέναι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τούς τε ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας τρέπουσι καὶ διαφθείρουσι πολλούς, καὶ τῷ ἐρύματι προσβαλόντες ἠνάγκασαν ὁμολογίᾳ τήν τε ἀκρόπολιν παραδοῦναι καὶ ἐπὶ Μεσσήνην ξυστρατεῦσαι. [4] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπελθόντων οἱ Μεσσήνιοι τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων προσεχώρησαν καὶ αὐτοί, ὁμήρους τε δόντες καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πιστὰ παρασχόμενοι.

[90] During the same summer war was going on in various parts of Sicily, the Hellenes in Sicily fighting against one another, the Athenians helping their own allies. I will mention the chief actions in which the Athenians took part, whether by the help of their allies attacking, or attacked by their enemies. Charoeades, the Athenian general, had been killed in battle by the Syracusans, and, Laches having taken the entire command of the fleet, he and the allies made an expedition against Mylae, a town belonging to Messenè. Two tribes of the Messenians were keeping guard there, and they had set an ambuscade for the force which they were expecting to land; but the Athenians and their allies put to flight with heavy loss the troops which came out of the ambush. Then, attacking the fortress, they compelled its defenders to come to terms, surrender the citadel, and march with them against Messenè. Finally, upon the approach of the Athenians and their allies, the Messenians themselves came to terms, giving hostages and the other pledges which were required of them.

91. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τριάκοντα μὲν ναῦς ἔστειλαν περὶ Πελοπόννησον, ὧν ἐστρατήγει Δημοσθένης τε ὁ Ἀλκισθένους καὶ Προκλῆς ὁ Θεοδώρου, ἑξήκοντα δὲ ἐς Μῆλον καὶ δισχιλίους ὁπλίτας: ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου. [2] τοὺς γὰρ Μηλίους ὄντας νησιώτας καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ὑπακούειν οὐδὲ ἐς τὸ αὐτῶν ξυμμαχικὸν ἰέναι ἐβούλοντο προσαγαγέσθαι. [3] ὡς δὲ αὐτοῖς δῃουμένης τῆς γῆς οὐ προσεχώρουν, ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Μήλου αὐτοὶ μὲν ἔπλευσαν ἐς Ὠρωπὸν τῆς Γραϊκῆς, ὑπὸ νύκτα δὲ σχόντες εὐθὺς ἐπορεύοντο οἱ ὁπλῖται ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζῇ ἐς Τάναγραν τῆς Βοιωτίας. [4] οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πανδημεὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, Ἱππονίκου τε τοῦ Καλλίου στρατηγοῦντος καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντος τοῦ Θουκλέους, ἀπὸ σημείου ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ γῆν ἀπήντων. [5] καὶ στρατοπεδευσάμενοι ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐν τῇ Τανάγρᾳ ἐδῄουν καὶ ἐνηυλίσαντο. καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς ἐπεξελθόντας τῶν Ταναγραίων καὶ Θηβαίων τινὰς προσβεβοηθηκότας καὶ

ὅπλα λαβόντες καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἀνεχώρησαν, οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. [6] καὶ παραπλεύσας ὁ Νικίας ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ τῆς Λοκρίδος τὰ ἐπιθαλάσσια ἔτεμε καὶ ἀνεχώρησεν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

[91] In the same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round the Peloponnese under the command of Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, and Procles the son of Theodorus. They also sent sixty ships and two thousand hoplites to Melos, under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus, wishing to subdue the Melians, who, although they were islanders, resisted them and would not join their alliance. So they ravaged their country, but finding that the Melians would not yield, they sailed away to Oropus, opposite Euboea. There they put in at nightfall, and the hoplites disembarking went at once by land to Tanagra in Boeotia. Meanwhile the entire Athenian force, under the command of Hipponicus the son of Callias, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, upon a signal given marched to meet them at the same spot. There they encamped, and all together devastated the country, remaining at Tanagra during that day and the following night. On the morrow they defeated the Tanagraeans who sallied out upon them, and also some Thebans who had come to their aid; they then took up the arms of the slain, raised a trophy, and returned, the one part of the forces back again to the city, the other to their ships. Nicias with his sixty ships then sailed to the coast of Locris; after ravaging the country he returned home.

92. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχινίᾳ ἀποικίαν καθίσταντο ἀπὸ τοιᾶσδε γνώμης. [2] Μηλιῆς οἱ ξύμπαντες εἰσὶ μὲν τρία μέρη, Παράλιοι Ἰριῆς Τραχίνιοι: τούτων δὲ οἱ Τραχίνιοι πολέμῳ ἐφθαρμένοι ὑπὸ Οἰταίων ὁμόρων ὄντων, τὸ πρῶτον μελλήσαντες Ἀθηναίοις προσθεῖναι σφᾶς αὐτούς, δείσαντες δὲ μὴ οὐ σφίσι πιστοὶ ὦσι, πέμπουσιν ἐς Λακεδαίμονα, ἑλόμενοι πρεσβευτὴν Τεισαμενόν. [3] ξυνεπρεσβεύοντο δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Δωριῆς, ἡ μητρόπολις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, τῶν αὐτῶν δεόμενοι: ὑπὸ

γὰρ τῶν Οἰταίων καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφθείροντο. [4] ἀκούσαντες δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι γνώμην εἶχον τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐκπέμπειν, τοῖς τε Τραχινίοις βουλόμενοι καὶ τοῖς Δωριεῦσι τιμωρεῖν, καὶ ἅμα τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου καλῶς αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει ἡ πόλις καθίστασθαι: ἐπί τε γὰρ τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ ναυτικὸν παρασκευασθῆναι ἄν, ὥστ᾽ ἐκ βραχέος τὴν διάβασιν γίγνεσθαι, τῆς τε ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης παρόδου χρησίμως ἕξειν. τό τε ξύμπαν ὥρμηντο τὸ χωρίον κτίζειν. [5] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐν Δελφοῖς τὸν θεὸν ἐπήροντο, κελεύοντος δὲ ἐξέπεμψαν τοὺς οἰκήτορας αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν περιοίκων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκέλευον ἕπεσθαι πλὴν Ἰώνων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν καὶ ἔστιν ὧν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν. οἰκισταὶ δὲ τρεῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ἡγήσαντο, Λέων καὶ Ἀλκίδας καὶ Δαμάγων. [6] καταστάντες δὲ ἐτείχισαν τὴν πόλιν ἐκ καινῆς, ἣ νῦν Ἡράκλεια καλεῖται, ἀπέχουσα Θερμοπυλῶν σταδίους μάλιστα τεσσαράκοντα, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης εἴκοσι. νεώριά τε παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ εἶρξαν τὸ κατὰ Θερμοπύλας κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ στενόν, ὅπως εὐφύλακτα αὐτοῖς εἴη.

[92] About the same time the Lacedaemonians founded Heraclea, their colony in Trachinia. The intention was as follows: The Trachinians are one of the three Melian tribes; the other two being the Paralians and the Hiereans. These Trachinians, having suffered greatly in war from their neighbours the Oetaeans, at first thought of attaching themselves to the Athenians, but, fearing that they could not trust them, sent Tisamenus, whom they appointed their envoy, to Lacedaemon. The Dorians, who were the mother state of Lacedaemon, joined in the embassy and also requested help, for they too were suffering from the Oetaeans. The Lacedaemonians heard their appeal, and, being desirous of assisting both the Trachinians and Dorians, made up their minds to send out a colony. They also thought that the situation of the new city would be convenient for carrying on the war against the Athenians. There a navy could be equipped if they wanted to attack Euboea, which was quite near, and the station would be handy for the

conveyance of troops to Chalcidicè. For every reason they were eager to colonise the place. First they enquired of the God at Delphi; he bade them go, and they sent out settlers taken from their own citizens and the Perioeci, announcing that any Hellenes who desired, not being of the Ionian, Achaean, or certain other races, might accompany them. The leaders of the colony were three Lacedaemonians, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. They set to work and built afresh the walls of the city, which received the name of Heraclea, and is situated about four miles and a half from Thermopylae and a little more than two from the sea. They also constructed docks, beginning the works near Thermopylae, at the pass, that the city might be perfectly defended.

93. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς πόλεως ταύτης ξυνοικιζομένης τὸ πρῶτον ἔδεισάν τε καὶ ἐνόμισαν ἐπὶ τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ μάλιστα καθίστασθαι, ὅτι βραχύς ἐστιν ὁ διάπλους πρὸς τὸ Κήναιον τῆς Εὐβοίας. ἔπειτα μέντοι παρὰ δόξαν αὐτοῖς ἀπέβη: οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς δεινὸν οὐδέν. [2] αἴτιον δὲ ἦν οἵ τε Θεσσαλοὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντες τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων, καὶ ὧν ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ ἐκτίζετο, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσι μεγάλῃ ἰσχύι παροικῶσιν, ἔφθειρον καὶ διὰ παντὸς ἐπολέμουν ἀνθρώποις νεοκαταστάτοις, ἕως ἐξετρύχωσαν γενομένους τὸ πρῶτον καὶ πάνυ πολλούς· πᾶς γάρ τις Λακεδαιμονίων οἰκιζόντων θαρσαλέως ᾔει, βέβαιον νομίζων τὴν πόλιν·: οὐ μέντοι ἥκιστα οἱ ἄρχοντες αὐτῶν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οἱ ἀφικνούμενοι τὰ πράγματά τε ἔφθειρον καὶ ἐς ὀλιγανθρωπίαν κατέστησαν, ἐκφοβήσαντες τοὺς πολλοὺς χαλεπῶς τε καὶ ἔστιν ἃ οὐ καλῶς ἐξηγούμενοι, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἤδη αὐτῶν οἱ πρόσοικοι ἐπεκράτουν.

[93] While the new colonists were collecting at Heraclea, the Athenians grew alarmed; the scheme appeared to be aimed at Euboea, for Cape Cenaeum on the opposite coast is within a short sail. But their fears were not realised; no harm whatever ensued. The reasons were these: In the first place the Thessalians are strong in that part of the country, and fearing that Heraclea, which was built to control them, would

be a powerful and dangerous neighbour, they carried on uninterrupted war against the young colony until they completely wore the settlers out, although originally they had been very numerous. For every one joined without hesitation, encouraged by the promise of security which a Lacedaemonian colony seemed to offer. But another great cause of the ruin and depopulation of the place was the conduct of the governors sent out from Lacedaemon, who frightened the people away by their severe and often unjust administration. Thus the Heracleans fell an easy prey to their neighbours.

94. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους, καὶ περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ὃν ἐν τῇ Μήλῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κατείχοντο, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα νεῶν Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ Πελοπόννησον ὄντες πρῶτον ἐν Ἑλλομενῷ τῆς Λευκαδίας φρουρούς τινας λοχήσαντες διέφθειραν, ἔπειτα ὕστερον ἐπὶ Λευκάδα μείζονι στόλῳ ἦλθον, Ἀκαρνᾶσί τε πᾶσιν, οἳ πανδημεὶ πλὴν Οἰνιαδῶν ξυνέσποντο, καὶ Ζακυνθίοις καὶ Κεφαλλῆσι καὶ Κερκυραίων πέντε καὶ δέκα ναυσίν. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν Λευκάδιοι τῆς τε ἔξω γῆς δῃουμένης καὶ τῆς ἐντὸς τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ, ἐν ᾗ καὶ ἡ Λευκάς ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος, πλήθει βιαζόμενοι ἡσύχαζον: οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνες ἠξίουν Δημοσθένη τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποτειχίζειν αὐτούς, νομίζοντες ῥᾳδίως γ᾽ ἂν ἐκπολιορκῆσαι καὶ πόλεως αἰεὶ σφίσι πολεμίας ἀπαλλαγῆναι. [3] Δημοσθένης δ᾽ ἀναπείθεται κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ὑπὸ Μεσσηνίων ὡς καλὸν αὐτῷ στρατιᾶς τοσαύτης ξυνειλεγμένης Αἰτωλοῖς ἐπιθέσθαι, Ναυπάκτῳ τε πολεμίοις οὖσι καί, ἢν κρατήσῃ αὐτῶν, ῥᾳδίως καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἠπειρωτικὸν τὸ ταύτῃ Ἀθηναίοις προσποιήσειν. [4] τὸ γὰρ ἔθνος μέγα μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ μάχιμον, οἰκοῦν δὲ κατὰ κώμας ἀτειχίστους, καὶ ταύτας διὰ πολλοῦ, καὶ σκευῇ ψιλῇ χρώμενον οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπέφαινον, πρὶν ξυμβοηθῆσαι, καταστραφῆναι. [5] ἐπιχειρεῖν δ᾽ ἐκέλευον πρῶτον μὲν Ἀποδωτοῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ Ὀφιονεῦσι καὶ μετὰ τούτους Εὐρυτᾶσιν, ὅπερ μέγιστον μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, ἀγνωστότατοι δὲ γλῶσσαν καὶ ὠμοφάγοι εἰσίν,

ὡς λέγονται: τούτων γὰρ ληφθέντων ῥᾳδίως καὶ τἆλλα προσχωρήσειν.

[94] During the same summer, and just about the same time when the Athenians were engaged at Melos, the troops which were cruising in the thirty Athenian ships about Peloponnesus set an ambuscade at Ellomenus in Leucadia and killed a few of the guards of the country. They next attacked Leucas itself with a larger armament, consisting of the Acarnanians, who followed them with their whole forces, all but the inhabitants of Oeniadae, and some Zacynthians and Cephallenians, together with fifteen ships from Corcyra. The Leucadians saw their territory both on the mainland and within the isthmus, where the town of Leucas and the temple of Apollo are situated, ravaged by the enemy; but being powerless against a superior force, they remained inactive. The Acarnanians begged Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to cut Leucas off by a wall, thinking that they could easily take the city and so rid themselves of an old enemy. But just then he was persuaded by the Messenians that, having such an army in the field, it would be a great thing to attack the Aetolians: they were the enemies of Naupactus, and if he defeated them he would easily subjugate the adjoining part of the mainland to the Athenians. The Aetolians, they said, though a large and warlike people, dwelt in unwalled villages, which were widely scattered, and as they had only light-armed soldiers, they would be subdued without difficulty before they could combine. They told him that he should first attack the Apodotians, then the Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytanians, The last are the largest tribe of the Aetolians; they speak a dialect more unintelligible than any of their neighbours, and are believed to eat raw flesh. They said that, if he conquered these, the rest would readily come over to him.

95. ὁ δὲ τῶν Μεσσηνίων χάριτι πεισθεὶς καὶ μάλιστα νομίσας ἄνευ τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως τοῖς ἠπειρώταις

ξυμμάχοις μετὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δύνασθαι ἂν κατὰ γῆν ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ Βοιωτοὺς διὰ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἐς Κυτίνιον τὸ Δωρικόν, ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχων τὸν Παρνασσόν, ἕως καταβαίη ἐς Φωκέας, οἳ προθύμως ἐδόκουν κατὰ τὴν Ἀθηναίων αἰεί ποτε φιλίαν ξυστρατεύσειν ἢ κἂν βίᾳ προσαχθῆναι καὶ Φωκεῦσιν ἤδη ὅμορος ἡ Βοιωτία ἐστίν , ἄρας οὖν ξύμπαντι τῷ στρατεύματι ἀπὸ τῆς Λευκάδος ἀκόντων τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων παρέπλευσεν ἐς Σόλλιον. [2] κοινώσας δὲ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῖς Ἀκαρνᾶσιν, ὡς οὐ προσεδέξαντο διὰ τῆς Λευκάδος τὴν οὐ περιτείχισιν, αὐτὸς τῇ λοιπῇ στρατιᾷ, Κεφαλλῆσι καὶ Μεσσηνίοις καὶ Ζακυνθίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίων τριακοσίοις τοῖς ἐπιβάταις τῶν σφετέρων νεῶν αἱ γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα τῶν Κερκυραίων ἀπῆλθον νῆες , ἐστράτευσεν ἐπ᾽ Αἰτωλούς. [3] ὡρμᾶτο δὲ ἐξ Οἰνεῶνος τῆς Λοκρίδος. οἱ δὲ Ὀζόλαι οὗτοι Λοκροὶ ξύμμαχοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἔδει αὐτοὺς πανστρατιᾷ ἀπαντῆσαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὴν μεσόγειαν: ὄντες γὰρ ὅμοροι τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ ὁμόσκευοι μεγάλη ὠφελία ἐδόκουν εἶναι ξυστρατεύοντες μάχης τε ἐμπειρίᾳ τῆς ἐκείνων καὶ χωρίων.

[95] He was influenced by his regard for the Messenians, and still more by the consideration that without reinforcements from Athens, and with no other help than that of the allies on the mainland, to whom he hoped to add the Aetolians, he could make his way by land to attack Boeotia. He might proceed through the Ozolian Locri to the Dorian Cytinium, keeping Mount Parnassus on the right, until he came down upon the Phocians. They would probably be eager to join in the expedition because they had always been friendly to Athens, or, if unwilling, they might be coerced; and once in Phocis he would be on the borders of Boeotia. So he left Leucas with all his army, much against the will of the Acarnanians, and sailed to Sollium. He there communicated his design to them, but they would not accompany him because he had refused to blockade Leucas; so with the remainder of his army, which consisted of Cephallenians, Messenians, Zacynthians, and three hundred marines

belonging to the Athenian fleet, the fifteen Corcyraean vessels having left, he marched against the Aetolians, starting from Oeneon in Locris. The Ozolian Locrians were allies of the Athenians, and they were to meet him with their whole force in the interior of the country. They dwelt on the border of the Aetolians, and as they were armed in a similar manner and knew their country and ways of fighting, their help in the expedition seemed likely to be very valuable.

96. αὐλισάμενος δὲ τῷ στρατῷ ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Νεμείου τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐν ᾧ Ἡσίοδος ὁ ποιητὴς λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν ταύτῃ ἀποθανεῖν, χρησθὲν αὐτῷ ἐν Νεμέᾳ τοῦτο παθεῖν, ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ἄρας ἐπορεύετο ἐς τὴν Αἰτωλίαν. [2] καὶ αἱρεῖ τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ Ποτιδανίαν καὶ τῇ δευτέρᾳ Κροκύλειον καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ Τείχιον, ἔμενέ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν λείαν ἐς Εὐπάλιον τῆς Λοκρίδος ἀπέπεμψεν: τὴν γὰρ γνώμην εἶχε τὰ ἄλλα καταστρεψάμενος οὕτως ἐπὶ Ὀφιονέας, εἰ μὴ βούλοιντο ξυγχωρεῖν, ἐς Ναύπακτον ἐπαναχωρήσας στρατεῦσαι ὕστερον. [3]τοὺς δὲ Αἰτωλοὺς οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν αὕτη ἡ παρασκευὴ οὔτε ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεβουλεύετο, ἐπειδή τε ὁ στρατὸς ἐσεβεβλήκει, πολλῇ χειρὶ ἐπεβοήθουν πάντες, ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἔσχατοι Ὀφιονέων οἱ πρὸς τὸν Μηλιακὸν κόλπον καθήκοντες Βωμιῆς καὶ Καλλιῆς ἐβοήθησαν.

[96] He encamped the first night at the temple of Nemean Zeus, where the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the inhabitants in fulfilment of an oracle which foretold that he should die at Nemea. Early the next morning he proceeded on his march into Aetolia. On the first day he took Potidania, on the second Crocyleium, on the third Teichium. There he stayed and sent back the spoils to Eupalium in Locris. For he did not intend to attack the Ophioneans yet; when he had subjugated the rest of the country he would return to Naupactus and make a second expedition against them if they continued to resist. The Aetolians were aware of his designs from the very first; and no sooner did he enter their territory than they all collected in great force; even the most distant of the Ophioneans, the Bomieans and Callieans

who reach down towards the Malian Gulf, came to the aid of their countrymen.

97. τῷ δὲ Δημοσθένει τοιόνδε τι οἱ Μεσσήνιοι παρῄνουν: ὅπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀναδιδάσκοντες αὐτὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ὡς εἴη ῥᾳδία ἡ αἵρεσις, ἰέναι ἐκέλευον ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπὶ τὰς κώμας καὶ μὴ μένειν ἕως ἂν ξύμπαντες ἀθροισθέντες ἀντιτάξωνται, τὴν δ᾽ ἐν ποσὶν αἰεὶ πειρᾶσθαι αἱρεῖν. [2] ὁ δὲ τούτοις τε πεισθεὶς καὶ τῇ τύχῃ ἐλπίσας, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ ἠναντιοῦτο, τοὺς Λοκροὺς οὐκ ἀναμείνας οὓς αὐτῷ ἔδει προσβοηθῆσαι ⌈ψιλῶν γὰρ ἀκοντιστῶν ἐνδεὴς ἦν μάλιστα⌉ ἐχώρει ἐπὶ Αἰγιτίου, καὶ κατὰ κράτος αἱρεῖ ἐπιών. ὑπέφευγον γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ τῶν λόφων τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως: ἦν γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ὑψηλῶν χωρίων ἀπέχουσα τῆς θαλάσσης ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίους μάλιστα. [3] οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοί ⌈βεβοηθηκότες γὰρ ἤδη ἦσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Αἰγίτιον⌉ προσέβαλλον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις καταθέοντες ἀπὸ τῶν λόφων ἄλλοι ἄλλοθεν καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον, καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἐπίοι τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, ὑπεχώρουν, ἀναχωροῦσι δὲ ἐπέκειντο: καὶ ἦν ἐπὶ πολὺ τοιαύτη ἡ μάχη, διώξεις τε καὶ ὑπαγωγαί, ἐν οἷς ἀμφοτέροις ἥσσους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι.

[97] The Messenians repeated the advice which they had originally given to Demosthenes. They assured him that there would be no difficulty in conquering the Aetolians, and told him to march as quickly as he could against the villages. He should not wait until they could combine and meet him with an army, but should endeavour to take any place which was nearest. He, trusting to their advice, and confident in his good fortune since everything was going favourably, did not wait for the Locrians, who should have supplied his deficiency in javelin-men, but at once marched towards Aegitium, which he attacked, and forced his way in. The inhabitants had stolen away and taken up a position on the top of the hills overhanging the town, which was itself built upon heights at a distance of about nine miles from the sea. The other Aetolians, who had by this time come to the

rescue of Aegitium, attacked the Athenians and their allies. Some ran down from one hill and some from another and hurled darts at them; when the Athenian army advanced they retired, and when the Athenians retreated they pressed upon them. The battle, which lasted long, was nothing but a series of pursuits and retreats, and in both the Athenians were at a disadvantage.

98. μέχρι μὲν οὖν οἱ τοξόται εἶχόν τε τὰ βέλη αὐτοῖς καὶ οἷοί τε ἦσαν χρῆσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀντεῖχον τοξευόμενοι γὰρ οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ψιλοὶ ἀνεστέλλοντο: ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦ τε τοξάρχου ἀποθανόντος οὗτοι διεσκεδάσθησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐκεκμήκεσαν καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῷ αὐτῷ πόνῳ ξυνεχόμενοι, οἵ τε Αἰτωλοὶ ἐνέκειντο καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον, οὕτω δὴ τραπόμενοι ἔφευγον, καὶ ἐσπίπτοντες ἔς τε χαράδρας ἀνεκβάτους καὶ χωρία ὧν οὐκ ἦσαν ἔμπειροι διεφθείροντο: καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἡγεμὼν αὐτοῖς τῶν ὁδῶν Χρόμων ὁ Μεσσήνιος ἐτύγχανε τεθνηκώς. [2] οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ τροπῇ κατὰ πόδας αἱροῦντες ἄνθρωποι ποδώκεις καὶ ψιλοὶ διέφθειρον, τοὺς δὲ πλείους τῶν ὁδῶν ἁμαρτάνοντας καὶ ἐς τὴν ὕλην ἐσφερομένους, ὅθεν διέξοδοι οὐκ ἦσαν, πῦρ κομισάμενοι περιεπίμπρασαν: [3] πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη τῆς φυγῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀλέθρου τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μόλις τε ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὸν Οἰνεῶνα τῆς Λοκρίδος, ὅθεν περ καὶ ὡρμήθησαν, οἱ περιγενόμενοι κατέφυγον. [4] ἀπέθανον δὲ τῶν τε ξυμμάχων πολλοὶ καὶ αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων ὁπλῖται περὶ εἴκοσι μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν. τοσοῦτοι μὲν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἡλικία ἡ αὐτὴ οὗτοι βέλτιστοι δὴ ἄνδρες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε ἐκ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως διεφθάρησαν: ἀπέθανε δὲ καὶ ὁ ἕτερος στρατηγὸς Προκλῆς. [5] τοὺς δὲ νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀνελόμενοι παρὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ ἀναχωρήσαντες ἐς Ναύπακτον ὕστερον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκομίσθησαν. Δημοσθένης δὲ περὶ Ναύπακτον καὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα ὑπελείφθη, τοῖς πεπραγμένοις φοβούμενος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.

[98] While their archers had arrows and were able to use them, the Athenians maintained their ground, for the

Aetolians, being light-armed, were driven back by the arrows. But at length the captain of the archers was slain, and the forces under his command no longer kept together. The Athenians themselves grew weary of the long and tedious struggle. The Aetolians came closer and closer, and never ceased hurling darts at them. At last they turned and fled, and falling into ravines, out of which there was no way, or losing themselves in a strange country, they perished. Their guide, Chromon the Messenian, had been killed. The Aetolians, who were light-armed and swift of foot, followed at their heels, hurling darts, and caught and slew many of them in the actual rout. The greater number missed their way and got into the woods, out of which no path led; and their enemies brought fire and burnt the wood about them. So the Athenian army tried every means of escape and perished in all manner of ways. The survivors with difficulty made their way to the sea at Oeneon in Locris, whence they had set out. Many of the allies fell, and of the Athenian heavy-armed about a hundred and twenty, all in the flower of their youth; they were the very finest men whom the city of Athens lost during the war. Procles, one of the two generals, was also killed. When they had received the bodies of their dead under a flag of truce from the Aetolians, they retreated to Naupactus, and returned in their ships to Athens. Demosthenes remained behind in Naupactus and the neighbourhood; for, after what had happened, he feared the anger of the Athenians.

99. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους καὶ οἱ περὶ Σικελίαν Ἀθηναῖοι πλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Λοκρίδα ἐν ἀποβάσει τέ τινι τοὺς προσβοηθήσαντας Λοκρῶν ἐκράτησαν καὶ περιπόλιον αἱροῦσιν ὃ ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ Ἅληκι ποταμῷ.

[99] About the same time the Athenian forces engaged in Sicily, sailing to the territory of Locri and there disembarking, defeated the Locrians who came out to meet them, and took a small garrison fort, which was situated upon the river Halex.

100. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους Αἰτωλοὶ προπέμψαντες πρότερον ἔς τε Κόρινθον καὶ ἐς Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις, Τόλοφόν τε τὸν Ὀφιονέα καὶ Βοριάδην τὸν Εὐρυτᾶνα καὶ Τείσανδρον τὸν Ἀποδωτόν, πείθουσιν ὥστε σφίσι πέμψαι στρατιὰν ἐπὶ Ναύπακτον διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγήν. [2] καὶ ἐξέπεμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι περὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον τρισχιλίους ὁπλίτας τῶν ξυμμάχων. τούτων ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι ἐξ Ἡρακλείας τῆς ἐν Τραχῖνι πόλεως τότε νεοκτίστου οὔσης: Σπαρτιάτης δ᾽ ἦρχεν Εὐρύλοχος τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ ξυνηκολούθουν αὐτῷ Μακάριος καὶ Μενεδάϊος οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται.

[100] During the same summer the Aetolians, who had some time before despatched Tolophus the Ophionean, Boriades the Eurytanian, and Tisander the Apodotian on an embassy to Corinth and Lacedaemon, induced the Lacedaemonians to aid them by sending an army against Naupactus, in order to punish the inhabitants for inviting the Athenian invasion. So in the autumn they sent out three thousand hoplites of their allies, including five hundred from Heraclea, the newly-founded city in Trachis. Eurylochus, a Spartan, was general, and with him were associated in the command Macarius and Menedaeus, also Spartans.

101. ξυλλεγέντος δὲ τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐς Δελφοὺς ἐπεκηρυκεύετο Εὐρύλοχος Λοκροῖς τοῖς Ὀζόλαις: διὰ τούτων γὰρ ἡ ὁδὸς ἦν ἐς Ναύπακτον, καὶ ἅμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐβούλετο ἀποστῆσαι αὐτούς. [2] ξυνέπρασσον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτῷ τῶν Λοκρῶν Ἀμφισσῆς διὰ τὸ τῶν Φωκέων ἔχθος δεδιότες: καὶ αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι δόντες ὁμήρους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔπεισαν δοῦναι φοβουμένους τὸν ἐπιόντα στρατόν, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς ὁμόρους αὐτοῖς Μυονέας ταύτῃ γὰρ δυσεσβολώτατος ἡ Λοκρίς, ἔπειτα Ἱπνέας καὶ Μεσσαπίους καὶ Τριταιέας καὶ Χαλαίους καὶ Τολοφωνίους καὶ Ἡσσίους καὶ Οἰανθέας. οὗτοι καὶ ξυνεστράτευον πάντες. Ὀλπαῖοι δὲ ὁμήρους μὲν ἔδοσαν, ἠκολούθουν δὲ οὔ: καὶ Ὑαῖοι οὐκ ἔδοσαν ὁμήρους πρὶν αὐτῶν εἶλον κώμην Πόλιν ὄνομα ἔχουσαν.

[101] When the army was collected at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Ozolian Locrians, for he had to pass through their country on the way to Naupactus; and he also wished to detach them from the Athenian alliance. Of the Locrians, the inhabitants of Amphissa were most willing to co-operate with him, being anxious for protection against their enemies the Phocians; they were the first who gave hostages, and by them the other Locrians, who were alarmed at the impending invasion, were persuaded to do the like: — first their neighbours the Myoneans, who commanded the most difficult pass into Locris; then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritaeeans, Chalaeans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oeantheans; all these tribes also joined the expedition. The Olpaeans gave hostages but did not join; the Hyaeans would not give hostages until the Lacedaemonians had taken one of their villages, called Polis.

102. ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο πάντα καὶ τοὺς ὁμήρους κατέθετο ἐς Κυτίνιον τὸ Δωρικόν, ἐχώρει τῷ στρατῷ ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον διὰ τῶν Λοκρῶν, καὶ πορευόμενος Οἰνεῶνα αἱρεῖ αὐτῶν καὶ Εὐπάλιον: οὐ γὰρ προσεχώρησαν. [2] γενόμενοι δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Ναυπακτίᾳ καὶ οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ ἅμα ἤδη προσβεβοηθηκότες ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ προάστειον ἀτείχιστον ὂν εἷλον: ἐπί τε Μολύκρειον ἐλθόντες τὴν Κορινθίων μὲν ἀποικίαν, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπήκοον, αἱροῦσιν. [3] Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἔτι γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν μετὰ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας περὶ Ναύπακτον προαισθόμενος τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ δείσας περὶ αὐτῆς, ἐλθὼν πείθει Ἀκαρνᾶνας, χαλεπῶς διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος ἀναχώρησιν, βοηθῆσαι Ναυπάκτῳ. [4] καὶ πέμπουσι μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν χιλίους ὁπλίτας, οἳ ἐσελθόντες περιεποίησαν τὸ χωρίον: δεινὸν γὰρ ἦν μὴ μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ τείχους, ὀλίγων δὲ τῶν ἀμυνομένων, οὐκ ἀντίσχωσιν. [5] Εὐρύλοχος δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὡς ᾔσθοντο τὴν στρατιὰν ἐσεληλυθυῖαν καὶ ἀδύνατον ὂν τὴν πόλιν βίᾳ ἑλεῖν, ἀνεχώρησαν οὐκ ἐπὶ Πελοποννήσου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς τὴν Αἰολίδα τὴν νῦν καλουμένην Καλυδῶνα καὶ Πλευρῶνα καὶ ἐς τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία καὶ ἐς

Πρόσχιον τῆς Αἰτωλίας. [6] οἱ γὰρ Ἀμπρακιῶται ἐλθόντες πρὸς αὐτοὺς πείθουσιν ὥστε μετὰ σφῶν Ἄργει τε τῷ Ἀμφιλοχικῷ καὶ Ἀμφιλοχίᾳ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπιχειρῆσαι καὶ Ἀκαρνανίᾳ ἅμα, λέγοντες ὅτι, ἢν τούτων κρατήσωσι, πᾶν τὸ ἠπειρωτικὸν Λακεδαιμονίοις ξύμμαχον καθεστήξει. [7] καὶ ὁ μὲν Εὐρύλοχος πεισθεὶς καὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἀφεὶς ἡσύχαζε τῷ στρατῷ περὶ τοὺς χώρους τούτους, ἕως τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ἐκστρατευσαμένοις περὶ τὸ Ἄργος δέοι βοηθεῖν. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[102] When everything was ready, and Eurylochus had deposited the hostages at Cytinium of the Dorians, he marched with his army against Naupactus, through the territory of the Locrians. On his march he took Oeneon and Eupalium, two Locrian towns which refused to come to terms. When they had arrived in the territory of Naupactus and the Aetolians had at length joined them, they devastated the country, and after taking the unwalled suburbs of the town marched against Molycrium, a colony of the Corinthians subject to Athens, which they captured. But Demosthenes the Athenian, who after his misfortune in Aetolia was still in the neighbourhood of Naupactus, having previous intelligence, and fearing for the town, went and persuaded the Acarnanians, much against their will — for they had not forgotten his withdrawal from Leucas — to assist Naupactus. So they sent with him on board the Athenian ships a thousand hoplites; these got in and saved the place, which was in danger of having to capitulate, owing to the extent of the wall and the paucity of its defenders. Eurylochus and his soldiers, when they saw that the garrison had been reinforced, and that there was no possibility of taking the city by storm, instead of going back to Peloponnesus, retired into the country of Aeolis, which is now called by the names of the towns Calydon and Pleuron, and to other places in the neighbourhood; also to Proschium in Aetolia. For the Ambraciots sent and persuaded them to take part in an attack on the Amphilochian Argos and the

rest of Amphilochia and Acarnania, declaring that, if they gained possession of these places, all the tribes of the mainland would at once come over to the Lacedaemonians. Eurylochus assented and, dismissing the Aetolians, waited with his army in that region until the time for the Ambraciots to make their expedition and for him to join them in the neighbourhood of Argos. Thus the summer ended.

103. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἐπελθόντες μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ξυμμάχων καὶ ὅσοι Σικελῶν κατὰ κράτος ἀρχόμενοι ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων καὶ ξύμμαχοι ὄντες ἀποστάντες αὐτοῖς [ἀπὸ Συρακοσίων] ξυνεπολέμουν, ἐπ᾽ Ἴνησσαν τὸ Σικελικὸν πόλισμα, οὗ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν Συρακόσιοι εἶχον, προσέβαλον, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἑλεῖν, ἀπῆσαν. [2] ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀναχωρήσει ὑστέροις Ἀθηναίων τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐπιτίθενται οἱ ἐκ τοῦ τειχίσματος Συρακόσιοι, καὶ προσπεσόντες τρέπουσί τε μέρος τι τοῦ στρατοῦ καὶ ἀπέκτειναν οὐκ ὀλίγους. [3] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ὁ Λάχης καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Λοκρίδα ἀποβάσεις τινὰς ποιησάμενοι κατὰ τὸν Καϊκῖνον ποταμὸν τοὺς προσβοηθοῦντας Λοκρῶν μετὰ Προξένου τοῦ Καπάτωνος ὡς τριακοσίους μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν καὶ ὅπλα λαβόντες ἀπεχώρησαν.

[103] In the following winter the Athenians in Sicily and their Hellenic allies made an attack upon the Sicel fort of Inessa, a Sicel town of which the citadel was held by the Syracusans. They were joined by many of the Sicels, who had formerly been allies to the Syracusans, and, having been held down by them, had now revolted to the Athenians. The attempt failed, and they retreated. But during their retreat the Syracusans sallied out and fell upon the allies who were in the rear of the Athenians, routed them, and put to flight a part of their forces with great loss. Soon afterwards, Laches and the Athenians in the fleet made several descents upon Locris. At the river Caecinus they defeated about three hundred Locrians who came out to meet them under Proxenus the son of Capaton, took arms from the slain, and returned.

104. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Δῆλον ἐκάθηραν Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ χρησμὸν δή τινα. ἐκάθηρε μὲν γὰρ καὶ Πεισίστρατος ὁ τύραννος πρότερον αὐτήν, οὐχ ἅπασαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐφεωρᾶτο τῆς νήσου: τότε δὲ πᾶσα ἐκαθάρθη τοιῷδε τρόπῳ. [2] θῆκαι ὅσαι ἦσαν τῶν τεθνεώτων ἐν Δήλῳ, πάσας ἀνεῖλον, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν προεῖπον μήτε ἐναποθνῄσκειν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ μήτε ἐντίκτειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς τὴν Ῥήνειαν διακομίζεσθαι. ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Ῥήνεια τῆς Δήλου οὕτως ὀλίγον ὥστε Πολυκράτης ὁ Σαμίων τύραννος ἰσχύσας τινὰ χρόνον ναυτικῷ καὶ τῶν τε ἄλλων νήσων ἄρξας καὶ τὴν Ῥήνειαν ἑλὼν ἀνέθηκε τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Δηλίῳ ἀλύσει δήσας πρὸς τὴν Δῆλον. καὶ τὴν πεντετηρίδα τότε πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐποίησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ Δήλια. [3] ἦν δέ ποτε καὶ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλη ξύνοδος ἐς τὴν Δῆλον τῶν Ἰώνων τε καὶ περικτιόνων νησιωτῶν: ξύν τε γὰρ γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν ἐθεώρουν, ὥσπερ νῦν ἐς τὰ Ἐφέσια Ἴωνες, καὶ ἀγὼν ἐποιεῖτο αὐτόθι καὶ γυμνικὸς καὶ μουσικός, χορούς τε ἀνῆγον αἱ πόλεις. [4] δηλοῖ δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι τοῖσδε, ἃ ἐστιν ἐκ προοιμίου Ἀπόλλωνος:”ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε Δήλῳ, Φοῖβε, μάλιστά γε θυμὸν ἐτέρφθης,ἔνθα τοι ἑλκεχίτωνες Ἰάονες ἠγερέθονταισὺν

σφοῖσιν τεκέεσσι γυναιξί τε σὴν ἐς ἀγυιάν:ἔνθα σε πυγμαχίῃ τε καὶ ὀρχηστυῖ καὶ ἀοιδῇμνησάμενοι τέρπουσιν, ὅταν καθέσωσιν ἀγῶνα.” [5] ὅτι δὲ καὶ μουσικῆς ἀγὼν ἦν καὶ ἀγωνιούμενοι ἐφοίτων ἐν τοῖσδε αὖ δηλοῖ, ἅ ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προοιμίου: τὸν γὰρ Δηλιακὸν χορὸν τῶν γυναικῶν ὑμνήσας ἐτελεύτα τοῦ ἐπαίνου ἐς τάδε τὰ ἔπη, ἐν οἷς καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπεμνήσθη: “ἀλλ᾽ ἄγεθ᾽, ἱλήκοι μὲν Ἀπόλλων Ἀρτέμιδι ξύν,χαίρετε δ᾽ ὑμεῖς πᾶσαι. ἐμεῖο δὲ καὶ μετόπισθεμνήσασθ᾽, ὁππότε κέν τις ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπωνἐνθάδ᾽ ἀνείρηται ταλαπείριος ἄλλος ἐπελθών:’ὦ κοῦραι, τίς δ᾽ ὔμμιν ἀνὴρ ἥδιστος ἀοιδῶνἐνθάδε πωλεῖται, καὶ τέῳ τέρπεσθε μάλιστα;’ὑμεῖς δ᾽ εὖ μάλα πᾶσαι ὑποκρίνασθαι ἀφήμως:’τυφλὸς ἀνήρ, οἰκεῖ δὲ Χίῳ ἔνι παιπαλοέσσῃ.’” [6] τοσαῦτα μὲν Ὅμηρος ἐτεκμηρίωσεν ὅτι ἦν καὶ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλη ξύνοδος καὶ ἑορτὴ ἐν τῇ Δήλῳ: ὕστερον δὲ τοὺς μὲν χοροὺς οἱ νησιῶται καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μεθ᾽ ἱερῶν ἔπεμπον, τὰ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατελύθη ὑπὸ ξυμφορῶν, ὡς εἰκός, πρὶν δὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τότε τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐποίησαν καὶ ἱπποδρομίας, ὃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν.

[104] In the same winter the Athenians, by command of an oracle, purified the island of Delos. Pisistratus the tyrant had already purified it, but imperfectly, for the purification only extended to that part which was within sight of the temple. The whole island was now purified in the following manner: — The Athenians took away all the coffins of the dead which were in Delos, and passed a decree that henceforward no one should die or give birth to a child there, but that the inhabitants when they were near the time of either should be carried across to Rhenea. Now Rhenea is near to Delos, so near indeed that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who for a time had a powerful navy, attached this island, which he conquered with the rest of the islands and dedicated to the Delian Apollo, by a chain to Delos. After the purification, the Athenians for the first time celebrated the Delian games, which were held every four years. There had been in ancient days a great gathering of the Ionians and the neighbouring

islanders at Delos; whither they brought their wives and children to be present at the Delian games, as the Ionians now frequent the games at Ephesus. Musical and gymnastic contests were held there, and the cities celebrated choral dances. The character of the festival is attested by Homer in the following verses, which are taken from the hymn to Apollo:'At other times, Phoebus, Delos is dearest to thy heart,Where are gathered together the Ionians in flowing robes,With their wives and children in thy street:There do they delight thee with boxing and dancing and song,Making mention of thy name when they gather at the assembly.'And that there were musical contests which attracted competitors is implied in the following words of the same hymn. After commemorating the Delian dance of women, Homer ends their praises with these lines, in which he alludes to himself:'And now may Apollo and Artemis be gracious,And to all of you, maidens, I say farewell. Yet remember me when I am gone; And if some other toiling pilgrim among the sons of menComes and asks: O maidens,Who is the sweetest minstrel of all who wander hither,And in whom do you delight most?Make answer with one voice, in gentle words,The blind old man of Chios' rocky isle.'Thus far Homer, who clearly indicates that even in days of old there was a great gathering and festival at Delos. In after ages the islanders and the Athenians led choruses in procession, and sacrificed. But the games and the greater part of the ceremonies naturally fell into disuse, owing to the misfortunes of Ionia. The Athenians now restored the games and for the first time introduced horse-races.

105. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Ἀμπρακιῶται, ὥσπερ ὑποσχόμενοι Εὐρυλόχῳ τὴν στρατιὰν κατέσχον, ἐκστρατεύονται ἐπὶ Ἄργος τὸ Ἀμφιλοχικὸν τρισχιλίοις ὁπλίταις, καὶ ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν καταλαμβάνουσιν Ὄλπας, τεῖχος ἐπὶ λόφου ἰσχυρὸν πρὸς τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὅ ποτε Ἀκαρνᾶνες τειχισάμενοι κοινῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἐχρῶντο: ἀπέχει δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀργείων πόλεως ἐπιθαλασσίας οὔσης πέντε καὶ

εἴκοσι σταδίους μάλιστα. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνες οἱ μὲν ἐς Ἄργος ξυνεβοήθουν, οἱ δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιλοχίας ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χωρίῳ ὃ Κρῆναι καλεῖται, φυλάσσοντες τοὺς μετὰ Εὐρυλόχου Πελοποννησίους μὴ λάθωσι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀμπρακιώτας διελθόντες, ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. [3] πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ Δημοσθένη τὸν ἐς τὴν Αἰτωλίαν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγήσαντα, ὅπως σφίσιν ἡγεμὼν γίγνηται, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς εἴκοσι ναῦς Ἀθηναίων αἳ ἔτυχον περὶ Πελοπόννησον οὖσαι, ὧν ἦρχεν Ἀριστοτέλης τε ὁ Τιμοκράτους καὶ Ἱεροφῶν ὁ Ἀντιμνήστου. [4] ἀπέστειλαν δὲ καὶ ἄγγελον οἱ περὶ τὰς Ὄλπας Ἀμπρακιῶται ἐς τὴν πόλιν κελεύοντες σφίσι βοηθεῖν πανδημεί, δεδιότες μὴ οἱ μετ᾽ Εὐρυλόχου οὐ δύνωνται διελθεῖν τοὺς Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ σφίσιν ἢ μονωθεῖσιν ἡ μάχη γένηται ἢ ἀναχωρεῖν βουλομένοις οὐκ ᾖ ἀσφαλές.

[105] During the same winter the Ambraciots, in fulfilment of the promise by which they had induced Eurylochus and his army to remain, made an expedition against the Amphilochian Argos with three thousand hoplites. They invaded the Argive territory and seized Olpae, a strong fort on a hill by the sea-side, which in former days the Acarnanians had fortified and used as a common hall of justice. The place is about three miles from Argos, which is also on the sea-shore. One division of the Acarnanians came to the aid of Argos, while another encamped at a spot called the Wells, where they could lie in wait for Eurylochus and the Peloponnesians, and prevent them from joining the Ambraciots unobserved. They also despatched a messenger to Demosthenes, who had led the Athenian expedition into Aetolia, asking him to be their commander, and sent for twenty Athenian ships which were just then cruising about the Peloponnese under the command of Aristoteles the son of Timocrates, and Hierophon the son of Antimnestus. The Ambraciots sent a messenger from Olpae to their own citizens, bidding them come and help them with their entire force; for they were afraid that Eurylochus and his followers might not be able to make their way through the

Acarnanians, and then they would have either to fight alone, or to attempt a hazardous retreat.

106. οἱ μὲν οὖν μετ᾽ Εὐρυλόχου Πελοποννήσιοι ὡς ᾔσθοντο τοὺς ἐν Ὄλπαις Ἀμπρακιώτας ἥκοντας, ἄραντες ἐκ τοῦ Προσχίου ἐβοήθουν κατὰ τάχος, καὶ διαβάντες τὸν Ἀχελῷον ἐχώρουν δι᾽ Ἀκαρνανίας οὔσης ἐρήμου διὰ τὴν ἐς Ἄργος βοήθειαν, ἐν δεξιᾷ μὲν ἔχοντες τὴν Στρατίων πόλιν καὶ τὴν φρουρὰν αὐτῶν, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δὲ τὴν ἄλλην Ἀκαρνανίαν. [2] καὶ διελθόντες τὴν Στρατίων γῆν ἐχώρουν διὰ τῆς Φυτίας καὶ αὖθις Μεδεῶνος παρ᾽ ἔσχατα, ἔπειτα διὰ Λιμναίας: καὶ ἐπέβησαν τῆς Ἀγραίων, οὐκέτι Ἀκαρνανίας, φιλίας δὲ σφίσιν. [3] λαβόμενοι δὲ τοῦ Θυάμου ὄρους, ὅ ἐστιν Ἀγραϊκόν, ἐχώρουν δι᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατέβησαν ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν νυκτὸς ἤδη, καὶ διεξελθόντες μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ἀργείων πόλεως καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ Κρήναις Ἀκαρνάνων φυλακῆς ἔλαθον καὶ προσέμειξαν τοῖς ἐν Ὄλπαις Ἀμπρακιώταις.

[106] Eurylochus and the Peloponnesians, when they heard that the Ambraciots had arrived at Olpae, left Proschium and went with all speed to help, them. Passing over the river Achelous they marched through Acarnania, leaving the city and garrison of Stratus on the right hand, and the rest of Acarnania on their left. The land was deserted, for the inhabitants had gone to the assistance of Argos. Crossing the territory of Stratus they proceeded through Phytia and by the extreme border of Medeon, and so through Limnaea; at last they left Acarnania, and reached the friendly territory of the Agraeans. Then taking to Mount Thyamus, which is open country, they marched on and descended into the plain of Argos after dark. Making their way unobserved between the city of Argos and the Acarnanian force stationed at the Wells, they at length reached the Ambraciots at Olpae.

107. γενόμενοι δὲ ἀθρόοι ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καθίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν Μητρόπολιν καλουμένην καὶ στρατόπεδον ἐποιήσαντο. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσὶν οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον παραγίγνονται ἐς τὸν Ἀμπρακικὸν κόλπον βοηθοῦντες τοῖς

Ἀργείοις, καὶ Δημοσθένης Μεσσηνίων μὲν ἔχων διακοσίους ὁπλίτας, ἑξήκοντα δὲ τοξότας Ἀθηναίων. [2] καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆες περὶ τὰς Ὄλπας τὸν λόφον ἐκ θαλάσσης ἐφώρμουν: οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνες καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων ὀλίγοι οἱ γὰρ πλείους ὑπὸ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν βίᾳ κατείχοντο ἐς τὸ Ἄργος ἤδη ξυνεληλυθότες παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς μαχούμενοι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ παντὸς ξυμμαχικοῦ αἱροῦνται Δημοσθένη μετὰ τῶν σφετέρων στρατηγῶν. [3] ὁ δὲ προσαγαγὼν ἐγγὺς τῆς Ὄλπης ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο, χαράδρα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς μεγάλη διεῖργεν. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν πέντε ἡσύχαζον, τῇ δ᾽ ἕκτῃ ἐτάσσοντο ἀμφότεροι ὡς ἐς μάχην. καὶ μεῖζον γὰρ ἐγένετο καὶ περιέσχε τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων στρατόπεδον ὁ Δημοσθένης δείσας μὴ κυκλωθῇ λοχίζει ἐς ὁδόν τινα κοίλην καὶ λοχμώδη ὁπλίτας καὶ ψιλοὺς ξυναμφοτέρους ἐς τετρακοσίους, ὅπως κατὰ τὸ ὑπερέχον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐν τῇ ξυνόδῳ αὐτῇ ἐξαναστάντες οὗτοι κατὰ νώτου γίγνωνται. [4] ἐπεὶ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο ἀμφοτέροις, ἦσαν ἐς χεῖρας, Δημοσθένης μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχων μετὰ Μεσσηνίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὀλίγων, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο Ἀκαρνᾶνες ὡς ἕκαστοι τεταγμένοι ἐπεῖχον, καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων οἱ παρόντες ἀκοντισταί, Πελοποννήσιοι δὲ καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται ἀναμὶξ τεταγμένοι πλὴν Μαντινέων: οὗτοι δὲ ἐν τῷ εὐωνύμῳ μᾶλλον καὶ οὐ τὸ κέρας ἄκρον ἔχοντες ἀθρόοι ἦσαν, ἀλλ᾽ Εὐρύλοχος ἔσχατον εἶχε τὸ εὐώνυμον καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, κατὰ Μεσσηνίους καὶ Δημοσθένη.

[107] The two armies having effected this junction moved at break of day to a place called Metropolis, and there encamped. Soon afterwards the Argives received the expected reinforcement of twenty Athenian ships, which arrived in the Ambracian Gulf. With them came Demosthenes, who brought two hundred Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian archers. The ships anchored about the hill of Olpae, while the Acarnanians and a few of the Amphilochians (the greater part of them were prevented from stirring by the Ambraciots), having mustered at Argos, were now preparing to give battle. They associated

Demosthenes with their own generals in the command of the allied forces. He led them to the neighbourhood of Olpae, and there encamped at a place where they were divided from the enemy by a great ravine. During five days they remained inactive; on the sixth day both armies drew up in battle array. Demosthenes, fearing that he would be surrounded by the Peloponnesians who were more numerous and extended beyond his own line, placed hoplites and light-armed troops, numbering altogether four hundred, in a deep lane overgrown with brushwood, intending them to lie in wait until the moment of conflict, when they were to rush out from the rear on the line of the enemy where it overlapped. The preparations of both armies were now complete and they engaged. Demosthenes led his own right wing, on which were the Messenians and a few Athenians, while the other was held by the Acarnanians, who were disposed according to their cities, and by the Amphilochian javelin-men who were in the battle. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were intermingled, with the exception of the Mantineans, who were all collected on the left wing; but the extremity of the wing was occupied by Eurylochus and his division, who were opposed to the Messenians under Demosthenes.

108. ὡς δ᾽ ἐν χερσὶν ἤδη ὄντες περιέσχον τῷ κέρᾳ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ἐκυκλοῦντο τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν ἐναντίων, οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας Ἀκαρνᾶνες ἐπιγενόμενοι αὐτοῖς κατὰ νώτου προσπίπτουσί τε καὶ τρέπουσιν, ὥστε μήτε ἐς ἀλκὴν ὑπομεῖναι φοβηθέντας τε ἐς φυγὴν καὶ τὸ πλέον τοῦ στρατεύματος καταστῆσαι: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἶδον τὸ κατ᾽ Εὐρύλοχον καὶ ὃ κράτιστον ἦν διαφθειρόμενον, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐφοβοῦντο. καὶ οἱ Μεσσήνιοι ὄντες ταύτῃ μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους τὸ πολὺ τοῦ ἔργου ἐπεξῆλθον. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀμπρακιῶται καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἐνίκων τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὸ Ἄργος ἀπεδίωξαν: καὶ γὰρ μαχιμώτατοι τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνα τὰ χωρία τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες. [3] ἐπαναχωροῦντες δὲ ὡς ἑώρων τὸ πλέον νενικημένον καὶ

οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀκαρνᾶνες σφίσι προσέκειντο, χαλεπῶς διεσῴζοντο ἐς τὰς Ὄλπας, καὶ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν, ἀτάκτως καὶ οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ προσπίπτοντες πλὴν Μαντινέων: οὗτοι δὲ μάλιστα ξυντεταγμένοι παντὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀνεχώρησαν. καὶ ἡ μὲν μάχη ἐτελεύτα ἐς ὀψέ.

[108] When the two armies were at close quarters, the left wing of the Peloponnesians out-flanked the right wing of their opponents and threatened to surround them; whereupon the Acarnanians, coming upon them from behind out of the ambuscade, charged and turned them. They fled without striking a blow, and their panic caused the greater part of the army to run with them. For, when they saw Eurylochus and their best troops routed, they lost whatever courage they had. The Messenians, who were in this part of the field under the command of Demosthenes, were foremost in the action. The right wing of the enemy, however, and the Ambraciots, who are the most warlike nation in those parts, vanquished their opponents and drove them back to Argos. But, returning, they saw the greater part of the army defeated, and were hard pressed by the victorious division of the Acarnanians, whereupon, escaping with difficulty, they made their way to Olpae. Numbers of the defeated were killed, for they dashed into the fort wildly and in confusion, except the Mantineans, who kept together and retreated in better order than any other part of the army. The battle, which had lasted until evening, now ended.

109. Μενεδάϊος δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ Εὐρυλόχου τεθνεῶτος καὶ Μακαρίου αὐτὸς παρειληφὼς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἀπορῶν μεγάλης ἥσσης γεγενημένης ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἢ μένων πολιορκήσεται ἔκ τε γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ταῖς Ἀττικαῖς ναυσὶν ἀποκεκλῃμένος ἢ καὶ ἀναχωρῶν διασωθήσεται, προσφέρει λόγον περὶ σπονδῶν καὶ ἀναχωρήσεως Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς Ἀκαρνάνων στρατηγοῖς, καὶ περὶ νεκρῶν ἅμα ἀναιρέσεως. [2] οἱ δὲ νεκροὺς μὲν ἀπέδοσαν καὶ τροπαῖον αὐτοὶ ἔστησαν καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν τριακοσίους

μάλιστα ἀποθανόντας ἀνείλοντο, ἀναχώρησιν δὲ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ προφανοῦς οὐκ ἐσπείσαντο ἅπασι, κρύφα δὲ Δημοσθένης μετὰ τῶν ξυστρατήγων Ἀκαρνάνων σπένδονται Μαντινεῦσι καὶ Μενεδαΐῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρχουσι τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ ὅσοι αὐτῶν ἦσαν ἀξιολογώτατοι ἀποχωρεῖν κατὰ τάχος, βουλόμενος ψιλῶσαι τοὺς Ἀμπρακιώτας τε καὶ τὸν μισθοφόρον ὄχλον [τὸν ξενικόν], μάλιστα δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Πελοποννησίους διαβαλεῖν ἐς τοὺς ἐκείνῃ χρῄζων Ἕλληνας ὡς καταπροδόντες τὸ ἑαυτῶν προυργιαίτερον ἐποιήσαντο. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν τούς τε νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο καὶ διὰ τάχους ἔθαπτον, ὥσπερ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν κρύφα οἷς ἐδέδοτο ἐπεβούλευον:

[109] On the next day Menedaeus took the command, for Eurylochus and Macarius, the two other generals, had been slain. He knew not what to do after so serious a defeat. He could not hope, if he remained, to stand a siege, hemmed in as he was by land, and at sea blockaded by the Athenian ships; neither could he safely retire; so entering into a parley with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian generals about the burial of the dead, he tried to negotiate with them at the same time for a retreat. The Athenians gave back to the enemy their dead, erected a trophy, and took up their own dead, in number about three hundred. They would not openly agree to the proposal for a general retreat, but Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues made a secret treaty with the Mantineans, and Menedaeus, and the other Peloponnesian generals and chief persons, allowing their army to depart. He wanted partly to isolate the Ambraciots and their foreign mercenary troops, but much more to take away the character of the Lacedaemonians and Peloponnesians among the Hellenes in those parts and convict them of selfishness and treachery. Accordingly the Peloponnesians took up their dead, and burying them quickly as well as they could, consulted secretly how those who had permission could best depart.

110. τῷ δὲ Δημοσθένει καὶ τοῖς Ἀκαρνᾶσιν ἀγγέλλεται τοὺς Ἀμπρακιώτας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πανδημεὶ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐκ τῶν Ὀλπῶν ἀγγελίαν ἐπιβοηθεῖν διὰ τῶν Ἀμφιλόχων, βουλομένους τοῖς ἐν Ὄλπαις ξυμμεῖξαι, εἰδότας οὐδὲν τῶν γεγενημένων. [2] καὶ πέμπει εὐθὺς τοῦ στρατοῦ μέρος τι τὰς ὁδοὺς προλοχιοῦντας καὶ τὰ καρτερὰ προκαταληψομένους, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ ἅμα παρεσκευάζετο βοηθεῖν ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς.

[110] Meanwhile news was brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the whole remaining force of the Ambraciots, who some time previously had been summoned from the city to join the troops in Olpae, were now on their way through the territory of the Amphilochians and were in entire ignorance of what had occurred. Whereupon he at once sent forward a part of his army to lie in ambush in the roads and to occupy the strong places, himself at the same time preparing to support them with the rest of his forces.

111. ἐν τούτῳ δ᾽ οἱ Μαντινῆς καὶ οἷς ἔσπειστο πρόφασιν ἐπὶ λαχανισμὸν καὶ φρυγάνων ξυλλογὴν ἐξελθόντες ὑπαπῇσαν κατ᾽ ὀλίγους, ἅμα ξυλλέγοντες ἐφ᾽ ἃ ἐξῆλθον δῆθεν: προκεχωρηκότες δὲ ἤδη ἄπωθεν τῆς Ὄλπης θᾶσσον ἀπεχώρουν. [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀμπρακιῶται καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι † μὲν ἐτύγχανον οὕτως † ἀθρόοι ξυνεξελθόντες, ὡς ἔγνωσαν ἀπιόντας, ὥρμησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἔθεον δρόμῳ, ἐπικαταλαβεῖν βουλόμενοι. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον καὶ πάντας ἐνόμισαν ἀπιέναι ἀσπόνδους ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ἐπεδίωκον, καί τινας αὐτῶν τῶν στρατηγῶν κωλύοντας καὶ φάσκοντας ἐσπεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς ἠκόντισέ τις, νομίσας καταπροδίδοσθαι σφᾶς: ἔπειτα μέντοι τοὺς μὲν Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ἀφίεσαν, τοὺς δ᾽ Ἀμπρακιώτας ἔκτεινον. [4] καὶ ἦν πολλὴ ἔρις καὶ ἄγνοια εἴτε Ἀμπρακιώτης τίς ἐστιν εἴτε Πελοποννήσιος. καὶ ἐς διακοσίους μέν τινας αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι διέφυγον ἐς τὴν Ἀγραΐδα ὄμορον οὖσαν, καὶ Σαλύνθιος αὐτοὺς ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἀγραίων φίλος ὢν ὑπεδέξατο.

[111] In the meantime the Mantineans and the others who were included in the truce went out on pretence of gathering herbs and sticks, and stole away one by one, picking up as they went along what they pretended to be looking for. But, as they got farther away from Olpae, they quickened their steps, and then the Ambraciots and others who happened to collect on the instant, when they saw that they were leaving, ran after them at full speed, wanting to get up with them. The Acarnanians at first thought that none of those who were going away were protected by a truce, and pursued the Peloponnesians. Some of the generals tried to keep them back and explained how matters stood; whereupon a soldier, suspecting that there was treachery, hurled a javelin at them. At length the soldiers understood, and let the Mantineans and other Peloponnesians go, but began to kill the Ambraciots. There was great dispute and uncertainty as to who was an Ambraciot and who a Peloponnesian. Of the former they killed about two hundred; the Peloponnesians escaped into the neighbouring country of Agraea, and were received by king Salynthius who was their friend.

112. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Ἀμπρακιῶται ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπ᾽ Ἰδομενήν. ἐστὸν δὲ δύο λόφω ἡ Ἰδομενὴ ὑψηλώ: τούτοιν τὸν μὲν μείζω νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης οἱ προαποσταλέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἔλαθόν τε καὶ ἔφθασαν προκαταλαβόντες τὸν δ᾽ ἐλάσσω ἔτυχον οἱ Ἀμπρακιῶται προαναβάντες καὶ ηὐλίσαντο. [2] ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης δειπνήσας ἐχώρει καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα ἀπὸ ἑσπέρας εὐθύς, αὐτὸς μὲν τὸ ἥμισυ ἔχων ἐπὶ τῆς ἐσβολῆς, τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο διὰ τῶν Ἀμφιλοχικῶν ὀρῶν. [3] καὶ ἅμα ὄρθρῳ ἐπιπίπτει τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ἔτι ἐν ταῖς εὐναῖς καὶ οὐ προῃσθημένοις τὰ γεγενημένα, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον νομίσασι τοὺς ἑαυτῶν εἶναι: [4] καὶ γὰρ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους πρώτους ἐπίτηδες ὁ Δημοσθένης προύταξε καὶ προσαγορεύειν ἐκέλευε, Δωρίδα τε γλῶσσαν ἱέντας καὶ τοῖς προφύλαξι πίστιν παρεχομένους, ἅμα δὲ καὶ οὐ καθορωμένους τῇ ὄψει

νυκτὸς ἔτι οὔσης. [5] ὡς οὖν ἐπέπεσε τῷ στρατεύματι αὐτῶν, τρέπουσι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς αὐτοῦ διέφθειραν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ κατὰ τὰ ὄρη ἐς φυγὴν ὥρμησαν. [6] προκατειλημμένων δὲ τῶν ὁδῶν, καὶ ἅμα τῶν μὲν Ἀμφιλόχων ἐμπείρων ὄντων τῆς ἑαυτῶν γῆς καὶ ψιλῶν πρὸς ὁπλίτας, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων καὶ ἀνεπιστημόνων ὅπῃ τράπωνται, ἐσπίπτοντες ἔς τε χαράδρας καὶ τὰς προλελοχισμένας ἐνέδρας διεφθείροντο. [7] καὶ ἐς πᾶσαν ἰδέαν χωρήσαντες τῆς φυγῆς ἐτράποντό τινες καὶ ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχουσαν, καὶ ὡς εἶδον τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναῦς παραπλεούσας ἅμα τοῦ ἔργου τῇ ξυντυχίᾳ, προσένευσαν, ἡγησάμενοι ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα φόβῳ κρεῖσσον εἶναι σφίσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν, εἰ δεῖ, διαφθαρῆναι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ ἐχθίστων Ἀμφιλόχων. [8] οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀμπρακιῶται τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ κακωθέντες ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐσώθησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν: Ἀκαρνᾶνες δὲ σκυλεύσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τροπαῖα στήσαντες ἀπεχώρησαν ἐς Ἄργος.

[112] Meanwhile the reinforcement from the city of Ambracia had reached Idomenè, which is the name of two lofty peaks. The higher of the two had been already occupied unobserved at nightfall by the troops which Demosthenes had sent forward; of the lower the Ambraciots first obtained possession and encamped there. As soon as it was dark, after supper, Demosthenes advanced with the rest of his army, himself leading half of them towards the pass between the mountains, while the rest made their way through the Amphilochian hills. At the first dawn of day he fell upon the Ambraciots, who were still half-asleep, and so far from knowing anything of what had happened that they imagined his troops to be their own comrades. For Demosthenes had taken care to place the Messenians in the first rank and desired them to speak to the enemy in their own Doric dialect, thereby putting the sentinels off their guard; and as it was still dark, their appearance could not be distinguished. So they fell upon the Ambraciots and routed them. Most of them were slain on the spot; the remainder

fled over the mountains. But the paths were beset; the Amphilochians were lightly-armed, and in their own country which they knew, while their enemies were heavy-armed and the country was strange to them. And so, not knowing which way to turn, they fell into ravines and into ambuscades which had been set for them, and perished. Every means of escape was tried. Some even fled to the sea which was not far distant, and seeing the Athenian ships which were sailing by while the action was taking place, swam out to them, thinking in the terror of the moment that they had better be killed, if die they must, by the Athenians in the ships than by their barbarous and detested enemies the Amphilochians. So the Ambraciots were cut to pieces, and but few out of many returned home to their city. The Acarnanians, having despoiled the dead and raised trophies, returned to Argos.

113. καὶ αὐτοῖς τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦλθε κῆρυξ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐς Ἀγραίους καταφυγόντων ἐκ τῆς Ὄλπης Ἀμπρακιωτῶν, ἀναίρεσιν αἰτήσων τῶν νεκρῶν οὓς ἀπέκτειναν ὕστερον τῆς πρώτης μάχης, ὅτε μετὰ τῶν Μαντινέων καὶ τῶν ὑποσπόνδων ξυνεξῆσαν ἄσπονδοι. [2] ἰδὼν δ᾽ ὁ κῆρυξ τὰ ὅπλα τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ἐθαύμαζε τὸ πλῆθος: οὐ γὰρ ᾔδει τὸ πάθος, ἀλλ᾽ ὥετο τῶν μετὰ σφῶν εἶναι. [3] καί τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο ὅτι θαυμάζοι καὶ ὁπόσοι αὐτῶν τεθνᾶσιν, οἰόμενος αὖ ὁ ἐρωτῶν εἶναι τὸν κήρυκα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰδομεναῖς. ὁ δ᾽ ἔφη διακοσίους μάλιστα. ὑπολαβὼν δ᾽ ὁ ἐρωτῶν εἶπεν ‘οὔκουν τὰ ὅπλα ταυτὶ φαίνεται, [4] ἀλλὰ πλέον ἢ χιλίων.’ αὖθις δὲ εἶπεν ἐκεῖνος ‘οὐκ ἄρα τῶν μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν μαχομένων ἐστίν.’ ὁ δ᾽ ἀπεκρίνατο ‘εἴπερ γε ὑμεῖς ἐν Ἰδομενῇ χθὲς ἐμάχεσθε.’ ‘ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς γε οὐδενὶ ἐμαχόμεθα χθές, ἀλλὰ πρῴην ἐν τῇ ἀποχωρήσει.’ ‘καὶ μὲν δὴ τούτοις γε ἡμεῖς χθὲς ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως βοηθήσασι τῆς Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ἐμαχόμεθα.’ [5] ὁ δὲ κῆρυξ ὡς ἤκουσε καὶ ἔγνω ὅτι ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως βοήθεια διέφθαρται, ἀνοιμώξας καὶ ἐκπλαγεὶς τῷ μεγέθει τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπῆλθεν εὐθὺς ἄπρακτος καὶ οὐκέτι ἀπήτει τοὺς νεκρούς. [6] πάθος γὰρ

τοῦτο μιᾷ πόλει Ἑλληνίδι ἐν ἴσαις ἡμέραις μέγιστον δὴ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε ἐγένετο. καὶ ἀριθμὸν οὐκ ἔγραψα τῶν ἀποθανόντων, διότι ἄπιστον τὸ πλῆθος λέγεται ἀπολέσθαι ὡς πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως. Ἀμπρακίαν μέντοι οἶδα ὅτι, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν Ἀκαρνᾶνες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Δημοσθένει πειθόμενοι ἐξελεῖν, αὐτοβοεὶ ἂν εἷλον: νῦν δ᾽ ἔδεισαν μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔχοντες αὐτὴν χαλεπώτεροι σφίσι πάροικοι ὦσιν.

[113] On the following day there arrived a herald from the Ambraciots who had escaped out of Olpae to the Agraeans. He came to recover the bodies of the dead who had been slain subsequently to the first engagement, when, unprotected by the treaty, they tried to get out of Olpae in company with the Mantineans and others protected by it. The herald saw the arms of the Ambraciot troops from the city and wondered at the number of them; he knew nothing of the later disaster, and he imagined that they belonged to his own division of the army. Some one present thought that the herald had come from the army defeated at Idomenè, and asked why he looked so astonished, and how many of their men had fallen; he replied, ‘about two hundred’; whereupon the other rejoined, ‘These which you see are not the arms of two hundred men, but of more than a thousand.’ The herald replied, ‘Then they cannot be the arms of our men.’ The other answered, ‘They must be, if you were fighting yesterday at Idomenè’ ‘But yesterday we did not fight at all; it was the day before, in the retreat.’ ‘All I know is that we fought yesterday with these men, who were marching to your aid from Ambracia.’ When the herald heard these words, and knew that the army coming from the city had perished, he uttered a cry of anguish, and, overwhelmed by the greatness of the blow, went away at once without doing his errand, no longer caring to demand the dead. And indeed in the whole war no such calamity happened within so few days to any Hellenic state. I have not ventured to set down the number of those who fell, for the loss would

appear incredible when compared with the size of the city. Of this I am certain, that if the Acarnanians had been willing to destroy Ambracia as Demosthenes and the Athenians desired, they might have taken it at the first onset. But they were afraid that the Athenians, if they once got possession of the place, would be more troublesome neighbours than the Ambraciots.

114. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τρίτον μέρος νείμαντες τῶν σκύλων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὰς πόλεις διείλοντο. καὶ τὰ μὲν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πλέοντα ἑάλω, τὰ δὲ νῦν ἀνακείμενα ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ἱεροῖς Δημοσθένει ἐξῃρέθησαν τριακόσιαι πανοπλίαι, καὶ ἄγων αὐτὰς κατέπλευσεν: καὶ ἐγένετο ἅμα αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Αἰτωλίας ξυμφορὰν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πράξεως ἀδεεστέρα ἡ κάθοδος. [2] ἀπῆλθον δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσὶν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς Ναύπακτον. Ἀκαρνᾶνες δὲ καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δημοσθένους τοῖς ὡς Σαλύνθιον καὶ Ἀγραίους καταφυγοῦσιν Ἀμπρακιώταις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἀναχώρησιν ἐσπείσαντο ἐξ Οἰνιαδῶν, οἵπερ καὶ μετανέστησαν παρὰ Σαλυνθίου. [3] καὶ ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο ἑκατὸν ἔτη Ἀκαρνᾶνες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι πρὸς Ἀμπρακιώτας ἐπὶ τοῖσδε, ὥστε μήτε Ἀμπρακιώτας μετὰ Ἀκαρνάνων στρατεύειν ἐπὶ Πελοποννησίους μήτε Ἀκαρνᾶνας μετὰ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίους, βοηθεῖν δὲ τῇ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἀποδοῦναι Ἀμπρακιώτας ὁπόσα ἢ χωρία ἢ ὁμήρους Ἀμφιλόχων ἔχουσι, καὶ ἐπὶ Ἀνακτόριον μὴ βοηθεῖν πολέμιον ὂν Ἀκαρνᾶσιν. [4] ταῦτα ξυνθέμενοι διέλυσαν τὸν πόλεμον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Κορίνθιοι φυλακὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐς τὴν Ἀμπρακίαν ἀπέστειλαν ἐς τριακοσίους ὁπλίτας καὶ Ξενοκλείδαν τὸν Εὐθυκλέους ἄρχοντα: οἳ κομιζόμενοι χαλεπῶς διὰ τῆς ἠπείρου ἀφίκοντο. τὰ μὲν κατ᾽ Ἀμπρακίαν οὕτως ἐγένετο.

[114] After assigning a third part of the spoils to the Athenians, the Acarnanians divided the remainder among their cities. The spoils of the Athenians were captured on the voyage. But three hundred panoplies which were allotted to Demosthenes he brought home with him, and they are still

preserved in the Athenian temples. This good service of his enabled him to return to Athens with less apprehension after his misfortune in Aetolia. The twenty Athenian ships sailed away to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, after the Athenians and Demosthenes had left them, granted a truce to the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had fled to Salynthius and the Agraeans; they were thus enabled to return home from Oeniadae, whither they had removed from the country of Salynthius. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians now made a treaty of alliance for one hundred years with the Ambraciots, of which the terms were as follows:— 'The Ambraciots shall not be required to join the Acarnanians in making war on the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians to join the Ambraciots in making war on the Athenians. But they shall aid in the defence of one another's territory. The Ambraciots shall give up such places or hostages of the Amphilochians as they possess, and they shall not assist Anactorium' (which was hostile to the Acarnanians). Upon these terms they put an end to the war. Soon afterwards the Corinthians sent a force of their own, consisting of three hundred hoplites under the command of Xenocleidas the son of Euthycles, to guard Ambracia, whither they made their way with some difficulty by land. Such was the end of the Ambracian war.

115. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος ἔς τε τὴν Ἱμεραίαν ἀπόβασιν ἐποιήσαντο ἐκ τῶν νεῶν μετὰ τῶν Σικελῶν τῶν ἄνωθεν ἐσβεβληκότων ἐς τὰ ἔσχατα τῆς Ἱμεραίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰόλου νήσους ἔπλευσαν. [2] ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἐς Ῥήγιον Πυθόδωρον τὸν Ἰσολόχου Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸν καταλαμβάνουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς διάδοχον ὧν ὁ Λάχης ἦρχεν. [3] οἱ γὰρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ξύμμαχοι πλεύσαντες ἔπεισαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βοηθεῖν σφίσι πλείοσι ναυσίν: τῆς μὲν γὰρ γῆς αὐτῶν οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐκράτουν, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης ὀλίγαις ναυσὶν εἰργόμενοι παρεσκευάζοντο ναυτικὸν ξυναγείροντες ὡς οὐ περιοψόμενοι. [4] καὶ ἐπλήρουν ναῦς τεσσαράκοντα οἱ

Ἀθηναῖοι ὡς ἀποστελοῦντες αὐτοῖς, ἅμα μὲν ἡγούμενοι θᾶσσον τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον καταλυθήσεσθαι, ἅμα δὲ βουλόμενοι μελέτην τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ποιεῖσθαι. [5] τὸν μὲν οὖν ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπέστειλαν Πυθόδωρον ὀλίγαις ναυσί, Σοφοκλέα δὲ τὸν Σωστρατίδου καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους ἐπὶ τῶν πλειόνων νεῶν ἀποπέμψειν ἔμελλον. [6] ὁ δὲ Πυθόδωρος ἤδη ἔχων τὴν τοῦ Λάχητος τῶν νεῶν ἀρχὴν ἔπλευσε τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐπὶ τὸ Λοκρῶν φρούριον ὃ πρότερον Λάχης εἶλε, καὶ νικηθεὶς μάχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν Λοκρῶν ἀπεχώρησεν.

[115] During the same winter the Athenian fleet in Sicily, sailing to Himera, made a descent upon the country in concert with the Sicels, who had invaded the extreme border of the Himeraeans from the interior; they also attacked the Aeolian Isles. Returning to Rhegium, they found that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, one of the Athenian generals, had superseded Laches in the command of the fleet. The allies of the Athenians in Sicily had sailed to Athens, and persuaded the Athenians to send a larger fleet to their aid; for their territory was in the power of the Syracusans, and they were kept off the sea by a few ships only; so they were preparing to resist, and had begun to collect a navy. The Athenians manned forty ships for their relief, partly hoping to finish the war in Sicily the sooner, partly because they wanted to exercise their fleet. They despatched one of the commanders, Pythodorus, with a few ships, intending to send Sophocles the son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, with the larger division of the fleet afterwards. Pythodorus, having now succeeded Laches in the command, sailed at the end of the winter against the Locrian fort which Laches had previously taken,* but he was defeated by the Locrians and retired.

116. ἐρρύη δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔαρ τοῦτο ὁ ῥύαξ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τῆς Αἴτνης, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, καὶ γῆν τινὰ ἔφθειρε τῶν Καταναίων, οἳ ὑπὸ τῇ Αἴτνῃ τῷ ὄρει οἰκοῦσιν, ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ὄρος ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ. [2] λέγεται δὲ

πεντηκοστῷ ἔτει ῥυῆναι τοῦτο μετὰ τὸ πρότερον ῥεῦμα, τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν τρὶς γεγενῆσθαι τὸ ῥεῦμα ἀφ᾽ οὗ Σικελία ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων οἰκεῖται. [3] ταῦτα μὲν κατὰ τὸν χειμῶνα τοῦτον ἐγένετο, καὶ ἕκτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[116] In the early spring the burning lava, not for the first time, issued from Mount Aetna, which is the highest mountain in Sicily, and devastated a portion of the territory of the Catanaeans who dwell on the skirts of Aetna. The last eruption is said to have taken place fifty years before; and altogether three eruptions are recorded since the Hellenes first settled in Sicily. Such were the events of the winter; and so ended the sixth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

Βιβλίο Δ’ — BOOK IV

1. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους περὶ σίτου ἐκβολὴν Συρακοσίων δέκα νῆες πλεύσασαι καὶ Λοκρίδες ἴσαι Μεσσήνην τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ κατέλαβον, αὐτῶν ἐπαγαγομένων, καὶ ἀπέστη Μεσσήνη Ἀθηναίων. [2] ἔπραξαν δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ὁρῶντες προσβολὴν ἔχον τὸ χωρίον τῆς Σικελίας καὶ φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁρμώμενοί ποτε σφίσι μείζονι παρασκευῇ ἐπέλθωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λοκροὶ κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Ῥηγίνων, βουλόμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν αὐτοὺς καταπολεμεῖν. [3] καὶ ἐσεβεβλήκεσαν ἅμα ἐς τὴν Ῥηγίνων οἱ Λοκροὶ πανστρατιᾷ, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιβοηθῶσι τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ξυνεπαγόντων Ῥηγίνων φυγάδων, οἳ ἦσαν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς: τὸ γὰρ Ῥήγιον ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐστασίαζε καὶ ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοὺς Λοκροὺς ἀμύνεσθαι, ᾗ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπετίθεντο. [4] δῃώσαντες δὲ οἱ μὲν Λοκροὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἀπεχώρησαν, αἱ δὲ νῆες Μεσσήνην ἐφρούρουν: καὶ ἄλλαι αἱ πληρούμεναι ἔμελλον αὐτόσε ἐγκαθορμισάμεναι τὸν πόλεμον ἐντεῦθεν ποιήσεσθαι.

[1] IN the following summer, about the time when the corn comes into ear, ten Syracusan and ten Locrian ships took possession of Messenè in Sicily, whither they had gone by the invitation of the inhabitants. And so Messenè revolted from the Athenians. The Syracusans took part in this affair chiefly because they saw that Messenè was the key to Sicily. They were afraid that the Athenians would one day establish themselves there and come and attack them with a larger force. The Locrians took part because the Rhegians were their enemies, and they wanted to crush them by sea as well as by land. They had already invaded the territory of Rhegium with their whole army, in order to hinder the Rhegians from assisting the Messenians; they were also partly instigated by certain Rhegian exiles who had taken refuge with them. For the Rhegians had been for a long time torn by revolution, and in their present condition could not

resist the Locrians, who for this very reason were the more disposed to attack them. After wasting the country, the Locrians withdrew their land forces; but the ships remained to protect Messenè. Another fleet which the allies were manning was intended to lie in the harbour of Messenè, and to carry on the war from thence.

2. ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ ἦρος, πρὶν τὸν σῖτον ἐν ἀκμῇ εἶναι, Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἄγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς, καὶ ἐγκαθεζόμενοι ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν. [2] Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τάς τε τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς ἐς Σικελίαν ἀπέστειλαν, ὥσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ στρατηγοὺς τοὺς ὑπολοίπους Εὐρυμέδοντα καὶ Σοφοκλέα: Πυθόδωρος γὰρ ὁ τρίτος αὐτῶν ἤδη προαφῖκτο ἐς Σικελίαν. [3] εἶπον δὲ τούτοις καὶ Κερκυραίων ἅμα παραπλέοντας τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιμεληθῆναι, οἳ ἐληστεύοντο ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὄρει φυγάδων: καὶ Πελοποννησίων αὐτόσε νῆες ἑξήκοντα παρεπεπλεύκεσαν τοῖς ἐν τῷ ὄρει τιμωροὶ καὶ λιμοῦ ὄντος μεγάλου ἐν τῇ πόλει νομίζοντες κατασχήσειν ῥᾳδίως τὰ πράγματα. [4] Δημοσθένει δὲ ὄντι ἰδιώτῃ μετὰ τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τὴν ἐξ Ἀκαρνανίας αὐτῷ δεηθέντι εἶπον χρῆσθαι ταῖς ναυσὶ ταύταις, ἢν βούληται, περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον.

[2] During the spring and about the same time, before the corn was in full ear, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king. They encamped and ravaged the country.The Athenians sent to Sicily the forty ships, which were now ready, under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, the third general, Pythodorus, having gone thither beforehand. Orders were given to them, as they passed Corcyra, to assist the Corcyraeans in the city, who were harassed by the exiles in the mountain. The Peloponnesians had already sent sixty ships to the assistance of the exiles, expecting to make themselves masters of the situation with little difficulty; for there was a

great famine in the city. Demosthenes, since his return from Acarnania, had been in no command, but now at his own request the Athenians allowed him to make use of the fleet about the Peloponnese according to his judgment.

3. καὶ ὡς ἐγένοντο πλέοντες κατὰ τὴν Λακωνικὴν καὶ ἐπυνθάνοντο ὅτι αἱ νῆες ἐν Κερκύρᾳ ἤδη εἰσὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων, ὁ μὲν Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἠπείγοντο ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν, ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Πύλον πρῶτον ἐκέλευε σχόντας αὐτοὺς καὶ πράξαντας ἃ δεῖ τὸν πλοῦν ποιεῖσθαι: ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ κατὰ τύχην χειμὼν ἐπιγενόμενος κατήνεγκε τὰς ναῦς ἐς τὴν Πύλον. [2] καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης εὐθὺς ἠξίου τειχίζεσθαι τὸ χωρίον ⌈ἐπὶ τοῦτο γὰρ ξυνεκπλεῦσαι⌉, καὶ ἀπέφαινε πολλὴν εὐπορίαν ξύλων τε καὶ λίθων, καὶ φύσει καρτερὸν ὂν καὶ ἐρῆμον αὐτό τε καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς χώρας: ἀπέχει γὰρ σταδίους μάλιστα ἡ Πύλος τῆς Σπάρτης τετρακοσίους καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνίᾳ ποτὲ οὔσῃ γῇ, καλοῦσι δὲ αὐτὴν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Κορυφάσιον. [3] οἱ δὲ πολλὰς ἔφασαν εἶναι ἄκρας ἐρήμους τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ἣν βούληται καταλαμβάνων τὴν πόλιν δαπανᾶν. τῷ δὲ διάφορόν τι ἐδόκει εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον, λιμένος τε προσόντος καὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους οἰκείους ὄντας αὐτῷ τὸ ἀρχαῖον καὶ ὁμοφώνους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν βλάπτειν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁρμωμένους, καὶ βεβαίους ἅμα τοῦ χωρίου φύλακας ἔσεσθαι.

[3] When they arrived off the coast of Laconia and heard that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles wanted to hasten thither, but Demosthenes desired them first to put in at Pylos and not to proceed on their voyage until they had done what he wanted. They objected, but it so happened that a storm came on and drove them into Pylos. Instantly Demosthenes urged them to fortify the place; this being the project which he had in view when he accompanied the fleet. He pointed out to them that there was abundance of timber and stone ready to their hand, and that the position was naturally strong, while both the place itself and the country for a long

way round was uninhabited. Pylos is distant about forty-six miles from Sparta, and is situated in the territory which once belonged to the Messenians; by the Lacedaemonians it is called Coryphasium. The other generals argued that there were plenty of desolate promontories on the coast of Peloponnesus which he might occupy if he wanted to waste the public money. But Demosthenes thought that this particular spot had exceptional advantages. There was a harbour ready at hand; the Messenians, who were the ancient inhabitants of the country and spoke the same language with the Lacedaemonians, would make descents from the fort and do the greatest mischief: and they would be a trusty garrison.

4. ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν οὔτε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οὔτε τοὺς στρατιώτας, ὕστερον καὶ τοῖς ταξιάρχοις κοινώσας, ἡσύχαζεν ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας, μέχρι αὐτοῖς τοῖς στρατιώταις σχολάζουσιν ὁρμὴ ἐνέπεσε περιστᾶσιν ἐκτειχίσαι τὸ χωρίον. [2] καὶ ἐγχειρήσαντες εἰργάζοντο, σιδήρια μὲν λιθουργὰ οὐκ ἔχοντες, λογάδην δὲ φέροντες λίθους, καὶ ξυνετίθεσαν ὡς ἕκαστόν τι ξυμβαίνοι: καὶ τὸν πηλόν, εἴ που δέοι χρῆσθαι, ἀγγείων ἀπορίᾳ ἐπὶ τοῦ νώτου ἔφερον, ἐγκεκυφότες τε, ὡς μάλιστα μέλλοι ἐπιμένειν, καὶ τὼ χεῖρε ἐς τοὐπίσω ξυμπλέκοντες, ὅπως μὴ ἀποπίπτοι. [3] παντί τε τρόπῳ ἠπείγοντο φθῆναι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὰ ἐπιμαχώτατα ἐξεργασάμενοι πρὶν ἐπιβοηθῆσαι: τὸ γὰρ πλέον τοῦ χωρίου αὐτὸ καρτερὸν ὑπῆρχε καὶ οὐδὲν ἔδει τείχους.

[4] As neither generals nor soldiers would listen to him, he at last communicated his idea to the officers of divisions; who would not listen to him either. The weather was still unfit for sailing; he was therefore compelled to remain doing nothing; until at length the soldiers, who had nothing to do, were themselves seized with a desire to come round and fortify the place forthwith. So they put their hands to the work; and, being unprovided with iron tools, brought stones which they picked out and put them together as they

happened to fit; if they required to use mortar, having no hods, they carried it on their backs, which they bent so as to form a resting-place for it, clasping their hands behind them that it might not fall off. By every means in their power they hurried on the weaker points, wanting to finish them before the Lacedaemonians arrived. The position was in most places so strongly fortified by nature as to have no need of a wall.

5. οἱ δὲ ἑορτήν τινα ἔτυχον ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα πυνθανόμενοι ἐν ὀλιγωρίᾳ ἐποιοῦντο, ὡς, ὅταν ἐξέλθωσιν, ἢ οὐχ ὑπομενοῦντας σφᾶς ἢ ῥᾳδίως ληψόμενοι βίᾳ: καί τι καὶ αὐτοὺς ὁ στρατὸς ἔτι ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις ὢν ἐπέσχεν. [2] τειχίσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῦ χωρίου τὰ πρὸς ἤπειρον καὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἔδει ἐν ἡμέραις ἓξ τὸν μὲν Δημοσθένη μετὰ νεῶν πέντε αὐτοῦ φύλακα καταλείπουσι, ταῖς δὲ πλείοσι ναυσὶ τὸν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πλοῦν καὶ Σικελίαν ἠπείγοντο.

[5] The Lacedaemonians, who were just then celebrating a festival, made light of the news, being under the impression that they could easily storm the fort whenever they chose to attack it, even if the Athenians did not run away of themselves at their approach. They were also delayed by the absence of their army in Attica. In six days the Athenians finished the wall on the land side, and in places towards the sea where it was most required; they then left Demosthenes with five ships to defend it, and with the rest hastened on their way to Corcyra and Sicily.

6. οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὄντες Πελοποννήσιοι ὡς ἐπύθοντο τῆς Πύλου κατειλημμένης, ἀνεχώρουν κατὰ τάχος ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, νομίζοντες μὲν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἄγις ὁ βασιλεὺς οἰκεῖον σφίσι τὸ περὶ τὴν Πύλον: ἅμα δὲ πρὼ ἐσβαλόντες καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἔτι χλωροῦ ὄντος ἐσπάνιζον τροφῆς τοῖς πολλοῖς, χειμών τε ἐπιγενόμενος μείζων παρὰ τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ὥραν ἐπίεσε τὸ στράτευμα. [2] ὥστε πολλαχόθεν ξυνέβη ἀναχωρῆσαί τε θᾶσσον αὐτοὺς καὶ βραχυτάτην γενέσθαι τὴν ἐσβολὴν ταύτην: ἡμέρας γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα ἔμειναν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ.

[6] The Peloponnesian army in Attica, when they heard that Pylos had been occupied, quickly returned home, Agis and the Lacedaemonians thinking that this matter touched them very nearly. The invasion had been made quite early in the year while the corn was yet green, and they were in want of food for their soldiers; moreover the wet and unseasonable weather had distressed them, so that on many grounds they were inclined to return sooner than they had intended. This was the shortest of all the Peloponnesian invasions; they only remained fifteen days in Attica.

7. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον Σιμωνίδης Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς Ἠιόνα τὴν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης Μενδαίων ἀποικίαν, πολεμίαν δὲ οὖσαν, ξυλλέξας Ἀθηναίους τε ὀλίγους ἐκ τῶν φρουρίων καὶ τῶν ἐκείνῃ ξυμμάχων πλῆθος προδιδομένην κατέλαβεν. καὶ παραχρῆμα ἐπιβοηθησάντων Χαλκιδέων καὶ Βοττιαίων ἐξεκρούσθη τε καὶ ἀπέβαλε πολλοὺς τῶν στρατιωτῶν.

[7] About the same time Simonides, an Athenian general, collecting a few troops from the Athenian garrisons, and a larger force from their allies in that neighbourhood, took Eion in Chalcidicè, a colony of Mendè, which had been hostile to Athens; the place was betrayed to him. But the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans quickly came to the rescue and he was driven out with considerable loss.

8. ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς Πελοποννησίων οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται αὐτοὶ μὲν καὶ οἱ ἐγγύτατα τῶν περιοίκων εὐθὺς ἐβοήθουν ἐπὶ τὴν Πύλον, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Λακεδαιμονίων βραδυτέρα ἐγίγνετο ἡ ἔφοδος, ἄρτι ἀφιγμένων ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρας στρατείας. [2] περιήγγελλον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν Πελοπόννησον βοηθεῖν ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπὶ Πύλον καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ ναῦς σφῶν τὰς ἑξήκοντα ἔπεμψαν, αἳ ὑπερενεχθεῖσαι τὸν Λευκαδίων ἰσθμὸν καὶ λαθοῦσαι τὰς ἐν Ζακύνθῳ Ἀττικὰς ναῦς ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ Πύλον: παρῆν δὲ ἤδη καὶ ὁ πεζὸς στρατός. [3] Δημοσθένης δὲ προσπλεόντων ἔτι τῶν Πελοποννησίων ὑπεκπέμπει φθάσας δύο ναῦς ἀγγεῖλαι Εὐρυμέδοντι καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐν Ζακύνθῳ

Ἀθηναίοις παρεῖναι ὡς τοῦ χωρίου κινδυνεύοντος. [4] καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆες κατὰ τάχος ἔπλεον κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους: οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς τῷ τειχίσματι προσβαλοῦντες κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἐλπίζοντες ῥᾳδίως αἱρήσειν οἰκοδόμημα διὰ ταχέων εἰργασμένον καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγων ἐνόντων. [5] προσδεχόμενοι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Ζακύνθου τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν βοήθειαν ἐν νῷ εἶχον, ἢν ἄρα μὴ πρότερον ἕλωσι, καὶ τοὺς ἔσπλους τοῦ λιμένος ἐμφάρξαι, ὅπως μὴ ᾖ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐφορμίσασθαι ἐς αὐτόν. [6] ἡ γὰρ νῆσος ἡ Σφακτηρία καλουμένη τόν τε λιμένα παρατείνουσα καὶ ἐγγὺς ἐπικειμένη ἐχυρὸν ποιεῖ καὶ τοὺς ἔσπλους στενούς, τῇ μὲν δυοῖν νεοῖν διάπλουν κατὰ τὸ τείχισμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὴν Πύλον, τῇ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην ἤπειρον ὀκτὼ ἢ ἐννέα: ὑλώδης τε καὶ ἀτριβὴς πᾶσα ὑπ᾽ ἐρημίας ἦν καὶ μέγεθος περὶ πέντε καὶ δέκα σταδίους μάλιστα. [7] τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἔσπλους ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀντιπρῴροις βύζην κλῄσειν ἔμελλον: τὴν δὲ νῆσον ταύτην φοβούμενοι μὴ ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸν πόλεμον σφίσι ποιῶνται, ὁπλίτας διεβίβασαν ἐς αὐτὴν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἤπειρον ἄλλους ἔταξαν. [8] οὕτω γὰρ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τήν τε νῆσον πολεμίαν ἔσεσθαι τήν τε ἤπειρον, ἀπόβασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν τὰ γὰρ αὐτῆς τῆς Πύλου ἔξω τοῦ ἔσπλου πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος ἀλίμενα ὄντα οὐχ ἕξειν ὅθεν ὁρμώμενοι ὠφελήσουσι τοὺς αὐτῶν σφεῖς δὲ ἄνευ τε ναυμαχίας καὶ κινδύνου ἐκπολιορκήσειν τὸ χωρίον κατὰ τὸ εἰκός, σίτου τε οὐκ ἐνόντος καὶ δι᾽ ὀλίγης παρασκευῆς κατειλημμένον. [9] ὡς δ᾽ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ διεβίβαζον ἐς τὴν νῆσον τοὺς ὁπλίτας ἀποκληρώσαντες ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν λόχων. καὶ διέβησαν μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι πρότερον κατὰ διαδοχήν, οἱ δὲ τελευταῖοι καὶ ἐγκαταληφθέντες εἴκοσι καὶ τετρακόσιοι ἦσαν καὶ Εἵλωτες οἱ περὶ αὐτούς: ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἐπιτάδας ὁ Μολόβρου.

[8] On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the Spartans and the Perioeci in the neighbourhood of the city went at once to attack Pylos, but the other Lacedaemonians, having only just returned from an expedition, were slower in

arriving. A message was sent round the Peloponnesus bidding the allies come without a moment’s delay and meet at Pylos; another message summoned the sixty Peloponnesian ships from Corcyra. These were carried over the Leucadian isthmus, and, undiscovered by the Athenian ships, which were by this time at Zacynthus, reached Pylos, where their land forces had already assembled. While the Peloponnesian fleet was still on its way, Demosthenes succeeded in despatching unobserved two vessels to let Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet know of his danger, and to bid them come at once.While the Athenian ships were hastening to the assistance of Demosthenes in accordance with his request, the Lacedaemonians prepared to attack the fort both by sea and by land; they thought that there would be little difficulty in taking a work hastily constructed and defended by a handful of men. But as they expected the speedy arrival of the Athenian fleet they meant to close the entrances to the harbour, and prevent the Athenians from anchoring there should they fail in taking the fort before their arrival.The island which is called Sphacteria stretches along the land and is quite close to it, making the harbour safe and the entrances narrow; there is only a passage for two ships at the one end, which was opposite Pylos and the Athenian fort, while at the other the strait between the island and the mainland is wide enough to admit eight or nine. The length of the island is about a mile and three-quarters; it was wooded, and being uninhabited had no roads. The Lacedaemonians were intending to block up the mouths of the harbour by ships placed close together with their prows outwards; meanwhile, fearing lest the Athenians should use the island for military operations, they conveyed thither some hoplites, and posted others along the shore of the mainland. Thus both the island and the mainland would be hostile to the Athenians; and nowhere on the mainland would there be a possibility of landing. For on the shore of Pylos itself, outside the entrance of the strait, and where the

land faced the open sea, there were no harbours, and the Athenians would find no position from which they could assist their countrymen. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, avoiding the risk of an engagement at sea, might take the fort, which had been occupied in a hurry and was not provisioned. Acting on this impression they conveyed their hoplites over to the island, selecting them by lot out of each division of the army. One detachment relieved another; those who went over last and were taken in the island were four hundred and twenty men, besides the Helots who attended them; they were under the command of Epitadas the son of Molobrus.

9. Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁρῶν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μέλλοντας προσβάλλειν ναυσί τε ἅμα καὶ πεζῷ παρεσκευάζετο καὶ αὐτός, καὶ τὰς τριήρεις αἳ περιῆσαν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῶν καταλειφθεισῶν ἀνασπάσας ὑπὸ τὸ τείχισμα προσεσταύρωσε, καὶ τοὺς ναύτας ἐξ αὐτῶν ὥπλισεν ἀσπίσι [τε] φαύλαις καὶ οἰσυΐναις ταῖς πολλαῖς: οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὅπλα ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ πορίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἐκ λῃστρικῆς Μεσσηνίων τριακοντόρου καὶ κέλητος ἔλαβον, οἳ ἔτυχον παραγενόμενοι. ὁπλῖταί τε τῶν Μεσσηνίων τούτων ὡς τεσσαράκοντα ἐγένοντο, οἷς ἐχρῆτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων. [2] τοὺς μὲν οὖν πολλοὺς τῶν τε ἀόπλων καὶ ὡπλισμένων ἐπὶ τὰ τετειχισμένα μάλιστα καὶ ἐχυρὰ τοῦ χωρίου πρὸς τὴν ἤπειρον ἔταξε, προειπὼν ἀμύνασθαι τὸν πεζόν, ἢν προσβάλῃ: αὐτὸς δὲ ἀπολεξάμενος ἐκ πάντων ἑξήκοντα ὁπλίτας καὶ τοξότας ὀλίγους ἐχώρει ἔξω τοῦ τείχους ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, ᾗ μάλιστα ἐκείνους προσεδέχετο πειράσειν ἀποβαίνειν, ἐς χωρία μὲν χαλεπὰ καὶ πετρώδη πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τετραμμένα, σφίσι δὲ τοῦ τείχους ταύτῃ ἀσθενεστάτου ὄντος ἐσβιάσασθαι αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖτο προθυμήσεσθαι: [3] οὔτε γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἐλπίζοντές ποτε ναυσὶ κρατήσεσθαι οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν ἐτείχιζον, ἐκείνοις τε βιαζομένοις τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἁλώσιμον τὸ χωρίον γίγνεσθαι. [4] κατὰ τοῦτο οὖν πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν θάλασσαν χωρήσας ἔταξε

τοὺς ὁπλίτας ὡς εἴρξων, ἢν δύνηται, καὶ παρεκελεύσατο τοιάδε.

[9] Demosthenes, seeing that the Lacedaemonians were about to attack him both by sea and by land, made his own preparations. He drew up on shore under the fort the three triremes remaining to him out of the five which had not gone on to Corcyra, and protected them by a stockade; their crews he armed with shields, but of a poor sort, most of them made of wicker-work. In an uninhabited country there was no possibility of procuring arms, and these were only obtained from a thirty-oared privateer and a light boat belonging to some Messenians who had just arrived. Of these Messenians about forty were hoplites, whom Demosthenes used with the others. He placed the greater part of his forces, armed and unarmed, upon the side of the place which looks towards the mainland and was stronger and better fortified; these he ordered, if they should be attacked, to repel the land forces, while he himself selected out of the whole body of his troops sixty hoplites and a few archers, and marched out of the fort to the sea-shore at the point where the Lacedaemonians seemed most likely to attempt a landing. The spot which he chose lay towards the open sea, and was rocky and dangerous; but he thought that the enemy would be attracted thither and would be sure to make a dash at that point because the fortifications were weaker. For the Athenians, not expecting to be defeated at sea, had left the wall just there less strong, while if the enemy could once force a landing, the place would easily be taken. Accordingly, marching down to the very edge of the sea, he there posted his hoplites; he was determined to keep the enemy off if he could, and in this spirit he addressed his men:

10. ‘ἄνδρες οἱ ξυναράμενοι τοῦδε τοῦ κινδύνου, μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε ἀνάγκῃ ξυνετὸς βουλέσθω δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐκλογιζόμενος ἅπαν τὸ περιεστὸς ἡμᾶς δεινόν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπερισκέπτως εὔελπις ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐκ

τούτων ἂν περιγενόμενος. ὅσα γὰρ ἐς ἀνάγκην ἀφῖκται ὥσπερ τάδε, λογισμὸν ἥκιστα ἐνδεχόμενα κινδύνου τοῦ ταχίστου προσδεῖται. [2] ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τὰ πλείω ὁρῶ πρὸς ἡμῶν ὄντα, ἢν ἐθέλωμέν τε μεῖναι καὶ μὴ τῷ πλήθει αὐτῶν καταπλαγέντες τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἡμῖν κρείσσω καταπροδοῦναι. [3] τοῦ τε γὰρ χωρίου τὸ δυσέμβατον ἡμέτερον νομίζω, ὃ μενόντων μὲν ἡμῶν ξύμμαχον γίγνεται, ὑποχωρήσασι δὲ καίπερ χαλεπὸν ὂν εὔπορον ἔσται μηδενὸς κωλύοντος, καὶ τὸν πολέμιον δεινότερον ἕξομεν μὴ ῥᾳδίας αὐτῷ πάλιν οὔσης τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως, ἢν καὶ ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν βιάζηται ἐπὶ γὰρ ταῖς ναυσὶ ῥᾷστοί εἰσιν ἀμύνεσθαι, ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ ἥδη, [4] τό τε πλῆθος αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄγαν δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι: κατ᾽ ὀλίγον γὰρ μαχεῖται καίπερ πολὺ ὂν ἀπορίᾳ τῆς προσορμίσεως, καὶ οὐκ ἐν γῇ στρατός ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου μείζων, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ νεῶν, αἷς πολλὰ τὰ καίρια δεῖ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ξυμβῆναι. [5] ὥστε τὰς τούτων ἀπορίας ἀντιπάλους ἡγοῦμαι τῷ ἡμετέρῳ πλήθει, καὶ ἅμα ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς, Ἀθηναίους ὄντας καὶ ἐπισταμένους ἐμπειρίᾳ τὴν ναυτικὴν ἐπ᾽ ἄλλους ἀπόβασιν ὅτι, εἴ τις ὑπομένοι καὶ μὴ φόβῳ ῥοθίου καὶ νεῶν δεινότητος κατάπλου ὑποχωροίη, οὐκ ἄν ποτε βιάζοιτο, καὶ αὐτοὺς νῦν μεῖναί τε καὶ ἀμυνομένους παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν ῥαχίαν σῴζειν ἡμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ χωρίον.’

[10] ‘My companions in danger, let none of you now on the eve of battle desire to display his wits by reckoning up the sum of the perils which surround us; let him rather resolve to meet the enemy without much thought, but with a lively hope that he will survive them all. In cases like these, when there is no choice, reflection is useless, and the sooner danger comes the better. I am sure that our chances are more than equal if we will only stand firm, and, having so many advantages, do not take fright at the numbers of the enemy and throw them all away. The inaccessibility of the place is one of them; this, however, will only aid us if we maintain our position; when we have once retreated, the ground, though difficult in itself, will be easy enough to the

enemy, for there will be no one to oppose him. And if we turn and press upon him he will be more obstinate than ever; for his retreat will be next to impossible. On ship-board the Peloponnesians are easily repelled, but once landed they are as good as we are. Of their numbers again we need not be so much afraid; for, numerous as they are, few only can fight at a time, owing to the difficulty of bringing their ships to shore. We are contending against an army superior indeed in numbers, but they are not our equals in other respects; for they are not on land but on water, and ships require many favourable accidents before they can act with advantage. So that I consider their embarrassments to counterbalance our want of numbers. You are Athenians, who know by experience the difficulty of disembarking in the presence of an enemy, and that if a man is not frightened out of his wits at the splashing of oars and the threatening look of a ship bearing down upon him, but is determined to hold his ground, no force can move him. It is now your turn to be attacked, and I call on you to stand fast and not to let the enemy touch the beach at all. Thus you will save yourselves and the place.’

11. τοσαῦτα τοῦ Δημοσθένους παρακελευσαμένου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐθάρσησάν τε μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπικαταβάντες ἐτάξαντο παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν θάλασσαν. [2] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἄραντες τῷ τε κατὰ γῆν στρατῷ προσέβαλλον τῷ τειχίσματι καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἅμα οὔσαις τεσσαράκοντα καὶ τρισί, ναύαρχος δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπέπλει Θρασυμηλίδας ὁ Κρατησικλέους Σπαρτιάτης. προσέβαλλε δὲ ᾗπερ ὁ Δημοσθένης προσεδέχετο. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἔκ τε γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἠμύνοντο: οἱ δὲ κατ᾽ ὀλίγας ναῦς διελόμενοι, διότι οὐκ ἦν πλέοσι προσσχεῖν, καὶ ἀναπαύοντες ἐν τῷ μέρει τοὺς ἐπίπλους ἐποιοῦντο, προθυμίᾳ τε πάσῃ χρώμενοι καὶ παρακελευσμῷ, εἴ πως ὠσάμενοι ἕλοιεν τὸ τείχισμα. [4] πάντων δὲ φανερώτατος Βρασίδας ἐγένετο. τριηραρχῶν γὰρ καὶ ὁρῶν τοῦ χωρίου χαλεποῦ ὄντος τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ

κυβερνήτας, εἴ που καὶ δοκοίη δυνατὸν εἶναι σχεῖν, ἀποκνοῦντας καὶ φυλασσομένους τῶν νεῶν μὴ ξυντρίψωσιν, ἐβόα λέγων ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς εἴη ξύλων φειδομένους τοὺς πολεμίους ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ περιιδεῖν τεῖχος πεποιημένους, ἀλλὰ τάς τε σφετέρας ναῦς βιαζομένους τὴν ἀπόβασιν καταγνύναι ἐκέλευε, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μὴ ἀποκνῆσαι ἀντὶ μεγάλων εὐεργεσιῶν τὰς ναῦς τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐπιδοῦναι, ὀκείλαντας δὲ καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀποβάντας τῶν τε ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ χωρίου κρατῆσαι.

[11] The Athenians, inspirited by the words of Demosthenes, went down to the shore and formed a line along the water’s edge. The Lacedaernonians now began to move, and assaulted the fort with their army by land, and with their fleet, consisting of forty-three ships, by sea. The admiral in command was Thrasymelidas, son of Cratesicles, a Spartan; he made his attack just where Demosthenes expected. The Athenians defended themselves both by sea and land. The Peloponnesians had divided their fleet into relays of a few ships — the space would not allow of more — and so resting and fighting by turns they made their attack with great spirit, loudly exhorting one another to force back the enemy and take the fort. Brasidas distinguished himself above all other men in the engagement; he was captain of a ship, and seeing his fellow-captains and the pilots, even if they could touch anywhere, hesitating and afraid of running their ships on the rocks, he called out to them: ‘Not to be sparing of timber when the enemy had built a fort in their country; let them wreck their ships to force a landing’: this he said to his own countrymen, and to the allies that ‘they should not hesitate at such a moment to make a present of their ships to the Lacedaemonians, who had done so much for them; they must run aground, and somehow or other get to land and take the fort and the men in it.’

12. καὶ ὁ μὲν τούς τε ἄλλους τοιαῦτα ἐπέσπερχε καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κυβερνήτην ἀναγκάσας ὀκεῖλαι τὴν ναῦν ἐχώρει ἐπὶ τὴν ἀποβάθραν: καὶ πειρώμενος ἀποβαίνειν ἀνεκόπη ὑπὸ

τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τραυματισθεὶς πολλὰ ἐλιποψύχησέ τε καὶ πεσόντος αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν παρεξειρεσίαν ἡ ἀσπὶς περιερρύη ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐξενεχθείσης αὐτῆς ἐς τὴν γῆν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνελόμενοι ὕστερον πρὸς τὸ τροπαῖον ἐχρήσαντο ὃ ἔστησαν τῆς προσβολῆς ταύτης. [2] οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι προυθυμοῦντο μέν, ἀδύνατοι δ᾽ ἦσαν ἀποβῆναι τῶν τε χωρίων χαλεπότητι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μενόντων καὶ οὐδὲν ὑποχωρούντων. [3] ἐς τοῦτό τε περιέστη ἡ τύχη ὥστε Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἐκ γῆς τε καὶ ταύτης Λακωνικῆς ἀμύνεσθαι ἐκείνους ἐπιπλέοντας, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ἐκ νεῶν τε καὶ ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πολεμίαν οὖσαν ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἀποβαίνειν: ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίει τῆς δόξης ἐν τῷ τότε τοῖς μὲν ἠπειρώταις μάλιστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ πεζὰ κρατίστοις, τοῖς δὲ θαλασσίοις τε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ πλεῖστον προύχειν.

[12] While thus upbraiding the others he compelled his own pilot to run his ship aground, and made for the gangway. But in attempting to disembark he was struck by the Athenians, and, after receiving many wounds, he swooned away and fell into the fore part of the ship; his shield slipped off his arm into the sea, and, being washed ashore, was taken up by the Athenians and used for the trophy which they raised in commemoration of this attack. The Peloponnesians in the other ships made great efforts to disembark, but were unable on account of the roughness of the ground and the tenacity with which the Athenians held their position. It was a singular turn of fortune which drove the Athenians to repel the Lacedaemonians, who were attacking them by sea, from the Lacedaemonian coast, and the Lacedaemonians to fight for a landing on their own soil, now hostile to them, in the face of the Athenians. For in those days it was the great glory of the Lacedaemonians to be a land power distinguished for their military prowess, and of the Athenians to be a nation of sailors and the first sea power in Hellas.

13. ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τῆς ὑστεραίας μέρος τι προσβολὰς ποιησάμενοι ἐπέπαυντο: καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ ἐπὶ ξύλα

ἐς μηχανὰς παρέπεμψαν τῶν νεῶν τινὰς ἐς Ἀσίνην, ἐλπίζοντες τὸ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα τεῖχος ὕψος μὲν ἔχειν, ἀποβάσεως δὲ μάλιστα οὔσης ἐλεῖν <ἂν> μηχαναῖς. [2] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Ζακύνθου νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων παραγίγνονται τεσσαράκοντα: προσεβοήθησαν γὰρ τῶν τε φρουρίδων τινὲς αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐκ Ναυπάκτου καὶ Χῖαι τέσσαρες. [3] ὡς δὲ εἶδον τήν τε ἤπειρον ὁπλιτῶν περίπλεων τήν τε νῆσον, ἔν τε τῷ λιμένι οὔσας τὰς ναῦς καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλεούσας, ἀπορήσαντες ὅπῃ καθορμίσωνται, τότε μὲν ἐς Πρωτὴν τὴν νῆσον, ἣ οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχει ἐρῆμος οὖσα, ἔπλευσαν καὶ ηὐλίσαντο, τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ παρασκευασάμενοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν ἀνήγοντο, ἢν μὲν ἀντεκπλεῖν ἐθέλωσι σφίσιν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς αὐτοὶ ἐπεσπλευσούμενοι. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν οὔτε ἀντανήγοντο οὔτε ἃ διενοήθησαν, φάρξαι τοὺς ἔσπλους, ἔτυχον ποιήσαντες, ἡσυχάζοντες δ᾽ ἐν τῇ γῇ τάς τε ναῦς ἐπλήρουν καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο, ἢν ἐσπλέῃ τις, ὡς ἐν τῷ λιμένι ὄντι οὐ σμικρῷ ναυμαχήσοντες.

[13] The Peloponnesians, having continued their efforts during this day and a part of the next, at length desisted; on the third day they sent some of their ships to Asinè for timber with which to make engines, hoping by their help to take the part of the fort looking towards the harbour where the landing was easier, although it was built higher. Meanwhile the Athenian ships arrived from Zacynthus; they had been increased in number to fifty by the arrival of some guard-ships from Naupactus and of four Chian vessels. Their commanders saw that both the mainland and the island were full of hoplites, and that the ships were in the harbour and were not coming out: so, not knowing where to find anchorage, they sailed away for the present to the island of Protè, which is close at hand and uninhabited, and there passed the night. Next day, having made ready for action, they put off to sea, intending, if, as they hoped, the Peloponnesians were willing to come out against them, to give battle in the open; if not, to sail into the harbour. The

Peloponnesians did not come out, and had somehow neglected to close the mouths as they had intended. They showed no sign of moving, but were on shore, manning their ships and preparing to fight, if any one entered the harbour, which was of considerable size.

14. οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι γνόντες καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον τὸν ἔσπλουν ὥρμησαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτούς, καὶ τὰς μὲν πλείους καὶ μετεώρους ἤδη τῶν νεῶν καὶ ἀντιπρῴρους προσπεσόντες ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν, καὶ ἐπιδιώκοντες ὡς διὰ βραχέος ἔτρωσαν μὲν πολλάς, πέντε δὲ ἔλαβον, καὶ μίαν τούτων αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν: ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς ἐν τῇ γῇ καταπεφευγυίαις ἐνέβαλλον. αἱ δὲ καὶ πληρούμεναι ἔτι πρὶν ἀνάγεσθαι ἐκόπτοντο: καί τινας καὶ ἀναδούμενοι κενὰς εἶλκον τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐς φυγὴν ὡρμημένων. [2] ἃ ὁρῶντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ περιαλγοῦντες τῷ πάθει, ὅτιπερ αὐτῶν οἱ ἄνδρες ἀπελαμβάνοντο ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, παρεβοήθουν, καὶ ἐπεσβαίνοντες ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ξὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἀνθεῖλκον ἐπιλαμβανόμενοι τῶν νεῶν: καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κεκωλῦσθαι ἐδόκει ἕκαστος ᾧ μή τινι καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργῳ παρῆν. [3] ἐγένετό τε ὁ θόρυβος μέγας καὶ ἀντηλλαγμένου τοῦ ἑκατέρων τρόπου περὶ τὰς ναῦς: οἵ τε γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπὸ προθυμίας καὶ ἐκπλήξεως ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ ἐκ γῆς ἐναυμάχουν, οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦντες καὶ βουλόμενοι τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐπεξελθεῖν ἀπὸ νεῶν ἐπεζομάχουν. [4] πολύν τε πόνον παρασχόντες ἀλλήλοις καὶ τραυματίσαντες διεκρίθησαν, καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς κενὰς ναῦς πλὴν τῶν τὸ πρῶτον ληφθεισῶν διέσωσαν. [5] καταστάντες δὲ ἑκάτεροι ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον οἱ μὲν τροπαῖόν τε ἔστησαν καὶ νεκροὺς ἀπέδοσαν καὶ ναυαγίων ἐκράτησαν, καὶ τὴν νῆσον εὐθὺς περιέπλεον καὶ ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχον ὡς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀπειλημμένων: οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων ἤδη βεβοηθηκότες ἔμενον κατὰ χώραν ἐπὶ τῇ Πύλῳ.

[14] The Athenians, seeing how matters stood, rushed in upon them at both mouths of the harbour. Most of the enemies’ ships had by this time got into deep water and

were facing them. These they put to flight and pursued them as well as they could in such a narrow space; damaging many and taking five, one of them with the crew. They charged the remaining vessels even after they had reached the land, and there were some which they disabled while the crews were getting into them and before they put out at all. Others they succeeded in tying to their own ships and began to drag them away empty, the sailors having taken flight. At this sight the Lacedaemonians were in an agony, for their friends were being cut off in the island; they hurried to the rescue, and dashing armed as they were into the sea, took hold of the ships and pulled them back; that was a time when every one thought that the action was at a stand where he himself was not engaged. The confusion was tremendous; the two combatants in this battle for the ships interchanging their usual manner of fighting; for the Lacedaemonians in their excitement and desperation did, as one may say, carry on a sea-fight from the land, and the Athenians, who were victorious and eager to push their good fortune to the utmost, waged a land-fight from their ships. At length, after giving each other much trouble and inflicting great damage, they parted. The Lacedaemonians saved their empty ships, with the exception of those which were first taken. Both sides retired to their encampments; the Athenians then raised a trophy, gave up the dead, and took possession of the wrecks. They lost no time in sailing round the island and establishing a guard over the men who were cut off there. The Peloponnesians on the mainland, who had now been joined by all their contingents, remained in their position before Pylos.

15. ἐς δὲ τὴν Σπάρτην ὡς ἠγγέλθη τὰ γεγενημένα περὶ Πύλον, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ ξυμφορᾷ μεγάλῃ τὰ τέλη καταβάντας ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον βουλεύειν παραχρῆμα ὁρῶντας ὅτι ἂν δοκῇ. [2] καὶ ὡς εἶδον ἀδύνατον ὂν τιμωρεῖν τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ κινδυνεύειν οὐκ ἐβούλοντο ἢ ὑπὸ λιμοῦ τι παθεῖν αὐτοὺς ἢ ὑπὸ πλήθους βιασθέντας κρατηθῆναι,

ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἢν ἐθέλωσι, σπονδὰς ποιησαμένους τὰ περὶ Πύλον ἀποστεῖλαι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρέσβεις περὶ ξυμβάσεως καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ὡς τάχιστα πειρᾶσθαι κομίσασθαι.

[15] At Sparta, when the news arrived, there was great consternation; it was resolved that the magistrates should go down to the camp and see for themselves; they could then take on the spot any measures which they thought necessary. Finding on their arrival that nothing could be done for their soldiers in the island, and not liking to run the risk of their being starved to death or overcome by force of numbers, they decided that with the consent of the Athenian generals they would suspend hostilities at Pylos, and sending ambassadors to ask for peace at Athens, would endeavour to recover their men as soon as possible.

16. δεξαμένων δὲ τῶν στρατηγῶν τὸν λόγον ἐγίγνοντο σπονδαὶ τοιαίδε, Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν τὰς ναῦς ἐν αἷς ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πάσας, ὅσαι ἦσαν μακραί, παραδοῦναι κομίσαντας ἐς Πύλον Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν τῷ τειχίσματι μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε κατὰ θάλασσαν, Ἀθηναίους δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἀνδράσι σῖτον ἑᾶν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐκπέμπειν τακτὸν καὶ μεμαγμένον, δύο χοίνικας ἑκάστῳ Ἀττικὰς ἀλφίτων καὶ δύο κοτύλας οἴνου καὶ κρέας, θεράποντι δὲ τούτων ἡμίσεα: ταῦτα δὲ ὁρώντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐσπέμπειν καὶ πλοῖον μηδὲν ἐσπλεῖν λάθρᾳ: φυλάσσειν δὲ καὶ τὴν νῆσον Ἀθηναίους μηδὲν ἧσσον, ὅσα μὴ ἀποβαίνοντας, καὶ ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν τῷ Πελοποννησίων στρατῷ μήτε κατὰ γῆν μήτε κατὰ θάλασσαν. [2] ὅτι δ᾽ ἂν τούτων παραβαίνωσιν ἑκάτεροι καὶ ὁτιοῦν, τότε λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδάς. ἐσπεῖσθαι δὲ αὐτὰς μέχρι οὗ ἐπανέλθωσιν οἱ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις: ἀποστεῖλαι δὲ αὐτοὺς τριήρει Ἀθηναίους καὶ πάλιν κομίσαι. ἐλθόντων δὲ τάς τε σπονδὰς λελύσθαι ταύτας καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀποδοῦναι Ἀθηναίους ὁμοίας οἵασπερ ἂν παραλάβωσιν. [3] αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγένοντο, καὶ

αἱ νῆες παρεδόθησαν οὖσαι περὶ ἑξήκοντα, καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀπεστάλησαν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.

[16] The Athenian commanders accepted their proposals, and a truce was made on the following conditions:'The Lacedaemonians shall deliver into the hands of the Athenians at Pylos the ships in which they fought, and shall also bring thither and deliver over any other ships of war which are in Laconia; and they shall make no assault upon the fort either by sea or land. The Athenians shall permit the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send to those on the island a fixed quantity of kneaded flour, viz. two Attic quarts of barley-meal for each man, and a pint of wine, and also a piece of meat; for an attendant, half these quantities; they shall send them into the island under the inspection of the Athenians, and no vessel shall sail in by stealth. The Athenians shall guard the island as before, but not land, and shall not attack the Peloponnesian forces by land or by sea. If either party violate this agreement in any particular, however slight, the truce is to be at an end. The agreement is to last until the Lacedaemonian ambassadors return from Athens, and the Athenians are to convey them thither and bring them back in a trireme. When they return the truce is to be at an end, and the Athenians are to restore the ships in the same condition in which they received them.' Such were the terms of the truce. The ships, which were about sixty in number, were given up to the Athenians. The ambassadors went on their way, and arriving at Athens spoke as follows:

17. 'ἔπεμψαν ἡμᾶς Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἀνδρῶν πράξοντας ὅτι ἂν ὑμῖν τε ὠφέλιμον ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ πείθωμεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐς τὴν ξυμφορὰν ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων κόσμον μάλιστα μέλλῃ οἴσειν. [2] τοὺς δὲ λόγους μακροτέρους οὐ παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς μηκυνοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιχώριον ὂν ἡμῖν οὗ μὲν βραχεῖς ἀρκῶσι μὴ πολλοῖς χρῆσθαι, πλέοσι δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ διδάσκοντάς τι τῶν προύργου λόγοις τὸ δέον πράσσειν. [3] λάβετε δὲ αὐτοὺς μὴ πολεμίως μηδ᾽ ὡς ἀξύνετοι διδασκόμενοι, ὑπόμνησιν δὲ τοῦ

καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι πρὸς εἰδότας ἡγησάμενοι. [4]’ὑμῖν γὰρ εὐτυχίαν τὴν παροῦσαν ἔξεστι καλῶς θέσθαι, ἔχουσι μὲν ὧν κρατεῖτε, προσλαβοῦσι δὲ τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν, καὶ μὴ παθεῖν ὅπερ οἱ ἀήθως τι ἀγαθὸν λαμβάνοντες τῶν ἀνθρώπων: αἰεὶ γὰρ τοῦ πλέονος ἐλπίδι ὀρέγονται διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰ παρόντα ἀδοκήτως εὐτυχῆσαι. [5] οἷς δὲ πλεῖσται μεταβολαὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα ξυμβεβήκασι, δίκαιοί εἰσι καὶ ἀπιστότατοι εἶναι ταῖς εὐπραγίαις: ὃ τῇ τε ὑμετέρᾳ πόλει δι᾽ ἐμπειρίαν καὶ ἡμῖν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος προσείη.

[17] ‘Men of Athens, the Lacedaemonians have sent us to negotiate for the recovery of our countrymen in the island, in the hope that you may be induced to grant us terms such as will be at once advantageous to you and not inglorious to us in our present misfortune. If we speak at length, this will be no departure from the custom of our country. On the contrary, it is our manner not to say much where few words will suffice, but to be more liberal of speech when something important has to be said and words are the ministers of action. Do not receive what we say in a hostile spirit, or imagine that we deem you ignorant and are instructing you, but regard us simply as putting you in mind of what you already know to be good policy. For you may turn your present advantage to excellent account, not only keeping what you have won, but gaining honour and glory as well. You will then escape the reverse which is apt to be experienced by men who attain any unusual good fortune; for, having already succeeded beyond all expectation, they see no reason why they should set any limit to their hopes and desires. Whereas they who have oftenest known the extremes of either kind of fortune ought to be most suspicious of prosperity; and this may naturally be expected to be the lesson which experience has taught both us and you.

18. γνῶτε δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς ἡμετέρας νῦν ξυμφορὰς ἀπιδόντες, οἵτινες ἀξίωμα μέγιστον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔχοντες ἥκομεν παρ᾽ ὑμᾶς, πρότερον αὐτοὶ κυριώτεροι νομίζοντες

εἶναι δοῦναι ἐφ᾽ ἃ νῦν ἀφιγμένοι ὑμᾶς αἰτούμεθα. [2] καίτοι οὔτε δυνάμεως ἐνδείᾳ ἐπάθομεν αὐτὸ οὔτε μείζονος προσγενομένης ὑβρίσαντες, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχόντων γνώμῃ σφαλέντες, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει. [3] ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν νῦν ῥώμην πόλεώς τε καὶ τῶν προσγεγενημένων καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης οἴεσθαι αἰεὶ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν ἔσεσθαι. [4] σωφρόνων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἵτινες τἀγαθὰ ἐς ἀμφίβολον ἀσφαλῶς ἔθεντο καὶ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς οἱ αὐτοὶ εὐξυνετώτερον ἂν προσφέροιντο, τόν τε πόλεμον νομίσωσι μὴ καθ᾽ ὅσον ἄν τις αὐτοῦ μέρος βούληται μεταχειρίζειν, τούτῳ ξυνεῖναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν αἱ τύχαι αὐτῶν ἡγήσωνται: καὶ ἐλάχιστ᾽ ἂν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πταίοντες διὰ τὸ μὴ τῷ ὀρθουμένῳ αὐτοῦ πιστεύοντες ἐπαίρεσθαι ἐν τῷ εὐτυχεῖν ἂν μάλιστα καταλύοιντο. [5] ὃ νῦν ὑμῖν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καλῶς ἔχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρᾶξαι,καὶ μή ποτε ὕστερον, ἢν ἄρα μὴ πειθόμενοι σφαλῆτε, ἃ πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται, νομισθῆναι τύχῃ καὶ τὰ νῦν προχωρήσαντα κρατῆσαι, ἐξὸν ἀκίνδυνον δόκησιν ἰσχύος καὶ ξυνέσεως ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα καταλιπεῖν.

[18] ‘Look only at the calamity which has just overtaken us, who formerly enjoyed the greatest prestige of any Hellenic state, but are now come hither to ask of you the boon which at one time we should have thought ourselves better able to confer. You cannot attribute our mishap to any want of power; nor to the pride which an increase of power fosters. We were neither stronger nor weaker than before, but we erred in judgment, and to such errors all men are liable. Therefore you should not suppose that, because your city and your empire are powerful at this moment, you will always have fortune on your side. The wise ensure their own safety by not making too sure of their gains, and when disasters come they can meet them more intelligently; they know that war will go on its way whithersoever chance may lead, and will not restrict itself to the limits which he who begins to meddle with it would fain prescribe. They of all men will be least likely to meet with reverses, because they are not puffed up with military success, and they will be

most inclined to end the struggle in the hour of victory. It will be for your honour, Athenians, to act thus towards us. And then the victories which you have gained already cannot be attributed to mere luck; as they certainly will be if, rejecting our prayer, you should hereafter encounter disasters, a thing which is not unlikely to happen. Whereas you may if you will leave to posterity a reputation for power and wisdom which no danger can affect.

19. ‘Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν, ἀνταιτοῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας, καὶ ἄμεινον ἡγούμενοι ἀμφοτέροις μὴ διακινδυνεύεσθαι, εἴτε βίᾳ διαφύγοιεν παρατυχούσης τινὸς σωτηρίας εἴτε καὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντες μᾶλλον ἂν χειρωθεῖεν. [2] νομίζομέν τε τὰς μεγάλας ἔχθρας μάλιστ᾽ ἂν διαλύεσθαι βεβαίως, οὐκ ἢν ἀνταμυνόμενός τις καὶ ἐπικρατήσας τὰ πλείω τοῦ πολέμου κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ὅρκοις ἐγκαταλαμβάνων μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ξυμβῇ, ἀλλ᾽ ἢν παρὸν τὸ αὐτὸ δρᾶσαι πρὸς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ἀρετῇ αὐτὸν νικήσας παρὰ ἃ προσεδέχετο μετρίως ξυναλλαγῇ. [3] ὀφείλων γὰρ ἤδη ὁ ἐναντίος μὴ ἀνταμύνεσθαι ὡς βιασθείς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνταποδοῦναι ἀρετήν, ἑτοιμότερός ἐστιν αἰσχύνῃ ἐμμένειν οἷς ξυνέθετο. [4] καὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τοὺς μειζόνως ἐχθροὺς τοῦτο δρῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς τὰ μέτρια διενεχθέντας: πεφύκασί τε τοῖς μὲν ἑκουσίως ἐνδοῦσιν ἀνθησσᾶσθαι μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ὑπεραυχοῦντα καὶ παρὰ γνώμην διακινδυνεύειν.

[19] ‘The Lacedaemonians invite you to make terms with them and to finish the war. They offer peace and alliance and a general friendly and happy relation, and they ask in return their countrymen who are cut off in the island. They think it better that neither city should run any further risk, you of the escape of the besieged, who may find some means of forcing their way out, we of their being compelled to surrender and passing absolutely into your hands. We think that great enmities are most effectually reconciled, not

when one party seeks revenge and, getting a decided superiority, binds his adversary by enforced oaths and makes a treaty with him on unequal terms, but when, having it in his power to do all this, he from a generous and equitable feeling overcomes his resentment, and by the moderation of his terms surprises his adversary, who, having sufered no violence at his hands, is bound to recompense his generosity not with evil but with good, and who therefore, from a sense of honour, is more likely to keep his word. And mankind are more ready to make such a concession to their greater enemies than to those with whom they have only a slight difference. Again, they joyfully give way to those who first give way themselves, although against overbearing power they will risk a conflict even contrary to their own better judgment.

20. ‘ἡμῖν δὲ καλῶς, εἴπερ ποτέ, ἔχει ἀμφοτέροις ἡ ξυναλλαγή, πρίν τι ἀνήκεστον διὰ μέσου γενόμενον ἡμᾶς καταλαβεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη ἀίδιον ὑμῖν ἔχθραν πρὸς τῇ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίαν ἔχειν, ὑμᾶς δὲ στερηθῆναι ὧν νῦν προκαλούμεθα. [2] ἔτι δ᾽ ὄντων ἀκρίτων καὶ ὑμῖν μὲν δόξης καὶ ἡμετέρας φιλίας προσγιγνομένης, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸ αἰσχροῦ τινὸς ξυμφορᾶς μετρίως κατατιθεμένης διαλλαγῶμεν, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀντὶ πολέμου εἰρήνην ἑλώμεθα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν ἀνάπαυσιν κακῶν ποιήσωμεν: οἳ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὑμᾶς αἰτιωτέρους ἡγήσονται. πολεμοῦνται μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφῶς ὁποτέρων ἀρξάντων: καταλύσεως δὲ γενομένης, ἧς νῦν ὑμεῖς τὸ πλέον κύριοί ἐστε, τὴν χάριν ὑμῖν προσθήσουσιν. [3] ἤν τε γνῶτε, Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔξεστιν ὑμῖν φίλους γενέσθαι βεβαίως, αὐτῶν τε προκαλεσαμένων χαρισαμένοις τε μᾶλλον ἢ βιασαμένοις. [4] καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὰ ἐνόντα ἀγαθὰ σκοπεῖτε ὅσα εἰκὸς εἶναι: ἡμῶν γὰρ καὶ ὑμῶν ταὐτὰ λεόντων τό γε ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ἴστε ὅτι ὑποδεέστερον ὂν τὰ μέγιστα τιμήσει.’

[20] ‘Now, if ever, is the time of reconciliation for us both, before either has suffered any irremediable calamity, which must cause, besides the ordinary antagonism of contending

states, a personal and inveterate hatred, and will deprive you of the advantages which we now offer. While the contest is still undecided, while you may acquire reputation and our friendship, and while our disaster can be repaired on tolerable terms, and disgrace averted, let us be reconciled, and choosing peace instead of war ourselves, let us give relief and rest to all the Hellenes. The chief credit of the peace will be yours. Whether we or you drove them into war is uncertain; but to give them peace lies with you, and to you they will be grateful. If you decide for peace, you may assure to yourselves the lasting friendship of the Lacedaemonians freely offered by them, you on your part employing no force but kindness only. Consider the great advantages which such a friendship will yield. If you and we are at one, you may be certain that the rest of Hellas, which is less powerful than we, will pay to both of us the greatest deference.’

21. οἱ μὲν οὖν Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοσαῦτα εἶπον, νομίζοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ σπονδῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμεῖν, σφῶν δὲ ἐναντιουμένων κωλύεσθαι, διδομένης δὲ εἰρήνης ἀσμένους δέξεσθαί τε καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀποδώσειν. [2] οἱ δὲ τὰς μὲν σπονδάς, ἔχοντες τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ἤδη σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον ἑτοίμους εἶναι, ὁπόταν βούλωνται ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ὠρέγοντο. [3] μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνῆγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος: καὶ ἔπεισεν ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς χρὴ τὰ μὲν ὅπλα καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ παραδόντας πρῶτον κομισθῆναι Ἀθήναζε, ἐλθόντων δὲ ἀποδόντας Λακεδαιμονίους Νίσαιαν καὶ Πηγὰς καὶ Τροιζῆνα καὶ Ἀχαΐαν, ἃ οὐ πολέμῳ ἔλαβον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς προτέρας ξυμβάσεως Ἀθηναίων ξυγχωρησάντων κατὰ ξυμφορὰς καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε δεομένων τι μᾶλλον σπονδῶν, κομίσασθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι ὁπόσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον ἀμφοτέροις.

[21] Thus spoke the Lacedaemonians, thinking that the Athenians, who had formerly been desirous of making terms

with them, and had only been prevented by their refusal, would now, when peace was offered to them, joyfully agree and would restore their men. But the Athenians reflected that, since they had the Lacedaemonians shut up in the island, it was at any time in their power to make peace, and they wanted more. These feelings were chiefly encouraged by Cleon the son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader of the day who had the greatest influence over the multitude. He persuaded them to reply that the men in the island must first of all give up themselves and their arms and be sent to Athens; the Lacedaemonians were then to restore Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia — places which had not been taken in war, but had been surrendered under a former treaty in a time of reverse, when the Athenians were more anxious to obtain peace than they now were. On these conditions they might recover the men and make a treaty of such duration as both parties should approve.

22. οἱ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀπόκρισιν οὐδὲν ἀντεῖπον, ξυνέδρους δὲ σφίσιν ἐκέλευον ἑλέσθαι οἵτινες λέγοντες καὶ ἀκούοντες περὶ ἑκάστου ξυμβήσονται κατὰ ἡσυχίαν ὅτι ἂν πείθωσιν ἀλλήλους. [2] Κλέων δὲ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολὺς ἐνέκειτο, λέγων γιγνώσκειν μὲν καὶ πρότερον οὐδὲν ἐν νῷ ἔχοντας δίκαιον αὐτούς, σαφὲς δ᾽ εἶναι καὶ νῦν,οἵτινες τῷ μὲν πλήθει οὐδὲν ἐθέλουσιν εἰπεῖν, ὀλίγοις δὲ ἀνδράσι ξύνεδροι βούλονται γίγνεσθαι: ἀλλὰ εἴ τι ὑγιὲς διανοοῦνται, λέγειν ἐκέλευσεν ἅπασιν. [3] ὁρῶντες δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτε σφίσιν οἷόν τε ὂν ἐν πλήθει εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ξυγχωρεῖν, μὴ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους διαβληθῶσιν εἰπόντες καὶ οὐ τυχόντες, οὔτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ μετρίοις ποιήσοντας ἃ προυκαλοῦντο, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἄπρακτοι.

[22] To this reply the Lacedaemonians said nothing, but only requested that the Athenians would appoint commissioners to discuss with them the details of the agreement and quietly arrive at an understanding about them if they could. This proposal was assailed by Cleon in unmeasured

language: he had always known, he said, that they meant no good, and now their designs were unveiled; for they were unwilling to speak a word before the people, but wanted to be closeted with a select few;if they had any honesty in them, let them say what they wanted to the whole city. But the Lacedaemonians knew that, although they might be willing to make concessions under the pressure of their calamities, they could not speak openly before the assembly (for if they spoke and did not succeed, the terms which they offered might injure them in the opinion of their allies); they saw too that the Athenians would not grant what was asked of them on any tolerable conditions. So, after a fruitless negotiation, they returned home.

23. ἀφικομένων δὲ αὐτῶν διελέλυντο εὐθὺς αἱ σπονδαὶ αἱ περὶ Πύλον, καὶ τὰς ναῦς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπῄτουν, καθάπερ ξυνέκειτο: οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐγκλήματα ἔχοντες ἐπιδρομήν τε τῷ τειχίσματι παράσπονδον καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀξιόλογα δοκοῦντα εἶναι οὐκ ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἰσχυριζόμενοι ὅτι δὴ εἴρητο, ἐὰν καὶ ὁτιοῦν παραβαθῇ, λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδάς. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀντέλεγόν τε καὶ ἀδίκημα ἐπικαλέσαντες τὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀπελθόντες ἐς πόλεμον καθίσταντο. [2] καὶ τὰ περὶ Πύλον ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων κατὰ κράτος ἐπολεμεῖτο, Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν δυοῖν νεοῖν ἐναντίαιν αἰεὶ τὴν νῆσον περιπλέοντες τῆς ἡμέρας τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς καὶ ἅπασαι περιώρμουν, πλὴν τὰ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος, ὁπότε ἄνεμος εἴη: καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὐτοῖς εἴκοσι νῆες ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὴν φυλακήν, ὥστε αἱ πᾶσαι ἑβδομήκοντα ἐγένοντο , Πελοποννήσιοι δὲ ἔν τε τῇ ἠπείρῳ στρατοπεδευόμενοι καὶ προσβολὰς ποιούμενοι τῷ τείχει, σκοποῦντες καιρὸν εἴ τις παραπέσοι ὥστε τοὺς ἄνδρας σῶσαι.

[23] Upon their return the truce at Pylos instantly came to an end, and the Lacedaemonians demanded back their ships according to the agreement. But the Athenians accused them of making an assault upon the fort, and of some other petty infractions of the treaty which seemed hardly worth mentioning. Accordingly they refused to restore them,

insisting upon the clause which said that if ‘in any particular, however slight,’ the agreement were violated, the treaty was to be at an end. The Lacedaemonians remonstrated, and went away protesting against the injustice of detaining their ships. Both parties then renewed the war at Pylos with the utmost vigour. The Athenians had two triremes sailing round Sphacteria in opposite directions throughout the day, and at night their whole fleet was moored about the island, except on the side towards the sea when the wind was high. Twenty additional ships had come from Athens to assist in the blockade, so that the entire number was seventy. The Peloponnesians lay encamped on the mainland and made assaults upon the fort, watching for any opportunity which might present itself of rescuing their men.

24. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρὸς ταῖς ἐν Μεσσήνῃ φρουρούσαις ναυσὶ τὸ ἄλλο ναυτικὸν ὃ παρεσκευάζοντο προσκομίσαντες τὸν πόλεμον [2] ἐποιοῦντο ἐκ τῆς Μεσσήνης □καὶ μάλιστα ἐνῆγον οἱ Λοκροὶ τῶν Ῥηγίνων κατὰ ἔχθραν, καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐσεβεβλήκεσαν πανδημεὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν□, [3] καὶ ναυμαχίας ἀποπειρᾶσθαι ἐβούλοντο, ὁρῶντες τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰς μὲν παρούσας ὀλίγας ναῦς, ταῖς δὲ πλέοσι καὶ μελλούσαις ἥξειν πυνθανόμενοι τὴν νῆσον πολιορκεῖσθαι. [4] εἰ γὰρ κρατήσειαν τῷ ναυτικῷ, τὸ Ῥήγιον ἤλπιζον πεζῇ τε καὶ ναυσὶν ἐφορμοῦντες ῥᾳδίως χειρώσεσθαι, καὶ ἤδη σφῶν ἰσχυρὰ τὰ πράγματα γίγνεσθαι: ξύνεγγυς γὰρ κειμένου τοῦ τε Ῥηγίου ἀκρωτηρίου τῆς Ἰταλίας τῆς τε Μεσσήνης τῆς Σικελίας, τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις [τε] οὐκ ἂν εἶναι ἐφορμεῖν καὶ τοῦ πορθμοῦ κρατεῖν. [5] ἔστι δὲ ὁ πορθμὸς ἡ μεταξὺ Ῥηγίου θάλασσα καὶ Μεσσήνης, ᾗπερ βραχύτατον Σικελία τῆς ἠπείρου ἀπέχει: καὶ ἔστιν ἡ Χάρυβδις κληθεῖσα τοῦτο, ᾗ Ὀδυσσεὺς λέγεται διαπλεῦσαι. διὰ στενότητα δὲ καὶ ἐκ μεγάλων πελαγῶν, τοῦ τε Τυρσηνικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Σικελικοῦ, ἐσπίπτουσα ἡ θάλασσα ἐς αὐτὸ καὶ ῥοώδης οὖσα εἰκότως χαλεπὴ ἐνομίσθη.

[24] Meanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans and the allies brought up the fleet which they had been equipping to Messenè, and joining the other fleet which was keeping guard there, carried on the war from thence. They were instigated chiefly by the Locrians, who hated the Rhegians, and had already invaded their territory with their whole force. They were eager to try their fortune in a naval engagement, for they saw that the Athenians had only a few ships actually on the spot; the larger portion of the fleet which had been despatched to Sicily being, as they heard, engaged in the siege of Sphacteria. If they conquered at sea they hoped to blockade Rhegium both by sea and land; they would easily master the place, and their affairs would then be really gaining strength. Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy, and Messenè, of Sicily, are close to one another; and if Rhegium were taken the Athenians would not be able to lie there and command the strait. Now the strait is that portion of sea between Rhegium and Messenè where Sicily is nearest to the continent; it is the so-called Charybdis by which Odysseus is said to have passed. The channel was naturally considered dangerous; for the strait is narrow; and the sea flowing into it from two great oceans, the Tyrrhenian and Sicilian, is full of currents.

25. ἐν τούτῳ οὖν τῷ μεταξὺ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ναυσὶν ὀλίγῳ πλέοσιν ἢ τριάκοντα ἠναγκάσθησαν ὀψὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ναυμαχῆσαι περὶ πλοίου διαπλέοντος, ἀντεπαναγόμενοι πρός τε Ἀθηναίων ναῦς ἑκκαίδεκα καὶ Ῥηγίνας ὀκτώ. [2] καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τάχους ἀπέπλευσαν ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα στρατόπεδα, τό τε ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίῳ, μίαν ναῦν ἀπολέσαντες: καὶ νὺξ ἐπεγένετο τῷ ἔργῳ. [3] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Λοκροὶ ἀπῆλθον ἐκ τῆς Ῥηγίνων, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν Πελωρίδα τῆς Μεσσήνης ξυλλεγεῖσαι αἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων νῆες ὥρμουν καὶ ὁ πεζὸς αὐτοῖς παρῆν. [4] προσπλεύσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Ῥηγῖνοι ὁρῶντες τὰς ναῦς κενὰς ἐνέβαλον, καὶ χειρὶ σιδηρᾷ ἐπιβληθείσῃ μίαν

ναῦν αὐτοὶ ἀπώλεσαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀποκολυμβησάντων. [5] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐσβάντων ἐς τὰς ναῦς καὶ παραπλεόντων ἀπὸ κάλω ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην, αὖθις προσβαλόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀποσιμωσάντων ἐκείνων καὶ προεμβαλόντων, ἑτέραν ναῦν ἀπολλύουσιν. [6] καὶ ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ καὶ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τοιουτοτρόπῳ γενομένῃ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι παρεκομίσθησαν ἐς τὸν ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ λιμένα. [7]καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι, Καμαρίνης ἀγγελθείσης προδίδοσθαι Συρακοσίοις ὑπ᾽ Ἀρχίου καὶ τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἔπλευσαν ἐκεῖσε: Μεσσήνιοι δ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ πανδημεὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἅμα ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Νάξον τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν ὅμορον οὖσαν. [8] καὶ τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τειχήρεις ποιήσαντες τοὺς Ναξίους ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν, τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες κατὰ τὸν Ἀκεσίνην ποταμὸν τὴν γῆν ἐδῄουν, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἐσέβαλλον. [9] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Σικελοὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄκρων πολλοὶ κατέβαινον βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς Μεσσηνίους. καὶ οἱ Νάξιοι ὡς εἶδον, θαρσήσαντες καὶ παρακελευόμενοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὡς οἱ Λεοντῖνοι σφίσι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ξύμμαχοι ἐς τιμωρίαν ἐπέρχονται, ἐκδραμόντες ἄφνω ἐκ τῆς πόλεως προσπίπτουσι τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις, καὶ τρέψαντες ἀπέκτεινάν τε ὑπὲρ χιλίους καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ χαλεπῶς ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου: καὶ γὰρ οἱ βάρβαροι ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐπιπεσόντες τοὺς πλείστους διέφθειραν. [10] καὶ αἱ νῆες σχοῦσαι ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην ὕστερον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἔκασται διεκρίθησαν. Λεοντῖνοι δὲ εὐθὺς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Μεσσήνην ὡς κεκακωμένην ἐστράτευον, καὶ προσβάλλοντες οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ τὸν λιμένα ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐπείρων, ὁ δὲ πεζὸς πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. [11] ἐπεκδρομὴν δὲ ποιησάμενοι οἱ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Λοκρῶν τινὲς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοτέλους, οἳ μετὰ τὸ πάθος ἐγκατελείφθησαν φρουροί, ἐξαπιναίως προσπεσόντες τρέπουσι τοῦ στρατεύματος τῶν Λεοντίνων τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἀπέκτειναν πολλούς. ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ἀποβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἐβοήθουν, καὶ κατεδίωξαν τοὺς Μεσσηνίους πάλιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν,τεταραγμένοις ἐπιγενόμενοι: καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες

ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον. [12] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἕλληνες ἄνευ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατὰ γῆν ἐστράτευον ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους.

[25] In this strait the Syracusans and their allies, who had somewhat more than thirty ships, were compelled to fight late in the day for a vessel which was sailing through. They put out against sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian ships; but, being defeated by the Athenians, they made a hasty retreat, each ship as it best could, to their stations at Messenè and near Rhegium; one ship was lost. Night closed the engagement. After this the Locrians quitted the Rhegian territory, and the Syracusans and their confederates united their fleet and anchored at the promontory of Pelorus near Messenè, where their land-forces were also stationed. The Athenians and Rhegians, sailing up to them, and seeing that the crews were not there, fell upon the empty vessels, but an iron grapnel was thrown out at them, and they in their turn lost a ship, from which the crew escaped by swimming. Then the Syracusans embarked, and, as they were being towed along the shore towards Messenè, the Athenians again attacked them. Making a sudden twist outwards they struck the first blow at the Athenians, who lost another ship. Thus both in the movement along the coast and in the naval engagement which ensued, the Syracusans proved themselves quite a match for the Athenians, and at length made their way into the harbour at Messenè.The Athenians, hearing that Camarina was to be betrayed to the Syracusans by a certain Archias and his confederates, sailed thither. Meanwhile the Messenians, with their whole power by land and with the allied fleet, made war upon Naxos, a Chalcidian city which was their neighbour. On the first day they forced the Naxians to retire within their walls and ravaged the country; on the morrow they sailed round to the mouth of the river Acesines, again ravaged the country, and with their land-forces made incursions right up to the city. But in the meantime a large body of Sicels came down over the heights

to assist the Naxians against the Messenians. Perceiving this the besieged took heart, and shouting to one another that the Leontines and their other Hellenic allies were coming to succour them, they sallied out of the city, charged the Messenians, and put them to flight with a loss of more than a thousand men; the rest with difficulty escaped, for the barbarians fell upon them in the roads and destroyed most of them. The allied fleet, putting into Messenè, broke up and returned home. Whereupon the Leontines and their allies, in concert with the Athenians, marched against the now enfeebled Messenè. The Athenian fleet attempted an assault of the harbour while the army attacked the city. But the Messenians and a Locrian garrison under Demoteles, which after their disaster at Naxos had been left to protect the place, suddenly falling upon them put to flight the main body of the Leontines with great loss; whereupon the Athenians disembarked, came to their aid, and, falling on the Messenians while they were still in confusion, chased them back to the city. They then erected a trophy and retired to Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in Sicily went on fighting against one another by land; but the Athenians took no part in their operations.

26. ἐν δὲ τῇ Πύλῳ ἔτι ἐπολιόρκουν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ στρατόπεδον τῶν Πελοποννησίων κατὰ χώραν ἔμενεν. [2] ἐπίπονος δ᾽ ἦν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἡ φυλακὴ σίτου τε ἀπορίᾳ καὶ ὕδατος: οὐ γὰρ ἦν κρήνη ὅτι μὴ μία ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει τῆς Πύλου καὶ αὕτη οὐ μεγάλη, ἀλλὰ διαμώμενοι τὸν κάχληκα οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἔπινον οἷον εἰκὸς ὕδωρ. [3] στενοχωρία τε ἐν ὀλίγῳ στρατοπεδευομένοις ἐγίγνετο, καὶ τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχουσῶν ὅρμον αἱ μὲν σῖτον ἐν τῇ γῇ ᾑροῦντο κατὰ μέρος, αἱ δὲ μετέωροι ὥρμουν. [4] ἀθυμίαν τε πλείστην ὁ χρόνος παρεῖχε παρὰ λόγον ἐπιγιγνόμενος, οὓς ᾠοντο ἡμερῶν ὀλίγων ἐκπολιορκήσειν ἐν νήσῳ τε ἐρήμῃ καὶ ὕδατι ἀλμυρῷ χρωμένους. [5] αἴτιον δὲ ἦν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προειπόντες ἐς τὴν νῆσον ἐσάγειν σῖτόν τε

τὸν βουλόμενον ἀληλεμένον καὶ οἶνον καὶ τυρὸν καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο βρῶμα, οἷ᾽ ἂν ἐς πολιορκίαν ξυμφέρῃ, τάξαντες ἀργυρίου πολλοῦ καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων τῷ ἐσαγαγόντι ἐλευθερίαν ὑπισχνούμενοι. [6] καὶ ἐσῆγον ἄλλοι τε παρακινδυνεύοντες καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Εἵλωτες, ἀπαίροντες ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ὁπόθεν τύχοιεν καὶ καταπλέοντες ἔτι νυκτὸς ἐς τὰ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τῆς νήσου. [7] μάλιστα δὲ ἐτήρουν ἀνέμῳ καταφέρεσθαι: ῥᾷον γὰρ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν τριήρων ἐλάνθανον, ὁπότε πνεῦμα ἐκ πόντου εἴη: ἄπορον γὰρ ἐγίγνετο περιορμεῖν, τοῖς δὲ ἀφειδὴς ὁ κατάπλους καθειστήκει: ἐπώκελλον γὰρ τὰ πλοῖα τετιμημένα χρημάτων, καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται περὶ τὰς κατάρσεις τῆς νήσου ἐφύλασσον. ὅσοι δὲ γαλήνῃ κινδυνεύσειαν, ἡλίσκοντο. [8] ἐσένεον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα κολυμβηταὶ ὕφυδροι,καλῳδίῳ ἐν ἀσκοῖς ἐφέλκοντες μήκωνα μεμελιτωμένην καὶ λίνου σπέρμα κεκομμένον: ὧν τὸ πρῶτον λανθανόντων φυλακαὶ ὕστερον ἐγένοντο. [9] παντί τε τρόπῳ ἑκάτεροι ἐτεχνῶντο οἱ μὲν ἐσπέμπειν τὰ σιτία, οἱ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν σφᾶς.

[26] At Pylos meanwhile the Athenians continued to blockade the Lacedaemonians in the island, and the Peloponnesian forces on the mainland remained in their old position. The watch was harassing to the Athenians, for they were in want both of food and water; there was only one small well, which was in the acropolis, and the soldiers were commonly in the habit of scraping away the shingle on the sea-shore, and drinking such water as they could get. The Athenian garrison was crowded into a narrow space, and, their ships having no regular anchorage, the crews took their meats on land by turns; one half of the army eating while the other lay at anchor in the open sea. The unexpected length of the siege was a great discouragement to them; they had hoped to starve their enemies out in a few days, for they were on a desert island, and had only brackish water to drink. The secret of this protracted resistance was a proclamation issued by the Lacedaemonians offering large

fixed prices, and freedom if he were a Helot, to any one who would convey into the island meal, wine, cheese or any other provision suitable for a besieged place. Many braved the danger, especially the Helots; they started from all points of Peloponnesus, and before daybreak bore down upon the shore of the island looking towards the open sea. They took especial care to have a strong wind in their favour, since they were less likely to be discovered by the triremes when it blew hard from the sea. The blockade was then impracticable, and the crews of the boats were perfectly reckless in running them aground; for a value had been set upon them, and Lacedaemonian hoplites were waiting to receive them about the landing-places of the island. All however who ventured when the sea was calm were captured. Some too dived and swam by way of the harbour, drawing after them by a cord skins containing pounded linseed and poppy-seeds mixed with honey. At first they were not found out, but afterwards watches were posted. The two parties had all sorts of devices, the one determined to send in food, the other to detect them.

27. ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθήναις πυνθανόμενοι περὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς ὅτι ταλαιπωρεῖται καὶ σῖτος τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ὅτι ἐσπλεῖ, ἠπόρουν καὶ ἐδεδοίκεσαν μὴ σφῶν χειμὼν τὴν φυλακὴν ἐπιλάβοι, ὁρῶντες τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων τὴν περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον κομιδὴν ἀδύνατον ἐσομένην, ἅμα ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ καὶ οὐδ᾽ ἐν θέρει οἷοί τε ὄντες ἱκανὰ περιπέμπειν, τόν τε ἔφορμον χωρίων ἁλιμένων ὄντων οὐκ ἐσόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ σφῶν ἀνέντων τὴν φυλακὴν περιγενήσεσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας ἢ τοῖς πλοίοις ἃ τὸν σῖτον αὐτοῖς ἦγε χειμῶνα τηρήσαντας ἐκπλεύσεσθαι. [2] πάντων τε ἐφοβοῦντο μάλιστα τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ὅτι ἔχοντάς τι ἰσχυρὸν αὐτοὺς ἐνόμιζον οὐκέτι σφίσιν ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι: καὶ μετεμέλοντο τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ δεξάμενοι. [3] Κλέων δὲ γνοὺς αὐτῶν τὴν ἐς αὐτὸν ὑποψίαν περὶ τῆς κωλύμης τῆς ξυμβάσεως οὐ τἀληθῆ ἔφη λέγειν τοὺς ἐξαγγέλλοντας. παραινούντων δὲ τῶν ἀφιγμένων, εἰ μὴ σφίσι πιστεύουσι, κατασκόπους τινὰς

πέμψαι, ᾑρέθη κατάσκοπος αὐτὸς μετὰ Θεαγένους ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων. [4] καὶ γνοὺς ὅτι ἀναγκασθήσεται ἢ ταὐτὰ λέγειν οἷς διέβαλλεν ἢ τἀναντία εἰπὼν ψευδὴς φανήσεσθαι, παρῄνει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ ὡρμημένους τι τὸ πλέον τῇ γνώμῃ στρατεύειν, ὡς χρὴ κατασκόπους μὲν μὴ πέμπειν μηδὲ διαμέλλειν καιρὸν παριέντας, εἰ δὲ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα, πλεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας. [5] καὶ ἐς Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἀπεσήμαινεν, ἐχθρὸς ὢν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν, ῥᾴδιον εἶναι παρασκευῇ, εἰ ἄνδρες εἶεν οἱ στρατηγοί, πλεύσαντας λαβεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, καὶ αὐτός γ᾽ ἄν, εἰ ἦρχε, ποιῆσαι τοῦτο.

[27] When the Athenians heard that their own army was suffering and that supplies were introduced into the island, they began to be anxious and were apprehensive that the blockade might extend into the winter. They reflected that the conveyance of necessaries round the Peloponnese would then be impracticable. Their troops were in a desert place, to which, even in summer, they were not able to send a sufficient supply. The coast was without harbours; and therefore it would be impossible to maintain the blockade. Either the watch would be relaxed and the men would escape; or, taking advantage of a storm, they might sail away in the ships which brought them food. Above all they feared that the Lacedaemonians, who no longer made overtures to them, must now be reassured of the strength of their own position, and they regretted having rejected their advances. Cleon, knowing that he was an object of general mistrust because he had stood in the way of peace, challenged the reports of the messengers from Pylos; who rejoined that, if their words were not believed, the Athenians should send commissioners of their own. And so Theogenes and Cleon himself were chosen commissioners. As he knew that he could only confirm the report of the messengers whom he was calumniating, or would be convicted of falsehood if he contradicted them, observing too that the Athenians were now more disposed to take active measures,

he advised them not to send commissioners, which would only be a loss of valuable time, but, if they were themselves satisfied with the report, to send a fleet against the island. Pointedly alluding to Nicias the son of Niceratus, who was one of the generals and an enemy of his, he declared sarcastically that, if the generals were men, they might easily sail with an expedition to the island and take the garrison, and that this was what he would certainly have done, had he been general.

28. ὁ δὲ Νικίας τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων τι ὑποθορυβησάντων ἐς τὸν Κλέωνα, ὅτι οὐ καὶ νῦν πλεῖ, εἰ ῥᾴδιόν γε αὐτῷ φαίνεται, καὶ ἅμα ὁρῶν αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμῶντα, ἐκέλευεν ἥντινα βούλεται δύναμιν λαβόντα τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι ἐπιχειρεῖν. [2] ὁ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἰόμενος αὐτὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἀφιέναι ἑτοῖμος ἦν, γνοὺς δὲ τῷ ὄντι παραδωσείοντα ἀνεχώρει καὶ οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνον στρατηγεῖν, δεδιὼς ἤδη καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενός οἱ αὐτὸν τολμῆσαι ὑποχωρῆσαι. [3] αὖθις δὲ ὁ Νικίας ἐκέλευε καὶ ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς καὶ μάρτυρας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐποιεῖτο. οἱ δέ, οἷον ὄχλος φιλεῖ ποιεῖν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ Κλέων ὑπέφευγε τὸν πλοῦν καὶ ἐξανεχώρει τὰ εἰρημένα, τόσῳ ἐπεκελεύοντο τῷ Νικίᾳ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐπεβόων πλεῖν. [4] ὥστε οὐκ ἔχων ὅπως τῶν εἰρημένων ἔτι ἐξαπαλλαγῇ, ὑφίσταται τὸν πλοῦν, καὶ παρελθὼν οὔτε φοβεῖσθαι ἔφη Λακεδαιμονίους πλεύσεσθαί τε λαβὼν ἐκ μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὐδένα, Λημνίους δὲ καὶ Ἰμβρίους τοὺς παρόντας καὶ πελταστὰς οἳ ἦσαν ἔκ τε Αἴνου βεβοηθηκότες καὶ ἄλλοθεν τοξότας τετρακοσίους: ταῦτα δὲ ἔχων ἔφη πρὸς τοῖς ἐν Πύλῳ στρατιώταις ἐντὸς ἡμερῶν εἴκοσιν ἢ ἄξειν Λακεδαιμονίους ζῶντας ἢ αὐτοῦ ἀποκτενεῖν. [5] τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε μέν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῇ κουφολογίᾳ αὐτοῦ, ἀσμένοις δ᾽ ὅμως ἐγίγνετο τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, λογιζομένοις δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου τεύξεσθαι, ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι, ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον, ἢ σφαλεῖσι γνώμης Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι.

[28] Nicias perceived that the multitude were murmuring at Cleon, and asking ‘why he did not sail in any case — now was his time if he thought the capture of Sphacteria to be such an easy matter’; and hearing him find fault, he told him that, as far as they, the generals, were concerned, he might take any force which he required and try. Cleon at first imagined that the offer of Nicias was only a pretence, and was willing to go; but finding that he was in earnest, he tried to back out; and said that not he but Nicias was general. He was now alarmed, for he never imagined that Nicias would go so far as to give up his place to him Again Nicias bade him take the command of the expedition against Pylos, which he formally gave up to him in the presence of the assembly. And the more Cleon declined the proffered command and tried to retract what he had said, so much the more the multitude, as their manner is, urged Nicias to resign and shouted to Cleon that he should sail. At length, not knowing how to escape from his own words, he undertook the expedition, and, coming forward, said that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians, and that he would sail without taking a single man from the city if he were allowed to have the Lemnian and Imbrian forces now at Athens, the auxiliaries from Aenus, who were targeteers, and four hundred archers from other places. With these and with the troops already at Pylos he gave his word that within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedaemonians alive or kill them on the spot. His vain words moved the Athenians to laughter; nevertheless; the wiser sort of men were pleased when they reflected that of two good things they could not fail to obtain one — either there would be no more trouble with Cleon, which they would have greatly preferred, or, if they were disappointed, he would put the Lacedaemonians into their hands.

29. καὶ πάντα διαπραξάμενος ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ψηφισαμένων Ἀθηναίων αὐτῷ τὸν πλοῦν, τῶν τε ἐν Πύλῳ στρατηγῶν ἕνα προσελόμενος Δημοσθένη, τὴν ἀναγωγὴν

διὰ τάχους ἐποιεῖτο. [2] τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη προσέλαβε πυνθανόμενος τὴν ἀπόβασιν αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν νῆσον διανοεῖσθαι. οἱ γὰρ στρατιῶται κακοπαθοῦντες τοῦ χωρίου τῇ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ μᾶλλον πολιορκούμενοι ἢ πολιορκοῦντες ὥρμηντο διακινδυνεῦσαι. καὶ αὐτῷ ἔτι ῥώμην καὶ ἡ νῆσος ἐμπρησθεῖσα παρέσχεν. [3] πρότερον μὲν γὰρ οὔσης αὐτῆς ὑλώδους ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἀτριβοῦς διὰ τὴν αἰεὶ ἐρημίαν ἐφοβεῖτο καὶ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων τοῦτο ἐνόμιζε μᾶλλον εἶναι: πολλῷ γὰρ ἂν στρατοπέδῳ ἀποβάντι ἐξ ἀφανοῦς χωρίου προσβάλλοντας αὐτοὺς βλάπτειν. σφίσι μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἐκείνων ἁμαρτίας καὶ παρασκευὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ὕλης οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως δῆλα εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ αὐτῶν στρατοπέδου καταφανῆ ἂν εἶναι πάντα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, ὥστε προσπίπτειν ἂν αὐτοὺς ἀπροσδοκήτως ᾗ βούλοιντο: ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις γὰρ εἶναι ἂν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν. [4] εἰ δ᾽ αὖ ἐς δασὺ χωρίον βιάζοιτο ὁμόσε ἰέναι, τοὺς ἐλάσσους, ἐμπείρους δὲ τῆς χώρας, κρείσσους ἐνόμιζε τῶν πλεόνων ἀπείρων: λανθάνειν τε ἂν τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον πολὺ ὂν διαφθειρόμενον, οὐκ οὔσης τῆς προσόψεως ᾗ χρῆν ἀλλήλοις ἐπιβοηθεῖν.

[29] When he had concluded the affair in the assembly, and the Athenians had passed the necessary vote for his expedition, he made choice of Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, to be his colleague, and proceeded to sail with all speed. He selected Demosthenes because he heard that he was already intending to make an attack upon the island; for the soldiers, who were suffering much from the discomfort of the place, in which they were rather besieged than besiegers, were eager to strike a decisive blow. He had been much encouraged by a fire which had taken place in the island. It had previously been nearly covered with wood and was pathless, having never been inhabited; and he had feared that the nature of the country would give the enemy an advantage. For, however large the force with which he landed, the Lacedaemonians might attack him from some place of ambush and do him much injury. Their mistakes and the character of their forces would be concealed by the

wood; whereas all the errors made by his own army would be palpable, and so the enemy, with whom the power of attack would rest, might come upon them suddenly wherever they liked. And if they were compelled to go into the wood and there engage, a smaller force which knew the ground would be more than a match for the larger number who were unacquainted with it. Their own army, however numerous, would be destroyed without knowing it, for they would not be able to see where they needed one another’s assistance.

30. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰτωλικοῦ πάθους, ὃ διὰ τὴν ὕλην μέρος τι ἐγένετο, οὐχ ἥκιστα αὐτὸν ταῦτα ἐσῄει. [2] τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν ἀναγκασθέντων διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν τῆς νήσου τοῖς ἐσχάτοις προσίσχοντας ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι διὰ προφυλακῆς καὶ ἐμπρήσαντός τινος κατὰ μικρὸν τῆς ὕλης ἄκοντος καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου πνεύματος ἐπιγενομένου τὸ πολὺ αὐτῆς ἔλαθε κατακαυθέν. [3] οὕτω δὴ τούς τε Λακεδαιμονίους μᾶλλον κατιδὼν πλείους ὄντας, ὑπονοῶν πρότερον ἐλάσσοσι τὸν σῖτον αὐτοῦ ἐσπέμπειν, τήν τε νῆσον εὐαποβατωτέραν οὖσαν, τότε ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀξιόχρεων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μᾶλλον σπουδὴν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν παρεσκευάζετο, στρατιάν τε μεταπέμπων ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς ξυμμάχων καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἑτοιμάζων. [4]Κλέων δὲ ἐκείνῳ τε προπέμψας ἄγγελον ὡς ἥξων καὶ ἔχων στρατιὰν ἣν ᾐτήσατο, ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Πύλον. καὶ ἅμα γενόμενοι πέμπουσι πρῶτον ἐς τὸ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ στρατόπεδον κήρυκα, προκαλούμενοι, εἰ βούλοιντο, ἄνευ κινδύνου τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἄνδρας σφίσι τά τε ὅπλα καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κελεύειν παραδοῦναι, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ φυλακῇ τῇ μετρίᾳ τηρήσονται, ἕως ἄν τι περὶ τοῦ πλέονος ξυμβαθῇ.

[30] Demosthenes was led to make these reflections from his experience in Aetolia, where his defeat had been in a great measure owing to the forest. However, while the Athenian soldiers were taking their midday meal, with a guard posted in advance, at the extremity of the island, compelled as they were by want of room to land on the edge of the shore at meal-times, some one unintentionally set fire to a portion of

the wood; a wind came on; and from this accident, before they knew what was happening, the greater part of it was burnt. Demosthenes, who had previously suspected that the Lacedaemonians when they sent in provisions to the besieged had exaggerated their number, saw that the men were more numerous than he had imagined. He saw too the increased zeal of the Athenians, who were now convinced that the attempt was worth making; and the island seemed to him more accessible. So he prepared for the descent, despatching messengers to the allies in the neighbourhood for additional forces and putting all in readiness. Cleon sent and announced to Demosthenes his approach, and soon afterwards, bringing with him the army which he had requested, himself arrived at Pylos. On the meeting of the two generals they first of all sent a herald to the Lacedaemonian force on the mainland, proposing that they should avoid any further risk by ordering the men in the island to surrender with their arms; they were to be placed under surveillance but well treated until a general peace was concluded.

31. οὐ προσδεξαμένων δὲ αὐτῶν μίαν μὲν ἡμέραν ἐπέσχον, τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀνηγάγοντο μὲν νυκτὸς ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγας ναῦς τοὺς ὁπλίτας πάντας ἐπιβιβάσαντες, πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἕω ὀλίγον ἀπέβαινον τῆς νήσου ἑκατέρωθεν, ἔκ τε τοῦ πελάγους καὶ πρὸς τοῦ λιμένος, ὁκτακόσιοι μάλιστα ὄντες ὁπλῖται, καὶ ἐχώρουν δρόμῳ ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον φυλακτήριον τῆς νήσου. [2] ὧδε γὰρ διετετάχατο: ἐν ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ φυλακῇ ὡς τριάκοντα ἦσαν ὁπλῖται, μέσον δὲ καὶ ὁμαλώτατόν τε καὶ περὶ τὸ ὕδωρ οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν καὶ Ἐπιτάδας ὁ ἄρχων εἶχε, μέρος δέ τι οὐ πολὺ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐφύλασσε τῆς νήσου τὸ πρὸς τὴν Πύλον, ὃ ἦν ἔκ τε θαλάσσης ἀπόκρημνον καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἥκιστα ἐπίμαχον: καὶ γάρ τι καὶ ἔρυμα αὐτόθι ἦν παλαιὸν λίθων λογάδην πεποιημένον, ὃ ἐνόμιζον σφίσιν ὠφέλιμον ἂν εἶναι, εἰ καταλαμβάνοι ἀναχώρησις βιαιοτέρα. οὕτω μὲν τεταγμένοι ἦσαν.

[31] Finding that their proposal was rejected, the Athenians waited for a day, and on the night of the day following put off, taking with them all their heavy-armed troops, whom they had embarked in a few ships. A little before dawn they landed on both sides of the island, towards the sea and towards the harbour, a force amounting in all to about eight hundred men. They then ran as fast as they could to the first station on the island. Now the disposition of the enemy was as follows: This first station was garrisoned by about thirty hoplites, while the main body under the command of Epitadas was posted near the spring in the centre of the island, where the ground was most level. A small force guarded the furthest extremity of the island opposite Pylos, which was precipitous towards the sea, and on the land side the strongest point of all, being protected to some extent by an ancient wall made of rough stones, which the Spartans thought would be of use to them if they were overpowered and compelled to retreat. Such was the disposition of the Lacedaemonian troops.

32. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς μὲν πρώτους φύλακας, οἷς ἐπέδραμον, εὐθὺς διαφθείρουσιν ἔν τε ταῖς εὐναῖς ἔτι καὶ ἀναλαμβάνοντας τὰ ὅπλα, λαθόντες τὴν ἀπόβασιν, οἰομένων αὐτῶν τὰς ναῦς κατὰ τὸ ἔθος ἐς ἔφορμον τῆς νυκτὸς πλεῖν. [2] ἅμα δὲ ἕῳ γιγνομένῃ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος στρατὸς ἀπέβαινεν, ἐκ μὲν νεῶν ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ὀλίγῳ πλεόνων πάντες πλὴν θαλαμιῶν, ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐσκευασμένοι, τοξόται δὲ ὀκτακόσιοι καὶ πελτασταὶ οὐκ ἐλάσσους τούτων, Μεσσηνίων τε οἱ βεβοηθηκότες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι περὶ Πύλον κατεῖχον πάντες πλὴν τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους φυλάκων. [3] Δημοσθένους δὲ τάξαντος διέστησαν κατὰ διακοσίους τε καὶ πλείους, ἔστι δ᾽ ᾗ ἐλάσσους, τῶν χωρίων τὰ μετεωρότατα λαβόντες, ὅπως ὅτι πλείστη ἀπορία ᾖ τοῖς πολεμίοις πανταχόθεν κεκυκλωμένοις καὶ μὴ ἔχωσι πρὸς ὅτι ἀντιτάξωνται, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφίβολοι γίγνωνται τῷ πλήθει, εἰ μὲν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐπίοιεν, ὑπὸ τῶν κατόπιν βαλλόμενοι, εἰ δὲ τοῖς πλαγίοις, ὑπὸ τῶν ἑκατέρωθεν παρατεταγμένων.

[4]κατὰ νώτου τε αἰεὶ ἔμελλον αὐτοῖς, ᾗ χωρήσειαν, οἱ πολέμιοι ἔσεσθαι ψιλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπορώτατοι, τοξεύμασι καὶ ἀκοντίοις καὶ λίθοις καὶ σφενδόναις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἔχοντες ἀλκήν, οἷς μηδὲ ἐπελθεῖν οἷόν τε ἦν: φεύγοντές τε γὰρ ἐκράτουν καὶ ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐπέκειντο. τοιαύτῃ μὲν γνώμῃ ὁ Δημοσθένης τό τε πρῶτον τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἐπενόει καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἔταξεν:

[32] The Athenians rushed upon the first garrison and cut them down, half asleep as they were and just snatching up their arms. Their landing had been unobserved, the enemy supposing that the ships were only gone to keep the customary watch for the night. When the dawn appeared, the rest of the army began to disembark. They were the crews of rather more than seventy ships, including all but the lowest rank of rowers, variously equipped. There were also archers to the number of eight hundred, and as many targeteers, besides the Messenian auxiliaries and all who were on duty about Pylos, except the guards who could not be spared from the walls of the fortress. Demosthenes divided them into parties of two hundred more or less, who seized the highest points of the island in order that the enemy, being completely surrounded and distracted by the number of their opponents, might not know whom they should face first, but might be exposed to missiles on every side. For if they attacked those who were in front, they would be assailed by those behind; and if those on one flank, by those posted on the other; and whichever way they moved, the light-armed troops of the enemy were sure to be in their rear. These were their most embarrassing opponents, because they were armed with bows and javelins and slings and stones, which could be used with effect at a distance. Even to approach them was impossible, for they conquered in their very flight, and when an enemy retreated, pressed close at his heels. Such was the plan of the descent which Demosthenes had in his mind, and which he now carried into execution.

33. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπιτάδαν καὶ ὅπερ ἦν πλεῖστον τῶν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ὡς εἶδον τό τε πρῶτον φυλακτήριον διεφθαρμένον καὶ στρατὸν σφίσιν ἐπιόντα, ξυνετάξαντο καὶ τοῖς ὁπλίταις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπῇσαν, βουλόμενοι ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν: ἐξ ἐναντίας γὰρ οὗτοι καθειστήκεσαν, ἐκ πλαγίου δὲ οἱ ψιλοὶ καὶ κατὰ νώτου. [2] τοῖς μὲν οὖν ὁπλίταις οὐκ ἐδυνήθησαν προσμεῖξαι οὐδὲ τῇ σφετέρᾳ ἐμπειρίᾳ χρήσασθαι: οἱ γὰρ ψιλοὶ ἑκατέρωθεν βάλλοντες εἶργον, καὶ ἅμα ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἀντεπῇσαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχαζον: τοὺς δὲ ψιλούς, ᾗ μάλιστα αὐτοῖς ἐπιθέοντες προσκέοιντο, ἔτρεπον, καὶ οἳ ὑποστρέφοντες ἠμύνοντο, ἄνθρωποι κούφως τε ἐσκευασμένοι καὶ προλαμβάνοντες ῥᾳδίως τῆς φυγῆς χωρίων τε χαλεπότητι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς πρὶν ἐρημίας τραχέων ὄντων, ἐν οἷς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐκ ἐδύναντο διώκειν ὅπλα ἔχοντες.

[33] The main body of the Lacedaemonians on the island under Epitadas, when they saw the first garrison cut to pieces and an army approaching them, drew up in battle array. The Athenian hoplites were right in front, and the Lacedaemonians advanced against them, wanting to come to close quarters; but having light-armed adversaries both on their flank and rear, they could not get at them or profit by their own military skill, for they were impeded by a shower of missiles from both sides. Meanwhile the Athenians instead of going to meet them remained in position, while the light-armed again and again ran up and attacked the Lacedaemonians, who drove them back where they pressed closest. But though compelled to retreat they still continued fighting, being lightly equipped and easily getting the start of their enemies. The ground was difficult and rough, the island having been uninhabited; and the Lacedaemonians, who were incumbered by their arms, could not pursue them in such a place.

34. χρόνον μὲν οὖν τινὰ ὀλίγον οὕτω πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἠκροβολίσαντο: τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐκέτι ὀξέως ἐπεκθεῖν ᾗ προσπίπτοιεν δυναμένων, γνόντες αὐτοὺς οἱ

ψιλοὶ βραδυτέρους ἤδη ὄντας τῷ ἀμύνασθαι, καὶ αὐτοὶ τῇ τε ὄψει τοῦ θαρσεῖν τὸ πλεῖστον εἰληφότες πολλαπλάσιοι φαινόμενοι καὶ ξυνειθισμένοι μᾶλλον μηκέτι δεινοὺς αὐτοὺς ὁμοίως σφίσι φαίνεσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ εὐθὺς ἄξια τῆς προσδοκίας ἐπεπόνθεσαν, ὥσπερ ὅτε πρῶτον ἀπέβαινον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, καταφρονήσαντες καὶ ἐμβοήσαντες ἀθρόοι ὥρμησαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔβαλλον λίθοις τε καὶ τοξεύμασι καὶ ἀκοντίοις, ὡς ἕκαστός τι πρόχειρον εἶχεν. [2] γενομένης δὲ τῆς βοῆς ἅμα τῇ ἐπιδρομῇ ἔκπληξίς τε ἐνέπεσεν ἀνθρώποις ἀήθεσι τοιαύτης μάχης καὶ ὁ κονιορτὸς τῆς ὕλης νεωστὶ κεκαυμένης ἐχώρει πολὺς ἄνω, ἄπορόν τε ἦν ἰδεῖν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν τοξευμάτων καὶ λίθων ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων μετὰ τοῦ κονιορτοῦ ἅμα φερομένων. [3] τό τε ἔργον ἐνταῦθα χαλεπὸν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καθίστατο: οὔτε γὰρ οἱ πῖλοι ἔστεγον τὰ τοξεύματα, δοράτιά τε ἐναπεκέκλαστο βαλλομένων, εἶχόν τε οὐδὲν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι ἀποκεκλῃμένοι μὲν τῇ ὄψει τοῦ προορᾶν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μείζονος βοῆς τῶν πολεμίων τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς παραγγελλόμενα οὐκ ἐσακούοντες, κινδύνου τε πανταχόθεν περιεστῶτος καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα καθ᾽ ὅτι χρὴ ἀμυνομένους σωθῆναι.

[34] For some little time these skirmishes continued. But soon the Lacedaemonians became too weary to rush out upon their assailants, who began to be sensible that their resistance grew feebler. The sight of their own number, which was many times that of the enemy, encouraged them more than anything; they soon found that their losses were trifling compared with what they had expected; and familiarity made them think their opponents much less formidable than when they first landed cowed by the fear of facing Lacedaemonians. They now despised them and with a loud cry rushed upon them in a body, hurling at them stones, arrows, javelins, whichever came first to hand. The shout with which they accompanied the attack dismayed the Lacedaemonians, who were unaccustomed to this kind of warfare. Clouds of dust arose from the newly-burnt wood,

and there was no possibility of a man’s seeing what was before him, owing to the showers of arrows and stones hurled by their assailants which were flying amid the dust. And now the Lacedaemonians began to be sorely distressed, for their felt cuirasses did not protect them against the arrows, and the points of the javelins broke off where they struck them. They were at their wits’ end, not being able to see out of their eyes or to hear the word of command, which was drowned by the cries of the enemy. Destruction was staring them in the face, and they had no means or hope of deliverance.

35. τέλος δὲ τραυματιζομένων ἤδη πολλῶν διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ξυγκλῄσαντες ἐχώρησαν ἐς τὸ ἔσχατον ἔρυμα τῆς νήσου, ὃ οὐ πολὺ ἀπεῖχε, καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν φύλακας. [2] ὡς δὲ ἐνέδοσαν, ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πολλῷ ἔτι πλέονι βοῇ τεθαρσηκότες οἱ ψιλοὶ ἐπέκειντο, καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὅσοι μὲν ὑποχωροῦντες ἐγκατελαμβάνοντο, ἀπέθνῃσκον, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ διαφυγόντες ἐς τὸ ἔρυμα μετὰ τῶν ταύτῃ φυλάκων ἐτάξαντο παρὰ πᾶν ὡς ἀμυνούμενοι ᾗπερ ἦν ἐπίμαχον. [3] καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπισπόμενοι περίοδον μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ κύκλωσιν χωρίου ἰσχύι οὐκ εἶχον, προσιόντες δὲ ἐξ ἐναντίας ὥσασθαι ἐπειρῶντο. [4] καὶ χρόνον μὲν πολὺν καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας τὸ πλεῖστον ταλαιπωρούμενοι ἀμφότεροι ὑπό τε τῆς μάχης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἡλίου ἀντεῖχον, πειρώμενοι οἱ μὲν ἐξελάσασθαι ἐκ τοῦ μετεώρου, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐνδοῦναι: ῥᾷον δ᾽ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἠμύνοντο ἢ ἐν τῷ πρίν, οὐκ οὔσης σφῶν τῆς κυκλώσεως ἐς τὰ πλάγια.

[35] At length, finding that so long as they fought in the same narrow spot more and more of their men were wounded, they closed their ranks and fell back on the last fortification of the island, which was not far off, and where their other garrison was stationed. Instantly the light-armed troops of the Athenians pressed upon them with fresh confidence, redoubling their cries. Those of the Lacedaemonians who were caught by them on the way were killed, but the greater number escaped to the fort and

ranged themselves with the garrison, resolved to defend the heights wherever they were assailable. The Athenians followed, but the strength of the position made it impossible to surround and cut them off, and so they attacked them in face and tried to force them back. For a long time, and indeed during the greater part of the day, both armies, although suffering from the battle and thirst and the heat of the sun, held their own; the one endeavouring to thrust their opponents from the high ground, the other determined not to give way. But the Lacedaemonians now defended themselves with greater ease, because they were not liable to be taken in flank.

36. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπέραντον ἦν, προσελθὼν ὁ τῶν Μεσσηνίων στρατηγὸς Κλέωνι καὶ Δημοσθένει ἄλλως ἔφη πονεῖν σφᾶς: εἰ δὲ βούλονται ἑαυτῷ δοῦναι τῶν τοξοτῶν μέρος τι καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν περιιέναι κατὰ νώτου αὐτοῖς ὁδῷ ᾗ ἂν αὐτὸς εὕρῃ, δοκεῖν βιάσεσθαι τὴν ἔφοδον. [2] λαβὼν δὲ ἃ ᾐτήσατο, ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς ὁρμήσας ὥστε μὴ ἰδεῖν ἐκείνους, κατὰ τὸ αἰεὶ παρεῖκον τοῦ κρημνώδους τῆς νήσου προσβαίνων, καὶ ᾗ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι χωρίου ἰσχύι πιστεύσαντες οὐκ ἐφύλασσον, χαλεπῶς τε καὶ μόλις περιελθὼν ἔλαθε, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μετεώρου ἐξαπίνης ἀναφανεὶς κατὰ νώτου αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ ἐξέπληξε, τοὺς δὲ ἃ προσεδέχοντο ἰδόντας πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωσεν. [3] καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι βαλλόμενοί τε ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἤδη καὶ γιγνόμενοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ξυμπτώματι, ὡς μικρὸν μεγάλῳ εἰκάσαι, τῷ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις, ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ τῇ ἀτραπῷ περιελθόντων τῶν Περσῶν διεφθάρησαν, οὗτοί τε ἀμφίβολοι ἤδη ὄντες οὐκέτι ἀντεῖχον, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς τε ὀλίγοι μαχόμενοι καὶ ἀσθενείᾳ σωμάτων διὰ τὴν σιτοδείαν ὑπεχώρουν, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκράτουν ἤδη τῶν ἐφόδων.

[36] There was no sign of the end. At length the general of the Messenian contingent came to Cleon and Demosthenes and told them that the army was throwing away its pains, but if they would give him some archers and light-armed troops and let him find a path by which he might get round

in the rear of the Lacedaemonians, he thought that he could force the approach. Having obtained his request he started from a point out of sight of the enemy, and making his way wherever the broken ground afforded a footing and where the cliff was so steep that no guards had been set, he and his men with great difficulty got round unseen and suddenly appeared on the summit in their rear, striking panic into the astonished enemy and redoubling the courage of his own friends who were watching for his reappearance. The Lacedaemonians were now assailed on both sides, and to compare a smaller thing to a greater, were in the same case with their own countrymen at Thermopylae. For as they perished when the Persians found a way round by the path, so now the besieged garrison were attacked on both sides, and no longer resisted. The disparity of numbers, and the failure of bodily strength arising from want of food, compelled them to fall back; and the Athenians were at length masters of the approaches.

37. γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Κλέων καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης [ὅτι], εἰ καὶ ὁποσονοῦν μᾶλλον ἐνδώσουσι, διαφθαρησομένους αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς σφετέρας στρατιᾶς, ἔπαυσαν τὴν μάχην καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀπεῖρξαν, βουλόμενοι ἀγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις ζῶντας, εἴ πως τοῦ κηρύγματος ἀκούσαντες ἐπικλασθεῖεν τῇ γνώμῃ τὰ ὅπλα παραδοῦναι καὶ ἡσσηθεῖεν τοῦ παρόντος δεινοῦ. [2] ἐκήρυξάν τε, εἰ βούλονται, τὰ ὅπλα παραδοῦναι καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις ὥστε βουλεῦσαι ὅτι ἂν ἐκείνοις δοκῇ.

[37] Cleon and Demosthenes saw that if the Lacedaemonians gave way one step more they would be destroyed by the Athenians; so they stopped the engagement and held back their own army, for they wanted, if possible, to bring them alive to Athens. They were in hopes that when they heard the offer of terms their courage might be broken, and that they might be induced by their desperate situation to yield up their arms. Accordingly they proclaimed to them that

they might, if they would, surrender at discretion to the Athenians themselves and their arms.

38. οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες παρῆκαν τὰς ἀσπίδας οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀνέσεισαν, δηλοῦντες προσίεσθαι τὰ κεκηρυγμένα. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα γενομένης τῆς ἀνοκωχῆς ξυνῆλθον ἐς λόγους ὅ τε Κλέων καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ ἐκείνων Στύφων ὁ Φάρακος, τῶν πρότερον ἀρχόντων τοῦ μὲν πρώτου τεθνηκότος Ἐπιτάδου, τοῦ δὲ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν Ἱππαγρέτου ἐφῃρημένου ἐν τοῖς νεκροῖς ἔτι ζῶντος κειμένου ὡς τεθνεῶτος, αὐτὸς τρίτος ἐφῃρημένος ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον, εἴ τι ἐκεῖνοι πάσχοιεν. [2] ἔλεγε δὲ ὁ Στύφων καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὅτι βούλονται διακηρυκεύσασθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Λακεδαιμονίους ὅτι χρὴ σφᾶς ποιεῖν. [3] καὶ ἐκείνων μὲν οὐδένα ἀφέντων, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καλούντων ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου κήρυκας καὶ γενομένων ἐπερωτήσεων δὶς ἢ τρίς, ὁ τελευταῖος διαπλεύσας αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου Λακεδαιμονίων ἀνὴρ ἀπήγγειλεν ὅτι [οἱ] ‘Λακεδαιμόνιοι κελεύουσιν ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν βουλεύεσθαι μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιοῦντας’: οἱ δὲ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς βουλευσάμενοι τὰ ὅπλα παρέδοσαν καὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς. [4] καὶ ταύτην μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν νύκτα ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχον αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι: τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἐν τῇ νήσῳ τἆλλα διεσκευάζοντο ὡς ἐς πλοῦν, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοῖς τριηράρχοις διεδίδοσαν ἐς φυλακήν, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κήρυκα πέμψαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς διεκομίσαντο. [5] ἀπέθανον δ᾽ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ ζῶντες ἐλήφθησαν τοσοίδε: εἴκοσι μὲν ὁπλῖται διέβησαν καὶ τετρακόσιοι οἱ πάντες: τούτων ζῶντες ἐκομίσθησαν ὀκτὼ ἀποδέοντες τριακόσιοι, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἀπέθανον. καὶ Σπαρτιᾶται τούτων ἦσαν τῶν ζώντων περὶ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν. Ἀθηναίων δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ διεφθάρησαν: ἡ γὰρ μάχη οὐ σταδαία ἦν.

[38] Upon hearing the proclamation most of them lowered their shields and waved their hands in token of their willingness to yield. A truce was made, and then Cleon and Demosthenes on the part of the Athenians, and Styphon the

son of Pharax on the part of the Lacedaemonians, held a parley. Epitadas, who was the first in command, had been already slain; Hippagretas, who was next in succession, lay among the slain for dead; and Styphon had taken the place of the two others, having been appointed, as the law prescribed, in case anything should happen to them. He and his companions expressed their wish to communicate with the Lacedaemonians on the mainland as to the course which they should pursue. The Athenians allowed none of them to stir, but themselves invited heralds from the shore; and after two or three communications, the herald who came over last from the body of the army brought back word, 'The Lacedaemonians bid you act as you think best, but you are not to dishonour yourselves.' Whereupon they consulted together, and then gave up themselves and their arms. During that day and the following night the Athenians kept guard over them; on the next day they set up a trophy on the island and made preparations to sail, distributing the prisoners among the trierarchs. The Lacedaemonians sent a herald and conveyed away their own dead. The number of the dead and the prisoners was as follows: — Four hundred and twenty hoplites in all passed over into the island; of these, two hundred and ninety-two were brought to Athens alive, the remainder had perished. Of the survivors the Spartans numbered about a hundred and twenty. But few Athenians fell, for there was no regular engagement.

39. χρόνος δὲ ὁ ξύμπας ἐγένετο ὅσον οἱ ἄνδρες [οἱ] ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἐπολιορκήθησαν, ἀπὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας μέχρι τῆς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ μάχης, ἑβδομήκοντα ἡμέραι καὶ δύο. [2] τούτων περὶ εἴκοσιν ἡμέρας, ἐν αἷς οἱ πρέσβεις περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν ἀπῆσαν, ἐσιτοδοτοῦντο, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τοῖς ἐσπλέουσι λάθρᾳ διετρέφοντο. καὶ ἦν σῖτός τις ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ ἄλλα βρώματα ἐγκατελήφθη: ὁ γὰρ ἄρχων Ἐπιτάδας ἐνδεεστέρως ἑκάστῳ παρεῖχεν ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἐξουσίαν. [3] οἱ μὲν δὴ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ στρατῷ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου ἑκάτεροι ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος

καίπερ μανιώδης οὖσα ἡ ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη: ἐντὸς γὰρ εἴκοσιν ἡμερῶν ἦγαγε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ὥσπερ ὑπέστη.

[39] Reckoned from the sea-fight to the final battle in the island, the time during which the blockade lasted was ten weeks and two days. For about three weeks the Lacedaemonians were supplied with food while the Spartan ambassadors were gone to solicit peace, but during the rest of this time they lived on what was brought in by stealth. A store of corn and other provisions was found in the island at the time of the capture; for the commander Epitadas had not served out full rations. The Athenians and Peloponnesians now withdrew their armies from Pylos and returned home. And the mad promise of Cleon was fulfilled; for he did bring back the prisoners within twenty days, as he had said.

40. παρὰ γνώμην τε δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο: τοὺς γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίους οὔτε λιμῷ οὔτ᾽ ἀνάγκῃ οὐδεμιᾷ ἠξίουν τὰ ὅπλα παραδοῦναι, ἀλλὰ ἔχοντας καὶ μαχομένους ὡς ἐδύναντο ἀποθνῄσκειν. [2] ἀπιστοῦντές τε μὴ εἶναι τοὺς παραδόντας τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ὁμοίους, καί τινος ἐρομένου ποτὲ ὕστερον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμάχων δι᾽ ἀχθηδόνα ἕνα τῶν ἐκ τῆς νήσου αἰχμαλώτων εἰ οἱ τεθνεῶτες αὐτῶν καλοὶ κἀγαθοί, ἀπεκρίνατο αὐτῷ πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιον εἶναι τὸν ἄτρακτον, λέγων τὸν οἰστόν, εἰ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς διεγίγνωσκε, δήλωσιν ποιούμενος ὅτι ὁ ἐντυγχάνων τοῖς τε λίθοις καὶ τοξεύμασι διεφθείρετο.

[40] Nothing which happened during the war caused greater amazement in Hellas; for it was universally imagined that the Lacedaemonians would never give up their arms, either under the pressure of famine or in any other extremity, but would fight to the last and die sword in hand. No one would believe that those who surrendered were men of the same quality with those who perished. There is a story of a reply made by a captive taken in the island to one of the Athenian allies who had sneeringly asked ‘Where were their brave men all killed?’ He answered that ‘The spindle’ (meaning the arrow) `would be indeed a valuable weapon if it picked out

the brave.’ He meant to say that the destruction caused by the arrows and stones was indiscriminate.

41. κομισθέντων δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβούλευσαν δεσμοῖς μὲν αὐτοὺς φυλάσσειν μέχρι οὗ τι ξυμβῶσιν, ἢν δ᾽ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι πρὸ τούτου ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐσβάλωσιν, ἐξαγαγόντες ἀποκτεῖναι. [2] τῆς δὲ Πύλου φυλακὴν κατεστήσαντο, καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου Μεσσήνιοι ὡς ἐς πατρίδα ταύτην ⌈ἔστι γὰρ ἡ Πύλος τῆς Μεσσηνίδος ποτὲ οὔσης γῆς⌉ πέμψαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἐλῄζοντό τε τὴν Λακωνικὴν καὶ πλεῖστα ἔβλαπτον ὁμόφωνοι ὄντες. [3] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ λῃστείας καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου πολέμου, τῶν τε Εἱλώτων αὐτομολούντων καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ μακρότερον σφίσι τι νεωτερισθῇ τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἔφερον, ἀλλὰ καίπερ οὐ βουλόμενοι ἔνδηλοι εἶναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπρεσβεύοντο παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπειρῶντο τήν τε Πύλον καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομίζεσθαι. [4] οἱ δὲ μειζόνων τε ὠρέγοντο καὶ πολλάκις φοιτώντων αὐτοὺς ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμπον. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Πύλον γενόμενα.

[41] On the arrival of the captives the Athenians resolved to put them in chains until peace was concluded, but if in the meantime the Lacedaemonians invaded Attica, to bring them out and put them to death. They placed a garrison in Pylos; and the Messenians of Naupactus, regarding the place as their native land (for Pylos is situated in the territory which was once Messenia), sent thither some of themselves, being such troops as were best suited for the service, who ravaged Laconia and did great harm, because they spoke the same language with the inhabitants. The Lacedaemonians had never before experienced this irregular and predatory warfare; and finding the Helots desert, and dreading some serious domestic calamity, they were in great trouble. Although reluctant to expose their condition before the Athenians, they sent envoys to them and endeavoured to recover Pylos and the prisoners. But the Athenians only raised their terms, and at last, after they had made many

fruitless journeys, dismissed them. Thus ended the affair of Pylos.

42. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους μετὰ ταῦτα εὐθὺς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Κορινθίαν ἐστράτευσαν ναυσὶν ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ δισχιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐν ἱππαγωγοῖς ναυσὶ διακοσίοις ἱππεῦσιν: ἠκολούθουν δὲ καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Μιλήσιοι καὶ Ἄνδριοι καὶ Καρύστιοι, ἐστρατήγει δὲ Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου τρίτος αὐτός. [2] πλέοντες δὲ ἅμα ἕῳ ἔσχον μεταξὺ Χερσονήσου τε καὶ Ῥείτου ἐς τὸν αἰγιαλὸν τοῦ χωρίου ὑπὲρ οὗ ὁ Σολύγειος λόφος ἐστίν, ἐφ᾽ ὃν Δωριῆς τὸ πάλαι ἱδρυθέντες τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει Κορινθίοις ἐπολέμουν οὖσιν Αἰολεῦσιν: καὶ κώμη νῦν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ Σολύγεια καλουμένη ἐστίν. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ τούτου ἔνθα αἱ νῆες κατέσχον ἡ μὲν κώμη αὕτη δώδεκα σταδίους ἀπέχει, ἡ δὲ Κορινθίων πόλις ἑξήκοντα, ὁ δὲ Ἰσθμὸς εἴκοσι. [3] Κορίνθιοι δὲ προπυθόμενοι ἐξ Ἄργους ὅτι ἡ στρατιὰ ἥξει τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐκ πλείονος ἐβοήθησαν ἐς Ἰσθμὸν πάντες πλὴν τῶν ἔξω Ἰσθμοῦ: καὶ ἐν Ἀμπρακίᾳ καὶ ἐν Λευκάδι ἀπῆσαν αὐτῶν πεντακόσιοι φρουροί: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πανδημεὶ ἐπετήρουν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἳ κατασχήσουσιν. [4] ὡς δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔλαθον νυκτὸς καταπλεύσαντες καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτοῖς ἤρθη, καταλιπόντες τοὺς ἡμίσεις αὐτῶν ἐν Κεγχρειᾷ, ἣν ἄρα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τὸν Κρομμυῶνα ἴωσιν, ἐβοήθουν κατὰ τάχος.

[42] During the same summer and immediately afterwards the Athenians attacked the Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand heavy-armed, and cavalry to the number of two hundred conveyed in horse transports. They were accompanied by allies from Miletus, Andros, and Carystus. Nicias the son of Niceratus, and two others, were in command. Very early in the morning they put in between the promontory Chersonesus and the stream Rhetus, to that part of the coast which is overhung by the Solygean ridge; there in ancient times Dorian invaders had taken up their position and fought against their Aeolian enemies in Corinth, and to this day there is a village, called Solygea, on the hill

which they occupied. From the beach where the crews landed this village is distant nearly a mile and a half, the city of Corinth about seven miles, and the isthmus about two miles and a quarter. The Corinthians, having had early intimation from Argos of the intended invasion, came in good time to the isthmus. The whole population, with the exception of those who dwelt to the north of the isthmus and five hundred troops who were employed in protecting Ambracia and Leucadia, was on the watch to see where the Athenians would land. But, having sailed in before daylight, they were not discovered; the Corinthians however were soon informed by signals of their landing; and so, leaving half their troops at Cenchreae in case the Athenians should attack Crommyon, they came to the rescue with all speed.

43. καὶ Βάττος μὲν ὁ ἕτερος τῶν στρατηγῶν — δύο γὰρ ἦσαν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ οἱ παρόντες — λαβὼν λόχον ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Σολύγειαν κώμην φυλάξων ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν, Λυκόφρων δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυνέβαλεν. [2] καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τῷ δεξιῷ κέρᾳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων εὐθὺς ἀποβεβηκότι πρὸ τῆς Χερσονήσου οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐπέκειντο, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατεύματι. καὶ ἦν ἡ μάχη καρτερὰ καὶ ἐν χερσὶ πᾶσα. [3] καὶ τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Καρυστίων — οὗτοι γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι ἦσαν ἔσχατοι — ἐδέξαντό τε τοὺς Κορινθίους καὶ ἐώσαντο μόλις: οἱ δὲ ὑποχωρήσαντες πρὸς αἱμασιάν — ἦν γὰρ τὸ χωρίον πρόσαντες πᾶν — βάλλοντες τοῖς λίθοις καθύπερθεν ὄντες καὶ παιανίσαντες ἐπῆσαν αὖθις, δεξαμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν χερσὶν ἦν πάλιν ἡ μάχη. [4] λόχος δέ τις τῶν Κορινθίων ἐπιβοηθήσας τῷ εὐωνύμῳ κέρᾳ ἑαυτῶν ἔτρεψε τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας καὶ ἐπεδίωξεν ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν: πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀνέστρεψαν οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ Καρύστιοι. [5] τὸ δὲ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐμάχετο ξυνεχῶς, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Κορινθίων, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ὁ Λυκόφρων ὢν κατὰ τὸ εὐώνυμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡμύνετο: ἤλπιζον γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν Σολύγειαν κώμην πειράσειν.

[43] Battus, one of the two generals who were present in the engagement, taking a single division of the force, went to Solygea, intending to protect the village, which was not fortified; Lycophron with the remainder of the army attacked the enemy. The Corinthians first of all assailed the right wing of the Athenians, which had only just landed in front of the Chersonesus, and then engaged with the rest. The conflict was stubborn, and all hand to hand. The Athenians, who were on the right wing, and the Carystians, who were on the extreme right, received the Corinthians, and with some difficulty drove them back. They retired behind a loose stone wall, and the whole place being a steep hill-side, threw the stones down from above; but soon they raised the paean and again came on. Again the Athenians received them, and another hand-to-hand fight ensued, when a division of the Corinthians coming to the aid of their left wing, forced back the right wing of the Athenians and pursued them to the sea; but the Athenians and Carystians in their turn again drove them back from the ships. Meanwhile the rest of the two armies had been fighting steadily. On the right wing of the Corinthians, where Lycophron was opposed to the Athenian left, the defence was most energetic; for he and his troops were apprehensive that the Athenians would move on the village of Solygea.

44. χρόνον μὲν οὖν πολὺν ἀντεῖχον οὐκ ἐνδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις: ἔπειτα ἦσαν γὰρ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οἱ ἱππῆς ὠφέλιμοι ξυμμαχόμενοι, τῶν ἑτέρων οὐκ ἐχόντων ἵππους ἐτράποντο οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ ὑπεχώρησαν πρὸς τὸν λόφον καὶ ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα καὶ οὐκέτι κατέβαινον, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχαζον. [2] ἐν δὲ τῇ τροπῇ ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας οἱ πλεῖστοί τε αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον καὶ Λυκόφρων ὁ στρατηγός. ἡ δὲ ἄλλη στρατιὰ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ οὐ κατὰ δίωξιν πολλὴν οὐδὲ ταχείας φυγῆς γενομένης, ἐπεὶ ἐβιάσθη, ἐπαναχωρήσασα πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἱδρύθη. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐκέτι αὐτοῖς ἐπῇσαν ἐς μάχην, τούς τε νεκροὺς ἐσκύλευον καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀνῃροῦντο, τροπαῖόν τε εὐθέως ἔστησαν. [4] τοῖς δ᾽

ἡμίσεσι τῶν Κορινθίων, οἳ ἐν τῇ Κεγχρειᾷ ἐκάθηντο φύλακες μὴ ἐπὶ τὸν Κρομμυῶνα πλεύσωσι, τούτοις οὐ κατάδηλος ἡ μάχη ἦν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄρους τοῦ Ὀνείου: κονιορτὸν δὲ ὡς εἶδον καὶ [ὡς] ἔγνωσαν, ἐβοήθουν εὐθύς. ἐβοήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πρεσβύτεροι τῶν Κορινθίων αἰσθόμενοι τὸ γεγενημένον. [5] ἰδόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξύμπαντας αὐτοὺς ἐπιόντας καὶ νομίσαντες τῶν ἐγγὺς ἀστυγειτόνων Πελοποννησίων βοήθειαν ἐπιέναι, ἀνεχώρουν κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, ἔχοντες τὰ σκυλεύματα καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νεκροὺς πλὴν δυοῖν, οὓς ἐγκατέλιπον οὐ δυνάμενοι εὑρεῖν. [6] καὶ ἀναβάντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπεραιώθησαν ἐς τὰς ἐπικειμένας νήσους, ἐκ δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐπικηρυκευσάμενοι τοὺς νεκροὺς οὓς ἐγκατέλιπον ὑποσπόνδους ἀνείλοντο. ἀπέθανον δὲ Κορινθίων μὲν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ δώδεκα καὶ διακόσιοι, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους πεντήκοντα.

[44] For a long time neither would give way, but at length the Athenians, having an advantage in cavalry, with which the Corinthians were unprovided, drove them back, and they retired to the summit of the ridge; where they grounded their arms and remained inactive, refusing to come down. In this defeat of their right wing the Corinthians incurred the heaviest loss, and Lycophron their general was slain. The whole army was now forced back upon the high ground, where they remained in position; they were not pursued far, and made a leisurely retreat. The Athenians seeing that they did not return to the attack, at once erected a trophy and began to spoil the enemies’ dead and take up their own. The other half of the Corinthians who were keeping guard at Cenchreae, lest the Athenians should sail against Crommyon, had their view of the battle intercepted by Mount Oneum. But when they saw the dust and knew what was going on, they instantly came to the rescue. The elder men of Corinth hearing of the defeat likewise hastened to the spot. The united army then advanced against the Athenians, who fancying that a reinforcement had come from the neighbouring states of Peloponnesus, quickly

retreated to their ships, taking their spoils and their own dead, with the exception of two whom they could not find; they then embarked and sailed to the neighbouring islands. Thence they sent a herald asking for a truce, and recovered the two dead bodies which were missing. The Corinthians lost two hundred and twelve men; the Athenians hardly so many as fifty.

45. ἄραντες δὲ ἐκ τῶν νήσων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔπλευσαν αὐθημερὸν ἐς Κρομμυῶνα τῆς Κορινθίας: ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς πόλεως εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν σταδίους. καὶ καθορμισάμενοι τήν τε γῆν ἐδῄωσαν καὶ τὴν νύκτα ηὐλίσαντο. [2] τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ παραπλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν πρῶτον καὶ ἀπόβασίν τινα ποιησάμενοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Μέθανα τὴν μεταξὺ Ἐπιδαύρου καὶ Τροιζῆνος, καὶ ἀπολαβόντες τὸν τῆς χερσονήσου ἰσθμὸν ἐτείχισαν, [ἐν ᾧ ἡ Μεθώνη ἐστί,] καὶ φρούριον καταστησάμενοι ἐλῄστευον τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον τήν τε Τροιζηνίαν γῆν καὶ Ἁλιάδα καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίαν. ταῖς δὲ ναυσίν, ἐπειδὴ ἐξετείχισαν τὸ χωρίον, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

[45] On the same day the Athenians sailed from the islands to Crommyon, which is in the territory of Corinth, nearly fourteen miles from the city, and, there anchoring, they ravaged the country and encamped for the night. On the following day they sailed along the coast to Epidaurus, where they made a descent, and then passed onward and came to Methonè, which is situated between Epidaurus and Troezen. They built a wall across the isthmus, and so cut off the peninsula on which Methonè stands. There they established a garrison, which continued for some time to ravage the country of Troezen, Halieis, and Epidaurus. The fleet, when the fortification was completed, returned home.

46. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, καθ᾽ ὃν ταῦτα ἐγίγνετο, καὶ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Σοφοκλῆς, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου ἀπῆραν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων, ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Κέρκυραν ἐστράτευσαν μετὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὄρει τῆς Ἰστώνης Κερκυραίων καθιδρυμένους, οἳ τότε μετὰ τὴν

στάσιν διαβάντες ἐκράτουν τε τῆς γῆς καὶ πολλὰ ἔβλαπτον. [2] προσβαλόντες δὲ τὸ μὲν τείχισμα εἶλον, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες καταπεφευγότες ἀθρόοι πρὸς μετέωρόν τι ξυνέβησαν ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐπικούρους παραδοῦναι, περὶ δὲ σφῶν τὰ ὅπλα παραδόντων τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον διαγνῶναι. [3] καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐς τὴν νῆσον οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν Πτυχίαν ἐς φυλακὴν διεκόμισαν ὑποσπόνδους, μέχρι οὗ Ἀθήναζε πεμφθῶσιν, ὥστ᾽, ἐάν τις ἁλῷ ἀποδιδράσκων, ἅπασι λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδάς. [4] οἱ δὲ τοῦ δήμου προστάται τῶν Κερκυραίων, δεδιότες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς ἐλθόντας οὐκ ἀποκτείνωσι, μηχανῶνται τοιόνδε τι: [5] τῶν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πείθουσί τινας ὀλίγους, ὑποπέμψαντες φίλους καὶ διδάξαντες ὡς κατ᾽ εὔνοιαν δὴ λέγειν ὅτι κράτιστον αὐτοῖς εἴη ὡς τάχιστα ἀποδρᾶναι, πλοῖον δέ τι αὐτοὶ ἑτοιμάσειν: μέλλειν γὰρ δὴ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων παραδώσειν αὐτοὺς τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Κερκυραίων.

[46] Just about this time Eurymedon and Sophocles, who had started from Pylos on their voyage to Sicily with the Athenian fleet, arrived at Corcyra, and in concert with the popular party attacked the Corcyraean oligarchs, who after the revolution had crossed over into the island and settled in Mount Istonè. Here they had become masters of the country again, and were doing great mischief. The Athenians assaulted and took their fortress; the garrison, who had fled in a body to a peak of the hill, came to terms, agreeing to give up their auxiliaries and surrender their arms, but stipulating that their own fate should be decided by the Athenian people. The garrison themselves were conveyed by the generals to the island of Ptychia and kept there under a promise of safety until they could be sent to Athens; on condition however that if any of them were caught attempting to escape, they should all lose the benefit of the agreement. Now the leaders of the Corcyraean democracy feared that when the captives arrived at Athens they would not be put to death; so they devised the following trick: — They sent to the island friends of the captives, whom with

seeming good-will they instructed to tell them that they had better escape as fast as they could, for the fact was that the Athenian generals were about to hand them over to the Corcyraean democracy; they would themselves provide a vessel.

47. ὡς δὲ ἔπεισαν, καὶ μηχανησαμένων τὸ πλοῖον ἐκπλέοντες ἐλήφθησαν, ἐλέλυντό τε αἱ σπονδαὶ καὶ τοῖς Κερκυραίοις παρεδίδοντο οἱ πάντες. [2] ξυνελάβοντο δὲ τοῦ τοιούτου οὐχ ἥκιστα, ὥστε ἀκριβῆ τὴν πρόφασιν γενέσθαι καὶ τοὺς τεχνησαμένους ἀδεέστερον ἐγχειρῆσαι, οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατάδηλοι ὄντες τοὺς ἄνδρας μὴ ἂν βούλεσθαι ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων κομισθέντας, διότι αὐτοὶ ἐς Σικελίαν ἔπλεον, τὴν τιμὴν τοῖς ἄγουσι προσποιῆαι. [3] παραλαβόντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐς οἴκημα μέγα κατεῖρξαν, καὶ ὕστερον ἐξάγοντες κατὰ εἴκοσιν ἄνδρας διῆγον διὰ δυοῖν στοίχοιν ὁπλιτῶν ἑκατέρωθεν παρατεταγμένων, δεδεμένους τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ παιομένους καὶ κεντουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν παρατεταγμένων, εἴ πού τίς τινα ἴδοι ἐχθρὸν ἑαυτοῦ: μαστιγοφόροι τε παριόντες ἐπετάχυνον τῆς ὁδοῦ τοὺς σχολαίτερον προϊόντας.

[47] The friends of the captives persuaded a few of them, and the vessel was provided. The prisoners were taken sailing out; the truce was at an end, and they were all instantly delivered up to the Corcyraeans. The feeling which the Athenian generals displayed greatly contributed to the result; for, being compelled to proceed to Sicily themselves, they were well known to wish that no one else should gain the credit of bringing the prisoners to Athens; and therefore the agreement was interpreted to the letter, and the contrivers of the trick thought that they could execute it with impunity. The Corcyraeans took the prisoners and shut them up in a large building; then, leading them out in bands of twenty at a time, they made them pass between two files of armed men; they were bound to one another and struck and pierced by the men on each side, whenever any one saw

among them an enemy of his own; and there were men with whips, who accompanied them to the place of execution and quickened the steps of those who lingered.

48. καὶ ἐς μὲν ἄνδρας ἑξήκοντα ἔλαθον τοὺς ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐξαγαγόντες καὶ διαφθείραντες ᾤοντο γὰρ αὐτοὺς μεταστήσοντάς ποι ἄλλοσε ἄγειν: ὡς δὲ ᾐσθοντο καί τις αὐτοῖς ἐδήλωσε, τούς τε Ἀθηναίους ἐπεκαλοῦντο καὶ ἐκέλευον σφᾶς, εἰ βούλονται, αὐτοὺς διαφθείρειν, ἔκ τε τοῦ οἰκήματος οὐκέτι ἤθελον ἐξιέναι, οὐδ᾽ ἐσιέναι ἔφασαν κατὰ δύναμιν περιόψεσθαι οὐδένα. [2] οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι κατὰ μὲν τὰς θύρας οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὶ διενοοῦντο βιάζεσθαι, ἀναβάντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ τέγος τοῦ οἰκήματος καὶ διελόντες τὴν ὀροφὴν ἔβαλλον τῷ κεράμῳ καὶ ἐτόξευον κάτω. [3] οἱ δὲ ἐφυλάσσοντό τε ὡς ἐδύναντο καὶ ἅμα οἱ πολλοὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρον, οἱστούς τε οὓς ἀφίεσαν ἐκεῖνοι ἐς τὰς σφαγὰς καθιέντες καὶ ἐκ κλινῶν τινῶν αἳ ἔτυχον αὐτοῖς ἐνοῦσαι τοῖς σπάρτοις καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἱματίων παραιρήματα ποιοῦντες ἀπαγχόμενοι, παντί <τε> τρόπῳ τὸ πολὺ τῆς νυκτός ἐπεγένετο γὰρ νὺξ τῷ παθήματι ἀναλοῦντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ βαλλόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄνω διεφθάρησαν. [4] καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι, ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, φορμηδὸν ἐπὶ ἁμάξας ἐπιβαλόντες ἀπήγαγον ἔξω τῆς πόλεως. τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας, ὅσαι ἐν τῷ τειχίσματι ἐάλωσαν, ἠνδραποδίσαντο. [5] τοιούτῳ μὲν τρόπῳ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ ὄρους Κερκυραῖοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου διεφθάρησαν, καὶ ἡ στάσις πολλὴ γενομένη ἐτελεύτησεν ἐς τοῦτο, ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἦν ὑπόλοιπον τῶν ἑτέρων ὅτι καὶ ἀξιόλογον. [6] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ἵναπερ τὸ πρῶτον ὥρμηντο, ἀποπλεύσαντες μετὰ τῶν ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχων ἐπολέμουν.

[48] In this manner they brought the prisoners out of the building, and slew them to the number of sixty undiscovered by the rest, who thought that they were taking them away to some other place. But soon they found out what was happening, for some one told them, and then they called upon the Athenians, if they wanted them to die, to take their

lives themselves. Out of the building they refused to stir, and threatened that into it, if they could help, no one should enter. The Corcyraean populace had not the least intention of forcing a way in by the door, but they got upon the roof and, making an opening, threw tiles and shot arrows down from above. The prisoners sought to shelter themselves as they best could. Most of them at the same time put an end to their own lives; some thrust into their throats arrows which were shot at them, others strangled themselves with cords taken from beds which they found in the place, or with strips which they tore from their own garments. This went on during the greater part of the night, which had closed upon their sufferings, until in one way or another, either by their own hand or by missiles hurled from above, they all perished. At daybreak the Corcyraeans flung the dead bodies cross-wise on waggons and carried them out of the city. The women who were taken in the fortress on Mount Istonè were reduced to slavery. Thus the Corcyraeans in the mountain were destroyed by the people, and, at least while the Peloponnesian war lasted, there was an end of the great sedition; for there was nothing left of the other party worth mentioning. The Athenians then sailed for Sicily, their original destination, and there fought in concert with their allies.

49. καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνες ἅμα τελευτῶντος τοῦ θέρους στρατευσάμενοι Ἀνακτόριον Κορινθίων πόλιν, ἣ κεῖται ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμπρακικοῦ κόλπου, ἔλαβον προδοσίᾳ: καὶ ἐκπέμψαντες [Κορινθίους]αὐτοὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνες οἰκήτορας ἀπὸ πάντων ἔσχον τὸ χωρίον. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[49] At the end of the summer the Athenian forces in Naupactus and some Acarnanians made an expedition against Anactorium, a Corinthian town at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, which was betrayed to them. The Acarnanians expelled the Corinthians, and sent a colony of

their own, taken from the whole nation, to occupy the place. So the summer ended.

50. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Ἀριστείδης ὁ Ἀρχίππου, εἷς τῶν ἀργυρολόγων νεῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, αἳ ἐξεπέμφθησαν πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους, Ἀρταφέρνην ἄνδρα Πέρσην παρὰ βασιλέως πορευόμενον ἐς Λακεδαίμονα ξυλλαμβάνει ἐν Ἠιόνι τῇ ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι. [2] καὶ αὐτοῦ κομισθέντος οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰς μὲν ἐπιστολὰς μεταγραψάμενοι ἐκ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων γραμμάτων ἀνέγνωσαν, ἐν αἷς πολλῶν ἄλλων γεγραμμένων κεφάλαιον ἦν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, οὐ γιγνώσκειν ὅτι βούλονται: πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρέσβεων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ λέγειν: εἰ οὖν τι βούλονται σαφὲς λέγειν, πέμψαι μετὰ τοῦ Πέρσου ἄνδρας ὡς αὐτόν. [3] τὸν δὲ Ἀρταφέρνην ὕστερον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποστέλλουσι τριήρει ἐς Ἔφεσον καὶ πρέσβεις ἅμα: οἳ πυθόμενοι αὐτόθι βασιλέα Ἀρταξέρξην τὸν Ξέρξου νεωστὶ τεθνηκότα κατὰ γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἐτελεύτησεν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀνεχώρησαν.

[50] During the ensuing winter Aristides the son of Archippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian vessels which collected tribute from the allies, captured, at Eion upon the Strymon, Artaphernes a Persian, who was on his way from the King to Sparta. He was brought to Athens, and the Athenians had the despatches which he was carrying and which were written in the Assyrian character translated, and read them; there were many matters contained in them, but the chief point was a remonstrance addressed to the Lacedaemonians by the King, who said that he could not understand what they wanted; for, although many envoys had come to him, no two of them agreed. If they meant to make themselves intelligible, he desired them to send to him another embassy with the Persian envoy. Shortly afterwards the Athenians sent Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and with him an embassy of their own, but they found that Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes had recently died;

for the embassy arrived just at that time. Whereupon they returned home.

51. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Χῖοι τὸ τεῖχος περιεῖλον τὸ καινὸν κελευσάντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ ὑποπτευσάντων ἐς αὐτούς τι νεωτεριεῖν, ποιησάμενοι μέντοι πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πίστεις καὶ βεβαιότητα ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν μηδὲν περὶ σφᾶς νεώτερον βουλεύσειν. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἕβδομον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[51] During the same winter the Chians dismantled their new walls by order of the Athenians, who suspected that they meant to rebel, not however without obtaining from the Athenians such pledges and assurances as they could, that no violent change should be made in their condition. So the winter came to an end; and with it the seventh year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

52. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς τοῦ τε ἡλίου ἐκλιπές τι ἐγένετο περὶ νουμηνίαν καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μηνὸς ἱσταμένου ἔσεισεν. [2] καὶ οἱ Μυτιληναίων φυγάδες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Λεσβίων, ὁρμώμενοι οἱ πολλοὶ ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου καὶ μισθωσάμενοι ἔκ τε Πελοποννήσου ἐπικουρικὸν καὶ αὐτόθεν ξυναγείραντες, αἱροῦσι Ῥοίτειον, καὶ λαβόντες δισχιλίους στατῆρας Φωκαΐτας ἀπέδοσαν πάλιν οὐδὲν ἀδικήσαντες: [3] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ Ἄντανδρον στρατεύσαντες προδοσίας γενομένης λαμβάνουσι τὴν πόλιν. καὶ ἦν αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τάς τε ἄλλας πόλεις τὰς Ἀκταίας καλουμένας, ἃς πρότερον Μυτιληναίων νεμομένων Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον, ἐλευθεροῦν, καὶ πάντων μάλιστα τὴν Ἄντανδρον: καὶ κρατυνάμενοι αὐτὴν ναῦς τε γὰρ εὐπορία ἦν ποιεῖσθαι, αὐτόθεν ξύλων ὑπαρχόντων καὶ τῆς Ἴδης ἐπικειμένης, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ σκευῇ ῥᾳδίως ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ὁρμώμενοι τήν τε Λέσβον ἐγγὺς οὖσαν κακώσειν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Αἰολικὰ πολίσματα χειρώσεσθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα παρασκευάζεσθαι ἔμελλον.

[52] Early in the ensuing summer there was a partial eclipse of the sun at the time of the new moon, and within the first ten days of the same month an earthquake.The main body of the refugees who had escaped from Mitylenè and the rest of Lesbos had established themselves on the continent. They hired mercenaries from Peloponnesus or collected them on the spot, and took Rhoeteum, but on receiving a payment of two thousand Phocaean staters, they restored the town uninjured. They then made an expedition against Antandrus and took the city, which was betrayed into their hands. They hoped to liberate the other so-called ‘cities of the coast,’ which had been formerly in the possession of the Mytilenaeans and were now held by the Athenians, but their principal object was Antandrus itself, which they intended to strengthen and make their head-quarters. Mount Ida was near and would furnish timber for shipbuilding, and by the help of a fleet and by other means they could easily harass Lesbos which was close at hand, and reduce the Aeolian towns on the continent. Such were their designs.

53. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ δισχιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἱππεῦσί τε ὀλίγοις καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Μιλησίους καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἀγαγόντες ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ Κύθηρα: ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ Νικόστρατος ὁ Διειτρέφους καὶ Αὐτοκλῆς ὁ Τολμαίου. [2] τὰ δὲ Κύθηρα νῆσός ἐστιν, ἐπίκειται δὲ τῇ Λακωνικῇ κατὰ Μαλέαν: Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ᾽ εἰσὶ τῶν περιοίκων, καὶ κυθηροδίκης ἀρχὴ ἐκ τῆς Σπάρτης διέβαινεν αὐτόσε κατὰ ἔτος, ὁπλιτῶν τε φρουρὰν διέπεμπον αἰεὶ καὶ πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο. [3] ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν τε ἀπ᾽ Αἰγύπτου καὶ Λιβύης ὁλκάδων προσβολή, καὶ λῃσταὶ ἅμα τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἧσσον ἐλύπουν ἐκ θαλάσσης, ᾗπερ μόνον οἷόν τε ἦν κακουργεῖσθαι: πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνέχει πρὸς τὸ Σικελικὸν καὶ Κρητικὸν πέλαγος.

[53] During the same summer the Athenians with sixty ships, two thousand hoplites, and a few cavalry, taking also certain Milesian and other allied forces, made an expedition against Cythera, under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus the son of Diotrephes, and Autocles the son of Tolmaeus. Cythera is an island which lies close to Laconia off Cape Malea; it is inhabited by Lacedaemonian Perioeci, and a Spartan officer called the judge of Cythera was sent thither every year. The Lacedaemonians kept there a garrison of hoplites, which was continually relieved, and took great care of the place. There the merchant vessels coming from Egypt and Libya commonly put in; the island was a great protection to the Lacedaemonians against depredation by sea, on which element, though secure by land, they were exposed to attack, for the whole of Laconia runs out towards the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

54. κατασχόντες οὖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῷ στρατῷ, δέκα μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ δισχιλίοις Μιλησίων ὁπλίταις τὴν ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πόλιν Σκάνδειαν καλουμένην αἱροῦσι, τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ στρατεύματι ἀποβάντες τῆς νήσου ἐς τὰ πρὸς Μαλέαν τετραμμένα ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν [ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ] πόλιν τῶν Κυθηρίων, καὶ ηὗρον εὐθὺς αὐτοὺς ἐστρατοπεδευμένους

ἅπαντας. [2] καὶ μάχης γενομένης ὀλίγον μέν τινα χρόνον ὑπέστησαν οἱ Κυθήριοι, ἔπειτα τραπόμενοι κατέφυγον ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλιν, καὶ ὕστερον ξυνέβησαν πρὸς Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ξυνάρχοντας Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτρέψαι περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν πλὴν θανάτου. [3] ἦσαν δέ τινες καὶ γενόμενοι τῷ Νικίᾳ λόγοι πρότερον πρός τινας τῶν Κυθηρίων, δι᾽ ὃ καὶ θᾶσσον καὶ ἐπιτηδειότερον τό τε παραυτίκα καὶ τὸ ἔπειτα τὰ τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐπράχθη αὐτοῖς: ἀνέστησαν γὰρ <ἂν> οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Κυθηρίους, Λακεδαιμονίους τε ὄντας καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ Λακωνικῇ τῆς νήσου οὕτως ἐπικειμένης. [4] μετὰ δὲ τὴν ξύμβασιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τήν τε Σκάνδειαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ λιμένι πόλισμα παραλαβόντες καὶ τῶν Κυθήρων φυλακὴν ποιησάμενοι ἔπλευσαν ἔς τε Ἀσίνην καὶ Ἅλος καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν περὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἀποβάσεις ποιούμενοι καὶ ἐναυλιζόμενοι τῶν χωρίων οὗ καιρὸς εἴη ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν ἡμέρας μάλιστα ἑπτά.

[54] The Athenian fleet appeared off Cythera, and with a detachment of ten ships and two thousand Milesian hoplites took Scandea, one of the cities on the sea-shore. The rest of their army disembarked on the side of the island looking towards Malea, and moved on to the lower city of the Cytherians, which is also on the sea-coast; there they found all the inhabitants encamped in force. A battle was fought in which the Cytherians held their ground for some little time, and then, betaking themselves to flight, retired to the upper city. They at length surrendered to Nicias and his colleagues, placing themselves at the disposal of the Athenians, but stipulating that their lives should be spared. Nicias had already contrived to enter into communication with some of them, and in consequence the negotiations were speedier, and lighter terms were imposed upon them both at the time and afterwards. Else the Athenians would have expelled them, because they were Lacedaemonians and their island was close to Laconia. After the capitulation they took into their own hands Scandea, the city near the harbour, and secured the island by a garrison. They then sailed away,

made descents upon Asinè, Helos, and most of the other maritime towns of Laconia, and, encamping wherever they found convenient, ravaged the country for about seven days.

55. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἰδόντες μὲν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὰ Κύθηρα ἔχοντας, προσδεχόμενοι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν σφῶν ἀποβάσεις τοιαύτας ποιήσεσθαι, ἀθρόᾳ μὲν οὐδαμοῦ τῇ δυνάμει ἀντετάξαντο, κατὰ δὲ τὴν χώραν φρουρὰς διέπεμψαν, ὁπλιτῶν πλῆθος, ὡς ἑκασταχόσε ἔδει, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν φυλακῇ πολλῇ ἦσαν, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσι νεώτερόν τι γένηται τῶν περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν, γεγενημένου μὲν τοῦ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πάθους ἀνελπίστου καὶ μεγάλου, Πύλου δὲ ἐχομένης καὶ Κυθήρων καὶ πανταχόθεν σφᾶς περιεστῶτος πολέμου ταχέος καὶ ἀπροφυλάκτου, [2] ὥστε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς ἱππέας τετρακοσίους κατεστήσαντο καὶ τοξότας, ἔς τε τὰ πολεμικά, εἴπερ ποτέ, μάλιστα δὴ ὀκνηρότεροι ἐγένοντο, ξυνεστῶτες παρὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν σφῶν ἰδέαν τῆς παρασκευῆς ναυτικῷ ἀγῶνι, καὶ τούτῳ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, οἷς τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρούμενον αἰεὶ ἐλλιπὲς ἦν τῆς δοκήσεώς τι πράξειν: [3] καὶ ἅμα τὰ τῆς τύχης πολλὰ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ ξυμβάντα παρὰ λόγον αὐτοῖς ἔκπληξιν μεγίστην παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐδέδισαν μή ποτε αὖθις ξυμφορά τις αὐτοῖς περιτύχῃ οἵα καὶ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ. [4] ἀτολμότεροι δὲ δι᾽ αὐτὸ ἐς τὰς μάχας ἦσαν, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι κινήσειαν ᾤοντο ἁμαρτήσεσθαι διὰ τὸ τὴν γνώμην ἀνεχέγγυον γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῆς πρὶν ἀηθείας τοῦ κακοπραγεῖν.

[55] The Lacedaemonians seeing that the Athenians had got possession of Cythera, and anticipating similar descents on their own shores, nowhere opposed them with their united forces, but distributed a body of hoplites in garrisons through the country where their presence seemed to be needed. They kept strict watch, fearing lest some domestic revolution should break out. Already a great and unexpected blow had fallen upon them at Sphacteria; Pylos and Cythera were in the hands of the Athenians, and they were beset on every side by an enemy against whose swift attacks

precaution was vain. Contrary to their usual custom they raised a force of four hundred cavalry and archers. Never in their history had they shown so much hesitation in their military movements. They were involved in a war at sea, an element to which they were strange, against a power like the Athenians, in whose eyes to miss an opportunity was to lose a victory. Fortune too was against them, and they were panic-stricken by the many startling reverses which had befallen them within so short a time. They feared lest some new calamity like that of the island might overtake them; and therefore they dared not venture on an engagement, but expected all their undertakings to fail; they had never hitherto known misfortune, and now they lost all confidence in their own powers.

56. τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις τότε τὴν παραθαλάσσιον δῃοῦσι τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἡσύχασαν, ὡς καθ᾽ ἑκάστην φρουρὰν γίγνοιτό τις ἀπόβασις, πλήθει τε ἐλάσσους ἕκαστοι ἡγούμενοι εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: μία δὲ φρουρά, ἥπερ καὶ ἠμύνατο περὶ Κοτύρταν καὶ Ἀφροδιτίαν, τὸν μὲν ὄχλον τῶν ψιλῶν ἐσκεδασμένον ἐφόβησεν ἐπιδρομῇ, τῶν δὲ ὁπλιτῶν δεξαμένων ὑπεχώρησε πάλιν, καὶ ἄνδρες τέ τινες ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν ὀλίγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἐλήφθη, τροπαῖόν τε στήσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Κύθηρα. [2] ἐκ δὲ αὐτῶν περιέπλευσαν ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον τὴν Λιμηράν, καὶ δῃώσαντες μέρος τι τῆς γῆς ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ Θυρέαν, ἥ ἐστι μὲν τῆς Κυνουρίας γῆς καλουμένης, μεθορία δὲ τῆς Ἀργείας καὶ Λακωνικῆς: νεμόμενοι δὲ αὐτὴν ἔδοσαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Αἰγινήταις ἐκπεσοῦσιν ἐνοικεῖν διά τε τὰς ὑπὸ τὸν σεισμὸν σφίσι γενομένας καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων τὴν ἐπανάστασιν εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὅτι Ἀθηναίων ὑπακούοντες ὅμως πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων γνώμην αἰεὶ ἔστασαν.

[56] While the Athenians were ravaging their coasts they hardly ever stirred; for each garrison at the places where they happened to land considered in their depressed state of mind that they were too few to act. One of them however, which was in the neighbourhood of Cotyrta and Aphrodisia,

did offer some resistance, and by a sudden rush put to flight the multitude of light-armed troops who had been scattered, but, being encountered by the hoplites, they again retired with the loss of some few men and arms. The Athenians, raising a trophy, sailed back to Cythera. Thence they coasted round to Epidaurus Limera and, after devastating some part of its territory, to Thyrea, which is situated in the country called Cynuria, on the border of Argolis and Laconia. The Lacedaemonians, who at that time held the town, had settled there the Aeginetan exiles, whom they wished to requite for services rendered to them at the time of the earthquake and the Helot revolt, and also because they had always been partisans of theirs, although subjects of the Athenians.

57. προσπλεόντων οὖν ἔτι τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ Αἰγινῆται τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὃ ἔτυχον οἰκοδομοῦντες τεῖχος ἐκλείπουσιν, ἐς δὲ τὴν ἄνω πόλιν, ἐν ᾗ ᾤκουν, ἀπεχώρησαν, ἀπέχουσαν σταδίους μάλιστα δέκα τῆς θαλάσσης. [2] καὶ αὐτοῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰ μία τῶν περὶ τὴν χώραν, ἥπερ καὶ ξυνετείχιζε, ξυνεσελθεῖν μὲν ἐς τὸ τεῖχος οὐκ ἠθέλησαν δεομένων τῶν Αἰγινητῶν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῖς κίνδυνος ἐφαίνετο ἐς τὸ τεῖχος κατακλῄεσθαι: ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μετέωρα, ὡς οὐκ ἐνόμιζον ἀξιόμαχοι εἶναι, ἡσύχαζον. [3] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κατασχόντες καὶ χωρήσαντες εὐθὺς πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ αἱροῦσι τὴν Θυρέαν. καὶ τήν τε πόλιν κατέκαυσαν καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα ἐξεπόρθησαν, τούς τε Αἰγινήτας, ὅσοι μὴ ἐν χερσὶ διεφθάρησαν, ἄγοντες ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα ὃς παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἦν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, Τάνταλον τὸν Πατροκλέους: ἐζωγρήθη γὰρ τετρωμένος. [4] ἦγον δέ τινας καὶ ἐκ τῶν Κυθήρων ἄνδρας ὀλίγους, οὓς ἐδόκει ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα μεταστῆσαι. καὶ τούτους μὲν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβουλεύσαντο καταθέσθαι ἐς τὰς νήσους, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Κυθηρίους οἰκοῦντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν φόρον τέσσαρα τάλαντα φέρειν, Αἰγινήτας δὲ ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας ὅσοι ἑάλωσαν διὰ τὴν προτέραν αἰεί ποτε ἔχθραν,

Τάνταλον δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίους καταδῆσαι.

[57] Before the Athenian ships had actually touched, the Aeginetans quitted a fort on the sea-shore which they were just building and retired to the upper city, where they lived, a distance of rather more than a mile. One of the country garrisons of the Lacedaemonians which was helping to build the fort was entreated by the Aeginetans to enter the walls, but refused, thinking that to be shut up inside them would be too dangerous. So they ascended to the high ground, and then, considering the enemy to be more than a match for them, would not come down. Meanwhile the Athenians landed, marched straight upon Thyrea with their whole army, and took it. They burnt and plundered the city, and carried away with them to Athens all the Aeginetans who had not fallen in the battle, and the Lacedaemonian governor of the place, Tantalus the son of Patrocles, who had been wounded and taken prisoner. They also had on board a few of the inhabitants of Cythera, whose removal seemed to be required as a measure of precaution. These the Athenians determined to deposit in some of the islands; at the same time they allowed the other Cytherians to live in their own country, paying a tribute of four talents. They resolved to kill all the Aeginetans whom they had taken in satisfaction of their long-standing hatred, and to put Tantalus in chains along with the captives from Sphacteria.

58. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐν Σικελίᾳ Καμαριναίοις καὶ Γελῴοις ἐκεχειρία γίγνεται πρῶτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους: εἶτα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Σικελιῶται ξυνελθόντες ἐς Γέλαν, ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων πρέσβεις, ἐς λόγους κατέστησαν ἀλλήλοις, εἴ πως ξυναλλαγεῖεν. καὶ ἄλλαι τε πολλαὶ γνῶμαι ἐλέγοντο ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα, διαφερομένων καὶ ἀξιούντων, ὡς ἕκαστοί τι ἐλασσοῦσθαι ἐνόμιζον, καὶ Ἑρμοκράτης ὁ Ἕρμωνος Συρακόσιος, ὅσπερ καὶ ἔπεισε μάλιστα αὐτούς, ἐς τὸ κοινὸν τοιούτους δὴ λόγους εἶπεν.

[58] During the same summer the people of Camarina and Gela in Sicily made a truce, in the first instance with one another only. But after a while all the other Sicilian states sent envoys to Gela, where they held a conference in the hope of effecting a reconciliation. Many opinions were expressed on both sides; and the representatives of the different cities wrangled and put in claims for the redress of their several grievances. At length Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a Syracusan, whose words chiefly influenced their decision, addressed the conference in the following speech:

59. ‘οὔτε πόλεως ὢν ἐλαχίστης, ὦ Σικελιῶται, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσομαι οὔτε πονουμένης μάλιστα τῷ πολέμῳ, ἐς κοινὸν δὲ τὴν δοκοῦσάν μοι βελτίστην γνώμην εἶναι ἀποφαινόμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ πάσῃ. [2] καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ὡς χαλεπὸν τί ἄν τις πᾶν τὸ ἐνὸν ἐκλέγων ἐν εἰδόσι μακρηγοροίη; οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε ἀμαθίᾳ ἀναγκάζεται αὐτὸ δρᾶν, οὔτε φόβῳ, ἢν οἴηταί τι πλέον σχήσειν, ἀποτρέπεται. ξυμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὰ κέρδη μείζω φαίνεσθαι τῶν δεινῶν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους ἐθέλουσιν ὑφίστασθαι πρὸ τοῦ αὐτίκα τι ἐλασσοῦσθαι: [3] αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰ μὴ ἐν καιρῷ τύχοιεν ἑκάτεροι πράσσοντες, αἱ παραινέσεις τῶν ξυναλλαγῶν ὠφέλιμοι. [4] ὃ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πειθομένοις πλείστου ἂν ἄξιον γένοιτο: τὰ γὰρ ἴδια ἕκαστοι εὖ βουλευόμενοι δὴ θέσθαι τό τε πρῶτον ἐπολεμήσαμεν καὶ νῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους δι᾽ ἀντιλογιῶν πειρώμεθα καταλλαγῆναι καί, ἢν ἄρα μὴ προχωρήσῃ ἴσον ἑκάστῳ ἔχοντι ἀπελθεῖν, πάλιν πολεμήσομεν.

[59] ‘Sicilians, the city to which I belong is not the least in Sicily, nor am I about to speak because Syracuse suffers more than other cities in the war, but because I want to lay before you the policy which seems to me best fitted to promote the common good of the whole country. You well know, and therefore I shall not rehearse to you at length, all the misery of war. Nobody is driven into war by ignorance, and no one who thinks that he will gain anything from it is deterred by fear. The truth is that the aggressor deems the

advantage to be greater than the suffering; and the side which is attacked would sooner run any risk than suffer the smallest immediate loss. But when such feelings on the part of either operate unseasonably, the time for offering counsels of peace has arrived, and such counsels, if we will only listen to them, will be at this moment invaluable to us. Why did we go to war? Simply from a consideration of our own individual interests, and with a view to our interests we are now trying by means of discussion to obtain peace; and if, after all, we do not before we separate succeed in getting our respective rights, we shall go to war again.

60. ‘καίτοι γνῶναι χρὴ ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων μόνον, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἡ ξύνοδος ἔσται, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἐπιβουλευομένην τὴν πᾶσαν Σικελίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ κρίνω, ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων δυνησόμεθα ἔτι διασῶσαι: καὶ διαλλακτὰς πολὺ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων ἀναγκαιοτέρους περὶ τῶνδε Ἀθηναίους νομίσαι, οἳ δύναμιν ἔχοντες μεγίστην τῶν Ἑλλήνων τάς τε ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν τηροῦσιν ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες, καὶ ὀνόματι ἐννόμῳ ξυμμαχίας τὸ φύσει πολέμιον εὐπρεπῶς ἐς τὸ ξυμφέρον καθίστανται. [2] πόλεμον γὰρ αἱρομένων ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπαγομένων αὐτούς, ἄνδρας οἳ καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπικαλουμένοις αὐτοὶ ἐπιστρατεύουσι, κακῶς τε ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ποιούντων τέλεσι τοῖς οἰκείοις, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἅμα προκοπτόντων ἐκείνοις, εἰκός, ὅταν γνῶσιν ἡμᾶς τετρυχωμένους, καὶ πλέονί ποτε στόλῳ ἐλθόντας αὐτοὺς τάδε πάντα πειράσασθαι ὑπὸ σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι.

[60] ‘But at the same time we should have the sense to see that this conference is not solely concerned with our private interests, but with those of the whole country. Sicily is in my opinion at this moment imperilled by the designs of the Athenians, and we must try, if not too late, to save her. The Athenians are a much more convincing argument of peace than any words of mine can be. They are the greatest power in Hellas; they come hither with a few ships to spy out our mistakes; though we are their natural enemies, they assume the honourable name of allies, and under this flimsy

pretence turn our enmity to good account. For when we go to war and invite their assistance (and they are fond of coming whether they are invited or not) we are taxing ourselves for our own destruction, and at the same time paving the way for the advance of their empire. And at some future day, when they see that we are exhausted, they are sure to come again with a larger armament, and attempt to bring all Sicily under their yoke.

61. ‘καίτοι τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἑκάστους, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, χρὴ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα ἐπικτωμένους μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἑτοῖμα βλάπτοντας ξυμμάχους τε ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους προσλαμβάνειν, νομίσαι τε στάσιν μάλιστα φθείρειν τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν Σικελίαν, ἧς γε οἱ ἔνοικοι ξύμπαντες μὲν ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, κατὰ πόλεις δὲ διέσταμεν. [2] ἃ χρὴ γνόντας καὶ ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτῃ καταλλαγῆναι καὶ πόλιν πόλει, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι κοινῇ σῴζειν τὴν πᾶσαν Σικελίαν, παρεστάναι δὲ μηδενὶ ὡς οἱ μὲν Δωριῆς ἡμῶν πολέμιοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τὸ δὲ Χαλκιδικὸν τῇ ἰάδι ξυγγενείᾳ ἀσφαλές. [3] οὐ γὰρ τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, ὅτι δίχα πέφυκε, τοῦ ἑτέρου ἔχθει ἐπίασιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐφιέμενοι, ἃ κοινῇ κεκτήμεθα. [4] ἐδήλωσαν δὲ νῦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Χαλκιδικοῦ γένους παρακλήσει: τοῖς γὰρ οὐδεπώποτε σφίσι κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν προσβοηθήσασιν αὐτοὶ τὸ δίκαιον μᾶλλον τῆς ξυνθήκης προθύμως παρέσχοντο. [5] καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ταῦτα πλεονεκτεῖν τε καὶ προνοεῖσθαι πολλὴ ξυγγνώμη, καὶ οὐ τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις μέμφομαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπακούειν ἑτοιμοτέροις οὖσιν: πέφυκε γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν μὲν τοῦ εἴκοντος, φυλάσσεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἐπιόν. [6] ὅσοι δὲ γιγνώσκοντες αὐτὰ μὴ ὀρθῶς προσκοποῦμεν, μηδὲ τοῦτό τις πρεσβύτατον ἥκει κρίνας, τὸ κοινῶς φοβερὸν ἅπαντας εὖ θέσθαι, ἁμαρτάνομεν. [7] τάχιστα δ᾽ ἂν ἀπαλλαγὴ αὐτοῦ γένοιτο, εἰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβαῖμεν: οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῶν ὁρμῶνται Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐπικαλεσαμένων. καὶ οὕτως οὐ πόλεμος πολέμῳ, εἰρήνῃ δὲ διαφοραὶ ἀπραγμόνως παύονται, οἵ τ᾽ ἐπίκλητοι εὐπρεπῶς ἄδικοι ἐλθόντες εὐλόγως ἄπρακτοι ἀπίασιν.

[61] ‘And yet if we must call in allies and involve ourselves in dangers, as men of sense, looking to the interest of our several states, we should set before us the prospect of gaining an increase of dominion, not of losing what we already have. We should consider that internal quarrels more than anything else are the ruin of Sicily and her cities; we Sicilians are fighting against one another at the very time when we are threatened by a common enemy. Knowing this, we should be reconciled man to man, city to city, and make an united effort for the preservation of all Sicily. Let no one say to himself, “The Dorians among us may be enemies to the Athenians, but the Chalcidians, being Ionians, are safe because they are their kinsmen.” For the Athenians do not attack us because we are divided into two races, of which one is their enemy and the other their friend, but because they covet the good things of Sicily which we all share alike. Is not their reception of the Chalcidian appeal a proof of this? They have actually gone out of their way to grant the full privileges of their old treaty to those who up to this hour have never aided them as required by the terms of that treaty. The ambition and craft of the Athenians are pardonable enough. I blame not those who wish to rule, but those who are willing to serve. The same human nature which is always ready to domineer over the subservient, bids us defend ourselves against the aggressor. And if, knowing all these things, we continue to take no thought for the future, and have not, every one of us, made up our minds already that first and foremost we must all deal wisely with the danger which threatens all, we are grievously in error.’Now a mutual reconciliation would be the speediest way of deliverance from this danger; for the Athenians do not come direct from their own country, but first plant themselves in that of the Sicilians who have invited them. Instead of finishing one war only to begin another, we should then quietly end our differences by peace. And those who came at our call and had so good a reason for doing

wrong will have a still better reason for going away and doing nothing.

62. ‘καὶ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τοσοῦτον ἀγαθὸν εὖ βουλευομένοις εὑρίσκεται: [2] τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογουμένην ἄριστον εἶναι εἰρήνην πῶς οὐ χρὴ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιήσασθαι; ἢ δοκεῖτε, εἴ τῳ τι ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ἢ εἴ τῳ τὰ ἐναντία, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν μᾶλλον ἢ πόλεμον τὸ μὲν παῦσαι ἂν ἑκατέρῳ, τὸ δὲ ξυνδιασῶσαι, καὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ λαμπρότητας ἀκινδυνοτέρας ἔχειν τὴν εἰρήνην, ἄλλα τε ὅσα ἐν μήκει λόγων ἄν τις διέλθοι, ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν; ἃ χρὴ σκεψαμένους μὴ τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους ὑπεριδεῖν, τὴν δὲ αὐτοῦ τινὰ σωτηρίαν μᾶλλον ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν προϊδεῖν. [3] καὶ εἴ τις βεβαίως τι ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ ἢ βίᾳ πράξειν οἴεται, τῷ παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα μὴ χαλεπῶς σφαλλέσθω, γνοὺς ὅτι πλείους ἤδη καὶ τιμωρίαις μετιόντες τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ ἐλπίσαντες ἕτεροι δυνάμει τινὶ πλεονεκτήσειν, οἱ μὲν οὐχ ὅσον οὐκ ἡμύναντο, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐσώθησαν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀντὶ τοῦ πλέον ἔχειν προσκαταλιπεῖν τὰ αὐτῶν ξυνέβη. [4] τιμωρία γὰρ οὐκ εὐτυχεῖ δικαίως, ὅτι καὶ ἀδικεῖται: οὐδὲ ἰσχὺς βέβαιον, διότι καὶ εὔελπι. τὸ δὲ ἀστάθμητον τοῦ μέλλοντος ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον κρατεῖ, πάντων τε σφαλερώτατον ὂν ὅμως καὶ χρησιμώτατον φαίνεται: ἐξ ἴσου γὰρ δεδιότες προμηθίᾳ μᾶλλον ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐρχόμεθα.

[62] ‘Such is the great advantage which we obtain by sound policy as against the Athenians. And why, if peace is acknowledged by all to be the greatest of blessings, should we not make peace among ourselves? Whatever good or evil is the portion of any of us, is not peace more likely than war to preserve the one and to alleviate the other? And has not peace honours and glories of her own unattended by the dangers of war? (But it is unnecessary to dilate on the blessings of peace any more than on the miseries of war.) Consider what I am saying, and instead of despising my words, may every man seek his own safety in them! And should there be some one here present who was hoping to gain a permanent advantage either by right or by force, let

him not take his disappointment to heart. For he knows that many a man before now who has sought a righteous revenge, far from obtaining it, has not even escaped himself; and many an one who in the consciousness of power has grasped at what was another's, has ended by losing what was his own. The revenge of a wrong is not always successful merely because it is just; nor is strength most assured of victory when it is most full of hope. The inscrutable future is the controller of events, and, being the most treacherous of all things, is also the most beneficent; for when there is mutual fear, men think twice before they make aggressions upon one another.

63. 'καὶ νῦν τοῦ ἀφανοῦς τε τούτου διὰ τὸ ἀτέκμαρτον δέος καὶ διὰ τὸ ἤδη † φοβεροὺς παρόντας Ἀθηναίους, κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἐκπλαγέντες, καὶ τὸ ἐλλιπὲς τῆς γνώμης, ὧν ἕκαστός τι ᾠήθημεν πράξειν, ταῖς κωλύμαις ταύταις ἱκανῶς νομίσαντες εἰρχθῆναι, τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας πολεμίους ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀποπέμπωμεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἐς ἀίδιον ξυμβῶμεν, εἰ δὲ μή, χρόνον ὡς πλεῖστον σπεισάμενοι τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς ἐς αὖθις ἀναβαλώμεθα. [2] τὸ ξύμπαν τε δὴ γνῶμεν πειθόμενοι μὲν ἐμοὶ πόλιν ἔξοντες ἕκαστος ἐλευθέραν, ἀφ᾽ ἧς αὐτοκράτορες ὄντες τὸν εὖ καὶ κακῶς δρῶντα ἐξ ἴσου ἀρετῇ ἀμυνούμεθα: ἢν δ᾽ ἀπιστήσαντες ἄλλοις ὑπακούσωμεν, οὐ περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαί τινα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄγαν εἰ τύχοιμεν, φίλοι μὲν ἂν τοῖς ἐχθίστοις, διάφοροι δὲ οἷς οὐ χρὴ κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην γιγνοίμεθα.

[63] 'And now, because we know not what this hidden future may bring forth, and because the Athenians, who are dangerous enemies, are already at our gates, — having these two valid reasons for alarm, let us acquiesce in our disappointment, deeming that the obstacles to the fulfilment of our individual hopes are really insuperable. Let us send out of the country the enemies who threaten us, and make peace among ourselves, if possible for ever; but if not, for as long as we can, and let our private enmities bide their time. If you take my advice, rest assured that you will

maintain the freedom of your several cities; from which you will go forth your own masters, and recompense, like true men, the good or evil which is done to you. But if you will not believe me, and we are enslaved by others, the punishment of our enemies will be out of the question. Even supposing we succeed in obtaining vengeance to our hearts' content, we may perhaps become the friends of our greatest enemies, we certainly become the enemies of our real friends.

64. 'καὶ ἐγὼ μέν, ἅπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον, πόλιν τε μεγίστην παρεχόμενος καὶ ἐπιών τῳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀμυνούμενος ἀξιῶ προιδόμενος αὐτῶν ξυγχωρεῖν, καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐναντίους οὕτω κακῶς δρᾶν ὥστε αὐτὸς τὰ πλείω βλάπτεσθαι, μηδὲ μωρίᾳ φιλονικῶν ἡγεῖσθαι τῆς τε οἰκείας γνώμης ὁμοίως αὐτοκράτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἧς οὐκ ἄρχω τύχης, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσον εἰκὸς ἡσσᾶσθαι. [2] καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δικαιῶ ταὐτό μοι ποιῆσαι, ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων τοῦτο παθεῖν. [3] οὐδὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν οἰκείους οἰκείων ἡσσᾶσθαι, ἢ Δωριᾶ τινὰ Δωριῶς ἢ Χαλκιδέα τῶν ξυγγενῶν, τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν γείτονας ὄντας καὶ ξυνοίκους μιᾶς χώρας καὶ περιρρύτου καὶ ὄνομα ἓν κεκλημένους Σικελιώτας: οἳ πολεμήσομέν τε, οἶμαι, ὅταν ξυμβῇ, καὶ ξυγχωρησόμεθά γε πάλιν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς λόγοις κοινοῖς χρώμενοι: [4] τοὺς δὲ ἀλλοφύλους ἐπελθόντας ἀθρόοι αἰεί, ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, ἀμυνούμεθα, εἴπερ καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους βλαπτόμενοι ξύμπαντες κινδυνεύομεν: ξυμμάχους δὲ οὐδέποτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπαξόμεθα οὐδὲ διαλλακτάς. [5] τάδε γὰρ ποιοῦντες ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν οὐ στερήσομεν τὴν Σικελίαν, Ἀθηναίων τε ἀπαλλαγῆναι καὶ οἰκείου πολέμου, καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέραν νεμούμεθα καὶ ὑπὸ ἄλλων ἧσσον ἐπιβουλευομένην.'

[64] 'As I said at first, I am the representative of a great city which is more likely to act on the aggressive than on the defensive; and yet with the prospect of these dangers before me I am willing to come to terms, and not to injure my enemies in such a way that I shall doubly injure myself. Nor

am I so obstinate and foolish as to imagine that, because I am master of my own will, I can control fortune, of whom I am not master; but I am disposed to make reasonable concessions. And I would ask the other Sicilians to do the same of their own accord, and not to wait until the enemy compels them. There is no disgrace in kinsmen yielding to kinsmen, whether Dorians to Dorians, or Chalcidians to the other Ionians. Let us remember too that we are all neighbours, inhabitants of one island home, and called by the common name of Sicilians. When we see occasion we will fight among ourselves, and will negotiate and come to terms among ourselves. But we shall always, if we are wise, unite as one man against the invader; for when a single state suffers, all are imperilled. We will never again introduce allies from abroad, no, nor pretended mediators. This policy will immediately secure to Sicily two great blessings; she will get rid of the Athenians, and of civil war. And for the future we shall keep the island free and our own, and none will be tempted to attack us.’

65. τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἑρμοκράτους εἰπόντος πειθόμενοι οἱ Σικελιῶται αὐτοὶ μὲν κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ξυνηνέχθησαν γνώμῃ ὥστε ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι τοῦ πολέμου ἔχοντες ἃ ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, τοῖς δὲ Καμαριναίοις Μοργαντίνην εἶναι ἀργύριον τακτὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἀποδοῦσιν: [2] οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι παρακαλέσαντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐν τέλει ὄντας εἶπον ὅτι ξυμβήσονται καὶ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἔσονται κἀκείνοις κοιναί. ἐπαινεσάντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ὁμολογίαν, καὶ αἱ νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπέπλευσαν μετὰ ταῦτα ἐκ Σικελίας. [3] ἐλθόντας δὲ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς μὲν φυγῇ ἐζημίωσαν, Πυθόδωρον καὶ Σοφοκλέα, τὸν δὲ τρίτον Εὐρυμέδοντα χρήματα ἐπράξαντο, ὡς ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐν Σικελίᾳ καταστρέψασθαι δώροις πεισθέντες ἀποχωρήσειαν. [4] οὕτω τῇ [τε] παρούσῃ εὐτυχίᾳ χρώμενοι ἠξίουν σφίσι μηδὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ τὰ ἀπορώτερα μεγάλῃ τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐνδεεστέρᾳ παρασκευῇ κατεργάζεσθαι. αἰτία δ᾽ ἦν ἡ παρὰ

λόγον τῶν πλεόνων εὐπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτιθεῖσα ἰσχὺν τῆς ἐλπίδος.

[65] Such were the words of Hermocrates. The Sicilians took his advice and agreed among themselves to make peace, on the understanding that they should all retain what they had; only Morgantinè was handed over to the Camarinaeans, who were to pay in return a fixed sum to the Syracusans. The cities in alliance with Athens sent for the Athenian generals and told them that a treaty was about to be made in which they might join if they pleased. They assented; the treaty was concluded; and so the Athenian ships sailed away from Sicily. When the generals returned the Athenians punished two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, with exile, and imposed a fine on the third, Eurymedon, believing that they might have conquered Sicily but had been bribed to go away. For in their present prosperity they were indignant at the idea of a reverse; they expected to accomplish everything, possible or impossible, with any force, great or small. The truth was that they were elated by the unexpected success of most of their enterprises, which inspired them with the liveliest hope.

66. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους Μεγαρῆς οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει πιεζόμενοι ὑπό τε Ἀθηναίων τῷ πολέμῳ, αἰεὶ κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον δὶς ἐσβαλλόντων πανστρατιᾷ ἐς τὴν χώραν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σφετέρων φυγάδων τῶν ἐκ Πηγῶν, οἳ στασιασάντων ἐκπεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους χαλεποὶ ἦσαν λῃστεύοντες, ἐποιοῦντο λόγους ἐν ἀλλήλοις ὡς χρὴ δεξαμένους τοὺς φεύγοντας μὴ ἀμφοτέρωθεν τὴν πόλιν φθείρειν. [2] οἱ δὲ φίλοι τῶν ἔξω τὸν θροῦν αἰσθόμενοι φανερῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καὶ αὐτοὶ ἠξίουν τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἔχεσθαι. [3] γνόντες δὲ οἱ τοῦ δήμου προστάται οὐ δυνατὸν τὸν δῆμον ἐσόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶν μετὰ σφῶν καρτερεῖν, ποιοῦνται λόγους δείσαντες πρὸς τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγούς, Ἱπποκράτη τε τὸν Ἀρίφρονος καὶ Δημοσθένη τὸν Ἀλκισθένους, βουλόμενοι ἐνδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ νομίζοντες ἐλάσσω σφίσι τὸν κίνδυνον ἢ τοὺς

ἐκπεσόντας ὑπὸ σφῶν κατελθεῖν. ξυνέβησάν τε πρῶτα μὲν τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἑλεῖν Ἀθηναίους ▯ἦν δὲ σταδίων μάλιστα ὀκτὼ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν τὸν λιμένα αὐτῶν▯, ὅπως μὴ ἐπιβοηθήσωσιν ἐκ τῆς Νισαίας οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐν ᾗ αὐτοὶ μόνοι ἐφρούρουν βεβαιότητος ἕνεκα τῶν Μεγάρων, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄνω πόλιν πειρᾶσθαι ἐνδοῦναι: ῥᾷον δ᾽ ἤδη ἔμελλον προσχωρήσειν τούτου γεγενημένου.

[66] During the same summer the citizens of Megara were hard pressed by the Athenians, who twice every year invaded the country with their whole army, as well as by their own exiles in Pegae, who had been driven out by the people in a revolution, and were continually harassing and plundering them. So they conferred together upon the advisability of recalling the exiles, lest they should expose the city to destruction from the attacks of two enemies at once. The friends of the exiles became aware of the agitation and ventured to urge the measure more openly than hitherto. But the popular leaders, knowing that their partisans were in great extremity and could not be trusted to hold out in support of them much longer, took alarm and entered into negotiation with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates the son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes. They thought that they would incur less danger by surrendering the city to them than by the restoration of the exiles whom they had themselves expelled. So they agreed that the Athenians should in the first place seize their Long Walls, which were a little less than a mile in length and extended from the city to their harbour Nisaea. They wanted to prevent the Peloponnesians intefering from Nisaea, of which they formed the sole garrison, being stationed there to secure Megara. The conspirators were then to try and place in the hands of the Athenians the upper city, which would be more ready to come over when they once had possession of the Long Walls.

67. οἱ οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπειδὴ ἀπό τε τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν λόγων παρεσκεύαστο ἀμφοτέροις, ὑπὸ νύκτα πλεύσαντες ἐς

Μινῴαν τὴν Μεγαρέων νῆσον ὁπλίταις ἑξακοσίοις, ὧν Ἱπποκράτης ἦρχεν, ἐν ὀρύγματι ἐκαθέζοντο, ὅθεν ἐπλίνθευον τὰ τείχη καὶ ἀπεῖχεν οὐ πολύ: [2] οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους τοῦ ἑτέρου στρατηγοῦ Πλαταιῆς τε ψιλοὶ καὶ ἕτεροι περίπολοι ἐνήδρευσαν ἐς τὸ Ἐνυάλιον, ὅ ἐστιν ἔλασσον ἄπωθεν. καὶ ᾔσθετο οὐδεὶς εἰ μὴ οἱ ἄνδρες οἷς ἐπιμελὲς ἦν εἰδέναι τὴν νύκτα ταύτην. [3] καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔως ἔμελλε γίγνεσθαι, οἱ προδιδόντες τῶν Μεγαρέων οὗτοι τοιόνδε ἐποίησαν. ἀκάτιον ἀμφηρικὸν ὡς λῃσταί, ἐκ πολλοῦ τεθεραπευκότες τὴν ἄνοιξιν τῶν πυλῶν, εἰώθεσαν ἐπὶ ἀμάξῃ, πείθοντες τὸν ἄρχοντα, διὰ τῆς τάφρου κατακομίζειν τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐκπλεῖν: καὶ πρὶν ἡμέραν εἶναι πάλιν αὐτὸ τῇ ἀμάξῃ κομίσαντες ἐς τὸ τεῖχος κατὰ τὰς πύλας ἐσῆγον, ὅπως τοῖς ἐκ τῆς Μινῴας Ἀθηναίοις ἀφανὴς δὴ εἴη ἡ φυλακή, μὴ ὄντος ἐν τῷ λιμένι πλοίου φανεροῦ μηδενός. [4] καὶ τότε πρὸς ταῖς πύλαις ἤδη ἦν ἡ ἄμαξα, καὶ ἀνοιχθεισῶν κατὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς ὡς τῷ ἀκατίῳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ▯ἐγίγνετο γὰρ ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος τὸ τοιοῦτον▯ ἰδόντες ἔθεον δρόμῳ ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας, βουλόμενοι φθάσαι πρὶν ξυγκλῃσθῆναι πάλιν τὰς πύλας καὶ ἔως ἔτι ἡ ἄμαξα ἐν αὐταῖς ἦν, κώλυμα οὖσα προσθεῖναι: καὶ αὐτοῖς ἅμα καὶ οἱ ξυμπράσσοντες Μεγαρῆς τοὺς κατὰ τὰς πύλας φύλακας κτείνουσιν. [5] καὶ πρῶτον μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημοσθένη Πλαταιῆς τε καὶ περίπολοι ἐσέδραμον οὗ νῦν τὸ τροπαῖόν ἐστι, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐντὸς τῶν πυλῶν ▯ᾔσθοντο γὰρ οἱ ἐγγύτατα Πελοποννήσιοι▯ μαχόμενοι τοὺς προσβοηθοῦντας οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἐκράτησαν καὶ τοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὁπλίταις ἐπιφερομένοις βεβαίους τὰς πύλας παρέσχον:

[67] Both parties had now made all necessary preparations, both in word and act. The Athenians sailed at nightfall to Minoa, the island in front of Megara, with six hundred hoplites under the command of Hippocrates. They then took up their position not far from the Long Walls, in a pit out of which the bricks for the walls had been dug. A second division of the Athenian army, consisting of light-armed Plataeans and of a part of the force employed in guarding

the frontier, under the command of Demosthenes the other general, lay in ambush at the temple of Ares, which is nearer still. During the night no one knew what they were about, except the men who were immediately concerned. Just before daybreak the conspirators executed their plan. They had long ago provided that the gates should be open when required; for by the permission of the commander, who supposed them to be privateering, they had been in the habit of conveying a sculling-boat out of the town by night. This they placed upon a waggon, and carried it down to the sea through the trench; they then sailed out, and just before day broke the boat was brought back by them on the waggon and taken in at the gates; their object being, as they pretended, to baffle the Athenian watch at Minoa, as no vessel would be seen in the harbour at all. The waggon had just arrived at the gates, which were opened for the boat to enter, when the Athenians, with whom the whole affair had been preconcerted, seeing this movement, rushed out of the ambuscade, wanting to get in before the gates were shut again and while the waggon was still in them, and prevented them from being closed. At the same instant their Megarian confederates cut down the guards stationed at the gates. First of all the Plataeans and the frontier-guard under Demosthenes rushed in where the trophy now stands. No sooner were they within the gates than the Peloponnesians who were nearest and saw what was going on hastened to the rescue; but they were overpowered by the Plataeans, who secured the gates for the entrance of the Athenian hoplites as they came running up.

68. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἤδη ὁ αἰεὶ ἐντὸς γιγνόμενος ἐχώρει ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος. [2] καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι φρουροὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντίσχοντες ἠμύνοντο ὀλίγοι, καὶ ἀπέθανόν τινες αὐτῶν, οἱ δὲ πλείους ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν, φοβηθέντες ἐν νυκτί τε πολεμίων προσπεπτωκότων καὶ τῶν προδιδόντων Μεγαρέων ἀντιμαχομένων, νομίσαντες τοὺς ἅπαντας σφᾶς Μεγαρέας προδεδωκέναι. [3] ξυνέπεσε γὰρ καὶ

τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκα ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ γνώμης κηρύξαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἰέναι Μεγαρέων μετὰ Ἀθηναίων θησόμενον τὰ ὅπλα. οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἤκουσαν, οὐκέτι ἀνέμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι νομίσαντες κοινῇ πολεμεῖσθαι κατέφυγον ἐς τὴν Νίσαιαν. [4] ἅμα δὲ ἕῳ ἐαλωκότων ἤδη τῶν τειχῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει Μεγαρέων θορυβουμένων οἱ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πράξαντες καὶ ἄλλο μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πλῆθος, ὃ ξυνῄδει, ἔφασαν χρῆναι ἀνοίγειν τὰς πύλας καὶ ἐπεξιέναι ἐς μάχην. [5] ξυνέκειτο δὲ αὐτοῖς τῶν πυλῶν ἀνοιχθεισῶν ἐσπίπτειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, αὐτοὶ δὲ διάδηλοι ἔμελλον ἔσεσθαι λίπα γὰρ ἀλείψεσθαι , ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶνται. ἀσφάλεια δὲ αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἐγίγνετο τῆς ἀνοίξεως: καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐλευσῖνος κατὰ τὸ ξυγκείμενον τετρακισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἱππῆς ἑξακόσιοι [οἱ] τὴν νύκτα πορευόμενοι παρῆσαν. [6] ἀληλιμμένων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὄντων ἤδη περὶ τὰς πύλας καταγορεύει τις ξυνειδὼς τοῖς ἑτέροις τὸ ἐπιβούλευμα. καὶ οἳ ξυστραφέντες ἀθρόοι ἦλθον καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν χρῆναι οὔτε ἐπεξιέναι οὐδὲ γὰρ πρότερόν πω τοῦτο ἰσχύοντες μᾶλλον τολμῆσαι οὔτε ἐς κίνδυνον φανερὸν τὴν πόλιν καταγαγεῖν: εἴ τε μὴ πείσεταί τις, αὐτοῦ τὴν μάχην ἔσεσθαι. ἐδήλουν δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι ἴσασι τὰ πρασσόμενα, ἀλλὰ ὡς τὰ βέλτιστα βουλεύοντες ἰσχυρίζοντο, καὶ ἅμα περὶ τὰς πύλας παρέμενον φυλάσσοντες, ὥστε οὐκ ἐγένετο τοῖς ἐπιβουλεύουσι πρᾶξαι ὃ ἔμελλον.

[68] Then the Athenians entered, and one after another proceeded to mount the wall. A few Peloponnesian guards at first resisted and some of them were killed; but the greater part took to flight; they were terrified at the night attack of the enemy, and fancied, when they saw the Megarians who were in the conspiracy fighting against them, that all the Megarians had betrayed them. It had occurred at the same time to the Athenian herald, without orders, to make proclamation that any Megarian who pleased might join the ranks of the Athenians. When the Lacedaemonians heard the proclamation none of them remained any longer, but

thinking that the Megarians were really fighting on the Athenian side they fled, into Nisaea.When the morning dawned and the Long Walls were already captured, Megara was in a tumult, and those who had negotiated with the Athenians and a large number of others who were in the plot insisted upon opening the gates and going out to battle. Now they had agreed that the Athenians should immediately rush in; and they were themselves to be anointed with oil; this was the mark by which they were to be distinguished, that they might be spared in the attack. There was the less danger in opening the gates, since there had now arrived four thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred horse, who by a previous arrangement had come from Eleusis during the night. When they were anointed and had collected about the gates some one in the secret acquainted the other party, who instantly came upon them in a compact body and declared that there should be no going out; even when they were stronger than at present they had not ventured to take the field; the danger to the city was too palpable; if any one opposed them the battle would have to be fought first within the walls. They did not betray their knowledge of the plot, but assumed the confident tone of men who were recommending the best course. At the same time they kept watch about the gates; and thus the conspiracy was foiled.

69. γνόντες δὲ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ὅτι ἐναντίωμά τι ἐγένετο καὶ τὴν πόλιν βίᾳ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἔσονται λαβεῖν, τὴν Νίσαιαν εὐθὺς περιετείχιζον, νομίζοντες, εἰ πρὶν ἐπιβοηθῆσαί τινας ἐξέλοιεν, θᾶσσον ἂν καὶ [2] τὰ Μέγαρα προσχωρῆσαι παρεγένετο δὲ σίδηρός τε ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ταχὺ καὶ λιθουργοὶ καὶ τἆλλα ἐπιτήδεια: ἀρξάμενοι δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ὃ εἶχον καὶ διοικοδομήσαντες τὸ πρὸς Μεγαρέας, ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἑκατέρωθεν ἐς θάλασσαν τῆς Νισαίας τάφρον τε καὶ τείχη διελομένη ἡ στρατιά, ἔκ τε τοῦ προαστείου λίθοις καὶ πλίνθοις χρώμενοι, καὶ κόπτοντες τὰ δένδρα καὶ ὕλην ἀπεσταύρουν εἴ πῃ δέοιτό τι: καὶ αἱ οἰκίαι τοῦ προαστείου ἐπάλξεις λαμβάνουσαι αὐταὶ ὑπῆρχον

ἔρυμα. [3] καὶ ταύτην μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην εἰργάζοντο: τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ περὶ δείλην τὸ τεῖχος ὅσον οὐκ ἀπετετέλεστο, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Νισαίᾳ δείσαντες, σίτου τε ἀπορίᾳ [ἐφ᾽ ἡμέραν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ἄνω πόλεως ἐχρῶντο] καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐ νομίζοντες ταχὺ ἐπιβοηθήσειν, τούς τε Μεγαρέας πολεμίους ἡγούμενοι, ξυνέβησαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ῥητοῦ μὲν ἕκαστον ἀργυρίου ἀπολυθῆναι ὅπλα παραδόντας, τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις, τῷ τε ἄρχοντι καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἐνῆν, χρῆσθαι Ἀθηναίους ὅτι ἂν βούλωνται. [4] ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁμολογήσαντες ἐξῆλθον, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἀπορρήξαντες ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως καὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν παραλαβόντες τἆλλα παρεσκευάζοντο.

[69] The Athenian generals became aware that some difficulty had arisen, and that they could not carry the city by storm. So they immediately set about the circumvallation of Nisaea, thinking that, if they could take it before any assistance arrived, Megara itself would be more likely to capitulate. Iron and other things needful, as well as masons, were quickly procured from Athens. Beginning from the wall which they already held they intercepted the approach from Megara by a cross wall, and from that drew another on either side of Nisaea down to the sea. The army divided among them the execution of the trench and walls, obtaining stones and bricks from the suburbs of the town. They also cut down timber and fruit-trees and made palisades where they were needed. The houses in the suburbs were of themselves a sufficient fortification, and only required battlements. All that day they continued working; on the following day, towards evening, the wall was nearly finished, and the terrified inhabitants of Nisaea having no food (for they depended for their daily supplies on the upper city), and imagining that Megara had gone over to the enemy, despairing too of any aid soon arriving from Peloponnesus, capitulated to the Athenians. The conditions were as follows: They were to go free, every man paying a fixed ransom and giving up his arms; but the Athenians might deal as they

pleased with the Lacedaemonian commander and any Lacedaemonian who was in the place. Upon these terms they came out, and the Athenians, having broken down the Long Walls between Megara and Nisaea, took possession of Nisaea and prepared for further action.

70. Βρασίδας δὲ ὁ Τέλλιδος Λακεδαιμόνιος κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον ἐτύγχανε περὶ Σικυῶνα καὶ Κόρινθον ὤν, ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης στρατείαν παρασκευαζόμενος. καὶ ὡς ᾔσθετο τῶν τειχῶν τὴν ἅλωσιν, δείσας περί τε τοῖς ἐν τῇ Νισαίᾳ Πελοποννησίοις καὶ μὴ τὰ Μέγαρα ληφθῇ, πέμπει ἔς τε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς κελεύων κατὰ τάχος στρατιᾷ ἀπαντῆσαι ἐπὶ Τριποδίσκον ▯ ἔστι δὲ κώμη τῆς Μεγαρίδος ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχουσα ὑπὸ τῷ ὄρει τῇ Γερανείᾳ ▯, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων ἦλθεν ἑπτακοσίους μὲν καὶ δισχιλίους Κορινθίων ὁπλίτας, Φλειασίων δὲ τετρακοσίους, Σικυωνίων δὲ ἑξακοσίους, καὶ τοὺς μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ ὅσοι ἤδη ξυνειλεγμένοι ἦσαν, οἰόμενος τὴν Νίσαιαν ἔτι καταλήψεσθαι ἀνάλωτον. [2] ὡς δὲ ἐπύθετο ▯ἔτυχε γὰρ νυκτὸς ἐπὶ τὸν Τριποδίσκον ἐξελθών▯, ἀπολέξας τριακοσίους τοῦ στρατοῦ, πρὶν ἔκπυστος γενέσθαι, προσῆλθε τῇ τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλει λαθὼν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὄντας περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, βουλόμενος μὲν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἅμα, εἰ δύναιτο, ἔργῳ τῆς Νισαίας πειρᾶσαι, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τὴν τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλιν ἐσελθὼν βεβαιώσασθαι. καὶ ἠξίου δέξασθαι σφᾶς, λέγων ἐν ἐλπίδι εἶναι ἀναλαβεῖν Νίσαιαν.

[70] But it so happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, the Lacedaemonian, who was equipping an expedition intended for Chalcidicè, was in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and Corinth at the time. Hearing of the capture of the Long Walls, and fearing for the safety of the Peloponnesians in Nisaea, and of Megara itself, he sent to the Boeotians, desiring them to bring an army and meet him with all speed at Tripodiscus. The place so called is a village of Megara situated under Mount Geranea. Thither he also came himself, bringing two thousand seven hundred Corinthian, four hundred Phliasian, and six hundred Sicyonian hoplites,

as well as the followers whom he had previously collected. He had hoped to find Nisaea still untaken; but the news of the capture reached him on his exit from the hills at Tripodiscus, where he did not arrive until night. He immediately took with him a body of three hundred chosen men, and before his arrival in the country was reported reached Megara, undiscovered by the Athenians, who were near the sea. He professed that he wanted, and he really meant if he could, to attempt the recovery of Nisaea; but the great point was to get into Megara and make that safe. So he demanded admission, saying that he had hopes of regaining Nisaea.

71. αἱ δὲ τῶν Μεγαρέων στάσεις φοβούμεναι, οἱ μὲν μὴ τοὺς φεύγοντας σφίσιν ἐσαγαγὼν αὐτοὺς ἐκβάλῃ, οἱ δὲ μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁ δῆμος δείσας ἐπίθηται σφίσι καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐν μάχῃ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν οὖσα ἐγγὺς ἐφεδρευόντων Ἀθηναίων ἀπόληται, οὐκ ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις ἐδόκει ἡσυχάσασι τὸ μέλλον περιιδεῖν. [2] ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ μάχην ἑκάτεροι ἔσεσθαι τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν προσβοηθησάντων, καὶ οὕτω σφίσιν ἀσφαλεστέρως ἔχειν, οἷς τις εἴη εὔνους, κρατήσασι προσχωρῆσαι: ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας ὡς οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐς τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα.

[71] The two factions in Megara were both equally afraid to receive him — the one lest he should introduce the exiles and drive them out, the other lest the people, fearing this very thing, should set upon them and ruin the city, which would then be distracted by civil war and at the same time beset by the Athenians. And so both parties determined to wait and see what would happen. For they both expected a battle to ensue between the Athenians and the army which had come to the relief of the city, and when the victory was won the party whose friends had conquered could more safely join them. Brasidas, thus failing in his purpose, returned to the main body of his troops.

72. ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἕῳ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ παρῆσαν, διανενοημένοι μὲν καὶ πρὶν Βρασίδαν πέμψαι βοηθεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ Μέγαρα, ὡς οὐκ

ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος τοῦ κινδύνου, καὶ ἤδη ὄντες πανστρατιᾷ Πλαταιᾶσιν: ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἦλθεν ὁ ἄγγελος, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐρρώσθησαν, καὶ ἀποστείλαντες διακοσίους καὶ δισχιλίους ὁπλίτας καὶ ἱππέας ἑξακοσίους τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀπῆλθον πάλιν. [2] παρόντος δὲ ἤδη ξύμπαντος τοῦ στρατεύματος, ὁπλιτῶν οὐκ ἔλασσον ἑξακισχιλίων, καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τῶν μὲν ὁπλιτῶν περί τε τὴν Νίσαιαν ὄντων καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἐν τάξει, τῶν δὲ ψιλῶν ἀνὰ τὸ πεδίον ἐσκεδασμένων, οἱ ἱππῆς οἱ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἐπιπεσόντες τοῖς ψιλοῖς ἔτρεψαν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρὸ τοῦ οὐδεμία βοήθειά πω τοῖς Μεγαρεῦσιν οὐδαμόθεν ἐπῆλθεν : [3] ἀντεπεξελάσαντες δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐς χεῖρας ᾖσαν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἱππομαχία ἐπὶ πολύ, ἐν ᾗ ἀξιοῦσιν ἑκάτεροι οὐχ ἥσσους γενέσθαι. [4] τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἵππαρχον τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς οὐ πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν Νίσαιαν προσελάσαντας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι [καὶ] ἀποκτείναντες ἐσκύλευσαν, καὶ τῶν τε νεκρῶν τούτων κρατήσαντες ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησαν: οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παντὶ ἔργῳ βεβαίως οὐδέτεροι τελευτήσαντες ἀπεκρίθησαν, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν.

[72] At dawn of day the Boeotians appeared. Even before they were summoned by Brasidas they had intended to relieve Megara; for the danger came home to them; and their whole force was already collected at Plataea. When his messenger arrived they were more resolved than ever, and sent forward two thousand two hundred heavy-armed and six hundred horse, allowing the greater number to return. The entire army of Brasidas now amounted to six thousand hoplites. The Athenian hoplites were drawn up near Nisaea and the sea, and their light-armed troops were scattered over the plain, when the Boeotian cavalry came riding up, fell upon the light-armed, and drove them to the shore. The attack was unexpected, for in no former invasion had aid come to the Megarians from any quarter. The Athenian cavalry now rode forward and there was a long engagement,

in which both parties claimed to have won a victory. The Athenians drove the general of the Boeotian cavalry and a few other horsemen up to the walls of Nisaea, and there slew them and took their arms. As they retained possession of the dead bodies, and only restored them under a flag of truce, they raised a trophy. Still in respect of the whole engagement neither side when they parted had a decided advantage. The Boeotians retired to their main body, and the Athenians to Nisaea.

73. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Βρασίδας καὶ τὸ στράτευμα ἐχώρουν ἐγγυτέρω τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως, καὶ καταλαβόντες χωρίον ἐπιτήδειον παραταξάμενοι ἡσύχαζον, οἰόμενοι σφίσιν ἐπιέναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Μεγαρέας ἐπιστάμενοι περιορωμένους ὁποτέρων ἡ νίκη ἔσται. [2] καλῶς δὲ ἐνόμιζον σφίσιν ἀμφότερα ἔχειν, ἅμα μὲν τὸ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν προτέρους μηδὲ μάχης καὶ κινδύνου ἑκόντας ἄρξαι, ἐπειδή γε ἐν φανερῷ ἔδειξαν ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἀκονιτὶ τὴν νίκην δικαίως ἂν τίθεσθαι, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρέας ὀρθῶς ξυμβαίνειν: [3] εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ὤφθησαν ἐλθόντες, οὐκ ἂν ἐν τύχῃ γίγνεσθαι σφίσιν, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἂν ὥσπερ ἡσσηθέντων στερηθῆναι εὐθὺς τῆς πόλεως: νῦν δὲ κἂν τυχεῖν αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ βουληθέντας ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ὥστε ἀμαχητὶ ἂν περιγενέσθαι αὐτοῖς ὧν ἕνεκα ἦλθον. ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο. [4] οἱ γὰρ Μεγαρῆς, ὡς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐτάξαντο μὲν παρὰ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη ἐξελθόντες, ἡσύχαζον δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἐπιόντων, λογιζόμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐκείνων στρατηγοὶ μὴ ἀντίπαλον εἶναι σφίσι τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πλείω αὐτοῖς προυκεχωρήκει, ἄρξασι μάχης πρὸς πλέονας αὐτῶν ἢ λαβεῖν νικήσαντας Μέγαρα ἢ σφαλέντας τῷ βελτίστῳ τοῦ ὁπλιτικοῦ βλαφθῆναι, τοῖς δὲ ξυμπάσης τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν παρόντων μέρος ἕκαστον κινδυνεύειν εἰκότως ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν, χρόνον δὲ ἐπισχόντες καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων ἐπεχειρεῖτο, ἀπῆλθον πρότερον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὴν Νίσαιαν καὶ αὖθις οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ὅθενπερ ὡρμήθησαν. οὕτω δὴ τῷ μὲν Βρασίδᾳ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ἄρχουσιν οἱ

τῶν φευγόντων φίλοι Μεγαρῆς, ὡς ἐπικρατήσαντι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐκέτι ἐθελησάντων μάχεσθαι, θαρσοῦντες μᾶλλον ἀνοίγουσί τε τὰς πύλας καὶ δεξάμενοι καταπεπληγμένων ἤδη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πραξάντων ἐς λόγους ἔρχονται.

[73] Brasidas and his army then moved nearer to the sea and to the town of Megara, and there, taking up a convenient position and marshalling their forces, they remained without moving. They were expecting the Athenians to attack them, and knew that the Megarians were waiting to see who would be the conquerors. They were very well satisfied, for two reasons. In the first place they were not the assailants, and had not gone out of their way to risk a battle, although they had clearly shown that they were ready to engage; and so they might fairly claim a victory without fighting. Again, the result in regard to Megara was good: for if they had not put in an appearance they would have had no chance at all, but would have been as good as beaten, and beyond a doubt would immediately have lost the city. Whereas now the Athenians themselves might be unwilling to fight; and, if so, they would gain their object without striking a blow. And this turned out to be the fact; for the Megarians did in the end receive Brasidas. At first the Athenians came out and drew up near the Long Walls, but not being attacked they likewise remained inactive. The generals on their side were restrained by similar reflections. They had gained the greater part of what they wanted; they would be offering battle against a superior force; and their own danger would be out of proportion to that of the enemy. They might be victorious and take Megara, but if they failed the loss would fall on the flower of their infantry. Whereas the Peloponnesians were naturally more willing to encounter a risk which would be divided among the several contingents making up the army now in the field; and each of these was but a part of their whole force, present and absent. Both armies waited for a time, and, when neither saw the other

moving, the Athenians first of the two retired into Nisaea and the Peloponnesians returned to their previous position. Whereupon the party in Megara friendly to the exiles took courage, opened the gates, and received Brasidas and the generals of the other cities, considering that the Athenians had finally made up their minds not to fight, and that he was the conqueror. They then entered into negotiations with him; for the other faction which had conspired with the Athenians was now paralysed.

74. καὶ ὕστερον ὁ μὲν διαλυθέντων τῶν ξυμμάχων κατὰ πόλεις ἐπανελθὼν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον τὴν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης στρατείαν παρεσκεύαζεν, ἵναπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὥρμητο: [2] οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει Μεγαρῆς, ἀποχωρησάντων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, ὅσοι μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μάλιστα μετέσχον, εἰδότες ὅτι ὤφθησαν εὐθὺς ὑπεξῆλθον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι κοινολογησάμενοι τοῖς τῶν φευγόντων φίλοις κατάγουσι τοὺς ἐκ Πηγῶν, ὁρκώσαντες πίστεσι μεγάλαις μηδὲν μνησικακήσειν, βουλεύσειν δὲ τῇ πόλει τὰ ἄριστα. [3] οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγένοντο καὶ ἐξέτασιν ὅπλων ἐποιήσαντο, διαστήσαντες τοὺς λόχους ἐξελέξαντο τῶν τε ἐχθρῶν καὶ οἳ ἐδόκουν μάλιστα ξυμπρᾶξαι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἄνδρας ὡς ἑκατόν, καὶ τούτων πέρι ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον ψῆφον φανερὰν διενεγκεῖν, ὡς κατεγνώσθησαν, ἔκτειναν, καὶ ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τὰ μάλιστα κατέστησαν τὴν πόλιν. [4] καὶ πλεῖστον δὴ χρόνον αὕτη ὑπ᾽ ἐλαχίστων γενομένη ἐκ στάσεως μετάστασις ξυνέμεινεν.

[74] After this the allies dispersed to their several cities and Brasidas returned to Corinth, where he made preparations for his expedition into Chalcidicè, his original destination. When the Athenians had also gone home, such of the Megarians as had been chiefly concerned with them, knowing that they were discovered, at once slipped away. The rest of the citizens, after conferring with the friends of the exiles, recalled them from Pegae, first binding them by the most solemn oaths to consider the interests of the state

and to forget old quarrels. But no sooner had they come into office than, taking the opportunity of a review and drawing up the divisions apart from one another, they selected about a hundred of their enemies, and of those who seemed to have been most deeply implicated with the Athenians, and compelled the people to give sentence upon them by an open vote; having obtained their condemnation, they put them to death. They then established in the city an extreme oligarchy. And no government based on a counter revolution effected by so few ever lasted so long a time.

75. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους τῆς Ἀντάνδρου ὑπὸ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὥσπερ διενοοῦντο, μελλούσης κατασκευάζεσθαι, οἱ τῶν ἀργυρολόγων νεῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ Δημόδοκος καὶ Ἀριστείδης, ὄντες περὶ Ἑλλήσποντον ὁ γὰρ τρίτος αὐτῶν Λάμαχος δέκα ναυσὶν ἐς τὸν Πόντον ἐσεπεπλεύκει ὡς ᾐσθάνοντο τὴν παρασκευὴν τοῦ χωρίου καὶ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς δεινὸν εἶναι μὴ ὥσπερ τὰ Ἄναια ἐπὶ τῇ Σάμῳ γένηται, ἔνθα οἱ φεύγοντες τῶν Σαμίων καταστάντες τούς τε Πελοποννησίους ὠφέλουν ἐς τὰ ναυτικὰ κυβερνήτας πέμποντες καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει Σαμίους ἐς ταραχὴν καθίστασαν καὶ τοὺς ἐξιόντας ἐδέχοντο: οὕτω δὴ ξυναγείραντες ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων στρατιὰν καὶ πλεύσαντες, μάχῃ τε νικήσαντες τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἀντάνδρου ἐπεξελθόντας, ἀναλαμβάνουσι τὸ χωρίον πάλιν. [2] καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἐς τὸν Πόντον ἐσπλεύσας Λάμαχος, ἐν τῇ Ἡρακλεώτιδι ὁρμίσας ἐς τὸν Κάληταποταμὸν ἀπόλλυσι τὰς ναῦς ὕδατος ἄνωθεν γενομένου καὶ κατελθόντος αἰφνιδίου τοῦ ῥεύματος: αὐτὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ πεζῇ διὰ Βιθυνῶν Θρᾳκῶν, οἵ εἰσι πέραν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ, ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Καλχηδόνα τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Πόντου Μεγαρέων ἀποικίαν.

[75] During the same summer Demodocus and Aristides, two commanders of the Athenian fleet which collected tribute from the allies, happened to be in the neighbourhood of the Hellespont; there were only two of them, the third, Lamachus, having sailed with ten ships into the Pontus.

They saw that the Lesbian exiles were going to strengthen Antandrus as they had intended, and they feared that it would prove as troublesome an enemy to Lesbos as Anaea had been to Samos; for the Samian refugees, who had settled there, aided the Peloponnesian navy by sending them pilots; they likewise took in fugitives from Samos and kept the island in a state of perpetual alarm. So the Athenian generals collected troops from their allies, sailed to Antandrus, and, defeating a force which came out against them, recovered the place. Not long afterwards Lamachus, who had sailed into the Pontus and had anchored in the territory of Heraclea at the mouth of the river Calex, lost his ships by a sudden flood which a fall of rain in the upper country had brought down. He and his army returned by land through the country of the Bithynian Thracians who dwell on the Asiatic coast across the water, and arrived at Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the Pontus.

76. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει καὶ Δημοσθένης Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ναύπακτον, εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Μεγαρίδος ἀναχώρησιν. [2] τῷ γὰρ Ἱπποκράτει καὶ ἐκείνῳ τὰ Βοιώτια πράγματα ἀπό τινων ἀνδρῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐπράσσετο, βουλομένων μεταστῆσαι τὸν κόσμον καὶ ἐς δημοκρατίαν ὥσπερ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τρέψαι: καὶ Πτοιοδώρου μάλιστ᾽ ἀνδρὸς φυγάδος ἐκ Θηβῶν ἐσηγουμένου τάδε αὐτοῖς παρεσκευάσθη. [3] Σίφας μὲν ἔμελλόν τινες προδώσειν [αἱ δὲ Σῖφαί εἰσι τῆς Θεσπικῆς γῆς ἐν τῷ Κρισαίῳ κόλπῳ ἐπιθαλασσίδιοι]: Χαιρώνειαν δέ, ἢ ἐς Ὀρχομενὸν τὸν Μινύειον πρότερον καλούμενον, νῦν δὲ Βοιώτιον, ξυντελεῖ, ἄλλοι ἐξ Ὀρχομενοῦ ἐνεδίδοσαν, καὶ οἱ Ὀρχομενίων φυγάδες ξυνέπρασσον τὰ μάλιστα καὶ ἄνδρας ἐμισθοῦντο ἐκ Πελοποννήσου [ἔστι δὲ ἡ Χαιρώνεια ἔσχατον τῆς Βοιωτίας πρὸς τῇ Φανοτίδι τῆς Φωκίδος], καὶ Φωκέων μετεῖχόν τινες. [4] τοὺς δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἔδει Δήλιον καταλαβεῖν τὸ ἐν τῇ Ταναγραίᾳ πρὸς Εὔβοιαν τετραμμένον Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερόν, ἅμα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ γίγνεσθαι, ὅπως μὴ ξυμβοηθήσωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον οἱ Βοιωτοὶ ἀθρόοι,

ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι κινούμενα. [5] καὶ εἰ κατορθοῖτο ἡ πεῖρα καὶ τὸ Δήλιον τειχισθείη, ῥᾳδίως ἤλπιζον, εἰ καὶ μὴ παραυτίκα νεωτερίζοιτό τι τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς, ἐχομένων τούτων τῶν χωρίων καὶ λῃστευομένης τῆς γῆς καὶ οὔσης ἑκάστοις διὰ βραχέος ἀποστροφῆς, οὐ μενεῖν κατὰ χώραν τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μὲν προσιόντων τοῖς ἀφεστηκόσι, τοῖς δὲ οὐκ οὔσης ἀθρόας τῆς δυνάμεως, καταστήσειν αὐτὰ ἐς τὸ ἐπιτήδειον.

[76] In the same summer, and immediately after the withdrawal of the Athenians from Megara, the Athenian general Demosthenes arrived at Naupactus with forty ships. A party in the cities of Boeotia, who wanted to overthrow their constitution and set up a democracy like that of Athens, had entered into communications with him and with Hippocrates, and a plan of operations had been concerted, chiefly under the direction of Ptoeodorus, a Theban exile. Some of the democratical party undertook to betray Siphae, which is a seaport on the Crisaean Gulf in the Thespian territory, and certain Orchomenians were to deliver up to the Athenians Chaeronea, which is a dependency of the Boeotian, or as it was formerly called the Minyan, Orchomenus. A body of Orchomenian exiles had a principal hand in this design and were seeking to hire a Peloponnesian force. The town of Chaeronea is at the extremity of Boeotia near the territory of Phanoteus in Phocis, and some Phocians took part in the plot. The Athenians meanwhile were to seize Delium, a temple of Apollo which is in the district of Tanagra and looks towards Euboea. In order to keep the Boeotians occupied with disturbances at home, and prevent them from marching in a body to Delium, the whole movement was to be made on a single day, which was fixed beforehand. If the attempt succeeded and Delium was fortified, even though no revolution should at once break out in the states of Boeotia, they might hold the places which they had taken and

plunder the country. The partisans of democracy in the several cities would have a refuge near at hand to which in case of failure they might retreat. Matters could not long remain as they were; and in time, the Athenians acting with the rebels, and the Boeotian forces being divided, they would easily settle Boeotia in their interest. Such was the nature of the proposed attempt.

77. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιβουλὴ τοιαύτη παρεσκευάζετο, ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν ἔχων, ὁπότε καιρὸς εἴη, ἔμελλε στρατεύειν ἐς τοὺς Βοιωτούς, τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη προαπέστειλε ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον, ὅπως ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν χωρίων στρατὸν ξυλλέξας Ἀκαρνάνων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων πλέοι ἐπὶ τὰς Σίφας ὡς προδοθησομένας: ἡμέρα δ᾽ αὐτοῖς εἴρητο ᾗ ἔδει ἅμα ταῦτα πράσσειν. [2] καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης ἀφικόμενος, Οἰνιάδας δὲ ὑπό τε Ἀκαρνάνων πάντων κατηναγκασμένους καταλαβὼν ἐς τὴν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναστήσας τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν τὸ ἐκείνῃ πᾶν, ἐπὶ Σαλύνθιον καὶ Ἀγραίους στρατεύσας πρῶτον καὶ προσποιησάμενος τἆλλα ἡτοιμάζετο ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς Σίφας, ὅταν δέῃ, ἀπαντησόμενος.

[77] Hippocrates himself with a force from the city was ready to march into Boeotia when the moment came. He had sent Demosthenes beforehand with the forty ships to Naupactus, intending him to collect an army of Acarnanians and other allies of the Athenians in that region and sail against Siphae, which was to be betrayed to them. These operations were to be carried out simultaneously on the day appointed.Demosthenes on his arrival found that the confederate Acarnanians had already compelled Oeniadae to enter the Athenian alliance. He then himself raised all the forces of the allies in those parts and proceeded first to make war upon Salynthius and the Agraeans. Having subdued them, he took the necessary steps for keeping his appointment at Siphae.

78. Βρασίδας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦ θέρους πορευόμενος ἑπτακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἐπειδὴ ἐγένετο ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ τῇ ἐν Τραχῖνι καί, προπέμψαντος αὐτοῦ ἄγγελον ἐς Φάρσαλον παρὰ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους, ἀξιοῦντος διάγειν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν στρατιάν, ἦλθον ἐς Μελίτειαν τῆς Ἀχαΐας Πάναιρός τε καὶ Δῶρος καὶ Ἱπολοχίδας καὶ Τορύλαος καὶ Στρόφακος πρόξενος ὢν Χαλκιδέων, τότε δὴ ἐπορεύετο. [2] ἦγον δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Θεσσαλῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκ Λαρίσης Νικονίδας Περδίκκᾳ ἐπιτήδειος ὤν. τὴν γὰρ Θεσσαλίαν ἄλλως τε οὐκ εὔπορον ἦν διιέναι ἄνευ ἀγωγοῦ καὶ μετὰ ὅπλων γε δή, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσί γε ὁμοίως Ἕλλησιν ὕποπτον καθειστήκει τὴν τῶν πέλας μὴ πείσαντας διιέναι: τοῖς τε Ἀθηναίοις αἰεί ποτε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εὔνουν ὑπῆρχεν. [3] ὥστε εἰ μὴ δυναστείᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἰσονομίᾳ ἐχρῶντο τὸ ἐγχώριον οἱ Θεσσαλοί, οὐκ ἄν ποτε προῆλθεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τότε πορευομένῳ αὐτῷ ἀπαντήσαντες ἄλλοι τῶν τἀναντία τούτοις βουλομένων ἐπὶ τῷ Ἐνιπεῖ ποταμῷ ἐκώλυον καὶ ἀδικεῖν ἔφασαν ἄνευ τοῦ πάντων κοινοῦ πορευόμενον. [4] οἱ δὲ ἄγοντες οὔτε ἀκόντων ἔφασαν διάξειν, αἰφνίδιόν τε παραγενόμενον ξένοι ὄντες κομίζειν. ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Βρασίδας τῇ Θεσσαλῶν γῇ καὶ αὐτοῖς φίλος ὢν ἰέναι καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πολεμίοις οὖσι καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνοις ὅπλα ἐπιφέρειν, Θεσσαλοῖς τε οὐκ εἰδέναι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔχθραν οὖσαν ὥστε τῇ ἀλλήλων γῇ μὴ χρῆσθαι, νῦν τε ἀκόντων ἐκείνων οὐκ ἂν προελθεῖν ‐οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι‐, οὐ μέντοι ἀξιοῦν γε εἴργεσθαι. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα ἀπῆλθον, ὁ δὲ κελευόντων τῶν ἀγωγῶν, πρίν τι πλέον ξυστῆναι τὸ κωλῦσον, ἐχώρει οὐδὲν ἐπισχὼν δρόμῳ. καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ᾗ ἐκ τῆς Μελιτείας ἀφώρμησεν, ἐς Φάρσαλόν τε ἐτέλεσε καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀπιδανῷ ποταμῷ, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐς Φάκιον, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐς Περραιβίαν. [6] ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου ἤδη οἱ μὲν τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ἀγωγοὶ πάλιν ἀπῆλθον, οἱ δὲ Περραιβοὶ αὐτόν, ὑπήκοοι ὄντες Θεσσαλῶν, κατέστησαν ἐς Δῖον τῆς Περδίκκου ἀρχῆς, ὃ ὑπὸ τῷ Ὀλύμπῳ Μακεδονίας πρὸς Θεσσαλοὺς πόλισμα κεῖται.

[78] During this summer, and about the same time, Brasidas set out on his way to Chalcidicè with seventeen hundred hoplites. When he arrived at Heraclea in Trachis he despatched a messenger to Pharsalus, where he had friends, with a request that they would conduct him and his army through the country. Accordingly there came to meet him at Melitia, in Achaea Phthiotis, Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and Strophacus who was the proxenus of the Chalcidians. Under their guidance he started. Other Thessalians also conducted him; in particular, Niconidas a friend of Perdiccas from Larissa. Under any circumstances it would not have been easy to cross Thessaly without an escort, and certainly for an armed force to go through a neighbour's country without his consent was a proceeding which excited jealousy among all Hellenes. Besides, the common people of Thessaly were always well disposed towards the Athenians. And if the traditions of the country had not been in favour of a close oligarchy, Brasidas could never have gone on; even as it was, some of the opposite party met him on his march at the river Enipeus and would have stopped him, saying that he had no business to proceed without the consent of the whole nation. His escort replied that they would not conduct him if the others objected, but that he had suddenly presented himself and they were doing the duty of hosts in accompanying him. Brasidas himself added that he came as a friend to the Thessalian land and people, and that he was making war upon his enemies the Athenians, and not upon them. He had never heard that there was any ill-feeling between the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians which prevented either of them from passing through the territory of the other; however, if they refused their consent, he would not and indeed could not go on; but such was not the treatment which he had a right to expect from them. Upon this they departed, and he by the advice of his escort, fearing that a large force might collect and stop him, marched on at full

speed and without a halt. On the same day on which he started from Melitia he arrived at Pharsalus, and encamped by the river Apidanus. Thence he went on to Phacium, and thence to Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian escort returned; and the Perrhaebians, who are subjects of the Thessalians, brought him safe to Dium in the territory of Perdiccas, a city of Macedonia which is situated under Mount Olympus on the Thessalian side.

79. τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ Βρασίδας Θεσσαλίαν φθάσας διέδραμε πρίν τινα κωλύειν παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ ἀφίκετο ὡς Περδίκκαν καὶ ἐς τὴν Χαλκιδικήν. [2] ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Πελοποννήσου, ὡς τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ηὐτύχει, δείσαντες οἵ τε ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἀφεστῶτες Ἀθηναίων καὶ Περδίκκας ἐξήγαγον τὸν στρατόν, οἱ μὲν Χαλκιδῆς νομίζοντες ἐπὶ σφᾶς πρῶτον ὁρμήσειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἅμα αἱ πλησιόχωροι πόλεις αὐτῶν αἱ οὐκ ἀφεστηκυῖαι ξυνεπῆγον κρύφα, Περδίκκας δὲ πολέμιος μὲν οὐκ ὢν ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ, φοβούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ παλαιὰ διάφορα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ μάλιστα βουλόμενος Ἀρραβαῖον τὸν Λυγκηστῶν βασιλέα παραστήσασθαι. [3]ξυνέβη δὲ αὐτοῖς, ὥστε ῥᾷον ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στρατὸν ἐξαγαγεῖν, ἡ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κακοπραγία.

[79] Thus Brasidas succeeded in running through Thessaly before any measures were taken to stop him, and reached Perdiccas and Chalcidicè. He and the revolted tributaries of the Athenians, alarmed at their recent successes, had invited the Peloponnesians. The Chalcidians were expecting that the first efforts of the Athenians would be directed against them: their cities in the neighbourhood also which had not revolted secretly joined in the invitation. Perdiccas was not a declared enemy of Athens, but was afraid that the old differences between himself and the Athenians might revive, and he was especially anxious to subdue Arrhibaeus, king of the Lyncestians.

80. τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ἐγκειμένων τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τῇ ἐκείνων γῇ ἤλπιζον ἀποτρέψειν αὐτοὺς

μάλιστα, εἰ ἀντιπαραλυποῖεν πέμψαντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους αὐτῶν στρατιάν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων τρέφειν τε καὶ ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει σφᾶς ἐπικαλουμένων. [2] καὶ ἅμα τῶν Εἱλώτων βουλομένοις ἦν ἐπὶ προφάσει ἐκπέμψαι, μή τι πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τῆς Πύλου ἐχομένης νεωτερίσωσιν: [3] ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε ἔπραξαν φοβούμενοι αὐτῶν τὴν σκαιότητα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αἰεὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις πρὸς τοὺς Εἵλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι μάλιστα καθειστήκει: προεῖπον αὐτῶν ὅσοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γεγενῆσθαι σφίσιν ἄριστοι,κρίνεσθαι, ὡς ἐλευθερώσοντες, πεῖραν ποιούμενοι καὶ ἡγούμενοι τούτους σφίσιν ὑπὸ φρονήματος, οἵπερ καὶ ἠξίωσαν πρῶτος ἕκαστος ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, μάλιστα ἂν καὶ ἐπιθέσθαι. [4] καὶ προκρίναντες ἐς δισχιλίους, οἱ μὲν ἐστεφανώσαντό τε καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ περιῆλθον ὡς ἠλευθερωμένοι, οἱ δὲ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἠφάνισάν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἕκαστος διεφθάρη. [5] καὶ τότε προθύμως τῷ Βρασίδᾳ αὐτῶν ξυνέπεμψαν ἑπτακοσίους ὁπλίτας, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μισθῷ πείσας ἐξήγαγεν.

[80] The Lacedaemonians were the more willing to let the Chalcidians have an army from Peloponnesus owing to the unfortunate state of their affairs. For now that the Athenians were infesting Peloponnesus, and especially Laconia, they thought that a diversion would be best effected if they could retaliate on them by sending troops to help their dissatisfied allies, who moreover were offering to maintain them, and had asked for assistance from Sparta with the intention of revolting. They were also glad of a pretext for sending out of the way some of the Helots, fearing that they would take the opportunity of rising afforded by the occupation of Pylos. Most of the Lacedaemonian institutions were specially intended to secure them against this source of danger. Once, when they were afraid of the number and vigour of the Helot youth, this was what they did: They proclaimed that a selection would be made of those Helots who claimed to have rendered the best service to the Lacedaemonians in

war, and promised them liberty. The announcement was intended to test them; it was thought that those among them who were foremost in asserting their freedom would be most high-spirited, and most likely to rise against their masters. So they selected about two thousand, who were crowned with garlands and went in procession round the temples; they were supposed to have received their liberty; but not long afterwards the Spartans put them all out of the way, and no man knew how any one of them came by his end. And so they were only too glad to send with Brasidas seven hundred Helots as hoplites. The rest of his army he hired from Peloponnesus. He himself was even more willing to go than they were to send him.

81. αὐτόν τε Βρασίδαν βουλόμενον μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπέστειλαν προυθυμήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς , ἄνδρα ἔν τε τῇ Σπάρτῃ δοκοῦντα δραστήριον εἶναι ἐς τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐξῆλθε πλείστου ἄξιον Λακεδαιμονίοις γενόμενον. [2] τό τε γὰρ παραυτίκα ἑαυτὸν παρασχὼν δίκαιον καὶ μέτριον ἐς τὰς πόλεις ἀπέστησε τὰ πολλά, τὰ δὲ προδοσίᾳ εἶλε τῶν χωρίων, ὥστε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις γίγνεσθαι ξυμβαίνειν τε βουλομένοις, ὅπερ ἐποίησαν, ἀνταπόδοσιν καὶ ἀποδοχὴν χωρίων καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου λώφησιν: ἔς τε τὸν χρόνῳ ὕστερον μετὰ τὰ ἐκ Σικελίας πόλεμον ἡ τότε Βρασίδου ἀρετὴ καὶ ξύνεσις, τῶν μὲν πείρᾳ αἰσθομένων, τῶν δὲ ἀκοῇ νομισάντων, μάλιστα ἐπιθυμίαν ἐνεποίει τοῖς Ἀθηναίων ξυμμάχοις ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. [3] πρῶτος γὰρ ἐξελθὼν καὶ δόξας εἶναι κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθὸς ἐλπίδα ἐγκατέλιπε βέβαιον ὡς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν.

[81] The Chalcidians too desired to have him, for at Sparta he had always been considered a man of energy. And on this expedition he proved invaluable to the Lacedaemonians. At the time he gave an impression of justice and moderation in his behaviour to the cities, which induced most of them to revolt, while others were betrayed into his hands. Thus the Lacedaemonians were able to lighten the pressure of war

upon Peloponnesus; and when shortly afterwards they desired to negotiate, they had places to give in return for what they sought to recover. And at a later period of the war, after the Sicilian expedition, the honesty and ability of Brasidas which some had experienced, and of which others had heard the fame, mainly attracted the Athenian allies to the Lacedaemonians. For he was the first Spartan who had gone out to them, and he proved himself to be in every way a good man. Thus he left in their minds a firm conviction that the others would be like him.

82. τότε δ᾽ οὖν ἀφικομένου αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πυθόμενοι τόν τε Περδίκκαν πολέμιον ποιοῦνται, νομίσαντες αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς παρόδου, καὶ τῶν ταύτῃ ξυμμάχων φυλακὴν πλέονα κατεστήσαντο.

[82] The Athenians, hearing of the arrival of Brasidas in Chalcidicè, and believing that Perdiccas was the instigator of the expedition, declared war against the latter and kept a closer watch over their allies in that region.

83. Περδίκκας δὲ Βρασίδαν καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν εὐθὺς λαβὼν μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως στρατεύει ἐπὶ Ἀρραβαῖον τὸν Βρομεροῦ Λυγκηστῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλέα ὅμορον ὄντα, διαφορᾶς τε αὐτῷ οὔσης καὶ βουλόμενος καταστρέψασθαι. [2] ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο τῷ στρατῷ μετὰ τοῦ Βρασίδου ἐπὶ τῇ ἐσβολῇ τῆς Λύγκου, Βρασίδας λόγοις ἔφη βούλεσθαι πρῶτον ἐλθὼν πρὸ πολέμου Ἀρραβαῖον ξύμμαχον Λακεδαιμονίων, ἢν δύνηται, ποιῆσαι. [3] καὶ γάρ τι καὶ Ἀρραβαῖος ἐπεκηρυκεύετο, ἑτοῖμος ὢν Βρασίδᾳ μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν: καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδέων πρέσβεις ξυμπαρόντες ἐδίδασκον αὐτὸν μὴ ὑπεξελεῖν τῷ Περδίκκᾳ τὰ δεινά, ἵνα προθυμοτέρῳ ἔχοιεν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἑαυτῶν χρῆσθαι. [4] ἅμα δέ τι καὶ εἰρήκεσαν τοιοῦτον οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Περδίκκου ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι, ὡς πολλὰ αὐτοῖς τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν χωρίων ξύμμαχα ποιήσοι, ὥστε ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου κοινῇ μᾶλλον ὁ Βρασίδας τὰ τοῦ Ἀρραβαίου ἠξίου πράσσειν. [5] Περδίκκας δὲ οὔτε δικαστὴν ἔφη Βρασίδαν τῶν σφετέρων διαφορῶν ἀγαγεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ καθαιρέτην ὧν ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποφαίνῃ

πολεμίων, ἀδικήσειν τε εἰ αὐτοῦ τρέφοντος τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ στρατοῦ ξυνέσται Ἀρραβαίῳ. [6] ὁ δὲ ἄκοντος καὶ ἐκ διαφορᾶς ξυγγίγνεται, καὶ πεισθεὶς τοῖς λόγοις ἀπήγαγε τὴν στρατιὰν πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν χώραν. Περδίκκας δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο τρίτον μέρος ἀνθ᾽ ἡμίσεος τῆς τροφῆς ἐδίδου, νομίζων ἀδικεῖσθαι.

[83] Perdiccas, at once uniting the soldiers of Brasidas with his own forces, made war upon Arrhibaeus the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestians, a neighbouring people of Macedonia; for he had a quarrel with him and wanted to subdue him. But when he and Brasidas and the army arrived at the pass leading into Lyncus, Brasidas said that before appealing to arms he should like to try in person the effect of negotiations, and see if he could not make Arrhibaeus an ally of the Lacedaemonians. He was partly influenced by messages which came from Arrhibaeus expressing his willingness to submit any matter in dispute to the arbitration of Brasidas: and the Chalcidian ambassadors who accompanied the expedition recommended him not to remove from Perdiccas' path all his difficulties, lest, when they were wanting him for their own affairs, his ardour should cool. Besides, the envoys of Perdiccas when at Sparta had said something to the Lacedaemonians about his making many of the neighbouring tribes their allies, and on this ground Brasidas claimed to act jointly with Perdiccas in the matter of Arrhibaeus. But Perdiccas answered that he had not brought Brasidas there to arbitrate in the quarrels of Macedonia; he had meant him to destroy his enemies when he pointed them out. While he, Perdiccas, was maintaining half the Lacedaemonian army, Brasidas had no business to be holding parley with Arrhibaeus. But in spite of the opposition and resentment of Perdiccas, Brasidas communicated with Arrhibaeus, and was induced by his words to withdraw his army without invading the country. From that time Perdiccas thought himself ill-used, and paid only a third instead of half the expenses of the army.

84. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει εὐθὺς ὁ Βρασίδας ἔχων καὶ Χαλκιδέας ἐπὶ Ἄκανθον τὴν Ἀνδρίων ἀποικίαν ὀλίγον πρὸ τρυγήτου ἐστράτευσεν. [2] οἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ δέχεσθαι αὐτὸν κατ᾽ ἀλλήλους ἐστασίαζον, οἵ τε μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδέων ξυνεπάγοντες καὶ ὁ δῆμος. ὅμως δὲ διὰ τοῦ καρποῦ τὸ δέος ἔτι ἔξω ὄντος πεισθὲν τὸ πλῆθος ὑπὸ τοῦ Βρασίδου δέξασθαί τε αὐτὸν μόνον καὶ ἀκούσαντας βουλεύσασθαι, δέχεται: καὶ καταστὰς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ﷽ἦν δὲ οὐδὲ ἀδύνατος, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιος, εἰπεῖν﷽ ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

[84] During the same summer, immediately on his return from Lyncus, and a little before the vintage, Brasidas, reinforced by Chalcidian troops, marched against Acanthus, a colony of Andros. The inhabitants of the city were not agreed about admitting him; those who in concert with the Chalcidians had invited him being opposed to the mass of the people. So he asked them to receive him alone, and hear what he had to say before they decided; and to this request the multitude, partly out of fear for their still ungathered vintage, were induced to consent. Whereupon, coming forward to the people (and for a Lacedaemonian he was not a bad speaker), he addressed them as follows:

85. ‘ἡ μὲν ἔκπεμψίς μου καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὦ Ἀκάνθιοι, γεγένηται τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπαληθεύουσα ἣν ἀρχόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου προείπομεν, Ἀθηναίοις ἐλευθεροῦντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα πολεμήσειν: [2] εἰ δὲ χρόνῳ ἐπήλθομεν, σφαλέντες τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκεῖ πολέμου δόξης, ᾗ διὰ τάχους αὐτοὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὑμετέρου κινδύνου ἠλπίσαμεν Ἀθηναίους καθαιρήσειν, μηδεὶς μεμφθῇ: νῦν γάρ, ὅτε παρέσχεν, ἀφιγμένοι καὶ μετὰ ὑμῶν πειρασόμεθα κατεργάζεσθαι αὐτούς. [3] θαυμάζω δὲ τῇ τε ἀποκλήσει μου τῶν πυλῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀσμένοις ὑμῖν ἀφῖγμαι. [4] ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οἰόμενοί τε παρὰ ξυμμάχους, καὶ πρὶν ἔργῳ ἀφικέσθαι, τῇ γοῦν γνώμῃ ἥξειν καὶ βουλομένοις ἔσεσθαι, κίνδυνόν [τε] τοσόνδε ἀνερρίψαμεν διὰ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν ἰόντες καὶ πᾶν τὸ πρόθυμον παρεχόμενοι: [5] ὑμεῖς δὲ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐν νῷ ἔχετε ἢ εἰ

ἐναντιώσεσθε τῇ τε ὑμετέρᾳ αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, δεινὸν ἂν εἴη. [6] καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἀνθίστασθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐπίω, ἧσσόν τις ἐμοὶ πρόσεισι, δυσχερὲς ποιούμενοι εἰ ἐπὶ οὓς πρῶτον ἦλθον ὑμᾶς, καὶ πόλιν ἀξιόχρεων παρεχομένους καὶ ξύνεσιν δοκοῦντας ἔχειν, μὴ ἐδέξασθε: καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐχ ἕξω πιστὴν ἀποδεικνύναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἄδικον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐπιφέρειν ἢ ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀδύνατος τιμωρῆσαι τὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἢν ἐπίωσιν, ἀφῖχθαι. [7] καίτοι στρατιᾷ γε τῇδ᾽ ἢν νῦν [ἐγὼ] ἔχω ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν ἐμοῦ βοηθήσαντος οὐκ ἠθέλησαν Ἀθηναῖοι πλέονες ὄντες προσμεῖξαι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς νηίτῃ γε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἐν Νισαίᾳ στρατῷ ἴσον πλῆθος ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀποστεῖλαι.

[85] ‘Men of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me out at the head of this army to justify the declaration which we made at the beginning of the war — that we were going to fight against the Athenians for the liberties of Hellas. If we have been long in coming, the reason is that we were disappointed in the result of the war nearer home; for we had hoped that, without involving you in danger, we might ourselves have made a speedy end of the Athenians. And therefore let no one blame us; we have come as soon as we could, and with your help will do our best to overthrow them. But how is it that you close your gates against me, and do not greet my arrival? We Lacedaemonians thought that we were coming to those who even before we came in act were our allies in spirit, and would joyfully receive us; having this hope we have braved the greatest dangers, marching for many days through a foreign country, and have shown the utmost zeal in your cause. And now, for you to be of another mind and to set yourselves against the liberties of your own city and of all Hellas would be monstrous! The evil is not only that you resist me yourselves, but wherever I go people will be less likely to join me; they will take it amiss when they hear that you to whom I first came, representing a powerful city and reputed to be men of sense, did not receive me, and I shall not be able to give a satisfactory

explanation, but shall have to confess either that I offer a spurious liberty, or that I am weak and incapable of protecting you against the threatened attack of the Athenians. And yet when I brought assistance to Nisaea in command of the army which I have led hither, the Athenians, though more numerous, refused to engage with me; and they are not likely now, when their forces must be conveyed by sea, to send an army against you equal to that which they had at Nisaea.

86. αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερώσει δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα, ὅρκοις τε Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη τοῖς μεγίστοις ἦ μὴν οὓς ἂν ἔγωγε προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους ἔσεσθαι αὐτονόμους, καὶ ἅμα οὐχ ἵνα ξυμμάχους ὑμᾶς ἔχωμεν ἢ βίᾳ ἢ ἀπάτῃ προσλαβόντες, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ὑμῖν δεδουλωμένοις ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχήσοντες. [2] οὔκουν ἀξιῶ οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύεσθαι, πίστεις γε διδοὺς τὰς μεγίστας, οὐδὲ τιμωρὸς ἀδύνατος νομισθῆναι, προσχωρεῖν τε ὑμᾶς θαρσήσαντας. [3] καὶ εἴ τις ἰδίᾳ τινὰ δεδιὼς ἄρα, μὴ ἐγώ τισι προσθῶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀπρόθυμός ἐστι, πάντων μάλιστα πιστευσάτω. [4] οὐ γὰρ ξυστασιάσων ἥκω, οὐδὲ ἂν σαφῆ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, εἰ τὸ πάτριον παρεὶς τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς πᾶσι δουλώσαιμι. [5] χαλεπωτέρα γὰρ ἂν τῆς ἀλλοφύλου ἀρχῆς εἴη, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐκ ἂν ἀντὶ πόνων χάρις καθίσταιτο, ἀντὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης αἰτία μᾶλλον: οἷς τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήμασι καταπολεμοῦμεν, αὐτοὶ ἂν φαινοίμεθα ἐχθίονα ἢ ὁ μὴ ὑποδείξας ἀρετὴν κατακτώμενοι. [6] ἀπάτῃ γὰρ εὐπρεπεῖ αἴσχιον τοῖς γε ἐν ἀξιώματι πλεονεκτῆσαι ἢ βίᾳ ἐμφανεῖ: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἰσχύος δικαιώσει, ἣν ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν, ἐπέρχεται, τὸ δὲ γνώμης ἀδίκου ἐπιβουλῇ.

[86] And I myself, why am I here? I come, not to injure, but to emancipate the Hellenes. And I have bound the government of Lacedaemon by the most solemn oaths to respect the independence of any states which I may bring over to their side. I do not want to gain your alliance by force or fraud,

but to give you ours, that we may free you from the Athenian yoke. I think that you ought not to doubt my word when I offer you the most solemn pledges, nor should I be regarded as an inefficient champion; but you should confidently join me.’If any one among you hangs back because he has a personal fear of anybody else, and is under the impression that I shall hand over the city to a party, him above all I would reassure. For I am not come hither to be the tool of a faction; nor do I conceive that the liberty which I bring you is of an ambiguous character; I should forget the spirit of my country were I to enslave the many to the few, or the minority to the whole people. Such a tyranny would be worse than the dominion of the foreigner, and we Lacedaemonians should receive no thanks in return for our trouble, but, instead of honour and reputation, only reproach. We should lay ourselves open to the charges which are our best weapons against the Athenians, and in a far more detestable form, for they have never been great examples of virtue. For to men of character there is more disgrace in seeking aggrandisement by specious deceit than by open violence; the violent have the justification of strength which fortune gives them, but a policy of intrigue is insidious and wicked.

87. οὕτω πολλὴν περιωπὴν τῶν ἡμῖν ἐς τὰ μέγιστα διαφόρων ποιούμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείζω πρὸς τοῖς ὅρκοις βεβαίωσιν λάβοιτε ἢ οἷς τὰ ἔργα ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἀναθρούμενα δόκησιν ἀναγκαίαν παρέχεται ὡς καὶ ξυμφέρει ὁμοίως ὡς εἶπον. [2]’εἰ δ᾽ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα προϊσχομένου ἀδύνατοι μὲν φήσετε εἶναι, εὖνοι δ᾽ ὄντες ἀξιώσετε μὴ κακούμενοι διωθεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν μὴ ἀκίνδυνον ὑμῖν φαίνεσθαι, δίκαιόν τε εἶναι, οἷς καὶ δυνατὸν δέχεσθαι αὐτήν, τούτοις καὶ ἐπιφέρειν, ἄκοντα δὲ μηδένα προσαναγκάζειν, μάρτυρας μὲν θεοὺς καὶ ἥρως τοὺς ἐγχωρίους ποιήσομαι ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ ἥκων οὐ πείθω, γῆν δὲ τὴν ὑμετέραν δῃῶν πειράσομαι βιάζεσθαι, [3] καὶ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἔτι νομιῶ, προσεῖναι δέ τί μοι καὶ κατὰ δύο ἀνάγκας τὸ

εὔλογον, τῶν μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅπως μὴ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ εὔνῳ, εἰ μὴ προσαχθήσεσθε, τοῖς ἀπὸ ὑμῶν χρήμασι φερομένοις παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους βλάπτωνται, οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες ἵνα μὴ κωλύωνται ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν δουλείας ἀπαλλαγῆναι. [4] οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἰκότως γ᾽ ἂν τάδε πράσσοιμεν, οὐδὲ ὀφείλομεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὴ κοινοῦ τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίᾳ τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν: [5] οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἀρχῆς ἐφιέμεθα, παῦσαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑτέρους σπεύδοντες τοὺς πλείους ἂν ἀδικοῖμεν, εἰ ξύμπασιν αὐτονομίαν ἐπιφέροντες ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους περιίδοιμεν. [6] πρὸς ταῦτα βουλεύεσθε εὖ, καὶ ἀγωνίσασθε τοῖς τε Ἕλλησιν ἄρξαι πρῶτοι ἐλευθερίας καὶ ἀίδιον δόξαν καταθέσθαι, καὶ αὐτοὶ τά τε ἴδια μὴ βλαφθῆναι καὶ ξυμπάσῃ τῇ πόλει τὸ κάλλιστον ὄνομα περιθεῖναι.’

[87] ‘So careful are we where our highest interests are at stake. And not to speak of our oaths, you cannot have better assurance than they give whose actions, when compared with their professions, afford a convincing proof that it is their interest to keep their word.’But if you plead that you cannot accept the proposals which I offer, and insist that you ought not to suffer for the rejection of them because you are our friend; if you are of opinion that liberty is perilous and should not in justice be forced upon any one, but gently brought to those who are able to receive it, — I shall first call the Gods and heroes of the country to witness that I have come hither for your good, and that you would not be persuaded by me: I shall then use force and ravage your country without any more scruple. I shall deem myself justified by two overpowering arguments. In the first place, I must not permit the Lacedaemonians to suffer by your friendship, and suffer they will through the revenues which the Athenians will continue to derive from you if you do not join me; and in the second place, the Hellenes must not lose their hope of liberation by your fault. On any other ground we should certainly be wrong in taking such a step; it is only for the sake of the general weal that we Lacedaemonians

have any right to be forcing liberty upon those who would rather not have it. For ourselves, we are far from desiring empire, but we want to overthrow the empire of others. And having this end in view, we should do injustice to the majority if, while bringing independence to all, we tolerated opposition in you. Wherefore be well advised. Strive to take the lead in liberating Hellas, and lay up a treasure of undying fame. You will save your own property, and you will crown your city with glory.’

88. ὁ μὲν Βρασίδας τοσαῦτα εἶπεν. οἱ δὲ Ἀκάνθιοι,πολλῶν λεχθέντων πρότερον ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα, κρύφα διαψηφισάμενοι, διά τε τὸ ἐπαγωγὰ εἰπεῖν τὸν Βρασίδαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ καρποῦ φόβῳ ἔγνωσαν οἱ πλείους ἀφίστασθαι Ἀθηναίων, καὶ πιστώσαντες αὐτὸν τοῖς ὅρκοις οὓς τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὀμόσαντα αὐτὸν ἐξέπεμψαν, ἢ μὴν ἔσεσθαι ξυμμάχους αὐτονόμους οὓς ἂν προσαγάγηται, οὕτω δέχονται τὸν στρατόν. [2] καὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον καὶ Στάγιρος Ἀνδρίων ἀποικία ξυναπέστη. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ ἐγένετο.

[88]Thus spoke Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much had been said on both sides, partly under the attraction of his words, and partly because they were afraid of losing their vintage, determined by a majority, voting secretly, to revolt from Athens. They pledged Brasidas to stand by the engagement to which the government of Sparta had sworn before they sent him out, to respect the independence of all whom he brought over to the Lacedaemonian alliance. They then admitted his army; and shortly afterwards Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, revolted also. Such were the events of the summer.

89. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου, ὡς τῷ Ἱπποκράτει καὶ Δημοσθένει στρατηγοῖς οὖσιν Ἀθηναίων τὰ ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς ἐνεδίδοτο καὶ ἔδει τὸν μὲν Δημοσθένη ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς τὰς Σίφας ἀπαντῆσαι, τὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον, γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐς ἃς ἔδει ἀμφοτέρους στρατεύειν, ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης πρότερον πλεύσας πρὸς τὰς

Σίφας καὶ ἔχων ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ πολλοὺς ξυμμάχων, ἄπρακτος γίγνεται μηνυθέντος τοῦ ἐπιβουλεύματος ὑπὸ Νικομάχου ἀνδρὸς Φωκέως ἐκ Φανοτέως, ὃς Λακεδαιμονίοις εἶπεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ Βοιωτοῖς: [2] καὶ βοηθείας γενομένης πάντων Βοιωτῶν οὐ γάρ πω Ἱπποκράτης παρελύπει ἐν τῇ γῇ ὧν προκαταλαμβάνονται αἵ τε Σῖφαι καὶ ἡ Χαιρώνεια. ὡς δὲ ᾔσθοντο οἱ πράσσοντες τὸ ἁμάρτημα, οὐδὲν ἐκίνησαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

[89] Meanwhile the betrayal of Boeotia into the hands of Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, was on the eve of accomplishment. At the beginning of the ensuing winter Demosthenes and his fleet were to appear at Siphae, and Hippocrates simultaneously to march upon Delium. But there was a mistake about the day, and Demosthenes, with his Acarnanian and numerous other allies drawn from that neighbourhood, sailed to Siphae too soon. His attempt failed; for the plot was betrayed by Nicomachus a Phocian, of the town of Phanoteus, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they the Boeotians. Whereupon there was a general levy of the Boeotians, for Hippocrates, who was to have been in the country and to have distracted their attention, had not yet arrived; and so they forestalled the Athenians by the occupation of Siphae and Chaeronea. When the conspirators in the Boeotian cities saw that there had been a mistake they made no movement from within.

90. ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης ἀναστήσας Ἀθηναίους πανδημεί, αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ ξένων ὅσοι παρῆσαν ὕστερος ἀφικνεῖται ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον, ἤδη τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀνακεχωρηκότων ἀπὸ τῶν Σιφῶν: καὶ καθίσας τὸν στρατὸν Δήλιον ἐτείχιζε τοιῷδε τρόπῳ [τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος]. [2] τάφρον μὲν κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν νεὼν ἔσκαπτον, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὀρύγματος ἀνέβαλλον ἀντὶ τείχους τὸν χοῦν, καὶ σταυροὺς παρακαταπηγνύντες, ἄμπελον κόπτοντες τὴν περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ἐσέβαλλον καὶ λίθους ἅμα καὶ πλίνθον ἐκ τῶν οἰκοπέδων τῶν ἐγγὺς καθαιροῦντες, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐμετεώριζον τὸ ἔρυμα. πύργους τε ξυλίνους κατέστησαν ᾗ

καιρὸς ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ οἰκοδόμημα οὐδὲν ὑπῆρχεν: ἥπερ γὰρ ἦν στοὰ κατεπεπτώκει. [3] ἡμέρᾳ δὲ ἀρξάμενοι τρίτῃ ὡς οἴκοθεν ὥρμησαν ταύτην τε εἰργάζοντο καὶ τὴν τετάρτην καὶ τῆς πέμπτης μέχρι ἀρίστου. [4] ἔπειτα, ὡς τὰ πλεῖστα ἀπετετέλεστο, τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον προαπεχώρησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Δηλίου οἷον δέκα σταδίους ὡς ἐπ᾽ οἴκου πορευόμενον, καὶ οἱ μὲν ψιλοὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν, οἱ δ᾽ ὁπλῖται θέμενοι τὰ ὅπλα ἡσύχαζον: Ἱπποκράτης δὲ ὑπομένων ἔτι καθίστατο φυλακάς τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ προτείχισμα, ὅσα ἦν ὑπόλοιπα, ὡς χρῆν ἐπιτελέσαι.

[90] Hippocrates had called out the whole force of Athens, metics as well as citizens, and all the strangers who were then in the city. But he did not arrive at Delium until after the Boeotians had quitted Siphae. He encamped and fortified Delium, which is a temple of Apollo. His army dug a trench around the temple and the sacred precinct, the earth which they threw up out of the trench forming a rampart; along this rampart they drove in a double palisade, and cutting down the vines in the neighbourhood of the temple threw them in between. They made a like use of the stones and bricks of the houses near, which they pulled down, and by every means in their power strove to increase the height of the rampart. Where the temple buildings did not extend they erected wooden towers at convenient places; the cloister which had once existed had fallen down. They began their work on the third day after their departure from Athens, and continued all this day and the next and the following day until the midday meal. When it was nearly finished the army retired from Delium to a distance of a little more than a mile, intending to go home. The greater part of the light-armed troops proceeded on their march, but the hoplites piled their arms and rested. Hippocrates, who had remained behind, was occupied in placing the guards at their posts, and in superintending the completion of that part of the outworks which was still unfinished.

91. οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ταύταις ξυνελέγοντο ἐς τὴν Τάναγραν: καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων παρῆσαν καὶ ᾐσθάνοντο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους προχωροῦντας ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, τῶν ἄλλων βοιωταρχῶν, οἵ εἰσιν ἔνδεκα, οὐ ξυνεπαινούντων μάχεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ ἔτι εἰσί μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Ὠρωπίας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν, ὅτε ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα, Παγώνδας ὁ Αἰολάδου βοιωταρχῶν ἐκ Θηβῶν μετ᾽ Ἀριανθίδου τοῦ Λυσιμαχίδου καὶ ἡγεμονίας οὔσης αὐτοῦ βουλόμενος τὴν μάχην ποιῆσαι καὶ νομίζων ἄμεινον εἶναι κινδυνεῦσαι, προσκαλῶν ἑκάστους κατὰ λόχους, ὅπως μὴ ἀθρόοι ἐκλίποιεν τὰ ὅπλα, ἔπειθε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἰέναι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῖσθαι, λέγων τοιάδε.

[91] Meanwhile the Boeotians were gathering at Tanagra. All the forces from the different cities had now arrived. They saw that the Athenians were already marching homewards, and most of the Boeotarchs (who are in number eleven) disapproved of giving battle, because the enemy had left the Boeotian territory. For when the Athenians rested in their march they were just on the borders of Oropia. But Pagondas the son of Aeoladas, one of the two Boeotarchs from Thebes, who was in command at the time (the other being Arianthidas the son of Lysimachidas), wanted to fight, believing that the risk was worth encountering. So calling the soldiers to him in successive divisions, that they might not all leave their arms at once, he exhorted the Boeotians to march against the Athenians and to hazard battle, in the following words:

92. ‘χρῆν μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Βοιωτοί, μηδ᾽ ἐς ἐπίνοιάν τινα ἡμῶν ἐλθεῖν τῶν ἀρχόντων ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίοις, ἢν ἄρα μὴ ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ ἔτι καταλάβωμεν αὐτούς, διὰ μάχης ἐλθεῖν. τὴν γὰρ Βοιωτίαν ἐκ τῆς ὁμόρου ἐλθόντες τεῖχος ἐνοικοδομησάμενοι μέλλουσι φθείρειν, καὶ εἰσὶ δήπου πολέμιοι ἐν ᾧ τε ἂν χωρίῳ καταληφθῶσι καὶ ὅθεν ἐπελθόντες πολέμια ἔδρασαν. [2] νυνὶ δ᾽ εἴ τῳ καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ἔδοξεν εἶναι, μεταγνώτω. οὐ γὰρ τὸ

προμηθές, οἷς ἂν ἄλλος ἐπίῃ, περὶ τῆς σφετέρας ὁμοίως ἐνδέχεται λογισμὸν καὶ ὅστις τὰ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχει, τοῦ πλέονος δὲ ὀρεγόμενος ἑκών τινι ἐπέρχεται. [3] πάτριόν τε ὑμῖν στρατὸν ἀλλόφυλον ἐπελθόντα καὶ ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πέλας ὁμοίως ἀμύνεσθαι. Ἀθηναίους δὲ καὶ προσέτι ὁμόρους ὄντας πολλῷ μάλιστα δεῖ. [4] πρός τε γὰρ τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας πᾶσι τὸ ἀντίπαλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καθίσταται, καὶ πρὸς τούτους γε δή, οἳ καὶ μὴ τοὺς ἐγγύς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄπωθεν πειρῶνται δουλοῦσθαι, πῶς οὐ χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀγῶνος ἐλθεῖν παράδειγμα δὲ ἔχομεν τούς τε ἀντιπέρας Εὐβοέας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος τὸ πολὺ ὡς αὐτοῖς διάκειται , καὶ γνῶναι ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις οἱ πλησιόχωροι περὶ γῆς ὅρων τὰς μάχας ποιοῦνται, ἡμῖν δὲ ἐς πᾶσαν, ἢν νικηθῶμεν, εἷς ὅρος οὐκ ἀντίλεκτος παγήσεται; [5] ἐσελθόντες γὰρ βίᾳ τὰ ἡμέτερα ἕξουσιν. τοσούτῳ ἐπικινδυνοτέραν ἑτέρων τὴν παροίκησιν τῶνδε ἔχομεν. εἰώθασί τε οἱ ἰσχύος που θράσει τοῖς πέλας, ὥσπερ Ἀθηναῖοι νῦν, ἐπιόντες τὸν μὲν ἡσυχάζοντα καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον ἀμυνόμενον ἀδεέστερον ἐπιστρατεύειν, τὸν δὲ ἔξω ὅρων προαπαντῶντα καί, ἢν καιρὸς ᾖ, πολέμου ἄρχοντα ἧσσον ἑτοίμως κατέχειν. [6] πεῖραν δὲ ἔχομεν ἡμεῖς αὐτοῦ ἐς τούσδε: νικήσαντες γὰρ ἐν Κορωνείᾳ αὐτούς, ὅτε τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν στασιαζόντων κατέσχον, πολλὴν ἄδειαν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ μέχρι τοῦδε κατεστήσαμεν. [7] ὧν χρὴ μνησθέντας ἡμᾶς τούς τε πρεσβυτέρους ὁμοιωθῆναι τοῖς πρὶν ἔργοις, τούς τε νεωτέρους πατέρων τῶν τότε ἀγαθῶν γενομένων παῖδας πειρᾶσθαι μὴ αἰσχῦναι τὰς προσηκούσας ἀρετάς, πιστεύσαντας δὲ τῷ θεῷ πρὸς ἡμῶν ἔσεσθαι, οὗ τὸ ἱερὸν ἀνόμως τειχίσαντες νέμονται, καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἃ ἡμῖν θυσαμένοις καλὰ φαίνεται, ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοῖσδε καὶ δεῖξαι ὅτι ὧν μὲν ἐφίενται πρὸς τοὺς μὴ ἀμυνομένους ἐπιόντες κτάσθων, οἷς δὲ γενναῖον τήν τε αὐτῶν αἰεὶ ἐλευθεροῦν μάχῃ καὶ τὴν ἄλλων μὴ δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως, ἀνανταγώνιστοι ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἀπίασιν.’

[92] ‘Men of Boeotia, no one among us generals should ever have allowed the thought to enter his mind that we ought

not to fight with the Athenians, even although we may not overtake them on Boeotian soil. They have crossed our frontier; it is Boeotia in which they have built a fort, and Boeotia which they intend to lay waste. Our enemies they clearly are wherever we find them, and therefore in that country out of which they came and did us mischief. But perhaps not to fight may appear to some one to be the safer course. Well then, let him who thinks so think again. When a man being in full possession of his own goes out of his way to attack others because he covets more, he cannot reflect too much; but when a man is attacked by another and has to fight for his own, prudence does not allow of reflection. In you the temper has been hereditary which would repel the foreign invader, whether he be in another's country or in your own; the Athenian invader above all others should be thus repelled, because he is your next neighbour. For among neighbours antagonism is ever a condition of independence, and against men like these, who are seeking to enslave not only near but distant countries, shall we not fight to the last? Look at their treatment of Euboea just over the strait, and of the greater part of Hellas. I would have you know, that whereas other men fight with their neighbours about the lines of a frontier, for us, if we are conquered, there will be no more disputing about frontiers, but one fixed boundary, including our whole country, for the Athenians will come in and take by force all that we have. So much more dangerous are they than ordinary neighbours. And men who, like them, wantonly assail others, will not hesitate to attack him who remains quietly at home and only defends himself; but they are not so ready to overbear the adversary who goes out of his own country to meet them, and when there is an opportunity strikes first. We have proved this in our own dealings with the Athenians. Once, owing to our internal dissensions, they took possession of our land, but we overcame them at Coronea, and gave Boeotia that complete security which has lasted to this day. Remember

the past: let the elder men among us emulate their own earlier deeds, and the younger who are the sons of those valiant fathers do their best not to tarnish the virtues of their race. Confident that the God whose temple they have impiously fortified and now occupy will be our champion, and relying on the sacrifices, which are favourable to us, let us advance to meet them. They may satisfy their greed by attacking those who do not defend themselves; but we will show them that from men whose generous spirit ever impels them to fight for the liberties of their country, and who will not see that of others unjustly enslaved, — from such men they will not part without a battle.’

93. τοιαῦτα ὁ Παγώνδας τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς παραινέσας ἔπεισεν ἰέναι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. καὶ κατὰ τάχος ἀναστήσας ἦγε τὸν στρατόν ἤδη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ὀψὲ ἦν , καὶ ἐπειδὴ προσέμειξεν ἐγγὺς τοῦ στρατεύματος αὐτῶν, ἐς χωρίον καθίσας ὅθεν λόφου ὄντος μεταξὺ οὐκ ἐθεώρουν ἀλλήλους, ἔτασσέ τε καὶ παρεσκευάζετο ὡς ἐς μάχην. [2] τῷ δὲ Ἱπποκράτει ὄντι περὶ τὸ Δήλιον ὡς αὐτῷ ἠγγέλθη ὅτι Βοιωτοὶ ἐπέρχονται, πέμπει ἐς τὸ στράτευμα κελεύων ἐς τάξιν καθίστασθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐπῆλθε, καταλιπὼν ὡς τριακοσίους ἱππέας περὶ τὸ Δήλιον, ὅπως φύλακές τε ἅμα εἶεν, εἴ τις ἐπίοι αὐτῷ, καὶ τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς καιρὸν φυλάξαντες ἐπιγένοιντο ἐν τῇ μάχῃ. [3] Βοιωτοὶ δὲ πρὸς τούτους ἀντικατέστησαν τοὺς ἀμυνουμένους, καὶ ἐπειδὴ καλῶς αὐτοῖς εἶχεν, ὑπερεφάνησαν τοῦ λόφου καὶ ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ ἔμελλον, ὁπλῖται ἑπτακισχίλιοι μάλιστα καὶ ψιλοὶ ὑπὲρ μυρίους, ἱππῆς δὲ χίλιοι καὶ πελτασταὶ πεντακόσιοι. [4] εἶχον δὲ δεξιὸν μὲν κέρας Θηβαῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμοροι αὐτοῖς: μέσοι δὲ Ἁλιάρτιοι καὶ Κορωναῖοι καὶ Κωπαιῆς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ περὶ τὴν λίμνην: τὸ δὲ εὐώνυμον εἶχον Θεσπιῆς καὶ Ταναγραῖοι καὶ Ὀρχομένιοι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ κέρᾳ ἑκατέρῳ οἱ ἱππῆς καὶ ψιλοὶ ἦσαν. ἐπ᾽ ἀσπίδας δὲ πέντε μὲν καὶ εἴκοσι Θηβαῖοι ἐτάξαντο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον. [5] αὕτη μὲν Βοιωτῶν παρασκευὴ καὶ διάκοσμος ἦν:

[93] With this exhortation Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians to march against the Athenians, and quickly moved his army forward (for the day was far advanced). As soon as he approached the enemy he took up a position where a hill intercepted the view, and there drew up his army and prepared for action. Hippocrates, who was still at Delium, heard that the Boeotians were advancing, and sent a message to the army bidding them get into position. He himself came up shortly afterwards, having left three hundred cavalry at Delium, in order that they might protect the place if assailed, and also might watch their opportunity and attack the Boeotians while the battle was going on. To these the Boeotians opposed a separate force. When everything was ready they appeared over the crest of the hill, and halted in the order which they proposed to maintain in the engagement; they numbered about seven thousand hoplites, more than ten thousand light-armed troops, a thousand cavalry, and five hundred targeteers. The Thebans and the Boeotians who served in their ranks occupied the right wing. In the centre were the men of Haliartus, Coronea, and Copae, and the other dwellers about the Lake Copais. On the left wing were the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians; the cavalry and light-armed troops were placed on both wings. The Thebans were formed in ranks of five and twenty deep; the formation of the others varied. Such was the character and array of the Boeotian forces.

94. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ οἱ μὲν ὁπλῖται ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ πᾶν τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐτάξαντο ὄντες πλήθει ἰσοπαλεῖς τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἱππῆς δὲ ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρῳ τῷ κέρᾳ. ψιλοὶ δὲ ἐκ παρασκευῆς μὲν ὡπλισμένοι οὔτε τότε παρῆσαν οὔτε ἐγένοντο τῇ πόλει: οἵπερ δὲ ξυνεσέβαλον ὄντες πολλαπλάσιοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἄοπλοί τε πολλοὶ ἠκολούθησαν, ἅτε πανστρατιᾶς ξένων τῶν παρόντων καὶ ἀστῶν γενομένης, καὶ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὥρμησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, οὐ παρεγένοντο ὅτι μὴ ὀλίγοι. [2] καθεστώτων δὲ ἐς τὴν τάξιν καὶ ἤδη μελλόντων ξυνιέναι, Ἱπποκράτης ὁ στρατηγὸς

ἐπιπαριὼν τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεκελεύετό τε καὶ ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

[94] All the hoplites of the Athenian army were arranged in ranks eight deep; in numbers they equalled the hoplites of the enemy; the cavalry were stationed on either wing. No regular light-armed troops accompanied them, for Athens had no organised force of this kind. Those who originally joined the expedition were many times over the number of their opponents; but they were to a great extent without proper arms, for the whole force, strangers as well as citizens, had been called out. Having once started homewards, there were but few of them forthcoming in the engagement. When the Athenians were ranged in order of battle and, on the point of advancing, Hippocrates the general, proceeding along the lines, exhorted them as follows:

95. ‘ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, δι᾽ ὀλίγου μὲν ἡ παραίνεσις γίγνεται, τὸ ἴσον δὲ πρός γε τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας δύναται καὶ ὑπόμνησιν μᾶλλον ἔχει ἢ ἐπικέλευσιν. [2] παραστῇ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑμῶν ὡς ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ οὐ προσῆκον τοσόνδε κίνδυνον ἀναρριπτοῦμεν. ἐν γὰρ τῇ τούτων ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται: καὶ ἢν νικήσωμεν, οὐ μή ποτε ὑμῖν Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς τὴν χώραν ἄνευ τῆς τῶνδε ἵππου ἐσβάλωσιν, ἐν δὲ μιᾷ μάχῃ τήνδε τε προσκτᾶσθε καὶ ἐκείνην μᾶλλον ἐλευθεροῦτε. [3] χωρήσατε οὖν ἀξίως ἐς αὐτοὺς τῆς τε πόλεως, ἣν ἕκαστος πατρίδα ἔχων πρώτην ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀγάλλεται, καὶ τῶν πατέρων, οἳ τούσδε μάχῃ κρατοῦντες μετὰ Μυρωνίδου ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις τὴν Βοιωτίαν ποτὲ ἔσχον.’

[95] ‘Men of Athens, there is not much time for exhortation, but to the brave a few words are as good as many; I am only going to remind, not to admonish you. Let no man think that because we are on foreign soil we are running into great danger without cause. Although in Boeotian territory we shall be fighting for our own. If we are victors, the Peloponnesians, deprived of the Boeotian cavalry, will never

invade our land again, so that in one battle you win Boeotia and win at the same time for Attica a more complete freedom. Meet them in a spirit worthy of the first city in Hellas-of that Athens which we are all proud to call our country; in a spirit too worthy of our fathers, who in times past under Myronides at Oenophyta overcame these very Boeotians and conquered their land.’

96. τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους παρακελευομένου καὶ μέχρι μὲν μέσου τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἐπελθόντος, τὸ δὲ πλέον οὐκέτι φθάσαντος, οἱ Βοιωτοί, παρακελευσαμένου καὶ σφίσιν ὡς διὰ ταχέων καὶ ἐνταῦθα Παγώνδου, παιανίσαντες ἐπῆσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου. ἀντεπῆσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ προσέμειξαν δρόμῳ. [2] καὶ ἑκατέρων τῶν στρατοπέδων τὰ ἔσχατα οὐκ ἦλθεν ἐς χεῖρας, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔπαθεν: ῥύακες γὰρ ἐκώλυσαν. τὸ δὲ ἄλλο καρτερᾷ μάχῃ καὶ ὠθισμῷ ἀσπίδων ξυνειστήκει. [3] καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ μέχρι μέσου ἡσσᾶτο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐπίεσαν τούς τε ἄλλους ταύτῃ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοὺς Θεσπιᾶς. ὑποχωρησάντων γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν παρατεταγμένων, καὶ κυκλωθέντων ἐν ὀλίγῳ, οἵπερ διεφθάρησαν Θεσπιῶν, ἐν χερσὶν ἀμυνόμενοι κατεκόπησαν: καί τινες καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τὴν κύκλωσιν ταραχθέντες ἠγνόησάν τε καὶ ἀπέκτειναν ἀλλήλους. [4] τὸ μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ ἡσσᾶτο τῶν Βοιωτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μαχόμενον κατέφυγε, τὸ δὲ δεξιόν, ᾗ οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἦσαν, ἐκράτει τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ὠσάμενοι κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπηκολούθουν. [5] καὶ ξυνέβη, Παγώνδου περιπέμψαντος δύο τέλη τῶν ἱππέων ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς περὶ τὸν λόφον, ὡς ἐπόνει τὸ εὐώνυμον αὐτῶν, καὶ ὑπερφανέντων αἰφνιδίως, τὸ νικῶν τῶν Ἀθηναίων κέρας, νομίσαν ἄλλο στράτευμα ἐπιέναι, ἐς φόβον καταστῆναι: [6] καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἤδη, ὑπό τε τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων ἐφεπομένων καὶ παραρρηγνύντων, φυγὴ καθειστήκει παντὸς τοῦ στρατοῦ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. [7] καὶ οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὸ Δήλιόν τε καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ὥρμησαν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ, ἄλλοι δὲ πρὸς Πάρνηθα τὸ ὄρος, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοί τινα εἶχον ἐλπίδα σωτηρίας. [8] Βοιωτοὶ δὲ

ἐφεπόμενοι ἔκτεινον, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἱππῆς οἵ τε αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ Λοκροὶ βεβοηθηκότες ἄρτι τῆς τροπῆς γιγνομένης: νυκτὸς δὲ ἐπιλαβούσης τὸ ἔργον ῥᾷον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν φευγόντων διεσώθη. [9] καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἵ τε ἐκ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Δηλίου φυλακὴν ἐγκαταλιπόντες εἶχον γὰρ αὐτὸ ὅμως ἔτι ἀπεκομίσθησαν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

[96] Thus spoke Hippocrates, and had gone over half the army, not having had time for more, when the Boeotians (to whom Pagondas just before engaging had been making a second short exhortation) raised the paean, and came down upon them from the hill. The Athenians hastened forward, and the two armies met at a run. The extreme right and left of either army never engaged, for the same reason; they were both prevented by water-courses. But the rest closed, and there was a fierce struggle and pushing of shield against shield. The left wing of the Boeotians as far as their centre was worsted by the Athenians, who pressed hard upon this part of the army, especially upon the Thespians. For the troops ranged at their side having given way they were surrounded and hemmed in; and so the Thespians who perished were cut down fighting hand to hand. Some of the Athenians themselves in surrounding the enemy were thrown into confusion and unwittingly slew one another. On this side then the Boeotians were overcome, and fled to that part of the army which was still fighting; but the right wing, where the Thebans were stationed, overcame the Athenians, and forcing them back, at first step by step, were following hard upon them, when Pagondas, seeing that his left wing was in distress, sent two squadrons of horse unperceived round the hill. They suddenly appeared over the ridge; the victorious wing of the Athenians, fancying that another army was attacking them, was struck with panic; and so at both points, partly owing to this diversion, and partly to the pressure of the advancing Thebans who broke their line, the rout of the Athenian army became general. Some fled to the sea at Delium, others towards Oropus, others to Mount

Parnes, or in any direction which gave hope of safety. The Boeotians, especially their cavalry and that of the Locrians which arrived when the rout had begun, pursued and slaughtered them. Night closed upon the pursuit, and aided the mass of the fugitives in their escape. On the next day those of them who had reached Oropus and Delium, which, though defeated, they still held, were conveyed home by sea. A garrison was left in the place.

97. καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀνελόμενοι νεκροὺς τούς τε τῶν πολεμίων σκυλεύσαντες καὶ φυλακὴν καταλιπόντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν Τάναγραν, καὶ τῷ Δηλίῳ ἐπεβούλευον ὡς προσβαλοῦντες. [2]ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κῆρυξ πορευόμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀπαντᾷ κήρυκι Βοιωτῷ, ὃς αὐτὸν ἀποστρέψας καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐδὲν πράξει πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸς ἀναχωρήσῃ πάλιν, καταστὰς ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τὰ παρὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν, ὅτι οὐ δικαίως δράσειαν παραβαίνοντες τὰ νόμιμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων: [3] πᾶσι γὰρ εἶναι καθεστηκὸς ἰόντας ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἱερῶν τῶν ἐνόντων ἀπέχεσθαι, Ἀθηναίους δὲ Δήλιον τειχίσαντας ἐνοικεῖν, καὶ ὅσα ἄνθρωποι ἐν βεβήλῳ δρῶσι πάντα γίγνεσθαι αὐτόθι, ὕδωρ τε ὃ ἦν ἄψαυστον σφίσι πλὴν πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ χέρνιβι χρῆσθαι, ἀνασπάσαντας ὑδρεύεσθαι: [4] ὥστε ὑπέρ τε τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἑαυτῶν Βοιωτούς, ἐπικαλουμένους τοὺς ὁμωχέτας δαίμονας καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, προαγορεύειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀπιόντας ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν.

[97] The Boeotians, after raising a trophy, took up their own dead, and despoiled those of the enemy. They then left them under the care of a guard, and retiring to Tanagra concerted an attack upon Delium. The herald of the Athenians, as he was on his way to ask for their dead, met a Boeotian herald, who turned him back, declaring that he would get no answer until he had returned himself. He then came before the Athenians and delivered to them the message of the Boeotians, by whom they were accused of transgressing the universally recognised customs of Hellas. Those who

invaded the territory of others ever abstained from touching the temples, whereas the Athenians had fortified Delium and were now dwelling there, and doing all that men usually do in an unconsecrated place. They were even drawing, for common use, the water which the Boeotians themselves were forbidden to use except as holy water for the sacrifices. They therefore on behalf both of the God and of themselves, invoking Apollo and all the divinities who had a share in the temple, bade the Athenians depart and carry off what belonged to them.

98. τοσαῦτα τοῦ κήρυκος εἰπόντος οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πέμψαντες παρὰ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἑαυτῶν κήρυκα τοῦ μὲν ἱεροῦ οὔτε ἀδικῆσαι ἔφασαν οὐδὲν οὔτε τοῦ λοιποῦ ἑκόντες βλάψειν: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐσελθεῖν ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μᾶλλον σφᾶς ἀμύνωνται. [2] τὸν δὲ νόμον τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἶναι, ὧν ἂν ᾖ τὸ κράτος τῆς γῆς ἑκάστης ἥν τε πλέονος ἥν τε βραχυτέρας, τούτων καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τρόποις θεραπευόμενα οἷς ἂν πρὸς τοῖς εἰωθόσι καὶ δύνωνται. [3] καὶ γὰρ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἐξαναστήσαντές τινα βίᾳ νέμονται γῆν, ἀλλοτρίοις ἱεροῖς τὸ πρῶτον ἐπελθόντας οἰκεῖα νῦν κεκτῆσθαι. [4] καὶ αὐτοί, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον δυνηθῆναι τῆς ἐκείνων κρατῆσαι, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν ἔχειν: νῦν δὲ ἐν ᾧ μέρει εἰσίν, ἑκόντες εἶναι ὡς ἐκ σφετέρου οὐκ ἀπιέναι. [5] ὕδωρ τε ἐν τῇ ἀνάγκῃ κινῆσαι, ἣν οὐκ αὐτοὶ ὕβρει προσθέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνους προτέρους ἐπὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἐλθόντας ἀμυνόμενοι βιάζεσθαι χρῆσθαι. [6] πᾶν δ᾽ εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸ πολέμῳ καὶ δεινῷ τινὶ κατειργόμενον ξύγγνωμόν τι γίγνεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τοῦ θεοῦ. καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς βωμούς, παρανομίαν τε ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀνάγκῃ κακοῖς ὀνομασθῆναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμφορῶν τι τολμήσασιν. [7] τούς τε νεκροὺς πολὺ μειζόνως ἐκείνους ἀντὶ ἱερῶν ἀξιοῦντας ἀποδιδόναι ἀσεβεῖν ἢ τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλοντας ἱεροῖς τὰ πρέποντα κομίζεσθαι. [8] σαφῶς τε ἐκέλευον σφίσιν εἰπεῖν μὴ ἀπιοῦσιν ἐκ τῆς Βοιωτῶν γῆς οὐ

γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων ἔτι εἶναι, ἐν ᾗ δὲ δορὶ ἐκτήσαντο, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τοὺς νεκροὺς σπένδουσιν ἀναιρεῖσθαι.

[98] Upon the delivery of this message the Athenians sent to the Boeotians a herald of their own, who on their behalf declared ‘that they had done no wilful injury to the temple, and would not damage it if they could help it; they had not originally entered it with any injurious intent, but in order that from it they might defend themselves against those who were really injuring them. According to Hellenic practice, they who were masters of the land, whether much or little, invariably had possession of the temples, to which they were bound to a show the customary reverence, but in such ways only as were possible.There was a time when the Boeotians themselves and most other nations, including all who had driven out the earlier inhabitants of the land which they now occupied, attacked the temples of others, and these had in time become their own. So the Boeotian temples would have become theirs if they had succeeded in conquering more of Boeotia. So much of the country as they did occupy was their own, and they did not mean to leave it until compelled. As to meddling with the water, they could not help themselves; the use of it was a necessity which they had not incurred wantonly; they were resisting the Boeotians who had begun by attacking their territory. When men were constrained by war, or by some other great calamity, there was every reason to think that their offence was forgiven by the God himself. He who has committed an involuntary misdeed finds a refuge at the altar, and men are said to transgress, not when they presume a little in their distress, but when they do evil of their own free will. The Boeotians, who demanded a sacred place as a ransom for the bodies of the dead, were guilty of a far greater impiety than the Athenians who refused to make such an unseemly exchange. They desired the Boeotians to let them take away their dead, not adding the condition “if they would quit Boeotia,” for in fact they were in a spot which they had fairly

won by arms and not in Boeotia, but simply saying, “if they would make a truce according to ancestral custom.”’

99. οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπεκρίναντο, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ εἰσίν, ἀπιόντας ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀποφέρεσθαι τὰ σφέτερα, εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων, αὐτοὺς γιγνώσκειν τὸ ποιητέον, νομίζοντες, τὴν μὲν Ὠρωπίαν, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς μάχης γενομένης κεῖσθαι ξυνέβη, Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὸ ὑπήκοον εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αὐτοὺς βίᾳ σφῶν κρατῆσαι αὐτῶν: οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἐσπένδοντο δῆθεν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων: τὸ δὲ ‘ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν’ εὐπρεπὲς εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ‘ἀπιόντας καὶ ἀπολαβεῖν ἃ ἀπαιτοῦσιν.’ ὁ δὲ κῆρυξ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀκούσας ἀπῆλθεν ἄπρακτος.

[99] The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia they might take what belonged to them, but must depart out of it; if they were in their own land they could do as they pleased. They knew that the territory of Oropus, in which the dead lay (for the battle took place on the border), was actually in the possession of Athens, but that the Athenians could not take them away without their leave, and they were unwilling as they pretended to make a truce respecting a piece of ground which did not belong to them. And to say in their reply ‘that if they would quit Boeotian ground they might take what they asked for,’ sounded plausible. Thereupon the Athenian herald departed, leaving his purpose unaccomplished.

100. καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ εὐθὺς μεταπεμψάμενοι ἔκ τε τοῦ Μηλιῶς κόλπου ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ σφενδονήτας, καὶ βεβοηθηκότων αὐτοῖς μετὰ τὴν μάχην Κορινθίων τε δισχιλίων ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκ Νισαίας ἐξεληλυθότων Πελοποννησίων φρουρῶν καὶ Μεγαρέων ἅμα, ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον καὶ προσέβαλον τῷ τειχίσματι, ἄλλῳ τε τρόπῳ πειράσαντες καὶ μηχανὴν προσήγαγον, ἥπερ εἶλεν αὐτό, τοιάνδε. [2] κεραίαν μεγάλην δίχα πρίσαντες ἐκοίλαναν ἅπασαν καὶ ξυνήρμοσαν πάλιν ἀκριβῶς ὥσπερ αὐλόν, καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄκραν λέβητά τε ἥρτησαν ἀλύσεσι καὶ ἀκροφύσιον ἀπὸ τῆς κεραίας σιδηροῦν ἐς αὐτὸν νεῦον καθεῖτο, καὶ

ἐσεσιδήρωτο ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ξύλου. [3] προσῆγον δὲ ἐκ πολλοῦ ἀμάξαις τῷ τείχει, ᾗ μάλιστα τῇ ἀμπέλῳ καὶ τοῖς ξύλοις ᾠκοδόμητο: καὶ ὁπότε εἴη ἐγγύς, φύσας μεγάλας ἐσθέντες ἐς τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτῶν ἄκρον τῆς κεραίας ἐφύσων. [4] ἡ δὲ πνοὴ ἰοῦσα στεγανῶς ἐς τὸν λέβητα, ἔχοντα ἄνθρακάς τε ἡμμένους καὶ θεῖον καὶ πίσσαν, φλόγα ἐποίει μεγάλην καὶ ἧψε τοῦ τείχους, ὥστε μηδένα ἔτι ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ μεῖναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπολιπόντας ἐς φυγὴν καταστῆναι καὶ τὸ τείχισμα τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἁλῶναι. [5] τῶν δὲ φρουρῶν οἱ μὲν ἀπέθανον, διακόσιοι δὲ ἐλήφθησαν: τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τὸ πλῆθος ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβὰν ἀπεκομίσθη ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

[100] The Boeotians immediately sent for javelin-men and slingers from the Malian Gulf. They had been joined after the battle by the Corinthians with two thousand hoplites, and by the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisaea, as well as by some Megarians. They now marched against Delium and attacked the rampart, employing among other military devices an engine, with which they succeeded in taking the place; it was of the following description. They sawed in two and hollowed out a great beam, which they joined together again very exactly, like a flute, and suspended a vessel by chains at the end of the beam; the iron mouth of a bellows directed downwards into the vessel was attached to the beam, of which a great part was itself overlaid with iron. This machine they brought up from a distance on carts to various points of the rampart where vine stems and wood had been most extensively used, and when it was quite near the wall they applied a large bellows to their own end of the beam, and blew through it. The blast, prevented from escaping, passed into the vessel which contained burning coals and sulphur and pitch; these made a huge flame, and set fire to the rampart, so that no one could remain upon it. The garrison took flight, and the fort was taken. Some were slain; two hundred were captured; but the greater number got on board their ships and so reached home.

101. τοῦ δὲ Δηλίου ἑπτακαιδεκάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ληφθέντος μετὰ τὴν μάχην καὶ τοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκος οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένου τῶν γεγενημένων ἐλθόντος οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον αὖθις περὶ τῶν νεκρῶν, ἀπέδοσαν οἱ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ οὐκέτι ταὐτὰ ἀπεκρίναντο. [2] ἀπέθανον δὲ Βοιωτῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους πεντακοσίων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους χιλίων καὶ Ἱπποκράτης ὁ στρατηγός, ψιλῶν δὲ καὶ σκευοφόρων πολὺς ἀριθμός. [3]μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην ταύτην καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης ὀλίγῳ ὕστερον, ὡς αὐτῷ τότε πλεύσαντι τὰ περὶ τὰς Σίφας τῆς προδοσίας πέρι οὐ προυχώρησεν, ἔχων τὸν στρατὸν ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν τῶν τε Ἀκαρνάνων καὶ Ἀγραίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων τετρακοσίους ὁπλίτας, ἀπόβασιν ἐποιήσατο ἐς τὴν Σικυωνίαν. [4] καὶ πρὶν πάσας τὰς ναῦς καταπλεῦσαι βοηθήσαντες οἱ Σικυώνιοι τοὺς ἀποβεβηκότας ἔτρεψαν καὶ κατεδίωξαν ἐς τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἔλαβον. τροπαῖον δὲ στήσαντες τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν. [5] ἀπέθανε δὲ καὶ Σιτάλκης Ὀδρυσῶν βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας τοῖς ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, στρατεύσας ἐπὶ Τριβαλλοὺς καὶ νικηθεὶς μάχῃ. Σεύθης δὲ ὁ Σπαραδόκου ἀδελφιδοῦς ὢν αὐτοῦ ἐβασίλευσεν Ὀδρυσῶν τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Θρᾴκης ἧσπερ καὶ ἐκεῖνος.

[101] Delium was captured seventeen days after the battle. The Athenian herald came shortly afterwards in ignorance of its fate to ask again for the dead, and now the Boeotians, instead of repeating their former answer, gave them up. In the battle the Boeotians lost somewhat less than five hundred; the Athenians not quite a thousand, and Hippocrates their general; also a great number of light-armed troops and baggage-bearers.Shortly after the battle of Delium, Demosthenes, on the failure of the attempt to betray Siphae, against which he had sailed with forty ships, employed the Agraean and Acarnanian troops together with four hundred Athenian hoplites whom he had on board in a descent on the Sicyonian coast. Before all the fleet had reached the shore the Sicyonians came out against the invaders, put to flight those who had landed, and pursued

them to their ships, killing some, and making prisoners of others. They then erected a trophy, and gave back the dead under a flag of truce.While the affair of Delium was going on, Sitalces the Odrysian king died; he had been engaged in an expedition against the Triballi, by whom he was defeated in battle. Seuthes the son of Sparadocus, his nephew, succeeded him in the kingdom of the Odrysians and the rest of his Thracian dominions.

102. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Βρασίδας ἔχων τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ξυμμάχους ἐστράτευσεν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι ποταμῷ Ἀθηναίων ἀποικίαν. [2] τὸ δὲ χωρίον τοῦτο ἐφ᾽ οὗ νῦν ἡ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐπείρασε μὲν πρότερον καὶ Ἀρισταγόρας ὁ Μιλήσιος φεύγων βασιλέα Δαρεῖον κατοικίσαι, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ Ἠδώνων ἐξεκρούσθη, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτεσι δύο καὶ τριάκοντα ὕστερον, ἐποίκους μυρίους σφῶν τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν βουλόμενον πέμψαντες, οἳ διεφθάρησαν ἐν Δραβήσκῳ ὑπὸ Θρᾳκῶν. [3] καὶ αὖθις ἐνὸς δέοντι τριακοστῷ ἔτει ἐλθόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, Ἄγνωνος τοῦ Νικίου οἰκιστοῦ ἐκπεμφθέντος, Ἠδῶνας ἐξελάσαντες ἔκτισαν τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο, ὅπερ πρότερον Ἐννέα ὁδοὶ ἐκαλοῦντο. ὡρμῶντο δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἠιόνος, ἣν αὐτοὶ εἶχον ἐμπόριον ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπιθαλάσσιον, πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι σταδίους ἀπέχον ἀπὸ τῆς νῦν πόλεως, ἣν Ἀμφίπολιν Ἄγνων ὠνόμασεν, ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα περιρρέοντος τοῦ Στρυμόνος [διὰ τὸ περιέχειν αὐτὴν] τείχει μακρῷ ἀπολαβὼν ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμὸν περιφανῆ ἐς θάλασσάν τε καὶ τὴν ἤπειρον ᾠκισεν.

[102] During the same winter, Brasidas and his Chalcidian allies made an expedition against Amphipolis upon the river Strymon, the Athenian colony. The place where the city now stands is the same which Aristagoras of Miletus in days of old, when he was fleeing from King Darius, attempted to colonise; he was driven out by the Edonians. Two and thirty years afterwards the Athenians made another attempt; they sent a colony of ten thousand, made up partly of their own citizens, partly of any others who liked to join; but these also

were attacked by the Thracians at Drabescus, and perished. Twenty-nine years later the Athenians came again, under the leadership of Hagnon the son of Nicias, drove out the Edonians, and built a town on the same spot, which was formerly called `The Nine Ways.' Their base of operations was Eion, a market and seaport which they already possessed, at the mouth of the river, about three miles from the site of the present town. Wanting to enclose the newly-founded city, which on two sides is surrounded by the river Strymon, Hagnon cut it off by a long wall reaching from the upper part of the river to the lower, and called the place Amphipolis, because it strikes the eye both by sea and land.

103. ἐπὶ ταύτην οὖν ὁ Βρασίδας ἄρας ἐξ Ἀρνῶν τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς ἐπορεύετο τῷ στρατῷ. καὶ ἀφικόμενος περὶ δείλην ἐπὶ τὸν Αὐλῶνα καὶ Βορμίσκον, ᾗ ἡ Βόλβη λίμνη ἐξίησιν ἐς θάλασσαν, καὶ δειπνοποιησάμενος ἐχώρει τὴν νύκτα. [2] χειμὼν δὲ ἦν καὶ ὑπένειφεν: ᾗ καὶ μᾶλλον ὥρμησε, βουλόμενος λαθεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ἀμφιπόλει πλὴν τῶν προδιδόντων. [3] ἦσαν γὰρ Ἀργιλίων τε ἐν αὐτῇ οἰκήτορες — εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι Ἀνδρίων ἄποικοι — καὶ ἄλλοι οἳ ξυνέπρασσον ταῦτα, οἱ μὲν Περδίκκᾳ πειθόμενοι, οἱ δὲ Χαλκιδεῦσιν. [4] μάλιστα δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι, ἐγγύς τε προσοικοῦντες καὶ αἰεί ποτε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὄντες ὕποπτοι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τῷ χωρίῳ, ἐπειδὴ παρέτυχεν ὁ καιρὸς καὶ Βρασίδας ἦλθεν, ἔπραξάν τε ἐκ πλέονος πρὸς τοὺς ἐμπολιτεύοντας σφῶν ἐκεῖ ὅπως ἐνδοθήσεται ἡ πόλις, καὶ τότε δεξάμενοι αὐτὸν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀποστάντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκείνῃ τῇ νυκτὶ κατέστησαν τὸν στρατὸν πρὸ ἕω ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ. [5] ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πόλισμα πλέον τῆς διαβάσεως, καὶ οὐ καθεῖτο τείχη ὥσπερ νῦν, φυλακὴ δέ τις βραχεῖα καθειστήκει: ἣν βιασάμενος ῥᾳδίως ὁ Βρασίδας, ἅμα μὲν τῆς προδοσίας οὔσης, ἅμα δὲ καὶ χειμῶνος ὄντος καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτοις προσπεσών, διέβη τὴν γέφυραν, καὶ τὰ ἔξω τῶν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν οἰκούντων κατὰ πᾶν τὸ χωρίον εὐθὺς εἶχεν.

[103] Against Amphipolis Brasidas now led his army. Starting from Arnae in Chalcidicè, towards evening he reached Aulon and Bromiscus at the point where the lake Bolbè flows into the sea; having there supped, he marched on during the night. The weather was wintry and somewhat snowy; and so he pushed on all the quicker; he was hoping that his approach might be known at Amphipolis only to those who were in the secret. There dwelt in the place settlers from Argilus, a town which was originally colonised from Andros; these and others aided in the attempt, instigated some by Perdiccas, others by the Chalcidians. The town of Argilus is not far off, and the inhabitants were always suspected by the Athenians, and were always conspiring against Amphipolis. For some time past, ever since the arrival of Brasidas had given them an opportunity, they had been concerting measures with their countrymen inside the walls for the surrender of the city. They now revolted from the Athenians on that very night, and received him into their town, and before dawn they conducted the army to the bridge over the river, which is at some distance from the town. At that time no walls had been built down to the river, as they have since been; a small guard was posted there. Brasidas easily overcame the guard, owing partly to the plot within the walls, partly to the severity of the weather and the suddenness of his attack; he then crossed the bridge, and at once was master of all the possessions of the Amphipolitans outside the walls. For they lived scattered about in the country.

104. τῆς δὲ διαβάσεως αὐτοῦ ἄφνω τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει γεγενημένης, καὶ τῶν ἔξω πολλῶν μὲν ἁλισκομένων, τῶν δὲ καὶ καταφευγόντων ἐς τὸ τεῖχος, οἱ Ἀμφιπολῖται ἐς θόρυβον μέγαν κατέστησαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὕποπτοι ὄντες. [2] καὶ λέγεται Βρασίδαν, εἰ ἠθέλησε μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἁρπαγὴν τῷ στρατῷ τραπέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς χωρῆσαι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, δοκεῖν ἂν ἑλεῖν. [3] νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν ἱδρύσας τὸν στρατόν, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἔξω ἐπέδραμε καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔνδον ὡς

προσεδέχετο ἀπέβαινεν, ἡσύχαζεν: [4] οἱ δὲ ἐναντίοι τοῖς προδιδοῦσι, κρατοῦντες τῷ πλήθει ὥστε μὴ αὐτίκα τὰς πύλας ἀνοίγεσθαι, πέμπουσι μετὰ Εὐκλέους τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ὃς ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν παρῆν αὐτοῖς φύλαξ τοῦ χωρίου, ἐπὶ τὸν ἕτερον στρατηγὸν τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, Θουκυδίδην τὸν Ὀλόρου, ὃς τάδε ξυνέγραψεν, ὄντα περὶ Θάσον ἔστι δὲ ἡ νῆσος Παρίων ἀποικία, ἀπέχουσα τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως ἡμίσεος ἡμέρας μάλιστα πλοῦν, κελεύοντες σφίσι βοηθεῖν. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκούσας κατὰ τάχος ἑπτὰ ναυσὶν αἳ ἔτυχον παροῦσαι ἔπλει, καὶ ἐβούλετο φθάσαι μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν, πρίν τι ἐνδοῦναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν Ἠιόνα προκαταλαβών.

[104] The passage of the river was a complete surprise to the citizens within the walls. Many who happened to be outside were taken. Others fled into the town. The Amphipolitans were in great consternation, for they suspected one another. It is even said that Brasidas, if, instead of allowing his army to plunder, he had marched direct to the place, would probably have captured it. But he merely occupied a position, and overran the country outside the walls; and then, finding that his confederates within failed in accomplishing their part, he took no further step. Meanwhile the opponents of the conspirators, being superior in number, prevented the immediate opening of the gates, and acting with Eucles, the general to whose care the place had been committed by the Athenians, sent for help to the other general in Chalcidicè, Thucydides the son of Olorus, who wrote this history; he was then at Thasos, an island colonised from Paros, and distant from Amphipolis about half a day’s sail. As soon as he heard the tidings he sailed quickly to Amphipolis with seven ships which happened to be on the spot; he wanted to get into Amphipolis if possible before it could capitulate, or at any rate to occupy Eion.

105. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ὁ Βρασίδας δεδιὼς καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς Θάσου τῶν νεῶν βοήθειαν καὶ πυνθανόμενος τὸν Θουκυδίδην κτῆσίν τε ἔχειν τῶν χρυσείων μετάλλων ἐργασίας ἐν τῇ περὶ ταῦτα Θρᾴκῃ καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι

ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἠπειρωτῶν, ἠπείγετο προκατασχεῖν, εἰ δύναιτο, τὴν πόλιν, μὴ ἀφικνουμένου αὐτοῦ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν, ἐλπίσαν ἐκ θαλάσσης ξυμμαχικὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Θρᾴκης ἀγείραντα αὐτὸν περιποιήσειν σφᾶς, οὐκέτι προσχωροίη. [2] καὶ τὴν ξύμβασιν μετρίαν ἐποιεῖτο, κήρυγμα τόδε ἀνειπών, Ἀμφιπολιτῶν καὶ Ἀθηναίων τῶν ἐνόντων τὸν μὲν βουλόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἴσης καὶ ὁμοίας μετέχοντα μένειν, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐθέλοντα ἀπιέναι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκφερόμενον πέντε ἡμερῶν.

[105] Meanwhile Brasidas, fearing the arrival of the ships from Thasos, and hearing that Thucydides had the right of working gold mines in the neighbouring district of Thrace, and was consequently one of the leading men of the country, did his utmost to get possession of the city before his arrival. He was afraid that, if Thucydides once came, the people of Amphipolis would no longer be disposed to surrender. For their hope would be that he would bring in allies from the islands or maritime towns or from the interior of Thrace, and relieve them. He therefore offered moderate terms, proclaiming that any Amphipolitan or Athenian might either remain in the city and have the enjoyment of his property on terms of equality; or, if he preferred, might depart, taking his goods with him, within five days.

106. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀλλοιότεροι ἐγένοντο τὰς γνώμας, ἄλλως τε καὶ βραχὺ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ἐμπολιτεῦον, τὸ δὲ πλέον ξύμμεικτον, καὶ τῶν ἔξω ληφθέντων συχνοῖς οἰκεῖοι ἔνδον ἦσαν: καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα πρὸς τὸν φόβον δίκαιον εἶναι ὑπελάμβανον, οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ τὸ ἄσμενοι ἂν ἐξελθεῖν, ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἐν ὁμοίῳ σφίσι τὰ δεινὰ εἶναι καὶ ἅμα οὐ προσδεχόμενοι βοήθειαν ἐν τάχει, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ὅμιλος πόλεώς τε ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ οὐ στερισκόμενοι καὶ κινδύνου παρὰ δόξαν ἀφιέμενοι. [2] ὥστε τῶν πρασσόντων τῷ Βρασίδᾳ ἤδη καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ διαδικαιούντων αὐτά, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἑώρων τετραμμένον καὶ τοῦ παρόντος Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦ οὐκέτι ἀκροώμενον, ἐγένετο ἡ ὁμολογία καὶ προσεδέξαντο ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἐκήρυξεν. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν τὴν πόλιν

τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ παρέδοσαν, ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης καὶ αἱ νῆες ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὀψὲ κατέπλεον ἐς τὴν Ἠιόνα. [4] καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν Βρασίδας ἄρτι εἶχε, τὴν δὲ Ἠιόνα παρὰ νύκτα ἐγένετο λαβεῖν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐβοήθησαν αἱ νῆες διὰ τάχους, ἅμα ἕῳ ἂν εἴχετο.

[106] When the people heard the proclamation they began to waver; for very few of the citizens were Athenians, the greater number being a mixed multitude. Many within the walls were relatives of those who had been captured outside. In their alarm they thought the terms reasonable; the Athenian population because they were too glad to withdraw, reflecting how much greater their share of the danger was, and not expecting speedy relief; the rest of the people because they retained all their existing rights, and were delivered from a fate which seemed inevitable. The partisans of Brasidas now proceeded to justify his proposals without disguise, for they saw that the mind of the whole people had changed, and that they no longer paid any regard to the Athenian general who was on the spot. So his terms were accepted, and the city was surrendered and delivered up to him. On the evening of the same day Thucydides and his ships sailed into Eion, but not until Brasidas had taken possession of Amphipolis, missing Eion only by a night. For if the ships had not come to the rescue with all speed, the place would have been in his hands on the next morning.

107. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ὁ μὲν τὰ ἐν τῇ Ἠιόνι καθίστατο, ὅπως καὶ τὸ αὐτίκα, ἢν ἐπίῃ ὁ Βρασίδας, καὶ τὸ ἔπειτα ἀσφαλῶς ἕξει, δεξάμενος τοὺς ἐθελήσαντας ἐπιχωρῆσαι ἄνωθεν κατὰ τὰς σπονδάς: [2] ὁ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν Ἠιόνα κατά τε τὸν ποταμὸν πολλοῖς πλοίοις ἄφνω καταπλεύσας, εἴ πως τὴν προύχουσαν ἄκραν ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους λαβὼν κρατοίη τοῦ ἔσπλου, καὶ κατὰ γῆν ἀποπειράσας ἅμα, ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἀπεκρούσθη, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν ἐξηρτύετο. [3] καὶ Μύρκινός τε αὐτῷ προσεχώρησεν Ἠδωνικὴ πόλις, Πιττακοῦ τοῦ Ἠδώνων βασιλέως ἀποθανόντος ὑπὸ τῶν Γοάξιος

παίδων καὶ Βραυροῦς τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ Γαληψὸς οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον καὶ Οἰσύμη: εἰσὶ δὲ αὗται Θασίων ἀποικίαι. παρὼν δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἅλωσιν ξυγκαθίστη ταῦτα.

[107] Thucydides now put Eion in a state of defence, desiring to provide not only against any immediate attempt of Brasidas, but also against future danger. He received the fugitives who had chosen to quit Amphipolis according to the agreement and wished to come into Eion. Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of small craft down the river to Eion, hoping that he might take the point which runs out from the wall, and thereby command the entrance to the harbour; at the same time he made an attack by land. But in both these attempts he was foiled. Whereupon he returned, and took measures for the settlement of Amphipolis. Myrcinus a city in the Edonian country joined him, Pittacus the king of the Edonians having been assassinated by the children of Goaxis and Brauro his wife. Soon afterwards Galepsus and Oesymè (both colonies from Thasos) came over to him. Perdiccas likewise arrived shortly after the taking of Amphipolis, and assisted him in settling the newly-acquired towns.

108. ἐχομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς μέγα δέος κατέστησαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅτι ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἦν ὠφέλιμος ξύλων τε ναυπηγησίμων πομπῇ καὶ χρημάτων προσόδῳ, καὶ ὅτι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Στρυμόνος ἦν πάροδος Θεσσαλῶν διαγόντων ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους σφῶν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, τῆς δὲ γεφύρας μὴ κρατούντων, ἄνωθεν μὲν μεγάλης οὔσης ἐπὶ πολὺ λίμνης τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς Ἠιόνα τριήρεσι τηρουμένων, οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι προελθεῖν: τότε δὲ ῥᾴδια ἤδη [ἐνόμιζεν] γεγενῆσθαι. καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐφοβοῦντο μὴ ἀποστῶσιν. [2] ὁ γὰρ Βρασίδας ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μέτριον ἑαυτὸν παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πανταχοῦ ἐδήλου ὡς ἐλευθερώσων τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐκπεμφθείη. [3] καὶ αἱ πόλεις πυνθανόμεναι αἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι τῆς τε Ἀμφιπόλεως τὴν ἅλωσιν καὶ ἃ παρέχεται,

τήν τε ἐκείνου πραότητα, μάλιστα δὴ ἐπήρθησαν ἐς τὸ νεωτερίζειν, καὶ ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο πρὸς αὐτὸν κρύφα, ἐπιπαριέναι τε κελεύοντες καὶ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὶ ἕκαστοι πρῶτοι ἀποστῆναι. [4] καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄδεια ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς, ἐψευσμένοις μὲν τῆς Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὅση ὕστερον διεφάνη, τὸ δὲ πλέον βουλήσει κρίνοντες ἀσαφεῖ ἢ προνοίᾳ ἀσφαλεῖ, εἰωθότες οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὖ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἐλπίδι ἀπερισκέπτῳ διδόναι, ὃ δὲ μὴ προσίενται λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι. [5] ἅμα δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς νεωστὶ πεπληγμένων καὶ τοῦ Βρασίδου ἐφολκὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγοντος, ὡς αὐτῷ ἐπὶ Νίσαιαν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μόνῃ στρατιᾷ οὐκ ἠθέλησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξυμβαλεῖν, ἐθάρσουν καὶ ἐπίστευον μηδένα ἂν ἐπὶ σφᾶς βοηθῆσαι. [6] τὸδὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα καὶ ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίων ὀργώντων ἔμελλον πειράσεσθαι, κινδυνεύειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν. ὧν αἰσθανόμενοι οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι φυλακάς, ὡς ἐξ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν χειμῶνι, διέπεμπον ἐς τὰς πόλεις, ὁ δὲ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ἐφιέμενος στρατιάν τε προσαποστέλλειν ἐκέλευε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Στρυμόνι ναυπηγίαν τριήρων παρεσκευάζετο. [7] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ὑπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, τὰ δὲ καὶ βουλόμενοι μᾶλλον τούς τε ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομίσασθαι καὶ τὸν πόλεμον καταλῦσαι.

[108] The Athenians were seriously alarmed at the loss of Amphipolis; the place was very useful to them, and supplied them with a revenue, and with timber which they imported for shipbuilding. As far as the Strymon the Lacedaemonians could always have found a way to the allies of Athens, if the Thessalians allowed them to pass; but until they gained possession of the bridge they could proceed no further, because, for a long way above, the river forms a large lake, and below, towards Eion, there were triremes on guard. All difficulty seemed now to be removed, and the Athenians feared that more of their allies would revolt. For Brasidas in all his actions showed himself reasonable, and whenever he

made a speech lost no opportunity of declaring that he was sent to emancipate Hellas. The cities which were subject to Athens, when they heard of the taking of Amphipolis and of his promises and of his gentleness, were more impatient than ever to rise, and privately sent embassies to him, asking him to come and help them, every one of them wanting to be first. They thought that there was no danger, for they had under-estimated the Athenian power, which afterwards proved its greatness and the magnitude of their mistake; they judged rather by their own illusive wishes than by the safe rule of prudence. For such is the manner of men; what they like is always seen by them in the light of unreflecting hope, what they dislike they peremptorily set aside by an arbitrary conclusion. Moreover, the Athenians had lately received a blow in Boeotia, and Brasidas told the allies what was likely to attract them, but untrue, that at Nisaea the Athenians had refused to fight with his unassisted forces. And so they grew bold, and were quite confident that no army would ever reach them. Above all, they were influenced by the pleasurable excitement of the moment; they were now for the first time going to find out of what the Lacedaemonians were capable when in real earnest, and therefore they were willing to risk anything. The Athenians were aware of their disaffection, and as far as they could, at short notice and in winter time, sent garrisons to the different cities. Brasidas also despatched a message to the Lacedaemonians requesting them to let him have additional forces, and he himself began to build triremes on the Strymon. But they would not second his efforts because their leading men were jealous of him, and also because they preferred to recover the prisoners taken in the island and bring the war to an end.

109. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Μεγαρῆς τε τὰ μακρὰ τείχη, ἃ σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον, κατέσκαψαν ἑλόντες ἐς ἔδαφος, καὶ Βρασίδας μετὰ τὴν Ἀμφιπόλεως ἅλωσιν ἔχων τοὺς ξυμμάχους στρατεύει ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀκτὴν καλουμένην. [2] ἔστι δὲ

ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως διορύγματος ἔσω προύχουσα, καὶ ὁ Ἄθως αὐτῆς ὄρος ὑψηλὸν τελευτᾷ ἐς τὸ Αἰγαῖον πέλαγος. [3] πόλεις δὲ ἔχει Σάνην μὲν Ἀνδρίων ἀποικίαν παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν διώρυχα, ἐς τὸ πρὸς Εὔβοιαν πέλαγος τετραμμένην, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Θυσσὸν καὶ Κλεωνὰς καὶ Ἀκροθῴους καὶ Ὀλόφυξον καὶ Δῖον: [4] αἳ οἰκοῦνται ξυμμείκτοις ἔθνεσι βαρβάρων διγλώσσων, καί τι καὶ Χαλκιδικὸν ἔνι βραχύ, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον Πελασγικόν, τῶν καὶ Λῆμνόν ποτε καὶ Ἀθήνας Τυρσηνῶν οἰκησάντων, καὶ Βισαλτικὸν καὶ Κρηστωνικὸν καὶ Ἠδῶνες: κατὰ δὲ μικρὰ πολίσματα οἰκοῦσιν. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν πλείους προσεχώρησαν τῷ Βρασίδᾳ, Σάνη δὲ καὶ Δῖον ἀντέστη, καὶ αὐτῶν τὴν χώραν ἐμμείνας τῷ στρατῷ ἐδῄου.

[109] In the same winter the Megarians recovered their Long Walls which had been in the hands of the Athenians, and razed them to the ground.After the taking of Amphipolis, Brasidas and his allies marched to the so-called Actè, or coastland, which runs out from the canal made by the Persian King and extends into the peninsula; it ends in Athos, a high mountain projecting into the Aegean sea. There are cities in the peninsula, of which one is Sanè, an Andrian colony on the edge of the canal looking towards the sea in the direction of Euboea; the others are Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium; their inhabitants are a mixed multitude of barbarians, speaking Greek as well as their native tongue. A few indeed are Chalcidian; but the greater part are Pelasgians (sprung from the Tyrrhenians who once inhabited Lemnos and Athens), or Bisaltians, Crestonians, Edonians. They all dwell in small cities. Most of them joined Brasidas, but Sanè and Dium held out; whereupon he remained there for a time and wasted their territory.

110. ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐσήκουον, εὐθὺς στρατεύει ἐπὶ Τορώνην τὴν Χαλκιδικήν, κατεχομένην ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων: καὶ αὐτὸν ἄνδρες ὀλίγοι ἐπήγοντο, ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες τὴν πόλιν παραδοῦναι. καὶ ἀφικόμενος νυκτὸς ἔτι καὶ περὶ ὄρθρον τῷ στρατῷ ἐκαθέζετο πρὸς τὸ Διοσκόρεον,ὃ ἀπέχει τῆς

πόλεως τρεῖς μάλιστα σταδίους. [2] τὴν μὲν οὖν ἄλλην πόλιν τῶν Τορωναίων καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τοὺς ἐμφρουροῦντας ἔλαθεν: οἱ δὲ πράσσοντες αὐτῷ εἰδότες ὅτι ἥξοι, καὶ προελθόντες τινὲς αὐτῶν λάθρᾳ ὀλίγοι, ἐτήρουν τὴν πρόσοδον, καὶ ὡς ᾔσθοντο παρόντα, ἐσκομίζουσι παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐγχειρίδια ἔχοντας ἄνδρας ψιλοὺς ἑπτά τοσοῦτοι γὰρ μόνοι ἀνδρῶν εἴκοσι τὸ πρῶτον ταχθέντων οὐ κατέδεισαν ἐσελθεῖν: ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Λυσίστρατος Ὀλύνθιος, οἳ διαδύντες διὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τείχους καὶ λαθόντες τούς τε ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνωτάτω φυλακτηρίου φρουρούς, οὔσης τῆς πόλεως πρὸς λόφον, ἀναβάντες διέφθειραν καὶ τὴν κατὰ Καναστραῖον πυλίδα διῄρουν.

[110] Finding that they would not yield, he promptly made an expedition against Toronè in Chalcidicè, which was held by the Athenians. He was invited by a few of the inhabitants, who were ready to deliver the city into his hands. Arriving at night, or about daybreak, he took up a position at the temple of the Dioscuri, which is distant about three furlongs from the city. The great body of the inhabitants and the Athenian garrison never discovered him; but those Toronaeans who were in his interest, and knew that he was coming, were awaiting his approach; some few of them had privately gone to meet him. When his confederates found that he had arrived, they introduced into the city, under the command of Lysistratus an Olynthian, seven light-armed soldiers carrying daggers (for of twenty who had been originally appointed to that service, only seven had the courage to enter). These men slipped in undiscovered by way of the wall where it looks towards the sea. They ascended the side of the hill on the slope of which the city is built, and slew the sentinels posted on the summit; they then began to break down the postern-gate towards the promontory of Canastraeum.

111. ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας τῷ μὲν ἄλλῳ στρατῷ ἡσύχαζεν ὀλίγον προελθών, ἑκατὸν δὲ πελταστὰς προπέμπει, ὅπως, ὁπότε πύλαι τινὲς ἀνοιχθεῖεν καὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἀρθείη ὃ

ξυνέκειτο, πρῶτοι ἐσδράμοιεν. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν χρόνου ἐγγιγνομένου καὶ θαυμάζοντες κατὰ μικρὸν ἔτυχον ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως προσελθόντες: οἱ δὲ τῶν Τορωναίων ἔνδοθεν παρασκευάζοντες μετὰ τῶν ἐσεληλυθότων, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἥ τε πυλὶς διῄρητο καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν πύλαι τοῦ μοχλοῦ διακοπέντος ἀνεῴγοντο, πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὴν πυλίδα τινὰς περιαγαγόντες ἐσεκόμισαν, ὅπως κατὰ νώτου καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει οὐδὲν εἰδότας ἐξαπίνης φοβήσειαν, ἔπειτα τὸ σημεῖόν τε τοῦ πυρός, ὡς εἴρητο, ἀνέσχον, καὶ διὰ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν πυλῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς ἤδη τῶν πελταστῶν ἐσεδέχοντο.

[111] Meanwhile Brasidas advanced a little with the rest of his army, and then halting, sent forward a hundred targeteers, that as soon as any of the gates were opened, and the signal agreed upon displayed, they might rush in first. There was a delay, and they, wondering what had happened, drew by degrees nearer and nearer to the city. Their partisans in Toronè, acting with the soldiers who had already got inside, had now broken through the postern-gate, and proceeded to cut the bar which fastened the gates near the market-place. They then brought round some of the targeteers by way of the postern-gate, and introduced them into the city, hoping to strike panic into the unconscious citizens by the sudden appearance of an armed force in their rear and on both sides of them at once. Their next step was to raise the fire-signal according to agreement; they then received the rest of the targeteers through the gates by the market-place.

112. καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας ἰδὼν τὸ ξύνθημα ἔθει δρόμῳ, ἀναστήσας τὸν στρατὸν ἐμβοήσαντάς τε ἀθρόον καὶ ἔκπληξιν πολλὴν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει παρασχόντας. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν κατὰ τὰς πύλας εὐθὺς ἐσέπιπτον, οἱ δὲ κατὰ δοκοὺς τετραγώνους, αἳ ἔτυχον τῷ τείχει πεπτωκότι καὶ οἰκοδομουμένῳ πρὸς λίθων ἀνολκὴν προσκείμεναι. [3] Βρασίδας μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εὐθὺς ἄνω καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ μετέωρα τῆς πόλεως ἐτράπετο, βουλόμενος κατ᾽ ἄκρας καὶ

βεβαίως ἐλεῖν αὐτήν: ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ὅμιλος κατὰ πάντα ὁμοίως ἐσκεδάννυντο.

[112] Brasidas, when he saw the signal, gave his army the word to advance, and ran forward. Raising with one voice a shout which struck great terror into the inhabitants, they followed him. Some of them dashed in by the gates; others found a way in at a place where the wall had fallen down and was being repaired, getting up by some planks which were placed against it, intended for drawing up stones. He himself with the main body of his army ascended to the upper part of the city, wanting to make the capture thorough and secure; the rest of his soldiers overran the town.

113. τῶν δὲ Τορωναίων γιγνομένης τῆς ἁλώσεως τὸ μὲν πολὺ οὐδὲν εἰδὸς ἐθορυβεῖτο, οἱ δὲ πράσσοντες καὶ οἷς ταῦτα ἤρεσκε μετὰ τῶν ἐσελθόντων εὐθὺς ἦσαν. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ὁπλῖται καθεύδοντες ὡς πεντήκοντα ἐπειδὴ ᾔσθοντο, οἱ μέν τινες ὀλίγοι διαφθείρονται ἐν χερσὶν αὐτῶν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν οἱ μὲν πεζῇ, οἱ δὲ ἐς τὰς ναῦς, αἳ ἐφρούρουν δύο, καταφυγόντες διασῴζονται ἐς τὴν Λήκυθον τὸ φρούριον, ὃ εἶχον αὐτοὶ καταλαβόντες, ἄκρον τῆς πόλεως ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἀπειλημμένον ἐν στενῷ ἰσθμῷ. [3] κατέφυγον δὲ καὶ τῶν Τορωναίων ἐς αὐτοὺς ὅσοι ἦσαν σφίσιν ἐπιτήδειοι.

[113] While the capture was proceeding the Toronaeans generally, who knew nothing about the plot, were in confusion. The conspirators and their party at once joined the assailants. Of the Athenian hoplites, who to the number of fifty chanced to be sleeping in the Agora, a few were cut down at once, but the greater number, when they saw what had happened, fled, some by land, others to the Athenian guard-ships, of which two were on the spot, and reached safely the fort of Lecythus, a high point of the city which the Athenians had occupied and retained in their own hands; it runs out into the sea, and is only joined to the mainland by a

narrow isthmus; thither fled also such Toronaeans as were friendly to the Athenians.

114. γεγενημένης δὲ ἡμέρας ἤδη καὶ βεβαίως τῆς πόλεως ἐχομένης ὁ Βρασίδας τοῖς μὲν μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Τορωναίοις καταπεφευγόσι κήρυγμα ἐποιήσατο τὸν βουλόμενον ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐξελθόντα ἀδεῶς πολιτεύειν, τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις κήρυκα προσπέμψας ἐξιέναι ἐκέλευεν ἐκ τῆς Ληκύθου ὑποσπόνδους καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντας ὡς οὔσης Χαλκιδέων. [2] οἱ δὲ ἐκλείψειν μὲν οὐκ ἔφασαν, σπείσασθαι δὲ σφίσιν ἐκέλευον ἡμέραν τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀνελέσθαι. ὁ δὲ ἐσπείσατο δύο. ἐν ταύταις δὲ αὐτός τε τὰς ἐγγὺς οἰκίας ἐκρατύνατο καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ σφέτερα. [3] καὶ ξύλλογον τῶν Τορωναίων ποιήσας ἔλεξε τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀκάνθῳ παραπλήσια, ὅτι οὐ δίκαιον εἴη οὔτε τοὺς πράξαντας πρὸς αὐτὸν τὴν λῆψιν τῆς πόλεως χείρους οὐδὲ προδότας ἡγεῖσθαι οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ οὐδὲ χρήμασι πεισθέντας δρᾶσαι τοῦτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῆς πόλεως οὔτε τοὺς μὴ μετασχόντας οἴεσθαι μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τεύξεσθαι: ἀφῖχθαι γὰρ οὐ διαφθερῶν οὔτε πόλιν οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὐδένα. [4] τὸ δὲ κήρυγμα ποιήσασθαι τούτου ἕνεκα τοῖς παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους καταπεφευγόσιν, ὡς ἡγούμενος οὐδὲν χείρους τῇ ἐκείνων φιλίᾳ: οὐδ᾽ ἂν σφῶν πειρασαμένους αὐτοὺς [τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων] δοκεῖν ἧσσον, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ δικαιότερα πράσσουσιν, εὔνους ἂν σφίσι γενέσθαι, ἀπειρίᾳ δὲ νῦν πεφοβῆσθαι. [5] τούς τε πάντας παρασκευάζεσθαι ἐκέλευεν ὡς βεβαίους τε ἐσομένους ξυμμάχους καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε ἤδη ὅτι ἂν ἁμαρτάνωσιν αἰτίαν ἔξοντας: τὰ δὲ πρότερα οὐ σφεῖς ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνους μᾶλλον ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων κρεισσόνων, καὶ ξυγγνώμην εἶναι εἴ τι ἠναντιοῦντο.

[114] It was now daylight, and the city being completely in his power, Brasidas made proclamation to the Toronaeans who had taken refuge with the Athenians, that if they liked they might come out and return to their homes; they would suffer no harm in the city. He also sent a herald to the Athenians, bidding them take what was their own and

depart under a flag of truce out of Lecythus. The place, he said, belonged to the Chalcidians, and not to them. They refused to go, but asked him to make a truce with them for a day, that they might take up their dead, and he granted them two days. During these two days he fortified the buildings which were near Lecythus, and the Athenians strengthened the fort itself. He then called a meeting of the Toronaeans, and addressed them much in the same terms which he had used at Acanthus. He told them that they ought not to think badly of those citizens who had aided him, much less to deem them traitors; for they were not bribed and had not acted with any view of enslaving the city, but in the interest of her freedom and welfare. Those of the inhabitants who had not joined in the plot were not to suppose that they would fare worse than the rest; for he had not come thither to destroy either the city or any of her citizens. In this spirit he had made the proclamation to those who had taken refuge with the Athenians, and he thought none the worse of them for being their friends; when they had a similar experience of the Lacedaemonians their attachment to them would be still greater, for they would recognise their superior honesty; they were only afraid of them now because they did not know them. They must all make up their minds to be faithful allies, and expect henceforward to be held responsible if they offended; but in the past the Lacedaemonians had not been wronged by them; on the contrary, it was they who had been wronged by a power too great for them, and were to be excused if they had opposed him.

115. καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαῦτα εἰπὼν καὶ παραθαρσύνας διελθουσῶν τῶν σπονδῶν τὰς προσβολὰς ἐποιεῖτο τῇ Ληκύθῳ: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἠμύνοντό τε ἐκ φαύλου τειχίσματος καὶ ἀπ᾽ οἰκιῶν ἐπάλξεις ἐχουσῶν, [2] καὶ μίαν μὲν ἡμέραν ἀπεκρούσαντο: τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ μηχανῆς μελλούσης προσάξεσθαι αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀφ᾽ ἧς πῦρ ἐνήσειν διενοοῦντο ἐς τὰ ξύλινα παραφράγματα, καὶ προσιόντος

ἤδη τοῦ στρατεύματος, ᾗ ᾤοντο μάλιστα αὐτοὺς προσκομιεῖν τὴν μηχανὴν καὶ ἦν ἐπιμαχώτατον, πύργον ξύλινον ἐπ᾽ οἴκημα ἀντέστησαν, καὶ ὕδατος ἀμφορέας πολλοὺς καὶ πίθους ἀνεφόρησαν καὶ λίθους μεγάλους, ἄνθρωποί τε πολλοὶ ἀνέβησαν. [3] τὸ δὲ οἴκημα λαβὸν μεῖζον ἄχθος ἐξαπίνης κατερράγη καὶ ψόφου πολλοῦ γενομένου τοὺς μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ ὁρῶντας τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐλύπησε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐφόβησεν, οἱ δὲ ἄπωθεν, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ διὰ πλείστου, νομίσαντες ταύτῃ ἐαλωκέναι ἤδη τὸ χωρίον, φυγῇ ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ὥρμησαν.

[115] With these words he encouraged the citizens. On the expiration of the truce he made his intended attack upon Lecythus. The Athenians defended themselves from the fortress, which was weak, and from some houses which had battlements. For a whole day they repulsed the assault; but on the morrow an engine was brought against them, from which the Lacedaemonians proposed to throw fire upon the wooden breastwork. Just as the army was drawing near the wall, the Athenians raised a wooden tower upon the top of a building at a point where the approach was easiest and where they thought that the enemy would be most likely to apply the engine. To this tower they carried up numerous jars and,casks of water and great stones; and many men mounted upon it. Suddenly the building, being too heavily weighted, fell in with a loud crash. This only annoyed and did not much alarm the Athenians who were near and saw what had happened, but the rest were terrified, and their fright was the greater in proportion as they were further off. They thought that the place had been taken at that spot, and fled as fast as they could to the sea where their ships lay.

116. καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας ὡς ᾔσθετο αὐτοὺς ἀπολείποντάς τε τὰς ἐπάλξεις καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὁρῶν, ἐπιφερόμενος τῷ στρατῷ εὐθὺς τὸ τείχισμα λαμβάνει, καὶ ὅσους ἐγκατέλαβε διέφθειρεν. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς τε πλοίοις καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκλιπόντες τὸ χωρίον ἐς Παλλήνην

διεκομίσθησαν: ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ληκύθῳ Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερόν, καὶ ἔτυχε κηρύξας, ὅτε ἔμελλε προσβαλεῖν,τῷ ἐπιβάντι πρώτῳ τοῦ τείχους τριάκοντα μνᾶς ἀργυρίου δώσειν νομίσας ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἢ ἀνθρωπείῳ τὴν ἅλωσιν γενέσθαι, τάς τε τριάκοντα μνᾶς τῇ θεῷ ἀπέδωκεν ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὴν Λήκυθον καθελὼν καὶ ἀνασκευάσας τέμενος ἀνῆκεν ἅπαν. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ χειμῶνος ἅ τε εἶχε τῶν χωρίων καθίστατο καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπεβούλευεν: καὶ τοῦ χειμῶνος διελθόντος ὄγδοον ἔτος ἐτελεύτα τῷ πολέμῳ.

[116] Brasidas witnessed the accident and observed that they were abandoning the battlements. He at once rushed forward with his army, captured the fort, and put to death all whom he found in it. Thus the Athenians were driven out; and in their ships of war and other vessels crossed over to Pallenè. There happened to be in Lecythus a temple of Athenè; and when Brasidas was about to storm the place he had made a proclamation that he who first mounted the wall should receive thirty minae; but now, believing that the capture had been effected by some more than human power, he gave the thirty minae to the Goddess for the service of the temple, and then pulling down Lecythus and clearing the ground, he consecrated the whole place. The rest of this winter he spent in settling the administration of the towns which he already held, and in concerting measures against the rest. At the end of the winter ended the eighth year of the war.

117. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι ἅμα ἦρι τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς ἐκεχειρίαν ἐποιήσαντο ἐνιαύσιον, νομίσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τὸν Βρασίδαν σφῶν προσαποστῆσαι οὐδὲν πρὶν παρασκευάσαιντο καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν, καὶ ἅμα, εἰ καλῶς σφίσιν ἔχοι, καὶ ξυμβῆναι τὰ πλείω, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγούμενοι ἅπερ ἐδέδισαν φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ γενομένης ἀνοκωχῆς κακῶν καὶ ταλαιπωρίας μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμήσειν αὐτοὺς πειρασαμένους ξυναλλαγῆναί τε καὶ

τοὺς ἄνδρας σφίσιν ἀποδόντας σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι καὶ ἐς τὸν πλείω χρόνον. [2] τοὺς γὰρ δὴ ἄνδρας περὶ πλέονος ἐποιοῦντο κομίσασθαι, ὡς ἔτι Βρασίδας ηὐτύχει: καὶ ἔμελλον ἐπὶ μεῖζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος τῶν μὲν στέρεσθαι, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι κινδυνεύσειν καὶ κρατήσειν. [3] γίγνεται οὖν ἐκεχειρία αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἥδε.

[117] Early in the following spring the Lacedaemonians and Athenians made a truce for a year. The Athenians hoped to prevent Brasidas from gaining over any more of their allies for the present; the interval would give them leisure for preparation; and hereafter, if it was for their interest, they might come to a general understanding. The Lacedaemonians had truly divined the fears of the Athenians, and thought that, having enjoyed an intermission of trouble and hardship, they would be more anxious to make terms, restore the captives taken in the island, and conclude a durable peace. Their main object was to recover their men while the good fortune of Brasidas lasted; when, owing to his successful career and the balance which he had established between the contending powers, they did not feel the loss of them, and yet by retaliating on equal terms with the remainder of their forces might have a fair prospect of victory. So they made a truce for themselves and their allies in the following terms:

118. ‘περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαντείου τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθίου δοκεῖ ἡμῖν χρῆσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἀδόλως καὶ ἀδεῶς κατὰ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους. [2] τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις ταῦτα δοκεῖ καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς παροῦσιν: Βοιωτοὺς δὲ καὶ Φωκέας πείσειν φασὶν ἐς δύναμιν προσκηρυκευόμενοι. [3] περὶ δὲ τῶν χρημάτων τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιμέλεσθαι ὅπως τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἐξευρήσομεν, ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρώμενοι καὶ ὑμεῖς καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ βουλόμενοι, τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρώμενοι πάντες. [4] περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἔδοξε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις κατὰ ταῦτα:

τάδε δὲ ἔδοξε Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις ἐὰν σπονδὰς ποιῶνται οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῶν μένειν ἑκατέρους ἔχοντας ἅπερ νῦν ἔχομεν, τοὺς μὲν ἐν τῷ Κορυφασίῳ ἐντὸς τῆς Βουφράδος καὶ τοῦ Τομέως μένοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἐν Κυθήροις μὴ ἐπιμισγομένους ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, μήτε ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς μήτε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν Νισαίᾳ καὶ Μινῴᾳ μὴ ὑπερβαίνοντας τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ Νίσου ἐπὶ τὸ Ποσειδώνιον, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Ποσειδωνίου εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν τὴν ἐς Μινῴαν μηδὲ Μεγαρέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὑπερβαίνειν τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην καὶ τὴν νῆσον, ἥνπερ ἔλαβον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔχοντας, μηδὲ ἐπιμισγομένους μηδετέρους μηδετέρωσε, καὶ τὰ ἐν Τροιζῆνι, ὅσαπερ νῦν ἔχουσι, καθ᾽ ἃ ξυνέθεντο πρὸς Ἀθηναίους: [5] καὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ χρωμένους, ὅσα ἂν κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους πλεῖν μὴ μακρᾷ νηί, ἄλλῳ δὲ κωπήρει πλοίῳ, ἐς πεντακόσια τάλαντα ἄγοντι μέτρα. [6] κήρυκι δὲ καὶ πρεσβείᾳ καὶ ἀκολούθοις, ὁπόσοις ἂν δοκῇ, περὶ καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου καὶ δικῶν ἐς Πελοπόννησον καὶ Ἀθήναζε σπονδὰς εἶναι ἰοῦσι καὶ ἀπιοῦσι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [7] τοὺς δὲ αὐτομόλους μὴ δέχεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, μήτε ἐλεύθερον μήτε δοῦλον, μήτε ὑμᾶς μήτε ἡμᾶς. [8] δίκας τε διδόναι ὑμᾶς τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς ὑμῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, τὰ ἀμφίλογα δίκῃ διαλύοντας ἄνευ πολέμου. [9] τοῖς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ταῦτα δοκεῖ: εἰ δέ τι ὑμῖν εἴτε κάλλιον εἴτε δικαιότερον τούτων δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἰόντες ἐς Λακεδαίμονα διδάσκετε: οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἀποστήσονται, ὅσα ἂν δίκαια λέγητε, οὔτε οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτε οἱ ξύμμαχοι. [10] οἱ δὲ ἰόντες τέλος ἔχοντες ἰόντων, ᾗπερ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμᾶς κελεύετε. αἱ δὲ σπονδαὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἔσονται.[11] ‘ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ. Ἀκαμαντὶς ἐπρυτάνευε, Φαίνιππος ἐγραμμάτευε, Νικιάδης ἐπεστάτει. Λάχης εἶπε, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων, ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν καθ᾽ ἃ ξυγχωροῦσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν καὶ ὡμολόγησαν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ: [12] τὴν <δ᾽> ἐκεχειρίαν εἶναι ἐνιαυτόν, ἄρχειν δὲ τήνδε τὴν ἡμέραν,

τετράδα ἐπὶ δέκα τοῦ Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος μηνός. [13] ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἰόντας ὡς ἀλλήλους πρέσβεις καὶ κήρυκας ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους, καθ᾽ ὅτι ἔσται ἡ κατάλυσις τοῦ πολέμου. [14] ἐκκλησίαν δὲ ποιήσαντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς πρυτάνεις πρῶτον περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ... βουλεύσασθαι Ἀθηναίους καθ᾽ ὅτι ἂν ἐσίῃ ἡ πρεσβεία περὶ τῆς καταλύσεως τοῦ πολέμου. σπείσασθαι δὲ αὐτίκα μάλα τὰς πρεσβείας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὰς παρούσας ἦ μὴν ἐμμενεῖν ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς τὸν ἐνιαυτόν.

[118] ‘I. Concerning the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, it seems good to us that any one who will shall ask counsel thereat without fraud and without fear, according to his ancestral customs. To this we, the Lacedaemonians and their allies here present, agree, and we will send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians, and do our best to gain their assent likewise.’II. Concerning the treasures of the God, we will take measures for the detection of evil-doers, both you and we, according to our ancestral customs, and any one else who will, according to his ancestral customs, proceeding always with right and equity. Thus it seems good to the Lacedaemonians and their allies in respect of these matters.’III. It further seems good to the Lacedaemonians and their allies that, if the Athenians consent to a truce, either party shall remain within his own territory, retaining what he has. The Athenians at Coryphasium shall keep between Buphras and Tomeus. They shall remain at Cythera, but shall not communicate with the Lacedaemonian confederacy, neither we with them nor they with us. The Athenians who are in Nisaea and Minoa shall not cross the road which leads from the gates of the shrine of Nisus to the temple of Poseidon, and from the temple of Poseidon goes direct to the bridge leading to Minoa; neither shall the Megarians and their allies cross this road; the Athenians shall hold the island which they have taken, neither party communicating with the other. They shall also hold what they now hold near Troezen, according to the agreement

concluded between the Athenians and Troezenians.’IV. At sea the Lacedaemonians and their allies may sail along their own coasts and the coasts of the confederacy, not in ships of war, but in any other rowing vessel whose burden does not exceed five hundred talents.’V. There shall be a safe-conduct both by sea and land for a herald, with envoys and any number of attendants which may be agreed upon, passing to and fro between Peloponnesus and Athens, to make arrangements about the termination of the war and about the arbitration of disputed points.’ VI. While the truce lasts, neither party, neither we nor you, shall receive deserters, either bond or free.’VII. And we will give satisfaction to you and you shall give satisfaction to us according to our ancestral customs, and determine disputed points by arbitration and not by arms.’These things seem good to us, the Lacedaemonians, and to our allies. But if you deem any other condition more just or honourable, go to Lacedaemon and explain your views; neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies will reject any just claim which you may prefer.’And we desire you, as you desire us, to send envoys invested with full powers.’ This truce shall be for a year.’’The Athenian people passed the following decree. The prytanes were of the tribe Acamantis, Phaenippus was the registrar, Niciades was the president. Laches moved that a truce be concluded on the terms to which the Lacedaemonians and their allies had consented; and might it be for the best interests of the Athenian people! Accordingly the assembly agreed that the truce shall last for a year, beginning from this day, being the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion. During the year of truce ambassadors and heralds are to go from one state to another and discuss proposals for the termination of the war. The generals and prytanes shall proceed to hold another assembly, at which the people shall discuss, first of all, the question of peace, whatever proposal the Lacedaemonian embassy may offer about the termination of the war. The embassies now

present shall bind themselves on the spot, in the presence of the assembly, to abide for a year by the truce just made.’

119. ‘ταῦτα ξυνέθεντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι [καὶ ὤμοσαν] καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις μηνὸς ἐν Λακεδαίμονι Γεραστίου δωδεκάτῃ. [2] ξυνετίθεντο δὲ καὶ ἐσπένδοντο Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν οἵδε: Ταῦρος Ἐχετιμίδα, Ἀθήναιος Περικλείδα, Φιλοχαρίδας Ἐρυξιλαΐδα: Κορινθίων δὲ Αἰνέας Ὠκύτου, Εὐφαμίδας Ἀριστωνύμου: Σικυωνίων δὲ Δαμότιμος Ναυκράτους, Ὀνάσιμος Μεγακλέους: Μεγαρέων δὲ Νίκασος Κεκάλου, Μενεκράτης Ἀμφιδώρου: Ἐπιδαυρίων δὲ Ἀμφίας Εὐπαιΐδα: Ἀθηναίων δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ Νικόστρατος Διειτρέφους, Νικίας Νικηράτου, Αὐτοκλῆς Τολμαίου’. [3]ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐκεχειρία αὕτη ἐγένετο, καὶ ξυνῇσαν ἐν αὐτῇ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων σπονδῶν διὰ παντὸς ἐς λόγους.

[119] To these terms the Lacedaemonians assented, and they and their allies took oath to the Athenians and their allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month Gerastius. Those who formally ratified the truce were, on behalf of Lacedaemon, Taurus the son of Echetimidas, Athenaeus the son of Periclidas, Philocharidas the son of Eryxidaidas; of Corinth, Aeneas the son of Ocytus, Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus; of Sicyon, Damotimus the son of Naucrates, Onasimus the son of Megacles; of Megara, Nicasus the son of Cecalus, Menecrates the son of Amphidorus; of Epidaurus, Amphias the son of Eupaidas; and on behalf of Athens, Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Autocles the son of Tolmaeus. Such were the terms of the armistice; during its continuance fresh negotiations for a final peace were constantly carried on.

120. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἡμέρας ταύτας αἷς ἐπήρχοντο Σκιώνη ἐν τῇ Παλλήνῃ πόλις ἀπέστη ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Βρασίδαν. φασὶ δὲ οἱ Σκιωναῖοι Πελληνῆς μὲν εἶναι ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, πλέοντας δ᾽ ἀπὸ Τροίας σφῶν τοὺς πρώτους κατενεχθῆναι ἐς τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο τῷ χειμῶνι ᾧ ἐχρήσαντο Ἀχαιοί, καὶ αὐτοῦ οἰκῆσαι. [2] ἀποστᾶσι δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὁ Βρασίδας διέπλευσε νυκτὸς ἐς τὴν Σκιώνην, τριήρει μὲν φιλίᾳ προπλεούσῃ,

αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν κελητίῳ ἄπωθεν ἐφεπόμενος, ὅπως, εἰ μέν τινι τοῦ κέλητος μείζονι πλοίῳ περιτυγχάνοι, ἡ τριήρης ἀμύνοι αὐτῷ, ἀντιπάλου δὲ ἄλλης τριήρους ἐπιγενομένης οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἔλασσον νομίζων τρέψεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ αὐτὸν διασώσειν. [3] περαιωθεὶς δὲ καὶ ξύλλογον ποιήσας τῶν Σκιωναίων ἔλεγεν ἅ τε ἐν τῇ Ἀκάνθῳ καὶ Τορώνῃ, καὶ προσέτι φάσκων ἀξιωτάτους αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἐπαίνου, οἵτινες τῆς Παλλήνης ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ ἀπειλημμένης ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων Ποτείδαιαν ἐχόντων καὶ ὄντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ νησιῶται αὐτεπάγγελτοι ἐχώρησαν πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ οὐκ ἀνέμειναν ἀτολμίᾳ ἀνάγκην σφίσι προσγενέσθαι περὶ τοῦ φανερῶς οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ: σημεῖόν τ᾽ εἶναι τοῦ καὶ ἄλλο τι ἂν αὐτοὺς τῶν μεγίστων ἀνδρείως ὑπομεῖναι: εἴ τε θήσεται κατὰ νοῦν τὰ πράγματα, πιστοτάτους τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἡγήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων φίλους καὶ τἆλλα τιμήσειν.

[120] About the time when the envoys engaged in the negotiations were passing to and fro, Scionè, a town of Pallenè, revolted from the Athenians and joined Brasidas. The Scionaeans, according to their own account, sprang originally from Pellenè in Peloponnesus, but their ancestors returning from Troy were carried by the storm which the Achaean fleet encountered to Scionè, where they took up their abode. Brasidas, when he heard of the revolt, sailed thither by night, sending before him a friendly trireme, while he himself followed at some distance in a small boat, thinking that if he met any vessel, not a trireme, larger than the boat, the trireme would protect him, while if another trireme of equal strength came up, it would fall, not upon the boat, but upon the larger vessel, and in the meantime he would be able to save himself. He succeeded in crossing, and having summoned a meeting of the Scionaeans, he repeated what he had said at Acanthus and Toronè, adding that their conduct was deserving of the highest praise; for at a time when the Athenians were holding Potidaea and the isthmus of Pallenè, and they, being cut off from the

mainland, were as defenceless as if they had been islanders, they had taken the side of liberty unbidden. They were not such cowards as to wait until they were compelled to do what was obviously for their own interest; and this was a sufficient proof that they would endure like men any hardships, however great, if only their aspirations could be realised. He should reckon them the truest and most loyal friends of the Lacedaemonians, and pay them the highest honour.

121. καὶ οἱ μὲν Σκιωναῖοι ἐπήρθησάν τε τοῖς λόγοις καὶ θαρσήσαντες πάντες ὁμοίως, καὶ οἷς πρότερον μὴ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρασσόμενα, τόν τε πόλεμον διενοοῦντο προθύμως οἴσειν καὶ τὸν Βρασίδαν τά τ᾽ ἄλλα καλῶς ἐδέξαντο καὶ δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδησαν ὡς ἐλευθεροῦντα τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἐταινίουν τε καὶ προσήρχοντο ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ. [2] ὁ δὲ τό τε παραυτίκα φυλακήν τινα αὐτοῖς ἐγκαταλιπὼν διέβη πάλιν καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ στρατιὰν πλείω ἐπεραίωσε, βουλόμενος μετ᾽ αὐτῶν τῆς τε Μένδης καὶ τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἀποπειρᾶσαι, ἡγούμενος καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βοηθῆσαι ἂν ὡς ἐς νῆσον καὶ βουλόμενος φθάσαι: καί τι αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπράσσετο ἐς τὰς πόλεις ταύτας προδοσίας πέρι.

[121] The Scionaeans were inspirited by his words; and one and all, even those who had previously been against the movement, took courage and determined to bear cheerfully the burdens of the war. They received Brasidas with honour, and in the name of the city crowned him with a golden crown as the liberator of Hellas; many too, in token of their personal admiration, placed garlands on his head, and congratulated him, as if he had been a victor in the games. For the present he left a small garrison with them and returned, but soon afterwards again crossed the sea with a larger army, being desirous, now that he had the help of the Scionaeans, to attempt Mendè and Potidaea; he made sure that the Athenians would follow him with their ships to Pallenè, which they would consider an island; and he wished

to anticipate them. Moreover he had entered into negotiations with these cities, and had some hope of their being betrayed to him.

122. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔμελλεν ἐγχειρήσειν ταῖς πόλεσι ταύταις, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τριήρει οἱ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν περιαγγέλλοντες ἀφικνοῦνται παρ᾽ αὐτόν, Ἀθηναίων μὲν Ἀριστώνυμος, Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ Ἀθήναιος. [2] καὶ ἡ μὲν στρατιὰ πάλιν διέβη ἐς Τορώνην, οἱ δὲ τῷ Βρασίδᾳ ἀνήγγελλον τὴν ξυνθήκην, καὶ ἐδέξαντο πάντες οἱ ἐπὶ Θράκης ξύμμαχοι Λακεδαιμονίων τὰ πεπραγμένα. [3] Ἀριστώνυμος δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κατῄνει, Σκιωναίους δὲ αἰσθόμενος ἐκ λογισμοῦ τῶν ἡμερῶν ὅτι ὕστερον ἀφεστήκοιεν, οὐκ ἔφη ἐνσπόνδους ἔσεσθαι. Βρασίδας δὲ ἀντέλεγε πολλά, ὡς πρότερον, καὶ οὐκ ἀφίει τὴν πόλιν. [4] ὡς δ᾽ ἀπήγγελλεν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ὁ Ἀριστώνυμος περὶ αὐτῶν, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εὐθὺς ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τὴν Σκιώνην. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρέσβεις πέμψαντες παραβήσεσθαι ἔφασαν αὐτοὺς τὰς σπονδάς, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀντεποιοῦντο Βρασίδᾳ πιστεύοντες, δίκῃ τε ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν περὶ αὐτῆς κρίνεσθαι. [5] οἱ δὲ δίκῃ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελον κινδυνεύειν, στρατεύειν δὲ ὡς τάχιστα, ὀργὴν ποιούμενοι εἰ καὶ οἱ ἐν ταῖς νήσοις ἤδη ὄντες ἀξιοῦσι σφῶν ἀφίστασθαι, τῇ κατὰ γῆν Λακεδαιμονίων ἰσχύι ἀνωφελεῖ πιστεύοντες. [6] εἶχε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια περὶ τῆς ἀποστάσεως μᾶλλον ᾗ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐδικαίουν: δύο γὰρ ἡμέραις ὕστερον ἀπέστησαν οἱ Σκιωναῖοι. ψήφισμά τ᾽ εὐθὺς ἐποιήσαντο, Κλέωνος γνώμῃ πεισθέντες, Σκιωναίους ἐξελεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι. καὶ τἆλλα ἡσυχάζοντες ἐς τοῦτο παρεσκευάζοντο.

[122] But before he had executed his intentions, a trireme arrived conveying the ambassadors who went round to proclaim the truce, Aristonymus from Athens, and Athenaeus from Lacedaemon. His army then returned to Toronè, and the truce was formally announced to him. All the allies of the Lacedaemonians in Chalcidicè agreed to the terms. Aristonymus the Athenian assented generally, but finding on a calculation of the days that the Scionaeans had revolted

after the conclusion of the truce, refused to admit them. Brasidas insisted that they were in time, and would not surrender the city. Whereupon Aristonymus despatched a message to Athens. The Athenians were ready at once to make an expedition against Scionè. The Lacedaemonians, however, sent an embassy to them and protested that such a step would be a breach of the truce. They laid claim to the place, relying on the testimony of Brasidas, and proposed to have the matter decided by arbitration. But the Athenians, instead of risking an arbitration, wanted to send an expedition instantly; for they were exasperated at discovering that even the islanders were now daring to revolt from them, in a futile reliance on the Lacedaemonian power by land. The greater right was on their side; for the truth was that the Scionaeans had revolted two days after the truce was made. They instantly carried a resolution, moved by Cleon, to destroy Scionè and put the citizens to the sword; and, while abstaining from hostilities elsewhere, they prepared to carry out their intentions.

123. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Μένδη ἀφίσταται αὐτῶν, πόλις ἐν τῇ Παλλήνῃ, Ἐρετριῶν ἀποικία. καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐδέξατο ὁ Βρασίδας, οὐ νομίζων ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκεχειρίᾳ φανερῶς προσεχώρησαν: ἔστι γὰρ ἃ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐνεκάλει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παραβαίνειν τὰς σπονδάς. [2] διʼ ὃ καὶ οἱ Μενδαῖοι μᾶλλον ἐτόλμησαν, τήν τε τοῦ Βρασίδου γνώμην ὁρῶντες ἑτοίμην, τεκμαιρόμενοι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Σκιώνης ὅτι οὐ προυδίδου, καὶ ἅμα τῶν πρασσόντων σφίσιν ὀλίγων τε ὄντων καὶ ὡς τότε ἐμέλλησαν οὐκέτι ἀνέντων, ἀλλὰ περὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς φοβουμένων τὸ κατάδηλον καὶ καταβιασαμένων παρὰ γνώμην τοὺς πολλούς. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι εὐθὺς πυθόμενοι, πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὀργισθέντες παρεσκευάζοντο ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέρας τὰς πόλεις. [4] καὶ Βρασίδας προσδεχόμενος τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὐτῶν ὑπεκκομίζει ἐς Ὄλυνθον τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας τῶν Σκιωναίων καὶ Μενδαίων, καὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων αὐτοῖς πεντακοσίους ὁπλίτας διέπεμψε καὶ πελταστὰς τριακοσίους

Χαλκιδέων, ἄρχοντά τε τῶν ἁπάντων Πολυδαμίδαν. καὶ οἱ μὲν τὰ περὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς, ὡς ἐν τάχει παρεσομένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων, κοινῇ ηὐτρεπίζοντο.

[123] In the meantime Mendè, a city of Pallenè and an Eretrian colony, revolted from them. Brasidas felt justified in receiving the Mendaeans, although, when they came to him, the peace had unmistakably been declared, because there were certain points in which he too charged the Athenians with violating the treaty. His attitude encouraged them to take this bold step; they saw his zeal in the cause, which they likewise inferred from his unwillingness to hand over Scionè to the Athenians. Moreover the persons who negotiated with him were few in number, and having once begun, would not give up their purpose. For they feared the consequences of detection, and therefore compelled the multitude to act contrary to their own wishes. When the Athenians heard of the revolt they were more angry than ever, and made preparations against both cities. Brasidas, in expectation of their attack, conveyed away the wives and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans to Olynthus in Chalcidice, and sent over five hundred Peloponnesian hoplites and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, under the sole command of Polydamidas, to their aid. The two cities concerted measures for their defence against the Athenians, who were expected shortly to arrive.

124. Βρασίδας δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας ἐν τούτῳ στρατεύουσιν ἅμα ἐπὶ Ἀρραβαῖον τὸ δεύτερον ἐς Λύγκον. καὶ ἦγον ὁ μὲν ὧν ἐκράτει Μακεδόνων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων Ἑλλήνων ὁπλίτας, ὁ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς αὐτοῦ περιλοίποις τῶν Πελοποννησίων Χαλκιδέας καὶ Ἀκανθίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ δύναμιν ἑκάστων. ξύμπαν δὲ τὸ ὁπλιτικὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τρισχίλιοι μάλιστα, ἱππῆς δ᾽ οἱ πάντες ἠκολούθουν Μακεδόνων ξὺν Χαλκιδεῦσιν ὀλίγου ἐς χιλίους, καὶ ἄλλος ὅμιλος τῶν βαρβάρων πολύς. [2] ἐσβαλόντες δὲ ἐς τὴν Ἀρραβαίου καὶ εὑρόντες ἀντεστρατοπεδευμένους αὐτοῖς τοὺς Λυγκηστὰς ἀντεκαθέζοντο καὶ αὐτοί. [3] καὶ

ἐχόντων τῶν μὲν πεζῶν λόφον ἑκατέρωθεν, πεδίου δὲ τοῦ μέσου ὄντος, οἱ ἱππῆς ἐς αὐτὸ καταδραμόντες ἱππομάχησαν πρῶτα ἀμφοτέρων, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ ὁ Περδίκκας, προελθόντων προτέρων ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου μετὰ τῶν ἱππέων τῶν Λυγκηστῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων μάχεσθαι, ἀντεπαγαγόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ξυνέβαλον καὶ ἔτρεψαν τοὺς Λυγκηστάς, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν διέφθειραν, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ διαφυγόντες πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἡσύχαζον. [4] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τροπαῖον στήσαντες δύο μὲν ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἐπέσχον, τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς μένοντες, οἳ ἔτυχον τῷ Περδίκκᾳ μισθοῦ μέλλοντες ἥξειν: ἔπειτα ὁ Περδίκκας ἐβούλετο προϊέναι ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ Ἀρραβαίου κώμας καὶ μὴ καθῆσθαι, Βρασίδας δὲ τῆς τε Μένδης περιορώμενος, μὴ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρότερον ἐπιπλευσάντων τι πάθῃ, καὶ ἅμα τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν οὐ παρόντων, οὐ πρόθυμος ἦν, ἀλλὰ ἀναχωρεῖν μᾶλλον.

[124] Brasidas and Perdiccas now joined their forces, and made a second expedition to Lyncus against Arrhibaeus. Perdiccas led his own Macedonian army and a force of hoplites supplied by the Hellenic inhabitants of the country. Brasidas, beside the Peloponnesians who remained with him, had under his command a body of Chalcidians from Acanthus and other cities which supplied as many troops as they severally could. The entire heavy-armed Hellenic forces numbered about three thousand; the Chalcidian and Macedonian cavalry nearly a thousand, and there was also a great multitude of barbarians. They entered the territory of Arrhibaeus, and there finding the Lyncestians ready for battle, they took up a position in face of them. The infantry of the two armies was stationed upon two opposite hills, and between them was a plain, into which the cavalry of both first descended and fought. Then the Lyncestian heavy-armed troops began to advance from the hill, and forming a junction with their cavalry, offered battle. Brasidas and Perdiccas now drew out their army and charged; the Lyncestians were put to flight and many slain; the rest

escaped to the high ground, and there remained inactive. The conquerors raised a trophy, and waited for two or three days expecting the arrival of some Illyrians whom Perdiccas had hired. Then Perdiccas wanted, instead of sitting idle, to push on against the villages of Arrhibaeus, but Brasidas was anxious about Mendè, and apprehensive that the Athenians might sail thither and do some mischief before he returned. The Illyrians had not appeared; and for both reasons he was more disposed to retreat than to advance.

125. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ διαφερομένων αὐτῶν ἠγγέλθη ὅτι οἱ Ἰλλυριοὶ μετ᾽ Ἀρραβαίου προδόντες Περδίκκαν γεγένηνται: ὥστε ἤδη ἀμφοτέροις μὲν δοκοῦν ἀναχωρεῖν διὰ τὸ δέος αὐτῶν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων μαχίμων, κυρωθὲν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς διαφορᾶς ὀπηνίκα χρὴ ὁρμᾶσθαι, νυκτός τε ἐπιγενομένης, οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν βαρβάρων εὐθὺς φοβηθέντες, ὅπερ φιλεῖ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἀσαφῶς ἐκπλήγνυσθαι, καὶ νομίσαντες πολλαπλασίους μὲν ἢ ἦλθον ἐπιέναι, ὅσον δὲ οὔπω παρεῖναι, καταστάντες ἐς αἰφνίδιον φυγὴν ἐχώρουν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τὸ πρῶτον οὐκ αἰσθανόμενον, ὡς ἔγνω, ἠνάγκασαν πρὶν τὸν Βρασίδαν ἰδεῖν ἄπωθεν γὰρ πολὺ ἀλλήλων ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο προαπελθεῖν. [2] Βρασίδας δὲ ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ὡς εἶδε τοὺς Μακεδόνας προκεχωρηκότας τούς τε Ἰλλυριοὺς καὶ τὸν Ἀρραβαῖον μέλλοντας ἐπιέναι, ξυναγαγὼν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τετράγωνον τάξιν τοὺς ὁπλίτας καὶ τὸν ψιλὸν ὅμιλον ἐς μέσον λαβὼν διενοεῖτο ἀναχωρεῖν. [3] ἐκδρόμους δέ, εἴ πῃ προσβάλλοιεν αὐτοῖς, ἔταξε τοὺς νεωτάτους, καὶ αὐτὸς λογάδας ἔχων τριακοσίους τελευταῖος γνώμην εἶχεν ὑποχωρῶν τοῖς τῶν ἐναντίων πρώτοις προσκεισομένοις ἀνθιστάμενος ἀμύνεσθαι. [4] καὶ πρὶν τοὺς πολεμίους ἐγγὺς εἶναι, ὡς διὰ ταχέων παρεκελεύσατο τοῖς στρατιώταις τοιάδε.

[125] But while they were disputing, the news arrived that the Illyrians had just betrayed Perdiccas and joined Arrhibaeus, whereupon they both resolved to retreat; for they were afraid of the Illyrians, who are a nation of warriors.

Owing to the dispute nothing had been determined respecting the time of their departure. Night came on, and the Macedonians and the mass of the barbarians were instantly seized with one of those unaccountable panics to which great armies are liable. They fancied that the Illyrians were many times their real number, and that they were close at their heels; so, suddenly betaking themselves to flight, they hastened homewards. And they compelled Perdiccas, when he understood the state of affairs, which at first he did not, to go away without seeing Brasidas, for the two armies were encamped at a considerable distance from one another. At dawn Brasidas, finding that Arrhibaeus and the Illyrians were coming on and that the Macedonians had already decamped, resolved to follow them. So he formed his hoplites into a compact square, and placed his light-armed troops in the centre. He selected the youngest of his soldiers to run out upon the enemy at whatever point the attack might be made. He himself proposed during the retreat to take his post in the rear with three hundred chosen men, meaning to stop the foremost of his assailants and beat them off. Before the Illyrians came up he exhorted his soldiers, as far as the shortness of the time permitted, in the following words:

126. ‘εἰ μὲν μὴ ὑπώπτευον, ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, ὑμᾶς τῷ τε μεμονῶσθαι καὶ ὅτι βάρβαροι οἱ ἐπιόντες καὶ πολλοὶ ἔκπληξιν ἔχειν, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως διδαχὴν ἅμα τῇ παρακελεύσει ἐποιούμην: νῦν δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀπόλειψιν τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων βραχεῖ ὑπομνήματι καὶ παραινέσει τὰ μέγιστα πειράσομαι πείθειν. [2] ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι ὑμῖν προσήκει τὰ πολέμια οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων παρουσίαν ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ οἰκείαν ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων, οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλεόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν. [3] βαρβάρους δὲ οὓς νῦν ἀπειρίᾳ δέδιτε μαθεῖν χρή, ἐξ ὧν τε

προηγώνισθε τοῖς Μακεδόσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐγὼ εἰκάζω τε καὶ ἄλλων ἀκοῇ ἐπίσταμαι, οὐ δεινοὺς ἐσομένους. [4] καὶ γὰρ ὅσα μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἀσθενῆ ὄντα τῶν πολεμίων δόκησιν ἔχει ἰσχύος, διδαχὴ ἀληθὴς προσγενομένη περὶ αὐτῶν ἐθάρσυνε μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀμυνομένους: οἷς δὲ βεβαίως τι πρόσεστιν ἀγαθόν, μὴ προειδώς τις ἂν αὐτοῖς τολμηρότερον προσφέροιτο. [5] οὗτοι δὲ τὴν μέλλησιν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβεράν: καὶ γὰρ πλήθει ὄψεως δεινοὶ καὶ βοῆς μεγέθει ἀφόρητοι, ἥ τε διὰ κενῆς ἐπανάσεισις τῶν ὅπλων ἔχει τινὰ δήλωσιν ἀπειλῆς. προσμεῖξαι δὲ τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν αὐτὰ οὐχ ὁμοῖοι: οὔτε γὰρ τάξιν ἔχοντες αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἂν λιπεῖν τινὰ χώραν βιαζόμενοι ἥ τε φυγὴ καὶ ἡ ἔφοδος αὐτῶν ἴσην ἔχουσα δόξαν τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἔχει αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχη μάλιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ πρόφασιν τοῦ σῴζεσθαί τινι πρεπόντως πορίσειε, τοῦ τε ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν πιστότερον τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι ὑμᾶς ἀκινδύνως ἡγοῦνται: ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἂν πρὸ τούτου ἐχρῶντο. [6] σαφῶς τε πᾶν τὸ προϋπάρχον δεινὸν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὁρᾶτε ἔργῳ μὲν βραχὺ ὄν, ὄψει δὲ καὶ ἀκοῇ κατασπέρχον. ὃ ὑπομείναντες ἐπιφερόμενον καί, ὅταν καιρὸς ᾖ, κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει αὖθις ὑπαγαγόντες, ἔς τε τὸ ἀσφαλὲς θᾶσσον ἀφίζεσθε καὶ γνώσεσθε τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὄχλοι τοῖς μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον δεξαμένοις ἄπωθεν ἀπειλαῖς τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μελλήσει ἐπικομποῦσιν, οἳ δ᾽ ἂν εἴξωσιν αὐτοῖς, κατὰ πόδας τὸ εὔψυχον ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ὀξεῖς ἐνδείκνυνται.’

[126] ‘Did I not suspect, men of Peloponnesus, that you may be terrified because you have been deserted by your companions and are assailed by a host of barbarians, I should think only of encouraging and not of instructing you. But now that we are left alone in the face of numerous enemies, I shall endeavour in a few words to impress upon you the main points which it concerns you to be informed of and to remember. For you ought to fight like men not merely when you happen to have allies present, but because courage is native to you; nor should you fear any number of foreign troops. Remember that in the cities from which you

come, not the many govern the few, but the few govern the many, and have acquired their supremacy simply by successful fighting. Your enemies are barbarians, and you in your inexperience fear them. But you ought to know, from your late conflicts with the Macedonian portion of them — and any estimate which I can form, or account of them which I receive from others, would lead me to infer — that they will not prove so very formidable. An enemy often has weak points which wear the appearance of strength; and these; when their nature is explained, encourage rather than frighten their opponents. As, on the other hand, where an army has a real advantage, the adversary who is the most ignorant is also the most foolhardy. The Illyrians, to those who have no experience of them, do indeed at first sight present a threatening aspect. The spectacle of their numbers is terrible, their cries are intolerable, and the brandishing of their spears in the air has a menacing effect. But in action they are not the men they look, if their opponents will only stand their ground; for they have no regular order, and therefore are not ashamed of leaving any post in which they are hard pressed; to fly and to advance being alike honourable, no imputation can be thrown on their courage. When every man is his own master in battle he will readily find a decent excuse for saving himself. They clearly think that to frighten us at a safe distance is a better plan than to meet us hand to hand; else why do they shout instead of fighting? You may easily see that all the terrors with which you have invested them are in reality nothing; they do but startle the sense of sight and hearing. If you repel their tumultuous onset, and, when opportunity offers, withdraw again in good order, keeping your ranks, you will sooner arrive at a place of safety, and will also learn the lesson that mobs like these, if an adversary withstand their first attack, do but threaten at a distance and make a flourish of valour, although if he yields to them they are

quick enough to show their courage in following at his heels when there is no danger.’

127. τοιαῦτα ὁ Βρασίδας παραινέσας ὑπῆγε τὸ στράτευμα. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ἰδόντες πολλῇ βοῇ καὶ θορύβῳ προσέκειντο, νομίσαντες φεύγειν τε αὐτὸν καὶ καταλαβόντες διαφθερεῖν. [2] καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς αἵ τε ἐκδρομαὶ ὅπῃ προσπίπτοιεν ἀπήντων καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων τοὺς λογάδας ἐπικειμένους ὑφίστατο, τῇ τε πρώτῃ ὁρμῇ παρὰ γνώμην ἀντέστησαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπιφερομένους μὲν δεχόμενοι ἠμύνοντο, ἡσυχαζόντων δὲ αὐτοὶ ὑπεχώρουν, τότε δὴ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ Βρασίδου Ἑλλήνων ἐν τῇ εὐρυχωρίᾳ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπέσχοντο, μέρος δέ τι καταλιπόντες αὐτοῖς ἐπακολουθοῦν προσβάλλειν, οἱ λοιποὶ χωρήσαντες δρόμῳ ἐπί τε τοὺς φεύγοντας τῶν Μακεδόνων οἷς ἐντύχοιεν ἔκτεινον καὶ τὴν ἐσβολήν, ἥ ἐστι μεταξὺ δυοῖν λόφοιν στενὴ ἐς τὴν Ἀρραβαίου, φθάσαντες προκατέλαβον, εἰδότες οὐκ οὖσαν ἄλλην τῷ Βρασίδᾳ ἀναχώρησιν. καὶ προσιόντος αὐτοῦ ἐς αὐτὸ ἤδη τὸ ἄπορον τῆς ὁδοῦ κυκλοῦνται ὡς ἀπολῃψόμενοι.

[127] Brasidas, having addressed his army, began to retreat. Whereupon the barbarians with loud noise and in great disorder pressed hard upon him, supposing that he was flying, and that they could overtake and destroy his troops. But, wherever they attacked, the soldiers appointed for the purpose ran out and met them, and Brasidas himself with his chosen men received their charge. Thus the first onset of the barbarians met with a resistance which surprised them, and whenever they renewed the attack the Lacedaemonians received and repelled them again, and when they ceased, proceeded with their march. Thereupon the greater part of the barbarians abstained from attacking Brasidas and his Hellenes in the open country; but leaving a certain number to follow and harass them, they ran on after the fugitive Macedonians and killed any with whom they fell in. They then secured beforehand the narrow pass between two hills which led into the country of Arrhibaeus, knowing that this

was the only path by which Brasidas could retreat. And as he was approaching the most dangerous point of the defile they began to surround him in the hope of cutting him off.

128. ὁ δὲ γνοὺς προεῖπε τοῖς μεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ τριακοσίοις, ὃν ᾧετο μᾶλλον ἂν ἐλεῖν τῶν λόφων, χωρήσαντας πρὸς αὐτὸν δρόμῳ, ὡς τάχιστα ἕκαστος δύναται, ἄνευ τάξεως, πειρᾶσαι ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐκκροῦσαι τοὺς ἤδη ἐπόντας βαρβάρους, πρὶν καὶ τὴν πλέονα κύκλωσιν σφῶν αὐτόσε προσμεῖξαι. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν προσπεσόντες ἐκράτησάν τε τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ λόφου, καὶ ἡ πλείων ἤδη στρατιὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ῥᾷον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπορεύοντο: οἱ γὰρ βάρβαροι καὶ ἐφοβήθησαν, τῆς τροπῆς αὐτοῖς ἐνταῦθα γενομένης σφῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ μετεώρου,καὶ ἐς τὸ πλέον οὐκέτ᾽ ἐπηκολούθουν, νομίζοντες καὶ ἐν μεθορίοις εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἤδη καὶ διαπεφευγέναι. [3] Βρασίδας δὲ ὡς ἀντελάβετο τῶν μετεώρων, κατὰ ἀσφάλειαν μᾶλλον ἰὼν αὐθημερὸν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἄρνισαν πρῶτον τῆς Περδίκκου ἀρχῆς. [4] καὶ αὐτοὶ ὀργιζόμενοι οἱ στρατιῶται τῇ προαναχωρήσει τῶν Μακεδόνων, ὅσοις ἐνέτυχον κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ζεύγεσιν αὐτῶν βοεικοῖς ἢ εἴ τινι σκεύει ἐκπεπτωκότι, οἷα ἐν νυκτερινῇ καὶ φοβερᾷ ἀναχωρήσει εἰκὸς ἦν ξυμβῆναι, τὰ μὲν ὑπολύοντες κατέκοπτον, τῶν δὲ οἰκείωσιν ἐποιοῦντο. [5] ἀπὸ τούτου τε πρῶτον Περδίκκας Βρασίδαν τε πολέμιον ἐνόμισε καὶ ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν Πελοποννησίων τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ δι᾽ Ἀθηναίους οὐ ξύνηθες μῖσος εἶχε, τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων ξυμφόρων διαναστὰς ἔπρασσεν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τάχιστα τοῖς μὲν ξυμβήσεται, τῶν δὲ ἀπαλλάξεται.

[128] Perceiving their intention, he told his three hundred to leave their ranks and run every man as fast as he could to the top of one of the hills, being the one which he thought the barbarians would be most likely to occupy; and before a larger number of them could come up and surround them, to dislodge those who were already there. They accordingly attacked and defeated them; and so the main body of his army more easily reached the summit; for the barbarians, seeing their comrades defeated and driven from the high

ground, took alarm; they considered too that the enemy were already on the borders of the country, and had got away from them, and therefore followed no further. Brasidas had now gained the high ground and could march unmolested; on the same day he arrived at Arnissa, which is in the dominion of Perdiccas. The soldiers were enraged at the hasty retreat of the Macedonians, and when they came upon carts of theirs drawn by oxen, or any baggage which had been dropped in the flight, as was natural in a retreat made in a panic and by night, they of themselves loosed the oxen and slaughtered them, and appropriated the baggage. From that time forward Perdiccas regarded Brasidas in the light of a foe, and conceived a new hatred of the Peloponnesians, which was not a natural feeling in an enemy of the Athenians. Nevertheless, disregarding his own nearest interests, he took steps to make terms with the one and get rid of the other.

129. Βρασίδας δὲ ἀναχωρήσας ἐκ Μακεδονίας ἐς Τορώνην καταλαμβάνει Ἀθηναίους Μένδην ἤδη ἔχοντας, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἡσυχάζων ἐς μὲν τὴν Παλλήνην ἀδύνατος ἤδη ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι διαβὰς τιμωρεῖν, τὴν δὲ Τορώνην ἐν φυλακῇ εἶχεν. [2] ὑπὸ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῖς ἐν τῇ Λύγκῳ ἐξέπλευσαν ἐπί τε τὴν Μένδην καὶ τὴν Σκιώνην οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο, ναυσὶ μὲν πεντήκοντα, ὧν ἦσαν δέκα Χῖαι, ὁπλίταις δὲ χιλίοις ἑαυτῶν καὶ τοξόταις ἑξακοσίοις καὶ Θρᾳξὶ μισθωτοῖς χιλίοις καὶ ἄλλοις τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων πελτασταῖς: ἐστρατήγει δὲ Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ Νικόστρατος ὁ Διειτρέφους. [3] ἄραντες δὲ ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ σχόντες κατὰ τὸ Ποσειδώνιον ἐχώρουν ἐς τοὺς Μενδαίους. οἱ δὲ αὐτοί τε καὶ Σκιωναίων τριακόσιοι βεβοηθηκότες Πελοποννησίων τε οἱ ἐπίκουροι, ξύμπαντες [δὲ] ἑπτακόσιοι ὁπλῖται, καὶ Πολυδαμίδας ὁ ἄρχων αὐτῶν, ἔτυχον ἐξεστρατοπεδευμένοι ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ. [4] καὶ αὐτοῖς Νικίας μὲν Μεθωναίους τε ἔχων εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ψιλοὺς καὶ λογάδας τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὁπλιτῶν ἑξήκοντα καὶ τοὺς τοξότας ἅπαντας

κατὰ ἀτραπόν τινα τοῦ λόφου πειρώμενος προσβῆναι καὶ τραυματιζόμενος ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐδυνήθη βιάσασθαι: Νικόστρατος δὲ ἄλλῃ ἐφόδῳ ἐκ πλέονος παντὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατοπέδῳ ἐπιὼν τῷ λόφῳ ὄντι δυσπροσβάτῳ καὶ πάνυ ἐθορυβήθη, καὶ ἐς ὀλίγον ἀφίκετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων νικηθῆναι. [5] καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ὡς οὐκ ἐνέδοσαν οἱ Μενδαῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀναχωρήσαντες ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, καὶ οἱ Μενδαῖοι νυκτὸς ἐπελθούσης ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἀπῆλθον.

[129] Brasidas returned from Macedonia to Toronè, and when he arrived there found the Athenians already in possession of Mendè. Thinking it now too late to cross over to Pallenè and assist Mendè and Scionè, he remained quiet and guarded Toronè. While he was engaged with the Lyncestians, the Athenians, having completed their preparations, had sailed against Mendè and Scionè with fifty ships, of which ten were Chian, conveying a thousand hoplites of their own, six hundred archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and targeteers furnished by their allies in the neighbourhood. They were under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes. Sailing from Potidaea and putting in near the temple of Poseidon they marched against the Mendaeans. Now they and three hundred Scionaeans who had come to their aid, and their Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred hoplites in all, with Polydamidas their commander, had just encamped outside the city on a steep hill. Nicias, taking with him for the assault a hundred and twenty Methonaean light-armed troops, sixty select Athenian hoplites and all the archers, made an attempt to ascend the hill by a certain pathway, but he was wounded and failed to carry the position. Nicostratus with the remainder of his troops approaching the hill, which was hard of access, by another and more circuitous route was thrown into utter confusion, and the whole army of the Athenians were nearly defeated. So on this day the Athenians, finding that the Mendaeans and

their allies refused to give way, retreated and encamped; and when night came on, the Mendaeans likewise returned to the city.

130. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι περιπλεύσαντες ἐς τὸ πρὸς Σκιώνης τό τε προάστειον εἷλον καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ἅπασαν ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν οὐδενὸς ἐπεξιόντος ⸀ἦν γάρ τι καὶ στασιασμοῦ ἐν τῇ πόλει⸁, οἱ δὲ τριακόσιοι τῶν Σκιωναίων τῆς ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [2] καὶ τῇ ἐπιγιγνομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ Νικίας μὲν τῷ ἡμίσει τοῦ στρατοῦ προϊὼν ἅμα ἐς τὰ μεθόρια τῶν Σκιωναίων τὴν γῆν ἐδῄου, Νικόστρατος δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς κατὰ τὰς ἄνω πύλας, ᾗ ἐπὶ Ποτειδαίας ἔρχονται, προσεκάθητο τῇ πόλει. [3] ὁ δὲ Πολυδαμίδας ⸀ ἔτυχε γὰρ ταύτῃ τοῖς Μενδαίοις καὶ ἐπικούροις ἐντὸς τοῦ τείχους τὰ ὅπλα κείμενα⸁ διατάσσει τε ὡς ἐς μάχην καὶ παρῄνει τοῖς Μενδαίοις ἐπεξιέναι. [4] καί τινος αὐτῷ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἀντειπόντος κατὰ τὸ στασιωτικὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπέξεισιν οὐδὲ δέοιτο πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀντεῖπεν ἐπισπασθέντος τε τῇ χειρὶ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ θορυβηθέντος, ὁ δῆμος εὐθὺς ἀναλαβὼν τὰ ὅπλα περιοργὴς ἐχώρει ἐπί τε Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἐναντία σφίσι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πράξαντας. [5] καὶ προσπεσόντες τρέπουσιν ἅμα μὲν μάχῃ αἰφνιδίῳ, ἅμα δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τῶν πυλῶν ἀνοιγομένων φοβηθέντων: ᾠήθησαν γὰρ ἀπὸ προειρημένου τινὸς αὐτοῖς τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν γενέσθαι. [6] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὅσοι μὴ αὐτίκα διεφθάρησαν, κατέφυγον, ἥνπερ καὶ τὸ πρότερον αὐτοὶ εἶχον: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ⸀ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἐπαναστρέψας πρὸς τῇ πόλει ἦν⸁ ἐσπεσόντες ἐς τὴν Μένδην πόλιν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ἀνοιχθεῖσαν, ἁπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ὡς κατὰ κράτος ἑλόντες διήρπασαν, καὶ μόλις οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατέσχον ὥστε μὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διαφθείρεσθαι. [7] καὶ τοὺς μὲν Μενδαίους μετὰ ταῦτα πολιτεύειν ἐκέλευον ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, αὐτοὺς κρίναντας ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εἴ τινας ἡγοῦνται αἰτίους εἶναι τῆς ἀποστάσεως: τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει ἀπετείχισαν ἑκατέρωθεν τείχει ἐς θάλασσαν καὶ φυλακὴν

ἐπικαθίσταντο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν Μένδην κατέσχον, ἐπὶ τὴν Σκιώνην ἐχώρουν.

[130] On the following day the Athenians sailed round to the side of Mendè looking towards Scionè; they took the suburb, and during the whole of that day devastated the country. No one came out to meet them; for a division had arisen in the city, and on the following night the three hundred Scionaeans returned home. On the next day Nicias with half his army went as far as the Scionaean frontier and devastated the country on his march, while Nicostratus with the other half sat down before the upper gates of Mendè, out of which the road leads to Potidaea. In this part of the city within the walls the Mendaeans and their allies chanced to have their arms deposited, and Polydamidas, arraying his forces in order of battle, was just exhorting the Mendaeans to go forth. Some one of the popular faction answered in the heat of party that he would not go out, and that he did not care to fight, but no sooner had he uttered the words than he was seized by the Peloponnesian commander and roughly handled. Whereupon the people lost patience, caught up their arms, and made a furious rush upon the Peloponnesians and the opposite party who were in league with them. They soon put them to flight, partly because the onslaught was sudden, and also because the gates were thrown open to the Athenians, which greatly terrified them. For they thought that the attack upon them was premeditated. All the Peloponnesians who were not killed on the spot fled to the citadel, which they had previously kept in their own hands. Nicias had now returned and was close to the city, and the Athenians rushed into Mendè with their whole force. As the gates had been opened without any previous capitulation they plundered the town as if it had been stormed; and even the lives of the citizens were with difficulty saved by the efforts of the generals. The Mendaeans were then told that they were to retain their former constitution, and bring to trial among themselves any

whom they thought guilty of the revolt. At the same time the Athenians blockaded the garrison in the Acropolis by a wall extending to the sea on either side and established a guard. Having thus secured Mendè, they proceeded against Scionè.

131. οἱ δὲ ἀντεπεξελθόντες αὐτοὶ καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι ἱδρύθησαν ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃν εἰ μὴ ἕλοιεν οἱ ἐναντίοι, οὐκ ἐγίγνετο σφῶν περιτείχισις. [2] προσβαλόντες δ᾽ αὐτῷ κατὰ κράτος οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ μάχῃ ἐκκρούσαντες τοὺς ἐπόντας ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντό τε καὶ ἐς τὸν περιτειχισμὸν τροπαῖον στήσαντες παρεσκευάζοντο. [3] καὶ αὐτῶν οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἤδη ἐν ἔργῳ ὄντων οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ἐν τῇ Μένδῃ πολιορκούμενοι ἐπίκουροι βιασάμενοι παρὰ θάλασσαν τὴν φυλακὴν νυκτὸς ἀφικνοῦνται, καὶ διαφυγόντες οἱ πλεῖστοι τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ Σκιώνῃ στρατόπεδον ἐσῆλθον ἐς αὐτήν.

[131] The inhabitants of Scionè and the Peloponnesian garrison had come out to meet them and occupied a steep hill in front of the city. The hill had to be taken by the Athenians before they could effect the circumvallation of the place. So they made a furious attack and dislodged those who were stationed there; they then encamped, and after raising a trophy, prepared to invest the city. Soon afterwards, while they were engaged in the work, the Peloponnesian auxiliaries who were besieged in the Acropolis of Mendè, forcing their way out by the sea-shore, broke through the watch and came to Scionè by night. Most of them eluded the Athenians who were encamped outside, and got into the town.

132. περιτειχιζομένης δὲ τῆς Σκιώνης Περδίκκας τοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῖς ἐπικηρυκευσάμενος ὁμολογίαν ποιεῖται πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους διὰ τὴν τοῦ Βρασίδου ἔχθραν περὶ τῆς ἐκ τῆς Λύγκου ἀναχωρήσεως, εὐθὺς τότε ἀρξάμενος πράσσειν. [2] καὶ □ἐτύγχανε γὰρ τότε Ἰσχαγόρας ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος στρατιὰν μέλλων πεζῇ πορεύσειν ὡς Βρασίδαν □ ὁ [δὲ] Περδίκκας, ἅμα μὲν κελεύοντος τοῦ Νικίου, ἐπειδὴ ξυνεβεβήκει, ἔνδηλόν τι ποιεῖν τοῖς

Ἀθηναίοις βεβαιότητος πέρι, ἅμα δ᾽ αὐτὸς οὐκέτι βουλόμενος Πελοποννησίους ἐς τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀφικνεῖσθαι, παρασκευάσας τοὺς ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ ξένους,χρώμενος αἰεὶ τοῖς πρώτοις, διεκώλυσε τὸ στράτευμα καὶ τὴν παρασκευήν, ὥστε μηδὲ πειρᾶσθαι Θεσσαλῶν. [3] Ἰσχαγόρας μέντοι καὶ Ἀμεινίας καὶ Ἀριστεὺς αὐτοί τε ὡς Βρασίδαν ἀφίκοντο, ἐπιδεῖν πεμψάντων Λακεδαιμονίων τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῶν ἡβώντων αὐτῶν παρανόμως ἄνδρας ἐξῆγον ἐκ Σπάρτης, ὥστε τῶν πόλεων ἄρχοντας καθιστάναι καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἐντυχοῦσιν ἐπιτρέπειν. καὶ Κλεαρίδαν μὲν τὸν Κλεωνύμου καθίστησιν ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει, Πασιτελίδαν δὲ τὸν Ἡγησάνδρου ἐν Τορώνῃ.

[132] While the circumvallation of Scionè was proceeding, Perdiccas, who, after what had occurred in the retreat from Lyncus, hated Brasidas, sent heralds to the Athenian generals, and came to an understanding with them, which without loss of time he took measures to carry out. It so happened that Ischagoras the Lacedaemonian was then on the eve of marching with an army to reinforce Brasidas. Perdiccas was told by Nicias that, having now made friends with the Athenians, he should give them some evidence of his sincerity. He himself too no longer wished the Peloponnesians to find their way into his country. And so by his influence over the Thessalian chiefs, with whom he was always on good terms, he put a stop to the whole expedition; indeed, the Lacedaemonians did not even attempt to obtain the consent of the Thessalians. Nevertheless, Ischagoras, Ameinias, and Aristeus, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonian government to report on the state of affairs, found their way to Brasidas. They brought with them, though contrary to law, certain young Spartans, intending to make them governors of the cities, instead of leaving the care of them to chance persons. Accordingly Brasidas appointed Clearidas the son of Cleonymus governor of Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas the son of Hegesander governor of Toronè.

133. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει Θηβαῖοι Θεσπιῶν τεῖχος περιεῖλον ἐπικαλέσαντες ἀττικισμόν, βουλόμενοι μὲν καὶ αἰεί, παρεσχηκὸς δὲ ῥᾷον ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους μάχῃ ὅτι ἦν αὐτῶν ἄνθος ἀπωλώλει. [2] καὶ ὁ νεὼς τῆς Ἥρας τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐν Ἄργει κατεκαύθη, Χρυσίδος τῆς ἱερείας λύχνον τινὰ θείσης ἡμμένον πρὸς τὰ στέμματα καὶ ἐπικαταδαρθούσης, ὥστε ἔλαθεν ἀφθέντα πάντα καὶ καταφλεχθέντα. [3] καὶ ἡ Χρυσὶς μὲν εὐθὺς τῆς νυκτὸς δείσασα τοὺς Ἀργείους ἐς Φλειοῦντα φεύγει: οἱ δὲ ἄλλην ἱέρειαν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ προκειμένου κατεστήσαντο Φαεινίδα ὄνομα. ἔτη δὲ ἡ Χρυσὶς τοῦ πολέμου τοῦδε ἐπέλαβεν ὀκτὼ καὶ ἔνατον ἐκ μέσου, ὅτε ἐπεφεύγει. [4] καὶ ἡ Σκιώνη τοῦ θέρους ἤδη τελευτῶντος περιετετείχιστό τε παντελῶς, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ φυλακὴν καταλιπόντες ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατῷ.

[133] During the same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall of the Thespians, charging them with Athenian tendencies. This was an object which they always had in view, and now they had their opportunity, because the flower of the Thespian army had fallen in the battle of Delium. During the same summer the temple of Herè near Argos was burnt down; Chrysis the priestess had put a light too near the sacred garlands, and had then gone to sleep, so that the whole place took fire and was consumed. In her fear of the people she fled that very night to Phlius; and the Argives, as the law provided, appointed another priestess named Phaeinis. Chrysis had been priestess during eight years of the war and half of the ninth when she became an exile. Towards the close of the summer Scionè was completely invested, and the Athenians, leaving a guard, retired with the rest of their army.

134. ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπιόντι χειμῶνι τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἡσύχαζε διὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ Τεγεᾶται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἑκατέρων ξυνέβαλον ἐν Λαοδοκείῳ τῆς Ὀρεσθίδος, καὶ νίκη ἀμφιδήριτος ἐγένετο: κέρας γὰρ ἑκάτεροι τρέψαντες τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς τροπαῖά τε

ἀμφότεροι ἔστησαν καὶ σκῦλα ἐς Δελφοὺς ἀπέπεμψαν. [2] διαφθαρέντων μέντοι πολλῶν ἑκατέροις καὶ ἀγχωμάλου τῆς μάχης γενομένης καὶ ἀφελομένης νυκτὸς τὸ ἔργον οἱ Τεγεᾶται μὲν ἐπηυλίσαντό τε καὶ εὐθὺς ἔστησαν τροπαῖον, Μαντινῆς δὲ ἀπεχώρησάν τε ἐς Βουκολιῶνα καὶ ὕστερον ἀντέστησαν.

[134] In the following winter the Athenians and Lacedaemonians remained inactive, in consequence of the armistice; but the Mantineans and the Tegeans with their respective allies fought a battle at Laodicium in the territory of Orestheum; the victory was disputed. For the troops of both cities defeated the allies on the wing opposed to them, and both erected trophies, and sent spoils to Delphi. The truth is that, although there was considerable slaughter on both sides, and the issue was still undecided when night put an end to the conflict, the Tegeans encamped on the field and at once erected a trophy, while the Mantineans retreated to Bucolion and raised a rival trophy, but afterwards.

135. ἀπεπείρασε δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας τελευτῶντος καὶ πρὸς ἔαρ ἤδη Ποτειδαίας. προσελθὼν γὰρ νυκτὸς καὶ κλίμακα προσθεὶς μέχρι μὲν τούτου ἔλαθεν: τοῦ γὰρ κώδωνος παρενεχθέντος οὕτως ἐς τὸ διάκενον, πρὶν ἐπανελθεῖν τὸν παραδιδόντα αὐτόν, ἡ πρόσθεσις ἐγένετο: ἔπειτα μέντοι εὐθὺς αἰσθομένων, πρὶν προσβῆναι, ἀπήγαγε πάλιν κατὰ τάχος τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ οὐκ ἀνέμεινεν ἡμέραν γενέσθαι. [2] καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἔνατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[135] At the close of the same winter, towards the beginning of spring, Brasidas made an attempt on Potidaea. He approached the place by night and planted a ladder against the walls. Thus far he proceeded undiscovered; for the ladder was fixed at a point which the sentinel who was passing on the bell had just quitted, and before he had returned to his post. But Brasidas had not yet mounted the ladder when he was detected by the garrison: whereupon he

withdrew his army in haste without waiting for the dawn. So the winter ended, and with it the ninth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

Βιβλίο Ε’ — BOOK V

1. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους αἱ μὲν ἐνιαύσιοι σπονδαὶ διελέλυντο μέχρι Πυθίων, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκεχειρίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι Δηλίους ἀνέστησαν ἐκ Δήλου, ἡγησάμενοι κατὰ παλαιάν τινα αἰτίαν οὐ καθαροὺς ὄντας ἱερῶσθαι, καὶ ἅμα ἐλλιπὲς σφίσιν εἶναι τοῦτο τῆς καθάρσεως, ᾗ πρότερόν μοι δεδήλωται ὡς ἀνελόντες τὰς θήκας τῶν τεθνεώτων ὀρθῶς ἐνόμισαν ποιῆσαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν Δήλιοι Ἀτραμύττιον Φαρνάκου δόντος αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ᾤκησαν, οὕτως ὡς ἕκαστος ὥρμητο.

[1] WITH the return of summer the year of the truce expired, but hostilities were not resumed until after the Pythian games. During the armistice the Athenians removed the Delians from Delos; they considered them impure and unworthy of their sacred character by reason of a certain ancient offence. The island had been purified before, when they took up the coffns of the dead as I have already narrated; but this purification, which seemed sufficient at the time, was now thought unsatisfactory because the inhabitants had been suffered to remain. Pharnaces gave to the Delians an asylum at Adramyttium in Asia, and whoever chose went and settled there.

2. Κλέων δὲ Ἀθηναίους πείσας ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία ἐξέπλευσε μετὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, Ἀθηναίων μὲν ὁπλίτας ἔχων διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους καὶ ἱππέας τριακοσίους, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων πλείους, ναῦς δὲ τριάκοντα. [2] σχὼν δὲ ἐς Σκιώνην πρῶτον ἔτι πολιορκουμένην καὶ προσλαβὼν αὐτόθεν ὁπλίτας τῶν φρουρῶν, κατέπλευσεν ἐς τὸν Κωφὸν λιμένα τῶν Τορωναίων ἀπέχοντα οὐ πολὺ τῆς πόλεως. [3] ἐκ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ, αἰσθόμενος ὑπ᾽ αὐτομόλων ὅτι οὔτε Βρασίδας ἐν τῇ Τορώνῃ οὔτε οἱ ἐνόντες ἀξιόμαχοι εἶεν, τῇ μὲν στρατιᾷ τῇ πεζῇ ἐχώρει ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ναῦς δὲ περιέπεμψε δέκα <ἐς > τὸν λιμένα περιπλεῖν. [4] καὶ πρὸς τὸ περιτείχισμα πρῶτον ἀφικνεῖται, ὃ προσπεριέβαλε τῇ πόλει ὁ Βρασίδας ἐντὸς

βουλόμενος ποιῆσαι τὸ προάστειον, καὶ διελὼν τοῦ παλαιοῦ τείχους μίαν αὐτὴν ἐποίησε πόλιν.

[2] When the armistice was over, Cleon, having obtained the consent of the people, sailed on an expedition to the Chalcidian cities with thirty ships conveying twelve hundred Athenian hoplites, three hundred Athenian horsemen, and numerous allies. Touching first at Scionè (which was still blockaded, and taking from thence some hoplites of the besieging force, he sailed into the so-called Colophonian port, which was near the city of Toronè; there learning from deserters that Brasidas was not in Toronè, and that the garrison was too weak to resist, he marched with his army against the town, and sent ten ships to sail round into the harbour. First he came to the new line of wall which Brasidas had raised when, wanting to take in the suburbs, he broke down a part of the old wall and made the whole city one.

3. βοηθήσαντες δὲ ἐς αὐτὸ Πασιτελίδας τε ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἄρχων καὶ ἡ παροῦσα φυλακὴ προσβαλόντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἠμύνοντο. καὶ ὡς ἐβιάζοντο καὶ αἱ νῆες ἅμα περιέπλεον <αἱ> ἐς τὸν λιμένα περιπεμφθεῖσαι, δείσας ὁ Πασιτελίδας μὴ αἵ τε νῆες φθάσωσι λαβοῦσαι ἐρῆμον τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῦ τειχίσματος ἁλισκομένου ἐγκαταληφθῇ, ἀπολιπὼν αὐτὸ δρόμῳ ἐχώρει ἐς τὴν πόλιν. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι φθάνουσιν οἵ τε ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἐλόντες τὴν Τορώνην καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἐπισπόμενος αὐτοβοεὶ κατὰ τὸ διῃρημένον τοῦ παλαιοῦ τείχους ξυνεσπεσών. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Τορωναίων εὐθὺς ἐν χερσί, τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἔλαβον, καὶ Πασιτελίδαν τὸν ἄρχοντα. [3] Βρασίδας δὲ ἐβοήθει μὲν τῇ Τορώνῃ, αἰσθόμενος δὲ καθ᾽ ὁδὸν ἐαλωκυῖαν ἀνεχώρησεν, ἀποσχὼν τεσσαράκοντα μάλιστα σταδίους μὴ φθάσαι ἐλθών. [4] ὁ δὲ Κλέων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖά τε ἔστησαν δύο, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸν λιμένα, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῷ τειχίσματι, καὶ τῶν Τορωναίων γυναῖκας μὲν καὶ παῖδας ἠνδραπόδισαν, αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ Πελοποννησίους καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος Χαλκιδέων ἦν, ξύμπαντας ἐς ἑπτακοσίους, ἀπέπεμψαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας: καὶ αὐτοῖς τὸ μὲν Πελοποννήσιον

ὕστερον ἐν ταῖς γενομέναις σπονδαῖς ἀπῆλθε, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐκομίσθη ὑπ᾽ Ὀλυνθίων, ἀνὴρ ἀντ᾽ ἀνδρὸς λυθείς. [5] εἶλον δὲ καὶ Πάνακτον Ἀθηναίων ἐν μεθορίοις τεῖχος Βοιωτοὶ ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον προδοσίᾳ. [6] καὶ ὁ μὲν Κλέων φυλακὴν καταστησάμενος τῆς Τορώνης ἄρας περιέπλει τὸν Ἄθων ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν.

[3] But Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian governor, and the garrison under his command came to the defence of this quarter of the town, and fought against their assailants, who pressed them hard. Meanwhile the Athenian fleet was sailing round into the harbour, and Pasitelidas feared that the ships would take the city before he could return and defend it, and that the new fortifications would be captured and himself in them. So he left the suburb and ran back into the city. But the enemy were too quick; the Athenians from the ships having taken Toronè before he arrived; while their infantry followed close upon him, and in a moment dashed in along with him at the breach in the old wall. Some of the Peloponnesians and Toronaeans were slain upon the spot, others were captured, and among them Pasitelidas the governor. Brasidas was on his way to the relief of Toronè at the time, but, hearing that the place was taken, he stopped and returned; he was within four miles and a half at the time of the capture. Cleon and the Athenians erected two trophies, one at the harbour and the other near the new wall. The women and children were made slaves; the men of Toronè and any other Chalcidians, together with the Peloponnesians, numbering in all seven hundred, were sent to Athens. The Peloponnesian captives were liberated at the peace which was concluded shortly afterwards; the rest were recovered by the Olynthians in exchange for a like number of the captives held by them. About the same time Panactum, a fortress on the Athenian frontier, was betrayed to the Boeotians. Cleon, putting a garrison into Toronè, sailed round Mount Athos, intending to attack Amphipolis.

4. Φαίαξ δὲ ὁ Ἐρασιστράτου τρίτος αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίων πεμπόντων ναυσὶ δύο ἐς Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν πρεσβευτὴς ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἐξέπλευσεν. [2] Λεοντῖνοι γὰρ ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς καὶ ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενόει ἀναδάσασθαι. [3] οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ αἰσθόμενοι Συρακοσίους τε ἐπάγονται καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι τὸν δῆμον. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπλανήθησαν ὡς ἕκαστοι, οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ ὁμολογήσαντες Συρακοσίοις καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπόντες καὶ ἐρημώσαντες Συρακούσας ἐπὶ πολιτείᾳ ᾤκησαν. [4] καὶ ὕστερον πάλιν αὐτῶν τινὲς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκεσθαι ἀπολιπόντες ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν Φωκαίας τε τῆς πόλεώς τι τῆς Λεοντίνων χωρίον καλούμενον καταλαμβάνουσι καὶ Βρικιννίας ὂν ἔρυμα ἐν τῇ Λεοντίνῃ. καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου τότε ἐκπεσόντων οἱ πολλοὶ ἦλθον ὡς αὐτούς, καὶ καταστάντες ἐκ τῶν τειχῶν ἐπολέμουν. [5] ἃ πυνθανόμενοι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν Φαίακα πέμπουσιν, εἴ πως πείσαντες τοὺς σφίσιν ὄντας αὐτόθι ξυμμάχους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢν δύνωνται, Σικελιώτας κοινῇ ὡς Συρακοσίων δύναμιν περιποιουμένων ἐπιστρατεῦσαι, διασώσειαν τὸν δῆμον τῶν Λεοντίνων. [6] ὁ δὲ Φαίαξ ἀφικόμενος τοὺς μὲν Καμαριναίους πείθει καὶ Ἀκραγαντίνους, ἐν δὲ Γέλᾳ ἀντιστάντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πράγματος οὐκέτι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔρχεται, αἰσθόμενος οὐκ ἂν πείθειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναχωρήσας διὰ τῶν Σικελῶν ἐς Κατάνην καὶ ἅμα ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ καὶ ἐς τὰς Βρικιννίας ἐλθὼν καὶ παραθαρσύνας ἀπέπλει.

[4] About the same time three envoys, of whom one was Phaeax the son of Erasistratus, were sent by the Athenians with two ships to Italy and Sicily. After the general peace and the withdrawal of the Athenians from Sicily, the Leontines had enrolled many new citizens, and the people contemplated a redistribution of the land. The oligarchy, perceiving their intention, called in the Syracusans and drove out the people, who separated and wandered up and down the island. The oligarchy then made an agreement with the Syracusans; and, leaving their own city deserted,

settled in Syracuse, and received the privileges of citizenship. Not long afterwards some of them grew discontented, and, quitting Syracuse, seized a place called Phocaeae, which was a part of the town of Leontini, and Bricinniae, a fortress in the Leontine territory. Here they were joined by most of the common people who had been previously driven out, and from their strongholds they carried on a continual warfare against Syracuse. It was the report of these events which induced the Athenians to send Phaeax to Sicily. He was to warn the Sicilians that the Syracusans were aiming at supremacy, and to unite the allies of Athens, and if possible the other cities, in a war against Syracuse. The Athenians hoped that they might thus save the Leontine people. Phaeax succeeded in his mission to the Camarinaeans and Agrigentines, but in Gela he failed, and, convinced that he could not persuade the other states, went no further. Returning by land through the country of the Sicels, and by the way going to Bricinniae and encouraging the exiles, he arrived at Catana, where he embarked for Athens.

5. ἐν δὲ τῇ παρακομιδῇ τῇ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀναχωρήσει καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ τισὶ πόλεσιν ἐχρημάτισε περὶ φιλίας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ Λοκρῶν ἐντυγχάνει τοῖς ἐκ Μεσσήνης ἐποίκοις ἐκπεπτωκόσιν, οἳ μετὰ τὴν τῶν Σικελιωτῶν ὁμολογίαν στασιασάντων Μεσσηνίων καὶ ἐπαγαγομένων τῶν ἑτέρων Λοκροὺς ἔποικοι ἐξεπέμφθησαν, καὶ ἐγένετο Μεσσήνη Λοκρῶν τινὰ χρόνον. [2] τούτοις οὖν ὁ Φαίαξ ἐντυχὼν τοῖς κομιζομένοις οὐκ ἠδίκησεν: ἐγεγένητο γὰρ τοῖς Λοκροῖς πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμολογία ξυμβάσεως πέρι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. [3] μόνοι γὰρ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅτε Σικελιῶται ξυνηλλάσσοντο, οὐκ ἐσπείσαντο Ἀθηναίοις, οὐδ᾽ ἂν τότε, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὺς κατεῖχεν ὁ πρὸς Ἱππωνιᾶς καὶ Μεδμαίους πόλεμος ὁμόρους τε ὄντας καὶ ἀποίκους. καὶ ὁ μὲν Φαίαξ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας χρόνῳ ὕστερον ἀφίκετο.

[5] On his voyage, both to and from Sicily, he made proposals of friendship to several of the Italian cities. He also

fell in with some Locrian settlers who had been driven out of Messenè. After the agreement between the Sicilian towns, a feud had broken out at Messenè, and one of the two parties called in the Locrians, who sent some of their citizens to settle there; thus Messenè was held for a time by the Locrians. They were returning home after their expulsion when Phaeax fell in with them, but he did them no harm; for the Locrians had already agreed with him to enter into a treaty with the Athenians. At the general reconciliation of the Sicilians, they alone of the allies had not made peace with Athens. And they would have continued to hold out had they not been constrained by a war with the Itoneans and Melaeans, who were their neighbours and colonists from their city. Phaeax then returned to Athens.

6. ὁ δὲ Κλέων ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς Τορώνης τότε περιέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν, ὁρμώμενος ἐκ τῆς Ἠιόνος Σταγίρῳ μὲν προσβάλλει Ἀνδρίων ἀποικίᾳ καὶ οὐχ εἶλε, Ἀληψὸν δὲ τὴν Θασίων ἀποικίαν λαμβάνει κατὰ κράτος. [2] καὶ πέμψας ὡς Περδίκκαν πρέσβεις, ὅπως παραγένοιτο στρατιᾷ κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν, καὶ ἐς τὴν Θρᾴκην ἄλλους παρὰ Πολλῆν τὸν Ὀδομάντων βασιλέα, ἄξοντας μισθοῦ Θρᾷκας ὡς πλείστους, αὐτὸς ἡσύχαζε περιμένων ἐν τῇ Ἠιόνι. [3] Βρασίδας δὲ πυνθανόμενος ταῦτα ἀντεκάθητο καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Κερδυλίῳ: ἔστι δὲ τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο Ἀργιλίων ἐπὶ μετεώρου πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχον τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως, καὶ κατεφαίνετο πάντα αὐτόθεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν ὁρμώμενος ὁ Κλέων τῷ στρατῷ: ὅπερ προσεδέχετο ποιήσειν αὐτόν, ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν, ὑπεριδόντα σφῶν τὸ πλῆθος, τῇ παρούσῃ στρατιᾷ ἀναβήσεσθαι. [4] ἅμα δὲ καὶ παρεσκευάζετο Θρᾷκάς τε μισθωτοὺς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους, καὶ τοὺς Ἡδῶνας πάντας παρακαλῶν, πελταστὰς καὶ ἱππέας: καὶ Μυρκινίων καὶ Χαλκιδέων χιλίους πελταστὰς εἶχε πρὸς τοῖς ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει. [5] τὸ δ᾽ ὁπλιτικὸν ξύμπαν ἠθροίσθη δισχίλιοι μάλιστα καὶ ἱππῆς Ἕλληνες τριακόσιοι. τούτων Βρασίδας μὲν ἔχων ἐπὶ

Κερδυλίῳ ἐκάθητο ἐς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει μετὰ Κλεαρίδου ἐτετάχατο.

[6] Cleon had now sailed round from Toronè against Amphipolis, and making Eion his headquarters, attacked Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians, which he failed to take. He succeeded, however, in storming Galepsus, a Thasian colony. He sent an embassy to Perdiccas, desiring him to come with an army, according to the terms of the alliance, and another to Polles, the king of the Odomantian Thracians, who was to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as he could; he then remained quietly at Eion waiting for these reinforcements. Brasidas, hearing of his movements, took up a counter-position on Cerdylium. This is a high ground on the right bank of the river, not far from Amphipolis, belonging to the Argilians. From this spot he commanded a view of the country round, so that Cleon was sure to be seen by him if, — as Brasidas fully expected, — despising the numbers of his opponents, he should go up against Amphipolis without waiting for his reinforcements. At the same time he prepared for a battle, summoning to his side fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries and the entire forces of the Edonians, who were targeteers and horsemen; he had already one thousand Myrcinian and Chalcidian targeteers, in addition to the troops in Amphipolis. His heavy-armed, when all mustered, amounted to nearly two thousand, and he had three hundred Hellenic cavalry. Of these forces about fifteen hundred were stationed with Brasidas on Cerdylium, and the remainder were drawn up in order of battle under Clearidas in Amphipolis.

7. ὁ δὲ Κλέων τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζεν, ἔπειτα ἠναγκάσθη ποιῆσαι ὅπερ ὁ Βρασίδας προσεδέχετο. [2] τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ἀχθομένων μὲν τῇ ἕδρᾳ, ἀναλογιζομένων δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου ἡγεμονίαν πρὸς οἵαν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τόλμαν μετὰ οἵας ἀνεπιστημοσύνης καὶ μαλακίας γενήσοιτο καὶ οἴκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ξυνῆλθον, αἰσθόμενος τὸν θροῦν καὶ οὐ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καθημένους

βαρύνεσθαι, ἀναλαβὼν ἦγεν. [3] καὶ ἐχρήσατο τῷ τρόπῳ ᾧπερ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πύλον εὐτυχήσας ἐπίστευσέ τι φρονεῖν: ἐς μάχην μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἤλπισέν οἱ ἐπεξιέναι οὐδένα, κατὰ θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ χωρίου, καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμενεν, οὐχ ὡς τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, ἢν ἀναγκάζηται, περισχήσων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς κύκλῳ περιστὰς βίᾳ αἱρήσων τὴν πόλιν. [4] ἐλθών τε καὶ καθίσας ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ πρὸ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως τὸν στρατὸν αὐτὸς ἐθεᾶτο τὸ λιμνῶδες τοῦ Στρυμόνος καὶ τὴν θέσιν τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τῇ Θρᾴκῃ ὡς ἔχοι. [5] ἀπιέναι τε ἐνόμιζεν, ὁπόταν βούληται, ἀμαχεί: καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐφαίνετο οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους οὐδεὶς οὔτε κατὰ πύλας ἐξῄει, κεκλῃμέναι τε ἦσαν πᾶσαι. ὥστε καὶ μηχανὰς ὅτι οὐκ ἀνῆλθεν ἔχων, ἁμαρτεῖν ἐδόκει: ἑλεῖν γὰρ ἂν τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ ἐρῆμον.

[7] Cleon did nothing for a time, but he was soon compelled to make the movement which Brasidas expected. For the soldiers were disgusted at their inaction, and drew comparisons between the generals; what skill and enterprise might be expected on the one side, and what ignorance and cowardice on the other. And they remembered how unwilling they had been to follow Cleon when they left Athens. He, observing their murmurs, and not wanting them to be depressed by too long a stay in one place, led his army forward. He went to work in the same confident spirit which had already been successful at Pylos, and of which the success had given him a high opinion of his own wisdom. That any one would come out to fight with him he never even imagined; he said that he was only going to look at the place. If he waited for a larger force, this was not because he thought that there was any risk of his being defeated should he be compelled to fight, but that he might completely surround and storm the city. So he stationed his army upon a steep hill above Amphipolis, whence he surveyed with his own eyes the lake formed by the river Strymon, and the lie of the country on the side towards Thrace. He thought that he could go away without fighting whenever he pleased. For

indeed there was no one to be seen on the walls, nor passing through the gates, which were all closed. He even imagined that he had made a mistake in coming up against the city without siege-engines; had he brought them he would have taken Amphipolis, for there was no one to prevent him.

8. ὁ δὲ Βρασίδας εὐθὺς ὡς εἶδε κινουμένους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καταβὰς καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ Κερδυλίου ἐσέρχεται ἐς τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν. [2] καὶ ἐπέξοδον μὲν καὶ ἀντίταξιν οὐκ ἐποιήσατο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, δεδιὼς τὴν αὐτοῦ παρασκευὴν καὶ νομίζων ὑποδεεστέρους εἶναι, οὐ τῷ πλήθει ⸀ἀντίπαλα γάρ πως ἦν⸁, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀξιώματι ⸀τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ὅπερ ἐστράτευε καθαρὸν ἐξῆλθε καὶ Λημνίων καὶ Ἰμβρίων τὸ κράτιστον ⸁ , τέχνῃ δὲ παρεσκευάζετο ἐπιθησόμενος. [3] εἰ γὰρ δείξειε τοῖς ἐναντίοις τό τε πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ὅπλισιν ἀναγκαίαν οὖσαν τῶν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἡγεῖτο μᾶλλον περιγενέσθαι ἢ ἄνευ προόψεώς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος καταφρονήσεως. [4] ἀπολεξάμενος οὖν αὐτὸς πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν ὁπλίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Κλεαρίδᾳ προστάξας ἐβουλεύετο ἐπιχειρεῖν αἰφνιδίως πρὶν ἀπελθεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οὐκ ἂν νομίζων αὐτοὺς ὁμοίως ἀπολαβεῖν αὖθις μεμονωμένους, εἰ τύχοι ἐλθοῦσα αὐτοῖς ἡ βοήθεια.ξυγκαλέσας δὲ τοὺς πάντας στρατιώτας καὶ βουλόμενος παραθαρσῦναί τε καὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν φράσαι, ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

[8] No sooner did Brasidas see the Athenians in motion, than he himself descended from Cerdylium, and went into Amphipolis. He did not go out and draw up his forces in order of battle; he feared too much the inferiority of his own troops, not in their numbers (which were about equal to those of the enemy) but in quality; for the Athenian forces were the flower of their army, and they were supported by the best of the Lemnians and Imbrians. So he determined to employ a manoeuvre, thinking that, if he showed them the real number and meagre equipment of his soldiers, he would be less likely to succeed than if he came upon them before there had been time to observe him, and when as yet they

had no real grounds for their contempt of him. Selecting a hundred and fifty hoplites, and handing over the rest to Clearidas, he resolved to make a sudden attack before the Athenians retired, considering that, if their reinforcements should arrive, he might never again have an opportunity of fighting them by themselves. So he called together all his troops, and wishing to encourage them, and explain his plan, spoke as follows:

9. ‘ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, ἀπὸ μὲν οἵας χώρας ἥκομεν, ὅτι αἰεὶ διὰ τὸ εὔψυχον ἐλευθέρας, καὶ ὅτι Δωριῆς μέλλετε Ἴωσι μάχεσθαι, ὧν εἰώθατε κρείσσους εἶναι, ἀρκείτω βραχέως δεδηλωμένον: [2] τὴν δὲ ἐπιχείρησιν ᾗ τρόπῳ διανοοῦμαι ποιεῖσθαι, διδάξω, ἵνα μή τῳ τὸ κατ᾽ ὀλίγον καὶ μὴ ἅπαντας κινδυνεύειν ἐνδεὲς φαινόμενον ἀτολμίαν παράσχῃ. [3] τοὺς γὰρ ἐναντίους εἰκάζω καταφρονήσει τε ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐλπίσαντας ὡς ἂν ἐπεξέλθοι τις αὐτοῖς ἐς μάχην ἀναβῆναί τε πρὸς τὸ χωρίον καὶ νῦν ἀτάκτως κατὰ θέαν τετραμμένους ὀλιγωρεῖν. [4] ὅστις δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας ἁμαρτίας τῶν ἐναντίων κάλλιστα ἰδὼν καὶ ἅμα πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖται μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀντιπαραταχθέντος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ξυμφέροντος, πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοῖτο: [5] καὶ τὰ κλέμματα ταῦτα καλλίστην δόξαν ἔχει ἃ τὸν πολέμιον μάλιστ᾽ ἄν τις ἀπατήσας τοὺς φίλους μέγιστ᾽ ἂν ὠφελήσειεν. [6] ἕως οὖν ἔτι ἀπαράσκευοι θαρσοῦσι καὶ τοῦ ὑπαπιέναι πλέον ἢ τοῦ μένοντος, ἐξ ὧν ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἐν τῷ ἀνειμένῳ αὐτῶν τῆς γνώμης καὶ πρὶν ξυνταθῆναι μᾶλλον τὴν δόξαν, ἐγὼ μὲν ἔχων τοὺς μετ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ φθάσας, ἢν δύνωμαι, προσπεσοῦμαι δρόμῳ κατὰ μέσον τὸ στράτευμα: [7] σὺ δέ, Κλεαρίδα, ὕστερον, ὅταν ἐμὲ ὁρᾷς ἤδη προσκείμενον καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς φοβοῦντα αὐτούς, τοὺς μετὰ σεαυτοῦ τούς τ᾽ Ἀμφιπολίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυμμάχους ἄγων αἰφνιδίως τὰς πύλας ἀνοίξας ἐπεκθεῖν καὶ ἐπείγεσθαι ὡς τάχιστα ξυμμεῖξαι. [8] ἐλπὶς γὰρ μάλιστα αὐτοὺς οὕτω φοβηθῆναι: τὸ γὰρ ἐπιὸν ὕστερον δεινότερον τοῖς πολεμίοις τοῦ παρόντος καὶ μαχομένου. [9] καὶ αὐτός τε ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς

γίγνου, ὥσπερ σε εἰκὸς ὄντα Σπαρτιάτην, καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, ἀκολουθήσατε ἀνδρείως, καὶ νομίσατε <τρία> εἶναι τοῦ καλῶς πολεμεῖν τὸ ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ <τὸ> τοῖς ἄρχουσι πείθεσθαι, καὶ τῇδε ὑμῖν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἢ ἀγαθοῖς γενομένοις ἐλευθερίαν τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμάχοις κεκλῆσθαι, ἢ Ἀθηναίων τε δούλοις, ἢν τὰ ἄριστα ἄνευ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ ἢ θανατώσεως πράξητε, καὶ δουλείαν χαλεπωτέραν ἢ πρὶν εἴχετε, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς Ἕλλησι κωλυταῖς γενέσθαι ἐλευθερώσεως. [10] ἀλλὰ μήτε ὑμεῖς μαλακισθῆτε, ὁρῶντες περὶ ὅσων ὁ ἀγών ἐστιν, ἐγώ τε δείξω οὐ παραινέσαι οἷός τε ὢν μᾶλλον τοῖς πέλας ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν.’

[9] ‘Men of Peloponnesus, I need not waste words in telling you that we come from a land which has always been brave, and therefore free, and that you are Dorians, and are about to fight with Ionians whom you have beaten again and again. But I must explain to you my plan of attack; lest you should be disheartened at the seeming disproportion of numbers, because we go into battle not with our whole force but with a handful of men. Our enemies, if I am not mistaken, despise us; they believe that no one will come out against them, and so they have ascended the hill, where they are busy looking about them in disorder, and making but small account of us. Now, he is the most successful general who discerns most clearly such mistakes when made by his enemies, and adapts his attack to the character of his own forces, not always assailing them openly and in regular array, but acting according to the circumstances of the case. And the greatest reputation is gained by those stratagems in which a man deceives his enemies most completely, and does his friends most service. Therefore while they are still confident and unprepared, and, if I read their intentions aright, are thinking of withdrawing rather than of maintaining their ground, while they are off their guard and before they have recovered their presence of mind, I and my men will do our best to anticipate their retreat, and will

make a rush at the centre of the army. Then, Clearidas, when you see me engaged, and I hope striking panic into them, bring up your troops, the Amphipolitans and the other allies, open the gates suddenly, run out, and lose no time in closing with them. This is the way to terrify them; for reinforcements are always more formidable to an enemy than the troops with which he is already engaged. Show yourself a brave man and a true Spartan, and do you, allies, follow manfully, remembering that readiness, obedience, and a sense of honour are the virtues of a soldier. To-day you have to choose between freedom and slavery; between the name of Lacedaemonian allies, which you will deserve if you are brave, and of servants of Athens. For even if you should be so fortunate as to escape bonds or death, servitude will be your lot, a servitude more cruel than hitherto; and what is more, you will be an impediment to the liberation of the other Hellenes. Do not lose heart; think of all that is at stake; and I will show you that I can not only advise others, but fight myself.’

10. ὁ μὲν Βρασίδας τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν τήν τε ἔξοδον παρεσκευάζετο αὐτὸς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μετὰ τοῦ Κλεαρίδα καθίστη ἐπὶ τὰς Θρᾳκίας καλουμένας τῶν πυλῶν, ὅπως ὥσπερ εἴρητο ἐπεξίοιεν. [2] τῷ δὲ Κλέωνι, φανεροῦ γενομένου αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ Κερδυλίου καταβάντος καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιφανεῖ οὔσῃ ἔξωθεν περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς θυομένου καὶ ταῦτα πράσσοντος, ἀγγέλλεται προυκεχωρήκει γὰρ τότε κατὰ τὴν θέαν ὅτι ἥ τε στρατιὰ ἅπασα φανερὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς πύλας ἵππων τε πόδες πολλοὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἐξιόντων ὑποφαίνονται. [3] ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας ἐπῆλθεν: καὶ ὡς εἶδεν, οὐ βουλόμενος μάχῃ διαγωνίσασθαι πρίν οἱ καὶ τοὺς βοηθοὺς ἥκειν καὶ οἰόμενος φθήσεσθαι ἀπελθών, σημαίνειν τε ἅμα ἐκέλευεν ἀναχώρησιν καὶ παρήγγειλε τοῖς ἀπιοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας, ὥσπερ μόνον οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν, ὑπάγειν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἠιόνος. [4] ὡς δ᾽ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει σχολὴ γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὰ γυμνὰ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους

δοὺς ἀπῆγε τὴν στρατιάν. [5] κἀν τούτῳ Βρασίδας ὡς ὁρᾷ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων κινούμενον, λέγει τοῖς μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅτι ‘οἱ ἄνδρες ἡμᾶς οὐ μενοῦσιν. δῆλοι δὲ τῶν τε δοράτων τῇ κινήσει καὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν: οἷς γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο γίγνηται, οὐκ εἰώθασι μένειν τοὺς ἐπιόντας. ἀλλὰ τάς τε πύλας τις ἀνοιγέτω ἐμοὶ ἃς εἴρηται, καὶ ἐπεξίωμεν ὡς τάχιστα θαρσοῦντες.’ [6] καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἐπὶ τὸ σταύρωμα πύλας καὶ τὰς πρώτας τοῦ μακροῦ τείχους τότε ὄντος ἐξελθὼν ἔθει δρόμῳ τὴν ὁδὸν ταύτην εὐθεῖαν, ᾗπερ νῦν κατὰ τὸ καρτερώτατον τοῦ χωρίου ἰόντι τροπαῖον ἔστηκε, καὶ προσβαλὼν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις πεφοβημένοις τε ἅμα τῇ σφετέρᾳ ἀταξίᾳ καὶ τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ ἐκπεπληγμένοις κατὰ μέσον τὸ στράτευμα τρέπει. [7] καὶ ὁ Κλεαρίδας, ὥσπερ εἴρητο, ἅμα κατὰ τὰς Θρᾳκίας πύλας ἐπεξελθὼν τῷ στρατῷ ἐπεφέρετο. ξυνέβη τε τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ καὶ ἐξαπίνης ἀμφοτέρωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους θορυβηθῆναι, [8] καὶ τὸ μὲν εὐώνυμον κέρας αὐτῶν τὸ πρὸς τὴν Ἠιόνα, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ προυκεχωρήκει, εὐθὺς ἀπορραγὲν ἔφευγεν: καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας ὑποχωροῦντος ἤδη αὐτοῦ ἐπιπαριὼν τῷ δεξιῷ τιτρώσκεται, καὶ πεσόντα αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ αἰσθάνονται, οἱ δὲ πλησίον ἄραντες ἀπήνεγκαν. [9] τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔμενέ [τε] μᾶλλον, καὶ ὁ μὲν Κλέων, ὡς τὸ πρῶτον οὐ διενοεῖτο μένειν, εὐθὺς φεύγων καὶ καταληφθεὶς ὑπὸ Μυρκινίου πελταστοῦ ἀποθνῄσκει, οἱ δὲ αὐτοῦ ξυστραφέντες ὁπλῖται ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον τόν τε Κλεαρίδαν ἠμύνοντο καὶ δὶς ἢ τρὶς προσβαλόντα, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν πρὶν ἥ τε Μυρκινία καὶ ἡ Χαλκιδικὴ ἵππος καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ περιστάντες καὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες αὐτοὺς ἔτρεψαν. [10] οὕτω δὴ τὸ στράτευμα πᾶν ἤδη τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυγὸν χαλεπῶς καὶ πολλὰς ὁδοὺς τραπόμενοι κατὰ ὄρη, ὅσοι μὴ διεφθάρησαν ἢ αὐτίκα ἐν χερσὶν ἢ ὑπὸ τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς ἵππου καὶ τῶν πελταστῶν, οἱ λοιποὶ ἀπεκομίσθησαν ἐς τὴν Ἠιόνα. [11] οἱ δὲ τὸν Βρασίδαν ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς μάχης καὶ διασώσαντες ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἔτι ἔμπνουν ἐσεκόμισαν: καὶ ᾔσθετο μὲν ὅτι νικῶσιν οἱ μεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ, οὐ πολὺ δὲ διαλιπὼν ἐτελεύτησεν. [12] καὶ ἡ ἄλλη

στρατιὰ ἀναχωρήσασα μετὰ τοῦ Κλεαρίδου ἐκ τῆς διώξεως νεκρούς τε ἐσκύλευσε καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησεν.

[10] When Brasidas had thus spoken, he prepared to sally forth with his own division, and stationed the rest of his army with Clearidas at the so-called Thracian gate, that they might come out and support him, in accordance with his instructions. He had been seen descending from Cerdylium into Amphipolis, and then offering up sacrifice at the temple of Athenè within the walls; for the interior of the city was visible from the surrounding country. While he was thus employed, a report was brought to Cleon, who had just gone forward to reconnoitre, that the whole army of the enemy could plainly be seen collected inside the town, and that the feet of numerous men and horses ready to come forth were visible under the gate. He went to the spot and saw for himself; but, not wishing to hazard a regular engagement until his allies arrived, and thinking he could get away soon enough, he gave a general signal for retreat, at the same time ordering his forces to retire slowly on the left wing, which was the only direction possible, towards Eion. They appeared to linger; whereupon he caused his own right wing to face round, and so with his unshielded side exposed to the enemy began to lead off his army. Meanwhile Brasidas, seeing that the Athenians were on the move and that his opportunity was come, said to his companions and to the troops: ‘These men do not mean to face us; see how their spears and their heads are shaking; such behaviour always shows that an army is going to run away. Open me the gates there as I ordered, and let us boldly attack them at once.’ Thereupon he went out himself by the gate leading to the palisade and by the first gate of the long wall which was then standing, and ran at full speed straight up the road, where, on the steepest part of the hill, a trophy now stands: he then attacked the centre of the Athenians, who were terrified at his audacity and their own disorder, and put them to flight. Then Clearidas, as he was bidden, sallied

forth by the Thracian gate with his division, and charged the Athenians. The sudden attack at both points created a panic among them. Their left wing, which had proceeded some little way along the road towards Eion, broke off and instantly fled. They were already in full retreat, and Brasidas was going on to the right wing when he was wounded; the Athenians did not observe his fall, and those about him carried him off the field. The right wing of the Athenians was more disposed to stand. Cleon indeed, who had never intended to remain, fled at once, and was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer. But his soldiers rallied where they were on the top of the hill, and repulsed Clearidas two or three times. They did not yield until the Chalcidian and Myrcinian cavalry and the targeteers hemmed them in and put them to flight with a shower of darts. And so the rout became general, and those of the Athenians who were not slain at once in close combat or destroyed by the Chalcidian horse and the targeteers, hard-pressed and wandering by many paths over the hills, made their way back to Eion. Brasidas was carried safely by his followers out of the battle into the city. He was still alive, and knew that his army had conquered, but soon afterwards he died. The rest of the army, returning with Clearidas from the pursuit, spoiled the dead, and erected a trophy.

11. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸν Βρασίδαν οἱ ξύμμαχοι πάντες ξὺν ὅπλοις ἐπισπόμενοι δημοσίᾳ ἔθαψαν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὔσης: καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπολῖται, περιείρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον, ὡς ἥρωί τε ἐντέμνουσι καὶ τιμὰς δεδώκασιν ἀγῶνας καὶ ἐτησίους θυσίας, καὶ τὴν ἀποικίαν ὡς οἰκιστῇ προσέθεσαν, καταβαλόντες τὰ Ἀγνώνεια οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἀφανίσαντες εἴ τι μνημόσυνόν που ἔμελλεν αὐτοῦ τῆς οἰκίσεως περιέσεσθαι, νομίσαντες τὸν μὲν Βρασίδαν σωτῆρά τε σφῶν γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἅμα τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμαχίαν φόβῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων θεραπεύοντες, τὸν δὲ Ἄγνωνα κατὰ τὸ πολέμιον τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως σφίσι ξυμφόρως οὐδ᾽ ἂν

ἡδέως τὰς τιμὰς ἔχειν. [2] καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀπέδοσαν. ἀπέθανον δὲ Ἀθηναίων μὲν περὶ ἑξακοσίους, τῶν δ᾽ ἐναντίων ἑπτά, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐκ παρατάξεως, ἀπὸ δὲ τοιαύτης ξυντυχίας καὶ προεκφοβήσεως τὴν μάχην μᾶλλον γενέσθαι. [3] μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀναίρεσιν οἱ μὲν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀπέπλευσαν, οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Κλεαρίδου τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν καθίσταντο.

[11] Brasidas was buried in the city with public honours in front of what is now the Agora. The whole body of the allies in military array followed him to the grave. The Amphipolitans enclosed his sepulchre, and to this day they sacrifice to him as to a hero, and have also instituted games and yearly offerings in his honour. They likewise made him their founder, and dedicated their colony to him, pulling down the buildings which Hagnon had erected, and obliterating any memorials which might have remained to future time of his foundation. For they considered Brasidas to have been their deliverer, and under the present circumstances the fear of Athens induced them to pay court to their Lacedaemonian allies. That Hagnon should retain the honours of a founder, now that they were enemies of the Athenians, seemed to them no longer in accordance with their interests, and likely to be displeasing to him.They gave back to the Athenians their dead, who numbered about six hundred, while only seven were slain on the other side. For there was no regular engagement, but an unforeseen circumstance led to the battle; and the Athenians were panic-stricken before it had well begun. After the recovery of the dead the Athenians went home by sea. Clearidas and his companions remained and administered the affairs of Amphipolis.

12. καὶ ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος Ῥαμφίας καὶ Αὐτοχαρίδας καὶ Ἐπικυδίδας Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία βοήθειαν ἦγον ἐνακοσίων ὁπλιτῶν, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχῖνι καθίσταντο ὅτι αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν. [2]

ἐνδιατριβόντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἔτυχεν ἡ μάχη αὕτη γενομένη, καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[12] At the end of the summer, a little before this time, a reinforcement of nine hundred heavy-armed, under the command of the Lacedaemonian generals Rhamphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, set out for Chalcidicè. Coming first to Heraclea in Trachis, they regulated whatever appeared to them to be amiss. They were staying there when the battle of Amphipolis occurred. And so the summer came to an end.

13. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς μέχρι μὲν Πιερίου τῆς Θεσσαλίας διῆλθον οἱ περὶ τὸν Ῥαμφίαν, κωλυόντων δὲ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν καὶ ἅμα Βρασίδου τεθνεῶτος, ᾧπερ ἦγον τὴν στρατιάν, ἀπετράποντο ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, νομίσαντες οὐδένα καιρὸν ἔτι εἶναι τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων ἥσσῃ ἀπεληλυθότων καὶ οὐκ ἀξιόχρεων αὐτῶν ὄντων δρᾶν τι ὧν κἀκεῖνος ἐπενόει. [2] μάλιστα δὲ ἀπῆλθον εἰδότες τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ὅτε ἐξῇσαν, πρὸς τὴν εἰρήνην μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην ἔχοντας.

[13] The following winter Rhamphias and his army went as far as Pierium in Thessaly, but as the Thessalians would not let them proceed, and Brasidas, for whom these reinforcements were intended, was dead, they returned home, thinking that the time for action had gone by. They felt that they were not competent to carry out the great designs of Brasidas, and the Athenians had now left the country defeated. But their chief reason for not proceeding was that the Lacedaemonians, at the time when they left Sparta, were inclined towards peace.

14. ξυνέβη τε εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει μάχην καὶ τὴν Ῥαμφίου ἀναχώρησιν ἐκ Θεσσαλίας ὥστε πολέμου μὲν μηδὲν ἔτι ἅψασθαι μηδετέρους, πρὸς δὲ τὴν εἰρήνην μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι πληγέντες ἐπί τε τῷ Δηλίῳ καὶ δι᾽ ὀλίγου αὖθις ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει, καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς ῥώμης πιστὴν ἔτι, ᾗπερ οὐ προσεδέχοντο πρότερον τὰς σπονδάς, δοκοῦντες τῇ παρούσῃ εὐτυχίᾳ

καθυπέρτεροι γενήσεσθαι: [2] καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἅμα ἐδέδισαν σφῶν μὴ διὰ τὰ σφάλματα ἐπαιρόμενοι ἐπὶ πλέον ἀποστῶσι, μετεμέλοντό τε ὅτι μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πύλῳ καλῶς παρασχὸν οὐ ξυνέβησαν: [3] οἱ δ᾽ αὖ Λακεδαιμόνιοι παρὰ γνώμην μὲν ἀποβαίνοντος σφίσι τοῦ πολέμου, ἐν ᾧ ᾤοντο ὀλίγων ἐτῶν καθαιρήσειν τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν, εἰ τὴν γῆν τέμνοιεν, περιπεσόντες δὲ τῇ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορᾷ, οἵα οὔπω ἐγεγένητο τῇ Σπάρτῃ, καὶ λῃστευομένης τῆς χώρας ἐκ τῆς Πύλου καὶ Κυθήρων, αὐτομολούντων τε τῶν Εἱλώτων καὶ αἰεὶ προσδοκίας οὔσης μή τι καὶ οἱ ὑπομένοντες τοῖς ἔξω πίσυνοι πρὸς τὰ παρόντα σφίσιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον νεωτερίσωσιν. [4] ξυνέβαινε δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους αὐτοῖς τὰς τριακοντούτεις σπονδὰς ἐπ᾽ ἐξόδῳ εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλας οὐκ ἤθελον σπένδεσθαι οἱ Ἀργεῖοι εἰ μή τις αὐτοῖς τὴν Κυνουρίαν γῆν ἀποδώσει, ὥστ᾽ ἀδύνατα εἶναι ἐφαίνετο Ἀργείοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἅμα πολεμεῖν. τῶν τε ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεων ὑπώπτευόν τινας ἀποστήσεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους: ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο.

[14] After the battle of Amphipolis and the return of Rhamphias from Thessaly, neither side undertook any military operations. Both alike were inclined to peace. The Athenians had been beaten at Delium, and shortly afterwards at Amphipolis; and so they had lost that confidence in their own strength which had indisposed them to treat at a time when temporary success seemed to make their final triumph certain. They were afraid too that their allies would be elated at their disasters, and that more of them would revolt; they repented that after the affair at Pylos, when they might honourably have done so, they had not come to terms. The Lacedaemonians on the other hand inclined to peace because the course of the war had disappointed their expectations. There was a time when they fancied that, if they only devastated Attica, they would crush the power of Athens within a few years; and yet they had received a blow at Sphacteria such as Sparta had never experienced until then; their country was continually

ravaged from Pylos and Cythera; the Helots were deserting, and they were always fearing lest those who had not deserted, relying on the help of those who had, should seize their opportunity and revolt, as they had done once before. Moreover, the truce for thirty years which they had made with Argos was on the point of expiring; the Argives were unwilling to renew it unless Cynuria were restored to them, and the Lacedaemonians deemed it impossible to fight against the Argives and Athenians combined. They suspected also that some of the Peloponnesian cities would secede and join the Argives, which proved to be the case.

15. ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἀμφοτέροις αὐτοῖς λογιζομένοις ἐδόκει ποιητέα εἶναι ἡ ξύμβασις, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς νήσου κομίσασθαι: ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται αὐτῶν πρῶτοί τε καὶ † ὁμοίως † σφίσι ξυγγενεῖς. [2] ἤρξαντο μὲν οὖν καὶ εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἅλωσιν αὐτῶν πράσσειν, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὔπως ἤθελον, εὖ φερόμενοι, ἐπὶ τῇ ἴσῃ καταλύεσθαι. σφαλέντων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῷ Δηλίῳ παραχρῆμα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, γνόντες νῦν μᾶλλον ἂν ἐνδεξαμένους, ποιοῦνται τὴν ἐνιαύσιον ἐκεχειρίαν, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει ξυνιόντας καὶ περὶ τοῦ πλέονος χρόνου βουλεύεσθαι.

[15] Upon these grounds both governments thought it desirable to make peace. The Lacedaemonians were the more eager of the two, because they wanted to recover the prisoners taken at Sphacteria; for the Spartans among them were of high rank, and all alike related to themselves. They had negotiated for their recovery immediately after they were taken, but the Athenians, in the hour of their prosperity, would not as yet agree to fair terms. After their defeat at Delium, the Lacedaemonians were well aware that they would now be more compliant, and therefore they had at once made a truce for a year, during which the envoys of the two states were to meet and advise about a lasting peace.

16. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει ἦσσα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐγεγένητο καὶ ἐτεθνήκει Κλέων τε καὶ Βρασίδας, οἵπερ ἀμφοτέρωθεν μάλιστα ἠναντιοῦντο τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ὁ μὲν διὰ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν τε καὶ τιμᾶσθαι ἐκ τοῦ πολεμεῖν, ὁ δὲ γενομένης ἡσυχίας καταφανέστερος νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων, τότε δὴ ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ πόλει σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν Πλειστοάναξ τε ὁ Παυσανίου βασιλεὺς Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου, πλεῖστα τῶν τότε εὖ φερόμενος ἐν στρατηγίαις, πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον προυθυμοῦντο, Νικίας μὲν βουλόμενος, ἐν ᾧ ἀπαθὴς ἦν καὶ ἠξιοῦτο, διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐτυχίαν, καὶ ἔς τε τὸ αὐτίκα πόνων πεπαῦσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ τοὺς πολίτας παῦσαι καὶ τῷ μέλλοντι χρόνῳ καταλιπεῖν ὄνομα ὡς οὐδὲν σφήλας τὴν πόλιν διεγένετο, νομίζων ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου τοῦτο ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ὅστις ἐλάχιστα τύχῃ αὐτὸν παραδίδωσι, τὸ δὲ ἀκίνδυνον τὴν εἰρήνην παρέχειν, Πλειστοάναξ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν διαβαλλόμενος περὶ τῆς καθόδου, καὶ ἐς ἐνθυμίαν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰεὶ προβαλλόμενος ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ὁπότε τι πταίσειαν, ὡς διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου κάθοδον παρανομηθεῖσαν ταῦτα ξυμβαίνοι. [2] τὴν γὰρ πρόμαντιν τὴν ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπῃτιῶντο αὐτὸν πεῖσαι μετ᾽ Ἀριστοκλέους τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ὥστε χρῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπὶ πολὺ τάδε θεωροῖς ἀφικνουμένοις, Διὸς υἱοῦ ἡμιθέου τὸ σπέρμα ἐκ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀναφέρειν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀργυρέᾳ εὐλάκᾳ εὐλαξεῖν: [3] χρόνῳ δὲ προτρέψαι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους φεύγοντα αὐτὸν ἐς Λύκαιον διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ποτὲ μετὰ δώρων δοκήσεως ἀναχώρησιν, καὶ ἥμισυ τῆς οἰκίας τοῦ ἱεροῦ τότε τοῦ Διὸς οἰκοῦντα φόβῳ τῷ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἔτει ἑνὸς δέοντι εἰκοστῷ τοῖς ὁμοίοις χοροῖς καὶ θυσίαις καταγαγεῖν ὥσπερ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαίμονα κτίζοντες τοὺς βασιλέας καθίσταντο.

[16] When Athens had received a second blow at Amphipolis, and Brasidas and Cleon, who had been the two greatest enemies of peace, the one because the war brought him success and reputation, and the other because he fancied that in quiet times his rogueries would be more transparent

and his slanders less credible, had fallen in the battle, the two chief aspirants for political power end to the war at Athens and Sparta, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias the son of Niceratus the Athenian, who had been the most fortunate general of his day, became more eager than ever to make an end of the war. Nicias desired, whilst he was still successful and held in repute, to preserve his good fortune; he would have liked to rest from toil, and to give the people rest; and he hoped to leave behind him to other ages the name of a man who in all his life had never brought disaster on the city. He thought that the way to gain his wish was to trust as little as possible to fortune, and to keep out of danger; and that danger would be best avoided by peace. Pleistoanax wanted peace, because his enemies were always stirring up the scruples of the Lacedaemonians against him, and insisting whenever misfortunes came that they were to be attributed to his illegal return from exile. For they accused him and Aristocles his brother of having induced the priestess at Delphi, whenever Lacedaemonian envoys came to enquire of the oracle, constantly to repeat the same answer: ‘Bring back the seed of the hero son of Zeus from a strange country to your own; else you will plough with a silver ploughshare’: until, after a banishment of nineteen years, he persuaded the Lacedaemonians to bring him home again with dances and sacrifices and such ceremonies as they observed when they first enthroned their kings at the foundation of Lacedaemon. He had been banished on account of his retreat from Attica, when he was supposed to have been bribed. While in exile at Mount Lycaeum he had occupied a house half within the sacred precinct of Zeus, through fear of the Lacedaemonians.

17. ἀχθόμενος οὖν τῇ διαβολῇ ταύτῃ καὶ νομίζων ἐν εἰρήνῃ μὲν οὐδενὸς σφάλματος γιγνομένου καὶ ἅμα τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιζομένων κἂν αὐτὸς τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀνεπίληπτος εἶναι, πολέμου δὲ καθεστῶτος αἰεὶ

ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοὺς προύχοντας ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμφορῶν διαβάλλεσθαι, προυθυμήθη τὴν ξύμβασιν. [2] καὶ τόν τε χειμῶνα τοῦτον ᾖσαν ἐς λόγους καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἔαρ ἤδη παρασκευή τε προεπανεσείσθη ἀπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων περιαγγελλομένη κατὰ πόλεις ὡς <ἐς > ἐπιτειχισμόν, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἐσακούοιεν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῶν ξυνόδων ἅμα πολλὰς δικαιώσεις προενεγκόντων ἀλλήλοις ξυνεχωρεῖτο ὥστε ἃ ἑκάτεροι πολέμῳ ἔσχον ἀποδόντας τὴν εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι, Νίσαιαν δ᾽ ἔχειν Ἀθηναίους ⌈ἀνταπαιτούντων γὰρ Πλάταιαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἔφασαν οὐ βίᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμολογίᾳ αὐτῶν προσχωρησάντων καὶ οὐ προδόντων ἔχειν τὸ χωρίον, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ τὴν Νίσαιαν⌉, τότε δὴ παρακαλέσαντες τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ξυμμάχους οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ ψηφισαμένων πλὴν Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων καὶ Ἠλείων καὶ Μεγαρέων τῶν ἄλλων ὥστε καταλύεσθαι ⌈τούτοις δὲ οὐκ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρασσόμενα⌉, ποιοῦνται τὴν ξύμβασιν καὶ ἐσπείσαντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ὤμοσαν, ἐκεῖνοί τε πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, τάδε.

[17] He was vexed by these accusations, and thinking that in peace, when there would be no mishaps, and when the Lacedaemonians would have recovered the captives, he would himself be less open to attack, whereas in war leading men must always have the misfortunes of the state laid at their door, he was very anxious to come to terms. Negotiations were commenced during the winter. Towards spring the Lacedaemonians sounded a note of preparation by announcing to the allies that their services would be required in the erection of a fort; they thought that the Athenians would thereby be induced to listen to them. At the same time, after many conferences and many demands urged on both sides, an understanding was at last arrived at that both parties should give up what they had gained by arms. The Athenians, however, were to retain Nisaea, for when they demanded the restoration of Plataea the Thebans protested that they had obtained possession of the place not

by force or treachery, but by agreement; to which the Athenians rejoined that they had obtained Nisaea in the same manner. The Lacedaemonians then summoned their allies; and although the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians were dissatisfied, the majority voted for peace. And so the peace was finally concluded and ratified by oaths and libations, the Lacedaemonians binding themselves to the Athenians and the Athenians to the Lacedaemonians in the following terms:

18. ‘σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι κατὰ τάδε, καὶ ὤμοσαν κατὰ πόλεις. [2] περὶμὲν τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν κοινῶν, θύειν καὶ ἰέναι καὶ μαντεύεσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀδεῶς. τὸ δ᾽ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν νεὼν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Δελφοὺς αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αὐτοδίκους καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἑαυτῶν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. [3] ἔτη δὲ εἶναι τὰς σπονδὰς πεντήκοντα Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀδόλους καὶ ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [4] ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῇ μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μήτε Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, μήτε τέχνῃ μήτε μηχανῇ μηδεμιᾷ. ἢν δέ τι διάφορον ᾖ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, δικαίῳ χρήσθων καὶ ὅρκοις, καθ᾽ ὅτι ἂν ξυνθῶνται. [5] ἀποδόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀμφίπολιν. ὅσας δὲ πόλεις παρέδοσαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίοις, ἐξέστω ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούλωνται αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔχοντας: τὰς δὲ πόλεις φερούσας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ᾽ Ἀριστείδου αὐτονόμους εἶναι. ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν Ἀθηναίους μηδὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἀποδιδόντων τὸν φόρον, ἐπειδὴ αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο. εἰσὶ δὲ Ἄργιλος, Στάγιρος, Ἄκανθος, Σκῶλος, Ὄλυνθος, Σπάρτωλος. ξυμμάχους δ᾽ εἶναι μηδετέρων, μήτε Λακεδαιμονίων μήτε Ἀθηναίων: ἢν δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πείθωσι τὰς πόλεις, βουλομένας

ταύτας ἐξέστω ξυμμάχους ποιεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις. [6] Μηκυβερναίους δὲ καὶ Σαναίους καὶ Σιγγαίους οἰκεῖν τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἑαυτῶν, καθάπερ Ὀλύνθιοι καὶ Ἀκάνθιοι. [7] ἀποδόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι Πάνακτον. ἀποδόντων δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι Λακεδαιμονίοις Κορυφάσιον καὶ Κύθηρα καὶ Μέθανα καὶ Πτελεὸν καὶ Ἀταλάντην καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ὅσοι εἰσὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων ἢ ἄλλοθί που ὅσης Ἀθηναῖοι ἄρχουσιν ἐν δημοσίῳ: καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σκιώνῃ πολιορκουμένους Πελοποννησίων ἀφεῖναι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσοι Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοι ἐν Σκιώνῃ εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσους Βρασίδας ἐσέπεμψε καὶ εἴ τις τῶν ξυμμάχων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἧς Ἀθηναῖοι ἄρχουσιν ἐν δημοσίῳ. ἀποδόντων δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι οὕστινας ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων κατὰ ταὐτά. [8] Σκιωναίων δὲ καὶ Τορωναίων καὶ Σερμυλιῶν καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλην πόλιν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, Ἀθηναίους βουλεύεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ὅτι ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς. [9] ὅρκους δὲ ποιήσασθαι Ἀθηναίους πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κατὰ πόλεις. ὀμνύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὅρκον ἑκάτεροι τὸν μέγιστον ἑπτὰ καὶ δέκα ἑκάστης πόλεως. ὁ δ᾽ ὅρκος ἔστω ὅδε: “ἐμμενῶ ταῖς ξυνθήκαις καὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖσδε δικαίως καὶ ἀδόλως.” ἔστω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὅρκος πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, [10] τὸν δὲ ὅρκον ἀνανεοῦσθαι κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀμφοτέρους. στήλας δὲ στῆσαι Ὀλυμπίασι καὶ Πυθοῖ καὶ Ἰσθμοῖ καὶ Ἀθήνησιν ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἐν Ἀμυκλαίῳ. [11] εἰ δέ τι ἀμνημονοῦσιν ὁποτεροιοῦν καὶ ὅτου πέρι, λόγοις δικαίοις χρωμένοις εὔορκον εἶναι ἀμφοτέροις ταύτῃ μεταθεῖναι ὅπῃ ἂν δοκῇ ἀμφοτέροις, Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις.

[18] ‘The Athenians and Lacedaemonians and their respective allies make peace upon the following terms, to which they swear, each city separately:’I. Touching the common temples, any one who pleases may go and sacrifice in them and enquire at them, on behalf either of himself or

of the state, according to the custom of his country, both by land and sea, without fear.II. The precinct and the temple of Apollo at Delphi and the Delphian people shall be independent, and shall retain their own revenues and their own courts of justice, both for themselves and for their territory, according to their ancestral customs.’III. The peace between the Athenians and their confederates and the Lacedaemonians and their confederates shall endure fifty years, both by sea and land, without fraud or hurt.’IV. They shall not be allowed to bear arms to the hurt of one another in any way or manner; neither the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies, nor the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedaemonians and their allies; and they shall determine any controversy which may arise between them by oaths and other legal means in such sort as they shall agree.’V. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians.’VI. The inhabitants of any cities which the Lacedaemonians deliver over to the Athenians may depart whithersoever they please, and take their property with them. The said cities shall be independent, but shall pay the tribute which was fixed in the time of Aristides. After the conclusion of the treaty the Athenians and their allies shall not be allowed to make war upon them to their hurt, so long as they pay the tribute. The cities are these — Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus: these shall be allies neither of the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians, but if the Athenians succeed in persuading them, having their consent, they may make them allies.’VII. The Mecybernaeans, Sanaeans, and Singaeans shall dwell in their own cities on the same terms as the Olynthians and Acanthians.’VII. The Lacedaemonians and the allies shall restore Panaetum to the Athenians. The Athenians shall restore to the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methonè, Pteleum, and Atalantè.IX. The Athenians shall surrender the Lacedaemonian captives whom they have in

their public prison, or who are in the public prison of any place within the Athenian dominions, and they shall let go the Peloponnesians who are besieged in Scionè, and any other allies of the Lacedaemonians who are in Scionè, and all whom Brasidas introduced into the place, and any of the allies of the Lacedaemonians who are in the public prison at Athens, or in the public prison of any place within the Athenian dominions. The Lacedaemonians and their allies in like manner shall restore those of the Athenians and their allies who are their prisoners.’X. Respecting Scionè, Toronè, and Sermylè, or any cities which are held by the Athenians, the Athenians shall do with the inhabitants of the said cities, or of any cities which are held by them, as they think fit.’XI. The Athenians shall bind themselves by oath to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, city by city, and the oath shall be that which in the several cities of the two contracting parties is deemed the most binding. The oath shall be in the following form:— ‘I will abide by this treaty and by this peace truly and sincerely.’ The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall bind themselves by a similar oath to the Athenians. This oath shall be renewed by both parties every year; and they shall erect pillars at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, at Athens in the Acropolis, at Lacedaemon in the temple of Apollo at Amyclae.’XII. If anything whatsoever be forgotten on one side or the other, either party may, without violation of their oaths, take honest counsel and alter the treaty in such manner as shall seem good to the two parties, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.’

19. ‘ἄρχει δὲ τῶν σπονδῶν <ἐν μὲν Λακεδαίμονι> ἔφορος Πλειστόλας Ἀρτεμισίου μηνὸς τετάρτῃ φθίνοντος, ἐν δὲ Ἀθήναις ἄρχων Ἀλκαῖος Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος μηνὸς ἕκτῃ φθίνοντος. ὤμνυον δὲ οἵδε καὶ ἐσπένδοντο. [2] Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν <Πλειστοάναξ, Ἄγις,> Πλειστόλας, Δαμάγητος, Χίονις, Μεταγένης, Ἄκανθος, Δάιθος, Ἰσχαγόρας, Φιλοχαρίδας, Ζευξίδας, Ἄντιππος, Τέλλις, Ἀλκινάδας, Ἐμπεδίας, Μηνᾶς,

Λάφιλος. Ἀθηναίων δὲ οἵδε. Λάμπων, Ἰσθμιόνικος, Νικίας, Λάχης, Εὐθύδημος, Προκλῆς, Πυθόδωρος, Ἄγνων, Μυρτίλος, Θρασυκλῆς, Θεαγένης, Ἀριστοκράτης, Ἰώλκιος, Τιμοκράτης, Λέων, Λάμαχος, Δημοσθένης.’

[19] The treaty begins, at Lacedaemon in the Ephorate of Pleistolas, and on the twenty-seventh day of the month Artemisium, and at Athens in the Archonship of Alcaeus, on the twenty-fifth day of the month Elaphebolion. The following persons took the oaths and ratified the treaty: — On behalf of the Lacedaemonians, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daïthus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus; on behalf of the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.

20. αὗται αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος ἅμα ἦρι, ἐκ Διονυσίων εὐθὺς τῶν ἀστικῶν, αὐτόδεκα ἐτῶν διελθόντων καὶ ἡμερῶν ὀλίγων παρενεγκουσῶν ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἡ ἐσβολὴ ἡ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦδε ἐγένετο. [2] σκοπείτω δέ τις κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους καὶ μὴ τῶν ἐκασταχοῦ ἢ ἀρχόντων ἢ ἀπὸ τιμῆς τινὸς ἐς τὰ προγεγενημένα σημαινόντων τὴν ἀπαρίθμησιν τῶν ὀνομάτων πιστεύσας μᾶλλον. οὐ γὰρ ἀκριβές ἐστιν, οἷς καὶ ἀρχομένοις καὶ μεσοῦσι καὶ ὅπως ἔτυχέ τῳ ἐπεγένετό τι. [3] κατὰ θέρη δὲ καὶ χειμῶνας ἀριθμῶν, ὥσπερ γέγραπται, εὑρήσει, ἐξ ἡμισείας ἑκατέρου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχοντος, δέκα μὲν θέρη, ἴσους δὲ χειμῶνας τῷ πρώτῳ πολέμῳ τῷδε γεγενημένους.

[20] This treaty was concluded at the end of winter, just at the beginning of spring, immediately after the city Dionysia. Ten years, with a difference of a few days, had passed since the invasion of Attica and the commencement of the war. I would have a person reckon the actual periods of time, and not rely upon catalogues of the archons or other official

personages whose names may be used in different cities to mark the dates of past events. For whether an event occurred in the beginning, or in the middle, or whatever might be the exact point, of a magistrate’s term of office is left uncertain by such a mode of reckoning. But if he measure by summers and winters as they are here set down, and count each summer and winter as a half year, he will find that ten summers and ten winters passed in the first part of the war.

21. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δέ ἔλαχον γὰρ πρότεροι ἀποδιδόναι ἃ εἶχον τούς τε ἄνδρας εὐθὺς τοὺς παρὰ σφίσιν αἰχμαλώτους ἀφίεσαν καὶ πέμψαντες ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης πρέσβεις Ἰσχαγόραν καὶ Μηνᾶν καὶ Φιλοχαρίδαν ἐκέλευον τὸν Κλεαρίδαν τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν παραδιδόναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τὰς σπονδάς, ὡς εἴρητο ἑκάστοις, δέχεσθαι. [2] οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ ἤθελον, νομίζοντες οὐκ ἐπιτηδείας εἶναι: οὐδὲ ὁ Κλεαρίδας παρέδωκε τὴν πόλιν, χαριζόμενος τοῖς Χαλκιδεῦσι, λέγων ὡς οὐ δυνατὸς εἴη βίᾳ ἐκείνων παραδιδόναι. [3] ἐλθὼν δὲ αὐτὸς κατὰ τάχος μετὰ πρέσβεων αὐτόθεν ἀπολογησόμενός τε ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα, ἢν κατηγορῶσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἰσχαγόραν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπείθετο, καὶ ἅμα βουλόμενος εἰδέναι εἰ ἔτι μετακινητὴ εἴη ἡ ὁμολογία, ἐπειδὴ ηὗρε κατειλημμένους, αὐτὸς μὲν πάλιν πεμπόντων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ κελευόντων μάλιστα μὲν καὶ τὸ χωρίον παραδοῦναι, εἰ δὲ μή, ὁπόσοι Πελοποννησίων ἔνεισιν ἐξαγαγεῖν, κατὰ τάχος ἐπορεύετο.

[21] The Lacedaemonians — for the lot having fallen upon them they had to make restitution first — immediately released their prisoners, and sending three envoys, Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas, to Chalcidicè, commanded Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and the other cities to accept the articles of the treaty which severally concerned them. But they did not approve of the terms, and refused. Clearidas, who acted in the interest of the Chalcidians, would not give up the place, and said that it was not in his power to do so against their

will. Accompanied by envoys from the Chalcidian cities, he himself went direct to Lacedaemon, intending to defend himself in case Ischagoras and his colleagues should accuse him of insubordination; he also wanted to know whether the treaty could still be reconsidered. On his arrival he found that it was positively concluded, and he himself was sent back to Thrace by the Lacedaemonians, who commanded him to give up Amphipolis, or, if he could not, at any rate to withdraw all the Peloponnesian forces from the place. So he returned in haste.

22. οἱ δὲ ξύμμαχοι ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι αὐτοὶ ἔτυχον ὄντες, καὶ αὐτῶν τοὺς μὴ δεξαμένους τὰς σπονδὰς ἐκέλευον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖσθαι. οἱ δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ προφάσει ᾗπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπεώσαντο οὐκ ἔφασαν δέξεσθαι, ἢν μή τινας δικαιοτέρας τούτων ποιῶνται. [2] ὡς δ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐσήκουον, ἐκείνους μὲν ἀπέπεμψαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιοῦντο, νομίζοντες ἥκιστα ἂν σφίσι τούς τε Ἀργείους, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἤθελον Ἀμπελίδου καὶ Λίχου ἐλθόντων ἐπισπένδεσθαι νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων οὐ δεινοὺς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἡσυχάζειν: πρὸς γὰρ ἂν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, εἰ ἐξῆν, χωρεῖν. [3] παρόντων οὖν πρέσβεων ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ γενομένων λόγων ξυνέβησαν, καὶ ἐγένοντο ὅρκοι καὶ ξυμμαχία ἥδε.

[22] The representatives of the other allies were present at Lacedaemon, and the Lacedaemonians urged the reluctant states to accept the treaty. But they refused for the same reasons as before, and insisted that they must have more equitable conditions. Finding that they would not come in, the Lacedaemonians dismissed them, and proceeded on their own account to make an alliance with the Athenians. They thought that the Argives, whose hostile intentions had been manifested by their refusal to renew the peace at the request of Ampelidas and Lichas, the Lacedaemonian envoys who had gone thither, being now unsupported by the Athenians, would thus be least dangerous and that the rest of Peloponnesus would be least likely to stir. For the

Athenian alliance, to which they would otherwise have had recourse, would now be closed to them. There were present at the time Athenian envoys, and after a negotiation the two parties took oaths, and made an alliance, of which the terms were as follows:

23. ‘κατὰ τάδε ξύμμαχοι ἔσονται Λακεδαιμόνιοι <καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι> πεντήκοντα ἔτη. ἢν [δέ] τινες ἴωσιν ἐς τὴν γῆν πολέμιοι τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ κακῶς ποιῶσι Λακεδαιμονίους, ὠφελεῖν Ἀθηναίους Λακεδαιμονίους τρόπῳ ὁποίῳ ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: ἢν δὲ δῃώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων, καταλύειν δὲ ἅμα ἄμφω τὼ πόλεε. ταῦτα δ᾽ εἶναι δικαίως καὶ προθύμως καὶ ἀδόλως. [2] καὶ ἦν τινες ἐς τὴν Ἀθηναίων γῆν ἴωσι πολέμιοι καὶ κακῶς ποιῶσιν Ἀθηναίους, ὠφελεῖν Λακεδαιμονίους <Ἀθηναίους > τρόπῳ ὅτῳ ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: ἢν δὲ δῃώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων, καταλύειν δὲ ἅμα ἄμφω τὼ πόλεε. [3] ταῦτα δ᾽ εἶναι δικαίως καὶ προθύμως καὶ ἀδόλως. ἢν δὲ ἡ δουλεία ἐπανιστῆται, ἐπικουρεῖν Ἀθηναίους Λακεδαιμονίοις παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. [4] ὀμοῦνται δὲ ταῦτα οἵπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας σπονδὰς ὤμνυον ἑκατέρων. ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ <τὸν ὅρκον> κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν ἰόντας ἐς Ἀθήνας πρὸς τὰ Διονύσια, Ἀθηναίους δὲ ἰόντας ἐς Λακεδαίμονα πρὸς τὰ Ὑακίνθια. [5] στήλην δὲ ἑκατέρους στῆσαι, τὴν μὲν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι παρ᾽ Ἀπόλλωνι ἐν Ἀμυκλαίῳ, τὴν δὲ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐν πόλει παρ᾽ Ἀθηνᾷ. [6] ἢν δέ τι δοκῇ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν περὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας, ὅτι ἂν δοκῇ, εὔορκον ἀμφοτέροις εἶναι.

[23] ‘The Lacedaemonians shall be allies of the Athenians for fifty years, on the following conditions:’I. If any enemy invade the Lacedaemonian territory and harm the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians shall assist the

Lacedaemonians in any way which they can, and to the utmost of their power; and if the enemy ravage their territory and depart, the offending city shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, and shall suffer at the hands of both of them, and neither city shall cease from war before the other. These things shall be performed honestly, and zealously, and sincerely.’II. If any enemy invade the Athenian territory and harm the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians shall assist them in any way which they can, and to the utmost of their power; and if the enemy ravage their territory and depart, the offending city shall be the enemy of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, and shall suffer at the hands of both of them, and neither city shall cease from war before the other. These things shall be performed honestly, and zealously, and sincerely.’III. If the slaves rebel, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedaemonians with all their might and to the utmost of their power.’IV. These provisions shall be sworn to on both sides by the same persons who swore to the former treaty. Every year the Lacedaemonians shall go to Athens at the Dionysia and renew the oath, and the Athenians shall go to Lacedaemon at the Hyacinthia and renew the oath. Both parties shall erect pillars, one in Lacedaemon at the temple of Apollo in Amyclae, another at Athens in the Acropolis at the temple of Athenè.’V. If the Lacedaemonians and Athenians agree that anything shall be added to or taken away from the treaty of alliance, whatever it be, this may be done without violation of their oaths.’

24. ‘τὸν δὲ ὅρκον ὤμνυον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν οἵδε, Πλειστοάναξ, Ἄγις, Πλειστόλας, Δαμάγητος, Χίονις, Μεταγένης, Ἄκανθος, Δάιθος, Ἰσχαγόρας, Φιλοχαρίδας, Ζευξίδας, Ἄντιππος, Ἀλκινάδας, Τέλλις, Ἐμπεδίας, Μηνᾶς, Λάφιλος, Ἀθηναίων δὲ Λάμπων, Ἰσθμιόνικος, Λάχης, Νικίας, Εὐθύδημος, Προκλῆς, Πυθόδωρος, Ἄγνων, Μυρτίλος, Θρασυκλῆς, Θεαγένης, Ἀριστοκράτης, Ἰώλκιος, Τιμοκράτης, Λέων, Λάμαχος, Δημοσθένης.’[2] αὕτη ἡ

ξυμμαχία ἐγένετο μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἀπέδοσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ τὸ θέρος ἦρχε τοῦ ἑνδεκάτου ἔτους. ταῦτα δὲ τὰ δέκα ἔτη ὁ πρῶτος πόλεμος ξυνεχῶς γενόμενος γέγραπται.

[24] On behalf of the Lacedaemonians there took the oaths, Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daïthus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. On behalf of the Athenians there took the oaths, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.This alliance was made shortly after the treaty; at the same time the Athenians restored to the Lacedaemonians the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. The summer of the eleventh year then began. During the previous ten years the first war, of which the history has now been written, went on without intermission.

25. μετὰ δὲ τὰς σπονδὰς καὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, αἳ ἐγένοντο μετὰ τὸν δεκέτη πόλεμον ἐπὶ Πλειστόλα μὲν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ἐφόρου, Ἀλκαίου δ᾽ ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι, τοῖς μὲν δεξαμένοις αὐτὰς εἰρήνη ἦν, οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι καὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεών τινες διεκίνουν τὰ πεπραγμένα, καὶ εὐθὺς ἄλλη ταραχὴ καθίστατο τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα. [2] καὶ ἅμα καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου ὕποπτοι ἐγένοντο ἔστιν ἐν οἷς οὐ ποιοῦντες ἐκ τῶν ξυγκειμένων ἃ εἴρητο. [3] καὶ ἐπὶ ἓξ ἔτη μὲν καὶ δέκα μῆνας ἀπέσχοντο μὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἑκατέρων γῆν στρατεῦσαι, ἔξωθεν δὲ μετ᾽ ἀνοκωχῆς οὐ βεβαίου ἔβλαπτον ἀλλήλους τὰ μάλιστα: ἔπειτα μέντοι καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες λῦσαι τὰς μετὰ τὰ δέκα ἔτη σπονδὰς αὖθις ἐς πόλεμον φανερὸν κατέστησαν.

[25] The treaty and the alliance which terminated the ten years’ war were made in the Ephorate of Pleistolas at Lacedaemon, and the Archonship of Alcaeus at Athens.

Those who accepted the treaty were now at peace; but the Corinthians and several of the Peloponnesian cities did what they could to disturb the arrangement. And so before long a new cause of quarrel set the allies against the Lacedaemonians; who also, as time went on, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians, because in certain particulars they would not execute the provisions of the treaty. For six years and ten months the two powers abstained from invading each other's territories, but abroad the cessation of arms was intermittent, and they did each other all the harm which they could. At last they were absolutely compelled to break the treaty made at the end of the first ten years, and engaged once more in open war.

26. γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ἑξῆς, ὡς ἕκαστα ἐγένετο, κατὰ θέρη καὶ χειμῶνας, μέχρι οὗ τήν τε ἀρχὴν κατέπαυσαν τῶν Ἀθηναίων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατέλαβον. ἔτη δὲ ἐς τοῦτο τὰ ξύμπαντα ἐγένετο τῷ πολέμῳ ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι. [2] καὶ τὴν διὰ μέσου ξύμβασιν εἴ τις μὴ ἀξιώσει πόλεμον νομίζειν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δικαιώσει. τοῖς [τε] γὰρ ἔργοις ὡς διῄρηται ἀθρείτω, καὶ εὑρήσει οὐκ εἰκὸς ὂν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, ἐν ᾗ οὔτε ἀπέδοσαν πάντα οὔτ᾽ ἀπεδέξαντο ἃ ξυνέθεντο, ἔξω τε τούτων πρὸς τὸν Μαντινικὸν καὶ Ἐπιδαύριον πόλεμον καὶ ἐς ἄλλα ἀμφοτέροις ἁμαρτήματα ἐγένοντο καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ξύμμαχοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον πολέμιοι ἦσαν Βοιωτοί τε ἐκεχειρίαν δεχήμερον ἦγον. [3] ὥστε ξὺν τῷ πρώτῳ πολέμῳ τῷ δεκέτει καὶ τῇ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν ὑπόπτῳ ἀνοκωχῇ καὶ τῷ ὕστερον ἐξ αὐτῆς πολέμῳ εὑρήσει τις τοσαῦτα ἔτη, λογιζόμενος κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους, καὶ ἡμέρας οὐ πολλὰς παρενεγκούσας, καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ χρησμῶν τι ἰσχυρισαμένοις μόνον δὴ τοῦτο ἐχυρῶς ξυμβάν. [4] αἰεὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε μέμνημαι, καὶ ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου καὶ μέχρι οὗ ἐτελεύτησε, προφερόμενον ὑπὸ πολλῶν ὅτι τρὶς ἐννέα ἔτη δέοι γενέσθαι αὐτόν. [5] ἐπεβίων δὲ διὰ παντὸς αὐτοῦ αἰσθανόμενός τε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ προσέχων τὴν γνώμην, ὅπως ἀκριβές τι εἴσομαι: καὶ ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν

τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἔτη εἴκοσι μετὰ τὴν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν, καὶ γενομένῳ παρ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τοῖς Πελοποννησίων διὰ τὴν φυγήν, καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν μᾶλλον αἰσθέσθαι. [6] τὴν οὖν μετὰ τὰ δέκα ἔτη διαφοράν τε καὶ ξύγχυσιν τῶν σπονδῶν καὶ τὰ ἔπειτα ὡς ἐπολεμήθη ἐξηγήσομαι.

[26] The same Thucydides of Athens continued the history, following the order of events, which he reckoned by summers and winters, up to the destruction of the Athenian empire and the taking of Piraeus and the Long Walls by the Lacedaemonians and their allies. Altogether the war lasted twenty-seven years, for if any one argue that the interval during which the truce continued should be excluded, he is mistaken. If he have regard to the facts of the case, he will see that the term ‘peace’ can hardly be applied to a state of things in which neither party gave back or received all the places stipulated; moreover in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and in other matters there were violations of the treaty on both sides; the Chalcidian allies maintained their attitude of hostility towards Athens, and the Boeotians merely observed an armistice terminable at ten days’ notice. So that, including the first ten years’ war, the doubtful truce which followed, and the war which followed that, he who reckons up the actual periods of time will find that I have rightly given the exact number of years with the difference only of a few days. He will also find that this was the solitary instance in which those who put their faith in oracles were justified by the event. For I well remember how, from the beginning to the end of the war, there was a common and often repeated saying that it was to last thrice nine years. I lived through the whole of it, being of mature years and judgment, and I took great pains to make out the exact truth. For twenty years I was banished from my country after I held the command at Amphipolis, and associating with both sides, with the Peloponnesians quite as much as with the Athenians, because of my exile, I was thus enabled to

watch quietly the course of events. I will now proceed to narrate the quarrels which after the first ten years broke up the treaty, and the events of the war which followed.

27. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αἱ πεντηκοντούτεις σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο καὶ ὕστερον ἡ ξυμμαχία, καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου πρεσβεῖαι, αἵπερ παρεκλήθησαν ἐς αὐτά, ἀνεχώρουν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος: [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀπῆλθον, Κορίνθιοι δὲ ἐς Ἄργος τραπόμενοι πρῶτον λόγους ποιοῦνται πρός τινας τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων Ἀργείων ὡς χρή, ἐπειδὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῆς Πελοποννήσου σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους τοὺς πρὶν ἐχθίστους πεποίηνται, ὁρᾶν τοὺς Ἀργείους ὅπως σωθήσεται ἡ Πελοπόννησος καὶ ψηφίσασθαι τὴν βουλομένην πόλιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἥτις αὐτόνομός τέ ἐστι καὶ δίκας ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας δίδωσι, πρὸς Ἀργείους ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι ὥστε τῇ ἀλλήλων ἐπιμαχεῖν, ἀποδεῖξαι δὲ ἄνδρας ὀλίγους ἀρχὴν αὐτοκράτορας καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τοὺς λόγους εἶναι, τοῦ μὴ καταφανεῖς γίγνεσθαι τοὺς μὴ πείσαντας τὸ πλῆθος: ἔφασαν δὲ πολλοὺς προσχωρήσεσθαι μίσει τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι διδάξαντες ταῦτα ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου:

[27] After the conclusion of the fifty years’ peace and of the subsequent alliance, the ambassadors who had been invited to the conference from the other states of Peloponnesus left Lacedaemon. They all went home except the Corinthians, who turned aside to Argos and opened communications with certain of the Argive magistrates, saying that the Lacedaemonians had made peace and alliance with the Athenians, hitherto their mortal enemies, to no good end, but for the enslavement of Peloponnesus, and that the Argives were bound to take measures for its deliverance. They ought to pass a vote that any independent Hellenic city which would allow a settlement of disputes on equal terms might enter into a defensive alliance with them. The negotiation should not be carried on with the assembly, but the Argives should appoint a few commissioners having full

powers, lest, if any states appealed to the people and were rejected, their failure should become public. They added that hatred of the Lacedaemonians would induce many to join them. Having offered this recommendation, the Corinthians returned home.

28. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων ἄνδρες ἀκούσαντες ἐπειδὴ ἀνήνεγκαν τοὺς λόγους ἔς τε τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὸν δῆμον, ἐψηφίσαντο Ἀργεῖοι καὶ ἄνδρας εἵλοντο δώδεκα, πρὸς οὓς τὸν βουλόμενον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι πλὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων: τούτων δὲ μηδετέροις ἐξεῖναι ἄνευ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀργείων σπείσασθαι. [2] ἐδέξαντό τε ταῦτα οἱ Ἀργεῖοι μᾶλλον ὁρῶντες τόν τε Λακεδαιμονίων σφίσι πόλεμον ἐσόμενον ἐπ᾽ ἐξόδῳ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτοὺς αἱ σπονδαὶ ἦσαν καὶ ἅμα ἐλπίσαντες τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἡγήσεσθαι: κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφοράς, οἵ τε Ἀργεῖοι ἄριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσιν, οὐ ξυναράμενοι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου, ἀμφοτέροις δὲ μᾶλλον ἔνσπονδοι ὄντες ἐκκαρπωσάμενοι. [3] οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀργεῖοι οὕτως ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προσεδέχοντο τοὺς ἐθέλοντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων,

[28] The Argive magistrates, after hearing these proposals, referred them to their colleagues and the people. The Argives passed a vote accordingly, and elected twelve commissioners; through these any of the Hellenes who pleased might make an alliance with them, except the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, who could only be admitted to the league with the sanction of the Argive people. The Argives were the more inclined to take this course because, their truce with the Lacedaemonians being about to expire, they saw that war was imminent. Moreover they were encouraged by the hope of becoming the leaders of Peloponnesus. For at this time the reputation of Lacedaemon had fallen very low; her misfortunes had brought her into contempt, while the resources of Argos were unimpaired. For the Argives had not taken part in the war with Athens, and,

being at peace with both parties, had reaped a harvest from them.

29. Μαντινῆς δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν πρῶτοι προσεχώρησαν, δεδιότες τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον: ὥστε ἄσμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους ἐτράποντο, πόλιν τε μεγάλην νομίζοντες καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις αἰεὶ διάφορον, δημοκρατουμένην τε ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοί. [2] ἀποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Πελοπόννησος ἐς θροῦν καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητέον τοῦτο, νομίσαντες πλέον τέ τι εἰδότας μεταστῆναι αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἅμα δι᾽ ὀργῆς ἔχοντες, ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς ταῖς Ἀττικαῖς ἐγέγραπτο εὔορκον εἶναι προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν ὅτι ἂν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν πολέοιν δοκῇ, Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις. [3] τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ γράμμα μάλιστα τὴν Πελοπόννησον διεθορύβει καὶ ἐς ὑποψίαν καθίστη μὴ μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι δουλώσασθαι: δίκαιον γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ξυμμάχοις γεγράφθαι τὴν μετάθεσιν. [4] ὥστε φοβούμενοι οἱ πολλοὶ ὥρμηντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἕκαστοι ξυμμαχίαν ποιεῖσθαι.

[29] The first to enter the alliance offered by the Argives to any Hellenes who were willing to accept it were the Mantineans and their allies, who joined through fear of the Lacedaemonians. For, during the war with Athens, they had subjected a part of Arcadia, which they thought that the Lacedaemonians, now that their hands were free, would no longer allow them to retain. So they gladly joined Argos, reflecting that it was a great city, the constant enemy of Sparta, and, like their own, governed by a democracy. When Mantinea seceded, a murmur ran through the other states of Peloponnesus that they must secede too; they imagined that the Mantineans had gone over to the Argives because they had better information than themselves, and also they were

angry with the Lacedaemonians, chiefly on account of that clause in the treaty with Athens which provided that the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, if agreed, might add to or take away from it whatever they pleased. This clause aroused great uneasiness among the Peloponnesians, and made them suspect that the Lacedaemonians meant to unite with the Athenians in order to enslave them; they argued that the power of altering the treaty ought to have been given only to the whole confederacy. Entertaining these fears they generally inclined towards Argos, and every state was eager to follow the example of Mantinea and form an alliance with her.

30. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τὸν θροῦν τοῦτον ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καθεστῶτα καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους διδασκάλους τε γενομένους καὶ αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας σπείσεσθαι πρὸς τὸ Ἄργος, πέμπουσι πρέσβεις ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον βουλόμενοι προκαταλαβεῖν τὸ μέλλον, καὶ ᾐτιῶντο τήν τε ἐσήγησιν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ εἰ Ἀργείοις σφῶν ἀποστάντες ξύμμαχοι ἔσονται, παραβήσεσθαί τε ἔφασαν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ὅρκους, καὶ ἤδη ἀδικεῖν ὅτι οὐ δέχονται τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδάς, εἰρημένον κύριον εἶναι ὅτι ἂν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ξυμμάχων ψηφίσηται, ἢν μή τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ. [2] Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν ξυμμάχων ὅσοι οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπονδάς παρεκάλεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ πρότερον, ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἃ μὲν ἠδικοῦντο οὐ δηλοῦντες ἄντικρυς, ὅτι οὔτε Σόλλιον σφίσιν ἀπέλαβον παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίων οὔτε Ἀνακτόριον εἴ τέ τι ἄλλο ἐνόμιζον ἐλασσοῦσθαι, πρόσχημα δὲ ποιούμενοι τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης μὴ προδώσειν: ὀμόσαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὅρκους ἰδίᾳ τε, ὅτε μετὰ Ποτειδεατῶν τὸ πρῶτον ἀφίσταντο, καὶ ἄλλους ὕστερον. [3] οὔκουν παραβαίνειν τοὺς τῶν ξυμμάχων ὅρκους ἔφασαν οὐκ ἐσιόντες ἐς τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων σπονδάς: θεῶν γὰρ πίστεις ὀμόσαντες ἐκείνοις οὐκ ἂν εὐορκεῖν προδιδόντες αὐτούς. εἰρῆσθαι δ᾽ ὅτι ‘ἢν μὴ θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ:’ φαίνεσθαι οὖν σφίσι κώλυμα θεῖον τοῦτο. [4] καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν ὅρκων τοσαῦτα εἶπον, περὶ δὲ τῆς Ἀργείων ξυμμαχίας μετὰ τῶν φίλων

βουλευσάμενοι ποιήσειν ὅτι ἂν δίκαιον ᾖ. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου: ἔτυχον δὲ παρόντες ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ Ἀργείων πρέσβεις, οἳ ἐκέλευον τοὺς Κορινθίους ἰέναι ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ μὴ μέλλειν: οἱ δὲ ἐς τὸν ὕστερον ξύλλογον αὐτοῖς τὸν παρὰ σφίσι προεῖπον ἥκειν.

[30] The Lacedaemonians perceived that great excitement prevailed in Peloponnesus, and that the Corinthians had inspired it and were themselves on the point of making a treaty with Argos. So they sent envoys to Corinth, desiring to anticipate what might happen. They laid the blame of having instigated the whole movement on the Corinthians, and protested that, if they deserted them and joined the Argives, they would be forsworn; indeed they were already much to blame for not accepting the peace made with Athens, although there was an article in their league which said that what the majority of the allies voted should be binding unless there was some impediment on the part of Gods or heroes. Now the Corinthians had previously summoned those of the allies who, like themselves, had rejected the treaty: and, replying in their presence, they were unwilling to speak out and state their grievances, of which the chief was that the Lacedaemonians had not recovered for them Sollium or Anactorium. But they pretended that they could not betray their allies in Thrace, to whom, when they originally joined in the revolt of Potidaea, they had sworn a separate oath, and had afterwards renewed it. They denied therefore that they were violating the terms of the league by refusing to join in the peace with the Athenians, for, having sworn in the name of the Gods to their allies, they would be violating their oaths if they betrayed them: the treaty said ‘unless there was some impediment on the part of Gods or heroes,’ and this did appear to them to be an impediment of that nature. Thus far they pleaded their former oaths; as to the Argive alliance they would take counsel with their friends, and do whatever

was right. So the Lacedaemonians returned home. Now there happened to be at that time Argive envoys present at Corinth who urged the Corinthians to join the alliance without more delay, and the Corinthians told them to come to their next assembly.

31. ἦλθε δὲ καὶ Ἠλείων πρεσβεία εὐθὺς καὶ ἐποιήσατο πρὸς Κορινθίους ξυμμαχίαν πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ἐκεῖθεν ἐς Ἄργος ἐλθόντες, καθάπερ προείρητο, Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο. διαφερόμενοι γὰρ ἐτύγχανον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις περὶ Λεπρέου. [2] πολέμου γὰρ γενομένου ποτὲ πρὸς Ἀρκάδων τινὰς Λεπρεάταις καὶ Ἠλείων παρακληθέντων ὑπὸ Λεπρεατῶν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμισείᾳ τῆς γῆς καὶ λυσάντων τὸν πόλεμον Ἠλεῖοι τὴν γῆν νεμομένοις αὐτοῖς τοῖς Λεπρεάταις τάλαντον ἔταξαν τῷ Διὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ ἀποφέρειν. [3] καὶ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου ἀπέφερον, ἔπειτα παυσαμένων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου οἱ Ἠλεῖοι ἐπηνάγκαζον, οἱ δ᾽ ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ δίκης Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπιτραπείσης ὑποτοπήσαντες οἱ Ἠλεῖοι μὴ ἴσον ἔξειν ἀνέντες τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν Λερεατῶν τὴν γῆν ἔτεμον. [4] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐδίκασαν αὐτονόμους εἶναι Λεπρεάτας καὶ ἀδικεῖν Ἠλείους, καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἐμμεινάντων τῇ ἐπιτροπῇ φρουρὰν ὁπλιτῶν ἐσέπεμψαν ἐς Λέπρεον. [5] οἱ δὲ Ἠλεῖοι νομίζοντες πόλιν σφῶν ἀφεστηκυῖαν δέξασθαι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τὴν ξυνθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ᾗ εἴρητο, ἃ ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἴσον ἔχοντες ἀφίστανται πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους, καὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν, ὥσπερ προείρητο, καὶ οὗτοι ἐποιήσαντο. [6] ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι εὐθὺς μετ᾽ ἐκείνους καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης Χαλκιδῆς Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντες ἡσύχαζον, περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ νομίζοντες σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένοις ἧσσον ξύμφορον εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.

[31] Soon afterwards envoys from Elis likewise arrived at Corinth, who, first of all making an alliance with the

Corinthians, went on to Argos, and became allies of the Argives in the manner prescribed. Now the Eleans had a quarrel with the Lacedaemonians about the town of Lepreum. A war had arisen between the Lepreans and certain Arcadian tribes, and the Eleans having been called in by the Lepreans came to assist them, on condition of receiving half their territory. When they had brought the war to a successful end the Eleans allowed the inhabitants of Lepreum to cultivate the land themselves, paying a rent of a talent to Olympian Zeus. Until the Peloponnesian war they had paid the talent, but taking advantage of the war they ceased to pay, and the Eleans tried to compel them. The Lepreans then had recourse to the Lacedaemonians, who undertook to arbitrate. The Eleans suspected that they would not have fair play at their hands; they therefore disregarded the arbitration and ravaged the Leprean territory. Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians went on with the case and decided that Lepreum was an independent state, and that the Eleans were in the wrong. As their award was rejected by the Eleans, they sent a garrison of hoplites to Lepreum. The Eleans, considering that the Lacedaemonians had taken into alliance a city which had seceded from them, appealed to the clause of the agreement which provided that whatever places any of the confederates had held previous to the war with Athens should be retained by them at its conclusion, and acting under a sense of injustice they now seceded to the Argives and, like the rest, entered into the alliance with them in the manner prescribed. Immediately afterwards the Corinthians and the Chalcidians of Thrace joined; but the Boeotians and the Megarians agreed to refuse, and, jealously watched by the Lacedaemonians, stood aloof; for they were well aware that the Lacedaemonian constitution was far more congenial to their own oligarchical form of government than the Argive democracy.

32. περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τούτου Σκιωναίους μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκπολιορκήσαντες ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς ἡβῶντας, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἠνδραπόδισαν, καὶ τὴν γῆν Πλαταιεῦσιν ἔδοσαν νέμεσθαι, Δηλίους δὲ κατήγαγον πάλιν ἐς Δῆλον, ἐνθυμούμενοι τάς τε ἐν ταῖς μάχαις ξυμφορὰς καὶ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς θεοῦ χρήσαντος. [2] καὶ Φωκῆς καὶ Λοκροὶ ἤρξαντο πολεμεῖν. [3]καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι ἤδη ξύμμαχοι ὄντες ἔρχονται ἐς Τεγέαν ἀποστήσοντες Λακεδαιμονίων, ὁρῶντες μέγα μέρος ὂν καί, εἰ σφίσι προσγένοιτο, νομίζοντες ἅπασαν ἂν ἔχειν Πελοπόννησον. [4] ὡς δὲ οὐδὲν ἂν ἔφασαν ἐναντιωθῆναι οἱ Τεγεᾶται Λακεδαιμονίοις, οἱ Κορίνθιοι μέχρι τούτου προθύμως πράσσοντες ἀνεῖσαν τῆς φιλονικίας καὶ ὠρρώδησαν μὴ οὐδεὶς σφίσιν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων προσχωρῇ. [5] ὅμως δὲ ἐλθόντες ἐς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἐδέοντο σφῶν τε καὶ Ἀργείων γίγνεσθαι ξυμμάχους καὶ τἆλλα κοινῇ πράσσειν: τάς τε δεχημέρους ἐπισπονδάς, αἳ ἦσαν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Βοιωτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον γενόμεναι [τούτων] τῶν πεντηκοντουτίδων σπονδῶν, ἐκέλευον οἱ Κορίνθιοι τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας Ἀθήναζε καὶ σφίσι ποιῆσαι, [ὥσπερ Βοιωτοὶ εἶχον,] μὴ δεχομένων δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ σπένδεσθαι ἄνευ αὐτῶν. [6] Βοιωτοὶ δὲ δεομένων τῶν Κορινθίων περὶ μὲν τῆς Ἀργείων ξυμμαχίας ἐπισχεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευον, ἐλθόντες δὲ Ἀθήναζε μετὰ Κορινθίων οὐχ ηὔροντο τὰς δεχημέρους σπονδάς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπεκρίναντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Κορινθίοις εἶναι σπονδάς, εἴπερ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰσὶ ξύμμαχοι. [7] Βοιωτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀπεῖπον τὰς δεχημέρους, ἀξιούντων καὶ αἰτιωμένων Κορινθίων ξυνθέσθαι σφίσιν: Κορινθίοις δὲ ἀνοκωχὴ ἄσπονδος ἦν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους.

[32] During the same summer, and about this time, the Athenians took Scionè which they were blockading, put to death all the grown-up men, and enslaved the women and children; they then gave possession of the land to the Plataeans. They also replaced the Delians in Delos, moved

partly by the defeats which they had sustained, partly by an oracle of the Delphic God. About this time too the Phocians and Locrians went to war. The Corinthians and Argives (who were now allies) came to Tegea, which they hoped to withdraw from the Lacedaemonian alliance, thinking that if they could secure so important a part of Peloponnesus they would soon have the whole of it. The Tegeans however said that they could have no quarrel with the Lacedaemonians; and the Corinthians, who had hitherto been zealous in the cause, now began to cool, and were seriously afraid that no other Peloponnesian state would join them. Nevertheless they applied to the Boeotians and begged them to become allies of themselves and of the Argives, and generally to act with them; they further requested that they would accompany them to Athens and procure an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, similar to that which the Athenians and Boeotians had made with one another shortly after the conclusion of the fifty years' peace. If the Athenians did not agree, then the Corinthians demanded of the Boeotians that they should renounce the armistice and for the future make no truce without them. The Boeotians on receiving this request desired the Corinthians to say no more about alliance with the Argives. But they went together to Athens, where the Boeotians failed to obtain the armistice for the Corinthians, the Athenians replying that the original truce extended to them, if they were allies of the Lacedaemonians. The Boeotians however did not renounce their own armistice, although the Corinthians expostulated, and argued that such had been the agreement. Thus the Corinthians had only a suspension of hostilities with Athens, but no regular truce.

33. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους πανδημεὶ ἐστράτευσαν, Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου Λακεδαιμονίων Βασιλέως ἡγουμένου, τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἐς Παρρασίους, Μαντινέων ὑπηκόους ὄντας, κατὰ στάσιν ἐπικαλεσαμένων σφᾶς, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν Κυψέλοις τεῖχος

ἀναιρήσοντες, ἢν δύνωνται, ὃ ἐτείχισαν Μαντινῆς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφρούρουν, ἐν τῇ Παρρασικῇ κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ Σκιρίτιδι τῆς Λακωνικῆς. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν γῆν τῶν Παρρασίων ἐδῄουν, οἱ δὲ Μαντινῆς τὴν πόλιν Ἀργείοις φύλαξι παραδόντες αὐτοὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίδα ἐφρούρουν: ἀδύνατοι δ᾽ ὄντες διασῶσαι τό τε ἐν Κυψέλοις τεῖχος καὶ τὰς ἐν Παρρασίοις πόλεις ἀπῆλθον. [3] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τούς τε Παρρασίους αὐτονόμους ποιήσαντες καὶ τὸ τεῖχος καθελόντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

[33] During the same summer the Lacedaemonians with their whole force, commanded by their king Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, made war upon the Parrhasians of Arcadia, who were subjects of the Mantineans. They had been invited by a faction among the Parrhasians; and moreover they wanted to demolish a fortress in the Parrhasian town of Cypsela, threatening the Laconian district of Sciritis, which the Mantineans had built and garrisoned. The Lacedaemonians devastated the country of the Parrhasians; and the Mantineans, leaving the custody of their own city to a force of Argives, themselves garrisoned the territory of their allies. But being unable to save either the fort of Cypsela or the cities of Parrhasia, they went home again; whereupon the Lacedaemonians, having demolished the fort and restored the independence of the Parrhasians, returned home likewise.

34. καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἤδη ἡκόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης μετὰ Βρασίδου ἐξελθόντων στρατιωτῶν, οὓς ὁ Κλεαρίδας μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς ἐκόμισεν, οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐψηφίσαντο τοὺς μὲν μετὰ Βρασίδου Εἵλωτας μαχεσαμένους ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ αὐτοὺς μετὰ τῶν νεοδαμωδῶν ἐς Λέπρεον κατέστησαν, κείμενον ἐπὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς καὶ τῆς Ἠλείας, ὄντες ἤδη διάφοροι Ἠλείοις: [2] τοὺς δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς νήσου ληφθέντας σφῶν καὶ τὰ ὅπλα παραδόντας, δείσαντες μή τι διὰ τὴν ξυμφορὰν νομίσαντες ἐλασσωθήσεσθαι καὶ ὄντες ἐπίτιμοι νεωτερίσωσιν, ἤδη καὶ

ἀρχάς τινας ἔχοντας ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιάνδε ὥστε μήτε ἄρχειν μήτε πριαμένους τι ἢ πωλοῦντας κυρίους εἶναι. ὕστερον δὲ αὖθις χρόνῳ ἐπίτιμοι ἐγένοντο.

[34] In the course of the same summer the troops serving in Thrace, which had gone out under Brasidas and were brought home by Clearidas after the conclusion of peace, arrived at Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemonians passed a vote that the Helots who had fought under Brasidas should be free and might dwell wherever they pleased. Not long afterwards, they settled them, together with the Neodamodes, at Lepreum, which is on the borders of Laconia and Elis, being now enemies of the Eleans. Fearing lest their own citizens who had been taken in the island and had delivered up their arms might expect to be slighted in consequence of their misfortune, and, if they retained the privileges of citizens, would attempt revolution, they took away the right of citizenship from them, although some of them were holding office at the time. By this disqualification they were deprived of their eligibility to offices, and of the legal right to buy and sell. In time, however, their privileges were restored to them.

35. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους καὶ Θυσσὸν τὴν ἐν τῇ Ἄθῳ Ἀκτῇ Διῆς εἶλον, Ἀθηναίων οὖσαν ξύμμαχον. [2]καὶ τὸ θέρος τοῦτο πᾶν ἐπιμειξίαι μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις, ὑπώπτευον δὲ ἀλλήλους εὐθὺς μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ τὴν τῶν χωρίων ἀλλήλοις οὐκ ἀπόδοσιν. [3] τὴν γὰρ Ἀμφίπολιν πρότεροι λαχόντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀποδιδόναι καὶ τἆλλα οὐκ ἀπεδεδώκεσαν, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης παρεῖχον ξυμμάχους τὰς σπονδὰς δεχομένους οὐδὲ Βοιωτοὺς οὐδὲ Κορινθίους, λέγοντες αἰεὶ ὡς μετ᾽ Ἀθηναίων τούτους, ἢν μὴ ‘θέλωσι, κοινῇ ἀναγκάσουσιν: χρόνους τε προύθεντο ἄνευ ξυγγραφῆς ἐν οἷς χρῆν τοὺς μὴ ἐσιόντας ἀμφοτέροις πολεμίους εἶναι. [4] τούτων οὖν ὁρῶντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἔργῳ γιγνόμενον ὑπώπτευον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲν δίκαιον διανοεῖσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε Πύλον ἀπαιτούντων αὐτῶν

ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου δεσμώτας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες, τά τε ἄλλα χωρία εἶχον, μένοντες ἕως σφίσι κἀκεῖνοι ποιήσειαν τὰ εἰρημένα. [5] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ἔφασαν πεποιηκέναι: τοὺς γὰρ παρὰ σφίσι δεσμώτας ὄντας Ἀθηναίων ἀποδοῦναι καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης στρατιώτας ἀπαγαγεῖν καὶ εἴ του ἄλλου ἐγκρατεῖς ἦσαν: Ἀμφιπόλεως δὲ οὐκ ἔφασαν κρατεῖν ὥστε παραδοῦναι, Βοιωτοὺς δὲ πειράσεσθαι καὶ Κορινθίους ἐς τὰς σπονδὰς ἐσαγαγεῖν καὶ Πάνακτον ἀπολαβεῖν καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν Βοιωτοῖς αἰχμάλωτοι κομιεῖν. [6] πύλον μέντοι ἠξίουν σφίσιν ἀποδοῦναι: εἰ δὲ μή, Μεσσηνίους γε καὶ τοὺς Εἵλωτας ἐξαγαγεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης, Ἀθηναίους δὲ φρουρεῖν τὸ χωρίον αὐτούς, εἰ βούλονται. [7] πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ ἔπεισαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὥστε ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐκ Πύλου Μεσσηνίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Εἵλωτάς τε καὶ ὅσοι ηὐτομολήκεσαν ἐκ τῆς Λακωνικῆς: καὶ κατῴκισαν αὐτοὺς ἐν Κρανίοις τῆς Κεφαλληνίας. [8] τὸ μὲν οὖν θέρος τοῦτο ἡσυχία ἦν καὶ ἔφοδοι παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους.

[35] During this summer the Dictidians took Thyssus, a town of Mount Athos, which was in alliance with the Athenians. During the whole summer intercourse continued between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. But almost as soon as the peace was concluded both Athenians and Lacedaemonians began to mistrust one another, because the places mentioned in the treaty were not given up. For the Lacedaemonians, who were to make restitution first, according to the lot, had not surrendered Amphipolis and the other less important places which they held, and had not made their allies in Chalcidicè, nor the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians accept the treaty, but only kept declaring that they would join the Athenians in coercing them if they continued to refuse. They even fixed a time, though they did not commit themselves in writing, within which those who would not come into the treaty were to be declared the enemies of both parties. The Athenians, seeing that nothing

was being really done, suspected the Lacedaemonians of dishonesty, and therefore they would not give up Pylos when the Lacedaemonians required it; they even repented that they had restored the prisoners taken at Sphacteria, and resolved to keep the other places until the Lacedaemonians had fulfilled their part of the contract. The Lacedaemonians replied that they had done what they could. They had delivered up the Athenian prisoners who were in their hands, and had withdrawn their soldiers from Chalcidicè; they had neglected nothing which lay within their power. But they could not give up Amphipolis, of which they were not entirely masters; they would however try to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians into the treaty, to get back Panactum, and recover all the Athenian captives who were in the hands of the Boeotians. They still continued to insist on the restoration of Pylos, or at any rate on the withdrawal of the Messenians and Helots, now that the Lacedaemonians had withdrawn their troops from Chalcidicè; the Athenians might, if they liked, garrison the place themselves. After many long conferences held during the summer, they persuaded the Athenians to withdraw the Messenians, Helots, and Lacedaemonian deserters: these the Athenians settled at Cranii in Cephallenia. So during this summer there was peace and intercourse between Athens and Sparta.

36. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἔτυχον γὰρ ἔφοροι ἕτεροι καὶ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ὧν αἱ σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο ἄρχοντες ἤδη, καί τινες αὐτῶν καὶ ἐναντίοι <ταῖς > σπονδαῖς ἐλθουσῶν πρεσβειῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ξυμμαχίδος καὶ παρόντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων καὶ πολλὰ ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἰπόντων καὶ οὐδὲν ξυμβάντων, ὡς ἀπῆσαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς καὶ Κορινθίοις Κλεόβουλος καὶ Ξενάρης, οὗτοι οἵπερ τῶν ἐφόρων ἐβούλοντο μάλιστα διαλῦσαι τὰς σπονδάς, λόγους ποιοῦνται ἰδίους, παραινοῦντες ὅτι μάλιστα ταῦτά τε γιγνώσκειν καὶ πειρᾶσθαι Βοιωτούς, Ἀργείων γενομένους πρῶτον αὐτοὺς ξυμμάχους, αὖθις μετὰ Βοιωτῶν Ἀργείους

Λακεδαιμονίοις ποιῆσαι ξυμμάχους οὕτω γὰρ ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν ἀναγασθῆναι Βοιωτοὺς ἐς τὰς Ἀττικὰς σπονδὰς ἐσελθεῖν: ἐλέσθαι γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίους πρὸ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἔχθρας καὶ διαλύσεως τῶν σπονδῶν Ἀργείους σφίσι φίλους καὶ ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι: τὸ γὰρ Ἄργος αἰεὶ ἠπίσταντο ἐπιθυμοῦντας τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καλῶς σφίσι φίλιον γενέσθαι, ἡγούμενοι τὸν ἔξω Πελοποννήσου πόλεμον ῥᾴω ἂν εἶναι. [2] τὸ μέντοι Πάνακτον ἐδέοντο Βοιωτοὺς ὅπως παραδώσουσι Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἵνα ἀντ᾽ αὐτοῦ Πύλον, ἣν δύνωνται, ἀπολαβόντες ῥᾷον καθιστῶνται Ἀθηναίοις ἐς πόλεμον.

[36] Before the following winter the Ephors under whom the peace was concluded were succeeded by others, of whom some were actually opposed to it. During the winter, embassies from the allied states arrived at Sparta, including representatives of Athens, Boeotia, and Corinth. Much was said with no result. As the ambassadors were departing, Cleobulus and Xenares, the Ephors who were most desirous of renewing the war, entered into a private negotiation with the Boeotians and Corinthians, recommending them to unite as closely as possible, and suggesting that the Boeotians should first enter the Argive alliance and then try and make the Argives, as well as themselves, allies of the Lacedaemonians. The Boeotians would thus escape the necessity of accepting the peace with Athens; for the Lacedaemonians would prefer the friendship and alliance of Argos to anything which they might lose by the enmity of Athens and the dissolution of the treaty. The two Ephors knew that a satisfactory alliance with Argos was an object which the Lacedaemonians always had at heart, perceiving as they did that it would enable them to carry on the war beyond the Peloponnesus with greater freedom. At the same time they entreated the Boeotians to give up Panactum to the Lacedaemonians, in order that they might exchange it for Pylos, and so be in a better position for renewing the war with Athens.

37. καὶ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Κορίνθιοι ταῦτα ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπό τε τοῦ Ξενάρους καὶ Κλεοβούλου καὶ ὅσοι φίλοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὥστε ἀπαγγεῖλαι ἐπὶ τὰ κοινά, ἐκάτεροι ἀνεχώρουν. [2] Ἀργείων δὲ δύο ἄνδρες τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς μεγίστης ἐπετήρουν ἀπιόντας αὐτοὺς καθ᾽ ὁδὸν καὶ ξυγγενόμενοι ἐς λόγους ἦλθον, εἴ πως οἱ Βοιωτοὶ σφίσι ξύμμαχοι γένοιντο ὥσπερ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Ἠλεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς: νομίζειν γὰρ ἂν τούτου προχωρήσαντος ῥᾳδίως ἤδη καὶ πολεμεῖν καὶ σπένδεσθαι καὶ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, εἰ βούλοιντο, κοινῷ λόγῳ χρωμένους, καὶ εἴ τινα πρὸς ἄλλον δέοι. [3] τοῖς δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν πρέσβεσιν ἀκούουσιν ἤρεσκεν: κατὰ τύχην γὰρ ἐδέοντο τούτων ὧνπερ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος αὐτοῖς φίλοι ἐπεστάλκεσαν. καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀργείων ἄνδρες ὡς ᾔσθοντο αὐτοὺς δεχομένους τὸν λόγον, εἰπόντες ὅτι πρέσβεις πέμψουσιν ἐς Βοιωτοὺς ἀπῆλθον. [4] ἀφικόμενοι δὲ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπήγγειλαν τοῖς βοιωτάρχαις τά τε ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ξυγγενομένων Ἀργείων: καὶ οἱ βοιωτάρχαι ἠρέσκοντό τε καὶ πολλῷ προθυμότεροι ἦσαν, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρωθεν ξυνεβεβήκει αὐτοῖς τούς τε φίλους τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ἐς τὰ ὁμοῖα σπεύδειν. [5] καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον πρέσβεις παρῆσαν Ἀργείων τὰ εἰρημένα προκαλούμενοι: καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀπέπεμψαν ἐπαινέσαντες τοὺς λόγους οἱ βοιωτάρχαι καὶ πρέσβεις ὑποσχόμενοι ἀποστελεῖν περὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἐς Ἄργος.

[37] The Boeotians and Corinthians, having received from Xenares and Cleobulus and their other Lacedaemonian friends the instructions which they were to convey to their own governments, returned to their respective cities. On their way home two Argives high in office, who had been waiting for them on the road, entered into communications with them, in the hope that the Boeotians, like the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans, might join their alliance; if this could only be accomplished, and they could act together, they might easily, they said, go to war or make peace, either with Lacedaemon or with any other power. The

Boeotian envoys were pleased at the proposal, for it so happened that the request of the Argives coincided with the instructions of their Lacedaemonian friends. Whereupon the Argives, finding that their proposals were acceptable to the Boeotians, promised to send an embassy to them, and so departed. When the Boeotians returned home they told the Boeotarchs what they had heard, both at Lacedaemon and from the Argives who had met them on their way. The Boeotarchs were glad, and their zeal was quickened when they discovered that the request made to them by their friends in Lacedaemon fell in with the projects of the Argives. Soon afterwards the envoys from Argos appeared, inviting the Boeotians to fulfil their engagement. The Boeotarchs encouraged their proposals, and dismissed them; promising that they would send envoys of their own to negotiate the intended alliance.

38. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ἐδόκει πρῶτον τοῖς βοιωτάρχαις καὶ Κορινθίοις καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης πρέσβεσιν ὀμόσαι ὅρκους ἀλλήλοις ἦ μὴν ἕν τε τῷ παρατυχόντι ἀμυνεῖν τῷ δεομένῳ καὶ μὴ πολεμήσειν τῳ μηδὲ ξυμβήσεσθαι ἄνευ κοινῆς γνώμης, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Μεγαρέας τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐποίουν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους σπένδεσθαι. [2] πρὶν δὲ τοὺς ὅρκους γενέσθαι οἱ βοιωτάρχαι ἐκοίνωσαν ταῖς τέσσαρσι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ταῦτα, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσιν, καὶ παρῄνουν γενέσθαι ὅρκους ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅσαι βούλονται ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ σφίσι ξυνομνύναι. [3] οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ὄντες οὐ προσδέχονται τὸν λόγον, δεδιότες μὴ ἐναντία Λακεδαιμονίοις ποιήσωσι, τοῖς ἐκείνων ἀφεστῶσι Κορινθίοις ξυνομνύντες: οὐ γὰρ εἶπον αὐτοῖς οἱ βοιωτάρχαι τὰ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος, ὅτι τῶν τε ἐφόρων Κλεόβουλος καὶ Ξενάρης καὶ οἱ φίλοι παραινοῦσιν Ἀργείων πρῶτον καὶ Κορινθίων γενομένους ξυμμάχους ὕστερον μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων γίγνεσθαι, οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλήν, κἂν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν. [4] ὡς δὲ ἀντέστη τὸ πρᾶγμα, οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι

καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης πρέσβεις ἄπρακτοι ἀπῆλθον, οἱ δὲ βοιωτάρχαι μέλλοντες πρότερον, εἰ ταῦτα ἔπεισαν, καὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν πειράσεσθαι πρὸς Ἀργείους ποιεῖν, οὐκέτι ἐσήνεγκαν περὶ Ἀργείων ἐς τὰς βουλάς, οὐδὲ ἐς τὸ Ἄργος τοὺς πρέσβεις οὓς ὑπέσχοντο ἔπεμπον, ἀμέλεια δέ τις ἐνῆν καὶ διατριβὴ τῶν πάντων.

[38] In the meantime the Boeotarchs and the envoys from Corinth, Megara, and Chalcidicè determined that they would take an oath to one another, pledging themselves to assist whichever of them was at any time in need, and not go to war or make peace without the consent of all. When they had got thus far, the Megarians and Boeotians, who acted together in the matter, were to enter into an agreement with the Argives. But before the oath was sworn, the Boeotarchs communicated their intentions to the Four Councils of the Boeotians, whose sanction is always necessary, and urged that oaths of alliance should be offered to any cities which were willing to join with them for mutual protection. But the Boeotian Councils, fearing that they might offend the Lacedaemonians if they swore alliance to the Corinthians who had seceded from them, rejected their proposals. For the Boeotarchs did not tell them what had passed at Lacedaemon, and how two of the Ephors, Cleobulus and Xenares, and their friends had advised them first to become allies of Argos and Corinth, and then to make a further alliance with the Lacedaemonians. They thought that the Councils, whether informed of this or not, would be sure to ratify their foregone decision when it was communicated to them. So the plan broke down, and the Corinthian and the Chalcidian envoys went away without effecting their purpose. The Boeotarchs, who had originally intended, if they succeeded, to do their best to effect an alliance with the Argives, gave up the idea of bringing this latter measure before the Councils, and did not fulfil their promise of sending envoys to Argos; but the whole business was neglected and deferred.

39. καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ Μηκύβερναν Ὀλύνθιοι, Ἀθηναίων φρουρούντων, ἐπιδραμόντες εἶλον. [2]μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐγίγνοντο γὰρ αἰεὶ λόγοι τοῖς τε Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις περὶ ὧν εἶχον ἀλλήλων ἐλπίζοντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, εἰ Πάνακτον Ἀθηναῖοι παρὰ Βοιωτῶν ἀπολάβοιεν, κομίσασθαι ἂν αὐτοὶ Πύλον, ἦλθον ἐς τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς πρεσβευόμενοι καὶ ἐδέοντο σφίσι Πάνακτόν τε καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων δεσμώτας παραδοῦναι, ἵνα ἀντ᾽ αὐτῶν Πύλον κομίσωνται. [3] οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀποδώσειν, ἢν μὴ σφίσι ξυμμαχίαν ἰδίαν ποιήσωνται ὥσπερ Ἀθηναίοις. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ εἰδότες μὲν ὅτι ἀδικήσουσιν Ἀθηναίους, εἰρημένον ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μήτε σπένδεσθαί τῳ μήτε πολεμεῖν, βουλόμενοι δὲ τὸ Πάνακτον παραλαβεῖν ὡς τὴν Πύλον ἀντ᾽ αὐτοῦ κομιούμενοι, καὶ ἅμα τῶν ξυγχέαι σπευδόντων τὰς σπονδὰς προθυμουμένων τὰ ἐς Βοιωτούς, ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τοῦ χειμῶνος τελευτῶντος ἤδη καὶ πρὸς ἔαρ: καὶ τὸ Πάνακτον εὐθὺς καθῃρεῖτο. καὶ ἐνδέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

[39] During the same winter the Olynthians made a sudden attack upon Mecyberna, which was held by an Athenian garrison, and took it. The Athenians and Lacedaemonians still continued to negotiate about the places which had not been restored, the Lacedaemonians hoping that, if the Athenians got back Panactum from the Boeotians, they might themselves recover Pylos. So they sent an embassy to the Boeotians, and begged of them to give up Panactum and the Athenian prisoners to themselves, that they might obtain Pylos in return for them. But the Boeotians refused to give them up unless the Lacedaemonians made a separate alliance with them as they had done with the Athenians. Now the Lacedaemonians knew that, if they acceded to this request, they would be dealing unfairly with Athens, because there was a stipulation which forbade either state to make war or peace without the consent of the other; but they were eager to obtain Panactum and thereby, as they hoped, recover Pylos. At the same time the party who

wished to break the peace with Athens were zealous on behalf of the Boeotians. So they made the alliance about the end of winter and the beginning of spring. The Boeotians at once commenced the demolition of Panactum; and the eleventh year of the war ended.

40. ἅμα δὲ τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους οἱ Ἀργεῖοι, ὡς οἵ τε πρέσβεις τῶν Βοιωτῶν οὓς ἔφασαν πέμψειν οὐχ ἥκον τό τε Πάνακτον ᾑσθοντο καθαιρούμενον καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἰδίαν γεγενημένην τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἔδεισαν μὴ μονωθῶσι καὶ ἐς Λακεδαιμονίους πᾶσα ἡ ξυμμαχία χωρήσῃ: [2] τοὺς γὰρ Βοιωτοὺς ᾤοντο πεπεῖσθαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τό τε Πάνακτον καθελεῖν καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδὰς ἐσιέναι, τούς τε Ἀθηναίους εἰδέναι ταῦτα, ὥστε οὐδὲ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἔτι σφίσιν εἶναι ξυμμαχίαν ποιήσασθαι, πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες ἐκ τῶν διαφορῶν, εἰ μὴ μείνειαν αὐτοῖς αἱ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους σπονδαί, τοῖς γοῦν Ἀθηναίοις ξύμμαχοι ἔσεσθαι. [3] ἀποροῦντες οὖν ταῦτα οἱ Ἀργεῖοι, καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Τεγεάταις, Βοιωτοῖς καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἅμα πολεμῶσι, πρότερον οὐ δεχόμενοι τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων σπονδάς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν φρονήματι ὄντες τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἡγήσεσθαι, ἔπεμπον ὡς ἐδύναντο τάχιστα ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις Εὔστροφον καὶ Αἴσωνα, οἳ ἐδόκουν προσφιλέστατοι αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἡγούμενοι ἐκ τῶν παρόντων κράτιστα πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι, ὅπῃ ἂν ξυγχωρῇ, ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν.

[40] Immediately on the commencement of spring, the Argives, observing that the envoys whom the Beeotians promised to send had not arrived, that Panactum was being demolished, and that a private alliance had been made between the Lacedaemonians and the Boeotians, began to fear that they would be isolated, and that the whole confederacy would go over to the Lacedaemonians. For they thought that the Boeotians were demolishing Panactum by the desire of the Lacedaemonians, and had likewise been induced by them to come into the Athenian treaty; and that

the Athenians were cognisant of the whole affair. But, if so, they could no longer form an alliance even with Athens, although they had hitherto imagined that the enmity of the two powers would secure them an alliance with one or the other, and that if they lost the peace with Lacedaemon, they might at any rate become allies of the Athenians. So in their perplexity, fearing that they might have to fight Lacedaemon, Tegea, Boeotia, and Athens, all at once, the Argives, who at the time when they were proudly hoping to be the leaders of Peloponnesus had refused to make a treaty with Lacedaemon, now sent thither two envoys, Eustrophus and Aeson, who were likely to be well regarded by the Spartans. For under present circumstances it seemed to them that nothing better could be done than to make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians on any terms whatever, and keep out of war.

41. καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀφικόμενοι αὐτῶν λόγους ἐποιοῦντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ἂν σφίσιν αἱ σπονδαὶ γίγνοιντο. [2] καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἠξίουν δίκης ἐπιτροπὴν σφίσι γενέσθαι ἢ ἐς πόλιν τινὰ ἢ ἰδιώτην περὶ τῆς Κυνουρίας γῆς, ἧς αἰεὶ πέρι διαφέρονται μεθορίας οὔσης ☐ἔχει δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ Θυρέαν καὶ Ἀνθήνην πόλιν, νέμονται δ᾽ αὐτὴν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ☐ : ἔπειτα δ᾽ οὐκ ἐώντων Λακεδαιμονίων μεμνῆσθαι περὶ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ᾽, εἰ βούλονται σπένδεσθαι ὥσπερ πρότερον, ἑτοῖμοι εἶναι, οἱ Ἀργεῖοι πρέσβεις τάδε ὅμως ἐπηγάγοντο τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ξυγχωρῆσαι, ἐν μὲν τῷ παρόντι σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι ἔτη πεντήκοντα, ἐξεῖναι δ᾽ ὁποτεροισοῦν προκαλεσαμένοις, μήτε νόσου οὔσης μήτε πολέμου Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Ἄργει, διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῆς γῆς ταύτης, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερόν ποτε ὅτε αὐτοὶ ἑκάτεροι ἠξίωσαν νικᾶν, διώκειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι περαιτέρω τῶν πρὸς Ἄργος καὶ Λακεδαίμονα ὅρων. [3] τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα, ἔπειτα ☐ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος πάντως φίλιον ἔχειν ☐ ξυνεχώρησαν ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἠξίουν καὶ ξυνεγράψαντο. ἐκέλευον δ᾽ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρὶν τέλος τι αὐτῶν ἔχειν, ἐς

τὸ Ἄργος πρῶτον ἐπαναχωρήσαντας αὐτοὺς δεῖξαι τῷ πλήθει, καὶ ἢν ἀρέσκοντα ᾖ, ἥκειν ἐς τὰ Ὑακίνθια τοὺς ὅρκους ποιησομένους. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνεχώρησαν:

[41] The envoys arrived, and began to confer with the Lacedaemonians respecting the conditions on which the peace should be made. The Argives at first demanded that the old quarrel about the border-land of Cynuria, a district which contains the cities of Thyrea and Anthenè and is occupied by the Lacedaemonians, should be referred to the arbitration of some state or person. Of this the Lacedaemonians would not allow a word to be said, but they professed their readiness to renew the treaty on the old terms. The Argives at length induced them to make a fifty years' peace, on the understanding however that either Lacedaemon or Argos, provided that neither city were suffering at the time from war or plague, might challenge the other to fight for the disputed territory, as they had done once before when both sides claimed the victory; but the conquered party was not to be pursued over their own border. The Lacedaemonians at first thought that this proposal was nonsense; however, as they were desirous of having the friendship of Argos on any terms, they assented, and drew up a written treaty. But they desired the envoys, before any of the provisions took effect, to return and lay the matter before the people of Argos; if they agreed, they were to come again at the Hyacinthia and take the oaths. So they departed.

42. ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ᾧ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ταῦτα ἔπρασσον, οἱ πρέσβεις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων Ἀνδρομένης καὶ Φαίδιμος καὶ Ἀντιμενίδας, οὓς ἔδει τὸ Πάνακτον καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς παρὰ Βοιωτῶν παραλαβόντας Ἀθηναίοις ἀποδοῦναι, τὸ μὲν Πάνακτον ὑπὸ τῶν Βοιωτῶν αὐτῶν καθῃρημένον ηὗρον, ἐπὶ προφάσει ὡς ἦσάν ποτε Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Βοιωτοῖς ἐκ διαφορᾶς περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅρκοι παλαιοὶ μηδετέρους οἰκεῖν τὸ χωρίον, ἀλλὰ κοινῇ νέμειν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἄνδρας οὓς εἶχον αἰχμαλώτους Βοιωτοὶ Ἀθηναίων παραλαβόντες οἱ περὶ τὸν

Ἀνδρομένη ἐκόμισαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ἀπέδοσαν, τοῦ τε Πανάκτου τὴν καθαίρεσιν ἔλεγον αὐτοῖς, νομίζοντες καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδιδόναι: πολέμιον γὰρ οὐκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναίοις οἰκήσειν οὐδένα. [2] λεγομένων δὲ τούτων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεινὰ ἐποίουν, νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τοῦ τε Πανάκτου τῇ καθαιρέσει, ὃ ἔδει ὀρθὸν παραδοῦναι, καὶ πυνθανόμενοι ὅτι καὶ Βοιωτοῖς ἰδίᾳ ξυμμαχίαν πεποίηνται, φάσκοντες πρότερον κοινῇ τοὺς μὴ δεχομένους τὰς σπονδὰς προσαναγκάσειν. τά τε ἄλλα ἐσκόπουν ὅσα ἐξελελοίπεσαν τῆς ξυνθήκης καὶ ἐνόμιζον ἐξηπατῆσθαι, ὥστε χαλεπῶς πρὸς τοὺς πρέσβεις ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀπέπεμψαν.

[42] While the Argives were thus engaged, the envoys ofthe Lacedaemonians — Andromedes, Phaedimus, and Antimenidas — who were appointed to receive Panactum and the prisoners from the Boeotians, and give them up to the Athenians, found Panactum already demolished by the Boeotians. They alleged that the Athenians and Boeotians in days of old had quarrelled about the place, and had sworn that neither of them should inhabit it, but both enjoy the use of it. However, Andromedes and his colleagues conveyed the Athenian prisoners who were in the hands of the Boeotians to Athens, and restored them; they further announced the destruction of Panactum, maintaining that they were restoring that too, inasmuch as no enemy of the Athenians could any longer dwell there. Their words raised a violent outcry among the Athenians; they felt that the Lacedaemonians were dealing unfairly with them in two respects: first, there was the demolition of Panactum, which should have been delivered standing; secondly, they were informed of the separate alliance which the Lacedaemonians had made with the Boeotians, notwithstanding their promise that they would join in coercing those who did not accept the peace. They called to mind all their other shortcomings in the fulfilment of the treaty, and conscious that they had

been deceived, they answered the envoys roughly, and sent them away.

43. κατὰ τοιαύτην δὴ διαφορὰν ὄντων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οἱ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις αὖ βουλόμενοι λῦσαι τὰς σπονδὰς εὐθὺς ἐνέκειντο. [2] ἦσαν δὲ ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ἔτι τότε ὢν νέος ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος: ᾧ ἐδόκει μὲν καὶ ἄμεινον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους μᾶλλον χωρεῖν, οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονικῶν ἠναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς σπονδάς, ἑαυτὸν κατά τε τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἢν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων διενοεῖτο ἀνανεώσασθαι. [3] πανταχόθεν τε νομίζων ἐλασσοῦσθαι τό τε πρῶτον ἀντεῖπεν, οὐ βεβαίους φάσκων εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα Ἀργείους σφίσι σπεισάμενοι ἐξέλωσι καὶ αὖθις ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίους μόνους ἴωσι, τούτου ἕνεκα σπένδεσθαι αὐτούς, καὶ τότε, ἐπειδὴ ἡ διαφορὰ ἐγεγένητο, πέμπει εὐθὺς ἐς Ἄργος ἰδίᾳ, κελεύων ὡς τάχιστα ἐπὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προκαλουμένους ἥκειν μετὰ Μαντινέων καὶ Ἠλείων, ὡς καιροῦ ὄντος καὶ αὐτὸς ξυμπράξων τὰ μάλιστα.

[43] When the difference between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians had gone thus far, the war party at Athens in their turn lost no time in pressing their views. Foremost among them was Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, a man who would have been thought young in any other city, but was influential by reason of his high descent: he sincerely preferred the Argive alliance, but at the same time he took part against the Lacedaemonians from temper, and because his pride was touched. For they had not consulted him, but had negotiated the peace through Nicias and Laches, despising his youth, and disregarding an ancient connexion with his family, who had been their proxeni; a connexion which his grandfather had renounced, and he, by the attention which he had paid to the captives from Sphacteria,

had hoped to have renewed. Piqued at the small respect which was shown to all his claims, he had originally opposed the negotiations; declaring that the Lacedaemonians were not to be trusted, and that their only object in making terms was that they might by Athenian help crush the Argives, and afterwards attack the Athenians themselves when they had no friends. As soon as the rupture occurred he promptly despatched a private message to the Argives, bidding them send an embassy as quickly as they could, together with representatives of Mantinea and Elis, and invite the Athenians to enter the alliance; now was the time, and he would do his utmost to assist them.

44. οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι ἀκούσαντες τῆς τε ἀγγελίας καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔγνωσαν οὐ μετ᾽ Ἀθηναίων πραχθεῖσαν τὴν τῶν Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς διαφορὰν μεγάλην καθεστῶτας αὐτοὺς πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, τῶν μὲν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι πρέσβεων, οἳ σφίσι περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν ἔτυχον ἀπόντες, ἠμέλουν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μᾶλλον τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, νομίζοντες πόλιν τε σφίσι φιλίαν ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ καὶ δημοκρατουμένην ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην ἔχουσαν τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ξυμπολεμήσειν σφίσιν, ἢν καθιστῶνται ἐς πόλεμον. [2] ἔπεμπον οὖν εὐθὺς πρέσβεις ὡς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας: ξυνεπρεσβεύοντο δὲ καὶ Ἠλεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς. [3]ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις κατὰ τάχος, δοκοῦντες ἐπιτήδειοι εἶναι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, Φιλοχαρίδας καὶ Λέων καὶ Ἔνδιος, δείσαντες μὴ τήν τε ξυμμαχίαν ὀργιζόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους ποιήσωνται, καὶ ἅμα Πύλον ἀπαιτήσοντες ἀντὶ Πανάκτου καὶ περὶ τῆς Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίας ἀπολογησόμενοι, ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐποιήσαντο.

[44] The Argives received his message, and thus became aware that the alliance with the Boeotians had been made without the consent of the Athenians, and that a violent quarrel had broken out between Athens and Lacedaemon. So they thought no more about their ambassadors who were at that very moment negotiating the peace with Lacedaemon,

but turned their thoughts towards Athens. They reflected that Athens was a city which had been their friend of old; like their own it was governed by a democracy, and would be a powerful ally to them at sea, if they were involved in war. They at once sent envoys to negotiate an alliance with the Athenians; the Eleans and Mantineans joined in the embassy. Thither also came in haste three envoys from Lacedaemon, who were thought likely to be acceptable at Athens — Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius. They were sent because the Lacedaemonians were afraid that the Athenians in their anger would join the Argive alliance. The envoys while they demanded the restoration of Pylos in return for Panactum, were to apologise for the alliance with the Boeotians, and to explain that it was not made with any view to the injury of Athens.

45. καὶ λέγοντες ἐν τῇ βουλῇ περί τε τούτων καὶ ὡς αὐτοκράτορες ἥκουσι περὶ πάντων ξυμβῆναι τῶν διαφόρων, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐφόβουν μὴ καί, ἢν ἐς τὸν δῆμον ταῦτα λέγωσιν, ἐπαγάγωνται τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀπωσθῇ ἡ Ἀργείων ξυμμαχία. [2] μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοιόνδε τι ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης: τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει πίστιν αὐτοῖς δούς, ἢν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν, Πύλον τε αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἀντιλέγειν καὶ τἆλλα ξυναλλάξειν. [3] βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε ἀποστῆσαι ταῦτα ἔπρασσε καὶ ὅπως ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὡς οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταὐτά, τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ. καὶ ἐγένετο οὕτως. [4] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐς τὸν δῆμον παρελθόντες καὶ ἐπερωτώμενοι οὐκ ἔφασαν ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ἠνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐσήκουόν τε καὶ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγόντες τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ξυμμάχους ποιεῖσθαι: σεισμοῦ δὲ γενομένου πρίν τι ἐπικυρωθῆναι, ἡ ἐκκλησία αὖτη ἀνεβλήθη.

[45] They delivered their message to the council, adding that they came with full power to treat about all differences. Alcibiades took alarm; he feared that if the envoys made a similar statement to the people they would win them over to their side, and that the Argive alliance would be rejected. Whereupon he devised the following trick: he solemnly assured the Lacedaemonians that if they would not communicate to the people the extent of their powers, he would restore Pylos to them, for he would use his influence in their favour instead of against them, and would arrange their other differences. But his real aim all the time was to alienate them from Nicias, and to bring about an alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, which he hoped to effect, if he could only discredit them in the assembly, and create the impression that their intentions were not honest, and that they never told the same tale twice. And he succeeded; for when the envoys appeared before the assembly, and in answer to the question whether they had full powers replied ‘No,’ in direct contradiction to what they had said in the council, the patience of the Athenians was exhausted, and Alcibiades declaimed against the Lacedaemonians more violently than ever. The people were carried away and were ready to have in the Argives, and make an alliance with them and their confederates on the spot. But an earthquake occurred before the final vote was taken, and the assembly was adjourned.

46. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὁ Νικίας, καίπερ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων αὐτῶν ἠπατημένων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐξηπατημένος περὶ τοῦ μὴ αὐτοκράτορας ὁμολογῆσαι ἥκειν, ὅμως τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔφη χρῆναι φίλους μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπισχόντας τὰ πρὸς Ἀργείους πέμψαι ἔτι ὡς αὐτοὺς καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι διανοοῦνται, λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῷ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι: σφίσι μὲν γὰρ εὖ ἑστώτων τῶν πραγμάτων ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἄριστον εἶναι διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐπραγίαν, ἐκείνοις δὲ δυστυχοῦσιν ὅτι τάχιστα εὕρημα εἶναι διακινδυνεῦσαι. [2] ἔπεισέ τε πέμψαι πρέσβεις, ὧν καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν, κελεύσοντας Λακεδαιμονίους, εἴ τι δίκαιον διανοοῦνται, Πάνακτόν τε ὀρθὸν ἀποδιδόναι καὶ Ἀμφίπολιν, καὶ τὴν Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχίαν ἀνεῖναι, ἢν μὴ ἐς τὰς σπονδὰς ἐσίωσι, καθάπερ εἴρητο ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδενὶ ξυμβαίνειν. [3] εἰπεῖν τε ἐκέλευον ὅτι καὶ σφεῖς, εἰ ἐβούλοντο ἀδικεῖν, ἤδη ἂν Ἀργείους ξυμμάχους πεποιῆσθαι, ὡς παρεῖναί γ᾽ αὐτοὺς αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα. εἴ τέ τι ἄλλο ἐνεκάλουν, πάντα ἐπιστείλαντες ἀπέπεμψαν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικίαν πρέσβεις. [4]καὶ ἀφικομένων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπαγγειλάντων τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τέλος εἰπόντων ὅτι εἰ μὴ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν ἀνήσουσι Βοιωτοῖς μὴ ἐσιοῦσιν ἐς τὰς σπονδάς, ποιήσονται καὶ αὐτοὶ Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ξυμμάχους, τὴν μὲν ξυμμαχίαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Βοιωτοῖς οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀνήσειν, ἐπικρατούντων τῶν περὶ τὸν Ξενάρη τὸν ἔφορον ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν, τοὺς δὲ ὅρκους δεομένου Νικίου ἀνενεώσαντο: ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ μὴ πάντα ἀτελῆ ἔχων ἀπέλθῃ καὶ διαβληθῇ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο, αἴτιος δοκῶν εἶναι τῶν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους σπονδῶν. [5] ἀναχωρήσαντός τε αὐτοῦ ὡς ἤκουσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος πεπραγμένον, εὐθὺς δι᾽ ὀργῆς εἶχον, καὶ νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔτυχον γὰρ παρόντες οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι παραγαγόντος Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐποιήσαντο σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τήνδε.

[46] The trick which had deceived the Lacedaemonians themselves completely deceived Nicias, who could not

understand the disavowal of their powers. Nevertheless in the assembly which met on the following day he still continued to maintain that the Athenians ought to prefer the friendship of Sparta, and not to conclude the Argive alliance until they had sent to the Lacedaemonians and ascertained their intentions. He urged them not to renew the war now, when it could be put off with honour to themselves and discredit to the Lacedaemonians; they were successful and should seek to preserve their good fortune as long as they could, but the Lacedaemonians were in a bad way, and would be only too glad to fight as soon as possible at all hazards. And he prevailed on them to send envoys, of whom he was himself one, requiring the Lacedaemonians, if they were sincere in their intentions, to rebuild and restore Panactum, to restore Amphipolis, and to renounce their alliance with the Boeotians unless they came into the treaty, according to the stipulation which forbade the contracting parties to make a new alliance except by mutual consent. If we, they added, had wanted to deal unfairly, we should already have accepted an alliance with the Argives, whose ambassadors have come hither to offer it. They entrusted the representation of these and their other grievances to Nicias and his colleagues, and sent them away to Sparta. These, on their arrival, delivered their message, which they concluded by declaring that, unless the Lacedaemonians renounced their alliance with the Boeotians in case the latter still refused to accept the peace, the Athenians on their part would enter into an alliance with the Argives and their confederates. The Lacedaemonians refused to give up their Boeotian alliance, Xenares the Ephor, with his friends and partisans, carrying this point. However they consented to ratify their former oaths at the request of Nicias, who was afraid that he would return without having settled anything, and would incur the blame of failure, as indeed he did, because he was held to be responsible for the original treaty with the Lacedaemonians. When the Athenians learned on

his return that the negotiations with Sparta had miscarried, they were furious; and acting under a sense of injustice, entered into an alliance with the Argives and their allies, whose ambassadors were present at the time, for Alcibiades had introduced them on purpose. The terms were as follows:

47. ‘σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο ἑκατὸν Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτη καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἠλεῖοι <πρὸς ἀλλήλους >, ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι, ἀδόλους καὶ ἀβλαβεῖς καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [2] ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐξέστω ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ πημονῇ μήτε Ἀργείους καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ὧν ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι μήτε Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους <ὧν ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι> ἐπὶ Ἀργείους καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, τέχνῃ μηδὲ μηχανῇ μηδεμιᾷ. [3] κατὰ τάδε ξυμμάχους εἶναι Ἀθηναίους καὶ Ἀργείους καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ Ἠλείους ἑκατὸν ἔτη. ἢν πολέμιοι ἴωσιν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν Ἀθηναίων, βοηθεῖν Ἀργείους καὶ Μαντινέας καὶ Ἠλείους Ἀθήναζε, καθ᾽ ὅτι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, τρόπῳ ὁποίῳ ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: ἢν δὲ δῃώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Ἀργείοις καὶ Μαντινεῦσι καὶ Ἠλείοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἁπασῶν τῶν πόλεων τούτων: καταλύειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ταύτην τὴν πόλιν μηδεμιᾷ τῶν πόλεων, ἢν μὴ ἁπάσαις δοκῇ. [4] βοηθεῖν δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἐς Ἄργος καὶ Μαντίνειαν καὶ Ἦλιν, ἢν πολέμιοι ἴωσιν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν Ἀργείων ἢ τὴν Μαντινέων ἢ τὴν Ἠλείων, καθ᾽ ὅτι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν αἱ πόλεις αὗται, τρόπῳ ὁποίῳ ἂν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: ἢν δὲ δῃώσαντες οἴχωνται, πολεμίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις καὶ Μαντινεῦσι καὶ Ἠλείοις καὶ κακῶς πάσχειν ὑπὸ ἁπασῶν τούτων τῶν πόλεων: καταλύειν δὲ μὴ ἐξεῖναι τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ταύτην τὴν πόλιν <μηδεμιᾷ τῶν πόλεων>, ἢν μὴ ἁπάσαις δοκῇ [ταῖς πόλεσιν]. [5] ὅπλα δὲ μὴ ἐᾶν ἔχοντας διιέναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ διὰ τῆς γῆς τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἕκαστοι, μηδὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἢν μὴ

ψηφισαμένων τῶν πόλεων ἁπασῶν τὴν δίοδον εἶναι, Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἀργείων καὶ Μαντινέων καὶ Ἠλείων. [6] τοῖς δὲ βοηθοῦσιν ἡ πόλις ἡ πέμπουσα παρεχέτω μέχρι μὲν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν σῖτον, ἐπὴν ἔλθωσιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἐπαγγείλασαν βοηθεῖν, καὶ ἀπιοῦσι κατὰ ταὐτά: ἢν δὲ πλέονα βούληται χρόνον τῇ στρατιᾷ χρῆσθαι, ἡ πόλις ἡ μεταπεμψαμένη διδότω σῖτον, τῷ μὲν ὁπλίτῃ καὶ ψιλῷ καὶ τοξότῃ τρεῖς ὀβολοὺς Αἰγιναίους τῆς ἡμέρας ἑκάστης, τῷ δ᾽ ἱππεῖ δραχμὴν Αἰγιναίαν. [7] ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡ μεταπεμψαμένη <τῇ στρατιᾷ> τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχέτω, ὅταν ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς ὁ πόλεμος ᾖ: ἢν δέ ποι δόξῃ <ἁπάσαις > ταῖς πόλεσι κοινῇ στρατεύεσθαι, τὸ ἴσον τῆς ἡγεμονίας μετεῖναι ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν. [8] ὀμόσαι δὲ τὰς σπονδὰς Ἀθηναίους μὲν ὑπέρ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἠλεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τούτων κατὰ πόλεις ὀμνύντων. ὀμνύντων δὲ τὸν ἐπιχώριον ὅρκον ἕκαστοι τὸν μέγιστον κατὰ ἱερῶν τελείων. ὁ δὲ ὅρκος ἔστω ὅδε: “ἐμμενῶ τῇ ξυμμαχίᾳ κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα δικαίως καὶ ἀβλαβῶς καὶ ἀδόλως, καὶ οὐ παραβήσομαι τέχνῃ οὐδὲ μηχανῇ οὐδεμιᾷ.” [9] ὀμνύντων δὲ Ἀθήνησι μὲν ἡ βουλὴ καὶ αἱ ἔνδημοι ἀρχαί, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ πρυτάνεις: ἐν Ἄργει δὲ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ οἱ ἀρτῦναι, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα: ἐν δὲ Μαντινείᾳ οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρχαί, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ θεωροὶ καὶ οἱ πολέμαρχοι: ἐν δὲ Ἤλιδι οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ ἑξακόσιοι, ἐξορκούντων δὲ οἱ δημιουργοὶ καὶ οἱ θεσμοφύλακες. [10] ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ τοὺς ὅρκους Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἰόντας ἐς Ἦλιν καὶ ἐς Μαντίνειαν καὶ ἐς Ἄργος τριάκοντα ἡμέραις πρὸ Ὀλυμπίων, Ἀργείους δὲ καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Μαντινέας ἰόντας Ἀθήναζε δέκα ἡμέραις πρὸ Παναθηναίων τῶν μεγάλων. [11] τὰς δὲ ξυνθήκας τὰς περὶ τῶν σπονδῶν καὶ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἀναγράψαι ἐν στήλῃ λιθίνῃ Ἀθηναίους μὲν ἐν πόλει, Ἀργείους δὲ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τῷ ἱερῷ, Μαντινέας δὲ ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τῷ ἱερῷ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ: καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκῆν κοινῇ Ὀλυμπίοις τοῖς νυνί. [12] ἐὰν δέ τι δοκῇ

ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῖς πόλεσι ταύταις προσθεῖναι πρὸς τοῖς ξυγκειμένοις, ὅτι [δ᾽] ἂν δόξῃ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἁπάσαις κοινῇ βουλευομέναις, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι.’

[47] ‘I. The Athenians and the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, on their own behalf and that of the allies over whom they severally rule, make a peace to continue for a hundred years both by sea and land, without fraud or hurt. The Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies shall not make war against the Athenians and the allies over whom they rule, and the Athenians and their allies shall not make war against the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies, in any sort or manner.’II. Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea shall be allied for a hundred years on the following conditions: — If enemies invade the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to Athens and render the Athenians any assistance which they may demand of them, in the most effectual manner, and to the utmost of their power. And if the enemy spoil their territory and depart, the offending city shall be an enemy to Argos, Mantinea, Elis, and Athens, and suffer at the hands of all these cities; and it shall not be lawful for any of them to make peace with the offending city, unless they have the consent of all the rest. And if enemies shall invade the territory of the Eleans or Argives or Mantineans, the Athenians shall go to Argos, Mantinea, or Elis, and render these cities any assistance which they may demand of them, in the most effectual manner, and to the utmost of their power. If an enemy spoil their territory and depart, the offending city shall be an enemy to Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, and shall suffer at the hands of all these cities; and it shall not be lawful for any of them to make peace with the offending city, unless they have the consent of all the rest.’III. The confederates shall not allow armed men to pass through their own territory, or that of the allies over whom they severally rule or may rule, or to pass by sea, with hostile intent, unless all the cities have formally consented

to their passage — that is to say, Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis.’IV. The city which sends troops to help another shall supply them with provisions for thirty days, counting from the time of their arrival at the city which summons them; it shall also provide for them at their departure. But if the city which summons the troops wishes to employ them for a longer time, it shall give them provisions at the rate of three Aeginetan obols a day for heavy-armed and light-armed troops and for archers, and an Aeginetan drachma for cavalry.’V. The city which sent for the troops shall have the command when the war is carried on in her territory. Or, if the allied cities agree to send out a joint expedition, then the command shall be equally shared among all the cities.’VI. The Athenians shall swear to the peace on their own behalf and on that of their allies; the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans, and their allies shall swear city by city. The oath shall be taken over full-grown victims, and shall be that oath which in the countries of the several contracting parties is deemed the most binding. The form of oath shall be as follows:”I will be true to the alliance, and will observe the agreement in all honesty and without fraud or hurt; I will not transgress it in any way or manner.”’At Athens the senate and the home magistrates shall swear, and the prytanes shall administer the oath; at Argos the senate and the council of eighty and the artynae shall swear, and the eighty shall administer the oath; at Mantinea the demiurgi and the senate and the other magistrates shall swear, and the theori and the polemarchs shall administer the oath. At Elis the demiurgi and the supreme magistrates and the six hundred shall swear, and the demiurgi and the guardians of the law shall administer the oath. Thirty days before the Olympian games the Athenians shall go to Elis, to Mantinea, and to Argos, and renew the oath. Ten days before the Great Panathenaea the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to Athens and renew the oath. The agreement concerning the treaty and the oaths and the alliance shall

be inscribed on a stone column in the Acropolis by the Athenians, by the Argives on a similar column in the temple of Apollo in the Agora, and by the Mantineans in the temple of Zeus in the Agora. They shall together erect at Olympia a brazen column at the coming Olympic games. And if these cities think it desirable to make any improvement in the treaty, they shall add it to the provisions of it. Whatever the cities agree upon in common shall hold good.

48. αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ καὶ ἡ ξυμμαχία οὕτως ἐγένοντο, καὶ αἱ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἀπείρηντο τούτου ἕνεκα οὐδ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων. [2] Κορίνθιοι δὲ Ἀργείων ὄντες ξύμμαχοι οὐκ ἐσῆλθον ἐς αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ γενομένης πρὸ τούτου Ἠλείοις καὶ Ἀργείοις καὶ Μαντινεῦσι ξυμμαχίας, τοῖς αὐτοῖς πολεμεῖν καὶ εἰρήνην ἄγειν, οὐ ξυνώμοσαν, ἀρκεῖν δ᾽ ἔφασαν σφίσι τὴν πρώτην γενομένην ἐπιμαχίαν, ἀλλήλοις βοηθεῖν, ξυνεπιστρατεύειν δὲ μηδενί. [3] οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι οὕτως ἀπέστησαν τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πάλιν τὴν γνώμην εἶχον.

[48] Thus the peace and the alliance were concluded. Nevertheless the previous treaty between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians was not on that account renounced by either party. The Corinthians, although allies of the Argives, took no part in the new alliance; they had already refused to swear to an offensive and defensive alliance which the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans had previously made with one another. They said that they were satisfied with the original defensive alliance which bound them only to assist one another when attacked, but not to join in offensive movements. Thus the Corinthians severed themselves from the allies, and were again beginning to turn their thoughts to the Lacedaemonians.

49. Ὀλύμπια δ᾽ ἐγένετο τοῦ θέρους τούτου, οἷς Ἀνδροσθένης Ἀρκὰς παγκράτιον τὸ πρῶτον ἐνίκα: καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῦ ἱεροῦ ὑπὸ Ἠλείων εἴρχθησαν ὥστε μὴ θύειν μηδ᾽ ἀγωνίζεσθαι, οὐκ ἐκτίνοντες τὴν δίκην αὐτοῖς ἣν ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιακῷ νόμῳ Ἠλεῖοι κατεδικάσαντο αὐτῶν

φάσκοντες <ἐς > σφᾶς ἐπὶ Φύρκον τε τεῖχος ὅπλα ἐπενεγκεῖν καὶ ἐς Λέπρεον αὐτῶν ὁπλίτας ἐν ταῖς Ὀλυμπιακαῖς σπονδαῖς ἐσπέμψαι. ἡ δὲ καταδίκη δισχίλιαι μναῖ ἦσαν, κατὰ τὸν ὁπλίτην ἕκαστον δύο μναῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ νόμος ἔχει. [2] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πρέσβεις πέμψαντες ἀντέλεγον μὴ δικαίως σφῶν καταδεδικάσθαι, λέγοντες μὴ ἐπηγγέλθαι πω ἐς Λακεδαίμονα τὰς σπονδάς, ὅτ᾽ ἐσέπεμψαν τοὺς ὁπλίτας. [3] Ἠλεῖοι δὲ τὴν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐκεχειρίαν ἤδη ἔφασαν εἶναι □πρώτοις γὰρ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαγγέλλουσιν□, καὶ ἡσυχαζόντων σφῶν καὶ οὐ προσδεχομένων ὡς ἐν σπονδαῖς, αὐτοὺς λαθεῖν ἀδικήσαντας. [4] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπελάμβανον οὐ χρεὼν εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἐπαγγεῖλαι ἔτι ἐς Λακεδαίμονα, εἰ ἀδικεῖν γε ἤδη ἐνόμιζον αὐτούς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς νομίζοντας τοῦτο δρᾶσαι, καὶ ὅπλα οὐδαμόσε ἔτι αὐτοῖς ἐπενεγκεῖν. [5] Ἠλεῖοι δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου εἴχοντο, ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἀδικοῦσι μὴ ἂν πεισθῆναι, εἰ δὲ βούλονται σφίσι Λέπρεον ἀποδοῦναι, τό τε αὐτῶν μέρος ἀφιέναι τοῦ ἀργυρίου, καὶ ὃ τῷ θεῷ γίγνεται αὐτοὶ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ἐκτίσειν.

[49] During the summer the Olympic games were celebrated, the Olympiad being that in which Androsthenes, an Arcadian, won his first victory in the pancratium. The Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple by the Eleans, and so could neither sacrifice nor contend in the games. For they had refused to pay the fine which, according to Olympic law, the Eleans had imposed upon them, alleging that they had brought an armed force against the fortress of Phyrcus, and had introduced some hoplites of their own into Lepreum during the Olympic truce. The fine amounted to two thousand minae, being two minae for each hoplite, which is the penalty imposed by the law. The Lacedaemonians sent envoys who argued that the sentence was unjust, for at the time when their troops entered Lepreum the truce had not been announced at Lacedaemon. The Eleans replied that the truce (which they always proclaim first to themselves) had already begun with them,

and that while they were quietly observing the truce, and expecting nothing less, the Lacedaemonians had treacherously attacked them. The Lacedaemonians rejoined by asking why the Eleans proclaimed the truce at all at Lacedaemon if they considered them to have broken it already — they could not really have thought so when they made the proclamation; and from the moment when the announcement reached Lacedaemon all hostilities had ceased. The Eleans were still positive that the Lacedaemonians were in the wrong, and said that they would never be persuaded of the contrary. But if the Lacedaemonians were willing to restore Lepreum to them, they offered to remit their own share of the penalty, and pay on their behalf that part which was due to the God.

50. ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐσήκουον, αὖθις τάδε ἠξίουν, Λέπρεον μὲν μὴ ἀποδοῦναι, εἰ μὴ βούλονται, ἀναβάντας δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου, ἐπειδὴ προθυμοῦνται χρῆσθαι τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐπομόσαι ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦ μὴν ἀποδώσειν ὕστερον τὴν καταδίκην. [2] ὡς δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἤθελον, Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἴργοντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ [θυσίας καὶ ἀγώνων] καὶ οἴκοι ἔθυον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἐθεώρουν πλὴν Λεπρεατῶν. [3] ὅμως δὲ οἱ Ἠλεῖοι δεδιότες μὴ βίᾳ θύσωσι, ξὺν ὅπλοις τῶν νεωτέρων φυλακὴν εἶχον: ἦλθον δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς, χίλιοι ἑκατέρων, καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἱππῆς, οἳ ἐν Ἀρπίνῃ ὑπέμενον τὴν ἑορτήν. [4] δέος δ᾽ ἐγένετο τῇ πανηγύρει μέγα μὴ ξὺν ὅπλοις ἔλθωσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ὑπὸ τῶν ῥαβδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς ἀγωνίσεως προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος δηλῶσαι ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἅρμα: ὥστε πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐπεφόβηντο πάντες καὶ ἐδόκει τι νέον ἔσεσθαι. οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἡσύχασάν τε καὶ ἡ ἑορτὴ αὐτοῖς οὕτω διῆλθεν. [5]ἐς δὲ Κόρινθον μετὰ τὰ Ὀλύμπια Ἀργεῖοί τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀφίκοντο δεησόμενοι αὐτῶν παρὰ σφᾶς ἐλθεῖν.

καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις ἔτυχον παρόντες, καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων τέλος οὐδὲν ἐπράχθη, ἀλλὰ σεισμοῦ γενομένου διελύθησαν ἕκαστοι ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[50] As this proposal was rejected, the Eleans made another: the Lacedaemonians need not give up Lepreum if they did not like, but since they wanted to have access to the temple of Olympian Zeus, they might go up to his altar and swear before all the Hellenes that they would hereafter pay the fine. But neither to this offer would the Lacedaemonians agree; they were therefore excluded from the temple and from the sacrifices and games, and sacrificed at home. The other Hellenes, with the exception of the people of Lepreum, sent representatives to Olympia. The Eleans however, fearing that the Lacedaemonians would force their way into the temple and offer sacrifice, had a guard of young men under arms; there came to their aid likewise a thousand Argives, and a thousand Mantineans, and certain Athenian horsemen, who had been awaiting the celebration of the festival at Argos. The whole assembly were in terror lest the Lacedaemonians should come upon them in arms, and their fears were redoubled when Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus, was struck by the officers. As a Lacedaemonian he had been excluded from the lists, but his chariot had been entered in the name of the Boeotian state, and was declared victorious. He had then come forward into the arena and placed a garland on the head of his charioteer, wishing to show that the chariot was his own. When the blows were given the anxiety became intense, and every one thought that something serious would happen. But the Lacedaemonians did not stir, and the festival passed off quietly.The Olympic games being over, the Argives and their allies went to Corinth, and requested the Corinthians to join them. An embassy from Lacedaemon was also present. After much discussion nothing was concluded, for an earthquake broke

up the assembly, and the envoys from the several states returned home. So the summer ended.

51. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Ἡρακλεώταις τοῖς ἐν Τραχῖνι μάχη ἐγένετο πρὸς Αἰνιᾶνας καὶ Δόλοπας καὶ Μηλιᾶς καὶ Θεσσαλῶν τινάς. [2] προσοικοῦντα γὰρ τὰ ἔθνη ταῦτα τῇ πόλει πολέμια ἦν: οὐ γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῃ τινὶ γῇ ἢ τῇ τούτων τὸ χωρίον ἐτειχίσθη. καὶ εὐθύς τε καθισταμένῃ τῇ πόλει ἠναντιοῦντο ἐς ὅσον ἐδύναντο φθείροντες καὶ τότε τῇ μάχῃ ἐνίκησαν τοὺς Ἡρακλεώτας, καὶ Ξενάρης ὁ Κνίδιος Λακεδαιμόνιος ἄρχων αὐτῶν ἀπέθανε, διεφθάρησαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ δωδέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

[51] In the following winter there was a battle between the Heracleans of Trachis and the Oenianians, Dolopes, Malians, and certain Thessalians. These were neighbouring tribes hostile to the place, for it was in order to control them that it was originally fortified; they had been enemies to it from the first, and had done it all the damage in their power. In this battle they gained a victory over the Heracleans. Xenares, son of Cnidis, the Lacedaemonian governor, and many of the Heracleans were killed. Thus ended the winter, and with it the twelfth year of the war.

52. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου τὴν Ἡράκλειαν, ὡς μετὰ τὴν μάχην κακῶς ἐφθείρετο, Βοιωτοὶ παρέλαβον, καὶ Ἀγησιππίδαν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἄρχοντα ἐξέπεμψαν. δείσαντες δὲ παρέλαβον τὸ χωρίον μὴ Λακεδαιμονίων τὰ κατὰ Πελοπόννησον θορυβουμένων Ἀθηναῖοι λάβωσιν: Λακεδαιμόνιοι μέντοι ὠργίζοντο αὐτοῖς. [2] καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου στρατηγὸς ὢν Ἀθηναίων, Ἀργείων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ξυμπρασσόντων, ἐλθὼν ἐς Πελοπόννησον μετ᾽ ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων παραλαβὼν τά τε ἄλλα ξυγκαθίστη περὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν διαπορευόμενος Πελοπόννησον τῇ στρατιᾷ, καὶ Πατρέας τε τείχη καθεῖναι ἔπεισεν ἐς θάλασσαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἕτερον διενοεῖτο τειχίσαι ἐπὶ τῷ Ῥίῳ τῷ Ἀχαϊκῷ. Κορίνθιοι

δὲ καὶ Σικυώνιοι, καὶ οἷς ἦν ἐν βλάβῃ τειχισθὲν βοηθήσαντες διεκώλυσαν.

[52] At the beginning of the following summer the Boeotians took possession of Heraclea, which after the battle was in a miserable plight. They dismissed Hegesippidas, the Lacedaemonian governor, for his misconduct, and occupied the place themselves. They were afraid that now, when the Lacedaemonians were embroiled in Peloponnesus, the Athenians would take it if they did not. But, for all that, the Lacedaemonians were offended.During the same summer, Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, now one of the Athenian generals, acting in concert with the Argives and their allies, led into Peloponnesus a small Athenian force of hoplites and archers. He collected other troops from the Athenian allies in the Peloponnese, and, marching with his army through the country, organised the affairs of the confederacy. Coming to Patrae, he persuaded the citizens to build walls reaching down to the sea. He was intending also to erect a fort himself on the promontory of Rhium in Achaia. But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and others to whose interests the fort would have been injurious, came and prevented him.

53. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους Ἐπιδαυρίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις πόλεμος ἐγένετο, προφάσει μὲν περὶ τοῦ θύματος τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Πυθαέως, ὃ δέον ἀπαγαγεῖν οὐκ ἀπέπεμπον ὑπὲρ βοταμίων Ἐπιδαύριοι □κυριώτατοι δὲ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἦσαν Ἀργεῖοι□: ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῆς αἰτίας τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον τῷ τε Ἀλκιβιάδῃ καὶ τοῖς Ἀργείοις προσλαβεῖν, ἢν δύνωνται, τῆς τε Κορίνθου ἕνεκα ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς Αἰγίνης βραχυτέραν ἔσεσθαι τὴν βοήθειαν ἢ Σκύλλαιον περιπλεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. παρεσκευάζοντο οὖν οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ὡς αὐτοὶ ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον διὰ τοῦ θύματος τὴν ἔσπραξιν ἐσβαλοῦντες.

[53] In the same summer there broke out a war between the Epidaurians and the Argives. The occasion of the war was as follows: The Epidaurians were bound to send a victim as a tribute for the meadows to the temple of Apollo Pythaeus over which the Argives had chief authority, and they had not

done so. But this charge was a mere pretext; for in any case Alcibiades and the Argives had determined, if possible, to attach Epidaurus to their league, that they might keep the Corinthians quiet, and enable the Athenians to bring forces to Argos direct from Aegina instead of sailing round the promontory of Scyllaeum. So the Argives prepared to invade Epidauria, as if they wished on their own account to exact payment of the sacrifice.

54. ἐξεστράτευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους πανδημεὶ ἐς Λεῦκτρα τῆς ἑαυτῶν μεθορίας πρὸς τὸ Λύκαιον, Ἄγιδος τοῦ Ἀρχιδάμου βασιλέως ἡγουμένου: ᾔδει δὲ οὐδεὶς ὅποι στρατεύουσιν, οὐδὲ αἱ πόλεις ἐξ ὧν ἐπέμφθησαν. [2] ὡς δ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὰ διαβατήρια θυομένοις οὐ προυχώρει, αὐτοί τε ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις περιήγγειλαν μετὰ τὸν μέλλοντα Καρνεῖος δ᾽ ἦν μήν, ἱερομηνία Δωριεῦσι παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς στρατευσομένους. [3] Ἀργεῖοι δ᾽ ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνείου μηνὸς ἐξελθόντες τετράδι φθίνοντος, καὶ ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν καὶ ἐδῄουν. [4] Ἐπιδαύριοι δὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπεκαλοῦντο: ὧν τινὲς οἱ μὲν τὸν μῆνα προυφασίσαντο, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς μεθορίαν τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας ἐλθόντες ἡσύχαζον.

[54] About the same time the Lacedaemonians with their whole force, under the command of king Agis the son of Archidamus, likewise made an expedition. They marched as far as Leuctra, a place on their own frontier in the direction of Mount Lycaeum. No one, not even the cities whence the troops came, knew whither the expedition was going. But at the frontier the sacrifices proved unfavourable; so they returned, and sent word to their allies that, when the coming month was over, which was Carneus, a month held sacred by the Dorians, they should prepare for an expedition. When they had retreated, the Argives, setting out on the twenty-seventh day of the month before Carneus, and continuing the observance of this day during the whole time of the expedition, invaded and devastated the territory of

Epidaurus. The Epidaurians summoned their allies, but some of them refused to come, pleading the sanctity of the month; others came as far as the frontier of Epidauria and there stopped.

55. καὶ καθ᾽ ὃν χρόνον ἐν τῇ Ἐπιδαύρῳ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἦσαν, ἐς Μαντίνειαν πρεσβεῖαι ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ξυνῆλθον, Ἀθηναίων παρακαλεσάντων. καὶ γιγνομένων λόγων Εὐφαμίδας ὁ Κορίνθιος οὐκ ἔφη τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις ὁμολογεῖν: σφεῖς μὲν γὰρ περὶ εἰρήνης ξυγκαθῆσθαι, τοὺς δ᾽ Ἐπιδαυρίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους μεθ᾽ ὅπλων ἀντιτετάχθαι: διαλῦσαι οὖν πρῶτον χρῆναι ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων ἐλθόντας τὰ στρατόπεδα, καὶ οὕτω πάλιν λέγειν περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης. [2] καὶ πεισθέντες ᾠχοντο καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ἀπήγαγον ἐκ τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας. ὕστερον δὲ ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ ξυνελθόντες οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἐδυνήθησαν ξυμβῆναι, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι πάλιν ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν ἐσέβαλον καὶ ἐδῄουν. [3] ἐξεστράτευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς Καρύας,καὶ ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἐνταῦθα τὰ διαβατήρια αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο, ἐπανεχώρησαν. [4] Ἀργεῖοι δὲ τεμόντες τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας ὡς τὸ τρίτον μέρος ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. καὶ Ἀθηναίων αὐτοῖς χίλιοι ἐβοήθησαν ὁπλῖται καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης στρατηγός: πυθόμενος δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐξεστρατεῦσθαι, καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἔτι αὐτῶν ἔδει, ἀπῆλθεν. καὶ τὸ θέρος οὕτω διῆλθεν.

[55] While the Argives were in Epidauria, envoys from the different cities met at Mantinea, on the invitation of the Athenians. A conference was held, at which Euphamidas the Corinthian remarked that their words and their actions were at variance; for they were conferring about peace while the Argives and the Epidaurians with their allies were in the field against each other; first let envoys from both parties go and induce the armies to disband, and then they might come back and discuss the peace. His advice was approved; so they went straight to the Argives and compelled them to withdraw from Epidauria. But, when they reassembled, they were still unable to agree, and the Argives again invaded and began to ravage the Epidaurian territory. Whereupon

the Lacedaemonians likewise made an expedition as far as Caryae; but again the sacrifices at the frontier proved unfavourable, and they returned home. The Argives, after devastating about one-third of Epidauria, also returned home. One thousand Athenian hoplites, under the command of Alcibiades, had come to their aid. But hearing that the Lacedaemonian expedition was over, and seeing that there was no longer any need of them, they departed. And so passed the summer.

56. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Λακεδαιμόνιοι λαθόντες Ἀθηναίους φρουρούς τε τριακοσίους καὶ Ἀγησιππίδαν ἄρχοντα κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον ἐσέπεμψαν. [2] Ἀργεῖοι δ᾽ ἐλθόντες παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἐπεκάλουν ὅτι γεγραμμένον ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἑκάστους μὴ ἐᾶν πολεμίους διιέναι ἐάσειαν κατὰ θάλασσαν παραπλεῦσαι: καὶ εἰ μὴ κἀκεῖνοι ἐς Πύλον κομιοῦσιν ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους τοὺς Μεσσηνίους καὶ Εἵλωτας, ἀδικήσεσθαι αὐτοί. [3] Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδου πείσαντος τῇ μὲν Λακωνικῇ στήλῃ ὑπέγραψαν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνέμειναν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς ὅρκοις, ἐς δὲ Πύλον ἐκόμισαν τοὺς ἐκ Κρανίων Εἵλωτας λῄζεσθαι, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα ἡσύχαζον. [4] τὸν δὲ χειμῶνα τοῦτον πολεμούντων Ἀργείων καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίων μάχη μὲν οὐδεμία ἐγένετο ἐκ παρασκευῆς, ἐνέδραι δὲ καὶ καταδρομαί, ἐν αἷς ὡς τύχοιεν ἑκατέρων τινὲς διεφθείροντο. [5] καὶ τελευτῶντος τοῦ χειμῶνος πρὸς ἔαρ ἤδη κλίμακας ἔχοντες οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον, ὡς ἐρήμου οὔσης διὰ τὸν πόλεμον βίᾳ αἱρήσοντες: καὶ ἄπρακτοι ἀπῆλθον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ τρίτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

[56] In the following winter the Lacedaemonians, unknown to the Athenians, sent by sea to Epidaurus a garrison of three hundred under the command of Agesippidas. The Argives came to the Athenians and complained that, notwithstanding the clause in the treaty which forbade the passage of enemies through the territory of any of the contracting parties, they had allowed the Lacedaemonians

to pass by sea along the Argive coast. If they did not retaliate by replacing the Messenians and Helots in Pylos, and letting them ravage Laconia, they, the Argives, would consider themselves wronged. The Athenians, by the advice of Alcibiades, inscribed at the foot of the column on which the treaty was recorded words to the effect that the Lacedaemonians had not abided by their oaths, and thereupon conveyed the Helots recently settled at Cranii to Pylos that they might plunder the country, but they took no further steps. During the winter the war between the Argives and Epidaurians continued; there was no regular engagement, but there were ambuscades and incursions in which losses were inflicted, now on one side, now on the other. At the end of winter, when the spring was approaching, the Argives came with scaling-ladders against Epidaurus, expecting to find that the place was stripped of its defenders by the war, and could be taken by storm. But the attempt failed, and they returned. So the winter came to an end, and with it the thirteenth year of the war.

57. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους μεσοῦντος Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἵ τε Ἐπιδαύριοι ξύμμαχοι ὄντες ἐταλαιπώρουν καὶ τἆλλα ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ τὰ μὲν ἀφειστήκει, τὰ δ᾽ οὐ καλῶς εἶχε, νομίσαντες, εἰ μὴ προκαταλήψονται ἐν τάχει, ἐπὶ πλέον χωρήσεσθαι αὐτά, ἐστράτευον αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ Εἵλωτες πανδημεὶ ἐπ᾽ Ἄργος: ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἆγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. [2] ξυνεστράτευον δ᾽ αὐτοῖς Τεγεᾶταί τε καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι Ἀρκάδων Λακεδαιμονίοις ξύμμαχοι ἦσαν. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Πελοποννήσου ξύμμαχοι καὶ οἱ ἔξωθεν ἐς Φλειοῦντα ξυνελέγοντο, Βοιωτοὶ μὲν πεντακισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται καὶ τοσοῦτοι ψιλοὶ καὶ ἱππῆς πεντακόσιοι καὶ ἄμιπποι ἴσοι, Κορίνθιοι δὲ δισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστοι, Φλειάσιοι δὲ πανστρατιᾷ, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων ἦν τὸ στράτευμα.

[57] In the middle of the following summer, the Lacedaemonians, seeing that their Epidaurian allies were in

great distress, and that several cities of Peloponnesus had seceded from them, while others were disaffected, and knowing that if they did not quickly take measures of precaution the evil would spread, made war on Argos with their whole forces, including the Helots, under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king. The Tegeans and the other Arcadian allies of the Lacedaemonians took part in the expedition. The rest of their allies, both from within and without the Peloponnesus, mustered at Phlius. Among the other contingents there came from Boeotia five thousand heavy-armed, and as many light-armed, five hundred cavalry, and attached to each horseman a foot-soldier; and from Corinth two thousand heavy-armed, while the Phliasians joined with their whole force, because the army was to assemble in their country.

58. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ προαισθόμενοι τό τε πρῶτον τὴν παρασκευὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς τὸν Φλειοῦντα βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἄλλοις προσμεῖξαι ἐχώρουν, τότε δὴ ἐξεστράτευσαν καὶ αὐτοί: ἐβοήθησαν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ Μαντινῆς, ἔχοντες τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους, καὶ Ἠλείων τρισχίλιοι ὁπλῖται. [2] καὶ προϊόντες ἀπαντῶσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐν Μεθυδρίῳ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας. καὶ καταλαμβάνουσιν ἑκάτεροι λόφον: καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι ὡς μεμονωμένοις τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις παρεσκευάζοντο μάχεσθαι, ὁ δὲ Ἄγις τῆς νυκτὸς ἀναστήσας τὸν στρατὸν καὶ λαθὼν ἐπορεύετο ἐς Φλειοῦντα παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυμμάχους. [3] καὶ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι αἰσθόμενοι ἅμα ἕῳ ἐχώρουν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐς Ἄργος, ἔπειτα δὲ ᾗ προσεδέχοντο τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων καταβήσεσθαι, τὴν κατὰ Νεμέαν ὁδόν. [4] Ἄγις δὲ ταύτην μὲν ἣν προσεδέχοντο οὐκ ἐτράπετο, παραγγείλας δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀρκάσι καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίοις ἄλλην ἐχώρησε χαλεπὴν καὶ κατέβη ἐς τὸ Ἀργείων πεδίον: καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Πελληνῆς καὶ Φλειάσιοι ὄρθιον ἑτέραν ἐπορεύοντο: τοῖς δὲ Βοιωτοῖς καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι καὶ Σικυωνίοις εἴρητο τὴν ἐπὶ Νεμέας ὁδὸν καταβαίνειν, ᾗ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐκάθηντο, ὅπως, εἰ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐπὶ

σφᾶς ἰόντες ἐς τὸ πεδίον βοηθοῖεν, ἐφεπόμενοι τοῖς ἵπποις χρῷντο. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν οὕτω διατάξας καὶ ἐσβαλὼν ἐς τὸ πεδίον ἐδῄου Σάμινθόν τε καὶ ἄλλα:

[58] The Argives, having had previous notice of the Lacedaemonian preparations, and seeing that they were actually on their march to join the rest of the army at Phlius, now took the field themselves. The Mantineans and their allies and three thousand Elean hoplites came to their aid. They advanced to the territory of Methydrium in Arcadia, where they fell in with the Lacedaemonians. The two armies each occupied a hill, and the Argives, thinking that they now had the Lacedaemonians alone, prepared for action. But in the night Agis removed his forces unknown to them and went to join the allies at Phlius. At dawn the Argives became aware of his departure, and moved first towards Argos, then to the Nemean road, by which they expected the Lacedaemonians and their allies to descend into the plain. But Agis, instead of taking the road by which he was expected, led the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians by a more difficult path, and so made his way down; the Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians went by another steep pass; the Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians he commanded to descend by the Nemean road, where the Argives had taken up their position, in order that, if the Argives should return and attack his own division of the army in the plain, they might be pursued and harassed by their cavalry. Having made these dispositions, and having come down into the plain, he began to devastate Saminthus and the neighbourhood.

59. οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γνόντες ἐβοήθουν ἡμέρας ἤδη ἐκ τῆς Νεμέας, καὶ περιτυχόντες τῷ Φλειασίων καὶ Κορινθίων στρατοπέδῳ τῶν μὲν Φλειασίων ὀλίγους ἀπέκτειναν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν Κορινθίων αὐτοὶ οὐ πολλῷ πλείους διεφθάρησαν. [2] καὶ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ οἱ Μεγαρῆς καὶ οἱ Σικυώνιοι ἐχώρουν, ὥσπερ εἴρητο αὐτοῖς, ἐπὶ τῆς Νεμέας, καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους οὐκέτι κατέλαβον, ἀλλὰ καταβάντες, ὡς ἑώρων τὰ ἑαυτῶν

δῃούμενα, ἐς μάχην παρετάσσοντο. ἀντιπαρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. [3] ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ἀπειλημμένοι ἦσαν οἱ Ἀργεῖοι: ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πεδίου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εἶργον τῆς πόλεως καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, καθύπερθεν δὲ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Φλειάσιοι καὶ Πελληνῆς, τὸ δὲ πρὸς Νεμέας Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Σικυώνιοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς. ἵπποι δὲ αὐτοῖς οὐ παρῆσαν: οὐ γάρ πω οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μόνοι τῶν ξυμμάχων ἦκον. [4]τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν Ἀργείων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων οὐχ οὕτω δεινὸν τὸ παρὸν ἐνόμιζον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν καλῷ ἐδόκει ἡ μάχη ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπειληφέναι ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν τε καὶ πρὸς τῇ πόλει. [5] τῶν δὲ Ἀργείων δύο ἄνδρες, Θράσυλός τε τῶν πέντε στρατηγῶν εἷς ὢν καὶ Ἀλκίφρων πρόξενος Λακεδαιμονίων, ἤδη τῶν στρατοπέδων ὅσον οὐ ξυνιόντων προσελθόντε Ἄγιδι διελεγέσθην μὴ ποιεῖν μάχην: ἑτοίμους γὰρ εἶναι Ἀργείους δίκας δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας, εἴ τι ἐπικαλοῦσιν Ἀργείοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἰρήνην ἄγειν σπονδὰς ποιησαμένους.

[59] It was now daylight, and the Argives, who had become aware of his movements, quitted Nemea and went in search of the enemy. Encountering the Phliasian and Corinthian forces, they killed a few of the Phliasians, and had rather more of their own troops killed by the Corinthians. The Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians marched as they were ordered towards Nemea, but found the Argives no longer there, for by this time they had descended from the high ground, and seeing their lands ravaged were drawing up their troops in order of battle. The Lacedaemonians prepared to meet them. The Argives were now surrounded by their enemies; for on the side of the plain the Lacedaemonians and their division of the army cut them off from the city; from the hills above they were hemmed in by the Corinthians, Phliasians and Pellenians, towards Nemea by the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megarians, and in the absence of the Athenians, who alone of their allies had not arrived, they had no cavalry. The main body of the Argives and their allies had no conception of their danger. They

thought that their position was a favourable one, and that they had cut off the Lacedaemonians in their own country and close to the city of Argos. But two of the Argives, Thrasyllus one of the five generals, and Alciphron the proxenus of the Lacedaemonians, came to Agis when the armies were on the point of engaging and urged him privately not to fight; the Argives were ready to offer and accept a fair arbitration, if the Lacedaemonians had any complaint to make of them; they would gladly conclude a treaty, and be at peace for the future.

60. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα εἰπόντες τῶν Ἀργείων ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν καὶ οὐ τοῦ πλήθους κελεύσαντος εἶπον: καὶ ὁ Ἄγις δεξάμενος τοὺς λόγους αὐτός, καὶ οὐ μετὰ τῶν πλεόνων οὐδὲ αὐτὸς βουλευσάμενος ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ κοινώσας τῶν ἐν τέλει ξυστρατευομένων, σπένδεται τέσσαρας μῆνας, ἐν οἷς ἔδει ἐπιτελέσαι αὐτοὺς τὰ ῥηθέντα. καὶ ἀπήγαγε τὸν στρατὸν εὐθύς, οὐδενὶ φράσας τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων. [2] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι εἵποντο μὲν ὡς ἡγεῖτο διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν αἰτίᾳ δ᾽ εἶχον κατ᾽ ἀλλήλους πολλῇ τὸν Ἄγιν, νομίζοντες ἐν καλῷ παρατυχὸν σφίσι ξυμβαλεῖν καὶ πανταχόθεν αὐτῶν ἀποκεκλῃμένων καὶ ὑπὸ ἱππέων καὶ πεζῶν οὐδὲν δράσαντες ἄξιον τῆς παρασκευῆς ἀπιέναι. [3] στρατόπεδον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο κάλλιστον Ἑλληνικὸν τῶν μέχρι τοῦδε ξυνῆλθεν: ὤφθη δὲ μάλιστα ἕως ἔτι ἦν ἀθρόον ἐν Νεμέᾳ, ἐν ᾧ Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε πανστρατιᾷ ἦσαν καὶ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Σικυώνιοι καὶ Πελληνῆς καὶ Φλειάσιοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς, καὶ οὗτοι πάντες λογάδες ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστων, ἀξιόμαχοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι οὐ τῇ Ἀργείων μόνον ξυμμαχίᾳ ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄλλῃ ἔτι προσγενομένῃ. [4] τὸ μὲν οὖν στρατόπεδον οὕτως ἐν αἰτίᾳ ἔχοντες τὸν Ἄγιν ἀνεχώρουν τε καὶ διελύθησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἕκαστοι, [5] Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ἐν πολλῷ πλέονι αἰτίᾳ εἶχον τοὺς σπεισαμένους ἄνευ τοῦ πλήθους, νομίζοντες κἀκεῖνοι μὴ ἂν σφίσι ποτὲ κάλλιον παρασχὸν Λακεδαιμονίους διαπεφευγέναι: πρός τε γὰρ τῇ σφετέρᾳ πόλει καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων τὸν ἀγῶνα ἂν γίγνεσθαι. [6]

τόν τε Θράσυλον ἀναχωρήσαντες ἐν τῷ Χαράδρῳ, οὗπερ τὰς ἀπὸ στρατείας δίκας πρὶν ἐσιέναι κρίνουσιν, ἤρξαντο λεύειν. ὁ δὲ καταφυγὼν ἐπὶ τὸν βωμὸν περιγίγνεται: τὰ μέντοι χρήματα ἐδήμευσαν αὐτοῦ.

[60] These Argives spoke of their own motion; they had no authority from the people; and Agis, likewise on his own authority, accepted their proposals, not conferring with his countrymen at large, but only with one of the Lacedaemonian magistrates who accompanied the expedition. He made a treaty with the Argives for four months, within which they were to execute their agreement, and then, without saying a word to any of the allies, he at once withdrew his army. The Lacedaemonians and their allies followed Agis out of respect for the law, but they blamed him severely among themselves. For they believed that they had lost a glorious opportunity; their enemies had been surrounded on every side both by horse and foot; and yet they were returning home having done nothing worthy of their great effort. — No finer Hellenic army had ever up to that day been collected; its appearance was most striking at Nemea while the host was still one; the Lacedaemonians were there in their full strength; arrayed by their side were Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megarians, from each state chosen men — they might have been thought a match not only for the Argive confederacy, but for another as large. — So the army returned and dispersed to their homes, much out of humour with Agis.The Argives on their part found still greater fault with those who had made the peace, unauthorised by the people; they too thought that such an opportunity would never recur, and that it was the Lacedaemonians who had escaped, for the combat would have taken place close to their own city, and they had numerous and brave allies. And so, as they were retreating and had reached the bed of the Charadrus, where they hold military trials before they enter

the city, they began to stone Thrasyllus. He saved his life by flying to the altar, but they confiscated his property.

61. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Ἀθηναίων βοηθησάντων χιλίων ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τριακοσίων ἱππέων, ὧν ἐστρατήγουν Λάχης καὶ Νικόστρατος, οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ὅμως γὰρ τὰς σπονδὰς ὤκνουν λῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευον αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον οὐ προσῆγον βουλομένους χρηματίσαι, πρὶν δὴ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἠλεῖοι ἔτι γὰρ παρῆσαν κατηνάγκασαν δεόμενοι. [2] καὶ ἔλεγον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Ἀλκιβιάδου πρεσβευτοῦ παρόντος ἔν τε τοῖς Ἀργείοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις ταῦτα, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς αἱ σπονδαὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων καὶ γένοιντο, καὶ νῦν ἐν καιρῷ γὰρ παρεῖναι σφεῖς ἄπτεσθαι χρῆναι τοῦ πολέμου. [3] καὶ πείσαντες ἐκ τῶν λόγων τοὺς ξυμμάχους εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ Ὀρχομενὸν τὸν Ἀρκαδικὸν πάντες πλὴν Ἀργείων: οὗτοι δὲ ὅμως καὶ πεισθέντες ὑπελείποντο πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δ᾽ ὕστερον καὶ οὗτοι ἦλθον. [4] καὶ προσκαθεζόμενοι τὸν Ὀρχομενὸν πάντες ἐπολιόρκουν καὶ προσβολὰς ἐποιοῦντο, βουλόμενοι ἄλλως τε προσγενέσθαι σφίσι καὶ ὅμηροι ἐκ τῆς Ἀρκαδίας ἦσαν αὐτόθι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κείμενοι. [5] οἱ δὲ Ὀρχομένιοι δείσαντες τήν τε τοῦ τείχους ἀσθένειαν καὶ τοῦ στρατοῦ τὸ πλῆθος καί, ὡς οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς ἐβοήθει, μὴ προαπόλωνται, ξυνέβησαν ὥστε ξύμμαχοί τε εἶναι καὶ ὁμήρους σφῶν τε αὐτῶν δοῦναι Μαντινεῦσι καὶ οὓς κατέθεντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι παραδοῦναι.

[61] Soon afterwards there arrived an Athenian reinforcement of a thousand hoplites and three hundred horse, under the command of Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives, although dissatisfied with the truce, were reluctant to break it, so they bade them depart; and, when they desired to treat, they would not present them to the assembly until they were compelled by the importunity of their Mantinean and Elean allies, who had not yet left Argos. The Athenians then, speaking by the mouth of their ambassador Alcibiades, told the Argives in the presence of the rest that they had no right to make the truce at all

independently of their allies, and that, the Athenians having arrived at the opportune moment, they should fight at once. The allies were convinced, and they all, with the exception of the Argives, immediately marched against Orchomenus in Arcadia; the Argives, though consenting, did not join them at first, but they came afterwards. The united forces then sat down before Orchomenus, which they assailed repeatedly; they were especially anxious to get the place into their hands, because certain Arcadian hostages had been deposited there by the Lacedaemonians. The Orchomenians, considering the weakness of their fortifications and the numbers of the enemy, and beginning to fear that they might perish before any one came to their assistance, agreed to join the alliance: they were to give hostages of their own to the Mantineans, and to deliver up those whom the Lacedaemonians had deposited with them.

62. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔχοντες ἤδη τὸν Ὀρχομενὸν ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐφ᾽ ὅτι χρὴ πρῶτον ἰέναι τῶν λοιπῶν. καὶ Ἠλεῖοι μὲν ἐπὶ Λέπρεον ἐκέλευον, Μαντινῆς δὲ ἐπὶ Τεγέαν: καὶ προσέθεντο οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Μαντινεῦσιν. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἠλεῖοι ὀργισθέντες ὅτι οὐκ ἐπὶ Λέπρεον ἐψηφίσαντο ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου: οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι παρεσκευάζοντο ἐν τῇ Μαντινείᾳ ὡς ἐπὶ Τεγέαν ἰόντες. καί τινες αὐτοῖς καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνεδίδοσαν τὰ πράγματα.

[62] The allied force, now in possession of Orchomenus, considered against what town they should next proceed; the Eleans wanted them to attack Lepreum, the Mantineans Tegea. The Argives and Athenians sided with the Mantineans; whereupon the Eleans, indignant that they had not voted for the expedition against Lepreum, returned home, but the remainder of the allies made preparations at Mantinea to attack Tegea. They were assisted by a party within the walls who were ready to betray the place to them.

63. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀνεχώρησαν ἐξ Ἄργους τὰς τετραμήνους σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι, Ἅγιν ἐν μεγάλῃ αἰτίᾳ

εἶχον οὐ χειρωσάμενον σφίσιν Ἄργος, παρασχὸν καλῶς ὡς οὔπω πρότερον αὐτοὶ ἐνόμιζον: ἀθρόους γὰρ τοσούτους ξυμμάχους καὶ τοιούτους οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι λαβεῖν. [2] ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ περὶ Ὀρχομενοῦ ἠγγέλλετο ἑαλωκέναι, πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐχαλέπαινον καὶ ἐβούλευον εὐθὺς ὑπ᾽ ὀργῆς παρὰ τὸν τρόπον τὸν ἑαυτῶν ὡς χρὴ τήν τε οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ κατασκάψαι καὶ δέκα μυριάσι δραχμῶν ζημιῶσαι. [3] ὁ δὲ παρῃτεῖτο μηδὲν τούτων δρᾶν: ἔργῳ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ ῥύσεσθαι τὰς αἰτίας στρατευσάμενος, ἢ τότε ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ὅτι βούλονται. [4] οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ζημίαν καὶ τὴν κατασκαφὴν ἐπέσχον, νόμον δὲ ἔθεντο ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὃς οὔπω πρότερον ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς: δέκα γὰρ ἄνδρας Σπαρτιατῶν προσείλοντο αὐτῷ ξυμβούλους, ἄνευ ὧν μὴ κύριον εἶναι ἀπάγειν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως.

[63] The Lacedaemonians, when after making the four months’ truce they had returned home, severely blamed Agis because he had not conquered Argos, and had lost an opportunity of which, in their own judgment, they had never before had the like. For it was no easy matter to bring together a body of allies so numerous and brave. But when the news came that Orchomenus had fallen they were furious, and in a fit of passion, which was unlike their usual character, they had almost made up their minds to raze his house and fine him in the sum of a hundred thousand drachmae. But he besought them not to punish him, promising that he would atone for his error by some brave action in the field; if he did not keep his word they might do as they pleased with him. So they did not inflict the fine or demolish his house, but on this occasion they passed a law which had no precedent in their history, providing that ten Spartans should be appointed his counsellors, who were to give their consent before he could lead the army out of the city.

64. ἐν τούτῳ δ᾽ ἀφικνεῖται αὐτοῖς ἀγγελία παρὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐκ Τεγέας ὅτι, εἰ μὴ παρέσονται ἐν τάχει, ἀποστήσεται αὐτῶν Τεγέα πρὸς Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς

ξυμμάχους καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἀφέστηκεν. [2] ἐνταῦθα δὴ βοήθεια τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων γίγνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων πανδημεὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ οἵα οὔπω πρότερον. [3] ἐχώρουν δὲ ἐς Ὀρέσθειον τῆς Μαιναλίας: καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀρκάδων σφετέροις οὖσι ξυμμάχοις προεῖπον ἀθροισθεῖσιν ἰέναι κατὰ πόδας αὐτῶν ἐς Τεγέαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ Ὀρεσθείου πάντες ἐλθόντες, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ τὸ ἕκτον μέρος σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀποπέμψαντες ἐπ᾽ οἴκου, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἦν, ὥστε τὰ οἴκοι φρουρεῖν, τῷ λοιπῷ στρατεύματι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Τεγέαν. καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀπ᾽ Ἀρκάδων παρῆσαν. [4] πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον καὶ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Φωκέας καὶ Λοκρούς, βοηθεῖν κελεύοντες κατὰ τάχος ἐς Μαντίνειαν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγου τε ἐγίγνετο, καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἦν μὴ ἀθρόοις καὶ ἀλλήλους περιμείνασι διελθεῖν τὴν πολεμίαν ξυνέκλῃε γὰρ διὰ μέσου , ὅμως δὲ ἠπείγοντο. [5] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἀναλαβόντες τοὺς παρόντας Ἀρκάδων ξυμμάχους ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Μαντινικήν, καὶ στρατοπεδευσάμενοι πρὸς τῷ Ἡρακλείῳ ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν.

[64] Meanwhile word was brought from their friends in Tegea that they must come at once, since Tegea was about to secede and had almost seceded already to the Argives and their allies. Whereupon the Lacedaemonians led out their whole force, including the Helots, with an alacrity which they had never before displayed, and marched to Orestheum in Maenalia. They told their Arcadian allies to assemble and follow them at once to Tegea. When the army had proceeded as far as Orestheum they dismissed the sixth part, including the elder and the younger men, who were to keep guard at home, and arrived at Tegea with the rest of their troops. Not long afterwards the Arcadian allies appeared. They had also sent to the Corinthians, and to the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, whom they summoned to meet them with all speed at Mantinea. But the notice given to the allies was short, and their passage was barred by the enemies’ country, which they could not easily traverse unless they waited for one

another and came all together. However, they did their best. The Lacedaemonians, accompanied by their Arcadian allies, invaded the territory of Mantinea, and pitching their camp near the temple of Heracles, wasted the country.

65. οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὡς εἶδον αὐτούς, καταλαβόντες χωρίον ἐρυμνὸν καὶ δυσπρόσοδον παρετάξαντο ὡς ἐς μάχην. [2] καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς αὐτοῖς ἐπῇσαν: καὶ μέχρι μὲν λίθου καὶ ἀκοντίου βολῆς ἐχώρησαν, ἔπειτα τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τις Ἄγιδι ἐπεβόησεν, ὁρῶν πρὸς χωρίον καρτερὸν ἰόντας σφᾶς, ὅτι διανοεῖται κακὸν κακῷ ἰᾶσθαι, δηλῶν τῆς ἐξ Ἄργους ἐπαιτίου ἀναχωρήσεως τὴν παροῦσαν ἄκαιρον προθυμίαν ἀνάληψιν βουλόμενον εἶναι. [3] ὁ δέ, εἴτε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐπιβόημα εἴτε καὶ αὐτῷ ἄλλο τι ἢ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δόξαν ἐξαίφνης, πάλιν τὸ στράτευμα κατὰ τάχος πρὶν ξυμμεῖξαι ἀπῆγεν. [4] καὶ ἀφικόμενος πρὸς τὴν Τεγεᾶτιν τὸ ὕδωρ ἐξέτρεπεν ἐς τὴν Μαντινικήν, περὶ οὗπερ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ βλάπτοντος ὁποτέρωσε ἂν ἐσπίπτῃ Μαντινῆς καὶ Τεγεᾶται πολεμοῦσιν. ἐβούλετο δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου βοηθοῦντας ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος ἐκτροπήν, ἐπειδὰν πύθωνται, καταβιβάσαι [τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους] καὶ ἐν τῷ ὁμαλῷ τὴν μάχην ποιεῖσθαι. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην μείνας αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐξέτρεπεν: οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον καταπλαγέντες τῇ ἐξ ὀλίγου αἰφνιδίῳ αὐτῶν ἀναχωρήσει οὐκ εἶχον ὅτι εἰκάσωσιν: εἶτα ἐπειδὴ ἀναχωροῦντες ἐκεῖνοί τε ἀπέκρυψαν καὶ σφεῖς ἡσύχαζον καὶ οὐκ ἐπηκολούθουν, ἐνταῦθα τοὺς ἑαυτῶν στρατηγοὺς αὖθις ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶχον τό τε πρότερον καλῶς ληφθέντας πρὸς Ἄργει Λακεδαιμονίους ἀφεθῆναι καὶ νῦν ὅτι ἀποδιδράσκοντας οὐδεὶς ἐπιδιώκει, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν οἱ μὲν σῴζονται, σφεῖς δὲ προδίδονται. [6] οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ ἐθορυβήθησαν μὲν τὸ παραυτίκα, ὕστερον δὲ ἀπάγουσιν αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου καὶ προελθόντες ἐς τὸ ὁμαλὸν ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ὡς ἰόντες ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους.

[65] When the Argives and their allies saw the enemy they took up a steep and hardly assailable position, and arranged

themselves in order of battle. The Lacedaemonians instantly charged them, and had proceeded within a javelin or stone's throw when one of the elder Spartans, seeing the strength of the ground which they were attacking, called out to Agis that he was trying to mend one error by another; he meant to say that his present mistaken forwardness was intended to repair the discredit of his former retreat. And, either in consequence of this exclamation or because some new thought suddenly struck him, he withdrew his army in haste without actually engaging. He marched back into the district of Tegea, and proceeded to turn the water into the Mantinean territory. This water is a constant source of war between the Mantineans and Tegeans, on account of the great harm which is done to one or other of them according to the direction which the stream takes. Agis hoped that the Argives and their allies when they heard of this movement would come down from the hill and try to prevent it; he could then fight them on level ground. Accordingly he stayed about the water during the whole day, diverting the stream. Now the Argives and their confederates were at first amazed at the sudden retreat of their enemies when they were so near, and did not know what to think. But when the Lacedaemonians had retired and disappeared from view, and they found themselves standing still and not pursuing, they once more began to blame their own generals. Their cry was that they had already let the Lacedaemonians slip when they had them at a disadvantage close to Argos; and now they were running away and no one pursued them; the enemy were just allowed to escape, while their own army was quietly betrayed. The commanders were at first bewildered by the outcry; but soon they quitted the hill, and advancing into the plain took up a position with the intention of attacking.

66. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἵ τε Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ξυνετάξαντο, ὡς ἔμελλον μαχεῖσθαι, ἢν περιτύχωσιν: οἵ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος πρὸς τὸ Ἡράκλειον πάλιν ἐς

τὸ αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον ἰόντες ὁρῶσι δι᾽ ὀλίγου τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐν τάξει τε ἤδη πάντας καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου προεληλυθότας. [2] μάλιστα δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς ὃ ἐμέμνηντο ἐν τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ἐξεπλάγησαν. διὰ βραχείας γὰρ μελλήσεως ἡ παρασκευὴ αὐτοῖς ἐγίγνετο, καὶ εὐθὺς ὑπὸ σπουδῆς καθίσταντο ἐς κόσμον τὸν ἑαυτῶν, Ἄγιδος τοῦ βασιλέως ἕκαστα ἐξηγουμένου κατὰ τὸν νόμον. [3] βασιλέως γὰρ ἄγοντος ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου πάντα ἄρχεται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πολεμάρχοις αὐτὸς φράζει τὸ δέον, οἱ δὲ τοῖς λοχαγοῖς, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τοῖς πεντηκοντῆρσιν, αὖθις δ᾽ οὗτοι τοῖς ἐνωμοτάρχοις καὶ οὗτοι τῇ ἐνωμοτίᾳ. [4] καὶ αἱ παραγγέλσεις, ἤν τι βούλωνται, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ χωροῦσι καὶ ταχεῖαι ἐπέρχονται: σχεδὸν γάρ τι πᾶν πλὴν ὀλίγου τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντες ἀρχόντων εἰσί, καὶ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς τοῦ δρωμένου πολλοῖς προσήκει.

[66] On the following day the Argives and their allies drew themselves up in the order in which they intended to fight should they meet with the enemy. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians returned from the water to their old encampment near the temple of Heracles. There they saw quite close to them the Argive army, which had moved on from the hill, and was already in order of battle. Never within their recorded history were the Lacedaemonians more dismayed than at that instant; not a moment was to be lost: immediately they hurried every man to his own place, the king Agis, according to the law, directing their several movements. For when the king is in the field nothing is done without him; he in person gives general orders to the polemarchs, which they convey to the commanders of divisions; these again to the commanders of fifties, the commanders of fifties to the commanders of enomoties, and these to the enomoty. In like manner any more precise instructions are passed down through the army, and quickly reach their destination. For almost the whole Lacedaemonian army are officers who have officers under

them, and the responsibility of executing an order devolves upon many.

67. τότε δὲ κέρας μὲν εὐώνυμον Σκιρῖται αὐτοῖς καθίσταντο, αἰεὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν μόνοι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες: παρὰ δ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης Βρασίδειοι στρατιῶται καὶ νεοδαμώδεις μετ᾽ αὐτῶν: ἔπειτ᾽ ἤδη Λακεδαιμόνιοι αὐτοὶ ἐξῆς καθίστασαν τοὺς λόχους, καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς Ἀρκάδων Ἠραιῆς, μετὰ δὲ τούτους Μαινάλιοι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ κέρᾳ Τεγεᾶται καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ὀλίγοι τὸ ἔσχατον ἔχοντες, καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς αὐτῶν ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρῳ τῷ κέρᾳ. [2] Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν οὕτως ἐτάξαντο: οἱ δ᾽ ἐναντίοι αὐτοῖς δεξιὸν μὲν κέρας Μαντινῆς εἶχον, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων τὸ ἔργον ἐγίγνετο, παρὰ δ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ ξύμμαχοι Ἀρκάδων ἦσαν, ἔπειτα Ἀργείων οἱ χίλιοι λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἄσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρεῖχε, καὶ ἐχόμενοι αὐτῶν οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀργεῖοι, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν, Κλεωναῖοι καὶ Ὀρνεᾶται, ἔπειτα Ἀθηναῖοι ἔσχατοι τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας ἔχοντες, καὶ ἱππῆς μετ᾽ αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι.

[67] On this occasion the Sciritae formed the left wing, a position to which in the Lacedaemonian army they have a peculiar and exclusive right. Next to the Sciritae were placed the troops who had served in Chalcidicè under Brasidas, and with them the Neodamodes. Next in order were ranged the several divisions of the Lacedaemonian army, and near them the Heraeans of Arcadia; next the Maenalians, and on the right wing the Tegeans, and a few Lacedaemonians at the extreme point of the line; the cavalry were placed on both wings. This was the order of the Lacedaemonians. On the right wing of the enemy were placed the Mantineans, because the action was to be fought in their country, and next to them such of the Arcadians as were their allies. Then came the select force of a thousand Argives, whom the city had long trained at the public expense in military exercises; next the other Argives, and after them their allies, the

Cleonaeans and Orneatae. Last of all the Athenians occupied the left wing, supported by their own cavalry.

68. τάξις μὲν ἥδε καὶ παρασκευὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἦν, τὸ δὲ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων μεῖζον ἐφάνη. [2] ἀριθμὸν δὲ γράψαι ἢ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους ἑκατέρων ἢ ξύμπαντας οὐκ ἂν ἐδυνάμην ἀκριβῶς: τὸ μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων πλῆθος διὰ τῆς πολιτείας τὸ κρυπτὸν ἠγνοεῖτο, τῶν δ᾽ αὖ διὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον κομπῶδες ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα πλήθη ἠπιστεῖτο. ἐκ μέντοι τοιοῦδε λογισμοῦ ἔξεστί τῳ σκοπεῖν τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τότε παραγενόμενον πλῆθος. [3] λόχοι μὲν γὰρ ἐμάχοντο ἑπτὰ ἄνευ Σκιριτῶν ὄντων ἑξακοσίων, ἐν δὲ ἑκάστῳ λόχῳ πεντηκοστύες ἦσαν τέσσαρες, καὶ ἐν τῇ πεντηκοστύι ἐνωμοτίαι τέσσαρες. τῆς τε ἐνωμοτίας ἐμάχοντο ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ζυγῷ τέσσαρες: ἐπὶ δὲ βάθος ἐτάξαντο μὲν οὐ πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς λοχαγὸς ἕκαστος ἐβούλετο, ἐπὶ πᾶν δὲ κατέστησαν ἐπὶ ὀκτώ. παρὰ δὲ ἅπαν πλὴν Σκιριτῶν τετρακόσιοι καὶ δυοῖν δέοντες πεντήκοντα ἄνδρες ἡ πρώτη τάξις ἦν.

[68] Such was the order and composition of the two armies: that of the Lacedaemonians appeared to be the larger, but what the number was, either of the several contingents, or of the total on either side, I cannot pretend exactly to say, for the secrecy of the government did not allow the strength of the Lacedaemonian army to be known, and the numbers on the other side were thought to be exaggerated by the vanity natural to men when speaking of their own forces. However, the following calculation may give some idea of the Lacedaemonian numbers. There were seven divisions in the field, besides the Sciritae who numbered six hundred; in each division there were four pentecosties, in every pentecosty four enomoties, and of each enomoty there fought in the front rank four. The depth of the line was not everywhere equal, but was left to the discretion of the generals commanding divisions; on an average it was eight deep. The front line consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men, exclusive of the Sciritae.

69. ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνιέναι ἔμελλον ἤδη, ἐνταῦθα καὶ παραινέσεις καθ᾽ ἑκάστους ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων στρατηγῶν τοιαίδε ἐγίγνοντο, Μαντινεῦσι μὲν ὅτι ὑπέρ τε πατρίδος ἡ μάχη ἔσται καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς ἅμα καὶ δουλείας, τὴν μὲν μὴ πειρασαμένοις ἀφαιρεθῆναι, τῆς δὲ μὴ αὖθις πειρᾶσθαι: Ἀργείοις δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς τε παλαιᾶς ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῆς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ποτὲ ἰσομοιρίας μὴ διὰ παντὸς στερισκομένους ἀνέχεσθαι, καὶ ἄνδρας ἅμα ἐχθροὺς καὶ ἀστυγείτονας ὑπὲρ πολλῶν ἀδικημάτων ἀμύνασθαι: τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις καλὸν εἶναι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων ἀγωνιζομένους μηδενὸς λείπεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ Λακεδαιμονίους νικήσαντες τήν τε ἀρχὴν βεβαιοτέραν καὶ μείζω ἔξουσι καὶ οὐ μή ποτέ τις αὐτοῖς ἄλλος ἐς τὴν γῆν ἔλθῃ. [2] τοῖς μὲν Ἀργείοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις τοιαῦτα παρῃνέθη, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκάστους τε καὶ μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὧν ἠπίσταντο τὴν παρακέλευσιν τῆς μνήμης ἀγαθοῖς οὖσιν ἐποιοῦντο, εἰδότες ἔργων ἐκ πολλοῦ μελέτην πλείω σῴζουσαν ἢ λόγων δι᾽ ὀλίγου καλῶς ῥηθεῖσαν παραίνεσιν.

[69] The two armies were now on the point of engaging, but first the several commanders addressed exhortations to their own contingents. The Mantineans were told that they were not only about to fight for their country, but would have to choose between dominion or slavery; having tried both, did they want to be deprived of the one, or to have any more acquaintance with the other? The Argives were reminded that in old times they had been sovereign, and more recently the equals of Sparta, in Peloponnesus; would they acquiesce for ever in the loss of their supremacy, and lose at the same time the chance of revenging themselves upon their hateful neighbours, who had wronged them again and again? The Athenians were told that it was glorious to be fighting side by side with a host of brave allies and to be found equal to the bravest. If they could conquer a Lacedaemonian army in Peloponnesus, they would both extend and secure their dominion, and need never fear an

invader again. Such were the exhortations addressed to the Argives and to their allies. But the Lacedaemonians, both in their war-songs and in the words which a man spoke to his comrade, did but remind one another of what their brave spirits knew already. For they had learned that true safety was to be found in long previous training, and not in eloquent exhortations uttered when they were going into action.

70. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ ξύνοδος ἦν, Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐντόνως καὶ ὀργῇ χωροῦντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν ὁμοῦ ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ βαίνοντες προσέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διασπασθείη αὐτοῖς ἡ τάξις, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς προσόδοις ποιεῖν.

[70] At length the two armies went forward. The Argives and their allies advanced to the charge with great fury and determination. The Lacedaemonians moved slowly and to the music of many flute-players, who were stationed in their ranks, and played, not as an act of religion, but in order that the army might march evenly and in true measure, and that the line might not break, as often happens in great armies when they go into battle.

71. ξυνιόντων δ᾽ ἔτι Ἄγις ὁ βασιλεὺς τοιόνδε ἐβουλεύσατο δρᾶσαι. τὰ στρατόπεδα ποιεῖ μὲν καὶ ἅπαντα τοῦτο: ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ κέρατα αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ξυνόδοις μᾶλλον ἐξωθεῖται, καὶ περιίσχουσι κατὰ τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων εὐώνυμον ἀμφότεροι τῷ δεξιῷ, διὰ τὸ φοβουμένους προσστέλλειν τὰ γυμνὰ ἕκαστον ὡς μάλιστα τῇ τοῦ ἐν δεξιᾷ παρατεταγμένου ἀσπίδι καὶ νομίζειν τὴν πυκνότητα τῆς ξυγκλῄσεως εὐσκεπαστότατον εἶναι: καὶ ἡγεῖται μὲν τῆς αἰτίας ταύτης ὁ πρωτοστάτης τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως, προθυμούμενος ἐξαλλάσσειν αἰεὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γύμνωσιν, ἕπονται δὲ διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν φόβον καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. [2] καὶ τότε περιέσχον μὲν οἱ Μαντινῆς πολὺ τῷ κέρᾳ τῶν Σκιριτῶν, ἔτι δὲ πλέον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Τεγεᾶται τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅσῳ μεῖζον τὸ στράτευμα εἶχον. [3] δείσας δὲ Ἄγις

μὴ σφῶν κυκλωθῇ τὸ εὐώνυμον, καὶ νομίσας ἄγαν περιέχειν τοὺς Μαντινέας, τοῖς μὲν Σκιρίταις καὶ Βρασιδείοις ἐσήμηνεν ἐπεξαγαγόντας ἀπὸ σφῶν ἐξισῶσαι τοῖς Μαντινεῦσιν, ἐς δὲ τὸ διάκενον τοῦτο παρήγγελλεν ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως δύο λόχους τῶν πολεμάρχων Ἱπποονοΐδᾳ καὶ Ἀριστοκλεῖ ἔχουσι παρελθεῖν καὶ ἐσβαλόντας πληρῶσαι, νομίζων τῷ θ᾽ ἑαυτῶν δεξιῷ ἔτι περιουσίαν ἔσεσθαι καὶ τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Μαντινέας βεβαιότερον τετάξεσθαι.

[71] Before they had actually closed a thought occurred to Agis. All armies, when engaging, are apt to thrust outwards their right wing; and either of the opposing forces tends to outflank his enemy’s left with his own right, because every soldier individually fears for his exposed side, which he tries to cover with the shield of his comrade on the right, conceiving that the closer he draws in the better he will be protected. The first man in the front rank of the right wing is originally responsible for the deflection, for he always wants to withdraw from the enemy his own exposed side, and the rest of the army, from a like fear, follow his example. In this battle the line of the Mantineans, who were on the Argive right wing, extended far beyond the Sciritae: and still further, in proportion as the army to which they belonged was the larger, did the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans on the Lacedaemonian right wing extend beyond the Athenian left. Agis was afraid that the Lacedaemonian left wing would be surrounded, and, thinking that the Mantineans outflanked them too far, he signalled to the Sciritae and the old soldiers of Brasidas to make a lateral movement away from his own division of the army, and so cover the line of the Mantineans: to fill up the space thus left vacant he ordered Hipponoidas and Aristocles, two of the polemarchs, to bring up their two divisions from the right wing, thinking that he would still have more troops than he wanted there, and that he would thus strengthen that part of his line which was opposed to the Mantineans.

72. ξυνέβη οὖν αὐτῷ ἅτε ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἐφόδῳ καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου παραγγείλαντι τόν τε Ἀριστοκλέα καὶ τὸν Ἱππονοΐδαν μὴ ‘θελῆσαι παρελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ αἰτίαμα ὕστερον φεύγειν ἐκ Σπάρτης δόξαντας μαλακισθῆναι, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους φθάσαι τῇ προσμείξει, καὶ κελεύσαντος αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τοὺς Σκιρίτας ὡς οὐ παρῆλθον οἱ λόχοι, πάλιν αὖ σφίσι προσμεῖξαι, μὴ δυνηθῆναι ἔτι μηδὲ τούτους ξυγκλῄσαι. [2] ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δὴ κατὰ πάντα τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλασσωθέντες τότε τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἔδειξαν οὐχ ἧσσον περιγενόμενοι. [3] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν χερσὶν ἐγίγνοντο τοῖς ἐναντίοις, τὸ μὲν τῶν Μαντινέων δεξιὸν τρέπει αὐτῶν τοὺς Σκιρίτας καὶ τοὺς Βρασιδείους, καὶ ἐσπεσόντες οἱ Μαντινῆς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων οἱ χίλιοι λογάδες κατὰ τὸ διάκενον καὶ οὐ ξυγκλῃσθὲν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους διέφθειρον καὶ κυκλωσάμενοι ἔτρεψαν καὶ ἐξέωσαν ἐς τὰς ἁμάξας καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τῶν ἐπιτεταγμένων ἀπέκτειναν τινας. [4] καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν ἡσσῶντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι: τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ στρατοπέδῳ καὶ μάλιστα τῷ μέσῳ, ᾗπερ ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἄγις ἦν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν οἱ τριακόσιοι ἱππῆς καλούμενοι, προσπεσόντες τῶν [τε] Ἀργείων τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις καὶ πέντε λόχοις ὠνομασμένοις καὶ Κλεωναίοις καὶ Ὀρνεάταις καὶ Ἀθηναίων τοῖς παρατεταγμένοις, ἔτρεψαν οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομείναντας, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπῆσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐθὺς ἐνδόντας καὶ ἔστιν οὓς καὶ καταπατηθέντας τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν.

[72] He had given the order at the last moment, when the charge had already begun, and Aristocles and Hipponoidas refused to make the movement. (For the cowardice which they were supposed to have shown on this occasion they were afterwards banished from Sparta.) The enemy were upon him before he was ready, and as the two divisions would not advance into the place left by the Sciritae, Agis ordered the Sciritae themselves to close up, but he found that it was too late, and that they also were now unable to fill the vacant space. Then the Lacedaemonians showed in a

remarkable manner that, although utterly failing in their tactics, they could win by their courage alone. When they were at close quarters with the enemy, the Mantinean right put to flight the Sciritae and the soldiers of Brasidas. The Mantineans and their allies and the thousand chosen Argives dashed in through the gap in the Lacedaemonian ranks and completed their defeat; they surrounded and routed them, and so drove them to their waggons, where they killed some of the elder men who were appointed to guard them. In this part of the field the Lacedaemonians were beaten, but elsewhere, and especially in the centre of the army, where the king Agis and the three hundred Knights, as they are called, who attend him, were posted, they charged the elder Argives, the Five Divisions as they are termed, the Cleonaeans, Orneatae, and those of the Athenians who were ranged with them, and put them to flight. Most of them never even struck a blow, but gave way at once on the approach of the Lacedaemonians; some were actually trodden under foot, being overtaken by the advancing host.

73. ὡς δὲ ταύτῃ ἐνεδεδώκει τὸ τῶν Ἀργείων καὶ ξυμμάχων στράτευμα, παρερρήγνυντο ἤδη ἅμα καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερα, καὶ ἅμα τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Τεγεατῶν ἐκυκλοῦτο τῷ περιέχοντι σφῶν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν αὐτοὺς κίνδυνος περιειστήκει, τῇ μὲν κυκλουμένους, τῇ δὲ ἤδη ἡσσημένους. καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐταλαιπώρησαν, εἰ μὴ οἱ ἱππῆς παρόντες αὐτοῖς ὠφέλιμοι ἦσαν. [2] καὶ ξυνέβη τὸν Ἄγιν, ὡς ᾔσθετο τὸ εὐώνυμον σφῶν πονοῦντὸ κατὰ τοὺς Μαντινέας καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων τοὺς χιλίους, παραγγεῖλαι παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι χωρῆσαι ἐπὶ τὸ νικώμενον. [3] καὶ γενομένου τούτου οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς παρῆλθε καὶ ἐξέκλινεν ἀπὸ σφῶν τὸ στράτευμα, καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν ἐσώθησαν καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων μετ᾽ αὐτῶν τὸ ἡσσηθέν: οἱ δὲ Μαντινῆς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων οἱ λογάδες οὐκέτι πρὸς τὸ ἐγκεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, ἀλλ᾽ ὁρῶντες τούς τε

σφετέρους νενικημένους καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπιφερομένους ἐς φυγὴν ἐτράποντο. [4] καὶ τῶν μὲν Μαντινέων καὶ πλείους διεφθάρησαν, τῶν δὲ Ἀργείων λογάδων τὸ πολὺ ἐσώθη. ἡ μέντοι φυγὴ καὶ ἀποχώρησις οὐ βίαιος οὐδὲ μακρὰ ἦν: οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μέχρι μὲν τοῦ τρέψαι χρονίους τὰς μάχας καὶ βεβαίους τῷ μένειν ποιοῦνται, τρέψαντες δὲ βραχείας καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ τὰς διώξεις.

[73] When the allies and the Argives had yielded in this quarter, they became severed from their comrades to the left as well as to the right of the line; meanwhile the extended right wing of the Lacedaemonians and the Tegeans threatened to surround the Athenians. They were in great danger; their men were being hemmed in at one point and were already defeated at another; and but for their cavalry, which did them good service, they would have suffered more than any other part of the army. Just then Agis, observing the distress of the Lacedaemonian left wing, which was opposed to the Mantineans and the thousand select Argives, commanded his whole forces to go and assist their own defeated troops. Whereupon the Athenians, when their opponents turned aside and began to move away from them, quietly made their escape, and along with them the defeated Argives. The Mantineans and their allies and the chosen force of Argives, seeing their army conquered and the Lacedaemonians bearing down upon them, gave up all thoughts of following up their advantage and fled. The loss incurred by the chosen Argives was small, that of the Mantineans more serious. The pursuit was not fierce nor the flight protracted, for the Lacedaemonians fight long and refuse to move until they have put an enemy to flight, but, having once defeated him, they do not follow him far or long.

74. καὶ ἡ μὲν μάχη τοιαύτη καὶ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων ἐγένετο, πλείστου δὴ χρόνου μεγίστη δὴ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ ὑπὸ ἀξιολογωτάτων πόλεων ξυνελθοῦσα. [2] οἱ δὲ

Λακεδαιμόνιοι προθέμενοι τῶν πολεμίων νεκρῶν τὰ ὅπλα τροπαῖον εὐθὺς ἵστασαν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐσκύλευον, καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀνείλοντο καὶ ἀπήγαγον ἐς Τεγέαν, οὗπερ ἐτάφησαν, καὶ τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν. [3] ἀπέθανον δὲ Ἀργείων μὲν καὶ Ὀρνεατῶν καὶ Κλεωναίων ἑπτακόσιοι, Μαντινέων δὲ διακόσιοι, καὶ Ἀθηναίων ξὺν Αἰγινήταις διακόσιοι καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀμφότεροι. Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ οἱ μὲν ξύμμαχοι οὐκ ἐταλαιπώρησαν ὥστε καὶ ἀξιόλογόν τι ἀπογενέσθαι: αὐτῶν δὲ χαλεπὸν μὲν ἦν τὴν ἀλήθειαν πυθέσθαι, ἐλέγοντο δὲ περὶ τριακοσίους ἀποθανεῖν.

[74] Thus, or nearly thus, went the battle, by far the greatest of Hellenic battles which had taken place for a long time, and fought by the most famous cities. The Lacedaemonians exposed the arms of the enemies' dead, and made a trophy of them; they then plundered the bodies, and taking up their own dead carried them away to Tegea, where they were buried; the enemies' dead they gave back under a flag of truce. Of the Argives, Orneatae, and Cleonaeans there fell seven hundred, of the Mantineans two hundred, and of the Athenians, including their settlers in Aegina, two hundred, and both their generals. As to the Lacedaemonians, their allies were not hard pressed and did not incur any considerable loss; how many of themselves fell it was hard to ascertain precisely, but their dead are reported to have numbered about three hundred.

75. τῆς δὲ μάχης μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι καὶ Πλειστοάναξ ὁ ἕτερος βασιλεὺς ἔχων τούς τε πρεσβυτέρους καὶ νεωτέρους ἐβοήθησε, καὶ μέχρι μὲν Τεγέας ἀφίκετο, πυθόμενος δὲ τὴν νίκην ἀπεχώρησεν. [2] καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ Κορίνθου καὶ ἔξω Ἰσθμοῦ ξυμμάχους ἀπέστρεψαν πέμψαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναχωρήσαντες καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀφέντες Κάρνεια γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐτύγχανον ὄντα τὴν ἑορτὴν ἦγον. [3] καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τότε ἐπιφερομένην αἰτίαν ἔς τε μαλακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰν καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδυτῆτα ἐνὶ

ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο, τύχῃ μέν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ὄντες. [4]τῇ δὲ προτέρᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ξυνέβη τῆς μάχης ταύτης καὶ τοὺς Ἐπιδαυρίους πανδημεὶ ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν ὡς ἐρῆμον οὖσαν καὶ τοὺς ὑπολοίπους φύλακας τῶν Ἀργείων ἐξελθόντων αὐτῶν διαφθεῖραι πολλούς. [5] καὶ Ἠλείων τρισχιλίων ὁπλιτῶν βοηθησάντων Μαντινεῦσιν ὕστερον τῆς μάχης καὶ Ἀθηναίων χιλίων πρὸς τοῖς προτέροις ἐστράτευσαν ἅπαντες οἱ ξύμμαχοι οὗτοι εὐθὺς ἐπὶ Ἐπίδαυρον, ἕως οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Κάρνεια ἦγον, καὶ διελόμενοι τὴν πόλιν περιετείχιζον. [6] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐξεπαύσαντο, Ἀθηναῖοι δέ, ὥσπερ προσετάχθησαν, τὴν ἄκραν τὸ Ἡραῖον εὐθὺς ἐξειργάσαντο. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ξυγκαταλιπόντες ἅπαντες τῷ τειχίσματι φρουρὰν ἀνεχώρησαν κατὰ πόλεις ἕκαστοι. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[75] Just before the battle, Pleistoanax, the other king, led out of Sparta a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; he had proceeded as far as Tegea when he heard of the victory, and returned. The Lacedaemonians sent and countermanded the reinforcements from Corinth and beyond the Isthmus; they then went home themselves and, dismissing the allies, celebrated the festival of the Carnea, for which this happened to be the season. Thus, by a single action, they wiped out the charge of cowardice, which was due to their misfortune at Sphacteria, and of general stupidity and sluggishness, then current against them in Hellas. They were now thought to have been hardly used by fortune; but in character to be the same as ever.The very day before the battle, the Epidaurians with their whole force invaded the territory of Argos, expecting to find it deserted; they killed many of the men who had been left to protect the country when the main army took the field. After the battle three thousand Elean hoplites came to the aid of the Mantineans, and a second detachment of a thousand from Athens. While the Lacedaemonians were still celebrating the Carnea they marched all together against Epidaurus, and

began to surround the city with a wall, dividing the task among them. The other allies did not persevere, but the Athenians soon completed their own portion, the fortification of the promontory on which the temple of Herè stood. In this part of the works a garrison was left, to which all furnished a contingent; they then returned to their several cities. So the summer ended.

76. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἀρχομένου εὐθὺς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπειδὴ τὰ Κάρνεια ἤγαγον, ἐξεστράτευσαν, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Τεγέαν λόγους προύπεμπον ἐς τὸ Ἄργος ξυμβατηρίους. [2] ἦσαν δὲ αὐτοῖς πρότερόν τε ἄνδρες ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ βουλόμενοι τὸν δῆμον τὸν ἐν Ἄργει καταλῦσαι: καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἡ μάχη ἐγεγένητο, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐδύναντο πείθειν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐς τὴν ὁμολογίαν. ἐβούλοντο δὲ πρῶτον σπονδὰς ποιήσαντες πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους αὖθις ὕστερον καὶ ξυμμαχίαν, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη τῷ δήμῳ ἐπιτίθεσθαι. [3] καὶ ἀφικνεῖται πρόξενος ὢν Ἀργείων Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου παρὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δύο λόγω φέρων ἐς τὸ Ἄργος, τὸν μὲν καθ᾽ ὅτι εἰ βούλονται πολεμεῖν, τὸν δ᾽ ὡς εἰ εἰρήνην ἄγειν. καὶ γενομένης πολλῆς ἀντιλογίας ἔτυχε γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης παρών οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πράσσοντες, ἤδη καὶ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τολμῶντες, ἔπεισαν τοὺς Ἀργείους προσδέξασθαι τὸν ξυμβατήριον λόγον. ἔστι δὲ ὅδε.

[76] At the very beginning of the following winter, after the celebration of the Carnea, the Lacedaemonians led out an army as far as Tegea, whence they sent proposals of peace to the Argives. There had always been some partisans of Lacedaemon in the city, who had wanted to put down the democracy. After the battle it was far easier for this party to draw the people into an alliance with Sparta. Their intention was to make first of all a peace, and then an alliance, with the Lacedaemonians, and, having done so, to set upon the people. And now there arrived in Argos, Lichas the son of Arcesilaus, the proxenus of the Argives, offering them one of two alternatives: There were terms of peace, but they might

also have war if they pleased. A warm discussion ensued, for Alcibiades happened to be in the place. The party which had been intriguing for the Lacedaemonians, and had at last ventured to come forward openly, persuaded the Argives to accept the terms of peace, which were as follows:

77. ‘καττάδε δοκεῖ τᾷ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμβαλέσθαι ποττὼς Ἀργείως, ἀποδιδόντας τὼς παῖδας τοῖς Ὀρχομενίοις καὶ τὼς ἄνδρας τοῖς Μαιναλίοις, καὶ τὼς ἄνδρας τὼς ἐν Μαντινείᾳ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀποδιδόντας, καὶ ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρω ἐκβῶντας καὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀναιρίοντας. [2] αἰ δέ κα μὴ εἴκωντι τοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρω, πολεμίως ἦμεν τοῖς Ἀργείοις καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξυμμάχοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν Ἀργείων ξυμμάχοις. [3] καὶ αἴ τινα τοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι παῖδα ἔχοντι, ἀποδόμεν ταῖς πολίεσσι πάσαις. [4] περὶ δὲ τῶ σιῶ σύματος, αἰ μὲν λῆν, τοῖς Ἐπιδαυρίοις ὄρκον δόμεν, <αἰ> δέ, αὐτὼς ὀμόσαι. [5] τὰς δὲ πόλιας τὰς ἐν Πελοποννάσῳ, καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμως ἦμεν πάσας καττὰ πάτρια. [6] αἰ δέ κα τῶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσω τις ἐπὶ τὰν Πελοπόννασον γᾶν ἴῃ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἀλεξέμεναι ἀμόθι βωλευσαμένως, ὅπᾳ κα δικαιότατα δοκῇ τοῖς Πελοποννασίοις. [7] ὅσσοι δ᾽ ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσω τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοί ἐντι, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐσσίονται ἐν τῷπερ καὶ τοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τοὶ τῶν Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι ἐν τ<ῷ αὐτῷ ἐσσίονται ἐν τῷπερ καὶ τοὶ Ἀργεῖοι>, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες. [8] ἐπιδείξαντας δὲ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ξυμβαλέσθαι, αἴ κα αὐτοῖς δοκῇ. αἰ δέ τι δοκῇ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις, οἴκαδ᾽ ἀπιάλλην.’

[77] ‘It seems good to the Lacedaemonian assembly to make an agreement with the Argives on the following terms:’I. The Argives shall restore to the Orchomenians the youths, and to the Maenalians the men whom they hold as hostages, and to the Lacedaemonians the men who were deposited in Mantinea.’II. They shall also evacuate Epidauria, and demolish the fortifications which they have erected there. If the Athenians refuse to evacuate Epidauria, they shall be enemies to the Argives and Lacedaemonians, and to the

allies of the Lacedaemonians, and to the allies of the Argives.’III. If the Lacedaemonians have any youths belonging to any of the allies in their country, they shall restore them to their several cities.’IV. Concerning the sacrifice to the God, the Epidaurians shall be permitted to take an oath which the Argives shall formally tender to them.’V. The cities in Peloponnesus, both small and great, shall be all independent, according to their ancestral laws.’VI. If anyone from without Peloponnesus comes against Peloponnesus with evil intent, the Peloponnesians shall take council together and shall repel the enemy; and the several states shall bear such a share in the war as may seem equitable to the Peloponnesians.’VII. The allies of the Lacedaemonians without Peloponnesus shall be in the same position as the other allies of the Lacedaemonians and the allies of the Argives, and they shall retain their present territory.’VIII. The Argives may if they think fit show this agreement to their allies and make terms with them, but if the allies raise any objection, they shall dismiss them to their homes.’

78. τοῦτον μὲν τὸν λόγον προσεδέξαντο πρῶτον οἱ Ἀργεῖοι, καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ στράτευμα ἀνεχώρησεν ἐκ τῆς Τεγέας ἐπ᾽ οἴκου: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐπιμειξίας οὔσης ἤδη παρ᾽ ἀλλήλους, οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἔπραξαν αὖθις οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄνδρες ὥστε τὴν Μαντινέων καὶ τὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἠλείων ξυμμαχίαν ἀφέντας Ἀργείους σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ποιήσασθαι πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ ἐγένοντο αἵδε.

[78] When the Argives had accepted these propositions in the first instance, the Lacedaemonian army returned home from Tegea. The two states now began to hold intercourse with one another, and not long afterwards the same party which had negotiated the treaty contrived that the Argives should renounce their alliance with Mantinea, Athens, and Elis, and make a new treaty of alliance with Lacedaemon on the following terms:

79. ‘καττάδε ἔδοξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἦμεν πεντήκοντα ἔτη, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις δίκας διδόντας καττὰ πάτρια: ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλιες ταὶ ἐν Πελοποννάσῳ κοινανεόντων τᾶν σπονδᾶν καὶ τᾶς ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλιες, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες, καττὰ πάτρια δίκας διδόντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας. [2] ὅσσοι δὲ ἔξω Πελοποννάσω Λακεδαιμονίοις ξύμμαχοί ἐντι, ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐσσίονται τοῖσπερ καὶ τοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι: καὶ τοὶ τῶν Ἀργείων ξύμμαχοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐσσίονται τῷπερ καὶ τοὶ Ἀργεῖοι, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες. [3] αἰ δέ ποι στρατείας δέῃ κοινᾶς, βουλεύεσθαι Λακεδαιμονίως καὶ Ἀργείως ὅπᾳ κα δικαιότατα κρίναντας τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. [4] αἰ δέ τινι τᾶν πολίων ᾖ ἀμφίλλογα, ἢ τᾶν ἐντὸς ἢ τᾶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννάσω, αἴτε περὶ ὅρων αἴτε περὶ ἄλλω τινός, διακριθῆμεν. αἰ δέ τις τῶν ξυμμάχων πόλις πόλι ἐρίζοι, ἐς πόλιν ἐλθῆν ἄντινα ἴσαν ἀμφοῖν ταῖς πολίεσσι δοκείοι. τὼς δὲ ἔτας καττὰ πάτρια δικάζεσθαι.’

[79] ‘It seems good to the Lacedaemonians and to the Argives to make peace and alliance for fifty years on the following conditions:’I. They shall submit to arbitration on fair and equal terms, according to their ancestral customs.’II. The other cities of Peloponnesus shall participate in the peace and alliance, and shall be independent and their own masters, retaining their own territory and submitting to arbitration on fair and equal terms, according to their ancestral customs.’III. All the allies of the Lacedaemonians outside Peloponnesus shall share in the same terms as the Lacedaemonians, and the allies of the Argives shall be in the same position as the Argives, and shall retain their present territory.`IV. If it shall be necessary to make an expedition in common against any place, the Lacedaemonians and the Argives shall consult together and fix the share in the war which may be equitably borne by the allies.’V. If any of the states, either within or without Peloponnesus, have a dispute about a frontier, or any other matter, the difference shall be duly settled. But should a quarrel break out between two of

the allied cities, they shall appeal to some state which both the cities deem to be impartial.’VI. Justice shall be administered to the individual citizens of each state according to their ancestral customs.’

80. αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ καὶ ἡ ξυμμαχία αὕτη ἐγεγένητο: καὶ ὁπόσα ἀλλήλων πολέμῳ ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο εἶχον, διελύσαντο. κοινῇ δὲ ἤδη τὰ πράγματα τιθέμενοι ἐψηφίσαντο κήρυκα καὶ πρεσβείαν παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίων μὴ προσδέχεσθαι, ἢν μὴ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἐξίωσι τὰ τείχη ἐκλιπόντες, καὶ μὴ ξυμβαίνειν τῳ μηδὲ πολεμεῖν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἅμα. [2] καὶ τά τε ἄλλα θυμῷ ἔφερον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης χωρία καὶ ὡς Περδίκκαν ἔπεμψαν ἀμφότεροι πρέσβεις, καὶ ἀνέπεισαν Περδίκκαν ξυνομόσαι σφίσιν. οὐ μέντοι εὐθύς γε ἀπέστη τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἀλλὰ διενοεῖτο, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ἑώρα: ἦν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐξ Ἄργους. καὶ τοῖς Χαλκιδεῦσι τούς τε παλαιοὺς ὅρκους ἀνενεώσαντο καὶ ἄλλους ὤμοσαν. [3] ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ Ἀργεῖοι πρέσβεις, τὸ ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου τεῖχος κελεύοντες ἐκλιπεῖν. οἱ δ᾽ ὁρῶντες ὀλίγοι πρὸς πλείους ὄντες τοὺς ξυμφύλακας, ἔπεμψαν Δημοσθένη τοὺς σφετέρους ἐξάξοντα. ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος καὶ ἀγῶνά τινα πρόφασιν γυμνικὸν ἔξω τοῦ φρουρίου ποιήσας, ὡς ἐξῆλθε τὸ ἄλλο φρούριον, ἀπέκλῃσε τὰς πύλας: καὶ ὕστερον Ἐπιδαυρίοις ἀνανεωσάμενοι τὰς σπονδὰς αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τείχισμα.

[80] Thus the peace and the alliance were concluded, and the Lacedaemonians and Argives settled with each other any difference which they had about captures made in the war, or about any other matter. They now acted together, and passed a vote that no herald or embassy should be received from the Athenians, unless they evacuated the fortifications which they held in Peloponnesus and left the country; they agreed also that they would not enter into alliance or make war except in concert. They were very energetic in all their doings, and jointly sent ambassadors to the Chalcidian cities in Thrace, and to Perdiccas whom they persuaded to join their confederacy. He did not, however,

immediately desert the Athenians, but he was thinking of deserting, being influenced by the example of the Argives; for he was himself of Argive descent. The Argives and Lacedaemonians renewed the oaths formerly taken by the Lacedaemonians to the Chalcidians and swore new ones. The Argives also sent envoys to the Athenians bidding them evacuate the fortifications which they had raised at Epidaurus. They, seeing that their troops formed but a small part of the garrison, sent Demosthenes to bring them away with him. When he came he proposed to hold a gymnastic contest outside the fort; upon this pretext he induced the rest of the garrison to go out, and then shut the gates upon them. Soon afterwards the Athenians renewed their treaty with the Epidaurians, and themselves restored the fort to them.

81. μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων ἀπόστασιν ἐκ τῆς ξυμμαχίας καὶ οἱ Μαντινῆς, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντέχοντες, ἔπειτ᾽ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἄνευ τῶν Ἀργείων, ξυνέβησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφεῖσαν τῶν πόλεων. [2] καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, χίλιοι ἑκάτεροι, ξυστρατεύσαντες τά τ᾽ ἐν Σικυῶνι ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον κατέστησαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλθόντες, καὶ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ξυναμφότεροι ἤδη καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἄργει δῆμον κατέλυσαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχία ἐπιτηδεία τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις κατέστη. καὶ πρὸς ἔαρ ἤδη ταῦτα ἦν τοῦ χειμῶνος λήγοντος, καὶ τέταρτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

[81] When the Argives deserted the alliance the Mantineans held out for a time, but without the Argives they were helpless, and so they too came to terms with the Lacedaemonians, and gave up their claim to supremacy over the cities in Arcadia which had been subject to them. Next the Lacedaemonians and the Argives, each providing a thousand men, made a joint expedition: first the Lacedaemonians went alone and set up a more oligarchical government at Sicyon; then they and the Argives uniting

their forces put down the democracy at Argos, and established an oligarchy which was in the interest of the Lacedaemonians. These changes were effected at the close of winter towards the approach of spring, and so ended the fourteenth year of the war.

82. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους Διῆς τε οἱ ἐν Ἄθῳ ἀπέστησαν Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Χαλκιδέας, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ ἐν Ἀχαΐᾳ οὐκ ἐπιτηδείως πρότερον ἔχοντα καθίσταντο. [2]καὶ Ἀργείων ὁ δῆμος κατ᾽ ὀλίγον ξυνιστάμενός τε καὶ ἀναθαρσήσας ἐπέθεντο τοῖς ὀλίγοις, τηρήσαντες αὐτὰς τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων: καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπεκράτησεν ὁ δῆμος, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ ἐξήλασεν. [3] οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὺς μετεπέμποντο οἱ φίλοι, οὐκ ἦλθον ἐκ πλέονος, ἀναβαλόμενοι δὲ τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας ἐβοήθουν. καὶ ἐν Τεγέᾳ πυθόμενοι ὅτι νενίκηνται οἱ ὀλίγοι, προελθεῖν μὲν οὐκέτι ἠθέλησαν δεομένων τῶν διαπεφευγότων, ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἐπ᾽ οἴκου τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας ἦγον. [4] καὶ ὕστερον ἐλθόντων πρέσβεων ἀπό τε τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει [ἀγγέλων] καὶ τῶν ἔξω Ἀργείων, παρόντων τε τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ῥηθέντων πολλῶν ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων ἔγνωσαν μὲν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς στρατεύειν ἐς Ἄργος, διατριβαὶ δὲ καὶ μελλήσεις ἐγίγνοντο. [5] ὁ δὲ δῆμος τῶν Ἀργείων ἐν τούτῳ φοβούμενος τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίαν πάλιν προσαγόμενός τε καὶ νομίζων μέγιστον ἂν σφᾶς ὠφελῆσαι, τειχίζει μακρὰ τείχη ἐς θάλασσαν, ὅπως, ἢν τῆς γῆς εἴργωνται, ἡ κατὰ θάλασσαν σφᾶς μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ὠφελῇ. [6] ξυνῄδεσαν δὲ τὸν τειχισμὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ τινὲς πόλεων. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι πανδημεί, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ οἰκέται, ἐτείχιζον: καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὐτοῖς ἦλθον τέκτονες καὶ λιθουργοί. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[82] In the ensuing summer the Dictidians in Mount Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidians; and the Lacedaemonians resettled the affairs of Achaia upon a footing more favourable to their interests than hitherto. The

popular party at Argos, reconstituting themselves by degrees, plucked up courage, and, taking advantage of the festival of the Gymnopaediae at Lacedaemon, attacked the oligarchy. A battle took place in the city: the popular party won, and either killed or expelled their enemies. The oligarchy had sought help from their friends the Lacedaemonians, but they did not come for some time; at last they put off the festival and went to their aid. When they arrived at Tegea they heard that the oligarchs had been defeated. They would proceed no further, but in spite of the entreaties of the fugitives returned home and resumed the celebration of the festival. Not long afterwards envoys came to them both from the party now established in Argos and from those who had been driven out, and in the presence of their allies, after hearing many pleas from both sides, they passed a vote condemning the victorious faction; they then resolved to send an expedition to Argos, but delays occurred and time was lost. Meanwhile the democracy at Argos, fearing the Lacedaemonians, and again courting the Athenian alliance in which their hopes were centred, began building Long Walls to the sea, in order that if they were blockaded by land they might have the advantage, with Athenian help, of introducing provisions by water. Certain other states in Peloponnesus were privy to this project. The whole Argive people, the citizens themselves, their wives, and their slaves, set to work upon the wall, and the Athenians sent them carpenters and masons from Athens. So the summer ended.

83. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὡς ᾔσθοντο τειχιζόντων, ἐστράτευσαν ἐς τὸ Ἄργος αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πλὴν Κορινθίων: ὑπῆρχε δέ τι αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἄργους αὐτόθεν πρασσόμενον. ἦγε δὲ τὴν στρατιὰν Ἄγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. [2] καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως δοκοῦντα προϋπάρχειν οὐ προυχώρησεν ἔτι: τὰ δὲ οἰκοδομούμενα τείχη ἑλόντες καὶ καταβαλόντες καὶ Ὑσιὰς χωρίον τῆς Ἀργείας λαβόντες καὶ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους

ἅπαντας οὓς ἔλαβον ἀποκτείναντες ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις. [3] ἐστράτευσαν δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ Ἀργεῖοι ἐς τὴν Φλειασίαν καὶ δῃώσαντες ἀπῆλθον, ὅτι σφῶν τοὺς φυγάδας ὑπεδέχοντο: οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα κατῴκηντο. [4] κατέκλῃσαν δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ Μακεδόνας Ἀθηναῖοι, Περδίκκᾳ ἐπικαλοῦντες τήν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους γενομένην ξυνωμοσίαν, καὶ ὅτι παρασκευασαμένων αὐτῶν στρατιὰν ἄγειν ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης καὶ Ἀμφίπολιν Νικίου τοῦ Νικηράτου στρατηγοῦντος ἔψευστο τὴν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ἡ στρατεία μάλιστα διελύθη ἐκείνου †ἀπάραντος †: πολέμιος οὖν ἦν. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα οὗτος, καὶ πέμπτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.

[83] In the ensuing winter the Lacedaemonians, hearing of the progress of the work, made an expedition to Argos with their allies, all but the Corinthians; there was also a party at Argos itself acting in their interest. Agis the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, led the army. The support which they expected to find at Argos was not forthcoming; the walls however, which were not yet finished, were captured by them and razed to the ground; they also seized Hysiae, a place in the Argive territory, and put to death all the free men whom they caught; they then withdrew, and returned to their several cities. Next the Argives in their turn made an expedition into the territory of Phlius, which they ravaged because the Phliasians had received the Argive refugees, most of whom had settled there; they then returned home.During the same winter the Athenians blockaded Perdiccas in Macedonia, complaining of the league which he had made with the Argives and Lacedaemonians; and also that he had been false to their alliance when they had prepared to send an army against the Chalcidians and against Amphipolis under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus. The army was in fact disbanded chiefly owing to his withdrawal. So he became

their enemy. Thus the winter ended, and with it the fifteenth year of the war.

84. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους Ἀλκιβιάδης τε πλεύσας ἐς Ἄργος ναυσὶν εἴκοσιν Ἀργείων τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἔτι ὑπόπτους εἶναι καὶ τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονεῖν ἔλαβε τριακοσίους ἄνδρας, καὶ κατέθεντο αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὰς ἐγγὺς νήσους ὧν ἦρχον: καὶ ἐπὶ Μῆλον τὴν νῆσον Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευσαν ναυσὶν ἑαυτῶν μὲν τριάκοντα, Χίαις δὲ ἕξ, Λεσβίαιν δὲ δυοῖν, καὶ ὁπλίταις ἑαυτῶν μὲν διακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις καὶ τοξόταις τριακοσίοις καὶ ἱπποτοξόταις εἴκοσι, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων καὶ νησιωτῶν ὁπλίταις μάλιστα πεντακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις. [2] οἱ δὲ Μήλιοι Λακεδαιμονίων μέν εἰσιν ἄποικοι, τῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων οὐκ ἤθελον ὑπακούειν ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι νησιῶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐδετέρων ὄντες ἡσύχαζον, ἔπειτα ὡς αὐτοὺς ἠνάγκαζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δῃοῦντες τὴν γῆν, ἐς πόλεμον φανερὸν κατέστησαν. [3] στρατοπεδευσάμενοι οὖν ἐς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν τῇ παρασκευῇ ταύτῃ οἱ στρατηγοὶ Κλεομήδης τε ὁ Λυκομήδους καὶ Τεισίας ὁ Τεισιμάχου, πρὶν ἀδικεῖν τι τῆς γῆς, λόγους πρῶτον ποιησομένους ἔπεμψαν πρέσβεις. οὓς οἱ Μήλιοι πρὸς μὲν τὸ πλῆθος οὐκ ἤγαγον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις λέγειν ἐκέλευον περὶ ὧν ἥκουσιν.

[84] In the ensuing summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships, and seized any of the Argives who were still suspected to be of the Lacedaemonian faction, to the number of three hundred; and the Athenians deposited them in the subject islands near at hand. The Athenians next made an expedition against the island of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian, twelve hundred hoplites and three hundred archers besides twenty mounted archers of their own, and about fifteen hundred hoplites furnished by their allies in the islands. The Melians are colonists of the Lacedaemonians who would not submit to Athens like the other islanders. At first they were neutral and took no part. But when the Athenians tried to coerce them by ravaging their lands, they were driven into open

hostilities. The generals, Cleomedes the son of Lycomedes and Tisias the son of Tisimachus, encamped with the Athenian forces on the island. But before they did the country any harm they sent envoys to negotiate with the Melians. Instead of bringing these envoys before the people, the Melians desired them to explain their errand to the magistrates and to the dominant class. They spoke as follows:

85. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἔλεγον τοιάδε. ‘ἐπειδὴ οὐ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος οἱ λόγοι γίγνονται, ὅπως δὴ μὴ ξυνεχεῖ ῥήσει οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ ἀνέλεγκτα ἐσάπαξ ἀκούσαντες ἡμῶν ἀπατηθῶσιν γιγνώσκομεν γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο φρονεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους ἀγωγή , ὑμεῖς οἱ καθήμενοι ἔτι ἀσφαλέστερον ποιήσατε. καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γὰρ καὶ μηδ᾽ ὑμεῖς ἑνὶ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκοῦν ἐπιτηδείως λέγεσθαι εὐθὺς ὑπολαμβάνοντες κρίνετε. καὶ πρῶτον εἰ ἀρέσκει ὡς λέγομεν εἴπατε.’

[85] ‘Since we are not allowed to speak to the people, lest, forsooth, a multitude should be deceived by seductive and unanswerable arguments which they would hear set forth in a single uninterrupted oration (for we are perfectly aware that this is what you mean in bringing us before a select few), you who are sitting here may as well make assurance yet surer. Let us have no set speeches at all, but do you reply to each several statement of which you disapprove, and criticise it at once. Say first of all how you like this mode of proceeding.’

86. οἱ δὲ τῶν Μηλίων ξύνεδροι ἀπεκρίναντο ‘ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν ἀλλήλους οὐ ψέγεται, τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου παρόντα ἤδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντα διαφέροντα αὐτοῦ φαίνεται. ὁρῶμεν γὰρ αὐτούς τε κριτὰς ἥκοντας ὑμᾶς τῶν λεχθησομένων καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς περιγενομένοις μὲν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδοῦσι πόλεμον ἡμῖν φέρουσαν, πεισθεῖσι δὲ δουλείαν.’

[86] The Melian representatives answered: ‘The quiet interchange of explanations is a reasonable thing, and we do not object to that. But your warlike movements, which are present not only to our fears but to our eyes, seem to belie your words. We see that, although you may reason with us, you mean to be our judges; and that at the end of the discussion, if the justice of our cause prevail and we therefore refuse to yield, we may expect war; if we are convinced by you, slavery.’

87. ΑΘ.εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ὑπονοίας τῶν μελλόντων λογιούμενοι ἢ ἄλλο τι ξυνήκετε ἢ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων καὶ ὧν ὁρᾶτε περὶ σωτηρίας βουλεύσοντες τῇ πόλει, παυοίμεθ᾽ ἄν: εἰ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦτο, λέγοιμεν ἄν.

[87] Athenians. ‘Nay, but if you are only going to argue from fancies about the future, or if you meet us with any other purpose than that of looking your circumstances in the face and saving your city, we have done; but if this is your intention we will proceed.’

88. ΜΗΛ.εἰκὸς μὲν καὶ ξυγγνώμη ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε καθεστῶτας ἐπὶ πολλὰ καὶ λέγοντας καὶ δοκοῦντας τρέπεσθαι: ἡ μέντοι ξύνοδος καὶ περὶ σωτηρίας ἥδε πάρεστι, καὶ ὁ λόγος ᾧ προκαλεῖσθε τρόπῳ, εἰ δοκεῖ, γιγνέσθω.

[88] Mel. ‘It is an excusable and natural thing that men in our position should neglect no argument and no view which may avail. But we admit that this conference has met to consider the question of our preservation; and therefore let the argument proceed in the manner which you propose.’

89. ΑΘ.ἡμεῖς τοίνυν οὔτε αὐτοὶ μετ᾽ ὀνομάτων καλῶν, ὡς ἢ δικαίως τὸν Μῆδον καταλύσαντες ἄρχομεν ἢ ἀδικούμενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόμεθα, λόγων μῆκος ἄπιστον παρέξομεν, οὔθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῦμεν ἢ ὅτι Λακεδαιμονίων ἄποικοι ὄντες οὐ ξυνεστρατεύσατε ἢ ὡς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ἠδικήκατε λέγοντας οἴεσθαι πείσειν, τὰ δυνατὰ δ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἑκάτεροι ἀληθῶς φρονοῦμεν διαπράσσεσθαι, ἐπισταμένους πρὸς εἰδότας ὅτι δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης

κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν.

[89] Ath. `Well, then, we Athenians will use no fine words; we will not go out of our way to prove at length that we have a right to rule, because we overthrew the Persians; or that we attack you now because we are suffering any injury at your hands. We should not convince you if we did; nor must you expect to convince us by arguing that, although a colony of the Lacedaemonians, you have taken no part in their expeditions, or that you have never done us any wrong. But you and we should say what we really think, and aim only at what is possible, for we both alike know that into the discussion of human affairs the question of justice only enters where there is equal power to enforce it, and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.'

90. ΜΗΛ.ἦι μὲν δὴ νομίζομέν γε, χρήσιμον ἀνάγκη γάρ, ἐπειδὴ ὑμεῖς οὕτω παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε μὴ καταλύειν ὑμᾶς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ αἰεὶ ἐν κινδύνῳ γιγνομένῳ εἶναι τὰ εἰκότα καὶ δίκαια, καί τι καὶ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς πείσαντά τινα ὠφεληθῆναι. καὶ πρὸς ὑμῶν οὐχ ἧσσον τοῦτο, ὅσῳ καὶ ἐπὶ μεγίστῃ τιμωρίᾳ σφαλέντες ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις παράδειγμα γένοισθε.

[90] Mel. `Well, then, since you set aside justice and invite us to speak of expediency, in our judgment it is certainly expedient that you should respect a principle which is for the common good; that to every man when in peril a reasonable claim should be accounted a claim of right, and that any plea which he is disposed to urge, even if failing of the point a little, should help his cause. Your interest in this principle is quite as great as ours, inasmuch as you, if you fall, will incur the heaviest vengeance, and will be the most terrible example to mankind.'

91. ΑΘ.ἡμεῖς δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς, ἢν καὶ παυθῇ, οὐκ ἀθυμοῦμεν τὴν τελευτήν: οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὗτοι δεινοὶ τοῖς νικηθεῖσιν ἔστι δὲ οὐ

πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών, ἀλλ᾽ ἢν οἱ ὑπήκοοί που τῶν ἀρξάντων αὐτοὶ ἐπιθέμενοι κρατήσωσιν. [2] καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτου ἡμῖν ἀφείσθω κινδυνεύεσθαι: ὡς δὲ ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ τε πάρεσμεν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ νῦν τοὺς λόγους ἐροῦμεν τῆς ὑμετέρας πόλεως, ταῦτα δηλώσομεν, βουλόμενοι ἀπόνως μὲν ὑμῶν ἄρξαι, χρησίμως δ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀμφοτέροις σωθῆναι.

[91] Ath. ‘The fall of our empire, if it should fall, is not an event to which we look forward with dismay; for ruling states such as Lacedaemon are not cruel to their vanquished enemies. With the Lacedaemonians, however, we are not now contending; the real danger is from our many subject states, who may of their own motion rise up and overcome their masters. But this is a danger which you may leave to us. And we will now endeavour to show that we have come in the interests of our empire, and that in what we are about to say we are only seeking the preservation of your city. For we want to make you ours with the least trouble to ourselves, and it is for the interests of us both that you should not be destroyed.’

92. ΜΗΛ.καὶ πῶς χρήσιμον ἂν ξυμβαίη ἡμῖν δουλεῦσαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ὑμῖν ἄρξαι;

[92] Mel. ‘It may be your interest to be our masters, but how can it be ours to be your slaves?’

93. ΑΘ.ὅτι ὑμῖν μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τὰ δεινότατα παθεῖν ὑπακοῦσαι ἂν γένοιτο, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ διαφθείραντες ὑμᾶς κερδαίνοιμεν ἄν.

[93] Ath. ‘To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for your preservation.’

94. ΜΗΛ.ὥστε [δὲ] ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας ἡμᾶς φίλους μὲν εἶναι ἀντὶ πολεμίων, ξυμμάχους δὲ μηδετέρων, οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε;

[94] Mel. ‘But must we be your enemies? Will you not receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you?’

95. ΑΘ.οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς βλάπτει ἡ ἔχθρα ὑμῶν ὅσον ἡ φιλία μὲν ἀσθενείας, τὸ δὲ μῖσος δυνάμεως παράδειγμα τοῖς ἀρχομένοις δηλούμενον.

[95] Ath. `No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your friendship; for the one is in the eyes of our subjects an argument of our power, the other of our weakness.'

96. ΜΗΛ.σκοποῦσι δ᾽ ὑμῶν οὕτως οἱ ὑπήκοοι τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε τούς τε μὴ προσήκοντας καὶ ὅσοι ἄποικοι ὄντες οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀποστάντες τινὲς κεχείρωνται ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ τιθέασιν;

[96] Mel. 'But are your subjects really unable to distinguish between states in which you have no concern, and those which are chiefly your own colonies, and in some cases have revolted and been subdued by you ?'

97. ΑΘ.δικαιώματι γὰρ οὐδετέρους ἐλλείπειν ἡγοῦνται, κατὰ δύναμιν δὲ τοὺς μὲν περιγίγνεσθαι, ἡμᾶς δὲ φόβῳ οὐκ ἐπιέναι: ὥστε ἔξω καὶ τοῦ πλεόνων ἄρξαι καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἂν παράσχοιτε, ἄλλως τε καὶ νησιῶται ναυκρατόρων καὶ ἀσθενέστεροι ἑτέρων ὄντες εἰ μὴ περιγένοισθε.

[97] Ath. 'Why, they do not doubt that both of them have a good deal to say for themselves on the score of justice, but they think states like yours are left free because they are able to defend themselves, and that we do not attack them because we dare not. So that your subjection will give us an increase of security, as well as an extension of empire. For we are masters of the sea, and you who are islanders, and insignificant islanders too, must not be allowed to escape us.'

98. ΜΗΛ.ἐν δ᾽ ἐκείνῳ οὐ νομίζετε ἀσφάλειαν; δεῖ γὰρ αὖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς τῶν δικαίων λόγων ἡμᾶς ἐκβιβάσαντες τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ξυμφόρῳ ὑπακούειν πείθετε, καὶ ἡμᾶς τὸ ἡμῖν χρήσιμον διδάσκοντας, εἰ τυγχάνει καὶ ὑμῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ξυμβαῖνον, πειρᾶσθαι πείθειν. ὅσοι γὰρ νῦν μηδετέροις ξυμμαχοῦσι, πῶς οὐ πολεμώσεσθε αὐτούς, ὅταν ἐς τάδε βλέψαντες ἡγήσωνταί ποτε ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἥξειν; κἀν

τούτῳ τί ἄλλο ἢ τοὺς μὲν ὑπάρχοντας πολεμίους μεγαλύνετε, τοὺς δὲ μηδὲ μελλήσαντας γενέσθαι ἄκοντας ἐπάγεσθε;

[98] Mel. ‘But do you not recognise another danger? For, once more, since you drive us from the plea of justice and press upon us your doctrine of expediency, we must show you what is for our interest, and, if it be for yours also, may hope to convince you: — Will you not be making enemies of all who are now neutrals? When they see how you are treating us they will expect you some day to turn against them; and if so, are you not strengthening the enemies whom you already have, and bringing upon you others who, if they could help, would never dream of being your enemies at all?’

99. ΑΘ.οὐ γὰρ νομίζομεν ἡμῖν τούτους δεινοτέρους ὅσοι ἠπειρῶταί που ὄντες τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ πολλὴν τὴν διαμέλλησιν τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς φυλακῆς ποιήσονται, ἀλλὰ τοὺς νησιώτας τέ που ἀνάρκτους, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς, καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τῆς ἀρχῆς τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ παροξυνομένους. οὗτοι γὰρ πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν τῷ ἀλογίστῳ ἐπιτρέψαντες σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐς προῦπτον κίνδυνον καταστήσειαν.

[99] Ath. ‘We do not consider our really dangerous enemies to be any of the peoples inhabiting the mainland who, secure in their freedom, may defer indefinitely any measures of precaution which they take against us, but islanders who, like you, happen to be under no control, and all may be already irritated by the necessity of submission to our empire — these are our real enemies, for they are the most reckless and most likely to bring themselves as well as us into a danger which they cannot but foresee.’

100. ΜΗΛ.ἦ που ἄρα, εἰ τοσαύτην γε ὑμεῖς τε μὴ παυθῆναι ἀρχῆς καὶ οἱ δουλεύοντες ἤδη ἀπαλλαγῆναι τὴν παρακινδύνευσιν ποιοῦνται, ἡμῖν γε τοῖς ἔτι ἐλευθέροις πολλὴ κακότης καὶ δειλία μὴ πᾶν πρὸ τοῦ δουλεῦσαι ἐπεξελθεῖν.

[100] Mel. `Surely then, if you and your subjects will brave all this risk, you to preserve your empire and they to be quit of it, how base and cowardly would it be in us, who retain our freedom, not to do and suffer anything rather than be your slaves.'

101. ΑΘ.οὔκ, ἤν γε σωφρόνως βουλεύησθε: οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ὁ ἀγὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὑμῖν, μὴ αἰσχύνην ὀφλεῖν, περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας μᾶλλον ἡ βουλή, πρὸς τοὺς κρείσσονας πολλῷ μὴ ἀνθίστασθαι.

[101] Ath. 'Not so, if you calmly reflect: for you are not fighting against equals to whom you cannot yield without disgrace, but you are taking counsel whether or no you shall resist an overwhelming force. The question is not one of honour but of prudence.'

102. ΜΗΛ.ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιστάμεθα τὰ τῶν πολέμων ἔστιν ὅτε κοινοτέρας τὰς τύχας λαμβάνοντα ἢ κατὰ τὸ διαφέρον ἑκατέρων πλῆθος: καὶ ἡμῖν τὸ μὲν εἶξαι εὐθὺς ἀνέλπιστον, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ δρωμένου ἔτι καὶ στῆναι ἐλπὶς ὀρθῶς.

[102] Mel. 'But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes impartial, and not always on the side of numbers. If we yield now, all is over; but if we fight, there is yet a hope that we may stand upright.'

103. ΑΘ.ἐλπὶς δὲ κινδύνῳ παραμύθιον οὖσα τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ περιουσίας χρωμένους αὐτῇ, κἂν βλάψῃ, οὐ καθεῖλεν: τοῖς δ᾽ ἐς ἅπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναρριπτοῦσι □δάπανος γὰρ φύσει□ ἅμα τε γιγνώσκεται σφαλέντων καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ ἔτι φυλάξεταί τις αὐτὴν γνωρισθεῖσαν οὐκ ἐλλείπει. [2] ὃ ὑμεῖς ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ ἐπὶ ῥοπῆς μιᾶς ὄντες μὴ βούλεσθε παθεῖν μηδὲ ὁμοιωθῆναι τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἷς παρὸν ἀνθρωπείως ἔτι σῴζεσθαι, ἐπειδὰν πιεζομένους αὐτοὺς ἐπιλίπωσιν αἱ φανεραὶ ἐλπίδες, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀφανεῖς καθίστανται μαντικήν τε καὶ χρησμοὺς καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μετ᾽ ἐλπίδων λυμαίνεται.

[103] Ath. 'Hope is a good comforter in the hour of danger, and when men have something else to depend upon, although hurtful, she is not ruinous. But when her spendthrift nature has induced them to stake their all, they

see her as she is in the moment of their fall, and not till then. While the knowledge of her might enable them to be ware of her, she never fails.You are weak and a single turn of the scale might be your ruin. Do not you be thus deluded; avoid the error of which so many are guilty, who, although they might still be saved if they would take the natural means, when visible grounds of confidence forsake them, have recourse to the invisible, to prophecies and oracles and the like, which ruin men by the hopes which they inspire in them.’

104. ΜΗΛ.χαλεπὸν μὲν καὶ ἡμεῖς εὖ ἴστε νομίζομεν πρὸς δύναμίν τε τὴν ὑμετέραν καὶ τὴν τύχην, εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἔσται, ἀγωνίζεσθαι: ὅμως δὲ πιστεύομεν τῇ μὲν τύχῃ ἐκ τοῦ θείου μὴ ἐλασσώσεσθαι, ὅτι ὅσιοι πρὸς οὐ δικαίους ἱστάμεθα, τῆς δὲ δυνάμεως τῷ ἐλλείποντι τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἡμῖν ξυμμαχίαν προσέσεσθαι, ἀνάγκην ἔχουσαν, καὶ εἰ μή του ἄλλου, τῆς γε ξυγγενείας ἕνεκα καὶ αἰσχύνῃ βοηθεῖν. καὶ οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτως ἀλόγως θρασυνόμεθα.

[104] Mel. `We know only too well how hard the struggle must be against your power, and against fortune, if she does not mean to be impartial. Nevertheless we do not despair of fortune; for we hope to stand as high as you in the favour of heaven, because we are righteous, and you against whom we contend are unrighteous; and we are satisfied that our deficiency in power will be compensated by the aid of our allies the Lacedaemonians; they cannot refuse to help us, if only because we are their kinsmen, and for the sake of their own honour. And therefore our confidence is not so utterly blind as you suppose.’

105. ΑΘ.τῆς μὲν τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐμενείας οὐδ᾽ ἡμεῖς οἰόμεθα λελείψεσθαι: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔξω τῆς ἀνθρωπείας τῶν μὲν ἐς τὸ θεῖον νομίσεως, τῶν δ᾽ ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βουλήσεως δικαιοῦμεν ἢ πράσσομεν. [2] ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν: καὶ ἡμεῖς οὔτε θέντες τὸν

νόμον οὔτε κειμένῳ πρῶτοι χρησάμενοι, ὄντα δὲ παραλαβόντες καὶ ἐσόμενον ἐς αἰεὶ καταλείψοντες χρώμεθα αὐτῷ, εἰδότες καὶ ὑμᾶς ἂν καὶ ἄλλους ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει ἡμῖν γενομένους δρῶντας ἂν ταὐτό. [3] καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ θεῖον οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος οὐ φοβούμεθα ἐλασσώσεσθαι: τῆς δὲ ἐς Λακεδαιμονίους δόξης, ἣν διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν δὴ βοηθήσειν ὑμῖν πιστεύετε αὐτούς, μακαρίσαντες ὑμῶν τὸ ἀπειρόκακον οὐ ζηλοῦμεν τὸ ἄφρον. [4] Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ πρὸς σφᾶς μὲν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα πλεῖστα ἀρετῇ χρῶνται: πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους πολλὰ ἄν τις ἔχων εἰπεῖν ὡς προσφέρονται, ξυνελὼν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν δηλώσειεν ὅτι ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ ξυμφέροντα δίκαια. καίτοι οὐ πρὸς τῆς ὑμετέρας νῦν ἀλόγου σωτηρίας ἡ τοιαύτη διάνοια.

[105] Ath. ‘As for the Gods, we expect to have quite as much of their favour as you: for we are not doing or claiming anything which goes beyond common opinion about divine or men’s desires about human things. For of the Gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a law of their nature wherever they can rule they will. This law was not made by us, and we are not the first who have acted upon it; we did but inherit it, and shall bequeath it to all time, and, we know that you and all mankind, if you were as strong as we are, would do as we do. So much for the Gods; we have told you why we expect to stand as high in their good opinion as you. And then as to the Lacedaemonians — when you imagine that out of very shame they will assist you, we admire the innocence of your idea, but we do not envy you the folly of it. The Lacedaemonians are exceedingly virtuous among themselves, and according to their national standard of morality. But, in respect of their dealings with others, although many things might be said, they can be described in few words — of all men whom we know they are the most notorious for identifying what is pleasant with what is honourable, and what is expedient with what is just. But how

inconsistent is such a character with your present blind hope of deliverance!’

106. ΜΗΛ.ἡμεῖς δὲ κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἤδη καὶ μάλιστα πιστεύομεν τῷ ξυμφέροντι αὐτῶν, Μηλίους ἀποίκους ὄντας μὴ βουλήσεσθαι προδόντας τοῖς μὲν εὔνοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπίστους καταστῆναι, τοῖς δὲ πολεμίοις ὠφελίμους.

[106] Mel. `That is the very reason why we trust them; they will look to their interest, and therefore will not be willing to betray the Melians, who are their own colonists, lest they should be distrusted by their friends in Hellas and play into the hands of their enemies.’

107. ΑΘ.οὔκουν οἴεσθε τὸ ξυμφέρον μὲν μετ᾽ ἀσφαλείας εἶναι, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν μετὰ κινδύνου δρᾶσθαι: ὃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἥκιστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τολμῶσιν.

[107] Ath. ‘ But do you not see that the path of expediency is safe, whereas justice and honour involve danger in practice, and such dangers the Lacedaemonians seldom care to face?’

108. ΜΗΛ.ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους τε ἡμῶν ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἡγούμεθ᾽ ἂν ἐγχειρίσασθαι αὐτούς, καὶ βεβαιοτέρους ἢ ἐς ἄλλους νομιεῖν, ὅσῳ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἔργα τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐγγὺς κείμεθα, τῆς δὲ γνώμης τῷ ξυγγενεῖ πιστότεροι ἑτέρων ἐσμέν.

[108] Mel. ‘On the other hand, we think that whatever perils there may be, they will be ready to face them for our sakes, and will consider danger less dangerous where we are concerned. For if they need our aid we are close at hand, and they can better trust our loyal feeling because we are their kinsmen.’

109. ΑΘ.τὸ δ᾽ ἐχυρόν γε τοῖς ξυναγωνιουμένοις οὐ τὸ εὔνουν τῶν ἐπικαλεσαμένων φαίνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἢν τῶν ἔργων τις δυνάμει πολὺ προύχῃ: ὃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ πλέον τι τῶν ἄλλων σκοποῦσιν ▯ τῆς γοῦν οἰκείας παρασκευῆς ἀπιστίᾳ καὶ μετὰ ξυμμάχων πολλῶν τοῖς πέλας ἐπέρχονται▯, ὥστε οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐς νῆσόν γε αὐτοὺς ἡμῶν ναυκρατόρων ὄντων περαιωθῆναι.

[109] Ath. `Yes, but what encourages men who are invited to join in a conflict is clearly not the good-will of those who summon them to their side, but a decided superiority in real power. To this no men look more keenly than the Lacedaemonians; so little confidence have they in their own resources, that they only attack their neighbours when they have numerous allies, and therefore they are not likely to find their way by themselves to an island, when we are masters of the sea.'

110. ΜΗΛ.οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους ἂν ἔχοιεν πέμψαι: πολὺ δὲ τὸ Κρητικὸν πέλαγος, δι᾽ οὗ τῶν κρατούντων ἀπορώτερος ἡ λῆψις ἢ τῶν λαθεῖν βουλομένων ἡ σωτηρία. [2] καὶ εἰ τοῦδε σφάλλοιντο, τράποιντ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ὑμῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅσους μὴ Βρασίδας ἐπῆλθεν: καὶ οὐ περὶ τῆς μὴ προσηκούσης μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς οἰκειοτέρας ξυμμαχίδος τε καὶ γῆς ὁ πόνος ὑμῖν ἔσται.

[110] Mel. `But they may send their allies: the Cretan sea is a large place; and the masters of the sea will have more difficulty in overtaking vessels which want to escape than the pursued in escaping. If the attempt should fail they may invade Attica itself, and find their way to allies of yours whom Brasidas did not reach: and then you will have to fight, not for the conquest of a land in which you have no concern, but nearer home, for the preservation of your confederacy and of your own territory.'

111. ΑΘ.τούτων μὲν καὶ πεπειραμένοις ἄν τι γένοιτο καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ μιᾶς πώποτε πολιορκίας Ἀθηναῖοι δι᾽ ἄλλων φόβον ἀπεχώρησαν. [2] ἐνθυμούμεθα δὲ ὅτι φήσαντες περὶ σωτηρίας βουλεύσειν οὐδὲν ἐν τοσούτῳ λόγῳ εἰρήκατε ᾧ ἄνθρωποι ἂν πιστεύσαντες νομίσειαν σωθήσεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῶν τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρότατα ἐλπιζόμενα μέλλεται, τὰ δ᾽ ὑπάρχοντα βραχέα πρὸς τὰ ἤδη ἀντιτεταγμένα περιγίγνεσθαι. πολλήν τε ἀλογίαν τῆς διανοίας παρέχετε, εἰ μὴ μεταστησάμενοι ἔτι ἡμᾶς ἄλλο τι τῶνδε σωφρονέστερον γνώσεσθε. [3] οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπί γε τὴν ἐν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς καὶ προύπτοις κινδύνοις πλεῖστα

διαφθείρουσαν ἀνθρώπους αἰσχύνην τρέψεσθε. πολλοῖς γὰρ προορωμένοις ἔτι ἐς οἷα φέρονται τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλούμενον ὀνόματος ἐπαγωγοῦ δυνάμει ἐπεσπάσατο ἡσσηθεῖσι τοῦ ῥήματος ἔργῳ ξυμφοραῖς ἀνηκέστοις ἑκόντας περιπεσεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνην αἰσχίω μετὰ ἀνοίας ἢ τύχῃ προσλαβεῖν. [4] ὃ ὑμεῖς, ἢν εὖ βουλεύησθε, φυλάξεσθε, καὶ οὐκ ἀπρεπὲς νομιεῖτε πόλεώς τε τῆς μεγίστης ἡσσᾶσθαι μέτρια προκαλουμένης, ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι ἔχοντας τὴν ὑμετέραν αὐτῶν ὑποτελεῖς, καὶ δοθείσης αἱρέσεως πολέμου πέρι καὶ ἀσφαλείας μὴ τὰ χείρω φιλονικῆσαι: ὡς οἵτινες τοῖς μὲν ἴσοις μὴ εἴκουσι, τοῖς δὲ κρείσσοσι καλῶς προσφέρονται, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἥσσους μέτριοί εἰσι, πλεῖστ᾽ ἂν ὀρθοῖντο. [5] σκοπεῖτε οὖν καὶ μεταστάντων ἡμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμεῖσθε πολλάκις ὅτι περὶ πατρίδος βουλεύεσθε, ἧς μιᾶς πέρι καὶ ἐς μίαν βουλὴν τυχοῦσάν τε καὶ μὴ κατορθώσασαν ἔσται.

[111] Ath. `Help may come from Lacedaemon to you as it has come to others, and should you ever have actual experience of it, then you will know that never once have the Athenians retired from a siege through fear of a foe elsewhere. You told us that the safety of your city would be your first care, but we remark that, in this long discussion, not a word has been uttered by you which would give a reasonable man expectation of deliverance. Your strongest grounds are hopes deferred, and what power you have is not to be compared with that which is already arrayed against you. Unless after we have withdrawn you mean to come, as even now you may, to a wiser conclusion, you are showing a great want of sense. For surely you cannot dream of flying to that false sense of honour which has been the ruin of so many when danger and dishonour were staring them in the face. Many men with their eyes still open to the consequences have found the word “honour” too much for them, and have suffered a mere name to lure them on, until it has drawn down upon them real and irretrievable calamities; through their own folly they have incurred a worse dishonour than fortune would have inflicted upon them. If you are wise you

will not run this risk; you ought to see that there can be no disgrace in yielding to a great city which invites you to become her ally on reasonable terms, keeping your own land, and merely paying tribute; and that you will certainly gain no honour if, having to choose between two alternatives, safety and war, you obstinately prefer the worse. To maintain our rights against equals, to be politic with superiors, and to be moderate towards inferiors is the path of safety. Reflect once more when we have withdrawn, and say to yourselves over and over again that you are deliberating about your one and only country, which may be saved or may be destroyed by a single decision.’

112. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι μετεχώρησαν ἐκ τῶν λόγων: οἱ δὲ Μήλιοι κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς γενόμενοι, ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς παραπλήσια καὶ ἀντέλεγον, ἀπεκρίναντο τάδε. [2] ‘οὔτε ἄλλα δοκεῖ ἡμῖν ἢ ἄπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτ᾽ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πόλεως ἑπτακόσια ἔτη ἤδη οἰκουμένης τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀφαιρησόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῇ τε μέχρι τοῦδε σῳζούσῃ τύχῃ ἐκ τοῦ θείου αὐτὴν καὶ τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων τιμωρίᾳ πιστεύοντες πειρασόμεθα σῴζεσθαι. [3] προκαλούμεθα δὲ ὑμᾶς φίλοι μὲν εἶναι, πολέμιοι δὲ μηδετέροις, καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἡμῶν ἀναχωρῆσαι σπονδὰς ποιησαμένους αἵτινες δοκοῦσιν ἐπιτήδειοι εἶναι ἀμφοτέροις.’

[112] The Athenians left the conference: the Melians, after consulting among themselves, resolved to persevere in their refusal, and made answer as follows:— ‘Men of Athens, our resolution is unchanged; and we will not in a moment surrender that liberty which our city, founded seven hundred years ago, still enjoys; we will trust to the good fortune which, by the favour of the Gods, has hitherto preserved us, and for human help to the Lacedaemonians, and endeavour to save ourselves. We are ready however to be your friends, and the enemies neither of you nor of the Lacedaemonians, and we ask you to leave our country when you have made such a peace as may appear to be in the interest of both parties.’

113. οἱ μὲν δὴ Μήλιοι τοσαῦτα ἀπεκρίναντο: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι διαλυόμενοι ἤδη ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἔφασαν ‘ἀλλ᾽ οὖν μόνοι γε ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν βουλευμάτων, ὡς ἡμῖν δοκεῖτε, τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα τῶν ὁρωμένων σαφέστερα κρίνετε, τὰ δὲ ἀφανῆ τῷ βούλεσθαι ὡς γιγνόμενα ἤδη θεᾶσθε, καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τύχῃ καὶ ἐλπίσι πλεῖστον δὴ παραβεβλημένοι καὶ πιστεύσαντες πλεῖστον καὶ σφαλήσεσθε.’

[113] Such was the answer of the Melians; the Athenians, as they quitted the conference, spoke as follows:— ‘Well, we must say, judging from the decision at which you have arrived, that you are the only men who deem the future to be more certain than the present, and regard things unseen as already realised in your fond anticipation, and that the more you cast yourselves upon the Lacedaemonians and fortune and hope, and trust them, the more complete will be your ruin.’

114. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὸ στράτευμα: οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς οὐδὲν ὑπήκουον οἱ Μήλιοι, πρὸς πόλεμον εὐθὺς ἐτρέποντο καὶ διελόμενοι κατὰ πόλεις περιετείχισαν κύκλῳ τοὺς Μηλίους. [2] καὶ ὕστερον φυλακὴν σφῶν τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων καταλιπόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀνεχώρησαν τῷ

πλέονι τοῦ στρατοῦ. οἱ δὲ λειπόμενοι παραμένοντες ἐπολιόρκουν τὸ χωρίον.

[114] The Athenian envoys returned to the army; and the generals, when they found that the Melians would not yield, immediately commenced hostilities. They surrounded the town of Melos with a wall, dividing the work among the several contingents. They then left troops of their own and of their allies to keep guard both by land and by sea, and retired with the greater part of their army; the remainder carried on the blockade.

115. καὶ Ἀργεῖοι κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Φλειασίαν καὶ λοχισθέντες ὑπό τε Φλειασίων καὶ τῶν σφετέρων φυγάδων διεφθάρησαν ὡς ὀγδοήκοντα. [2] καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου Ἀθηναῖοι Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὴν λείαν ἔλαβον: καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δι᾽ αὐτὸ τὰς μὲν σπονδὰς οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἀφέντες ἐπολέμουν αὐτοῖς, ἐκήρυξαν δὲ εἴ τις βούλεται παρὰ σφῶν Ἀθηναίους λῄζεσθαι. [3] καὶ Κορίνθιοι ἐπολέμησαν ἰδίων τινῶν διαφορῶν ἕνεκα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι Πελοποννήσιοι ἡσύχαζον. [4] εἶλον δὲ καὶ οἱ Μήλιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ περιτειχίσματος τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν προσβαλόντες νυκτός, καὶ ἄνδρας τε ἀπέκτειναν καὶ ἐσενεγκάμενοι σῖτόν τε καὶ ὅσα πλεῖστα ἐδύναντο χρήσιμα ἀναχωρήσαντες ἡσύχαζον: καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄμεινον τὴν φυλακὴν τὸ ἔπειτα παρεσκευάζοντο. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[115] About the same time the Argives made an inroad into Phliasia, and lost nearly eighty men, who were caught in an ambuscade by the Phliasians and the Argive exiles. The Athenian garrison in Pylos took much spoil from the Lacedaemonians; nevertheless the latter did not renounce the peace and go to war, but only notified by a proclamation that if any one of their own people had a mind to make reprisals on the Athenians he might. The Corinthians next declared war upon the Athenians on some private grounds, but the rest of the Peloponnesians did not join them. The Melians took that part of the Athenian wall which looked towards the agora by a night assault, killed a few men, and

brought in as much corn and other necessaries as they could; they then retreated and remained inactive. After this the Athenians set a better watch. So the summer ended.

116. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Λακεδαιμόνιοι μελλήσαντες ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν στρατεύειν, ὡς αὐτοῖς τὰ διαβατήρια [ἱερὰ ἐν τοῖς ὁρίοις] οὐκ ἐγίγνετο, ἀνεχώρησαν. καὶ Ἀργεῖοι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων μέλλησιν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὰς ὑποπτεύσαντες τοὺς μὲν ξυνέλαβον, οἱ δ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ διέφυγον. [2] καὶ οἱ Μήλιοι περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους αὖθις καθ᾽ ἕτερόν τι τοῦ περιτειχίσματος εἷλον τῶν Ἀθηναίων, παρόντων οὐ πολλῶν τῶν φυλάκων. [3] καὶ ἐλθούσης στρατιᾶς ὕστερον ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἄλλης, ὡς ταῦτα ἐγίγνετο, ἧς ἦρχε Φιλοκράτης ὁ Δημέου, καὶ κατὰ κράτος ἤδη πολιορκούμενοι, γενομένης καὶ προδοσίας τινός, ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ξυνεχώρησαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὥστε ἐκείνους περὶ αὐτῶν βουλεῦσαι. [4] οἱ δὲ ἀπέκτειναν Μηλίων ὅσους ἡβῶντας ἔλαβον, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἠνδραπόδισαν: τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτοὶ ᾤκισαν, ἀποίκους ὕστερον πεντακοσίους πέμψαντες.

[116] In the following winter the Lacedaemonians had intended to make an expedition into the Argive territory, but finding that the sacrifices which they offered at the frontier were unfavourable they returned home. The Argives, suspecting that the threatened invasion was instigated by citizens of their own, apprehended some of them; others however escaped.About the same time the Melians took another part of the Athenian wall; for the fortifications were insufficiently guarded. Whereupon the Athenians sent fresh troops, under the command of Philocrates the son of Demeas. The place was now closely invested, and there was treachery among the citizens themselves. So the Melians were induced to surrender at discretion. The Athenians thereupon put to death all who were of military age, and made slaves of the women and children. They then colonised the island, sending thither five hundred settlers of their own.

Βιβλίο ΣΤ’ — BOOK VI

1. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβούλοντο αὖθις μείζονι παρασκευῇ τῆς μετὰ Λάχητος καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντος ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεύσαντες καταστρέψασθαι, εἰ δύναιντο, ἄπειροι οἱ πολλοὶ ὄντες τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς νήσου καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων τοῦ πλήθους καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πολλῷ τινὶ ὑποδεέστερον πόλεμον ἀνῃροῦντο ἢ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους. [2] Σικελίας γὰρ περίπλους μέν ἐστιν ὀλκάδι οὐ πολλῷ τινὶ ἔλασσον ἢ ὀκτὼ ἡμερῶν, καὶ τοσαύτη οὖσα ἐν εἰκοσισταδίῳ μάλιστα μέτρῳ τῆς θαλάσσης διείργεται τὸ μὴ ἤπειρος εἶναι:

[1] DURING the same winter the Athenians conceived a desire of sending another expedition to Sicily, larger than those commanded by Laches and Eurymedon. They hoped to conquer the island. Of its great size and numerous population, barbarian as well as Hellenic, most of them knew nothing, and they never reflected that they were entering on a struggle almost as arduous as the Peloponnesian War. The voyage in a merchant-vessel round Sicily takes up nearly eight days, and this great island is all but a part of the mainland, being divided from it by a sea not much more than two miles in width.

2. ᾠκίσθη δὲ ὧδε τὸ ἀρχαῖον, καὶ τοσάδε ἔθνη ἔσχε τὰ ξύμπαντα. παλαίτατοι μὲν λέγονται ἐν μέρει τινὶ τῆς χώρας Κύκλωπες καὶ Λαιστρυγόνες οἰκῆσαι, ὧν ἐγὼ οὔτε γένος ἔχω εἰπεῖν οὔτε ὁπόθεν ἐσῆλθον ἢ ὅποι ἀπεχώρησαν: ἀρκείτω δὲ ὡς ποιηταῖς τε εἴρηται καὶ ὡς ἕκαστός πῃ γιγνώσκει περὶ αὐτῶν. [2] Σικανοὶ δὲ μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς πρῶτοι φαίνονται ἐνοικισάμενοι, ὡς μὲν αὐτοί φασι, καὶ πρότεροι διὰ τὸ αὐτόχθονες εἶναι, ὡς δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια εὑρίσκεται, Ἴβηρες ὄντες καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Σικανοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ ὑπὸ Λιγύων ἀναστάντες. καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν Σικανία τότε ἡ νῆσος ἐκαλεῖτο, πρότερον Τρινακρία καλουμένη: οἰκοῦσι δὲ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ πρὸς ἑσπέραν τὴν Σικελίαν. [3] Ἰλίου δὲ

ἁλισκομένου τῶν Τρώων τινὲς διαφυγόντες Ἀχαιοὺς πλοίοις ἀφικνοῦνται πρὸς τὴν Σικελίαν, καὶ ὅμοροι τοῖς Σικανοῖς οἰκήσαντες ξύμπαντες μὲν Ἔλυμοι ἐκλήθησαν, πόλεις δ᾽ αὐτῶν Ἔρυξ τε καὶ Ἔγεστα. προσξυνῴκησαν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Φωκέων τινὲς τῶν ἀπὸ Τροίας τότε χειμῶνι ἐς Λιβύην πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ἐς Σικελίαν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς κατενεχθέντες. [4] Σικελοὶ δ᾽ ἐξ Ἰταλίας ⸂ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ᾤκουν⸃ διέβησαν ἐς Σικελίαν, φεύγοντες Ὀπικούς, ὡς μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ λέγεται, ἐπὶ σχεδιῶν, τηρήσαντες τὸν πορθμὸν κατιόντος τοῦ ἀνέμου, τάχα ἂν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐσπλεύσαντες. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ Σικελοί, καὶ ἡ χώρα ἀπὸ Ἰταλοῦ βασιλέως τινὸς Σικελῶν, τοὔνομα τοῦτο ἔχοντος, οὕτως Ἰταλία ἐπωνομάσθη. [5] ἐλθόντες δὲ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν στρατὸς πολὺς τούς τε Σικανοὺς κρατοῦντες μάχῃ ἀνέστειλαν πρὸς τὰ μεσημβρινὰ καὶ ἑσπέρια αὐτῆς καὶ ἀντὶ Σικανίας Σικελίαν τὴν νῆσον ἐποίησαν καλεῖσθαι, καὶ τὰ κράτιστα τῆς γῆς ᾠκησαν ἔχοντες, ἐπεὶ διέβησαν, ἔτη ἐγγὺς τριακόσια πρὶν Ἕλληνας ἐς Σικελίαν ἐλθεῖν: ἔτι δὲ καὶ νῦν τὰ μέσα καὶ τὰ πρὸς βορρᾶν τῆς νήσου ἔχουσιν. [6] ᾤκουν δὲ καὶ Φοίνικες περὶ πᾶσαν μὲν τὴν Σικελίαν ἄκρας τε ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἀπολαβόντες καὶ τὰ ἐπικείμενα νησίδια ἐμπορίας ἕνεκεν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Σικελούς: ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ Ἕλληνες πολλοὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπεσέπλεον, ἐκλιπόντες τὰ πλείω Μοτύην καὶ Σολόεντα καὶ Πάνορμον ἐγγὺς τῶν Ἐλύμων ξυνοικήσαντες ἐνέμοντο, ξυμμαχίᾳ τε πίσυνοι τῇ τῶν Ἐλύμων, καὶ ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν ἐλάχιστον πλοῦν Καρχηδὼν Σικελίας ἀπέχει. βάρβαροι μὲν οὖν τοσοίδε Σικελίαν καὶ οὕτως ᾤκησαν.

[2] I will now describe the original settlement of Sicily, and enumerate the nations which it contained. Oldest of all were [1] the Cyclopes and Laestrygones, who are said to have dwelt in a district of the island; but who they were, whence they came, or whither they went, I cannot tell. We must be content with the legends of the poets, and every one must be left to form his own opinion. [2] The Sicanians appear to have succeeded these early races, although according to their own account they were still older; for they profess to

have been children of the soil. But the fact proves to be that they were Iberians, and were driven from the river Sicanus in Iberia by the Ligurians. Sicily, which was originally called Trinacria, received from them the name Sicania. To this day the Sicanians inhabit the western parts of the island. 3 After the capture of Troy, some Trojans who had escaped from the Achaeans came in ships to Sicily; they settled near the Sicanians, and took the common name of Elymi but had two separate cities, Eryx and Egesta. 4 These were joined by certain Phocians, who had also fought at Troy, and were driven by a storm first to Libya and thence to Sicily. 5 The Sicels were originally inhabitants of Italy, whence they were driven by the Opici, and passed over into Sicily; according to a probable tradition they crossed upon rafts, taking advantage of the wind blowing from the land, but they may have found other ways of effecting a passage; there are Sicels still in Italy, and the country itself was so called from Italus a Sicel king. They entered Sicily with a large army, and defeating the Sicanians in battle, drove them back to the southern and western parts of the country; from them the island, formerly Sicania, took the name of Sicily. For nearly three hundred years after their arrival until the time when the Hellenes came to Sicily they occupied the most fertile districts, and they still inhabit the central and northern regions. 6 The Phoenicians at one time had settlements all round the island. They fortified headlands on the sea-coast, and settled in the small islands adjacent, for the sake of trading with the Sicels; but when the Hellenes began to find their way by sea to Sicily in greater numbers they withdrew from the larger part of the island, and forming a union established themselves in Motyè, Soloeis, and Panormus, in the neighbourhood of the Elymi, partly trusting to their alliance with them, and partly because this is the point at which the passage from Carthage to Sicily is shortest. Such were the Barbarian nations who inhabited Sicily, and these were their settlements.

3. Ἑλλήνων δὲ πρῶτοι Χαλκιδῆς ἐξ Εὐβοίας πλεύσαντες μετὰ Θουκλέους οἰκιστοῦ Νάξον ᾤκισαν, καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος Ἀρχηγέτου βωμὸν ὅστις νῦν ἔξω τῆς πόλεώς ἐστιν ἱδρύσαντο, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ, ὅταν ἐκ Σικελίας θεωροὶ πλέωσι, πρῶτον θύουσιν. [2] Συρακούσας δὲ τοῦ ἐχομένου ἔτους Ἀρχίας τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν ἐκ Κορίνθου ᾤκισε, Σικελοὺς ἐξελάσας πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἐν ᾗ νῦν οὐκέτι περικλυζομένῃ ἡ πόλις ἡ ἐντός ἐστιν: ὕστερον δὲ χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ ἔξω προστειχισθεῖσα πολυάνθρωπος ἐγένετο. [3] Θουκλῆς δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς ἐκ Νάξου ὁρμηθέντες ἔτει πέμπτῳ μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκισθείσας Λεοντίνους τε πολέμῳ τοὺς Σικελοὺς ἐξελάσαντες οἰκίζουσι, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς Κατάνην: οἰκιστὴν δὲ αὐτοὶ Καταναῖοι ἐποιήσαντο Εὔαρχον.

[3] The first Hellenic colonists sailed from Chalcis in Euboea under the leadership of Thucles, and founded Naxos; there they erected an altar in honour of Apollo the Founder, which is still standing without the city, and on this altar religious embassies sacrifice before they sail from Sicily. [8] In the following year Archias, one of the Heraclidae, came from Corinth and founded Syracuse, first driving the Sicels out of the island of Ortygia; in which, though it is no longer surrounded by the sea, the inner city now stands; in process of time the outer city was included within the walls and became populous. [9] In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse Thucles and the Chalcidians went forth from Naxos, and driving out the Sicels by force of arms, founded first Leontini, then Catana. The Catanaeans however chose a founder of their own, named Evarchus.

4. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ Λάμις ἐκ Μεγάρων ἀποικίαν ἄγων ἐς Σικελίαν ἀφίκετο, καὶ ὑπὲρ Παντακύου τε ποταμοῦ Τρώτιλόν τι ὄνομα χωρίον οἰκίσας, καὶ ὕστερον αὐτόθεν τοῖς Χαλκιδεῦσιν ἐς Λεοντίνους ὀλίγον χρόνον ξυμπολιτεύσας καὶ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐκπεσὼν καὶ Θάψον οἰκίσας αὐτὸς μὲν ἀποθνῄσκει, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἐκ τῆς Θάψου ἀναστάντες Ὕβλωνος βασιλέως Σικελοῦ προδόντος τὴν χώραν καὶ καθηγησαμένου Μεγαρέας ᾤκισαν τοὺς

Ὑβλαίους κληθέντας. [2] καὶ ἔτη οἰκήσαντες πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ διακόσια ὑπὸ Γέλωνος τυράννου Συρακοσίων ἀνέστησαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ χώρας. πρὶν δὲ ἀναστῆναι, ἔτεσιν ὕστερον ἑκατὸν ἢ αὐτοὺς οἰκίσαι, Πάμιλλον πέμψαντες Σελινοῦντα κτίζουσι, καὶ ἐκ Μεγάρων τῆς μητροπόλεως οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἐπελθὼν ξυγκατῴκισεν. [3] Γέλαν δὲ Ἀντίφημος ἐκ Ῥόδου καὶ Ἔντιμος ἐκ Κρήτης ἐποίκους ἀγαγόντες κοινῇ ἔκτισαν, ἔτει πέμπτῳ καὶ τεσσαρακοστῷ μετὰ Συρακουσῶν οἴκισιν. καὶ τῇ μὲν πόλει ἀπὸ τοῦ Γέλα ποταμοῦ τοὔνομα ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ χωρίον οὗ νῦν ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ καὶ ὃ πρῶτον ἐτειχίσθη Λίνδιοι καλεῖται: νόμιμα δὲ Δωρικὰ ἐτέθη αὐτοῖς. [4] ἔτεσι δὲ ἐγγύτατα ὀκτὼ καὶ ἑκατὸν μετὰ τὴν σφετέραν οἴκισιν Γελῷοι Ἀκράγαντα ᾤκισαν, τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀκράγαντος ποταμοῦ ὀνομάσαντες, οἰκιστὰς δὲ ποιήσαντες Ἀριστόνουν καὶ Πυστίλον, νόμιμα δὲ τὰ Γελῴων δόντες. [5] Ζάγκλη δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ Κύμης τῆς ἐν Ὀπικίᾳ Χαλκιδικῆς πόλεως λῃστῶν ἀφικομένων ᾠκίσθη, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ Χαλκίδος καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Εὐβοίας πλῆθος ἐλθὸν ξυγκατενείμαντο τὴν γῆν: καὶ οἰκισταὶ Περιήρης καὶ Κραταιμένης ἐγένοντο αὐτῆς, ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ Κύμης, ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ Χαλκίδος. ὄνομα δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον Ζάγκλη ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν Σικελῶν κληθεῖσα, ὅτι δρεπανοειδὲς τὴν ἰδέαν τὸ χωρίον ἐστί τὸ δὲ δρέπανον οἱ Σικελοὶ ζάγκλον καλοῦσιν , ὕστερον δ᾽ αὐτοὶ μὲν ὑπὸ Σαμίων καὶ ἄλλων Ἰώνων ἐκπίπτουσιν, οἳ Μήδους φεύγοντες προσέβαλον Σικελίᾳ, [6] τοὺς δὲ Σαμίους Ἀναξίλας Ῥηγίνων τύραννος οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐκβαλὼν καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτὸς ξυμμείκτων ἀνθρώπων οἰκίσας Μεσσήνην ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πατρίδος ἀντωνόμασεν.

[4] About the same time Lamis came from Megara bringing a colony to Sicily, where he occupied a place called Trotilus, upon the river Pantacyas; but he soon afterwards joined the settlement of the Chalcidians at Leontini; with them he dwelt a short time; until he was driven out; he then founded Thapsus, where he died. His followers quitted Thapsus and founded the city which is called the Hyblaean Megara;

Hyblon, a Sicel king, had betrayed the place to them and guided them thither. There they remained two hundred and forty-five years, and were then driven out of their town and land by Gelo the tyrant of Syracuse; but before they were driven out, and a hundred years after their own foundation, they sent out Pamillus and founded Selinus; he had come from Megara, their own mother state, to take part in the new colony. 11 In the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse, Antiphemus of Rhodes and Entimus of Crete came with their followers and together built Gela. The city was named from the river Gela, but the spot which is now the Acropolis and was first fortified is called Lindii. The institutions of the new settlement were Dorian. Exactly a hundred and eight years after their own foundation the inhabitants of Gela founded Agrigentum (Acragas), which they named from the river Acragas; they appointed Aristonous and Pystilus founders of the place, and gave to it their own institutions. 12 Zanclè was originally colonised by pirates who came from Cymè, the Chalcidian city in Opicia; these were followed by a large body of colonists from Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, who shared in the allotment of the soil. The first settlement was led by Perieres of Cymè, the second by Crataemenes of Chalcis. Zanclè was the original name of the place, a name given by the Sicels because the site was in shape like a sickle, for which the Sicel word is *zanclon*. These earlier settlers were afterwards driven out by the Samians and other Ionians, who when they fled from the Persians found their way to Sicil. Not long afterwards Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium, drove out these Samians. He then repeopled their city with a mixed multitude, and called the place Messenè after his native country.

5. καὶ Ἱμέρα ἀπὸ Ζάγκλης ᾠκίσθη ὑπὸ Εὐκλείδου καὶ Σίμου καὶ Σάκωνος, καὶ Χαλκιδῆς μὲν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦλθον ἐς τὴν ἀποικίαν, ξυνῴκισαν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκ Συρακουσῶν φυγάδες στάσει νικηθέντες, οἱ Μυλητίδαι καλούμενοι: καὶ φωνὴ μὲν μεταξὺ τῆς τε Χαλκιδέων καὶ Δωρίδος ἐκράθη, νόμιμα δὲ

τὰ Χαλκιδικὰ ἐκράτησεν. [2] Ἄκραι δὲ καὶ Κασμέναι ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων ᾠκίσθησαν, Ἄκραι μὲν ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτεσι μετὰ Συρακούσας, Κασμέναι δ᾽ ἐγγὺς εἴκοσι μετὰ Ἄκρας. [3] καὶ Καμάρινα τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων ᾠκίσθη, ἔτεσιν ἐγγύτατα πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μετὰ Συρακουσῶν κτίσιν: οἰκισταὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο αὐτῆς Δάσκων καὶ Μενέκωλος. ἀναστάτων δὲ Καμαριναίων γενομένων πολέμῳ ὑπὸ Συρακοσίων δι᾽ ἀπόστασιν, χρόνῳ Ἱπποκράτης ὕστερον Γέλας τύραννος, λύτρα ἀνδρῶν Συρακοσίων αἰχμαλώτων λαβὼν τὴν γῆν τὴν Καμαριναίων, αὐτὸς οἰκιστὴς γενόμενος κατῴκισε Καμάριναν. καὶ αὖθις ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνάστατος γενομένη τὸ τρίτον κατῳκίσθη ὑπὸ Γελῴων.

[5] Himera was colonised from Zanclè by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon. Most of the settlers were Chalcidian, but the so-called Myletidae, Syracusan exiles who had been defeated in a civil war, took part in the colony. Their language was a mixture of the Chalcidian and Doric dialects, but their institutions were mainly Chalcidian. 13 Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans, Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenae nearly twenty years after Acrae. Camarina was originally founded by the Syracusans exactly a hundred and thirty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse; the founders were Dascon and Menecolus. But the Camarinaeans revolted, and as a punishment for their revolt were violently expelled by the Syracusans. After a time Hippocrates the tyrant of Gela, receiving the territory of Camarina as the ransom of certain Syracusan prisoners, became the second founder of the place, which he colonised anew. The inhabitants were once more driven out by Gelo, who himself colonised the city for the third time.

6. τοσαῦτα ἔθνη Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων Σικελίαν ᾤκει,καὶ ἐπὶ τοσήνδε οὖσαν αὐτὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύειν ὥρμηντο, ἐφιέμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ξυγγενέσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις ξυμμάχοις. [2]

μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐξώρμησαν Ἐγεσταίων [τε] πρέσβεις παρόντες καὶ προθυμότερον ἐπικαλούμενοι. ὅμοροι γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς Σελινουντίοις ἐς πόλεμον καθέστασαν περί τε γαμικῶν τινῶν καὶ περὶ γῆς ἀμφισβητήτου, καὶ οἱ Σελινούντιοι Συρακοσίους ἐπαγόμενοι ξυμμάχους κατεῖργον αὐτοὺς τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν: ὥστε τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ Λάχητος καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολέμου Λεοντίνων οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι ξυμμαχίαν ἀναμιμνῄσκοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐδέοντο σφίσι ναῦς πέμψαντας ἐπαμῦναι, λέγοντες ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ κεφάλαιον, εἰ Συρακόσιοι Λεοντίνους τε ἀναστήσαντες ἀτιμώρητοι γενήσονται καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἔτι ξυμμάχους αὐτῶν διαφθείροντες αὐτοὶ τὴν ἅπασαν δύναμιν τῆς Σικελίας σχήσουσι, κίνδυνον εἶναι μή ποτε μεγάλῃ παρασκευῇ Δωριῆς τε Δωριεῦσι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ ἅμα ἄποικοι τοῖς ἐκπέμψασι Πελοποννησίοις βοηθήσαντες καὶ τὴν ἐκείνων δύναμιν ξυγκαθέλωσιν: σῶφρον δ᾽ εἶναι μετὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων ἔτι ξυμμάχων ἀντέχειν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, ἄλλως τε καὶ χρήματα σφῶν παρεξόντων ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανά. [3] ὧν ἀκούοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν τε Ἐγεσταίων πολλάκις λεγόντων καὶ τῶν ξυναγορευόντων αὐτοῖς ἐψηφίσαντο πρέσβεις πέμψαι πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Ἔγεσταν περί τε τῶν χρημάτων σκεψομένους εἰ ὑπάρχει, ὥσπερ φασίν, ἐν τῷ κοινῷ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἅμα πρὸς τοὺς Σελινουντίους ἐν ὅτῳ ἐστὶν εἰσομένους.

[6] These were the nations, Hellenic or Barbarian, who inhabited Sicily, and such was the great island on which the Athenians were determined to make war. They virtuously professed that they were going to assist their own kinsmen and their newly-acquired allies, but the simple truth was that they aspired to the empire of Sicily. They were principally instigated by an embassy which had come from Egesta and was urgent in requesting aid. The Egestaeans had gone to war with the neighbouring city of Selinus about certain questions of marriage and about a disputed piece of land. The Selinuntians summoned the Syracusans to their

assistance, and their united forces reduced the Egestaeans to great straits both by sea and land. The Egestaean envoys reminded the Athenians of the alliance which they had made with the Leontines under Laches in the former war, and begged them to send ships to their relief. Their chief argument was that, if the Syracusans were not punished for the expulsion of the Leontines, but were allowed to destroy the remaining allies of the Athenians, and to get the whole of Sicily into their own hands, they would one day come with a great army, Dorians assisting Dorians, who were their kinsmen, and colonists assisting their Peloponnesian founders, and would unite in overthrowing Athens herself. Such being the danger, the Athenians would be wise in combining with the allies who were still left to them in Sicily against the Syracusans, especially since the Egestaeans would themselves provide money sufficient for the war. These arguments were constantly repeated in the ears of the Athenian assembly by the Egestaeans and their partisans; at length the people passed a vote that they would at all events send envoys to ascertain on the spot whether the Egestaeans really had the money which they professed to have in their treasury and in their temples, and to report on the state of the war with Selinus. So the Athenian envoys were despatched to Sicily.

7. καὶ οἱ μὲν πρέσβεις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπεστάλησαν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν: Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πλὴν Κορινθίων στρατεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν τῆς τε γῆς ἔτεμον οὐ πολλὴν καὶ σῖτον ἀνεκομίσαντό τινα ζεύγη κομίσαντες, καὶ ἐς Ὀρνεὰς κατοικίσαντες τοὺς Ἀργείων φυγάδας καὶ τῆς ἄλλης στρατιᾶς παρακαταλιπόντες αὐτοῖς ὀλίγους, καὶ σπεισάμενοί τινα χρόνον ὥστε μὴ ἀδικεῖν Ὀρνεάτας καὶ Ἀργείους τὴν ἀλλήλων, ἀπεχώρησαν τῷ στρατῷ ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [2] ἐλθόντων δὲ Ἀθηναίων οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ναυσὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑξακοσίοις ὁπλίταις, οἱ Ἀργεῖοι μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πανστρατιᾷ ἐξελθόντες τοὺς μὲν ἐν Ὀρνεαῖς μίαν ἡμέραν

ἐπολιόρκουν: ὑπὸ δὲ νύκτα αὐλισαμένου τοῦ στρατεύματος ἄπωθεν ἐκδιδράσκουσιν οἱ ἐκ τῶν Ὀρνεῶν. καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ὡς ᾔσθοντο, κατασκάψαντες τὰς Ὀρνεὰς ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὕστερον ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [3]καὶ ἐς Μεθώνην τὴν ὅμορον Μακεδονίᾳ ἱππέας κατὰ θάλασσαν κομίσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι σφῶν τε αὐτῶν καὶ Μακεδόνων τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι φυγάδας ἐκακούργουν τὴν Περδίκκου. [4] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ πέμψαντες παρὰ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, ἄγοντας πρὸς Ἀθηναίους δεχημέρους σπονδάς, ξυμπολεμεῖν ἐκέλευον Περδίκκᾳ: οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ ἤθελον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἕκτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος ἐτελεύτα τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[7] During the same winter the Lacedaemonians and their allies, all but the Corinthians, made an expedition into the Argive territory, of which they devastated a small part, and, having brought with them waggons, carried away a few loads of corn. They settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, where they left a small garrison, and having made an agreement that the inhabitants of Orneae and the Argives should not injure one another’s land for a given time, returned home with the rest of their army. Soon afterwards the Athenians arrived with thirty ships and six hundred hoplites. They and the people of Argos with their whole power went out and blockaded Orneae for a day, but at night the Argive exiles within the walls got away unobserved by the besiegers, who were encamped at some distance. On the following day the Argives, perceiving what had happened, razed Orneae to the ground and returned. Soon afterwards the Athenian fleet returned likewise.The Athenians also conveyed by sea cavalry of their own, and some Macedonian exiles who had taken refuge with them, to Methonè on the borders of Macedonia, and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. Whereupon the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who were maintaining an armistice terminable at ten days’ notice with the Athenians, and commanded them to assist Perdiccas, but they refused.

So the winter ended, and with it the sixteenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

8. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους ἅμα ἦρι οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἦκον ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας καὶ οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἄγοντες ἑξήκοντα τάλαντα ἀσήμου ἀργυρίου ὡς ἐς ἑξήκοντα ναῦς μηνὸς μισθόν, ἃς ἔμελλον δεήσεσθαι πέμπειν. [2] καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκκλησίαν ποιήσαντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες τῶν τε Ἐγεσταίων καὶ τῶν σφετέρων πρέσβεων τά τε ἄλλα ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῆ καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὡς εἴη ἑτοῖμα ἔν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, ἐψηφίσαντο ναῦς ἑξήκοντα πέμπειν ἐς Σικελίαν καὶ στρατηγοὺς αὐτοκράτορας Ἀλκιβιάδην τε τὸν Κλεινίου καὶ Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου καὶ Λάμαχον τὸν Ξενοφάνους, βοηθοὺς μὲν Ἐγεσταίοις πρὸς Σελινουντίους, ξυγκατοικίσαι δὲ καὶ Λεοντίνους, ἤν τι περιγίγνηται αὐτοῖς τοῦ πολέμου, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πρᾶξαι ὅπῃ ἂν γιγνώσκωσιν ἄριστα Ἀθηναίοις. [3] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἡμέρᾳ πέμπτῃ ἐκκλησία αὖθις ἐγίγνετο, καθ᾽ ὅτι χρὴ τὴν παρασκευὴν ταῖς ναυσὶ τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, εἴ του προσδέοιντο, ψηφισθῆναι ἐς τὸν ἔκπλουν. [4] καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἀκούσιος μὲν ἠρημένος ἄρχειν, νομίζων δὲ τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ προφάσει βραχείᾳ καὶ εὐπρεπεῖ τῆς Σικελίας ἁπάσης, μεγάλου ἔργου, ἐφίεσθαι, παρελθὼν ἀποτρέψαι ἐβούλετο, καὶ παρῄνει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοιάδε.

[8] Early in the next spring the Athenian envoys returned from Sicily. They were accompanied by Egestaeans who brought sixty talents of uncoined silver, being a month’s pay for sixty vessels which they hoped to obtain from Athens. The Athenians called an assembly, and when they heard both from their own and from the Egestaean envoys, amongst other inviting but untrue statements, that there was abundance of money lying ready in the temples and in the treasury of Egesta, they passed a vote that sixty ships should be sent to Sicily; Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus the son of Xenophanes were appointed commanders with full powers.

They were to assist Egesta against Selinus; if this did not demand all their military strength they were empowered to restore the Leontines, and generally to further in such manner as they deemed best the Athenian interests in Sicily. Five days afterwards another assembly was called to consider what steps should be taken for the immediate equipment of the expedition, and to vote any additional supplies which the generals might require. Nicias, who had been appointed general against his will, thought that the people had come to a wrong conclusion, and that upon slight if specious grounds they were aspiring to the conquest of Sicily, which was no easy task. So, being desirous of diverting the Athenians from their purpose, he came forward and admonished them in the following terms:

9. ‘ἡ μὲν ἐκκλησία περὶ παρασκευῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας ἥδε ξυνελέγη, καθ᾽ ὅτι χρὴ ἐς Σικελίαν ἐκπλεῖν: ἐμοὶ μέντοι δοκεῖ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου ἔτι χρῆναι σκέψασθαι, εἰ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἐκπέμπειν τὰς ναῦς, καὶ μὴ οὕτω βραχείᾳ βουλῇ περὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων ἀνδράσιν ἀλλοφύλοις πειθομένους πόλεμον οὐ προσήκοντα ἄρασθαι. [2] καίτοι ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ ἧσσον ἑτέρων περὶ τῷ ἐμαυτοῦ σώματι ὀρρωδῶ, νομίζων ὁμοίως ἀγαθὸν πολίτην εἶναι ὃς ἂν καὶ τοῦ σώματός τι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας προνοῆται: μάλιστα γὰρ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως δι᾽ ἑαυτὸν βούλοιτο ὀρθοῦσθαι. ὅμως δὲ οὔτε ἐν τῷ πρότερον χρόνῳ διὰ τὸ προτιμᾶσθαι εἶπον παρὰ γνώμην οὔτε νῦν, ἀλλὰ ᾗ ἂν γιγνώσκω βέλτιστα, ἐρῶ. [3] καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἀσθενὴς ἄν μου ὁ λόγος εἴη, εἰ τά τε ὑπάρχοντα σῴζειν παραινοίην καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἑτοίμοις περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν καὶ μελλόντων κινδυνεύειν: ὡς δὲ οὔτε ἐν καιρῷ σπεύδετε οὔτε ῥᾴδιά ἐστι κατασχεῖν ἐφ᾽ ἃ ὥρμησθε, ταῦτα διδάξω.

[9] ‘I know that we are assembled here to discuss the preparations which are required for our expedition to Sicily, but in my judgment it is still a question whether we ought to go thither at all; we should not be hasty in determining a

matter of so much importance, or allow ourselves to enter into an impolitic war at the instigation of foreigners. Yet to me personally war brings honour; and I am as careless as any man about my own life: not that I think the worse of a citizen who takes a little thought about his life or his property, for I believe that the sense of a man's own interest will quicken his interest in the prosperity of the state. But I have never in my life been induced by the love of reputation to say a single word contrary to what I thought; neither will I now: I will say simply what I believe to be best. If I told you to take care of what you have and not to throw away present advantages in order to gain an uncertain and distant good, my words would be powerless against a temper like yours. I would rather argue that this is not the time for vigorous action, and that your great aims will not be easily realised.

10. ‘φημὶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς πολεμίους πολλοὺς ἐνθάδε ὑπολιπόντας καὶ ἑτέρους ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐκεῖσε πλεύσαντας δεῦρο ἐπαγαγέσθαι. [2] καὶ οἴεσθε ἴσως τὰς γενομένας ὑμῖν σπονδὰς ἔχειν τι βέβαιον, αἳ ἡσυχαζόντων μὲν ὑμῶν ὀνόματι σπονδαὶ ἔσονται ▯ οὕτω γὰρ ἐνθένδε τε ἄνδρες ἔπραξαν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ▯, σφαλέντων δέ που ἀξιόχρεῳ δυνάμει ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμῖν οἱ ἐχθροὶ ποιήσονται, οἷς πρῶτον μὲν διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ξύμβασις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αἰσχίονος ἢ ἡμῖν κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἐγένετο, ἔπειτα ἐν αὐτῇ ταύτῃ πολλὰ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα ἔχομεν. [3] εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἳ οὐδὲ ταύτην πω τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἐδέξαντο, καὶ οὐχ οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι: ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἄντικρυς πολεμοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ Λακεδαιμονίους ἔτι ἡσυχάζειν δεχημέροις σπονδαῖς καὶ αὐτοὶ κατέχονται. [4] τάχα δ᾽ ἂν ἴσως, εἰ δίχα ἡμῶν τὴν δύναμιν λάβοιεν, ὅπερ νῦν σπεύδομεν, καὶ πάνυ ἂν ξυνεπιθοῖντο μετὰ Σικελιωτῶν, οὓς πρὸ πολλῶν ἂν ἐτιμήσαντο ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ. [5] ὥστε χρὴ σκοπεῖν τινὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ μετεώρῳ τε <τῇ> πόλει ἀξιοῦν κινδυνεύειν καὶ ἀρχῆς ἄλλης ὀρέγεσθαι πρὶν ἣν ἔχομεν βεβαιωσώμεθα, εἰ Χαλκιδῆς γε οἱ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἔτη τοσαῦτα ἀφεστῶτες ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν ἔτι ἀχείρωτοί εἰσι καὶ ἄλλοι

τινὲς κατὰ τὰς ἠπείρους ἐνδοιαστῶς ἀκροῶνται. ἡμεῖς δὲ Ἐγεσταίοις δὴ οὖσι ξυμμάχοις ὡς ἀδικουμένοις ὀξέως βοηθοῦμεν: ὑφ᾽ ὧν δ᾽ αὐτοὶ πάλαι ἀφεστώτων ἀδικούμεθα, ἔτι μέλλομεν ἀμύνεσθαι.

[10] ‘I tell you that in going to Sicily you are leaving many enemies behind you, and seem to be bent on bringing new ones hither. You are perhaps relying upon the treaty recently made, which if you remain quiet may retain the name of a treaty; for to a mere name the intrigues of certain persons both here and at Lacedaemon have nearly succeeded in reducing it. But if you meet with any serious reverse, your enemies will be upon you in a moment, for the agreement was originally extracted from them by the pressure of misfortune, and the discredit of it was on their side not on ours. In the treaty itself there are many disputed points; and, unsatisfactory as it is, to this hour several cities, and very powerful cities too, persist in rejecting it. Some of these are at open war with us already; others may declare war at ten days’ notice; and they only remain at peace because the Lacedaernonians are indisposed to move. And in all probability, if they find our power divided (and such a division is precisely what we are striving to create), they will eagerly join the Sicilians, whose alliance in the war they would long ago have given anything to obtain. These considerations should weigh with us. The state is far from the desired haven, and we should not run into danger and seek to gain a new empire before we have fully secured the old. The Chalcidians in Thrace have been rebels all these years and remain unsubdued, and there are other subjects of ours in various parts of the mainland who are uncertain in their allegiance. And we forsooth cannot lose a moment in avenging the wrongs of our allies the Egestaeans, while we still defer the punishment of our revolted subjects, whose offences are of long standing.

11. καίτοι τοὺς μὲν κατεργασάμενοι κἂν κατάσχοιμεν: τῶν δ᾽ εἰ καὶ κρατήσαιμεν, διὰ πολλοῦ γε καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων

χαλεπῶς ἂν ἄρχειν δυναίμεθα. ἀνόητον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοιούτους ἰέναι ὧν κρατήσας τε μὴ κατασχήσει τις καὶ μὴ κατορθώσας μὴ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ καὶ πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἔσται. [2] Σικελιῶται δ᾽ ἄν μοι δοκοῦσιν, ὥς γε νῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ ἔτι ἂν ἧσσον δεινοὶ ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, εἰ ἄρξειαν αὐτῶν Συρακόσιοι: ὅπερ οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἐκφοβοῦσιν. [3] νῦν μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἔλθοιεν ἴσως Λακεδαιμονίων ἕκαστοι χάριτι, ἐκείνως δ᾽ οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν στρατεῦσαι: ᾧ γὰρ ἂν τρόπῳ τὴν ἡμετέραν μετὰ Πελοποννησίων ἀφέλωνται, εἰκὸς ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σφετέραν διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καθαιρεθῆναι. [4] ἡμᾶς δ᾽ ἂν οἱ ἐκεῖ Ἕλληνες μάλιστα μὲν ἐκπεπληγμένοι εἶεν εἰ μὴ ἀφικοίμεθα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ εἰ δείξαντες τὴν δύναμιν δι᾽ ὀλίγου ἀπέλθοιμεν: τὰ γὰρ διὰ πλείστου πάντες ἴσμεν θαυμαζόμενα καὶ τὰ πεῖραν ἥκιστα τῆς δόξης δόντα. εἰ δὲ σφαλείημέν τι, τάχιστ᾽ ἂν ὑπεριδόντες μετὰ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐπιθοῖντο. [5] ὅπερ νῦν ὑμεῖς ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους πεπόνθατε: διὰ τὸ παρὰ γνώμην αὐτῶν πρὸς ἃ ἐφοβεῖσθε τὸ πρῶτον περιγεγενῆσθαι, καταφρονήσαντες ἤδη καὶ Σικελίας ἐφίεσθε. [6] χρὴ δὲ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπαίρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰς διανοίας κρατήσαντας θαρσεῖν, μηδὲ Λακεδαιμονίους ἄλλο τι ἡγήσασθαι ἢ διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σκοπεῖν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ἢν δύνωνται, σφήλαντες ἡμᾶς τὸ σφέτερον ἀπρεπὲς εὖ θήσονται, ὅσῳ καὶ περὶ πλείστου καὶ διὰ πλείστου δόξαν ἀρετῆς μελετῶσιν. [7] ὥστε οὐ περὶ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Ἐγεσταίων ἡμῖν, ἀνδρῶν βαρβάρων, ὁ ἀγών, εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως πόλιν δι᾽ ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπιβουλεύουσαν ὀξέως φυλαξόμεθα.

[11] ‘And yet if we subdue the Chalcidian rebels we may retain our hold on them; but Sicily is a populous and distant country; over which, even if we are victorious, we shall hardly be able to maintain our dominion. And how foolish it is to select for attack a land which no conquest can secure, while he who fails to conquer will not be where he was before!’I should say that the Sicilian cities are not dangerous to you, certainly not in their present condition, and they

would be even so if they were to fall under the sway of the Syracusans (and this is the prospect with which the Egestaeans would fain scare you). At present individuals might cross the sea out of friendship for the Lacedaemonians; but if the states of Sicily were all united in one empire they would not be likely to make war upon another empire. For whatever chance they may have of overthrowing us if they unite with the Peloponnesians, there will be the same chance of their being overthrown themselves if the Peloponnesians and Athenians are ever united against them. The Hellenes in Sicily will dread us most if we never come; in a less degree if we display our strength and speedily depart; but if any disaster occur, they will despise us and be ready enough to join the enemies who are attacking us here. We all know that men have the greatest respect for that which is farthest off, and for that of which the reputation has been least tested; and this, Athenians, you may verify by your own experience. There was a time when you feared the Lacedaemonians and their allies, but now you have got the better of them, and because your first fears have not been realised you despise them, and even hope to conquer Sicily. But you ought not to be elated at the chance mishaps of your enemies; before you can be confident you should have gained the mastery over their minds. Remember that the Lacedaemonians are sensitive to their disgrace, and that their sole thought is how they may even yet find a way of inflicting a blow upon us which will retrieve their own character; the rather because they have laboured so earnestly and so long to win a name for valour. If we are wise we shall not trouble ourselves about the barbarous Egestaeans in Sicily; the real question is how we can make ourselves secure against the designs of an insidious oligarchy.

12. ‘καὶ μεμνῆσθαι χρὴ ἡμᾶς ὅτι νεωστὶ ἀπὸ νόσου μεγάλης καὶ πολέμου βραχύ τι λελωφήκαμεν, ὥστε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ηὐξῆσθαι: καὶ ταῦτα ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν

δίκαιον ἐνθάδε εἶναι ἀναλοῦν, καὶ μὴ ὑπὲρ ἀνδρῶν φυγάδων τῶνδε ἐπικουρίας δεομένων, οἷς τό τε ψεύσασθαι καλῶς χρήσιμον καὶ τῷ τοῦ πέλας κινδύνῳ, αὐτοὺς λόγους μόνον παρασχομένους, ἢ κατορθώσαντας χάριν μὴ ἀξίαν εἰδέναι ἢ πταίσαντάς που τοὺς φίλους ξυναπολέσαι. [2] εἴ τέ τις ἄρχειν ἄσμενος αἱρεθεὶς παραινεῖ ὑμῖν ἐκπλεῖν, τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον σκοπῶν, ἄλλως τε καὶ νεώτερος ὢν ἔτι ἐς τὸ ἄρχειν, ὅπως θαυμασθῇ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἱπποτροφίας, διὰ δὲ πολυτέλειαν καὶ ὠφεληθῇ τι ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς, μηδὲ τούτῳ ἐμπαράσχητε τῷ τῆς πόλεως κινδύνῳ ἰδίᾳ ἐλλαμπρύνεσθαι, νομίσατε δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους τὰ μὲν δημόσια ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἴδια ἀναλοῦν, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μέγα εἶναι καὶ μὴ οἷον νεωτέρῳ βουλεύσασθαί τε καὶ ὀξέως μεταχειρίσαι.

[12] ‘We must remember also that we have only just recovered in some measure from a great plague and a great war, and are beginning to make up our losses in men and money. It is our duty to expend our new resources upon ourselves at home, and not upon begging exiles who have an interest in successful lies; who find it expedient only to contribute words, and let others fight their battles; and who, if saved, prove ungrateful; if they fail, as they very likely may, only involve their friends in a common ruin.’I dare say there may be some young man here who is delighted at holding a command, and the more so because he is too young for his post; and he, regarding only his own interest, may recommend you to sail; he may be one who is much admired for his stud of horses, and wants to make something out of his command which will maintain him in his extravagance. But do not you give him the opportunity of indulging his own magnificent tastes at the expense of the state. Remember that men of this stamp impoverish themselves and defraud the public. An expedition to Sicily is a serious business, and not one which a mere youth can plan and carry into execution off-hand.

13. ‘οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶν νῦν ἐνθάδε τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ παρακελευστοὺς καθημένους φοβοῦμαι, καὶ τοῖς

πρεσβυτέροις ἀντιπαρακελεύομαι μὴ καταισχυνθῆναι, εἴ τῳ τις παρακάθηται τῶνδε, ὅπως μὴ δόξει, ἐὰν μὴ ψηφίζηται πολεμεῖν, μαλακὸς εἶναι, μηδ᾽, ὅπερ ἂν αὐτοὶ πάθοιεν, δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων, γνόντας ὅτι ἐπιθυμίᾳ μὲν ἐλάχιστα κατορθοῦνται, προνοίᾳ δὲ πλεῖστα, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ὡς μέγιστον δὴ τῶν πρὶν κίνδυνον ἀναρριπτούσης ἀντιχειροτονεῖν, καὶ ψηφίζεσθαι τοὺς μὲν Σικελιώτας οἵσπερ νῦν ὅροις χρωμένους πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ μεμπτοῖς, τῷ τε Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ παρὰ γῆν ἥν τις πλέῃ, καὶ τῷ Σικελικῷ διὰ πελάγους, τὰ αὐτῶν νεμομένους καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ ξυμφέρεσθαι: [2] τοῖς δ᾽ Ἐγεσταίοις ἰδίᾳ εἰπεῖν, ἐπειδὴ ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ξυνῆψαν πρὸς Σελινουντίους τὸ πρῶτον πόλεμον, μετὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ καταλύεσθαι: καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ξυμμάχους μὴ ποιεῖσθαι ὥσπερ εἰώθαμεν, οἷς κακῶς μὲν πράξασιν ἀμυνοῦμεν, ὠφελίας δ᾽ αὐτοὶ δεηθέντες οὐ τευξόμεθα.

[13] The youth of whom I am speaking has summoned to his side young men like himself, whom, not without alarm, I see sitting by him in this assembly, and I appeal against them to you elder citizens. If any of you should be placed next one of his supporters, I would not have him ashamed, or afraid, of being thought a coward if he does not vote for war. Do not, like them, entertain a desperate craving for things out of your reach; you know that by prevision many successes are gained, but few or none by mere greed. On behalf of our country, now on the brink of the greatest danger which she has ever known, I entreat you to hold up your hands against them. Do not interfere with the boundaries which divide us from Sicily; I mean the Ionian gulf which parts us if we sail along the coast, the Sicilian sea if we sail through the open water; these are quite satisfactory. The Sicilians have their own country; let them manage their own concerns. And let the Egestaeans in particular be informed that, having originally gone to war with the Selinuntians on their own account, they must make peace on their own account. Let us have no more allies such as ours have too often been, whom

we are expected to assist when they are in misfortune, but to whom we ourselves when in need may look in vain.

14. ‘καὶ σύ, ὦ πρύτανι, ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἡγεῖ σοι προσήκειν κήδεσθαί τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ βούλει γενέσθαι πολίτης ἀγαθός, ἐπιψήφιζε καὶ γνώμας προτίθει αὖθις Ἀθηναίοις, νομίσας, εἰ ὀρρωδεῖς τὸ ἀναψηφίσαι, τὸ μὲν λύειν τοὺς νόμους μὴ μετὰ τοσῶνδ᾽ ἂν μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σχεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως <κακῶς > βουλευσαμένης ἰατρὸς ἂν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἄρξαι τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι, ὃς ἂν τὴν πατρίδα ὠφελήσῃ ὡς πλεῖστα ἢ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδὲν βλάψῃ.’

[14] ‘And you, Prytanis, as you wish to be a good citizen, and believe that the welfare of the state is entrusted to you, put my proposal to the vote, and lay the question once more before the Athenians. If you hesitate, remember that in the presence of so many witnesses there can be no question of breaking the law, and that you will be the physician of the state at the critical moment. The first duty of the good magistrate is to do the very best which he can for his country, or, at least, to do her no harm which he can avoid.’

15. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοιαῦτα εἶπε, τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων παριόντες οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι στρατεύειν παρῄνουν καὶ τὰ ἐψηφισμένα μὴ λύειν, οἱ δέ τινες καὶ ἀντέλεγον. [2] ἐνῆγε δὲ προθυμότατα τὴν στρατείαν Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὢν καὶ ἐς τἆλλα διάφορος τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη, καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν. [3] ὢν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζοσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρῆτο ἔς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας: ὅπερ καὶ καθεῖλεν ὕστερον τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἥκιστα. [4] φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν δίαιταν καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὧν καθ᾽ ἓν ἕκαστον ἐν ὅτῳ γίγνοιτο ἔπρασσεν, ὡς τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμιοι καθέστασαν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ τοῦ

πολέμου ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν. [5] τότε δ᾽ οὖν παρελθὼν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρῄνει τοιάδε.

[15] Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians who came forward to speak were in favour of war, and reluctant to rescind the vote which had been already passed, although a few took the other side. The most enthusiastic supporter of the expedition was Alcibiades the son of Cleinias; he was determined to oppose Nicias, who was always his political enemy and had just now spoken of him in disparaging terms; but the desire to command was even a stronger motive with him. He was hoping that he might be the conqueror of Sicily and Carthage; and that success would repair his private fortunes, and gain him money as well as glory. He had a great position among the citizens and was devoted to horse-racing and other pleasures which outran his means. And in the end his wild courses went far to ruin the Athenian state. For the people feared the extremes to which he carried the lawlessness of his personal habits, and the far-reaching purposes which invariably animated him in all his actions. They thought that he was aiming at a tyranny and set themselves against him. And therefore, although his talents as a military commander were unrivalled, they entrusted the administration of the war to others, because they personally objected to his private habits; and so they speedily shipwrecked the state. He now came forward and spoke as follows:

16. ‘καὶ προσήκει μοι μᾶλλον ἑτέρων, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄρχειν ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ἄρξασθαι, ἐπειδή μου Νικίας καθήψατο , καὶ ἄξιος ἅμα νομίζω εἶναι. ὧν γὰρ πέρι ἐπιβόητός εἰμι, τοῖς μὲν προγόνοις μου καὶ ἐμοὶ δόξαν φέρει ταῦτα, τῇ δὲ πατρίδι καὶ ὠφελίαν. [2] οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπίαζε θεωρίας, πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμῆσθαι, διότι ἅρματα μὲν ἑπτὰ καθῆκα,

ὅσα οὐδείς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησα δὲ καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενόμην καὶ τἆλλα ἀξίως τῆς νίκης παρεσκευασάμην. νόμῳ μὲν γὰρ τιμὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δρωμένου καὶ δύναμις ἅμα ὑπονοεῖται. [3] καὶ ὅσα αὖ ἐν τῇ πόλει χορηγίαις ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ λαμπρύνομαι, τοῖς μὲν ἀστοῖς φθονεῖται φύσει, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ξένους καὶ αὕτη ἰσχὺς φαίνεται. καὶ οὐκ ἄχρηστος ἦδ᾽ ἡ ἄνοια, ὃς ἂν τοῖς ἰδίοις τέλεσι μὴ ἑαυτὸν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῇ. [4] οὐδέ γε ἄδικον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονοῦντα μὴ ἴσον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ κακῶς πράσσων πρὸς οὐδένα τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἰσομοιρεῖ: ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ δυστυχοῦντες οὐ προσαγορευόμεθα, ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τις ἀνεχέσθω καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν εὐπραγούντων ὑπερφρονούμενος, ἢ τὰ ἴσα νέμων τὰ ὁμοῖα ἀνταξιούτω. [5] οἶδα δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους, καὶ ὅσοι ἔν τινος λαμπρότητι προέσχον, ἐν μὲν τῷ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς βίῳ λυπηροὺς ὄντας, τοῖς ὁμοίοις μὲν μάλιστα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυνόντας, τῶν δὲ ἔπειτα ἀνθρώπων προσποίησίν τε ξυγγενείας τισὶ καὶ μὴ οὖσαν καταλιπόντας, καὶ ἧς ἂν ὦσι πατρίδος, ταύτῃ αὔχησιν ὡς οὐ περὶ ἀλλοτρίων οὐδ᾽ ἁμαρτόντων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς περὶ σφετέρων τε καὶ καλὰ πραξάντων. [6] ὧν ἐγὼ ὀρεγόμενος καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τὰ ἴδια ἐπιβοώμενος τὰ δημόσια σκοπεῖτε εἴ του χεῖρον μεταχειρίζω. Πελοποννήσου γὰρ τὰ δυνατώτατα ξυστήσας ἄνευ μεγάλου ὑμῖν κινδύνου καὶ δαπάνης Λακεδαιμονίους ἐς μίαν ἡμέραν κατέστησα ἐν Μαντινείᾳ περὶ τῶν ἁπάντων ἀγωνίσασθαι: ἐξ οὗ καὶ περιγενόμενοι τῇ μάχῃ οὐδέπω καὶ νῦν βεβαίως θαρσοῦσιν.

[16] ‘I have a better right to command, men of Athens, than another; for as Nicias has attacked me, I must begin by praising myself; and I consider that I am worthy. Those doings of mine for which I am so much cried out against are an honour to myself and to my ancestors, and a solid advantage to my country. In consequence of the distinguished manner in which I represented the state at Olympia, the other Hellenes formed an idea of our power which even exceeded the reality, although they had previously imagined that we were exhausted by war. I sent

into the lists seven chariots, — no other private man ever did the like; I was victor, and also won the second and fourth prize; and I ordered everything in a style worthy of my victory. Apart from the conventional honour paid to such successes, the energy which is shown by them creates an impression of power. At home, again, whenever I gain distinction by providing choruses or by the performance of some other public duty, although the citizens are naturally jealous of me, to strangers these acts of munificence are a new argument of our strength. There is some use in the folly of a man who at his own cost benefits not only himself, but the state. And where is the injustice, if I or any one who feels his own superiority to another refuses to be on a level with him? The unfortunate keep their misfortunes to themselves. We do not expect to be recognised by our acquaintance when we are down in the world; and on the same principle why should any one complain when treated with disdain by the more fortunate? He who would have proper respect shown to him should himself show it towards others. I know that men of this lofty spirit, and all who have been in any way illustrious, are hated while they are alive, by their equals especially, and in a lesser degree by others who have to do with them; but that they leave behind them to after-ages a reputation which leads even those who are not of their family to claim kindred with them, and that they are the glory of their country, which regards them, not as aliens or as evil-doers, but as her own children, of whose character she is proud. These are my own aspirations, and this is the reason why my private life is assailed; but let me ask you, whether in the management of public affairs any man surpasses me. Did I not, without involving you in any great danger or expense, combine the most powerful states of Peloponnesus against the Lacedaemonians, whom I compelled to stake at Mantinea all that they had upon the fortune of one day? And even to this hour, although they

were victorious in the battle, they have hardly recovered courage.

17. ‘καὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἐμὴ νεότης καὶ ἄνοια παρὰ φύσιν δοκοῦσα εἶναι ἐς τὴν Πελοποννησίων δύναμιν λόγοις τε πρέπουσιν ὠμίλησε καὶ ὀργῇ πίστιν παρασχομένη ἔπεισεν. καὶ νῦν μὴ πεφόβησθε αὐτήν, ἀλλ᾽ ἕως ἐγώ τε ἔτι ἀκμάζω μετ᾽ αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ Νικίας εὐτυχὴς δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀποχρήσασθε τῇ ἑκατέρου ἡμῶν ὠφελίᾳ. [2] καὶ τὸν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν πλοῦν μὴ μεταγιγνώσκετε ὡς ἐπὶ μεγάλην δύναμιν ἐσόμενον. ὄχλοις τε γὰρ ξυμμείκτοις πολυανδροῦσιν αἱ πόλεις καὶ ῥᾳδίας ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς. [3] καὶ οὐδεὶς δι᾽ αὐτὸ ὡς περὶ οἰκείας πατρίδος οὔτε τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὅπλοις ἐξήρτυται οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ νομίμοις κατασκευαῖς: ὅτι δὲ ἕκαστος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ λέγων πείθειν οἴεται ἢ στασιάζων ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ λαβὼν ἄλλην γῆν, μὴ κατορθώσας, οἰκήσειν, ταῦτα ἑτοιμάζεται. [4] καὶ οὐκ εἰκὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὅμιλον οὔτε λόγου μιᾷ γνώμῃ ἀκροᾶσθαι οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἔργα κοινῶς τρέπεσθαι: ταχὺ δ᾽ ἂν ὡς ἕκαστοι, εἴ τι καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν λέγοιτο, προσχωροῖεν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ στασιάζουσιν, ὥσπερ πυνθανόμεθα. [5] καὶ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ὁπλῖται οὔτ᾽ ἐκείνοις ὅσοιπερ κομποῦνται, οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες διεφάνησαν τοσοῦτοι ὄντες ὅσους ἕκαστοι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἠρίθμουν, ἀλλὰ μέγιστον δὴ αὐτοὺς ἐψευσμένη ἡ Ἑλλὰς μόλις ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ ἱκανῶς ὡπλίσθη. [6] τά τε οὖν ἐκεῖ, ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἀκοῇ αἰσθάνομαι, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἔτι εὐπορώτερα ἔσται βαρβάρους [τε] γὰρ πολλοὺς ἕξομεν οἳ Συρακοσίων μίσει ξυνεπιθήσονται αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἐπικωλύσει, ἢν ὑμεῖς ὀρθῶς βουλεύησθε. [7] οἱ γὰρ πατέρες ἡμῶν τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους οὕσπερ νῦν φασὶ πολεμίους ὑπολείποντας ἂν ἡμᾶς πλεῖν καὶ προσέτι τὸν Μῆδον ἐχθρὸν ἔχοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἢ τῇ περιουσίᾳ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἰσχύοντες. [8] καὶ νῦν οὔτε ἀνέλπιστοί πω μᾶλλον Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο, εἴ τε καὶ πάνυ ἔρρωνται, τὸ μὲν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν ἐσβάλλειν, κἂν μὴ ἐκπλεύσωμεν, ἱκανοί εἰσι, τῷ δὲ ναυτικῷ οὐκ ἂν

δύναιντο βλάπτειν: ὑπόλοιπον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἀντίπαλον ναυτικόν.

[17] ‘These were the achievements of my youth, and of what is supposed to be my monstrous folly; thus did I by winning words conciliate the Peloponnesian powers, and my heartiness made them believe in me and follow me. And now do not be afraid of me because I am young, but while I am in the flower of my days and Nicias enjoys the reputation of success, use the services of us both.Having determined to sail, do not change your minds under the impression that Sicily is a great power. For although the Sicilian cities are populous, their inhabitants are a mixed multitude, and they readily give up old forms of government and receive new ones from without. No one really feels that he has a city of his own; and so the individual is ill provided with arms, and the country has no regular means of defence. A man looks only to what he can win from the common stock by arts of speech or by party violence; hoping, if he is overthrown, at any rate to carry off his prize and enjoy it elsewhere. They are a motley crew, who are never of one mind in counsel, and are incapable of any concert in action. Every man is for himself, and will readily come over to anyone who makes an attractive offer; the more readily if, as report says, they are in a state of internal discord. They boast of their hoplites, but, as has proved to be the case in all Hellenic states, the number of them is grossly exaggerated. Hellas has been singularly mistaken about her heavy infantry; and even in this war it was as much as she could do to collect enough of them. The obstacles then which will meet us in Sicily, judging of them from the information which I have received, are not great; indeed, I have overrated them, for there will be many barbarians who, through fear of the Syracusans, will join us in attacking them. And at home there is nothing which, viewed rightly, need interfere with the expedition. Our forefathers had the same enemies whom we are now told that we are leaving behind us, and the Persian besides;

but their strength lay in the greatness of their navy, and by that and that alone they gained their empire. Never were the Peloponnesians more hopeless of success than at the present moment; and let them be ever so confident, they will only invade us by land, which they can equally do whether we go to Sicily or not. But on the sea they cannot hurt us, for we shall leave behind us a navy equal to theirs.

18. ὥστε τί ἂν λέγοντες εἰκὸς ἦ αὐτοὶ ἀποκνοῖμεν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχους σκηπτόμενοι μὴ βοηθοῖμεν; οἷς χρεών, ἐπειδή γε καὶ ξυνωμόσαμεν, ἐπαμύνειν, καὶ μὴ ἀντιτιθέναι ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι ἡμῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα δεῦρο ἀντιβοηθῶσι προσεθέμεθα αὐτούς, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἐχθροῖς ἡμῶν λυπηροὶ ὄντες δεῦρο κωλύωσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπιέναι. [2] τήν τε ἀρχὴν οὕτως ἐκτησάμεθα καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἄλλοι ἦρξαν, παραγιγνόμενοι προθύμως τοῖς αἰεὶ ἢ βαρβάροις ἢ Ἕλλησιν ἐπικαλουμένοις, ἐπεὶ εἴ γε ἡσυχάζοιεν πάντες ἢ φυλοκρινοῖεν οἷς χρεὼν βοηθεῖν, βραχὺ ἄν τι προσκτώμενοι αὐτῇ περὶ αὐτῆς ἂν ταύτης μᾶλλον κινδυνεύοιμεν. τὸν γὰρ προύχοντα οὐ μόνον ἐπιόντα τις ἀμύνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἔπεισι προκαταλαμβάνει. [3] καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμιεύεσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τῷδε καθέσταμεν, τοῖς μὲν ἐπιβουλεύειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἀνιέναι, διὰ τὸ ἀρχθῆναι ἂν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων αὐτοῖς κίνδυνον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοιμεν. καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑμῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἥσυχον, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐς τὸ ὁμοῖον μεταλήψεσθε. [4] ’λογισάμενοι οὖν τάδε μᾶλλον αὐξήσειν, ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ἦν ἴωμεν, ποιώμεθα τὸν πλοῦν, ἵνα Πελοποννησίων τε στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα, εἰ δόξομεν ὑπεριδόντες τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἡσυχίαν καὶ ἐπὶ Σικελίαν πλεῦσαι: καὶ ἅμα ἢ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῶν ἐκεῖ προσγενομένων πάσης τῷ εἰκότι ἄρξομεν, ἢ κακώσομέν γε Συρακοσίους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὠφελησόμεθα. [5] τὸ δὲ ἀσφαλές, καὶ μένειν, ἤν τι προχωρῇ, καὶ ἀπελθεῖν, αἱ νῆες παρέξουσιν: ναυκράτορες γὰρ ἐσόμεθα καὶ ξυμπάντων Σικελιωτῶν. [6] καὶ μὴ ὑμᾶς ἡ Νικίου τῶν λόγων ἀπραγμοσύνη καὶ διάστασις τοῖς νέοις ἐς τοὺς

πρεσβυτέρους ἀποτρέψῃ, τῷ δὲ εἰωθότι κόσμῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν ἅμα νέοι γεραιτέροις βουλεύοντες ἐς τάδε ἦραν αὐτά, καὶ νῦν τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ πειρᾶσθε προαγαγεῖν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ νομίσατε νεότητα μὲν καὶ γῆρας ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲν δύνασθαι, ὁμοῦ δὲ τό τε φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνυ ἀκριβὲς ἂν ξυγκραθὲν μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἰσχύειν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἐὰν μὲν ἡσυχάζῃ, τρίψεσθαί τε αὐτὴν περὶ αὐτὴν ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ πάντων τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐγγηράσεσθαι, ἀγωνιζομένην δὲ αἰεὶ προσλήψεσθαί τε τὴν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ μᾶλλον ξύνηθες ἕξειν. [7] παράπαν τε γιγνώσκω πόλιν μὴ ἀπράγμονα τάχιστ᾽ ἄν μοι δοκεῖν ἀπραγμοσύνης μεταβολῇ διαφθαρῆναι, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσφαλέστατα τούτους οἰκεῖν οἳ ἂν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἤθεσι καὶ νόμοις, ἢν καὶ χείρω ᾖ, ἥκιστα διαφόρως πολιτεύωσιν.’

[18] ‘What reason can we give to ourselves for hesitation? What excuse can we make to our allies for denying them aid? We have sworn to them, and have no right to argue that they never assisted us. In seeking their alliance we did not intend that they should come and help us here, but that the should harass our enemies in Sicily, and prevent them from coming hither. Like all other imperial powers, we have acquired our dominion by our readiness to assist any one, whether Barbarian or Hellene, who may have invoked our aid. If we are all to sit and do nothing, or to draw distinctions of race when our help is requested, we shall add little to our empire, and run a great risk of losing it altogether. For mankind do not await the attack of a superior power, they anticipate it. We cannot cut down an empire as we might a household; but having once gained our present position, we must, while keeping a firm hold upon some, contrive occasion against others; for if we are not rulers we shall be subjects. You cannot afford to regard inaction in the same light as others might, unless you impose a corresponding restriction on your practice. Convinced then that we shall be most likely to increase our power here if we attack our

enemies there, let us sail. We shall humble the pride of the Peloponnesians when they see that, scorning the delights of repose, we have attacked Sicily. By the help of our acquisitions there, we shall probably become masters of all Hellas; at any rate we shall injure the Syracusans, and at the same time benefit ourselves and our allies. Whether we succeed and remain, or depart, in either case our navy will ensure our safety; for at sea we shall be more than a match for all Sicily. Nicias must not divert you from your purpose by preaching indolence, and by trying to set the young against the old; rather in your accustomed order, old and young taking counsel together, after the manner of your fathers who raised Athens to this height of greatness, strive to rise yet higher. Consider that youth and age have no power unless united; but that the shallower and the more exact and the middle sort of judgment, when duly attempered, are likely to be most efficient. The state, if at rest, like everything else will wear herself out by internal friction. Every pursuit which requires skill will tend to decay, whereas by conflict the city will always be gaining fresh experience and learning to defend herself, not in theory, but in practice. My opinion in short is, that a state used to activity will quickly be ruined by the change to inaction; and that they of all men enjoy the greatest security who are truest to themselves and their institutions even when they are not the best.’

19. τοιαῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης εἶπεν: οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἐκείνου τε καὶ τῶν Ἐγεσταίων καὶ Λεοντίνων φυγάδων, οἳ παρελθόντες ἐδέοντό τε καὶ τῶν ὁρκίων ὑπομιμνήσκοντες ἱκέτευον βοηθῆσαι σφίσι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ὥρμηντο στρατεύειν. [2] καὶ ὁ Νικίας γνοὺς ὅτι ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀποτρέψειε, παρασκευῆς δὲ πλήθει, εἰ πολλὴν ἐπιτάξειε, τάχ᾽ ἂν μεταστήσειεν αὐτούς, παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς αὖθις ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

[19] Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing him and the Egestaeans and certain Leontine exiles who came

forward and earnestly entreated assistance, reminding the Athenians of the oaths which they had sworn, the people were more than ever resolved upon war. Nicias, seeing that his old argument would no longer deter them, but that he might possibly change their minds if he insisted on the magnitude of the force which would be required, came forward again and spoke as follows:

20. ‘ἐπειδὴ πάντως ὁρῶ ὑμᾶς, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡρμημένους στρατεύειν, ξυνενέγκοι μὲν ταῦτα ὡς βουλόμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ παρόντι ἃ γιγνώσκω σημανῶ. [2] ἐπὶ γὰρ πόλεις, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκοῇ αἰσθάνομαι, μέλλομεν ἰέναι μεγάλας καὶ οὔθ᾽ ὑπηκόους ἀλλήλων οὔτε δεομένας μεταβολῆς, ᾗ ἂν ἐκ βιαίου τις δουλείας ἄσμενος ἐς ῥᾴω μετάστασιν χωροίη, οὐδ᾽ ἂν τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν ἡμετέραν εἰκότως ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθερίας προσδεξαμένας, τό τε πλῆθος ὡς ἐν μιᾷ νήσῳ πολλὰς τὰς Ἑλληνίδας. [3] πλὴν γὰρ Νάξου καὶ Κατάνης, ἃς ἐλπίζω ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ Λεοντίνων ξυγγενὲς προσέσεσθαι, ἄλλαι εἰσὶν ἑπτά, καὶ παρεσκευασμέναι τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοιοτρόπως μάλιστα τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ δυνάμει, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐπὶ ἃς μᾶλλον πλέομεν, Σελινοῦς καὶ Συράκουσαι. [4] πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ὁπλῖται ἔνεισι καὶ τοξόται καὶ ἀκοντισταί, πολλαὶ δὲ τριήρεις καὶ ὅχλος ὁ πληρώσων αὐτάς. χρήματά τ᾽ ἔχουσι τὰ μὲν ἴδια, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐστὶ Σελινουντίοις, Συρακοσίοις δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων τινῶν ἀπαρχὴ ἐσφέρεται: ᾧ δὲ μάλιστα ἡμῶν προύχουσιν, ἵππους τε πολλοὺς κέκτηνται καὶ σίτῳ οἰκείῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐπακτῷ χρῶνται.

[20] ‘Men of Athens, as I see that you are thoroughly determined to go to war, I accept the decision, and will advise you according1y, trusting that the event will be such as we all wish. The cities which we are about to attack are, I am informed, powerful, and independent of one another; they are not inhabited by slaves, who would gladly pass out of a harder into an easier condition of life; and they are very unlikely to accept our rule in exchange for their present liberty. As regards numbers, although Sicily is but one island, it contains a great many Hellenic states. Not

including Naxos and Catana (of which the inhabitants, as I hope, will be our allies because they are the kinsmen of the Leontines), there are seven other cities fully provided with means of warfare similar to our own, above all Selinus and Syracuse, the cities against which our expedition is particularly directed. For they have numerous hoplites, archers, and javelin-men, and they have many triremes which their large population will enable them to man; besides their private wealth, they have the treasures of the Selinuntian temples; and the Syracusans receive a tribute which has been paid them from time immemorial by certain barbarian tribes. Moreover, they have a numerous cavalry, and grow their own corn instead of importing it: in the two last respects they have a great advantage over us.

21. ‘πρὸς οὖν τοιαύτην δύναμιν οὐ ναυτικῆς καὶ φαύλου στρατιᾶς μόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεζὸν πολὺν ξυμπλεῖν, εἴπερ βουλόμεθα ἄξιον τῆς διανοίας δρᾶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ἱππέων πολλῶν εἴργεσθαι τῆς γῆς, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ ξυστῶσιν αἱ πόλεις φοβηθεῖσαι καὶ μὴ ἀντιπαράσχωσιν ἡμῖν φίλοι τινὲς γενόμενοι ἄλλοι ἢ Ἐγεσταῖοι ᾧ ἀμυνούμεθα ἱππικόν [2] αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους: αὐτόθεν δὲ παρασκευῇ ἀξιόχρεῳ ἐπιέναι, γνόντας ὅτι πολύ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν μέλλομεν πλεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ στρατευσόμενοι καὶ ὅτε ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὑπηκόοις ξύμμαχοι ἤλθετε ἐπί τινα, ὅθεν ῥᾴδιαι αἱ κομιδαὶ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας ὧν προσέδει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐς ἀλλοτρίαν πᾶσαν ἀπαρτήσοντες, ἐξ ἧς μηνῶν οὐδὲ τεσσάρων τῶν χειμερινῶν ἄγγελον ῥᾴδιον ἐλθεῖν.

[21] ‘Against such a power more is needed than an insignificant force of marines; if we mean to do justice to our design, and not to be kept within our lines by the numbers of their cavalry, we must embark a multitude of infantry. For what if the Sicilians in terror combine against us, and we make no friends except the Egestaeans who can furnish us with horsemen capable of opposing theirs? To be driven from

the island or to send for reinforcements, because we were wanting in forethought at first, would be disgraceful. We must take a powerful armament with us from home, in the full knowledge that we are going to a distant land, and that the expedition will be of a kind very different from any which you have hitherto made among your subjects against some enemy in this part of the world, yourselves the allies of others. Here a friendly country is always near, and you can easily obtain supplies. There you will be dependent on a country which is entirely strange to you, and whence during the four winter months hardly even a message can be sent hither.

22. ὁπλίτας τε οὖν πολλούς μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡμᾶς ἄγειν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, τῶν τε ὑπηκόων καὶ ἤν τινα ἐκ Πελοποννήσου δυνώμεθα ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ μισθῷ προσαγαγέσθαι, καὶ τοξότας πολλοὺς καὶ σφενδονήτας, ὅπως πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνων ἱππικὸν ἀντέχωσι, ναυσί τε καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾷον ἐσκομιζώμεθα, τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σῖτον ἐν ὁλκάσι, πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγμένας κριθάς, ἄγειν, καὶ σιτοποιοὺς ἐκ τῶν μυλώνων πρὸς μέρος ἠναγκασμένους ἐμμίσθους, ἵνα, ἤν που ὑπὸ ἁπλοίας ἀπολαμβανώμεθα, ἔχῃ ἡ στρατιὰ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια □πολλὴ γὰρ οὖσα οὐ πάσης ἔσται πόλεως ὑποδέξασθαι□, τά τε ἄλλα ὅσον δυνατὸν ἑτοιμάσασθαι, καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ ἑτέροις γίγνεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ χρήματα αὐτόθεν ὡς πλεῖστα ἔχειν. τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ Ἐγεσταίων, ἃ λέγεται ἐκεῖ ἑτοῖμα, νομίσατε καὶ λόγῳ ἂν μάλιστα ἑτοῖμα εἶναι.

[22] ‘I say, therefore, that we must take with us a large heavy-armed force both of Athenians and of allies, whether our own subjects or any Peloponnesians whom we can persuade or attract by pay to our service; also plenty of archers and javelin-men to act against the enemy’s cavalry. Our naval superiority must be overwhelming, that we may not only be able to fight, but may have no difficulty in bringing in supplies. And there is the food carried from home, such as wheat and parched barley, which will have to

be conveyed in merchant-vessels; we must also have bakers, drafted in a certain proportion from each mill, who will receive pay, but will be forced to serve, in order that, if we should be detained by a calm, the army may not want food; for it is not every city that will be able to receive so large a force as ours. We must make our preparations as complete as possible, and not be at the mercy of others; above all, we must take out with us as much money as we can; for as to the supplies of the Egestaeans which are said to be awaiting us, we had better assume that they are imaginary.

23. ἢν γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἔλθωμεν ἐνθένδε μὴ ἀντίπαλον μόνον παρασκευασάμενοι,πλήν γε πρὸς τὸ μάχιμον αὐτῶν, τὸ ὁπλιτικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντες τοῖς πᾶσι, μόλις οὕτως οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα τῶν μὲν κρατεῖν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διασῶσαι. [2] πόλιν τε νομίσαι χρὴ ἐν ἀλλοφύλοις καὶ πολεμίοις οἰκιοῦντας ἰέναι, οὓς πρέπει τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ᾗ ἂν κατάσχωσιν εὐθὺς κρατεῖν τῆς γῆς, ἢ εἰδέναι ὅτι, ἢν σφάλλωνται, πάντα πολέμια ἕξουσιν. [3] ὅπερ ἐγὼ φοβούμενος, καὶ εἰδὼς πολλὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς δέον εὖ βουλεύσασθαι, ἔτι δὲ πλείω εὐτυχῆσαι χαλεπὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας , ὅτι ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοὺς ἐμαυτὸν βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἀσφαλὴς ἐκπλεῦσαι. ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ τε ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βεβαιότατα ἡγοῦμαι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς στρατευσομένοις σωτήρια. εἰ δέ τῳ ἄλλως δοκεῖ, παρίημι αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχήν.’

[23] ‘Even supposing we leave Athens with a force of our own, not merely equal to that of the enemy, but in every way superior, except indeed as regards the number of hoplites which they can put into the field, for in that respect equality is impossible, still it will be no easy task to conquer Sicily, or indeed to preserve ourselves. You ought to consider that we are like men going to found a city in a land of strangers and enemies, who on the very day of their disembarkation must have command of the country; for if they meet with a disaster they will have no friends. And this is what I fear. We shall have much need of prudence; still

more of good fortune (and who can guarantee this to mortals?). Wherefore I would trust myself and the expedition, as little as possible to accident, and would not sail until I had taken such precautions as will be likely to ensure our safety. This I conceive to be the course which is the most prudent for the whole state, and, for us who are sent upon the expedition, a condition of safety. If any one thinks otherwise, to him I resign the command.’

24. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα εἶπε νομίζων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῷ πλήθει τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ ἀποτρέψειν ἤ, εἰ ἀναγκάζοιτο στρατεύεσθαι, μάλιστ᾽ <ἂν> οὕτως ἀσφαλῶς ἐκπλεῦσαι: [2] οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν τοῦ πλοῦ οὐκ ἐξῃρέθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀχλώδους τῆς παρασκευῆς, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο, καὶ τοὐναντίον περιέστη αὐτῷ: εὖ τε γὰρ παραινέσαι ἔδοξε καὶ ἀσφάλεια νῦν δὴ καὶ πολλὴ ἔσεσθαι. [3] καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβυτέροις ὡς ἢ καταστρεψομένοις ἐφ᾽ ἃ ἔπλεον ἢ οὐδὲν ἂν σφαλεῖσαν μεγάλην δύναμιν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τῆς τε ἀπούσης πόθῳ ὄψεως καὶ θεωρίας, καὶ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες σωθήσεσθαι: ὁ δὲ πολὺς ὅμιλος καὶ στρατιώτης ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι ἀργύριον οἴσειν καὶ προσκτήσεσθαι δύναμιν ὅθεν ἀίδιον μισθοφορὰν ὑπάρξειν. [4] ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν τῶν πλεόνων ἐπιθυμίαν, εἴ τῳ ἄρα καὶ μὴ ἤρεσκε, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀντιχειροτονῶν κακόνους δόξειεν εἶναι τῇ πόλει ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν.

[24] These were the words of Nicias. He meant either to deter the Athenians by bringing home to them the vastness of the undertaking, or to provide as far as he could for the security of the expedition if he were compelled to proceed. The result disappointed him. Far from losing their enthusiasm at the disagreeable prospect, they were more determined than ever; they approved of his advice, and were confident that every chance of danger was now removed. All alike were seized with a passionate desire to sail, the elder among them convinced that they would achieve the conquest of Sicily, — at any rate such an armament could suffer no disaster; the youth were longing to see with their own eyes

the marvels of a distant land, and were confident of a safe return; the main body of the troops expected to receive present pay, and to conquer a country which would be an inexhaustible mine of pay for the future. The enthusiasm of the majority was so overwhelming that, although some disapproved, they were afraid of being thought unpatriotic if they voted on the other side, and therefore held their peace.

25. καὶ τέλος παρελθών τις τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ παρακαλέσας τὸν Νικίαν οὐκ ἔφη χρῆναι προφασίζεσθαι οὐδὲ διαμέλλειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐναντίον ἁπάντων ἤδη λέγειν ἥντινα αὐτῷ παρασκευὴν Ἀθηναῖοι ψηφίσωνται. [2] ὁ δὲ ἄκων μὲν εἶπεν ὅτι καὶ μετὰ τῶν ξυναρχόντων καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν μᾶλλον βουλεύσοιτο, ὅσα μέντοι ἤδη δοκεῖν αὐτῷ, τριήρεσι μὲν οὐκ ἔλασσον ἢ ἑκατὸν πλευστέα εἶναι αὐτῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἔσεσθαι ὁπλιταγωγοὺς ὅσαι ἂν δοκῶσι, καὶ ἄλλας ἐκ τῶν ξυμμάχων μεταπεμπτέας εἶναι, ὁπλίταις δὲ τοῖς ξύμπασιν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πεντακισχιλίων μὲν οὐκ ἐλάσσοσιν, ἢν δέ τι δύνωνται, καὶ πλέοσιν: τὴν δὲ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ὡς κατὰ λόγον, καὶ τοξοτῶν τῶν αὐτόθεν καὶ ἐκ Κρήτης καὶ σφενδονητῶν, καὶ ἤν τι ἄλλο πρέπον δοκῇ εἶναι, ἑτοιμασάμενοι ἄξειν.

[25] At last an Athenian came forward and, calling upon Nicias, said that they would have no more excuses and delays; he must speak out and say what forces the people were to vote him. He replied, with some unwillingness, that he would prefer to consider the matter at leisure with his colleagues, but that, as far as he could see at present, they ought to have at least a hundred triremes of their own; of these a certain number might be used as transports, and they must order more triremes from their allies. Of heavy-armed troops they would require in all, including Athenians and allies, not less than five thousand, and more if they could possibly have them; the rest of the armament must be in proportion, and should comprise archers to be procured both at home and from Crete, and slingers. These forces, and

whatever else seemed to be required, the generals would make ready before they started.

26. ἀκούσαντες δ᾽ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐψηφίσαντο εὐθὺς αὐτοκράτορας εἶναι καὶ περὶ στρατιᾶς πλήθους καὶ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πλοῦ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς πράσσειν ᾗ ἂν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ ἄριστα εἶναι [Ἀθηναίοις]. [2] καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ παρασκευὴ ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ἔς τε τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἔπεμπον καὶ αὐτόθεν καταλόγους ἐποιοῦντο, ἄρτι δ᾽ ἀνειλήφει ἡ πόλις ἑαυτὴν ἀπὸ τῆς νόσου καὶ τοῦ ξυνεχοῦς πολέμου ἔς τε ἡλικίας πλῆθος ἐπιγεγενημένης καὶ ἐς χρημάτων ἄθροισιν διὰ τὴν ἐκεχειρίαν, ὥστε ῥᾷον πάντα ἐπορίζετο. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦσαν.

[26] Upon this the Athenians at once decreed that the generals should be empowered to act as they thought best in the interest of the state respecting the numbers of the army and the whole management of the expedition. Then the preparations began. Lists for service were made up at home and orders given to the allies. The city had newly recovered from the plague and from the constant pressure of war; a new population had grown up; there had been time for the accumulation of money during the peace; so that there was abundance of everything at command.

27. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ, ὅσοι Ἑρμαῖ ἦσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ Ἀθηναίων εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπιχώριον, ἡ τετράγωνος ἐργασία, πολλοὶ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις προθύροις καὶ ἐν ἱεροῖς, μιᾷ νυκτὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα. [2] καὶ τοὺς δράσαντας ᾔδει οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ μεγάλοις μηνύτροις δημοσίᾳ οὗτοί τε ἐζητοῦντο καὶ προσέτι ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλο τι οἶδεν ἀσέβημα γεγενημένον, μηνύειν ἀδεῶς τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ δούλων. [3] καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μειζόνως ἐλάμβανον: τοῦ τε γὰρ ἔκπλου οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι.

[27] While they were in the midst of their preparations, the Hermae or square stone figures carved after the ancient Athenian fashion, and standing everywhere at the doorways

both of temples and private houses, in one night had nearly all of them throughout the city their faces mutilated. The offenders were not known, but great rewards were publicly offered for their detection, and a decree was passed that any one, whether citizen, stranger, or slave, might without fear of punishment disclose this or any other profanation of which he was cognisant. The Athenians took the matter greatly to heart — it seemed to them ominous of the fate of the expedition; and they ascribed it to conspirators who wanted to effect a revolution and to overthrow the democracy.

28. μηνύεται οὖν ἀπὸ μετοίκων τέ τινων καὶ ἀκολούθων περὶ μὲν τῶν Ἑρμῶν οὐδέν, ἄλλων δὲ ἀγαλμάτων περικοπαί τινες πρότερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρων μετὰ παιδιᾶς καὶ οἴνου γεγενημέναι, καὶ τὰ μυστήρια ἅμα ὡς ποιεῖται ἐν οἰκίαις ἐφ᾽ ὕβρει: ὧν καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐπῃτιῶντο. [2] καὶ αὐτὰ ὑπολαμβάνοντες οἱ μάλιστα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ἀχθόμενοι ἐμποδὼν ὄντι σφίσι μὴ αὐτοῖς τοῦ δήμου βεβαίως προεστάναι, καὶ νομίσαντες, εἰ αὐτὸν ἐξελάσειαν, πρῶτοι ἂν εἶναι, ἐμεγάλυνον καὶ ἐβόων ὡς ἐπὶ δήμου καταλύσει τά τε μυστικὰ καὶ ἡ τῶν Ἑρμῶν περικοπὴ γένοιτο καὶ οὐδὲν εἴη αὐτῶν ὅτι οὐ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐπράχθη, ἐπιλέγοντες τεκμήρια τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴν παρανομίαν.

[28] Certain metics and servants gave information, not indeed about the Hermae, but about the mutilation of other statues which had shortly before been perpetrated by some young men in a drunken frolic: they also said that the mysteries were repeatedly profaned by the celebration of them in private houses, and of this impiety they accused, among others, Alcibiades. A party who were jealous of his influence over the people, which interfered with the permanent establishment of their own, thinking that if they could get rid of him they would be supreme, took up and exaggerated the charges against him, clamorously insisting that both the mutilation of the Hermae and the profanation

of the mysteries were part of a conspiracy against the democracy, and that he was at the bottom of the whole affair. In proof they alleged the excesses of his ordinary life, which were unbecoming in the citizen of a free state.

29. ὁ δ᾽ ἔν τε τῷ παρόντι πρὸς τὰ μηνύματα ἀπελογεῖτο καὶ ἑτοῖμος ἦν πρὶν ἐκπλεῖν κρίνεσθαι, εἴ τι τούτων εἰργασμένος ἦν ἤδη γὰρ καὶ τὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἐπεπόριστο, καὶ εἰ μὲν τούτων τι εἴργαστο, δίκην δοῦναι, εἰ δ᾽ ἀπολυθείη, ἄρχειν. [2] καὶ ἐπεμαρτύρετο μὴ ἀπόντος πέρι αὐτοῦ διαβολὰς ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη ἀποκτείνειν, εἰ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ ὅτι σωφρονέστερον εἴη μὴ μετὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, πρὶν διαγνῶσι, πέμπειν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τοσούτῳ στρατεύματι. [3] οἱ δ᾽ ἐχθροὶ δεδιότες τό τε στράτευμα μὴ εὔνουν ἔχῃ, ἢν ἤδη ἀγωνίζηται, ὅ τε δῆμος μὴ μαλακίζηται θεραπεύων ὅτι δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον οἵ τ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι ξυνεστράτευον καὶ τῶν Μαντινέων τινές, ἀπέτρεπον καὶ ἀπέσπευδον, ἄλλους ῥήτορας ἐνιέντες οἳ ἔλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀναγωγήν, ἐλθόντα δὲ κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς, βουλόμενοι ἐκ μείζονος διαβολῆς, ἢν ἔμελλον ῥᾷον αὐτοῦ ἀπόντος ποριεῖν, μετάπεμπτον κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι. καὶ ἔδοξε πλεῖν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην.

[29] He strove then and there to clear himself of the charges, and also offered to be tried before he sailed (for all was now ready), in order that, if he were guilty, he might be punished, and if acquitted, might retain his command. He adjured his countrymen to listen to no calumnies which might be propagated against him in his absence; and he protested that they would be wiser in not sending a man who had so serious an imputation hanging over him on a command so important. But his enemies feared that if the trial took place at once he would have the support of the army; and that the people would be lenient, and would not forget that he had induced the Argives and some Mantineans to join in the expedition. They therefore exerted themselves to postpone the trial. To this end they suborned fresh speakers, who proposed that he should sail now and

not delay the expedition, but should return and stand his trial within a certain number of days. Their intention was that he should be recalled and tried when they had stirred up a stronger feeling against him, which they could better do in his absence. So it was decided that Alcibiades should sail.

30. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θέρους μεσοῦντος ἤδη ἡ ἀναγωγὴ ἐγίγνετο ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ξυμμάχων τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ ταῖς σιταγωγοῖς ὁλκάσι καὶ τοῖς πλοίοις καὶ ὅση ἄλλη παρασκευὴ ξυνείπετο πρότερον εἴρητο ἐς Κέρκυραν ξυλλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐκεῖθεν ἀθρόοις ἐπὶ ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν τὸν Ἰόνιον διαβαλοῦσιν: αὐτοὶ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ εἴ τινες τῶν ξυμμάχων παρῆσαν, ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ καταβάντες ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ ἅμα ἕῳ ἐπλήρουν τὰς ναῦς ὡς ἀναξόμενοι. [2] ξυγκατέβη δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ἅπας ὡς εἰπεῖν ὁ ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων, οἱ μὲν ἐπιχώριοι τοὺς σφετέρους αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι προπέμποντες, οἱ μὲν ἑταίρους, οἱ δὲ ξυγγενεῖς, οἱ δὲ υἱεῖς, καὶ μετ᾽ ἐλπίδος τε ἅμα ἰόντες καὶ ὀλοφυρμῶν, τὰ μὲν ὡς κτήσοιντο, τοὺς δ᾽ εἴ ποτε ὄψοιντο, ἐνθυμούμενοι ὅσον πλοῦν ἐκ τῆς σφετέρας ἀπεστέλλοντο.

[30] About the middle of summer the expedition started for Sicily. Orders had been previously given to most of the allies, to the cornships, the smaller craft, and generally to the vessels in attendance on the armament, that they should muster at Corcyra, whence the whole fleet was to strike across the Ionian gulf to the promontory of Iapygia. Early in the morning of the day appointed for their departure, the Athenian forces and such of their allies as had already joined them went down to the Piraeus and began to man the ships. Almost the entire population of Athens accompanied them, citizens and strangers alike. The citizens came to take farewell, one of an acquaintance, another of a kinsman, another of a son, and as they passed along were full of hope and full of tears; hope of conquering Sicily, tears because they doubted whether they would ever see their friends

again, when they thought of the long voyage on which they were going away. At the last moment of parting the danger was nearer; and terrors which had never occurred to them when they were voting the expedition now entered into their souls. Nevertheless their spirits revived at the sight of the armament in all its strength and of the abundant provision which they had made. The strangers and the rest of the multitude came out of curiosity, desiring to witness an enterprise of which the greatness exceeded belief.

31. καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ, ὡς ἤδη ἔμελλον μετὰ κινδύνων ἀλλήλους ἀπολιπεῖν, μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἐσῄει τὰ δεινὰ ἢ ὅτε ἐψηφίζοντο πλεῖν: ὅμως δὲ τῇ παρούσῃ ῥώμῃ, διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἑκάστων ὧν ἑώρων, τῇ ὄψει ἀνεθάρσουν. οἱ δὲ ξένοι καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὄχλος κατὰ θέαν ἦκεν ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀξιόχρεων καὶ ἄπιστον διάνοιαν. παρασκευὴ γὰρ αὕτη πρώτη ἐκπλεύσασα μιᾶς πόλεως δυνάμει Ἑλληνικῇ πολυτελεστάτη δὴ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν ἐς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο. [2] ἀριθμῷ δὲ νεῶν καὶ ὁπλιτῶν καὶ ἡ ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον μετὰ Περικλέους καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐς Ποτείδαιαν μετὰ Ἄγνωνος οὐκ ἐλάσσων ἦν: τετράκις γὰρ χίλιοι ὁπλῖται αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τριακόσιοι ἱππῆς καὶ τριήρεις ἑκατόν, καὶ Λεσβίων καὶ Χίων πεντήκοντα, καὶ ξύμμαχοι ἔτι πολλοὶ ξυνέπλευσαν. [3] ἀλλὰ ἐπί τε βραχεῖ πλῷ ὡρμήθησαν καὶ παρασκευῇ φαύλῃ, οὗτος δὲ ὁ στόλος ὡς χρόνιός τε ἐσόμενος καὶ κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα, οὗ ἂν δέῃ, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ἅμα ἐξαρτυθείς, τὸ μὲν ναυτικὸν μεγάλαις δαπάναις τῶν τε τριηράρχων καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐκπονηθέν, τοῦ μὲν δημοσίου δραχμὴν τῆς ἡμέρας τῷ ναύτῃ ἑκάστῳ διδόντος καὶ ναῦς παρασχόντος κενὰς ἑξήκοντα μὲν ταχείας, τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ὁπλιταγωγοὺς καὶ ὑπηρεσίας ταύταις τὰς κρατίστας, τῶν <δὲ> τριηράρχων ἐπιφοράς τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ διδόντων τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν καὶ ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις καὶ τἆλλα σημείοις καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένων,καὶ ἐς τὰ μακρότατα προθυμηθέντος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ὅπως αὐτῷ τινὶ εὐπρεπείᾳ τε ἡ ναῦς μάλιστα προέξει καὶ τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν, τὸ δὲ πεζὸν καταλόγοις τε

χρηστοῖς ἐκκριθὲν καὶ ὅπλων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα σκευῶν μεγάλῃ σπουδῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀμιλληθέν. [4] ξυνέβη δὲ πρός τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἅμα ἔριν γενέσθαι, ᾧ τις ἕκαστος προσετάχθη, καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας ἐπίδειξιν μᾶλλον εἰκασθῆναι τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ ἐξουσίας ἢ ἐπὶ πολεμίους παρασκευήν. [5] εἰ γάρ τις ἐλογίσατο τήν τε τῆς πόλεως ἀνάλωσιν δημοσίαν καὶ τῶν στρατευομένων τὴν ἰδίαν, τῆς μὲν πόλεως ὅσα τε ἤδη προετετελέκει καὶ ἃ ἔχοντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀπέστελλε, τῶν δὲ ἰδιωτῶν ἅ τε περὶ τὸ σῶμά τις καὶ τριήραρχος ἐς τὴν ναῦν ἀνηλώκει καὶ ὅσα ἔτι ἔμελλεν ἀναλώσειν, χωρὶς δ᾽ ἃ εἰκὸς ἦν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου μισθοῦ πάντα τινὰ παρασκευάσασθαι ἐφόδιον ὡς ἐπὶ χρόνιον στρατείαν, καὶ ὅσα ἐπὶ μεταβολῇ τις ἢ στρατιώτης ἢ ἔμπορος ἔχων ἔπλει, πολλὰ ἂν τάλαντα ηὑρέθη ἐκ τῆς πόλεως τὰ πάντα ἐξαγόμενα. [6] καὶ ὁ στόλος οὐχ ἧσσον τόλμης τε θάμβει καὶ ὄψεως λαμπρότητι περιβόητος ἐγένετο ἢ στρατιᾶς πρὸς οὓς ἐπῆσαν ὑπερβολῇ, καὶ ὅτι μέγιστος ἤδη διάπλους ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας καὶ ἐπὶ μεγίστῃ ἐλπίδι τῶν μελλόντων πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπεχειρήθη.

[31] No armament so magnificent or costly had ever been sent out by any single Hellenic power, though in mere number of ships and hoplites that which sailed to Epidaurus under Pericles and afterwards under Hagnon to Potidaea was not inferior. For that expedition consisted of a hundred Athenian and fifty Chian and Lesbian triremes, conveying four thousand hoplites all Athenian citizens, three hundred cavalry, and a multitude of allied troops. Still the voyage was short and the equipments were poor, whereas this expedition was intended to be long absent, and was thoroughly provided both for sea and, land service, wherever its presence might be required. On the fleet the greatest pains and expense had been lavished by the trierarchs and the state. The public treasury gave a drachma a day to each sailor, and furnished empty hulls for sixty swift-sailing vessels, and for forty transports carrying hoplites. All these

were manned with the best crews which could be obtained. The trierarchs, besides the pay given by the state, added somewhat more out of their own means to the wages of the upper ranks of rowers and of the petty officers. The figure-heads and other fittings provided by them were of the most costly description. Every one strove to the utmost that his own ship might excel both in beauty and swiftness. The infantry had been well selected and the lists carefully made up. There was the keenest rivalry among the soldiers in the matter of arms and personal equipment. And while at home the Athenians were thus competing with one another in the performance of their several duties, to the rest of Hellas the expedition seemed to be a grand display of their power and greatness, rather than a preparation for war. If any one had reckoned up the whole expenditure, both of the state and of individual soldiers and others, including in the first not only what the city had already laid out, but what was entrusted to the generals, and in the second what either at the time or afterwards private persons spent upon their outfit, or the trierarchs upon their ships, the provision for the long voyage which every one may be supposed to have carried with him over and above his public pay, and what soldiers or traders may have taken for purposes of exchange, he would have found that altogether an immense sum amounting to many talents was withdrawn from the city. Men were quite amazed at the boldness of the scheme and the magnificence of the spectacle, which were everywhere spoken of, no less than at the great disproportion of the force when compared with that of the enemy against whom it was intended. Never had a greater expedition been sent to a foreign land; never was there an enterprise in which the hope of future success seemed to be better justified by actual power.

32. ἐπειδὴ δὲ αἱ νῆες πλήρεις ἦσαν καὶ ἐσέκειτο πάντα ἤδη ὅσα ἔχοντες ἔμελλον ἀνάξεσθαι, τῇ μὲν σάλπιγγι σιωπὴ ὑπεσημάνθη, εὐχὰς δὲ τὰς νομιζομένας πρὸ τῆς ἀναγωγῆς οὐ κατὰ ναῦν ἑκάστην, ξύμπαντες δὲ ὑπὸ κήρυκος

ἐποιοῦντο, κρατῆράς τε κεράσαντες παρ᾽ ἄπαν τὸ στράτευμα καὶ ἐκπώμασι χρυσοῖς τε καὶ ἀργυροῖς οἵ τε ἐπιβάται καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες σπένδοντες. [2] ξυνεπηύχοντο δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ὁ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τῶν τε πολιτῶν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος εὔνους παρῆν σφίσιν. παιανίσαντες δὲ καὶ τελεώσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἀνήγοντο, καὶ ἐπὶ κέρως τὸ πρῶτον ἐκπλεύσαντες ἄμιλλαν ἤδη μέχρι Αἰγίνης ἐποιοῦντο. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν, ἔνθαπερ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα τῶν ξυμμάχων ξυνελέγετο, ἠπείγοντο ἀφικέσθαι. [3]ἐς δὲ τὰς Συρακούσας ἠγγέλλετο μὲν πολλαχόθεν τὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐπίπλου, οὐ μέντοι ἐπιστεύετο ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γενομένης ἐκκλησίας ἐλέχθησαν τοιοίδε λόγοι ἀπό τε ἄλλων, τῶν μὲν πιστευόντων τὰ περὶ τῆς στρατείας τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τῶν δὲ τὰ ἐναντία λεγόντων, καὶ Ἑρμοκράτης ὁ Ἕρμωνος παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς, ὡς σαφῶς οἰόμενος εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν, ἔλεγε καὶ παρῄνει τοιάδε.

[32] When the ships were manned and everything required for the voyage had been placed on board, silence was proclaimed by the sound of the trumpet, and all with one voice before setting sail offered up the customary prayers; these were recited, not in each ship separately, but by a single herald, the whole fleet accompanying him. On every deck both the officers and the marines, mingling wine in bowls, made libations from vessels of gold and silver. The multitude of citizens and other well-wishers who were looking on from the land joined in the prayer. The crews raised the paean and, when the libations were completed, put to sea. After sailing out for some distance in single file, the ships raced with one another as far as Aegina; thence they hastened onwards to Corcyra, where the allies who formed the rest of the army were assembling.Meanwhile reports of the expedition were coming in to Syracuse from many quarters, but for a long time nobody gave credit to them. At length an assembly was held. Even then different opinions were expressed, some affirming and others denying

that the expedition was coming. At last Hermocrates the son of Hermon, believing that he had certain information, came forward, and warned the Syracusans in the following words:

33. ‘ἄπιστα μὲν ἴσως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές, δόξω ὑμῖν περὶ τοῦ ἐπίπλου τῆς ἀληθείας λέγειν, καὶ γιγνώσκω ὅτι οἱ τὰ μὴ πιστὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι ἢ λέγοντες ἢ ἀπαγγέλλοντες οὐ μόνον οὐ πείθουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄφρονες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι: ὅμως δὲ οὐ καταφοβηθεὶς ἐπισχήσω κινδυνευούσης τῆς πόλεως, πείθων γε ἐμαυτὸν σαφέστερόν τι ἑτέρου εἰδὼς λέγειν. [2] Ἀθηναῖοι γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς, ὃ πάνυ θαυμάζετε, πολλῇ στρατιᾷ ὥρμηνται καὶ ναυτικῇ καὶ πεζῇ, πρόφασιν μὲν Ἐγεσταίων ξυμμαχίᾳ καὶ Λεοντίνων κατοικίσει, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς Σικελίας ἐπιθυμίᾳ, μάλιστα δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως, ἡγούμενοι, εἰ ταύτην σχοῖεν, ῥᾳδίως καὶ τἆλλα ἕξειν. [3] ὡς οὖν ἐν τάχει παρεσομένων, ὁρᾶτε ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὅτῳ τρόπῳ κάλλιστα ἀμυνεῖσθε αὐτούς, καὶ μήτε καταφρονήσαντες ἄφαρκτοι ληφθήσεσθε μήτε ἀπιστήσαντες τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἀμελήσετε. [4] εἰ δέ τῳ καὶ πιστά, τὴν τόλμαν αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν μὴ ἐκπλαγῇ. οὔτε γὰρ βλάπτειν ἡμᾶς πλείω οἷοί τ᾽ ἔσονται ἢ πάσχειν, οὔθ᾽ ὅτι μεγάλῳ στόλῳ ἐπέρχονται, ἀνωφελεῖς, ἀλλὰ πρός τε τοὺς ἄλλους Σικελιώτας πολὺ ἄμεινον μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐθελήσουσιν ἐκπλαγέντες ἡμῖν ξυμμαχεῖν , καὶ ἢν ἄρα ἢ κατεργασώμεθα αὐτοὺς ἢ ἀπράκτους ὧν ἐφίενται ἀπώσωμεν οὐ γὰρ δὴ μὴ τύχωσί γε ὧν προσδέχονται φοβοῦμαι , κάλλιστον δὴ ἔργον ἡμῖν ξυμβήσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον ἔμοιγε. [5] ὀλίγοι γὰρ δὴ στόλοι μεγάλοι ἢ Ἑλλήνων ἢ βαρβάρων πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀπάραντες κατώρθωσαν. οὔτε γὰρ πλείους τῶν ἐνοικούντων καὶ ἀστυγειτόνων ἔρχονται πάντα γὰρ ὑπὸ δέους ξυνίσταται , ἤν τε δι᾽ ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ γῇ σφαλῶσι, τοῖς ἐπιβουλευθεῖσιν ὄνομα, κἂν περὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὰ πλείω πταίσωσιν, ὅμως καταλείπουσιν. [6] ὅπερ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοὶ οὗτοι, τοῦ Μήδου παρὰ λόγον πολλὰ σφαλέντος, ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι ὡς ἐπ᾽ Ἀθήνας ᾔει ηὐξήθησαν, καὶ ἡμῖν οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον τὸ τοιοῦτο ξυμβῆναι.

[33] ‘I dare say that, like others, I shall not be believed when I tell you that the expedition is really coming; and I am well aware that those who are either the authors or reporters of tidings which seem incredible not only fail to convince others, but are thought fools for their pains. Yet, when the city is in danger, fear shall not stop my mouth; for I am convinced in my own mind that I have better information than anybody. The Athenians, wonder as you may, are coming against us with a great fleet and army; they profess to be assisting their Egestaean allies and to be restoring the Leontines. But the truth is that they covet Sicily, and especially our city. They think that, if they can conquer us, they will easily conquer the rest. They will soon be here, and you must consider how with your present resources you can make the most successful defence. You should not let them take you by surprise because you despise them, or neglect the whole matter because you will not believe that they are coming at all. But to him who is not of this unbelieving temper I say- And do not you be dismayed at their audacity and power. They cannot do more harm to us than we can do to them; the very greatness of their armament may be an advantage to us; it will have a good effect on the other Sicilian cities, who will be alarmed, and in their terror will be the more ready to assist us. Then, again, if in the end we overpower them, or at any rate drive them away baffled, for I have not the slightest fear of their accomplishing their purpose, we shall have achieved a noble triumph. And of this I have a good hope. Rarely have great expeditions, whether Hellenic or Barbarian, when sent far from home, met with success. They are not more numerous than the inhabitants and their neighbours, who all combine through fear; and if owing to scarcity of supplies in a foreign land they miscarry, although their ruin may be chiefly due to themselves, they confer glory on those whom they meant to overthrow. The greatness of these very Athenians was based on the utter and unexpected ruin of the Persians, who were

always supposed to have directed their expedition against Athens. And I think that such a destiny may very likely be reserved for us.

34. ‘θαρσοῦντες οὖν τά τε αὐτοῦ παρασκευαζώμεθα καὶ ἐς τοὺς Σικελοὺς πέμποντες τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον βεβαιωσώμεθα, τοῖς δὲ φιλίαν καὶ ξυμμαχίαν πειρώμεθα ποιεῖσθαι, ἔς τε τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν πέμπωμεν πρέσβεις δηλοῦντες ὡς κοινὸς ὁ κίνδυνος, καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ὅπως ἢ ξυμμαχίαν ποιώμεθα ἡμῖν ἢ μὴ δέχωνται Ἀθηναίους. [2] δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι: οὐ γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, ὥστε τάχ᾽ ἂν ἴσως νομίσαντες, εἰ τάδε προήσονται, κἂν σφεῖς ἐν πόνῳ εἶναι, ἐθελήσειαν ἡμῖν ἤτοι κρύφα γε ἢ φανερῶς ἢ ἐξ ἑνός γέ του τρόπου ἀμῦναι. δυνατοὶ δὲ εἰσὶ μάλιστα τῶν νῦν, βουληθέντες: χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλεῖστον κέκτηνται, ὅθεν ὅ τε πόλεμος καὶ τἆλλα εὐπορεῖ. [3] πέμπωμεν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ ἐς Κόρινθον δεόμενοι δεῦρο κατὰ τάχος βοηθεῖν καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον κινεῖν. [4] ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγώ τε νομίζω ἐπίκαιρον ὑμεῖς τε διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν ὀξέως πείθοισθε, ὅμως εἰρήσεται. Σικελιῶται γὰρ εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν ξύμπαντες, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι πλεῖστοι μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν, καθελκύσαντες ἅπαν τὸ ὑπάρχον ναυτικὸν μετὰ δυοῖν μηνοῖν τροφῆς ἀπαντῆσαι Ἀθηναίοις ἐς Τάραντα καὶ ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν, καὶ δῆλον ποιῆσαι αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῆς Σικελίας πρότερον ἔσται ὁ ἀγὼν ἢ τοῦ ἐκείνους περαιωθῆναι τὸν Ἰόνιον, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκπλήξαιμεν καὶ ἐς λογισμὸν καταστήσαιμεν ὅτι ὁρμώμεθα μὲν ἐκ φιλίας χώρας φύλακες ὑποδέχεται γὰρ ἡμᾶς Τάρας, τὸ δὲ πέλαγος αὐτοῖς πολὺ περαιοῦσθαι μετὰ πάσης τῆς παρασκευῆς, χαλεπὸν δὲ διὰ πλοῦ μῆκος ἐν τάξει μεῖναι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἂν εὐεπίθετος εἴη, βραδεῖά τε καὶ κατ᾽ ὀλίγον προσπίπτουσα. [5] εἰ δ᾽ αὖ τῷ ταχυναυτοῦντι ἀθροωτέρῳ κουφίσαντες προσβάλοιεν, εἰ μὲν κώπαις χρήσαιντο, ἐπιθοίμεθ᾽ ἂν κεκμηκόσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ δοκοίη, ἔστι καὶ ὑποχωρῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐς Τάραντα: οἱ δὲ μετ᾽ ὀλίγων ἐφοδίων ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίᾳ περαιωθέντες ἀποροῖεν ἂν

κατὰ χωρία ἐρῆμα, καὶ ἢ μένοντες πολιορκοῖντο ἂν ἢ πειρώμενοι παραπλεῖν τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἀπολείποιεν ἂν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἂν βέβαια ἔχοντες, εἰ ὑποδέξοιντο, ἀθυμοῖεν. [6] ὥστ᾽ ἔγωγε τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἡγοῦμαι ἀποκλῃομένους αὐτοὺς οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἀπᾶραι ἀπὸ Κερκύρας, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ διαβουλευσαμένους καὶ κατασκοπαῖς χρωμένους, ὁπόσοι τ᾽ ἐσμὲν καὶ ἐν ᾧ χωρίῳ, ἐξωσθῆναι ἂν τῇ ὥρᾳ ἐς χειμῶνα, ἢ καταπλαγέντας τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ καταλῦσαι ἂν τὸν πλοῦν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἐμπειροτάτου τῶν στρατηγῶν, ὡς ἐγὼ ἀκούω, ἄκοντος ἡγουμένου καὶ ἀσμένου ἂν πρόφασιν λαβόντος, εἴ τι ἀξιόχρεων ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν ὀφθείη. [7] ἀγγελλοίμεθα δ᾽ ἂν εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον: τῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ αἱ γνῶμαι ἵστανται, καὶ τοὺς προεπιχειροῦντας ἢ τοῖς γε ἐπιχειροῦσι προδηλοῦντας ὅτι ἀμυνοῦνται μᾶλλον πεφόβηνται, ἰσοκινδύνους ἡγούμενοι. [8] ὅπερ ἂν νῦν Ἀθηναῖοι πάθοιεν. ἐπέρχονται γὰρ ἡμῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀμυνουμένοις, δικαίως κατεγνωκότες ὅτι αὐτοὺς οὐ μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐφθείρομεν: εἰ δ᾽ ἴδοιεν παρὰ γνώμην τολμήσαντας, τῷ ἀδοκήτῳ μᾶλλον ἂν καταπλαγεῖεν ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς δυνάμει. [9]᾽πείθεσθε οὖν μάλιστα μὲν ταῦτα τολμήσαντες, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι τάχιστα τἆλλα ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἑτοιμάζειν, καὶ παραστῆναι παντὶ τὸ μὲν καταφρονεῖν τοὺς ἐπιόντας ἐν τῶν ἔργων τῇ ἀλκῇ δείκνυσθαι, τὸ δ᾽ ἤδη τὰς μετὰ φόβου παρασκευὰς ἀσφαλεστάτας νομίσαντας ὡς ἐπὶ κινδύνου πράσσειν χρησιμώτατον ἂν ξυμβῆναι. οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες καὶ ἐπέρχονται καὶ ἐν πλῷ εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι ἤδη εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσον οὔπω πάρεισιν.’

[34] ‘Let us take courage then, and put ourselves into a state of defence; let us also send envoys to the Sicels, and, while we make sure of our old allies, endeavour to gain new ones. We will despatch envoys to the rest of Sicily, and point out that the danger is common to all; we will also send to the Italian cities in the hope that they may either join us, or at any rate refuse to receive the Athenians. And I think that we should send to the Carthaginians; the idea of an Athenian attack is no novelty to them; they are always living in

apprehension of it. They will probably feel that if they leave us to our fate, the trouble may reach themselves, and therefore they may be inclined in some way or other, secretly, if not openly, to assist us. If willing to help, of all existing states they are the best able; for they have abundance of gold and silver, and these make war, like other things, go smoothly. Let us also send to the Lacedaemonians and Corinthians and entreat them to come to our aid speedily, and at the same time to revive the war in Hellas. I have a plan which in my judgment is the best suited to the present emergency, although it is the last which you in your habitual indolence will readily embrace. Let me tell you what it is. If all the Sicilian Greeks, or at least if we and as many as will join us, taking two months' provisions, would put out to sea with all our available ships and prepare to meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of Iapygia, thereby proving to them that before they fight for Sicily they must fight for the passage of the Ionian Sea, we should strike a panic into them. They would then reflect that at Tarentum (which receives us), we, the advanced guard of Sicily, are among friends, and go forth from a friendly country, and that the sea is a large place not easy to traverse with so great an armament as theirs. They would know that after a long voyage their ships will be unable to keep in line, and coming up slowly and few at a time will be at our mercy. On the other hand, if they lighten their vessels and meet us in a compact body with the swifter part of their fleet, they may have to use oars, and then we shall attack them when they are exhausted. Or if we prefer not to fight, we can retire again to Tarentum. Having come over with slender supplies and prepared for a naval engagement, they will not know what to do on these desolate coasts. If they remain they will find themselves blockaded; if they attempt to sail onwards they will cut themselves off from the rest of their armament, and will be discouraged; for they will be far from certain whether the cities of Italy and Sicily will receive

them. In my opinion the anticipation of these difficulties will hamper them to such a degree, that they will never leave Corcyra. While they are holding consultations, and sending out spies to discover our number and exact position, they will find themselves driven into winter; or in dismay at the unexpected opposition, they may very likely break up the expedition; especially if, as I am informed, the most experienced of their generals has taken the command against his will, and would gladly make any considerable demonstration on our part an excuse for retreating. I am quite sure that rumour will exaggerate our strength. The minds of men are apt to be swayed by what they hear; and they are most afraid of those who commence an attack, or who at any rate show to the aggressor betimes that he will meet with resistance; for then they reflect that the risk is equally divided. And so it will be with the Athenians. They are now attacking us because they do not believe that we shall defend ourselves, and in this opinion they are justified by our neglect to join with the Lacedaemonians in putting them down. But, if they see that they were mistaken, and that we boldly venture, they will be more dismayed at our unexpected resistance than at our real power. Take my advice; if possible, resolve on this bold step, but if not, adopt other measures of defence as quickly as possible. Remember each and all of you that the true contempt of an invader is shown by deeds of valour in the field, and that meanwhile the greatest service which you can render to the state is to act as if you were in the presence of danger, considering that safety depends on anxious preparation. The Athenians are coming; I am certain that they are already on the sea and will soon be here.’

35. καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἑρμοκράτης τοσαῦτα εἶπεν: τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔριδι ἦσαν, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδενὶ ἂν τρόπῳ ἔλθοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδ᾽ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶν ἃ λέγει, τοῖς δέ, εἰ καὶ ἔλθοιεν, τί ἂν δράσειαν αὐτοὺς ὅτι οὐκ ἂν μεῖζον ἀντιπάθοιεν. ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ πάνυ

καταφρονοῦντες ἐς γέλωτα ἔτρεπον τὸ πρᾶγμα. ὀλίγον δ᾽ ἦν τὸ πιστεῦον τῷ Ἑρμοκράτει καὶ φοβούμενον τὸ μέλλον. [2] παρελθὼν δ᾽ αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς δήμου τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

[35] Thus spoke Hermocrates. Great was the contention which his words aroused among the Syracusan people, some asserting that the Athenians would never come, and that he was not speaking truth, others asking, ‘And if they should come, what harm could they do to us nearly so great as we could do to them?’ while others were quite contemptuous, and made a jest of the whole matter. A few only believed Hermocrates and realised the danger. At last Athenagoras, the popular leader, who had at that time the greatest influence with the multitude, came forward and spoke as follows:

36. ‘τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ὅστις μὴ βούλεται οὕτω κακῶς φρονῆσαι καὶ ὑποχειρίους ἡμῖν γενέσθαι ἐνθάδε ἐλθόντας, ἢ δειλός ἐστιν ἢ τῇ πόλει οὐκ εὔνους: τοὺς δὲ ἀγγέλλοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ περιφόβους ὑμᾶς ποιοῦντας τῆς μὲν τόλμης οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ ἀξυνεσίας, εἰ μὴ οἴονται ἔνδηλοι εἶναι. [2] οἱ γὰρ δεδιότες ἰδίᾳ τι βούλονται τὴν πόλιν ἐς ἔκπληξιν καθιστάναι, ὅπως τῷ κοινῷ φόβῳ τὸν σφέτερον ἐπηλυγάζωνται. καὶ νῦν αὗται αἱ ἀγγελίαι τοῦτο δύνανται: οὐκ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, ἐκ δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἵπερ αἰεὶ τάδε κινοῦσι ξύγκεινται. [3] ὑμεῖς δὲ ἢν εὖ βουλεύησθε, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν οὗτοι ἀγγέλλουσι σκοποῦντες λογιεῖσθε τὰ εἰκότα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἂν ἄνθρωποι δεινοὶ καὶ πολλῶν ἔμπειροι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ Ἀθηναίους ἀξιῶ, δράσειαν. [4] οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰκὸς Πελοποννησίους τε ὑπολιπόντας καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον μήπω βεβαίως καταλελυμένους ἐπ᾽ ἄλλον πόλεμον οὐκ ἐλάσσω ἑκόντας ἐλθεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἔγωγε ἀγαπᾶν οἶομαι αὐτοὺς ὅτι οὐχ ἡμεῖς ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνους ἐρχόμεθα, πόλεις τοσαῦται καὶ οὕτω μεγάλαι.

[36] ‘He is either a coward or a traitor who would not rejoice to hear that the Athenians are so mad as to come hither and

deliver themselves into our hands. The audacity of the people who are spreading these alarms does not surprise me, but I do wonder at their folly if they cannot see that their motives are transparent. Having private reasons for being afraid, they want to strike terror into the whole city that they may hide themselves under the shadow of the common fear. And now, what is the meaning of these rumours? They do not grow of themselves; they have been got up by persons who are the troublers of our state. And you, if you are wise, will not measure probabilities by their reports, but by what we may assume to be the intentions of shrewd and experienced men such as I conceive the Athenians to be. They are not likely to leave behind them a power such as Peloponnesus. The war which they have already on their hands is far from settled, and will they go out of their way to bring upon themselves another as great? In my opinion they are only too glad that we are not attacking them, considering the number and power of our states.

37. εἰ δὲ δή, ὥσπερ λέγονται, ἔλθοιεν, ἱκανωτέραν ἡγοῦμαι Σικελίαν Πελοποννήσου διαπολεμῆσαι ὅσῳ κατὰ πάντα ἄμεινον ἐξήρτυται, τὴν δὲ ἡμετέραν πόλιν αὐτὴν τῆς νῦν στρατιᾶς, ὥς φασιν, ἐπιούσης, καὶ εἰ δὶς τοσαύτη ἔλθοι, πολὺ κρείσσω εἶναι, οἷς γ᾽ ἐπίσταμαι οὔθ᾽ ἵππους ἀκολουθήσοντας, οὐδ᾽ αὐτόθεν πορισθησομένους εἰ μὴ ὀλίγους τινὰς παρ᾽ Ἐγεσταίων, οὔθ᾽ ὁπλίτας ἰσοπληθεῖς τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἐπὶ νεῶν γε ἐλθόντας ▯μέγα γὰρ τὸ καὶ αὐταῖς ταῖς ναυσὶ κούφαις τοσοῦτον πλοῦν δεῦρο κομισθῆναι▯, τήν τε ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ὅσην δεῖ ἐπὶ πόλιν τοσήνδε πορισθῆναι, οὐκ ὀλίγην οὖσαν. [2] ὥστε, παρὰ τοσοῦτον γιγνώσκω, μόλις ἄν μοι δοκοῦσιν, εἰ πόλιν ἑτέραν τοσαύτην ὅσαι Συράκουσαί εἰσιν ἔλθοιεν ἔχοντες καὶ ὅμορον οἰκίσαντες τὸν πόλεμον ποιοῖντο, οὐκ ἂν παντάπασι διαφθαρῆναι, ἦ πού γε δὴ ἐν πάσῃ πολεμίᾳ Σικελίᾳ ▯ξυστήσεται γάρ▯ στρατοπέδῳ τε ἐκ νεῶν ἱδρυθέντι καὶ ἐκ σκηνιδίων καὶ ἀναγκαίας παρασκευῆς οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑπὸ τῶν

ἡμετέρων ἱππέων ἐξιόντες. τό τε ξύμπαν οὐδ᾽ ἂν κρατῆσαι αὐτοὺς τῆς γῆς ἡγοῦμαι: τοσούτῳ τὴν ἡμετέραν παρασκευὴν κρείσσω νομίζω.

[37] ‘Even if the rumour of their coming should turn out to be true, I am sure that Sicily is more fit than Peloponnesus to maintain a great war. The whole island is better supplied in every way, and our own city is herself far more than a match for the army which is said to be threatening us; aye, and for another as great. I know that they will not bring cavalry with them, and will find none here, except the few horsemen which they may procure from Egesta. They cannot provide a force of hoplites equal to ours, for they have to cross the sea; and to come all this distance, if only with ships and with no troops or lading, would be work enough. I know too that an armament which is directed against so great a city as ours will require immense supplies. Nay, I venture to assert that if they came hither, having at their command another city close upon our border as large as Syracuse, and could there settle and carry on war against us from thence, they would still be destroyed to a man; how much more when the whole country will be their enemy (for Sicily will unite), and when they must pitch their camp the moment they are out of their ships, and will have nothing but their wretched huts and meagre supplies, being prevented by our cavalry from advancing far beyond their lines? Indeed I hardly think that they will effect a landing at all. So far superior, in my judgment, are our forces to theirs.

38. ‘ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι γιγνώσκοντες τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι σῴζουσι, καὶ ἐνθένδε ἄνδρες οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἂν γενόμενα λογοποιοῦσιν, [2] οὓς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλ᾽ αἰεὶ ἐπίσταμαι ἤτοι λόγοις γε τοιοῖσδε καὶ ἔτι τούτων κακουργοτέροις ἢ ἔργοις βουλομένους καταπλήξαντας τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αὐτοὺς τῆς πόλεως ἄρχειν. καὶ δέδοικα μέντοι μήποτε πολλὰ πειρῶντες καὶ κατορθώσωσιν: ἡμεῖς δὲ κακοί, πρὶν ἐν τῷ παθεῖν ὦμεν, προφυλάξασθαί τε καὶ αἰσθόμενοι ἐπεξελθεῖν.

[3] τοιγάρτοι δι᾽ αὐτὰ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ὀλιγάκις μὲν ἡσυχάζει, στάσεις δὲ πολλὰς καὶ ἀγῶνας οὐ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πλέονας ἢ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀναιρεῖται, τυραννίδας δὲ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ δυναστείας ἀδίκους. [4] ὧν ἐγὼ πειράσομαι, ἤν γε ὑμεῖς ἐθέλητε ἕπεσθαι, μήποτε ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν τι περιιδεῖν γενέσθαι, ὑμᾶς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς πείθων, τοὺς δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα μηχανωμένους κολάζων, μὴ μόνον αὐτοφώρους ▯χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνειν▯, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὧν βούλονται μέν, δύνανται δ᾽ οὔ ▯τὸν γὰρ ἐχθρὸν οὐχ ὧν δρᾷ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς διανοίας προαμύνεσθαι χρή, εἴπερ καὶ μὴ προφυλαξάμενός τις προπείσεται▯, τοὺς δ᾽ αὖ ὀλίγους τὰ μὲν ἐλέγχων, τὰ δὲ φυλάσσων, τὰ δὲ καὶ διδάσκων: μάλιστα γὰρ δοκῶ ἄν μοι οὕτως ἀποτρέπειν τῆς κακουργίας. [5] καὶ δῆτα, ὃ πολλάκις ἐσκεψάμην, τί καὶ βούλεσθε, ὦ νεώτεροι; πότερον ἄρχειν ἤδη; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔννομον: ὁ δὲ νόμος ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ὑμᾶς μᾶλλον ἢ δυναμένους ἐτέθη ἀτιμάζειν. ἀλλὰ δὴ μὴ μετὰ πολλῶν ἰσονομεῖσθαι; καὶ πῶς δίκαιον τοὺς αὐτοὺς μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι;

[38] ‘The Athenians, I repeat, know all that I am telling you, and do not mean to throw away what they have got: I am pretty sure of that. But some of our people are fabricating reports which neither are, nor are ever likely to be, true. I know, and have always known, that by words like these, and yet more mischievous, if not by acts, they want to intimidate you, the Syracusan people, and make themselves chiefs of the state. And I am afraid that if they persevere they will succeed at last, and that we shall be delivered into their hands before we have had the sense to take precautions or to detect and punish them. This is the reason why our city is always in a state of unrest and disorganisation, fighting against herself quite as much as against foreign enemies, and from time to time subjected to tyrants and to narrow and wicked oligarchies. If the people will only support me I shall endeavour to prevent any such misfortunes happening in our day. With you I shall use persuasion, but to these conspirators I shall apply force; and I shall not wait until

they are detected in the act (for who can catch them?), but I shall punish their intentions and the mischief which they would do if they could. For the thoughts of our enemies must be punished before they have ripened into deeds. If a man does not strike first, he will be the first struck. As to the rest of the oligarchical party, I must expose them and have an eye on their designs; I must also instruct them; that, I think, will be the way by which I can best deter them from their evil courses. Come now, young men, and answer me a question which I have often asked myself. “What can you want?” To hold office already? But the law forbids. And the law was not intended to slight you had you been capable; it was passed because you were incapable. And so you would rather not be on an equality with the many? But when there is no real difference between men, why should there be a privileged class?

39. φήσει τις δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετὸν οὔτ᾽ ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δ᾽ ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα βελτίστους. ἐγὼ δέ φημι πρῶτα μὲν δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος, ἔπειτα φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλεῦσαι δ᾽ ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετούς, κρῖναι δ᾽ ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς, καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν. [2]ὀλιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δ᾽ ὠφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντ᾽ ἀφελομένη ἔχει: ἃ ὑμῶν οἵ τε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι προθυμοῦνται, ἀδύνατα ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει κατασχεῖν. ‘ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν, ὦ πάντων ἀξυνετώτατοι, εἰ μὴ μανθάνετε κακὰ σπεύδοντες, ἢ ἀμαθέστατοί ἐστε ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα Ἑλλήνων, ἢ ἀδικώτατοι, εἰ εἰδότες τολμᾶτε.

[39] ‘I shall be told that democracy is neither a wise nor a just thing, and that those who have the money are most likely to govern well. To which I answer, first of all, that the people is the name of the whole, the oligarchy of a part; secondly, that the rich are the best guardians of the public purse, the wise the best counsellors, and the many, when

they have heard a matter discussed, the best judges; and that each and all of these classes have in a democracy equal privileges. Whereas an oligarchy, while giving the people the full share of danger, not merely takes too much of the good things, but absolutely monopolises them. And this is what the powerful among you and the young would like to have, and what in a great city they will never obtain.

40. ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι μαθόντες γε ἢ μεταγνόντες τὸ τῆς πόλεως ξύμπασι κοινὸν αὔξετε, ἡγησάμενοι τοῦτο μὲν ἂν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλέον οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὑμῶν [ἥπερ τὸ τῆς πόλεως πλῆθος] μετασχεῖν, εἰ δ᾽ ἄλλα βουλήσεσθε, καὶ τοῦ παντὸς κινδυνεῦσαι στερηθῆναι: καὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀγγελιῶν ὡς πρὸς αἰσθανομένους καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέψοντας ἀπαλλάγητε. [2] ἡ γὰρ πόλις ἥδε, καὶ εἰ ἔρχονται Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀμυνεῖται αὐτοὺς ἀξίως αὐτῆς, καὶ στρατηγοί εἰσιν ἡμῖν οἳ σκέψονται αὐτά: καὶ εἰ μή τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὥσπερ οὐκ οἴομαι, οὐ πρὸς τὰς ὑμετέρας ἀγγελίας καταπλαγεῖσα καὶ ἑλομένη ὑμᾶς ἄρχοντας αὐθαίρετον δουλείαν ἐπιβαλεῖται, αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ αὐτῆς σκοποῦσα τούς τε λόγους ἀφ᾽ ὑμῶν ὡς ἔργα δυναμένους κρινεῖ καὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐλευθερίαν οὐχὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἀφαιρεθήσεται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἔργῳ φυλασσομένη μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν πειράσεται σῴζειν.’

[40] ‘O most senseless of men, for such you are indeed if you do not see the mischief of your own schemes; never in all my experience have I known such blindness among Hellenes, or such wickedness if you have your eyes open to what you are doing. Yet even now learn if you are stupid, repent if you are guilty; and let your aim be the welfare of the whole country. Remember that the good among you will have an equal or larger share in the government of it than the people; while if you want more you will most likely lose all. Away with these reports; we know all about them, and are determined to suppress them. Let the Athenians come, and Syracuse will repel her enemies in a manner worthy of herself; we have generals who will look to the matter. But if, as I believe, none of your tales are true, the state is not

going to be deceived, and will not in a moment of panic admit you to power, or impose upon her own neck the yoke of slavery. She will take the matter into her own hands, and when she gives judgment will reckon words to be equally criminal with actions. She will not be talked out of her liberty by you, but will do her utmost to preserve it; she will be on her guard, and will put you down with a strong hand.’

41. τοιαῦτα δὲ Ἀθηναγόρας εἶπεν. τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν εἷς ἀναστὰς ἄλλον μὲν οὐδένα ἔτι εἴασε παρελθεῖν, αὐτὸς δὲ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἔλεξε τοιάδε. [2] ‘διαβολὰς μὲν οὐ σῶφρον οὔτε λέγειν τινὰς ἐς ἀλλήλους οὔτε τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἀποδέχεσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐσαγγελλόμενα μᾶλλον ὁρᾶν, ὅπως εἷς τε ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις καλῶς τοὺς ἐπιόντας παρασκευασόμεθα ἀμύνεσθαι. [3] καὶ ἢν ἄρα μηδὲν δεήσῃ, οὐδεμία βλάβη τοῦ τε τὸ κοινὸν κοσμηθῆναι καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὅπλοις [4] καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἷς ὁ πόλεμος ἀγάλλεται τὴν δ᾽ ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ἐξέτασιν αὐτῶν ἡμεῖς ἔξομεν, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰς πόλεις διαπομπῶν ἅμα ἔς τε κατασκοπὴν καὶ ἤν τι ἄλλο φαίνηται ἐπιτήδειον. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμεμελήμεθα ἤδη, καὶ ὅτι ἂν αἰσθώμεθα ἐς ὑμᾶς οἴσομεν.’ καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι τοσαῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ διελύθησαν ἐκ τοῦ ξυλλόγου.

[41] Thus spoke Athenagoras. Whereupon one of the generals rose, and suffering no one else to come forward, closed the discussion himself in the following words:’There is little wisdom in exchanging abuse or in sitting by and listening to it; let us rather, in view of the reported danger, see how the whole city and every man in it may take measures for resisting the invaders worthily. Why should not the city be richly furnished with arms, horses, and all the pride and pomp of war; where is the harm even if they should not be wanted? We, who are generals, will take in hand all these matters and examine into them ourselves; and we will send messengers to the neighbouring cities in order to obtain information, and for any other purpose which may be necessary. Some precautions we have taken already,

and whatever comes to our notice we will communicate to you.’ When the general had thus spoken, the assembly dispersed.

42. οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἤδη ἐν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἅπαντες ἦσαν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπεξέτασιν τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ ξύνταξιν, ὥσπερ ἔμελλον ὁρμιεῖσθαί τε καὶ στρατοπεδεύεσθαι, οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐποιήσαντο, καὶ τρία μέρη νείμαντες ἓν ἑκάστῳ ἐκλήρωσαν, ἵνα μήτε ἅμα πλέοντες ἀπορῶσιν ὕδατος καὶ λιμένων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐν ταῖς καταγωγαῖς, πρός τε τἆλλα εὐκοσμότεροι καὶ ῥᾴους ἄρχειν ὦσι, κατὰ τέλη στρατηγῷ προστεταγμένοι: [2] ἔπειτα δὲ προύπεμψαν καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν τρεῖς ναῦς εἰσομένας αἵτινες σφᾶς τῶν πόλεων δέξονται. καὶ εἴρητο αὐταῖς προαπαντᾶν, ὅπως ἐπιστάμενοι καταπλέωσιν.

[42] The Athenians and their allies were by this time gathered at Corcyra. There the generals began by holding a final review of the ships, and disposed them in the order in which they were to anchor at their stations. The fleet was divided into three squadrons, and one of them assigned by lot to each of the three generals, in order to avoid any difficulties which might occur, if they sailed together, in finding water, anchorage, and provisions where they touched; they also thought that the presence of a general with each division would promote good order and discipline throughout the fleet. They then sent before them to Italy and Sicily three ships, which had orders to find out what cities in those regions would receive them, and to meet them again on their way, that they might know before they put in.

43. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοσῇδε ἤδη τῇ παρασκευῇ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Κερκύρας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἐπεραιοῦντο, τριήρεσι μὲν ταῖς πάσαις τέσσαρσι καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ δυοῖν Ῥοδίοιν πεντηκοντόροιν τούτων Ἀττικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν ἑκατόν, ὧν αἱ μὲν ἑξήκοντα ταχεῖαι, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι στρατιώτιδες, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ναυτικὸν Χίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων , ὁπλίταις δὲ τοῖς ξύμπασιν ἑκατὸν καὶ

πεντακισχιλίοις καὶ τούτων Ἀθηναίων μὲν αὐτῶν ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐκ καταλόγου, ἑπτακόσιοι δὲ θῆτες ἐπιβάται τῶν νεῶν, ξύμμαχοι δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι ξυνεστράτευον, οἱ μὲν τῶν ὑπηκόων, οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργείων πεντακόσιοι καὶ Μαντινέων καὶ μισθοφόρων πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι , τοξόταις δὲ τοῖς πᾶσιν ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ τετρακοσίοις καὶ τούτων Κρῆτες οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα ἦσαν καὶ σφενδονήταις Ῥοδίων ἑπτακοσίοις, καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι ψιλοῖς φυγάσιν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ ἱππαγωγῷ μιᾷ τριάκοντα ἀγούσῃ ἱππέας.

[43] At length the great armament proceeded to cross from Corcyra to Sicily. It consisted of a hundred and thirty-four triremes in all, besides two Rhodian vessels of fifty oars. Of these a hundred were Athenian; sixty being swift vessels, and the remaining forty transports: the rest of the fleet was furnished by the Chians and other allies. The hoplites numbered in all five thousand one hundred, of whom fifteen hundred were Athenians taken from the roll, and seven hundred who served as marines were of the fourth and lowest class of Athenian citizens. The remainder of the hoplites were furnished by the allies, mostly by the subject states; but five hundred came from Argos, besides two hundred and fifty Mantinean and other mercenaries. The archers were in all four hundred and eighty, of whom eighty were Cretans. There were seven hundred Rhodian slingers, a hundred and twenty light-armed Megarians who were exiles; and one horse transport which conveyed thirty horsemen and horses.

44. τοσαύτη ἡ πρώτη παρασκευὴ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον διέπλει. τούτοις δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἄγουσαι ὁλκάδες μὲν τριάκοντα σιταγωγοί, καὶ τοὺς σιτοποιοὺς ἔχουσαι καὶ λιθολόγους καὶ τέκτονας καὶ ὅσα ἐς τειχισμὸν ἐργαλεῖα, πλοῖα δὲ ἑκατόν, ἃ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετὰ τῶν ὁλκάδων ξυνέπλει: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πλοῖα καὶ ὁλκάδες ἑκούσιοι ξυνηκολούθουν τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐμπορίας ἕνεκα: ἃ τότε πάντα ἐκ τῆς Κερκύρας ξυνδιέβαλλε τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον. [2] καὶ

προσβαλοῦσα ἡ πᾶσα παρασκευὴ πρός τε ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ πρὸς Τάραντα καὶ ὡς ἕκαστοι ηὐπόρησαν, παρεκομίζοντο τὴν Ἰταλίαν, τῶν μὲν πόλεων οὐ δεχομένων αὐτοὺς ἀγορᾷ οὐδὲ ἄστει, ὕδατι δὲ καὶ ὅρμῳ, Τάραντος δὲ καὶ Λοκρῶν οὐδὲ τούτοις, ἕως ἀφίκοντο ἐς Ῥήγιον τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀκρωτήριον. [3] καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἠθροίζοντο, καὶ ἔξω τῆς πόλεως, ὡς αὐτοὺς ἔσω οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, στρατόπεδόν τε κατεσκευάσαντο ἐν τῷ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερῷ, οὗ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀγορὰν παρεῖχον, καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀνελκύσαντες ἡσύχασαν. καὶ πρός [τε] τοὺς Ῥηγίνους λόγους ἐποιήσαντο, ἀξιοῦντες Χαλκιδέας ὄντας Χαλκιδεῦσιν οὖσι Λεοντίνοις βοηθεῖν: οἱ δὲ οὐδὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων ἔφασαν ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἂν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἰταλιώταις ξυνδοκῇ, τοῦτο ποιήσειν. [4] οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ἐσκόπουν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἄριστα προσοίσονται: καὶ τὰς πρόπλους ναῦς ἐκ τῆς Ἐγέστης ἅμα προσέμενον, βουλόμενοι εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν χρημάτων εἰ ἔστιν ἃ ἔλεγον ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις οἱ ἄγγελοι.

[44] Such were the forces with which the first expedition crossed the sea. For the transport of provisions thirty merchant-ships, which also conveyed bakers, masons, carpenters, and tools such as are required in sieges, were included in the armament. It was likewise attended by a hundred small vessels; these, as well as the merchant-vessels, were pressed into the service. Other merchant-vessels and lesser craft in great numbers followed of their own accord for purposes of trade. The whole fleet now struck across the Ionian sea from Corcyra. They arrived at the promontory of Iapygia and at Tarentum, each ship taking its own course, and passed along the coast of Italy. The Italian cities did not admit them within their walls, or open a market to them, but allowed them water and anchorage; Tarentum and Locri refused even these. At length they reached Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy, where the fleet reunited. As they were not received within the walls they encamped outside the city at the temple of Artemis; there

they were provided by the inhabitants with a market, and drawing up their ships on shore they took a rest. They held a conference with the Rhegians, and pressed them, being Chalcidians themselves, to aid their Chalcidian kinsmen the Leontines. But the Rhegians replied that they would be neutral, and would only act in accordance with the decision of all the Italian Greeks. The Athenian commanders now began to consider how they could best commence operations in Sicily. Meanwhile they were expecting the ships which had gone on and were to meet them from Egesta; for they wanted to know whether the Egestaeans really had the money of which the messengers had brought information to Athens.

45. τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις ἐν τούτῳ πολλαχόθεν τε ἤδη καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κατασκόπων σαφῆ ἠγγέλλετο ὅτι ἐν Ῥηγίῳ αἱ νῆές εἰσι, καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τούτοις παρεσκευάζοντο πάσῃ τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ οὐκέτι ἠπίστουν. καὶ ἔς τε τοὺς Σικελοὺς περιέπεμπον, ἔνθα μὲν φύλακας, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις, καὶ ἐς τὰ περιπόλια τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ φρουρὰς ἐσεκόμιζον, τά τε ἐν τῇ πόλει ὅπλων ἐξετάσει καὶ ἵππων ἐσκόπουν εἰ ἐντελῆ ἐστί, καὶ τἆλλα ὡς ἐπὶ ταχεῖ πολέμῳ καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντι καθίσταντο.

[45] From many quarters the news began to reach the Syracusans that the Athenian fleet was at Rhegium, and the report was confirmed by their spies. They now no longer doubted, but fell to work heart and soul. To some of the Sicel towns they sent troops, to others envoys; they also garrisoned the forts in the territory of Syracuse, and within the city itself inspected the horses and arms, and saw that they were in good condition. In short, they made every preparation, as for a war which was rapidly approaching, and almost at their gates.

46. αἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Ἐγέστης τρεῖς νῆες αἱ πρόπλοι παραγίγνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον, ἀγγέλλουσαι ὅτι τἆλλα μὲν οὐκ ἔστι χρήματα ἃ ὑπέσχοντο, τριάκοντα δὲ τάλαντα μόνα φαίνεται. [2] καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ εὐθὺς ἐν ἀθυμίᾳ ἦσαν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς τοῦτό τε πρῶτον ἀντεκεκρούκει καὶ οἱ

Ῥηγῖνοι οὐκ ἐθελήσαντες ξυστρατεύειν, οὓς πρῶτον ἤρξαντο πείθειν καὶ εἰκὸς ἦν μάλιστα, Λεοντίνων τε ξυγγενεῖς ὄντας καὶ σφίσιν αἰεὶ ἐπιτηδείους. καὶ τῷ μὲν Νικίᾳ προσδεχομένῳ ἦν τὰ παρὰ τῶν Ἐγεσταίων, τοῖν δὲ ἑτέροιν καὶ ἀλογώτερα. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἐγεσταῖοι τοιόνδε τι ἐξετεχνήσαντο τότε ὅτε οἱ πρῶτοι πρέσβεις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἦλθον αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν κατασκοπὴν τῶν χρημάτων. ἔς τε τὸ ἐν Ἔρυκι ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀγαγόντες αὐτοὺς ἐπέδειξαν τὰ ἀναθήματα, φιάλας τε καὶ οἰνοχόας καὶ θυμιατήρια καὶ ἄλλην κατασκευὴν οὐκ ὀλίγην, ἃ ὄντα ἀργυρᾶ πολλῷ πλείω τὴν ὄψιν ἀπ᾽ ὀλίγης δυνάμεως χρημάτων παρείχετο: καὶ ἰδίᾳ ξενίσεις ποιούμενοι τῶν τριηριτῶν τά τε ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἐγέστης ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ ξυλλέξαντες καὶ τὰ ἑκ τῶν ἐγγὺς πόλεων καὶ Φοινικικῶν καὶ Ἑλληνίδων αἰτησάμενοι ἐσέφερον ἐς τὰς ἑστιάσεις ὡς οἰκεῖα ἕκαστοι. [4] καὶ πάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρωμένων καὶ πανταχοῦ πολλῶν φαινομένων μεγάλην τὴν ἔκπληξιν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριήρων Ἀθηναίοις παρεῖχε, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας διεθρόησαν ὡς χρήματα πολλὰ ἴδοιεν. [5] καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτοί τε ἀπατηθέντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τότε πείσαντες, ἐπειδὴ διῆλθεν ὁ λόγος ὅτι οὐκ εἴη ἐν τῇ Ἐγέστῃ τὰ χρήματα, πολλὴν τὴν αἰτίαν εἶχον ὑπὸ τῶν στρατιωτῶν: οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἐβουλεύοντο.

[46] The three ships which had gone forward to Egesta now returned to the Athenians at Rhegium; they reported that of the money which had been promised thirty talents only were forthcoming and no more. The spirits of the generals fell at once on receiving this their first discouragement. They were also disappointed at the unfavourable answer of the Rhegians, whom they had asked first, and who might naturally have been expected to join them because they were kinsmen of the Leontines, and had always hitherto been in the Athenian interest. Nicias had expected that the Egestaeans would fail them; to the two others their behaviour appeared even more incomprehensible than the defection of the Rhegians. The fact was that when the

original envoys came from Athens to inspect the treasure, the Egestaeans had practised a trick upon them. They brought them to the temple of Aphrodite at Eryx, and showed them the offerings deposited there, consisting of bowls, flagons, censers, and a good deal of other plate. Most of the vessels were only of silver, and therefore they made a show quite out of proportion to their value. They also gave private entertainments to the crews of the triremes: on each of these occasions they produced, as their own, drinking-vessels of gold and silver not only collected in Egesta itself, but borrowed from the neighbouring towns, Phoenician as well as Hellenic. All of them exhibiting much the same vessels and making everywhere a great display, the sailors were amazed, and on their arrival at Athens told every one what heaps of wealth they had seen. When the news spread that the Egestaeans had not got the money, great was the unpopularity incurred throughout the army by these men, who having been first imposed upon themselves had been instrumental in imposing upon others.

47. καὶ Νικίου μὲν ἦν γνώμη πλεῖν ἐπὶ Σελινοῦντα πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ, ἐφ᾽ ὅπερ μάλιστα ἐπέμφθησαν, καὶ ἢν μὲν παρέχωσι χρήματα παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι Ἐγεσταῖοι, πρὸς ταῦτα βουλεύεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσίν, ὅσασπερ ᾐτήσαντο, ἀξιοῦν διδόναι αὐτοὺς τροφήν, καὶ παραμείναντας Σελινουντίους ἢ βίᾳ ἢ ξυμβάσει διαλλάξαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὕτω παραπλεύσαντας τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις καὶ ἐπιδείξαντας μὲν τὴν δύναμιν τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως, δηλώσαντας δὲ τὴν ἐς τοὺς φίλους καὶ ξυμμάχους προθυμίαν, ἀποπλεῖν οἴκαδε, ἢν μή τι δι᾽ ὀλίγου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀδοκήτου ἢ Λεοντίνους οἷοί τε ὦσιν ὠφελῆσαι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ πόλεων προσαγαγέσθαι, καὶ τῇ πόλει δαπανῶντας τὰ οἰκεῖα μὴ κινδυνεύειν.

[47] The generals now held a council of war. Nicias was of opinion that they should sail with the whole fleet against Selinus, which was their main errand: if the Egestaeans provided pay for all their forces, they would shape their course accordingly; if not, they would demand maintenance for sixty ships, the number which the Egestaeans had requested, and remain on the spot until they had brought the Selinuntians to terms either by force or by negotiation. They would then pass along the coast before the eyes of the other cities and display the visible power of Athens, while they proved at the same time her zeal in the cause of her friends and allies; after this they would return home, unless a speedy way of relieving the Leontines or obtaining support from some of the other cities should unexpectedly present itself. But they should not throw away their own resources and imperil the safety of Athens.

48. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ οὐκ ἔφη χρῆναι τοσαύτῃ δυνάμει ἐκπλεύσαντας αἰσχρῶς καὶ ἀπράκτους ἀπελθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔς τε τὰς πόλεις ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι πλὴν Σελινοῦντος καὶ Συρακουσῶν τὰς ἄλλας, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι καὶ τοὺς Σικελοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀφιστάναι ἀπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα σῖτον καὶ στρατιὰν ἔχωσι, πρῶτον δὲ πείθειν Μεσσηνίους ἐν πόρῳ γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ προσβολῇ εἶναι

αὐτοὺς τῆς Σικελίας, καὶ λιμένα καὶ ἐφόρμησιν τῇ στρατιᾷ ἱκανωτάτην ἔσεσθαι : προσαγαγομένους δὲ τὰς πόλεις, εἰδότας μεθ᾽ ὧν τις πολεμήσει, οὕτως ἤδη Συρακούσαις καὶ Σελινοῦντι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢν μὴ οἱ μὲν Ἐγεσταίοις ξυμβαίνωσιν, οἱ δὲ Λεοντίνους ἐῶσι κατοικίζειν.

[48] Alcibiades urged that it would be a disgrace to have gone forth with so great an armament and to return without achieving anything. They should send envoys to every city of Sicily, with the exception of Selinus and Syracuse; they should also negotiate with the Sicels, making friends of the independent tribes, and persuading the rest to revolt from the Syracusans. They would thus obtain supplies and reinforcements. They should first appeal to the Messenians, whose city being on the highway of traffic was the key of Sicily, and possessed a harbour from which the Athenian forces could most conveniently watch the enemy. Finally, when they had brought the cities over to them and knew who would be on their side in the war, they should attack Selinus and Syracuse, unless the Selinuntians would come to terms with the Egestaeans, and the Syracusans would permit the restoration of the Leontines.

49. Λάμαχος δὲ ἄντικρυς ἔφη χρῆναι πλεῖν ἐπὶ Συρακούσας καὶ πρὸς τῇ πόλει ὡς τάχιστα τὴν μάχην ποιεῖσθαι, ἕως ἔτι ἀπαράσκευοί τε εἰσὶ καὶ μάλιστα ἐκπεπληγμένοι. [2] τὸ γὰρ πρῶτον πᾶν στράτευμα δεινότατον εἶναι: ἢν δὲ χρονίσῃ πρὶν ἐς ὄψιν ἐλθεῖν, τῇ γνώμῃ ἀναθαρσοῦντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ τῇ ὄψει καταφρονεῖν μᾶλλον. αἰφνίδιοι δὲ ἢν προσπέσωσιν, ἕως ἔτι περιδεεῖς προσδέχονται, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν σφεῖς περιγενέσθαι καὶ κατὰ πάντα ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐκφοβῆσαι, τῇ τε ὄψει πλεῖστοι γὰρ ἂν νῦν φανῆναι καὶ τῇ προσδοκίᾳ ὧν πείσονται, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἂν τῷ αὐτίκα κινδύνῳ τῆς μάχης. [3] εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς πολλοὺς ἀποληφθῆναι ἔξω διὰ τὸ ἀπιστεῖν σφᾶς μὴ ἥξειν, καὶ ἐσκομιζομένων αὐτῶν τὴν στρατιὰν οὐκ ἀπορήσειν χρημάτων, ἢν πρὸς τῇ πόλει κρατοῦσα καθέζηται. [4] τούς τε ἄλλους Σικελιώτας οὕτως ἤδη μᾶλλον

καὶ ἐκείνοις οὐ ξυμμαχήσειν καὶ σφίσι προσιέναι καὶ οὐ διαμελλήσειν περισκοποῦντας ὁπότεροι κρατήσουσιν. ναύσταθμον δὲ ἐπαναχωρήσαντας καὶ ἐφορμηθέντας Μέγαρα ἔφη χρῆναι ποιεῖσθαι, ἃ ἦν ἐρῆμα, ἀπέχοντα Συρακουσῶν οὔτε πλοῦν πολὺν οὔτε ὁδόν.

[49] Lamachus was of opinion that they ought to sail direct to Syracuse, and fight as soon as possible under the walls of the city, while the inhabitants were unprepared and the consternation was at its height. He argued that all armies are most terrible at first; if the appearance of them is long delayed the spirits of men revive, and, when they actually come, the sight of them only awakens contempt. If the Athenians could strike suddenly, while their opponents were still in fear and suspense, that would be the best chance of victory. Not only the sight of the armament which would never seem so numerous again, but the near approach of suffering, and above all the immediate peril of battle, would create a panic among the enemy. Many of the Syracusans would probably be cut off in the country, not believing in the approach of an invader; and while the villagers were trying to convey their property into the city, their own army, which would be encamped close under the walls, would be masters of the field and could have no lack of provisions. In the end, the other Sicilian Greeks, instead of joining the Syracusan alliance, would come over to them, and would no longer hesitate and look about them to see which side would conquer. He was also of opinion that they should make Megara their naval station, the fleet returning thither from Syracuse and anchoring in the harbour. The place was deserted, and was not far distant from Syracuse either by land or by sea.

50. Λάμαχος μὲν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὅμως προσέθετο καὶ αὐτὸς τῇ Ἀλκιβιάδου γνώμῃ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Ἀλκιβιάδης τῇ αὐτοῦ νηὶ διαπλεύσας ἐς Μεσσήνην καὶ λόγους ποιησάμενος περὶ ξυμμαχίας πρὸς αὐτούς, ὡς οὐκ ἔπειθεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπεκρίναντο πόλει μὲν ἂν οὐ δέξασθαι, ἀγορὰν δ᾽ ἔξω παρέξειν, ἀπέπλει

ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον. [2] καὶ εὐθὺς ξυμπληρώσαντες ἑξήκοντα ναῦς ἐκ πασῶν οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια λαβόντες παρέπλεον ἐς Νάξον, τὴν ἄλλην στρατιὰν ἐν Ῥηγίῳ καταλιπόντες καὶ ἕνα σφῶν αὐτῶν. [3] Ναξίων δὲ δεξαμένων τῇ πόλει παρέπλεον ἐς Κατάνην. καὶ ὡς αὐτοὺς οἱ Καταναῖοι οὐκ ἐδέχοντο ⟨ἐνῆσαν γὰρ αὐτόθι ἄνδρες τὰ Συρακοσίων βουλόμενοι⟩, [4] ἐκομίσθησαν ἐπὶ τὸν Τηρίαν ποταμόν, καὶ αὐλισάμενοι τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπὶ Συρακούσας ἔπλεον ἐπὶ κέρως ἔχοντες τὰς ἄλλας ναῦς: δέκα δὲ τῶν νεῶν προύπεμψαν ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα πλεῦσαί τε καὶ κατασκέψασθαι εἴ τι ναυτικόν ἐστι καθειλκυσμένον, καὶ κηρῦξαι ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν προσπλεύσαντας ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι ἥκουσι Λεοντίνους ἐς τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατοικιοῦντες κατὰ ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ξυγγένειαν: τοὺς οὖν ὄντας ἐν Συρακούσαις Λεοντίνων ὡς παρὰ φίλους καὶ εὐεργέτας Ἀθηναίους ἀδεῶς ἀπιέναι. [5] ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐκηρύχθη καὶ κατεσκέψαντο τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν ἐξ ἧς αὐτοῖς ὁρμωμένοις πολεμητέα ἦν, ἀπέπλευσαν πάλιν ἐς Κατάνην.

[50] Lamachus having thus spoken nevertheless gave his own voice for the proposal of Alcibiades. Whereupon Alcibiades sailed across in his admiral’s ship to Messenè and proposed an alliance to the inhabitants. He failed to convince them, for they refused to receive the Athenians into the city, although they offered to open a market for them outside the walls. So he sailed back to Rhegium. The generals at once manned sixty ships, selecting the crews indifferently out of the entire fleet, and taking the necessary provisions coasted along to Naxos; they left the rest of the armament and one of themselves at Rhegium. The Naxians received them into their city, and they sailed on to Catana; but the Catanaeans, having a Syracusan party within their walls, denied admission to them; so they moved to the river Terias and there encamped. On the following day they went on to Syracuse in long file with all their ships, except ten, which they had sent forward to sail into the Great Harbour and see whether there was any fleet launched. On their

approaching the city a herald was to proclaim from the decks that the Athenians had come to restore their allies and kinsmen the Leontines to their homes, and that therefore any Leontines who were in Syracuse should regard the Athenians as their friends and benefactors, and join them without fear. When the proclamation had been made, and the fleet had taken a survey of the city, and harbours, and of the ground which was to be the scene of operations, they sailed back to Catana.

51. καὶ ἐκκλησίας γενομένης τὴν μὲν στρατιὰν οὐκ ἐδέχοντο οἱ Καταναῖοι, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγοὺς ἐσελθόντας ἐκέλευον, εἴ τι βούλονται, εἰπεῖν. καὶ λέγοντος τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τετραμμένων, οἱ στρατιῶται πυλίδα τινὰ ἐνῳκοδομημένην κακῶς ἔλαθον διελόντες, καὶ ἐσελθόντες ἠγόραζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν. [2] τῶν δὲ Καταναίων οἱ μὲν τὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων φρονοῦντες, ὡς εἶδον τὸ στράτευμα ἔνδον, εὐθὺς περιδεεῖς γενόμενοι ὑπεξῆλθον οὐ πολλοί τινες, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐψηφίσαντό τε ξυμμαχίαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα ἐκέλευον ἐκ Ῥηγίου κομίζειν. [3] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο διαπλεύσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὸ Ῥήγιον, πάσῃ ἤδη τῇ στρατιᾷ ἄραντες ἐς τὴν Κατάνην, ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο, κατεσκευάζοντο τὸ στρατόπεδον.

[51] The Catanaeans now held an assembly and, although they still refused to receive the army, they told the generals to come in and say what they had to say. While Alcibiades was speaking and the people of the city had their attention occupied with the assembly, the soldiers broke down unobserved a postern gate which had been badly walled up, and finding their way into the town began to walk about in the market-place. Those of the Catanaeans who were in the Syracusan interest, when they saw that the enemy had entered, took alarm and stole away. They were not numerous, and the other Catanaeans voted the alliance with the Athenians, and told them to bring up the rest of their armament from Rhegium. The Athenians then sailed back to

Rhegium, and with their entire force moved to Catana, where on their arrival they began to establish their camp.

52. ἐσηγγέλλετο δὲ αὐτοῖς ἔκ τε Καμαρίνης ὡς, εἰ ἔλθοιεν, προσχωροῖεν ἄν, καὶ ὅτι Συρακόσιοι πληροῦσι ναυτικόν. ἀπάσῃ οὖν τῇ στρατιᾷ παρέπλευσαν πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ Συρακούσας: καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ηὗρον ναυτικὸν πληρούμενον, παρεκομίζοντο αὖθις ἐπὶ Καμαρίνης, καὶ σχόντες ἐς τὸν αἰγιαλὸν ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο. οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐδέχοντο, λέγοντες σφίσι τὰ ὅρκια εἶναι μιᾷ νηὶ καταπλεόντων Ἀθηναίων δέχεσθαι, ἢν μὴ αὐτοὶ πλείους μεταπέμπωσιν. [2] ἄπρακτοι δὲ γενόμενοι ἀπέπλεον: καὶ ἀποβάντες κατά τι τῆς Συρακοσίας καὶ ἁρπαγὴν ποιησάμενοι, καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἱππέων βοηθησάντων καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν τινὰς ἐσκεδασμένους διαφθειράντων, ἀπεκομίσθησαν ἐς Κατάνην.

[52] But meanwhile news came from Camarina that if they would go thither the Camarinaeans would join them. They also heard that the Syracusans were manning a navy. So they sailed with their whole force first to Syracuse, but they found that there was no fleet in preparation; they then passed on to Camarina, and putting in to the open beach they sent a herald to the city. The citizens would not receive them, declaring that their oath bound them not to receive the Athenians if they came with more than one ship, unless they themselves sent for a greater number. So they sailed away without effecting their purpose. They then disembarked on a part of the Syracusan territory, which they ravaged. But a few Syracusan horse coming up killed some of their light-armed troops who were straggling. They then returned to Catana.

53. καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν Σαλαμινίαν ναῦν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἥκουσαν ἐπί τε Ἀλκιβιάδην ὡς κελεύσοντας ἀποπλεῖν ἐς ἀπολογίαν ὧν ἡ πόλις ἐνεκάλει, καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ μεμηνυμένων περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων ὡς ἀσεβούντων, τῶν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν Ἑρμῶν. [2] οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπειδὴ ἡ στρατιὰ ἀπέπλευσεν,

οὐδὲν ἧσσον ζήτησιν ἐποιοῦντο τῶν περὶ τὰ μυστήρια καὶ τῶν περὶ τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς δρασθέντων, καὶ οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτάς, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὑπόπτως ἀποδεχόμενοι, διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν πάνυ χρηστοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ξυλλαμβάνοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι βασανίσαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὑρεῖν ἢ διὰ μηνυτοῦ πονηρίαν τινὰ καὶ χρηστὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα ἀνέλεγκτον διαφυγεῖν. [3] ἐπιστάμενος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος ἀκοῇ τὴν Πεισιστράτου καὶ τῶν παίδων τυραννίδα χαλεπὴν τελευτῶσαν γενομένην καὶ προσέτι οὐδ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν καὶ Ἁρμοδίου καταλυθεῖσαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἐφοβεῖτο αἰεὶ καὶ πάντα ὑπόπτως ἐλάμβανεν.

[53] There they found that the vessel Salaminia had come from Athens to fetch Alcibiades, who had been put upon his trial by the state and was ordered home to defend himself. With him were summoned certain of the soldiers, who were accused at the same time, some of profaning the mysteries, others of mutilation of the Hermae. For after the departure of the expedition the Athenians prosecuted both enquiries as keenly as ever. They did not investigate the character of the informers, but in their suspicious mood listened to all manner of statements, and seized and imprisoned some of the most respectable citizens on the evidence of wretches; they thought it better to sift the matter and discover the truth; and they would not allow even a man of good character, against whom an accusation was brought, to escape without a thorough investigation, merely because the informer was a rogue. For the people, who had heard by tradition that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons ended in great oppression, and knew moreover that their power was overthrown, not by Harmodius or any efforts of their own, but by the Lacedaemonians, were in a state of incessant fear and suspicion.

54. τὸ γὰρ Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ Ἁρμοδίου τόλμημα δι᾽ ἐρωτικὴν ξυντυχίαν ἐπεχειρήθη, ἣν ἐγὼ ἐπὶ πλέον διηγησάμενος ἀποφανῶ οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους οὔτε αὐτοὺς

Ἀθηναίους περὶ τῶν σφετέρων τυράννων οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενομένου ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν λέγοντας. [2] Πεισιστράτου γὰρ γηραιοῦ τελευτήσαντος ἐν τῇ τυραννίδι οὐχ Ἵππαρχος, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἀλλ᾽ Ἱππίας πρεσβύτατος ὢν ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχήν. γενομένου δὲ Ἁρμοδίου ὥρᾳ ἡλικίας λαμπροῦ Ἀριστογείτων ἀνὴρ τῶν ἀστῶν, μέσος πολίτης, ἐραστὴς ὢν εἶχεν αὐτόν. [3] πειραθεὶς δὲ ὁ Ἁρμόδιος ὑπὸ Ἱππάρχου τοῦ Πεισιστράτου καὶ οὐ πεισθεὶς καταγορεύει τῷ Ἀριστογείτονι. ὁ δὲ ἐρωτικῶς περιαλγήσας καὶ φοβηθεὶς τὴν Ἱππάρχου δύναμιν μὴ βίᾳ προσαγάγηται αὐτόν, ἐπιβουλεύει εὐθὺς ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἀξιώσεως κατάλυσιν τῇ τυραννίδι. [4] καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ Ἵππαρχος ὡς αὖθις πειράσας οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἔπειθε τὸν Ἁρμόδιον, βίαιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐβούλετο δρᾶν, ἐν τρόπῳ δέ τινι ἀφανεῖ ὡς οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ παρεσκευάζετο προπηλακιῶν αὐτόν. [5] οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἐπαχθὴς ἦν ἐς τοὺς πολλούς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνεπιφθόνως κατεστήσατο: καὶ ἐπετήδευσαν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὴ τύραννοι οὗτοι ἀρετὴν καὶ ξύνεσιν, καὶ Ἀθηναίους εἰκοστὴν μόνον πρασσόμενοι τῶν γιγνομένων τήν τε πόλιν αὐτῶν καλῶς διεκόσμησαν καὶ τοὺς πολέμους διέφερον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἱερὰ ἔθυον. [6] τὰ δὲ ἄλλα αὐτὴ ἡ πόλις τοῖς πρὶν κειμένοις νόμοις ἐχρῆτο, πλὴν καθ᾽ ὅσον αἰεί τινα ἐπεμέλοντο σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἶναι. καὶ ἄλλοι τε αὐτῶν ἦρξαν τὴν ἐνιαύσιον Ἀθηναίοις ἀρχὴν καὶ Πεισίστρατος ὁ Ἱππίου τοῦ τυραννεύσαντος υἱός, τοῦ πάππου ἔχων τοὔνομα, ὃς τῶν δώδεκα θεῶν βωμὸν τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἄρχων ἀνέθηκε καὶ τὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐν Πυθίου. [7] καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ προσοικοδομήσας ὕστερον ὁ δῆμος Ἀθηναίων μεῖζον μῆκος τοῦ βωμοῦ ἠφάνισε τοὐπίγραμμα: τοῦ δ᾽ ἐν Πυθίου ἔτι καὶ νῦν δῆλόν ἐστιν ἀμυδροῖς γράμμασι λέγον τάδε: “μνῆμα τόδ᾽ ἧς ἀρχῆς Πεισίστρατος Ἱππίου υἱόςθῆκεν Ἀπόλλωνος Πυθίου ἐν τεμένει.”

[54] Now the attempt of Aristogiton and Harmodius arose out of a love affair, which I will narrate at length; and the narrative will show that the Athenians themselves give quite

an inaccurate account of their own tyrants, and of the incident in question, and know no more than other Hellenes. Pisistratus died at an advanced age in possession of the tyranny, and then, not, as is the common opinion, Hipparchus, but Hippias (who was the eldest of his sons) succeeded to his power. Harmodius was in the flower of youth, and Aristogiton, a citizen of the middle class, became his lover. Hipparchus made an attempt to gain the affections of Harmodius, but he would not listen to him, and told Aristogiton. The latter was naturally tormented at the idea, and fearing that Hipparchus who was powerful would resort to violence, at once formed such a plot as a man in his station might for the overthrow of the tyranny. Meanwhile Hipparchus made another attempt; he had no better success, and thereupon he determined, not indeed to take any violent step, but to insult Harmodius in some secret place, so that his motive could not be suspected. To use violence would have been at variance with the general character of his rule, which was not unpopular or oppressive to the many; in fact no tyrants ever displayed greater merit or capacity than these. Although the tax on the produce of the soil which they exacted amounted only to five per cent, they improved and adorned the city, and carried on successful wars; they were also in the habit of sacrificing in the temples. The city meanwhile was permitted to retain her ancient laws; but the family of Pisistratus took care that one of their own number should always be in office. Among others who thus held the annual archonship at Athens was Pisistratus, a son of the tyrant Hippias. He was named after his grandfather Pisistratus, and during his term of office he dedicated the altar of the Twelve Gods in the Agora, and another altar in the temple of the Pythian Apollo. The Athenian people afterwards added to one side of the altar in the Agora and so concealed the inscription upon it; but the other inscription on the altar of the Pythian Apollo may still be seen, although the letters are nearly effaced. It runs as

follows:’Pisistratus the son of Hippias dedicated this memorial of his archonship in the sacred precinct of the Pythian Apollo.’

55. ὅτι δὲ πρεσβύτατος ὢν Ἱππίας ἦρξεν, εἰδὼς μὲν καὶ ἀκοῇ ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλων ἰσχυρίζομαι, γνοίη δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ: παῖδες γὰρ αὐτῷ μόνῳ φαίνονται τῶν γνησίων ἀδελφῶν γενόμενοι, ὡς ὅ τε βωμὸς σημαίνει καὶ ἡ στήλη περὶ τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἀδικίας ἡ ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλει σταθεῖσα, ἐν ᾗ Θεσσαλοῦ μὲν οὐδ᾽ Ἱππάρχου οὐδεὶς παῖς γέγραπται, Ἱππίου δὲ πέντε, οἳ αὐτῷ ἐκ Μυρρίνης τῆς Καλλίου τοῦ Ὑπεροχίδου θυγατρὸς ἐγένοντο: εἰκὸς γὰρ ἦν τὸν πρεσβύτατον πρῶτον γῆμαι. [2] καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ στήλῃ πρῶτος γέγραπται μετὰ τὸν πατέρα, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπεοικότως διὰ τὸ πρεσβεύειν τε ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ τυραννεῦσαι. [3] οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἂν κατασχεῖν μοι δοκεῖ ποτὲ Ἱππίας τὸ παραχρῆμα ῥᾳδίως τὴν τυραννίδα, εἰ Ἵππαρχος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὢν ἀπέθανεν, αὐτὸς δὲ αὐθημερὸν καθίστατο: ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πρότερον ξύνηθες τοῖς μὲν πολίταις φοβερόν, ἐς δὲ τοὺς ἐπικούρους ἀκριβές, πολλῷ τῷ περιόντι τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς κατεκράτησε, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀδελφὸς νεώτερος ὢν ἡπόρησεν, ἐν ᾧ οὐ πρότερον ξυνεχῶς ὡμιλήκει τῇ ἀρχῇ. [4] Ἱππάρχῳ δὲ ξυνέβη τοῦ πάθους τῇ δυστυχίᾳ ὀνομασθέντα καὶ τὴν δόξαν τῆς τυραννίδος ἐς τὰ ἔπειτα προσλαβεῖν.

[55] That Hippias was the eldest son of Pisistratus and succeeded to his power I can positively affirm from special information which has been transmitted to me. But there is other evidence. Of the legitimate sons of Pisistratus he alone had children; this is indicated by the altar just mentioned, and by the column which the Athenians set up in the Acropolis to commemorate the oppression of the tyrants. For on that column no son of Thessalus or of Hipparchus is named, but five of Hippias who were born to him of Myrrhinè the daughter of Callias the son of Hyperechides; now there is a presumption that the son who married first would be the eldest. Moreover, his name is inscribed on the same column

immediately after his father’s; this again is a presumption that he was his eldest son and succeeded him. I think too that Hippias would have found a difficulty in seizing the tyranny if Hipparchus had been tyrant at the time of his death and he had tried to step into his place. As it was, owing to the habitual dread which he had inspired in the citizens, and the strict discipline which he maintained among his body-guard, he held the government with the most perfect security and without the least difficulty. Nor did he behave at all like a younger brother, who would not have known what to do because he had not been regularly used to command. Yet Hipparchus by reason of his violent end became famous, and obtained in after ages the reputation of having been the tyrant.

56. τὸν δ᾽ οὖν Ἁρμόδιον ἀπαρνηθέντα τὴν πείρασιν, ὥσπερ διενοεῖτο, προυπηλάκισεν: ἀδελφὴν γὰρ αὐτοῦ κόρην ἐπαγγείλαντες ἥκειν κανοῦν οἴσουσαν ἐν πομπῇ τινί, ἀπήλασαν λέγοντες οὐδὲ ἐπαγγεῖλαι τὴν ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξίαν εἶναι. [2] χαλεπῶς δὲ ἐνεγκόντος τοῦ Ἁρμοδίου πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων παρωξύνετο. καὶ αὐτοῖς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς ξυνεπιθησομένους τῷ ἔργῳ ἐπέπρακτο, περιέμενον δὲ Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα, ἐν ᾗ μόνον ἡμέρᾳ οὐχ ὕποπτον ἐγίγνετο ἐν ὅπλοις τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς τὴν πομπὴν πέμψοντας ἀθρόους γενέσθαι: καὶ ἔδει ἄρξαι μὲν αὐτούς, ξυνεπαμύνειν δὲ εὐθὺς τὰ πρὸς τοὺς δορυφόρους ἐκείνους. [3] ἦσαν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ οἱ ξυνομωμοκότες ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα: ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ προειδότας, εἰ καὶ ὁποσοιοῦν τολμήσειαν, ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἔχοντάς γε ὅπλα ἐθελήσειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ξυνελευθεροῦν.

[56] When Hipparchus found his advances repelled by Harmodius he carried out his intention of insulting him. There was a young sister of his whom Hipparchus and his friends first invited to come and carry a sacred basket in a procession, and then rejected her, declaring that she had never been invited by them at all because she was

unworthy. At this Harmodius was very angry, and Aristogiton, for his sake, more angry still. They and the other conspirators had already laid their preparations, but were waiting for the festival of the great Panathenaea, when the citizens who took part in the procession assembled in arms; for to do so on any other day would have aroused suspicion. Harmodius and Aristogiton were to begin the attack, and the rest were immediately to join in, and engage with the guards. The plot had been communicated to a few only, the better to avoid detection; but they hoped that, however few struck the blow, the crowd who would be armed, although not in the secret, would at once rise and assist in the recovery of their own liberties.

57. καὶ ὡς ἐπῆλθεν ἡ ἑορτή, Ἱππίας μὲν ἔξω ἐν τῷ Κεραμεικῷ καλουμένῳ μετὰ τῶν δορυφόρων διεκόσμει ὡς ἕκαστα ἐχρῆν τῆς πομπῆς προϊέναι, ὁ δὲ Ἁρμόδιος καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων ἔχοντες ἤδη τὰ ἐγχειρίδια ἐς τὸ ἔργον προῆσαν. [2] καὶ ὡς εἶδόν τινα τῶν ξυνωμοτῶν σφίσι διαλεγόμενον οἰκείως τῷ Ἱππίᾳ □ἦν δὲ πᾶσιν εὐπρόσοδος ὁ Ἱππίας□, ἔδεισαν καὶ ἐνόμισαν μεμηνῦσθαί τε καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ξυλληφθήσεσθαι. [3] τὸν λυπήσαντα οὖν σφᾶς καὶ δι᾽ ὅνπερ πάντα ἐκινδύνευον ἐβούλοντο πρότερον, εἰ δύναιντο, προτιμωρήσασθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ εἶχον ὥρμησαν ἔσω τῶν πυλῶν, καὶ περιέτυχον τῷ Ἱππάρχῳ παρὰ τὸ Λεωκόρειον καλούμενον, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀπερισκέπτως προσπεσόντες καὶ ὡς ἂν μάλιστα δι᾽ ὀργῆς ὁ μὲν ἐρωτικῆς, ὁ δὲ ὑβρισμένος, ἔτυπτον καὶ ἀποκτείνουσιν αὐτόν. [4] καὶ ὁ μὲν τοὺς δορυφόρους τὸ αὐτίκα διαφεύγει ὁ Ἀριστογείτων, ξυνδραμόντος τοῦ ὄχλου, καὶ ὕστερον ληφθεὶς οὐ ῥᾳδίως διετέθη: Ἁρμόδιος δὲ αὐτοῦ παραχρῆμα ἀπόλλυται.

[57] The day of the festival arrived, and Hippias went out of the city to the place called the Ceramicus, where he was occupied with his guards in marshalling the procession. Harmodius and Aristogiton, who were ready with their daggers, stepped forward to do the deed. But seeing one of the conspirators in familiar conversation with Hippias, who

was readily accessible to all, they took alarm, and imagined that they had been betrayed and were on the point of being seized. Whereupon they determined to take their revenge first on the man who had outraged them and was the cause of their desperate attempt. So they rushed, just as they were, within the gates. They found Hipparchus near the Leocorium, as it was called, and then and there falling upon him with all the blind fury, one of an injured lover, the other of a man smarting under an insult, they smote and slew him. The crowd ran together, and so Aristogiton for the present escaped the guards; but he was afterwards taken and not very gently handled. Harmodius perished on the spot.

58. ἀγγελθέντος δὲ Ἱππίᾳ ἐς τὸν Κεραμεικόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ γενόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοὺς πομπέας τοὺς ὁπλίτας, πρότερον ἢ αἰσθέσθαι αὐτοὺς ἄπωθεν ὄντας, εὐθὺς ἐχώρησε, καὶ ἀδήλως τῇ ὄψει πλασάμενος πρὸς τὴν ξυμφορὰν ἐκέλευσεν αὐτούς, δείξας τι χωρίον, ἀπελθεῖν ἐς αὐτὸ ἄνευ τῶν ὅπλων. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνεχώρησαν οἰόμενοί τι ἐρεῖν αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ τοῖς ἐπικούροις φράσας τὰ ὅπλα ὑπολαβεῖν ἐξελέγετο εὐθὺς οὓς ἐπῃτιᾶτο καὶ εἴ τις ηὑρέθη ἐγχειρίδιον ἔχων: μετὰ γὰρ ἀσπίδος καὶ δόρατος εἰώθεσαν τὰς πομπὰς ποιεῖν.

[58] The news was carried to Hippias at the Ceramicus; he went at once, not to the place, but to the armed men who were to march in the procession and, being at a distance, were as yet ignorant of what had happened. Betraying nothing in his looks of the calamity which had befallen him, he bade them leave their arms and go to a certain spot which he pointed out. They, supposing that he had something to say to them, obeyed, and then bidding his guards seize the arms, he at once selected those whom he thought guilty, and all who were found carrying daggers; for the custom was to march in the procession with spear and shield only.

59. τοιούτῳ μὲν τρόπῳ δι᾽ ἐρωτικὴν λύπην ἥ τε ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ ἡ ἀλόγιστος τόλμα ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα περιδεοῦς Ἁρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἀριστογείτονι ἐγένετο. [2] τοῖς δ᾽

Ἀθηναίοις χαλεπωτέρα μετὰ τοῦτο ἡ τυραννὶς κατέστη, καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας διὰ φόβου ἤδη μᾶλλον ὢν τῶν τε πολιτῶν πολλοὺς ἔκτεινε καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἔξω ἅμα διεσκοπεῖτο, εἴ ποθεν ἀσφάλειάν τινα ὁρῴη μεταβολῆς γενομένης ὑπάρχουσάν οἱ. [3] Ἱππόκλου γοῦν τοῦ Λαμψακηνοῦ τυράννου Αἰαντίδῃ τῷ παιδὶ θυγατέρα ἑαυτοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀρχεδίκην Ἀθηναῖος ὢν Λαμψακηνῷ ἔδωκεν, αἰσθανόμενος αὐτοὺς μέγα παρὰ βασιλεῖ Δαρείῳ δύνασθαι. καὶ αὐτῆς σῆμα ἐν Λαμψάκῳ ἐστὶν ἐπίγραμμα ἔχον τόδε: “ἀνδρὸς ἀριστεύσαντος ἐν Ἑλλάδι τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦἹππίου Ἀρχεδίκην ἥδε κέκευθε κόνις,ἣ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ᾽ οὖσα τυράννωνπαίδων τ᾽ οὐκ ἤρθη νοῦν ἐς ἀτασθαλίην.” [4] τυραννεύσας δὲ ἔτη τρία Ἱππίας ἔτι Ἀθηναίων καὶ παυθεὶς ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀλκμεωνιδῶν τῶν φευγόντων, ἐχώρει ὑπόσπονδος ἔς τε Σίγειον καὶ παρ᾽ Αἰαντίδην ἐς Λάμψακον, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ὡς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον, ὅθεν καὶ ὁρμώμενος ἐς Μαραθῶνα ὕστερον ἔτει εἰκοστῷ ἤδη γέρων ὢν μετὰ Μήδων ἐστράτευσεν.

[59] Such was the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogiton, which began in the resentment of a lover; the reckless attempt which followed arose out of a sudden fright. To the people at large the tyranny simply became more oppressive, and Hippias, after his brother’s death living in great fear, slew many of the citizens; he also began to look abroad in hope of securing an asylum should a revolution occur. Himself an Athenian, he married his daughter Archedicè to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son of Hippoclus the tyrant of Lampsacus; for he observed that the family of Hippoclus had great influence with King Darius. Her tomb is at Lampsacus, and bears this inscription:’This earth covers Archedicè the daughter of Hippias,A man who was great among the Hellenes of his day.Her father, her husband, her brothers, and her sons were tyrants,Yet was not her mind lifted up to vanity.’Hippias ruled three years longer over the Athenians. In the fourth year he was deposed by the Lacedaemonians and the exiled Alcmaeonidae. He retired under an

agreement, first to Sigeum, and then to Aeantides at Lampsacus. From him he went to the court of Darius, whence returning twenty years later with the Persian army he took part in the expedition to Marathon, being then an old man.

60. ὧν ἐνθυμούμενος ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ μιμνῃσκόμενος ὅσα ἀκοῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἠπίστατο, χαλεπὸς ἦν τότε καὶ ὑπόπτης ἐς τοὺς περὶ τῶν μυστικῶν τὴν αἰτίαν λαβόντας, καὶ πάντα αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ὀλιγαρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ πεπρᾶχθαι. [2] καὶ ὡς αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὀργιζομένων πολλοί τε καὶ ἀξιόλογοι ἄνθρωποι ἤδη ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ἦσαν καὶ οὐκ ἐν παύλῃ ἐφαίνετο, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπεδίδοσαν μᾶλλον ἐς τὸ ἀγριώτερόν τε καὶ πλείους ἔτι ξυλλαμβάνειν, ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται εἷς τῶν δεδεμένων, ὅσπερ ἐδόκει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι, ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνδεσμωτῶν τινὸς εἴτε ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὄντα μηνῦσαι εἴτε καὶ οὔ: ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα γὰρ εἰκάζεται, τὸ δὲ σαφὲς οὐδεὶς οὔτε τότε οὔτε ὕστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν δρασάντων τὸ ἔργον. [3] λέγων δὲ ἔπεισεν αὐτὸν ὡς χρή, εἰ μὴ καὶ δέδρακεν, αὐτόν τε ἄδειαν ποιησάμενον σῶσαι καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῆς παρούσης ὑποψίας παῦσαι: βεβαιοτέραν γὰρ αὐτῷ σωτηρίαν εἶναι ὁμολογήσαντι μετ᾽ ἀδείας ἢ ἀρνηθέντι διὰ δίκης ἐλθεῖν. [4] καὶ ὁ μὲν αὐτός τε καθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ᾽ ἄλλων μηνύει τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν: ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβών, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ σαφὲς καὶ δεινὸν ποιούμενοι πρότερον εἰ τοὺς ἐπιβουλεύοντας σφῶν τῷ πλήθει μὴ εἴσονται, τὸν μὲν μηνυτὴν εὐθὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὅσων μὴ κατηγορήκει ἔλυσαν, τοὺς δὲ καταιτιαθέντας κρίσεις ποιήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, ὅσοι ξυνελήφθησαν, τῶν δὲ διαφυγόντων θάνατον καταγνόντες ἐπανεῖπον ἀργύριον τῷ ἀποκτείναντι. [5] κἀν τούτῳ οἱ μὲν παθόντες ἄδηλον ἦν εἰ ἀδίκως ἐτετιμώρηντο, ἡ μέντοι ἄλλη πόλις ἐν τῷ παρόντι περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο.

[60] The Athenian people, recalling these and other traditions of the tyrants which had sunk deep into their minds, were suspicious and savage against the supposed profaners of the mysteries; the whole affair seemed to them

to indicate some conspiracy aiming at oligarchy or tyranny. Inflamed by these suspicions they had already imprisoned many men of high character. There was no sign of returning quiet, but day by day the movement became more furious and the number of arrests increased. At last one of the prisoners, who was believed to be deeply implicated, was induced by a fellow-prisoner to make a confession — whether true or false I cannot say; opinions are divided, and no one knew at the time, or to this day knows, who the offenders were. His companion argued that even if he were not guilty he ought to confess and claim a pardon; he would thus save his own life, and at the same time deliver Athens from the prevailing state of suspicion. His chance of escaping would be better if he confessed his guilt in the hope of a pardon, than if he denied it and stood his trial. So he gave evidence both against himself and others in the matter of the Hermae. The Athenians were delighted at finding out what they supposed to be the truth; they had been in despair at the thought that the conspirators against the democracy would never be known, and they immediately liberated the informer and all whom he had not denounced. The accused they brought to trial, and executed such of them as could be found. Those who had fled they condemned to death, and promised a reward to any one who would kill them. No one could say whether the sufferers were justly punished; but the beneficial effect on the city at the time was undeniable.

61. περὶ δὲ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐναγόντων τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οἵπερ καὶ πρὶν ἐκπλεῖν αὐτὸν ἐπέθεντο, χαλεπῶς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐλάμβανον: καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν ᾠόντο σαφὲς ἔχειν, πολὺ δὴ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ μυστικά, ὧν ἐπαίτιος ἦν, μετὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ξυνωμοσίας ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐδόκει πραχθῆναι. [2] καὶ γάρ τις καὶ στρατιὰ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐ πολλὴ ἔτυχε κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἐν ᾧ περὶ ταῦτα ἐθορυβοῦντο μέχρι Ἰσθμοῦ παρελθοῦσα, πρὸς Βοιωτούς τι πράσσοντες. ἐδόκει οὖν ἐκείνου πράξαντος καὶ οὐ Βοιωτῶν

ἕνεκα ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος ἥκειν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔφθασαν δὴ αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὸ μήνυμα ξυλλαβόντες τοὺς ἄνδρας, προδοθῆναι ἂν ἡ πόλις. καί τινα μίαν νύκτα καὶ κατέδαρθον ἐν Θησείῳ τῷ ἐν πόλει ἐν ὅπλοις. [3] οἵ τε ξένοι τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου οἱ ἐν Ἄργει κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ὑπωπτεύθησαν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπιτίθεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς ὁμήρους τῶν Ἀργείων τοὺς ἐν ταῖς νήσοις κειμένους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τότε παρέδοσαν τῷ Ἀργείων δήμῳ διὰ ταῦτα διαχρήσασθαι. [4] πανταχόθεν τε περιειστήκει ὑποψία ἐς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην. ὥστε βουλόμενοι αὐτὸν ἐς κρίσιν ἀγαγόντες ἀποκτεῖναι, πέμπουσιν οὕτω τὴν Σαλαμινίαν ναῦν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἐπί τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ ὧν πέρι ἄλλων ἐμεμήνυτο. [5] εἴρητο δὲ προειπεῖν αὐτῷ ἀπολογησομένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ξυλλαμβάνειν δὲ μή, θεραπεύοντες τό τε πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ στρατιώτας τε σφετέρους καὶ πολεμίους μὴ θορυβεῖν καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοὺς Μαντινέας καὶ Ἀργείους βουλόμενοι παραμεῖναι, δι᾽ ἐκείνου νομίζοντες πεισθῆναι σφίσι ξυστρατεύειν. [6] καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ναῦν καὶ οἱ ξυνδιαβεβλημένοι ἀπέπλεον μετὰ τῆς Σαλαμινίας ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας ὡς ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας: καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο ἐν Θουρίοις, οὐκέτι ξυνείποντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς νεὼς οὐ φανεροὶ ἦσαν, δείσαντες τὸ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ ἐς δίκην καταπλεῦσαι. [7] οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Σαλαμινίας τέως μὲν ἐζήτουν τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ: ὡς δ᾽ οὐδαμοῦ φανεροὶ ἦσαν, ᾤχοντο ἀποπλέοντες. ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἤδη φυγὰς ὢν οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἐπὶ πλοίου ἐπεραιώθη ἐς Πελοπόννησον ἐκ τῆς Θουρίας: οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐρήμῃ δίκῃ θάνατον κατέγνωσαν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν μετ᾽ ἐκείνου.

[61] The enemies of Alcibiades, who had attacked him before he sailed, continued their machinations, and popular feeling was deeply stirred against him. The Athenians now thought that they knew the truth about the Hermae, and they were more than ever convinced that the violation of the mysteries which had been laid to his charge was done by him with the same purpose, and was a part of the conspiracy. It so happened that while the city was in this state of excitement

a small Lacedaemonian force proceeded as far as the Isthmus, having something to do in Boeotia. They were supposed to have come, not in the interest of the Boeotians, but by a secret understanding with Alcibiades; and the Athenians really believed that but for their own alacrity in arresting the accused persons the city would have been betrayed. For one whole night the people lay in arms in the temple of Theseus which is within the walls. About this time too the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were suspected of conspiring against the Argive democracy, and accordingly the Argive hostages who had been deposited in the islands were at once given up by the Athenians to the vengeance of the Argive people. From every quarter suspicion had gathered around Alcibiades, and the Athenian people were determined to have him tried and executed; so they sent the ship Salaminia to Sicily bearing a summons to him and to others against whom information had been given. He was ordered to follow the officers home and defend himself, but they were told not to arrest him; the Athenians, having regard to their interests in Sicily, were anxious not to cause excitement in their own camp or to attract the attention of the enemy, and above all not to lose the Mantineans and Argives, whom they knew to have been induced by his influence to join in the expedition. He in his own ship, and those who were accused with him, left Sicily in company with the Salaminia, and sailed for Athens. When they arrived at Thurii they followed no further, but left the ship and disappeared, fearing to return and stand their trial when the prejudice against them was so violent. The crew of the Salaminia searched for them, but after a time, being unable to find them, gave up the search and went home. Alcibiades, now an exile, crossed not long afterwards in a small vessel from Thurii to Peloponnesus, and the Athenians on his non-appearance sentenced him and his companions to death.

62. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, δύο μέρη ποιήσαντες τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ

λαχὼν ἑκάτερος, ἔπλεον ξύμπαντι ἐπὶ Σελινοῦντος καὶ Ἐγέστης,βουλόμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι τὰ χρήματα εἰ δώσουσιν οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι, κατασκέψασθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν Σελινουντίων τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰ διάφορα μαθεῖν τὰ πρὸς Ἐγεσταίους. [2] παραπλέοντες δ᾽ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τὴν Σικελίαν, τὸ μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὸν Τυρσηνικὸν κόλπον, ἔσχον ἐς Ἱμέραν, ἥπερ μόνη ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει τῆς Σικελίας Ἑλλὰς πόλις ἐστίν: καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἐδέχοντο αὐτούς, παρεκομίζοντο. [3] καὶ ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ αἱροῦσιν Ὕκκαρα, πόλισμα Σικανικὸν μέν, Ἐγεσταίοις δὲ πολέμιον: ἦν δὲ παραθαλασσίδιον. καὶ ἀνδραποδίσαντες τὴν πόλιν παρέδοσαν Ἐγεσταίοις παρεγένοντο γὰρ αὐτῶν ἱππῆς , αὐτοὶ δὲ πάλιν τῷ μὲν πεζῷ ἐχώρουν διὰ τῶν Σικελῶν ἕως ἀφίκοντο ἐς Κατάνην, αἱ δὲ νῆες περιέπλευσαν τὰ ἀνδράποδα ἄγουσαι. [4] Νικίας δὲ εὐθὺς ἐξ Ὑκκάρων ἐπὶ Ἐγέστης παραπλεύσας, καὶ τἆλλα χρηματίσας καὶ λαβὼν τάλαντα τριάκοντα παρῆν ἐς τὸ στράτευμα: καὶ τἀνδράποδα ἀπέδοσαν, καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα. [5] καὶ ἐς τοὺς τῶν Σικελῶν ξυμμάχους περιέπλευσαν, στρατιὰν κελεύοντες πέμπειν: τῇ τε ἡμισείᾳ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἦλθον ἐπὶ Ὕβλαν τὴν Γελεᾶτιν πολεμίαν οὖσαν, καὶ οὐχ εἷλον. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[62] The two Athenian generals who remained in Sicily now divided the fleet between them by lot, and sailed towards Selinus and Egesta; they wanted to know whether the Egestaeans would give them the promised money, and also to ascertain the condition of the Selinuntians and the nature of their quarrel with the Egestaeans. Sailing along the north coast of Sicily, which looks towards the Tyrrhenian Gulf, they touched at Himera, the only Hellenic city in this part of the island. But they were not received, and passed on. On their voyage they took Hyccara, a city on the sea-shore which, although of Sicanian origin, was hostile to the Egestaeans. They reduced the inhabitants to slavery, and handed the place over to the Egestaeans, whose cavalry had now joined them. The Athenian troops then marched back through the country of the Sicels until they arrived at Catana; the ships

which conveyed the prisoners going round the coast to meet them. Nicias had sailed straight from Hyccara to Egesta, where he did his business, and having obtained thirty talents of silver, rejoined the army at Catana. The Athenians on their return disposed of their slaves; the sum realised by the sale was about a hundred and twenty talents. They next sailed round to their Sicel allies and bade them send reinforcements. Then with half of their army they marched against Hybla Geleatis, a hostile town, which they failed to take. And so ended the summer.

63. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος εὐθὺς τὴν ἔφοδον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ Συρακούσας παρεσκευάζοντο, οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνους ἰόντες. [2] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν πρῶτον φόβον καὶ τὴν προσδοκίαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπέκειντο, κατά τε τὴν ἡμέραν ἑκάστην προϊοῦσαν ἀνεθάρσουν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπειδὴ πλέοντές τε τὰ ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τῆς Σικελίας πολὺ ἀπὸ σφῶν ἐφαίνοντο καὶ πρὸς τὴν Ὕβλαν ἐλθόντες καὶ πειράσαντες οὐχ εἷλον βίᾳ, ἔτι πλέον κατεφρόνησαν καὶ ἠξίουν τοὺς στρατηγούς, οἷον δὴ ὄχλος φιλεῖ θαρσήσας ποιεῖν, ἄγειν σφᾶς ἐπὶ Κατάνην, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐκεῖνοι ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἔρχονται. [3] καὶ ἱππῆς προσελαύνοντες αἰεὶ κατάσκοποι τῶν Συρακοσίων πρὸς τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐφύβριζον ἄλλα τε καὶ εἰ ξυνοικήσοντες σφίσιν αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον ἥκοιεν ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἢ Λεοντίνους ἐς τὴν οἰκείαν κατοικιοῦντες.

[63] Early in the ensuing winter the Athenians made preparations for an attack upon Syracuse; the Syracusans likewise prepared to take the offensive. For when they found that their enemies did not assail them at once, as in their first panic they had expected, day by day their spirits rose. And now the Athenians, after cruising about at the other end of Sicily, where they seemed to be a long way off, had gone to Hybla, and their attack upon it had failed. So the Syracusans despised them more than ever. After the manner of the populace when elated, they insisted that since the Athenians would not come to them, their generals should

lead them against Catana. Syracusan horsemen, who were always riding up to the Athenian army and watching their movements, would ask insultingly whether, instead of resettling the Leontines in their old home, they were not themselves going to settle down with their good friends the Syracusans in a new one.

64. ἃ γιγνώσκοντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς ἄγειν πανδημεὶ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὅτι πλεῖστον, αὐτοὶ δὲ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐν τοσούτῳ ὑπὸ νύκτα παραπλεύσαντες στρατόπεδον καταλαμβάνειν ἐν ἐπιτηδείῳ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν, εἰδότες οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως δυνηθέντες καὶ εἰ ἐκ τῶν νεῶν πρὸς παρεσκευασμένους ἐκβιβάζοιεν ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἰόντες γνωσθεῖεν τοὺς γὰρ ἂν ψιλοὺς τοὺς σφῶν καὶ τὸν ὄχλον τῶν Συρακοσίων τοὺς ἱππέας πολλοὺς ὄντας, σφίσι δ᾽ οὐ παρόντων ἱππέων, βλάπτειν ἂν μεγάλα, οὕτω δὲ λήψεσθαι χωρίον ὅθεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων οὐ βλάψονται ἄξια λόγου: ἐδίδασκον δ᾽ αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ πρὸς τῷ Ὀλυμπιείῳ χωρίου, ὅπερ καὶ κατέλαβον, Συρακοσίων φυγάδες, οἳ ξυνείποντο, τοιόνδε τι οὖν πρὸς ἃ ἐβούλοντο οἱ στρατηγοὶ μηχανῶνται. [2] πέμπουσιν ἄνδρα σφίσι μὲν πιστόν, τοῖς δὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοῖς τῇ δοκήσει οὐχ ἧσσον ἐπιτήδειον: ἦν δὲ Καταναῖος ὁ ἀνήρ, καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης ἥκειν ἔφη ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ὀνόματα ἐγίγνωσκον καὶ ἠπίσταντο ἐν τῇ πόλει ἔτι ὑπολοίπους ὄντας τῶν σφίσιν εὔνων. [3] ἔλεγε δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους αὐλίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ εἰ βούλονται ἐκεῖνοι πανδημεὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ῥητῇ ἅμα ἕῳ ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ἐλθεῖν, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἀποκλῄσειν τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐμπρήσειν, ἐκείνους δὲ ῥᾳδίως τὸ στράτευμα προσβαλόντας τῷ σταυρώματι αἱρήσειν: εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ξυνδράσοντας πολλοὺς Καταναίων καὶ ἡτοιμάσθαι ἤδη, ἀφ᾽ ὧν αὐτὸς ἥκειν.

[64] The generals were aware of the state of affairs. They determined to draw the whole Syracusan army as far as possible out of the city, and then in their absence sail thither by night and take up a convenient position

unmolested. They knew that they would fail of their purpose if they tried to disembark their men in the face of an enemy who was prepared to meet them, or if they marched openly by land and were discovered, for they had no cavalry of their own, and the Syracusan horse which were numerous would do great harm to their light-armed troops and the mass of attendants. Whereas if they sailed thither by night they would be enabled to take up a position in which the cavalry could do them no serious mischief. The exact spot near the temple of Olympian Zeus which they afterwards occupied was indicated by Syracusan exiles who accompanied them. Accordingly the generals devised the following plan; they sent to Syracuse a man of whose fidelity they were assured, but whom the Syracusan leaders believed to be a friend of theirs. He was a Catanaean, and professed to come from adherents of their party whose names were familiar to them, and whom they knew to be still remaining in Catana. He told them that the Athenians lay within the city every night away from the camp in which their arms were deposited, and if at dawn on a set day the Syracusans with their whole force would come and attack the troops left in the camp, their partisans in Catana would themselves shut the Athenians up in the town and fire their ships; meanwhile the Syracusans might assault the palisade, and easily take the camp — preparations had been made, and many of the Catanaeans were in the plot; from them he came.

65. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων, μετὰ τοῦ καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα θαρσεῖν καὶ εἶναι ἐν διανοίᾳ καὶ ἄνευ τούτων ἰέναι παρεσκευάσθαι ἐπὶ Κατάνην, ἐπίστευσάν τε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πολλῷ ἀπερισκεπτότερον καὶ εὐθὺς ἡμέραν ξυνθέμενοι ᾗ παρέσονται ἀπέστειλαν αὐτόν, καὶ αὐτοί ἤδη γὰρ καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Σελινούντιοι καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς παρῆσαν προεῖπον πανδημεὶ πᾶσιν ἐξιέναι Συρακοσίοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἑτοῖμα αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ τῆς παρασκευῆς ἦν καὶ αἱ ἡμέραι ἐν αἷς ξυνέθεντο ἥξειν ἐγγὺς ἦσαν, πορευόμενοι ἐπὶ Κατάνης ηὐλίσαντο ἐπὶ τῷ Συμαίθῳ ποταμῷ ἐν τῇ Λεοντίνῃ. [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ὡς

ᾔσθοντο αὐτοὺς προσιόντας, ἀναλαβόντες τό τε στράτευμα ἅπαν τὸ ἑαυτῶν καὶ ὅσοι Σικελῶν αὐτοῖς ἢ ἄλλος τις προσεληλύθει καὶ ἐπιβιβάσαντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ πλοῖα, ὑπὸ νύκτα ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὰς Συρακούσας. [3] καὶ οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἅμα ἕῳ ἐξέβαινον ἐς τὸ κατὰ τὸ Ὀλυμπιεῖον ὡς τὸ στρατόπεδον καταληψόμενοι, καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς οἱ Συρακοσίων πρῶτοι προσελάσαντες ἐς τὴν Κατάνην καὶ αἰσθόμενοι ὅτι τὸ στράτευμα ἅπαν ἀνῆκται, ἀποστρέψαντες ἀγγέλλουσι τοῖς πεζοῖς, καὶ ξύμπαντες ἤδη ἀποτρεπόμενοι ἐβοήθουν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν.

[65] The Syracusan generals were already in high spirits, and before this proposal reached them had made up their minds to have all things in readiness for a march to Catana. So they trusted the man the more recklessly, and at once fixed the day on which they would arrive. They then sent him back, and issued orders for an expedition to their whole army, including the Selinuntians and the rest of the allies, who had now joined them. When they were ready and the appointed day drew near they marched towards Catana, and encamped by the river Symaethus in the Leontine territory. The Athenians, aware of the approach of the Syracusans, took all their own army and Sicel or other allies on board their ships and smaller craft, and sailed away at nightfall to Syracuse. At dawn they disembarked opposite the temple of Olympian Zeus, intending to seize a place for their camp; almost at the same moment the Syracusan horse who had advanced before the rest to Catana discovered that the whole Athenian army had put out to sea, whereupon they returned and told the infantry: and then all together hurried back to protect the city.

66. ἐν τούτῳ δ᾽ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, μακρᾶς οὔσης τῆς ὁδοῦ αὐτοῖς, καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν καθῖσαν τὸ στράτευμα ἐς χωρίον ἐπιτήδειον, καὶ ἐν ᾧ μάχης τε ἄρξειν ἔμελλον ὁπότε βούλοιντο καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ λυπήσειν: τῇ μὲν γὰρ τειχία τε καὶ οἰκίαι εἶργον καὶ δένδρα καὶ λίμνη, παρὰ δὲ τὸ

κρημνοί. [2] καὶ τὰ ἐγγὺς δένδρα κόψαντες καὶ κατενεγκόντες ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν παρά τε τὰς ναῦς σταύρωμα ἔπηξαν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ Δάσκωνι ἔρυμά τι, ᾗ εὐεφοδώτατον ἦν τοῖς πολεμίοις, λίθοις λογάδην καὶ ξύλοις διὰ ταχέων ὤρθωσαν, καὶ τὴν τοῦ Ἀνάπου γέφυραν ἔλυσαν. [3] παρασκευαζομένων δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῆς πόλεως οὐδεὶς ἐξιὼν ἐκώλυε, πρῶτοι δὲ οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων προσεβοήθησαν, ἔπειτα δὲ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ πεζὸν ἅπαν ξυνελέγη. καὶ προσῆλθον μὲν ἐγγὺς τοῦ στρατεύματος τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἀντιπροῇσαν αὐτοῖς, ἀναχωρήσαντες καὶ διαβάντες τὴν Ἑλωρίνην ὁδὸν ηὐλίσαντο.

[66] The march from Catana to Syracuse was long, and in the meantime the Athenians had quietly established themselves in an advantageous position, where they could give battle whenever they pleased, and the Syracusan horse were least likely to harass them either before or during the engagement. On one side they were protected by walls, and houses, and trees, and a marsh; on another by a line of cliffs. They felled the trees near, and bringing them down to the sea made a palisade to protect their ships; on the shore of Dascon too they hurriedly raised a fortification of rough stones and logs at a point where the ground was most accessible to the enemy, and broke down the bridge over the river Anapus. No one came out from the walls to hinder them in their work. The first to appear at all were the returning cavalry; after a while the whole body of infantry came up and re-formed. They at once marched right up to the Athenian position, but the Athenians did not come out to meet them; so they retired and encamped on the other side of the Helorine road.

67. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς ἐς μάχην, καὶ ξυνετάξαντο ὧδε. δεξιὸν μὲν κέρας Ἀργεῖοι εἶχον καὶ Μαντινῆς, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τὸ μέσον, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο οἱ ξύμμαχοι οἱ ἄλλοι. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ αὐτοῖς τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἦν τεταγμένον ἐπὶ

ὀκτώ, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ ἐπὶ ταῖς εὐναῖς ἐν πλαισίῳ, ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ καὶ τοῦτο τεταγμένον: οἷς εἴρητο, ᾗ ἂν τοῦ στρατεύματός τι πονῇ μάλιστα, ἐφορῶντας παραγίγνεσθαι. καὶ τοὺς σκευοφόρους ἐντὸς τούτων τῶν ἐπιτάκτων ἐποιήσαντο. [2] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἔταξαν τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας πάντας ἐφ᾽ ἑκκαίδεκα, ὄντας πανδημεὶ Συρακοσίους καὶ ὅσοι ξύμμαχοι παρῆσαν ἐβοήθησαν δὲ αὐτοῖς Σελινούντιοι μὲν μάλιστα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ Γελῴων ἱππῆς, τὸ ξύμπαν ἐς διακοσίους, καὶ Καμαριναίων ἱππῆς ὅσον εἴκοσι καὶ τοξόται ὡς πεντήκοντα, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας ἐπετάξαντο ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ, οὐκ ἔλασσον ὄντας ἢ διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους, παρὰ δ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστάς. [3] μέλλουσι δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις προτέροις ἐπιχειρήσειν ὁ Νικίας κατά τε ἔθνη ἐπιπαριὼν ἕκαστα καὶ ξύμπασι τοιάδε παρεκελεύετο.

[67] On the next day the Athenians and their allies prepared to give battle. Their order was as follows: The Argives and Mantineans formed the right wing, the Athenians held the centre; on the left wing were the remaining allies. Half of their army which formed the van was ranged eight deep. The other half was drawn up likewise eight deep close to their sleeping-places, in a hollow oblong. The latter were told to watch the engagement, and to move up to the support of any part of the line which might be distressed. In the midst of the reserve thus disposed were placed the baggage-bearers. The Syracusans drew up their heavy-armed sixteen deep; the army consisted of the whole Syracusan people and their allies, chiefly the Selinuntians, who were in the city; they had also two hundred horsemen from Gela, and twenty, with about fifty archers, from Camarina. The cavalry, numbering in all twelve hundred, were placed upon the right wing, and beside them the javelin-men. The Athenians determined to begin the attack. Just before the battle Nicias went up and down, and addressed the following words to all and each of the various peoples who composed the army:

68. ‘Πολλῇ μὲν παραινέσει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τί δεῖ χρῆσθαι, οἳ πάρεσμεν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀγῶνα; αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ παρασκευὴ ἱκανωτέρα μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι θάρσος παρασχεῖν ἢ καλῶς λεχθέντες λόγοι μετὰ ἀσθενοῦς στρατοπέδου. [2] ὅπου γὰρ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ νησιωτῶν οἱ πρῶτοί ἐσμεν, πῶς οὐ χρὴ μετὰ τοιῶνδε καὶ τοσῶνδε ξυμμάχων πάντα τινὰ μεγάλην τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς νίκης ἔχειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεί τε ἀμυνομένους καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς, καὶ προσέτι Σικελιώτας, οἳ ὑπερφρονοῦσι μὲν ἡμᾶς, ὑπομενοῦσι δ᾽ οὔ, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τόλμης ἧσσω ἔχειν. [3] παραστήτω δέ τινι καὶ τόδε, πολύ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ πρὸς γῇ οὐδεμιᾷ φιλίᾳ, ἥντινα μὴ αὐτοὶ μαχόμενοι κτήσεσθε. καὶ τοὐναντίον ὑπομιμνῄσκω ὑμᾶς ἢ οἱ πολέμιοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι παρακελεύονται: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι περὶ πατρίδος ἔσται ὁ ἀγών, ἐγὼ δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐν πατρίδι, ἐξ ἧς κρατεῖν δεῖ ἢ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποχωρεῖν: οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς πολλοὶ ἐπικείσονται. [4] τῆς τε οὖν ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν ἀξίας μνησθέντες ἐπέλθετε τοῖς ἐναντίοις προθύμως, καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀνάγκην καὶ ἀπορίαν φοβερωτέραν ἡγησάμενοι τῶν πολεμίων.’

[68] ‘What need, soldiers, is there of a long exhortation when we are all here united in the same cause? The mere sight of this great army is more likely to put courage into you than an eloquent speech and an inferior force. We are Argives and Mantineans, and Athenians and the chief of the islanders; and must not the presence of so many brave allies inspire every one of us with a good hope of victory, especially when we reflect that our opponents are not like ourselves picked soldiers, but a whole city which has turned out to meet us? They are Sicilians too, who, although they may despise us, will not stand their ground against us; for their skill is not equal to their courage. Consider again that we are far from home, and that there is no friendly land near but what you can win with your swords. The generals of the enemy, as I know well, are appealing to very different motives. They say to them, “you are fighting for your own country,” but I say to

you that you are fighting in a country which is not your own, and from which, if you do not conquer, retreat will be impossible, for swarms of cavalry will follow at your heels. Remember your own reputation, and charge valiantly, deeming the difficulties and necessities of your position to be more formidable than the enemy.’

69. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοιαῦτα παρακελευσάμενος ἐπῆγε τὸ στρατόπεδον εὐθύς. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἀπροσδόκητοι μὲν ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ ἦσαν ὡς ἤδη μαχούμενοι, καί τινες αὐτοῖς ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως οὔσης καὶ ἀπεληλύθεσαν: οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ σπουδῆς προσβοηθοῦντες δρόμῳ ὑστέριζον μέν, ὡς δὲ ἕκαστός πῃ τοῖς πλέοσι προσμείξειε καθίσταντο. οὐ γὰρ δὴ προθυμίᾳ ἐλλιπεῖς ἦσαν οὐδὲ τόλμῃ οὔτ᾽ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μάχῃ οὔτ᾽ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν ἀνδρείᾳ οὐχ ἥσσους ἐς ὅσον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἀντέχοι, τῷ δὲ ἐλλείποντι αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν βούλησιν ἄκοντες προυδίδοσαν. ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενοι σφίσι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους προτέρους ἐπελθεῖν καὶ διὰ τάχους ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἀμύνασθαι, ἀναλαβόντες τὰ ὅπλα εὐθὺς ἀντεπῆσαν. [2] καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρων οἵ τε λιθοβόλοι καὶ σφενδονῆται καὶ τοξόται προυμάχοντο καὶ τροπὰς οἵας εἰκὸς ψιλοὺς ἀλλήλων ἐποίουν: ἔπειτα δὲ μάντεις τε σφάγια προύφερον τὰ νομιζόμενα καὶ σαλπιγκταὶ ξύνοδον ἐπώτρυνον τοῖς ὁπλίταις, [3] οἱ δ᾽ ἐχώρουν, Συρακόσιοι μὲν περί τε πατρίδος μαχούμενοι καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἕκαστος τὸ μὲν αὐτίκα σωτηρίας, τὸ δὲ μέλλον ἐλευθερίας, τῶν δ᾽ ἐναντίων Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περί τε τῆς ἀλλοτρίας οἰκείαν σχεῖν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν μὴ βλάψαι ἡσσώμενοι, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων οἱ αὐτόνομοι ξυγκτήσασθαί τε ἐκείνοις ἐφ᾽ ἃ ἦλθον καὶ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν σφίσι πατρίδα νικήσαντες πάλιν ἐπιδεῖν: τὸ δ᾽ ὑπήκοον τῶν ξυμμάχων μέγιστον μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτίκα ἀνελπίστου σωτηρίας, ἢν μὴ κρατῶσι, τὸ πρόθυμον εἶχον, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐν παρέργῳ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ξυγκαταστρεψαμένοις ῥᾷον αὐτοῖς ὑπακούσεται.

[69] Nicias having thus exhorted his men led them at once to the charge. The Syracusans did not expect that they would have to fight just at that moment, and some of them had

even gone away into the city, which was close at hand; others came running up as fast as they could, and, although late, joined the main body one by one at the nearest point. For they showed no want of spirit or daring in this or any other engagement; in courage they were not a whit inferior to their enemies, had their skill only been adequate, but when it failed, they could no longer do justice to their good intentions. On this occasion they were compelled to make a hasty defence, for they felt sure that the Athenians would not begin the attack. Nevertheless they took up their arms and immediately went forward to meet them. For a while the throwers of stones, and slingers, and archers skirmished in front of the two armies, driving one another before them after the manner of light-armed troops. Then the soothsayers brought out the customary victims, and the trumpets sounded and called the infantry to the charge. The two armies advanced; the Syracusans to fight for their country, and every man for life now, and liberty hereafter; on the opposite side the Athenians to gain a new country, and to save the old from the disaster of defeat; the Argives and the independent allies eager to share the good things of Sicily, and, if they returned victorious, to see their own homes once more. The courage of the subject allies was chiefly inspired by a lively consciousness that their only chance of life was in victory; they had also a distant hope that, if they assisted the Athenians in overthrowing others, their own yoke might be lightened.

70. γενομένης δ᾽ ἐν χερσὶ τῆς μάχης ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντεῖχον ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ξυνέβη βροντάς τε ἅμα τινὰς γενέσθαι καὶ ἀστραπὰς καὶ ὕδωρ πολύ, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν πρῶτον μαχομένοις καὶ ἐλάχιστα πολέμῳ ὠμιληκόσι καὶ τοῦτο ξυνεπιλαβέσθαι τοῦ φόβου, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐμπειροτέροις τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ὥρᾳ ἔτους περαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστῶτας πολὺ μείζω ἔκπληξιν μὴ νικωμένους παρέχειν. [2] ὡσαμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων πρῶτον τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ κατὰ

σφᾶς αὐτούς, παρερρήγνυτο ἤδη καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ἐς φυγὴν κατέστη. [3] καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν οὐκ ἐδίωξαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων πολλοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀήσσητοι εἶργον, καὶ ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τοὺς ὁπλίτας αὐτῶν, εἴ τινας προδιώκοντας ἴδοιεν, ἀνέστελλον, ἐπακολουθήσαντες δὲ ἀθρόοι ὅσον ἀσφαλῶς εἶχε πάλιν ἐπανεχώρουν καὶ τροπαῖον ἵστασαν. [4] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἀθροισθέντες ἐς τὴν Ἑλωρίνην ὁδὸν καὶ ὡς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ξυνταξάμενοι ἔς τε τὸ Ὀλυμπιεῖον ὅμως σφῶν αὐτῶν παρέπεμψαν φυλακήν, δείσαντες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῶν χρημάτων ἃ ἦν αὐτόθι κινήσωσι, καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ἐπανεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

[70] The armies met, and for a long time the issue was doubtful. During the battle there came on thunder and lightning, and a deluge of rain; these added to the terror of the inexperienced who were fighting for the first time, but experienced soldiers ascribed the storm to the time of year, and were much more alarmed at the stubborn resistance of the enemy, First the Argives drove back the left wing of the Syracusans; next the Athenians the right wing which was opposed to them. Whereupon the rest of the army began to give way and were soon put to flight. Their opponents did not pursue them far, for the Syracusan horsemen, who were numerous and had not shared in the defeat, interposed, and wherever they saw hoplites advancing from the ranks attacked and drove them back. The Athenians pursued in a body as far as they safely could, and then returned and raised a trophy. The Syracusans rallied on the Helorine road, and did their best to reform after their defeat. They did not neglect to send some of their forces as a guard to the Olympieum, fearing lest the Athenians should plunder the treasures of the temple. The rest of the army returned to the city.

71. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἱερὸν οὐκ ἦλθον, ξυγκομίσαντες δὲ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νεκροὺς καὶ ἐπὶ πυρὰν ἐπιθέντες ηὐλίσαντο αὐτοῦ. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ τοῖς μὲν

Συρακοσίοις ἀπέδοσαν ὑποσπόνδους τοὺς νεκρούς ἀπέθανον δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων περὶ ἑξήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους , τῶν δὲ σφετέρων τὰ ὀστᾶ ξυνέλεξαν ἀπέθανον δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὡς πεντήκοντα, καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων σκῦλα ἔχοντες ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Κατάνην: [2] χειμών τε γὰρ ἦν, καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτόθεν ποιεῖσθαι οὔπω ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι, πρὶν ἂν ἱππέας τε μεταπέμψωσιν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ἀγείρωσιν, ὅπως μὴ παντάπασιν ἱπποκρατῶνται, καὶ χρήματα δὲ ἅμα αὐτόθεν τε ξυλλέξωνται καὶ παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἔλθῃ, τῶν τε πόλεών τινας προσαγάγωνται, ἃς ἤλπιζον μετὰ τὴν μάχην μᾶλλον σφῶν ὑπακούσεσθαι, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ σῖτον καὶ ὅσων δέοι παρασκευάσωνται ὡς ἐς τὸ ἔαρ ἐπιχειρήσοντες ταῖς Συρακούσαις.

[71] The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple at all, but collecting their dead, and laying them on a pyre, they passed the night where they were. On the following day they gave back the Syracusan dead under a flag of truce, and gathered from the pyre the bones of their own dead. There had fallen of the Syracusans and of their allies about two hundred and sixty; of the Athenians and their allies not more than fifty. The Athenians then taking with them the spoils of their enemies, sailed back to Catana. Winter had now set in, and they thought that before they could do anything more at Syracuse they must send for horsemen from Athens, and collect others from their Sicilian allies; without them they would be at the mercy of the Syracusan cavalry. They also wanted to obtain both in Sicily and from Athens a supply of money, and to gain over some of the Sicilian cities. These would be more willing to listen to them after their victory. They had likewise to provide supplies, and to make the other requisite preparations for attacking Syracuse in the spring.

72. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταύτῃ τῇ γνώμῃ ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Νάξον καὶ Κατάνην διαχειμάσοντες, Συρακόσιοι δὲ τοὺς σφετέρους αὐτῶν νεκροὺς θάψαντες ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίουν. [2]

καὶ παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς Ἑρμοκράτης ὁ Ἕρμωνος, ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐς τἆλλα ξύνεσιν οὐδενὸς λειπόμενος καὶ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐμπειρίᾳ τε ἱκανὸς γενόμενος καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐπιφανής, ἐθάρσυνέ τε καὶ οὐκ εἴα τῷ γεγενημένῳ ἐνδιδόναι: [3] τὴν μὲν γὰρ γνώμην αὐτῶν οὐχ ἡσσῆσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἀταξίαν βλάψαι. οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτόν γε λειφθῆναι ὅσον εἰκὸς εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐμπειρίᾳ ἰδιώτας ὡς εἰπεῖν χειροτέχναις ἀνταγωνισαμένους. [4] μέγα δὲ βλάψαι καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατηγῶν καὶ τὴν πολυαρχίαν ἦσαν γὰρ πέντε καὶ δέκα οἱ στρατηγοὶ αὐτοῖς τῶν τε πολλῶν τὴν ἀξύντακτον ἀναρχίαν. ἢν δὲ ὀλίγοι τε στρατηγοὶ γένωνται ἔμπειροι καὶ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ παρασκευάσωσι τὸ ὁπλιτικόν, οἷς τε ὅπλα μὴ ἔστιν ἐκπορίζοντες, ὅπως ὡς πλεῖστοι ἔσονται, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ μελέτῃ προσαναγκάζοντες, ἔφη κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς κρατήσειν σφᾶς τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀνδρείας μὲν σφίσιν ὑπαρχούσης, εὐταξίας δ᾽ ἐς τὰ ἔργα προσγενομένης: ἐπιδώσειν γὰρ ἀμφότερα αὐτά, τὴν μὲν μετὰ κινδύνων μελετωμένην, τὴν δ᾽ εὐψυχίαν αὐτὴν ἑαυτῆς μετὰ τοῦ πιστοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης θαρσαλεωτέραν ἔσεσθαι. [5] τούς τε στρατηγοὺς καὶ ὀλίγους καὶ αὐτοκράτορας χρῆναι ἑλέσθαι καὶ ὁμόσαι αὐτοῖς τὸ ὅρκιον ἦ μὴν ἐάσειν ἄρχειν ὅπῃ ἂν ἐπίστωνται: οὕτω γὰρ ἄ τε κρύπτεσθαι δεῖ μᾶλλον ἂν στέγεσθαι καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ κόσμον καὶ ἀπροφασίστως παρασκευασθῆναι.

[72] Accordingly they sailed away to Naxos and Catana, intending to winter.The Syracusans, after burying their dead; called an assembly. Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a man of first-rate ability, of distinguished bravery, and also of great military experience, came forward and encouraged them. He told them not to be disheartened at the result of the battle; for their resolution had not been defeated; but they had suffered from want of discipline. Yet they had proved less unequal than might have been expected; and they should remember that they had been contending against the most experienced soldiers of Hellas; they were unskilled workmen, and the Athenians masters in their craft.

Another great source of weakness had been the number of generals (there were fifteen of them); the division of authority had produced disorganisation and disorder among the troops. If they had a few experienced generals, and during the winter got their hoplites into order, providing arms for those who had none, and so raising the number of their forces to the utmost, while at the same time they insisted on strict drill and discipline, they would have a good chance of victory; for they had courage already, and only wanted steadiness in action. Both qualities would improve together; they would learn steadiness in the school of danger, and their natural courage would be reinforced by the confidence which skill inspires. The generals whom they elected should be few in number and should be entrusted with full power, the people taking a solemn oath to them that they would be allowed to command according to their own judgment. The secrets of the army would then be better kept, and everything would be done in a more orderly and straightforward manner.

73. καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι αὐτοῦ ἀκούσαντες ἐψηφίσαντό τε πάντα ὡς ἐκέλευε καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτόν τε εἵλοντο τὸν Ἑρμοκράτη καὶ Ἡρακλείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου καὶ Σικανὸν τὸν Ἐξηκέστου, τούτους τρεῖς, [2] καὶ ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλαν, ὅπως ξυμμαχία τε αὐτοῖς παραγένηται καὶ τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πόλεμον βεβαιότερον πείθωσι ποιεῖσθαι ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ὑπὲρ σφῶν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἵνα ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας ἀπαγάγωσιν αὐτοὺς ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐν Σικελίᾳ στράτευμα ἧσσον ὠφελίαν ἄλλην ἐπιπέμπωσιν.

[73] The Syracusans listened to him, and voted all that he desired. They chose three generals and no more; Hermocrates himself, Heraclides the son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus the son of Execestus. They also sent ambassadors to Corinth and to Lacedaemon requesting aid as allies, and urged the Lacedaemonians to make war openly and decidedly against the Athenians on their behalf; thus they

would either draw them off from Sicily, or at any rate prevent them from sending reinforcements to the army which was there already.

74. τὸ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Κατάνῃ στράτευμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔπλευσεν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ Μεσσήνην ὡς προδοθησομένην. καὶ ἃ μὲν ἐπράσσετο οὐκ ἐγένετο: Ἀλκιβιάδης γὰρ ὅτ᾽ ἀπῄει ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἤδη μετάπεμπτος, ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι φεύξοιτο, μηνύει τοῖς τῶν Συρακοσίων φίλοις τοῖς ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ ξυνειδὼς τὸ μέλλον: οἱ δὲ τούς τε ἄνδρας διέφθειραν πρότερον καὶ τότε στασιάζοντες καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις ὄντες ἐπεκράτουν μὴ δέχεσθαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ ταῦτα βουλόμενοι. [2] ἡμέρας δὲ μείναντες περὶ τρεῖς καὶ δέκα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὡς ἐχειμάζοντο καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκ εἶχον καὶ προυχώρει οὐδέν, ἀπελθόντες ἐς Νάξον καὶ ὅρια καὶ σταυρώματα περὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ποιησάμενοι αὐτοῦ διεχείμαζον: καὶ τριήρη ἀπέστειλαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπί τε χρήματα καὶ ἱππέας, ὅπως ἅμα τῷ ἦρι παραγένωνται.

[74] No sooner had the Athenians returned in the fleet to Catana than they sailed to Messenè, expecting that the city would be betrayed to them. But they were disappointed. For Alcibiades, when he was recalled and gave up his command, foreseeing that he would be an exile, communicated to the Syracusan party at Messenè the plot of which he was cognisant. They at once put to death the persons whom he indicated; and on the appearance of the Athenians the same party, rising and arming, prevented their admission. The Athenians remained there about thirteen days, but the weather was bad, their provisions failed, and they had no success. So they went to Naxos, and having surrounded their camp with a palisade, proposed to pass the winter there. They also despatched a trireme to Athens for money and cavalry, which were to arrive at the beginning of spring.

75. ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δι᾽ ἐλάσσονος εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, καὶ τὰ Μέγαρα

φρούριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιείῳ ἄλλο: καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν προυσταύρωσαν πανταχῇ ᾗ ἀποβάσεις ἦσαν. [2] καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἰδότες ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ χειμάζοντας ἐστράτευσαν πανδημεὶ ἐπὶ τὴν Κατάνην, καὶ τῆς τε γῆς αὐτῶν ἔτεμον καὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων σκηνὰς καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐμπρήσαντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. [3] καὶ πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐς τὴν Καμάριναν κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Λάχητος γενομένην ξυμμαχίαν πρεσβεύεσθαι, εἴ πως προσαγάγοιντο αὐτούς, ἀντεπρεσβεύοντο καὶ αὐτοί: ἦσαν γὰρ ὕποπτοι αὐτοῖς οἱ Καμαριναῖοι μὴ προθύμως σφίσι μήτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην μάχην πέμψαι ἃ ἔπεμψαν, ἔς τε τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ οὐκέτι βούλωνται ἀμύνειν, ὁρῶντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῇ μάχῃ εὖ πράξαντας, προσχωρῶσι δ᾽ αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν προτέραν φιλίαν πεισθέντες. [4] ἀφικομένων οὖν ἑκ μὲν Συρακουσῶν Ἑρμοκράτους καὶ ἄλλων ἐς τὴν Καμάριναν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Εὐφήμου μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων, ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης ξυλλόγου γενομένου τῶν Καμαριναίων βουλόμενος προδιαβάλλειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

[75] The Syracusans employed the winter in various defensive works. Close to the city they built a wall, which took in the shrine of Apollo Temenites and extended all along that side of Syracuse which looks towards Epipolae; they thus enlarged the area of the city, and increased the difficulty of investing it in case of defeat. They fortified and garrisoned Megara, and also raised a fort at the Olympieum, besides fixing stockades at all the landing-places along the shore. They knew that the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, and so, marching out with their whole army to Catana, they ravaged the country and burnt the huts and the camp of the Athenians; they then returned home. They heard that the Athenians were sending an embassy to gain over the Camarinaeans on the strength of their former alliance, which had been made under Laches, and they despatched a counter embassy of their own. They suspected that the Camarinaeans had not been over-zealous in sending their contingent to the first battle, and would not be

willing to assist them any longer now that the Athenians had gained a victory; old feelings of friendship would revive, and they would be induced to join them. Accordingly Hermocrates came with an embassy to Camarina, and Euphemus with another embassy from the Athenians. An assembly of the Camarinaeans was held, at which Hermocrates, hoping to raise a prejudice against the Athenians, spoke as follows:

76. ‘οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν δύναμιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὦ Καμαριναῖοι, μὴ αὐτὴν καταπλαγῆτε δείσαντες ἐπρεσβευσάμεθα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν λόγους, πρίν τι καὶ ἡμῶν ἀκοῦσαι, μὴ ὑμᾶς πείσωσιν. [2] ἥκουσι γὰρ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν προφάσει μὲν ᾗ πυνθάνεσθε, διανοίᾳ δὲ ἣν πάντες ὑπονοοῦμεν: καί μοι δοκοῦσιν οὐ Λεοντίνους βούλεσθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον ἐξοικίσαι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ εὔλογον τὰς μὲν ἐκεῖ πόλεις ἀναστάτους ποιεῖν, τὰς δὲ ἐνθάδε κατοικίζειν, καὶ Λεοντίνων μὲν Χαλκιδέων ὄντων κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς κήδεσθαι, Χαλκιδέας δὲ τοὺς ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ, ὧν οἵδε ἄποικοί εἰσι, δουλωσαμένους ἔχειν. [3] τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἰδέᾳ ἐκεῖνά τε ἔσχον καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νῦν πειρῶνται: ἡγεμόνες γὰρ γενόμενοι ἑκόντων τῶν τε Ἰώνων καὶ ὅσοι ἀπὸ σφῶν ἦσαν ξύμμαχοι ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ Μήδου τιμωρίᾳ, τοὺς μὲν λιποστρατίαν, τοὺς δὲ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλους στρατεύειν, τοῖς δ᾽ ὡς ἑκάστοις τινὰ εἶχον αἰτίαν εὐπρεπῆ ἐπενεγκόντες κατεστρέψαντο. [4] καὶ οὐ περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἄρα οὔτε οὗτοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὔθ᾽ οἱ Ἕλληνες τῆς ἑαυτῶν τῷ Μήδῳ ἀντέστησαν, περὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν σφίσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκείνῳ καταδουλώσεως, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ δεσπότου μεταβολῇ οὐκ ἀξυνετωτέρου, κακοξυνετωτέρου δέ.

[76] ‘We are not here, Camarinaeans, because we suppose that the presence of the Athenian army will dismay you; we are more afraid of their as yet unuttered words, to which you may too readily lend an ear if you hear them without first hearing us. You know the pretext on which they have come to Sicily, but we can all guess their real intentions. If I am

not mistaken they want, not to restore the Leontines to their city, but to drive us out of ours. Who can believe that they who desolate the cities of Hellas mean to restore those of Sicily, or that the enslavers and oppressors of the Chalcidians in Euboea have any feeling of kindred towards the colonists of these Chalcidians in Leontini? In their conquests at home, and in their attempt to conquer Sicily, is not the principle upon which they act one and the same? The Ionians and other colonists of theirs who were their allies, wanting to be revenged on the Persian, freely invited them to be their leaders; and they accepted the invitation. But soon they charged them, some with desertion, and some with making war upon each other; any plausible accusation which they could bring against any of them became an excuse for their overthrow. It was not for the liberties of Hellas that Athens, or for her own liberty that Hellas, fought against the Persian; they fought, the Athenians that they might enslave Hellas to themselves instead of him, the rest of the Hellenes that they might get a new master, who may be cleverer, but certainly makes a more dishonest use of his wits.

77. ‘ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων εὐκατηγόρητον οὖσαν πόλιν νῦν ἥκομεν ἀποφανοῦντες ἐν εἰδόσιν ὅσα ἀδικεῖ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς αἰτιασόμενοι ὅτι ἔχοντες παραδείγματα τῶν τ᾽ ἐκεῖ Ἑλλήνων ὡς ἐδουλώθησαν οὐκ ἀμύνοντες σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, καὶ νῦν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς ταὐτὰ παρόντα σοφίσματα, Λεοντίνων τε ξυγγενῶν κατοικίσεις καὶ Ἐγεσταίων ξυμμάχων ἐπικουρίας, οὐ ξυστραφέντες βουλόμεθα προθυμότερον δεῖξαι αὐτοῖς ὅτι οὐκ Ἴωνες τάδε εἰσὶν οὐδ᾽ Ἑλλησπόντιοι καὶ νησιῶται, οἳ δεσπότην ἢ Μῆδον ἢ ἕνα γέ τινα αἰεὶ μεταβάλλοντες δουλοῦνται, ἀλλὰ Δωριῆς ἐλεύθεροι ἀπ᾽ αὐτονόμου τῆς Πελοποννήσου τὴν Σικελίαν οἰκοῦντες. [2] ἢ μένομεν ἕως ἂν ἕκαστοι κατὰ πόλεις ληφθῶμεν, εἰδότες ὅτι ταύτῃ μόνον ἀλωτοί ἐσμεν καὶ ὁρῶντες αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος τρεπομένους ὥστε τοὺς μὲν λόγοις ἡμῶν διιστάναι, τοὺς δὲ

ξυμμάχων ἐλπίδι ἐκπολεμοῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἑκάστοις τι προσηνὲς λέγοντες δύνανται κακουργεῖν; καὶ οἰόμεθα τοῦ ἄπωθεν ξυνοίκου προαπολλυμένου οὐ καὶ ἐς αὐτόν τινα ἥξειν τὸ δεινόν, πρὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πάσχοντα καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν δυστυχεῖν;

[77] ‘However, the character of the Athenians is known to you already, and we do not come here to set forth their enormities, which would be an easy task, but rather to accuse ourselves. We have had a warning in the fate of the Hellenes elsewhere; we know that they were reduced to slavery because they would not stand by one another. And when the same tricks are practised upon us, and we hear the old tale once more about the restoration of “our kinsmen the Leontines,” and the succour of “our allies the Egestaeans,” why do we not all rise as one man and show them that here they will find, not Ionians, nor yet Hellespontians, nor islanders, who must always be the slaves, if not of the Persian, of some other master; but Dorians and free inhabitants of Sicily, sprung from the independent soil of Peloponnesus? Are we waiting till our cities are taken one by one, when we know that this is the only way in which we can be conquered? We see what their policy is: how in some cases their cunning words sow ill-feeling; in others they stir up war by the offer of alliance; or again, by some well-invented phrase specially agreeable to an individual state they do it all the mischief which they can. And does any one suppose that, if his countryman at a distance perishes, the danger will not reach him, or that he who suffers first will have no companions in ruin?

78. καὶ εἴ τῳ ἄρα παρέστηκε τὸν μὲν Συρακόσιον, ἑαυτὸν δ᾽ οὐ πολέμιον εἶναι τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ, καὶ δεινὸν ἡγεῖται ὑπέρ γε τῆς ἐμῆς κινδυνεύειν, ἐνθυμηθήτω οὐ περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς μᾶλλον, ἐν ἴσῳ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ μαχούμενος, τοσούτῳ δὲ καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον ὅσῳ οὐ προδιεφθαρμένου ἐμοῦ, ἔχων δὲ ξύμμαχον ἐμὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐρῆμος ἀγωνιεῖται: τόν τε Ἀθηναῖον μὴ τὴν τοῦ Συρακοσίου

ἔχθραν κολάσασθαι, τῇ δ᾽ ἐμῇ προφάσει τὴν ἐκείνου φιλίαν οὐχ ἧσσον βεβαιώσασθαι βούλεσθαι. [2] εἴ τέ τις φθονεῖ μὲν ἢ καὶ φοβεῖται ⸀ἀμφότερα γὰρ τάδε πάσχει τὰ μείζω⸁, διὰ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰς Συρακούσας κακωθῆναι μὲν ἵνα σωφρονισθῶμεν βούλεται, περιγενέσθαι δὲ ἕνεκα τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀσφαλείας, οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνης δυνάμεως βούλησιν ἐλπίζει: οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἅμα τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τῆς τύχης τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμοίως ταμίαν γενέσθαι. [3] καὶ εἰ γνώμῃ ἁμάρτοι, τοῖς αὐτοῦ κακοῖς ὀλοφυρθεὶς τάχ᾽ ἂν ἴσως καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποτὲ βουληθείη αὖθις φθονῆσαι. ἀδύνατον δὲ προεμένῳ καὶ μὴ τοὺς αὐτοὺς κινδύνους οὐ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἔργων, ἐθελήσαντι προσλαβεῖν: λόγῳ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡμετέραν δύναμιν σῴζοι ἄν τις, ἔργῳ δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ σωτηρίαν. [4] καὶ μάλιστα εἰκὸς ἦν ὑμᾶς, ὦ Καμαριναῖοι, ὁμόρους ὄντας καὶ τὰ δεύτερα κινδυνεύσοντας προορᾶσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ μαλακῶς ὥσπερ νῦν ξυμμαχεῖν, αὐτοὺς δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον ἰόντας, ἅπερ ἂν εἰ ἐς τὴν Καμαριναίαν πρῶτον ἀφίκοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεόμενοι ἂν ἐπεκαλεῖσθε, ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ νῦν παρακελευομένους ὅπως μηδὲν ἐνδώσομεν φαίνεσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ οὔθ᾽ ὑμεῖς νῦν γέ πω οὔθ᾽ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὥρμησθε.

[78] ‘If any one fancies that not he, but the Syracusan, is the enemy of the Athenian, and asks indignantly “Why should I risk myself for you?” let him consider that in fighting for my country he will be at the same time fighting in mine for his own. And he will fight with less danger, because I shall still be in existence; he will not carry on the struggle alone, for he will have me for an ally. Let him consider that the Athenian is not really seeking to chastise the enmity of the Syracusan, but under pretence of attacking me may be quite as desirous of drawing hard and fast the bonds of friendship with him. And if any one from envy, or possibly from fear (for greatness is exposed to both), would have Syracuse suffer that we may receive a lesson, but survive for his own security, he is asking to have a thing which human power cannot compass. For a man may regulate his own desires,

but he is not the dispenser of fortune; the time may come when he will find himself mistaken, and while mourning over his own ruin he may possibly wish that he could still have my prosperity to envy. But he cannot bring me back again when he has once abandoned me and has refused to take his share in the common danger, which, far from being imaginary, is only too real. For though in name you may be saving me, in reality you will be saving yourselves. And you especially, Camarinaeans, who are our next neighbours, and on whom the danger will fall next, should have anticipated all this, and not be so slack in your alliance. Instead of our coming to you, you should have come to us. Suppose the Athenians had gone to Camarina first, would you not at this moment be begging and praying for assistance? Then why did not you present yourselves at Syracuse, and say to us in our time of danger, “Never yield to the enemy”? But, hitherto, neither you nor any of the Sicilians have shown a spirit like this.

79. ‘Δειλίᾳ δὲ ἴσως τὸ δίκαιον πρός τε ἡμᾶς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιόντας θεραπεύσετε, λέγοντες ξυμμαχίαν εἶναι ὑμῖν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους: ἤν γε οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἐποιήσασθε, τῶν δὲ ἐχθρῶν ἤν τις ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἴῃ, καὶ τοῖς γε Ἀθηναίοις βοηθεῖν, ὅταν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων καὶ μὴ αὐτοὶ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς πέλας ἀδικῶσιν, [2] ἐπεὶ οὐδ᾽ οἱ Ῥηγῖνοι ὄντες Χαλκιδῆς Χαλκιδέας ὄντας Λεοντίνους ἐθέλουσι ξυγκατοικίζειν. καὶ δεινὸν εἰ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τὸ ἔργον τοῦ καλοῦ δικαιώματος ὑποπτεύοντες ἀλόγως σωφρονοῦσιν, ὑμεῖς δ᾽ εὐλόγῳ προφάσει τοὺς μὲν φύσει πολεμίους βούλεσθε ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον φύσει ξυγγενεῖς μετὰ τῶν ἐχθίστων διαφθεῖραι. [3] ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δίκαιον, ἀμύνειν δὲ καὶ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὴν παρασκευὴν αὐτῶν: οὐ γὰρ ἢν ἡμεῖς ξυστῶμεν πάντες δεινή ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤν, ὅπερ οὗτοι σπεύδουσι, τἀναντία διαστῶμεν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μόνους ἐλθόντες καὶ μάχῃ περιγενόμενοι ἔπραξαν ἃ ἐβούλοντο, ἀπῆλθον δὲ διὰ τάχους.

[79] ‘You may perhaps disguise your cowardice under the pretence of impartiality; you may balance between us and

the invaders, and plead that you have an alliance with the Athenians. But that alliance was made on the supposition that you were invaded by an enemy, not against a friend; and you promised to assist the Athenians if they were wronged by others, not when, as now, they are doing wrong themselves. Are the Rhegians who are Chalcidians so very anxious to join in the restoration of their Leontine kinsmen? And yet how monstrous that they, suspecting the real meaning of this plausible claim, should display a prudence for which they can give no reason; and that you, who have every reason for a like prudence, should be eager to assist your natural enemies, and to conspire with them for the destruction of those who by a higher law are your still more natural kinsmen. This should not be. You must make a stand against them. And do not be afraid of their armament. There is no danger if we hold together; the danger is in disunion, and they want to disunite us. Even when they engaged with our unaided forces, and defeated us in battle, they failed in their main purpose, and quickly retired.

80. ὥστε οὐχ ἁθρόους γε ὄντας εἰκὸς ἀθυμεῖν, ἰέναι δὲ ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προθυμότερον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου παρεσομένης ὠφελίας, οἳ τῶνδε κρείσσους εἰσὶ τὸ παράπαν τὰ πολέμια: καὶ μὴ ἐκείνην τὴν προμηθίαν δοκεῖν τῳ ἡμῖν μὲν ἴσην εἶναι, ὑμῖν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ, τὸ μηδετέροις δὴ ὡς καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντας ξυμμάχους βοηθεῖν. [2] οὐ γὰρ ἔργῳ ἴσον ὥσπερ τῷ δικαιώματί ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ δι᾽ ὑμᾶς μὴ ξυμμαχήσαντας ὅ τε παθὼν σφαλήσεται καὶ ὁ κρατῶν περιέσται, τί ἄλλο ἢ τῇ αὐτῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τοῖς μὲν οὐκ ἠμύνατε σωθῆναι, τοὺς δὲ οὐκ ἐκωλύσατε κακοὺς γενέσθαι; καίτοι κάλλιον τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις καὶ ἅμα ξυγγενέσι προσθεμένους τήν τε κοινὴν ὠφελίαν τῇ Σικελίᾳ φυλάξαι καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους φίλους δὴ ὄντας μὴ ἐᾶσαι ἁμαρτεῖν. [3] ᾽ξυνελόντες τε λέγομεν οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐκδιδάσκειν μὲν οὐδὲν ἔργον εἶναι σαφῶς οὔτε ὑμᾶς οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ οὐδὲν χεῖρον γιγνώσκετε: δεόμεθα δὲ καὶ μαρτυρόμεθα ἅμα, εἰ μὴ πείσομεν, ὅτι

ἐπιβουλευόμεθα μὲν ὑπὸ Ἰώνων αἰεὶ πολεμίων, προδιδόμεθα δὲ ὑπὸ ὑμῶν Δωριῆς Δωριῶν. [4] καὶ εἰ καταστρέψονται ἡμᾶς Ἀθηναῖοι, ταῖς μὲν ὑμετέραις γνώμαις κρατήσουσι, τῷ δ᾽ αὐτῶν ὀνόματι τιμηθήσονται, καὶ τῆς νίκης οὐκ ἄλλον τινὰ ἆθλον ἢ τὸν τὴν νίκην παρασχόντα λήψονται: καὶ εἰ αὖ ἡμεῖς περιεσόμεθα, τῆς αἰτίας τῶν κινδύνων οἱ αὐτοὶ τὴν τιμωρίαν ὑφέξετε. [5] σκοπεῖτε οὖν καὶ αἱρεῖσθε ἤδη ἢ τὴν αὐτίκα ἀκινδύνως δουλείαν ἢ κἂν περιγενόμενοι μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν τούσδε τε μὴ αἰσχρῶς δεσπότας λαβεῖν καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχθραν μὴ ἂν βραχεῖαν γενομένην διαφυγεῖν.’

[80] ‘If then we can once unite, there is no reason for discouragement. But there is every reason why you, who are our allies, should meet us more cordially. We may be sure that help will come to us from Peloponnesus, and the Peloponnesians are far better soldiers than the Athenians. Let no one think that the caution which professes to be in league with both, and therefore gives aid to neither, is just to us or safe for you. Such a policy, though it may pretend to impartiality, is really unjust. For if through your absence the victor overcomes and the vanquished falls, have you not abandoned the one to his fate, and allowed the other to commit a crime? How much nobler would it be to join your injured kinsmen, and thereby maintain the common interest of Sicily and save the Athenians, whom you call your friends, from doing wrong!’To sum up: We Syracusans are quite aware that there is no use in our dilating to you or to any one else on matters which you know as well as ourselves. But we prefer a prayer to you; and solemnly adjure you to consider, that, if you reject us, we, who are Dorians like yourselves, are betrayed by you to Ionians, our inveterate enemies, who are seeking our ruin. If the Athenians subdue us, your decision will have gained them the day; but the honour will be all their own, and the authors of their victory will be the prize of their victory. If on the other hand we conquer, you who have brought the peril upon us will have to suffer the penalty. Reflect then, and take your choice: will

you have present safety and slavery, or the hope of delivering yourselves and us, and thereby escaping the dishonour of submitting to the Athenian yoke, and the danger of our enmity, which will not be short-lived?’

81. τοιαῦτα μὲν ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης εἶπεν. ὁ δ᾽ Εὔφημος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πρεσβευτὴς μετ᾽ αὐτὸν τοιάδε.

[81] Thus spoke Hermocrates. Euphemus, the Athenian envoy, replied as follows:

82. ‘ἀφικόμεθα μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς πρότερον οὔσης ξυμμαχίας ἀνανεώσει, τοῦ δὲ Συρακοσίου καθαψαμένου ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰπεῖν ὡς εἰκότως ἔχομεν. [2] τὸ μὲν οὖν μέγιστον μαρτύριον αὐτὸς εἶπεν, ὅτι οἱ Ἴωνες αἰεί ποτε πολέμιοι τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν εἰσίν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ οὕτως: ἡμεῖς γὰρ Ἴωνες ὄντες Πελοποννησίοις Δωριεῦσι καὶ πλέοσιν οὖσι καὶ παροικοῦσιν ἐσκεψάμεθα ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἥκιστα αὐτῶν ὑπακουσόμεθα, [3] καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ ναῦς κτησάμενοι τῆς μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἀπηλλάγημεν,οὐδὲν προσῆκον μᾶλλόν τι ἐκείνους ἡμῖν ἢ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνοις ἐπιτάσσειν, πλὴν καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐν τῷ παρόντι μεῖζον ἴσχυον, αὐτοὶ δὲ τῶν ὑπὸ βασιλεῖ πρότερον ὄντων ἡγεμόνες καταστάντες οἰκοῦμεν, νομίσαντες ἥκιστ᾽ ἂν ὑπὸ Πελοποννησίοις οὕτως εἶναι, δύναμιν ἔχοντες ᾗ ἀμυνούμεθα, καὶ ἐς τὸ ἀκριβὲς εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ ἀδίκως καταστρεψάμενοι τούς τε Ἴωνας καὶ νησιώτας, οὓς ξυγγενεῖς φασὶν ὄντας ἡμᾶς Συρακόσιοι δεδουλῶσθαι. [4] ἦλθον γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν μητρόπολιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ Μήδου καὶ οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν ἀποστάντες τὰ οἰκεῖα φθεῖραι, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς ἐκλιπόντες τὴν πόλιν, δουλείαν δὲ αὐτοί τε ἐβούλοντο καὶ ἡμῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπενεγκεῖν.

[82] ‘We had come to renew our former alliance, but the attack made upon us by the Syracusan envoy renders it necessary for us to vindicate our title to empire. He himself bore the strongest witness in our favour when he said that Dorians and Ionians are inveterate enemies. And so they are. We Ionians dwelling in the neighbourhood of the Peloponnesians (who are Dorians and more numerous than

ourselves) have had to consider the best way of securing our independence. After the Persian War we were delivered by the help of our newly-acquired navy from the rule and supremacy of Lacedaemon; they had no more right to domineer over us than we over them, except the right of the stronger, which at the time they possessed. We then assumed the leadership of the King's former subjects, which we still retain; if we were not to be the slaves of the Peloponnesians we thought that we must have the means of self-defence. And what if we did subjugate those kinsmen of ours whom the Syracusans say that we have enslaved, the Ionians and the islanders? On the strictest principles, where was the injustice? For we were their mother-city, and they joined in the Persian invasion. They had not the courage to revolt from him and to destroy their homes, as we did when we left our city. But they chose slavery for their own portion, and would have imposed it upon us.

83. ἀνθ᾽ ὧν ἄξιοί τε ὄντες ἅμα ἄρχομεν, ὅτι τε ναυτικὸν πλεῖστόν τε καὶ προθυμίαν ἀπροφάσιστον παρεσχόμεθα ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, καὶ διότι καὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ἑτοίμως τοῦτο δρῶντες οὗτοι ἡμᾶς ἔβλαπτον, ἅμα δὲ τῆς πρὸς Πελοποννησίους ἰσχύος ὀρεγόμενοι. [2] καὶ οὐ καλλιεπούμεθα ὡς ἢ τὸν βάρβαρον μόνοι καθελόντες εἰκότως ἄρχομεν ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῇ τῶνδε μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ξυμπάντων τε καὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ αὐτῶν κινδυνεύσαντες. πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὴν προσήκουσαν σωτηρίαν ἐκπορίζεσθαι. καὶ νῦν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀσφαλείας ἕνεκα καὶ ἐνθάδε παρόντες ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὑμῖν ταὐτὰ ξυμφέροντα. [3] ἀποφαίνομεν δὲ ἐξ ὧν οἵδε τε διαβάλλουσι καὶ ὑμεῖς μάλιστα ἐπὶ τὸ φοβερώτερον ὑπονοεῖτε, εἰδότες τοὺς περιδεῶς ὑποπτεύοντάς τι λόγου μὲν ἡδονῇ τὸ παραυτίκα τερπομένους, τῇ δ᾽ ἐγχειρήσει ὕστερον τὰ ξυμφέροντα πράσσοντας. [4] τήν τε γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν εἰρήκαμεν διὰ δέος ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥκειν μετὰ τῶν φίλων ἀσφαλῶς καταστησόμενοι, καὶ οὐ δουλωσόμενοι, μὴ παθεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο κωλύσοντες.

[83] ‘We rule then, in the first place, because we deserve to rule; for we provided the largest navy and showed the most patriotic alacrity in the cause of Hellas; while those who became our subjects were willing slaves to the Persian, and were doing us mischief. And secondly, we were anxious to gain additional strength against the Peloponnesians. We use no fine words: we do not tell you that we have a right to rule on the ground that we alone overthrew the Barbarians, nor do we pretend that we fought for the liberty of our allies, and not equally for the general liberty and for our own. Can any man be blamed because he makes the natural provision for his own safety? The same care of our safety has brought us hither, and we can see that our presence here is for your benefit as well as for ours. This we will prove to you; and our proofs shall be drawn from the calumnies of our enemies, and from the suspicions and fears which most sway your minds. For we know that those who are timorous and mistrustful may be won for the moment by alluring words, but that when the time of action comes they follow their own interests.’We have told you already that fear makes us maintain our empire at home; and that a like fear brings us to your shores. For we desire by the help of our friends to secure our position in Sicily. And we have not come to enslave you, but to save you from being enslaved.

84. ‘ὑπολάβῃ δὲ μηδεὶς ὡς οὐδὲν προσῆκον ὑμῶν κηδόμεθα, γνοὺς ὅτι σῳζομένων ὑμῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀσθενεῖς ὑμᾶς ὄντας ἀντέχειν Συρακοσίοις ἧσσον ἂν τούτων πεμψάντων τινὰ δύναμιν Πελοποννησίοις ἡμεῖς βλαπτοίμεθα. [2] καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προσήκετε ἤδη ἡμῖν τὰ μέγιστα. διόπερ καὶ τοὺς Λεοντίνους εὔλογον κατοικίζειν μὴ ὑπηκόους ὥσπερ τοὺς ξυγγενεῖς αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς δυνατωτάτους, ἵνα ἐκ τῆς σφετέρας ὅμοροι ὄντες τοῖσδε ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λυπηροὶ ὦσιν. [3] τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀρκοῦμεν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, ὃν ἀλόγως ἡμᾶς φησὶ δουλωσαμένους τοὺς ἐνθάδε ἐλευθεροῦν, ξύμφορος ἡμῖν ἀπαράσκευος ὢν καὶ χρήματα μόνον φέρων,

τὰ δὲ ἐνθάδε καὶ Λεοντῖνοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι φίλοι ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτονομούμενοι.

[84] Let no one imagine that your welfare is no business of ours, for if you are preserved, and are strong enough to hold out against the Syracusans, they will be less likely to aid the Peloponnesians, and so to injure us. Thus you become at once our first concern. And we are quite consistent in restoring the Leontines, not to be subjects, like their kinsmen in Euboea, but to be as strong as ever we can make them, that from their position on the border they may harass the Syracusans and do our work. In Hellas we are a match for our enemies single-handed; and as to our subjection of the Chalcidians at home, which Hermocrates finds so inconsistent with our emancipation of the Chalcidians here, it is for our advantage, on the one hand, that the cities of Euboea should have no armed force and contribute money only, and, on the other hand, that the Leontines and our friends in Sicily should be as independent as possible.

85. ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ ἢ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ οὐδὲν ἄλογον ὅτι ξυμφέρον οὐδ᾽ οἰκεῖον ὅτι μὴ πιστόν: πρὸς ἕκαστα δὲ δεῖ ἢ ἐχθρὸν ἢ φίλον μετὰ καιροῦ γίγνεσθαι. καὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦτο ὠφελεῖ ἐνθάδε, οὐκ ἦν τοὺς φίλους κακώσωμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἢν οἱ ἐχθροὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν φίλων ῥώμην ἀδύνατοι ὦσιν. [2] ἀπιστεῖν δὲ οὐ χρή: καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἐκεῖ ξυμμάχους ὡς ἕκαστοι χρήσιμοι ἐξηγούμεθα, Χίους μὲν καὶ Μηθυμναίους νεῶν παροκωχῇ αὐτονόμους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς χρημάτων βιαιότερον φορᾷ, ἄλλους δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλευθέρως ξυμμαχοῦντας, καίπερ νησιώτας ὄντας καὶ εὐλήπτους, διότι ἐν χωρίοις ἐπικαίροις εἰσὶ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον. [3] ὥστε καὶ τἀνθάδε εἰκὸς πρὸς τὸ λυσιτελοῦν, καὶ ὃ λέγομεν, ἐς Συρακοσίους δέος καθίστασθαι. ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἐφίενται ὑμῶν καὶ βούλονται ἐπὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ ξυστήσαντες ὑμᾶς ὑπόπτῳ, βίᾳ ἢ καὶ κατ᾽ ἐρημίαν, ἀπράκτων ἡμῶν ἀπελθόντων, αὐτοὶ ἄρξαι τῆς Σικελίας. ἀνάγκη δέ, ἢν ξυστῆτε πρὸς αὐτούς: οὔτε γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι ἔσται ἰσχὺς τοσαύτη ἐς ἓν ξυστᾶσα

εὐμεταχείριστος, οὔθ᾽ οἵδ᾽ ἀσθενεῖς ἂν ἡμῶν μὴ παρόντων πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἶεν.

[85] ‘Now to a tyrant or to an imperial city nothing is inconsistent which is expedient, and no man is a kinsman who cannot be trusted. In each case we must make friends or enemies according to circumstances, and here our interest requires, not that we should weaken our friends, but that our friends should be too strong for our enemies. Do not mistrust us. In Hellas we act upon the same principle, managing our allies as our interest requires in their several cases. The Chians and Methymnaeans furnish us with ships, and are their own masters; the majority are less independent, and pay a tribute; others, although they are islanders and might be easily conquered, enjoy complete freedom, because they are situated conveniently for operations about Peloponnesus. So that in Sicily too our policy is likely to be determined by our interest, and, as I was saying, by our fear of the Syracusans. For they desire to be your masters, but first they must unite you in a common suspicion of us, and then either by force, or through your isolation, when we have failed and retired, they will dominate Sicily. This is inevitable if you now join them. Your united power will be more than we can manage, and the Syracusans, when we are gone, will be too much for you.

86. καὶ ὅτῳ ταῦτα μὴ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον ἐλέγχει. τὸ γὰρ πρότερον ἡμᾶς ἐπηγάγεσθε οὐκ ἄλλον τινὰ προσείοντες φόβον ἤ, εἰ περιοψόμεθα ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ Συρακοσίοις γενέσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν. [2] καὶ νῦν οὐ δίκαιον, ᾧπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἠξιοῦτε λόγῳ πείθειν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἀπιστεῖν, οὐδ᾽ ὅτι δυνάμει μείζονι πρὸς τὴν τῶνδε ἰσχὺν πάρεσμεν ὑποπτεύεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖσδε ἀπιστεῖν. [3] ἡμεῖς μέν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν, εἴ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαίμεθα, ἀδύνατοι κατασχεῖν διὰ μῆκός τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων καὶ τῇ παρασκευῇ ἠπειρωτίδων: οἵδε δὲ οὐ στρατοπέδῳ, πόλει δὲ μείζονι τῆς ἡμετέρας παρουσίας ἐποικοῦντες ὑμῖν αἰεί τε

ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ ὅταν καιρὸν λάβωσιν ἑκάστου, [4] οὐκ ἀνιᾶσιν ⸂ἔδειξαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἤδη καὶ τὰ ἐς Λεοντίνους⸃, καὶ νῦν τολμῶσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ταῦτα κωλύοντας καὶ ἀνέχοντας τὴν Σικελίαν μέχρι τοῦδε μὴ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοὺς εἶναι παρακαλεῖν ὑμᾶς ὡς ἀναισθήτους. [5] πολὺ δὲ ἐπὶ ἀληθεστέραν γε σωτηρίαν ἡμεῖς ἀντιπαρακαλοῦμεν, δεόμενοι τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀμφοτέροις μὴ προδιδόναι, νομίσαι δὲ τοῖσδε μὲν καὶ ἄνευ ξυμμάχων αἰεὶ ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἑτοίμην διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι ὁδόν, ὑμῖν δ᾽ οὐ πολλάκις παρασχήσειν μετὰ τοσῆσδε ἐπικουρίας ἀμύνασθαι: ἢν εἰ τῷ ὑπόπτῳ ἢ ἄπρακτον ἐάσετε ἀπελθεῖν ἢ καὶ σφαλεῖσαν, ἔτι βουλήσεσθε καὶ πολλοστὸν μόριον αὐτῆς ἰδεῖν, ὅτε οὐδὲν ἔτι περανεῖ παραγενόμενον ὑμῖν.

[86] He who thinks otherwise is convicted out of his own mouth. For when you originally invited us, the danger which we should incur if we allowed you to fall into the hands of the Syracusans was precisely what you held before our eyes, and now you ought not to distrust the argument which you thought good enough for us. Nor should you suspect us because we bring hither a force larger than before; for we have to contend against the power of Syracuse. Much more to be mistrusted are they. Without your aid we cannot even remain where we are, and if we were so dishonourable as to make conquests we should be unable to retain them, for the voyage is long, and it would be a hopeless task to garrison great cities which, though situated on an island, have the resources of a continent. Whereas these men are your nearest neighbours. And they dwell, not in a camp, but in a city far more powerful than the forces which we have brought to Sicily; they are always scheming against you, and never miss a chance, as they have often shown, especially in their conduct towards the Leontines. And now they have the impudence to stir you up against those who resist them, and have thus far saved Sicily from passing under their yoke. As if you had no eyes! Far more real than the security offered by them is that to which we invite you, a

security which we and you gain from one another, and we beseech you not to throw it away. Reflect: the Syracusans are so numerous that with or without allies they can always find their way to you, but you will not often have the chance of defending yourself with the aid of an army like ours. And if from any suspicion you allow us to depart unsuccessful, or perhaps defeated, the time may come when you will desire to see but a fraction of that army, although, if it came, it would be too late to save you.

87. ‘ἀλλὰ μήτε ὑμεῖς, ὦ Καμαριναῖοι, ταῖς τῶνδε διαβολαῖς ἀναπείθεσθε μήτε οἱ ἄλλοι: εἰρήκαμεν δ᾽ ὑμῖν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὧν ὑποπτευόμεθα, καὶ ἔτι ἐν κεφαλαίοις ὑπομνήσαντες ἀξιώσομεν πείθειν. [2] φαμὲν γὰρ ἄρχειν μὲν τῶν ἐκεῖ, ἵνα μὴ ὑπακούωμεν ἄλλου, ἐλευθεροῦν δὲ τὰ ἐνθάδε, ὅπως μὴ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν βλαπτώμεθα, πολλὰ δ᾽ ἀναγκάζεσθαι πράσσειν, διότι καὶ πολλὰ φυλασσόμεθα, ξύμμαχοι δὲ καὶ νῦν καὶ πρότερον τοῖς ἐνθάδε ὑμῶν ἀδικουμένοις οὐκ ἄκλητοι, παρακληθέντες δὲ ἥκειν. [3] καὶ ὑμεῖς μήθ᾽ ὡς δικασταὶ γενόμενοι τῶν ἡμῖν ποιουμένων μήθ᾽ ὡς σωφρονισταί, ὃ χαλεπὸν ἤδη, ἀποτρέπειν πειρᾶσθε, καθ᾽ ὅσον δέ τι ὑμῖν τῆς ἡμετέρας πολυπραγμοσύνης καὶ τρόπου τὸ αὐτὸ ξυμφέρει, τούτῳ ἀπολαβόντες χρήσασθε, καὶ νομίσατε μὴ πάντας ἐν ἴσῳ βλάπτειν αὐτά, πολὺ δὲ πλείους τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ὠφελεῖν: [4] ἐν παντὶ γὰρ πᾶς χωρίῳ, καὶ ᾧ μὴ ὑπάρχομεν, ὅ τε οἰόμενος ἀδικήσεσθαι καὶ ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων διὰ τὸ ἑτοίμην ὑπεῖναι ἐλπίδα τῷ μὲν ἀντιτυχεῖν ἐπικουρίας ἀφ᾽ ἡμῶν, τῷ δὲ εἰ ἥξομεν, μὴ ἀδεεῖ εἶναι κινδυνεύειν, ἀμφότεροι ἀναγκάζονται ὁ μὲν ἄκων σωφρονεῖν, ὁ δ᾽ ἀπραγμόνως σῴζεσθαι. [5] ταύτην οὖν τὴν κοινὴν τῷ τε δεομένῳ καὶ ὑμῖν νῦν παροῦσαν ἀσφάλειαν μὴ ἀπώσησθε, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξισώσαντες τοῖς ἄλλοις μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰεὶ φυλάσσεσθαι αὐτούς, καὶ ἀντεπιβουλεῦσαί ποτε ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου μεταλάβετε.’

[87] ‘But we would not have either you, Camarinaeans, or others moved by their calumnies. We have told you the whole truth about the suspicions which are entertained of

us; we will now sum up our arguments, and we think that they ought to convince you. We rule over the cities of Hellas in order to maintain our independence, and we emancipate the cities of Sicily that they may not be used against us. And we are compelled to adopt a policy of interference because we have many interests to guard. Lastly, we come now, as we came before, not uninvited, but upon your own invitation to assist those of you who are suffering wrong. Do not sit in judgment upon our actions, or seek to school us into moderation and so divert us from our purpose, (the time for good advice has gone by), but in as far as our busy, meddlesome spirit can be of service to you as well as to ourselves, take and use us, remembering that these qualities, so far from being injurious to all alike, actually benefit great numbers of the Hellenes. For in all places — however remote from our sphere — both he who fears and he who intends injustice, the one because he has a lively hope that from us he will obtain redress, and the other because he may well be alarmed for the consequences if we answer to the call, must both alike submit, the one to learn moderation against his will, the other to receive at our hands a deliverance which costs him nothing. Do not reject the common salvation which is offered to you at this moment, as well as to all who seek it, but following the example of your countrymen join with us and, instead of having always to watch the Syracusans, assert your equality and threaten them as they have long been threatening you.’

88. τοιαῦτα δὲ ὁ Εὔφημος εἶπεν. οἱ δὲ Καμαριναῖοι ἐπεπόνθεσαν τοιόνδε. τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις εὖνοι ἦσαν, πλὴν καθ᾽ ὅσον [εἰ] τὴν Σικελίαν ᾠοντο αὐτοὺς δουλώσεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις αἰεὶ κατὰ τὸ ὅμορον διάφοροι: δεδιότες δ᾽ οὐχ ἧσσον τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἐγγὺς ὄντας μὴ καὶ ἄνευ σφῶν περιγένωνται, τό τε πρῶτον αὐτοῖς τοὺς ὀλίγους ἱππέας ἔπεμψαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ὑπουργεῖν μὲν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μᾶλλον ἔργῳ, ὡς ἂν δύνωνται μετριώτατα, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι, ἵνα μηδὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις

ἔλασσον δοκῶσι νεῖμαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐπικρατέστεροι τῇ μάχῃ ἐγένοντο, λόγῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ἴσα ἀμφοτέροις. [2] καὶ οὕτω βουλευσάμενοι ἀπεκρίναντο, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἀμφοτέροις οὖσι ξυμμάχοις σφῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πόλεμος ὤν, εὔορκον δοκεῖν εἶναι σφίσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μηδετέροις ἀμύνειν. καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἑκατέρων ἀπῆλθον. [3]καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι τὰ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἐξηρτύοντο ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ ἐστρατοπεδευμένοι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Σικελοὺς ἔπρασσον ὅπως αὐτοῖς ὡς πλεῖστοι προσχωρήσονται. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰ πεδία μᾶλλον τῶν Σικελῶν ὑπήκοοι ὄντες τῶν Συρακοσίων οἱ πολλοὶ ἀφειστήκεσαν: τῶν δὲ τὴν μεσόγειαν ἐχόντων αὐτόνομοι οὖσαι καὶ πρότερον αἰεὶ <αἱ> οἰκήσεις εὐθὺς πλὴν ὀλίγοι μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἦσαν, καὶ σῖτόν τε κατεκόμιζον τῷ στρατεύματι καὶ εἰσὶν οἳ καὶ χρήματα. [5] ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς μὴ προσχωροῦντας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύοντες τοὺς μὲν προσηνάγκαζον, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων φρουρούς τε πεμπόντων καὶ βοηθούντων ἀπεκωλύοντο. τόν τε χειμῶνα μεθορμισάμενοι ἐκ τῆς Νάξου ἐς τὴν Κατάνην καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὃ κατεκαύθη ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων αὖθις ἀνορθώσαντες διεχείμαζον. [6] καὶ ἔπεμψαν μὲν ἐς Καρχηδόνα τριήρη περὶ φιλίας, εἰ δύναιντό τι ὠφελεῖσθαι, ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ ἐς Τυρσηνίαν, ἔστιν ὧν πόλεων ἐπαγγελλομένων καὶ αὐτῶν ξυμπολεμεῖν. περιήγγελλον δὲ καὶ τοῖς Σικελοῖς καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἔγεσταν πέμψαντες ἐκέλευον ἵππους σφίσιν ὡς πλείστους πέμπειν, καὶ τἆλλα ἐς τὸν περιτειχισμόν, πλινθία καὶ σίδηρον, ἡτοίμαζον, καὶ ὅσα ἔδει, ὡς ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ἐξόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου. [7]οἱ δ᾽ ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον καὶ Λακεδαίμονα τῶν Συρακοσίων ἀποσταλέντες πρέσβεις τούς τε Ἰταλιώτας ἅμα παραπλέοντες ἐπειρῶντο πείθειν μὴ περιορᾶν τὰ γιγνόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς καὶ ἐκείνοις ὁμοίως ἐπιβουλευόμενα, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ Κορίνθῳ ἐγένοντο, λόγους ἐποιοῦντο ἀξιοῦντες σφίσι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς βοηθεῖν. [8] καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι εὐθὺς ψηφισάμενοι αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι ὥστε πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ ἀμύνειν, καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ξυναπέστελλον αὐτοῖς πρέσβεις, ὅπως καὶ ἐκείνους ξυναναπείθοιεν τόν τε

αὐτοῦ πόλεμον σαφέστερον ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ὠφελίαν τινὰ πέμπειν. [9] καὶ οἵ τε ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου πρέσβεις παρῆσαν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης μετὰ τῶν ξυμφυγάδων περαιωθεὶς τότ᾽ εὐθὺς ἐπὶ πλοίου φορτηγικοῦ ἐκ τῆς Θουρίας ἐς Κυλλήνην τῆς Ἠλείας πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ὕστερον ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα αὐτῶν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων μεταπεμψάντων ὑπόσπονδος ἐλθών: ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν Μαντινικῶν πρᾶξιν. [10] καὶ ξυνέβη ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τούς τε Κορινθίους καὶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην δεομένους πείθειν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. καὶ διανοουμένων τῶν τε ἐφόρων καὶ τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων πρέσβεις πέμπειν ἐς Συρακούσας κωλύοντας μὴ ξυμβαίνειν Ἀθηναίοις, βοηθεῖν δὲ οὐ προθύμων ὄντων, παρελθὼν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης παρώξυνέ τε τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ ἐξώρμησε λέγων τοιάδε.

[88] Thus spoke Euphemus. Now the Camarinaeans were swayed by opposite feelings; they had a good will to the Athenians, tempered by a suspicion that they might be intending to enslave Sicily, whereas the Syracusans, from their proximity, were always at feud with them. But they were not so much afraid of the Athenians as of their Syracusan neighbours, who, as they thought, might win without their assistance. This was the reason why they sent them the small body of horse which took part in the first battle; and in a like spirit they now determined that for the future they would give real assistance only to the Syracusans, but to a very moderate extent. For the present however, that they might seem to deal equal justice to the Athenians, especially after their recent victory, they resolved to return the same answer to both. Such were the considerations which led them to reply that, as two of their allies were at war with one another, they thought that under the circumstances the best way of observing their oaths would be to assist neither. So the two embassies departed.The Syracusans proceeded with their own

preparations for the war, and the Athenians who were encamped at Naxos tried by negotiation to gain over as many of the Sicels as they could. The dwellers in the plain who were subjects of the Syracusans mostly stood aloof, but the Sicel settlements in the interior (which had always been independent) at once, with a few exceptions, joined the Athenians, and brought down food to the army; in some cases money also. Against those who were recalcitrant troops were despatched by the Athenians; and some of them were forced into submission, but others were protected by the garrisons which the Syracusans sent to their aid. They then transferred their station from Naxos to Catana and, reconstructing the camp which had been burnt by the Syracusans, passed the winter there. In the hope of obtaining assistance they sent a trireme to Carthage with a proposal of friendship; likewise to Tyrrhenia, since some of the cities there were offering of themselves to join them in the war: to the various Sicel tribes and to the Egestaeans they issued orders that they were to send as many horse as possible. They further prepared bricks, tools, and whatever else was requisite for siege operations, intending, when the spring arrived, to prosecute the war with vigour.The envoys whom the Syracusans had sent to Corinth and Lacedaemon endeavoured on the voyage to persuade the Italian Greeks that they were equally threatened by the Athenian designs, and should take an interest in the war. When they arrived at Corinth they appealed to the Corinthians for aid on the ground of relationship. The Corinthians, taking the lead of all the Hellenic states, voted that they would assist Syracuse with all possible energy. They sent with the Syracusan envoys ambassadors of their own to the Lacedaemonians, bearing a joint request that they would resume open hostilities at home, and unite with them in sending help to Sicily. At Lacedaemon the Corinthian ambassadors met Alcibiades and his fellow exiles. He had sailed at once from Thurii in a trading vessel to Cyllenè in Elis, and thence

proceeded to Lacedaemon on the invitation of the Lacedaemonians themselves, first obtaining a safe-conduct; for he was afraid of them after his proceedings in the matter of the Mantinean league. And so it came to pass that the Corinthians, the Syracusans, and Alcibiades appeared simultaneously in the Lacedaemonian assembly, and concurred in urging the same request. The ephors and the magistrates were already intending to send envoys to the Syracusans bidding them make no terms with the Athenians, although they were not disposed to assist them actively. But now Alcibiades came forward and stimulated the energies of the Lacedaemonians in the following words:

89. ‘ἀναγκαῖον περὶ τῆς ἐμῆς διαβολῆς πρῶτον ἐς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ χεῖρον τὰ κοινὰ τῷ ὑπόπτῳ μου ἀκροάσησθε. [2] τῶν δ᾽ ἐμῶν προγόνων τὴν προξενίαν ὑμῶν κατά τι ἔγκλημα ἀπειπόντων αὐτὸς ἐγὼ πάλιν ἀναλαμβάνων ἐθεράπευον ὑμᾶς ἄλλα τε καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκ Πύλου ξυμφοράν. καὶ διατελοῦντός μου προθύμου ὑμεῖς πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καταλλασσόμενοι τοῖς μὲν ἐμοῖς ἐχθροῖς δύναμιν δι᾽ ἐκείνων πράξαντες, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀτιμίαν περιέθετε. [3] καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δικαίως ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ πρός τε τὰ Μαντινέων καὶ Ἀργείων τραπομένου καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐνηντιούμην ὑμῖν ἐβλάπτεσθε: καὶ νῦν, εἴ τις καὶ τότε ἐν τῷ πάσχειν οὐκ εἰκότως ὠργίζετό μοι, μετὰ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς σκοπῶν ἀναπειθέσθω. ἢ εἴ τις, διότι καὶ τῷ δήμῳ προσεκείμην μᾶλλον, χείρω με ἐνόμιζε, μηδ᾽ οὕτως ἡγήσηται ὀρθῶς ἄχθεσθαι. [4] τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις αἰεί ποτε διάφοροί ἐσμεν πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ὠνόμασται , καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου ξυμπαρέμεινεν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλήθους. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς πόλεως δημοκρατουμένης τὰ πολλὰ ἀνάγκη ἦν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἕπεσθαι. [5] τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχούσης ἀκολασίας ἐπειρώμεθα μετριώτεροι ἐς τὰ πολιτικὰ εἶναι.ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἦσαν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πάλαι καὶ νῦν οἳ ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρότερα ἐξῆγον τὸν ὄχλον: οἵπερ καὶ ἐμὲ ἐξήλασαν. [6] ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος προέστημεν, δικαιοῦντες ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἐτύγχανε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη οὖσα καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατό τις,

τοῦτο ξυνδιασῴζειν, ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν γε καὶ ἐγιγνώσκομεν οἱ φρονοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἂν χεῖρον, ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι. ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο: καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡμῖν ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι ὑμῶν πολεμίων προσκαθημένων.

[89] 'I must endeavour first of all to remove a prejudice against myself, lest through suspicion of me you should turn a deaf ear to considerations of public interest. My ancestors in consequence of some misunderstanding renounced the office of Lacedaemonian proxenus; I myself resumed it, and did you many good offices, especially after your misfortune at Pylos. My anxiety to serve you never ceased, but when you were making peace with Athens you negotiated through my enemies, thereby conferring power on them, and bringing dishonour upon me. And if I then turned to the Mantineans and Argives and opposed you in that or in any other way, you were rightly served, and any one who while the wound was recent may have been unduly exasperated against me should now take another and a truer view. Or, again, if any one thought the worse of me because I was inclined to the people, let him acknowledge that here too there is no real ground of offence. Any power adverse to despotism is called democracy, and my family have always retained the leadership of the people in their hands because we have been the persistent enemies of tyrants. Living too under a popular government, how could we avoid in a great degree conforming to circumstances? However, we did our best to observe political moderation amid the prevailing licence. But there were demagogues, as there always have been, who led the people into evil ways, and it was they who drove me out. Whereas we were the leaders of the state as a whole, and not of a part only; it was our view that all ought to combine in maintaining that form of government which had been inherited by us, and under which the city enjoyed the greatest freedom and glory. Of course, like all sensible men, we knew only too well what democracy is, and I better

than any one, who have so good a reason for abusing it. The follies of democracy are universally admitted, and there is nothing new to be said about them. But we could not venture to change our form of government when an enemy like yourselves was so near to us.

90. ‘καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐς τὰς ἐμὰς διαβολὰς τοιαῦτα ξυνέβη: περὶ δὲ ὧν ὑμῖν τε βουλευτέον καὶ ἐμοί, εἴ τι πλέον οἶδα, ἐσηγητέον, μάθετε ἤδη. [2] ἐπλεύσαμεν ἐς Σικελίαν πρῶτον μέν, εἰ δυναίμεθα, Σικελιώτας καταστρεψόμενοι, μετὰ δ᾽ ἐκείνους αὖθις καὶ Ἰταλιώτας, ἔπειτα καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἀρχῆς καὶ αὐτῶν ἀποπειράσοντες. [3] εἰ δὲ προχωρήσειε ταῦτα ἢ πάντα ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείω, ἤδη τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐμέλλομεν ἐπιχειρήσειν, κομίσαντες ξύμπασαν μὲν τὴν ἐκεῖθεν προσγενομένην δύναμιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους μισθωσάμενοι καὶ Ἴβηρας καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμολογουμένως νῦν βαρβάρων μαχιμωτάτους, τριήρεις τε πρὸς ταῖς ἡμετέραις πολλὰς ναυπηγησάμενοι, ἐχούσης τῆς Ἰταλίας ξύλα ἄφθονα, αἷς τὴν Πελοπόννησον πέριξ πολιορκοῦντες καὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἅμα ἐκ γῆς ἐφορμαῖς τῶν πόλεων τὰς μὲν βίᾳ λαβόντες, τὰς δ᾽ ἐντειχισάμενοι, ῥᾳδίως ἠλπίζομεν καταπολεμήσειν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦ ξύμπαντος Ἑλληνικοῦ ἄρξειν. [4] χρήματα δὲ καὶ σῖτον, ὥστε εὐπορώτερον γίγνεσθαί τι αὐτῶν, αὐτὰ τὰ προσγενόμενα ἐκεῖθεν χωρία ἔμελλε διαρκῆ ἄνευ τῆς ἐνθένδε προσόδου παρέξειν.

[90] ‘Such is the truth about the calumnies under which I labour. And now I will speak to you of the matter which you have in hand, and about which I, in so far as I have better information, am bound to instruct you. We sailed to Sicily hoping in the first place to conquer the Sicilian cities; then to proceed against the Hellenes of Italy; and lastly, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian dominions, and on Carthage itself. If all or most of these enterprises succeeded, we meant finally to attack Peloponnesus, bringing with us the whole Hellenic power which we had gained abroad, besides many barbarians whom we intended to hire — Iberians and the

neighbouring tribes, esteemed to be the most warlike barbarians that now are. Of the timber which Italy supplies in such abundance we meant to build numerous additional triremes, and with them to blockade Peloponnesus. At the same time making inroads by land with our infantry, we should have stormed some of your cities and invested others. Thus we hoped to crush you easily, and to rule over the Hellenic world. For the better accomplishment of our various aims our newly-acquired territory would supply money and provisions enough, apart from the revenue which we receive in Hellas.

91. τοιαῦτα μὲν περὶ τοῦ νῦν οἰχομένου στόλου παρὰ τοῦ τὰ ἀκριβέστατα εἰδότος ὡς διενοήθημεν ἀκηκόατε: καὶ ὅσοι ὑπόλοιποι στρατηγοί, ἢν δύνωνται, ὁμοίως αὐτὰ πράξουσιν. ὡς δέ, εἰ μὴ βοηθήσετε οὐ περιέσται τἀκεῖ, μάθετε ἤδη. [2] Σικελιῶται γὰρ ἀπειρότεροι μέν εἰσιν, ὅμως δ᾽ ἂν ξυστραφέντες ἀθρόοι καὶ νῦν ἔτι περιγένοιντο: Συρακόσιοι δὲ μόνοι μάχῃ τε ἤδη πανδημεὶ ἡσσημένοι καὶ ναυσὶν ἅμα κατειργόμενοι ἀδύνατοι ἔσονται τῇ νῦν Ἀθηναίων ἐκεῖ παρασκευῇ ἀντισχεῖν. [3] καὶ εἰ αὖτη ἡ πόλις ληφθήσεται, ἔχεται καὶ ἡ πᾶσα Σικελία, καὶ εὐθὺς καὶ Ἰταλία: καὶ ὃν ἄρτι κίνδυνον ἐκεῖθεν προεῖπον, οὐκ ἂν διὰ μακροῦ ὑμῖν ἐπιπέσοι. [4] ὥστε μὴ περὶ τῆς Σικελίας τις οἰέσθω μόνον βουλεύειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου, εἰ μὴ ποιήσετε τάδε ἐν τάχει, στρατιάν τε ἐπὶ νεῶν πέμψετε τοιαύτην ἐκεῖσε οἵτινες αὐτερέται κομισθέντες καὶ ὁπλιτεύσουσιν εὐθύς, καὶ ὃ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἔτι χρησιμώτερον εἶναι νομίζω, ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην ἄρχοντα, ὡς ἂν τούς τε παρόντας ξυντάξῃ καὶ τοὺς μὴ ‘θέλοντας προσαναγκάσῃ: οὕτω γὰρ οἵ τε ὑπάρχοντες ὑμῖν φίλοι θαρσήσουσι μᾶλλον καὶ οἱ ἐνδοιάζοντες ἀδεέστερον προσίασιν. [5] καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε χρὴ ἅμα φανερώτερον ἐκπολεμεῖν, ἵνα Συρακόσιοί τε νομίζοντες ὑμᾶς ἐπιμέλεσθαι μᾶλλον ἀντέχωσι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἧσσον ἄλλην ἐπικουρίαν πέμπωσιν. [6] τειχίζειν τε χρὴ Δεκέλειαν τῆς Ἀττικῆς, ὅπερ Ἀθηναῖοι μάλιστα αἰεὶ φοβοῦνται, καὶ μόνου αὐτοῦ νομίζουσι τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐ

διαπεπειρᾶσθαι. βεβαιότατα δ᾽ ἄν τις οὕτω τοὺς πολεμίους βλάπτοι, εἰ ἃ μάλιστα δεδιότας αὐτοὺς αἰσθάνοιτο, ταῦτα σαφῶς πυνθανόμενος ἐπιφέροι: εἰκὸς γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀκριβέστατα ἑκάστους τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν δεινὰ ἐπισταμένους φοβεῖσθαι. [7] ἃ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἐπιτειχίσει αὐτοὶ ὠφελούμενοι τοὺς ἐναντίους κωλύσετε, πολλὰ παρεὶς τὰ μέγιστα κεφαλαιώσω. οἷς τε γὰρ ἡ χώρα κατεσκεύασται, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τὰ μὲν ληφθέντα, τὰ δ᾽ αὐτόματα ἥξει: καὶ τὰς τοῦ Λαυρείου τῶν ἀργυρείων μετάλλων προσόδους καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ δικαστηρίων νῦν ὠφελοῦνται εὐθὺς ἀποστερήσονται, μάλιστα δὲ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων προσόδου ἧσσον διαφορουμένης, οἳ τὰ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν νομίσαντες ἤδη κατὰ κράτος πολεμεῖσθαι ὀλιγωρήσουσιν.

[91] ‘You have heard the objects of our expedition from him who knows them best; the generals who remain will persevere and carry them out if they can. And now let me prove to you that if you do not come to the rescue Sicily will be lost. If the Greeks would all unite they might even now, notwithstanding their want of military skill, resist with success; but the Syracusans alone, whose whole forces have been already defeated, and who cannot move freely at sea, will be unable to withstand the power which the Athenians already have on the spot. And Syracuse once taken, the whole of Sicily is in their hands; the subjugation of Italy will follow; and the danger which, as I was saying, threatens you from that quarter, will speedily overwhelm you. And therefore remember every one of you that the safety, not of Sicily alone, but of Peloponnesus, is at stake. No time should be lost. You must send to Sicily a force of hoplites who will themselves handle the oars and will take the field immediately on landing. A Spartan commander I conceive to be even more indispensable than an army; his duty will be to organise the troops which are already enlisted, and to press the unwilling into the service. Thus you will inspire confidence in your friends and overcome the fears of the wavering. Here too in Hellas you should make open war. The

Syracusans, seeing that you have not forgotten them, will then persevere in their resistance, while the Athenians will have greater difficulty in reinforcing their army. You ought also to fortify Decelea in Attica; the Athenians are always in particular dread of this; to them it seems to be the only peril of which they have not faced the worst in the course of the war. And the way to hurt an enemy most surely is to inform yourself exactly about the weak points of which you see that he is conscious, and strike at them. For every man is likely to know best himself the dangers which he has most to fear. I will sum up briefly the chief though by no means all the advantages which you will gain, and the disadvantages which you will inflict, by the fortification of Decelea. The whole stock of the country will fall into your hands. The slaves will come over to you of their own accord; what there is besides will be seized by you. The Athenians will at once be deprived of the revenues which they obtain from the silver mines of Laurium, and of all the profits which they make by the land or by the law courts: above all, the customary tribute will cease to flow in; for their allies, when they see that you are now carrying on the war in earnest, will not mind them.

92. γίγνεσθαι δέ τι αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν τάχει καὶ προθυμότερον ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστίν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπεὶ ὥς γε δυνατά καὶ οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεσθαι οἶμαι γνώμης πάνυ θαρσῶ. [2] καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἀξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι, εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων φιλόπολίς ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι νῦν ἐγκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι, οὐδὲ ὑποπτεύεσθαί μου ἐς τὴν φυγαδικὴν προθυμίαν τὸν λόγον. [3] φυγάς τε γάρ εἰμι τῆς τῶν ἐξελασάντων πονηρίας, καὶ οὐ τῆς ὑμετέρας, ἢν πείθησθέ μοι, ὠφελίας: καὶ πολεμιώτεροι οὐχ οἱ τοὺς πολεμίους που βλάψαντες ὑμεῖς ἢ οἱ τοὺς φίλους ἀναγκάσαντες πολεμίους γενέσθαι. [4] τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὖσαν ἔτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν ἰέναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὖσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος ὀρθῶς, οὐχ ὃς ἂν τὴν

ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπίῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ὃς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν. [5] οὕτως ἐμοί τε ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐς κίνδυνον καὶ ἐς ταλαιπωρίαν πᾶσαν ἀδεῶς χρῆσθαι, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, γνόντας τοῦτον δὴ τὸν ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων προβαλλόμενον λόγον, ὡς εἰ πολέμιός γε ὢν σφόδρα ἔβλαπτον, κἂν φίλος ὢν ἱκανῶς ὠφελοίην, ὅσῳ τὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίων οἶδα, τὰ δ᾽ ὑμέτερα ᾔκαζον: καὶ αὐτοὺς νῦν νομίσαντας περὶ μεγίστων δὴ τῶν διαφερόντων βουλεύεσθαι μὴ ἀποκνεῖν τὴν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν τε καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν στρατείαν, ἵνα τά τε ἐκεῖ βραχεῖ μορίῳ ξυμπαραγενόμενοι μεγάλα σώσητε καὶ Ἀθηναίων τήν τε οὖσαν καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν δύναμιν καθέλητε, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα αὐτοί τε ἀσφαλῶς οἰκῆτε καὶ τῆς ἁπάσης Ἑλλάδος ἑκούσης καὶ οὐ βίᾳ, κατ᾽ εὔνοιαν δὲ ἡγῆσθε.’

[92] How far these plans are executed, and with how much speed and energy, Lacedaemonians, depends on you; for I am confident that they are practicable, and I am not likely to be mistaken.’You ought not in fairness to think the worse of me because, having been once distinguished as a lover of my country, I now cast in my lot with her worst foes and attack her with all my might; or suspect that I speak only with the eagerness of an exile. An exile I am indeed; I have lost an ungrateful country, but I have not lost the power of doing you service, if you will listen to me. The true enemies of my country are not those who, like you, have injured her in open war, but those who have compelled her friends to become her enemies. I love Athens, not in so far as I am wronged by her, but in so far as I once enjoyed the privileges of a citizen. The country which I am attacking is no longer mine, but a lost country which I am seeking to regain. He is the true patriot, not who, when unjustly exiled, abstains from attacking his country, but who in the warmth of his affection seeks to recover her without regard to the means. I desire therefore that you, Lacedaemonians, will use me without scruple in any service however difficult or dangerous, remembering that, according to the familiar

saying, “the more harm I did you as an enemy, the more good can I do you as a friend.” For I know the secrets of the Athenians, while I could only guess at yours. Remember the immense importance of your present decision, and do not hesitate to send an expedition to Sicily and Attica. By despatching a fraction of your forces to co-operate in Sicily you may save great interests, and may overthrow the Athenian power once and for ever. And so henceforward you may dwell safely yourselves and be leaders of all Hellas, which will follow you, not upon compulsion, but from affection.’

93. ὁ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδης τοσαῦτα εἶπεν, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι διανοούμενοι μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ πρότερον στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας, μέλλοντες δ᾽ ἔτι καὶ περιορώμενοι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπερρώσθησαν διδάξαντος ταῦτα ἕκαστα αὐτοῦ καὶ νομίσαντες παρὰ τοῦ σαφέστατα εἰδότος ἀκηκοέναι: [2] ὥστε τῇ ἐπιτειχίσει τῆς Δεκελείας προσεῖχον ἤδη τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ παραυτίκα καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πέμπειν τινὰ τιμωρίαν. καὶ Γύλιππον τὸν Κλεανδρίδου προστάξαντες ἄρχοντα τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἐκέλευον μετ᾽ ἐκείνων καὶ τῶν Κορινθίων βουλευόμενον ποιεῖν ὅπῃ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων μάλιστα καὶ τάχιστά τις ὠφελία ἥξει τοῖς ἐκεῖ. [3] ὁ δὲ δύο μὲν ναῦς τοὺς Κορινθίους ἤδη ἐκέλευέν οἱ πέμπειν ἐς Ἀσίνην, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς παρασκευάζεσθαι ὅσας διανοοῦνται πέμπειν καί, ὅταν καιρὸς ᾖ, ἑτοίμας εἶναι πλεῖν. ταῦτα δὲ ξυνθέμενοι ἀνεχώρουν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος. [4]ἀφίκετο δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας τριήρης τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἣν ἀπέστειλαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐπί τε χρήματα καὶ ἱππέας. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἐψηφίσαντο τήν τε τροφὴν πέμπειν τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ἕβδομον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[93] Thus spoke Alcibiades: the Lacedaemonians, who had been intending to send an army against Athens, but were still hesitating and looking about them, were greatly strengthened in their resolution when they heard all these points urged by him who, as they thought, knew best. Accordingly they now turned their thoughts to the fortification of Decelea, and determined to send immediate assistance to the Syracusans. They appointed Gylippus the son of Cleandridas commander of the Syracusan forces, and desired him to co-operate with the Syracusan and Corinthian representatives, and send aid to Sicily in the speediest and most effective manner which the circumstances admitted. Whereupon he told the Corinthians to despatch immediately two ships to him at Asine, and to fit out as many more as they meant to send; the latter were to be ready for sea when the season arrived. Coming to this understanding the envoys departed from Lacedaemon.About this time the trireme which the Athenian generals had despatched from Sicily for money and cavalry arrived at Athens. The Athenians, hearing their request, voted money and a force of cavalry for the army. So the winter ended, and with it the seventeenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

94. ἅμα δὲ τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς ἀρχομένῳ τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους οἱ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης παρέπλευσαν ἐπὶ Μεγάρων τῶν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, οὓς ἐπὶ Γέλωνος τοῦ τυράννου, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερόν μοι εἴρηται, ἀναστήσαντες Συρακόσιοι αὐτοὶ ἔχουσι τὴν γῆν. [2] ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐδῄωσαν τούς [τε] ἀγροὺς καὶ ἐλθόντες ἐπὶ ἔρυμά τι τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ οὐχ ἑλόντες αὖθις καὶ πεζῇ καὶ ναυσὶ παρακομισθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Τηρίαν ποταμὸν τό τε πεδίον ἀναβάντες ἐδῄουν καὶ τὸν σῖτον ἐνεπίμπρασαν, καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων περιτυχόντες τισὶν οὐ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀποκτείναντές τέ τινας καὶ τροπαῖον στήσαντες ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. [3] καὶ ἀποπλεύσαντες ἐς Κατάνην, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐπισιτισάμενοι, πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ

Κεντόριπα, Σικελῶν πόλισμα, καὶ προσαγαγόμενοι ὁμολογίᾳ ἀπῆσαν, πιμπράντες ἅμα τὸν σῖτον τῶν τε Ἰνησσαίων καὶ τῶν Ὑβλαίων. [4] καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Κατάνην καταλαμβάνουσι τούς τε ἱππέας ἥκοντας ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους ἄνευ τῶν ἵππων μετὰ σκευῆς, ὡς αὐτόθεν ἵππων πορισθησομένων, καὶ ἱπποτοξότας τριάκοντα καὶ τάλαντα ἀργυρίου τριακόσια.

[94] At the very beginning of the following spring the Athenians quitted Catana, and sailed along the coast towards the Sicilian Megara; this place, as I have already mentioned, in the days of Gelo the tyrant was depopulated by the Syracusans, who still retain possession of the country. They disembarked, and after ravaging the fields proceeded to attack a small Syracusan fortress, but without success; they then moved on some by land and some by sea to the river Terias, and going up the country wasted the plain and burned the corn. They encountered a few Syracusans, some of whom they killed, and setting up a trophy returned to their ships. They then sailed back to Catana, and having taken in provisions marched with their whole force against Centoripa, a Sicel town, which capitulated. Thence they returned, and on their way burned the corn of the Inessians and the Hyblaeans. Arriving at Catana they found that the horsemen, for whom they had sent, to the number of two hundred and fifty had come from Athens, with their equipments, but without horses, which they were expected to procure on the spot. Thirty mounted archers and three hundred talents of silver had arrived also.

95. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἦρος καὶ ἐπ᾽ Ἄργος στρατεύσαντες Λακεδαιμόνιοι μέχρι μὲν Κλεωνῶν ἦλθον, σεισμοῦ δὲ γενομένου ἀπεχώρησαν. καὶ Ἀργεῖοι μετὰ ταῦτα ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Θυρεᾶτιν ὅμορον οὖσαν λείαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὴν ἔλαβον, ἣ ἐπράθη ταλάντων οὐκ ἔλασσον πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι. [2] καὶ ὁ Θεσπιῶν δῆμος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἐπιθέμενος τοῖς τὰς ἀρχὰς

ἔχουσιν οὐ κατέσχεν, ἀλλὰ βοηθησάντων Θηβαίων οἱ μὲν ξυνελήφθησαν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐξέπεσον Ἀθήναζε.

[95] During the same spring the Lacedaemonians led an army against Argos, and advanced as far as Cleonae, but retired in consequence of an earthquake. The Argives in their turn invaded the neighbouring district of Thyrea, and took a great deal of spoil from the Lacedaemonians, which was sold for no less than twenty-five talents. Somewhat later the populace of Thespiae made an attack upon the government, but the attempt did not succeed; for the Thebans came to the rescue. Some of the insurgents were apprehended, others fled to Athens.

96. καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους, ὡς ἐπύθοντο τούς [τε] ἱππέας ἥκοντας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ μέλλοντας ἤδη ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἰέναι, νομίσαντες, ἐὰν μὴ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν κρατήσωσιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, χωρίου ἀποκρήμνου τε καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως εὐθὺς κειμένου, οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως σφᾶς, οὐδ᾽ εἰ κρατοῖντο μάχῃ, ἀποτειχισθῆναι, διενοοῦντο τὰς προσβάσεις αὐτῶν φυλάσσειν, ὅπως μὴ κατὰ ταύτας λάθωσι σφᾶς ἀναβάντες οἱ πολέμιοι: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῃ γε αὐτοὺς δυνηθῆναι. [2] ἐξήρτηται γὰρ τὸ ἄλλο χωρίον, καὶ μέχρι τῆς πόλεως ἐπικλινές τ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιφανὲς πᾶν ἔσω: καὶ ὠνόμασται ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων διὰ τὸ ἐπιπολῆς τοῦ ἄλλου εἶναι Ἐπιπολαί. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐξελθόντες πανδημεὶ ἐς τὸν λειμῶνα παρὰ τὸν Ἄναπον ποταμὸν ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐτύγχανον γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἑρμοκράτη στρατηγοὶ ἄρτι παρειληφότες τὴν ἀρχήν ἐξέτασίν τε ὅπλων ἐποιοῦντο καὶ ἑξακοσίους λογάδας τῶν ὁπλιτῶν ἐξέκριναν πρότερον, ὧν ἦρχε Διόμιλος φυγὰς ἐξ Ἄνδρου, ὅπως τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν εἶεν φύλακες, καὶ ἢν ἐς ἄλλο τι δέῃ, ταχὺ ξυνεστῶτες παραγίγνωνται.

[96] The Syracusans heard that the Athenians had received their cavalry, and that they would soon be upon them. They considered that, unless the Athenians gained possession of Epipolae (which was a steep place looking down upon Syracuse), the city could not easily be invested, even if they

were defeated in battle; they therefore determined to guard the paths leading to the summit that the enemy might not get up by stealth. At all other points the place was secure, as it lies high and slopes right down to the city, from the interior of which it can all be seen; the Syracusans call it Epipolae (or the plateau, because it is above the level of the adjacent country. Hermocrates and his colleagues had now entered upon their command. The whole people went out at break of day to the meadow skirting the river Anapus, and proceeded to hold a review of their forces. A selection was at once made of six hundred hoplites, who were appointed to guard Epipolae, and to run in a body to any point at which they were needed. They were commanded by Diomilus, an Andrian exile.

97. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς τῇ ἐπιγιγνομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἐξητάζοντο καὶ ἔλαθον αὐτοὺς παντὶ ἤδη τῷ στρατεύματι ἐκ τῆς Κατάνης σχόντες κατὰ τὸν Λέοντα καλούμενον, ὃς ἀπέχει τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἓξ ἢ ἑπτὰ σταδίους, καὶ τοὺς πεζοὺς ἀποβιβάσαντες, ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Θάψον καθορμισάμενοι: ἔστι δὲ χερσόνησος μὲν ἐν στενῷ ἰσθμῷ προύχουσα ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, τῆς δὲ Συρακοσίων πόλεως οὔτε πλοῦν οὔτε ὁδὸν πολλὴν ἀπέχει. [2] καὶ ὁ μὲν ναυτικὸς στρατὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Θάψῳ διασταυρωσάμενος τὸν ἰσθμὸν ἡσύχαζεν: ὁ δὲ πεζὸς ἐχώρει εὐθὺς δρόμῳ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς καὶ φθάνει ἀναβὰς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον πρὶν τοὺς Συρακοσίους αἰσθομένους ἐκ τοῦ λειμῶνος καὶ τῆς ἐξετάσεως παραγενέσθαι. [3] ἐβοήθουν δὲ οἵ τε ἄλλοι, ὡς ἕκαστος τάχους εἶχε, καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόμιλον ἑξακόσιοι: στάδιοι δὲ πρὶν προσμεῖξαι ἐκ τοῦ λειμῶνος ἐγίγνοντο αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔλασσον ἢ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι. [4] προσπεσόντες οὖν αὐτοῖς τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἀτακτότερον καὶ μάχῃ νικηθέντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπὶ ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν: καὶ ὅ τε Διόμιλος ἀποθνῄσκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς τριακόσιοι. [5] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖόν τε στήσαντες καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀποδόντες τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτὴν τῇ

ὑστεραίᾳ ἐπικαταβάντες, ὡς οὐκ ἐπεξῆσαν αὐτοῖς, ἐπαναχωρήσαντες φρούριον ἐπὶ τῷ Λαβδάλῳ ᾠκοδόμησαν, ἐπ᾽ ἄκροις τοῖς κρημνοῖς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν, ὀρῶν πρὸς τὰ Μέγαρα, ὅπως εἴη αὐτοῖς, ὁπότε προΐοιεν ἢ μαχούμενοι ἢ τειχιοῦντες, τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἀποθήκη.

[97] On the very same morning the Athenians were likewise holding a muster of their army. They had come from Catana with their whole force, and had put in unobserved near a place called Leon, which is distant from Epipolae not quite a mile; there they disembarked their troops. Their ships cast anchor at Thapsus, which is a peninsula with a narrow isthmus, running out into the sea, and not far from Syracuse either by land or water. The Athenian sailors made a stockade across the isthmus and remained at Thapsus, while the troops ran to Epipolae, and gained the summit by the way of the Euryelus before the Syracusans saw them or could come up to them from the meadow where the review was going on. Nevertheless Diomilus with his six hundred hurried to the spot, accompanied by the rest of the army, each man running as fast he could; but the distance from the meadow which they had to traverse before they could engage was not less than three miles; consequently they were in disorder when they closed with the Athenians. They were defeated in the engagement which ensued on Epipolae, and retired into the city. Diomilus and about three hundred others were slain. The Athenians erected a trophy, and gave up to the Syracusans the bodies of the dead under a flag of truce. On the following day they went down to the city itself, but as the Syracusans did not come out against them, they retired and built a fort upon Labdalum, at the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae looking towards Megara, in order that when they advanced either to fight or to construct lines, the place might serve as a depository for their baggage and their property.

98. καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον αὐτοῖς ἦλθον ἔκ τε Ἐγέστης ἱππῆς τριακόσιοι καὶ Σικελῶν καὶ Ναξίων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν

ὡς ἑκατόν: καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὑπῆρχον πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι, οἷς ἵππους τοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ Ἐγεσταίων καὶ Καταναίων ἔλαβον, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπρίαντο, καὶ ξύμπαντες πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑξακόσιοι ἱππῆς ξυνελέγησαν. [2] καὶ καταστήσαντες ἐν τῷ Λαβδάλῳ φυλακὴν ἐχώρουν πρὸς τὴν Συκῆν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵναπερ καθεζόμενοι ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους. καὶ ἔκπληξιν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις παρέσχον τῷ τάχει τῆς οἰκοδομίας: καὶ ἐπεξελθόντες μάχην διενοοῦντο ποιεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν. [3] καὶ ἤδη ἀντιπαρατασσομένων ἀλλήλοις οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοὶ ὡς ἑώρων σφίσι τὸ στράτευμα διεσπασμένον τε καὶ οὐ ῥᾳδίως ξυντασσόμενον, ἀνήγαγον πάλιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν πλὴν μέρους τινὸς τῶν ἱππέων: οὗτοι δὲ ὑπομένοντες ἐκώλυον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους λιθοφορεῖν τε καὶ ἀποσκίδνασθαι μακροτέραν. [4] καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυλὴ μία τῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς μετ᾽ αὐτῶν πάντες ἐτρέψαντο τοὺς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἱππέας προσβαλόντες, καὶ ἀπέκτειναν τέ τινας καὶ τροπαῖον τῆς ἱππομαχίας ἔστησαν.

[98] Not long afterwards the Athenians were joined by three hundred Egestaean horsemen, and about a hundred more furnished by the Sicels, Naxians, and others. They had two hundred and fifty of their own, for some of whom they received horses from the Egestaeans and Catanaeans; other horses they bought. The whole number of their cavalry was now raised to six hundred and fifty. They placed a garrison in Labdalum and went down to Sycè, where they took up a position and immediately commenced building a wall round the city. The Syracusans were amazed at the celerity of the work. They saw that they must interfere, and made up their minds to go out and fight. The two armies were already preparing to engage when the Syracusan generals, seeing that their forces were in disorder and were forming with difficulty, led them back into the city, all but a detachment of the cavalry, who, remaining on the spot, prevented their opponents from gathering stones for the wall, and compelled them to keep together. At length, advancing with one

division of their hoplites and all their cavalry, the Athenians attacked the Syracusan horse, whom they put to flight, and killed some of them; they then erected a trophy.

99. καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν ἐτείχιζον τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ κύκλου τεῖχος, οἱ δὲ λίθους καὶ ξύλα ξυμφοροῦντες παρέβαλλον ἐπὶ τὸν Τρωγίλον καλούμενον αἰεί, ᾗπερ βραχύτατον ἐγίγνετο αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν τὸ ἀποτείχισμα. [2] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἑρμοκράτους τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐσηγησαμένου μάχαις μὲν πανδημεὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους οὐκέτι ἐβούλοντο διακινδυνεύειν, ὑποτειχίζειν δὲ ἄμεινον ἐδόκει εἶναι, ᾗ ἐκεῖνοι ἔμελλον ἄξειν τὸ τεῖχος καί, εἰ φθάσειαν, ἀποκλῄσεις γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, μέρος ἀντιπέμπειν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς καὶ φθάνειν αὐτοὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντες τοῖς σταυροῖς τὰς ἐφόδους, ἐκείνους δὲ ἂν παυομένους τοῦ ἔργου πάντας ἂν πρὸς σφᾶς τρέπεσθαι. [3] ἐτείχιζον οὖν ἐξελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρας πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι, κάτωθεν τοῦ κύκλου τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἄγοντες, τάς τε ἐλάας ἐκκόπτοντες τοῦ τεμένους καὶ πύργους ξυλίνους καθιστάντες. [4] αἱ δὲ νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὔπω ἐκ τῆς Θάψου περιεπεπλεύκεσαν ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐκράτουν τῶν περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, κατὰ γῆν δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Θάψου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐπήγοντο.

[99] On the following day some of the Athenians proceeded with the construction of that part of the circle which lay towards the north; others began to collect wood and stones and lay them along the intended course of the wall towards Trogilus, where the distance was shortest from the Great Harbour to the outer sea. The Syracusans by the advice of their commanders, chiefly of Hermocrates, determined to risk no more general engagements. They thought it better to raise a counter-wall across the line along which the Athenian wall was building. If they were first they would intercept them. They might indeed be attacked by the Athenians while thus engaged, but then they could oppose them with a

part of their army; and there would be time to run a stockade across, if not a wall, before any attack took place. The Athenians on the other hand would have to leave their work, and employ their whole army against them. So they came out and drew a cross-wall, beginning at their own city, from a point below the circle of the Athenian wall, cutting down the olive-trees in the precinct of Apollo and erecting wooden towers. As yet the Athenian ships had not sailed round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour; the Syracusans were still masters of their own coast, and the Athenians brought their necessaries from Thapsus by land.

100. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἀρκούντως ἐδόκει ἔχειν ὅσα τε ἐσταυρώθη καὶ ᾠκοδομήθη τοῦ ὑποτειχίσματος, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἦλθον κωλύσοντες, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσι δίχα γιγνομένοις ῥᾷον μάχωνται, καὶ ἅμα τὴν καθ᾽ αὐτοὺς περιτείχισιν ἐπειγόμενοι, οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι φυλὴν μίαν καταλιπόντες φύλακα τοῦ οἰκοδομήματος ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τούς τε ὀχετοὺς αὐτῶν, οἳ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ὑπονομηδὸν ποτοῦ ὕδατος ἠγμένοι ἦσαν, διέφθειραν, καὶ τηρήσαντες τούς τε ἄλλους Συρακοσίους κατὰ σκηνὰς ὄντας ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ καί τινας καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἀποκεχωρηκότας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ σταυρώματι ἀμελῶς φυλάσσοντας, τριακοσίους μὲν σφῶν αὐτῶν λογάδας καὶ τῶν ψιλῶν τινὰς ἐκλεκτοὺς ὡπλισμένους προύταξαν θεῖν δρόμῳ ἐξαπιναίως πρὸς τὸ ὑποτείχισμα, ἡ δ᾽ ἄλλη στρατιὰ δίχα, ἡ μὲν μετὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου στρατηγοῦ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, εἰ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν, ἐχώρουν, ἡ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου πρὸς τὸ σταύρωμα τὸ παρὰ τὴν πυλίδα. [2] καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ τριακόσιοι αἱροῦσι τὸ σταύρωμα: καὶ οἱ φύλακες αὐτὸ ἐκλιπόντες κατέφυγον ἐς τὸ προτείχισμα τὸ περὶ τὸν Τεμενίτην. καὶ αὐτοῖς ξυνεσέπεσον οἱ διώκοντες, καὶ ἐντὸς γενόμενοι βίᾳ ἐξεκρούσθησαν πάλιν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων, καὶ τῶν Ἀργείων τινὲς αὐτόθι καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐ πολλοὶ διεφθάρησαν. [3] καὶ ἐπαναχωρήσασα ἡ πᾶσα στρατιὰ τήν τε ὑποτείχισιν καθεῖλον καὶ τὸ σταύρωμα ἀνέσπασαν καὶ

διεφόρησαν τοὺς σταυροὺς παρ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τροπαῖον ἔστησαν.

[100] The Athenians did not interfere with their work, for they were afraid of dividing and weakening their forces; and they were pressing forward that part of the line on which they were employed. So the Syracusans when they had sufficiently completed a part of their stockade and cross-wall, leaving one division to guard the work, retreated into the city with the rest of their army. The Athenians now destroyed their conduits, which were laid underground to bring drinking-water into the city. Then, choosing their time at noon when the Syracusan guard remained within their tents (some of them had even retired into the city) and when the vigilance of their sentinels at the stockade was relaxed, they took a body of three hundred chosen hoplites of their own and some light-armed troops, picked soldiers, to whom they had given heavy arms, and bade them run quickly to the cross-wall. The rest of the army proceeded in two divisions under the two generals, one towards the city in case the enemy should come to save the wall, the other to that part of the stockade which adjoined the postern-gate of the city. The three hundred attacked and captured the further end of the stockade, from which the guards retired and fled inside the new outer wall which enclosed the shrine of Apollo Temenites. The pursuers pressed forward and made their way in after them; but they were forced out again by the Syracusans; and some Argives and a few of the Athenians fell there. Then the whole army, turning back, destroyed the cross-wall, tore up the stockades, carried the stakes to their camp, and raised a trophy.

101. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀπὸ τοῦ κύκλου ἐτείχιζον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν κρημνὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἕλους, ὃς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα ὁρᾷ, καὶ ᾗπερ αὐτοῖς βραχύτατον ἐγίγνετο καταβᾶσι διὰ τοῦ ὁμαλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἕλους ἐς τὸν λιμένα τὸ περιτείχισμα. [2] καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτῳ ἐξελθόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπεσταύρουν αὖθις ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ

τῆς πόλεως διὰ μέσου τοῦ ἕλους, καὶ τάφρον ἅμα παρώρυσσον, ὅπως μὴ οἷόν τε ᾖ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης ἀποτειχίσαι. [3] οἱ δ᾽, ἐπειδὴ τὸ πρὸς τὸν κρημνὸν αὐτοῖς ἐξείργαστο, ἐπιχειροῦσιν αὖθις τῷ τῶν Συρακοσίων σταυρώματι καὶ τάφρῳ, τὰς μὲν ναῦς κελεύσαντες περιπλεῦσαι ἐκ τῆς Θάψου ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα τὸν τῶν Συρακοσίων, αὐτοὶ δὲ περὶ ὄρθρον καταβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἐς τὸ ὁμαλὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἕλους, ᾗ πηλῶδες ἦν καὶ στεριφώτατον, θύρας καὶ ξύλα πλατέα ἐπιθέντες καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν διαβαδίσαντες, αἱροῦσιν ἅμα ἕῳ τό τε σταύρωμα πλὴν ὀλίγου καὶ τὴν τάφρον, καὶ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ὑπολειφθὲν εἷλον. [4] καὶ μάχη ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνίκων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων οἱ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχοντες πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔφευγον, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν. καὶ αὐτοὺς βουλόμενοι ἀποκλῄσασθαι τῆς διαβάσεως οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τριακόσιοι λογάδες δρόμῳ ἠπείγοντο πρὸς τὴν γέφυραν. [5] δείσαντες δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ᾖσαν γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἱππέων αὐτοῖς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμόσε χωροῦσι τοῖς τριακοσίοις τούτοις, καὶ τρέπουσί τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐσβάλλουσιν ἐς τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων: καὶ προσπεσόντων αὐτῶν ξυνεφοβήθη καὶ ἡ πρώτη φυλὴ τοῦ κέρως. [6] ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Λάμαχος παρεβοήθει ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐωνύμου τοῦ ἑαυτῶν μετὰ τοξοτῶν τε οὐ πολλῶν καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους παραλαβών, καὶ ἐπιδιαβὰς τάφρον τινὰ καὶ μονωθεὶς μετ᾽ ὀλίγων τῶν ξυνδιαβάντων ἀποθνῄσκει αὐτός τε καὶ πέντε ἢ ἓξ τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ. καὶ τούτους μὲν οἱ Συρακόσιοι εὐθὺς κατὰ τάχος φθάνουσιν ἁρπάσαντες πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλές, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐπιόντος ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου στρατεύματος τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπεχώρουν.

[101] On the following day the Athenians, beginning at one end of the unfinished circle, began to bring the wall down over the cliff which on this side of Epipolae looks across the marsh towards the Great Harbour, intending to carry on the line by the shortest way to the harbour right through the level of the marsh. Meanwhile the Syracusans also came out, and beginning from the city, proceeded to carry another

stockade through the middle of the marsh, with a ditch at the side, in order to prevent the Athenians from completing their line to the sea. The latter, having finished their work as far as the cliff, attacked the new Syracusan stockade and ditch. They ordered the ships to sail round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour of the Syracusans; with the first break of day they descended themselves from Epipolae to the level ground; and passing through the marsh where the soil was clay and firmer than the rest, over planks and gates which they laid down, they succeeded at sunrise in taking nearly the whole of the stockade and the ditch, and the remainder not long afterwards. A battle took place in which the Athenians were victorious, and the Syracusans on the right wing fled to the city, those on the left along the river. The three hundred chosen Athenian troops pressed on at full speed towards the bridge, intending to stop their passage, but the Syracusans, fearing that they would be cut off, and having most of their horsemen on the spot, turned upon the three hundred, and putting them to flight, charged the right wing of the Athenians. The panic now extended to the whole division at the extremity of the wing. Lamachus saw what had happened, and hastened to the rescue from his own place on the left wing, taking with him a few archers and the Argive troops; but pressing forward across a certain ditch he and a few who had followed him were cut off from the rest, and he fell with five or six others. The Syracusans hastily snatched up their bodies, and carried them across the river out of the reach of the enemy. But when they saw the rest of the Athenian army advancing towards them they retreated.

102. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν τὸ πρῶτον καταφυγόντες ὡς ἑώρων ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, αὐτοί τε πάλιν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀναθαρσήσαντες ἀντετάξαντο πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ σφᾶς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ μέρος τι αὐτῶν πέμπουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν κύκλον τὸν ἐπὶ ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς, ἡγούμενοι ἐρῆμον αἱρήσειν. [2] καὶ τὸ μὲν δεκάπλεθρον προτείχισμα αὐτῶν αἱροῦσι καὶ διεπόρθησαν, αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν κύκλον Νικίας

διεκώλυσεν: ἔτυχε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ δι᾽ ἀσθένειαν ὑπολελειμμένος. τὰς γὰρ μηχανὰς καὶ ξύλα ὅσα πρὸ τοῦ τείχους ἦν καταβεβλημένα, ἐμπρῆσαι τοὺς ὑπηρέτας ἐκέλευσεν, ὡς ἔγνω ἀδυνάτους ἐσομένους ἐρημίᾳ ἀνδρῶν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ περιγενέσθαι. [3] καὶ ξυνέβη οὕτως: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσῆλθον οἱ Συρακόσιοι διὰ τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ ἀπεχώρουν πάλιν. καὶ γὰρ πρός τε τὸν κύκλον βοήθεια ἤδη κάτωθεν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποδιωξάντων τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐπανῄει, καὶ αἱ νῆες ἅμα αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς Θάψου, ὥσπερ εἴρητο, κατέπλεον ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα. [4] ἃ ὁρῶντες οἱ ἄνωθεν κατὰ τάχος ἀπῆσαν καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα στρατιὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐς τὴν πόλιν, νομίσαντες μὴ ἂν ἔτι ἀπὸ τῆς παρούσης σφίσι δυνάμεως ἱκανοὶ γενέσθαι κωλῦσαι τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν τειχισμόν.

[102] Meanwhile the Syracusans who fled first into the city, observing the resistance made by the left wing, took courage, and coming out drew up against that part of the Athenian line which was opposed to them. They also sent a detachment against the wall of circumvallation on Epipolae, supposing that it was undefended, and might be taken. They did indeed take and demolish the outwork, which was about a thousand feet in length; but Nicias, who happened to have been left there because he was ill, saved the lines themselves. He commanded the attendants of the camp to set fire to the engines and to the timber which had been left lying in front of the wall, for being without troops he knew that there was no other way of escape. The expedient succeeded; and in consequence of the fire the Syracusans gave up the attack. The Athenian army too was now hastening from the plain to the surrounding wall, with the intention of beating off the enemy; while the ships, as they had been ordered, were sailing from Thapsus into the Great Harbour. The Syracusans on the heights, seeing this combined movement, quickly retreated, together with the rest of the army, into the city, thinking that with their present force they were no longer able to prevent the completion of the line of wall towards the sea.

103. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖον ἔστησαν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Λαμάχου καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκομίσαντο: καὶ παρόντος ἤδη σφίσι παντὸς τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ, ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν καὶ τοῦ κρημνώδους ἀρξάμενοι ἀπετείχιζον μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης τείχει διπλῷ τοὺς Συρακοσίους. [2] τὰ δ᾽ ἐπιτήδεια τῇ στρατιᾷ ἐσήγετο ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας πανταχόθεν. ἦλθον δὲ καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν πολλοὶ ξύμμαχοι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, οἳ πρότερον περιεωρῶντο, καὶ ἐκ τῆς Τυρσηνίας νῆες πεντηκόντοροι τρεῖς. καὶ τἆλλα προυχώρει αὐτοῖς ἐς ἐλπίδας. [3] καὶ γὰρ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πολέμῳ μὲν οὐκέτι ἐνόμιζον ἂν περιγενέσθαι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ὠφελία οὐδεμία ἦκε, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἔν τε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐποιοῦντο ξυμβατικοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὸν Νικίαν: οὗτος γὰρ δὴ μόνος εἶχε Λαμάχου τεθνεῶτος τὴν ἀρχήν. [4] καὶ κύρωσις μὲν οὐδεμία ἐγίγνετο, οἷα δὲ εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπορούντων καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν πολιορκουμένων, πολλὰ ἐλέγετο πρός τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ πλείω ἔτι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν. καὶ γάρ τινα καὶ ὑποψίαν ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἐς ἀλλήλους εἶχον, καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς τε ἐφ᾽ ὧν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα ξυνέβη ἔπαυσαν, ὡς ἢ δυστυχίᾳ ἢ προδοσίᾳ τῇ ἐκείνων βλαπτόμενοι, καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθείλοντο, Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Εὐκλέα καὶ Τελλίαν.

[103] The Athenians then erected a trophy and restored the Syracusan dead under a flag of truce. The Syracusans delivered to them the bodies of Lamachus and his companions. The whole Athenian forces, both naval and military, were now on the spot, and they proceeded to cut off the Syracusans by a double wall, beginning at the southern cliff of Epipolae and extending to the sea. Provisions came to their army in abundance from various parts of Italy. Many of the Sicel tribes who had hitherto been hesitating now joined the Athenians, and three penteconters came from the Tyrrhenians. Everything began to answer to their hopes. The Syracusans despaired of saving the city by arms, for no help reached them even from Peloponnesus.

Within the walls they were talking of peace, and they began to enter into communications with Nicias, who, now that Lamachus was dead, had the sole command. But no definite result was attained; although, as might be expected when men began to feel the pressure of the siege and their own helplessness, many proposals were made to him, and many more were discussed in the city. Their calamities even made them suspicious of one another; accordingly they deposed their generals, attributing the misfortunes which had befallen the city since they were appointed either to their ill-luck or to their treachery. In their room they chose Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias.

104. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Γύλιππος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κορίνθου νῆες περὶ Λευκάδα ἤδη ἦσαν, βουλόμενοι ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν διὰ τάχους βοηθῆσαι. καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς αἱ ἀγγελίαι ἐφοίτων δειναὶ καὶ πᾶσαι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐψευσμέναι ὡς ἤδη παντελῶς ἀποτετειχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαί εἰσι, τῆς μὲν Σικελίας οὐκέτι ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν ὁ Γύλιππος, τὴν δὲ Ἰταλίαν βουλόμενος περιποιῆσαι αὐτὸς μὲν καὶ Πυθὴν ὁ Κορίνθιος ναυσὶ δυοῖν μὲν Λακωνικαῖν, δυοῖν δὲ Κορινθίαιν ὅτι τάχιστα ἐπεραιώθησαν τὸν Ἰόνιον ἐς Τάραντα, οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι πρὸς ταῖς σφετέραις δέκα Λευκαδίας δύο καὶ Ἀμπρακιώτιδας τρεῖς προσπληρώσαντες ὕστερον ἔμελλον πλεύσεσθαι. [2] καὶ ὁ μὲν Γύλιππος ἐκ τοῦ Τάραντος ἐς τὴν Θουρίαν πρῶτον πρεσβευσάμενος καὶ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀνανεωσάμενος πολιτείαν καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος αὐτοὺς προσαγαγέσθαι, ἄρας παρέπλει τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ ἁρπασθεὶς ὑπ᾽ ἀνέμου κατὰ τὸν Τεριναῖον κόλπον, ὃς ἐκπνεῖ ταύτῃ μέγας κατὰ βορέαν ἑστηκώς, ἀποφέρεται ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, καὶ πάλιν χειμασθεὶς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα τῷ Τάραντι προσμίσγει: καὶ τὰς ναῦς, ὅσαι μάλιστα ἐπόνησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀνελκύσας ἐπεσκεύαζεν. [3] ὁ δὲ Νικίας πυθόμενος αὐτὸν προσπλέοντα ὑπερεῖδε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεῶν, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ Θούριοι ἔπαθον, καὶ ληστικώτερον ἔδοξε παρεσκευασμένους πλεῖν, καὶ οὐδεμίαν φυλακήν πω ἐποιεῖτο.

[104] Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the ships from Corinth were already at Leucas hastening to their relief. They were alarmed at the reports which were continually pouring in, all false, but all agreeing that the Athenian lines round Syracuse were now complete. Gylippus had no longer any hope of Sicily, but thought that he might save Italy; so he and Pythen the Corinthian sailed across the Ionian Gulf to Tarentum as fast as they could, taking two Laconian and two Corinthian ships. The Corinthians were to man ten ships of their own, two Leucadian, and three Ambracian, and to follow. Gylippus on his arrival at Tarentum went on a mission to Thurii, of which his father had formerly been a citizen; he had hoped to gain over the Thurians, but failed; he then continued his voyage from Tarentum along the coast of Italy. He was caught in the Terinaean gulf by a wind which in this region blows violently and steadily from the north, and was carried into the open sea. After experiencing a most violent storm he returned to Tarentum, where he drew up those of his ships which had suffered in the gale and refitted them. Nicias heard of his approach, but despised the small number of his ships; in this respect he was like the Thurians. He thought that he had come on a mere privateering expedition, and for some time set no watch.

105. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτου τοῦ θέρους καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς τὸ Ἄργος ἐσέβαλον αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ τῆς γῆς τὴν πολλὴν ἐδῄωσαν, καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι Ἀργείοις τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐβοήθησαν: αἴπερ τὰς σπονδὰς φανερώτατα τὰς πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους αὐτοῖς ἔλυσαν. [2] πρότερον μὲν γὰρ λῃστείαις ἐκ Πύλου καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἀποβαίνοντες μετά τε Ἀργείων καὶ Μαντινέων ξυνεπολέμουν, καὶ πολλάκις Ἀργείων κελευόντων ὅσον σχόντας μόνον ξὺν ὅπλοις ἐς τὴν Λακωνικὴν καὶ τὸ ἐλάχιστον μετὰ σφῶν δῃώσαντας ἀπελθεῖν οὐκ ἤθελον: τότε δὲ Πυθοδώρου καὶ Λαισποδίου καὶ Δημαράτου ἀρχόντων ἀποβάντες ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον τὴν Λιμηρὰν καὶ Πρασιὰς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐδῄωσαν

τῆς γῆς, καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἤδη εὐπροφάσιστον μᾶλλον τὴν αἰτίαν ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τοῦ ἀμύνεσθαι ἐποίησαν. [3] ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκ τοῦ Ἄργους ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Φλειασίαν τῆς τε γῆς αὐτῶν ἔτεμον καὶ ἀπέκτεινάν τινας, καὶ ἀπῆλθον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου.

[105] During the same summer, about the same time, the Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Argolis and wasted most of the Argive territory. The Athenians assisted the Argives with thirty ships. The use which they made of them was a glaring violation of the treaty with the Lacedaemonians. Hitherto they had only gone out on marauding expeditions from Pylos; when they landed, it was not upon the shores of Laconia, but upon other parts of the Peloponnese; and they had merely fought as the allies of the Argives and Mantineans. The Argives had often urged them just to land soldiers on Lacedaemonian ground, and to waste some part of Laconia, however small, without remaining, and they had refused. But now, under the command of Pythodorus, Laespodias, and Demaratus, they landed at Epidaurus Limera, Prasiae, and other places, and wasted the country. Thereby the Athenians at last gave the Lacedaemonians a right to complain of them and completely justified measures of retaliation. After the Athenian fleet had departed from Argos, and the Lacedaemonians had likewise retired, the Argives invaded Phliasia, and having ravaged the country and killed a few of the Phliasians, returned home.

Βιβλίο Ζ’ — BOOK VII

1. ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος καὶ ὁ Πυθὴν ἐκ τοῦ Τάραντος, ἐπεὶ ἐπεσκεύασαν τὰς ναῦς, παρέπλευσαν ἐς Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ἐπιζεφυρίους: καὶ πυνθανόμενοι σαφέστερον ἤδη ὅτι οὐ παντελῶς πω ἀποτετειχισμέναι αἱ Συράκουσαί εἰσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι οἷόν τε κατὰ τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς στρατιᾷ ἀφικομένους ἐσελθεῖν, ἐβουλεύοντο εἴτ᾽ ἐν δεξιᾷ λαβόντες τὴν Σικελίαν διακινδυνεύσωσιν ἐσπλεῦσαι, εἴτ᾽ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ ἐς Ἰμέραν πρῶτον πλεύσαντες καὶ αὐτούς τε ἐκείνους καὶ στρατιὰν ἄλλην προσλαβόντες, οὓς ἂν πείθωσι, κατὰ γῆν ἔλθωσιν. [2] καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰμέρας πλεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν τεσσάρων νεῶν οὔπω παρουσῶν ἐν τῷ Ῥηγίῳ, ἃς ὁ Νικίας ὅμως πυνθανόμενος αὐτοὺς ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶναι ἀπέστειλεν. φθάσαντες δὲ τὴν φυλακὴν ταύτην περαιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ πορθμοῦ, καὶ σχόντες Ῥηγίῳ καὶ Μεσσήνῃ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ἰμέραν. [3] ἐκεῖ δὲ ὄντες τούς τε Ἰμεραίους ἔπεισαν ξυμπολεμεῖν καὶ αὐτούς τε ἔπεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν νεῶν τῶν σφετέρων ναύταις ὅσοι μὴ εἶχον ὅπλα παρασχεῖν τὰς γὰρ ναῦς ἀνείλκυσαν ἐν Ἰμέρᾳ , καὶ τοὺς Σελινουντίους πέμψαντες ἐκέλευον ἀπαντᾶν πανστρατιᾷ ἔς τι χωρίον. [4] πέμψειν δέ τινα αὐτοῖς ὑπέσχοντο στρατιὰν οὐ πολλὴν καὶ οἱ Γελῷοι καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινές, οἳ πολὺ προθυμότερον προσχωρεῖν ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν τοῦ τε Ἀρχωνίδου νεωστὶ τεθνηκότος, ὃς τῶν ταύτῃ Σικελῶν βασιλεύων τινῶν καὶ ὢν οὐκ ἀδύνατος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις φίλος ἦν,καὶ τοῦ Γυλίππου ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος προθύμως δοκοῦντος ἥκειν. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν Γύλιππος ἀναλαβὼν τῶν τε σφετέρων ναυτῶν καὶ ἐπιβατῶν τοὺς ὡπλισμένους ἑπτακοσίους μάλιστα, Ἰμεραίους δὲ ὁπλίτας καὶ ψιλοὺς ξυναμφοτέρους χιλίους καὶ ἱππέας ἑκατὸν καὶ Σελινουντίων τέ τινας ψιλοὺς καὶ ἱππέας καὶ Γελῴων ὀλίγους, Σικελῶν τε ἐς χιλίους τοὺς πάντας, ἐχώρει πρὸς τὰς Συρακούσας:

[1] GYLIPPUS and Pythen, after refitting their ships at Tarentum, coasted along to the Epizephyrian Locri. They now

learned the truth, that Syracuse was not as yet completely invested, but that an army might still enter by way of Epipolae. So they considered whether they should steer their course to the left or to the right of Sicily. They might attempt to throw themselves into Syracuse by sea, but the risk would be great; or they might go first to Himera, and gathering a force of the Himeraeans, and of any others whom they could induce to join them, make their way by land. They determined to sail to Himera, especially as the straits were unguarded. Nicias, when he heard that they were at Locri, although he had despised them at first, now sent out four Athenian ships to intercept them; but these had not as yet arrived at Rhegium, and came too late. So they sailed through the strait and, touching by the way at Rhegium and Messenè, reached Himera. They persuaded the Himeraeans to make common cause with them, and not only to join in the expedition themselves, but to supply arms to all their unarmed sailors, for they had beached their ships at Himera. They then sent to the Selinuntians and told them to come and meet them with their whole army at an appointed place. The Geloans and certain of the Sicels also promised to send them a small force; the latter with the more alacrity because Archonides, a Sicel king in these parts who was a powerful man and friendly to the Athenians, had recently died, and because Gylippus seemed to have come from Lacedaemon with hearty good-will. And so, taking with him about seven hundred of his own sailors and marines for whom he had obtained arms, about a thousand Himeraean infantry, heavy and light-armed included, and a hundred Himeraean horsemen, some light-armed troops and cavalry from Selinus, a few more from Gela, and of the Sicels about a thousand in all, Gylippus marched towards Syracuse.

2. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος Κορίνθιοι ταῖς τε ἄλλαις ναυσὶν ὡς εἶχον τάχους ἐβοήθουν καὶ Γογγύλος, εἷς τῶν Κορινθίων ἀρχόντων, μιᾷ νηὶ τελευταῖος ὁρμηθεὶς πρῶτος μὲν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ὀλίγον δὲ πρὸ Γυλίππου, καὶ

καταλαβὼν αὐτοὺς περὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ πολέμου μέλλοντας ἐκκλησιάσειν διεκώλυσέ τε καὶ παρεθάρσυνε, λέγων ὅτι νῆές τε ἄλλαι ἔτι προσπλέουσι καὶ Γύλιππος ὁ Κλεανδρίδου Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστειλάντων ἄρχων. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ἐπερρώσθησάν τε καὶ τῷ Γυλίππῳ εὐθὺς πανστρατιᾷ ὡς ἀπαντησόμενοι ἐξῆλθον: ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγγὺς ὄντα ᾐσθάνοντο αὐτόν. [3] ὁ δὲ Ἰέτας τότε τι τεῖχος ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ τῶν Σικελῶν ἑλὼν καὶ ξυνταξάμενος ὡς ἐς μάχην ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς: καὶ ἀναβὰς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ᾗπερ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον, ἐχώρει μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐπὶ τὸ τείχισμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων. [4] ἔτυχε δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο τοῦ καιροῦ ἐλθὼν ἐν ᾧ ἑπτὰ μὲν ἢ ὀκτὼ σταδίων ἤδη ἀπετετέλεστο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὸν μέγαν λιμένα διπλοῦν τεῖχος, πλὴν κατὰ βραχύ τι τὸ πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν — τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔτι ᾠκοδόμουν —, τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρωγίλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θάλασσαν λίθοι τε παραβεβλημένοι τῷ πλέονι ἤδη ἦσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ ἡμίεργα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξειργασμένα κατελέλειπτο. παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν αἱ Συράκουσαι ἦλθον κινδύνου.

[2] In the meantime the Corinthian ships had put to sea from Leucas and were coming with all speed to the relief of the besieged. Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who started last in a single ship, arrived at Syracuse before the rest of the fleet, and a little before Gylippus. He found the citizens on the point of holding an assembly at which the question of peace was to be discussed; from this intention he dissuaded them by the encouraging announcement that more ships, and Gylippus the son of Cleandridas, whom the Lacedaemonians had sent to take the command, were on their way. Whereupon the Syracusans were reassured, and at once went forth with their whole army to meet Gylippus, who, as they were informed, was now close at hand. He had shortly before captured the Sicel fort Geta on his march, and drawing up his men in readiness to fight, came to Epipolae, which he ascended by the Euryelus; where the Athenians had found a

way before him. Having formed a junction with the Syracusans, he marched against the Athenian lines. He arrived just at the time when the Athenians had all but finished their double wall, nearly a mile long, reaching to the Great Harbour; there remained only a small portion toward the sea, upon which they were still at work. Along the remainder of the line of wall, which extended towards Trogilus and the northern sea, the stones were mostly lying ready; a part was half-finished, a part had been completed and left. So near was Syracuse to destruction.

3. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι αἰφνιδίως τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων σφίσιν ἐπιόντων ἐθορυβήθησαν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, παρετάξαντο δέ. ὁ δὲ θέμενος τὰ ὅπλα ἐγγὺς κήρυκα προσπέμπει αὐτοῖς λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται ἐξιέναι ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας πέντε ἡμερῶν λαβόντες τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν, ἑτοῖμος εἶναι σπένδεσθαι. [2] οἱ δ᾽ ἐν ὀλιγωρίᾳ τε ἐποιοῦντο καὶ οὐδὲν ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀπέπεμψαν. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀντιπαρεσκευάζοντο ἀλλήλοις ὡς ἐς μάχην. [3] καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ὁρῶν τοὺς Συρακοσίους ταρασσομένους καὶ οὐ ῥᾳδίως ξυντασσομένους, ἐπανῆγε τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ Νικίας οὐκ ἐπῆγε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχαζε πρὸς τῷ ἑαυτῶν τείχει. ὡς δ᾽ ἔγνω ὁ Γύλιππος οὐ προσιόντας αὐτούς, ἀπήγαγε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄκραν τὴν Τεμενῖτιν καλουμένην, καὶ αὐτοῦ ηὐλίσαντο. [4] τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἄγων τὴν μὲν πλείστην τῆς στρατιᾶς παρέταξε πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅπως μὴ ἐπιβοηθοῖεν ἄλλοσε, μέρος δέ τι πέμψας πρὸς τὸ φρούριον τὸ Λάβδαλον αἱρεῖ, καὶ ὅσους ἔλαβεν ἐν αὐτῷ πάντας ἀπέκτεινεν: ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἐπιφανὲς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸ χωρίον. [5] καὶ τριήρης τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἁλίσκεται τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐφορμοῦσα τῷ λιμένι.

[3] The Athenians, though at first disconcerted by the sudden advance of Gylippus and the Syracusans, drew up their forces in order of battle. He halted as he approached, and sent a herald to them offering a truce if they were willing to quit Sicily within five days taking what belonged

to them. But they despised his offer, and sent away the herald without an answer. Whereupon both armies set themselves in order of battle. Gylippus, seeing that the Syracusans were in confusion, and could with difficulty form, led back his troops to the more open ground. Nicias did not follow, but lay still, close to his own wall. When Gylippus observed that the Athenians remained where they were, he led away his army to the height called Temenites; there they passed the night. On the following day he stationed the greater part of his troops in front of the Athenian wall that the enemy might not despatch a force to any other point, and then sent a detachment against the fort of Labdalum, which was out of sight of the Athenian lines. He took the place, and killed every one whom he found in it. On the same day an Athenian trireme which was keeping watch over the mouth of the harbour was taken by the Syracusans.

4. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐτείχιζον οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι ἄνω πρὸς τὸ * ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ μὴ δύναιντο κωλῦσαι, μηκέτι οἷοί τε ὦσιν ἀποτειχίσαι. [2] καὶ οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνεβεβήκεσαν ἤδη ἄνω, τὸ ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ τεῖχος ἐπιτελέσαντες, καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ⟨ἦν γάρ τι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοῦ τείχους ἀσθενές⟩ νυκτὸς ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπῄει πρὸς αὐτό. [3] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ⟨ἔτυχον γὰρ ἔξω αὐλιζόμενοι⟩ ὡς ᾔσθοντο, ἀντεπῆσαν: ὁ δὲ γνοὺς κατὰ τάχος ἀπήγαγε τοὺς σφετέρους πάλιν. ἐποικοδομήσαντες δὲ αὐτὸ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑψηλότερον αὐτοὶ μὲν ταύτῃ ἐφύλασσον, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ξυμμάχους κατὰ τὸ ἄλλο τείχισμα ἤδη διέταξαν, ᾗπερ ἔμελλον ἕκαστοι φρουρεῖν. [4]τῷ δὲ Νικίᾳ ἐδόκει τὸ Πλημμύριον καλούμενον τειχίσαι: ἔστι δὲ ἄκρα ἀντιπέρας τῆς πόλεως, ἥπερ προύχουσα τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος τὸ στόμα στενὸν ποιεῖ, καὶ εἰ τειχισθείη, ῥᾴων αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο ἡ ἐσκομιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔσεσθαι: δι᾽ ἐλάσσονος γὰρ πρὸς τῷ λιμένι τῷ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐφορμήσειν σφᾶς, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν ἐκ μυχοῦ τοῦ λιμένος τὰς ἐπαναγωγὰς ποιήσεσθαι, ἤν τι ναυτικῷ κινῶνται. προσεῖχέ τε ἤδη

μᾶλλον τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν πολέμῳ, ὁρῶν τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς σφίσιν ἤδη, ἐπειδὴ Γύλιππος ἦκεν, ἀνελπιστότερα ὄντα. [5] διακομίσας οὖν στρατιὰν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐξετείχισε τρία φρούρια: καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τά τε σκεύη τὰ πλεῖστα ἔκειτο καὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἤδη ἐκεῖ τὰ μεγάλα ὥρμει καὶ αἱ ταχεῖαι νῆες. [6] ὥστε καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων οὐχ ἥκιστα τότε πρῶτον κάκωσις ἐγένετο: τῷ τε γὰρ ὕδατι σπανίῳ χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύθεν, καὶ ἐπὶ φρυγανισμὸν ἅμα ὁπότε ἐξέλθοιεν οἱ ναῦται, ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων τῶν Συρακοσίων κρατούντων τῆς γῆς διεφθείροντο: τρίτον γὰρ μέρος τῶν ἱππέων τοῖς Συρακοσίοις διὰ τοὺς ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ, ἵνα μὴ κακουργήσοντες ἐξίοιεν, ἐπὶ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιείῳ πολίχνῃ ἐτετάχατο. [7] ἐπυνθάνετο δὲ καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς τῶν Κορινθίων ναῦς προσπλεούσας ὁ Νικίας: καὶ πέμπει ἐς φυλακὴν αὐτῶν εἴκοσι ναῦς, αἷς εἴρητο περί τε Λοκροὺς καὶ Ῥήγιον καὶ τὴν προσβολὴν τῆς Σικελίας ναυλοχεῖν αὐτάς.

[4] The Syracusans and their allies now began to build a single line of wall starting from the city and running upwards across Epipolae at an angle with the Athenian wall; this was a work which, unless it could be stopped by the Athenians, would make the investment of the city impossible. Towards the sea the Athenian wall was now completed, and their forces had come up to the high ground. Gylippus, knowing that a part of the wall was weak, instantly went by night with his army to attack it. But the Athenians, who happened to be passing the night outside the walls, perceived this movement and marched to oppose him; whereupon he at once withdrew. They then raised the weak portion of their wall higher; and guarded it themselves, while they posted the allies on the other parts of the fortification in the places severally assigned to them.Nicias now determined to fortify Plemmyrium, a promontory which runs out opposite the city and narrows the entrance to the Great Harbour. He thought that this measure would facilitate the introduction of supplies. His forces would then be able to watch the harbour of the Syracusans from a nearer point,

whereas they had hitherto been obliged to put out from the further corner of the Great Harbour whenever a Syracusan ship threatened to move. He was inclined to pay more attention than hitherto to naval operations; for since the arrival of Gylippus the Athenian prospects by land were not so encouraging. Having therefore transferred his ships and a portion of his army to Plemmyrium, he built three forts in which the greater part of the Athenian stores were deposited; and the large boats as well as the ships of war were now anchored at this spot. The removal was a first and main cause of the deterioration of the crews. For when the sailors went out to procure forage and water, of which there was little, and that only to be obtained from a distance, they were constantly cut off by the Syracusan cavalry, who were masters of the country, a third part of their force having been posted in a village at the Olympieum expressly in order to prevent the enemy at Plemmyrium from coming out and doing mischief. About this time Nicias was informed that the rest of the Corinthian fleet was on the point of arriving, and he sent twenty ships, which were ordered to lie in wait for them about Locri and Rhegium and the approach to Sicily.

5. ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἅμα μὲν ἐτείχιζε τὸ διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τεῖχος, τοῖς λίθοις χρώμενος οὓς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προπαρεβάλοντο σφίσιν, ἅμα δὲ παρέτασσεν ἐξάγων αἰεὶ πρὸ τοῦ τειχίσματος τοὺς Συρακοσίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους: καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο. [2] ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔδοξε τῷ Γυλίππῳ καιρὸς εἶναι, ἦρχε τῆς ἐφόδου: καὶ ἐν χερσὶ γενόμενοι ἐμάχοντο μεταξὺ τῶν τειχισμάτων, ᾗ τῆς ἵππου τῶν Συρακοσίων οὐδεμία χρῆσις ἦν. [3] καὶ νικηθέντων τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀνελομένων καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τροπαῖον στησάντων, ὁ Γύλιππος ξυγκαλέσας τὸ στράτευμα οὐκ ἔφη τὸ ἁμάρτημα ἐκείνων, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι: τῆς γὰρ ἵππου καὶ τῶν ἀκοντιστῶν τὴν ὠφελίαν τῇ τάξει ἐντὸς λίαν τῶν τειχῶν ποιήσας ἀφελέσθαι: νῦν οὖν αὖθις ἐπάξειν. [4] καὶ

διανοεῖσθαι οὕτως ἐκέλευεν αὐτοὺς ὡς τῇ μὲν παρασκευῇ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔξοντας, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἐσόμενον εἰ μὴ ἀξιώσουσι Πελοποννήσιοί τε ὄντες καὶ Δωριῆς Ἰώνων καὶ νησιωτῶν καὶ ξυγκλύδων ἀνθρώπων κρατήσαντες ἐξελάσασθαι ἐκ τῆς χώρας.

[5] While Gylippus was building the wall across Epipolae, employing the stones which the Athenians had previously laid there for their own use, he at the same time constantly led out and drew up in front of the wall the Syracusans and their allies, and the Athenians on their part drew up in face of them. When he thought that the moment had arrived he offered battle; the two armies met and fought hand to hand between the walls. But there the Syracusan cavalry was useless; the Syracusans and their allies were defeated, and received their dead under a flag of truce, while the Athenians raised a trophy. Gylippus then assembled his army and confessed that the fault was his own and not theirs; for by confining their ranks too much between the walls he had rendered useless both their cavalry and their javelin-men. So he would lead them out again. And he reminded them that in material force they were equal to their enemies, while as for resolution they ought to be far superior. That they, who were Peloponnesians and Dorians, should allow a mixed rabble of Ionians and islanders to remain in the country and not determine to master them and drive them out, was a thing not to be thought of.

6. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ καιρὸς ἦν, αὖθις ἐπῆγεν αὐτούς. ὁ δὲ Νικίας καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίζοντες, καὶ εἰ ἐκεῖνοι μὴ ἐθέλοιεν μάχης ἄρχειν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σφίσι μὴ περιορᾶν παροικοδομούμενον τὸ τεῖχος ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρεληλύθει τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῦ τείχους τελευτὴν ἡ ἐκείνων τείχισις, καί, εἰ προέλθοι, ταὐτὸν ἤδη ἐποίει αὐτοῖς νικᾶν τε μαχομένοις διὰ παντὸς καὶ μηδὲ μάχεσθαι , ἀντεπῆσαν οὖν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. [2] καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἔξω τῶν τειχῶν μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον προαγαγὼν ξυνέμισγεν αὐτοῖς, τοὺς δ᾽ ἱππέας καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς ἐκ

πλαγίου τάξας τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, ᾗ τῶν τειχῶν ἀμφοτέρων αἱ ἐργασίαι ἔληγον. [3] καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ ἱππῆς ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ κέρᾳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὅπερ κατ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἦν, ἔτρεψαν: καὶ δι᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα νικηθὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων κατηράχθη ἐς τὰ τειχίσματα. [4] καὶ τῇ ἐπιούσῃ νυκτὶ ἔφθασαν παροικοδομήσαντες καὶ παρελθόντες τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἰκοδομίαν, ὥστε μηκέτι μήτε αὐτοὶ κωλύεσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἐκείνους τε καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπεστερηκέναι, εἰ καὶ κρατοῖεν, μὴ ἂν ἔτι σφᾶς ἀποτειχίσαι.

[6] On the first opportunity he led them out again. Nicias and the Athenians had determined that, whether the Syracusans would offer battle or not, they must not allow them to carry on their counter-work. For already it had almost passed the end of the Athenian wall, and if the work advanced any further it would make no difference to the Athenians whether they fought and conquered in every battle, or never fought at all. So they went out to meet the Syracusans. Gylippus before engaging led his heavy-armed further outside the walls than on the former occasion; his cavalry and javelin-men he placed on the flanks of the Athenians in the open space between the points at which their respective lines of walls stopped. In the course of the battle the cavalry attacked the left wing of the Athenians which was opposed to them, and put them to flight; the defeat became general, and the whole Athenian army was driven back by main force within their lines. On the following night the Syracusans succeeded in carrying their wall past the works of the enemy. Their operations were now no longer molested by them, and the Athenians, whatever success they might gain in the field, were utterly deprived of all hope of investing the city.

7. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αἵ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα, λαθοῦσαι τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυλακήν □ ἦρχε δ᾽ αὐτῶν Ἐρασινίδης Κορίνθιος □, καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν

τοῖς Συρακοσίοις μέχρι * τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους. [2] καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν ἐπὶ στρατιάν τε ᾤχετο, καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζὴν ξυλλέξων, καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἅμα προσαξόμενος εἴ τις ἢ μὴ πρόθυμος ἦν ἢ παντάπασιν ἔτι ἀφειστήκει τοῦ πολέμου. [3] πρέσβεις τε ἄλλοι τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων ἐς Λακεδαίμονα καὶ Κόρινθον ἀπεστάλησαν, ὅπως στρατιὰ ἔτι περαιωθῇ τρόπῳ ᾧ ἂν ἐν ὁλκάσιν ἢ πλοίοις ἢ ἄλλως ὅπως ἂν προχωρῇ, ὡς καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιμεταπεμπομένων. [4] οἵ τε Συρακόσιοι ναυτικὸν ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο ὡς καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιχειρήσοντες, καὶ ἐς τἆλλα πολὺ ἐπέρρωντο.

[7] Not long afterwards the remaining Corinthian with the Ambraciot and Leucadian ships sailed in, under the command of Erasinides the Corinthian, having eluded the Athenian guardships. They assisted the Syracusans in completing what remained of the Syracusan wall up to the Athenian wall which it crossed. Gylippus meanwhile had gone off into Sicily to collect both naval and land forces, and also to bring over any cities which either were slack in the Syracusan cause or had stood aloof from the war. More ambassadors, Syracusan and Corinthian, were despatched to Lacedaemon and Corinth, requesting that reinforcements might be sent across the sea in merchantships or small craft, or by any other available means, since the Athenians were sending for assistance. The Syracusans, who were in high spirits, also manned a fleet, and began to practise, intending to try their hand at this new sort of warfare.

8. ὁ δὲ Νικίας αἰσθόμενος τοῦτο καὶ ὁρῶν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἐπιδιδοῦσαν τήν τε τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἀπορίαν, ἔπεμπε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀγγέλλων πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τῶν γιγνομένων, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τότε, νομίζων ἐν δεινοῖς τε εἶναι καί, εἰ μὴ ὡς τάχιστα ἢ σφᾶς μεταπέμψουσιν ἢ ἄλλους μὴ ὀλίγους ἀποστελοῦσιν, οὐδεμίαν εἶναι σωτηρίαν. [2] φοβούμενος δὲ μὴ οἱ πεμπόμενοι ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυνασίαν ἢ καὶ μνήμης ἐλλιπεῖς γιγνόμενοι ἢ τῷ ὄχλῳ πρὸς χάριν τι

λέγοντες οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἀπαγγέλλωσιν, ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολήν, νομίζων οὕτως ἂν μάλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην μηδὲν ἐν τῷ ἀγγέλῳ ἀφανισθεῖσαν μαθόντας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν ᾤχοντο φέροντες, οὓς ἀπέστειλε, τὰ γράμματα καὶ ὅσα ἔδει αὐτοὺς εἰπεῖν: ὁ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον διὰ φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἤδη ἔχων ἢ δι᾽ ἐκουσίων κινδύνων ἐπεμέλετο.

[8] Nicias observing how they were employed, and seeing that the strength of the enemy and the helplessness of the Athenians was daily increasing, sent to Athens a full report of his circumstances, as he had often done before, but never in such detail. He now thought the situation so critical that, if the Athenians did not at once recall them or send another considerable army to their help, the expedition was lost. Fearing lest his messengers, either from inability to speak or from want of intelligence, or because they desired to please the people, might not tell the whole truth, he wrote a letter, that the Athenians might receive his own opinion of their affairs unimpaired in the transmission, and so be better able to judge of the real facts of the case. The messengers departed carrying his letter and taking verbal instructions. He was now careful to keep his army on the defensive, and to run no risks which he could avoid.

9. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τελευτῶντι καὶ Εὐετίων στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων μετὰ Περδίκκου στρατεύσας ἐπ᾽ Ἀμφίπολιν Θρᾳξὶ πολλοῖς τὴν μὲν πόλιν οὐχ εἶλεν, ἐς δὲ τὸν Στρυμόνα περικομίσας τριήρεις ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπολιόρκει ὁρμώμενος ἐξ Ἱμεραίου. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[9] At the end of the same summer, Euetion, an Athenian general, in concert with Perdiccas and assisted by a large force of Thracians, made an attack upon Amphipolis, which he failed to take. He then brought round triremes into the Strymon and besieged the place from the river, making Himeraeum his head-quarters. So the summer ended.

10. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος ἥκοντες ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Νικίου ὅσα τε ἀπὸ γλώσσης εἴρητο

αὐτοῖς εἶπον, καὶ εἴ τίς τι ἐπηρώτα ἀπεκρίνοντο, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπέδοσαν. ὁ δὲ γραμματεὺς ὁ τῆς πόλεως παρελθὼν ἀνέγνω τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις δηλοῦσαν τοιάδε.

[10] In the following winter the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens. They delivered their verbal instructions, and answered any questions which were put to them. They also presented his letter, which the registrar of the city, coming forward, read to the Athenian people. It ran as follows:

11. ‘τὰ μὲν πρότερον πραχθέντα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς ἐπιστολαῖς ἴστε: νῦν δὲ καιρὸς οὐχ ἧσσον μαθόντας ὑμᾶς ἐν ᾧ ἐσμὲν βουλεύσασθαι. [2] κρατησάντων γὰρ ἡμῶν μάχαις ταῖς πλέοσι Συρακοσίους ἐφ᾽ οὓς ἐπέμφθημεν καὶ τὰ τείχη οἰκοδομησαμένων ἐν οἵσπερ νῦν ἐσμέν, ἦλθε Γύλιππος Λακεδαιμόνιος στρατιὰν ἔχων ἔκ τε Πελοποννήσου καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ πόλεων ἔστιν ὧν. καὶ μάχῃ τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ νικᾶται ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν, τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἱππεῦσί τε πολλοῖς καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς βιασθέντες ἀνεχωρήσαμεν ἐς τὰ τείχη. [3] νῦν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν παυσάμενοι τοῦ περιτειχισμοῦ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων ἡσυχάζομεν □ οὐδὲ γὰρ ξυμπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ δυναίμεθ᾽ ἂν χρήσασθαι ἀπανηλωκυίας τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν τειχῶν μέρος τι τοῦ ὁπλιτικοῦ □ : οἱ δὲ παρῳκοδομήκασιν ἡμῖν τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι ἔτι περιτειχίσαι αὐτούς, ἢν μή τις τὸ παρατείχισμα τοῦτο πολλῇ στρατιᾷ ἐπελθὼν ἕλῃ. [4] ξυμβέβηκέ τε πολιορκεῖν δοκοῦντας ἡμᾶς ἄλλους αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον, ὅσα γε κατὰ γῆν, τοῦτο πάσχειν: οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς χώρας ἐπὶ πολὺ διὰ τοὺς ἱππέας ἐξερχόμεθα.

[11] ‘Athenians, in many previous despatches I have reported to you the course of events up to this time, but now there is greater need than ever that you should inform yourselves of our situation, and come to some decision. After we had engaged the Syracusans, against whom you sent us, in several battles, and conquered in most of them, and had raised the lines within which we are now stationed, Gylippus, a Lacedaemonian arrived, bringing an army from

Peloponnesus and from certain of the cities of Sicily. In the first engagement he was defeated by us, but on the following day we were overcome by numerous horsemen and javelin-men, and retired within our lines. We have therefore desisted from our siege-works and remain idle, since we are overpowered by the superior numbers of the enemy, and indeed cannot bring our whole army into the field, for the defence of our wall absorbs a large part of our heavy-armed. The enemy meanwhile have built a single wall which crosses ours, and we cannot now invest them, unless a large army comes up and takes this cross-wall. So that we, who are supposed to be the besiegers, are really the besieged, at least by land; and the more so because we cannot go far even into the country, for we are prevented by their horsemen.

12. ‘πεπόμφασι δὲ καὶ ἐς Πελοπόννησον πρέσβεις ἐπ᾽ ἄλλην στρατιάν, καὶ ἐς τὰς ἐν Σικελίᾳ πόλεις Γύλιππος οἴχεται, τὰς μὲν καὶ πείσων ξυμπολεμεῖν ὅσαι νῦν ἡσυχάζουσιν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν καὶ στρατιὰν ἔτι πεζὴν καὶ ναυτικοῦ παρασκευήν, ἢν δύνηται, ἄξων. [2] διανοοῦνται γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, τῷ τε πεζῷ ἅμα τῶν τειχῶν ἡμῶν πειρᾶν καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. [3] καὶ δεινὸν μηδενὶ ὑμῶν δόξῃ εἶναι ὅτι καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν. τὸ γὰρ ναυτικὸν ἡμῶν, ὅπερ κἀκεῖνοι πυνθάνονται, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἤκμαζε καὶ τῶν νεῶν τῇ ξηρότητι καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων τῇ σωτηρίᾳ: νῦν δὲ αἵ τε νῆες διάβροχοι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἤδη θαλασσεύουσαι, καὶ τὰ πληρώματα ἔφθαρται. [4] τὰς μὲν γὰρ ναῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνελκύσαντας διαψύξαι διὰ τὸ ἀντιπάλους τῷ πλήθει καὶ ἔτι πλείους τὰς τῶν πολεμίων οὔσας αἰεὶ προσδοκίαν παρέχειν ὡς ἐπιπλεύσονται. [5] φανεραὶ δ᾽ εἰσὶν ἀναπειρώμεναι, καὶ αἱ ἐπιχειρήσεις ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις καὶ ἀποξηρᾶναι τὰς σφετέρας μᾶλλον ἐξουσία: οὐ γὰρ ἐφορμοῦσιν ἄλλοις.

[12] ‘Moreover they have sent ambassadors to Peloponnesus asking for reinforcements, and Gylippus has gone to the cities in Sicily intending to solicit those who are at present

neutral to join him, and to obtain from his allies fresh naval and land forces. For they purpose, as I hear, to attack our walls by land, and at the same time to make an effort at sea. And let no one be startled when I say “at sea.” Our fleet was originally in first-rate condition: the ships were sound and the crews were in good order, but now, as the enemy are well aware, the timbers of the ships, having been so long exposed to the sea, are soaked, and the efficiency of the crews is destroyed. We have no means of drawing up our vessels and airing them, because the enemy’s fleet is equal or even superior in numbers to our own, and we are always expecting an attack from them. They are clearly trying their strength; they can attack us when they please, and they have far greater facilities for drying their ships, since they are not, like us, engaged in a blockade.

13. ἡμῖν δ᾽ ἐκ πολλῆς ἂν περιουσίας νεῶν μόλις τοῦτο ὑπῆρχε καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζομένοις ὥσπερ νῦν πάσαις φυλάσσειν: εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρήσομέν τι καὶ βραχὺ τῆς τηρήσεως, τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐχ ἕξομεν, παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων πόλιν χαλεπῶς καὶ νῦν ἐσκομιζόμενοι. [2] τὰ δὲ πληρώματα διὰ τόδε ἐφθάρη τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἔτι νῦν φθείρεται, τῶν ναυτῶν [τῶν] μὲν διὰ φρυγανισμὸν καὶ ἁρπαγὴν καὶ ὑδρείαν μακρὰν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπολλυμένων: οἱ δὲ θεράποντες, ἐπειδὴ ἐς ἀντίπαλα καθεστήκαμεν, αὐτομολοῦσι, καὶ οἱ ξένοι οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες εὐθὺς κατὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀποχωροῦσιν,οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ μεγάλου μισθοῦ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπαρθέντες καὶ οἰόμενοι χρηματιεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μαχεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ γνώμην ναυτικόν τε δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνθεστῶτα ὁρῶσιν, οἱ μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτομολίας προφάσει ἀπέρχονται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἕκαστοι δύνανται □πολλὴ δ᾽ ἡ Σικελία□, εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἳ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμπορευόμενοι ἀνδράποδα Ὑκκαρικὰ ἀντεμβιβάσαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν πείσαντες τοὺς τριηράρχους τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἀφῄρηνται.

[13] ‘Even if we had a great superiority in the number of our ships, and were not compelled as we are to employ them all in keeping guard, we could hardly have the like advantage.

For our supplies have to pass so near the enemy’s city that they are with difficulty conveyed to us now, and if we relax our vigilance ever so little we shall lose them altogether.’It has been, and continues to be the ruin of our crews, that the sailors, having to forage and fetch water and wood from a distance, are cut off by the Syracusan horse, while our servants, since we have been reduced to an equality with the enemy, desert us. Of the foreign sailors, some who were pressed into the service run off at once to the Sicilian cities; others, having been originally attracted by high pay, and fancying that they were going to trade and not to fight, astonished at the resistance which they encounter, and especially at the naval strength of the enemy, either find an excuse for deserting to the Syracusans, or they effect their escape into the country; and Sicily is a large place. Others, again, have persuaded the trierarchs to take Hyccarian slaves in their room while they themselves are busy trading; and thus the precision of the service is lost.

14. ἐπισταμένοις δ᾽ ὑμῖν γράφω ὅτι βραχεῖα ἀκμὴ πληρώματος καὶ ὀλίγοι τῶν ναυτῶν οἱ ἐξορμῶντές τε ναῦν καὶ ξυνέχοντες τὴν εἰρεσίαν. [2] τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀπορώτατον τό τε μὴ οἷόν τε εἶναι ταῦτα ἐμοὶ κωλῦσαι τῷ στρατηγῷ □χαλεπαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑμέτεραι φύσεις ἄρξαι□ καὶ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ὀπόθεν ἐπιπληρωσόμεθα τὰς ναῦς ἔχομεν, ὃ τοῖς πολεμίοις πολλαχόθεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἔχοντες ἤλθομεν τά τε ὄντα καὶ ἀπαναλισκόμενα γίγνεσθαι: αἱ γὰρ νῦν οὖσαι πόλεις ξύμμαχοι ἀδύνατοι Νάξος καὶ Κατάνη. [3] εἰ δὲ προσγενήσεταί ἓν ἔτι τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὥστε τὰ τρέφοντα ἡμᾶς χωρία τῆς Ἰταλίας, ὁρῶντα ἐν ᾧ τ᾽ ἐσμὲν καὶ ὑμῶν μὴ ἐπιβοηθούντων, πρὸς ἐκείνους χωρῆσαι, διαπεπολεμήσεταί αὐτοῖς ἀμαχεὶ ἐκπολιορκηθέντων ἡμῶν [ὁ πόλεμος]. [4]’τούτων ἐγὼ ἡδίω μὲν ἂν εἶχον ὑμῖν ἕτερα ἐπιστέλλειν, οὐ μέντοι χρησιμώτερά γε, εἰ δεῖ σαφῶς εἰδότας τὰ ἐνθάδε βουλεύσασθαι. καὶ ἅμα τὰς φύσεις ἐπιστάμενος ὑμῶν, βουλομένων μὲν τὰ ἥδιστα ἀκούειν,

αἰτιωμένων δὲ ὕστερον, ἤν τι ὑμῖν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν μὴ ὁμοῖον ἐκβῇ, ἀσφαλέστερον ἡγησάμην τὸ ἀληθὲς δηλῶσαι.

[14] ‘You to whom I am writing know that the crew of a vessel does not long remain at its prime, and that the sailors who really start the ship and keep the rowing together are but a fraction of the whole number. The most hopeless thing of all is that, although I am general, I am not able to put a stop to these disorders, for tempers like yours are not easily controlled, and that we cannot even fill up the crews, whereas the enemy can obtain recruits from many sources. Our daily waste in men and stores can only be replaced out of the supplies which we brought with us; and these we have no means of increasing, for the cities which are now our confederates, Naxos and Catana, are unable to maintain us. There is only one advantage more which the Syracusans can gain over us: if the towns of Italy from which our provisions are derived, seeing in what a plight we are and that you do not come to our help, go over to the enemy, we shall be starved out, and they will have made an end of the war without striking a blow. I could have written you tidings more cheering than these, but none more profitable; for you should be well-informed of our circumstances if you are to take the right steps. Moreover I know your dispositions; you like to hear pleasant things, but afterwards lay the fault on those who tell you them if they are falsified by the event; therefore I think it safer to speak the truth.

15. καὶ νῦν ὡς ἐφ᾽ ἃ μὲν ἤλθομεν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ὑμῖν μὴ μεμπτῶν γεγενημένων, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε: ἐπειδὴ δὲ Σικελία τε ἅπασα ξυνίσταται καὶ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἄλλη στρατιὰ προσδόκιμος αὐτοῖς, βουλεύεσθε ἤδη ὡς τῶν γ᾽ ἐνθάδε μηδὲ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀνταρκούντων, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τούτους μεταπέμπειν δέον ἢ ἄλλην στρατιὰν μὴ ἐλάσσω ἐπιπέμπειν καὶ πεζὴν καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ χρήματα μὴ ὀλίγα, ἐμοὶ δὲ διάδοχόν τινα, ὡς ἀδύνατός εἰμι διὰ νόσον νεφρῖτιν παραμένειν. [2] ἀξιῶ δ᾽ ὑμῶν ξυγγνώμης τυγχάνειν: καὶ γὰρ

ὅτ᾽ ἐρρώμην πολλὰ ἐν ἡγεμονίαις ὑμᾶς εὖ ἐποίησα. ὅτι δὲ μέλλετε, ἅμα τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς καὶ μὴ ἐς ἀναβολὰς πράσσετε, ὡς τῶν πολεμίων τὰ μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ δι᾽ ὀλίγου πορισμένων, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου σχολαίτερον μέν, ὅμως δ᾽, ἢν μὴ προσέχητε τὴν γνώμην, τὰ μὲν λήσουσιν ὑμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, τὰ δὲ φθήσονται.’

[15] ‘And now, do not imagine that your soldiers and their generals have failed in the fulfilment of the duty which you originally imposed upon them. But when all Sicily is uniting against us, and the Syracusans are expecting another army from Peloponnesus, it is time that you should make up your minds. For the troops which we have here certainly cannot hold out even against our present enemies, and therefore you ought either to recall us or to send another army and fleet as large as this, and plenty of money. You should also send a general to succeed me, for I have a disease in the kidneys and cannot remain here. I claim your indulgence; while I retained my health I often did you good service when in command. But do whatever you mean to do at the very beginning of spring, and let there be no delay. The enemy will obtain reinforcements in Sicily without going far, and although the troops from Peloponnesus will not arrive so soon, yet if you do not take care they will elude you; their movements will either be too secret for you, as they were before, or too quick.’

16. ἡ μὲν τοῦ Νικίου ἐπιστολὴ τοσαῦτα ἐδήλου, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες αὐτῆς τὸν μὲν Νικίαν οὐ παρέλυσαν τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτῷ, ἕως ἂν ἕτεροι ξυνάρχοντες αἱρεθέντες ἀφίκωνται, τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖ δύο προσείλοντο Μένανδρον καὶ Εὐθύδημον, ὅπως μὴ μόνος ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ ταλαιπωροίη, στρατιὰν δὲ ἄλλην ἐψηφίσαντο πέμπειν καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ πεζὴν Ἀθηναίων τε ἐκ καταλόγου καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων. [2] καὶ ξυνάρχοντας αὐτῷ εἵλοντο Δημοσθένη τε τὸν Ἀλκισθένους καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους. καὶ τὸν μὲν Εὐρυμέδοντα εὐθὺς περὶ ἡλίου τροπὰς τὰς χειμερινὰς ἀποπέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν μετὰ δέκα νεῶν, ἄγοντα

εἴκοσι <καὶ ἑκατὸν> τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ ἅμα ἀγγελοῦντα τοῖς ἐκεῖ ὅτι ἥξει βοήθεια καὶ ἐπιμέλεια αὐτῶν ἔσται:

[16] Such was the condition of affairs described in the letter of Nicias. The Athenians, after hearing it read, did not release Nicias from his command, but they joined with him two officers who were already in Sicily, Menander and Euthydemus, until regular colleagues could be elected and sent out, for they did not wish him to bear the burden in his sickness alone. They also resolved to send a second fleet and an army of Athenians taken from the muster-roll and of allies. As colleagues to Nicias they elected Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. Eurymedon was despatched immediately to Sicily about the winter solstice; he took with him ten ships conveying a hundred and twenty talents of silver, and was to tell the army in Sicily that they should receive assistance and should not be neglected.

17. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ὑπομένων παρεσκευάζετο τὸν ἔκπλουν ὡς ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ποιησόμενος, στρατιάν τε ἐπαγγέλλων ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ χρήματα αὐτόθεν καὶ ναῦς καὶ ὁπλίτας ἑτοιμάζων. [2] πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναῦς, ὅπως φυλάσσοιεν μηδένα ἀπὸ Κορίνθου καὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν περαιοῦσθαι. [3] οἱ γὰρ Κορίνθιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ πρέσβεις ἦκον καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ βελτίω ἤγγελλον, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄκαιρον καὶ τὴν προτέραν πέμψιν τῶν νεῶν ποιήσασθαι, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωντο, καὶ ἐν ὁλκάσι παρεσκευάζοντο αὐτοί τε ἀποστελοῦντες ὁπλίτας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Πελοποννήσου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ πέμψοντες: [4] ναῦς τε οἱ Κορίνθιοι πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐπλήρουν, ὅπως ναυμαχίας τε ἀποπειράσωσι πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ φυλακήν, καὶ τὰς ὁλκάδας αὐτῶν ἧσσον οἱ ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι κωλύοιεν ἀπαίρειν, πρὸς τὴν σφετέραν ἀντίταξιν τῶν τριήρων τὴν φυλακὴν ποιούμενοι.

[17] Demosthenes remained behind, and busied himself in getting ready the expedition which he was to bring out in the spring. He announced to the allies that troops would be required, collected money, and mustered ships, and hoplites at Athens. The Athenians also sent twenty ships to cruise off the Peloponnesian coast and intercept any vessels trying to pass to Sicily from the Peloponnesus or Corinth. The Sicilian envoys had now arrived at Corinth, and the Corinthians had heard from them that affairs were looking better in Sicily. Seeing how opportune had been the arrival of the ships which they had already despatched they were more zealous than ever. They prepared to convey hoplites to Sicily in merchant-vessels; the Lacedaemonians were to do the like from Peloponnesus. The Corinthians also proceeded to man twenty-five ships of war, intending to hazard a naval engagement against the Athenian squadron stationed at Naupactus. They hoped that, if the attention of the Athenians was diverted by an opposing force, they would be unable to prevent their merchant-vessels from sailing.

18. παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολὴν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τε προυδέδοκτο αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Κορινθίων ἐναγόντων, ἐπειδὴ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὅπως δὴ ἐσβολῆς γενομένης διακωλυθῇ. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης προσκείμενος ἐδίδασκε τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχίζειν καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι τὸν πόλεμον. [2] μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐγεγένητό τις ῥώμη, διότι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐνόμιζον διπλοῦν τὸν πόλεμον ἔχοντας, πρός τε σφᾶς καὶ Σικελιώτας, εὐκαθαιρετωτέρους ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι τὰς σπονδὰς προτέρους λελυκέναι ἡγοῦντο αὐτούς: ἐν γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν, ἢν δίκας ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνόμιζον, καὶ ἐνεθυμοῦντο τήν τε περὶ Πύλον

ξυμφορὰν καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο. [3] ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἄργους ὁρμώμενοι Ἐπιδαύρου τέ τι καὶ Πρασιῶν καὶ ἄλλα ἐδῄωσαν καὶ ἐκ Πύλου ἅμα ἐλῃστεύοντο, καὶ ὁσάκις περί του διαφοραὶ γένοιντο τῶν κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς ἀμφισβητουμένων, ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οὐκ ἤθελον ἐπιτρέπειν, τότε δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι νομίσαντες τὸ παρανόμημα, ὅπερ καὶ σφίσι πρότερον ἡμάρτητο, αὖθις ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ αὐτὸ περιεστάναι, πρόθυμοι ἦσαν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον. [4] καὶ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ σίδηρόν τε περιήγγελλον κατὰ τοὺς ξυμμάχους καὶ τἆλλα ἐργαλεῖα ἡτοίμαζον ἐς τὸν ἐπιτειχισμόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ἅμα ὡς ἀποπέμψοντες ἐν ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ἐπικουρίαν αὐτοί τε ἐπόριζον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Πελοποννησίους προσηνάγκαζον. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα, καὶ ὄγδοον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[18] The Lacedaemonians also prepared for their already projected invasion of Attica. They were kept to their purpose by the Syracusans and Corinthians, who, having heard of the reinforcements which the Athenians were sending to Sicily, hoped they might be stopped by the invasion. Alcibiades was always at hand insisting upon the importance of fortifying Decelea and of carrying on the war with vigour. Above all, the Lacedaemonians were inspirited by the thought that the Athenians would be more easily overthrown now that they had two wars on hand, one against themselves, and another against the Sicilians. They considered also that this time they had been the first offenders against the treaty, whereas in the former war the transgression had rather been on their own side. For the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of peace, and they themselves had refused arbitration when offered by the Athenians, although the former treaty forbade war in case an adversary was willing to submit to arbitration. They felt that their ill success was deserved, and they took seriously to heart the disasters which had befallen them at Pylos and

elsewhere. But now the Athenians with a fleet of thirty ships had gone forth from Argive territory and ravaged part of the lands of Epidaurus and Prasiae, besides other places; marauding expeditions from Pylos were always going on; and whenever quarrels arose about disputed points in the treaty and the Lacedaemonians proposed arbitration, the Athenians refused it. Reflecting upon all this, the Lacedaemonians concluded that the guilt of their former transgression was now shifted to the Athenians, and they were full of warlike zeal. During the winter they bade their allies provide iron, and themselves got tools in readiness for the fortification of Decelea. They also prepared, and continually urged the other Peloponnesians to prepare, the succours which they intended to send in merchant-vessels to the Syracusans. And so the winter ended, and with it the eighteenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

19. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου ἦρος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου πρωίτατα δὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσέβαλον: ἡγεῖτο δὲ Ἄγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῆς χώρας τὰ περὶ τὸ πεδίον ἐδῄωσαν, ἔπειτα Δεκέλειαν ἐτείχιζον, κατὰ πόλεις διελόμενοι τὸ ἔργον. [2] ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Δεκέλεια σταδίους μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεως εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ οὐ πολλῷ πλέον καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Βοιωτίας. ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ πεδίῳ καὶ τῆς χώρας τοῖς κρατίστοις ἐς τὸ κακουργεῖν ᾠκοδομεῖτο τὸ τεῖχος, ἐπιφανὲς μέχρι τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλεως. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐτείχιζον, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἀπέστελλον περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ταῖς ὁλκάσι τοὺς ὁπλίτας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν τῶν τε Εἱλώτων ἐπιλεξάμενοι τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ τῶν νεοδαμωδῶν, ξυναμφοτέρων ἐς ἑξακοσίους ὁπλίτας,καὶ Ἔκκριτον Σπαρτιάτην ἄρχοντα, Βοιωτοὶ δὲ τριακοσίους ὁπλίτας, ὧν ἦρχον Ξένων τε καὶ Νίκων Θηβαῖοι καὶ Ἠγήσανδρος Θεσπιεύς. [4] οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι

ὁρμήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ Ταινάρου τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἐς τὸ πέλαγος ἀφῆκαν: μετὰ δὲ τούτους Κορίνθιοι οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον πεντακοσίους ὁπλίτας, τοὺς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς Κορίνθου, τοὺς δὲ προσμισθωσάμενοι Ἀρκάδων, καὶ ἄρχοντα Ἀλέξαρχον Κορίνθιον προστάξαντες ἀπέπεμψαν. ἀπέστειλαν δὲ καὶ Σικυώνιοι διακοσίους ὁπλίτας ὁμοῦ τοῖς Κορινθίοις, ὧν ἦρχε Σαργεὺς Σικυώνιος. [5] αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Κορινθίων αἱ τοῦ χειμῶνος πληρωθεῖσαι ἀνθώρμουν ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ εἴκοσιν Ἀττικαῖς, ἕωσπερ αὐτοῖς οὗτοι οἱ ὁπλῖται ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀπῆραν: οὗπερ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπληρώθησαν, ὅπως μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς τὰς ὁλκάδας μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις τὸν νοῦν ἔχωσιν.

[19] At the very beginning of the next spring, and earlier than ever before, the Lacedaemonians and their allies entered Attica under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus the Lacedaemonian king. They first devastated the plain and its neighbourhood. They then began to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the cities of the confederacy. Decelea is distant about fourteen miles from Athens, and not much further from Boeotia. The fort was designed for the devastation of the plain and the richest parts of the country, and was erected on a spot within sight of Athens.While the Peloponnesians and their allies in Attica were thus engaged, the Peloponnesians at home were despatching the hoplites in the merchant-vessels to Sicily. The Lacedaemonians selected the best of the Helots and Neodamodes, numbering in all six hundred, and placed them under the command of Eccritus, a Spartan. The Boeotians furnished three hundred hoplites, who were commanded by two Thebans, Xenon and Nicon, and by Hegesander, a Thespian. These started first and put out into the open sea from Taenarus in Laconia. Not long afterwards the Corinthians sent five hundred heavy-armed, some of them from Corinth itself, others who were Arcadian mercenaries; they were all placed under the command of

Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicyonians also sent with the Corinthians two hundred hoplites under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Meanwhile the twenty-five ships which the Corinthians had manned in the winter lay opposite to the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus until the merchant-vessels conveying the heavy-armed troops had got safely off. So the design succeeded, and the attention of the Athenians was diverted from the merchant-ships to the triremes.

20. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἅμα τῆς Δεκελείας τῷ τειχισμῷ καὶ τοῦ ἦρος εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου περί τε Πελοπόννησον ναῦς τριάκοντα ἔστειλαν καὶ Χαρικλέα τὸν Ἀπολλοδώρου ἄρχοντα, ᾧ εἴρητο καὶ ἐς Ἄργος ἀφικομένῳ κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν παρακαλεῖν Ἀργείων [τε] ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, [2] καὶ τὸν Δημοσθένη ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὥσπερ ἔμελλον, ἀπέστελλον ἑξήκοντα μὲν ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ πέντε Χίαις, ὁπλίταις δὲ ἐκ καταλόγου Ἀθηναίων διακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις, καὶ νησιωτῶν ὅσοις ἐκασταχόθεν οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν πλείστοις χρήσασθαι, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τῶν ὑπηκόων, εἴ ποθέν τι εἶχον ἐπιτήδειον ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, ξυμπορίσαντες. εἴρητο δ᾽ αὐτῷ πρῶτον μετὰ τοῦ Χαρικλέους ἅμα περιπλέοντα ξυστρατεύεσθαι περὶ τὴν Λακωνικήν. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Αἴγιναν προσπλεύσας τοῦ στρατεύματός τε εἴ τι ὑπελέλειπτο περιέμενε καὶ τὸν Χαρικλέα τοὺς Ἀργείους παραλαβεῖν.

[20] At the beginning of spring, whilst the Lacedaemonians were fortifying Decelea, the Athenians sent thirty ships under the command of Charicles the son of Apollodorus to cruise about Peloponnesus. He was told to touch at Argos, and there to summon and take on board a force of heavy-armed which the Argives, being allies of the Athenians, were bound to furnish. Meanwhile they despatched under Demosthenes their intended expedition to Sicily: it consisted of sixty Athenian ships and five Chian, twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians taken from the roll, and as many others as could possibly be obtained from the different

islanders; they had also collected from their subject-allies supplies of all sorts for the war. Demosthenes was told first of all to co-operate with Charicles on the coast of Laconia. So he sailed to Aegina, and there waited until the whole of his armament was assembled and until Charicles had taken on board the Argives.

21. ἐν δὲ τῇ Σικελίᾳ ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτου τοῦ ἦρος καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος ἦκεν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἄγων ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ὧν ἔπεισε στρατιὰν ὅσην ἑκασταχόθεν πλείστην ἐδύνατο. [2] καὶ ξυγκαλέσας τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἔφη χρῆναι πληροῦν ναῦς ὡς δύνανται πλείστας καὶ ναυμαχίας ἀπόπειραν λαμβάνειν: ἐλπίζειν γὰρ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τι ἔργον ἄξιον τοῦ κινδύνου ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατεργάσεσθαι. [3] ξυνανέπειθε δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης οὐχ ἥκιστα, τοῦ ταῖς ναυσὶ μὴ ἀθυμεῖν ἐπιχειρῆσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, λέγων οὐδ᾽ ἐκείνους πάτριον τὴν ἐμπειρίαν οὐδ᾽ ἀίδιον τῆς θαλάσσης ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἠπειρώτας μᾶλλον τῶν Συρακοσίων ὄντας καὶ ἀναγκασθέντας ὑπὸ Μήδων ναυτικοὺς γενέσθαι. καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας τολμηρούς, οἵους καὶ Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς ἀντιτολμῶντας χαλεπωτάτους ἂν [αὐτοῖς] φαίνεσθαι: ᾧ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς πέλας, οὐ δυνάμει ἔστιν ὅτε προύχοντες, τῷ δὲ θράσει ἐπιχειροῦντες καταφοβοῦσι, καὶ σφᾶς ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοίως τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑποσχεῖν. [4] καὶ Συρακοσίους εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφη τῷ τολμῆσαι ἀπροσδοκήτως πρὸς τὸ Ἀθηναίων ναυτικὸν ἀντιστῆναι πλέον τι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκπλαγέντων αὐτῶν περιγενησομένους ἢ Ἀθηναίους τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ τὴν Συρακοσίων ἀπειρίαν βλάψοντας. ἰέναι οὖν ἐκέλευεν ἐς τὴν πεῖραν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκνεῖν. [5]καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι, τοῦ τε Γυλίππου καὶ Ἑρμοκράτους καὶ εἴ του ἄλλου πειθόντων, ὥρμηντό τε ἐς τὴν ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρουν:

[21] In the same spring and about the same time Gylippus returned to Syracuse, bringing from each of the cities which he had persuaded to join him as many troops as he could obtain. He assembled the Syracusans and told them that they should man as large a fleet as possible and try their

fortune at sea; he hoped to obtain a decisive result which would justify the risk. Hermocrates took the same view, and urged them strongly not to be faint-hearted at the prospect of attacking with their ships. He said that the Athenians had not inherited their maritime skill, and would not retain it for ever; there was a time when they were less of a naval people than the Syracusans themselves, but they had been made sailors from necessity by the Persian invasion. To daring men like the Athenians those who emulated their daring were the most formidable foes. The same reckless courage which had often enabled the Athenians, although inferior in power, to strike terror into their adversaries might now be turned against them by the Syracusans. He was quite sure that if they faced the Athenian navy suddenly and unexpectedly, they would gain more than they would lose; the consternation which they would inspire would more than counterbalance their own inexperience and the superior skill of the Athenians. He told them therefore to try what they could do at sea, and not to be timid. Thus under the influence of Gylippus, Hermocrates, and others, the Syracusans, now eager for the conflict, began to man their ships.

22. ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἐπειδὴ παρεσκευάσατο τὸ ναυτικόν, ἀγαγὼν ὑπὸ νύκτα πᾶσαν τὴν στρατιὰν τὴν πεζὴν αὐτὸς μὲν τοῖς ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ τείχεσι κατὰ γῆν ἔμελλε προσβαλεῖν, αἱ δὲ τριήρεις τῶν Συρακοσίων ἅμα καὶ ἀπὸ ξυνθήματος πέντε μὲν καὶ τριάκοντα ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος ἐπέπλεον, αἱ δὲ πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος, οὗ ἦν καὶ τὸ νεώριον αὐτοῖς, [καὶ] περιέπλεον βουλόμενοι πρὸς τὰς ἐντὸς προσμεῖξαι καὶ ἅμα ἐπιπλεῖν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ, ὅπως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμφοτέρωθεν θορυβῶνται. [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ τάχους ἀντιπληρώσαντες ἑξήκοντα ναῦς ταῖς μὲν πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι πρὸς τὰς πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα τῶν Συρακοσίων τὰς ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ λιμένι ἐναυμάχουν, ταῖς δ᾽ ἐπιλοίποις ἀπήντων ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νεωρίου περιπλεούσας. καὶ εὐθὺς πρὸ τοῦ στόματος τοῦ μεγάλου λιμένος ἐναυμάχουν, καὶ

ἀντεῖχον ἀλλήλοις ἐπὶ πολύ, οἱ μὲν βιάσασθαι βουλόμενοι τὸν ἔσπλουν, οἱ δὲ κωλύειν.

[22] When the fleet was ready, Gylippus, under cover of night, led forth the whole land-army, intending to attack in person the forts on Plemmyrium. Meanwhile the triremes of the Syracusans, at a concerted signal, sailed forth, thirty-five from the greater harbour and forty-five from the lesser, where they had their arsenal. These latter sailed round into the Great Harbour, intending to form a junction with the other ships inside and make a combined attack on Plemmyrium, that the Athenians, assailed both by sea and land, might be disconcerted. The Athenians however quickly manned sixty ships; and with twenty-five of them engaged the thirty-five of the Syracusans which were in the Great Harbour: with the remainder they encountered those which were sailing round from the arsenal. These two squadrons met at once before the mouth of the Great Harbour: the struggle was long and obstinate, the Syracusans striving to force an entrance, the Athenians to prevent them.

23. ἐν τούτῳ δ᾽ ὁ Γύλιππος τῶν ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν ἐπικαταβάντων καὶ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τὴν γνώμην προσεχόντων φθάνει προσπεσὼν ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ αἰφνιδίως τοῖς τείχεσι, καὶ αἱρεῖ τὸ μέγιστον πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω δύο, οὐχ ὑπομεινάντων τῶν φυλάκων, ὡς εἶδον τὸ μέγιστον ῥᾳδίως ληφθέν. [2] καὶ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου ἀλόντος χαλεπῶς οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὅσοι καὶ ἐς τὰ πλοῖα καὶ ὁλκάδα τινὰ κατέφυγον, ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐξεκομίζοντο: τῶν γὰρ Συρακοσίων ταῖς ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ λιμένι ναυσὶ κρατούντων τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ ὑπὸ τριήρους μιᾶς καὶ εὖ πλεούσης ἐπεδιώκοντο: ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ δύο τειχίσματα ἡλίσκετο, ἐν τούτῳ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐτύγχανον ἤδη νικώμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτῶν φεύγοντες ῥᾷον παρέπλευσαν. [3] αἱ γὰρ τῶν Συρακοσίων αἱ πρὸ τοῦ στόματος νῆες ναυμαχοῦσαι βιασάμεναι τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἐσέπλεον, καὶ ταραχθεῖσαι περὶ ἀλλήλας παρέδοσαν τὴν νίκην τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις: ταύτας τε γὰρ ἔτρεψαν καὶ ὑφ᾽

ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ἐνικῶντο ἐν τῷ λιμένι. [4] καὶ ἕνδεκα μὲν ναῦς τῶν Συρακοσίων κατέδυσαν, καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπέκτειναν, πλὴν ὅσον ἐκ τριῶν νεῶν οὓς ἐζώγρησαν: τῶν δὲ σφετέρων τρεῖς νῆες διεφθάρησαν. τὰ δὲ ναυάγια ἀνελκύσαντες τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τροπαῖον ἐν τῷ νησιδίῳ στήσαντες τῷ πρὸ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον.

[23] Meanwhile Gylippus, quite early in the morning, while the Athenians in Plemmyrium who had gone down to the water-side had their minds occupied by the sea-fight, made a sudden attack upon their forts. He captured the largest of them first, then the two lesser, their garrisons forsaking them when they saw the largest so easily taken. Those who escaped from the fortress first captured, getting into a merchant-vessel and some boats which were moored at Plemmyrium, found their way to the main station of the Athenians, but with difficulty; for they were chased by a swift trireme, the Syracusans at that time having the advantage in the Great Harbour. But when the two lesser fortresses were taken, the Syracusans were already losing the day, and the fugitives got past them with greater ease. For the Syracusan ships which were fighting before the mouth of the harbour, having forced their way through the enemy, entered in disorder, and falling foul of one another gave away the victory to the Athenians, who routed not only these, but also the others by whom they were at first worsted inside the harbour. Eleven Syracusan ships were disabled; the crews in most of them were slain, in three, made prisoners. The Athenians themselves lost three ships. They now drew to land the wrecks of the Syracusan ships, and erecting a trophy on the little island in front of Plemmyrium returned to their own station.

24. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὕτως ἐπεπράγεσαν, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ Πλημμυρίῳ τείχη εἶχον, καὶ τροπαῖα ἔστησαν αὐτῶν τρία. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τοῖν δυοῖν τειχοῖν τοῖν ὕστερον ληφθέντοιν κατέβαλον, τὰ δὲ δύο

ἐπισκευάσαντες ἐφρούρουν. [2] ἄνθρωποι δ᾽ ἐν τῶν τειχῶν τῇ ἁλώσει ἀπέθανον καὶ ἐζωγρήθησαν πολλοί, καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ τὰ ξύμπαντα ἐάλω: ὥσπερ γὰρ ταμιείῳ χρωμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς τείχεσι πολλὰ μὲν ἐμπόρων χρήματα καὶ σῖτος ἐνῆν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν τριηράρχων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἱστία τεσσαράκοντα τριήρων καὶ τἆλλα σκεύη ἐγκατελήφθη καὶ τριήρεις ἀνειλκυσμέναι τρεῖς. [3] μέγιστόν τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον ἐκάκωσε τὸ στράτευμα τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἡ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λῆψις: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οὐδ᾽ οἱ ἔσπλοι ἀσφαλεῖς ἦσαν τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι ναυσὶν αὐτόθι ἐφορμοῦντες ἐκώλυον, καὶ διὰ μάχης ἤδη ἐγίγνοντο αἱ ἐσκομιδαί, ἔς τε τἆλλα κατάπληξιν παρέσχε καὶ ἀθυμίαν τῷ στρατεύματι.

[24] But although the Syracusans were unsuccessful in the sea-fight, still they had taken the fortresses of Plemmyrium. They erected three trophies, one for each fort. Two out of the three forts they repaired and garrisoned, but one of the two which were captured last they demolished. Many perished and many prisoners were made at the capture of the forts, and abundant spoil of different kinds was taken, for the Athenians had used them as a store, and much corn and goods of traders were deposited in them; also much property belonging to the trierarchs, including the sails and other fittings of forty triremes which fell into the enemy’s hands, and three triremes which had been drawn up on the beach. The loss of Plemmyrium was one of the greatest and severest blows which befell the Athenians. For now they could no longer even introduce provisions with safety, but the Syracusan ships lay watching to prevent them; and they had to fight for the passage. General discouragement and dismay prevailed throughout the army.

25. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ναῦς τε ἐκπέμπουσι δώδεκα οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ Ἀγάθαρχον ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν Συρακόσιον ἄρχοντα. καὶ αὐτῶν μία μὲν ἐς Πελοπόννησον ᾤχετο, πρέσβεις ἄγουσα οἵπερ τά τε σφέτερα φράσουσιν ὅτι ἐν ἐλπίσιν εἰσὶ καὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐποτρυνοῦσι γίγνεσθαι: αἱ

δ᾽ ἔνδεκα νῆες πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἔπλευσαν, πυνθανόμεναι πλοῖα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γέμοντα χρημάτων προσπλεῖν. [2] καὶ τῶν τε πλοίων ἐπιτυχοῦσαι τὰ πολλὰ διέφθειραν καὶ ξύλα ναυπηγήσιμα ἐν τῇ Καυλωνιάτιδι κατέκαυσαν, ἃ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἑτοῖμα ἦν. [3] ἔς τε Λοκροὺς μετὰ ταῦτα ἦλθον, καὶ ὁρμουσῶν αὐτῶν κατέπλευσε μία τῶν ὁλκάδων τῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἄγουσα Θεσπιῶν ὁπλίτας: [4] καὶ ἀναλαβόντες αὐτοὺς οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς παρέπλεον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. φυλάξαντες δ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναυσὶ πρὸς τοῖς Μεγάροις μίαν μὲν ναῦν λαμβάνουσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι, τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας οὐκ ἐδυνήθησαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποφεύγουσιν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας. [5]ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν σταυρῶν ἀκροβολισμὸς ἐν τῷ λιμένι, οὓς οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸ τῶν παλαιῶν νεωσοίκων κατέπηξαν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὅπως αὐτοῖς αἱ νῆες ἐντὸς ὁρμοῖεν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιπλέοντες μὴ βλάπτοιεν ἐμβάλλοντες. [6] προσαγαγόντες γὰρ ναῦν μυριοφόρον αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, πύργους τε ξυλίνους ἔχουσαν καὶ παραφράγματα, ἔκ τε τῶν ἀκάτων ὤνευον ἀναδούμενοι τοὺς σταυροὺς καὶ ἀνέκλων καὶ κατακολυμβῶντες ἐξέπριον. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἀπὸ τῶν νεωσοίκων ἔβαλλον: οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς ὁλκάδος ἀντέβαλλον, καὶ τέλος τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν σταυρῶν ἀνεῖλον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. [7] χαλεπωτάτη δ᾽ ἦν τῆς σταυρώσεως ἡ κρύφιος: ἦσαν γὰρ τῶν σταυρῶν οὓς οὐχ ὑπερέχοντας τῆς θαλάσσης κατέπηξαν, ὥστε δεινὸν ἦν προσπλεῦσαι, μὴ οὐ προϊδών τις ὥσπερ περὶ ἕρμα περιβάλῃ τὴν ναῦν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτους κολυμβηταὶ δυόμενοι ἐξέπριον μισθοῦ. ὅμως δ᾽ αὖθις οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐσταύρωσαν. [8] πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἷον εἰκὸς τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐγγὺς ὄντων καὶ ἀντιτεταγμένων ἐμηχανῶντο καὶ ἀκροβολισμοῖς καὶ πείραις παντοίαις ἐχρῶντο. [9]ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς πόλεις πρέσβεις οἱ Συρακόσιοι Κορινθίων καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀγγέλλοντας τήν τε τοῦ Πλημμυρίου λῆψιν καὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας πέρι ὡς οὐ τῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ σφετέρᾳ ταραχῇ ἡσσηθεῖεν, τά τε ἄλλα [αὖ] δηλώσοντας ὅτι ἐν ἐλπίσιν εἰσὶ καὶ ἀξιώσοντας ξυμβοηθεῖν

ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ, ὡς καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσδοκίμων ὄντων ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ καί, ἢν φθάσωσιν αὐτοὶ πρότερον διαφθείραντες τὸ παρὸν στράτευμα αὐτῶν, διαπεπολεμησόμενον. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ταῦτα ἔπρασσον.

[25] The Syracusans next sent out twelve ships under the command of Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these hastened to Peloponnesus conveying envoys who were to report their improved prospects, and to urge more strongly than ever the prosecution of the war in Hellas. The remaining eleven sailed to Italy, hearing that ships laden with supplies were on their way to the Athenians. They fell in with and destroyed most of these ships, and burnt a quantity of ship-timber which was lying ready for the Athenians in the territory of Caulonia. Then they came to Locri, and while they were at anchor there, one of the merchant-vessels from Peloponnesus sailed in, bringing some Thespian hoplites. These the Syracusans took on board, and sailed homewards. The Athenians watched for them near Megara with twenty ships and took one ship with the crew, but the rest made their escape to Syracuse.There was some skirmishing in the harbour about the palisades which the Syracusans had fixed in the sea in front of their old dock-houses, that their ships might ride at anchor in the enclosed space, where they could not be struck by the enemy, and would be out of harm’s way. The Athenians brought up a ship of ten thousand talents burden, which had wooden towers and bulwarks; and from their boats they tied cords to the stakes and wrenched and tore them up; or dived and sawed them through underneath the water. Meanwhile the Syracusans kept up a shower of missiles from the dock-houses, which the men in the ship returned. At length the Athenians succeeded in pulling up most of the palisade. The stakes which were out of sight were the most dangerous of all, there being some which were so fixed that they did not appear above the water; and no vessel could safely come

near. They were like a sunken reef, and a pilot, not seeing them, might easily catch his ship upon them. Even these were sawn off by men who dived for hire; but the Syracusans drove them in again. Many were the contrivances employed on both sides, as was very natural, when two armies confronted each other at so short a distance. There were continual skirmishes, and they practised all kinds of stratagems.The Syracusans also sent to the Siciliot cities Corinthian, Ambraciot, and Lacedaemonian ambassadors announcing the taking of Plemmyrium, and explaining that in the sea-fight they had been defeated not so much by the superior strength of the enemy as through their own disorder. They were also to report their great hopes of success, and to ask for assistance both by land and sea. They were to add that the Athenians were expecting reinforcements; if they could succeed in destroying the army then in Sicily before these arrived, there would be an end of the war. Such was the course of events in Sicily.

26. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης, ἐπεὶ ξυνελέγη αὐτῷ τὸ στράτευμα ὃ ἔδει ἔχοντα ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν βοηθεῖν, ἄρας ἐκ τῆς Αἰγίνης καὶ πλεύσας πρὸς τὴν Πελοπόννησον τῷ τε Χαρικλεῖ καὶ ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμίσγει, καὶ παραλαβόντες τῶν Ἀργείων ὁπλίτας ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἔπλεον ἐς τὴν Λακωνικήν: [2] καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῆς Ἐπιδαύρου τι τῆς Λιμηρᾶς ἐδῄωσαν, ἔπειτα σχόντες ἐς τὰ καταντικρὺ Κυθήρων τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἔνθα τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνός ἐστι, τῆς τε γῆς ἔστιν ἃ ἐδῄωσαν καὶ ἐτείχισαν ἰσθμῶδές τι χωρίον, ἵνα δὴ οἵ τε Εἵλωτες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων αὐτόσε αὐτομολῶσι καὶ ἅμα λῃσταὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου, ἁρπαγὴν ποιῶνται. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ξυγκατέλαβε τὸ χωρίον παρέπλει ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας, ὅπως καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ξυμμάχων παραλαβὼν τὸν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν πλοῦν ὅτι τάχιστα ποιῆται: ὁ δὲ Χαρικλῆς περιμείνας ἕως τὸ χωρίον ἐξετείχισε καὶ καταλιπὼν φυλακὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπεκομίζετο καὶ αὐτὸς ὕστερον ταῖς τριάκοντα ναυσὶν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου καὶ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἅμα.

[26] Demosthenes, when the reinforcements which he was to take to Sicily had all been collected, sailed from Aegina to Peloponnesus and joined Charicles and his thirty ships. He embarked the Argive hoplites, and, proceeding to Laconia, first devastated some part of the lands of Epidaurus Limera. Next the Athenians landed in the district of Laconia opposite Cythera, where there is a temple of Apollo. They ravaged various parts of the country, and fortified a sort of isthmus in the neighbourhood, that the Helots of the Lacedaemonians might desert and find a refuge there, and that privateers might make the place, as they did Pylos, their head-quarters for marauding expeditions. Demosthenes assisted in the occupation, and then sailed for Corcyra, intending to collect additional forces from the allies in that region, and to make his way with all speed to Sicily. Charicles waited until he had completed the fort, and then leaving a garrison he sailed home with his thirty ships, accompanied by the Argives.

27. ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Θρᾳκῶν τῶν μαχαιροφόρων τοῦ Διακοῦ γένους ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πελτασταὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τούτῳ τριακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι, οὓς ἔδει τῷ Δημοσθένει ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ξυμπλεῖν. [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ὕστεροι ἦκον, διενοοῦντο αὐτοὺς πάλιν ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐς Θρᾴκην ἀποπέμπειν. τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας πόλεμον αὐτοὺς πολυτελὲς ἐφαίνετο: δραχμὴν γὰρ τῆς ἡμέρας ἕκαστος ἐλάμβανεν. [3] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ Δεκέλεια τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑπὸ πάσης τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτῳ τειχισθεῖσα, ὕστερον δὲ φρουραῖς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων κατὰ διαδοχὴν χρόνου ἐπιούσαις τῇ χώρᾳ ἐπῳκεῖτο, πολλὰ ἔβλαπτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον χρημάτων τ᾽ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπων φθορᾷ ἐκάκωσε τὰ πράγματα. [4] πρότερον μὲν γὰρ βραχεῖαι γιγνόμεναι αἱ ἐσβολαὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον τῆς γῆς ἀπολαύειν οὐκ ἐκώλυον: τότε δὲ ξυνεχῶς ἐπικαθημένων, καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν καὶ πλεόνων ἐπιόντων, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῆς ἴσης φρουρᾶς καταθεούσης τε τὴν χώραν καὶ λῃστείας ποιουμένης, βασιλέως τε παρόντος τοῦ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων Ἄγιδος, ὃς οὐκ ἐκ παρέργου τὸν πόλεμον

ἐποιεῖτο, μεγάλα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐβλάπτοντο. [5] τῆς τε γὰρ χώρας ἁπάσης ἐστέρηντο, καὶ ἀνδραπόδων πλέον ἢ δύο μυριάδες ηὐτομολήκεσαν, καὶ τούτων τὸ πολὺ μέρος χειροτέχναι, πρόβατά τε πάντα ἀπωλώλει καὶ ὑποζύγια: ἵπποι τε, ὁσημέραι ἐξελαυνόντων τῶν ἱππέων πρός τε τὴν Δεκέλειαν καταδρομὰς ποιουμένων καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φυλασσόντων, οἱ μὲν ἀπεχωλοῦντο ἐν γῇ ἀποκρότῳ τε καὶ ξυνεχῶς ταλαιπωροῦντες, οἱ δ᾽ ἐτιτρώσκοντο.

[27] During the same summer there arrived at Athens thirteen hundred Thracian targeteers of the Dian race, who carried dirks; they were to have sailed with Demosthenes to Sicily, but came too late, and the Athenians determined to send them back to their native country. Each soldier was receiving a drachma per day; and to use them against Decelea would have been too expensive.For during this summer Decelea had been fortified by the whole Peloponnesian army, and was henceforward regularly occupied for the annoyance of the country by a succession of garrisons sent from the allied cities, whose incursions did immense harm to the Athenians: the destruction of property and life which ensued did as much as anything to ruin the city. Hitherto the invasions had been brief and did not prevent them from getting something from the soil in the interval; but now the Peloponnesians were continually on the spot; and sometimes they were reinforced by additional troops, but always the regular garrison, who were compelled to find their own supplies, overran and despoiled the country. The Lacedaemonian king, Agis, was present in person, and devoted his whole energies to the war. The sufferings of the Athenians were terrible. For they were dispossessed of their entire territory; more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, most of them workmen; all their sheep and cattle had perished, and now that the cavalry had to go out every day and make descents upon Decelea or keep guard all over the country, their horses were

either wounded by the enemy, or lamed by the roughness of the ground and the incessant fatigue.

28. ἥ τε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων παρακομιδὴ ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας, πρότερον ἐκ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ κατὰ γῆν διὰ τῆς Δεκελείας θάσσων οὖσα, περὶ Σούνιον κατὰ θάλασσαν πολυτελὴς ἐγίγνετο: τῶν τε πάντων ὁμοίως ἐπακτῶν ἐδεῖτο ἡ πόλις, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ πόλις εἶναι φρούριον κατέστη. [2] πρὸς γὰρ τῇ ἐπάλξει τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν κατὰ διαδοχὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι φυλάσσοντες, τὴν δὲ νύκτα καὶ ξύμπαντες πλὴν τῶν ἱππέων, οἱ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ὅπλοις † ποιούμενοι †, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους, καὶ θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος ἐταλαιπωροῦντο. [3] μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐπίεζεν ὅτι δύο πολέμους ἅμα εἶχον, καὶ ἐς φιλονικίαν καθέστασαν τοιαύτην ἣν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἠπίστησεν ἄν τις ἀκούσας. τὸ γὰρ αὐτοὺς πολιορκουμένους ἐπιτειχισμῷ ὑπὸ Πελοποννησίων μηδ᾽ ὡς ἀποστῆναι ἐκ Σικελίας, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖ Συρακούσας τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ἀντιπολιορκεῖν, πόλιν οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω αὐτήν γε καθ᾽ αὐτὴν τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τὸν παράλογον τοσοῦτον ποιῆσαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τόλμης, ὅσον κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτόν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τριῶν γε ἐτῶν οὐδεὶς πλείω χρόνον ἐνόμιζον περιοίσειν αὐτούς, εἰ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐσβάλοιεν ἐς τὴν χώραν, ὥστε ἔτει ἑπτακαιδεκάτῳ μετὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐσβολὴν ἦλθον ἐς Σικελίαν ἤδη τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ πάντα τετρυχωμένοι, καὶ πόλεμον οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω προσανείλοντο τοῦ πρότερον ὑπάρχοντος ἐκ Πελοποννήσου. [4] δι᾽ ἃ καὶ τότε ὑπό τε τῆς Δεκελείας πολλὰ βλαπτούσης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναλωμάτων μεγάλων προσπιπτόντων ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο τοῖς χρήμασιν. καὶ τὴν εἰκοστὴν ὑπὸ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἀντὶ τοῦ φόρου τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἐποίησαν, πλείω νομίζοντες ἂν σφίσι χρήματα οὕτω προσιέναι. αἱ μὲν γὰρ δαπάναι οὐχ ὁμοίως καὶ πρίν, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μείζους καθέστασαν, ὅσῳ καὶ μείζων ὁ πόλεμος ἦν: αἱ δὲ πρόσοδοι ἀπώλλυντο.

[28] Provisions, which had been formerly conveyed by the shorter route from Euboea to Oropus and thence overland through Decelea, were now carried by sea round the

promontory of Sunium at great cost. Athens was obliged to import everything from abroad, and resembled a fort rather than a city. In the daytime the citizens guarded the battlements by relays; during the night every man was on service except the cavalry; some at their places of arms, others on the wall , summer and winter alike, until they were quite worn out. But worse than all was the cruel necessity of maintaining two wars at once; and they carried on both with a determination which no one would have believed unless he had actually seen it. That, blockaded as they were by the Peloponnesians, who had raised a fort in their country, they should refuse to let go Sicily, and, themselves besieged, persevere in the siege of Syracuse, which as a mere city might rank with Athens, and whereas the Hellenes generally were expecting at the beginning of the war, some that they would survive a year, others two or perhaps three years, certainly not more, if the Peloponnesians invaded Attica — that in the seventeenth year from the first invasion, after so exhausting a struggle, the Athenians should have been strong enough and bold enough to go to Sicily at all, and to plunge into a fresh war as great as that in which they were already engaged — how contrary was all this to the expectation of mankind! Through the vast expense thus incurred, above all through the mischief done by Decelea, they were now greatly impoverished. It was at this time that they imposed upon their allies, instead of the tribute, a duty of five percent on all things imported and exported by sea, thinking that this would be more productive.

29. τοὺς οὖν Θρᾷκας τοὺς τῷ Δημοσθένει ὑστερήσαντας διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀπορίαν τῶν χρημάτων οὐ βουλόμενοι δαπανᾶν εὐθὺς ἀπέπεμπον, προστάξαντες κομίσαι αὐτοὺς Διειτρέφει, καὶ εἰπόντες ἅμα ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ ἐπορεύοντο γὰρ δι᾽ Εὐρίπου καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἤν τι δύνηται, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν βλάψαι. [2] ὁ δὲ ἔς τε τὴν Τάναγραν ἀπεβίβασεν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἁρπαγήν τινα ἐποιήσατο διὰ τάχους καὶ ἐκ Χαλκίδος τῆς Εὐβοίας ἀφ᾽ ἑσπέρας διέπλευσε τὸν Εὔριπον

καὶ ἀποβιβάσας ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἦγεν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Μυκαλησσόν. [3] καὶ τὴν μὲν νύκτα λαθὼν πρὸς τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ ηὐλίσατο ⸂ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς Μυκαλησσοῦ ἑκκαίδεκα μάλιστα σταδίους⸃, ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ πόλει προσέκειτο οὔσῃ οὐ μεγάλῃ, καὶ αἱρεῖ ἀφυλάκτοις τε ἐπιπεσὼν καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτοις μὴ ἄν ποτέ τινας σφίσιν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης τοσοῦτον ἐπαναβάντας ἐπιθέσθαι, τοῦ τείχους ἀσθενοῦς ὄντος καὶ ἔστιν ᾗ καὶ πεπτωκότος, τοῦ δὲ βραχέος ᾠκοδομημένου, καὶ πυλῶν ἅμα διὰ τὴν ἄδειαν ἀνεῳγμένων. [4] ἐσπεσόντες δὲ οἱ Θρᾷκες ἐς τὴν Μυκαλησσὸν τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ἐπόρθουν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐφόνευον φειδόμενοι οὔτε πρεσβυτέρας οὔτε νεωτέρας ἡλικίας, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἑξῆς, ὅτῳ ἐντύχοιεν, καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας κτείνοντες, καὶ προσέτι καὶ ὑποζύγια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔμψυχα ἴδοιεν: τὸ γὰρ γένος τὸ τῶν Θρᾳκῶν ὁμοῖα τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ βαρβαρικοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἂν θαρσήσῃ, φονικώτατόν ἐστιν. [5] καὶ τότε ἄλλη τε ταραχὴ οὐκ ὀλίγη καὶ ἰδέα πᾶσα καθειστήκει ὀλέθρου, καὶ ἐπιπεσόντες διδασκαλείῳ παίδων, ὅπερ μέγιστον ἦν αὐτόθι καὶ ἄρτι ἔτυχον οἱ παῖδες ἐσεληλυθότες, κατέκοψαν πάντας: καὶ ξυμφορὰ τῇ πόλει πάσῃ οὐδεμιᾶς ἥσσων μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἀδόκητός τε ἐπέπεσεν αὖτη καὶ δεινή.

[29] For their expenses became heavier and heavier as the war grew in extent, and at the same time their sources of revenue were drying up.And so, being in extreme want of money, and desirous to economise, they at once sent away the Thracians who came too late for Demosthenes, ordering Diitrephes to convey them home, but, as they must needs sail through the Euripus, to employ them in any way which he could against the enemy. He landed them at Tanagra and there made a hasty raid; in the evening he sailed from Chalcis in Euboea across the Euripus, and disembarking his troops in Boeotia led them against the town of Mycalessus. He passed the night unperceived at the temple of Hermes, which is distant from Mycalessus about two miles, and at the dawn of day he assaulted and captured the city, which is not

large. The inhabitants were taken off their guard; for they never imagined that an enemy would come and attack them at so great a distance from the sea. The walls were weak, and in some places had fallen down; in others they were built low; while the citizens, in their sense of security, had left their gates open. The Thracians dashed into the town, sacked the houses and temples, and slaughtered the inhabitants. They spared neither old nor young, but cut down, one after another, all whom they met, the women and children, the very beasts of burden, and every living thing which they saw. For the Thracians, when they dare, can be as bloody as the worst barbarians. There in Mycalessus the wildest panic ensued, and destruction in every form was rife. They even fell upon a boys' school, the largest in the place, which the children had just entered, and massacred them every one. No calamity could be worse than this, touching as it did the whole city, none was ever so sudden or so terrible.

30. οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐβοήθουν, καὶ καταλαβόντες προκεχωρηκότας ἤδη τοὺς Θρᾷκας οὐ πολὺ τήν τε λείαν ἀφείλοντο καὶ αὐτοὺς φοβήσαντες καταδιώκουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν Εὔριπον καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, οὗ αὐτοῖς τὰ πλοῖα ἃ ἤγαγεν ὥρμει. [2] καὶ ἀποκτείνουσιν αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ ἐσβάσει τοὺς πλείστους οὔτε ἐπισταμένους νεῖν τῶν τε ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις, ὡς ἑώρων τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ, ὁρμισάντων ἔξω τοξεύματος τὰ πλοῖα, ἐπεὶ ἔν γε τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀναχωρήσει οὐκ ἀτόπως οἱ Θρᾷκες πρὸς τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων ἱππικόν, ὅπερ πρῶτον προσέκειτο, προεκθέοντές τε καὶ ξυστρεφόμενοι ἐν ἐπιχωρίῳ τάξει τὴν φυλακὴν ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ἐν τούτῳ διεφθάρησαν. μέρος δέ τι καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει αὐτῇ δι᾽ ἁρπαγὴν ἐγκαταληφθὲν ἀπώλετο. οἱ δὲ ξύμπαντες τῶν Θρᾳκῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι ἀπὸ τριακοσίων καὶ χιλίων ἀπέθανον. [3] διέφθειραν δὲ καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἳ ξυνεβοήθησαν ἐς εἴκοσι μάλιστα ἱππέας τε καὶ ὁπλίτας ὁμοῦ καὶ Θηβαίων τῶν βοιωταρχῶν Σκιρφώνδαν: τῶν δὲ Μυκαλησσίων μέρος τι ἀπανηλώθη. τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν

Μυκαλησσὸν πάθει χρησαμένην οὐδενὸς ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἧσσον ὀλοφύρασθαι ἀξίῳ τοιαῦτα ξυνέβη.

[30] When the news reached the Thebans they hastened to the rescue. Coming upon the Thracians before they had gone far, they took away the spoil and, putting them to flight, pursued them to the Euripus, where the ships which had brought them were moored. Of those who fell, the greater number were slain in the attempt to embark; for they did not know how to swim, and the men on board, seeing what was happening, had anchored their vessels out of bow-shot. In the retreat itself the Thracians made a very fair defence against the Theban cavalry which first attacked them, running out and closing in again, after the manner of their country; and their loss was trifling. But a good many who remained for the sake of plunder were cut off within the city and slain. The whole number who fell was two hundred and fifty, out of thirteen hundred. They killed, however, some of the Thebans and others who came to the rescue, in all about twenty, both horsemen and hoplites. Scirphondas, one of the Theban Boeotarchs, was slain. A large proportion of the Mycalessians perished. Such was the fate of Mycalessus; considering the size of the city, no calamity more deplorable occurred during the war.

31. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης τότε ἀποπλέων ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Λακωνικῆς τείχισιν, ὁλκάδα ὁρμοῦσαν ἐν Φειᾷ τῇ Ἠλείων εὑρών, ἐν ᾗ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὁπλῖται ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἔμελλον περαιοῦσθαι, αὐτὴν μὲν διαφθείρει, οἱ δ᾽ ἄνδρες ἀποφυγόντες ὕστερον λαβόντες ἄλλην ἔπλεον. [2] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀφικόμενος ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐς τὴν Ζάκυνθον καὶ Κεφαλληνίαν ὁπλίτας τε παρέλαβε καὶ ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου τῶν Μεσσηνίων μετεπέμψατο καὶ ἐς τὴν ἀντιπέρας ἤπειρον τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας διέβη, ἐς Ἀλύζιάν τε καὶ Ἀνακτόριον, ὃ αὐτοὶ εἶχον. [3] ὄντι δ᾽ αὐτῷ περὶ ταῦτα ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ἁπαντᾷ ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας ἀποπλέων, ὃς τότε τοῦ χειμῶνος τὰ χρήματα ἄγων τῇ στρατιᾷ ἀπεπέμφθη, καὶ ἀγγέλλει τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι πύθοιτο κατὰ πλοῦν ἤδη ὢν τὸ Πλημμύριον ὑπὸ

τῶν Συρακοσίων ἑαλωκός. [4] ἀφικνεῖται δὲ καὶ Κόνων παρ᾽ αὐτούς, ὃς ἦρχε Ναυπάκτου, ἀγγέλλων ὅτι αἱ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Κορινθίων αἱ σφίσιν ἀνθορμοῦσαι οὔτε καταλύουσι τὸν πόλεμον ναυμαχεῖν τε μέλλουσιν: πέμπειν οὖν ἐκέλευεν αὐτοὺς ναῦς, ὡς οὐχ ἱκανὰς οὔσας δυοῖν δεούσας εἴκοσι τὰς ἑαυτῶν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ναυμαχεῖν. [5] τῷ μὲν οὖν Κόνωνι δέκα ναῦς ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων τὰς ἄριστα σφίσι πλεούσας ἀφ᾽ ὧν αὐτοὶ εἶχον ξυμπέμπουσι πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ: αὐτοὶ δὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς τὸν ξύλλογον ἡτοιμάζοντο, Εὐρυμέδων μὲν ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν πλεύσας καὶ πέντε καὶ δέκα τε ναῦς πληροῦν κελεύσας αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁπλίτας καταλεγόμενος ξυνῆρχε γὰρ ἤδη Δημοσθένει ἀποτραπόμενος, ὥσπερ καὶ ᾑρέθη, Δημοσθένης δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἀκαρνανίαν χωρίων σφενδονήτας τε καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς ξυναγείρων.

[31] Demosthenes, who after helping to build the fort on the Laconian coast, had sailed away to Corcyra, on his way thither destroyed a merchant-vessel anchored at Phea in Elis, which was intended to convey some of the Corinthian hoplites to Sicily. But the crew escaped, and sailed in another vessel. He went on to Zacynthus and Cephallenia, where he took on board some hoplites, and sent to the Messenians of Naupactus for others; he then passed over to the mainland of Acarnania, and touched at Alyzia and Anactorium, which were at that time occupied by the Athenians. While he was in those regions he met Eurymedon returning from Sicily, whither he had been sent during the winter in charge of the money which had been voted to the army; he reported, among other things, the capture of Plemmyrium by the Syracusans, of which he had heard on his voyage home. Conon too, the governor of Naupactus, brought word that the twenty-five Corinthian ships which were stationed on the opposite coast were still showing a hostile front, and clearly meant to fight. He requested the generals to send him reinforcements, since his own ships —

eighteen in number — were not able to give battle against the twenty-five of the enemy. Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent ten ships, the swiftest which they had, to the fleet at Naupactus, while they themselves completed the muster of the expedition. Eurymedon, sailing to Corcyra, ordered the Corcyraeans to man fifteen ships, and himself levied a number of hoplites. He had turned back from his homeward voyage, and was now holding the command, to which, in conjunction with Demosthenes, he had been appointed. Demosthenes meanwhile had been collecting slingers and javelin-men in the neighbourhood of Acarnania.

32. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν τότε μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Πλημμυρίου ἅλωσιν πρέσβεις οἰχόμενοι ἐς τὰς πόλεις ἐπειδὴ ἔπεισάν τε καὶ ξυναγείραντες ἔμελλον ἄξειν τὸν στρατόν, ὁ Νικίας προπυθόμενος πέμπει ἐς τῶν Σικελῶν τοὺς τὴν δίοδον ἔχοντας καὶ σφίσι ξυμμάχους, Κεντόριπάς τε καὶ Ἀλικυαίους καὶ ἄλλους, ὅπως μὴ διαφρήσωσι τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀλλὰ ξυστραφέντες κωλύσωσι διελθεῖν: ἄλλῃ γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ πειράσειν: Ἀκραγαντῖνοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐδίδοσαν διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ὁδόν. [2] πορευομένων δ᾽ ἤδη τῶν Σικελιωτῶν οἱ Σικελοί, καθάπερ ἐδέοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐνέδραν τινὰ τριχῇ ποιησάμενοι, ἀφυλάκτοις τε καὶ ἐξαίφνης ἐπιγενόμενοι διέφθειραν ἐς ὀκτακοσίους μάλιστα καὶ τοὺς πρέσβεις πλὴν ἑνὸς τοῦ Κορινθίου πάντας: οὗτος δὲ τοὺς διαφυγόντας ἐς πεντακοσίους καὶ χιλίους ἐκόμισεν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας.

[32] The ambassadors from Syracuse who had gone to the cities of Sicily after the taking of Plemmyrium, and had persuaded them to join in the war, were now about to bring back the army which they had collected. Nicias, having previous information, sent word to the Sicel allies of Athens who commanded the road, such as the Centoripes and Alicyaei, and told them not to let the forces of the enemy pass, but to unite and stop them; there was no likelihood, he said, that they would even think of taking another road, since they were not allowed to go through the country of the

Agrigentines. So when the forces of the Sicilian towns were on their way, the Sicels, complying with the request of the Athenians, set an ambush in three divisions, and falling upon them suddenly when they were off their guard, destroyed about eight hundred of them, and all the envoys except the Corinthian; he brought the survivors, numbering fifteen hundred, to Syracuse.

33. καὶ περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας καὶ οἱ Καμαριναῖοι ἀφικνοῦνται αὐτοῖς βοηθοῦντες, πεντακόσιοι μὲν ὁπλῖται, τριακόσιοι δὲ ἀκοντισταὶ καὶ τοξόται τριακόσιοι. ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Γελῷοι ναυτικόν τε ἐς πέντε ναῦς καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς τετρακοσίους καὶ ἱππέας διακοσίους. [2] σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἤδη πᾶσα ἡ Σικελία πλὴν Ἀκραγαντίνων οὗτοι δ᾽ οὐδὲ μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων ἦσαν, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μετὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων οἱ πρότερον περιορώμενοι ξυστάντες ἐβοήθουν. [3]καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι, ὡς αὐτοῖς τὸ ἐν τοῖς Σικελοῖς πάθος ἐγένετο, ἐπέσχον τὸ εὐθέως τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν: ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων, ἑτοίμης ἤδη τῆς στρατιᾶς οὔσης ἔκ τε τῆς Κερκύρας καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἠπείρου, ἐπεραιώθησαν ξυμπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ τὸν Ἰόνιον ἐπ᾽ ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν: [4] καὶ ὁρμηθέντες αὐτόθεν κατίσχουσιν ἐς τὰς Χοιράδας νήσους Ἰαπυγίας, καὶ ἀκοντιστάς τέ τινας τῶν Ἰαπύγων πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν τοῦ Μεσσαπίου ἔθνους ἀναβιβάζονται ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τῷ Ἄρτᾳ, ὅσπερ καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς δυνάστης ὢν παρέσχετο αὐτοῖς, ἀνανεωσάμενοί τινα παλαιὰν φιλίαν ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Μεταπόντιον τῆς Ἰταλίας. [5] καὶ τοὺς Μεταποντίους πείσαντες κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικὸν ἀκοντιστάς τε ξυμπέμπειν τριακοσίους καὶ τριήρεις δύο καὶ ἀναλαβόντες ταῦτα παρέπλευσαν ἐς Θουρίαν. καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι νεωστὶ στάσει τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐναντίους ἐκπεπτωκότας: [6] καὶ βουλόμενοι τὴν στρατιὰν αὐτόθι πᾶσαν ἀθροίσαντες εἴ τις ὑπελέλειπτο ἐξετάσαι, καὶ τοὺς Θουρίους πεῖσαι σφίσι ξυστρατεύειν τε ὡς προθυμότατα καί, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν τούτῳ τύχης εἰσί, τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις νομίζειν, περιέμενον ἐν τῇ Θουρίᾳ καὶ ἔπρασσον ταῦτα.

[33] About the same time arrived a reinforcement from Camarina of five hundred hoplites, three hundred javelin-men, and three hundred archers. The Geloans also sent five ships with four hundred javelin-men and two hundred horsemen. Hitherto the Sicilian cities had only watched the course of events, but now the whole island, with the exception of Agrigentum, which was neutral, united with the Syracusans against the Athenians.After their misfortune in the Sicel country, the Syracusans deferred their intended attack for a time. The forces which Demosthenes and Eurymedon had collected from Corcyra and the mainland were now ready, and they passed over the Ionian Sea to the promontory of Iapygia. Proceeding onwards, they touched at the Iapygian islands called Choerades, and took on board a hundred and fifty Iapygian javelin-men of the Messapian tribe. After renewing an ancient friendship with Artas, a native prince who had furnished the javelin-men, they went on to Metapontium in Italy. They persuaded the Metapontians, who were their allies, to let them have two triremes and three hundred javelin-men; these they took with them and sailed to Thurii. At Thurii they found that the party opposed to the Athenians had just been driven out by a revolution. Wishing to hold another muster and inspection of their whole army, and to be sure that no one was missing, they remained there for some time. They also did their best to gain the hearty co-operation of the Thurians, and to effect an offensive and defensive alliance with them, now that they had succeeded in expelling the anti-Athenian party.

34. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον οἱ ἐν ταῖς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσίν, οἵπερ τῶν ὁλκάδων ἕνεκα τῆς ἐς Σικελίαν κομιδῆς ἀνθώρμουν πρὸς τὰς ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ ναῦς, παρασκευασάμενοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίᾳ καὶ προσπληρώσαντες ἔτι ναῦς ὥστε ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους εἶναι αὐτοῖς τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν, ὁρμίζονται κατὰ Ἐρινεὸν τῆς Ἀχαΐας ἐν τῇ Ῥυπικῇ. [2] καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῦ χωρίου μηνοειδοῦς ὄντος ἐφ᾽ ᾧ ὥρμουν, ὁ μὲν πεζὸς ἑκατέρωθεν

προσβεβοηθηκὼς τῶν τε Κορινθίων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ ταῖς προανεχούσαις ἄκραις παρετέτακτο, αἱ δὲ νῆες τὸ μεταξὺ εἶχον ἐμφάρξασαι: ἦρχε δὲ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ Πολυάνθης Κορίνθιος. [3] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ τῆς Ναυπάκτου τριάκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ τρισίν ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Δίφιλος ἐπέπλευσαν αὐτοῖς. [4] καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡσύχαζον, ἔπειτα ἀρθέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ σημείου, ἐπεὶ καιρὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐναυμάχουν. καὶ χρόνον ἀντεῖχον πολὺν ἀλλήλοις. [5] καὶ τῶν μὲν Κορινθίων τρεῖς νῆες διαφθείρονται, τῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων κατέδυ μὲν οὐδεμία ἁπλῶς, ἑπτὰ δέ τινες ἄπλοι ἐγένοντο ἀντίπρῳροι ἐμβαλλόμεναι καὶ ἀναρραγεῖσαι τὰς παρεξειρεσίας ὑπὸ τῶν Κορινθίων νεῶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παχυτέρας τὰς ἐπωτίδας ἐχουσῶν. [6] ναυμαχήσαντες δὲ ἀντίπαλα μὲν καὶ ὡς αὐτοὺς ἑκατέρους ἀξιοῦν νικᾶν, ὅμως δὲ τῶν ναυαγίων κρατησάντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων διά τε τὴν τοῦ ἀνέμου ἄπωσιν αὐτῶν ἐς τὸ πέλαγος καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων οὐκέτι ἐπαναγωγήν, διεκρίθησαν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, καὶ δίωξις οὐδεμία ἐγένετο, οὐδ᾽ ἄνδρες οὐδετέρων ἑάλωσαν: οἱ μὲν γὰρ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι πρὸς τῇ γῇ ναυμαχοῦντες ῥᾳδίως διεσῴζοντο, τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων οὐδεμία κατέδυ ναῦς. [7] ἀποπλευσάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Ναύπακτον οἱ Κορίνθιοι εὐθὺς τροπαῖον ἔστησαν ὡς νικῶντες, ὅτι πλείους τῶν ἐναντίων ναῦς ἄπλους ἐποίησαν καὶ νομίσαντες αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἡσσᾶσθαι δι᾽ ὅπερ οὐδ᾽ οἱ ἕτεροι νικᾶν: οἵ τε γὰρ Κορίνθιοι ἡγήσαντο κρατεῖν εἰ μὴ καὶ πολὺ ἐκρατοῦντο, οἵ τ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνόμιζον ἡσσᾶσθαι ὅτι οὐ πολὺ ἐνίκων. [8] ἀποπλευσάντων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τοῦ πεζοῦ διαλυθέντος οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔστησαν τροπαῖον καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀχαΐᾳ ὡς νικήσαντες,ἀπέχον τοῦ Ἐρινεοῦ, ἐν ᾧ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὥρμουν, ὡς εἴκοσι σταδίους. καὶ ἡ μὲν ναυμαχία οὕτως ἐτελεύτα.

[34] About the same time the Peloponnesians in their fleet of twenty-five ships, which was stationed opposite the Athenian fleet at Naupactus to protect the passage of the merchant-vessels going to Sicily, made ready for action.

They manned some additional ships, which raised their number nearly to that of the Athenians, and anchored at Erineus off Achaia, which is in the territory of Rhypae. The bay, off the shore of which they were stationed, has the form of a crescent, and the infantry of the Corinthians and of the allies, which had come from the country on both sides to co-operate with the fleet, was disposed on the projecting promontories. The ships, which were under the command of Polyanthes the Corinthian, formed a close line between the two points. The Athenians sailed out against them from Naupactus with thirty-three ships, under the command of Diphilus. For a while the Corinthians remained motionless; in due time the signal was raised and they rushed upon the Athenians and engaged with them. The battle was long and obstinate. Three Corinthian ships were destroyed. The Athenians had no ships absolutely sunk, but about seven of them were rendered useless; for they were struck full in front by the beaks of the Corinthian vessels, which had the projecting beams of their prows designedly built thicker, and their bows were stoven in. The engagement was undecided and both sides claimed the victory; but the Athenians gained possession of the wrecks because the wind blew them towards the open sea and the Corinthians did not put out again. So the two fleets parted. There was no pursuit, nor were any prisoners taken on either side. For the Corinthians and Peloponnesians were fighting close to the land and thus their crews escaped, while on the Athenian side no ship was sunk. As soon as the Athenians had returned to Naupactus the Corinthians set up a trophy, insisting that they were the victors, because they had disabled more of the enemy’s ships than the enemy of theirs. They refused to acknowledge defeat on the same ground which made the Athenians unwilling to claim the victory. For the Corinthians considered themselves conquerors, if they were not severely defeated; but the Athenians thought that they were defeated because they

had not gained a signal victory. When however the Peloponnesians had sailed away and the land-army was dispersed, the Athenians raised another trophy in Achaia, at a distance of about two miles and a quarter from the Corinthian station at Erineus. Such was the result of the engagement.

35. ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων, ἐπειδὴ ξυστρατεύειν αὐτοῖς οἱ Θούριοι παρεσκευάσθησαν ἑπτακοσίοις μὲν ὁπλίταις, τριακοσίοις δὲ ἀκοντισταῖς, τὰς μὲν ναῦς παραπλεῖν ἐκέλευον ἐπὶ τῆς Κροτωνιάτιδος, αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸν πεζὸν πάντα ἐξετάσαντες πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῷ Συβάρει ποταμῷ ἦγον διὰ τῆς Θουριάδος γῆς. [2] καὶ ὡς ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῷ Ὑλίᾳ ποταμῷ καὶ αὐτοῖς οἱ Κροτωνιᾶται προσπέμψαντες εἶπον οὐκ ἂν σφίσι βουλομένοις εἶναι διὰ τῆς γῆς σφῶν τὸν στρατὸν ἰέναι, ἐπικαταβάντες ηὐλίσαντο πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ Ὑλίου: καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτοῖς ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπήντων. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ἀναβιβασάμενοι παρέπλεον, ἴσχοντες πρὸς ταῖς πόλεσι πλὴν Λοκρῶν, ἕως ἀφίκοντο ἐπὶ Πέτραν τῆς Ῥηγίνης.

[35] Demosthenes and Eurymedon, when the Thurians had been prevailed upon to help them, and had furnished seven hundred hoplites and three hundred javelin-men, commanded the ships to sail towards the territory of Crotona, and themselves, after holding a review of all their infantry at the river Sybaris, led them through the territory of Thurii. On their arrival at the river Hylias the people of Crotona sent to them, and said that they could not allow the army to march through their country. So they directed their march down to the sea and passed the night at the mouth of the river, where they were met by their ships. On the following day they re-embarked the army and coasted along, touching at the cities which they passed, with the exception of Locri, until they came to the promontory of Petra near Rhegium.

36. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτῳ πυνθανόμενοι αὐτῶν τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὖθις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀποπειρᾶσαι ἐβούλοντο καὶ τῇ

ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ τοῦ πεζοῦ, ἥνπερ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πρὶν ἐλθεῖν αὐτοὺς φθάσαι βουλόμενοι ξυνέλεγον. [2] παρεσκευάσαντο δὲ τό τε ἄλλο ναυτικὸν ὡς ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ναυμαχίας τι πλέον ἐνεῖδον σχήσοντες, καὶ τὰς πρῴρας τῶν νεῶν ξυντεμόντες ἐς ἔλασσον στεριφωτέρας ἐποίησαν, καὶ τὰς ἐπωτίδας ἐπέθεσαν ταῖς πρῴραις παχείας, καὶ ἀντηρίδας ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὑπέτειναν πρὸς τοὺς τοίχους ὡς ἐπὶ ἓξ πήχεις ἐντός τε καὶ ἔξωθεν: ᾧπερ τρόπῳ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ ναῦς ἐπισκευασάμενοι πρῴραθεν ἐναυμάχουν. [3] ἐνόμισαν γὰρ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀντινεναυπηγημένας, ἀλλὰ λεπτὰ τὰ πρῴραθεν ἐχούσας διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιπρῴροις μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐκ περίπλου ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρῆσθαι, οὐκ ἔλασσον σχήσειν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ λιμένι ναυμαχίαν, οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ πολλαῖς ναυσὶν οὖσαν, πρὸς ἑαυτῶν ἔσεσθαι: ἀντιπρῴροις γὰρ ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρώμενοι ἀναρρήξειν τὰ πρῴραθεν αὐτοῖς, στερίφοις καὶ παχέσι πρὸς κοῖλα καὶ ἀσθενῆ παίοντες τοῖς ἐμβόλοις. [4] τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἔσεσθαι σφῶν ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ οὔτε περίπλουν οὔτε διέκπλουν, ᾧπερ τῆς τέχνης μάλιστα ἐπίστευον: αὐτοὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τὸ μὲν οὐ δώσειν διεκπλεῖν, τὸ δὲ τὴν στενοχωρίαν κωλύσειν ὥστε μὴ περιπλεῖν. [5] τῇ τε πρότερον ἀμαθίᾳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν δοκούσῃ εἶναι, τὸ ἀντίπρῳρον ξυγκροῦσαι, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν αὐτοὶ χρήσασθαι: πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σχήσειν: τὴν γὰρ ἀνάκρουσιν οὐκ ἔσεσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐξωθουμένοις ἄλλοσε ἢ ἐς τὴν γῆν, καὶ ταύτην δι᾽ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐς ὀλίγον, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ ἑαυτῶν: τοῦ δ᾽ ἄλλου λιμένος αὐτοὶ κρατήσειν, καὶ ξυμφερομένους αὐτούς, ἤν πῃ βιάζωνται, [6] ἐς ὀλίγον τε καὶ πάντας ἐς τὸ αὐτό, προσπίπτοντας ἀλλήλοις ταράξεσθαι ὅπερ καὶ ἔβλαπτε μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ναυμαχίαις, οὐκ οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἐς πάντα τὸν λιμένα τῆς ἀνακρούσεως, ὥσπερ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις : περιπλεῦσαι δὲ ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, σφῶν ἐχόντων τὴν ἐπίπλευσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πελάγους τε καὶ ἀνάκρουσιν, οὐ δυνήσεσθαι αὐτούς, ἄλλως

τε καὶ τοῦ Πλημμυρίου πολεμίου τε αὐτοῖς ἐσομένου καὶ τοῦ στόματος οὐ μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ λιμένος.

[36] The Syracusans, hearing of their approach, desired to have another trial of the fleet, and to use the army which they had collected with the express purpose of bringing on an engagement before Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived in Sicily. Profiting by the experience which they had acquired in the last sea-fight, they devised several improvements in the construction of their vessels. They cut down and strengthened the prows, and also made the beams which projected from them thicker; these latter they supported underneath with stays of timber extending from the beams to and through the sides of the ship a length of nine feet within and nine without, after the fashion in which the Corinthians had refitted their prows before they fought with the squadron from Naupactus. For the Syracusans hoped thus to gain an advantage over the Athenian ships, which were not constructed to resist such improvements, but had their prows slender, because they were in the habit of rowing round an enemy and striking the side of his vessel instead of meeting him prow to prow. The plan would be the more effectual, because they were going to fight in the Great Harbour, where many ships would be crowded in a narrow space. They would charge full in face, and presenting their own massive and solid beaks would stave in the hollow and weak forepart of their enemies’ ships; while the Athenians, confined as they were, would not be able to wheel round them or break their line before striking, to which manoeuvres they mainly trusted — the want of room would make the one impossible, and the Syracusans themselves would do their best to prevent the other. What had hitherto been considered a defect of skill on the part of their pilots, the practice of striking beak to beak, would now be a great advantage, to which they would have constant recourse; for the Athenians, when forced to back water, could only retire towards the land, which was too near, and

of which but a small part, that is to say, their own encampment, was open to them. The Syracusans would be masters of the rest of the harbour, and, if the Athenians were hard pressed at any point, they would all be driven together into one small spot, where they would run foul of one another and fall into confusion. (Which proved to be the case; for nothing was more disastrous to the Athenians in all these sea-fights than the impossibility of retreating, as the Syracusans could, to any part of the harbour.) Again, while they themselves had command of the outer sea and could charge from it and back water into it whenever they pleased, the Athenians would be unable to sail into the open and turn before striking; besides, Plemmyrium was hostile to them, and the mouth of the harbour was narrow.

37. τοιαῦτα οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δύναμιν ἐπινοήσαντες καὶ ἅμα τεθαρσηκότες μᾶλλον ἤδη ἀπὸ τῆς προτέρας ναυμαχίας, ἐπεχείρουν τῷ τε πεζῷ ἅμα καὶ ταῖς ναυσίν. [2] καὶ τὸν μὲν πεζὸν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον τὸν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως Γύλιππος προεξαγαγὼν προσῆγε τῷ τείχει τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καθ᾽ ὅσον πρὸς τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῦ ἑώρα: καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου, οἵ τε ὁπλῖται ὅσοι ἐκεῖ ἦσαν καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς καὶ ἡ γυμνητεία τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα προσῄει τῷ τείχει: αἱ δὲ νῆες μετὰ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ἐπεξέπλεον τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων. [3] καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοὺς οἰόμενοι τῷ πεζῷ μόνῳ πειράσειν, ὁρῶντες δὲ καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπιφερομένας ἄφνω, ἐθορυβοῦντο, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη καὶ πρὸ τῶν τειχῶν τοῖς προσιοῦσιν ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου καὶ τῶν ἔξω κατὰ τάχος χωροῦντας ἱππέας τε πολλοὺς καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς ἀντεπεξῆσαν, ἄλλοι δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἅμα ἐπὶ τὸν αἰγιαλὸν παρεβοήθουν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πλήρεις ἦσαν, ἀντανῆγον πέντε καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ναῦς: καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἦσαν ὀγδοήκοντα μάλιστα.

[37] Having thus adapted their plans to the degree of naval skill and strength which they possessed, the Syracusans, greatly encouraged by the result of the previous

engagement, attacked the Athenians both by sea and land. A little before the fleet sailed forth, Gylippus led the land-forces out of the city against that part of the Athenian wall which faced Syracuse, while some of the heavy-armed troops, which together with the cavalry and light infantry were stationed at the Olympieum, approached the lines of the enemy from the opposite side. Nearly at the same instant the ships of the Syracusans and their allies sailed out. The Athenians at first thought that they were going to make an attempt by land only, but when they saw the ships suddenly bearing down upon them they were disconcerted. Some mounted the walls or prepared to meet their assailants in front of them; others went out against the numerous cavalry and javelin-men, who were hastening from the Olympieum and the outer side of the wall; others manned the ships or prepared to fight on the beach. When the crews had got on board they sailed out with seventy-five ships; the number of Syracusan ships being about eighty.

38. τῆς δὲ ἡμέρας ἐπὶ πολὺ προσπλέοντες καὶ ἀνακρουόμενοι καὶ πειράσαντες ἀλλήλων καὶ οὐδέτεροι δυνάμενοι ἄξιόν τι λόγου παραλαβεῖν, εἰ μὴ ναῦν μίαν ἢ δύο τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ Συρακόσιοι καταδύσαντες, διεκρίθησαν: καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν ἀπῆλθεν. [2]τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ἡσύχαζον, οὐδὲν δηλοῦντες ὁποῖόν τι τὸ μέλλον ποιήσουσιν: ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἰδὼν ἀντίπαλα τὰ τῆς ναυμαχίας γενόμενα καὶ ἐλπίζων αὐτοὺς αὖθις ἐπιχειρήσειν τούς τε τριηράρχους ἠνάγκαζεν ἐπισκευάζειν τὰς ναῦς, εἴ τίς τι ἐπεπονήκει, καὶ ὁλκάδας προώρμισε πρὸ τοῦ σφετέρου σταυρώματος, ὃ αὐτοῖς πρὸ τῶν νεῶν ἀντὶ λιμένος κληστοῦ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἐπεπήγει. [3] διαλειπούσας δὲ τὰς ὁλκάδας ὅσον δύο πλέθρα ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων κατέστησεν, ὅπως, εἴ τις βιάζοιτο ναῦς, εἴη κατάφευξις ἀσφαλὴς καὶ πάλιν καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν ἔκπλους. παρασκευαζόμενοι δὲ ταῦτα ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν διετέλεσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μέχρι νυκτός.

[38] During a great part of the day the two fleets continued advancing and retreating and skirmishing with one another.

Neither was able to gain any considerable advantage, only the Syracusans sank one or two ships of the Athenians; so they parted, and at the same time the infantry retired from the walls. On the following day the Syracusans remained quiet and gave no sign of what they meant to do next. Seeing how close the conflict had been, Nicias expected another attack; he therefore compelled the trierarchs to repair their ships wherever they were injured, and anchored merchant-vessels in front of the palisades which the Athenians had driven into the sea so as to form a kind of dock for the protection of their own ships; these he placed at a distance of about two hundred feet from one another, in order that any ship which was hard pressed might have a safe retreat and an opportunity of going out again at leisure. These preparations occupied the Athenians for a whole day from morning to night.

39. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Συρακόσιοι τῆς μὲν ὥρας πρωίτερον, τῇ δ᾽ ἐπιχειρήσει τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦ τε πεζοῦ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ προσέμισγον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, [2] καὶ ἀντικαταστάντες ταῖς ναυσὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον αὖθις ἐπὶ πολὺ διῆγον τῆς ἡμέρας πειρώμενοι ἀλλήλων, πρὶν δὴ Ἀρίστων ὁ Πυρρίχου Κορίνθιος, ἄριστος ὢν κυβερνήτης τῶν μετὰ Συρακοσίων, πείθει τοὺς σφετέρους τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἄρχοντας, πέμψαντας ὡς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιμελομένους, κελεύειν ὅτι τάχιστα τὴν ἀγορὰν τῶν πωλουμένων παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν μεταστῆσαι κομίσαντας, καὶ ὅσα τις ἔχει ἐδώδιμα, πάντας ἐκεῖσε φέροντας ἀναγκάσαι πωλεῖν, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ἐκβιβάσαντες τοὺς ναύτας εὐθὺς παρὰ τὰς ναῦς ἀριστοποιήσωνται, καὶ δι᾽ ὀλίγου αὖθις καὶ αὐθημερὸν ἀπροσδοκήτοις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρῶσιν.

[39] On the next day, in the same manner as before but at an earlier hour, the Syracusans attacked the Athenians both by sea and land. Again the ships faced one another, and again a great part of the day was passed in skirmishing. At length Ariston the son of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian, who was the ablest pilot in the Syracusan fleet, persuaded the

commanders to send a message to the proper authorities in the city desiring them to have the market transferred as quickly as possible to the shore, and to compel any one who had food for sale to bring his whole stock thither. The sailors would thus be enabled to disembark and take their midday meal close to the ships; and so after a short interval they might, without waiting until the next day, renew the attack upon the Athenians when least expected.

40. καὶ οἱ μὲν πεισθέντες ἔπεμψαν ἄγγελον, καὶ ἡ ἀγορὰ παρεσκευάσθη, καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐξαίφνης πρύμναν κρουσάμενοι πάλιν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔπλευσαν καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκβάντες αὐτοῦ ἄριστον ἐποιοῦντο: [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς ἡσσημένους σφῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀνακρούσασθαι, καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν ἐκβάντες τά τε ἄλλα διεπράσσοντο καὶ τὰ ἀμφὶ τὸ ἄριστον ὡς τῆς γε ἡμέρας ταύτης οὐκέτι οἰόμενοι ἂν ναυμαχῆσαι. [3] ἐξαίφνης δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πληρώσαντες τὰς ναῦς ἐπέπλεον αὖθις: οἱ δὲ διὰ πολλοῦ θορύβου καὶ ἄσιτοι οἱ πλείους οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἐσβάντες μόλις ποτὲ ἀντανήγοντο. [4] καὶ χρόνον μέν τινα ἀπέσχοντο ἀλλήλων φυλασσόμενοι: ἔπειτα οὐκ ἐδόκει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν διαμέλλοντας κόπῳ ἁλίσκεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιχειρεῖν ὅτι τάχιστα, καὶ ἐπιφερόμενοι ἐκ παρακελεύσεως ἐναυμάχουν. [5] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι δεξάμενοι καὶ ταῖς [τε] ναυσὶν ἀντιπρῴροις χρώμενοι, ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν, τῶν ἐμβόλων τῇ παρασκευῇ ἀνερρήγνυσαν τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς παρεξειρεσίας, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων αὐτοῖς ἀκοντίζοντες μεγάλα ἔβλαπτον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι μείζω οἱ ἐν τοῖς λεπτοῖς πλοίοις περιπλέοντες τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ἔς τε τοὺς ταρσοὺς ὑποπίπτοντες τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν καὶ ἐς τὰ πλάγια παραπλέοντες καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐς τοὺς ναύτας ἀκοντίζοντες.

[40] The generals, agreeing to the proposal, sent the message, and the market was brought down to the shore. Suddenly the Syracusans backed water and rowed towards the city; then disembarking they at once took their meal on

the spot. The Athenians, regarding their retreat as a confession of defeat, disembarked at leisure, and among other matters set about preparing their own meal, taking for granted that there would be no more fighting that day. Suddenly the Syracusans manned their ships and again bore down upon them; the Athenians, in great disorder and most of them fasting, hurried on board, and with considerable difficulty got under weigh. For some time the two fleets looked at one another, and did not engage; after a while the Athenians thought they had better not delay until they had fairly tired themselves out, but attack at once. So, cheering on one another, they charged and fought. The Syracusans remained firm, and meeting the enemy prow to prow, as they had resolved, stove in by the strength of their beaks a great part of the bows of the Athenian ships. Their javelin-men on the decks greatly injured the enemy. Still more mischief was done by Syracusans who rowed about in light boats and dashed in upon the blades of the enemy’s oars, or ran up alongside and threw darts at the sailors.

41. τέλος δὲ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ κατὰ κράτος ναυμαχοῦντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐνίκησαν, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τραπόμενοι διὰ τῶν ὁλκάδων τὴν κατάφευξιν ἐποιοῦντο ἐς τὸν ἑαυτῶν ὅρμον. [2] αἱ δὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων νῆες μέχρι μὲν τῶν ὁλκάδων ἐπεδίωκον: ἔπειτα αὐτοὺς αἱ κεραῖαι ὑπὲρ τῶν ἔσπλων αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁλκάδων δελφινοφόροι ἠρμέναι ἐκώλυον. [3] δύο δὲ νῆες τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐπαιρόμεναι τῇ νίκῃ προσέμειξαν αὐτῶν ἐγγὺς καὶ διεφθάρησαν, καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἑάλω. [4] καταδύσαντες δ᾽ οἱ Συρακόσιοι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἑπτὰ ναῦς καὶ κατατραυματίσαντες πολλὰς ἄνδρας τε τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ζωγρήσαντες, τοὺς δὲ ἀποκτείναντες ἀπεχώρησαν, καὶ τροπαῖά τε ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ναυμαχιῶν ἔστησαν, καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα ἤδη ἐχυρὰν εἶχον ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ πολὺ κρείσσους εἶναι, ἐδόκουν δὲ καὶ τὸν πεζὸν χειρώσεσθαι.

[41] By such expedients as these the Syracusans, who made a great effort, gained the victory; and the Athenians,

retreating between the merchant-vessels, took refuge at their own moorings. The ships of the enemy pursued them as far as the entrance, but they were prevented from following further by leaden dolphins, which were suspended aloft from beams placed in the merchant-vessels. Two Syracusan ships, in the exultation of victory, approached too near and were disabled; one of them was taken with its whole crew. The Syracusans damaged many of the Athenian ships and sank seven; the crews were either killed or taken prisoners. They then retired and raised trophies of the two sea-fights. They were now quite confident that they were not only equal but far superior to the Athenians at sea, and they hoped to gain the victory on land as well. So they prepared to renew the attack on both elements.

42. καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα παρεσκευάζοντο αὖθις, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Εὐρυμέδων ἔχοντες τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν βοήθειαν παραγίγνονται, ναῦς τε τρεῖς καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα μάλιστα ξὺν ταῖς ξενικαῖς καὶ ὁπλίτας περὶ πεντακισχιλίους ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ἀκοντιστάς τε βαρβάρους καὶ ῞Ελληνας οὐκ ὀλίγους, καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τοξότας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἱκανήν. [2] καὶ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις κατάπληξις ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα οὐκ ὀλίγη ἐγένετο, εἰ πέρας μηδὲν ἔσται σφίσι τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ κινδύνου, ὁρῶντες οὔτε διὰ τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχιζομένην οὐδὲν ἧσσον στρατὸν ἴσον καὶ παραπλήσιον τῷ προτέρῳ ἐπεληλυθότα τήν τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν πανταχόσε πολλὴν φαινομένην: τῷ δὲ προτέρῳ στρατεύματι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὡς ἐκ κακῶν ῥώμη τις ἐγεγένητο. [3] ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἰδὼν ὡς εἶχε τὰ πράγματα καὶ νομίσας οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι διατρίβειν οὐδὲ παθεῖν ὅπερ ὁ Νικίας ἔπαθεν ἀφικόμενος γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὁ Νικίας φοβερός, ὡς οὐκ εὐθὺς προσέκειτο ταῖς Συρακούσαις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν Κατάνῃ διεχείμαζεν, ὑπερώφθη τε καὶ ἔφθασεν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου στρατιᾷ ὁ Γύλιππος ἀφικόμενος, ἢν οὐδ᾽ ἂν μετέπεμψαν οἱ Συρακόσιοι, εἰ ἐκεῖνος εὐθὺς ἐπέκειτο: ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἅμα

τ᾽ ἂν ἔμαθον ἥσσους ὄντες καὶ ἀποτετειχισμένοι ἂν ἦσαν, ὥστε μηδ᾽ εἰ μετέπεμψαν ἔτι ὁμοίως ἂν αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖν, ταῦτα οὖν ἀνασκοπῶν ὁ Δημοσθένης, καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μάλιστα δεινότατός ἐστι τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐβούλετο ὅτι τάχος ἀποχρήσασθαι τῇ παρούσῃ τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐκπλήξει. [4] καὶ ὁρῶν τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἁπλοῦν ὂν καί, εἰ κρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου, ῥᾳδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθέν οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομεῖναι ἂν σφᾶς οὐδένα , [5] ἠπείγετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ πείρᾳ, καί οἱ ξυντομωτάτην ἡγεῖτο διαπολέμησιν: ἢ γὰρ κατορθώσας ἕξειν Συρακούσας, ἢ ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ οὐ τρίψεσθαι ἄλλως Ἀθηναίους τε τοὺς ξυστρατευομένους καὶ τὴν ξύμπασαν πόλιν. [6]πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τήν τε γῆν ἐξελθόντες τῶν Συρακοσίων ἕτεμον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ τὸν Ἄναπον, καὶ τῷ στρατεύματι ἐπεκράτουν ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτον, τῷ τε πεζῷ καὶ ταῖς ναυσίν οὐδὲ γὰρ καθ᾽ ἕτερα οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἀντεπεξῆσαν ὅτι μὴ τοῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ ἀκοντισταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιείου:

[42] But in the midst of their preparations Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian reinforcements. They brought a fleet, including foreign ships, of about seventy-three sail, carrying five thousand heavy infantry of their own and of their allies, numerous javelin-men, slingers, and archers, both Hellenic and Barbarian, and abundant supplies of every kind. The Syracusans and their allies were in consternation. It seemed to them as if their perils would never have an end when they saw, notwithstanding the fortification of Decelea, another army arriving nearly equal to the former, and Athens displaying such varied and exuberant strength; while the first Athenian army regained a certain degree of confidence after their disasters. Demosthenes at once saw how matters stood; he knew that there was no time to be lost, and resolved that it should not be with him as it had been with Nicias. For Nicias was

dreaded at his first arrival; but when, instead of at once laying siege to Syracuse, he passed the winter at Catana, he fell into contempt, and his delay gave Gylippus time to come with an army from Peloponnesus. Whereas if he had struck, hard at first, the Syracusans would never even have thought of getting fresh troops; strong in their own self-sufficiency, they would have discovered their inferiority only when the city had been actually invested, and then, if they had been sent for reinforcements, they would have found them useless. Demosthenes, reflecting on all this, and aware that he too would never again be in a position to inspire such terror as on the day of his arrival, desired to take the speediest advantage of the panic caused by the appearance of his army. Accordingly, seeing that the cross-wall of the Syracusans which had prevented the Athenians from investing them was but a single line, and that if he could gain the command of the way up to Epipolae and take the camp which was on the high ground the wall would be easily captured, for no one would so much as stand his ground against them, he resolved to make the attempt at once. This would be the shortest way of putting an end to the war. If he succeeded, Syracuse would fall into his hands; if he failed, he meant to bring away the expedition; he would no longer wear out the Athenian army, and weaken the state to no purpose.The Athenians began by ravaging the fields of the Syracusans about the Anapus, and regained their former superiority both by sea and land. At sea the Syracusans no longer opposed them; and on land they merely sent out parties of cavalry and javelin-men from the Olympieum.

43. ἔπειτα μηχαναῖς ἔδοξε τῷ Δημοσθένει πρότερον ἀποπειρᾶσαι τοῦ παρατειχίσματος. ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ προσαγαγόντι κατεκαύθησάν τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους ἀμυνομένων αἱ μηχαναὶ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ στρατιᾷ πολλαχῇ προσβάλλοντες ἀπεκρούοντο, οὐκέτι ἐδόκει διατρίβειν, ἀλλὰ πείσας τόν τε Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνάρχοντας, ὡς ἐπενόει, τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν

ἐποιεῖτο. [2] καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαθεῖν προσελθόντας τε καὶ ἀναβάντας, παραγγείλας δὲ πέντε ἡμερῶν σιτία καὶ τοὺς λιθολόγους καὶ τέκτονας πάντας λαβὼν καὶ ἄλλην παρασκευὴν τοξευμάτων τε καὶ ὅσα ἔδει, ἢν κρατῶσι, τειχίζοντας ἔχειν, αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπὸ πρώτου ὕπνου καὶ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Μένανδρος ἀναλαβὼν τὴν πᾶσαν στρατιὰν ἐχώρει πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς, Νικίας δὲ ἐν τοῖς τείχεσιν ὑπελέλειπτο. [3] καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο πρὸς αὐταῖς κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ᾗπερ καὶ ἡ προτέρα στρατιὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνέβη, λανθάνουσί τε τοὺς φύλακας τῶν Συρακοσίων, καὶ προσβάντες τὸ τείχισμα ὃ ἦν αὐτόθι τῶν Συρακοσίων αἱροῦσι καὶ ἄνδρας τῶν φυλάκων ἀποκτείνουσιν. [4] οἱ δὲ πλείους διαφυγόντες εὐθὺς πρὸς τὰ στρατόπεδα, ἃ ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τρία ἐν προτειχίσμασιν, ἓν μὲν τῶν Συρακοσίων, ἓν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Σικελιωτῶν, ἓν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ἀγγέλλουσι τὴν ἔφοδον καὶ τοῖς ἑξακοσίοις τῶν Συρακοσίων, οἳ καὶ πρῶτοι κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν φύλακες ἦσαν, ἔφραζον. [5] οἱ δ᾽ ἐβοήθουν τ᾽ εὐθύς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐντυχόντες ἀμυνομένους προθύμως ἔτρεψαν. καὶ αὐτοὶ μὲν εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν, ὅπως τῇ παρούσῃ ὁρμῇ τοῦ περαίνεσθαι ὧν ἕνεκα ἦλθον μὴ βραδεῖς γένωνται: ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης τὸ παρατείχισμα τῶν Συρακοσίων οὐχ ὑπομενόντων τῶν φυλάκων ᾕρουν τε καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπέσυρον. [6] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθουν ἐκ τῶν προτειχισμάτων, καὶ ἀδοκήτου τοῦ τολμήματος σφίσιν ἐν νυκτὶ γενομένου προσέβαλόν τε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐκπεπληγμένοι καὶ βιασθέντες ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν τὸ πρῶτον ὑπεχώρησαν. [7] προϊόντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν ἀταξίᾳ μᾶλλον ἤδη ὡς κεκρατηκότων καὶ βουλομένων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ μήπω μεμαχημένου τῶν ἐναντίων ὡς τάχιστα διελθεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἀνέντων σφῶν τῆς ἐφόδου αὖθις ξυστραφῶσιν, οἱ Βοιωτοὶ πρῶτοι αὐτοῖς ἀντέσχον καὶ προσβαλόντες ἔτρεψάν τε καὶ ἐς φυγὴν κατέστησαν.

[43] Before he attacked Epipolae, Demosthenes wished to try what could be done with engines against the counter-wall. But the engines which he brought up were burnt by the enemy, who fought from the wall, and, after making assaults at several points, the Athenian forces were repulsed. He now determined to delay no longer, and persuaded Nicias and his colleagues to carry out the plan of attacking Epipolae. To approach during the daytime and ascend the heights undetected appeared to be impossible; so he resolved to attack by night. He ordered provisions for five days, and took with him all the masons and carpenters in the army; also a supply of arrows and of the various implements which would be required for siege-works if he were victorious. About the first watch he, Eurymedon, and Menander led out the whole army and marched towards Epipolae. Nicias was left in the Athenian fortifications. Reaching Epipolae at the Euryelus, where their first army had originally ascended, and advancing undiscovered by the garrison to the fort which the Syracusans had there erected, they took it and killed some of the guards. But the greater number made good their escape and carried the news to the three fortified camps, one of the Syracusans, one of the other Sicilian Greeks, and one of the allies, which had been formed on Epipolae; they also gave the alarm to the six hundred who were an advanced guard stationed on this part of Epipolae. They hastened to meet the enemy, but Demosthenes and the Athenians came upon them and, in spite of a vigorous resistance, drove them back. The Athenians immediately pressed forward; they were determined not to lose a moment or to slacken their onset until they had accomplished their purpose. Others captured the first part of the Syracusan counter-wall and, the guards taking to flight, began to drag off the battlements. Meanwhile the Syracusans, the allies, and Gylippus with his own troops, were hurrying from the outworks. The boldness of this night attack quite amazed them. They had not recovered from their terror when they

met the Athenians, who were at first too strong for them and drove them back. But now the conquerors, in the confidence of victory, began to fall into disorder as they advanced; they wanted to force their way as quickly as they could through all that part of the enemy which had not yet fought, and they were afraid that if they relaxed their efforts the Syracusans might rally. The Boeotians were the first to make a stand: they attacked the Athenians, turned, and put them to flight.

44. καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ ἐγίγνοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἦν οὐδὲ πυθέσθαι ῥᾴδιον ἦν οὐδ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρων ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἕκαστα ξυνηνέχθη. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρᾳ σαφέστερα μέν, ὅμως δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα οἱ παραγενόμενοι πάντα πλὴν τὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος μόλις οἶδεν: ἐν δὲ νυκτομαχίᾳ, ἣ μόνη δὴ στρατοπέδων μεγάλων ἔν γε τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ ἐγένετο, πῶς ἄν τις σαφῶς τι ᾔδει; [2] ἦν μὲν γὰρ σελήνη λαμπρά, ἐώρων δὲ οὕτως ἀλλήλους ὡς ἐν σελήνῃ εἰκὸς τὴν μὲν ὄψιν τοῦ σώματος προορᾶν, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ οἰκείου ἀπιστεῖσθαι. ὁπλῖται δὲ ἀμφοτέρων οὐκ ὀλίγοι ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ ἀνεστρέφοντο. [3] καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ μὲν ἤδη ἐνικῶντο, οἱ δ᾽ ἔτι τῇ πρώτῃ ἐφόδῳ ἀήσσητοι ἐχώρουν. πολὺ δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου στρατεύματος αὐτοῖς τὸ μὲν ἄρτι ἀνεβεβήκει, τὸ δ᾽ ἔτι προσανῄει, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἠπίσταντο πρὸς ὅτι χρὴ χωρῆσαι. ἤδη γὰρ τὰ πρόσθεν τῆς τροπῆς γεγενημένης ἐτετάρακτο πάντα καὶ χαλεπὰ ἦν ὑπὸ τῆς βοῆς διαγνῶναι. [4] οἵ τε γὰρ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὡς κρατοῦντες παρεκελεύοντό τε κραυγῇ οὐκ ὀλίγῃ χρώμενοι, ἀδύνατον ὂν ἐν νυκτὶ ἄλλῳ τῳ σημῆναι, καὶ ἅμα τοὺς προσφερομένους ἐδέχοντο: οἵ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἐζήτουν τε σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίας, καὶ εἰ φίλιον εἴη τῶν ἤδη πάλιν φευγόντων, πολέμιον ἐνόμιζον, καὶ τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι τοῦ ξυνθήματος πυκνοῖς χρώμενοι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄλλῳ τῳ γνωρίσαι σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς θόρυβον πολὺν παρεῖχον ἅμα πάντες ἐρωτῶντες καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις σαφὲς αὐτὸ κατέστησαν: [5] τὸ δ᾽ ἐκείνων οὐχ ὁμοίως ἠπίσταντο διὰ τὸ κρατοῦντας αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ διεσπασμένους ἧσσον

ἀγνοεῖσθαι, ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἐντύχοιέν τισι κρείσσους ὄντες τῶν πολεμίων, διέφευγον αὐτοὺς ἅτε ἐκείνων ἐπιστάμενοι τὸ ξύνθημα, εἰ δ᾽ αὐτοὶ μὴ ἀποκρίνοιντο, διεφθείροντο. [6] μέγιστον δὲ καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἔβλαψε καὶ ὁ παιανισμός: ἀπὸ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων παραπλήσιος ὢν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχεν. οἵ τε γὰρ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι καὶ ὅσον Δωρικὸν μετ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἦν, ὁπότε παιανίσειαν, φόβον παρεῖχε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, οἵ τε πολέμιοι ὁμοίως. [7] ὥστε τέλος ξυμπεσόντες αὐτοῖς κατὰ πολλὰ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, ἐπεὶ ἅπαξ ἐταράχθησαν, φίλοι τε φίλοις καὶ πολῖται πολίταις, οὐ μόνον ἐς φόβον κατέστησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἀλλήλοις ἐλθόντες μόλις ἀπελύοντο. [8] καὶ διωκόμενοι κατά τε τῶν κρημνῶν [οἱ] πολλοὶ ῥίπτοντες ἑαυτοὺς ἀπώλλυντο, στενῆς οὔσης τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν πάλιν καταβάσεως, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς τὸ ὁμαλὸν οἱ σῳζόμενοι ἄνωθεν καταβαῖεν, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν τῶν προτέρων στρατιωτῶν ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον τῆς χώρας ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον διεφύγγανον, οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἥκοντες εἰσὶν οἳ διαμαρτόντες τῶν ὁδῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἐπλανήθησαν: οὕς,ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων περιελάσαντες διέφθειραν.

[44] The whole army was soon in utter confusion, and the perplexity was so great that from neither side could the particulars of the conflict be exactly ascertained. In the daytime the combatants see more clearly; though even then only what is going on immediately around them, and that imperfectly — nothing of the battle as a whole. But in a night engagement, like this in which two great armies fought — the only one of the kind which occurred during the war — who could be certain of anything? The moon was bright, and they saw before them, as men naturally would in the moonlight, the figures of one another, but were unable to distinguish with certainty who was friend or foe. Large bodies of heavy-armed troops, both Athenian and Syracusan, were moving about in a narrow space; of the Athenians some were already worsted, while others, still unconquered, were carrying on the original movement. A

great part of their army had not yet engaged, but either had just mounted the heights, or were making the ascent; and no one knew which way to go. For in front they were defeated already; there was nothing but confusion, and all distinction between the two armies was lost by reason of the noise. The victorious Syracusans and their allies, who had no other means of communication in the darkness, cheered on their comrades with loud cries as they received the onset of their assailants. The Athenians were looking about for each other; and every one who met them, though he might be a friend who had turned and fled, they imagined to be an enemy. They kept constantly asking the watchword (for there was no other mode of knowing one another), and thus they not only caused great confusion among themselves by all asking at once, but revealed the word to the enemy. The watchword of the Syracusans was not so liable to be discovered, because being victorious they kept together and were more easily recognised. So that when they were encountered by a superior number of the enemy they, knowing the Athenian watchword, escaped; but the Athenians in a like case, failing to answer the challenge, were killed. Most disastrous of all were the mistakes caused by the sound of the Paean, which, the same being heard in both armies, was a great source of perplexity. For there were in the battle Argives, Corcyraeans, and other Dorian allies of the Athenians, and when they raised the Paean they inspired as much alarm as the enemy themselves; so that in many parts of the army, when the confusion had once begun, not only did friends terrify friends and citizens their fellow-citizens whom they had encountered, but they attacked one another, and were with difficulty disentangled. The greater number of those who were pursued and killed perished by throwing themselves from the cliffs; for the descent from Epipolae is by a narrow path. The fugitives who reached the level ground, especially those who had served in the former army and knew the neighbourhood, mostly escaped to the

camp. But of the newly-arrived many missed their way, and, wandering about until daybreak, were then cut off by the Syracusan cavalry who were scouring the country.

45. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι δύο τροπαῖα ἔστησαν, ἐπί τε ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς ᾗ ἡ πρόσβασις καὶ κατὰ τὸ χωρίον ᾗ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ πρῶτον ἀντέστησαν, οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἐκομίσαντο. [2] ἀπέθανον δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅπλα μέντοι ἔτι πλείω ἢ κατὰ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐλήφθη: οἱ γὰρ κατὰ τῶν κρημνῶν βιασθέντες ἅλλεσθαι ψιλοὶ [ἄνευ τῶν ἀσπίδων] οἱ μὲν ἀπώλλυντο, οἱ δ᾽ ἐσώθησαν.

[45] On the following day the Syracusans erected two trophies, one on Epipolae at the summit of the ascent, the other at the spot where the Boeotians made the first stand. The Athenians received their dead under a flag of truce. A considerable number of them and of their allies had fallen; there were however more arms taken than there were bodies of the slain; for those who were compelled to leap from the heights, whether they perished or not, had thrown away their shields.

46. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι ὡς ἐπὶ ἀπροσδοκήτῳ εὐπραγίᾳ πάλιν αὖ ἀναρρωσθέντες, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ἐς μὲν Ἀκράγαντα στασιάζοντα πέντε καὶ δέκα ναυσὶ Σικανὸν ἀπέστειλαν, ὅπως ὑπαγάγοιτο τὴν πόλιν, εἰ δύναιτο: Γύλιππος δὲ κατὰ γῆν ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν ᾤχετο αὖθις, ἄξων στρατιὰν ἔτι, ὡς ἐν ἐλπίδι ὢν καὶ τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἱρήσειν βίᾳ, ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐν ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς οὕτω ξυνέβη.

[46] The confidence of the Syracusans was restored by their unexpected success, and they sent Sicanus with fifteen ships to Agrigentum, then in a state of revolution, that he might win over the place if he could. Gylippus had gone off again by land to collect a new army in the other parts of Sicily, hoping after the victory of Epipolae to carry the Athenian fortifications by storm.

47. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐβουλεύοντο πρός τε τὴν γεγενημένην ξυμφορὰν καὶ πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ κατὰ πάντα ἀρρωστίαν. τοῖς τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρήμασιν ἐώρων οὐ κατορθοῦντες καὶ τοὺς

στρατιώτας ἀχθομένους τῇ μονῇ: [2] νόσῳ τε γὰρ ἐπιέζοντο κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα, τῆς τε ὥρας τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ταύτης οὔσης ἐν ᾗ ἀσθενοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι μάλιστα, καὶ τὸ χωρίον ἅμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἑλῶδες καὶ χαλεπὸν ἦν, τά τε ἄλλα ὅτι ἀνέλπιστα αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνετο. [3] τῷ οὖν Δημοσθένει οὐκ ἐδόκει ἔτι χρῆναι μένειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅπερ καὶ διανοηθεὶς ἐς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς διεκινδύνευσεν, ἐπειδὴ ἔσφαλτο, ἀπιέναι ἐψηφίζετο καὶ μὴ διατρίβειν, ἕως ἔτι τὸ πέλαγος οἷόν τε περαιοῦσθαι καὶ τοῦ στρατεύματος ταῖς γοῦν ἐπελθούσαις ναυσὶ κρατεῖν. [4] καὶ τῇ πόλει ὠφελιμώτερον ἔφη εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ σφῶν ἐπιτειχίζοντας τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖσθαι ἢ Συρακοσίους, οὓς οὐκέτι ῥᾴδιον εἶναι χειρώσασθαι: οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἄλλως χρήματα πολλὰ δαπανῶντας εἰκὸς εἶναι προσκαθῆσθαι.

[47] Meanwhile the Athenian generals, troubled by their recent defeat and the utter discouragement which prevailed in the army, held a council of war. They saw that their attempts all failed, and that the soldiers were weary of remaining. For they were distressed by sickness, proceeding from two causes: the season of the year was that in which men are most liable to disease; and the place in which they were encamped was damp and unhealthy. And they felt that the situation was in every way hopeless. Demosthenes gave his voice against remaining; he said that the decisive attack upon Epipolae had failed, and, in accordance with his original intention, he should vote for immediate departure while the voyage was possible, and while, with the help of the ships which had recently joined them, they had the upper hand at any rate by sea. It was more expedient for the city that they should make war upon the Peloponnesians, who were raising a fort in Attica, than against the Syracusans, whom they could now scarcely hope to conquer; and there was no sense in carrying on the siege at a vast expense and with no result. This was the opinion of Demosthenes.

48. καὶ ὁ μὲν Δημοσθένης τοιαῦτα ἐγίγνωσκεν: ὁ δὲ Νικίας ἐνόμιζε μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς πονηρά σφῶν τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐδ᾽ ἐμφανῶς σφᾶς ψηφιζομένους μετὰ πολλῶν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλτους γίγνεσθαι: λαθεῖν γὰρ ἄν, ὁπότε βούλοιντο, τοῦτο ποιοῦντες πολλῷ ἧσσον. [2] τὸ δέ τι καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ᾐσθάνετο αὐτῶν, ἐλπίδος τι ἔτι παρεῖχε πονηρότερα τῶν σφετέρων ἔσεσθαι, ἢν καρτερῶσι προσκαθήμενοι: χρημάτων γὰρ ἀπορίᾳ αὐτοὺς ἐκτρυχώσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον ἤδη ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ναυσὶ θαλασσοκρατούντων. καὶ ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὰ πράγματα ἐνδοῦναι, ἐπεκηρυκεύετο ὡς αὐτὸν καὶ οὐκ εἴα ἀπανίστασθαι. [3] ἃ ἐπιστάμενος τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ ἔτι ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἔχων καὶ διασκοπῶν ἀνεῖχε, τῷ δ᾽ ἐμφανεῖ τότε λόγῳ οὐκ ἔφη ἀπάξειν τὴν στρατιάν. εὖ γὰρ εἰδέναι ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι σφῶν ταῦτα οὐκ ἀποδέξονται, ὥστε μὴ αὐτῶν ψηφισαμένων ἀπελθεῖν. καὶ γὰρ οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ψηφιεῖσθαί τε περὶ σφῶν [αὐτῶν] καὶ τὰ πράγματα ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁρῶντας καὶ οὐκ ἄλλων ἐπιτιμήσει ἀκούσαντας γνώσεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις εὖ λέγων διαβάλλοι, ἐκ τούτων αὐτοὺς πείσεσθαι. [4] τῶν τε παρόντων στρατιωτῶν πολλοὺς καὶ τοὺς πλείους ἔφη, οἳ νῦν βοῶσιν ὡς ἐν δεινοῖς ὄντες, ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένους τἀναντία βοήσεσθαι ὡς ὑπὸ χρημάτων καταπροδόντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀπῆλθον. οὔκουν βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε ἐπιστάμενος τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις ἐπ᾽ αἰσχρᾷ τε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκως ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν ἰδίᾳ. [5] τά τε Συρακοσίων ἔφη ὅμως ἔτι ἥσσω τῶν σφετέρων εἶναι: καὶ χρήμασι γὰρ αὐτοὺς ξενοτροφοῦντας καὶ ἐν περιπολίοις ἅμα ἀναλίσκοντας καὶ ναυτικὸν πολὺ ἔτι ἐνιαυτὸν ἤδη βόσκοντας τὰ μὲν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ δ᾽ ἔτι ἀμηχανήσειν: δισχίλιά τε γὰρ τάλαντα ἤδη ἀνηλωκέναι καὶ ἔτι πολλὰ προσοφείλειν, ἥν τε καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἐκλίπωσι τῆς νῦν παρασκευῆς τῷ μὴ διδόναι τροφήν, φθερεῖσθαι αὐτῶν τὰ

πράγματα, ἐπικουρικὰ μᾶλλον ἢ δι᾽ ἀνάγκης ὥσπερ τὰ σφέτερα ὄντα. [6] τρίβειν οὖν ἔφη χρῆναι προσκαθημένους καὶ μὴ χρήμασιν, ὧν πολὺ κρείσσους εἰσί, νικηθέντας ἀπιέναι.

[48] Nicias in his own mind took the same gloomy view of their affairs; but he did not wish openly to confess their weakness, or by a public vote given in a numerous assembly to let their intention reach the enemy’s ears, and so lose the advantage of departing secretly whenever they might choose to go. He had moreover still some reason to suppose that the Syracusans, of whose condition he was better informed than the other generals, were likely to be worse off than themselves if they would only persevere in the siege; they would be worn out by the exhaustion of their resources; and now the Athenians with their additional ships had much greater command of the sea. — There was a party in Syracuse itself which wanted to surrender the city to the Athenians, and they kept sending messages to Nicias and advising him not to depart. Having this information he was still wavering and considering, and had not made up his mind. But in addressing the council he positively refused to withdraw the army; he knew, he said, that the Athenian people would not forgive their departure if they left without an order from home. The men upon whose votes their fate would depend would not, like themselves, have seen with their own eyes the state of affairs; they would only have heard the criticisms of others, and would be convinced by any accusations which a clever speaker might bring forward. Indeed many or most of the very soldiers who were now crying out that their case was desperate would raise the opposite cry when they reached home, and would say that the generals were traitors, and had been bribed to depart; and therefore he, knowing the tempers of the Athenians, would for his own part rather take his chance and fall, if he must, alone by the hands of the enemy, than die unjustly on a dishonourable charge at the hands of the Athenians. And,

after all, the Syracusans were in a condition worse than their own; for they had to maintain mercenary troops; they were spending money on garrisons, and had now kept up a large navy for a whole year; already in great difficulties, they would soon be in greater; they had expended two thousand talents, and were heavily in arrear; and if by a failure in the pay they suffer any diminution of their present forces their affairs would be ruined. For they depended on mercenaries, who, unlike the Athenian allies, were under no compulsion to serve. Therefore, he said, they ought to persevere in the siege, and not go away disheartened by the greatness of the expense, for they were far richer than the enemy.

49. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα λέγων ἰσχυρίζετο, αἰσθόμενος τὰ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ἀκριβῶς καὶ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἀπορίαν καὶ ὅτι ἦν αὐτόθι πολὺ τὸ βουλόμενον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γίγνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα καὶ ἐπικηρυκευόμενον πρὸς αὐτὸν ὥστε μὴ ἀπανίστασθαι, καὶ ἅμα ταῖς γοῦν ναυσὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ἐθάρσησε κρατήσειν. [2] ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης περὶ μὲν τοῦ προσκαθῆσθαι οὐδ᾽ ὁπωσοῦν ἐνεδέχετο: εἰ δὲ δεῖ μὴ ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιὰν ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων ψηφίσματος, ἀλλὰ τρίβειν αὐτοῦ, ἔφη χρῆναι ἢ ἐς τὴν Θάψον ἀναστάντας τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἐς τὴν Κατάνην, ὅθεν τῷ τε πεζῷ ἐπὶ πολλὰ τῆς χώρας ἐπιόντες θρέψονται πορθοῦντες τὰ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ ἐκείνους βλάψουσι, ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐν πελάγει καὶ οὐκ ἐν στενοχωρίᾳ, ἢ πρὸς τῶν πολεμίων μᾶλλόν ἐστι, τοὺς ἀγῶνας ποιήσονται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ, ἐν ᾗ τά τε τῆς ἐμπειρίας χρήσιμα σφῶν ἔσται καὶ ἀναχωρήσεις καὶ ἐπίπλους οὐκ ἐκ βραχέος καὶ περιγραπτοῦ ὁρμώμενοί τε καὶ καταίροντες ἕξουσιν. [3] τό τε ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ οἱ ἔφη ἀρέσκειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔτι μένειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τάχιστα ἤδη ἐξανίστασθαι καὶ μὴ μέλλειν. καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων αὐτῷ ταῦτα ξυνηγόρευεν. [4] ἀντιλέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Νικίου ὄκνος τις καὶ μέλλησις ἐνεγένετο καὶ ἅμα ὑπόνοια μή τι καὶ πλέον εἰδὼς ὁ Νικίας ἰσχυρίζηται. καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ διεμέλλησάν τε καὶ κατὰ χώραν ἔμενον.

[49] Nicias spoke thus decidedly because he knew exactly how matters stood in Syracuse; he was aware of their want of money, and of the secret existence of that party within the walls which wished well to the Athenians, and was continually sending word to him not to depart; and the confidence in his navy, if not in his army, which now possessed him was greater than ever. But Demosthenes would not hear for an instant of persisting in the siege; if, he said, the army must remain and ought not to be removed without a vote of the assembly, then they should retire to Thapsus or Catana, whence they might overrun the whole country with their land-forces, maintaining themselves at the expense of the enemy and doing him great damage. They would thus fight their battles, not cooped up in the harbour, which gave an advantage to the enemy, but in the open sea, where their skill would be available and their charges and retreats would not be circumscribed by the narrow space which now hampered their movements whenever they had to put in or out. In a word, he wholly disapproved of the Athenians continuing in their present position; they should with all speed break up the siege and be gone. Eurymedon took the same side. Still Nicias resisted; there was delay and hesitation, and a suspicion that he might have some ground which they did not know for his unwillingness to yield. And so the Athenians stayed on where they were.

50. ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος καὶ ὁ Σικανὸς ἐν τούτῳ παρῆσαν ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ὁ μὲν Σικανὸς ἁμαρτὼν τοῦ Ἀκράγαντος ἐν Γέλᾳ γὰρ ὄντος αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἡ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις στάσις [ἐς] φιλία ἐξεπεπτώκει : ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ἄλλην τε στρατιὰν πολλὴν ἔχων ἦλθεν ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου τοῦ ἦρος ἐν ταῖς ὁλκάσιν ὁπλίτας ἀποσταλέντας, ἀφικομένους ἀπὸ τῆς Λιβύης ἐς Σελινοῦντα. [2] ἀπενεχθέντες γὰρ ἐς Λιβύην, καὶ δόντων Κυρηναίων τριήρεις δύο καὶ τοῦ πλοῦ ἡγεμόνας, καὶ ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ Εὐεσπερίταις πολιορκουμένοις ὑπὸ Λιβύων ξυμμαχήσαντες

καὶ νικήσαντες τοὺς Λίβυς, καὶ αὐτόθεν παραπλεύσαντες ἐς Νέαν πόλιν Καρχηδονιακὸν ἐμπόριον, ὅθενπερ Σικελία ἐλάχιστον δυοῖν ἡμερῶν καὶ νυκτὸς πλοῦν ἀπέχει, καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ περαιωθέντες ἀφίκοντο ἐς Σελινοῦντα. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν Συρακόσιοι εὐθὺς αὐτῶν ἐλθόντων παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς ἐπιθησόμενοι κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα αὖθις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ: οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ὁρῶντες στρατιάν τε ἄλλην προσγεγενημένην αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἅμα οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον χωροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν τοῖς πᾶσι χαλεπώτερον ἴσχοντα, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πιεζόμενα, μετεμέλοντό τε πρότερον οὐκ ἀναστάντες καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας ἔτι ὁμοίως ἐνηντιοῦτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μὴ φανερῶς γε ἀξιῶν ψηφίζεσθαι, προεῖπον ὡς ἐδύναντο ἀδηλότατα ἔκπλουν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πᾶσι, καὶ παρασκευάσασθαι ὅταν τις σημήνῃ. [4] καὶ μελλόντων αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ἀποπλεῖν ἡ σελήνη ἐκλείπει: ἐτύγχανε γὰρ πασσέληνος οὖσα. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἵ τε πλείους ἐπισχεῖν ἐκέλευον τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐνθύμιον ποιούμενοi, καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἦν γάρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῷ τε καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ προσκείμενος οὐδ᾽ ἂν διαβουλεύσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη πρίν, ὡς οἱ μάντεις ἐξηγοῦντο, τρὶς ἐννέα ἡμέρας μεῖναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινηθείη. καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις μελλήσασι διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μονὴ ἐγεγένητο.

[50] Meanwhile Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse. Sicanus had not succeeded in his design upon Agrigentum; for while he was at Gela on his way the party inclined to friendship with the Syracusans had been driven out. But Gylippus brought back a large army, together with the hoplites who had been sent in merchant-vessels from Peloponnesus in the spring, and had come by way of Libya to Selinus. They had been driven to Libya by stress of weather, and the Cyrenaeans had given them two triremes and pilots. On their voyage they had made common cause with the Evesperitae, who were besieged by the Libyans. After defeating the Libyans they sailed on to Neapolis, a Carthaginian factory which is the nearest point to Sicily, the

passage taking two days and a night only; thence they crossed and came to Selinus. On their arrival, the Syracusans immediately prepared to renew their attack upon the Athenians, both by land and sea. And the Athenian generals, seeing that their enemy had been reinforced by a new army, and that their own affairs, instead of improving, were daily growing worse in every respect, and being especially troubled by the sickness of their troops, repented that they had not gone before. Even Nicias now no longer objected, but only made the condition that there should be no open voting. So, maintaining such secrecy as they could, they gave orders for the departure of the expedition; the men were to prepare themselves against a given signal. The preparations were made and they were on the point of sailing, when the moon, being just then at the full, was eclipsed. The mass of the army was greatly moved, and called upon the generals to remain. Nicias himself, who was too much under the influence of divination and such like, refused even to discuss the question of their removal until they had remained thrice nine days, as the soothsayers prescribed. This was the reason why the departure of the Athenians was finally delayed.

51. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῦτο πυθόμενοι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπηρμένοι ἦσαν μὴ ἀνιέναι τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὡς καὶ αὐτῶν κατεγνωκότων ἤδη μηκέτι κρεισσόνων εἶναι σφῶν μήτε ταῖς ναυσὶ μήτε τῷ πεζῷ οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπιβουλεῦσαι, καὶ ἅμα οὐ βουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς ἄλλοσέ ποι τῆς Σικελίας καθεζομένους χαλεπωτέρους εἶναι προσπολεμεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὡς τάχιστα καὶ ἐν ᾧ σφίσι ξυμφέρει ἀναγκάσαι αὐτοὺς ναυμαχεῖν. [2] τὰς οὖν ναῦς ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἀνεπειρῶντο ἡμέρας ὅσαι αὐτοῖς ἐδόκουν ἱκαναὶ εἶναι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καιρὸς ἦν, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων προσέβαλλον, καὶ ἐπεξελθόντος μέρους τινὸς οὐ πολλοῦ καὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππέων κατά τινας πύλας ἀπολαμβάνουσί τε τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τινὰς καὶ τρεψάμενοι καταδιώκουσιν: οὔσης δὲ στενῆς τῆς ἐσόδου οἱ

Ἀθηναῖοι ἵππους τε ἑβδομήκοντα ἀπολλύασι καὶ τῶν ὁπλιτῶν οὐ πολλούς.

[51] And now the Syracusans, having heard what had happened, were more eager than ever to prosecute the war to the end; they saw in the intention of the Athenians to depart a confession that they were no longer superior to themselves, either by sea or land; and they did not want them to settle down in some other part of Sicily where they would be more difficult to manage, but sought to compel them forthwith to fight at sea under the disadvantages of their present position. So they manned their ships and exercised for as many days as they thought sufficient. When the time came they began by attacking the Athenian lines. A small number both of the hoplites and of the cavalry came out of some of the gates to meet them; they cut off however a portion of the hoplites, and, putting the main body to flight, drove them within their walls. The entrance was narrow, and the Athenians lost seventy horses and a few infantry.

52. καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀπεχώρησεν ἡ στρατιὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων: τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ ταῖς τε ναυσὶν ἐκπλέουσιν οὔσαις ἓξ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἅμα πρὸς τὰ τείχη ἐχώρουν. οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀντανῆγον ναυσὶν ἓξ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ προσμείξαντες ἐναυμάχουν. [2] καὶ τὸν Εὐρυμέδοντα ἔχοντα τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ βουλόμενον περικλῄσασθαι τὰς ναῦς τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ ἐπεξάγοντα τῷ πλῷ πρὸς τὴν γῆν μᾶλλον, νικήσαντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὸ μέσον πρῶτον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπολαμβάνουσι κἀκεῖνον ἐν τῷ κοίλῳ καὶ μυχῷ τοῦ λιμένος καὶ αὐτόν τε διαφθείρουσι καὶ τὰς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ναῦς ἐπισπομένας: ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰς πάσας ἤδη ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων κατεδίωκόν τε καὶ ἐξεώθουν ἐς τὴν γῆν.

[52] The Syracusan army then retired. On the morrow their ships, in number seventy-six, sailed forth, and at the same time their landforces marched against the walls. The Athenians on their side put out with eighty-six ships; and

the two fleets met and fought. Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the Athenians, hoping to surround the enemy, extended his line too far towards the land, and was defeated by the Syracusans, who, after overcoming the Athenian centre, cooped him up in the inner bay of the harbour. There he was slain, and the vessels which were under his command and had followed him were destroyed. The Syracusans now pursued and began to drive ashore the rest of the Athenian fleet.

53. ὁ δὲ Γύλιππος ὁρῶν τὰς ναῦς τῶν πολεμίων νικωμένας καὶ ἔξω τῶν σταυρωμάτων καὶ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν στρατοπέδου καταφερομένας, βουλόμενος διαφθείρειν τοὺς ἐκβαίνοντας καὶ τὰς ναῦς ῥᾷον τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἀφέλκειν τῆς γῆς φιλίας οὔσης, παρεβοήθει ἐπὶ τὴν χηλὴν μέρος τι ἔχων τῆς στρατιᾶς. [2] καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Τυρσηνοί — οὗτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ταύτῃ — ὁρῶντες ἀτάκτως προσφερομένους, ἐπεκβοηθήσαντες καὶ προσπεσόντες τοῖς πρώτοις τρέπουσι καὶ ἐσβάλλουσιν ἐς τὴν λίμνην τὴν Λυσιμέλειαν καλουμένην. [3] ὕστερον δὲ πλέονος ἤδη τοῦ στρατεύματος παρόντος τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιβοηθήσαντες καὶ δείσαντες περὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐς μάχην τε κατέστησαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ νικήσαντες ἐπεδίωξαν καὶ ὁπλίτας τε οὐ πολλοὺς ἀπέκτειναν καὶ τὰς ναῦς τὰς μὲν πολλὰς διέσωσάν τε καὶ ξυνήγαγον κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον, δυοῖν δὲ δεούσας εἴκοσιν οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔλαβον αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας πάντας ἀπέκτειναν. [4] καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐμπρῆσαι βουλόμενοι ὁλκάδα παλαιὰν κληματίδων καὶ δᾳδὸς γεμίσαντες — ἦν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὁ ἄνεμος οὔριος — ἀφεῖσαν [τὴν ναῦν] πῦρ ἐμβαλόντες. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δείσαντες περὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀντεμηχανήσαντό τε σβεστήρια κωλύματα καὶ παύσαντες τήν τε φλόγα καὶ τὸ μὴ προσελθεῖν ἐγγὺς τὴν ὁλκάδα τοῦ κινδύνου ἀπηλλάγησαν.

[53] Gylippus, observing the discomfiture of the enemy, who were being defeated and driven to land beyond their own palisade and the lines of their camp, hastened with a part of

his army to the causeway which ran along the harbour, intending to kill all who landed, and to assist the Syracusans in capturing the ships, which could be more easily towed away if the shore was in the hands of their friends. The Tyrrhenians, who guarded this part of the Athenian lines, seeing Gylippus and his forces advance in disorder, rushed out, and attacking the foremost put them to flight, and drove them into the marsh called Lysimelea. But soon the Syracusans and their allies came up in greater numbers. The Athenians in fear for their ships advanced to the support of the Tyrrhenians, and joined in the engagement; the Syracusans were overcome and pursued, and a few of their heavy-armed slain. Most of the Athenian ships were saved and brought back to the Athenian station. Still the Syracusans and their allies took eighteen, and killed the whole of their crews. Then, hoping to burn the remainder of the fleet, they procured an old merchant-vessel, which they filled with faggots and brands; these they lighted, and as the wind blew right upon the enemy they let the ship go. The Athenians, alarmed for the safety of their fleet, contrived means by which they extinguished their flames, and succeeded in keeping the fireship at a distance. Thus the danger was averted.

54. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Συρακόσιοι μὲν τῆς τε ναυμαχίας τροπαῖον ἔστησαν καὶ τῆς ἄνω τῆς πρὸς τῷ τείχει ἀπολήψεως τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, ὅθεν καὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἔλαβον, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἧς τε οἱ Τυρσηνοὶ τροπῆς ἐποιήσαντο τῶν πεζῶν ἐς τὴν λίμνην καὶ ἧς αὐτοὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ στρατοπέδῳ.

[54] The Syracusans now raised a trophy of their naval victory, and another marking their interception of the hoplites on the higher ground close to the wall at the place where they took the horses. The Athenians raised a trophy of the victory over the land-forces whom the Tyrrhenians drove into the marsh, and another of that which they had themselves gained with the rest of the army.

55. γεγενημένης δὲ τῆς νίκης τοῖς Συρακοσίοις λαμπρᾶς ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ἐφοβοῦντο τὰς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ναῦς ἐπελθούσας οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν παντὶ δὴ ἀθυμίας ἦσαν καὶ ὁ παράλογος αὐτοῖς μέγας ἦν, πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἔτι τῆς στρατείας ὁ μετάμελος. [2] πόλεσι γὰρ ταύταις μόναις ἤδη ὁμοιοτρόποις ἐπελθόντες, δημοκρατουμέναις τε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ ναῦς καὶ ἵππους καὶ μεγέθη ἐχούσαις, οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπενεγκεῖν οὔτ᾽ ἐκ πολιτείας τι μεταβολῆς τὸ διάφορον αὐτοῖς, ᾧ προσήγοντο ἄν, οὔτ᾽ ἐκ παρασκευῆς πολλῷ κρείσσονος, σφαλλόμενοι δὲ τὰ πλείω, τά τε πρὸ αὐτῶν ἠπόρουν, καὶ ἐπειδή γε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκρατήθησαν, ὃ οὐκ ἂν ᾠόντο, πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἔτι.

[55] The Syracusans, who up to this time had been afraid of the reinforcements of Demosthenes, had now gained a brilliant success by sea as well as by land; the Athenians were in utter despair. Great was their surprise at the result, and still greater their regret that they had ever come. The Sicilian were the only cities which they had ever encountered similar in character to their own, having the same democratic institutions and strong in ships, cavalry, and population. They were not able by holding out the prospect of a change of government to introduce an element of discord among them which might have gained them over, nor could they master them by a decided superiority of force. They had failed at almost every point, and were already in great straits, when the defeat at sea, which they could not have thought possible, reduced their fortunes to a still lower ebb.

56. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τόν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς παρέπλεον ἀδεῶς καὶ τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ διενοοῦντο κλῄσειν, ὅπως μηκέτι, μηδ᾽ εἰ βούλοιντο, λάθοιεν αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκπλεύσαντες. [2] οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοὶ σωθῆναι μόνον ἔτι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως ἐκείνους κωλύσουσι, νομίζοντες ὅπερ ἦν, ἀπό τε τῶν παρόντων πολὺ σφῶν καθυπέρτερα τὰ πράγματα εἶναι καί, εἰ δύναιντο κρατῆσαι Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ

κατὰ θάλασσαν, καλὸν σφίσιν ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὸ ἀγώνισμα φανεῖσθαι: τούς τε γὰρ ἄλλους Ἕλληνας εὐθὺς τοὺς μὲν ἐλευθεροῦσθαι, τοὺς δὲ φόβου ἀπολύεσθαι □οὐ γὰρ ἔτι δυνατὴν ἔσεσθαι τὴν ὑπόλοιπον Ἀθηναίων δύναμιν τὸν ὕστερον ἐπενεχθησόμενον πόλεμον ἐνεγκεῖν □, καὶ αὐτοὶ δόξαντες αὐτῶν αἴτιοι εἶναι ὑπό τε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔπειτα πολὺ θαυμασθήσεσθαι. [3] καὶ ἦν δὲ ἄξιος ὁ ἀγὼν κατά τε ταῦτα καὶ ὅτι οὐχὶ Ἀθηναίων μόνον περιεγίγνοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλῶν ξυμμάχων, καὶ οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὶ αὖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ξυμβοηθησάντων σφίσιν, ἡγεμόνες τε γενόμενοι μετὰ Κορινθίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τὴν σφετέραν πόλιν ἐμπαρασχόντες προκινδυνεῦσαί τε καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ μέγα μέρος προκόψαντες. [4] ἔθνη γὰρ πλεῖστα δὴ ἐπὶ μίαν πόλιν ταύτην ξυνῆλθε, πλήν γε δὴ τοῦ ξύμπαντος λόγου τοῦ ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τὴν Ἀθηναίων τε πόλιν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων.

[56] The Syracusans at once sailed round the shore of the harbour without fear, and determined to close the mouth, that the Athenians might not be able, even if they wanted, to sail out by stealth. For they were now striving, no longer to achieve their own deliverance, but to cut off the escape of the Athenians; they considered their position already far superior, as indeed it was, and they hoped that if they could conquer the Athenians and their allies by sea and land, their success would be glorious in the eyes of all the Hellenes, who would at once be set free, some from slavery, others from fear. For the Athenians, having lost so much of their power, would never be able to face the enemies who would rise up against them. And the glory of the deliverance would be ascribed to the Syracusans, who would be honoured by all living men and all future ages. The conflict was still further ennobled by the thought that they were now conquering, not only the Athenians, but a host of their allies. And they themselves were not alone, but many had come to their support; they were taking the command in a war by the side of Corinth and Lacedaemon; they had offered their own

city to bear the brunt of the encounter, and they had made an immense advance in naval power. More nations met at Syracuse than ever gathered around any single city, although not so many as the whole number of nations enrolled in this war under the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.

57. τοσοίδε γὰρ ἑκάτεροι ἐπὶ Σικελίαν τε καὶ περὶ Σικελίας, τοῖς μὲν ξυγκτησόμενοι τὴν χώραν ἐλθόντες, τοῖς δὲ ξυνδιασώσοντες, ἐπὶ Συρακούσας ἐπολέμησαν, οὐ κατὰ δίκην τι μᾶλλον οὐδὲ κατὰ ξυγγένειαν μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων στάντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἑκάστοις τῆς ξυντυχίας ἢ κατὰ τὸ ξυμφέρον ἢ ἀνάγκῃ ἔσχεν. [2] Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν αὐτοὶ Ἴωνες ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς Συρακοσίους ἑκόντες ἦλθον, καὶ αὐτοῖς τῇ αὐτῇ φωνῇ καὶ νομίμοις ἔτι χρώμενοι Λήμνιοι καὶ Ἴμβριοι καὶ Αἰγινῆται, οἳ τότε Αἴγιναν εἶχον, καὶ ἔτι Ἑστιαιῆς οἱ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ Ἑστίαιαν οἰκοῦντες ἄποικοι ὄντες ξυνεστράτευσαν. [3] τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων οἱ μὲν ὑπήκοοι,οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἳ μισθοφόροι ξυνεστράτευον. [4] καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑπηκόων καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῶν Ἐρετριῆς καὶ Χαλκιδῆς καὶ Στυρῆς καὶ Καρύστιοι ἀπ᾽ Εὐβοίας ἦσαν, ἀπὸ δὲ νήσων Κεῖοι καὶ Ἄνδριοι καὶ Τήνιοι, ἐκ δ᾽ Ἰωνίας Μιλήσιοι καὶ Σάμιοι καὶ Χῖοι. τούτων Χῖοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ὄντες φόρου, ναῦς δὲ παρέχοντες αὐτόνομοι ξυνέσποντο. καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον Ἴωνες ὄντες οὗτοι πάντες καὶ ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων πλὴν Καρυστίων □οὗτοι δ᾽ εἰσὶ Δρύοπες□, ὑπήκοοι δ᾽ ὄντες καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ὅμως Ἴωνές γε ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς ἡκολούθουν. [5] πρὸς δ᾽ αὐτοῖς Αἰολῆς, Μηθυμναῖοι μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ οὐ φόρῳ ὑπήκοοι, Τενέδιοι δὲ καὶ Αἴνιοι ὑποτελεῖς. οὗτοι δὲ Αἰολῆς Αἰολεῦσι τοῖς κτίσασι Βοιωτοῖς <τοῖς > μετὰ Συρακοσίων κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἐμάχοντο, Πλαταιῆς δὲ καταντικρὺ Βοιωτοὶ Βοιωτοῖς μόνοι εἰκότως κατὰ τὸ ἔχθος. [6] Ῥόδιοι δὲ καὶ Κυθήριοι Δωριῆς ἀμφότεροι, οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄποικοι Κυθήριοι ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους τοὺς ἅμα Γυλίππῳ μετ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ὅπλα ἔφερον, Ῥόδιοι δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γένος Συρακοσίοις μὲν Δωριεῦσι, Γελῴοις δὲ καὶ ἀποίκοις ἑαυτῶν οὖσι μετὰ Συρακοσίων στρατευομένοις ἠναγκάζοντο

πολεμεῖν. [7] τῶν τε περὶ Πελοπόννησον νησιωτῶν Κεφαλλῆνες μὲν καὶ Ζακύνθιοι αὐτόνομοι μέν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ νησιωτικὸν μᾶλλον κατειργόμενοι, ὅτι θαλάσσης ἐκράτουν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ξυνείποντο: Κερκυραῖοι δὲ οὐ μόνον Δωριῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ Κορίνθιοι σαφῶς ἐπὶ Κορινθίους τε καὶ Συρακοσίους, τῶν μὲν ἄποικοι ὄντες, τῶν δὲ ξυγγενεῖς, ἀνάγκῃ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ εὐπρεποῦς, βουλήσει δὲ κατὰ ἔχθος τὸ Κορινθίων οὐχ ἧσσον εἵποντο. [8] καὶ οἱ Μεσσήνιοι νῦν καλούμενοι ἐκ Ναυπάκτου καὶ ἐκ Πύλου τότε ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐχομένης ἐς τὸν πόλεμον παρελήφθησαν. καὶ ἔτι Μεγαρέων φυγάδες οὐ πολλοὶ Μεγαρεῦσι Σελινουντίοις οὖσι κατὰ ξυμφορὰν ἐμάχοντο. [9] τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἑκούσιος μᾶλλον ἡ στρατεία ἐγίγνετο ἤδη. Ἀργεῖοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων τε ἔχθρας καὶ τῆς παραυτίκα ἕκαστοι ἰδίας ὠφελίας Δωριῆς ἐπὶ Δωριᾶς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων Ἰώνων ἠκολούθουν, Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀρκάδων μισθοφόροι ἐπὶ τοὺς αἰεὶ πολεμίους σφίσιν ἀποδεικνυμένους ἰέναι εἰωθότες καὶ τότε τοὺς μετὰ Κορινθίων ἐλθόντας Ἀρκάδας οὐδὲν ἧσσον διὰ κέρδος ἡγούμενοι πολεμίους, Κρῆτες δὲ καὶ Αἰτωλοὶ μισθῷ καὶ οὗτοι πεισθέντες: ξυνέβη δὲ τοῖς Κρησὶ τὴν Γέλαν Ῥοδίοις ξυγκτίσαντας μὴ ξὺν τοῖς ἀποίκοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀποίκους ἑκόντας μετὰ μισθοῦ ἐλθεῖν. [10] καὶ Ἀκαρνάνων τινὲς ἅμα μὲν κέρδει, τὸ δὲ πλέον Δημοσθένους φιλίᾳ καὶ Ἀθηναίων εὐνοίᾳ ξύμμαχοι ὄντες ἐπεκούρησαν. [11] καὶ οἵδε μὲν τῷ Ἰονίῳ κόλπῳ ὁριζόμενοι: Ἰταλιωτῶν δὲ Θούριοι καὶ Μεταπόντιοι ἐν τοιαύταις ἀνάγκαις τότε στασιωτικῶν καιρῶν κατειλημμένοι ξυνεστράτευον, καὶ Σικελιωτῶν Νάξιοι καὶ Καταναῖοι, βαρβάρων δὲ Ἐγεσταῖοί τε, οἵπερ ἐπηγάγοντο, καὶ Σικελῶν τὸ πλέον, καὶ τῶν ἔξω Σικελίας Τυρσηνῶν τέ τινες κατὰ διαφορὰν Συρακοσίων καὶ Ἰάπυγες μισθοφόροι. τοσάδε μὲν μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ἔθνη ἐστράτευον.

[57] I will now enumerate the various peoples who came to Sicily as friends or enemies, to share either in the conquest or in the defence of the country, and who fought before Syracuse, choosing their side, not so much from a sense of

right, or from obligations of kinship, as from the accident of compulsion or of their own interest.The Athenians themselves, who were Ionians, went of their own free will against the Syracusans, who were Dorians; they were followed by the Lemnians and Imbrians and the then inhabitants of Aegina, and by the Hestiaeans dwelling at Hestiaea in Euboea: all these were their own colonists, speaking the same language with them, and retaining the same institutions.Of the rest who joined in the expedition, some were subjects, others independent allies, some again mercenaries. Of the subjects and tributaries, the Eretrians, Chalcidians, Styreans, and Carystians came from Euboea; the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians from the islands; the Milesians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia. Of these however the Chians were independent, and instead of paying tribute, provided ships. All or nearly all were Ionians and descendants of the Athenians, with the exception of the Carystians, who are Dryopes. They were subjects and constrained to follow, but still they were Ionians fighting against Dorians. There were also Aeolians, namely, the Methymnaeans, who furnished ships but were not tributaries, and the Tenedians and Aenians, who paid tribute. These Aeolians were compelled to fight against their Aeolian founders, the Boeotians, who formed part of the Syracusan army. The Plataeans were the only Boeotians opposed to Boeotians, a natural result of mutual hatred. The Rhodians and Cytherians were both Dorians; the Cytherians, although Lacedaemonian colonists, bore arms in the Athenian cause against the Lacedaemonians who came with Gylippus; and the Rhodians, though by descent Argive, were compelled to fight against the Syracusans, who were Dorians, and against the Geloans, who were actually their own colony, and were taking part with Syracuse. Of the islanders around Peloponnesus, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians were independent; still, being islanders, they followed under a certain degree of constraint; for the

Athenians were masters of the sea. The Corcyraeans, who were not only Dorians but actually Corinthians, were serving against Corinthians and Syracusans, although they were the colonists of the one and the kinsmen of the other; they followed under a decent appearance of compulsion, but quite readily, because they hated the Corinthians. The Messenians too, as the inhabitants of Naupactus were now called, including the garrison of Pylos, which was at that time held by the Athenians, were taken by them to the war. A few Megarians, having the misfortune to be exiles, were thus induced to fight against the Selinuntians, who were Megarians like themselves.The service of the remaining allies was voluntary. The Argives, not so much because they were allies of Athens, as owing to their hatred of the Lacedaemonians, and the desire of each man among them to better himself at the time, followed the Athenians, who were Ionians, being themselves Dorians, to fight against Dorians. The Mantineans and other Arcadians were mercenaries accustomed to attack any enemy who from time to time might be pointed out to them, and were now ready, if they were paid, to regard the Arcadians, who were in the service of the Corinthians, as their enemies. The Cretans and Aetolians also served for hire; the Cretans, who had once joined with the Rhodians in the foundation of Gela, came with reluctance; nevertheless for pay they consented to fight against their own colonists. Some of the Acarnanians came to aid their Athenian allies, partly from motives of gain, but much more out of regard for Demosthenes and good-will to Athens. All these dwelt on the eastern side of the Ionian Gulf.Of the Hellenes in Italy, the Thurians and Metapontians, constrained by the necessities of a revolutionary period, joined in the enterprise; of the Hellenes in Sicily, the Naxians and Catanaeans. Of Barbarians, there were the Egestaeans, who invited the expedition, and the greater part of the Sicels, and, besides native Sicilians, certain Tyrrhenians who had a quarrel with

the Syracusans; also Iapygians, who served for hire. These were the nations who followed the Athenians.

58. Συρακοσίοις δὲ ἀντεβοήθησαν Καμαριναῖοι μὲν ὅμοροι ὄντες καὶ Γελῷοι οἰκοῦντες μετ᾽ αὐτούς, ἔπειτα Ἀκραγαντίνων ἡσυχαζόντων ἐν τῷ ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ἱδρυμένοι Σελινούντιοι. [2] καὶ οἵδε μὲν τῆς Σικελίας τὸ πρὸς Λιβύην μέρος τετραμμένον νεμόμενοι, Ἱμεραῖοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν Τυρσηνικὸν πόντον μορίου, ἐν ᾧ καὶ μόνοι Ἕλληνες οἰκοῦσιν: οὗτοι δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνοι ἐβοήθησαν. [3] καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ μὲν ἔθνη τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ τοσάδε, Δωριῆς τε καὶ [οἱ] αὐτόνομοι πάντες, ξυνεμάχουν, βαρβάρων δὲ Σικελοὶ μόνοι ὅσοι μὴ ἀφέστασαν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους: τῶν δ᾽ ἔξω Σικελίας Ἑλλήνων Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἡγεμόνα Σπαρτιάτην παρεχόμενοι, νεοδαμώδεις δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ Εἵλωτας [δύναται δὲ τὸ νεοδαμῶδες ἐλεύθερον ἤδη εἶναι], Κορίνθιοι δὲ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ μόνοι παραγενόμενοι καὶ Λευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀμπρακιῶται κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές, ἐκ δὲ Ἀρκαδίας μισθοφόροι ὑπὸ Κορινθίων ἀποσταλέντες καὶ Σικυώνιοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες, καὶ τῶν ἔξω Πελοποννήσου Βοιωτοί. [4] πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐπελθόντας τούτους οἱ Σικελιῶται αὐτοὶ πλῆθος πλέον κατὰ πάντα παρέσχοντο ἅτε μεγάλας πόλεις οἰκοῦντες: καὶ γὰρ ὁπλῖται πολλοὶ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὁ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ἄφθονος ξυνελέγη. καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας αὖθις ὡς εἰπεῖν τοὺς ἄλλους Συρακόσιοι αὐτοὶ πλείω ἐπορίσαντο διὰ μέγεθός τε πόλεως καὶ ὅτι ἐν μεγίστῳ κινδύνῳ ἦσαν.

[58] The Syracusans, on the other hand, were assisted by the Camarinaeans, who were their nearest neighbours, and by the Geloans, who dwelt next beyond them; and then (for the Agrigentines, who came next, were neutral) by the still more distant Selinuntians. All these inhabited the region of Sicily which lies towards Libya. On the side looking towards the Tyrrhenian Gulf the Himeraeans, the only Hellenic people in those parts, were also their only allies. These were the Hellenic peoples in Sicily who fought on the side of the Syracusans; they were Dorians and independent. As for

Barbarians, they had only such of the Sicels as had not gone over to the Athenians.Of Hellenes who were not inhabitants of Sicily, the Lacedaemonians provided a Spartan general; the Lacedaemonian forces were all Neodamodes and Helots. (The meaning of the word Neodamode is freedman.) The Corinthians were the only power which furnished both sea and land forces. Their Leucadian and Ambraciot kinsmen accompanied them; from Arcadia came mercenaries sent by Corinth; there were also Sicyonians who served under compulsion; and of the peoples beyond the Peloponnese, some Boeotians. — This external aid however was small compared with the numerous troops of all kinds which the Sicilian Greeks themselves supplied; for they dwelt in great cities, and had mustered many ships and horses and hoplites, besides a vast multitude of other troops. And again, the proportion furnished by the Syracusans themselves was greater than that of all the rest put together; their city was the largest, and they were in the greatest danger.

59. καὶ αἱ μὲν ἑκατέρων ἐπικουρίαι τοσαίδε ξυνελέγησαν, καὶ τότε ἤδη πᾶσαι ἀμφοτέροις παρῆσαν καὶ οὐκέτι οὐδὲν οὐδετέροις ἐπῆλθεν. [2]οἱ δ᾽ οὖν Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι εἰκότως ἐνόμισαν καλὸν ἀγώνισμα σφίσιν εἶναι ἐπὶ τῇ γεγενημένῃ νίκῃ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἑλεῖν τε τὸ στρατόπεδον ἅπαν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοσοῦτον ὄν, καὶ μηδὲ καθ᾽ ἕτερα αὐτούς, μήτε διὰ θαλάσσης μήτε τῷ πεζῷ, διαφυγεῖν. [3] ἔκλῃον οὖν τόν τε λιμένα εὐθὺς τὸν μέγαν, ἔχοντα τὸ στόμα ὀκτὼ σταδίων μάλιστα, τριήρεσι πλαγίαις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἀκάτοις ἐπ᾽ ἀγκυρῶν ὁρμίζοντες, καὶ τἆλλα, ἢν ἔτι ναυμαχεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τολμήσωσι, παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ ὀλίγον οὐδὲν ἐς οὐδὲν ἐπενόουν.

[59] Such were the allies who were assembled on both sides. At that time they were all on the spot, and nothing whatever came afterwards to either army.The Syracusans and the allies naturally thought that the struggle would be brought to a glorious end if, after having defeated the Athenian fleet, they took captive the whole of their great armament, and

did not allow them to escape either by sea or land. So they at once began to close the mouth of the Great Harbour, which was about a mile wide, by means of triremes, merchant-vessels, and small boats, placed broadside, which they moored there. They also made every preparation for a naval engagement, should the Athenians be willing to hazard another; and all their thoughts were on a grand scale.

60. τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις τήν τε ἀπόκλῃσιν ὁρῶσι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην διάνοιαν αὐτῶν αἰσθομένοις βουλευτέα ἐδόκει. [2] καὶ ξυνελθόντες οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ταξίαρχοι πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἀπορίαν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ὅτι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὔτε αὐτίκα ἔτι εἶχον προπέμψαντες γὰρ ἐς Κατάνην ὡς ἐκπλευσόμενοι ἀπεῖπον μὴ ἐπάγειν οὔτε τὸ λοιπὸν ἔμελλον ἔξειν, εἰ μὴ ναυκρατήσουσιν, ἐβουλεύσαντο τὰ μὲν τείχη τὰ ἄνω ἐκλιπεῖν, πρὸς δ᾽ αὐταῖς ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀπολαβόντες διατειχίσματι ὅσον οἷόν τε ἐλάχιστον τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν ἱκανὸν γενέσθαι, τοῦτο μὲν φρουρεῖν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἄλλου πεζοῦ τὰς ναῦς ἁπάσας, ὅσαι ἦσαν καὶ δυναταὶ καὶ ἁπλοώτεραι, πάντα τινὰ ἐσβιβάζοντες πληρῶσαι, καὶ διαναυμαχήσαντες, ἢν μὲν νικῶσιν, ἐς Κατάνην κομίζεσθαι, ἢν δὲ μή, ἐμπρήσαντες τὰς ναῦς πεζῇ ξυνταξάμενοι ἀποχωρεῖν ᾗ ἂν τάχιστα μέλλωσί τινος χωρίου ἢ βαρβαρικοῦ ἢ Ἑλληνικοῦ φιλίου ἀντιλήψεσθαι. [3] καὶ οἱ μέν, ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, καὶ ἐποίησαν: ἔκ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄνω τειχῶν ὑποκατέβησαν καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐπλήρωσαν πάσας, ἀναγκάσαντες ἐσβαίνειν ὅστις καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἐδόκει ἡλικίας μετέχων ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι. [4] καὶ ξυνεπληρώθησαν νῆες αἱ πᾶσαι δέκα μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν: τοξότας τε ἐπ᾽ αὐτὰς πολλοὺς καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς τῶν τε Ἀκαρνάνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων ἐσεβίβαζον, καὶ τἆλλα ὡς οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν ἐξ ἀναγκαίου τε καὶ τοιαύτης διανοίας ἐπορίσαντο. [5] ὁ δὲ Νικίας, ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἑτοῖμα ἦν, ὁρῶν τοὺς στρατιώτας τῷ τε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς πολὺ ταῖς ναυσὶ κρατηθῆναι ἀθυμοῦντας καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων σπάνιν ὡς τάχιστα

βουλομένους διακινδυνεύειν, ξυγκαλέσας ἅπαντας παρεκελεύσατό τε πρῶτον καὶ ἔλεξε τοιάδε.

[60] The Athenians, seeing the closing of the harbour and inferring the intentions of the enemy, proceeded to hold a council. The generals and officers met and considered the difficulties of their position. The most pressing of all was the want of food. For they had already sent to Catana, when they intended to depart, and stopped the supplies for the present; and they could get no more in the future unless they recovered the command of the sea. They resolved therefore to quit their lines on the higher ground and to cut off by a cross-wall a space close to their ships, no greater than was absolutely required for their baggage and for their sick; after leaving a guard there they meant to put on board every other man, and to launch all their ships, whether fit for service or not; they would then fight a decisive battle, and, if they conquered, go to Catana; but if not, they would burn their ships, and retreat by land in good order, taking the nearest way to some friendly country, Barbarian or Hellenic. This design they proceeded to execute, and withdrawing quietly from the upper walls manned their whole fleet, compelling every man of any age at all suitable for service to embark. The entire number of the ships which they manned was about a hundred and ten. They put on board numerous archers and javelin-men, Acarnanians, and other foreigners, and made such preparations for action as their difficult situation and the nature of their plan allowed. When all was nearly ready, Nicias, perceiving that his men were depressed by their severe defeat at sea, which was so new an experience to them, while at the same time the want of provisions made them impatient to risk a battle with the least possible delay, called the whole army together, and before they engaged exhorted them as follows:

61. ‘ἄνδρες στρατιῶται Ἀθηναίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων, ὁ μὲν ἀγὼν ὁ μέλλων ὁμοίως κοινὸς ἅπασιν ἔσται περί τε σωτηρίας καὶ πατρίδος ἑκάστοις οὐχ ἧσσον ἢ

τοῖς πολεμίοις: ἢν γὰρ κρατήσωμεν νῦν ταῖς ναυσίν, ἔστι τῳ τὴν ὑπάρχουσάν που οἰκείαν πόλιν ἐπιδεῖν. [2] ἀθυμεῖν δὲ οὐ χρὴ οὐδὲ πάσχειν ὅπερ οἱ ἀπειρότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ τοῖς πρώτοις ἀγῶσι σφαλέντες ἔπειτα διὰ παντὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῦ φόβου ὁμοίαν ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἔχουσιν. [3] ἀλλ᾽ ὅσοι τε Ἀθηναίων πάρεστε, πολλῶν ἤδη πολέμων ἔμπειροι ὄντες, καὶ ὅσοι τῶν ξυμμάχων, ξυστρατευόμενοι αἰεί, μνήσθητε τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις παραλόγων, καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης κἂν μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐλπίσαντες στῆναι καὶ ὡς ἀναμαχούμενοι ἀξίως τοῦδε τοῦ πλήθους, ὅσον αὐτοὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐφορᾶτε, παρασκευάζεσθε.

[61] ‘Soldiers of Athens and of our allies, we have all the same interest in the coming struggle; every one of us as well as of our enemies will now have to fight for his life and for his country, and if only we can win in the impending sea-fight, every one may see his native city and his own home once more. But we must not be faint-hearted, nor behave as if we were mere novices in the art of war, who when defeated in their first battle are full of cowardly apprehensions and continually retain the impress of their disaster. You, Athenians, have had great military experience; and you, allies, are always fighting at our side. Remember the sudden turns of war; let your hope be that fortune herself may yet come over to us; and prepare to retrieve your defeat in a manner worthy of the greatness of your own army which you see before you.

62. ‘ἃ δὲ ἀρωγὰ ἐνείδομεν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λιμένος στενότητι πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ὄχλον τῶν νεῶν ἔσεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων παρασκευήν, οἷς πρότερον ἐβλαπτόμεθα, πάντα καὶ ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκ τῶν παρόντων μετὰ τῶν κυβερνητῶν ἐσκεμμένα ἡτοίμασται. [2] καὶ γὰρ τοξόται πολλοὶ καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ἐπιβήσονται καὶ ὅχλος, ᾧ ναυμαχίαν μὲν ποιούμενοι ἐν πελάγει οὐκ ἂν ἐχρώμεθα διὰ τὸ βλάπτειν ἂν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῇ βαρύτητι τῶν νεῶν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐνθάδε ἠναγκασμένῃ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζομαχίᾳ πρόσφορα ἔσται. [3] ηὕρηται δ᾽ ἡμῖν ὅσα χρὴ

ἀντιναυπηγῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐπωτίδων αὐτοῖς παχύτητας, ᾗπερ δὴ μάλιστα ἐβλαπτόμεθα, χειρῶν σιδηρῶν ἐπιβολαί, αἳ σχήσουσι τὴν πάλιν ἀνάκρουσιν τῆς προσπεσούσης νεώς, ἣν τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις οἱ ἐπιβάται ὑπουργῶσιν. [4] ἐς τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ ἠναγκάσμεθα ὥστε πεζομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, καὶ τὸ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἀνακρούεσθαι μήτ᾽ ἐκείνους ἐᾶν ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς γῆς, πλὴν ὅσον ἂν ὁ πεζὸς ἡμῶν ἐπέχῃ, πολεμίας οὔσης.

[62] ‘We have consulted the pilots about any improvements which seemed likely to avail against the crowding of ships in the narrow harbour, as well as against the force on the enemy’s decks, which in previous engagements did us so much harm, and we have adopted them as far as we had the means. Many archers and javelin-men will embark, and a great number of other troops, whom if we were going to fight in the open sea we should not employ because they increase the weight of the ships, and therefore impede our skill; but here, where we are obliged to fight a land-battle on ship-board, they will be useful. We have thought of all the changes which are necessary in the construction of our ships, and in order to counteract the thickness of the beams on the enemy’s prows, for this did us more mischief than anything else, we have provided iron grapnels, which will prevent any ship striking us from getting off if the marines are quick and do their duty. For, as I tell you, we are positively driven to fight a land-battle on ship-board, and our best plan is neither to back water ourselves nor to allow the enemy to back water after we have once closed with him. Recollect that the shore, except so far as our land-forces extend, is in their hands.

63. ‘ὧν χρὴ μεμνημένους διαμάχεσθαι ὅσον ἂν δύνησθε καὶ μὴ ἐξωθεῖσθαι ἐς αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ ξυμπεσούσης νηὶ νεὼς μὴ πρότερον ἀξιοῦν ἀπολύεσθαι ἢ τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ πολεμίου καταστρώματος ὁπλίτας ἀπαράξητε. [2] καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς ὁπλίταις οὐχ ἧσσον τῶν ναυτῶν παρακελεύομαι, ὅσῳ τῶν

ἄνωθεν μᾶλλον τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο: ὑπάρχει δ᾽ ἡμῖν ἔτι νῦν γε τὰ πλείω τῷ πεζῷ ἐπικρατεῖν. [3] τοῖς δὲ ναύταις παραινῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῷδε καὶ δέομαι μὴ ἐκπεπλῆχθαί τι ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς ἄγαν, τήν τε παρασκευὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων βελτίω νῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τὰς ναῦς πλείους, ἐκείνην τε τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ὡς ἀξία ἐστὶ διασώσασθαι, οἳ τέως Ἀθηναῖοι νομιζόμενοι καὶ μὴ ὄντες ἡμῶν τῆς τε φωνῆς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῇ μιμήσει ἐθαυμάζεσθε κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἔλασσον κατὰ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι ἔς τε τὸ φοβερὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι πολὺ πλέον μετείχετε. [4] ὥστε κοινωνοὶ μόνοι ἐλευθέρως ἡμῖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες δικαίως [ἂν] αὐτὴν νῦν μὴ καταπροδίδοτε, καταφρονήσαντες δὲ Κορινθίων τε, οὓς πολλάκις νενικήκατε, καὶ Σικελιωτῶν, ὧν οὐδ᾽ ἀντιστῆναι οὐδεὶς ἔως ἤκμαζε τὸ ναυτικὸν ἡμῖν ἠξίωσεν, ἀμύνασθε αὐτούς, καὶ δείξατε ὅτι καὶ μετ᾽ ἀσθενείας καὶ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ὑμετέρα ἐπιστήμη κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἑτέρας εὐτυχούσης ῥώμης.

[63] ‘Knowing all this, you must fight to the last with all your strength, and not be driven ashore. When ship strikes ship, refuse to separate until you have swept the enemy’s heavy-armed from their decks. I am speaking to the hoplites rather than to the sailors; for this is the special duty of the men on deck. We may still reckon on the superiority of our infantry. The sailors I would exhort, nay I would implore them, not to be paralysed by their disasters; for they will find the arrangements on deck improved, and the numbers of the fleet increased. Some among you have long been deemed Athenians, though they are not; and to them I say, Consider how precious is that privilege, and how worthy to be defended. You were admired in Hellas because you spoke our language and adopted our manners, and you shared equally with ourselves in the substantial advantages of our empire, while you gained even more than we by the dread which you inspired in subject-states and in your security against wrong. You alone have been free partners in that

empire; you ought not to betray it now. And so, despising the Corinthians whom you have beaten again and again, and the Sicilians who never dared to withstand us when our fleet was in its prime, repel your enemies, and show that your skill even amid weakness and disaster is superior to the strength of another in the hour of his success.

64. τούς τε Ἀθηναίους ὑμῶν πάλιν αὖ καὶ τάδε ὑπομιμνῄσκω, ὅτι οὔτε ναῦς ἐν τοῖς νεωσοίκοις ἄλλας ὁμοίας ταῖσδε οὔτε ὁπλιτῶν ἡλικίαν ὑπελίπετε, εἴ τε ξυμβήσεταί τι ἄλλο ἢ τὸ κρατεῖν ὑμῖν, τούς τε ἐνθάδε πολεμίους εὐθὺς ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα πλευσομένους καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ ὑπολοίπους ἡμῶν ἀδυνάτους ἐσομένους τούς τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἐπελθόντας ἀμύνασθαι. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἂν ὑπὸ Συρακοσίοις εὐθὺς γίγνοισθε, οἷς αὐτοὶ ἵστε οἵᾳ γνώμῃ ἐπήλθετε, οἱ δὲ ἐκεῖ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίοις. [2] ὥστε ἐν ἑνὶ τῷδε ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγῶνι καθεστῶτες καρτερήσατε, εἴπερ ποτέ, καὶ ἐνθυμεῖσθε καθ᾽ ἑκάστους τε καὶ ξύμπαντες ὅτι οἱ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὑμῶν νῦν ἐσόμενοι καὶ πεζοὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰσὶ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἡ ὑπόλοιπος πόλις καὶ τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, περὶ ὧν, εἴ τίς τι ἕτερος ἑτέρου προφέρει ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ ἢ εὐψυχίᾳ, οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἀποδειξάμενος αὐτός τε αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμος γένοιτο καὶ τοῖς ξύμπασι σωτήριος.’

[64] ‘Let me appeal once more to you who are Athenians, and remind you that there are no more ships like these in the dockyards of the Piraeus, and that you have no more young men fit for service. In any event but victory your enemies here will instantly sail against Athens, while our countrymen at home, who are but a remnant, will be unable to defend themselves against the attacks of their former foes reinforced by the new invaders. You who are in Sicily will instantly fall into the hands of the Syracusans (and you know how you meant to deal with them), and your friends at Athens into the hands of the Lacedaemonians. In this one struggle you have to fight for yourselves and them. Stand firm therefore now, if ever, and remember one and all of you

who are embarking that you are both the fleet and army of your country, and that on you hangs the whole state and the great name of Athens: for her sake if any man exceed another in skill or courage let him display them now; he will never have a better opportunity of doing good to himself and saving his country.’

65. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοσαῦτα παρακελευσάμενος εὐθὺς ἐκέλευε πληροῦν τὰς ναῦς. τῷ δὲ Γυλίππῳ καὶ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις παρῆν μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁρῶσι καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν παρασκευήν, ὅτι ναυμαχήσουσιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, προηγγέλθη δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡ ἐπιβολὴ τῶν σιδηρῶν χειρῶν, [2] καὶ πρός τε τἆλλα ἐξηρτύσαντο ὡς ἕκαστα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο: τὰς γὰρ πρῴρας καὶ τῆς νεὼς ἄνω ἐπὶ πολὺ κατεβύρσωσαν, ὅπως ἂν ἀπολισθάνοι καὶ μὴ ἔχοι ἀντιλαβὴν ἡ χεὶρ ἐπιβαλλομένη. [3] καὶ ἐπειδὴ πάντα ἑτοῖμα ἦν, παρεκελεύσαντο ἐκείνοις οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ Γύλιππος καὶ ἔλεξαν τοιάδε.

[65] Nicias, as soon as he had done speaking, gave orders to man the ships. Gylippus and the Syracusans could see clearly enough from the preparations which the Athenians were making that they were going to fight. But they had also previous notice, and had been told of the iron grapnels; and they took precautions against this as against all the other devices of the Athenians. They covered the prows of their vessels with hides, extending a good way along the upper part of their sides, so that the grapnels might slip and find no hold. When all was ready, Gylippus and the other generals exhorted their men in the following words:

66. ‘ὅτι μὲν καλὰ τὰ προειργασμένα καὶ ὑπὲρ καλῶν τῶν μελλόντων ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται, ὦ Συρακόσιοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, οἵ τε πολλοὶ δοκεῖτε ἡμῖν εἰδέναι οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως αὐτῶν προθύμως ἀντελάβεσθε, καὶ εἴ τις μὴ ἐπὶ ὅσον δεῖ ᾔσθηται, σημανοῦμεν. [2] Ἀθηναίους γὰρ ἐς τὴν χώραν τήνδε ἐλθόντας πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Σικελίας καταδουλώσει, ἔπειτ᾽, εἰ κατορθώσειαν, καὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος, καὶ ἀρχὴν τὴν ἤδη μεγίστην τῶν τε πρὶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν νῦν κεκτημένους, πρῶτοι ἀνθρώπων ὑποστάντες

τῷ ναυτικῷ, ᾧπερ πάντα κατέσχον, τὰς μὲν νενικήκατε ἤδη ναυμαχίας, τὴν δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος νῦν νικήσετε. [3] ἄνδρες γὰρ ἐπειδὰν ᾧ ἀξιοῦσι προύχειν κολουθῶσι, τό γ᾽ ὑπόλοιπον αὐτῶν τῆς δόξης ἀσθενέστερον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ εἰ μηδ᾽ ᾠήθησαν τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ τῷ παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα τοῦ αὐχήματος σφαλλόμενοι καὶ παρὰ ἰσχὺν τῆς δυνάμεως ἐνδιδόασιν: ὃ νῦν Ἀθηναίους εἰκὸς πεπονθέναι.

[66] ‘That our actions so far have been glorious, and that in the coming conflict we shall be fighting for a glorious prize, most of you, Syracusans and allies, seem to be aware: what else would have inspired you with so much energy? But if any one has failed to understand our position, we will enlighten him. The Athenians came hither intending to enslave first of all Sicily, and then, if they succeeded, Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas, they having already the largest dominion of any Hellenic power, past or present. But you set mankind the example of withstanding that invincible navy; which you have now defeated in several engagements at sea, and which you will probably defeat in this. For when men are crippled in what they assume to be their strength, any vestige of self-respect is more completely lost than if they had never believed in themselves at all. When once their pride has had a fall they throw away the power of resistance which they might still exert. And this we may assume to be the condition of the Athenians.

67. ἡμῶν δὲ τό τε ὑπάρχον πρότερον, ᾧπερ καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονες ἔτι ὄντες ἀπετολμήσαμεν, βεβαιότερον νῦν, καὶ τῆς δοκήσεως προσγεγενημένης αὐτῷ, τὸ κρατίστους εἶναι εἰ τοὺς κρατίστους ἐνικήσαμεν, διπλασία ἑκάστου ἡ ἐλπίς: τὰ δὲ πολλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιχειρήσεις ἡ μεγίστη ἐλπὶς μεγίστην καὶ τὴν προθυμίαν παρέχεται. [2]’τά τε τῆς ἀντιμιμήσεως αὐτῶν τῆς παρασκευῆς ἡμῶν τῷ μὲν ἡμετέρῳ τρόπῳ ξυνήθη τέ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀνάρμοστοι πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐσόμεθα: οἱ δ᾽, ἐπειδὰν πολλοὶ μὲν ὁπλῖται ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ὦσι, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ χερσαῖοι ὡς εἰπεῖν Ἀκαρνᾶνές τε καὶ

ἄλλοι ἐπὶ ναῦς ἀναβάντες, οἳ οὐδ᾽ ὅπως καθεζομένους χρὴ τὸ βέλος ἀφεῖναι εὑρήσουσι, πῶς οὐ σφαλοῦσί τε τὰς ναῦς καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς πάντες οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν τρόπῳ κινούμενοι ταράξονται; [3] ἐπεὶ καὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ὠφελήσονται, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ὑμῶν, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσαις ναυμαχήσει, πεφόβηται: ἐν ὀλίγῳ γὰρ πολλαὶ ἀργότεραι μὲν ἐς τὸ δρᾶν τι ὧν βούλονται ἔσονται, ῥᾷσται δὲ ἐς τὸ βλάπτεσθαι ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἡμῖν παρεσκεύασται. [4] τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθέστατον γνῶτε ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς οἰόμεθα σαφῶς πεπύσθαι: ὑπερβαλλόντων γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν κακῶν καὶ βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἀπορίας ἐς ἀπόνοιαν καθεστήκασιν οὐ παρασκευῆς πίστει μᾶλλον ἢ τύχης ἀποκινδυνεῦσαι οὕτως ὅπως δύνανται, ἵν᾽ ἢ βιασάμενοι ἐκπλεύσωσιν ἢ κατὰ γῆν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ποιῶνται, ὡς τῶν γε παρόντων οὐκ ἂν πράξαντες χεῖρον.

[67] ‘Far otherwise is it with us. The natural courage, which even in the days of our inexperience dared to risk all, is now better assured, and when we have the further conviction that he is the strongest who has overcome the strongest, the hopes of every one are redoubled. And in all enterprises the highest hopes infuse the greatest courage. Their imitation of our modes of fighting will be useless to them. To us they come naturally, and we shall readily adapt ourselves to any arrangements of ours which they have borrowed. But to them the employment of troops on deck is a novelty; they will be encumbered with crowds of hoplites and crowds of javelin-men, Acarnanians and others, who are mere awkward landsmen put into a ship, and will not even know how to discharge their darts when they are required to keep their places. Will they not make the ships unsteady? And their own movements will be so unnatural to them that they will all fall into utter confusion. The greater number of the enemy’s ships will be the reverse of an advantage to him, should any of you fear your inequality in that respect; for a large fleet confined in a small space will be hampered in action and far more likely to suffer from our devices. And I

would have you know what I believe on the best authority to be the simple truth. Their misfortunes paralyse them, and they are driven to despair at finding themselves helpless. They have grown reckless, and have no confidence in their own plans. They will take their chance as best they can, and either force a way out to sea, or in the last resort retreat by land; for they know that they cannot in any case be worse off than they are.

68. πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην καὶ τύχην ἀνδρῶν ἑαυτὴν παραδεδωκυῖαν πολεμιωτάτων ὀργῇ προσμείξωμεν, καὶ νομίσωμεν ἅμα μὲν νομιμώτατον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους οἳ ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τοῦ προσπεσόντος δικαιώσωσιν ἀποπλῆσαι τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, ἅμα δὲ ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνασθαι ἐκγενησόμενον ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ λεγόμενόν που ἥδιστον εἶναι. [2] ὡς δὲ ἐχθροὶ καὶ ἔχθιστοι, πάντες ἴστε, οἵ γε ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἦλθον δουλωσόμενοι, ἐν ᾧ, εἰ κατώρθωσαν, ἀνδράσι μὲν ἂν τἆλγιστα προσέθεσαν, παισὶ δὲ καὶ γυναιξὶ τὰ ἀπρεπέστατα, πόλει δὲ τῇ πάσῃ τὴν αἰσχίστην ἐπίκλησιν. [3] ἀνθ᾽ ὧν μὴ μαλακισθῆναί τινα πρέπει μηδὲ τὸ ἀκινδύνως ἀπελθεῖν αὐτοὺς κέρδος νομίσαι. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐὰν κρατήσωσιν ὁμοίως δράσουσιν: τὸ δὲ πραξάντων ἐκ τοῦ εἰκότος ἃ βουλόμεθα τούσδε τε κολασθῆναι καὶ τῇ πάσῃ Σικελίᾳ καρπουμένῃ καὶ πρὶν ἐλευθερίαν βεβαιοτέραν παραδοῦναι, καλὸς ὁ ἀγών. καὶ κινδύνων οὗτοι σπανιώτατοι οἳ ἂν ἐλάχιστα ἐκ τοῦ σφαλῆναι βλάπτοντες πλεῖστα διὰ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ὠφελῶσιν.’

[68] ‘Against such disorder, and against hateful enemies whose good fortune has run away from them to us, let us advance with fury. We should remember in the first place that men are doing a most lawful act when they take vengeance upon an enemy and an aggressor, and that they have a right to satiate their heart’s animosity; secondly, that this vengeance, which is proverbially the sweetest of all things, will soon be within our grasp. I need not tell you that they are our enemies, and our worst enemies. They came against our land that they might enslave us, and if they had

succeeded they would have inflicted the greatest sufferings on our men, and the worst indignities upon our wives and children; and would have stamped a name of dishonour upon our whole city. Wherefore let no one’s heart be softened towards them. Do not congratulate yourselves at the mere prospect of getting safely rid of them. Even if they conquer they can only depart. But supposing that we obtain, as we most likely shall, the fulness of our desires, in the punishment of the Athenians and in the confirmation to Sicily of the liberties which she now enjoys, how glorious will be our prize! Seldom are men exposed to hazards in which they lose little if they fail, and win all if they succeed.’

69. καὶ οἱ μὲν τῶν Συρακοσίων στρατηγοὶ καὶ Γύλιππος τοιαῦτα καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς σφετέροις στρατιώταις παρακελευσάμενοι ἀντεπλήρουν τὰς ναῦς εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ᾐσθάνοντο. [2] ὁ δὲ Νικίας ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ ὁρῶν οἷος ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ ὡς ἐγγὺς ἤδη [ἦν], ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνάγεσθαι, καὶ νομίσας, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις ἀγῶσι, πάντα τε ἔργῳ ἔτι σφίσιν ἐνδεᾶ εἶναι καὶ λόγῳ αὐτοῖς οὔπω ἱκανὰ εἰρῆσθαι, αὖθις τῶν τριηράρχων ἕνα ἕκαστον ἀνεκάλει, πατρόθεν τε ἐπονομάζων καὶ αὐτοὺς ὀνομαστὶ καὶ φυλήν, ἀξιῶν τό τε καθ᾽ ἑαυτόν, ᾧ ὑπῆρχε λαμπρότητός τι, μὴ προδιδόναι τινὰ καὶ τὰς πατρικὰς ἀρετάς, ὧν ἐπιφανεῖς ἦσαν οἱ πρόγονοι, μὴ ἀφανίζειν, πατρίδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομιμνήσκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσιν ἐς τὴν δίαιταν ἐξουσίας, ἄλλα τε λέγων ὅσα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἤδη τοῦ καιροῦ ὄντες ἄνθρωποι οὐ πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν τινὶ ἀρχαιολογεῖν φυλαξάμενοι εἴποιεν ἄν, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων παραπλήσια ἔς τε γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ θεοὺς πατρῴους προφερόμενα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῇ παρούσῃ ἐκπλήξει ὠφέλιμα νομίζοντες ἐπιβοῶνται. [3]καὶ ὁ μὲν οὐχ ἱκανὰ μᾶλλον ἢ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα νομίσας παρῃνῆσθαι, ἀποχωρήσας ἦγε τὸν πεζὸν πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ παρέταξεν ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐδύνατο, ὅπως ὅτι μεγίστη τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ὠφελία ἐς τὸ θαρσεῖν γίγνοιτο: [4] ὁ δὲ

Δημοσθένης καὶ Μένανδρος καὶ Εὐθύδημος οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐπέβησαν ἄραντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν στρατοπέδου εὐθὺς ἔπλεον πρὸς τὸ ζεῦγμα τοῦ λιμένος καὶ τὸν παραλειφθέντα διέκπλουν, βουλόμενοι βιάσασθαι ἐς τὸ ἔξω.

[69] When Gylippus and the other Syracusan generals had, like Nicias, encouraged their troops, perceiving the Athenians to be manning their ships, they presently did the same. Nicias, overwhelmed by the situation, and seeing how great and how near the peril was (for the ships were on the very point of rowing out), feeling too, as men do on the eve of a great struggle, that all which he had done was nothing, and that he had not said half enough, again addressed the trierarchs, and calling each of them by his father’s name, and his own name, and the name of his tribe, he entreated those who had made any reputation for themselves not to be false to it, and those whose ancestors were eminent not to tarnish their hereditary fame. He reminded them that they were the inhabitants of the freest country in the world, and how in Athens there was no interference with the daily life of any man. He spoke to them of their wives and children and their fathers’ Gods, as men will at such a time; for then they do not care whether their common-place phrases seem to be out of date or not, but loudly reiterate the old appeals, believing that they may be of some service at the awful moment. When he thought that he had exhorted them, not enough, but as much as the scanty time allowed, he retired, and led the land-forces to the shore, extending the line as far as he could, so that they might be of the greatest use in encouraging the combatants on board ship. Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, who had gone on board the Athenian fleet to take the command, now quitted their own station, and proceeded straight to the closed mouth of the harbour, intending to force their way to the open sea where a passage was still left.

70. προεξαγαγόμενοι δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ναυσὶ παραπλησίαις τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πρότερον, κατά τε τὸν ἔκπλουν μέρει αὐτῶν ἐφύλασσον καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον κύκλῳ λιμένα, ὅπως πανταχόθεν ἅμα προσπίπτοιεν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα αὐτοῖς παρεβοήθει ᾗπερ καὶ αἱ νῆες κατίσχοιεν. ἦρχον δὲ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις Σικανὸς μὲν καὶ Ἀγάθαρχος, κέρας ἑκάτερος τοῦ παντὸς ἔχων, Πυθὴν δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι τὸ μέσον. [2] ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι προσέμισγον τῷ ζεύγματι, τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ ῥύμῃ ἐπιπλέοντες ἐκράτουν τῶν τεταγμένων νεῶν πρὸς αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπειρῶντο λύειν τὰς κλῄσεις: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πανταχόθεν σφίσι τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων ἐπιφερομένων οὐ πρὸς τῷ ζεύγματι ἔτι μόνον ἡ ναυμαχία, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ἦν καρτερὰ καὶ οἵα οὐχ ἑτέρα τῶν προτέρων. [3] πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἑκατέροις προθυμία ἀπὸ τῶν ναυτῶν ἐς τὸ ἐπιπλεῖν ὁπότε κελευσθείη ἐγίγνετο, πολλὴ δὲ ἡ ἀντιτέχνησις τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἀγωνισμὸς πρὸς ἀλλήλους: οἵ τε ἐπιβάται ἐθεράπευον, ὁπότε προσπέσοι ναῦς νηί, μὴ λείπεσθαι τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ καταστρώματος τῆς ἄλλης τέχνης: πᾶς τέ τις ἐν ᾧ προσετέτακτο αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἠπείγετο πρῶτος φαίνεσθαι. [4] ξυμπεσουσῶν δὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλῶν νεῶν □πλεῖσται γὰρ δὴ αὗται ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ ἐναυμάχησαν: βραχὺ γὰρ ἀπέλιπον ξυναμφότεραι διακόσιαι γενέσθαι□ αἱ μὲν ἐμβολαὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀνακρούσεις καὶ διέκπλους ὀλίγαι ἐγίγνοντο, αἱ δὲ προσβολαί, ὡς τύχοι ναῦς νηὶ προσπεσοῦσα ἢ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν ἢ ἄλλῃ ἐπιπλέουσα, πυκνότεραι ἦσαν. [5] καὶ ὅσον μὲν χρόνον προσφέροιτο ναῦς, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων τοῖς ἀκοντίοις καὶ τοξεύμασι καὶ λίθοις ἀφθόνως ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐχρῶντο: ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσμείξειαν, οἱ ἐπιβάται ἐς χεῖρας ἰόντες ἐπειρῶντο ταῖς ἀλλήλων ναυσὶν ἐπιβαίνειν. [6] ξυνετύγχανέ τε πολλαχοῦ διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν τὰ μὲν ἄλλοις ἐμβεβληκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐμβεβλῆσθαι, δύο τε περὶ μίαν καὶ ἔστιν ᾗ καὶ πλείους ναῦς κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ξυνηρτῆσθαι, καὶ τοῖς κυβερνήταις τῶν μὲν φυλακήν, τῶν δ᾽ ἐπιβουλήν, μὴ καθ᾽ ἓν ἕκαστον, κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ

πανταχόθεν, περιεστάναι, καὶ τὸν κτύπον μέγαν ἀπὸ πολλῶν νεῶν ξυμπιπτουσῶν ἔκπληξίν τε ἅμα καὶ ἀποστέρησιν τῆς ἀκοῆς ὧν οἱ κελευσταὶ φθέγγοιντο παρέχειν. [7] πολλὴ γὰρ δὴ ἡ παρακέλευσις καὶ βοὴ ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρων τοῖς κελευσταῖς κατά τε τὴν τέχνην καὶ πρὸς τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις βιάζεσθαί τε τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπιβοῶντες καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐς τὴν πατρίδα σωτηρίας νῦν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις, προθύμως ἀντιλαβέσθαι, τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις καλὸν εἶναι κωλῦσαί τε αὐτοὺς διαφυγεῖν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν ἑκάστους πατρίδα νικήσαντας ἐπαυξῆσαι. [8] καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ προσέτι ἑκατέρων, εἴ τινά που ὁρῷεν μὴ κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην πρύμναν κρουόμενον, ἀνακαλοῦντες ὀνομαστὶ τὸν τριήραρχον ἡρώτων, οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι εἰ τὴν πολεμιωτάτην γῆν οἰκειοτέραν ἤδη τῆς οὐ δι᾽ ὀλίγου πόνου κεκτημένης θαλάσσης ἡγούμενοι ὑποχωροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι εἰ οὓς σαφῶς ἴσασι προθυμουμένους Ἀθηναίους παντὶ τρόπῳ διαφυγεῖν, τούτους αὐτοὶ φεύγοντας φεύγουσιν.

[70] The Syracusans and their allies had already put out with nearly the same number of ships as before. A detachment of them guarded the entrance of the harbour; the remainder were disposed all round it in such a manner that they might fall on the Athenians from every side at once, and that their land-forces might at the same time be able to co-operate wherever the ships retreated to the shore. Sicanus and Agatharchus commanded the Syracusan fleet, each of them a wing; Python and the Corinthians occupied the centre. When the Athenians approached the closed mouth of the harbour the violence of their onset overpowered the ships which were stationed there; they then attempted to loosen the fastenings. Whereupon from all sides the Syracusans and their allies came bearing down upon them, and the conflict was no longer confined to the entrance, but extended throughout the harbour. No previous engagement had been so fierce and obstinate. Great was the eagerness with which the rowers on both sides rushed upon their

enemies whenever the word of command was given; and keen was the contest between the pilots as they manoeuvred one against another. The marines too were full of anxiety that, when ship struck ship, the service on deck should not fall short of the rest; every one in the place assigned to him was eager to be foremost among his fellows. Many vessels meeting — and never did so many fight in so small a space, for the two fleets together amounted to nearly two hundred — they were seldom able to strike in the regular manner, because they had no opportunity of first retiring or breaking the line; they generally fouled one another as ship dashed against ship in the hurry of flight or pursuit. All the time that another vessel was bearing down, the men on deck poured showers of javelins and arrows and stones upon the enemy; and when the two closed, the marines fought hand to hand, and endeavoured to board. In many places, owing to the want of room, they who had struck another found that they were struck themselves; often two or even more vessels were unavoidably entangled about one, and the pilots had to make plans of attack and defence, not against one adversary only, but against several coming from different sides. The crash of so many ships dashing against one another took away the wits of the crews, and made it impossible to hear the boatswains, whose voices in both fleets rose high, as they gave directions to the rowers, or cheered them on in the excitement of the struggle. On the Athenian side they were shouting to their men that they must force a passage and seize the opportunity now or never of returning in safety to their native land. To the Syracusans and their allies was represented the glory of preventing the escape of their enemies, and of a victory by which every man would exalt the honour of his own city. The commanders too, when they saw any ship backing without necessity, would call the captain by his name, and ask, of the Athenians, whether they were retreating because they expected to be more at

home upon the land of their bitterest foes than upon that sea which had been their own so long; on the Syracusan side, whether, when they knew perfectly well that the Athenians were only eager to find some means of flight, they would themselves fly from the fugitives.

71. ὅ τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς πεζὸς ἀμφοτέρων ἰσορρόπου τῆς ναυμαχίας καθεστηκυίας πολὺν τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ ξύστασιν τῆς γνώμης εἶχε, φιλονικῶν μὲν ὁ αὐτόθεν περὶ τοῦ πλέονος ἤδη καλοῦ, δεδιότες δὲ οἱ ἐπελθόντες μὴ τῶν παρόντων ἔτι χείρω πράξωσιν. [2] πάντων γὰρ δὴ ἀνακειμένων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὰς ναῦς ὅ τε φόβος ἦν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐδενὶ ἐοικώς, καὶ διὰ τὸ <ἀνώμαλον> τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀνώμαλον καὶ τὴν ἔποψιν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἠναγκάζοντο ἔχειν. [3] δι᾽ ὀλίγου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς θέας καὶ οὐ πάντων ἅμα ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ σκοπούντων, εἰ μέν τινες ἴδοιέν πῃ τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσησάν τε ἂν καὶ πρὸς ἀνάκλησιν θεῶν μὴ στερῆσαι σφᾶς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐτρέποντο, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ ἡσσώμενον βλέψαντες ὀλοφυρμῷ τε ἅμα μετὰ βοῆς ἐχρῶντο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν δρωμένων τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τὴν γνώμην μᾶλλον τῶν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐδουλοῦντο: ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀντίπαλόν τι τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀπιδόντες, διὰ τὸ ἀκρίτως ξυνεχὲς τῆς ἀμίλλης καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτοῖς ἴσα τῇ δόξῃ περιδεῶς ξυναπονεύοντες ἐν τοῖς χαλεπώτατα διῆγον: αἰεὶ γὰρ παρ᾽ ὀλίγον ἢ διέφευγον ἢ ἀπώλλυντο. [4] ἦν τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρατεύματι τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἕως ἀγχώμαλα ἐναυμάχουν, πάντα ὁμοῦ ἀκοῦσαι, ὀλοφυρμὸς βοή, νικῶντες κρατούμενοι, ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν μεγάλῳ κινδύνῳ μέγα στρατόπεδον πολυειδῆ ἀναγκάζοιτο φθέγγεσθαι. [5] παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν αὐτοῖς ἔπασχον, πρίν γε δὴ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντισχούσης τῆς ναυμαχίας ἔτρεψάν τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐπικείμενοι λαμπρῶς, πολλῇ κραυγῇ καὶ διακελευσμῷ χρώμενοι, κατεδίωκον ἐς τὴν γῆν. [6] τότε δὲ ὁ μὲν ναυτικὸς στρατὸς ἄλλος ἄλλῃ, ὅσοι μὴ μετέωροι ἐάλωσαν, κατενεχθέντες ἐξέπεσον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον: ὁ δὲ πεζὸς οὐκέτι διαφόρως, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ μιᾶς ὁρμῆς οἰμωγῇ τε καὶ στόνῳ πάντες

δυσανασχετοῦντες τὰ γιγνόμενα, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς παρεβοήθουν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ τείχους ἐς φυλακήν, ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι ἤδη περὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὅπῃ σωθήσονται διεσκόπουν. [7] ἦν τε ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα οὐδεμιᾶς δὴ τῶν ξυμπασῶν ἐλάσσων ἔκπληξις. παραπλήσιά τε ἐπεπόνθεσαν καὶ ἔδρασαν αὐτοὶ ἐν Πύλῳ: διαφθαρεισῶν γὰρ τῶν νεῶν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις προσαπώλλυντο αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἄνδρες διαβεβηκότες, καὶ τότε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀνέλπιστον ἦν τὸ κατὰ γῆν σωθήσεσθαι, ἢν μή τι παρὰ λόγον γίγνηται.

[71] While the naval engagement hung in the balance the two armies on shore had great trial and conflict of soul. The Sicilian soldier was animated by the hope of increasing the glory which he had already won, while the invader was tormented by the fear that his fortunes might sink lower still. The last chance of the Athenians lay in their ships, and their anxiety was dreadful. The fortune of the battle varied; and it was not possible that the spectators on the shore should all receive the same impression of it. Being quite close and having different points of view, they would some of them see their own ships victorious; their courage would then revive, and they would earnestly call upon the Gods not to take from them their hope of deliverance. But others, who saw their ships worsted, cried and shrieked aloud, and were by the sight alone more utterly unnerved than the defeated combatants themselves. Others again, who had fixed their gaze on some part of the struggle which was undecided, were in a state of excitement still more terrible; they kept swaying their bodies to and fro in an agony of hope and fear as the stubborn conflict went on and on; for at every instant they were all but saved or all but lost. And while the strife hung in the balance you might hear in the Athenian army at once lamentation, shouting, cries of victory or defeat, and all the various sounds which are wrung from a great host in extremity of danger. Not less agonising were the feelings of those on board. At length the Syracusans and their allies,

after a protracted struggle, put the Athenians to flight, and triumphantly bearing down upon them, and encouraging one another with loud cries and exhortations, drove them to land. Then that part of the navy which had not been taken in the deep water fell back in confusion to the shore, and the crews rushed out of the ships into the camp. And the land-forces, no longer now divided in feeling, but uttering one universal groan of intolerable anguish, ran, some of them to save the ships, others to defend what remained of the wall; but the greater number began to look to themselves and to their own safety. Never had there been a greater panic in an Athenian army than at that moment. They now suffered what they had done to others at Pylos. For at Pylos the Lacedaemonians, when they saw their ships destroyed, knew that their friends who had crossed over into the island of Sphacteria were lost with them. And so now the Athenians, after the rout of their fleet, knew that they had no hope of saving themselves by land unless events took some extraordinary turn.

72. γενομένης δ᾽ ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ναυμαχίας καὶ πολλῶν νεῶν ἀμφοτέροις καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπολομένων οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπικρατήσαντες τά τε ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο, καὶ ἀποπλεύσαντες πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τροπαῖον ἔστησαν, [2] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπὸ μεγέθους τῶν παρόντων κακῶν νεκρῶν μὲν πέρι ἢ ναυαγίων οὐδὲ ἐπενόουν αἰτῆσαι ἀναίρεσιν, τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἐβουλεύοντο εὐθὺς ἀναχωρεῖν. [3] Δημοσθένης δὲ Νικίᾳ προσελθὼν γνώμην ἐποιεῖτο πληρώσαντας ἔτι τὰς λοιπὰς τῶν νεῶν βιάσασθαι, ἢν δύνωνται, ἅμα ἕῳ τὸν ἔκπλουν, λέγων ὅτι πλείους ἔτι αἱ λοιπαί εἰσι νῆες χρήσιμαι σφίσιν ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις: ἦσαν γὰρ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις περίλοιποι ὡς ἑξήκοντα, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐναντίοις ἐλάσσους ἢ πεντήκοντα. [4] καὶ ξυγχωροῦντος Νικίου τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ βουλομένων πληροῦν αὐτῶν οἱ ναῦται οὐκ ἤθελον ἐσβαίνειν διὰ τὸ καταπεπλῆχθαί τε τῇ ἥσσῃ καὶ μὴ ἂν ἔτι οἴεσθαι κρατῆσαι.

[72] Thus, after a fierce battle and a great destruction of ships and men on both sides, the Syracusans and their allies gained the victory. They gathered up the wrecks and bodies of the dead, and sailing back to the city, erected a trophy. The Athenians, overwhelmed by their misery, never so much as thought of recovering their wrecks or of asking leave to collect their dead. Their intention was to retreat that very night. Demosthenes came to Nicias and proposed that they should once more man their remaining vessels and endeavour to force the passage at daybreak, saying that they had more ships fit for service than the enemy. For the Athenian fleet still numbered sixty, but the enemy had less than fifty. Nicias approved of his proposal, and they would have manned the ships, but the sailors refused to embark; for they were paralysed by their defeat, and had no longer any hope of succeeding. So the Athenians all made up their minds to escape by land.

73. καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς κατὰ γῆν ἀναχωρήσοντες ἤδη ξύμπαντες τὴν γνώμην εἶχον, Ἑρμοκράτης δὲ ὁ Συρακόσιος ὑπονοήσας αὐτῶν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ νομίσας δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ τοσαύτη στρατιὰ κατὰ γῆν ὑποχωρήσασα καὶ καθεζομένη ποι τῆς Σικελίας βουλήσεται αὖθις σφίσι τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖσθαι, ἐσηγεῖται ἐλθὼν τοῖς ἐν τέλει οὖσιν ὡς οὐ χρεὼν ἀποχωρῆσαι τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτοὺς περιιδεῖν, λέγων ταῦτα ἃ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐδόκει, ἀλλὰ ἐξελθόντας ἤδη πάντας Συρακοσίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τάς τε ὁδοὺς ἀποικοδομῆσαι καὶ τὰ στενόπορα τῶν χωρίων προδιαλαβόντας φυλάσσειν. [2] οἱ δὲ ξυνεγίγνωσκον μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἧσσον ταῦτα ἐκείνου, καὶ ἐδόκει ποιητέα εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἄρτι ἀσμένους ἀπὸ ναυμαχίας τε μεγάλης ἀναπεπαυμένους καὶ ἅμα ἑορτῆς οὔσης ἔτυχε γὰρ αὐτοῖς Ἡρακλεῖ ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν θυσία οὖσα οὐ δοκεῖν ἂν ῥᾳδίως ἐθελῆσαι ὑπακοῦσαι: ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ περιχαροῦς τῆς νίκης πρὸς πόσιν τετράφθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ, καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἐλπίζειν ἂν σφῶν πείθεσθαι αὐτοὺς ἢ ὅπλα λαβόντας ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐξελθεῖν. [3] ὡς δὲ τοῖς ἄρχουσι ταῦτα λογιζομένοις ἐφαίνετο ἄπορα

καὶ οὐκέτι ἔπειθεν αὐτοὺς ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης, αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τούτοις τάδε μηχανᾶται, δεδιὼς μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν προφθάσωσιν ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ διελθόντες τὰ χαλεπώτατα τῶν χωρίων. πέμπει τῶν ἑταίρων τινὰς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μετὰ ἱππέων πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, ἡνίκα ξυνεσκόταζεν: οἳ προσελάσαντες ἐξ ὅσου τις ἔμελλεν ἀκούσεσθαι καὶ ἀνακαλεσάμενοί τινας ὡς ὄντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπιτήδειοι ⌈ἦσαν γάρ τινες τῷ Νικίᾳ διάγγελοι τῶν ἔνδοθεν⌉ ἐκέλευον φράζειν Νικίᾳ μὴ ἀπάγειν τῆς νυκτὸς τὸ στράτευμα ὡς Συρακοσίων τὰς ὁδοὺς φυλασσόντων, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν τῆς ἡμέρας παρασκευασάμενον ἀποχωρεῖν. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰπόντες ἀπῆλθον, καὶ οἱ ἀκούσαντες διήγγειλαν τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων:

[73] Hermocrates the Syracusan suspected their intention, and dreading what might happen if their vast army, retreating by land and settling somewhere in Sicily, should choose to renew the war, he went to the authorities, and represented to them that they ought not to allow the Athenians to withdraw by night (mentioning his own suspicion of their intentions), but that all the Syracusans and their allies should go out in advance, wall up the roads, and occupy the passes with a guard. They thought very much as he did, and wanted to carry out his plan, but doubted whether their men, who were too glad to repose after a great battle, and in time of festival — for there happened on that very day to be a sacrifice to Heracles — could be induced to obey. Most of them, in the exultation of victory, were drinking and keeping holiday, and at such a time how could they ever be expected to take up arms and go forth at the order of the generals? On these grounds the authorities decided that the thing was impossible. Whereupon Hermocrates himself, fearing lest the Athenians should gain a start and quietly pass the most difficult places in the night, contrived the following plan: when it was growing dark he sent certain of his own acquaintance, accompanied by a few horsemen, to the Athenian camp.

They rode up within earshot, and pretending to be friends (there were known to be men in the city who gave information to Nicias of what went on) called to some of the soldiers, and bade them tell him not to withdraw his army during the night, for the Syracusans were guarding the roads; he should make preparation at leisure and retire by day. Having delivered their message they departed, and those who had heard them informed the Athenian generals.

74. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἄγγελμα ἐπέσχον τὴν νύκτα, νομίσαντες οὐκ ἀπάτην εἶναι. καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὡς οὐκ εὐθὺς ὥρμησαν, ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν περιμεῖναι, ὅπως ξυσκευάσαιντο ὡς ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν οἱ στρατιῶται ὅτι χρησιμώτατα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα καταλιπεῖν, ἀναλαβόντες δὲ αὐτὰ ὅσα περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐς δίαιταν ὑπῆρχεν ἐπιτήδεια ἀφορμᾶσθαι. [2] Συρακόσιοι δὲ καὶ Γύλιππος τῷ μὲν πεζῷ προεξελθόντες τάς τε ὁδοὺς τὰς κατὰ τὴν χώραν, ᾗ εἰκὸς ἦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰέναι, ἀπεφάργνυσαν καὶ τῶν ῥείθρων καὶ [τῶν] ποταμῶν τὰς διαβάσεις ἐφύλασσον καὶ ἐς ὑποδοχὴν τοῦ στρατεύματος ὡς κωλύσοντες ᾗ ἐδόκει ἐτάσσοντο: ταῖς δὲ ναυσὶ προσπλεύσαντες τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ ἀφεῖλκον ⸀ἐνέπρησαν δέ τινας ὀλίγας, ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ⸁, τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν οὐδενὸς κωλύοντος ὡς ἑκάστην ποι ἐκπεπτωκυῖαν ἀναδησάμενοι ἐκόμιζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

[74] On receiving this message, which they supposed to be genuine, they remained during the night. And having once given up the intention of starting immediately, they decided to remain during the next day, that the soldiers might, as well as they could, put together their baggage in the most convenient form, and depart, taking with them the bare necessaries of life, but nothing else.Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus, going forth before them with their land-forces, blocked the roads in the country by which the Athenians were likely to pass, guarded the fords of the rivers and streams, and posted themselves at the best points for receiving and stopping them. Their sailors rowed up to the

beach and dragged away the Athenian ships. The Athenians themselves had burnt a few of them, as they had intended, but the rest the Syracusans towed away, unmolested and at their leisure, from the places where they had severally run aground, and conveyed them to the city.

75. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ ἐδόκει τῷ Νικίᾳ καὶ τῷ Δημοσθένει ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι, καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις ἤδη τοῦ στρατεύματος τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἀπὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐγίγνετο. [2] δεινὸν οὖν ἦν οὐ καθ᾽ ἓν μόνον τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅτι τάς τε ναῦς ἀπολωλεκότες πάσας ἀπεχώρουν καὶ ἀντὶ μεγάλης ἐλπίδος καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡ πόλις κινδυνεύοντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀπολείψει τοῦ στρατοπέδου ξυνέβαινε τῇ τε ὄψει ἑκάστῳ ἀλγεινὰ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ αἰσθέσθαι. [3] τῶν τε γὰρ νεκρῶν ἀτάφων ὄντων, ὁπότε τις ἴδοι τινὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων κείμενον, ἐς λύπην μετὰ φόβου καθίστατο, καὶ οἱ ζῶντες καταλειπόμενοι τραυματίαι τε καὶ ἀσθενεῖς πολὺ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοῖς ζῶσι λυπηρότεροι ἦσαν καὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἀθλιώτεροι. [4] πρὸς γὰρ ἀντιβολίαν καὶ ὀλοφυρμὸν τραπόμενοι ἐς ἀπορίαν καθίστασαν, ἄγειν τε σφᾶς ἀξιοῦντες καὶ ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐπιβοώμενοι, εἴ τινά πού τις ἴδοι ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ οἰκείων, τῶν τε ξυσκήνων ἤδη ἀπιόντων ἐκκρεμαννύμενοι καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦντες ἐς ὅσον δύναιντο, εἴ τῳ δὲ προλίποι ἡ ῥώμη καὶ τὸ σῶμα, οὐκ ἄνευ ὀλίγων ἐπιθειασμῶν καὶ οἰμωγῆς ὑπολειπόμενοι, ὥστε δάκρυσι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα πλησθὲν καὶ ἀπορίᾳ τοιαύτῃ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀφορμᾶσθαι, καίπερ ἐκ πολεμίας τε καὶ μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα τὰ μὲν πεπονθότας ἤδη, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφανεῖ δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσιν. [5] κατήφειά τέ τις ἅμα καὶ κατάμεμψις σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλὴ ἦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένῃ ἐῴκεσαν ὑποφευγούσῃ, καὶ ταύτῃ οὐ σμικρᾷ: μυριάδες γὰρ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ὄχλου οὐκ ἐλάσσους τεσσάρων ἅμα ἐπορεύοντο. καὶ τούτων οἵ τε ἄλλοι πάντες ἔφερον ὅτι τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος χρήσιμον, καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς αὐτοὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν σιτία ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις, οἱ μὲν ἀπορίᾳ ἀκολούθων, οἱ δὲ ἀπιστίᾳ: ἀπηυτομολήκεσαν γὰρ πάλαι τε καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι παραχρῆμα.

ἔφερον δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανά: σῖτος γὰρ οὐκέτι ἦν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ. [6] καὶ μὴν ἡ ἄλλη αἰκία καὶ ἡ ἰσομοιρία τῶν κακῶν, ἔχουσά τινα ὅμως τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν κούφισιν, οὐδ᾽ ὡς ῥᾳδία ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐδοξάζετο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ οἵας λαμπρότητος καὶ αὐχήματος τοῦ πρώτου ἐς οἵαν τελευτὴν καὶ ταπεινότητα ἀφῖκτο. [7] μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τὸ διάφορον τοῦτο [τῷ] Ἑλληνικῷ στρατεύματι ἐγένετο, οἷς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἄλλους δουλωσομένους ἥκειν αὐτοὺς τοῦτο μᾶλλον δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσι ξυνέβη ἀπιέναι, ἀντὶ δ᾽ εὐχῆς τε καὶ παιάνων, μεθ᾽ ὧν ἐξέπλεον, πάλιν τούτων τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐπιφημίσμασιν ἀφορμᾶσθαι,πεζούς τε ἀντὶ ναυβατῶν πορευομένους καὶ ὁπλιτικῷ προσέχοντας μᾶλλον ἢ ναυτικῷ. ὅμως δὲ ὑπὸ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐπικρεμαμένου ἔτι κινδύνου πάντα ταῦτα αὐτοῖς οἰστὰ ἐφαίνετο.

[75] On the third day after the sea-fight, when Nicias and Demosthenes thought that their preparations were complete, the army began to move. They were in a dreadful condition; not only was there the great fact that they had lost their whole fleet, and instead of their expected triumph had brought the utmost peril upon Athens as well as upon themselves, but also the sights which presented themselves as they quitted the camp were painful to every eye and mind. The dead were unburied, and when any one saw the body of a friend lying on the ground he was smitten with sorrow and dread, while the sick or wounded who still survived but had to be left were even a greater trial to the living, and more to be pitied than those who were gone. Their prayers and lamentations drove their companions to distraction; they would beg that they might be taken with them, and call by name any friend or relation whom they saw passing; they would hang upon their departing comrades and follow as far as they could, and, when their limbs and strength failed them, and they dropped behind, many were the imprecations and cries which they uttered. So that the whole army was in tears, and such was their despair that they could hardly make up their minds to stir,

although they were leaving an enemy’s country, having suffered calamities too great for tears already, and dreading miseries yet greater, in the unknown future. There was also a general feeling of shame and self-reproach, — indeed they seemed, not like an army, but like the fugitive population of a city captured after a siege; and of a great city too. For the whole multitude who were marching together numbered not less than forty thousand. Each of them took with him anything he could carry which was likely to be of use. Even the heavy-armed and cavalry, contrary to their practice when under arms, conveyed about their persons their own food, some because they had no attendants, others because they could not trust them; for they had long been deserting, and most of them had gone off all at once. Nor was the food which they carried sufficient; for the supplies of the camp had failed. Their disgrace and the universality of the misery, although there might be some consolation in the very community of suffering, were nevertheless at that moment hard to bear, especially when they remembered from what pride and splendour they had fallen into their present low estate. Never had an Hellenic army experienced such a reverse. They had come intending to enslave others, and they were going away in fear that they would be themselves enslaved. Instead of the prayers and hymns with which they had put to sea, they were now departing amid appeals to heaven of another sort. They were no longer sailors but landsmen, depending, not upon their fleet, but upon their infantry. Yet in face of the great danger which still threatened them all these things appeared endurable.

76. ὁρῶν δὲ ὁ Νικίας τὸ στράτευμα ἀθυμοῦν καὶ ἐν μεγάλῃ μεταβολῇ ὄν, ἐπιπαριὼν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐθάρσυνέ τε καὶ παρεμυθεῖτο, βοῇ τε χρώμενος ἔτι μᾶλλον ἑκάστοις καθ᾽ οὓς γίγνοιτο ὑπὸ προθυμίας καὶ βουλόμενος ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον γεγωνίσκων ὠφελεῖν τι.

[76] Nicias, seeing the army disheartened at their terrible fall, went along the ranks and encouraged and consoled

them as well as he could. In his fervour he raised his voice as he passed from one to another and spoke louder and louder, desiring that the benefit of his words might reach as far as possible.

77. ‘καὶ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξύμμαχοι, ἐλπίδα χρὴ ἔχειν ἤδη τινὲς καὶ ἐκ δεινοτέρων ἢ τοιῶνδε ἐσώθησαν, μηδὲ καταμέμφεσθαι ὑμᾶς ἄγαν αὐτοὺς μήτε ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μήτε ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν νῦν κακοπαθίαις. [2] κἀγώ τοι οὐδενὸς ὑμῶν οὔτε ῥώμῃ προφέρων ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾶτε δὴ ὡς διάκειμαι ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου οὔτ᾽ εὐτυχίᾳ δοκῶν που ὕστερός του εἶναι κατά τε τὸν ἴδιον βίον καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα, νῦν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κινδύνῳ τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις αἰωροῦμαι: καίτοι πολλὰ μὲν ἐς θεοὺς νόμιμα δεδιήτημαι, πολλὰ δὲ ἐς ἀνθρώπους δίκαια καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα. [3] ἀνθ᾽ ὧν ἡ μὲν ἐλπὶς ὅμως θρασεῖα τοῦ μέλλοντος, αἱ δὲ ξυμφοραὶ οὐ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν δὴ φοβοῦσιν. τάχα δὲ ἂν καὶ λωφήσειαν: ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις ηὐτύχηται, καὶ εἴ τῳ θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι ἐστρατεύσαμεν, ἀποχρώντως ἤδη τετιμωρήμεθα. [4] ἦλθον γάρ που καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἤδη ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρους, καὶ ἀνθρώπεια δράσαντες ἀνεκτὰ ἔπαθον. καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς νῦν τά τε ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐλπίζειν ἡπιώτερα ἔξειν οἴκτου γὰρ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀξιώτεροι ἤδη ἐσμὲν ἢ φθόνου, καὶ ὁρῶντες ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἷοι ὁπλῖται ἅμα καὶ ὅσοι ξυντεταγμένοι χωρεῖτε μὴ καταπέπληχθε ἄγαν, λογίζεσθε δὲ ὅτι αὐτοί τε πόλις εὐθύς ἐστε ὅποι ἂν καθέζησθε καὶ ἄλλη οὐδεμία ὑμᾶς τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἐπιόντας δέξαιτο ῥᾳδίως οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἱδρυθέντας που ἐξαναστήσειεν. [5] τὴν δὲ πορείαν ὥστ᾽ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ εὔτακτον εἶναι αὐτοὶ φυλάξατε, μὴ ἄλλο τι ἡγησάμενος ἕκαστος ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀναγκασθῇ χωρίῳ μάχεσθαι, τοῦτο καὶ πατρίδα καὶ τεῖχος κρατήσας ἕξειν. [6] σπουδὴ δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν ἔσται τῆς ὁδοῦ: τὰ γὰρ ἐπιτήδεια βραχέα ἔχομεν, καὶ ἢν ἀντιλαβώμεθά του φιλίου χωρίου τῶν Σικελῶν οὗτοι γὰρ ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ Συρακοσίων δέος ἔτι βέβαιοι εἰσίν, ἤδη νομίζετε ἐν τῷ ἐχυρῷ εἶναι. προπέπεμπται δ᾽ ὡς αὐτούς, καὶ ἀπαντᾶν εἰρημένον καὶ σιτία ἄλλα κομίζειν. [7] ‘τό τε ξύμπαν γνῶτε, ὦ ἄνδρες

στρατιῶται, ἀναγκαῖόν τε ὂν ὑμῖν ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς γίγνεσθαι ὡς μὴ ὄντος χωρίου ἐγγὺς ὅποι ἂν μαλακισθέντες σωθείητε καί, ἢν νῦν διαφύγητε τοὺς πολεμίους, οἵ τε ἄλλοι τευξόμενοι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖτέ που ἐπιδεῖν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν μεγάλην δύναμιν τῆς πόλεως καίπερ πεπτωκυῖαν ἐπανορθώσοντες: ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί.’

[77] ‘Even now, Athenians and allies, we must hope: men have been delivered out of worse straits than these, and I would not have you judge yourselves too severely on account either of the reverses which you have sustained or of your present undeserved miseries. I too am as weak as any of you; for I am quite prostrated by my disease, as you see. And although there was a time when I might have been thought equal to the best of you in the happiness of my private and public life, I am now in as great danger, and as much at the mercy of fortune, as the meanest. Yet my days have been passed in the performance of many a religious duty, and of many a just and blameless action. Therefore my hope of the future is still courageous, and our calamities do not appal me as they might. Who knows that they may not be lightened? For our enemies have had their full share of success, and if we were under the jealousy of any God when our fleet started, by this time we have been punished enough. Others ere now have attacked their neighbours; they have done as men will do, and suffered what men can bear. We may therefore begin to hope that the Gods will be more merciful to us; for we now invite their pity rather than their jealousy. And look at your own well-armed ranks; see how many brave soldiers you are, marching in solid array, and do not be dismayed; bear in mind that wherever you plant yourselves you are a city already, and that no city in Sicily will find it easy to resist your attack, or can dislodge you if you choose to settle. Provide for the safety and good order of your own march, and remember every one of you that on whatever spot a man is compelled to fight, there if

he conquer he may find a native land and a fortress. We must press forward day and night, for our supplies are but scanty. The Sicels through fear of the Syracusans still adhere to us, and if we can only reach any part of their territory we shall be among friends, and you may consider yourselves secure. We have sent to them, and they have been told to meet us and bring food. In a word, soldiers, let me tell you that you must be brave; there is no place near to which a coward can fly. And if you now escape your enemies, those of you who are not Athenians will see once more the home for which they long, while you Athenians will again rear aloft the fallen greatness of Athens. For men, and not walls or ships in which are no men, constitute a state.’

78. ὁ μὲν Νικίας τοιάδε παρακελευόμενος ἅμα ἐπῄει τὸ στράτευμα, καὶ εἴ πῃ ὁρῴη διεσπασμένον καὶ μὴ ἐν τάξει χωροῦν ξυνάγων καὶ καθιστάς, καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης οὐδὲν ἧσσον τοῖς καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν τοιαῦτά τε καὶ παραπλήσια λέγων. [2] τὸ δὲ ἐχώρει ἐν πλαισίῳ τεταγμένον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡγούμενον τὸ Νικίου, ἐφεπόμενον δὲ τὸ Δημοσθένους: τοὺς δὲ σκευοφόρους καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον ὄχλον ἐντὸς εἶχον οἱ ὁπλῖται. [3] καὶ ἐπειδή [τε] ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῇ διαβάσει τοῦ Ἀνάπου ποταμοῦ, ηὗρον ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ παρατεταγμένους τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων, καὶ τρεψάμενοι αὐτοὺς καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ πόρου ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν: οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι παριππεύοντές τε προσέκειντο καὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες οἱ ψιλοί. [4]καὶ ταύτῃ μὲν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ προελθόντες σταδίους ὡς τεσσαράκοντα ηὐλίσαντο πρὸς λόφῳ τινὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι: τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ πρῲ ἐπορεύοντο καὶ προῆλθον ὡς εἴκοσι σταδίους, καὶ κατέβησαν ἐς χωρίον ἄπεδόν τι καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, βουλόμενοι ἔκ τε τῶν οἰκιῶν λαβεῖν τι ἐδώδιμον ⌈ᾠκεῖτο γὰρ ὁ χῶρος⌉ καὶ ὕδωρ μετὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν φέρεσθαι αὐτόθεν: ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια, ᾗ ἔμελλον ἰέναι, οὐκ ἄφθονον ἦν. [5] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τούτῳ προελθόντες τὴν δίοδον τὴν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπετείχιζον: ἦν δὲ λόφος καρτερὸς καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν αὐτοῦ χαράδρα κρημνώδης, ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ

Ἀκραῖον λέπας. [6]τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προῇσαν, καὶ οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων αὐτοὺς ἱππῆς καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ὄντες πολλοὶ ἐκατέρωθεν ἐκώλυον καὶ ἐσηκόντιζόν τε καὶ παρίππευον. καὶ χρόνον μὲν πολὺν ἐμάχοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔπειτα ἀνεχώρησαν πάλιν ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον. καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκέτι ὁμοίως εἶχον: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀποχωρεῖν οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων.

[78] Thus exhorting his troops Nicias passed through the army, and wherever he saw gaps in the ranks or the men dropping out of line, he brought them back to their proper place. Demosthenes did the same for the troops under his command, and gave them similar exhortations. The army marched disposed in a hollow oblong: the division of Nicias leading, and that of Demosthenes following; the hoplites enclosed within their ranks the baggage-bearers and the rest of the host. When they arrived at the ford of the river Anapus they found a force of the Syracusans and of their allies drawn up to meet them; these they put to flight, and getting command of the ford, proceeded on their march. The Syracusans continually harassed them, the cavalry riding alongside, and the light-armed troops hurling darts at them. On this day the Athenians proceeded about four and a half miles and encamped at a hill. On the next day they started early, and, having advanced more than two miles, descended into a level plain, and encamped. The country was inhabited, and they were desirous of obtaining food from the houses, and also water which they might carry with them, as there was little to be had for many miles in the country which lay before them. Meanwhile the Syracusans had gone forward, and at a point where the road ascends a steep hill called the Acraean height, and there is a precipitous ravine on either side, were blocking up the pass by a wall. On the next day the Athenians advanced, although again impeded by the numbers of the enemy’s cavalry who rode alongside, and of their javelin-men who threw darts at them. For a long time the Athenians

maintained the struggle, but at last retired to their own encampment. Their supplies were now cut off, because the horsemen circumscribed their movements.

79. πρῲ δὲ ἄραντες ἐπορεύοντο αὖθις, καὶ ἐβιάσαντο πρὸς τὸν λόφον ἐλθεῖν τὸν ἀποτετειχισμένον, καὶ ηὗρον πρὸ ἑαυτῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀποτειχίσματος τὴν πεζὴν στρατιὰν παρατεταγμένην οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγων ἀσπίδων: στενὸν γὰρ ἦν τὸ χωρίον. [2] καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐτειχομάχουν, καὶ βαλλόμενοι ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου ἐπάντους ὄντος διικνοῦντο γὰρ ῥᾷον οἱ ἄνωθεν καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι βιάσασθαι ἀνεχώρουν πάλιν καὶ ἀνεπαύοντο. [3] ἔτυχον δὲ καὶ βρονταί τινες ἅμα γενόμεναι καὶ ὕδωρ, οἷα τοῦ ἔτους πρὸς μετόπωρον ἤδη ὄντος φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι: ἀφ᾽ ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἔτι ἠθύμουν καὶ ἐνόμιζον ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι. [4] ἀναπαυομένων δ᾽ αὐτῶν ὁ Γύλιππος καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πέμπουσι μέρος τι τῆς στρατιᾶς ἀποτειχιοῦντας αὖ ἐκ τοῦ ὄπισθεν αὐτοὺς ᾗ προεληλύθεσαν: ἀντιπέμψαντες δὲ κἀκεῖνοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τινὰς διεκώλυσαν. [5] καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ἀναχωρήσαντες πρὸς τὸ πεδίον μᾶλλον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ηὐλίσαντο. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ προυχώρουν, καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι προσέβαλλόν τε πανταχῇ αὐτοῖς κύκλῳ καὶ πολλοὺς κατετραυμάτιζον, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐπίοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑπεχώρουν, εἰ δ᾽ ἀναχωροῖεν, ἐπέκειντο, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ὑστάτοις προσπίπτοντες, εἴ πως κατὰ βραχὺ τρεψάμενοι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα φοβήσειαν. [6] καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ἀντεῖχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔπειτα προελθόντες πέντε ἢ ἓξ σταδίους ἀνεπαύοντο ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ: ἀνεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐς τὸ ἑαυτῶν στρατόπεδον.

[79] In the morning they started early and resumed their march. They pressed onwards to the hill where the way was barred, and found in front of them the Syracusan infantry drawn up to defend the wall, in deep array, for the pass was narrow. Whereupon the Athenians advanced and assaulted the barrier, but the enemy, who were numerous and had the advantage of position, threw missiles upon them from the

hill, which was steep, and so, not being able to force their way, they again retired and rested. During the conflict, as is often the case in the fall of the year, there came on a storm of rain and thunder, whereby the Athenians were yet more disheartened, for they thought that everything was conspiring to their destruction. While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans despatched a division of their army to raise a wall behind them across the road by which they had come; but the Athenians sent some of their own troops and frustrated their intention. They then retired with their whole army in the direction of the plain and passed the night. On the following day they again advanced. The Syracusans now surrounded and attacked them on every side, and wounded many of them. If the Athenians advanced they retreated, but charged them when they retired, falling especially upon the hindermost of them, in the hope that, if they could put to flight a few at a time, they might strike a panic into the whole army. In this fashion the Athenians struggled on for a long time, and having advanced about three-quarters of a mile rested in the plain. The Syracusans then left them and returned to their own encampment.

80. τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς τῷ Νικίᾳ καὶ Δημοσθένει ἐδόκει, ἐπειδὴ κακῶς σφίσι τὸ στράτευμα εἶχε τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων πάντων ἀπορίᾳ ἤδη, καὶ κατατετραυματισμένοι ἦσαν πολλοὶ ἐν πολλαῖς προσβολαῖς τῶν πολεμίων γεγενημέναις, πυρὰ καύσαντας ὡς πλεῖστα ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιάν, μηκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ᾗ διενοήθησαν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἢ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐτήρουν, πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν. [2] ἦν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα ὁδὸς αὕτη οὐκ ἐπὶ Κατάνης τῷ στρατεύματι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τῆς Σικελίας τὸ πρὸς Καμάριναν καὶ Γέλαν καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ πόλεις καὶ Ἑλληνίδας καὶ βαρβάρους. [3] καύσαντες οὖν πυρὰ πολλὰ ἐχώρουν ἐν τῇ νυκτί. καὶ αὐτοῖς, οἷον φιλεῖ καὶ πᾶσι στρατοπέδοις, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς μεγίστοις, φόβοι καὶ δείματα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν νυκτί τε καὶ διὰ πολεμίας καὶ ἀπὸ πολεμίων οὐ πολὺ ἀπεχόντων ἰοῦσιν, ἐμπίπτει ταραχή: [4] καὶ τὸ μὲν Νικίου

στράτευμα,ὥσπερ ἡγεῖτο, ξυνέμενέ τε καὶ προύλαβε πολλῷ, τὸ δὲ Δημοσθένους, τὸ ἥμισυ μάλιστα καὶ πλέον, ἀπεσπάσθη τε καὶ ἀτακτότερον ἐχώρει. [5] ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἕῳ ἀφικνοῦνται ὅμως πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐσβάντες ἐς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν Ἑλωρίνην καλουμένην ἐπορεύοντο, ὅπως, ἐπειδὴ γένοιντο ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ τῷ Κακυπάρει, παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἴοιεν ἄνω διὰ μεσογείας: ἤλπιζον γὰρ καὶ τοὺς Σικελοὺς ταύτῃ οὓς μετεπέμψαντο ἀπαντήσεσθαι. [6] ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ, ηὗρον καὶ ἐνταῦθα φυλακήν τινα τῶν Συρακοσίων ἀποτειχίζουσάν τε καὶ ἀποσταυροῦσαν τὸν πόρον. καὶ βιασάμενοι αὐτὴν διέβησάν τε τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ ἐχώρουν αὖθις πρὸς ἄλλον ποταμὸν τὸν Ἐρινεόν: ταύτῃ γὰρ οἱ ἡγεμόνες ἐκέλευον.

[80] The army was now in a miserable plight, being in want of every necessary; and by the continual assaults of the enemy great numbers of the soldiers had been wounded. Nicias and Demosthenes, perceiving their condition, resolved during the night to light as many watch-fires as possible and to lead off their forces. They intended to take another route and march towards the sea in the direction opposite to that from which the Syracusans were watching them. Now their whole line of march lay, not towards Catana, but towards the other side of Sicily, in the direction of Camarina and Gela, and the cities, Hellenic or Barbarian, of that region. So they lighted numerous fires and departed in the night. And then, as constantly happens in armies, especially in very great ones, and as might be expected when they were marching by night in an enemy’s country, and with the enemy from whom they were flying not far off; there arose a panic among them, and they fell into confusion. The army of Nicias, which was leading the way, kept together, and got on considerably in advance, but that of Demosthenes; which was the larger half, was severed from the other division, and marched in worse order. At daybreak, however, they succeeded in reaching the sea, and striking into the Helorine road marched along it, intending

as soon as they arrived at the Cacyparis to follow up the course of the river through the interior of the island. They were expecting that the Sicels for whom they had sent would meet them on this road. When they had reached the river they found there also a guard of the Syracusans cutting off the passage by a wall and palisade. They forced their way through and, crossing the river, passed on towards another river which is called the Erineus, this being the direction in which their guides led them.

81. ἐν τούτῳ δ᾽ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, ὡς ἥ τε ἡμέρα ἐγένετο καὶ ἔγνωσαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπεληλυθότας, ἐν αἰτίᾳ τε οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν Γύλιππον εἶχον ἑκόντα ἀφεῖναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ κατὰ τάχος διώκοντες, ᾗ οὐ χαλεπῶς ᾐσθάνοντο κεχωρηκότας, καταλαμβάνουσι περὶ ἀρίστου ὥραν. [2] καὶ ὡς προσέμειξαν τοῖς μετὰ τοῦ Δημοσθένους ὑστέροις τ᾽ οὖσι καὶ σχολαίτερον καὶ ἀτακτότερον χωροῦσιν, ὡς τῆς νυκτὸς τότε ξυνεταράχθησαν, εὐθὺς προσπεσόντες ἐμάχοντο, καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐκυκλοῦντό τε ῥᾷον αὐτοὺς δίχα δὴ ὄντας καὶ ξυνῆγον ἐς ταὐτό. [3] τὸ δὲ Νικίου στράτευμα ἀπεῖχεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν καὶ πεντήκοντα σταδίους: θᾶσσόν τε γὰρ ὁ Νικίας ἦγε, νομίζων οὐ τὸ ὑπομένειν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἑκόντας εἶναι καὶ μάχεσθαι σωτηρίαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς τάχιστα ὑποχωρεῖν, τοσαῦτα μαχομένους ὅσα ἀναγκάζονται. [4] ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἐτύγχανέ τε τὰ πλείω ἐν πόνῳ ξυνεχεστέρῳ ὢν διὰ τὸ ὑστέρῳ ἀναχωροῦντι αὐτῷ πρώτῳ ἐπικεῖσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τότε γνοὺς τοὺς Συρακοσίους διώκοντας οὐ προυχώρει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο, ἕως ἐνδιατρίβων κυκλοῦταί τε ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν πολλῷ θορύβῳ αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν: ἀνειληθέντες γὰρ ἔς τι χωρίον ᾧ κύκλῳ μὲν τειχίον περιῆν, ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν [τε] καὶ ἔνθεν, ἐλάας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβάλλοντο περισταδόν. [5] τοιαύταις δὲ προσβολαῖς καὶ οὐ ξυσταδὸν μάχαις οἱ Συρακόσιοι εἰκότως ἐχρῶντο: τὸ γὰρ ἀποκινδυνεύειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀπονενοημένους οὐ πρὸς ἐκείνων μᾶλλον ἦν ἔτι ἢ πρὸς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἅμα φειδώ

τέ τις ἐγίγνετο ἐπ᾽ εὐπραγίᾳ ἤδη σαφεῖ μὴ προαναλωθῆναί τῳ, καὶ ἐνόμιζον καὶ ὡς ταύτῃ τῇ ἰδέᾳ καταδαμασάμενοι λήψεσθαι αὐτούς.

[81] When daylight broke and the Syracusans and their allies saw that the Athenians had departed, most of them thought that Gylippus had let them go on purpose, and were very angry with him. They easily found the line of their retreat, and quickly following, came up with them about the time of the midday meal. The troops of Demosthenes were last; they were marching slowly and in disorder, not having recovered from the panic of the previous night, when they were overtaken by the Syracusans, who immediately fell upon them and fought. Separated as they were from the others, they were easily hemmed in by the Syracusan cavalry and driven into a narrow space. The division of Nicias was now as much as six miles in advance, for he marched faster, thinking that their safety depended at such a time, not in remaining and fighting, if they could avoid it, but in retreating as quickly as they could, and resisting only when they were positively compelled. Demosthenes, on the other hand, who had been more incessantly harassed throughout the retreat, because marching last he was first attacked by the enemy, now, when he saw the Syracusans pursuing him, instead of pressing onward, ranged his army in order of battle. Thus lingering he was surrounded, and he and the Athenians under his command were in the greatest confusion. For they were crushed into a walled enclosure, having a road on both sides and planted thickly with olive-trees, and missiles were hurled at them from all points. The Syracusans naturally preferred this mode of attack to a regular engagement. For to risk themselves against desperate men would have been only playing into the hands of the Athenians. Moreover, every one was sparing of his life; their good fortune was already assured; and they did not want to fall in the hour of victory. Even by this irregular

mode of fighting they thought that they could overpower and capture the Athenians.

82. ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ οὖν δι᾽ ἡμέρας βάλλοντες πανταχόθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ξυμμάχους ἑώρων ἤδη τεταλαιπωρημένους τοῖς τε τραύμασι καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ κακώσει, κήρυγμα ποιοῦνται Γύλιππος καὶ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρῶτον μὲν τῶν νησιωτῶν εἴ τις βούλεται ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερίᾳ ὡς σφᾶς ἀπιέναι: καὶ ἀπεχώρησάν τινες πόλεις οὐ πολλαί. [2] ἔπειτα δ᾽ ὕστερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μετὰ Δημοσθένους ὁμολογία γίγνεται ὥστε ὅπλα τε παραδοῦναι καὶ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν μηδένα μήτε βιαίως μήτε δεσμοῖς μήτε τῆς ἀναγκαιοτάτης ἐνδείᾳ διαίτης. [3] καὶ παρέδοσαν οἱ πάντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑξακισχίλιοι, καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ὃ εἶχον ἅπαν κατέθεσαν ἐσβαλόντες ἐς ἀσπίδας ὑπτίας, καὶ ἐνέπλησαν ἀσπίδας τέσσαρας. καὶ τούτους μὲν εὐθὺς ἀπεκόμιζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν: Νικίας δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Ἐρινεόν, καὶ διαβὰς πρὸς μετέωρόν τι καθῖσε τὴν στρατιάν.

[82] And so when they had gone on all day assailing them with missiles from every quarter, and saw that they were quite worn out with their wounds and all their other sufferings, Gylippus and the Syracusans made a proclamation, first of all to the islanders; that any of them who pleased might come over to them and have their freedom. But only a few cities accepted the offer. At length an agreement was made for the entire force under Demosthenes. Their arms were to be surrendered, but no one was to suffer death, either from violence or from imprisonment, or from want of the bare means of life. So they all surrendered, being in number six thousand, and gave up what money they had. This they threw into the hollows of shields and filled four. The captives were at once taken to the city. On the same day Nicias and his division reached the river Erineus, which he crossed, and halted his army on a rising ground.

83. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ καταλαβόντες αὐτὸν ἔλεγον ὅτι οἱ μετὰ Δημοσθένους παραδεδώκοιεν σφᾶς αὐτούς, κελεύοντες κἀκεῖνον τὸ αὐτὸ δρᾶν: ὁ δ᾽ ἀπιστῶν σπένδεται ἱππέα πέμψαι σκεψόμενον. [2] ὡς δ᾽ οἰχόμενος ἀπήγγειλε πάλιν παραδεδωκότας, ἐπικηρυκεύεται Γυλίππῳ καὶ Συρακοσίοις εἶναι ἑτοῖμος ὑπὲρ Ἀθηναίων ξυμβῆναι, ὅσα ἀνήλωσαν χρήματα Συρακόσιοι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, ταῦτα ἀποδοῦναι, ὥστε τὴν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ στρατιὰν ἀφεῖναι αὐτούς: μέχρι οὗ δ᾽ ἂν τὰ χρήματα ἀποδοθῇ, ἄνδρας δώσειν Ἀθηναίων ὁμήρους, ἕνα κατὰ τάλαντον. [3] οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ Γύλιππος οὐ προσεδέχοντο τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλὰ προσπεσόντες καὶ περιστάντες πανταχόθεν ἔβαλλον καὶ τούτους μέχρι ὀψέ. [4] εἶχον δὲ καὶ οὗτοι πονηρῶς σίτου τε καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀπορίᾳ. ὅμως δὲ τῆς νυκτὸς φυλάξαντες τὸ ἡσυχάζον ἔμελλον πορεύσεσθαι. καὶ ἀναλαμβάνουσί τε τὰ ὅπλα καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι αἰσθάνονται καὶ ἐπαιάνισαν. [5] γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτι οὐ λανθάνουσι, κατέθεντο πάλιν πλὴν τριακοσίων μάλιστα ἀνδρῶν: οὗτοι δὲ διὰ τῶν φυλάκων βιασάμενοι ἐχώρουν τῆς νυκτὸς ᾗ ἐδύναντο.

[83] On the following day he was overtaken by the Syracusans, who told him that Demosthenes had surrendered, and bade him do the same. He, not believing them, procured a truce while he sent a horseman to go and see. Upon the return of the horseman bringing assurance of the fact, he sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans, saying that he would agree, on behalf of the Athenian state, to pay the expenses which the Syracusans had incurred in the war, on condition that they should let his army go; until the money was paid he would give Athenian citizens as hostages, a man for a talent. Gylippus and the Syracusans would not accept these proposals, but attacked and surrounded this division of the army as they had the other, and hurled missiles at them from every side until the evening. They too were grievously in want of food and necessaries. Nevertheless they meant to wait for the dead of

the night and then to proceed. They were just resuming their arms, when the Syracusans discovered them and raised the Paean. The Athenians, perceiving that they were detected, laid down their arms again, with the exception of about three hundred men who broke through the enemy’s guard, and made their escape in the darkness as best they could.

84. Νικίας δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο ἦγε τὴν στρατιάν: οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι προσέκειντο τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον πανταχόθεν βάλλοντές τε καὶ κατακοντίζοντες. [2] καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἠπείγοντο πρὸς τὸν Ἀσσίναρον ποταμόν, ἅμα μὲν βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς πανταχόθεν προσβολῆς ἱππέων τε πολλῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ὄχλου, οἰόμενοι ῥᾷόν τι σφίσιν ἔσεσθαι, ἢν διαβῶσι τὸν ποταμόν, ἅμα δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς ταλαιπωρίας καὶ τοῦ πιεῖν ἐπιθυμίᾳ. [3] ὡς δὲ γίγνονται ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ἐσπίπτουσιν οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἔτι, ἀλλὰ πᾶς τέ τις διαβῆναι αὐτὸς πρῶτος βουλόμενος καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι ἐπικείμενοι χαλεπὴν ἤδη τὴν διάβασιν ἐποίουν: ἀθρόοι γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενοι χωρεῖν ἐπέπιπτόν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ κατεπάτουν, περί τε τοῖς δορατίοις καὶ σκεύεσιν οἱ μὲν εὐθὺς διεφθείροντο, οἱ δὲ ἐμπαλασσόμενοι κατέρρεον. [4] ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερά τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ παραστάντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἦν δὲ κρημνῶδες ἔβαλλον ἄνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ ποταμῷ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταρασσομένους. [5] οἵ τε Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπικαταβάντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ μάλιστα ἔσφαζον. καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ εὐθὺς διέφθαρτο, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπίνετό τε ὁμοῦ τῷ πηλῷ ᾑματωμένον καὶ περιμάχητον ἦν τοῖς πολλοῖς.

[84] When the day dawned Nicias led forward his army, and the Syracusans and the allies again assailed them on every side, hurling javelins and other missiles at them. The Athenians hurried on to the river Assinarus. They hoped to gain a little relief if they forded the river, for the mass of horsemen and other troops overwhelmed and crushed them; and they were worn out by fatigue and thirst. But no sooner did they reach the water than they lost all order and rushed

in; every man was trying to cross first, and, the enemy pressing upon them at the same time, the passage of the river became hopeless. Being compelled to keep close together they fell one upon another, and trampled each other under foot: some at once perished, pierced by their own spears; others got entangled in the baggage and were carried down the stream. The Syracusans stood upon the further bank of the river, which was steep, and hurled missiles from above on the Athenians, who were huddled together in the deep bed of the stream and for the most part were drinking greedily. The Peloponnesians came down the bank and slaughtered them, falling chiefly upon those who were in the river. Whereupon the water at once became foul, but was drunk all the same, although muddy and dyed with blood, and the crowd fought for it.

85. τέλος δὲ νεκρῶν τε πολλῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ἤδη κειμένων ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ καὶ διεφθαρμένου τοῦ στρατεύματος τοῦ μὲν κατὰ τὸν ποταμόν, τοῦ δὲ καί, εἴ τι διαφύγοι, ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων, Νικίας Γυλίππῳ ἑαυτὸν παραδίδωσι, πιστεύσας μᾶλλον αὐτῷ ἢ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις: καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν χρήσασθαι ἐκέλευεν ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ὅτι βούλονται, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους στρατιώτας παύσασθαι φονεύοντας. [2] καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος μετὰ τοῦτο ζωγρεῖν ἤδη ἐκέλευεν: καὶ τούς τε λοιποὺς ὅσους μὴ ἀπεκρύψαντο πολλοὶ δὲ οὗτοι ἐγένοντο ξυνεκόμισαν ζῶντας, καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τριακοσίους, οἳ τὴν φυλακὴν διεξῆλθον τῆς νυκτός, πέμψαντες τοὺς διωξομένους ξυνέλαβον. [3] τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀθροισθὲν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐς τὸ κοινὸν οὐ πολὺ ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ διακλαπὲν πολύ, καὶ διεπλήσθη πᾶσα Σικελία αὐτῶν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ὥσπερ τῶν μετὰ Δημοσθένους ληφθέντων. [4] μέρος δέ τι οὐκ ὀλίγον καὶ ἀπέθανεν: πλεῖστος γὰρ δὴ φόνος οὗτος καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐλάσσων τῶν ἐν τῷ [Σικελικῷ] πολέμῳ τούτῳ ἐγένετο. καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις προσβολαῖς ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πορείαν συχναῖς γενομέναις οὐκ ὀλίγοι ἐτεθνήκεσαν. πολλοὶ δὲ ὅμως καὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παραυτίκα, οἱ δὲ καὶ

δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ὕστερον: τούτοις δ᾽ ἦν ἀναχώρησις ἐς Κατάνην.

[85] At last, when the dead bodies were lying in heaps upon one another in the water and the army was utterly undone, some perishing in the river, and any who escaped being cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered to Gylippus, in whom he had more confidence than in the Syracusans. He entreated him and the Lacedaemonians to do what they pleased with himself, but not to go on killing the men. So Gylippus gave the word to make prisoners. Thereupon the survivors, not including however a large number whom the soldiers concealed, were brought in alive. As for the three hundred who had broken through the guard in the night, the Syracusans sent in pursuit and seized them. The total of the public prisoners when collected was not great; for many were appropriated by the soldiers, and the whole of Sicily was full of them, they not having capitulated like the troops under Demosthenes. A large number also perished; the slaughter at the river being very great, quite as great as any which took place in the Sicilian war; and not a few had fallen in the frequent attacks which were made upon the Athenians during their march. Still many escaped, some at the time, others ran away after an interval of slavery, and all these found refuge at Catana.

86. ξυναθροισθέντες δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, τῶν τε αἰχμαλώτων ὅσους ἐδύναντο πλείστους καὶ τὰ σκῦλα ἀναλαβόντες, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν. [2] καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὁπόσους ἔλαβον κατεβίβασαν ἐς τὰς λιθοτομίας, ἀσφαλεστάτην εἶναι νομίσαντες τήρησιν, Νικίαν δὲ καὶ Δημοσθένη ἄκοντος τοῦ Γυλίππου ἀπέσφαξαν. ὁ γὰρ Γύλιππος καλὸν τὸ ἀγώνισμα ἐνόμιζέν οἱ εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοὺς ἀντιστρατήγους κομίσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις. [3] ξυνέβαινε δὲ τὸν μὲν πολεμιώτατον αὐτοῖς εἶναι, Δημοσθένη, διὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ Πύλῳ, τὸν δὲ διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδειότατον: τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὁ Νικίας

προυθυμήθη, σπονδὰς πείσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ποιήσασθαι, ὥστε ἀφεθῆναι. [4] ἀνθ᾽ ὧν οἵ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἦσαν αὐτῷ προσφιλεῖς κἀκεῖνος οὐχ ἥκιστα διὰ τοῦτο πιστεύσας ἑαυτὸν τῷ Γυλίππῳ παρέδωκεν. ἀλλὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων τινές, ὡς ἐλέγετο, οἱ μὲν δείσαντες, ὅτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκεκοινολόγηντο, μὴ βασανιζόμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο ταραχὴν σφίσιν ἐν εὐπραγίᾳ ποιήσῃ, ἄλλοι δέ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ Κορίνθιοι, μὴ χρήμασι δὴ πείσας τινάς, ὅτι πλούσιος ἦν, ἀποδρᾷ καὶ αὖθις σφίσι νεώτερόν τι ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ γένηται, πείσαντες τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀπέκτειναν αὐτόν. [5] καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτῃ ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων αἰτίᾳ ἐτεθνήκει, ἥκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὢν τῶν γε ἐπ᾽ ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν.

[86] The Syracusans and their allies collected their forces and returned with the spoil, and as many prisoners as they could take with them, into the city. The captive Athenians and allies they deposited in the quarries, which they thought would be the safest place of confinement. Nicias and Demosthenes they put to the sword, although against the will of Gylippus. For Gylippus thought that to carry home with him to Lacedaemon the generals of the enemy, over and above all his other successes, would be a brilliant triumph. One of them, Demosthenes, happened to be the greatest foe, and the other the greatest friend of the Lacedaemonians, both in the same matter of Pylos and Sphacteria. For Nicias had taken up their cause, and had persuaded the Athenians to make the peace which set at liberty the prisoners taken in the island. The Lacedaemonians were grateful to him for the service, and this was the main reason why he trusted Gylippus and surrendered himself to him. But certain Syracusans, who had been in communication with him, were afraid (such was the report) that on some suspicion of their guilt he might be put to the torture and bring trouble on them in the hour of their prosperity. Others, and especially the Corinthians, feared

that, being rich, he might by bribery escape and do them further mischief. So the Syracusans gained the consent of the allies and had him executed. For these or the like reasons he suffered death. No one of the Hellenes in my time was less deserving of so miserable an end; for he lived in the practice of every virtue.

87. τοὺς δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς λιθοτομίαις οἱ Συρακόσιοι χαλεπῶς τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους μετεχείρισαν. ἐν γὰρ κοίλῳ χωρίῳ ὄντας καὶ ὀλίγῳ πολλοὺς οἵ τε ἥλιοι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ πνῖγος ἔτι ἐλύπει διὰ τὸ ἀστέγαστον καὶ αἱ νύκτες ἐπιγιγνόμεναι τοὐναντίον μετοπωριναὶ καὶ ψυχραὶ τῇ μεταβολῇ ἐς ἀσθένειαν ἐνεωτέριζον, [2] πάντα τε ποιούντων αὐτῶν διὰ στενοχωρίαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ προσέτι τῶν νεκρῶν ὁμοῦ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ξυννενημένων, οἳ ἕκ τε τῶν τραυμάτων καὶ διὰ τὴν μεταβολὴν καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπέθνῃσκον, καὶ ὀσμαὶ ἦσαν οὐκ ἀνεκτοί, καὶ λιμῷ ἅμα καὶ δίψῃ ἐπιέζοντο ἐδίδοσαν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἑκάστῳ ἐπὶ ὀκτὼ μῆνας κοτύλην ὕδατος καὶ δύο κοτύλας σίτου, ἄλλα τε ὅσα εἰκὸς ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ ἐμπεπτωκότας κακοπαθῆσαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπεγένετο αὐτοῖς: [3] καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἑβδομήκοντά τινας οὕτω διῃτήθησαν ἀθρόοι: ἔπειτα πλὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἴ τινες Σικελιωτῶν ἢ Ἰταλιωτῶν ξυνεστράτευσαν, τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπέδοντο. [4] ἐλήφθησαν δὲ οἱ ξύμπαντες, ἀκριβείᾳ μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐξειπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἑπτακισχιλίων. [5] ξυνέβη τε ἔργον τοῦτο [Ἑλληνικὸν] τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε μέγιστον γενέσθαι, δοκεῖν δ᾽ ἔμοιγε καὶ ὧν ἀκοῇ Ἑλληνικῶν ἴσμεν, καὶ τοῖς τε κρατήσασι λαμπρότατον καὶ τοῖς διαφθαρεῖσι δυστυχέστατον: [6] κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως νικηθέντες καὶ οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδὲν κακοπαθήσαντες πανωλεθρίᾳ δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ πεζὸς καὶ νῆες καὶ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀπενόστησαν. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Σικελίαν γενόμενα.

[87] Those who were imprisoned in the quarries were at the beginning of their captivity harshly treated by the Syracusans. There were great numbers of them, and they

were crowded in a deep and narrow place. At first the sun by day was still scorching and suffocating, for they had no roof over their heads, while the autumn nights were cold, and the extremes of temperature engendered violent disorders. Being cramped for room they had to do everything on the same spot. The corpses of those who died from their wounds, exposure to heat and cold, and the like, lay heaped one upon another. The smells were intolerable; and they were at the same time afflicted by hunger and thirst. During eight months they were allowed only about half a pint of water and a pint of food a day. Every kind of misery which could befall man in such a place befell them. This was the condition of all the captives for about ten weeks. At length the Syracusans sold them, with the exception of the Athenians and of any Sicilian or Italian Greeks who had sided with them in the war. The whole number of the public prisoners is not accurately known, but they were not less than seven thousand.Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this war, or indeed, as I think, of all Hellenic actions which are on record, this was the greatest — the most glorious to the victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished ; for they were utterly and at all points defeated, and their sufferings were prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth; nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home.Thus ended the Sicilian expedition.

Βιβλίο Η’ — BOOK VIII

1. ἐς δὲ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπειδὴ ἠγγέλθη, ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἠπίστουν καὶ τοῖς πάνυ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου διαπεφευγόσι καὶ σαφῶς ἀγγέλλουσι, μὴ οὕτω γε ἄγαν πανσυδὶ διεφθάρθαι: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς ξυμπροθυμηθεῖσι τῶν ῥητόρων τὸν ἔκπλουν, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισάμενοι, ὠργίζοντο δὲ καὶ τοῖς χρησμολόγοις τε καὶ μάντεσι καὶ ὁπόσοι τι τότε αὐτοὺς θειάσαντες ἐπήλπισαν ὡς λήψονται Σικελίαν. [2] πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει τε καὶ περιειστήκει ἐπὶ τῷ γεγενημένῳ φόβος τε καὶ κατάπληξις μεγίστη δή. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ στερόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ πόλις ὁπλιτῶν τε πολλῶν καὶ ἱππέων καὶ ἡλικίας οἵαν οὐχ ἑτέραν ἑώρων ὑπάρχουσαν ἐβαρύνοντο: ἅμα δὲ ναῦς οὐχ ὁρῶντες ἐν τοῖς νεωσοίκοις ἱκανὰς οὐδὲ χρήματα ἐν τῷ κοινῷ οὐδ᾽ ὑπηρεσίας ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀνέλπιστοι ἦσαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι σωθήσεσθαι, τούς τε ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας πολεμίους εὐθὺς σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον τῷ ναυτικῷ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ πλευσεῖσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοσοῦτον κρατήσαντας, καὶ τοὺς αὐτόθεν πολεμίους τότε δὴ καὶ διπλασίως πάντα παρεσκευασμένους κατὰ κράτος ἤδη καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἐπικείσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους σφῶν μετ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀποστάντας. [3] ὅμως δὲ ὡς ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐδόκει χρῆναι μὴ ἐνδιδόναι, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ ναυτικόν, ὅθεν ἂν δύνωνται ξύλα ξυμπορισαμένους, καὶ χρήματα, καὶ τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς ἀσφάλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τὴν Εὔβοιαν, τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι, καὶ ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἑλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ προβουλεύσουσιν. [4] πάντα τε πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεές, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν. καὶ ὡς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐποίουν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[1] THE news was brought to Athens, but the Athenians could not believe that the armament had been so

completely annihilated, although they had the positive assurances of the very soldiers who had escaped from the scene of action. At last they knew the truth; and then they were furious with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition — as if they had not voted it themselves — and with the soothsayers, and prophets, and all who by the influence of religion had at the time inspired them with the belief that they would conquer Sicily. Whichever way they looked there was trouble; they were overwhelmed by their calamity, and were in fear and consternation unutterable. The citizens and the city were alike distressed; they had lost a host of cavalry and hoplites and the flower of their youth, and there were none to replace them. And when they saw an insufficient number of ships in their docks, and no crews to man them, nor money in the treasury, they despaired of deliverance. They had no doubt that their enemies in Sicily, after the great victory which they had already gained, would at once sail against the Piraeus. Their enemies in Hellas, whose resources were now doubled, would likewise set upon them with all their might both by sea and land, and would be assisted by their own revolted allies. Still they determined, so far as their situation allowed, not to give way. They would procure timber and money by whatever means they might, and build a navy. They would make sure of their allies, and above all of Euboea. Expenses in the city were to be economised, and they were to choose a council of the elder men, who should advise together, and lay before the people the measures which from time to time might be required. After the manner of a democracy, they were very amenable to discipline while their fright lasted. They proceeded to carry out these resolutions. And so the summer ended.

2. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας τῶν Ἀθηναίων μεγάλην κακοπραγίαν εὐθὺς οἱ Ἕλληνες πάντες ἐπηρμένοι ἦσαν, οἱ μὲν μηδετέρων ὄντες ξύμμαχοι, ὡς, ἤν τις καὶ μὴ παρακαλῇ σφᾶς, οὐκ

ἀποστατέον ἔτι τοῦ πολέμου εἴη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐθελοντὶ ἰτέον ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, νομίσαντες κἂν ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἕκαστοι ἐλθεῖν αὐτούς, εἰ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ κατώρθωσαν, καὶ ἅμα βραχὺν ἔσεσθαι τὸν λοιπὸν πόλεμον, οὗ μετασχεῖν καλὸν εἶναι, οἱ δ᾽ αὖ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμμαχοι ξυμπροθυμηθέντες ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ πρὶν ἀπαλλάξεσθαι διὰ τάχους πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας. [2] μάλιστα δὲ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἀφίστασθαι διὰ τὸ ὀργῶντες κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα καὶ μηδ᾽ ὑπολείπειν λόγον αὐτοῖς ὡς τό γ᾽ ἐπιὸν θέρος οἷοί τ᾽ ἔσονται περιγενέσθαι. [3] ἡ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις πᾶσί τε τούτοις ἐθάρσει καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας αὐτοῖς ξύμμαχοι πολλῇ δυνάμει, κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἤδη τοῦ ναυτικοῦ προσγεγενημένου, ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ὡς εἰκὸς παρέσεσθαι ἔμελλον. [4] πανταχόθεν τε εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀπροφασίστως ἅπτεσθαι διενοοῦντο τοῦ πολέμου, λογιζόμενοι καλῶς τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ κινδύνων τε τοιούτων ἀπηλλάχθαι ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν οἷος καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων περιέστη ἂν αὐτούς, εἰ τὸ Σικελικὸν προσέλαβον, καὶ καθελόντες ἐκείνους αὐτοὶ τῆς πάσης Ἑλλάδος ἤδη ἀσφαλῶς ἡγήσεσθαι.

[2] During the following winter all Hellas was stirred by the great overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily. The states which had been neutral determined that the time had come when, invited or not, they could no longer stand aloof from the war; they must of their own accord attack the Athenians. They considered, one and all, that if the Sicilian expedition had succeeded, they would sooner or later have been attacked by them. The war would not last long, and they might as well share in the glory of it. The Lacedaemonian allies, animated by a common feeling, were more eager than ever to make a speedy end of their great hardships. But none showed greater alacrity than the subjects of the Athenians, who were everywhere willing even beyond their power to revolt; for they judged by their excited feelings, and would not admit a possibility that the Athenians could survive another summer. To the Lacedaemonians themselves all this

was most encouraging; and they had in addition the prospect that their allies from Sicily would join them at the beginning of spring with a large force of ships as well as men; necessity having at last compelled them to become a naval power. Everything looked hopeful, and they determined to strike promptly and vigorously. They considered that by the successful termination of the war they would be finally delivered from dangers such as would have surrounded them if the Athenians had become masters of Sicily. Athens once overthrown, they might assure to themselves the undisputed leadership of all Hellas.

3. εὐθὺς οὖν Ἆγις μὲν ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ ὁρμηθεὶς στρατῷ τινὶ ἐκ Δεκελείας τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων ἠργυρολόγησεν ἐς τὸ ναυτικὸν καὶ τραπόμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ Μηλιῶς κόλπου Οἰταίων τε κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ἔχθραν τῆς λείας τὴν πολλὴν ἀπολαβὼν χρήματα ἐπράξατο, καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς τοὺς Φθιώτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ταύτῃ Θεσσαλῶν ὑπηκόους μεμφομένων καὶ ἀκόντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ὁμήρους τέ τινας ἠνάγκασε δοῦναι καὶ χρήματα, καὶ κατέθετο τοὺς ὁμήρους ἐς Κόρινθον, ἔς τε τὴν ξυμμαχίαν ἐπειρᾶτο προσάγειν. [2] Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσταξιν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἑκατὸν νεῶν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ἑαυτοῖς μὲν καὶ Βοιωτοῖς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἑκατέροις ἔταξαν, Φωκεῦσι δὲ καὶ Λοκροῖς πέντε καὶ δέκα, καὶ Κορινθίοις πέντε καὶ δέκα, Ἀρκάσι δὲ καὶ Πελληνεῦσι καὶ Σικυωνίοις δέκα, Μεγαρεῦσι δὲ καὶ Τροιζηνίοις καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίοις καὶ Ἑρμιονεῦσι δέκα: τά τε ἄλλα παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς εὐθὺς πρὸς τὸ ἔαρ ἐξόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου.

[3] At the beginning therefore of this winter, Agis the Lacedaemonian king led out a body of troops from Decelea, and collected from the allies contributions towards the expenses of a navy. Then passing to the Malian Gulf he carried off from the Oetaeans, who were old enemies, the greater part of their cattle, and exacted money of them; from the Achaeans of Phthia, and from the other tribes in

that region, without the leave and in spite of the remonstrance of the Thessalians, to whom they were subject, he likewise extorted money and took some hostages, whom he deposited at Corinth, and tried to force upon them the Lacedaemonian alliance. The whole number of ships which the allies were to build was fixed by the Lacedaemonians at a hundred: twenty-five were to be built by themselves and twenty-five by the Boeotians, fifteen by the Phocians and Locrians, fifteen by the Corinthians, ten by the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians, ten by the Megarians, Troezenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians. Every sort of preparation was made, for the Lacedaemonians were determined to prosecute the war at the first appearance of spring.

4. παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥσπερ διενοήθησαν, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ τήν τε ναυπηγίαν, ξύλα ξυμπορισάμενοι, καὶ Σούνιον τειχίσαντες, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ἀσφάλεια ταῖς σιταγωγοῖς ναυσὶν εἴη τοῦ περίπλου, καὶ τό τε ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ τείχισμα ἐκλιπόντες ὃ ἐνῳκοδόμησαν παραπλέοντες ἐς Σικελίαν, καὶ τἆλλα, εἴ πού τι ἐδόκει ἀχρεῖον ἀναλίσκεσθαι, ξυστελλόμενοι ἐς εὐτέλειαν, μάλιστα δὲ τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων διασκοποῦντες ὅπως μὴ σφῶν ἀποστήσονται.

[4] The Athenians also carried out their intended preparations during this winter. They collected timber and built ships; they fortified Sunium for the protection of their corn-ships on the voyage round to Athens; also they abandoned the fort in Laconia which they had erected while sailing to Sicily, and cut down any expenses which seemed unnecessary. Above all, they kept strict watch over their allies, apprehending revolt.

5. πρασσόντων δὲ ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρων καὶ ὄντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων ἐν κατασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου, πρῶτοι Εὐβοῆς ὡς Ἄγιν περὶ ἀποστάσεως τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπρεσβεύσαντο ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ. ὁ δὲ προσδεξάμενος τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν μεταπέμπεται ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος

Ἀλκαμένη τὸν Σθενελαΐδου καὶ Μέλανθον ἄρχοντας ὡς ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν: οἱ δ᾽ ἦλθον ἔχοντες τῶν νεοδαμωδῶν ὡς τριακοσίους, καὶ παρεσκεύαζεν αὐτοῖς τὴν διάβασιν. [2] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ καὶ Λέσβιοι ἦλθον βουλόμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀποστῆναι: καὶ ξυμπρασσόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀναπείθεται Ἆγις ὥστε Εὐβοίας μὲν πέρι ἐπισχεῖν, τοῖς δὲ Λεσβίοις παρεσκεύαζε τὴν ἀπόστασιν, Ἀλκαμένη τε ἁρμοστὴν διδούς, ὃς ἐς Εὔβοιαν πλεῖν ἔμελλε, καὶ δέκα μὲν Βοιωτοὶ ναῦς ὑπέσχοντο, δέκα δὲ Ἆγις. [3] καὶ ταῦτα ἄνευ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πόλεως ἐπράσσετο: ὁ γὰρ Ἆγις, ὅσον χρόνον ἦν περὶ Δεκέλειαν ἔχων τὴν μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν, κύριος ἦν καὶ ἀποστέλλειν εἴ ποί τινα ἐβούλετο στρατιὰν καὶ ξυναγείρειν καὶ χρήματα πράσσειν. καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὡς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν αὐτοῦ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὑπήκουον [ἢ] τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει Λακεδαιμονίων: δύναμιν γὰρ ἔχων αὐτὸς εὐθὺς ἐκασταχόσε δεινὸς παρῆν. [4]καὶ ὁ μὲν τοῖς Λεσβίοις ἔπρασσε, Χῖοι δὲ καὶ Ἐρυθραῖοι ἀποστῆναι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες πρὸς μὲν Ἆγιν οὐκ ἐτράποντο, ἐς δὲ τὴν Λακεδαίμονα. καὶ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνους, ὃς βασιλεῖ Δαρείῳ τῷ Ἀρταξέρξου στρατηγὸς ἦν τῶν κάτω, πρεσβευτὴς ἅμα μετ᾽ αὐτῶν παρῆν. [5] ἐπήγετο γὰρ καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς Πελοποννησίους καὶ ὑπισχνεῖτο τροφὴν παρέξειν. ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένος τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσεσθαι ἐπωφείλησεν: τούς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι κακώσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἅμα βασιλεῖ ξυμμάχους Λακεδαιμονίους ποιήσειν, καὶ Ἀμόργην τὸν Πισσούθνου υἱὸν νόθον, ἀφεστῶτα περὶ Καρίαν, ὥσπερ αὐτῷ προσέταξε βασιλεύς, ἢ ζῶντα ἄξειν ἢ ἀποκτενεῖν.

[5] During the same winter, while both parties were as intent upon their preparations as if the war were only just beginning, first among the Athenian subjects the Euboeans sent envoys to negotiate with Agis. Agis accepted their proposals, and summoned from Lacedaemon Alcamenes the son of Sthenelaidas, and Melanthus, that they might take

the command in Euboea. They came, accompanied by three hundred of the Neodamodes. But while he was making ready to convey them across the strait, there arrived envoys from Lesbos, which was likewise anxious to revolt; and as the Boeotians were in their interest, Agis was persuaded to defer the expedition to Euboea while he prepared to assist the Lesbians. He appointed Alcamenes, who had been designed for Euboea, their governor; and he further promised them ten ships, the Boeotians promising ten more. All this was done without the authority of the Lacedaemonian government; for Agis, while he was with his army at Decelea, had the right to send troops whithersoever he pleased, to raise levies, and to exact money. And at that particular time he might be said to have far more influence over the allies than the Lacedaemonians at home, for he had an army at his disposal, and might appear in formidable strength anywhere at any time.While he was supporting the Lesbians, certain Chians and Erythraeans (who were also ready to revolt) had recourse, not to Agis, but to Lacedaemon; they were accompanied by an envoy from Tissaphernes, whom King Darius the son of Artaxerxes had appointed to be military governor of the provinces on the coast of Asia. Tissaphernes too was inviting the assistance of the Lacedaemonians, and promised to maintain their troops; for the King had quite lately been demanding of him the revenues due from the Hellenic cities in his province, which he had been prevented by the Athenians from collecting, and therefore still owed. He thought that if he could weaken the Athenians he would be more likely to get his tribute; he hoped also to make the Lacedaemonians allies of the King, and by their help either to slay or take alive, in accordance with the King’s orders, Amorges the natural son of Pissuthnes, who had revolted in Caria.

6. οἱ μὲν οὖν Χῖοι καὶ Τισσαφέρνης κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔπρασσον, Καλλίγειτος δὲ ὁ Λαοφῶντος Μεγαρεὺς καὶ Τιμαγόρας ὁ Ἀθηναγόρου Κυζικηνός, φυγάδες τῆς ἑαυτῶν

ἀμφότεροι παρὰ Φαρναβάζῳ τῷ Φαρνάκου κατοικοῦντες, ἀφικνοῦνται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πέμψαντος Φαρναβάζου, ὅπως ναῦς κομίσειαν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ αὐτός, εἰ δύναιτο, ἅπερ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης προυθυμεῖτο, τάς τε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις ἀποστήσειε τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τοὺς φόρους καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ποιήσειεν. [2]πρασσόντων δὲ ταῦτα χωρὶς ἑκατέρων, τῶν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ Φαρναβάζου καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους, πολλὴ ἅμιλλα ἐγίγνετο τῶν ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι, ὅπως οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ Χίον, οἱ δ᾽ ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον πρότερον ναῦς καὶ στρατιὰν πείσουσι πέμπειν. [3] οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ τῶν Χίων καὶ Τισσαφέρνους παρὰ πολὺ προσεδέξαντο μᾶλλον: ξυνέπρασσε γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Ἐνδίῳ ἐφορεύοντι πατρικὸς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα ξένος ὤν, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα Λακωνικὸν ἡ οἰκία αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ξενίαν ἔσχεν: Ἔνδιος γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐκαλεῖτο. [4] ὅμως δ᾽ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρῶτον κατάσκοπον ἐς τὴν Χίον πέμψαντες Φρῦνιν ἄνδρα περίοικον, εἰ αἵ τε νῆες αὐτοῖς εἰσὶν ὅσασπερ ἔλεγον καὶ τἆλλα εἰ ἡ πόλις ἱκανή ἐστι πρὸς τὴν λεγομένην δόξαν, ἀπαγγείλαντος αὐτοῖς ὡς εἴη ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ἅπερ ἤκουον, τούς τε Χίους καὶ τοὺς Ἐρυθραίους εὐθὺς ξυμμάχους ἐποιήσαντο καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς ἐψηφίσαντο αὐτοῖς πέμπειν, ὡς ἐκεῖ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἢ ἑξήκοντα ἀφ᾽ ὧν οἱ Χῖοι ἔλεγον ὑπαρχουσῶν. [5] καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον δέκα τούτων αὐτοὶ ἔμελλον πέμψειν, καὶ Μελαγχρίδαν, ὃς αὐτοῖς ναύαρχος ἦν: ἔπειτα σεισμοῦ γενομένου ἀντὶ τοῦ Μελαγχρίδου Χαλκιδέα ἔπεμπον καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν δέκα νεῶν πέντε παρεσκευάζοντο ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα καὶ ἐνὸς δέον εἰκοστὸν ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[6] While the Chians and Tissaphernes were pursuing their common object, Calligitus the son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both exiles from their own country, who were residing at the court of Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, came to Lacedaemon.

They had been commissioned by Pharnabazus to bring up a fleet to the Hellespont; like Tissaphernes he was anxious, if possible, to induce the cities in his province to revolt from the Athenians, that he might obtain the tribute from them; and he wanted the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and the King to come from himself. The two parties — that is to say, the envoys of Pharnabazus and those of Tissaphernes — were acting independently; and a vehement contest arose at Lacedaemon, the one party urging the Lacedaemonians to send a fleet and army to Ionia and Chios, the other to begin with the Hellespont. They were themselves far more favourable to the proposals of the Chians and Tissaphernes; for Alcibiades was in their interest, and he was a great hereditary friend of Endius, one of the Ephors of that year. — Through this friendship the Lacedaemonian name of Alcibiades had come into his family; for Alcibiades was the name of Endius' father, — Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians, before giving an answer, sent a commissioner, Phrynis, one of their Perioeci, to see whether the Chians had as many ships as they said, and whether the power of the city was equal to her reputation. He reported that what they had heard was true. Whereupon they at once made alliance with the Chians and Erythraeans and voted them forty ships — there being at Chios already, as the Chians informed them, no less than sixty. Of the forty ships they at first intended to send out ten themselves under the command of Melancridas their admiral; but an earthquake occurred; so instead of Melancridas they appointed Chalcideus, and instead of the ten ships they prepared to send five only, which they equipped in Laconia. So the winter ended, and with it the nineteenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

7. ἅμα δὲ τῷ ἦρι τοῦ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους εὐθὺς ἐπειγομένων τῶν Χίων ἀποστεῖλαι τὰς ναῦς καὶ δεδιότων μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ πρασσόμενα αἴσθωνται πάντες γὰρ κρύφα αὐτῶν ἐπρεσβεύοντο , ἀποπέμπουσιν οἱ

Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς Κόρινθον ἄνδρας Σπαρτιάτας τρεῖς, ὅπως ἀπὸ τῆς ἑτέρας θαλάσσης ὡς τάχιστα ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἀθήνας ὑπερενεγκόντες τὰς ναῦς τὸν Ἰσθμὸν κελεύσωσι πλεῖν ἐς Χίον πάσας, καὶ ἃς ὁ Ἄγις παρεσκεύαζεν ἐς τὴν Λέσβον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας: ἦσαν δὲ αἱ ξύμπασαι τῶν ξυμμαχίδων νῆες αὐτόθι μιᾶς δέουσαι τεσσαράκοντα.

[7] At the beginning of the next summer the Chians were eager to get the fleet sent off at once. For their proposals, like those of the other allies, had been made secretly, and they were afraid that the Athenians would detect them. Thereupon the Lacedaemomans sent to Corinth three Spartans, who were to give orders that the ships then lying at the Isthmus should be as quickly as possible dragged over from the Corinthian gulf to the coast on the other side. They were all to be despatched to Chios, including the ships which Agis had been equipping for Lesbos. The allied fleet then at the Isthmus numbered in all thirty-nine.

8. ὁ μὲν οὖν Καλλίγειτος καὶ Τιμαγόρας ὑπὲρ τοῦ Φαρναβάζου οὐκ ἐκοινοῦντο τὸν στόλον ἐς τὴν Χίον, οὐδὲ τὰ χρήματα ἐδίδοσαν ἃ ἦλθον ἔχοντες ἐς τὴν ἀποστολὴν πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι τάλαντα, ἀλλ᾽ ὕστερον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῶν διενοοῦντο ἄλλῳ στόλῳ πλεῖν: [2] ὁ δὲ Ἄγις ἐπειδὴ ἑώρα τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐς τὴν Χίον πρῶτον ὡρμημένους, οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἄλλο τι ἐγίγνωσκεν, ἀλλὰ ξυνελθόντες ἐς Κόρινθον οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐβουλεύοντο, καὶ ἔδοξε πρῶτον ἐς Χίον αὐτοῖς πλεῖν ἄρχοντα ἔχοντας Χαλκιδέα, ὃς ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ τὰς πέντε ναῦς παρεσκεύαζεν, ἔπειτα ἐς Λέσβον καὶ Ἀλκαμένη ἄρχοντα, ὅνπερ καὶ Ἄγις διενοεῖτο, τὸ τελευταῖον δὲ ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἀφικέσθαι προσετέτακτο δὲ ἐς αὐτὸν ἄρχων Κλέαρχος ὁ Ῥαμφίου , [3] διαφέρειν δὲ τὸν Ἰσθμὸν τὰς ἡμισείας τῶν νεῶν πρῶτον, καὶ εὐθὺς ταύτας ἀποπλεῖν, ὅπως μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς τὰς ἀφορμωμένας μᾶλλον τὸν νοῦν ἔχωσιν ἢ τὰς ὕστερον ἐπιδιαφερομένας. [4] καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦν ταύτῃ ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐποιοῦντο, καταφρονήσαντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀδυνασίαν, ὅτι ναυτικὸν

οὐδὲν αὐτῶν πολύ πω ἐφαίνετο. ὡς δὲ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ διεκόμισαν εὐθὺς μίαν καὶ εἴκοσι ναῦς.

[8] Calligitus and Timagoras, who represented Pharnabazus, took no part in the expedition to Chios, nor did they offer to contribute towards the expenses of it the money which they had brought with them, amounting to twenty-five talents; they thought of sailing later with another expedition. Agis, when he saw that the Lacedaemonians were bent on going to Chios first, offered no opposition; so the allies held a conference at Corinth, and after some deliberation determined to sail, first of all to Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who was equipping the five ships in Laconia, then to proceed to Lesbos, under the command of Alcamenes, whom Agis had previously designed to appoint to that island, and finally to the Hellespont; for this last command they had selected Clearchus the son of Rhamphias. They resolved to carry over the Isthmus half the ships first; these were to sail at once, that the attention of the Athenians might be distracted between those which were starting and those which were to follow. They meant to sail quite openly, taking it for granted that the Athenians were powerless, since no navy of theirs worth speaking of had as yet appeared. In pursuance of their plans they conveyed twenty-one ships over the Isthmus.

9. οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι, ἐπειγομένων αὐτῶν τὸν πλοῦν, οὐ προυθυμήθησαν ξυμπλεῖν πρὶν τὰ Ἴσθμια, ἃ τότε ἦν, διεορτάσωσιν. Ἄγις δὲ αὐτοῖς ἑτοῖμος ἦν ἐκείνους μὲν μὴ λύειν δὴ τὰς Ἰσθμιάδας σπονδάς, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ τὸν στόλον ἴδιον ποιήσασθαι. [2] οὐ ξυγχωρούντων δὲ τῶν Κορινθίων, ἀλλὰ διατριβῆς ἐγγιγνομένης, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ᾐσθάνοντο τὰ τῶν Χίων μᾶλλον, καὶ πέμψαντες ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν Ἀριστοκράτη ἐπῃτιῶντο αὐτούς, καὶ ἀρνουμένων τῶν Χίων τὸ πιστὸν ναῦς σφίσι ξυμπέμπειν ἐκέλευον ἐς τὸ ξυμμαχικόν: οἱ δ᾽ ἔπεμψαν ἑπτά. [3] αἴτιον δ᾽ ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα, οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ξυνειδότες τό τε πλῆθος οὐ

βουλόμενοί πω πολέμιον ἔχειν, πρίν τι καὶ ἰσχυρὸν λάβωσι, καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι προσδεχόμενοι ἥξειν, ὅτι διέτριβον.

[9] They were in a hurry to be off, but the Corinthians were unwilling to join them until the conclusion of the Isthmian games, which were then going on. Agis was prepared to respect their scruples and to take the responsibility of the expedition on himself. But the Corinthians would not agree to this proposal, and there was delay. In the meantime the Athenians began to discover the proceedings of the Chians, and despatched one of their generals, Aristocrates, to accuse them of treason. They denied the charge; whereupon he desired them to send back with him a few ships as a pledge of their fidelity to the alliance; and they sent seven. They could not refuse his request, for the Chian people were ignorant of the whole matter, while the oligarchs, who were in the plot, did not want to break with the multitude until they had secured their ground. And the Peloponnesian ships had delayed so long that they had ceased to expect them.

10. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὰ Ἴσθμια ἐγίγνετο, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπηγγέλθησαν γάρ ἐθεώρουν ἐς αὐτά, καὶ κατάδηλα μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς τὰ τῶν Χίων ἐφάνη. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀνεχώρησαν, παρεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς ὅπως μὴ λήσουσιν αὐτοὺς αἱ νῆες ἐκ τῶν Κεγχρειῶν ἀφορμηθεῖσαι. [2] οἱ δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν ἀνήγοντο μιᾷ καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσὶν ἐς τὴν Χίον, ἄρχοντα Ἀλκαμένη ἔχοντες. καὶ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸ πρῶτον ἴσαις ναυσὶ προσπλεύσαντες ὑπῆγον ἐς τὸ πέλαγος. ὡς δ᾽ ἐπὶ πολὺ οὐκ ἐπηκολούθησαν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπετράποντο, ἐπανεχώρησαν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι: τὰς γὰρ τῶν Χίων ἑπτὰ ναῦς ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ μετὰ σφῶν ἔχοντες οὐ πιστὰς ἐνόμιζον, [3] ἀλλ᾽ ὕστερον ἄλλας προσπληρώσαντες ἐς ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα παραπλέοντας αὐτοὺς καταδιώκουσιν ἐς Σπείραιον τῆς Κορινθίας: ἔστι δὲ λιμὴν ἐρῆμος καὶ ἔσχατος πρὸς τὰ μεθόρια τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας. καὶ μίαν μὲν ναῦν ἀπολλύασι μετέωρον οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ξυναγαγόντες ὁρμίζουσιν. [4] καὶ προσβαλόντων τῶν

Ἀθηναίων καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀποβάντων θόρυβός τε ἐγένετο πολὺς καὶ ἄτακτος, καὶ τῶν τε νεῶν τὰς πλείους κατατραυματίζουσιν ἐν τῇ γῇ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα Ἀλκαμένη ἀποκτείνουσιν: καὶ αὐτῶν τινὲς ἀπέθανον.

[10] Meanwhile the Isthmian games were celebrated. The Athenians, to whom they had been formally notified, sent representatives to them; and now their eyes began to be opened to the designs of the Chians. On their return home they took immediate measures to prevent the enemy’s ships getting away from Cenchreae unperceived. When the games were over, the Peloponnesians, under the command of Alcamenes, with their twenty-one ships set sail for Chios; the Athenians, with an equal number, first sailed up to them and tried to draw them into the open sea. The Peloponnesians did not follow them far, but soon turned back to Cenchreae; the Athenians likewise retired, because they could not depend on the fidelity of the seven Chian ships which formed a part of their fleet. So they manned some more ships, making the whole number thirty-seven, and when the Peloponnesians resumed their voyage along the coast they pursued them into Piraeum, a lonely harbour, the last in the Corinthian territory before you reach Epidauria. One ship was lost by the Peloponnesians at sea, but they got the rest together and came to anchor in the harbour. Again the Athenians attacked them, not only on the water, but also after they had landed; there was a fierce struggle, but no regular engagement; most of the enemy’s ships were damaged by the Athenians on the beach, and their commander, Alcamenes, was slain. Some Athenians also fell.

11. διακριθέντες δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὰς πολεμίας ναῦς ἐπέταξαν ἐφορμεῖν ἱκανάς, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς ἐς τὸ νησίδιον ὁρμίζονται ἐν ᾧ οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχοντι ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο, καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπὶ βοήθειαν ἔπεμπον. [2] παρῆσαν γὰρ καὶ τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ οἵ τε Κορίνθιοι βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι

πρόσχωροι. καὶ ὁρῶντες τὴν φυλακὴν ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ ἐπίπονον οὖσαν ἠπόρουν, καὶ ἐπενόησαν μὲν κατακαῦσαι τὰς ναῦς, ἔπειτα δὲ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἀνελκύσαι καὶ τῷ πεζῷ προσκαθημένους φυλακὴν ἔχειν, ἕως ἄν τις παρατύχῃ διαφυγὴ ἐπιτηδεία. ἔπεμψε δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἄγις αἰσθόμενος ταῦτα ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην Θέρμωνα. [3] τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις πρῶτον μὲν ἠγγέλθη ὅτι αἱ νῆες ἀνηγμέναι εἰσὶν ἐκ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ εἴρητο γάρ, ὅταν γένηται τοῦτο, Ἀλκαμένει ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἱππέα πέμψαι, καὶ εὐθὺς τὰς παρὰ σφῶν πέντε ναῦς καὶ Χαλκιδέα ἄρχοντα καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐβούλοντο πέμπειν: ἔπειτα ὡρμημένων αὐτῶν τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ Σπειραίῳ τῶν νεῶν καταφυγὴν ἠγγέλθη, καὶ ἀθυμήσαντες, ὅτι πρῶτον ἁπτόμενοι τοῦ Ἰωνικοῦ πολέμου ἔπταισαν, τὰς ναῦς τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν οὐκέτι διενοοῦντο πέμπειν, ἀλλὰ καί τινας προανηγμένας μετακαλεῖν.

[11] When the conflict was over, the conquerors left a sufficient number of ships to watch the enemy, and with the remainder they lay to under a little island not far off, where they encamped, and sent to Athens, requesting reinforcements. For on the day after the battle the Corinthians had come to assist the Peloponnesian ships, and the other inhabitants of the country quickly followed them. Foreseeing how great would be the labour of keeping guard on so desolate a spot, the Peloponnesians knew not what to do; they even entertained the idea of burning their ships, but on second thoughts they determined to draw them high up on shore, and to keep guard over them with their land-forces stationed near, until some good opportunity of escape should occur. Agis was informed of their condition, and sent Thermon, a Spartan, to them. The first tidings which had reached Sparta were to the effect that the ships had left the Isthmus (the Ephors having told Alcamenes to send a horseman announcing the fact), and immediately they determined to send out the five ships of their own which they had ready, under the command of Chalcideus, who was

to be accompanied by Alcibiades. But when they were on the point of departure, a second messenger reported that the other squadron had been chased into Piraeum; and then, disheartened by finding that they had begun the Ionian war with a failure, they determined to give up sending the ships from Laconia, and even to recall some others which had already sailed.

12. γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης πείθει αὖθις Ἔνδιον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐφόρους μὴ ἀποκνῆσαι τὸν πλοῦν, λέγων ὅτι φθήσονταί τε πλεύσαντες πρὶν τὴν τῶν νεῶν ξυμφορὰν Χίους αἰσθέσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ὅταν προσβάλῃ Ἰωνίᾳ, ῥᾳδίως πείσειν τὰς πόλεις ἀφίστασθαι τήν τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων λέγων ἀσθένειαν καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων προθυμίαν: πιστότερος γὰρ ἄλλων φανεῖσθαι. [2] Ἐνδίῳ τε αὐτῷ ἰδίᾳ ἔλεγε καλὸν εἶναι δι᾽ ἐκείνου ἀποστῆσαί τε Ἰωνίαν καὶ βασιλέα ξύμμαχον ποιῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ μὴ Ἄγιδος τὸ ἀγώνισμα τοῦτο γενέσθαι: ἐτύγχανε γὰρ τῷ Ἄγιδι αὐτὸς διάφορος ὤν. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν πείσας τούς τε ἄλλους ἐφόρους καὶ Ἔνδιον ἀνήγετο ταῖς πέντε ναυσὶ μετὰ Χαλκιδέως τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου, καὶ διὰ τάχους τὸν πλοῦν ἐποιοῦντο.

[12] Alcibiades, seeing the state of affairs, advised Endius and the Ephors to persevere in the expedition. They would arrive, he said, before the Chians had heard of the misadventure of the ships. He would himself, as soon as he reached Ionia, represent to the cities the weakness of the Athenians and the alacrity of the Lacedaemonians, and they would revolt at once; for they would believe him sooner than any one. To Endius he argued in private ‘that he would win honour if he were the instrument of effecting a revolt in Ionia, and of gaining the alliance of the King; he should not allow such a prize to fall into the hands of Agis’; — now Agis was a personal enemy of Alcibiades. His opinion prevailed with Endius and the other Ephors. So he put to sea with the five ships, accompanied by Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian, and hastened on his way.

13. ἀνεκομίζοντο δὲ ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας Πελοποννησίων ἑκκαίδεκα νῆες αἱ μετὰ Γυλίππου ξυνδιαπολεμήσασαι: καὶ περὶ τὴν Λευκάδα ἀποληφθεῖσαι καὶ κοπεῖσαι ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι νεῶν, ὧν ἦρχεν Ἱπποκλῆς Μενίππου φυλακὴν ἔχων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας νεῶν, αἱ λοιπαὶ πλὴν μιᾶς διαφυγοῦσαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους κατέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Κόρινθον.

[13] About this time sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had remained with Gylippus to the end of the Sicilian war were returning home. They were caught in the neighbourhood of Leucadia and roughly handled by twenty-seven Athenian vessels, under the command of Hippocles the son of Menippus, which were on the watch for ships coming from Sicily; but all except one of them escaped the Athenians and sailed into Corinth.

14. ὁ δὲ Χαλκιδεὺς καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλέοντες ὅσοις τε ἐπιτύχοιεν ξυνελάμβανον τοῦ μὴ ἐξάγγελτοι γενέσθαι, καὶ προσβαλόντες πρῶτον Κωρύκῳ τῆς ἠπείρου καὶ ἀφέντες ἐνταῦθα αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ μὲν προξυγγενόμενοι τῶν ξυμπρασσόντων Χίων τισὶ καὶ κελευόντων καταπλεῖν μὴ προειπόντας ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφικνοῦνται αἰφνίδιοι τοῖς Χίοις. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐν θαύματι ἦσαν καὶ ἐκπλήξει: τοῖς δ᾽ ὀλίγοις παρεσκεύαστο ὥστε βουλήν [τε] τυχεῖν ξυλλεγομένην, καὶ γενομένων λόγων ἀπό τε τοῦ Χαλκιδέως καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου ὡς ἄλλαι [τε] νῆες πολλαὶ προσπλέουσι καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιορκίας τῶν ἐν τῷ Σπειραίῳ νεῶν οὐ δηλωσάντων, ἀφίστανται Χῖοι καὶ αὖθις Ἐρυθραῖοι Ἀθηναίων. [3] καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τρισὶ ναυσὶ πλεύσαντες καὶ Κλαζομενὰς ἀφιστᾶσιν. διαβάντες τε εὐθὺς οἱ Κλαζομένιοι ἐς τὴν ἤπειρον τὴν Πολίχναν ἐτείχιζον, εἴ τι δέοι, σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς νησῖδος ἐν ᾗ οἰκοῦσι πρὸς ἀναχώρησιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀφεστῶτες ἐν τειχισμῷ τε πάντες ἦσαν καὶ παρασκευῇ πολέμου:

[14] Chalcideus and Alcibiades on their voyage seized every one whom they met in order that their coming might not be reported. They touched first at the promontory of Corycus on

the mainland, and there releasing their prisoners they held a preliminary conference with certain of the Chians, who were in the plot, and who advised them to give no notice of their intention, but to sail at once to the city. So they appeared suddenly at Chios, to the great wonder and alarm of the people. The oligarchs had contrived that the council should be sitting at the time. Chalcideus and Alcibiades made speeches and announced that many more ships were on their way, but said nothing about the blockade of Piraeum. So Chios first, and afterwards Erythrae, revolted from Athens. They then sailed with three vessels to Clazomenae, which they induced to revolt. The Clazomenians at once crossed over to the mainland and fortified Polichnè, intending in case of need to retreat thither from the little island on which Clazomenae stands. All the revolted cities were occupied in raising fortifications and preparing for war.

15. ἐς δὲ τὰς Ἀθήνας ταχὺ ἀγγελία τῆς Χίου ἀφικνεῖται: καὶ νομίσαντες μέγαν ἤδη καὶ σαφῆ τὸν κίνδυνον σφᾶς περιεστάναι, καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ξυμμάχους οὐκ ἐθελήσειν τῆς μεγίστης πόλεως μεθεστηκυίας ἡσυχάζειν, τά τε χίλια τάλαντα, ὧν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου ἐγλίχοντο μὴ ἅψασθαι, εὐθὺς ἔλυσαν τὰς ἐπικειμένας ζημίας τῷ εἰπόντι ἢ ἐπιψηφίσαντι ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἐκπλήξεως, καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο κινεῖν καὶ ναῦς πληροῦν οὐκ ὀλίγας, τῶν τε ἐν τῷ Σπειραίῳ ἐφορμουσῶν τὰς μὲν ὀκτὼ ἤδη πέμπειν, αἳ ἀπολιποῦσαι τὴν φυλακὴν τὰς μετὰ Χαλκιδέως διώξασαι καὶ οὐ καταλαβοῦσαι ἀνεκεχωρήκεσαν ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Στρομβιχίδης Διοτίμου, ἄλλας δὲ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον βοηθεῖν δώδεκα μετὰ Θρασυκλέους, ἀπολιπούσας καὶ ταύτας τὴν ἐφόρμησιν. [2] τάς τε τῶν Χίων ἑπτὰ ναῦς, αἳ αὐτοῖς ξυνεπολιόρκουν τὰς ἐν τῷ Σπειραίῳ, ἀπαγαγόντες τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐξ αὐτῶν ἠλευθέρωσαν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐλευθέρους κατέδησαν. ἑτέρας δὲ <δέκα> ἀντὶ πασῶν τῶν ἀπελθουσῶν νεῶν ἐς τὴν ἐφόρμησιν τῶν Πελοποννησίων διὰ τάχους πληρώσαντες ἀντέπεμψαν καὶ ἄλλας διενοοῦντο τριάκοντα

πληροῦν. καὶ πολλὴ ἦν ἡ προθυμία καὶ ὀλίγον ἐπράσσετο οὐδὲν ἐς τὴν βοήθειαν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Χίον.

[15] The news of the revolt of Chios soon reached Athens; and the Athenians realised at once the magnitude of the danger which now surrounded them. The greatest city of all had gone over to the enemy, and the rest of their allies were certain to rise. In the extremity of their alarm they abrogated the penalties denounced against any one who should propose or put to the vote the employment of the thousand talents which throughout the war they had hitherto jealously reserved. They now passed a decree permitting their use, and resolved to man a large number of ships; also to send at once to Chios eight ships which had been keeping guard at Piraeum, and had gone away under the command of Strombichides the son of Diotimus in pursuit of Chalcideus, but not overtaking him had returned. Twelve other ships, under the command of Thrasycles, were to follow immediately; these too were to be taken from the blockading force. They also withdrew the seven Chian ships which were assisting them in the blockade of Piraeum; and setting free the slaves in them, put the freemen in chains. Other ships were then quickly manned by them and sent to take the place of all those which had been subtracted from the blockading squadron, and they proposed to equip thirty more. They were full of energy, and spared no effort for the recovery of Chios.

16. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Στρομβιχίδης ταῖς ὀκτὼ ναυσὶν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Σάμον, καὶ προσλαβὼν Σαμίαν μίαν ἔπλευσεν ἐς Τέων καὶ ἡσυχάζειν ἠξίου αὐτούς. ἐκ δὲ τῆς Χίου ἐς τὴν Τέων καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς μετὰ τριῶν καὶ εἴκοσι νεῶν ἐπέπλει καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα ὁ τῶν Κλαζομενίων καὶ Ἐρυθραίων παρῄει. [2] προαισθόμενος δὲ ὁ Στρομβιχίδης ἐξανήγετο καὶ μετεωρισθεὶς ἐν τῷ πελάγει ὡς ἑώρα τὰς ναῦς πολλὰς τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς Χίου, φυγὴν ἐποιεῖτο ἐπὶ τῆς Σάμου: αἱ δὲ ἐδίωκον. [3] τὸν δὲ πεζὸν οἱ Τήιοι τὸ πρῶτον οὐκ ἐσδεχόμενοι, ὡς ἔφυγον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐσηγάγοντο. καὶ ἐπέσχον μὲν οἱ πεζοὶ

καὶ Χαλκιδέα ἐκ τῆς διώξεως περιμένοντες: ὡς δὲ ἐχρόνιζε, καθῄρουν αὐτοί τε τὸ τεῖχος ὃ ἀνῳκοδόμησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς Τηίων πόλεως τὸ πρὸς ἤπειρον, ξυγκαθῄρουν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπελθόντες οὐ πολλοί, ὧν ἦρχε Στάγης ὕπαρχος Τισσαφέρνους.

[16] Meanwhile Strombichides with his eight ships arrived at Samos, and thence, taking with him an additional Saurian vessel, sailed to Teos and warned the inhabitants against revolt. But Chalcideus with twenty-three ships was on his way from Chios to Teos, intending to attack it; he was assisted by the land-forces of Clazomenae and Erythrae, which followed his movements on the shore. Strombichides saw him in time, and put out to sea before he arrived.When fairly away from land he observed the superior numbers of the fleet coming from Chios, and fled towards Samos, pursued by the enemy. The land-forces were not at first received by the Teians, but after the flight of the Athenians they admitted them. The troops waited a little for the return of Chalcideus from the pursuit, but as he did not come they proceeded without him to demolish the fort which the Athenians had built for the protection of Teos on the land side. A few barbarians under the command of Stages, a lieutenant of Tissaphernes, came and joined in the work of demolition.

17. Χαλκιδεὺς δὲ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης ὡς κατεδίωξαν ἐς Σάμον Στρομβιχίδην, ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου νεῶν τοὺς ναύτας ὁπλίσαντες ἐν Χίῳ καταλιμπάνουσιν, ἀντιπληρώσαντες δὲ ταύτας τε ἐκ Χίου καὶ ἄλλας εἴκοσιν ἔπλεον ἐς Μίλητον ὡς ἀποστήσοντες: [2] ἐβούλετο γὰρ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὢν ἐπιτήδειος τοῖς προεστῶσι τῶν Μιλησίων, φθάσαι τάς τε ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ναῦς προσαγαγόμενος αὐτοὺς καὶ τοῖς Χίοις καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ Χαλκιδεῖ καὶ τῷ ἀποστείλαντι Ἐνδίῳ, ὥσπερ ὑπέσχετο, τὸ ἀγώνισμα προσθεῖναι, ὅτι πλείστας τῶν πόλεων μετὰ τῆς Χίων δυνάμεως καὶ Χαλκιδέως ἀποστήσας. [3] λαθόντες οὖν τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ πλοῦ καὶ φθάσαντες οὐ πολὺ τόν τε

Στρομβιχίδην καὶ τὸν Θρασυκλέα, ὃς ἔτυχεν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν δώδεκα ναυσὶν ἄρτι παρὼν καὶ ξυνδιώκων, ἀφιστᾶσι τὴν Μίλητον. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ πόδας μιᾶς δεούσαις εἴκοσι ναυσὶν ἐπιπλεύσαντες, ὡς αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐδέχοντο οἱ Μιλήσιοι, ἐν Λάδῃ τῇ ἐπικειμένῃ νήσῳ ἐφώρμουν. [4] καὶ ἡ πρὸς βασιλέα ξυμμαχία Λακεδαιμονίοις ἡ πρώτη Μιλησίων εὐθὺς ἀποστάντων διὰ Τισσαφέρνους καὶ Χαλκιδέως ἐγένετο ἥδε.

[17] Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides to Samos, gave heavy arms to the crews of the ships which they had brought from Peloponnesus, and left them in Chios. Then, having manned their own vessels and twenty others with Chians, they sailed to Miletus, intending to raise a revolt. — For Alcibiades, who was on friendly terms with the principal Milesians, wanted to gain over the place before any more ships from Peloponnesus arrived, and, using the Chian troops and those of Chalcideus only, to spread revolt far and wide among the cities of Ionia. Thus he would gain the chief glory of the war for the Chians, for himself, for Chalcideus; and, in fulfilment of his promise, for Endius, who had sent him out. — They were not observed during the greater part of their voyage, and, although narrowly escaping from Strombichides, and from Thrasycles who had just arrived with twelve ships from Athens and had joined Strombichides in the pursuit, they succeeded in raising a revolt in Miletus. The Athenians followed close behind them with nineteen ships, but the Milesians would not receive them, and they came to anchor at Ladè, the island opposite the town. Immediately after the revolt of Miletus the Lacedaemonians made their first alliance with the King of Persia, which was negotiated by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus. It ran as follows:

18. ‘ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ξυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς βασιλέα καὶ Τισσαφέρνην Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι. ὁπόσην χώραν καὶ πόλεις βασιλεὺς ἔχει καὶ οἱ πατέρες οἱ βασιλέως εἶχον, βασιλέως ἔστω: καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν πόλεων ὁπόσα Ἀθηναίοις ἐφοίτα χρήματα ἢ ἄλλο τι, κωλυόντων κοινῇ

βασιλεὺς καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὅπως μήτε χρήματα λαμβάνωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι μήτε ἄλλο μηδέν. [2] καὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους κοινῇ πολεμούντων βασιλεὺς καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι: καὶ κατάλυσιν τοῦ πολέμου πρὸς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐξέστω ποιεῖσθαι, ἢν μὴ ἀμφοτέροις δοκῇ, βασιλεῖ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. [3] ἢν δέ τινες ἀφιστῶνται ἀπὸ βασιλέως, πολέμιοι ὄντων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις: καὶ ἤν τινες ἀφιστῶνται ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, πολέμιοι ὄντων βασιλεῖ κατὰ ταὐτά.’

[18] ‘The Lacedaemonians and their allies make an alliance with the King and Tissaphernes on the following terms:’I. All the territory and all the cities which are in possession of the King, or were in possession of his forefathers, shall be the King’s, and whatever revenue or other advantages the Athenians derived from these cities, the King, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, shall combine to prevent them from receiving such revenue or advantage.’II. The King, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies, shall carry on the war against the Athenians in common, and they shall not make peace with the Athenians unless both parties — the King on the one hand and the Lacedaemonians and their allies on the other — agree.’III. Whosoever revolts from the King shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and whosoever revolts from the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall be the enemy of the King in like manner.’Such were the terms of the alliance.

19. ἡ μὲν ξυμμαχία αὕτη ἐγένετο: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ Χῖοι εὐθὺς δέκα ἑτέρας πληρώσαντες ναῦς ἔπλευσαν ἐς Ἄναια, βουλόμενοι περί τε τῶν ἐν Μιλήτῳ πυθέσθαι καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἅμα ἀφιστάναι. [2] καὶ ἐλθούσης παρὰ Χαλκιδέως ἀγγελίας αὐτοῖς ἀποπλεῖν πάλιν, καὶ ὅτι Ἀμόργης παρέσται κατὰ γῆν στρατιᾷ, ἔπλευσαν ἐς Διὸς ἱερόν: καὶ καθορῶσιν ἑκκαίδεκα ναῦς, ἃς ὕστερον ἔτι Θρασυκλέους Διομέδων ἔχων ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν προσέπλει. [3] καὶ ὡς εἶδον, ἔφευγον μιᾷ μὲν νηὶ ἐς Ἔφεσον, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Τέω. καὶ τέσσαρας μὲν κενὰς

οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι λαμβάνουσι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐς τὴν γῆν φθασάντων: αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι ἐς τὴν Τηίων πόλιν καταφεύγουσιν. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τῆς Σάμου ἀπέπλευσαν, οἱ δὲ Χῖοι ταῖς λοιπαῖς ναυσὶν ἀναγαγόμενοι καὶ ὁ πεζὸς μετ᾽ αὐτῶν Λέβεδον ἀπέστησαν καὶ αὖθις Αἰράς. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἕκαστοι ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀπεκομίσθησαν, καὶ ὁ πεζὸς καὶ αἱ νῆες.

[19] Shortly afterwards the Chians manned ten more ships and sailed to Anaea, wanting to hear whether the attempt on Miletus had succeeded, and to draw fresh cities into the revolt. A message however was brought from Chalcideus, bidding them return, and warning them that Amorges was coming thither by land at the head of an army. So they sailed to the Temple of Zeus, where they caught sight of sixteen Athenian ships which Diomedon, following Thrasycles, was bringing from Athens. They instantly fled; one ship to Ephesus, the remainder towards Teos. Four of them the Athenians took empty, the crews having got safe to land; the rest escaped to Teos. The Athenians then sailed away to Samos. The Chians with their remaining ships put to sea again, and, assisted by the land-forces of their allies, caused first Lebedus, and afterwards Erae, to revolt. Both the army and the fleet then returned home.

20. ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους αἱ ἐν τῷ Σπειραίῳ εἴκοσι νῆες τῶν Πελοποννησίων, καταδιωχθεῖσαι τότε καὶ ἐφορμούμεναι ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ἐπέκπλουν ποιησάμεναι αἰφνίδιον καὶ κρατήσασαι ναυμαχίᾳ τέσσαράς τε ναῦς λαμβάνουσι τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἀποπλεύσασαι ἐς Κεγχρειὰς τὸν ἐς τὴν Χίον καὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν πλοῦν αὖθις παρεσκευάζοντο. καὶ ναύαρχος αὐτοῖς ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος Ἀστύοχος ἐπῆλθεν, ᾧπερ ἐγίγνετο ἤδη πᾶσα ἡ ναυαρχία. [2]ἀναχωρήσαντος δὲ τοῦ ἐκ τῆς Τέω πεζοῦ καὶ Τισσαφέρνης αὐτὸς στρατιᾷ παραγενόμενος καὶ ἐπικαθελὼν τὸ ἐν τῇ Τέῳ τεῖχος, εἴ τι ὑπελείφθη, ἀνεχώρησεν. καὶ Διομέδων ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον δέκα ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφικόμενος ἐσπείσατο Τηίοις ὥστε δέχεσθαι καὶ σφᾶς. καὶ

παραπλεύσας ἐπὶ Αἰρὰς καὶ προσβαλών, ὡς οὐκ ἐλάμβανε τὴν πόλιν, ἀπέπλευσεν.

[20] About the same time the twenty Peloponnesian ships which had been chased into Piraeum, and were now blockaded by a like number of Athenian ships, made a sally, defeated the Athenians, and took four ships; they then got away to Cenchreae, and once more prepared to sail to Chios and Ionia. At Cenchreae they were met by Astyochus, the admiral from Lacedaemon, to whom the whole of the Peloponnesian navy was about to be entrusted.By this time the land-forces of Clazomenae and Erythrae, had retired from Teos, and Tissaphernes, who had led a second army thither in person and overthrown what was left of the Athenian fort, had retired also. Not long after his departure, Diomedon arrived with ten ships, and made an agreement with the Teians, who promised to receive the Athenians as well as the Peloponnesians. He then sailed to Erae, which he attacked without success, and departed.

21. ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων, οἳ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ παρόντες. καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων ἐς διακοσίους μέν τινας τοὺς πάντας τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀπέκτεινε, τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκίας νειμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς βεβαίοις ἤδη ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διῴκουν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς γεωμόροις μετεδίδοσαν οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ᾽ ἀγαγέσθαι παρ᾽ ἐκείνων οὐδ᾽ ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἔτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν.

[21] About the same time a great revolution occurred in Samos. The people, aided by the crews of three Athenian vessels which happened to be on the spot, rose against the nobles, slew in all about two hundred of them, and banished four hundred more; they then distributed their land and houses among themselves. The Athenian people, now assured of their fidelity, granted them independence; and henceforward the city was in the hands of the democracy.

They denied to the former landed proprietors all the privileges of citizenship, not even allowing them to contract marriage with any family belonging to the people, nor any of the people with them.

22. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους οἱ Χῖοι, ὥσπερ ἤρξαντο, οὐδὲν ἀπολείποντες προθυμίας, ἄνευ τε Πελοποννησίων πλήθει παρόντες ἀποστῆσαι τὰς πόλεις καὶ βουλόμενοι ἅμα ὡς πλείστους σφίσι ξυγκινδυνεύειν, στρατεύονται αὐτοί τε τρισκαίδεκα ναυσὶν ἐπὶ τὴν Λέσβον, ὥσπερ εἴρητο ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δεύτερον ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν ἰέναι καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων παρῄει ἐπὶ Κλαζομενῶν τε καὶ Κύμης: ἦρχε δ᾽ αὐτοῦ Εὐάλας Σπαρτιάτης, τῶν δὲ νεῶν Δεινιάδας περίοικος. [2] καὶ αἱ μὲν νῆες καταπλεύσασαι Μήθυμναν πρῶτον ἀφιστᾶσι, καὶ καταλείπονται τέσσαρες νῆες ἐν αὐτῇ: καὶ αὖθις αἱ λοιπαὶ Μυτιλήνην ἀφιστᾶσιν.

[22] The zeal of the Chians did not abate. They had already begun to go out with armies and raise revolts independently of the Peloponnesians, and they wished to draw as many cities as they could into their own danger. During the same summer they sent out a Chian fleet numbering thirteen ships. The expedition was directed first against Lesbos, the Lacedaemonians having originally instructed their officers to proceed from Chios to Lesbos, and thence to the Hellespont. It was placed under the command of Deiniadas, one of the Perioeci. Meanwhile the infantry of the Peloponnesians and of the neighbouring allies, under Evalas, a Spartan, moved along the shore towards Clazomenae and Cymè. The fleet sailed to Lesbos, and first induced Methymna to rebel; there leaving four of their ships, with the remainder they raised a revolt in Mytilenè.

23. Ἀστύοχος δὲ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ναύαρχος τέσσαρσι ναυσίν, ὥσπερ ὥρμητο, πλέων ἐκ τῶν Κεγχρειῶν ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Χίον. καὶ τρίτην ἡμέραν αὐτοῦ ἥκοντος αἱ Ἀττικαὶ νῆες πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔπλεον ἐς Λέσβον, ὧν ἦρχε Λέων καὶ

Διομέδων: Λέων γὰρ ὕστερον δέκα ναυσὶ προσεβοήθησεν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν. [2] ἀναγαγόμενος δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀστύοχος τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐς ὀψὲ καὶ προσλαβὼν Χίαν ναῦν μίαν ἔπλει ἐς τὴν Λέσβον, ὅπως ὠφελοίη, εἴ τι δύναιτο. καὶ ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὴν Πύρραν, ἐκεῖθεν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ἐς Ἔρεσον, ἔνθα πυνθάνεται ὅτι ἡ Μυτιλήνη ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων αὐτοβοεὶ ἑάλωκεν: [3] οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ὥσπερ ἔπλεον ἀπροσδόκητοι κατασχόντες ἐς τὸν λιμένα τῶν τε Χίων νεῶν ἐκράτησαν καὶ ἀποβάντες τοὺς ἀντιστάντας μάχῃ νικήσαντες τὴν πόλιν ἔσχον. [4] ἃ πυνθανόμενος ὁ Ἀστύοχος τῶν τε Ἐρεσίων καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Μηθύμνης μετ᾽ Εὐβούλου Χίων νεῶν, αἳ τότε καταλειφθεῖσαι καὶ ὡς ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἑάλω φεύγουσαι περιέτυχον αὐτῷ τρεῖς [μία γὰρ ἑάλω ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων], οὐκέτι ἐπὶ τὴν Μυτιλήνην ὥρμησεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Ἔρεσον ἀποστήσας καὶ ὁπλίσας, καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ νεῶν ὁπλίτας πεζῇ παραπέμπει ἐπὶ τὴν Ἄντισσαν καὶ Μήθυμναν ἄρχοντα Ἐτεόνικον προστάξας: καὶ αὐτὸς ταῖς τε μεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ναυσὶ καὶ ταῖς τρισὶ ταῖς Χίαις παρέπλει, ἐλπίζων τοὺς Μηθυμναίους θαρσήσειν τε ἰδόντας σφᾶς καὶ ἐμμενεῖν τῇ ἀποστάσει. [5] ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ τὰ ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ πάντα ἠναντιοῦτο, ἀπέπλευσε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ στρατὸν πεζὸν ἀναλαβὼν ἐς τὴν Χίον. ἀπεκομίσθη δὲ πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ὁ τῶν ξυμμάχων πεζός, ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐμέλλησεν ἰέναι. καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Κεγχρειᾷ ξυμμαχίδων Πελοποννησίων νεῶν ἀφικνοῦνται αὐτοῖς ἓξ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐς τὴν Χίον. [6] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τά τ᾽ ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ πάλιν κατεστήσαντο καὶ πλεύσαντες ἐξ αὐτῆς Κλαζομενίων τὴν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Πολίχναν τειχιζομένην ἑλόντες διεκόμισαν πάλιν αὐτοὺς ἐς τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πόλιν, πλὴν τῶν αἰτίων τῆς ἀποστάσεως: οὗτοι δὲ ἐς Δαφνοῦντα ἀπῆλθον. καὶ αὖθις Κλαζομεναὶ προσεχώρησαν Ἀθηναίοις.

[23] Meanwhile Astyochus the Lacedaemonian admiral, with four ships, set forth, as he intended, from Cenchreae, and arrived at Chios. On the third day after his arrival a division of the Athenian fleet, numbering twenty-five ships, sailed to Lesbos under the command of Leon and Diomedon; Leon

had arrived from Athens later than Diomedon with a reinforcement of ten ships. On the same day, towards evening, Astyochus put to sea, and taking with him one Chian ship, sailed to Lesbos, that he might render any assistance which he could to the Chian fleet. He came to Pyrrha, and on the following day to Eresus, where he heard that Mytilenè had been taken by the Athenians at the first blow. The Athenian ships had sailed right into the harbour when they were least expected, and captured the Chian vessels; the men on board had then landed, and defeating in a battle a Mytilenean force which came out to meet them, had taken possession of the city. Astyochus heard the news from the Eresians, and from the Chian ships which had been left with Eubulus at Methymna. They had fled when Mytilenè was taken, and had now fallen in with him; but only three out of the four, for one of them had been captured by the Athenians. Upon this, instead of going on to Mytilenè, he raised a revolt in Eresus, and armed the inhabitants: he then disembarked the heavy-armed from his ships and sent them by land to Antissa and Methymna under the command of Eteonicus; and with his own and the three Chian ships coasted thither himself, hoping that the Methymnaeans would take courage at the sight of them and persevere in their revolt. But everything went against him in Lesbos; so he re-embarked his troops and sailed back to Chios. The land-forces from the ships which were intended to go to the Hellespont also returned to their several homes. Not long afterwards six ships came to Chios from the allied forces of the Peloponnesians now collected at Cenchreae. The Athenians, when they had re-established their influence in Lesbos, sailed away, and having taken Polichnè on the mainland, which the Clazomenians were fortifying, brought them all back to their city on the island, except the authors of the revolt, who had escaped to Daphnus. So Clazomenae returned to the Athenian alliance.

24. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους οἵ τ᾽ ἐπὶ Μιλήτῳ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσὶν ἐν τῇ Λάδῃ ἐφορμοῦντες ἀπόβασιν ποιησάμενοι ἐς Πάνορμον τῆς Μιλησίας Χαλκιδέα τε τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον ἄρχοντα μετ᾽ ὀλίγων παραβοηθήσαντα ἀποκτείνουσι καὶ τροπαῖον τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ὕστερον διαπλεύσαντες ἔστησαν, ὃ οἱ Μιλήσιοι ὡς οὐ μετὰ κράτους τῆς γῆς σταθὲν ἀνεῖλον: [2] καὶ Λέων καὶ Διομέδων ἔχοντες τὰς ἐκ Λέσβου Ἀθηναίων ναῦς, ἔκ τε Οἰνουσσῶν τῶν πρὸ Χίου νήσων καὶ ἐκ Σιδούσσης καὶ ἐκ Πτελεοῦ, ἃ ἐν τῇ Ἐρυθραίᾳ εἶχον τείχη, καὶ ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου ὁρμώμενοι τὸν πρὸς τοὺς Χίους πόλεμον ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν ἐποιοῦντο: εἶχον δ᾽ ἐπιβάτας τῶν ὁπλιτῶν ἐκ καταλόγου ἀναγκαστούς. [3] καὶ ἔν τε Καρδαμύλῃ ἀποβάντες καὶ ἐν Βολίσκῳ τοὺς προσβοηθήσαντας τῶν Χίων μάχῃ νικήσαντες καὶ πολλοὺς διαφθείραντες ἀνάστατα ἐποίησαν τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία, καὶ ἐν Φάναις αὖθις ἄλλῃ μάχῃ ἐνίκησαν καὶ τρίτῃ ἐν Λευκωνίῳ. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἤδη οὐκέτι ἐπεξῆσαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν χώραν καλῶς κατεσκευασμένην καὶ ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε διεπόρθησαν. [4] Χῖοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους ὧν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ηὐδαιμόνησάν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἐπεδίδου ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, τόσῳ δὲ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον. [5] καὶ οὐδ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀπόστασιν, εἰ τοῦτο δοκοῦσι παρὰ τὸ ἀσφαλέστερον πρᾶξαι, πρότερον ἐτόλμησαν ποιήσασθαι ἢ μετὰ πολλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ξυμμάχων ἔμελλον ξυγκινδυνεύσειν καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ᾐσθάνοντο οὐδ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας ἔτι μετὰ τὴν Σικελικὴν ξυμφορὰν ὡς οὐ πάνυ πονηρά σφῶν [βεβαίως] τὰ πράγματα εἴη: εἰ δέ τι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπείοις τοῦ βίου παραλόγοις ἐσφάλησαν, μετὰ πολλῶν οἷς ταὐτὰ ἔδοξε, τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ταχὺ ξυναναιρεθήσεσθαι, τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ξυνέγνωσαν. [6] εἰργομένοις οὖν αὐτοῖς τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ κατὰ γῆν πορθουμένοις ἐνεχείρησάν τινες πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἀγαγεῖν τὴν πόλιν: οὓς αἰσθόμενοι οἱ ἄρχοντες αὐτοὶ μὲν ἡσύχασαν, Ἀστύοχον δὲ ἐξ Ἐρυθρῶν τὸν ναύαρχον μετὰ τεσσάρων νεῶν, αἳ παρῆσαν αὐτῷ, κομίσαντες ἐσκόπουν ὅπως

μετριώτατα ἢ ὁμήρων λήψει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τρόπῳ καταπαύσουσι τὴν ἐπιβουλήν. καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα ἔπρασσον.

[24] During the same summer the Athenians, who were stationed with twenty of their ships at the island of Ladè and were watching the enemy in Miletus, made a descent upon Panormus in the Milesian territory. Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian general with a few followers came out to meet them, but was killed. Three days later they again sailed across and set up a trophy, which the Milesians pulled down, because the Athenians were not really masters of the ground at the time when they erected it. Leon and Diomedon, who were at Lesbos with the rest of the Athenian fleet, stationed their ships at the islands called Oenussae which lie in front of Chios, at Sidussa and Pteleum, which were forts held by them in the Erythraean territory, and at Lesbos itself, and carried on the war by sea against the Chians. The marines whom they had on board were hoplites taken from the roll and compelled to serve. They made descents upon Cardamylè and Bolissus, and having defeated with heavy loss the Chians who came out to meet them, they devastated all that region. In another battle at Phanae they defeated them again, and in a third at Leuconium. Henceforward the Chians remained within their walls. The Athenians ravaged their country, which was well stocked, and from the Persian War until that time had never been touched by an invader. No people as far as I know, except the Chians and Lacedaemonians (but the Chians not equally with the Lacedaemonians), have preserved moderation in prosperity, and in proportion as their city has gained in power have gained also in the stability of their administration. In this revolt they may seem to have shown a want of prudence, yet they did not venture upon it until many brave allies were ready to share the peril with them, and until the Athenians themselves seemed to confess that after their calamity in Sicily the state of their affairs was hopelessly bad. And, if they were deceived through the

uncertainty of human things, this error of judgment was common to many who, like them, believed that the Athenian power would speedily be overthrown. But now that they were driven off the sea and saw their lands ravaged, some of their citizens undertook to bring back the city to the Athenians. The magistrates perceived their design, but instead of acting themselves, they sent to Erythrae for Astyochus the admiral. He came with four ships which he had on the spot, and they considered together by what means the conspiracy might be suppressed with the least violence, whether by taking hostages or in some other way.

25. ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος χίλιοι ὁπλῖται Ἀθηναίων καὶ πεντακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι Ἀργείων τοὺς γὰρ πεντακοσίους τῶν Ἀργείων ψιλοὺς ὄντας ὥπλισαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ χίλιοι τῶν ξυμμάχων ναυσὶ δυοῖν δεούσαις πεντήκοντα, ὧν ἦσαν καὶ ὁπλιταγωγοί, Φρυνίχου καὶ Ὀνομακλέους καὶ Σκιρωνίδου στρατηγούντων κατέπλευσαν ἐς Σάμον, καὶ διαβάντες ἐς Μίλητον ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. [2] Μιλήσιοι δὲ ἐξελθόντες αὐτοί τε, ὀκτακόσιοι ὁπλῖται, καὶ οἱ μετὰ Χαλκιδέως ἐλθόντες Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ Τισσαφέρνους τι [ξενικὸν] ἐπικουρικόν, καὶ αὐτὸς Τισσαφέρνης παρὼν καὶ ἡ ἵππος αὐτοῦ, ξυνέβαλον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. [3] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι τῷ σφετέρῳ αὐτῶν κέρᾳ προεξάξαντες καὶ καταφρονήσαντες, ὡς ἐπ᾽ Ἴωνάς τε καὶ οὐ δεξομένους ἀτακτότερον χωροῦντες, νικῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν Μιλησίων καὶ διαφθείρονται αὐτῶν ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τριακοσίων ἀνδρῶν: [4] Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τούς τε Πελοποννησίους πρώτους νικήσαντες καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ὄχλον ὡσάμενοι, τοῖς Μιλησίοις οὐ ξυμμείξαντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὑποχωρησάντων αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Ἀργείων τροπῆς ἐς τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἑώρων τὸ ἄλλο σφῶν ἡσσώμενον, πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν τῶν Μιλησίων κρατοῦντες ἤδη τὰ ὅπλα τίθενται. [5] καὶ ξυνέβη ἐν τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ τοὺς Ἴωνας ἀμφοτέρωθεν τῶν Δωριῶν κρατῆσαι: τούς τε γὰρ κατὰ σφᾶς Πελοποννησίους οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνίκων καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους οἱ Μιλήσιοι. στήσαντες δὲ τροπαῖον τὸν

περιτειχισμὸν ἰσθμώδους ὄντος τοῦ χωρίου οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρεσκευάζοντο, νομίζοντες, εἰ προσαγάγοιντο Μίλητον, ῥᾳδίως ἂν σφίσι καὶ τἆλλα προσχωρῆσαι.

[25] The Lacedaemonians were thus engaged in Chios when towards the end of the summer there came from Athens a thousand Athenian hoplites and fifteen hundred Argives, of whom five hundred were originally light-armed, but the Athenians gave them heavy arms; also a thousand of the allies. They were conveyed in forty-eight ships, of which some were transports, under the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides. Sailing first to Samos they crossed over to Miletus, and there took up a position. The Milesians with a force of eight hundred heavy-armed of their own, the Peloponnesians who came with Chalcideus, and certain foreign mercenaries of Tissaphernes, who was there in person with his cavalry, went out and engaged the Athenians and their allies. The Argives on their own wing dashed forward, and made a disorderly attack upon the troops opposed to them, whom they despised; they thought that, being Ionians, they would be sure to run away. But they were defeated by the Milesians, and nearly three hundred of them perished. The Athenians first overcame the Peloponnesians, and then forced back the barbarians and the inferior troops. But they never engaged the Milesians, who, after routing the Argives, when they saw their other wing defeated, returned to the city. The Athenians, having won the day, took up a position close under the walls of Miletus. In this engagement the Ionians on both sides had the advantage of the Dorians; for the Athenians vanquished the Peloponnesians who were opposed to them, and the Milesians vanquished the Argives. The Athenians now raised a trophy, and prepared to build a wall across the isthmus which separates the city from the mainland, thinking that, if they could reduce Miletus, the other cities would quickly return to their allegiance.

26. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ περὶ δείλην ἤδη ὀψίαν ἀγγέλλεται αὐτοῖς τὰς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ Σικελίας πέντε καὶ πεντήκοντα ναῦς ὅσον οὐ παρεῖναι. τῶν τε γὰρ Σικελιωτῶν, Ἑρμοκράτους τοῦ Συρακοσίου μάλιστα ἐνάγοντος ξυνεπιλαβέσθαι καὶ τῆς ὑπολοίπου Ἀθηναίων καταλύσεως, εἴκοσι νῆες Συρακοσίων ἦλθον καὶ Σελινούντιαι δύο, αἵ τε ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, ἃς παρεσκευάζοντο, ἑτοῖμαι ἤδη οὖσαι: καὶ Θηριμένει τῷ Λακεδαιμονίῳ ξυναμφότεραι ὡς Ἀστύοχον τὸν ναύαρχον προσταχθεῖσαι κομίσαι, κατέπλευσαν ἐς Λέρον πρῶτον τὴν πρὸ Μιλήτου νῆσον: [2] ἔπειτα ἐκεῖθεν αἰσθόμενοι ἐπὶ Μιλήτῳ ὄντας Ἀθηναίους ἐς τὸν Ἰασικὸν κόλπον πρότερον πλεύσαντες ἐβούλοντο εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ τῆς Μιλήτου. [3] ἐλθόντος δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἵππῳ ἐς Τειχιοῦσσαν τῆς Μιλησίας, οἷπερ τοῦ κόλπου πλεύσαντες ηὐλίσαντο, πυνθάνονται τὰ περὶ τῆς μάχης παρῆν γὰρ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ ξυνεμάχετο τοῖς Μιλησίοις καὶ Τισσαφέρνει, καὶ αὐτοῖς παρῄνει, εἰ μὴ βούλονται τά τε ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ καὶ τὰ ξύμπαντα πράγματα διολέσαι, ὡς τάχιστα βοηθεῖν Μιλήτῳ καὶ μὴ περιιδεῖν ἀποτειχισθεῖσαν.

[26] But meanwhile, late in the afternoon, news was brought to them that a fleet of fifty-five ships from Peloponnesus and Sicily was close at hand. Hermocrates the Syracusan had urged the Sicilians to assist in completing the overthrow of Athens. Twenty ships came from Syracuse, two from Selinus, and with them the Peloponnesian ships which had been in preparation. The two squadrons were entrusted to Theramenes, who was to conduct them to Astyochus the admiral. They sailed first to Leros, an island lying off Miletus. Thence, finding that the Athenians were at Miletus, they sailed away to the Iasian Gulf, wanting to ascertain the fate of the town. Alcibiades came on horseback to Teichiussa in the Milesian territory, the point of the gulf at which the fleet had passed the night, and from him they received news of the battle. For he had been present, and had fought on the side of the Milesians and Tissaphernes. And he recommended them, if they did not mean to ruin their cause

in Ionia and everywhere else, to assist Miletus at once, and break up the blockade.

27. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ἔμελλον βοηθήσειν: Φρύνιχος δὲ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς Λέρου ἐπύθετο τὰ τῶν νεῶν σαφῶς, βουλομένων τῶν ξυναρχόντων ὑπομείναντας διαναυμαχεῖν, οὐκ ἔφη οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς ποιήσειν τοῦτο οὔτ᾽ ἐκείνοις οὐδ᾽ ἄλλῳ οὐδενὶ ἐς δύναμιν ἐπιτρέψειν. [2] ὅπου γὰρ [ἔξεστιν] ἐν ὑστέρῳ σαφῶς εἰδότας πρὸς ὁπόσας τε ναῦς πολεμίας καὶ ὅσαις πρὸς αὐτὰς ταῖς σφετέραις ἱκανῶς καὶ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν παρασκευασαμένοις ἔσται ἀγωνίσασθαι, οὐδέποτε τῷ αἰσχρῷ ὀνείδει εἴξας ἀλόγως διακινδυνεύσειν. [3] οὐ γὰρ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι Ἀθηναίους ναυτικῷ μετὰ καιροῦ ὑποχωρῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ ὁτουοῦν τρόπου αἴσχιον ξυμβήσεσθαι ἢν ἡσσηθῶσιν: καὶ τὴν πόλιν οὐ μόνον τῷ αἰσχρῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μεγίστῳ κινδύνῳ περιπίπτειν, ᾗ μόλις ἐπὶ ταῖς γεγενημέναις ξυμφοραῖς ἐνδέχεσθαι μετὰ βεβαίου παρασκευῆς καθ᾽ ἑκουσίαν, ἢ πάνυ γε ἀνάγκῃ, προτέρᾳ ποι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ που δὴ μὴ βιαζομένῃ γε πρὸς αὐθαιρέτους κινδύνους ἰέναι. [4] ὡς τάχιστα δὲ ἐκέλευε τούς τε τραυματίας ἀναλαβόντας καὶ τὸν πεζὸν καὶ τῶν σκευῶν ὅσα ἦλθον ἔχοντες, ἃ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας εἰλήφασι καταλιπόντας ὅπως κοῦφαι ὦσιν αἱ νῆες, ἀποπλεῖν ἐς Σάμον, κἀκεῖθεν ἤδη ξυναγαγόντας πάσας τὰς ναῦς τοὺς ἐπίπλους, ἤν που καιρὸς ᾖ, ποιεῖσθαι. [5] ὡς δὲ ἔπεισε, καὶ ἔδρασε ταῦτα: καὶ ἔδοξεν οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα μᾶλλον ἢ ὕστερον, οὐκ ἐς τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς ὅσα ἄλλα Φρύνιχος κατέστη, οὐκ ἀξύνετος εἶναι. [6] καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι ἀφ᾽ ἑσπέρας εὐθὺς τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἀτελεῖ τῇ νίκῃ ἀπὸ τῆς Μιλήτου ἀνέστησαν, καὶ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι κατὰ τάχος καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἀπέπλευσαν ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἐπ᾽ οἴκου:

[27] They determined to go at daybreak and relieve the place. But Phrynichus the Athenian general had certain information from Leros of their approach, and, although his colleagues wanted to remain and risk a battle, he refused and declared that he would neither himself fight, nor allow

them or any one else to fight if he could help it. For when they might discover the exact number of the enemy's ships and the proportion which their own bore to them, and, before engaging, make adequate preparations at their leisure, he would not be so foolish as to risk all through fear of disgrace. There was no dishonour in Athenians retreating before an enemy's fleet when circumstances required. But there would be the deepest dishonour under any circumstances in a defeat; and the city would then not only incur disgrace, but would be in the utmost danger. Even if their preparations were complete and satisfactory, Athens after her recent disasters ought not to take the offensive, or in any case not without absolute necessity; and now when they were not compelled, why should they go out of their way to court danger? He urged them to put on board their wounded, and their infantry, and all the stores which they had brought with them, but to leave behind the plunder obtained from the enemy's country, that their ships might be lighter; they should sail back to Samos, and there uniting all their forces, they might go on making attacks upon Miletus when opportunity offered. His advice was followed.And not on this occasion only, but quite as much afterwards, whenever Phrynichus had to act, he showed himself to be a man of great sagacity. So the Athenians departed that very evening from Miletus without completing their victory, and the Argives, hurrying away from Samos in a rage after their disaster, went home.

28. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ ἐκ τῆς Τειχιούσσης ἄραντες ἐπικατάγονται, καὶ μείναντες ἡμέραν μίαν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ καὶ τὰς Χίας ναῦς προσλαβόντες τὰς μετὰ Χαλκιδέως τὸ πρῶτον ξυγκαταδιωχθείσας ἐβούλοντο πλεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὰ σκεύη ἃ ἐξείλοντο ἐς Τειχιοῦσσαν πάλιν. [2] καὶ ὡς ἦλθον, Τισσαφέρνης τῷ πεζῷ παρελθὼν πείθει αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Ἴασον, ἐν ᾗ Ἀμόργης πολέμιος ὢν κατεῖχε, πλεῦσαι. καὶ προσβαλόντες τῇ Ἰάσῳ αἰφνίδιοι καὶ οὐ προσδεχομένων ἀλλ᾽ ἢ Ἀττικὰς τὰς ναῦς εἶναι αἱροῦσιν:

καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐπῃνέθησαν. [3] καὶ τόν τε Ἀμόργην ζῶντα λαβόντες, Πισσούθνου νόθον υἱόν, ἀφεστῶτα δὲ βασιλέως, παραδιδόασιν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι Τισσαφέρνει ἀπαγαγεῖν, εἰ βούλεται, βασιλεῖ, ὥσπερ αὐτῷ προσέταξε, καὶ τὴν Ἴασον διεπόρθησαν καὶ χρήματα πάνυ πολλὰ ἡ στρατιὰ ἔλαβεν: παλαιόπλουτον γὰρ ἦν τὸ χωρίον. [4] τούς τ᾽ ἐπικούρους τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀμόργην παρὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κομίσαντες καὶ οὐκ ἀδικήσαντες ξυνέταξαν, ὅτι ἦσαν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐκ Πελοποννήσου: τό τε πόλισμα Τισσαφέρνει παραδόντες καὶ τὰ ἀνδράποδα πάντα καὶ δοῦλα καὶ ἐλεύθερα, ὧν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον στατῆρα Δαρεικὸν παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ξυνέβησαν λαβεῖν, ἔπειτα ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν Μίλητον. [5] καὶ Πεδάριτόν τε τὸν Λέοντος ἐς τὴν Χίον ἄρχοντα Λακεδαιμονίων πεμψάντων ἀποστέλλουσι πεζῇ μέχρι Ἐρυθρῶν ἔχοντα τὸ παρὰ Ἀμόργου ἐπικουρικόν, καὶ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον καθιστᾶσιν. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

[28] At dawn the Peloponnesians sailed from Teichiussa, and on their arrival at Miletus found that the Athenians had left: after remaining one day, on the morrow they took the Chian ships which under the command of Chalcideus had previously been chased into Miletus, and resolved to go back to Teichiussa and fetch that part of the tackle of which they had lightened the ships. There they found Tissaphernes, who had come with his infantry; he persuaded them to sail against Iasus, in which his enemy Amorges lay. So they attacked Iasus, which they took by a sudden assault; for it never occurred to the inhabitants that their ships were not Athenian. The Syracusans distinguished themselves greatly in the action. The Peloponnesians took captive Amorges the natural son of Pissuthnes, who had rebelled, and gave him to Tissaphernes, that, if he liked, he might convey him to the King in obedience to the royal command. They then plundered Iasus, and the army obtained a great deal of treasure; for the city had been rich from early times. They did no harm to the mercenaries of

Amorges, but received them into their own ranks; for most of them came from Peloponnesus. The town, and all their prisoners, whether bond or free, were delivered by them into the hands of Tissaphernes, who engaged to give them a Daric stater for each man; they then returned to Miletus. Thence they despatched by land as far as Erythrae Pedaritus the son of Leon, whom the Lacedaemonians had sent out to be governor of Chios; he was escorted by the mercenaries who had been in the service of Amorges. To remain on the spot, and take charge of Miletus, they appointed Philip. So the summer ended.

29. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος, ἐπειδὴ τὴν Ἴασον κατεστήσατο ὁ Τισσαφέρνης ἐς φυλακήν, παρῆλθεν ἐς τὴν Μίλητον, καὶ μηνὸς μὲν τροφήν, ὥσπερ ὑπέστη ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι, ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἑκάστῳ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριώβολον διδόναι, ἕως ἂν βασιλέα ἐπέρηται: ἢν δὲ κελεύῃ, δώσειν ἔφη ἐντελῆ τὴν δραχμήν. [2] Ἑρμοκράτους δὲ ἀντειπόντος τοῦ Συρακοσίου στρατηγοῦ —ὁ γὰρ Θηριμένης οὐ ναύαρχος ὤν, ἀλλ᾽ Ἀστυόχῳ παραδοῦναι τὰς ναῦς ξυμπλέων μαλακὸς ἦν περὶ τοῦ μισθοῦ— ὅμως δὲ παρὰ πέντε ναῦς πλέον ἀνδρὶ ἑκάστῳ ἢ τρεῖς ὀβολοὶ ὡμολογήθησαν. ἐς γὰρ πέντε ναῦς καὶ πεντήκοντα τριάκοντα τάλαντα ἐδίδου τοῦ μηνός: καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσῳ πλείους νῆες ἦσαν τούτου τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἐδίδοτο.

[29] During the following winter, Tissaphernes, after he had provided for the security of Iasus, came to Miletus. There he distributed one month’s pay among all the ships, at the rate of an Attic drachma a day per man, as his envoy had promised at Lacedaemon; in future he proposed to give half a drachma only until he had asked the King’s leave, promising that if he obtained it he would pay the entire drachma. On the remonstrance, however, of Hermocrates the Syracusan general (Theramenes, not being himself admiral, but only taking charge of the ships which he was to hand over to Astyochus, took no interest in the matter of the

pay), he promised to each man a payment of somewhat more than three obols, reckoning the total sum paid to every five ships. For he offered to every five ships, up to the number of fifty-five, three talents a month, and to any ships in excess of this number he agreed to give at a like rate.

30. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ Ἀθηναίοις προσαφιγμέναι γὰρ ἦσαν καὶ οἴκοθεν ἄλλαι νῆες πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ στρατηγοὶ Χαρμῖνος καὶ Στρομβιχίδης καὶ Εὐκτήμων, καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ Χίου καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας ξυναγαγόντες ἐβούλοντο διακληρωσάμενοι ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ Μιλήτῳ τῷ ναυτικῷ ἐφορμεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν Χίον καὶ ναυτικὸν καὶ πεζὸν πέμψαι. [2] καὶ ἐποίησαν οὕτως: Στρομβιχίδης μὲν γὰρ καὶ Ὀνομακλῆς καὶ Εὐκτήμων τριάκοντα ναῦς ἔχοντες καὶ τῶν ἐς Μίλητον ἐλθόντων χιλίων ὁπλιτῶν μέρος ἄγοντες ἐν ναυσὶν ὁπλιταγωγοῖς ἐπὶ Χίον λαχόντες ἔπλεον, οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἐν Σάμῳ μένοντες τέσσαρσι καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ναυσὶν ἐθαλασσοκράτουν καὶ ἐπίπλους τῇ Μιλήτῳ ἐποιοῦντο.

[30] During the same winter there arrived at Samos from Athens thirty-five ships, under the command of Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon. Whereupon the generals assembled their whole fleet, including the ships engaged at Chios, their purpose being to make a distribution of their forces by lot. The principal division was to continue watching Miletus, while a second force of ships and soldiers was to be sent to Chios. Accordingly Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty ships, besides transports in which they conveyed a portion of the thousand heavy-armed who had joined the army at Miletus, sailed away to Chios, the duty which the lot assigned to them. The other generals remaining at Samos with seventy-four ships, and having the mastery of the sea, prepared to make a descent upon Miletus.

31. ὁ δ᾽ Ἀστύοχος ὡς τότε ἐν τῇ Χίῳ ἔτυχε διὰ τὴν προδοσίαν τοὺς ὁμήρους καταλεγόμενος τούτου μὲν ἐπέσχεν,ἐπειδὴ ᾔσθετο τάς τε μετὰ Θηριμένους ναῦς

ἡκούσας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν βελτίω ὄντα, λαβὼν δὲ ναῦς τάς τε Πελοποννησίων δέκα καὶ Χίας δέκα ἀνάγεται, [2] καὶ προσβαλὼν Πτελεῷ καὶ οὐχ ἑλὼν παρέπλευσεν ἐπὶ Κλαζομενὰς καὶ ἐκέλευεν αὐτῶν τοὺς τὰ Ἀθηναίων φρονοῦντας ἀνοικίζεσθαι ἐς τὸν Δαφνοῦντα καὶ προσχωρεῖν σφίσιν: ξυνεκέλευε δὲ καὶ Τάμως Ἰωνίας ὕπαρχος ὤν. [3] ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐσήκουον, προσβολὴν ποιησάμενος τῇ πόλει οὔσῃ ἀτειχίστῳ καὶ οὐ δυνάμενος ἑλεῖν, ἀπέπλευσεν ἀνέμῳ μεγάλῳ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐς Φώκαιαν καὶ Κύμην, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι νῆες κατῆραν ἐς τὰς ἐπικειμένας ταῖς Κλαζομεναῖς νήσους, Μαραθοῦσσαν καὶ Πήλην καὶ Δρυμοῦσσαν. [4] καὶ ὅσα ὑπεξέκειτο αὐτόθι τῶν Κλαζομενίων, ἡμέρας ἐμμείναντες διὰ τοὺς ἀνέμους ὀκτὼ τὰ μὲν διήρπασαν καὶ ἀνήλωσαν, τὰ δὲ ἐσβαλόμενοι ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Φώκαιαν καὶ Κύμην ὡς Ἀστύοχον.

[31] Astyochus was at Chios selecting hostages as a precaution against the betrayal of the island to Athens, but when he heard of the reinforcements which Theramenes had brought, and of the improved prospects of the allies, he desisted, and taking with him his own Peloponnesian ships, ten in number, and ten Chian, he put to sea. Failing in an attack upon Pteleum he sailed on to Clazomenae, and demanded that the Athenian party should settle at Daphnus on the mainland, and come over to the Peloponnesians: Tamos, one of the Persian lieutenants of Ionia, joined in the demand. But the Clazomenians would not listen to him; whereupon he assaulted the city (which was unwalled), but being unable to take it, sailed away with a strong wind. He was himself carried to Phocaea and Cymè, and the remainder of the fleet put into the islands, Marathussa, Pelè, and Drymussa, which lie off Clazomenae. There, being detained eight days by the weather, they spoiled and destroyed part of the property of the Clazomenians which had been deposited in the islands, and, taking part on board, they sailed away to Phocaea and Cymè, where they rejoined Astyochus.

32. ὄντος δ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐνταῦθα Λεσβίων ἀφικνοῦνται πρέσβεις βουλόμενοι αὖθις ἀποστῆναι: καὶ αὐτὸν μὲν πείθουσιν, ὡς δ᾽ οἵ τε Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ἀπρόθυμοι ἦσαν διὰ τὸ πρότερον σφάλμα, ἄρας ἔπλει ἐπὶ τῆς Χίου. καὶ χειμασθεισῶν τῶν νεῶν ὕστερον ἀφικνοῦνται ἄλλαι ἄλλοθεν ἐς τὴν Χίον. [2] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο Πεδάριτος, τότε παριὼν πεζῇ ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου, γενόμενος ἐν Ἐρυθραῖς διαπεραιοῦται αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ στρατιὰ ἐς Χίον: ὑπῆρχον δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῶν πέντε νεῶν στρατιῶται ὑπὸ Χαλκιδέως ἐς πεντακοσίους ξὺν ὅπλοις καταλειφθέντες. [3] ἐπαγγελλομένων δέ τινων Λεσβίων τὴν ἀπόστασιν, προσφέρει τῷ τε Πεδαρίτῳ καὶ τοῖς Χίοις ὁ Ἀστύοχος τὸν λόγον ὡς χρὴ παραγενομένους ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀποστῆσαι τὴν λέσβον: ἢ γὰρ ξυμμάχους πλείους σφᾶς ἕξειν, ἢ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἤν τι σφάλλωνται,κακώσειν. οἱ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐσήκουον, οὐδὲ τὰς ναῦς ὁ Πεδάριτος ἔφη τῶν Χίων αὐτῷ προήσειν.

[32] While Astyochus was there, envoys came to him from Lesbos; the Lesbians were once more eager to revolt, and he was willing to assist them; but the Corinthians and the other allies were disheartened by the previous failure. So he put to sea and sailed back to Chios. His ships were scattered by a storm, and reached Chios from various places. Soon afterwards Pedaritus and his army having come by land from Miletus to Erythrae, where he crossed the channel, arrived in Chios. On his arrival he found at his disposal the sailors whom Chalcideus had taken from his five ships and left in Chios fully armed, to the number of five hundred. Some of the Lesbians renewing their proposal to revolt, Astyochus suggested to Pedaritus and the Chians that they should go with the fleet to Lesbos and raise the country; they would thus increase the number of their allies, and, even if the attempt did not wholly succeed, they would injure the Athenians. But they would not listen, and Pedaritus refused to let him have the Chian ships.

33. κἀκεῖνος λαβὼν τάς τε τῶν Κορινθίων πέντε καὶ ἕκτην Μεγαρίδα καὶ μίαν Ἑρμιονίδα καὶ ἃς αὐτὸς

Λακωνικὰς ἔχων ἦλθεν, ἔπλει ἐπὶ τῆς Μιλήτου πρὸς τὴν ναυαρχίαν, πολλὰ ἀπειλήσας τοῖς Χίοις ἦ μὴν μὴ ἐπιβοηθήσειν, ἤν τι δέωνται. [2] καὶ προσβαλὼν Κωρύκῳ τῆς Ἐρυθραίας ἐνηυλίσατο. οἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς Σάμου Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ τὴν Χίον πλέοντες τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα λόφου διείργοντο καὶ καθωρμίσαντο καὶ ἐλελήθεσαν ἀλλήλους. [3] ἐλθούσης δὲ παρὰ Πεδαρίτου ὑπὸ νύκτα ἐπιστολῆς ὡς Ἐρυθραίων ἄνδρες αἰχμάλωτοι ἐκ Σάμου ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ ἐς Ἐρυθρὰς ἥκουσιν ἀφειμένοι, ἀνάγεται ὁ Ἀστύοχος εὐθὺς ἐς τὰς Ἐρυθρὰς πάλιν, καὶ παρὰ τοσοῦτον ἐγένετο αὐτῷ μὴ περιπεσεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. [4] διαπλεύσας δὲ καὶ ὁ Πεδάριτος πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἀναζητήσαντες τὰ περὶ τῶν δοκούντων προδιδόναι, ὡς ηὗρον ἅπαν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκ τῆς Σάμου προφασισθέν, ἀπολύσαντες τῆς αἰτίας ἀπέπλευσαν ὁ μὲν ἐς τὴν Χίον, ὁ δὲ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον ἐκομίσθη, ὥσπερ διενοεῖτο.

[33] So Astyochus took five Corinthian ships and a sixth from Megara, one from Hermionè, and the Lacedaemonian ships which he had brought with him, and set sail for Miletus in order to assume his command. He threatened the Chians, again and again, that he would certainly not help them when their time of need came. Touching at Corycus in Erythraea he passed the night there. The Athenian ships from Samos were now on their way to Chios; they had put in at a place where they were only divided from the Peloponnesians by a hill, and neither fleet knew that the other was so near. But that night there came a despatch from Pedaritus informing Astyochus that certain Erythraean prisoners had been released by the Athenians from Samos on condition of betraying Erythrae, and had gone thither with that intention. Whereupon Astyochus sailed back to Erythrae. So narrowly did he escape falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pedaritus sailed over to meet him. They then enquired about the supposed traitors, and found that the whole matter was a trick which the men had devised in order to get away from Samos; so they acquitted them of the

charge, and Pedaritus returned to Chios, while Astyochus resumed his voyage to Miletus.

34. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατιὰ ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκ τοῦ Κωρύκου περιπλέουσα κατ᾽ Ἀργῖνον ἐπιτυγχάνει τρισὶ ναυσὶ τῶν Χίων μακραῖς, καὶ ὡς εἶδον, ἐδίωκον: καὶ χειμών τε μέγας ἐπιγίγνεται καὶ αἱ μὲν τῶν Χίων μόλις καταφεύγουσιν ἐς τὸν λιμένα, αἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἱ μὲν μάλιστα ὁρμήσασαι τρεῖς διαφθείρονται καὶ ἐκπίπτουσι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τῶν Χίων, καὶ ἄνδρες οἱ μὲν ἁλίσκονται, οἱ δ᾽ ἀποθνῄσκουσιν, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι καταφεύγουσιν ἐς τὸν ὑπὸ τῷ Μίμαντι λιμένα Φοινικοῦντα καλούμενον. ἐντεῦθεν δ᾽ ὕστερον ἐς τὴν Λέσβον καθορμισάμενοι παρεσκευάζοντο ἐς τὸν τειχισμόν.

[34] In the meantime the Athenian fleet, sailing round the promontory of Corycus towards Arginus, lighted upon three Chian ships of war, to which they gave chase. A great storm came on, and the Chian ships with difficulty escaped into their harbour, but of the Athenian ships the three which were most zealous in the pursuit were disabled and driven ashore near the city of Chios; the crews were either lost or taken captive. The remainder of the fleet found shelter in the harbour called Phoenicus, lying under Mount Mimas, whence again setting sail they put in at Lesbos, and made preparations for building the fort which they meant to establish in Chios.

35. ἐκ δὲ τῆς Πελοποννήσου τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐκπλεύσας δέκα μὲν Θουρίαις ναυσίν, ὧν ἦρχε Δωριεὺς ὁ Διαγόρου τρίτος αὐτός, μιᾷ δὲ Λακωνικῇ, μιᾷ δὲ Συρακοσίᾳ, καταπλεῖ ἐς Κνίδον: ἡ δ᾽ ἀφειστήκει ἤδη ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνους. [2] καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ, ὡς ᾔσθοντο, ἐκέλευον ταῖς μὲν ἡμισείαις τῶν νεῶν Κνίδον φυλάσσειν, ταῖς δὲ περὶ Τριόπιον οὔσαις τὰς ἀπ᾽ Αἰγύπτου ὁλκάδας προσβαλλούσας ξυλλαμβάνειν: ἔστι δὲ τὸ Τριόπιον ἄκρα τῆς Κνιδίας προύχουσα, Ἀπόλλωνος ἱερόν. [3] πυθόμενοι δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ πλεύσαντες ἐκ τῆς Σάμου λαμβάνουσι τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ Τριοπίῳ φρουρούσας ἓξ ναῦς: οἱ δ᾽

ἄνδρες ἀποφεύγουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐς τὴν Κνίδον καταπλεύσαντες καὶ προσβαλόντες τῇ πόλει ἀτειχίστῳ οὔσῃ ὀλίγου εἷλον. [4] τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ αὖθις προσέβαλλον, καὶ ὡς ἄμεινον φαρξαμένων αὐτῶν ὑπὸ νύκτα καὶ ἐπεσελθόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Τριοπίου ἐκ τῶν νεῶν διαφυγόντων οὐκέθ᾽ ὁμοίως ἔβλαπτον, ἀπελθόντες καὶ δῃώσαντες τὴν τῶν Κνιδίων γῆν ἐς τὴν Σάμον ἀπέπλευσαν.

[35] During the same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedaemonian sailed from the Peloponnese with one Laconian, one Syracusan, and ten Thurian ships; of these last Dorieus the son of Diagoras and two others were the commanders. They put in at Cnidus, which under the influence of Tissaphernes had already revolted from Athens. The Peloponnesian authorities at Miletus, when they heard of their arrival, ordered one half of these ships to protect Cnidus, and the other half to cruise off Triopium and seize the merchant-vessels which put in there from Egypt. This Triopium is a promontory in the district of Cnidus on which there is a temple of Apollo. The Athenians, hearing of their intentions, sailed from Samos and captured the six ships which were keeping guard at Triopium; the crews escaped. They then sailed to Cnidus, and attacking the town, which was unwalled, all but took it. On the following day they made a second attack, but during the night the inhabitants had improved their hasty defences, and some of the men who had escaped from the ships captured at Triopium had come into the city. So the Athenian assault was less destructive than on the first day; and after retiring from the city and devastating the country belonging to it they sailed back to Samos.

36. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον Ἀστυόχου ἥκοντος ἐς τὴν Μίλητον ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι εὐπόρως ἔτι εἶχον ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον: καὶ γὰρ μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ἀρκούντως καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Ἰάσου μεγάλα χρήματα διαρπασθέντα ὑπῆν τοῖς στρατιώταις, οἵ τε Μιλήσιοι

προθύμως τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἔφερον. [2] πρὸς δὲ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ἐδόκουν ὅμως τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις αἱ πρῶται ξυνθῆκαι αἱ πρὸς Χαλκιδέα γενόμεναι ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι καὶ οὐ πρὸς σφῶν μᾶλλον, καὶ ἄλλας ἔτι Θηριμένους παρόντος ἐποίουν: καὶ εἰσὶν αἵδε.

[36] About the same time Astyochus arrived at Miletus and took the command of the fleet. He found the Peloponnesians still abundantly provided with all requisites. They had sufficient pay; the great spoils taken at Iasus were in the hands of the army, and the Milesians carried on the war with a will. The Peloponnesians however considered the former treaty made between Tissaphernes and Chalcideus defective and disadvantageous to them; so before the departure of Theramenes they made new terms of alliance, which were as follows:

37. ‘ξυνθῆκαι Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς βασιλέα Δαρεῖον καὶ τοὺς παῖδας τοὺς βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρνην, σπονδὰς εἶναι καὶ φιλίαν κατὰ τάδε. [2] ὁπόση χώρα καὶ πόλεις βασιλέως εἰσὶ Δαρείου ἢ τοῦ πατρὸς ἦσαν ἢ τῶν προγόνων, ἐπὶ ταύτας μὴ ἰέναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ μηδὲ κακῷ μηδενὶ μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων, μηδὲ φόρους πράσσεσθαι ἐκ τῶν πόλεων τούτων μήτε Λακεδαιμονίους μήτε τοὺς ξυμμάχους τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων: μηδὲ Δαρεῖον βασιλέα μηδὲ ὧν βασιλεὺς ἄρχει ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἰέναι ἐπὶ πολέμῳ μηδὲ κακῷ μηδενί. [3] ἢν δέ τι δέωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἢ οἱ ξύμμαχοι βασιλέως ἢ βασιλεὺς Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅτι ἂν πείθωσιν ἀλλήλους, τοῦτο ποιοῦσι καλῶς ἔχειν. [4] τὸν δὲ πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους πολεμεῖν: ἢν δὲ κατάλυσιν ποιῶνται, κοινῇ ἀμφοτέρους ποιεῖσθαι. ὁπόση δ᾽ ἂν στρατιὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ τῇ βασιλέως ᾖ μεταπεμψαμένου βασιλέως, τὴν δαπάνην βασιλέα παρέχειν. [5] ἢν δέ τις τῶν πόλεων ὁπόσαι ξυνέθεντο βασιλεῖ ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλέως ἴῃ χώραν, τοὺς ἄλλους κωλύειν καὶ ἀμύνειν βασιλεῖ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν: καὶ ἤν τις τῶν ἐν τῇ βασιλέως

χώρᾳ ἢ ὅσης βασιλεὺς ἄρχει ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἴῃ ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων, βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω καὶ ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.’

[37] ‘The Lacedaemonians and their allies make agreement with King Darius and the sons of the King, and with Tissaphernes, that there shall be alliance and friendship between them on the following conditions:”I. Whatever territory and cities belong to King Darius, or formerly belonged to his father, or to his ancestors, against these neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies shall make war, or do them any hurt, nor shall the Lacedaemonians or their allies exact tribute of them. Neither Darius the King nor the subjects of the King shall make war upon the Lacedaemonians or their allies, or do them any hurt.”II. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies have need of anything from the King, or the King have need of anything from the Lacedaemonians and their allies, whatever they do by mutual agreement shall hold good.”III. They shall carry on the war against the Athenians and their allies in common, and if they make peace, shall make peace in common.”IV. The King shall defray the expense of any number of troops for which the King has sent, so long as they remain in the King’s country.”V. If any of the cities who are parties to this treaty go against the King’s country, the rest shall interfere and aid the King to the utmost of their power. And if any of the inhabitants of the King’s country or any country under the dominion of the King shall go against the country of the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King shall interfere and aid them to the utmost of his power”.’

38. μετὰ δὲ ταύτας τὰς ξυνθήκας Θηριμένης μὲν παραδοὺς Ἀστυόχῳ τὰς ναῦς ἀποπλέων ἐν κέλητι ἀφανίζεται, [2] οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου Ἀθηναῖοι ἤδη διαβεβηκότες ἐς τὴν Χίον τῇ στρατιᾷ καὶ κρατοῦντες καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης Δελφίνιον ἐτείχιζον, χωρίον ἄλλως τε ἐκ γῆς καρτερὸν καὶ λιμένας ἔχον καὶ τῆς τῶν Χίων πόλεως οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχον. [3] οἱ δὲ Χῖοι ἐν πολλαῖς ταῖς πρὶν μάχαις

πεπληγμένοι, καὶ ἄλλως ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς οὐ πάνυ εὖ διακείμενοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν μετὰ Τυδέως τοῦ Ἴωνος ἤδη ὑπὸ Πεδαρίτου ἐπ᾽ ἀττικισμῷ τεθνεώτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην ἐς ὀλίγους κατεχομένης ὑπόπτως διακείμενοι ἀλλήλοις ἡσύχαζον, καὶ οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ διὰ ταῦτα οὔθ᾽ οἱ μετὰ Πεδαρίτου ἐπίκουροι ἀξιόμαχοι αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνοντο. [4] ἐς μέντοι τὴν Μίλητον ἔπεμπον κελεύοντες σφίσι τὸν Ἀστύοχον βοηθεῖν: ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐσήκουεν, ἐπιστέλλει περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ὁ Πεδάριτος ὡς ἀδικοῦντος. [5] καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ Χίῳ ἐς τοῦτο καθειστήκει τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις: αἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου νῆες αὐτοῖς ἐπίπλους μὲν ἐποιοῦντο ταῖς ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ, ἐπεὶ δὲ μὴ ἀντανάγοιεν, ἀναχωροῦντες πάλιν ἐς τὴν Σάμον ἡσύχαζον.

[38] After the conclusion of the treaty, Theramenes, having delivered over the fleet to Astyochus, sailed away in a small boat and was no more heard of. The Athenians, who had now crossed over with their troops from Lesbos to Chios, and had the upper hand both by land and sea, began to fortify Delphinium, a place not far distant from the town of Chios, which had the double advantage of being strong by land and of possessing harbours. The Chians meanwhile remained inactive; they had been already badly beaten in several battles, and their internal condition was far from satisfactory; for Tydeus the son of Ion and his accomplices had been executed by Pedaritus on a charge of complicity with Athens, and the city was reduced by the strong hand to a mere oligarchy. Hence they were in a state of mutual distrust, and could not be persuaded that either they or the mercenaries brought by Pedaritus were a match for the enemy. They sent however to Miletus and requested the aid of Astyochus, but he refused. Whereupon Pedaritus sent a despatch to Lacedaemon, complaining of his misconduct. So favourable to the Athenians was the course of affairs in Chios. The main fleet, which they had left at Samos, from time to time made threatening movements against the

enemy at Miletus, but as they would never come out, the Athenians at length retired to Samos and there remained.

39. ἐκ δὲ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι αἱ τῷ Φαρναβάζῳ [ὑπὸ] Καλλιγείτου τοῦ Μεγαρέως καὶ Τιμαγόρου τοῦ Κυζικηνοῦ πρασσόντων παρασκευασθεῖσαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες ἄρασαι ἔπλεον ἐπὶ Ἰωνίας περὶ ἡλίου τροπάς, καὶ ἄρχων ἐπέπλει αὐτῶν Ἀντισθένης Σπαρτιάτης. [2] ξυνέπεμψαν δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἕνδεκα ἄνδρας Σπαρτιατῶν ξυμβούλους Ἀστυόχῳ, ὧν εἷς ἦν Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου: καὶ εἴρητο αὐτοῖς ἐς Μίλητον ἀφικομένους τῶν τε ἄλλων ξυνεπιμέλεσθαι ᾗ μέλλει ἄριστα ἕξειν, καὶ τὰς ναῦς ταύτας ἢ αὐτὰς ἢ πλείους ἢ καὶ ἐλάσσους ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ὡς Φαρνάβαζον, ἢν δοκῇ, ἀποπέμπειν, Κλέαρχον τὸν Ῥαμφίου, ὃς ξυνέπλει, ἄρχοντα προστάξαντας, καὶ Ἀστύοχον, ἢν δοκῇ τοῖς ἕνδεκα ἀνδράσι, παύειν τῆς ναυαρχίας, Ἀντισθένη δὲ καθιστάναι: πρὸς γὰρ τὰς τοῦ Πεδαρίτου ἐπιστολὰς ὑπώπτευον αὐτόν. [3] πλέουσαι οὖν αἱ νῆες ἀπὸ Μαλέας πελάγιαι Μήλῳ προσέβαλον, καὶ περιτυχόντες ναυσὶ δέκα Ἀθηναίων τὰς τρεῖς λαμβάνουσι κενὰς καὶ κατακαίουσιν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο δεδιότες μὴ αἱ διαφυγοῦσαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐκ τῆς Μήλου νῆες, ὅπερ ἐγένετο, μηνύσωσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὐτῶν, πρὸς τὴν Κρήτην πλεύσαντες καὶ πλείω τὸν πλοῦν διὰ φυλακῆς ποιησάμενοι ἐς τὴν Καῦνον τῆς Ἀσίας κατῆραν. [4] ἐντεῦθεν δὴ ὡς ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ ὄντες ἀγγελίαν ἔπεμπον ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ ναῦς τοῦ ξυμπαρακομισθῆναι.

[39] During the same winter, about the solstice, twenty-seven ships which Calligitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus, the agents of Pharnabazus, had persuaded the Lacedaemonians to fit out in his interest, sailed for Ionia: they were placed under the command of Antisthenes, a Spartan. The Lacedaemonians sent at the same time eleven Spartans to act as advisers to Astyochus, one of whom was Lichas the son of Arcesilaus. Besides receiving a general commission to assist in the direction of affairs to the best of their judgment, they were empowered on their arrival at

Miletus to send on, if they saw fit, these ships, or a larger or smaller number, to Pharnabazus at the Hellespont under the command of Clearchus the son of Rhamphias, who sailed with them. The eleven might also, if they thought good, deprive Astyochus of his command and appoint Antisthenes in his place, for the despatch of Pedaritus had excited suspicion against him. So the ships sailed from Malea over the open sea until they came to Melos. There they lighted on ten Athenian ships; of these they took three without their crews and burned them. But then, fearing that the remainder which had escaped would, as in fact they did, give information of their approach to the fleet at Samos, they took the precaution of going by a longer route. And sailing round by Crete they put in at Caunus in Asia. They thought that they were now safe, and sent a messenger to the fleet at Miletus requesting a convoy.

40. οἱ δὲ Χῖοι καὶ Πεδάριτος κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον οὐδὲν ἧσσον, καίπερ διαμέλλοντα, τὸν Ἀστύοχον πέμποντες ἀγγέλους ἠξίουν σφίσι πολιορκουμένοις βοηθῆσαι ἁπάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ καὶ μὴ περιιδεῖν τὴν μεγίστην τῶν ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ ξυμμαχίδων πόλεων ἔκ τε θαλάσσης εἰργομένην καὶ κατὰ γῆν λῃστείαις πορθουμένην. [2] οἱ γὰρ οἰκέται τοῖς Χίοις πολλοὶ ὄντες καὶ μιᾷ γε πόλει πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πλεῖστοι γενόμενοι καὶ ἅμα διὰ τὸ πλῆθος χαλεπωτέρως ἐν ταῖς ἀδικίαις κολαζόμενοι, ὡς ἡ στρατιὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βεβαίως ἔδοξε μετὰ τείχους ἱδρῦσθαι, εὐθὺς αὐτομολίᾳ τε ἐχώρησαν οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κακὰ ἐπιστάμενοι τὴν χώραν οὗτοι ἔδρασαν. [3] ἔφασαν οὖν χρῆναι οἱ Χῖοι, ἕως ἔτι ἐλπὶς καὶ δυνατὸν κωλῦσαι, τειχιζομένου τοῦ Δελφινίου καὶ ἀτελοῦς ὄντος καὶ στρατοπέδῳ καὶ ναυσὶν ἐρύματος μείζονος προσπεριβαλλομένου, βοηθῆσαι σφίσιν. ὁ δὲ Ἀστύοχος καίπερ οὐ διανοούμενος διὰ τὴν τότε ἀπειλήν, ὡς ἑώρα καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους προθύμους ὄντας, ὥρμητο ἐς τὸ βοηθεῖν.

[40] Meanwhile the Chians and Pedaritus continued to send messengers to Astyochus, who continued to delay. They

implored him to come to their help with his whole fleet, saying that they were blockaded, and that he should not allow the chief ally of Sparta in Ionia to be cut off from the sea and overrun and devastated by land. Now the Chians had more domestic slaves than any other state with the exception of Lacedaemon, and their offences were always more severely punished because of their number; so that, when the Athenian army appeared to be firmly settled in their fortifications, most of them at once deserted to the enemy. And they did the greatest damage, because they knew the country. The Chians pressed upon the Lacedaemonians the necessity of coming to their assistance while there was still hope of interfering to some purpose; the fortification of Delphinium, though not yet completed, was in progress, and the Athenians were beginning to extend the lines of defence which protected their army and ships. Astyochus, seeing that the allies were zealous in the cause, although he had fully meant to carry out his threat, now determined to relieve the Chians.

41. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Καύνου παραγίγνεται ἀγγελία ὅτι αἱ ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι νῆες καὶ οἱ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ξύμβουλοι πάρεισιν: καὶ νομίσας πάντα ὕστερα εἶναι τἆλλα πρὸς τὸ ναῦς τε, ὅπως θαλασσοκρατοῖεν μᾶλλον, τοσαύτας ξυμπαρακομίσαι, καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, οἳ ἦκον κατάσκοποι αὐτοῦ, ἀσφαλῶς περαιωθῆναι, εὐθὺς ἀφεὶς τὸ ἐς τὴν Χίον ἔπλει ἐς τὴν Καῦνον. [2] καὶ ἐς Κῶν τὴν Μεροπίδα ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ ἀποβὰς τήν τε πόλιν ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν καὶ ὑπὸ σεισμοῦ, ὃς αὐτοῖς ἔτυχε μέγιστός γε δὴ ὧν μεμνήμεθα γενόμενος, ξυμπεπτωκυῖαν ἐκπορθεῖ, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐς τὰ ὄρη πεφευγότων, καὶ τὴν χώραν καταδρομαῖς λείαν ἐποιεῖτο, πλὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων: τούτους δὲ ἀφίει. [3] ἐκ δὲ τῆς Κῶ ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Κνίδον νυκτὸς ἀναγκάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν Κνιδίων παραινούντων μὴ ἐκβιβάσαι τοὺς ναύτας, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἶχε πλεῖν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς εἴκοσιν, ἃς ἔχων Χαρμῖνος εἷς τῶν ἐκ Σάμου στρατηγῶν ἐφύλασσε ταύτας τὰς ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι ναῦς ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου

προσπλεούσας, ἐφ᾽ ἅσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἀστύοχος παρέπλει. [4] ἐπύθοντο δὲ οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ἐκ τῆς Μήλου τὸν ἐπίπλουν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ τῷ Χαρμίνῳ περὶ τὴν Σύμην καὶ Χάλκην καὶ Ῥόδον καὶ περὶ τὴν Λυκίαν ἦν: ἤδη γὰρ ᾐσθάνετο καὶ ἐν τῇ Καύνῳ οὔσας αὐτάς.

[41] But in the meantime he received a message from Caunus, informing him that the twenty-seven ships and his Lacedaemonian advisers had arrived. He thought that everything should give way to the importance of convoying so large a reinforcement which would secure to the Lacedaemonians greater command of the sea, and that he must first of all provide for the safe passage of the commissioners who were to report on his conduct. So he at once gave up his intended expedition to Chios and sailed for Caunus. As he coasted along he made a descent on the island of Cos Meropis. The city was unfortified and had been overthrown by an earthquake, the greatest which has ever happened within our memory. The citizens had fled into the mountains; so he sacked the town and overran and despoiled the country, but let go the free inhabitants whom he found. From Cos he came by night to Cnidus, and was prevailed upon by the importunity of the Cnidians, instead of disembarking his men, to sail at once, just as he was, against twenty Athenian ships with which Charminus (one of the generals at Samos) was watching for the twenty-seven ships expected from Peloponnesus, being those which Astyochus was going to escort. The Athenians at Samos had heard from Melos of their coming, and Charminus was cruising off the islands of Symè, Chalcè, and Rhodes, and on the coast of Lycia; he had by this time discovered that they were at Caunus.

42. ἐπέπλει οὖν ὥσπερ εἶχε πρὸς τὴν Σύμην ὁ Ἀστύοχος πρὶν ἔκπυστος γενέσθαι, εἴ πως περιλάβοι που μετεώρους τὰς ναῦς. καὶ αὐτῷ ὑετός τε καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ξυννέφελα ὄντα πλάνησιν τῶν νεῶν ἐν τῷ σκότει καὶ ταραχὴν παρέσχεν. [2] καὶ ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ διεσπασμένου τοῦ

ναυτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ μὲν φανεροῦ ἤδη ὄντος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τοῦ εὐωνύμου κέρως, τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου περὶ τὴν νῆσον ἔτι πλανωμένου, ἐπανάγονται κατὰ τάχος ὁ Χαρμῖνος καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐλάσσοσιν ἢ ταῖς εἴκοσι ναυσί, νομίσαντες ἅσπερ ἐφύλασσον ναῦς τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς Καύνου ταύτας εἶναι. [3] καὶ προσπεσόντες εὐθὺς κατέδυσάν τε τρεῖς καὶ κατετραυμάτισαν ἄλλας, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐπεκράτουν, μέχρι οὗ ἐπεφάνησαν αὐτοῖς παρὰ δόξαν αἱ πλείους τῶν νεῶν καὶ πανταχόθεν ἀπεκλῄοντο. [4] ἔπειτα δὲ ἐς φυγὴν καταστάντες ἓξ μὲν ναῦς ἀπολλύασι, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς καταφεύγουσιν ἐς τὴν Τευτλοῦσσαν νῆσον, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἐς Ἁλικαρνασσόν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς Κνίδον κατάραντες καὶ ξυμμιγεισῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς Καύνου ἑπτὰ καὶ εἴκοσι νεῶν αὐτοῖς ξυμπάσαις πλεύσαντες καὶ τροπαῖον ἐν τῇ Σύμῃ στήσαντες πάλιν ἐς τὴν Κνίδον καθωρμίσαντο:

[42] So Astyochus sailed at once to Symè before his arrival was reported, in the hope that he might come upon the Athenian squadron in the open sea. The rain and cloudy state of the atmosphere caused confusion among his ships, which lost their way in the dark. When dawn broke, the fleet was dispersed and the left wing alone was visible to the Athenians, while the other ships were still straggling off the shore of the island. Charminus and the Athenians put out to sea with part of their twenty ships, supposing that these were only the squadron from Caunus for which they were watching. They at once attacked them, sank three of them, disabled others, and were gaining the victory, when to their surprise there appeared the larger part of the Lacedaemonian fleet threatening to surround them. Whereupon they fled, and in their flight lost six ships, but with the rest gained the island of Teutlussa, and thence Halicarnassus. The Peloponnesians touched at Cnidus, and there uniting with the twenty-seven ships from Caunus, they all sailed to Symè and raised a trophy; they then returned and put into port again at Cnidus.

43. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ναυσὶ πάσαις, ὡς ᾔσθοντο τὰ τῆς ναυμαχίας, πλεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Σύμην καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ ἐν τῇ Κνίδῳ ναυτικὸν οὐχ ὁρμήσαντες, οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνους, λαβόντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σύμῃ σκεύη τῶν νεῶν καὶ Λωρύμοις τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ προσβαλόντες ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Σάμον. [2]ἅπασαι δ᾽ ἤδη οὖσαι ἅμα ἐν τῇ Κνίδῳ αἱ τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἐπεσκευάζοντό τε εἴ τι ἔδει καὶ πρὸς τὸν Τισσαφέρνην παρεγένετο γάρ λόγους ἐποιοῦντο οἱ ἔνδεκα ἄνδρες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων περί τε τῶν ἤδη πεπραγμένων, εἴ τι μὴ ἤρεσκεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος πολέμου, ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἄριστα καὶ ξυμφορώτατα ἀμφοτέροις πολεμήσεται. [3] μάλιστα δὲ ὁ Λίχας ἐσκόπει τὰ ποιούμενα, καὶ τὰς σπονδὰς οὐδετέρας, οὔτε τὰς Χαλκιδέως οὔτε τὰς Θηριμένους, ἔφη καλῶς ξυγκεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ χώρας ὅσης βασιλεὺς καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι ἦρξαν πρότερον, ταύτης καὶ νῦν ἀξιώσει κρατεῖν: ἐνεῖναι γὰρ καὶ νήσους ἁπάσας πάλιν δουλεύειν καὶ Θεσσαλίαν καὶ Λοκροὺς καὶ τὰ μέχρι Βοιωτῶν, καὶ ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθερίας ἂν Μηδικὴν ἀρχὴν τοῖς Ἕλλησι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους περιθεῖναι. [4] ἑτέρας οὖν ἐκέλευε βελτίους σπένδεσθαι, ἢ ταύταις γε οὐ χρήσεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῆς τροφῆς ἐπὶ τούτοις δεῖσθαι οὐδέν. ἀγανακτῶν δὲ ὁ μὲν Τισσαφέρνης ἀπεχώρησεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν δι᾽ ὀργῆς καὶ ἄπρακτος,

[43] As soon as the Athenians heard the result of the sea-fight they sailed from Samos to Symè with their whole fleet. They did not attack the Peloponnesians at Cnidus, nor the Peloponnesians them; but they carried away the heavy tackle of their own ships which had been left at Symè, and touching at Loryma, a place on the mainland, returned to Samos. The Peloponnesians were now all together at Cnidus, and were making the repairs necessary after the battle, while the Lacedaemonian commissioners conferred with Tissaphernes (who was himself on the spot) as to any matters in his past dealings with them at which they were displeased, and as to the best manner of securing their common interests in the future conduct of the war. Lichas

entered into the enquiry with great energy; he took exception to both the treaties; that of Chalcideus and that of Theramenes were equally objectionable. For the King at that time of day to claim power over all the countries which his ancestors had formerly held was monstrous. If either treaty were carried out, the inhabitants of all the islands, of Thessaly, of Locris, and of all Hellas, as far as Boeotia, would again be reduced to slavery; instead of giving the Hellenes freedom, the Lacedaemonians would be imposing upon them the yoke of Persia. So he desired them to conclude some more satisfactory treaty, for he would have nothing to say to these; he did not want to have the fleet maintained upon any such terms. Tissaphernes was indignant, and without settling anything went away in a rage.

44. οἱ δ᾽ ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον ἐπικηρυκευομένων ἀπὸ τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν τὴν γνώμην εἶχον πλεῖν, ἐλπίζοντες νῆσόν τε οὐκ ἀδύνατον καὶ ναυβατῶν πλήθει καὶ πεζῷ προσάξεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα ἡγούμενοι αὐτοὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ξυμμαχίας δυνατοὶ ἔσεσθαι Τισσαφέρνην μὴ αἰτοῦντες χρήματα τρέφειν τὰς ναῦς. [2] πλεύσαντες οὖν εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι ἐκ τῆς Κνίδου καὶ προσβαλόντες Καμείρῳ τῆς Ῥοδίας πρῶτον ναυσὶ τέσσαρσι καὶ ἐνενήκοντα ἐξεφόβησαν μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς οὐκ εἰδότας τὰ πρασσόμενα, καὶ ἔφευγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτειχίστου οὔσης τῆς πόλεως: εἶτα ξυγκαλέσαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τούτους τε καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τοῖν δυοῖν πολέοιν, Λίνδου καὶ Ἰηλυσοῦ, Ῥοδίους ἔπεισαν ἀποστῆναι Ἀθηναίων: καὶ προσεχώρησε Ῥόδος Πελοποννησίοις. [3] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ταῖς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ναυσὶν αἰσθόμενοι ἔπλευσαν μὲν βουλόμενοι φθάσαι καὶ ἐπεφάνησαν πελάγιοι, ὑστερήσαντες δὲ οὐ πολλῷ τὸ μὲν παραχρῆμα ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Χάλκην, ἐντεῦθεν δ᾽ ἐς Σάμον, ὕστερον δὲ ἐκ τῆς Χάλκης καὶ ἐκ τῆς Κῶ [καὶ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου] τοὺς ἐπίπλους ποιούμενοι ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥόδον ἐπολέμουν. [4] οἱ δὲ χρήματα μὲν ἐξέλεξαν ἐς δύο καὶ τριάκοντα τάλαντα οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι παρὰ τῶν Ῥοδίων, τὰ

δ᾽ ἄλλα ἡσύχαζον ἡμέρας ὀγδοήκοντα, ἀνελκύσαντες τὰς ναῦς.

[44] Meanwhile the Peloponnesians had been receiving communications from the chief men of Rhodes, and resolved to sail thither. They hoped to gain over an island which was strong alike in sailors and in infantry; if successful, they might henceforward maintain their navy by the help of their own allies without asking Tissaphernes for money. So in the same winter they sailed from Cnidus against Rhodes, and first attacked Camirus with ninety-four ships. The inhabitants, who were in ignorance of the plot and dwelt in an unfortified city, were alarmed and began to fly. The Lacedaemonians re-assured them, and assembling the people not only of Camirus, but of Lindus and Ialysus, the two other cities of Rhodes, persuaded all of them to revolt from the Athenians. Thus Rhodes went over to the Peloponnesians. Nearly at the same time the Athenians, who had heard of their intentions, brought up the fleet from Samos, hoping to forestall them; they appeared in the offing, but finding that they were just too late, sailed to Chalcè for the present, and thence back to Samos. They then fought against Rhodes, making descents upon it from Chalcè, Cos, and Samos, while the Peloponnesians, having collected thirty-two talents from the Rhodians, drew up their ships, and did nothing for eleven weeks.

45. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον αὐτοὺς ἀναστῆναι, τάδε ἐπράσσετο. Ἀλκιβιάδης μετὰ τὸν Χαλκιδέως θάνατον καὶ τὴν ἐν Μιλήτῳ μάχην τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις ὕποπτος ὤν, καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀφικομένης ἐπιστολῆς πρὸς Ἀστύοχον ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος ὥστ᾽ ἀποκτεῖναι ᾗν γὰρ καὶ τῷ Ἄγιδι ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἄλλως ἄπιστος ἐφαίνετο, πρῶτον μὲν ὑποχωρεῖ δείσας παρὰ Τισσαφέρνην, ἔπειτα ἐκάκου πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅσον ἐδύνατο μάλιστα τῶν Πελοποννησίων τὰ πράγματα, [2] καὶ διδάσκαλος πάντων γιγνόμενος τήν τε μισθοφορὰν ξυνέτεμεν, ἀντὶ δραχμῆς Ἀττικῆς ὥστε τριώβολον καὶ τοῦτο μὴ ξυνεχῶς δίδοσθαι,

λέγειν κελεύων τὸν Τισσαφέρνην πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι ἐκ πλέονος χρόνου ἐπιστήμονες ὄντες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τριώβολον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν διδόασιν, οὐ τοσοῦτον πενίᾳ ὅσον ἵνα αὐτῶν μὴ οἱ ναῦται ἐκ περιουσίας ὑβρίζοντες οἱ μὲν τὰ σώματα χείρω ἔχωσι δαπανῶντες ἐς τοιαῦτα ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἡ ἀσθένεια ξυμβαίνει, οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἀπολείπωσιν οὐχ ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ὁμηρείαν τὸν προσοφειλόμενον μισθόν: [3] καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων ἐδίδασκεν [ὥστε] δόντα χρήματα αὐτὸν πεῖσαι, ὥστε ξυγχωρῆσαι ταῦτα ἑαυτῷ πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων: τούτων δὲ Ἑρμοκράτης ἠναντιοῦτο μόνος ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντὸς ξυμμαχικοῦ. [4] τάς τε πόλεις δεομένας χρημάτων ἀπήλασεν αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους ὡς οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἀναίσχυντοι εἶεν πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐπικουρίᾳ δ᾽ ὅμως σῳζόμενοι ἀξιοῦσι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἄλλους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίας κινδυνεύειν: [5] τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας πόλεις ἔφη ἀδικεῖν, αἳ ἐς Ἀθηναίους πρότερον ἢ ἀποστῆναι ἀνήλουν, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ ἔτι πλείω ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐθελήσουσιν ἐσφέρειν. [6] τόν τε Τισσαφέρνην ἀπέφαινε νῦν μέν, τοῖς ἰδίοις χρήμασι πολεμοῦντα, εἰκότως φειδόμενον, ἢν δέ ποτε τροφὴ καταβῇ παρὰ βασιλέως, ἐντελῆ αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν τὸν μισθὸν καὶ τὰς πόλεις τὰ εἰκότα ὠφελήσειν.

[45] Before the Peloponnesians had removed to Rhodes affairs took a new turn. After the death of Chalcideus and the engagement at Miletus, Alcibiades fell under suspicion at Sparta, and orders came from home to Astyochus that he should be put to death. Agis hated him, and he was generally distrusted. In fear he retired to Tissaphernes, and soon, by working upon him, did all he could to injure the Peloponnesian cause. He was his constant adviser, and induced him to cut down the pay of the sailors from an Attic drachma to half a drachma, and this was only to be given at irregular intervals. Tissaphernes was instructed by him to tell the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, with their long experience of naval affairs, gave half a drachma only, not

from poverty, but lest their sailors should be demoralised by high pay, and spend their money on pleasures which injured their health, and thereby impaired their efficiency; the payment too was made irregularly, that the arrears, which they would forfeit by desertion, might be a pledge of their continuance in the service. He also recommended him to bribe the trierarchs and the generals of the allied cities into consenting. They all yielded with the exception of the Syracusans: Hermocrates alone stood firm on behalf of the whole alliance. When the allies who had revolted came asking for money, Alcibiades drove them away himself, saying on behalf of Tissaphernes that the Chians must have lost all sense of shame; they were the richest people in Hellas, and now, when they were being saved by foreign aid, they wanted other men, not only to risk life, but to expend money in their cause. To the other cities he replied that, having paid such large sums to the Athenians before they revolted, they would be inexcusable if they were not willing to contribute as much and even more for their own benefit. He represented further that Tissaphernes was now carrying on the war at his own expense, and must be expected to be careful. But if supplies should come from the King he would restore the full pay, and do whatever was reasonable for the cities.

46. παρῄνει δὲ καὶ τῷ Τισσαφέρνει μὴ ἄγαν ἐπείγεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον διαλῦσαι, μηδὲ βουληθῆναι κομίσαντα ἢ ναῦς Φοινίσσας ἅσπερ παρεσκευάζετο ἢ Ἕλλησι πλέοσι μισθὸν πορίζοντα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τῆς τε γῆς καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης τὸ κράτος δοῦναι, ἔχειν δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρους ἐᾶν δίχα τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ βασιλεῖ ἐξεῖναι αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτῷ λυπηροὺς τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐπάγειν. [2] γενομένης δ᾽ ἂν καθ᾽ ἓν τῆς ἐς γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν ἀρχῆς ἀπορεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν οἷς τοὺς κρατοῦντας ξυγκαθαιρήσει, ἢν μὴ αὐτὸς βούληται μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ καὶ κινδύνῳ ἀναστάς ποτε διαγωνίσασθαι. εὐτελέστερα δὲ τάδ᾽ εἶναι, βραχεῖ μορίῳ τῆς δαπάνης καὶ ἅμα μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀσφαλείας αὐτοὺς περὶ ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς Ἕλληνας κατατρῖψαι.

[3] ἐπιτηδειοτέρους τε ἔφη τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἶναι κοινωνοὺς αὐτῷ τῆς ἀρχῆς: ἧσσον γὰρ τῶν κατὰ γῆν ἐφίεσθαι, τὸν λόγον τε ξυμφορώτατον καὶ τὸ ἔργον ἔχοντας πολεμεῖν: τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ξυγκαταδουλοῦν ἂν σφίσι τε αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης μέρος καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὅσοι ἐν τῇ βασιλέως Ἕλληνες οἰκοῦσι, τοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐλευθερώσοντας ἥκειν, καὶ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπὸ μὲν σφῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθεροῦν νῦν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἀπὸ δ᾽ ἐκείνων [τῶν βαρβάρων], ἢν μή ποτε αὐτοὺς μὴ ἐξέλωσι, μὴ ἐλευθερῶσαι. [4] τρίβειν οὖν ἐκέλευε πρῶτον ἀμφοτέρους, καὶ ἀποτεμόμενον ὡς μέγιστα ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔπειτ᾽ ἤδη τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ἀπαλλάξαι ἐκ τῆς χώρας. [5] καὶ διενοεῖτο τὸ πλέον οὕτως ὁ Τισσαφέρνης, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ τῶν ποιουμένων ἦν εἰκάσαι. τῷ γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς εὖ περὶ τούτων παραινοῦντι προσθεὶς ἑαυτὸν ἐς πίστιν τήν τε τροφὴν κακῶς ἐπόριζε τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις καὶ ναυμαχεῖν οὐκ εἴα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας φάσκων ναῦς ἥξειν καὶ ἐκ περιόντος ἀγωνιεῖσθαι ἔφθειρε τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν ἀφείλετο γενομένην καὶ πάνυ ἰσχυράν, τά τε ἄλλα καταφανέστερον ἢ ὥστε λανθάνειν οὐ προθύμως ξυνεπολέμει.

[46] Alcibiades also advised Tissaphernes not to be in a hurry about putting an end to the war, and neither to bring up the Phoenician fleet which he was preparing, nor to give pay to more Hellenic sailors; he should not be so anxious to put the whole power both by sea and land into the same hands. Let the dominion only remain divided, and then, whichever of the two rivals was troublesome, the King might always use the other against him. But if one defeated the other and became supreme on both elements, who would help Tissaphernes to overthrow the conqueror? He would have to take the field in person and fight, which he might not like, at great risk and expense. The danger would be easily averted at a fraction of the cost, and at no risk to himself, if he wore out the Hellenes in internal strife. Alcibiades also said that the Athenians would be more suitable partners of empire,

because they were less likely to encroach by land, and both their principles and their practice in carrying on the war accorded better with the King's interest. For if he helped them to subject the element of the sea to themselves, they would gladly help him in the subjugation of the Hellenes who were in his country, whereas the Lacedaemonians came to be their liberators. But a power which was at that very moment emancipating the Hellenes from the dominion of another Hellenic power like themselves would not be satisfied to leave them under the yoke of the Barbarian if they once succeeded in crushing the Athenians. So he advised him first to wear them both out, and when he had clipped the Athenians as close as he could, then to get the Peloponnesians out of his country. To this course Tissaphernes was strongly inclined, if we may judge from his acts. For he gave his full confidence to Alcibiades, whose advice he approved; and kept the Peloponnesians ill-provided, at the same time refusing to let them fight at sea, and insisting that they must wait until the Phoenician ships arrived; they would then fight at an advantage. In this manner he ruined their affairs and impaired the efficiency of their navy, which had once been in first-rate condition. There were many other ways in which he showed openly and unmistakeably that he was not in earnest in the cause of his allies.

47. ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν τῷ Τισσαφέρνει καὶ [τῷ] βασιλεῖ, ὢν παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις, ἄριστα εἶναι νομίζων παρῄνει, ἅμα δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κάθοδον ἐς τὴν πατρίδα ἐπιθεραπεύων, εἰδώς, εἰ μὴ διαφθερεῖ αὐτήν, ὅτι ἔσται ποτὲ αὐτῷ πείσαντι κατελθεῖν: πεῖσαι δ᾽ ἂν ἐνόμιζε μάλιστα ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου, εἰ Τισσαφέρνης φαίνοιτο αὐτῷ ἐπιτήδειος ὤν: ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο. [2] ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ᾔσθοντο αὐτὸν ἰσχύοντα παρ᾽ αὐτῷ οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ Ἀθηναίων στρατιῶται, τὰ μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου προσπέμψαντος λόγους ἐς τοὺς δυνατωτάτους αὐτῶν ἄνδρας ὥστε μνησθῆναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐς τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ βούλεται καὶ

οὐ πονηρίᾳ οὐδὲ δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ αὐτὸν ἐκβαλούσῃ κατελθὼν καὶ παρασχὼν Τισσαφέρνην φίλον αὐτοῖς ξυμπολιτεύειν, τὸ δὲ πλέον καὶ ἀπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τριήραρχοί τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ δυνατώτατοι ὥρμηντο ἐς τὸ καταλῦσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν.

[47] In giving this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, now that he had passed under their protection, Alcibiades said what he really thought to be most for their interests. But he had another motive; he was preparing the way for his own return from exile. He knew that, if he did not destroy his country altogether, the time would come when he would persuade his countrymen to recall him; and he thought that his arguments would be most effectual if he were seen to be on intimate terms with Tissaphernes. And the result proved that he was right. The Athenian soldiers at Samos soon perceived that he had great influence with him, and he sent messages to the chief persons among them, whom he begged to remember him to all good men and true, and to let them know that he would be glad to return to his country and cast in his lot with them. He would at the same time make Tissaphernes their friend; but they must establish an oligarchy, and abolish the villainous democracy which had driven him out. Partly moved by these messages, but still more of their own inclination, the trierarchs and leading Athenians at Samos were now eager to overthrow the democracy.

48. καὶ ἐκινήθη πρότερον ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐντεῦθεν ὕστερον ἦλθεν. τῷ τε Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διαβάντες τινὲς ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἐς λόγους ἦλθον, καὶ ὑποτείνοντος αὐτοῦ Τισσαφέρνην μὲν πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ βασιλέα φίλον ποιήσειν, εἰ μὴ δημοκρατοῖντο □οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πιστεῦσαι μᾶλλον βασιλέα□, πολλὰς ἐλπίδας εἶχον αὐτοί θ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς οἱ δυνατώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ πράγματα, οἵπερ καὶ ταλαιπωροῦνται μάλιστα, ἐς ἑαυτοὺς περιποιήσειν καὶ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπικρατήσειν. [2] ἔς τε τὴν Σάμον ἐλθόντες ξυνίστασάν τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους ἐς

ξυνωμοσίαν καὶ ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς φανερῶς ἔλεγον ὅτι βασιλεὺς σφίσι φίλος ἔσοιτο καὶ χρήματα παρέξοι Ἀλκιβιάδου τε κατελθόντος καὶ μὴ δημοκρατουμένων. [3] καὶ ὁ μὲν ὅχλος, εἰ καί τι παραυτίκα ἤχθετο τοῖς πρασσομένοις, διὰ τὸ εὔπορον τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ παρὰ βασιλέως μισθοῦ ἡσύχαζεν: οἱ δὲ ξυνιστάντες τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐπειδὴ τῷ πλήθει ἐκοίνωσαν, αὖθις κἀν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ τῷ πλέονι τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐσκόπουν. [4] καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἐφαίνετο εὔπορα καὶ πιστά, Φρυνίχῳ δὲ στρατηγῷ ἔτι ὄντι οὐδὲν ἤρεσκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅ τε Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὅπερ καὶ ἦν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας δεῖσθαι ἐδόκει αὐτῷ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τι σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος κόσμου τὴν πόλιν μεταστήσας ὑπὸ τῶν ἑταίρων παρακληθεὶς κάτεισι, σφίσι δὲ περιοπτέον εἶναι τοῦτο μάλιστα, ὅπως μὴ στασιάσωσιν: [τῷ] βασιλεῖ τε οὐκ εὔπορον εἶναι καὶ Πελοποννησίων ἤδη ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ὄντων καὶ πόλεις ἐχόντων ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρχῇ οὐ τὰς ἐλαχίστας, Ἀθηναίοις προσθέμενον, οἷς οὐ πιστεύει, πράγματα ἔχειν, ἐξὸν Πελοποννησίους, ὑφ᾽ ὧν κακὸν οὐδέν πω πέπονθε, φίλους ποιήσασθαι. [5] τάς τε ξυμμαχίδας πόλεις, αἷς ὑπεσχῆσθαι δὴ σφᾶς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅτι δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δημοκρατήσονται, εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφη ὅτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον σφίσιν οὔθ᾽ αἱ ἀφεστηκυῖαι προσχωρήσονται οὔθ᾽ αἱ ὑπάρχουσαι βεβαιότεραι ἔσονται: οὐ γὰρ βουλήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας δουλεύειν μᾶλλον ἢ μεθ᾽ ὁποτέρου ἂν τύχωσι τούτων ἐλευθέρους εἶναι: [6] τούς τε καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους οὐκ ἐλάσσω αὐτοὺς νομίζειν σφίσι πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου, πορισταὶ ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητὰς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι: καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις εἶναι καὶ ἄκριτοι ἂν καὶ βιαιότερον ἀποθνῄσκειν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστήν. [7] καὶ ταῦτα παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμένας τὰς πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτὸς εἰδέναι ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσιν. οὔκουν ἑαυτῷ γε τῶν ἀπ᾽ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πρασσομένων ἀρέσκειν οὐδέν.

[48] The matter was stirred in the camp first of all, and introduced into the city afterwards. A few persons went over from Samos to Alcibiades, and conferred with him: to them he held out the hope that he would make, first of all Tissaphernes, and secondly the King himself, their friend, if they would put down democracy; the King would then be better able to trust them. And so the aristocracy, on whom the heaviest burdens are apt to fall, conceived great hopes of getting the government into their own hands, and overcoming their enemies. Returning to Samos, the envoys drew all such as seemed desirable accomplices into a conspiracy, while the language held in public to the main body of the army was that the King would be their friend and would supply them with money if Alcibiades was restored and democracy given up. Now the multitude were at first dissatisfied with the scheme, but the prospect of the King's pay was so grateful to them that they offered no opposition; and the authors of the movement, after they had broached the idea to the people, once more considered the proposals of Alcibiades among themselves and the members of their clubs. Most of them thought the matter safe and straightforward enough. Phrynichus, who was still general, was of another mind. He maintained, and rightly, that Alcibiades cared no more for oligarchy than he did for democracy, and in seeking to change the existing form of government was only considering how he might be recalled and restored to his country at the invitation of the clubs; whereas their one care should be to avoid disunion. Why should the King go out of his way to join the Athenians whom he did not trust, when he would only get into trouble with the Peloponnesians, who were now as great a naval power, and held some of the most important cities in his dominion? — it would be much easier for him to make friends with them, who had never done him any harm. As to the allies, to whom they had promised the blessings of oligarchy which they were now about to enjoy themselves,

he would be bound that the revolted cities would not return to them, and that their old allies would be not a whit more loyal in consequence. The form of government was indifferent to them if they could only be free, but they did not want to be in subjection either to an oligarchy or to a democracy. And as for the so-called nobility, the allies thought that they would be quite as troublesome as the people; they were the persons who suggested crimes to the popular mind; who provided the means for their execution; and who reaped the fruits themselves. As far as it rested with the oligarchy the punishment of death would be inflicted unscrupulously, and without trial, whereas the people brought the oligarchs to their senses, and were a refuge to which the oppressed might always have recourse. Experience had taught the cities this lesson, and he was well aware of their feelings. He was therefore himself utterly dissatisfied with the proposals of Alcibiades, and disapproved of the whole affair.

49. οἱ δὲ ξυλλεγέντες τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυνωμοσίᾳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει, τά τε παρόντα ἐδέχοντο καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρέσβεις Πείσανδρον καὶ ἄλλους παρεσκευάζοντο πέμπειν, ὅπως περί τε τῆς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου καθόδου πράσσοιεν καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἐκεῖ δήμου καταλύσεως καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην φίλον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ποιήσειαν.

[49] But the conspirators who were present were not at all shaken in their opinion. They accepted the plan and prepared to send Peisander and other envoys to Athens, that they might manage the recall of Alcibiades and the overthrow of the democracy, and finally make Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians.

50. γνοὺς δὲ ὁ Φρύνιχος ὅτι ἔσοιτο περὶ τῆς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου καθόδου λόγος καὶ ὅτι Ἀθηναῖοι ἐνδέξονται αὐτήν, δείσας πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν τῶν ὑφ᾽ αὐτοῦ λεχθέντων μή, ἢν κατέλθῃ, ὡς κωλυτὴν ὄντα κακῶς δρᾷ, τρέπεται ἐπὶ τοιόνδε τι. [2] πέμπει ὡς τὸν Ἀστύοχον τὸν Λακεδαιμονίων ναύαρχον ἔτι ὄντα τότε περὶ τὴν Μίλητον κρύφα ἐπιστείλας ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης αὐτῶν τὰ πράγματα φθείρει Τισσαφέρνην Ἀθηναίοις φίλον ποιῶν, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα σαφῶς ἐγγράψας: ξυγγνώμην δὲ εἶναι ἑαυτῷ περὶ ἀνδρὸς πολεμίου καὶ μετὰ τοῦ τῆς πόλεως ἀξυμφόρου κακόν τι βουλεύειν. [3] ὁ δὲ Ἀστύοχος τὸν μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἄλλως τε καὶ οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐς χεῖρας ἰόντα οὐδὲ διενοεῖτο τιμωρεῖσθαι, ἀνελθὼν δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐς Μαγνησίαν καὶ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνην ἅμα λέγει τε αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐπισταλέντα ἐκ τῆς Σάμου καὶ γίγνεται αὐτὸς μηνυτής, προσέθηκέ τε, ὡς ἐλέγετο, ἐπὶ ἰδίοις κέρδεσι Τισσαφέρνει ἑαυτὸν καὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινοῦσθαι: διόπερ καὶ [περὶ] τῆς μισθοφορᾶς οὐκ ἐντελοῦς οὔσης μαλακωτέρως ἀνθήπτετο. [4] ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης εὐθὺς πέμπει κατὰ Φρυνίχου γράμματα ἐς τὴν Σάμον πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τέλει ὄντας οἷα δέδρακε, καὶ ἀξιῶν αὐτὸν ἀποθνῄσκειν. [5] θορυβούμενος δὲ ὁ Φρύνιχος καὶ πάνυ ἐν τῷ μεγίστῳ κινδύνῳ ὢν διὰ τὸ μήνυμα ἀποστέλλει αὖθις πρὸς τὸν Ἀστύοχον, τά τε πρότερα μεμφόμενος ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἐκρύφθη καὶ νῦν ὅτι ὅλον τὸ στράτευμα τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἑτοῖμος εἴη τὸ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ παρασχεῖν αὐτοῖς διαφθεῖραι, γράψας καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, ἀτειχίστου οὔσης Σάμου, ᾧ ἂν τρόπῳ αὐτὰ πράξειε, καὶ ὅτι ἀνεπίφθονόν οἱ ἤδη εἴη περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δι᾽ ἐκείνους κινδυνεύοντι καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν δρᾶσαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθίστων αὐτὸν διαφθαρῆναι. ὁ δὲ Ἀστύοχος μηνύει καὶ ταῦτα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ.

[50] Phrynichus now knew that a proposal would be made for the restoration of Alcibiades, which the Athenians would certainly accept; and having opposed his return he feared that Alcibiades, if he were recalled, would do him a mischief, because he had stood in his way. So he had recourse to the

following device. He secretly sent a letter to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, who was still at Miletus, informing him that Alcibiades was gaining over Tissaphernes to the Athenians and ruining the Peloponnesian interests. He gave full particulars, adding that Astyochus must excuse him if he sought to harm an enemy even at some cost to his country." Now Astyochus had no idea of punishing Alcibiades, who moreover no longer came within his reach. On the contrary, he went to him and to Tissaphernes at Magnesia, and, turning informer, told them of the letter which he had received from Samos. (He was believed to have sold himself to Tissaphernes, to whom he now betrayed everything; and this was the reason why he was so unwilling to bestir himself about the reduction of the pay.) Alcibiades immediately sent a despatch denouncing to the leaders of the army at Samos the treason of Phrynichus, and demanding that he should be put to death. Phrynichus was confounded, and in fact the revelation placed him in the greatest danger. However he sent again to Astyochus, blaming him for having violated his former confidence. He then proceeded to say that he was ready to give the Peloponnesians the opportunity of destroying the whole Athenian army, and he explained in detail how Samos, which was unfortified, might best be attacked; adding that he was in danger of his life for their sakes, and that he need no longer apologise if by this or any other means he could save himself from destruction at the hands of his worst enemies. Again the message was communicated by Astyochus to Alcibiades.

51. καὶ ὡς προῄσθετο αὐτὸν ὁ Φρύνιχος ἀδικοῦντα καὶ ὅσον οὐ παροῦσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου περὶ τούτων ἐπιστολήν, αὐτὸς προφθάσας τῷ στρατεύματι ἐξάγγελος γίγνεται ὡς οἱ πολέμιοι μέλλουσιν ἀτειχίστου οὔσης τῆς Σάμου καὶ ἅμα τῶν νεῶν οὐ πασῶν ἔνδον ὁρμουσῶν ἐπιθήσεσθαι τῷ στρατοπέδῳ, καὶ ταῦτα σαφῶς πεπυσμένος εἴη, καὶ χρῆναι τειχίζειν τε Σάμον ὡς τάχιστα καὶ τἆλλα ἐν φυλακῇ ἔχειν: ἐστρατήγει δὲ καὶ κύριος ἦν αὐτὸς πράσσων

ταῦτα. [2] καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸν τειχισμόν τε παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου, καὶ ὡς μέλλουσα, Σάμος θᾶσσον ἐτειχίσθη: αἱ δὲ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐπιστολαὶ οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον ἦκον ὅτι προδίδοταί τε τὸ στράτευμα ὑπὸ Φρυνίχου καὶ οἱ πολέμιοι μέλλουσιν ἐπιθήσεσθαι. [3] δόξας δὲ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης οὐ πιστὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων προειδὼς τῷ Φρυνίχῳ ὡς ξυνειδότι κατ᾽ ἔχθραν ἀνατιθέναι, οὐδὲν ἔβλαψεν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξυνεμαρτύρησε μᾶλλον ταὐτὰ ἐσαγγείλας.

[51] Now Phrynichus was well aware of his treachery, and he knew that another letter from Alcibiades giving further information was on the point of arriving. Before its arrival he himself warned the army that, Samos being unwalled and some of the ships not anchoring within the harbour, the enemy were going to attack the fleet; of this he had certain knowledge. They ought therefore to fortify the place as quickly as they could, and to take every precaution. As he was a general he could execute his proposals by his own authority. So they set to work, and in consequence Samos, which would have been fortified in any case, was fortified all the sooner. Not long afterwards the expected letter came from Alcibiades warning the Athenians that the army was being betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy were going to make an attack. But Alcibiades was not trusted; he was thought to have attributed to Phrynichus out of personal animosity complicity in the enemy’s designs, with which he was himself acquainted. Thus he did him no harm, but rather strengthened his position by telling the same tale.

52. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο Ἀλκιβιάδης μὲν Τισσαφέρνην παρεσκεύαζε καὶ ἀνέπειθεν ὅπως φίλος ἔσται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, δεδιότα μὲν τοὺς Πελοποννησίους, ὅτι πλέοσι ναυσὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρῆσαν, βουλόμενον δὲ ὅμως, εἰ δύναιτό πως, πεισθῆναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἐν τῇ Κνίδῳ διαφορὰν περὶ τῶν Θηριμένους σπονδῶν ᾔσθετο τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἤδη γὰρ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἐν τῇ

Ῥόδῳ ὄντων αὐτῶν ἐγεγένητο: ἐν ᾗ τὸν τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου λόγον πρότερον εἰρημένον περὶ τοῦ ἐλευθεροῦν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὰς ἁπάσας πόλεις ἐπηλήθευσεν ὁ Λίχας, οὐ φάσκων ἀνεκτὸν εἶναι ξυγκεῖσθαι κρατεῖν βασιλέα τῶν πόλεων ὧν ποτὲ καὶ πρότερον ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ οἱ πατέρες ἦρχον. καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἅτε περὶ μεγάλων ἀγωνιζόμενος, προθύμως τὸν Τισσαφέρνην θεραπεύων προσέκειτο:

[52] Alcibiades still continued his practices with Tissaphernes, whom he now sought to draw over to the Athenian interest. But Tissaphernes was afraid of the Peloponnesians, who had more ships on the spot than the Athenians. And yet he would have liked, if he could, to have been persuaded; especially when he saw the opposition which the Peloponnesians raised at Cnidus to the treaty of Theramenes. For his quarrel with them had broken out before the Peloponnesians went to Rhodes, where they were at present stationed; and the words of Alcibiades, who had previously warned Tissaphernes that the Lacedaemonians were the liberators of all the cities of Hellas, were verified by the protest of Lichas, who declared that ‘for the King to hold all the cities which he or his ancestors had held was a stipulation not to be endured.’ So Alcibiades, who was playing for a great stake, was very assiduous in paying his court to Tissaphernes.

53. οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου πρέσβεις τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποσταλέντες ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας λόγους ἐποιοῦντο ἐν τῷ δήμῳ κεφαλαιοῦντες ἐκ πολλῶν, μάλιστα δὲ ὡς ἐξείη αὐτοῖς Ἀλκιβιάδην καταγαγοῦσι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δημοκρατουμένοις βασιλέα τε ξύμμαχον ἔχειν καὶ Πελοποννησίων περιγενέσθαι. [2] ἀντιλεγόντων δὲ πολλῶν καὶ ἄλλων περὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν Ἀλκιβιάδου ἅμα ἐχθρῶν διαβοώντων ὡς δεινὸν εἴη εἰ τοὺς νόμους βιασάμενος κάτεισι, καὶ Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ Κηρύκων περὶ τῶν μυστικῶν δι᾽ ἅπερ ἔφυγε μαρτυρομένων καὶ ἐπιθειαζόντων μὴ κατάγειν, ὁ Πείσανδρος παρελθὼν πρὸς πολλὴν ἀντιλογίαν καὶ σχετλιασμὸν ἠρώτα ἕνα ἕκαστον

παράγων τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων, εἴ τινα ἐλπίδα ἔχει σωτηρίας τῇ πόλει, Πελοποννησίων ναῦς τε οὐκ ἐλάσσους σφῶν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἀντιπρῴρους ἐχόντων καὶ πόλεις ξυμμαχίδας πλείους, βασιλέως τε αὐτοῖς καὶ Τισσαφέρνους χρήματα παρεχόντων, σφίσι τε οὐκέτι ὄντων, εἰ μή τις πείσει βασιλέα μεταστῆναι παρὰ σφᾶς. [3] ὁπότε δὲ μὴ φαῖεν ἐρωτώμενοι, ἐνταῦθα δὴ σαφῶς ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς ὅτι ‘τοῦτο τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ πολιτεύσομεν τε σωφρονέστερον καὶ ἐς ὀλίγους μᾶλλον τὰς ἀρχὰς ποιήσομεν, ἵνα πιστεύῃ ἡμῖν βασιλεύς, καὶ μὴ περὶ πολιτείας τὸ πλέον βουλεύσομεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἢ περὶ σωτηρίας ὕστερον γὰρ ἐξέσται ἡμῖν καὶ μεταθέσθαι, ἢν μή τι ἀρέσκῃ, Ἀλκιβιάδην τε κατάξομεν, ὃς μόνος τῶν νῦν οἷός τε τοῦτο κατεργάσασθαι.’

[53] Meanwhile Peisander and the other envoys who had been sent from Samos arrived at Athens and made their proposals to the people. They said much in few words, insisting above all that if the Athenians restored Alcibiades and modified their democracy they might secure the alliance of the King and gain the victory over the Peloponnesians. There was great opposition to any change in the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades were loud in protesting that it would be a dreadful thing if he were permitted to return in defiance of the law. The Eumolpidae and Ceryces called heaven and earth to witness that the city must never restore a man who had been banished for profaning the mysteries. Amid violent expressions of indignation Peisander came forward, and having up the objectors one by one he pointed out to them that the Peloponnesians had a fleet ready for action as large as their own, that they numbered more cities among their allies, and that they were furnished with money by Tissaphernes and the King; whereas the Athenians had spent everything: he then asked them whether there was the least hope of saving the country unless the King could be won over. They all acknowledged that there was none. He then said to them

plainly:’But this alliance is impossible unless we are governed in a wiser manner, and office is confined to a smaller number: then the King will trust us. Do not let us be dwelling on the form of the constitution, which we may hereafter change as we please, when the very existence of Athens is at stake. And we must restore Alcibiades, who is the only man living capable of saving us.’

54. ὁ δὲ δῆμος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀκούων χαλεπῶς ἔφερε τὸ περὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας: σαφῶς δὲ διδασκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου μὴ εἶναι ἄλλην σωτηρίαν, δείσας καὶ ἅμα ἐπελπίζων ὡς καὶ μεταβαλεῖται, ἐνέδωκεν. [2] καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο πλεύσαντα τὸν Πείσανδρον καὶ δέκα ἄνδρας μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ πράσσειν ὅπῃ [ἂν] αὐτοῖς δοκοίη ἄριστα ἔξειν τά τε πρὸς τὸν Τισσαφέρνην καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην. [3] ἅμα τε διαβαλόντος καὶ Φρύνιχον τοῦ Πεισάνδρου παρέλυσεν ὁ δῆμος τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τὸν ξυνάρχοντα Σκιρωνίδην, ἀντέπεμψαν δὲ στρατηγοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς Διομέδοντα καὶ Λέοντα. τὸν δὲ Φρύνιχον ὁ Πείσανδρος φάσκων Ἴασον προδοῦναι καὶ Ἀμόργην διέβαλεν, οὐ νομίζων ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι τοῖς πρὸς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην πρασσομένοις. [4] καὶ ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τάς τε ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἁπάσας ἐπελθὼν καὶ παρακελευσάμενος ὅπως ξυστραφέντες καὶ κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι καταλύσουσι τὸν δῆμον, καὶ τἆλλα παρασκευάσας ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν ὥστε μηκέτι διαμέλλεσθαι, αὐτὸς μετὰ τῶν δέκα ἀνδρῶν τὸν πλοῦν ὡς τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ποιεῖται.

[54] The people were very angry at the first suggestion of an oligarchy; but when Peisander proved to them that they had no other resource, partly in fear, and partly in hope that it might be hereafter changed, they gave way. So a decree was passed that Peisander himself and ten others should go out and negotiate to the best of their judgment with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. Peisander also denounced Phrynichus, and therefore the people dismissed him and his colleague Scironides from their commands, and appointed

Diomedon and Leon to be admirals in their room. Peisander thought that Phrynichus would stand in the way of the negotiations with Alcibiades, and for this reason he calumniated him, alleging that he had betrayed Iasus and Amorges. Then he went, one after another, to all the clubs which already existed in Athens for the management of trials and elections, and exhorted them to unite, and by concerted action put down the democracy. When he had completed all the necessary preparations and the plot was ripe, he and his colleagues proceeded on their voyage to Tissaphernes.

55. ὁ δὲ Λέων καὶ ὁ Διομέδων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι ἀφιγμένοι ἤδη ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς ἐπίπλουν τῇ Ῥόδῳ ἐποιήσαντο. καὶ τὰς μὲν ναῦς καταλαμβάνουσιν ἀνειλκυσμένας τῶν Πελοποννησίων, ἐς δὲ τὴν γῆν ἀπόβασίν τινα ποιησάμενοι καὶ τοὺς προσβοηθήσαντας Ῥοδίων νικήσαντες μάχῃ ἀπεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν Χάλκην, καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐντεῦθεν μᾶλλον <ἢ> ἐκ τῆς Κῶ ἐποιοῦντο: εὐφυλακτότερα γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐγίγνετο, εἴ ποι ἀπαίροι τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναυτικόν. [2]ἦλθε δ᾽ ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον καὶ Ξενοφαντίδας Λάκων παρὰ Πεδαρίτου ἐκ Χίου, λέγων ὅτι τὸ τεῖχος τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἤδη ἐπιτετέλεσται, καὶ εἰ μὴ βοηθήσουσι πάσαις ταῖς ναυσίν, ἀπολεῖται τὰ ἐν Χίῳ πράγματα. οἱ δὲ διενοοῦντο βοηθήσειν. [3] ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ὁ Πεδάριτος αὐτός τε καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ἐπικουρικὸν ἔχων καὶ τοὺς Χίους πανστρατιᾷ προσβαλὼν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τῷ περὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐρύματι αἱρεῖ τέ τι αὐτοῦ καὶ νεῶν τινῶν ἀνειλκυσμένων ἐκράτησεν: ἐπεκβοηθησάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τρεψαμένων τοὺς Χίους πρώτους νικᾶται καὶ τὸ ἄλλο τὸ περὶ τὸν Πεδάριτον, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀποθνῄσκει καὶ τῶν Χίων πολλοὶ καὶ ὅπλα ἐλήφθη πολλά.

[55] During the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had now entered upon their command, made a descent upon Rhodes. They found the Peloponnesian fleet drawn up out of their reach, but they landed, and defeated the Rhodians who came out to meet them. From Rhodes they retired to Chalcè,

which henceforth they made their base of operations rather than Cos, because they could there better command any movement which might be made by the Peloponnesian fleet. About this time Xenophantidas, a Lacedaemonian, brought word to Rhodes from Pedaritus, the governor of Chios, that the Athenian fortification was now completed, and that if the Peloponnesians with their whole fleet did not at once come to the rescue Chios would be lost. So they began to think of sending help. Meanwhile Pedaritus in person with his mercenaries and the whole Chian army attacked the lines which protected the Athenian fleet; he took a part of the wall and obtained possession of certain ships which were drawn up on shore. But the Athenians rushed out upon them, and first putting to flight the Chians, soon defeated the rest of his forces. Pedaritus himself was slain, together with many of the Chians, and a great quantity of arms was taken.

56. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἔκ τε γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ἐπολιορκοῦντο καὶ ὁ λιμὸς αὐτόθι ἦν μέγας: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις ἀφικόμενοι ὡς τὸν Τισσαφέρνην λόγους ποιοῦνται περὶ τῆς ὁμολογίας. [2] Ἀλκιβιάδης δέ οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ πάνυ τὰ ἀπὸ Τισσαφέρνους βέβαια ἦν, φοβουμένου τοὺς Πελοποννησίους μᾶλλον καὶ ἔτι βουλομένου, καθάπερ καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐδιδάσκετο, τρίβειν ἀμφοτέρους τρέπεται ἐπὶ τοιόνδε εἶδος ὥστε τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ὡς μέγιστα αἰτοῦντα παρὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων μὴ ξυμβῆναι. [3] δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τὸ αὐτὸ βουληθῆναι, αὐτὸς μὲν διὰ τὸ δέος, ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἐπειδὴ ἐώρα ἐκεῖνον καὶ ὡς οὐ ξυμβησείοντα, δοκεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐβούλετο μὴ ἀδύνατος εἶναι πεῖσαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς πεπεισμένῳ Τισσαφέρνει καὶ βουλομένῳ προσχωρῆσαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἱκανὰ διδόναι. [4] ᾔτει γὰρ τοσαῦτα ὑπερβάλλων ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, λέγων αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ παρόντος τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους, ὥστε τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καίπερ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὅτι αἰτοίη ξυγχωρούντων, ὅμως αἴτιον γενέσθαι:Ἰωνίαν τε γὰρ πᾶσαν ἠξίου δίδοσθαι καὶ αὖθις

νήσους τε τὰς ἐπικειμένας καὶ ἄλλα, οἷς οὐκ ἐναντιουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων τέλος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ ἤδη ξυνόδῳ, δείσας μὴ πάνυ φωραθῇ ἀδύνατος ὤν, ναῦς ἠξίου ἐᾶν βασιλέα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γῆν ὅπῃ ἂν καὶ ὅσαις ἂν βούληται. ἐνταῦθα δὴ οὐκέτι ... ἀλλ᾽ ἄπορα νομίσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐξηπατῆσθαι, δι᾽ ὀργῆς ἀπελθόντες κομίζονται ἐς τὴν Σάμον.

[56] The Chians were now blockaded more closely than ever both by sea and land, and there was a great famine in the place. Meanwhile Peisander and his colleagues came to Tissaphernes and proposed an agreement. But Alcibiades was not as yet quite sure of Tissaphernes, who was more afraid of the Peloponnesians than of the Athenians, and was still desirous, in accordance with the lesson which he had been taught by Alcibiades himself, to wear them both out. So he had recourse to the device of making Tissaphernes ask too much, that the negotiations might be broken off. And I imagine that Tissaphernes himself equally wanted them to fail; he was moved by his fears; while Alcibiades, seeing that his reluctance was insuperable, did not wish the Athenians to think that he was unable to persuade him — he wanted them to believe that Tissaphernes was already persuaded and anxious to make terms but could not, because they themselves would not grant enough. And so, speaking on behalf of Tissaphernes who was himself present, he made such exorbitant demands that, although for a time the Athenians were willing to grant anything which he asked, at length the responsibility of breaking off the conference was thrown upon them. He and Tissaphernes demanded, first the cession of all Ionia to the King, then that of the neighbouring islands; and there were some other conditions. Thus far the Athenians offered no opposition. But at last, fearing that his utter inability to fulfil his promise would be exposed, at the third interview he demanded permission for the King to build ships, and sail along his own coast wherever and with as many vessels as he pleased. This was too much; the

Athenians now perceived that matters were hopeless, and that they had been duped by Alcibiades. So they departed in anger to Samos.

57. Τισσαφέρνης δὲ εὐθὺς μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι παρέρχεται ἐς τὴν Καῦνον, βουλόμενος τοὺς Πελοποννησίους πάλιν τε κομίσαι ἐς τὴν Μίλητον καὶ ξυνθήκας ἔτι ἄλλας ποιησάμενος, ἃς ἂν δύνηται, τροφήν τε παρέχειν καὶ μὴ παντάπασιν ἐκπεπολεμῶσθαι, δεδιὼς μή, ἢν ἀπορῶσι πολλαῖς ναυσὶ τῆς τροφῆς, ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀναγκασθέντες ναυμαχεῖν ἡσσηθῶσιν ἢ κενωθεισῶν τῶν νεῶν ἄνευ ἑαυτοῦ γένηται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἃ βούλονται. ἔτι δὲ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα μὴ τῆς τροφῆς ζητήσει πορθήσωσι τὴν ἤπειρον. [2] πάντων οὖν τούτων λογισμῷ καὶ προνοίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐβούλετο ἐπανισοῦν τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρὸς ἀλλήλους, μεταπεμψάμενος οὖν τοὺς Πελοποννησίους τροφήν τε αὐτοῖς δίδωσι καὶ σπονδὰς τρίτας τάσδε σπένδεται.

[57] Immediately afterwards, and during the same winter, Tissaphernes came down to Caunus wishing to bring back the Peloponnesians to Miletus, and once more to make a treaty with them on such terms as he could get; he was willing to maintain them, for he did not want to become wholly their enemy, and was afraid that if their large fleet were at a loss for supplies they might be compelled to fight and be defeated, or their crews might desert; in either case the Athenians would gain their ends without his assistance. Above all he feared lest they should ravage the adjoining mainland in search of food. Taking into account all these possibilities, and true to his policy, which was to hold the balance evenly between the two contending powers, he sent for the Lacedaemonians, furnished them with supplies, and made a third treaty with them, which ran as follows:

58. ‘τρίτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει Δαρείου βασιλεύοντος, ἐφορεύοντος δὲ Ἀλεξιππίδα ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, ξυνθῆκαι ἐγένοντο ἐν Μαιάνδρου πεδίῳ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς Τισσαφέρνην καὶ Ἱεραμένη καὶ τοὺς Φαρνάκου παῖδας περὶ τῶν βασιλέως πραγμάτων καὶ

Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων. [2] χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστί, βασιλέως εἶναι: καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται. [3] Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους μὴ ἰέναι ἐπὶ χώραν τὴν βασιλέως ἐπὶ κακῷ μηδενί, μηδὲ βασιλέα ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων χώραν μηδὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ κακῷ μηδενί. [4] ἢν δέ τις Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ κακῷ ἴῃ ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλέως χώραν, Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους κωλύειν: καὶ ἤν τις ἐκ τῆς βασιλέως ἴῃ ἐπὶ κακῷ ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ἢ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω. [5] τροφὴν δὲ ταῖς ναυσὶ ταῖς νῦν παρούσαις Τισσαφέρνην παρέχειν κατὰ τὰ ξυγκείμενα μέχρι ἂν αἱ νῆες αἱ βασιλέως ἔλθωσιν: [6] Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ἐπὴν αἱ βασιλέως νῆες ἀφίκωνται, τὰς ἑαυτῶν ναῦς, ἢν βούλωνται, τρέφειν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι. ἢν δὲ παρὰ Τισσαφέρνους λαμβάνειν ἐθέλωσι τὴν τροφήν, Τισσαφέρνην παρέχειν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τελευτῶντος τοῦ πολέμου τὰ χρήματα Τισσαφέρνει ἀποδοῦναι ὁπόσα ἂν λάβωσιν. [7] ἐπὴν δὲ αἱ βασιλέως νῆες ἀφίκωνται, αἵ τε Λακεδαιμονίων νῆες καὶ αἱ τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αἱ βασιλέως κοινῇ τὸν πόλεμον πολεμούντων καθ᾽ ὅτι ἂν Τισσαφέρνει δοκῇ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. ἢν δὲ καταλύειν βούλωνται πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν ὁμοίῳ καταλύεσθαι.’

[58] ‘In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius the King, when Alexippidas was Ephor at Lacedaemon, a treaty was made in the plain of the Maeander between the Lacedaemonians and their allies on the one hand, and Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces on the other, touching the interests of the King, and of the Lacedaemonians and their allies.’I. All the King’s country which is in Asia shall continue to be the King’s, and the King shall act as he pleases in respect of his own country.’II. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not go against the King’s country to do hurt, and the King shall not go against the country of the Lacedaemonians and their allies to do

hurt. If any of the Lacedaemonians or their allies go against the King’s country and do hurt, the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall interfere: and if any of the dwellers in the King’s country shall go against the country of the Lacedaemonians and their allies and do hurt, the King shall interfere.’III. Tissaphernes shall provide maintenance for the number of ships which the Lacedaemonians have at present, according to the agreement, until the King’s ships arrive. When they have arrived, the Lacedaemonians and their allies may either maintain their own ships, or they may receive the maintenance of their ships from Tissaphernes. But in this case the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall at the end of the war repay to Tissaphernes the money which they have received.’IV. When the King’s ships have arrived, the ships of the Lacedaemonians and of their allies and of the King shall carry on the war in common, as may seem best to Tissaphernes and to the Lacedaemonians and their allies: and if they wish to make peace with the Athenians both parties shall make peace on the same terms.’

59. αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ αὗται ἐγένοντο, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα παρεσκευάζετο Τισσαφέρνης τάς τε Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἄξων, ὥσπερ εἴρητο, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσαπερ ὑπέσχετο, καὶ ἐβούλετο παρασκευαζόμενος γοῦν δῆλος εἶναι:

[59] Such was the treaty. Tissaphernes now prepared to bring up the Phoenician ships, as he had promised, and to fulfil his other pledges. He was anxious at all events to be seen making a beginning.

60. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ τελευτῶντος ἤδη τοῦ χειμῶνος Ὠρωπὸν εἷλον προδοσίᾳ, Ἀθηναίων ἐμφρουρούντων. ξυνέπραξαν δὲ Ἐρετριῶν τε ἄνδρες καὶ αὐτῶν Ὠρωπίων, ἐπιβουλεύοντες ἀπόστασιν τῆς Εὐβοίας: ἐπὶ γὰρ τῇ Ἐρετρίᾳ τὸ χωρίον ὂν ἀδύνατα ἦν Ἀθηναίων ἐχόντων μὴ οὐ μεγάλα βλάπτειν καὶ Ἐρέτριαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Εὔβοιαν. [2] ἔχοντες οὖν ἤδη τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ῥόδον οἱ Ἐρετριῆς, ἐπικαλούμενοι ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν τοὺς Πελοποννησίους. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῆς Χίου κακουμένης βοήθειαν μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο, καὶ ἅραντες

πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐκ τῆς Ῥόδου ἔπλεον. [3] καὶ γενόμενοι περὶ τὸ Τριόπιον καθορῶσι τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς πελαγίας ἀπὸ τῆς Χάλκης πλεούσας: καὶ ὡς οὐδέτεροι ἀλλήλοις ἐπέπλεον, ἀφικνοῦνται οἱ μὲν ἐς τὴν Σάμον, οἱ δὲ ἐς τὴν Μίλητον, καὶ ἐώρων οὐκέτι ἄνευ ναυμαχίας οἷόν τε εἶναι ἐς τὴν Χίον βοηθῆσαι. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα οὗτος, καὶ εἰκοστὸν ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

[60] Towards the end of the winter, Oropus, which was occupied by an Athenian garrison, was betrayed to the Boeotians. Certain of the Eretrians and of the Oropians themselves, both having an eye to the revolt of Euboea, were concerned in the enterprise. For Oropos, facing Eretria, while held by the Athenians could not be other than a serious annoyance, both to Eretria and to the whole of Euboea. Having now possession of Oropus the Eretrians came to Rhodes, and invited the Peloponnesians to Euboea. They were however more disposed to relieve the distress of Chios, and thither they sailed from Rhodes with their whole fleet. Near Triopium they descried the Athenian ships in the open sea sailing from Chalcè: neither fleet attacked the other, but both arrived safely, the one at Samos, and the other at Miletus. The Lacedaemonians now saw that they could no longer relieve Chios without a battle at sea. So the winter ended, and with it the twentieth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history.

61. τοῦ δ᾽ ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους ἅμα τῷ ἦρι εὐθὺς ἀρχομένῳ Δερκυλίδας τε ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιάτης στρατιὰν ἔχων οὐ πολλὴν παρεπέμφθη πεζῇ ἐφ᾽ Ἑλλησπόντου Ἄβυδον ἀποστήσων □εἰσὶ δὲ Μιλησίων ἄποικοι□, καὶ οἱ Χῖοι, ἐν ὅσῳ αὐτοῖς ὁ Ἀστύοχος ἠπόρει ὅπως βοηθήσοι, ναυμαχῆσαι πιεζόμενοι τῇ πολιορκίᾳ ἠναγκάσθησαν. [2] ἔτυχον δὲ ἔτι ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὄντος Ἀστυόχου ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου Λέοντά τε ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην, ὃς Ἀντισθένει ἐπιβάτης ξυνεξῆλθε, τοῦτον κεκομισμένοι μετὰ τὸν Πεδαρίτου θάνατον ἄρχοντα καὶ ναῦς δώδεκα, αἳ ἔτυχον φύλακες Μιλήτου οὖσαι, ὧν ἦσαν

Θούριαι πέντε καὶ Συρακόσιαι τέσσαρες καὶ μία Ἀναιῖτις καὶ μία Μιλησία καὶ Λέοντος μία. [3] ἐπεξελθόντων δὲ τῶν Χίων πανδημεὶ καὶ καταλαβόντων τι ἐρυμνὸν χωρίον καὶ τῶν νεῶν αὐτοῖς ἅμα ἓξ καὶ τριάκοντα ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύο καὶ τριάκοντα ἀναγαγομένων ἐναυμάχησαν: καὶ καρτερᾶς γενομένης ναυμαχίας οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ οἱ Χῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ὀψὲ ἦν ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν.

[61] At the beginning of the following spring, Dercyllidas, a Spartan, was sent at the head of a small army along the coast to the Hellespont. He was to effect the revolt of Abydos, a Milesian colony. The Chians, while Astyochus was doubting whether he could assist them, were compelled by the pressure of the blockade to fight at sea. While he was still at Rhodes they had obtained from Miletus, after the death of Pedaritus, a new governor, Leon, a Spartan, who had come out as a marine with Antisthenes; he brought with him twelve ships, five Thurian, four Syracusan, one from Anaea, one Milesian, and one which was Leon’s own; they had been employed in guarding Miletus. The Chians made a sally with their whole force, and seized a strong position; their ships at the same time, to the number of thirty-six, sailed out and fought with the thirty-two of the Athenians. The engagement was severe; the Chians and their allies had rather the advantage, but evening had come on; so they retired to the city.

62. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο εὐθὺς τοῦ Δερκυλίδου πεζῇ ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου παρεξελθόντος Ἄβυδος ἐν τῷ Ἑλλησπόντῳ ἀφίσταται πρὸς Δερκυλίδαν καὶ Φαρνάβαζον, καὶ Λάμψακος δυοῖν ἡμέραιν ὕστερον. [2] Στρομβιχίδης δὲ ἐκ τῆς Χίου πυθόμενος κατὰ τάχος βοηθήσας ναυσὶν Ἀθηναίων τέσσαρσι καὶ εἴκοσιν, ὧν καὶ στρατιώτιδες ἦσαν ὁπλίτας ἄγουσαι, ἐπεξελθόντων τῶν Λαμψακηνῶν μάχῃ κρατήσας καὶ αὐτοβοεὶ Λάμψακον ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν ἑλών, καὶ σκεύη μὲν καὶ ἀνδράποδα ἁρπαγὴν ποιησάμενος, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐλευθέρους πάλιν κατοικίσας, ἐπ᾽ Ἄβυδον ἦλθεν. [3] καὶ ὡς

οὔτε προσεχώρουν οὔτε προσβάλλων ἐδύνατο ἑλεῖν, ἐς τὸ ἀντιπέρας τῆς Ἀβύδου ἀποπλεύσας Σηστὸν πόλιν τῆς Χερσονήσου, ἥν ποτε Μῆδοι εἶχον, καθίστατο φρούριον καὶ φυλακὴν τοῦ παντὸς Ἑλλησπόντου.

[62] Soon afterwards Dercyllidas arrived at the Hellespont from Miletus; Abydos, and two days later Lampsacus, revolted to him and Pharnabazus. Strombichides, having intelligence, hastened thither from Chios with twenty-four Athenian ships, of which some were transports conveying hoplites. Defeating the Lampsacenes who came out against him, he took Lampsacus, which was unfortified, at the first onset. He made plunder of the slaves and property which he found there, and, reinstating the free inhabitants, went on to Abydos. But the people of Abydos would not yield, and though he attempted to take the place by assault, he failed; so he crossed over to Sestos, a city of the Chersonese opposite Abydos, which the Persians had formerly held. There he placed a garrison to keep watch over the entire Hellespont.

63. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Χῖοί τε θαλασσοκράτορες μᾶλλον ἐγένοντο καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ καὶ ὁ Ἀστύοχος πυθόμενος τὰ περὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας καὶ τὸν Στρομβιχίδην καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀπεληλυθότα ἐθάρσησεν. [2] καὶ παραπλεύσας δυοῖν νεοῖν Ἀστύοχος ἐς Χίον κομίζει αὐτόθεν τὰς ναῦς καὶ ξυμπάσαις ἤδη ἐπίπλουν ποιεῖται ἐπὶ τὴν Σάμον: καὶ ὡς αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ ἀλλήλοις ὑπόπτως ἔχειν οὐκ ἀντανήγοντο, ἀπέπλευσε πάλιν ἐς τὴν Μίλητον. [3]ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον καὶ ἔτι πρότερον ἡ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις δημοκρατία κατελέλυτο. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οἱ περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον πρέσβεις παρὰ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους ἐς τὴν Σάμον ἦλθον, τά τε ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ἔτι βεβαιότερον κατέλαβον καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν Σαμίων προυτρέψαντο τοὺς δυνατωτάτους ὥστε πειρᾶσθαι μετὰ σφῶν ὀλιγαρχηθῆναι, καίπερ ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται: [4] καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἅμα οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κοινολογούμενοι ἐσκέψαντο Ἀλκιβιάδην μέν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ βούλεται, ἐᾶν καὶ γὰρ οὐκ

ἐπιτήδειον αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐλθεῖν, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἤδη καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὁρᾶν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ μὴ ἀνεθήσεται τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἅμα ἀντέχειν καὶ ἐσφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων οἴκων προθύμως χρήματα καὶ ἤν τι ἄλλο δέῃ, ὡς οὐκέτι ἄλλοις ἢ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταλαιπωροῦντας.

[63] Meanwhile the Chians gained more command of the sea, and Astyochus and the Peloponnesians at Miletus, hearing of the naval engagement and of the withdrawal of Strombichides and his ships, took courage. Sailing to Chios with two ships, Astyochus fetched away the fleet which was there, and with his united forces made a demonstration against Samos. But the Athenian crews, who were in a state of mutual distrust, did not go out to meet him; so he sailed back to Miletus.For about this time, or rather sooner, the democracy at Athens had been subverted. Peisander and his fellow envoys, on their return to Samos after their visit to Tissaphernes, had strengthened their interest in the army, and had even persuaded the chief men of Samos to join them in setting up an oligarchy, although they had lately risen against their own countrymenin order to put down oligarchy. At the same time conferring among themselves, the Athenian leaders at Samos came to the conclusion that since Alcibiades would not join they had better leave him alone; for indeed he was not the sort of person who was suited to an oligarchy. But they determined, as they were already compromised, to proceed by themselves, and to take measures for carrying the movement through; they meant also to persevere in the war, and were willing enough to contribute money or anything else which might be wanted out of their own houses, since they would now be toiling, not for others, but for themselves.

64. παρακελευσάμενοι οὖν τοιαῦτα τὸν μὲν Πείσανδρον εὐθὺς τότε καὶ τῶν πρέσβεων τοὺς ἡμίσεις ἀπέστελλον ἐπ᾽ οἴκου πράξοντας τἀκεῖ, καὶ εἴρητο αὐτοῖς τῶν ὑπηκόων πόλεων αἷς ἂν προσσχῶσιν ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστάναι: τοὺς δ᾽

ἡμίσεις ἐς τἆλλα τὰ ὑπήκοα χωρία ἄλλους ἄλλῃ διέπεμπον, [2] καὶ Διειτρέφη ὄντα περὶ Χίον, ᾑρημένον δὲ ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης ἄρχειν, ἀπέστελλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ ἀφικόμενος ἐς τὴν Θάσον τὸν δῆμον κατέλυσεν. [3] καὶ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ οἱ Θάσιοι δευτέρῳ μηνὶ μάλιστα τὴν πόλιν ἐτείχιζον, ὡς τῆς μὲν μετ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἀριστοκρατίας οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεόμενοι, τὴν δ᾽ ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐλευθερίαν ὁσημέραι προσδεχόμενοι: [4] καὶ γὰρ καὶ φυγὴ αὐτῶν ἔξω ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρὰ τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις, καὶ αὕτη μετὰ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπιτηδείων κατὰ κράτος ἔπρασσε ναῦς τε κομίσαι καὶ τὴν Θάσον ἀποστῆσαι. ξυνέβη οὖν αὐτοῖς μάλιστα ἃ ἐβούλοντο, τὴν πόλιν τε ἀκινδύνως ὀρθοῦσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐναντιωσόμενον δῆμον καταλελύσθαι. [5] περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν Θάσον τἀναντία τοῖς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστᾶσι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγένετο, δοκεῖν δέ μοι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς τῶν ὑπηκόων: σωφροσύνην γὰρ λαβοῦσαι αἱ πόλεις καὶ ἄδειαν τῶν πρασσομένων ἐχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄντικρυς ἐλευθερίαν τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπούλου εὐνομίας οὐ προτιμήσαντες.

[64] Having thus encouraged one another in their purpose they sent Peisander and one half of the envoys back to Athens. They were to carry out the scheme at home, and had directions to set up an oligarchy in the subject-cities at which they touched on their voyage. The other half were despatched different ways to other subject-cities. Diotrephes, who was then at Chios, was sent to assume the command in Chalcidicè and on the coast of Thrace, to which he had been previously appointed. On arriving at Thasos he put down the democracy. But within about two months of his departure the Thasians began to fortify their city; they did not want to have an aristocracy dependent on Athens when they were daily expecting to obtain their liberty from Lacedaemon. For there were Thasian exiles who had been driven out by the Athenians dwelling in Peloponnesus, and they, with the assistance of their friends at home, were exerting themselves vigorously to obtain ships and effect

the revolt of Thasos. The recent change was exactly what they desired; for the government had been reformed without danger to themselves, and the democracy, who would have opposed them, had been overthrown. Thus the result in the case of Thasos, and also, as I imagine, of many other states, was the opposite of what the oligarchical conspirators had intended. For the subject-cities, having secured a moderate form of government, and having no fear of being called to account for their proceedings, aimed at absolute freedom; they scorned the sham independence proffered to them by the Athenians.

65. οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον παραπλέοντές τε, ὥσπερ ἐδέδοκτο, τοὺς δήμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κατέλυον, καὶ ἅμα ἔστιν ἀφ᾽ ὧν χωρίων καὶ ὁπλίτας ἔχοντες σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξυμμάχους ἦλθον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. [2] καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς ἑταίροις προειργασμένα. καὶ γὰρ Ἀνδροκλέα τέ τινα τοῦ δήμου μάλιστα προεστῶτα ξυστάντες τινὲς τῶν νεωτέρων κρύφα ἀποκτείνουσιν, ὅσπερ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐξήλασε, καὶ αὐτὸν κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα, τῆς τε δημαγωγίας ἕνεκα καὶ οἰόμενοι τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ὡς κατιόντι καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην φίλον ποιήσοντι χαριεῖσθαι, μᾶλλόν τι διέφθειραν: καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἀνεπιτηδείους τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ κρύφα ἀνήλωσαν. [3] λόγος τε ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ προείργαστο αὐτοῖς ὡς οὔτε μισθοφορητέον εἴη ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς στρατευομένους οὔτε μεθεκτέον τῶν πραγμάτων πλέοσιν ἢ πεντακισχιλίοις, καὶ τούτοις οἳ ἂν μάλιστα τοῖς τε χρήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ὠφελεῖν οἷοί τε ὦσιν.

[65] Peisander and his colleagues pursued their voyage and, as they had agreed, put down the democracies in the different states. From some places they obtained the assistance of heavy-armed troops, which they took with them to Athens. There they found the revolution more than half accomplished by the oligarchical clubs. Some of the younger citizens had conspired and secretly assassinated one Androcles, one of the chief leaders of the people, who had been foremost in procuring the banishment of

Alcibiades. Their motives were two-fold: they killed him because he was a demagogue; but more because they hoped to gratify Alcibiades, whom they were still expecting to return, and to make Tissaphernes their friend. A few others who were inconvenient to them they made away with in a like secret manner. Meanwhile they declared in their public programme that no one ought to receive pay who was not on military service; and that not more than five thousand should have a share in the government; those, namely, who were best able to serve the state in person and with their money.

66. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἔξειν γε τὴν πόλιν οἵπερ καὶ μεθίστασαν ἔμελλον. δῆμος μέντοι ὅμως ἔτι καὶ βουλὴ ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάμου ξυνελέγετο: ἐβούλευον δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι μὴ τοῖς ξυνεστῶσι δοκοίη, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ λέγοντες ἐκ τούτων ἦσαν καὶ τὰ ῥηθησόμενα πρότερον αὐτοῖς προύσκεπτο. [2] ἀντέλεγέ τε οὐδεὶς ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων, δεδιὼς καὶ ὁρῶν πολὺ τὸ ξυνεστηκός: εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἀντείποι, εὐθὺς ἐκ τρόπου τινὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἐτεθνήκει, καὶ τῶν δρασάντων οὔτε ζήτησις οὔτ᾽ εἰ ὑποπτεύοιντο δικαίωσις ἐγίγνετο, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν ὁ δῆμος καὶ κατάπληξιν τοιαύτην ὥστε κέρδος ὁ μὴ πάσχων τι βίαιον, εἰ καὶ σιγῴη, ἐνόμιζεν. [3] καὶ τὸ ξυνεστηκὸς πολὺ πλέον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι ἢ ὅσον ἐτύγχανεν ὂν ἡσσῶντο ταῖς γνώμαις, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν αὐτὸ ἀδύνατοι ὄντες διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀγνωσίαν οὐκ εἶχον [αὐτοὶ ἐξευρεῖν]. [4] κατὰ δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ προσολοφύρασθαί τινι ἀγανακτήσαντα, ὥστε ἀμύνασθαι ἐπιβουλεύσαντα, ἀδύνατον ἦν: ἢ γὰρ ἀγνῶτα ἂν ηὗρεν ᾧ ἐρεῖ ἢ γνώριμον ἄπιστον. [5] ἀλλήλοις γὰρ ἅπαντες ὑπόπτως προσῇσαν οἱ τοῦ δήμου, ὡς μετέχοντά τινα τῶν γιγνομένων. ἐνῆσαν γὰρ καὶ οὓς οὐκ ἄν ποτέ τις ᾤετο ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τραπέσθαι: καὶ τὸ ἄπιστον οὗτοι μέγιστον πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν καὶ πλεῖστα ἐς τὴν τῶν ὀλίγων ἀσφάλειαν ὠφέλησαν, βέβαιον τὴν ἀπιστίαν τῷ δήμῳ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καταστήσαντες.

[66] These were only pretences intended to look well in the eyes of the people; for the authors of the revolution fully meant to retain the new government in their own hands. The popular assembly and the council of five hundred were still convoked; but nothing was brought before them of which the conspirators had not approved; the speakers were of their party and the things to be said had been all arranged by them beforehand. No one any longer raised his voice against them; for the citizens were afraid when they saw the strength of the conspiracy, and if any one did utter a word, he was put out of the way in some convenient manner. No search was made for the assassins; and though there might be suspicion, no one was brought to trial; the people were so depressed and afraid to move that he who escaped violence thought himself fortunate, even though he had never said a word. Their minds were cowed by the supposed number of the conspirators, which they greatly exaggerated, having no means of discovering the truth, since the size of the city prevented them from knowing one another. For the same reason a man could not conspire and retaliate, because he was unable to express his sorrow or indignation to another; he could not make a confidant of a stranger, and he would not trust his acquaintance. The members of the popular party all approached one another with suspicion; every one was supposed to have a hand in what was going on. Some were concerned whom no one would ever have thought likely to turn oligarchs; their adhesion created the worst mistrust among the multitude, and by making it impossible for them to rely upon one another, greatly contributed to the security of the few.

67. ἐν τούτῳ οὖν τῷ καιρῷ οἱ περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον ἐλθόντες εὐθὺς τῶν λοιπῶν εἴχοντο. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὸν δῆμον ξυλλέξαντες εἶπον γνώμην δέκα ἄνδρας ἐλέσθαι ξυγγραφέας αὐτοκράτορας, τούτους δὲ ξυγγράψαντας γνώμην ἐσενεγκεῖν ἐς τὸν δῆμον ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν καθ᾽ ὅτι ἄριστα ἡ πόλις οἰκήσεται: [2] ἔπειτα ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐφῆκε,

ξυνέκλῃσαν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐς τὸν Κολωνόν· ἔστι δὲ ἱερὸν Ποσειδῶνος ἔξω πόλεως ἀπέχον σταδίους μάλιστα δέκα, καὶ ἐσήνεγκαν οἱ ξυγγραφῆς ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐξεῖναι μὲν Ἀθηναίων ἀνατεὶ εἰπεῖν γνώμην ἢν ἄν τις βούληται: ἢν δέ τις τὸν εἰπόντα ἢ γράψηται παρανόμων ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τρόπῳ βλάψῃ, μεγάλας ζημίας ἐπέθεσαν. [3] ἐνταῦθα δὴ λαμπρῶς ἐλέγετο ἤδη μήτε ἀρχὴν ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κόσμου μήτε μισθοφορεῖν προέδρους τε ἐλέσθαι πέντε ἄνδρας, τούτους δὲ ἑλέσθαι ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας, καὶ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἕκαστον πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τρεῖς: ἐλθόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς τετρακοσίους ὄντας ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον ἄρχειν ὅπῃ ἂν ἄριστα γιγνώσκωσιν αὐτοκράτορας, καὶ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους δὲ ξυλλέγειν ὁπόταν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ.

[67] Such was the state of affairs when Peisander and his colleagues arrived at Athens. They immediately set to work and prepared to strike the final blow. First, they called an assembly and proposed the election of ten commissioners, who should be empowered to frame for the city the best constitution which they could devise; this was to be laid before the people on a fixed day. When the day arrived they summoned an assembly to meet in the temple of Poseidon at Colonus without the walls, and distant rather more than a mile. But the commissioners only moved that any Athenian should be allowed to propose whatever resolution he pleased — nothing more; threatening at the same time with severe penalties anybody who indicted the proposer for unconstitutional action, or otherwise offered injury to him. The whole scheme now came to light. A motion was made to abolish all the existing magistracies and the payment of magistrates, and to choose a presiding board of five; these five were to choose a hundred, and each of the hundred was to co-opt three others. The Four Hundred thus selected were to meet in the council-chamber; they were to have absolute authority, and might govern as they deemed best; the Five

Thousand were to be summoned by them whenever they chose.

68. ἦν δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν γνώμην ταύτην εἰπὼν Πείσανδρος, καὶ τἆλλα ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς προθυμότατα ξυγκαταλύσας τὸν δῆμον: ὁ μέντοι ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα ξυνθεὶς ὅτῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη ἐς τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ πλείστου ἐπιμεληθεὶς Ἀντιφῶν ἦν ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἀρετῇ τε οὐδενὸς ὕστερος καὶ κράτιστος ἐνθυμηθῆναι γενόμενος καὶ ἃ γνοίη εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐς μὲν δῆμον οὐ παριὼν οὐδ᾽ ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἑκούσιος οὐδένα, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ πλεῖστα εἷς ἀνήρ, ὅστις ξυμβουλεύσαιτό τι, δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν. [2] καὶ αὐτός τε, ἐπειδὴ † μετέστη ἡ δημοκρατία καὶ ἐς ἀγῶνας κατέστη † τὰ τῶν τετρακοσίων ἐν ὑστέρῳ μεταπεσόντα ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἑκακοῦτο †, ἄριστα φαίνεται τῶν μέχρι ἐμοῦ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τούτων αἰτιαθείς, ὡς ξυγκατέστησε, θανάτου δίκην ἀπολογησάμενος. [3] παρέσχε δὲ καὶ ὁ Φρύνιχος ἑαυτὸν πάντων διαφερόντως προθυμότατον ἐς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δεδιὼς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ ἐπιστάμενος εἰδότα αὐτὸν ὅσα ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ πρὸς τὸν Ἀστύοχον ἔπραξε, νομίζων οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὑπ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίας κατελθεῖν: πολύ τε πρὸς τὰ δεινά, ἐπειδήπερ ὑπέστη, φερεγγυώτατος ἐφάνη. [4] καὶ Θηραμένης ὁ τοῦ Ἄγνωνος ἐν τοῖς ξυγκαταλύουσι τὸν δῆμον πρῶτος ἦν, ἀνὴρ οὔτε εἰπεῖν οὔτε γνῶναι ἀδύνατος. ὥστε ἀπ᾽ ἀνδρῶν πολλῶν καὶ ξυνετῶν πραχθὲν τὸ ἔργον οὐκ ἀπεικότως καίπερ μέγα ὂν προυχώρησεν: χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἦν τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον ἐπ᾽ ἔτει ἑκατοστῷ μάλιστα ἐπειδὴ οἱ τύραννοι κατελύθησαν ἐλευθερίας παῦσαι, καὶ οὐ μόνον μὴ ὑπήκοον ὄντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου αὐτὸν ἄλλων ἄρχειν εἰωθότα.

[68] The mover of this proposal, and to outward appearance the most active partisan of the revolution, was Peisander, but the real author and maturer of the whole scheme, who had been longest interested in it, was Antiphon, a man inferior in virtue to none of his contemporaries, and

possessed of remarkable powers of thought and gifts of speech. He did not like to come forward in the assembly, or in any other public arena. To the multitude, who were suspicious of his great abilities, he was an object of dislike; but there was no man who could do more for any who consulted him, whether their business lay in the courts of justice or in the assembly. And when the government of the Four Hundred was overthrown and became exposed to the vengeance of the people, and he being accused of taking part in the plot had to speak in his own case, his defence was undoubtedly the best ever made by any man tried on a capital charge down to my time. Phrynichus also showed extraordinary zeal in the interests of the oligarchy. He was afraid of Alcibiades, whom he knew to be cognisant of the intrigue which when at Samos he had carried on with Astyochus, and he thought that no oligarchy would ever be likely to restore him. Having once set his hand to the work he was deemed by the others to be the man upon whom they could best depend in the hour of danger. Another chief leader of the revolutionary party was Theramenes the son of Hagnon, a good speaker and a sagacious man. No wonder then that, in the hands of all these able men, the attempt, however arduous, succeeded. For an easy thing it certainly was not, about one hundred years after the fall of the tyrants, to destroy the liberties of the Athenians, who not only were a free, but during more than one half of this time had been an imperial people.

69. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ ἐκκλησία οὐδενὸς ἀντειπόντος, ἀλλὰ κυρώσασα ταῦτα διελύθη, τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἤδη ὕστερον τρόπῳ τοιῷδε ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον ἐσήγαγον. ἦσαν [δ᾽] Ἀθηναῖοι πάντες αἰεὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τείχει, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τάξει, τῶν ἐν Δεκελείᾳ πολεμίων ἕνεκα ἐφ᾽ ὅπλοις: [2] τῇ οὖν ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ τοὺς μὲν μὴ ξυνειδότας εἴασαν ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν ἀπελθεῖν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ξυνωμοσίᾳ εἴρητο ἡσυχῇ μὴ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὅπλοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἄπωθεν περιμένειν, καὶ ἤν τις ἐνιστῆται τοῖς ποιουμένοις, λαβόντας τὰ ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν. [3] ἦσαν δὲ καὶ

Ἄνδριοι καὶ Τήνιοι καὶ Καρυστίων τριακόσιοι καὶ Αἰγινητῶν τῶν ἐποίκων, οὓς Ἀθηναῖοι ἔπεμψαν οἰκήσοντας, ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἥκοντες ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ὅπλοις, οἷς ταὐτὰ προείρητο. [4] τούτων δὲ διατεταγμένων οὕτως ἐλθόντες οἱ τετρακόσιοι μετὰ ξιφιδίου ἀφανοῦς ἕκαστος, καὶ οἱ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν μετ᾽ αὐτῶν [Ἕλληνες] νεανίσκοι, οἷς ἐχρῶντο εἴ τί που δέοι χειρουργεῖν, ἐπέστησαν τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ κυάμου βουλευταῖς οὖσιν ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ καὶ εἶπον αὐτοῖς ἐξιέναι λαβοῦσι τὸν μισθόν: ἔφερον δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῦ ὑπολοίπου χρόνου παντὸς αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐξιοῦσιν ἐδίδοσαν.

[69] The assembly passed all these measures without a dissentient voice, and was then dissolved. And now the Four Hundred were introduced into the council-chamber. The manner was as follows: — The whole population were always on service, either manning the walls or drawn up at their places of arms, for the enemy were at Decelea. On the day of the assembly those who were not in the conspiracy were allowed to go home as usual, while the conspirators were quietly told to remain, not actually by their arms, but at a short distance; if anybody opposed what was doing they were to arm and interfere. There were also on the spot some Andrians and Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and some of the Athenian colonists from Aegina, who received similar instructions; they had all been told to bring with them from their homes their own arms for this especial purpose. Having disposed their forces the Four Hundred arrived, every one with a dagger concealed about his person, and with them a bodyguard of a hundred and twenty Hellenic youths whose services they used for any act of violence which they had in hand. They broke in upon the council of five hundred as they sat in the council-chamber, and told them to take their pay and begone. They had brought with them the pay of the senators for the remainder of their yearly term of office, which they handed to them as they went out.

70. ὡς δὲ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥ τε βουλὴ οὐδὲν ἀντειποῦσα ὑπεξῆλθε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται οὐδὲν ἐνεωτέριζον, ἀλλ᾽

ἡσύχαζον, οἱ [δὲ] τετρακόσιοι ἐσελθόντες ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον τότε μὲν πρυτάνεις τε σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀπεκλήρωσαν καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐχαῖς καὶ θυσίαις καθιστάμενοι ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐχρήσαντο, ὕστερον δὲ πολὺ μεταλλάξαντες τῆς τοῦ δήμου διοικήσεως πλὴν τοὺς φεύγοντας οὐ κατῆγον τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἕνεκα τά τε ἄλλα ἔνεμον κατὰ κράτος τὴν πόλιν. [2] καὶ ἄνδρας τέ τινας ἀπέκτειναν οὐ πολλούς, οἳ ἐδόκουν ἐπιτήδειοι εἶναι ὑπεξαιρεθῆναι, καὶ ἄλλους ἔδησαν, τοὺς δὲ καὶ μετεστήσαντο: πρός τε Ἄγιν τὸν Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέα ὄντα ἐν τῇ Δεκελείᾳ ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο, λέγοντες διαλλαγῆναι βούλεσθαι καὶ εἰκὸς εἶναι αὐτὸν σφίσι καὶ οὐκέτι τῷ ἀπίστῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον ξυγχωρεῖν.

[70] In this manner the council retired without offering any remonstrance; and the rest of the citizens kept perfectly quiet and made no counter-movement. The Four Hundred then installed themselves in the council-chamber; for the present they elected by lot Prytanes of their own number, and did all that was customary in the way of prayers and sacrifices to the Gods at their entrance into office. Soon however they wholly changed the democratic system; and although they did not recall the exiles, because Alcibiades was one of them, they governed the city with a high hand. Some few whom they thought would be better out of the way were put to death by them, others imprisoned, others again exiled. They also sent heralds to Agis, the Lacedaemonian king, who was at Decelea, saying that they desired to conclude a peace with him; and that they expected him to be more ready to treat with them than with the perfidious democracy.

71. ὁ δὲ νομίζων τὴν πόλιν οὐχ ἡσυχάζειν, οὐδ᾽ εὐθὺς οὕτω τὸν δῆμον τὴν παλαιὰν ἐλευθερίαν παραδώσειν, εἴ τε στρατιὰν πολλὴν ἴδοι σφῶν, οὐκ ἂν ἡσυχάζειν, οὐδ᾽ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πάνυ τι πιστεύων μὴ οὐκέτι ταράσσεσθαι αὐτούς, τοῖς μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων ἐλθοῦσιν οὐδὲν ξυμβατικὸν ἀπεκρίνατο, προσμεταπεμψάμενος δὲ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου

στρατιὰν πολλὴν οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον καὶ αὐτὸς τῇ ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας φρουρᾷ μετὰ τῶν ἐλθόντων κατέβη πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ τείχη τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐλπίσας ἢ ταραχθέντας αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἂν χειρωθῆναι σφίσιν ᾗ βούλονται ἢ καὶ αὐτοβοεὶ ἂν διὰ τὸν ἔνδοθέν τε καὶ ἔξωθεν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γενησόμενον θόρυβον: τῶν γὰρ μακρῶν τειχῶν διὰ τὴν κατ᾽ αὐτὰ ἐρημίαν λήψεως οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτεῖν. [2] ὡς δὲ προσέμειξέ τε ἐγγὺς καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ μὲν ἔνδοθεν οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν ἐκίνησαν, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας ἐκπέμψαντες καὶ μέρος τι τῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ ψιλῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν ἄνδρας τε κατέβαλον αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς προσελθεῖν καὶ ὅπλων τινῶν καὶ νεκρῶν ἐκράτησαν, οὕτω δὴ γνοὺς ἀπήγαγε πάλιν τὴν στρατιάν. [3] καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ κατὰ χώραν ἐν τῇ Δεκελείᾳ ἔμενον, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπελθόντας ὀλίγας τινὰς ἡμέρας ἐν τῇ γῇ μείναντας ἀπέπεμψεν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο παρά τε τὸν Ἄγιν ἐπρεσβεύοντο οἱ τετρακόσιοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον, κἀκείνου μᾶλλον ἤδη προσδεχομένου καὶ παραινοῦντος ἐκπέμπουσι καὶ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα περὶ ξυμβάσεως πρέσβεις, βουλόμενοι διαλλαγῆναι.

[71] But he, thinking that the city must be in an unsettled state and that the people would not so quickly yield up their ancient liberty, thinking too that the appearance of a great Lacedaemonian army would increase their excitement, and far from convinced that civil strife was not at that very moment raging among them, gave unfavourable answers to the envoys of the Four Hundred. He sent to Peloponnesus for large reinforcements, and then, with the garrison at Decelea and the newly arrived troops, came down in person to the very walls of Athens. He expected that the Athenians, distracted by civil strife, would be quite at his mercy; there would be such a panic created by the presence of enemies both within and without the walls, that he might even succeed in taking the city at the first onset; for the Long Walls would be deserted, and he could not fail of capturing them. But when he drew near there was no sign of the slightest disorder within; the Athenians, sending out their

cavalry and a force of heavy and light-armed troops and archers, struck down a few of his soldiers who had ventured too far, and retained possession of some arms and dead bodies; whereupon, having found out his mistake, he withdrew to Decelea. There he and the garrison remained at their posts; but he ordered the newly arrived troops, after they had continued a few days in Attica, to return home. The Four Hundred resumed negotiations, and Agis was now more ready to listen to them. At his suggestion they sent envoys to Lacedaemon in the hope of coming to terms.

72. πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Σάμον δέκα ἄνδρας παραμυθησομένους τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ διδάξοντας ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ ὀλιγαρχία κατέστη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ξυμπάντων πραγμάτων, πεντακισχίλιοί τε ὅτι εἶεν καὶ οὐ τετρακόσιοι μόνον οἱ πράσσοντες: καίτοι οὐ πώποτε Ἀθηναίους διὰ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὴν ὑπερόριον ἀσχολίαν ἐς οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα οὕτω μέγα ἐλθεῖν βουλεύσοντας ἐν ᾧ πεντακισχιλίους ξυνελθεῖν. [2] ἄλλα τ᾽ ἐπιστείλαντες τὰ πρέποντα εἰπεῖν ἀπέπεμψαν αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατάστασιν, δείσαντες μή, ὅπερ ἐγένετο, ναυτικὸς ὄχλος οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς μένειν ἐν τῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ κόσμῳ ἐθέλῃ, σφᾶς τε μὴ ἐκεῖθεν ἀρξαμένου τοῦ κακοῦ μεταστήσωσιν.

[72] They also sent ten commissioners to Samos, who were to pacify the army, and to explain that the oligarchy was not established with any design of injuring Athens or her citizens, but for the preservation of the whole state. The promoters of the change, they said, were five thousand, not four hundred; but never hitherto, owing to the pressure of war and of business abroad, had so many as five thousand assembled to deliberate even on the most important questions. They instructed them to say anything else which would have a good effect, and sent them on their mission as soon as they themselves were installed in the government. For they were afraid, and not without reason as the event showed, that the Athenian sailors would be impatient of the

oligarchical system, and that disaffection would begin at Samos and end in their own overthrow.

73. ἐν γὰρ τῇ Σάμῳ ἐνεωτερίζετο ἤδη τὰ περὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ ξυνέβη τοιάδε γενέσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ὅνπερ οἱ τετρακόσιοι ξυνίσταντο. [2] οἱ γὰρ τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις καὶ πεισθέντες ὑπό τε τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, ὅτε ἦλθε, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ξυνεστώτων Ἀθηναίων ἐγένοντό τε ἐς τριακοσίους ξυνωμόται καὶ ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς δήμῳ ὄντι ἐπιθήσεσθαι. [3] καὶ Ὑπέρβολόν τέ τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως, ἀποκτείνουσι μετὰ Χαρμίνου τε ἑνὸς τῶν στρατηγῶν καί τινων τῶν παρὰ σφίσιν Ἀθηναίων, πίστιν διδόντες αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἄλλα μετ᾽ αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, τοῖς τε πλέοσιν ὥρμηντο ἐπιτίθεσθαι. [4] οἱ δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τῶν τε στρατηγῶν Λέοντι καὶ Διομέδοντι οὗτοι γὰρ οὐχ ἑκόντες διὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἔφερον τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν τὸ μέλλον σημαίνουσι καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ καὶ Θρασύλῳ, τῷ μὲν τριηραρχοῦντι, τῷ δὲ ὁπλιτεύοντι, καὶ ἄλλοις οἳ ἐδόκουν αἰεὶ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦσθαι τοῖς ξυνεστῶσιν: καὶ οὐκ ἠξίουν περιιδεῖν αὐτοὺς σφᾶς τε διαφθαρέντας καὶ Σάμον Ἀθηναίοις ἀλλοτριωθεῖσαν, δι᾽ ἣν μόνον [μέχρι νῦν] ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτοῖς ἐς τοῦτο ξυνέμεινεν. [5] οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες τῶν τε στρατιωτῶν ἕνα ἕκαστον μετῇσαν μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοὺς Παράλους, ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίους τε καὶ ἐλευθέρους πάντας ἐν τῇ νηὶ πλέοντας καὶ αἰεὶ δήποτε ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ μὴ παρούσῃ ἐπικειμένους: ὅ τε Λέων καὶ ὁ Διομέδων αὐτοῖς ναῦς τινάς, ὁπότε ποι πλέοιεν, κατέλειπον φύλακας. [6] ὥστε ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς ἐπετίθεντο οἱ τριακόσιοι, βοηθησάντων πάντων τούτων, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν Παράλων, περιεγένοντο οἱ τῶν Σαμίων πλέονες, καὶ τριάκοντα μέν τινας ἀπέκτειναν τῶν τριακοσίων, τρεῖς δὲ τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους φυγῇ ἐζημίωσαν: τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις οὐ μνησικακοῦντες δημοκρατούμενοι τὸ λοιπὸν ξυνεπολίτευον.

[73] At the very time when the Four Hundred were establishing themselves at Athens, a reaction had set in against the oligarchical movement at Samos. Some Samians of the popular party, which had originally risen up against the nobles, had changed sides again when Peisander came to the island and, persuaded by him and his Athenian accomplices at Samos, had formed a body of three hundred conspirators and prepared to attack the rest of the popular party who had previously been their comrades. There was a certain Hyperbolus, an Athenian of no character, who, not for any fear of his power and influence, but for his villany, and because the city was ashamed of him, had been ostracised. This man was assassinated by them, and they were abetted in the act by Charminus, one of the generals, and by certain of the Athenians at Samos, to whom they pledged their faith. They also joined these Athenians in other deeds of violence, and were eager to fall upon the popular party. But the people, discovering their intention, gave information to the generals Leon and Diomedon, who were impatient of the attempted oligarchy because they were respected by the multitude, to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, one of whom was a trierarch and the other a private soldier, and to others who were thought to be the steadiest opponents of the oligarchical movement. They entreated them not to allow the Samian people to be destroyed, and the island of Samos, without which the Athenian empire would never have lasted until then, to be estranged. Thereupon the generals went to the soldiers one by one, and begged them to interfere, addressing themselves especially to the Parali, or crew of the ship Paralus, all freeborn Athenians, who were at any time ready to attack oligarchy, real or imaginary. Leon and Diomedon, whenever they sailed to any other place, left some ships for the protection of the Samians. And so, when the three hundred began the attack, all the crews, especially the Parali, hastened to the rescue, and the popular party gained

the victory. Of the three hundred they slew about thirty, and the three most guilty were banished; the rest they forgave, and henceforward all lived together under a democracy.

74. τὴν δὲ Πάραλον ναῦν καὶ Χαιρέαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς τὸν Ἀρχεστράτου, ἄνδρα Ἀθηναῖον, γενόμενον ἐς τὴν μετάστασιν πρόθυμον, ἀποπέμπουσιν οἵ τε Σάμιοι καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται κατὰ τάχος ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀπαγγελοῦντα τὰ γεγενημένα: οὐ γὰρ ᾔδεσάν πω τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἄρχοντας. [2] καὶ καταπλευσάντων αὐτῶν εὐθέως τῶν μὲν Παράλων τινὰς οἱ τετρακόσιοι δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἔδησαν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀφελόμενοι τὴν ναῦν καὶ μετεμβιβάσαντες ἐς ἄλλην στρατιῶτιν ναῦν ἔταξαν φρουρεῖν περὶ Εὔβοιαν. [3] ὁ δὲ Χαιρέας εὐθὺς διαλαθών πως, ὡς εἶδε τὰ παρόντα, πάλιν ἐς τὴν Σάμον ἐλθὼν ἀγγέλλει τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον πάντα δεινώσας τὰ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, ὡς πληγαῖς τε πάντας ζημιοῦσι καὶ ἀντειπεῖν ἔστιν οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ ὅτι αὐτῶν καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ παῖδες ὑβρίζονται, καὶ διανοοῦνται, ὁπόσοι ἐν Σάμῳ στρατεύονται μὴ ὄντες τῆς σφετέρας γνώμης, τούτων πάντων τοὺς προσήκοντας λαβόντες εἴρξειν, ἵνα, ἢν μὴ ὑπακούσωσι, τεθνήκωσιν: καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἐπικαταψευδόμενος ἔλεγεν.

[74] Chaereas the son of Archestratus, an Athenian, who had been active in the movement, was quickly despatched in the ship Paralus by the Samians and the army to Athens, there to report the defeat of the Samian oligarchy, for as yet they did not know that the government was in the hands of the Four Hundred. No sooner had he arrived than the Four Hundred imprisoned two or three of the Parali, and taking away their ship transferred the rest of the crew to a troop-ship which was ordered to keep guard about Euboea. Chaereas, seeing promptly how matters stood, had contrived to steal away and get back to Samos, where he told the soldiers with much aggravation the news from Athens, how they were punishing everybody with stripes, and how no one might speak a word against the government; he declared that their wives and children were being outraged, and that

the oligarchy were going to take the relations of all the men serving at Samos who were not of their faction and shut them up, intending, if the fleet did not submit, to put them to death. And he added a great many other falsehoods.

75. οἱ δὲ ἀκούοντες ἐπὶ τοὺς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μάλιστα ποιήσαντας καὶ ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς μετασχόντας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὥρμησαν βάλλειν, ἔπειτα μέντοι ὑπὸ τῶν διὰ μέσου κωλυθέντες καὶ διδαχθέντες μὴ τῶν πολεμίων ἀντιπρῴρων ἐγγὺς ἐφορμούντων ἀπολέσωσι τὰ πράγματα, ἐπαύσαντο. [2] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο λαμπρῶς ἤδη ἐς δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι μεταστῆσαι τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ὅ τε Θρασύβουλος ὁ τοῦ Λύκου καὶ Θράσυλος οὗτοι γὰρ μάλιστα προειστήκεσαν τῆς μεταβολῆς ὥρκωσαν πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγίστους ὅρκους, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα, ἥ μὴν δημοκρατήσεσθαί τε καὶ ὁμονοήσειν καὶ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμον προθύμως διοίσειν καὶ τοῖς τετρακοσίοις πολέμιοί τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπικηρυκεύσεσθαι. [3] ξυνώμνυσαν δὲ καὶ Σαμίων πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, καὶ τὰ πράγματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ἀποβησόμενα ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων ξυνεκοινώσαντο οἱ στρατιῶται τοῖς Σαμίοις, νομίζοντες οὔτε ἐκείνοις ἀποστροφὴν σωτηρίας οὔτε σφίσιν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽, ἐάν τε οἱ τετρακόσιοι κρατήσωσιν ἐάν τε οἱ ἐκ Μιλήτου πολέμιοι, διαφθαρήσεσθαι.

[75] When the army heard his report they instantly rushed upon the chief authors of the recent oligarchy who were present, and their confederates, and tried to stone them. But they were deterred by the warnings of the moderate party, who begged them not to ruin everything by violence while the enemy were lying close to them, prow threatening prow. Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, who were the chief leaders of the reaction, now thought that the time had come for the open proclamation of democracy among the Athenians at Samos, and they bound the soldiers, more especially those of the oligarchical party, by the most solemn oaths to maintain a democracy and be of one mind,

to prosecute vigorously the war with Peloponnesus, to be enemies to the Four hundred, and to hold no parley with them by heralds. All the Samians who were of full age took the same oath, and the Athenian soldiers determined to make common cause with the Samians in their troubles and dangers, and invited them to share their fortunes. They considered that neither the Samians nor themselves had any place of refuge to which they could turn, but that, whether the Four Hundred or their enemies at Miletus gained the day, they were doomed.

76. ἐς φιλονικίαν τε καθέστασαν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον οἱ μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἀναγκάζοντες δημοκρατεῖσθαι, οἱ δὲ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι. [2] ἐποίησαν δὲ καὶ ἐκκλησίαν εὐθὺς οἱ στρατιῶται, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς μὲν προτέρους στρατηγούς, καὶ εἴ τινα τῶν τριηράρχων ὑπώπτευον, ἔπαυσαν, ἄλλους δὲ ἀνθείλοντο καὶ τριηράρχους καὶ στρατηγούς, ὧν Θρασύβουλός τε καὶ Θράσυλος ὑπῆρχον. [3] καὶ παραινέσεις ἄλλας τε ἐποιοῦντο ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενοι καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν ὅτι ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἀφέστηκεν: τοὺς γὰρ ἐλάσσους ἀπὸ σφῶν τῶν πλεόνων καὶ ἐς πάντα ποριμωτέρων μεθεστάναι. [4] ἐχόντων γὰρ σφῶν τὸ πᾶν ναυτικόν, τάς τε ἄλλας πόλεις ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἀναγκάσειν τὰ χρήματα ὁμοίως διδόναι καὶ εἰ ἐκεῖθεν ὡρμῶντο □πόλιν τε γὰρ σφίσιν ὑπάρχειν Σάμον οὐκ ἀσθενῆ, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ παρ᾽ ἐλάχιστον δὴ ἦλθε τὸ Ἀθηναίων κράτος τῆς θαλάσσης, ὅτε ἐπολέμησεν, ἀφελέσθαι, τούς τε πολεμίους ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χωρίου ἀμυνεῖσθαι οὗπερ καὶ πρότερον□, καὶ δυνατώτεροι εἶναι σφεῖς ἔχοντες τὰς ναῦς πορίζεσθαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. [5] καὶ δι᾽ ἑαυτοὺς δὲ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ προκαθημένους καὶ πρότερον αὐτοὺς κρατεῖν τοῦ ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἔσπλου, καὶ νῦν ἐς τοιοῦτον καταστήσονται μὴ βουλομένων σφίσι πάλιν τὴν πολιτείαν ἀποδοῦναι, ὥστε αὐτοὶ δυνατώτεροι εἶναι εἴργειν ἐκείνους τῆς θαλάσσης ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων εἴργεσθαι. [6] βραχύ τέ τι εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον ὃ πρὸς τὸ περιγίγνεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων ἡ πόλις σφίσι χρήσιμος ἦν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπολωλεκέναι, οἵ γε μήτε ἀργύριον

εἶχον ἔτι πέμπειν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἐπορίζοντο οἱ στρατιῶται, μήτε βούλευμα χρηστόν, οὗπερ ἕνεκα πόλις στρατοπέδων κρατεῖ: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοὺς μὲν ἡμαρτηκέναι τοὺς πατρίους νόμους καταλύσαντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ σῴζειν καὶ ἐκείνους πειράσεσθαι προσαναγκάζειν, ὥστε οὐδὲ τούτους, οἵπερ ἂν βουλεύοιέν τι χρηστόν, παρὰ σφίσι χείρους εἶναι. [7] Ἀλκιβιάδην τε, ἢν αὐτῷ ἄδειάν τε καὶ κάθοδον ποιήσωσιν, ἄσμενον τὴν παρὰ βασιλέως ξυμμαχίαν παρέξειν. τό τε μέγιστον, ἢν ἁπάντων σφάλλωνται, εἶναι αὐτοῖς τοσοῦτον ἔχουσι ναυτικὸν πολλὰς τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις ἐν αἷς καὶ πόλεις καὶ γῆν εὑρήσουσιν.

[76] There was now an obstinate struggle; the one party determined to force democracy upon the city, the other to force oligarchy upon the fleet. The soldiers proceeded to summon an assembly, at which they deposed their former generals, and any trierarchs whom they suspected, and chose others. Among the new generals Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus naturally found a place. One after another the men rose and encouraged their comrades by various arguments. ‘We ought not to despond,’ they said, ‘because the city has revolted from us, for they are few and we are many; they have lost us and not we them, and our resources are far greater. Having the whole navy with us we can compel the subject-states to pay us tribute as well as if we sailed forth from the Piraeus; Samos is our own — no weak city, but one which in the Samian war all but wrested from Athens the dominion of the sea; and the position which we hold against our Peloponnesian enemies is as strong as heretofore. And again, with the help of the fleet we are better able to obtain supplies than the Athenians at home. Indeed the only reason why the citizens have so long retained the command of the Piraeus is that we who are stationed at Samos are the advanced guard of the Piraeus itself. And now if they will not agree to give us back the constitution, it will come to this — that we shall be better able to drive them off the sea than they us. The help which

the city gives us against our enemies is poor and worthless; and we have lost nothing in losing them. They have no longer any money to send’ (the soldiers were supplying themselves). ‘They cannot aid us by good counsel; and yet for what other reason do states exercise authority over armies? But in this respect too they are useless. They have gone altogether astray, and overthrown the constitution of their country, which we maintain and will endeavour to make the oligarchy maintain likewise. Our advisers in the camp then are at least as good as theirs in the city. Alcibiades, if we procure his recall and pardon, will be delighted to obtain for us the alliance of the King. And above all, if these hopes fail entirely, yet, while we have our great navy, there are many places of refuge open to us in which we shall find city and lands.’

77. τοιαῦτα ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐκκλησιάσαντες καὶ παραθαρσύναντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου παρεσκευάζοντο οὐδὲν ἧσσον. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων πεμφθέντες ἐς τὴν Σάμον [οἱ δέκα πρεσβευταὶ] ὡς ταῦτα ἐν τῇ Δήλῳ ἤδη ὄντες ᾐσθάνοντο, ἡσύχαζον αὐτοῦ.

[77] Having met and encouraged one another by these and similar appeals, they displayed a corresponding energy in their preparations for war. And the ten commissioners whom the Four Hundred had sent out to Samos, hearing when they reached Delos how matters stood, went no further.

78. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἐν τῷ ναυτικῷ στρατιῶται κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διεβόων ὡς ὑπό τε Ἀστυόχου καὶ Τισσαφέρνους φθείρεται τὰ πράγματα, τοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλοντος οὔτε πρότερον ναυμαχεῖν, ἕως ἔτι αὐτοί τε ἔρρωντο μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὀλίγον ἦν, οὔτε νῦν, ὅτε στασιάζειν τε λέγονται καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτῶν οὐδέπω ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ τὰς παρὰ Τισσαφέρνους Φοινίσσας ναῦς μένοντες, ἄλλως ὄνομα καὶ οὐκ ἔργον, κινδυνεύσειν διατριβῆναι: τὸν δ᾽ αὖ Τισσαφέρνην τάς τε ναῦς ταύτας οὐ κομίζειν, καὶ τροφὴν ὅτι οὐ ξυνεχῶς οὐδ᾽ ἐντελῆ διδοὺς

κακοῖ τὸ ναυτικόν. οὔκουν ἔφασαν χρῆναι μέλλειν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ διαναυμαχεῖν.

[78] Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Miletus had likewise troubles among themselves. The sailors complained loudly to one another that their cause was ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes. ‘Astyochus,’ they said, `refused to fight before, while we were strong and the Athenian navy weak, and will not fight now when they are reported to be in a state of anarchy, and their fleet is not as yet united. We are kept waiting for Tissaphernes and the Phoenician ships, which are a mere pretence and nothing more, and we shall soon be utterly exhausted. Tissaphernes never brings up the promised reinforcement, and he destroys our navy by his scanty and irregular payments: the time has come when we must fight.’ The Syracusans were especially vehement in the matter.

79. καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐνῆγον. αἰσθόμενοι δὲ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ ὁ Ἀστύοχος τὸν θροῦν, καὶ δόξαν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ ξυνόδου ὥστε διαναυμαχεῖν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐσηγγέλλετο αὐτοῖς ἡ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ταραχή, ἄραντες ταῖς ναυσὶ πάσαις οὔσαις δώδεκα καὶ ἑκατὸν καὶ τοὺς Μιλησίους πεζῇ κελεύσαντες ἐπὶ τῆς Μυκάλης παριέναι ἔπλεον ὡς πρὸς τὴν Μυκάλην. [2] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῖς ἐκ Σάμου ναυσὶ δυοῖν καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα, αἳ ἔτυχον ἐν Γλαύκῃ τῆς Μυκάλης ὁρμοῦσαι διέχει δὲ ὀλίγον ταύτῃ ἡ Σάμος τῆς ἠπείρου πρὸς τὴν Μυκάλην, ὡς εἶδον τὰς τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναῦς προσπλεούσας, ὑπεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν Σάμον, οὐ νομίσαντες τῷ πλήθει διακινδυνεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἱκανοὶ εἶναι. [3] καὶ ἅμα προῄσθοντο γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου ναυμαχησείοντας προσεδέχοντο καὶ τὸν Στρομβιχίδην ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου σφίσι ταῖς ἐκ τῆς Χίου ναυσὶν ἐπ᾽ Ἀβύδου ἀφικομέναις προσβοηθήσειν: προυπέπεμπτο γὰρ αὐτῷ ἄγγελος. [4] καὶ οἱ μὲν οὕτως ἐπὶ τῆς Σάμου ἀνεχώρησαν, οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι καταπλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τῆς Μυκάλης ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, καὶ τῶν Μιλησίων καὶ τῶν πλησιοχώρων ὁ πεζός. [5] καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μελλόντων αὐτῶν ἐπιπλεῖν τῇ Σάμῳ ἀγγέλλεται ὁ

Στρομβιχίδης ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου ναυσὶν ἀφιγμένος: καὶ εὐθὺς ἀπέπλεον πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς Μιλήτου. [6] οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι προσγενομένων σφίσι τῶν νεῶν ἐπίπλουν αὐτοὶ ποιοῦνται τῇ Μιλήτῳ ναυσὶν ὀκτὼ καὶ ἑκατὸν βουλόμενοι διαναυμαχῆσαι: καὶ ὡς οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς ἀντανήγετο, ἀπέπλευσαν πάλιν ἐς τὴν Σάμον.

[79] Astyochus and the allies became aware of the outcry, and had resolved in council to fight a decisive battle. This resolution was confirmed when they heard of the confusion at Samos. So they put to sea with all their ships, in number a hundred and twelve, and ordering the Milesians to march along the coast towards Mycalè, sailed thither themselves. But the Athenians with their fleet of eighty-two ships, which had come out of Samos and were just then moored at Glaucè on the promontory of Mycalè, a point of the mainland not far off, saw the Peloponnesians bearing down upon them, and returned, thinking that with their inferior numbers they were not justified in risking their all. Besides, having previous information from Miletus that the Peloponnesians were anxious to fight, they had sent a messenger to Strombichides at the Hellespont, and were waiting for him to come to their aid with the ships from Chios which had gone to Abydos. So they retreated to Samos, and the Peloponnesians sailed for Mycalè and there established themselves, together with the land-forces of Miletus and of the neighbouring cities. On the following day they were on the point of attacking Samos, when news came that Strombichides had arrived with the fleet from the Hellespont; whereupon the Peloponnesians immediately retired towards Miletus, and the Athenians themselves, thus reinforced, sailed against Miletus with a hundred and eight ships. They had hoped to fight a decisive battle, but no one came out to meet them, and they returned to Samos.

80. ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει μετὰ τοῦτο εὐθὺς οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ ἀθρόαις ταῖς ναυσὶν οὐκ ἀξιόμαχοι νομίσαντες εἶναι οὐκ ἀντανήγοντο, ἀπορήσαντες ὁπόθεν

τοσαύταις ναυσὶ χρήματα ἔξουσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ Τισσαφέρνους κακῶς διδόντος, ἀποστέλλουσιν ὡς τὸν Φαρνάβαζον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου προσετάχθη, Κλέαρχον τὸν Ῥαμφίου ἔχοντα ναῦς τεσσαράκοντα. [2] ἐπεκαλεῖτό τε γὰρ αὐτοὺς ὁ Φαρνάβαζος καὶ τροφὴν ἑτοῖμος ἦν παρέχειν, καὶ ἅμα καὶ τὸ Βυζάντιον ἐπεκηρυκεύετο αὐτοῖς ἀποστῆναι. [3] καὶ αἱ μὲν τῶν Πελοποννησίων αὗται νῆες ἀπάρασαι ἐς τὸ πέλαγος, ὅπως λάθοιεν ἐν τῷ πλῷ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, χειμασθεῖσαι, καὶ αἱ μὲν Δήλου λαβόμεναι αἱ πλείους μετὰ Κλεάρχου καὶ ὕστερον πάλιν ἐλθοῦσαι ἐς Μίλητον Κλέαρχος δὲ κατὰ γῆν αὖθις ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον κομισθεὶς ἦρχεν, αἱ δὲ μετὰ Ἑλίξου τοῦ Μεγαρέως στρατηγοῦ δέκα ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον διασωθεῖσαι Βυζάντιον ἀφιστᾶσιν. [4] καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πέμπουσιν αἰσθόμενοι νεῶν βοήθειαν καὶ φυλακὴν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καί τις καὶ ναυμαχία βραχεῖα γίγνεται πρὸ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ναυσὶν ὀκτὼ πρὸς ὀκτώ.

[80] The Peloponnesians had not gone out because they thought that even with their united force they could not risk a battle. But not knowing how to maintain so large a fleet, especially since Tissaphernes never paid them properly, they at once while the summer lasted sent Clearchus the son of Rhamphias with forty ships to Pharnabazus, this being the commission which he had originally received from Peloponnesus. Pharnabazus had been inviting them to come, and promised to maintain them; the Byzantians likewise had been sending envoys to them proposing to revolt. The Peloponnesian squadron put out into the open sea that they might not be seen on their voyage by the Athenians. They were caught in a storm; Clearchus and most of his ships found refuge at Delos, and thence returned to Miletus. He himself proceeded later by land to the Hellespont and assumed his command. But ten ships under Helixus of Megara arrived safely, and effected the revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Samos, receiving information of these movements, sent a naval force to guard the

Hellespont; and off Byzantium a small engagement was fought by eight ships against eight.

81. οἱ δὲ προεστῶτες ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ καὶ μάλιστα Θρασύβουλος, αἰεί γε τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἐχόμενος, ἐπειδὴ μετέστησε τὰ πράγματα, ὥστε κατάγειν Ἀλκιβιάδην, [καὶ] τέλος ἀπ᾽ ἐκκλησίας ἔπεισε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν, καὶ ψηφισαμένων αὐτῶν Ἀλκιβιάδῃ κάθοδον καὶ ἄδειαν πλεύσας ὡς τὸν Τισσαφέρνην κατῆγεν ἐς τὴν Σάμον τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην, νομίζων μόνην σωτηρίαν εἰ Τισσαφέρνην αὐτοῖς μεταστήσειεν ἀπὸ Πελοποννησίων. [2] γενομένης δὲ ἐκκλησίας τήν τε ἰδίαν ξυμφορὰν τῆς φυγῆς ἐπῃτιάσατο καὶ ἀνωλοφύρατο ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, καὶ περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἐς ἐλπίδας τε αὐτοὺς οὐ σμικρὰς τῶν μελλόντων καθίστη, καὶ ὑπερβάλλων ἐμεγάλυνε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν παρὰ τῷ Τισσαφέρνει, ἵνα οἵ τε οἴκοι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἔχοντες φοβοῖντο αὐτὸν καὶ μᾶλλον αἱ ξυνωμοσίαι διαλυθεῖεν καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τιμιώτερόν τε αὐτὸν ἄγοιεν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ πλέον θαρσοῖεν, οἵ τε πολέμιοι τῷ Τισσαφέρνει ὡς μάλιστα διαβάλλοιντο καὶ [ἀπὸ] τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν ἐλπίδων ἐκπίπτοιεν. [3] ὑπισχνεῖτο δ᾽ οὖν τάδε μέγιστα ἐπικομπῶν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὡς Τισσαφέρνης αὐτῷ ὑπεδέξατο ἦ μήν, ἕως ἄν τι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ λείπηται, ἢν Ἀθηναίοις πιστεύσῃ, μὴ ἀπορήσειν αὐτοὺς τροφῆς, οὐδ᾽ ἢν δέῃ τελευτῶντα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ στρωμνὴν ἐξαργυρῶσαι, τάς τε ἐν Ἀσπένδῳ ἤδη οὔσας Φοινίκων ναῦς κομιεῖν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ οὐ Πελοποννησίοις: πιστεῦσαι δ᾽ ἂν μόνως Ἀθηναίοις, εἰ σῶς αὐτὸς κατελθὼν αὐτῷ ἀναδέξαιτο.

[81] Ever since Thrasybulus restored the democracy at Samos he had strongly insisted that Alcibiades should be recalled; the other Athenian leaders were of the same mind, and at last the consent of the army was obtained at an assembly which voted his return and full pardon. Thrasybulus then sailed to Tissaphernes, and brought Alcibiades to Samos, convinced that there was no help for the Athenians unless by his means Tissaphernes could be drawn away from the Peloponnesians. An assembly was

called, at which Alcibiades lamented the cruel and unjust fate which had banished him; he then spoke at length of their political prospects; and bright indeed were the hopes of future victory with which he inspired them, while he magnified to excess his present influence over Tissaphernes. He meant thereby first to frighten the oligarchy at home, and effect the dissolution of their clubs; and secondly, to exalt himself in the eyes of the army at Samos and fortify their resolution; thirdly, to widen the breach between Tissaphernes and the enemy, and blast the hopes of the Lacedaemonians. Having these objects in view, Alcibiades carried his fulsome assurances to the utmost. Tissaphernes, he said, had promised him that if he could only trust the Athenians they should not want for food while he had anything to give, no not if he were driven at last to turn his own bed into money; that he would bring up the Phoenician ships (which were already at Aspendus) to assist the Athenians instead of the Peloponnesians; but that he could not trust the Athenians unless Alcibiades were restored and became surety for them.

82. οἱ δὲ ἀκούοντες ταῦτά τε καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ στρατηγόν τε αὐτὸν εὐθὺς εἵλοντο μετὰ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τὰ πράγματα πάντα ἀνετίθεσαν, τήν τε παραυτίκα ἐλπίδα ἕκαστος τῆς τε σωτηρίας καὶ τῆς τῶν τετρακοσίων τιμωρίας οὐδενὸς ἂν ἡλλάξαντο, καὶ ἑτοῖμοι ἤδη ἦσαν διὰ τὸ αὐτίκα τούς τε παρόντας πολεμίους ἐκ τῶν λεχθέντων καταφρονεῖν καὶ πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ. [2] ὁ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ πλεῖν τοὺς ἐγγυτέρω πολεμίους ὑπολιπόντας καὶ πάνυ διεκώλυσε, πολλῶν ἐπειγομένων, τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου πρῶτον ἔφη, ἐπειδὴ καὶ στρατηγὸς ᾑρητο, πλεύσας ὡς Τισσαφέρνην πράξειν. [3] καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐκκλησίας εὐθὺς ᾤχετο, ἵνα δοκῇ πάντα μετ᾽ ἐκείνου κοινοῦσθαι, καὶ ἅμα βουλόμενος αὐτῷ τιμιώτερός τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνδείκνυσθαι ὅτι καὶ στρατηγὸς ἤδη ᾑρηται καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς οἷός τέ ἐστιν αὐτὸν [ἤδη] ποιεῖν. ξυνέβαινε δὲ τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ μὲν

Τισσαφέρνει τοὺς Ἀθηναίους φοβεῖν, ἐκείνοις δὲ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην.

[82] Hearing all this, and a great deal more, the Athenians immediately appointed him a colleague of their other generals, and placed everything in his hands; no man among them would have given up for all the world the hope of deliverance and of vengeance on the Four Hundred which was now aroused in them; so excited were they that under the influence of his words they despised the Peloponnesians, and were ready to sail at once for the Piraeus. But in spite of the eagerness of the multitude he absolutely forbade them to go thither and leave behind them enemies nearer at hand. Having been elected general, he said, he would make the conduct of the war his first care, and go at once to Tissaphernes. And he went straight from the assembly, in order that he might be thought to do nothing without Tissaphernes; at the same time he wished to be honoured in the eyes of Tissaphernes himself, and to show him that he had now been chosen general, and that a time had come when he could do him a good or a bad turn. Thus Alcibiades frightened the Athenians with Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.

83. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ πυνθανόμενοι τὴν τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου κάθοδον, καὶ πρότερον τῷ Τισσαφέρνει ἀπιστοῦντες πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἔτι διεβέβληντο. [2] ξυνηνέχθη γὰρ αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὸν ἐπὶ τὴν Μίλητον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπίπλουν, ὡς οὐκ ἠθέλησαν ἀνταναγαγόντες ναυμαχῆσαι, πολλῷ ἐς τὴν μισθοδοσίαν τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ἀρρωστότερον γενόμενον καὶ ἐς τὸ μισεῖσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν πρότερον ἔτι τούτων διὰ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐπιδεδωκέναι. [3] καὶ ξυνιστάμενοι κατ᾽ ἀλλήλους οἷάπερ καὶ πρότερον οἱ στρατιῶται ἀνελογίζοντο καί τινες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἀνθρώπων καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸ στρατιωτικόν, ὡς οὔτε μισθὸν ἐντελῆ πώποτε λάβοιεν, τό τε διδόμενον βραχὺ καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ξυνεχῶς: καὶ εἰ μή τις ἢ διαναυμαχήσει ἢ ἀπαλλάξεται ὅθεν τροφὴν ἕξει, ἀπολείψειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους

τὰς ναῦς: πάντων τε Ἀστύοχον εἶναι αἴτιον ἐπιφέροντα ὀργὰς Τισσαφέρνει διὰ ἴδια κέρδη.

[83] The Peloponnesians at Miletus, who had already conceived a mistrust of Tissaphernes, when they heard of the restoration of Alcibiades were still more exasperated against him. About the time of the advance in force of the Athenians on Miletus, Tissaphernes, observing that the Peloponnesians would not put out to sea and fight with them, had become much more remiss in paying the fleet; and previously to this a dislike of him, arising out of his connexion with Alcibiades, had gained ground. He was now more hated than ever. As before, the soldiers began to gather in knots and to express discontent; and not only the soldiers, but some men of position complained that they had never yet received their full pay, and that the sum given was too small, while even this was irregularly paid; if nobody would fight, or go where food could be got, the men would desert. All these grievances they laid to the charge of Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for his own gain.

84. ὄντων δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐν τοιούτῳ ἀναλογισμῷ ξυνηνέχθη καὶ τοιόσδε τις θόρυβος περὶ τὸν Ἀστύοχον. [2] τῶν γὰρ Συρακοσίων καὶ Θουρίων ὅσῳ μάλιστα καὶ ἐλεύθεροι ἦσαν τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ναῦται, τοσούτῳ καὶ θρασύτατα προσπεσόντες τὸν μισθὸν ἀπῄτουν. ὁ δὲ αὐθαδέστερόν τέ τι ἀπεκρίνατο καὶ ἠπείλησε καὶ τῷ γε Δωριεῖ ξυναγορεύοντι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ναύταις καὶ ἐπανήρατο τὴν βακτηρίαν. [3] τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὡς εἶδον, οἷα δὴ ναῦται, ὥρμησαν ἐκραγέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀστύοχον ὥστε βάλλειν: ὁ δὲ προϊδὼν καταφεύγει ἐπὶ βωμόν τινα. οὐ μέντοι ἐβλήθη γε, ἀλλὰ διελύθησαν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων. [4] ἔλαβον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ ἐνῳκοδομημένον τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους φρούριον οἱ Μιλήσιοι λάθρᾳ ἐπιπεσόντες, καὶ τοὺς ἐνόντας φύλακας αὐτοῦ ἐκβάλλουσιν: ξυνεδόκει δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμμάχοις ταῦτα καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. [5] ὁ μέντοι Λίχας οὔτε ἠρέσκετο αὐτοῖς ἔφη τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρνει καὶ δουλεύειν Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν τῇ βασιλέως τὰ μέτρια

καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν, ἕως ἂν τὸν πόλεμον εὖ θῶνται. οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι ὠργίζοντό τε αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλα τοιουτότροπα καὶ νόσῳ ὕστερον ἀποθανόντα αὐτὸν οὐκ εἴασαν θάψαι οὗ ἐβούλοντο οἱ παρόντες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

[84] While these thoughts were passing in their minds the behaviour of Astyochus gave occasion to an outbreak. The Syracusan and Thurian sailors were for the most part free men, and therefore bolder than the rest in assailing him with demands for pay. Astyochus answered them roughly and threatened them; he even raised his stick against Dorieus of Thurii who was pleading the cause of his own sailors. When the men saw the action they, sailor-like, lost all control of themselves, and rushed upon him, intending to stone him; but he, perceiving what was coming, ran to an altar, where taking refuge he escaped unhurt, and they were parted. The Milesians, who were likewise discontented, captured by a sudden assault a fort which had been built in Miletus by Tissaphernes, and drove out the garrison which he had placed there. Of this proceeding the allies approved, especially the Syracusans; Lichas, however, was displeased, and said that the Milesians and the inhabitants of the King’s country should submit to the necessary humiliation, and manage to keep on good terms with Tissaphernes until the war was well over. His conduct on this and on other occasions excited a strong feeling against him among the Milesians; and afterwards, when he fell sick and died, they would not let him be buried where his Lacedaemonian comrades would have laid him.

85. κατὰ δὴ τοιαύτην διαφορὰν ὄντων αὐτοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων πρός τε τὸν Ἀστύοχον καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην Μίνδαρος διάδοχος τῆς Ἀστυόχου ναυαρχίας ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος ἐπῆλθε καὶ παραλαμβάνει τὴν ἀρχήν: ὁ δὲ Ἀστύοχος ἀπέπλει. [2] ξυνέπεμψε δὲ καὶ Τισσαφέρνης αὐτῷ πρεσβευτὴν τῶν παρ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, Γαυλίτην ὄνομα, Κᾶρα δίγλωσσον, κατηγορήσοντα τῶν τε Μιλησίων περὶ τοῦ

φρουρίου καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἅμα ἀπολογησόμενον, εἰδὼς τούς τε Μιλησίους πορευομένους ἐπὶ καταβοῇ τῇ αὐτοῦ μάλιστα καὶ τὸν Ἑρμοκράτη μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, ὃς ἔμελλε τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ἀποφαίνειν φθείροντα τῶν Πελοποννησίων τὰ πράγματα μετὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα. [3] ἔχθρα δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἦν αὐτῷ αἰεί ποτε περὶ τοῦ μισθοῦ τῆς ἀποδόσεως: καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα φυγόντος ἐκ Συρακουσῶν τοῦ Ἑρμοκράτους καὶ ἑτέρων ἡκόντων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐς τὴν Μίλητον στρατηγῶν, Ποτάμιδος καὶ Μύσκωνος καὶ Δημάρχου, ἐνέκειτο ὁ Τισσαφέρνης φυγάδι ὄντι ἤδη τῷ Ἑρμοκράτει πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον καὶ κατηγόρει ἄλλα τε καὶ ὡς χρήματά ποτε αἰτήσας αὐτὸν καὶ οὐ τυχὼν τὴν ἔχθραν οἱ προθοῖτο. [4] ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀστύοχος καὶ οἱ Μιλήσιοι καὶ ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα. ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης διεβεβήκει πάλιν ἤδη παρὰ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους ἐς τὴν Σάμον.

[85] While the Lacedaemonians were quarrelling in this manner with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus arrived from Lacedaemon; he had been appointed to succeed Astyochus, who surrendered to him the command of the fleet and sailed home. Tissaphernes sent with him an envoy, one of his own attendants, a Carian named Gaulites, who spoke both Greek and Persian. He was instructed to complain of the destruction of the fort by the Milesians, and also to defend Tissaphernes against their charges. For he knew that Milesian envoys were going to Sparta chiefly to accuse him, and Hermocrates with them, who would explain how he, aided by Alcibiades, was playing a double game and ruining the Peloponnesian cause. Now Tissaphernes owed Hermocrates a grudge ever since they quarrelled about the payment of the sailors. And when afterwards he had been exiled from Syracuse, and other generals, Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus, came to take the command of the Syracusan ships at Miletus, Tissaphernes attacked him with still greater violence in his exile, declaring among other things that Hermocrates had asked him for money and had

been refused, and that this was the reason of the enmity which he conceived against him. And so Astyochus, the Milesians, and Hermocrates sailed away to Lacedaemon. Alcibiades had by this time returned from Tissaphernes to Samos.

86. καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Δήλου ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων [πρεσβευταί], οὓς τότε ἔπεμψαν παραμυθησομένους καὶ ἀναδιδάξοντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ, ἀφικνοῦνται παρόντος τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, καὶ ἐκκλησίας γενομένης λέγειν ἐπεχείρουν. [2] οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐκ ἤθελον ἀκούειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποκτείνειν ἐβόων τοὺς τὸν δῆμον καταλύοντας, ἔπειτα μέντοι μόλις ἡσυχάσαντες ἤκουσαν. [3] οἱ δ᾽ ἀπήγγελλον ὡς οὔτε ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῆς πόλεως ἡ μετάστασις γίγνοιτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ, οὔθ᾽ ἵνα τοῖς πολεμίοις παραδοθῇ ἐξεῖναι γάρ, ὅτε ἐσέβαλον ἤδη σφῶν ἀρχόντων, τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν, οἵ τε οἰκεῖοι αὐτῶν οὔθ᾽ ὑβρίζονται, ὥσπερ Χαιρέας διαβάλλων ἀπήγγειλεν, οὔτε κακὸν ἔχουσιν οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς σφετέροις αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι κατὰ χώραν μένουσιν. [4] ἄλλα τε πολλὰ εἰπόντων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐσήκουον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐχαλέπαινον καὶ γνώμας ἄλλοι ἄλλας ἔλεγον, μάλιστα δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ πλεῖν. καὶ δοκεῖ Ἀλκιβιάδης πρῶτον τότε καὶ οὐδενὸς ἔλασσον τὴν πόλιν ὠφελῆσαι: ὡρμημένων γὰρ τῶν ἐν Σάμῳ Ἀθηναίων πλεῖν ἐπὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς, ἐν ᾧ σαφέστατα Ἰωνίαν καὶ Ἑλλήσποντον εὐθὺς εἶχον οἱ πολέμιοι, κωλυτὴς γενέσθαι. [5] καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε ἄλλος μὲν οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἱκανὸς ἐγένετο κατασχεῖν τὸν ὅχλον, ἐκεῖνος δὲ τοῦ τ᾽ ἐπίπλου ἔπαυσε καὶ τοὺς ἰδίᾳ τοῖς πρέσβεσιν ὀργιζομένους λοιδορῶν ἀπέτρεπεν. [6] αὐτὸς δὲ ἀποκρινάμενος αὐτοῖς ἀπέπεμπεν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν πεντακισχιλίους οὐ κωλύοι ἄρχειν, τοὺς μέντοι τετρακοσίους ἀπαλλάσσειν ἐκέλευεν αὐτοὺς καὶ καθιστάναι τὴν βουλὴν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, τοὺς πεντακοσίους: εἰ δὲ ἐς εὐτέλειάν τι ξυντέτμηται ὥστε τοὺς στρατευομένους μᾶλλον ἔχειν τροφήν, πάνυ ἐπαινεῖν. [7] καὶ τἆλλα ἐκέλευεν ἀντέχειν καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς πολεμίοις: πρὸς μὲν γὰρ

σφᾶς αὐτοὺς σῳζομένης τῆς πόλεως πολλὴν ἐλπίδα εἶναι καὶ ξυμβῆναι, εἰ δὲ ἅπαξ τὸ ἕτερον σφαλήσεται, ἢ τὸ ἐν Σάμῳ ἢ ἐκεῖνοι, οὐδ᾽ ὅτῳ διαλλαγήσεταί τις ἔτι ἔσεσθαι. [8]παρῆσαν δὲ καὶ Ἀργείων πρέσβεις, ἐπαγγελλόμενοι τῷ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ ὥστε βοηθεῖν: ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς καὶ εἰπὼν ὅταν τις καλῇ παρεῖναι οὕτως ἀπέπεμπεν. [9] ἀφίκοντο δὲ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι μετὰ τῶν Παράλων, οἳ τότε ἐτάχθησαν ἐν τῇ στρατιώτιδι νηὶ ὑπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων περιπλεῖν Εὔβοιαν, καὶ ἄγοντες Ἀθηναίων ἐς Λακεδαίμονα ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων [πεμπτοὺς] πρέσβεις, Λαισποδίαν καὶ Ἀριστοφῶντα καὶ Μελησίαν, [οἳ] ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο πλέοντες κατ᾽ Ἄργος, τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις ξυλλαβόντες τοῖς Ἀργείοις παρέδοσαν ὡς τῶν οὐχ ἥκιστα καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον ὄντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀφίκοντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἄγοντες ἐκ τοῦ Ἄργους ἐς τὴν Σάμον τοὺς πρέσβεις ἀφικνοῦνται ᾗπερ εἶχον τριήρει.

[86] The envoys whom the Four Hundred had sent to pacify the army and give explanations left Delos and came to Samos after the return of Alcibiades, and an assembly was held at which they endeavoured to speak. At first the soldiers would not listen to them, but shouted ‘Death to the subverters of the democracy.’ When quiet had been with difficulty restored, the envoys told them that the change was not meant for the destruction but for the preservation of the state, and that there was no intention of betraying Athens to the enemy, which might have been effected by the new government already if they had pleased during the recent invasion. They declared that all the Five Thousand were in turn to have a share in the administration; and that the families of the sailors were not being outraged, as Chaereas slanderously reported, or in any way molested; they were living quietly in their several homes. They defended themselves at length, but the more they said, the more furious and unwilling to listen grew the multitude. Various proposals were made; above all they wanted to sail to the Piraeus. Then Alcibiades appears to have done as

eminent a service to the state as any man ever did. For if the Athenians at Samos in their excitement had been allowed to sail against their fellow-citizens, the enemy would instantly have obtained possession of Ionia and the Hellespont. This he prevented, and at that moment no one else could have restrained the multitude: but he did restrain them, and with sharp words protected the envoys against the fury of individuals in the crowd. He then dismissed them himself with the reply that he had nothing to say against the rule of the Five Thousand, but that the Four Hundred must be got rid of, and the old council of Five Hundred restored. If they had reduced the expenditure in order that the soldiers on service might be better off for supplies, he highly approved. For the rest he entreated them to stand firm, and not give way to the enemy; if the city was preserved, there was good hope that they might be reconciled amongst themselves, but if once anything happened either to the army at Samos or to their fellow-citizens at home, there would be no one left to be reconciled with.There were also present envoys from Argos, who proffered their aid ‘to the Athenian people at Samos.’ Alcibiades complimented them, and requested them to come with their forces when they were summoned; he then dismissed them. These Argives came with the Parali who had been ordered by the Four Hundred to cruise off Euboea in a troop-ship; they were afterwards employed in conveying to Lacedaemon certain envoys sent by the Four Hundred, Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias. But when they were near Argos on their voyage the crews seized the envoys, and, as they were among the chief authors of the revolution, delivered them over to the Argives; while they, instead of returning to Athens, went from Argos to Samos, and brought with them in their trireme the Argive ambassadors.

87. τοῦ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ θέρους Τισσαφέρνης, κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα διά τε τἆλλα καὶ διὰ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου κάθοδον ἤχθοντο αὐτῷ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ὡς φανερῶς ἤδη

ἀττικίζοντι, βουλόμενος, ὡς ἐδόκει δή, ἀπολύεσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὰς διαβολάς, παρεσκευάζετο πορεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἐς Ἄσπενδον, καὶ τὸν Λίχαν ξυμπορεύεσθαι ἐκέλευεν: τῇ δὲ στρατιᾷ προστάξειν ἔφη Τάμων ἑαυτοῦ ὕπαρχον, ὥστε τροφὴν ἐν ὅσῳ ἂν αὐτὸς ἀπῇ διδόναι. [2] λέγεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτό, οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον εἰδέναι τίνι γνώμῃ παρῆλθεν ἐς τὴν Ἄσπενδον καὶ παρελθὼν οὐκ ἤγαγε τὰς ναῦς. [3] ὅτι μὲν γὰρ αἱ Φοίνισσαι νῆες ἑπτὰ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μέχρι Ἀσπένδου ἀφίκοντο σαφές ἐστι, διότι δὲ οὐκ ἦλθον πολλαχῇ εἰκάζεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἵνα διατρίβῃ ἀπελθών, ὥσπερ καὶ διενοήθη, τὰ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ▯ τροφὴν γοῦν οὐδὲν βέλτιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ χεῖρον ὁ Τάμως, ᾧ προσετάχθη, παρεῖχεν▯, οἱ δὲ ἵνα τοὺς Φοίνικας προαγαγὼν ἐς τὴν Ἄσπενδον ἐκχρηματίσαιτο ἀφείς ▯καὶ γὰρ ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔμελλε χρήσεσθαι▯, ἄλλοι δ᾽ ὡς καταβοῆς ἕνεκα τῆς ἐς Λακεδαίμονα, τοῦ λέγεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σαφῶς οἴχεται ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀληθῶς πεπληρωμένας. [4] ἐμοὶ μέντοι δοκεῖ σαφέστατον εἶναι διατριβῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνοκωχῆς τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τὸ ναυτικὸν οὐκ ἀγαγεῖν, φθορᾶς μέν, ἐν ὅσῳ παρῄει ἐκεῖσε καὶ διέμελλεν, ἀνισώσεως δέ, ὅπως μηδετέροις προσθέμενος ἰσχυροτέρους ποιήσῃ, ἐπεί, εἴ γε ἐβουλήθη, διαπολεμῆσαι <ἂν> ἐπιφανεὶς δήπου οὐκ ἐνδοιαστῶς: κομίσας γὰρ ἂν Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν νίκην κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἔδωκεν, οἵ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀντιπάλως μᾶλλον ἢ ὑποδεεστέρως τῷ ναυτικῷ ἀνθώρμουν. [5] καταφωρᾷ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ἦν εἶπε πρόφασιν οὐ κομίσας τὰς ναῦς. ἔφη γὰρ αὐτὰς ἐλάσσους ἢ ὅσας βασιλεὺς ἔταξε ξυλλεγῆναι: ὁ δὲ χάριν ἂν δήπου ἐν τούτῳ μείζω ἔτι ἔσχεν, οὔτ᾽ ἀναλώσας πολλὰ τῶν βασιλέως τά τε αὐτὰ ἀπ᾽ ἐλασσόνων πράξας. [6] ἐς δ᾽ οὖν τὴν Ἄσπενδον ᾗτινιδὴ γνώμῃ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης ἀφικνεῖται καὶ τοῖς Φοίνιξι ξυγγίγνεται: καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔπεμψαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς κελεύσαντος αὐτοῦ Φίλιππον ἄνδρα Λακεδαιμόνιον δύο τριήρεσιν.

[87] During the same summer, and just at the time when the Peloponnesians were most offended with Tissaphernes on

various grounds, and above all on account of the restoration of Alcibiades, which finally proved him to be a partisan of the Athenians, he, as if he were wanting to clear himself of these suspicions, prepared to go to Aspendus and fetch the Phoenician ships; and he desired Lichas to go with him. He also said that he would assign the charge of the army to his lieutenant Tamos, who would provide for them during his absence. Why he went to Aspendus, and having gone there never brought the ships, is a question not easy to answer, and which has been answered in various ways. For the Phoenician fleet of a hundred and forty-seven ships came as far as Aspendus — there is no doubt about this; but why they never came further is matter of conjecture. Some think that, in going to Aspendus, Tissaphernes was still pursuing his policy of wearing out the Peloponnesians; at any rate Tamos, who was in charge, supplied them no better, but rather worse. Others are of opinion that he brought up the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus in order to make money by selling the crews their discharge; for he certainly had no idea of using them in actual service. Others think that he was influenced by the outcry against him which had reached Lacedaemon; and that he wanted to create an impression of his honesty: ‘Now at any rate he has gone to fetch the ships, and they are really manned.’ I believe beyond all question that he wanted to wear out and to neutralise the Hellenic forces; his object was to damage them both while he was losing time in going to Aspendus, and to paralyse their action, and not strengthen either of them by his alliance. For if he had chosen to finish the war, finished it might have been once for all, as any one may see: he would have brought up the ships, and would in all probability have given the victory to the Lacedaemonians, who lay opposite to the Athenians and were fully a match for them already. The excuse which he gave for not bringing them is the most conclusive evidence against him; he said that there was not as many collected as the King had commanded. But if so,

the King would have been all the better pleased, for his money would have been saved and Tissaphernes would have accomplished the same result at less expense. Whatever may have been his intention, Tissaphernes came to Aspendus and conferred with the Phoenicians, and the Peloponnescans at his request sent Philip, a Lacedaemonian, with two triremes to fetch the ships:

88. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ᾔσθετο παριόντα ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσπένδου, ἔπλει καὶ αὐτὸς λαβὼν τρεῖς καὶ δέκα ναῦς, ὑποσχόμενος τοῖς ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ μεγάλην χάριν ᾗ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἄξειν Ἀθηναίοις τὰς Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἢ Πελοποννησίοις γε κωλύσειν ἐλθεῖν , εἰδώς, ὡς εἰκός, ἐκ πλέονος τὴν Τισσαφέρνους γνώμην ὅτι οὐκ ἄξειν ἔμελλε, καὶ βουλόμενος αὐτὸν τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ Ἀθηναίων φιλίαν ὡς μάλιστα διαβάλλειν, ὅπως μᾶλλον δι᾽ αὐτὸ σφίσιν ἀναγκάζοιτο προσχωρεῖν.καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄρας εὐθὺ τῆς Φασήλιδος καὶ Καύνου ἄνω τὸν πλοῦν ἐποιεῖτο.

[88] Alcibiades, when he learned that Tissaphernes was going to Aspendus, sailed thitherward himself with thirteen ships, promising the army at Samos that he would not fail to do them a great service. He would either bring the Phoenician ships to the Athenians, or, at any rate, make sure that they did not join the Peloponnesians. He had probably known all along the real mind of Tissaphernes, and that he never meant to bring them at all. He wanted further to injure him as much as possible in the opinion of the Peloponnesians when they observed how friendly Tissaphernes was towards himself and the Athenians; their distrust would compel him to change sides. So he set sail and went on his voyage eastward, making directly for Phaselis and Caunus.

89. οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων πεμφθέντες πρέσβεις ἐπειδὴ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀπήγγειλαν τὰ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς κελεύει τε ἀντέχειν καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐλπίδας τε ὅτι πολλὰς ἔχει

κἀκείνοις τὸ στράτευμα διαλλάξειν καὶ Πελοποννησίων περιέσεσθαι, ἀχθομένους καὶ πρότερον τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ἡδέως ἂν ἀπαλλαγέντας πῃ ἀσφαλῶς τοῦ πράγματος πολλῷ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐπέρρωσαν. [2] καὶ ξυνίσταντό τε ἤδη καὶ τὰ πράγματα διεμέμφοντο, ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνας τῶν πάνυ [στρατηγῶν] τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἐν ἀρχαῖς ὄντων, οἷον Θηραμένη τε τὸν Ἄγνωνος καὶ Ἀριστοκράτη τὸν Σκελίου καὶ ἄλλους, οἳ μετέσχον μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι τῶν πραγμάτων, φοβούμενοι δέ, ὡς ἔφασαν, τό τε ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ στράτευμα καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην σπουδῇ πάνυ, τούς τε ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πρεσβευομένους [ἔπεμπον], μή τι ἄνευ τῶν πλεόνων κακὸν δράσωσι τὴν πόλιν, οὐ τὸ † ἀπαλλαξείειν τοῦ ἄγαν ἐς ὀλίγους ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἔργῳ καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι χρῆναι ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἰσαιτέραν καθιστάναι. [3] ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς, κατ᾽ ἰδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσέκειντο, ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπόλλυται: πάντες γὰρ αὐθημερὸν ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι: ἐκ δὲ δημοκρατίας αἱρέσεως γιγνομένης ῥᾷον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει. [4] σαφέστατα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἐπῆρε τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἰσχυρὰ ὄντα καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐδόκει μόνιμον τὸ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔσεσθαι: ἠγωνίζετο οὖν εἷς ἕκαστος αὐτὸς πρῶτος προστάτης τοῦ δήμου γενέσθαι.

[89] The commissioners sent by the Four Hundred returned from Samos to Athens and reported the words of Alcibiades — how he bade them stand firm and not give way to the enemy, and what great hopes he entertained of reconciling the army to the city, and of overcoming the Peloponnesians. The greater number of the oligarchs, who were already dissatisfied, and would have gladly got out of the whole affair if they safely could, were now much encouraged. They began to come together and to criticise the conduct of affairs. Their leaders were some of the oligarchical generals

and actually in office at the time, for example, Theramenes the son of Hagnon and Aristocrates the son of Scellius. They had been among the chief authors of the revolution, but now, fearing, as they urged, the army at Samos, and being in good earnest afraid of Alcibiades, fearing also lest their colleagues, who were sending envoys to Lacedaemon, might, unauthorised by the majority, betray the city, they did not indeed openly profess that they meant to get rid of extreme oligarchy, but they maintained that the Five Thousand should be established in reality and not in name, and the constitution made more equal. This was the political phrase of which they availed themselves, but the truth was that most of them were given up to private ambition of that sort which is more fatal than anything to an oligarchy succeeding a democracy. For the instant an oligarchy is established the promoters of it disdain mere equality, and everybody thinks that he ought to be far above everybody else. Whereas in a democracy, when an election is made, a man is less disappointed at a failure because he has not been competing with his equals. The influence which most sensibly affected them were the great power of Alcibiades at Samos, and an impression that the oligarchy was not likely to be permanent. Accordingly every one was struggling hard to be the first champion of the people himself.

90. οἱ δὲ τῶν τετρακοσίων μάλιστα ἐναντίοι ὄντες τῷ τοιούτῳ εἴδει καὶ προεστῶτες Φρύνιχός τε, ὃς καὶ στρατηγήσας ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ [ποτὲ] τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τότε διηνέχθη, καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐκ πλείστου ἐναντίος τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ Πείσανδρος καὶ Ἀντιφῶν καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ δυνατώτατοι, πρότερόν τε, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα κατέστησαν καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ σφῶν ἐς δημοκρατίαν ἀπέστη, πρέσβεις τε ἀπέστελλον σφῶν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα καὶ τὴν ὁμολογίαν προυθυμοῦντο καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἠετιωνείᾳ καλουμένῃ τεῖχος ἐποιοῦντο, πολλῷ τε μᾶλλον ἔτι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πρέσβεις σφῶν ἦλθον, ὁρῶντες τούς τε πολλοὺς καὶ σφῶν τοὺς δοκοῦντας

πρότερον πιστοὺς εἶναι μεταβαλλομένους. [2] καὶ ἀπέστειλαν μὲν Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Φρύνιχον καὶ ἄλλους δέκα κατὰ τάχος, φοβούμενοι καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου, ἐπιστείλαντες παντὶ τρόπῳ ὅστις καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἀνεκτὸς ξυναλλαγῆναι πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, [3] ᾠκοδόμουν δὲ ἔτι προθυμότερον τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἠετιωνείᾳ τεῖχος. ἦν δὲ τοῦ τείχους ἡ γνώμη αὕτη, ὡς ἔφη Θηραμένης καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἵνα τοὺς ἐν Σάμῳ, ἢν βίᾳ ἐπιπλέωσι, μὴ δέξωνται ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα τοὺς πολεμίους μᾶλλον, ὅταν βούλωνται, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ δέξωνται. [4] χηλὴ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἡ Ἠετιωνεία, καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτὴν εὐθὺς ὁ ἔσπλους ἐστίν. ἐτειχίζετο οὖν οὕτω ξὺν τῷ πρότερον πρὸς ἤπειρον ὑπάρχοντι τείχει, ὥστε καθεζομένων ἐς αὐτὸ ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγων ἄρχειν τοῦ ἔσπλου:ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν γὰρ τὸν ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ λιμένος στενοῦ ὄντος τὸν ἕτερον πύργον ἐτελεύτα τό τε παλαιὸν τὸ πρὸς ἤπειρον καὶ τὸ ἐντὸς τὸ καινὸν τεῖχος τειχιζόμενον πρὸς θάλασσαν. [5] διῳκοδόμησαν δὲ καὶ στοάν, ἥπερ ἦν μεγίστη καὶ ἐγγύτατα τούτου εὐθὺς ἐχομένη ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ, καὶ ἦρχον αὐτοὶ αὐτῆς, ἐς ἣν καὶ τὸν σῖτον ἠνάγκαζον πάντας τὸν ὑπάρχοντά τε καὶ τὸν ἐσπλέοντα ἐξαιρεῖσθαι καὶ ἐντεῦθεν προαιροῦντας πωλεῖν.

[90] The leading men among the Four Hundred most violently opposed to the restoration of democracy were Phrynichus, who had been general at Samos, and had there come into antagonism with Alcibiades, Aristarchus, a man who had always been the most thorough-going enemy of the people, Peisander, and Antiphon. These and the other leaders, both at the first establishment of the oligarchy, and again later when the army at Samos declared for the democracy, sent envoys of their own number to Lacedaemon, and were always anxious to make peace; meanwhile they continued the fortification which they had begun to build at Eetionea. They were confirmed in their purposes after the return of their own ambassadors from Samos; for they saw that not only the people, but even

those who had appeared steadfast adherents of their own party, were now changing their minds. So, fearing what might happen both at Athens and Samos, they sent Antiphon, Phrynichus, and ten others, in great haste, authorising them to make peace with Lacedaemon upon anything like tolerable terms; at the same time they proceeded more diligently than ever with the fortification of Eetionea. The design was (so Theramenes and his party averred) not to bar the Piraeus against the fleet at Samos should they sail thither with hostile intentions, but rather to admit the enemy with his sea and land forces whenever they pleased. This Eetionea is the mole of the Piraeus and forms one side of the entrance; the new fortification was to be so connected with the previously existing wall, which looked towards the land, that a handful of men stationed between the two walls might command the approach from the sea. For the old wall looking towards the land, and the new inner wall in process of construction facing the water, ended at the same point in one of the two forts which protected the narrow mouth of the harbour: A cross-wall was added, taking in the largest storehouse in the Piraeus and the nearest to the new fortification, which it joined; this the authorities held themselves, and commanded every one to deposit their corn there, not only what came in by sea but what they had on the spot, and to take from thence all that they wanted to sell.

91. ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐκ πλέονός τε ὁ Θηραμένης διεθρόει καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος πρέσβεις οὐδὲν πράξαντες ἀνεχώρησαν τοῖς ξύμπασι ξυμβατικόν, φάσκων κινδυνεύσειν τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο καὶ τὴν πόλιν διαφθεῖραι. [2] ἅμα γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐτύγχανον Εὐβοέων ἐπικαλουμένων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τοῦτον δύο καὶ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες, ὧν ἦσαν καὶ ἐκ Τάραντος καὶ Λοκρῶν Ἰταλιώτιδες καὶ Σικελικαί τινες, ὁρμοῦσαι ἤδη ἐπὶ Λᾷ τῆς Λακωνικῆς καὶ παρασκευαζόμεναι τὸν ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν πλοῦν ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀγησανδρίδας Ἀγησάνδρου Σπαρτιάτης :

ἃς ἔφη Θηραμένης οὐκ Εὐβοίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τειχίζουσι τὴν Ἠετιωνείαν προσπλεῖν, καὶ εἰ μή τις ἤδη φυλάξεται, λήσειν διαφθαρέντας. [3] ἦν δέ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀπὸ τῶν τὴν κατηγορίαν ἐχόντων, καὶ οὐ πάνυ διαβολὴ μόνον τοῦ λόγου. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ μάλιστα μὲν ἐβούλοντο ὀλιγαρχούμενοι ἄρχειν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, εἰ δὲ μή, τάς τε ναῦς καὶ τὰ τείχη ἔχοντες αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἐξειργόμενοι δὲ καὶ τούτου μὴ οὖν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου γε αὖθις γενομένου αὐτοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων μάλιστα διαφθαρῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐσαγαγόμενοι ἄνευ τειχῶν καὶ νεῶν ξυμβῆναι καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχειν, εἰ τοῖς γε σώμασι σφῶν ἄδεια ἔσται.

[91] For some time Theramenes had been circulating whispers of their designs, and when the envoys returned from Lacedaemon without having effected anything in the nature of a treaty for the Athenian people, he declared that this fort was likely to prove the ruin of Athens. Now the Euboeans had requested the Peloponnesians to send them a fleet, and just at this time two and forty ships, including Italian vessels from Tarentum and Locri and a few from Sicily, were stationed at Las in Laconia, and were making ready to sail to Euboea under the command of Agesandridas the son of Agesander, a Spartan. Theramenes insisted that these ships were intended, not for Euboea, but for the party who were fortifying Eetionea, and that, if the people were not on the alert, they would be undone before they knew where they were. The charge was not a mere calumny, but had some foundation in the disposition of the ruling party. For what would have best pleased them would have been, retaining the oligarchy in any case, to have preserved the Athenian empire over the allies; failing this, to keep merely their ships and walls, and to be independent; if this too proved impracticable, at any rate they would not see democracy restored, and themselves fall the first victims, but would rather bring in the enemy and come to terms with them, not caring if thereby the city lost walls and ships and

everything else, provided that they could save their own lives.

92. διόπερ καὶ τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο καὶ πυλίδας ἔχον καὶ ἐσόδους καὶ ἐπεσαγωγὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐτείχιζόν τε προθύμως καὶ φθῆναι ἐβούλοντο ἐξεργασάμενοι. [2] πρότερον μὲν οὖν κατ᾽ ὀλίγους τε καὶ κρύφα μᾶλλον τὰ λεγόμενα ἦν: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ Φρύνιχος ἥκων ἐκ τῆς ἐς Λακεδαίμονα πρεσβείας πληγεὶς ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρὸς τῶν περιπόλων τινὸς ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ καὶ οὐ πολὺ ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου ἀπελθὼν ἀπέθανε παραχρῆμα, καὶ ὁ μὲν πατάξας διέφυγεν, ὁ δὲ ξυνεργὸς Ἀργεῖος ἄνθρωπος ληφθεὶς καὶ βασανιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων οὐδενὸς ὄνομα τοῦ κελεύσαντος εἶπεν οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅτι εἰδείη πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἐς τοῦ περιπολάρχου καὶ ἄλλοσε κατ᾽ οἰκίας ξυνιόντας, τότε δὴ οὐδενὸς γεγενημένου ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ νεωτέρου καὶ ὁ Θηραμένης ἤδη θρασύτερον καὶ Ἀριστοκράτης καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τῶν τετρακοσίων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἦσαν ὁμογνώμονες ᾖσαν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα. [3] ἅμα γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς Λᾶς αἱ νῆες ἤδη περιπεπλευκυῖαι καὶ ὁρμισάμεναι ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον τὴν Αἴγιναν κατεδεδραμήκεσαν: καὶ οὐκ ἔφη ὁ Θηραμένης εἰκὸς εἶναι ἐπ᾽ Εὔβοιαν πλεούσας αὐτὰς ἐς Αἴγιναν κατακολπίσαι καὶ πάλιν ἐν Ἐπιδαύρῳ ὁρμεῖν, εἰ μὴ παρακληθεῖσαι ἥκοιεν ἐφ᾽ οἷσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς αἰεὶ κατηγόρει: οὐκέτι οὖν οἷόν τε εἶναι ἡσυχάζειν. [4] τέλος δὲ πολλῶν καὶ στασιωτικῶν λόγων καὶ ὑποψιῶν προσγενομένων καὶ ἔργῳ ἤδη ἥπτοντο τῶν πραγμάτων: οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ τὸ τῆς Ἠετιωνείας τεῖχος ὁπλῖται οἰκοδομοῦντες, ἐν οἷς καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοκράτης ἦν ταξιαρχῶν καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φυλὴν ἔχων, ξυλλαμβάνουσιν Ἀλεξικλέα στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους τετραμμένον, καὶ ἐς οἰκίαν ἀγαγόντες εἶρξαν. [5] ξυνεπελάβοντο δὲ αὐτοῖς ἅμα καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ Ἕρμων τις τῶν περιπόλων τῶν Μουνιχίασι τεταγμένων ἄρχων: τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τὸ στῖφος ταῦτα ἐβούλετο. [6] ὡς δὲ ἐσηγγέλθη τοῖς τετρακοσίοις [ἔτυχον δὲ ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ ξυγκαθήμενοι], εὐθύς, πλὴν ὅσοις μὴ

βουλομένοις ταῦτ᾽ ἦν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν ἐς τὰ ὅπλα ἰέναι καὶ τῷ Θηραμένει καὶ τοῖς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἠπείλουν. ὁ δὲ ἀπολογούμενος ἑτοῖμος ἔφη εἶναι ξυναφαιρησόμενος ἰέναι ἤδη. καὶ παραλαβὼν ἕνα τῶν στρατηγῶν ὃς ἦν αὐτῷ ὁμογνώμων ἐχώρει ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ: ἐβοήθει δὲ καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ τῶν ἱππέων νεανίσκοι. [7] ἦν δὲ θόρυβος πολὺς καὶ ἐκπληκτικός: οἵ τε γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἤδη ᾠοντο τόν τε Πειραιᾶ κατειλῆφθαι καὶ τὸν ξυνειλημμένον τεθνάναι, οἵ τε ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ὅσον οὔπω ἐπὶ σφᾶς παρεῖναι. [8] μόλις δὲ τῶν τε πρεσβυτέρων διακωλυόντων τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἄστει διαθέοντας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα φερομένους καὶ Θουκυδίδου τοῦ Φαρσαλίου τοῦ προξένου τῆς πόλεως παρόντος καὶ προθύμως ἐμποδών τε ἑκάστοις γιγνομένου καὶ ἐπιβοωμένου μὴ ἐφεδρευόντων ἐγγὺς τῶν πολεμίων ἀπολέσαι τὴν πατρίδα, ἡσύχασάν τε καὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀπέσχοντο. [9] καὶ ὁ μὲν Θηραμένης ἐλθὼν ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ □ἦν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς στρατηγός□, ὅσον καὶ ἀπὸ βοῆς ἕνεκα, ὠργίζετο τοῖς ὁπλίταις: ὁ δὲ Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ οἱ ἐναντίοι τῷ ἀληθεῖ ἐχαλέπαινον. [10] οἱ δὲ ὁπλῖται ὁμόσε τε ἐχώρουν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῷ ἔργῳ καὶ οὐ μετεμέλοντο, καὶ τὸν Θηραμένη ἠρώτων εἰ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθῷ τὸ τεῖχος οἰκοδομεῖσθαι καὶ εἰ ἄμεινον εἶναι καθαιρεθέν. ὁ δέ, εἴπερ καὶ ἐκείνοις δοκεῖ καθαιρεῖν, καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἔφη ξυνδοκεῖν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν εὐθὺς ἀναβάντες οἵ τε ὁπλῖται καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πειραιῶς ἀνθρώπων κατέσκαπτον τὸ τείχισμα. [11] ἦν δὲ πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον ἡ παράκλησις ὡς χρή, ὅστις τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους βούλεται ἄρχειν ἀντὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων, ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον. ἐπεκρύπτοντο γὰρ ὅμως ἔτι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ ἄντικρυς δῆμον ὅστις βούλεται ἄρχειν ὀνομάζειν, φοβούμενοι μὴ τῷ ὄντι ὦσι καὶ πρός τινα εἰπών τίς τι ἀγνοίᾳ σφαλῇ. καὶ οἱ τετρακόσιοι διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἤθελον τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ ὄντας δήλους εἶναι, τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους ἄντικρυς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ ἀφανὲς φόβον ἐς ἀλλήλους παρέξειν.

[92] So they worked diligently at the fort, which had entrances and postern-gates and every facility for introducing the enemy, and did their best to finish the building in time. As yet the murmurs of discontent had been secret and confined to a few; when suddenly Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to Lacedaemon, in a full market-place, having just quitted the council-chamber, was struck by an assassin, one of the force employed in guarding the frontier, and fell dead. The man who dealt the blow escaped; his accomplice, an Argive, was seized and put to the torture by order of the Four Hundred, but did not disclose any name or say who had instigated the deed. All he would confess was that a number of persons used to assemble at the house of the commander of the frontier guard, and in other houses. No further measures followed; and so Theramenes and Aristocrates, and the other citizens, whether members of the Four Hundred or not, who were of the same mind, were emboldened to take decided steps. For the Peloponnesians had already sailed round from Las, and having overrun Aegina had cast anchor at Epidaurus; and Theramenes insisted that if they had been on their way to Euboea they would never have gone up the Saronic gulf to Aegina and then returned and anchored at Epidaurus, but that some one had invited them for the purposes which he had always alleged; it was impossible therefore to be any longer indifferent. After many insinuations and inflammatory harangues, the people began to take active measures. The hoplites who were at work on the fortification of Eetionea in the Piraeus, among whom was Aristocrates with his own tribe, which, as taxiarch, he commanded, seized Alexicles, an oligarchical general who had been most concerned with the clubs, and shut him up in a house. Others joined in the act, including one Hermon, who commanded the Peripoli stationed at Munychia; above all, the rank and file of the hoplites heartily approved. The Four Hundred, who were assembled in the council-house when the news was brought

to them, were ready in a moment to take up arms, except Theramenes and his associates, who disapproved of their proceedings; to these they began to use threats. Theramenes protested, and offered to go with them at once and rescue Alexicles. So, taking one of the generals who was of his own faction, he went down to the Piraeus. Aristarchus and certain young knights came also to the scene of action. Great and bewildering was the tumult, for in the city the people fancied that the Piraeus was in the hands of the insurgents, and that their prisoner had been killed, and the inhabitants of the Piraeus that they were on the point of being attacked from the city. The elder men with difficulty restrained the citizens, who were running up and down and flying to arms. Thucydides of Pharsalus, the proxenus of Athens in that city, happening to be on the spot, kept throwing himself in every man's way and loudly entreating the people, when the enemy was lying in wait so near, not to destroy their country. At length they were pacified, and refrained from laying hands on one another. Theramenes, who was himself a general, came to the Piraeus, and in an angry voice pretended to rate the soldiers, while Aristarchus and the party opposed to the people were furious. No effect was produced on the mass of the hoplites, who were for going to work at once. They began asking Theramenes if he thought that the fort was being built to any good end, and whether it would not be better demolished. He answered that, if they thought so, he thought so too. And immediately the hoplites and a crowd of men from the Piraeus got on the walls and began to pull them down. The cry addressed to the people was, 'Whoever wishes the Five Thousand to rule and not the Four Hundred, let him come and help us.' For they still veiled their real minds under the name of the Five Thousand, and did not venture to say outright 'Whoever wishes the people to rule': they feared that the Five Thousand might actually exist, and that a man speaking in ignorance to his neighbour might get into trouble. The Four

Hundred therefore did not wish the Five Thousand either to exist or to be known not to exist, thinking that to give so many a share in the government would be downright democracy, while at the same time the mystery tended to make the people afraid of one another.

93. τῇ δ᾽ ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν τετρακόσιοι ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον ὅμως καὶ τεθορυβημένοι ξυνελέγοντο: οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ὁπλῖται τόν τε Ἀλεξικλέα ὃν ξυνέλαβον ἀφέντες καὶ τὸ τείχισμα καθελόντες ἐς τὸ πρὸς τῇ Μουνιχίᾳ Διονυσιακὸν θέατρον ἐλθόντες καὶ θέμενοι τὰ ὅπλα ἐξεκλησίασαν, καὶ δόξαν αὐτοῖς εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ ἔθεντο αὖ ἐν τῷ Ἀνακείῳ τὰ ὅπλα. [2] ἐλθόντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων τινὲς ᾑρημένοι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ διελέγοντό τε καὶ ἔπειθον οὓς ἴδοιεν ἀνθρώπους ἐπιεικεῖς αὐτούς τε ἡσυχάζειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακατέχειν, λέγοντες τούς τε πεντακισχιλίους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει ᾗ ἂν τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις δοκῇ τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἔσεσθαι, τέως δὲ τὴν πόλιν μηδενὶ τρόπῳ διαφθείρειν μηδ᾽ ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους ἀνῶσαι. [3] τὸ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθος τῶν ὁπλιτῶν ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς λόγων γιγνομένων ἠπιώτερον ἦν ἢ πρότερον καὶ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πολιτικοῦ: ξυνεχώρησάν τε ὥστε ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας.

[93] The next day the Four Hundred, although much disturbed, met in the council-chamber. Meanwhile the hoplites in the Piraeus let go Alexicles whom they had seized, and having demolished the fort went to the theatre of Dionysus near Munychia; there piling arms they held an assembly, and resolved to march at once to the city, which they accordingly did, and again piled arms in the temple of the Dioscuri. Presently deputies appeared sent by the Four Hundred. These conversed with them singly, and tried to persuade the more reasonable part of them to keep quiet and restrain their comrades, promising that they would publish the names of the Five Thousand, and that out of

these the Four Hundred should be in turn elected in such a manner as the Five Thousand might think fit. In the meantime they begged them not to ruin everything; or to drive the city upon the enemy. The discussion became general on both sides, and at length the whole body of soldiers grew calmer, and turned their thoughts to the danger which threatened the commonwealth. They finally agreed that an assembly should be held on a fixed day in the theatre of Dionysus to deliberate on the restoration of harmony.

94. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπῆλθεν ἡ [ἐν Διονύσου] ἐκκλησία καὶ ὅσον οὐ ξυνειλεγμένοι ἦσαν, ἀγγέλλονται αἱ δύο καὶ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες καὶ ὁ Ἀγησανδρίδας ἀπὸ τῶν Μεγάρων τὴν Σαλαμῖνα παραπλεῖν: καὶ πᾶς τις [τῶν πολλῶν ὁπλιτῶν] αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ πάλαι λεγόμενον ὑπὸ Θηραμένους καὶ τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἐς τὸ τείχισμα ἔπλεον αἱ νῆες, καὶ χρησίμως ἐδόκει καταπεπτωκέναι. [2] ὁ δὲ Ἀγησανδρίδας τάχα μέν τι καὶ ἀπὸ ξυγκειμένου λόγου περί τε τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον καὶ ταύτῃ ἀνεστρέφετο, εἰκὸς δ᾽ αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸν παρόντα στασιασμὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, δι᾽ ἐλπίδος ὡς κἂν ἐς δέον παραγένοιτο, ταύτῃ ἀνέχειν. [3] οἱ δ᾽ αὖ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἠγγέλθη αὐτοῖς, εὐθὺς δρόμῳ ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ πανδημεὶ ἐχώρουν, ὡς τοῦ ἰδίου πολέμου μείζονος [ἢ] ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων οὐχ ἑκάς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ λιμένι ὄντος. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐς τὰς παρούσας ναῦς ἐσέβαινον, οἱ δὲ ἄλλας καθεῖλκον, οἱ δέ τινες ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ λιμένος παρεβοήθουν.

[94] When the day arrived and the assembly was on the point of meeting in the theatre of Dionysus, news came that Agesandridas and his forty-two ships had crossed over from Megara, and were sailing along the coast of Salamis. Every man of the popular party thought that this was what they had been so often told by Theramenes and his friends, and that the ships were sailing to the fort, happily now demolished. Nor is it impossible that Agesandridas may have been hovering about Epidaurus and the

neighbourhood by agreement; but it is equally likely that he lingered there of his own accord, with an eye to the agitation which prevailed at Athens, hoping to be on the spot at the critical moment. Instantly upon the arrival of the news the whole city rushed down to the Piraeus, thinking that a conflict with their enemies more serious than their domestic strife was now awaiting them, not at a distance, but at the very mouth of the harbour. Some embarked in the ships which were lying ready; others launched fresh ships; others manned the walls and prepared to defend the entrance of the Piraeus.

95. αἱ δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες παραπλεύσασαι καὶ περιβαλοῦσαι Σούνιον ὁρμίζονται μεταξὺ Θορικοῦ τε καὶ Πρασιῶν, ὕστερον δὲ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ὠρωπόν. [2] Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κατὰ τάχος καὶ ἀξυγκροτήτοις πληρώμασιν ἀναγκασθέντες χρήσασθαι, οἷα πόλεώς τε στασιαζούσης καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου ἐν τάχει βουλόμενοι βοηθῆσαι Εὔβοια γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀποκεκλῃμένης τῆς Ἀττικῆς πάντα ἦν, πέμπουσι Θυμοχάρη στρατηγὸν καὶ ναῦς ἐς Ἐρετρίαν, [3] ὧν ἀφικομένων ξὺν ταῖς πρότερον ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ οὔσαις ἓξ καὶ τριάκοντα ἐγένοντο. καὶ εὐθὺς ναυμαχεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο: ὁ γὰρ Ἀγησανδρίδας ἀριστοποιησάμενος ἐκ τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ ἀνήγαγε τὰς ναῦς: ἀπέχει δὲ μάλιστα ὁ Ὠρωπὸς τῆς τῶν Ἐρετριῶν πόλεως θαλάσσης μέτρον ἑξήκοντα σταδίους. [4] ὡς οὖν ἐπέπλει, εὐθὺς ἐπλήρουν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰς ναῦς, οἰόμενοι σφίσι παρὰ ταῖς ναυσὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας εἶναι: οἱ δὲ ἔτυχον οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἄριστον ἐπισιτιζόμενοι οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπωλεῖτο ἀπὸ προνοίας τῶν Ἐρετριῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἐπ᾽ ἔσχατα τοῦ ἄστεως οἰκιῶν, ὅπως σχολῇ πληρουμένων φθάσειαν οἱ πολέμιοι προσπεσόντες καὶ ἐξαναγκάσειαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὕτως ὅπως τύχοιεν ἀνάγεσθαι. σημεῖον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐς τὸν Ὠρωπὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἐρετρίας, ὁπότε χρὴ ἀνάγεσθαι, ἤρθη. [5] διὰ τοιαύτης δὴ παρασκευῆς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀναγαγόμενοι καὶ ναυμαχήσαντες ὑπὲρ τοῦ λιμένος τῶν Ἐρετριῶν ὀλίγον μέν τινα χρόνον ὅμως καὶ ἀντέσχον, ἔπειτα ἐς φυγὴν τραπόμενοι καταδιώκονται ἐς τὴν γῆν. [6] καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἐρετριῶν ὡς φιλίαν καταφεύγουσι, χαλεπώτατα ἔπραξαν φονευόμενοι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν: οἳ δὲ ἐς τὸ τείχισμα τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἐρετρίᾳ, ὃ εἶχον αὐτοί, περιγίγνονται καὶ ὅσαι ἐς Χαλκίδα ἀφικνοῦνται τῶν νεῶν. [7] λαβόντες δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι δύο καὶ εἴκοσι ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἄνδρας τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείναντες, τοὺς δὲ ζωγρήσαντες τροπαῖον ἔστησαν. καὶ ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ Εὔβοιάν [τε] ἅπασαν ἀποστήσαντες πλὴν Ὠρεοῦ ταύτην δὲ αὐτοὶ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον καὶ τἆλλα τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν καθίσταντο.

[95] The Peloponnesian squadron, however, sailed onward, doubled the promontory of Sunium, and then, after putting

in between Thoricus and Prasiae, finally proceeded to Oropus. The Athenians in their haste were compelled to employ crews not yet trained to work together, for the city was in a state of revolution, and the matter was vital and urgent; Euboea was all in all to them now that they were shut out from Attica. They despatched a fleet under the command of Thymochares to Eretria; these ships, added to those which were at Euboea before, made up thirty-six. No sooner had they arrived than they were constrained to fight; for Agesandridas, after his men had taken their midday meal, brought out his own ships from Oropus, which is distant by sea about seven miles from the city of Eretria, and bore down upon them. The Athenians at once began to man their ships, fancying that their crews were close at hand; but it had been so contrived that they were getting their provisions from houses at the end of the town, and not in the market, for the Eretrians intentionally sold nothing there that the men might lose time in embarking; the enemy would then come upon them before they were ready, and they would be compelled to put out as best they could. A signal was also raised at Eretria telling the fleet at Oropus when to attack. The Athenians putting out in this hurried manner, and fighting off the harbour of Eretria, nevertheless resisted for a little while, but before long they fled and were pursued to the shore. Those of them who took refuge in the city of Eretria, relying on the friendship of the inhabitants, fared worst, for they were butchered by them; but such as gained the fortified position which the Athenians held in the Eretrian territory escaped, and also the crews of the vessels which reached Chalcis. The Peloponnesians, who had taken twenty-two Athenian ships and had killed or made prisoners of the men, erected a trophy. Not long afterwards they induced all Euboea to revolt, except Oreus of which the Athenians still maintained possession. They then set in order the affairs of the island.

96. τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ὡς ἦλθε τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν γεγενημένα, ἔκπληξις μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὶν παρέστη. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ξυμφορά, καίπερ μεγάλη τότε δόξασα εἶναι, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν πω οὕτως ἐφόβησεν. [2] ὅπου γὰρ στρατοπέδου τε τοῦ ἐν Σάμῳ ἀφεστηκότος ἄλλων τε νεῶν οὐκ οὐσῶν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐσβησομένων αὐτῶν τε στασιαζόντων καὶ ἄδηλον ὂν ὁπότε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξυρράξουσι, τοσαύτη ἡ ξυμφορὰ ἐπεγεγένητο, ἐν ᾗ ναῦς τε καὶ τὸ μέγιστον Εὔβοιαν ἀπωλωλέκεσαν, ἐξ ἧς πλείω ἢ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὠφελοῦντο, πῶς οὐκ εἰκότως ἠθύμουν; [3] μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ δι᾽ ἐγγυτάτου ἐθορύβει, εἰ οἱ πολέμιοι τολμήσουσι νενικηκότες εὐθὺ σφῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἐρῆμον ὄντα νεῶν πλεῖν: καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἐνόμιζον αὐτοὺς παρεῖναι. [4] ὅπερ ἄν, εἰ τολμηρότεροι ἦσαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐποίησαν, καὶ ἢ διέστησαν ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν ἐφορμοῦντες ἤ, εἰ ἐπολιόρκουν μένοντες, καὶ τὰς ἀπ᾽ Ἰωνίας ναῦς ἠνάγκασαν ἂν καίπερ πολεμίας οὔσας τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τοῖς σφετέροις οἰκείοις καὶ τῇ ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βοηθῆσαι: καὶ ἐν τούτῳ Ἑλλήσποντός τε ἂν ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ Ἰωνία καὶ αἱ νῆσοι καὶ τὰ μέχρι Εὐβοίας καὶ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἡ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχὴ πᾶσα. [5] ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ μόνῳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἀθηναίοις πάντων δὴ ξυμφορώτατοι προσπολεμῆσαι ἐγένοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς: διάφοροι γὰρ πλεῖστον ὄντες τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀξεῖς, οἱ δὲ βραδεῖς, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπιχειρηταί, οἱ δὲ ἄτολμοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ναυτικῇ πλεῖστα ὠφέλουν. ἔδειξαν δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι: μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμοιότροποι γενόμενοι ἄριστα καὶ προσεπολέμησαν.

[96] When the news of the battle and of the defection of Euboea was brought to Athens, the Athenians were panic-stricken. Nothing which had happened before, not even the ruin of the Sicilian expedition, however overwhelming at the time, had so terrified them. The army at Samos was in insurrection; they had no ships in reserve or crews to man them; there was revolution at home — civil war might break out at any moment; and by this new and terrible misfortune they had lost, not only their ships, but what was worse,

Euboea, on which they were more dependent for supplies than on Attica itself. Had they not reason to despair? But what touched them nearest, and most agitated their minds, was the fear lest their enemies, emboldened by victory, should at once attack the Piraeus, in which no ships were left; indeed they fancied that they were all but there. And had the Peloponnesians been a little more enterprising they could easily have executed such a plan. Either they might have cruised near, and would then have aggravated the divisions in the city; or by remaining and carrying on a blockade they might have compelled the fleet in Ionia, although hostile to the oligarchy, to come and assist their kindred and their native city; and then the Hellespont, Ionia, all the islands between Ionia and Euboea, in a word, the whole Athenian empire, would have fallen into their hands. But on this as on so many other occasions the Lacedaemonians proved themselves to be the most convenient enemies whom the Athenians could possibly have had. For the two peoples were of very different tempers; the one quick, the other slow; the one adventurous, the other timorous; and the Lacedaemonian character was of great service to the Athenians, the more so because the empire for which they were fighting was maritime. And this view is confirmed by the defeat of the Athenians at Syracuse; for the Syracusans, who were most like them, fought best against them.

97. ἐπὶ δ᾽ οὖν τοῖς ἠγγελμένοις οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ναῦς τε εἴκοσιν ὅμως ἐπλήρουν καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ξυνέλεγον, μίαν μὲν εὐθὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Πύκνα καλουμένην, οὗπερ καὶ ἄλλοτε εἰώθεσαν, ἐν ᾗπερ καὶ τοὺς τετρακοσίους καταπαύσαντες τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδοῦναι εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται καὶ μισθὸν μηδένα φέρειν μηδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ: εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπάρατον ἐποιήσαντο. [2] ἐγίγνοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὕστερον πυκναὶ ἐκκλησίαι, ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ νομοθέτας καὶ τἆλλα ἐψηφίσαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον

χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες: μετρία γὰρ ἥ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν. [3] ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ ἄλλους μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ κατιέναι καὶ παρά τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἐν Σάμῳ στρατόπεδον πέμψαντες διεκελεύοντο ἀνθάπτεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων.

[97] When the news came the Athenians in their extremity still contrived to man twenty ships, and immediately summoned an assembly (the first of many) in the place called the Pnyx, where they had always been in the habit of meeting; at which assembly they deposed the Four Hundred, and voted that the government should be in the hands of the Five Thousand; this number was to include all who could furnish themselves with arms. No one was to receive pay for holding any office, on pain of falling under a curse. In the numerous other assemblies which were afterwards held they appointed Nomothetae, and by a series of decrees established a constitution. This government during its early days was the best which the Athenians ever enjoyed within my memory. Oligarchy and Democracy were duly attempered. And thus after the miserable state into which she had fallen, the city was again able to raise her head. The people also passed a vote recalling Alcibiades and others from exile, and sending to him and to the army in Samos exhorted them to act vigorously.

98. ἐν δὲ τῇ μεταβολῇ ταύτῃ εὐθὺς οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον καὶ Ἀλεξικλέα καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα ὑπεξέρχονται ἐς τὴν Δεκέλειαν: Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ αὐτῶν μόνος ▯ ἔτυχε γὰρ καὶ στρατηγῶν ▯ λαβὼν κατὰ τάχος τοξότας τινὰς τοὺς βαρβαρωτάτους ἐχώρει πρὸς τὴν Οἰνόην. [2] ἦν δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Βοιωτίας τεῖχος, ἐπολιόρκουν δ᾽ αὐτὸ διὰ ξυμφορὰν σφίσιν ἐκ τῆς Οἰνόης γενομένην ἀνδρῶν ἐκ Δεκελείας ἀναχωρούντων διαφθορᾶς οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐθελοντηδόν, προσπαρακαλέσαντες τοὺς Βοιωτούς. [3] κοινολογησάμενος οὖν αὐτοῖς ὁ

Ἀρίσταρχος ἀπατᾷ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Οἰνόῃ, λέγων ὡς καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει τἆλλα ξυμβεβήκασι Λακεδαιμονίοις, κἀκείνους δεῖ Βοιωτοῖς τὸ χωρίον παραδοῦναι: ἐπὶ τούτοις γὰρ ξυμβεβάσθαι. οἱ δὲ πιστεύσαντες ὡς ἀνδρὶ στρατηγῷ καὶ οὐκ εἰδότες οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ πολιορκεῖσθαι ὑπόσπονδοι ἐξέρχονται. [4] τούτῳ μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ Οἰνόην τε ληφθεῖσαν Βοιωτοὶ κατέλαβον καὶ ἡ ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις ὀλιγαρχία καὶ στάσις ἐπαύσατο.

[98] When this new revolution began, Peisander, Alexicles, and the other leaders of the oligarchy stole away to Decelea; all except Aristarchus, who, being one of the generals at the time, gathered round him hastily a few archers of the most barbarous sort and made his way to Oenoè. This was an Athenian fort on the borders of Boeotia which the Corinthians, having called the Boeotians to their aid, were now besieging on their own account, in order to revenge an overthrow inflicted by the garrison of Oenoè upon a party of them who were going home from Decelea. Aristarchus entered into communication with the besiegers, and deceived the garrison by telling them that the Athenian government had come to terms with the Lacedaemonians, and that by one of the conditions of the peace they were required to give up the place to the Boeotians. They, trusting him, whom they knew to be a general, and being in entire ignorance of what had happened because they were closely invested, capitulated and came out. Thus Oenoè was taken and occupied by the Boeotians; and the oligarchical revolution at Athens came to an end.

99. ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τούτου καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ Πελοποννήσιοι, ὡς τροφήν τε οὐδεὶς ἐδίδου τῶν ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνους τότε [ὅτε ἐπὶ τὴν Ἄσπενδον παρῄει] προσταχθέντων, καὶ αἱ Φοίνισσαι νῆες οὐδὲ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τέως που ἦκον, ὅ τε Φίλιππος ὁ ξυμπεμφθεὶς αὐτῷ ἐπεστάλκει Μινδάρῳ τῷ ναυάρχῳ καὶ ἄλλος Ἱπποκράτης, ἀνὴρ Σπαρτιάτης καὶ ὢν ἐν Φασήλιδι, ὅτι οὔτε αἱ νῆες παρέσοιντο πάντα τε ἀδικοῖντο ὑπὸ Τισσαφέρνους,

Φαρνάβαζός τε ἐπεκαλεῖτο αὐτοὺς καὶ ἦν πρόθυμος κομίσας τὰς ναῦς καὶ αὐτὸς τὰς λοιπὰς ἔτι πόλεις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς ἀποστῆσαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης, ἐλπίζων πλέον τι σχήσειν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, οὕτω δὴ ὁ Μίνδαρος πολλῷ κόσμῳ καὶ ἀπὸ παραγγέλματος αἰφνιδίου, ὅπως λάθοι τοὺς ἐν Σάμῳ, ἄρας ἀπὸ τῆς Μιλήτου ναυσὶ τρισὶ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα ἔπλει ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον πρότερον δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τῷδε ἑκκαίδεκα ἐς αὐτὸν νῆες ἐσέπλευσαν, αἳ καὶ τῆς Χερσονήσου τι μέρος κατέδραμον : χειμασθεὶς δὲ ἀνέμῳ καὶ ἀναγκασθεὶς καταίρει ἐς τὴν Ἴκαρον, καὶ μείνας ἐν αὐτῇ ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας πέντε ἢ ἓξ ἡμέρας ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τὴν Χίον.

[99] During this summer and about the same time Mindarus transferred the fleet of the Peloponnesians to the Hellespont. They had been waiting at Miletus. But none of the commissioners whom Tissaphernes on going to Aspendus appointed to supply the fleet gave them anything; and neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissaphernes himself had as yet made their appearance; Philip, who had been sent with Tissaphernes, and Hippocrates, a Spartan then in Phaselis, had informed the admiral Mindarus that the ships would never come, and that Tissaphernes was thoroughly dishonest in his dealings with them. All this time Pharnabazus was inviting them and was eager to secure the assistance of the fleet; he wanted, like Tissaphernes, to raise a revolt, whereby he hoped to profit, among the cities in his own dominion which still remained faithful to Athens. So at length Mindarus, in good order and giving the signal suddenly, lest he should be discovered by the Athenians at Samos, put to sea from Miletus with seventy-three ships, and set sail for the Hellespont, whither in this same summer a Peloponnesian force had already gone in sixteen ships, and had overrun a portion of the Chersonese. But meeting with a storm Mindarus was driven into Icarus, and being detained there five or six days by stress of weather, he put in at Chios.

100. ὁ δὲ Θράσυλος ἐκ τῆς Σάμου, ἐπειδὴ ἐπύθετο αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου ἀπηρκότα, ἔπλει καὶ αὐτὸς ναυσὶν εὐθὺς πέντε καὶ πεντήκοντα, ἐπειγόμενος μὴ φθάσῃ ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐσπλεύσας. [2] αἰσθόμενος δὲ ὅτι ἐν τῇ Χίῳ εἴη καὶ νομίσας αὐτὸν καθέξειν αὐτοῦ, σκοποὺς μὲν κατεστήσατο καὶ ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας ἠπείρῳ, εἰ ἄρα ποι κινοῖντο αἱ νῆες, ὅπως μὴ λάθοιεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐς τὴν Μήθυμναν παραπλεύσας ἄλφιτά τε καὶ τἆλλα ἐπιτήδεια παρασκευάζειν ἐκέλευεν ὡς, ἢν πλείων χρόνος γίγνηται, ἐκ τῆς Λέσβου τοὺς ἐπίπλους τῇ Χίῳ ποιησόμενος. [3] ἅμα δὲ ⸢Ἔρεσος γὰρ τῆς Λέσβου ἀφειστήκει⸣ ἐβούλετο ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν πλεύσας, εἰ δύναιτο, ἐξελεῖν. Μηθυμναίων γὰρ οὐχ οἱ ἀδυνατώτατοι φυγάδες διακομίσαντες ἔκ τε τῆς Κύμης προσεταιριστοὺς ὁπλίτας ὡς πεντήκοντα καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἠπείρου μισθωσάμενοι, ξύμπασιν ὡς τριακοσίοις, Ἀναξάνδρου Θηβαίου κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς ἡγουμένου, προσέβαλον πρῶτον Μηθύμνῃ, καὶ ἀποκρουσθέντες τῆς πείρας διὰ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Μυτιλήνης Ἀθηναίων φρουροὺς προελθόντας αὖθις ἔξω μάχῃ ἀπωσθέντες καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὄρους κομισθέντες ἀφιστᾶσι τὴν Ἔρεσον. [4] πλεύσας οὖν ὁ Θράσυλος ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ διενοεῖτο προσβολὴν ποιεῖσθαι: προαφιγμένος δὲ αὐτόσε ἦν καὶ ὁ Θρασύβουλος πέντε ναυσὶν ἐκ τῆς Σάμου, ὡς ἠγγέλθη αὐτοῖς ἡ τῶν φυγάδων αὕτη διάβασις: ὑστερήσας δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἔρεσον ἐφώρμει ἐλθών. [5] προσεγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου τινὲς δύο νῆες ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀνακομιζόμεναι καὶ Μηθυμναῖαι <πέντε>: καὶ αἱ πᾶσαι νῆες παρῆσαν ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑξήκοντα, ἀφ᾽ ὧν τῷ στρατεύματι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς κατὰ κράτος μηχαναῖς τε καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἢν δύνωνται, αἱρήσοντες τὴν Ἔρεσον.

[100] When Thrasyllus at Samos heard that he had started from Miletus he sailed away in all haste with fifty-five ships, fearing that the enemy might get into the Hellespont before him. Observing that Mindarus was at Chios, and thinking that he could keep him there, he placed scouts at Lesbos and on the mainland opposite, that he might be informed if

the ships made any attempt to sail away. He himself coasted along the island to Methymna and ordered a supply of barley-meal and other provisions, intending, if he were long detained, to make Lesbos his head-quarters while attacking Chios. He wanted also to sail against the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had revolted, and, if possible, to destroy the place. Now certain of the chief citizens of Methymna who had been driven into exile had conveyed to the island about fifty hoplites, partisans of theirs, from Cymè, besides others whom they hired on the mainland, to the number of three hundred in all. They were commanded by Anaxander, a Theban, who was chosen leader because the Lesbians were of Theban descent. They first of all attacked Methymna. In this attempt they were foiled by the timely arrival of the Athenian garrison from Mytilenè, and being a second time repulsed outside the walls, had marched over the mountains and induced Eresus to revolt. Thither Thrasyllus sailed, having determined to attack them with all his ships. He found that Thrasybulus had already reached the place, having started from Samos with five ships as soon as he heard that the exiles had landed. But he had come too late to prevent the revolt, and was lying off Eresus. There Thrasyllus was also joined by two ships which were on their way home from the Hellespont, and by a squadron from Methymna. The whole fleet now consisted of sixty-seven ships, from the crews of which the generals formed an army, and prepared by the help of engines and by every possible means to take Eresus.

101. ὁ δὲ Μίνδαρος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Χίου τῶν Πελοποννησίων αἱ νῆες ἐπισιτισάμεναι δυοῖν ἡμέραιν καὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Χίων τρεῖς τεσσαρακοστὰς ἕκαστος Χίας τῇ τρίτῃ διὰ ταχέων ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου <οὐ> πελάγιαι, ἵνα μὴ περιτύχωσι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ἐρέσῳ ναυσίν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἤπειρον. [2] καὶ προσβαλόντες τῆς Φωκαΐδος ἐς τὸν ἐν Καρτερίοις λιμένα καὶ ἀριστοποιησάμενοι, παραπλεύσαντες τὴν

Κυμαίαν δειπνοποιοῦνται ἐν Ἀργινούσαις τῆς ἠπείρου, ἐν τῷ ἀντιπέρας τῆς Μυτιλήνης. [3] ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἔτι πολλῆς νυκτὸς παραπλεύσαντες καὶ ἀφικόμενοι τῆς ἠπείρου ἐς Ἁρματοῦντα καταντικρὺ Μηθύμνης, ἀριστοποιησάμενοι διὰ ταχέων παραπλεύσαντες Λεκτὸν καὶ Λάρισαν καὶ Ἀμαξιτὸν καὶ τὰ ταύτῃ χωρία ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς Ῥοίτειον ἤδη τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πρωίτερον μέσων νυκτῶν. εἰσὶ δ᾽ αἳ τῶν νεῶν καὶ ἐς Σίγειον κατῆραν καὶ ἄλλοσε τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων.

[101] Meanwhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, having spent two days in provisioning, and having received from the Chians three Chian tesseracosts for each man, on the third day sailed hastily from Chios, not going through the open sea, lest they should fall in with the ships blockading Eresus, but making directly for the mainland and keeping Lesbos on the left. They touched at the harbour of the island Carteria, which belongs to Phocaea, and there taking their midday meal, sailed past the Cymaean territory, and supped at Argennusae on the mainland over against Mytilenè. They sailed away some time before dawn, and at Harmatus, which is opposite Methymna on the mainland, they again took their midday meal; they quickly passed by the promontory of Lectum, Larissa, Hamaxitus, and the neighbouring towns, and finally arrived at Rhoeteum in the Hellespont before midnight. Some of the ships also put into Sigeum and other places in the neighbourhood.

102. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Σηστῷ δυοῖν δεούσαις εἴκοσι ναυσὶν ὄντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς οἵ τε φρυκτωροὶ ἐσήμαινον καὶ ᾐσθάνοντο τὰ πυρὰ ἐξαίφνης πολλὰ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ φανέντα, ἔγνωσαν ὅτι ἐσπλέουσιν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι. καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης νυκτὸς ὡς εἶχον τάχους ὑπομείξαντες τῇ Χερσονήσῳ παρέπλεον ἐπ᾽ Ἐλαιοῦντος, βουλόμενοι ἐκπλεῦσαι ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς. [2] καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἐκκαίδεκα ναῦς ἔλαθον, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσιν: τὰς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Μινδάρου ἅμα τῇ ἕῳ κατιδόντες, τὴν δίωξιν εὐθὺς ποιουμένων οὐ φθάνουσι

πάσαις, ἀλλ᾽ αἱ μὲν πλείους ἐπὶ τῆς Ἴμβρου καὶ Λήμνου διέφυγον, τέσσαρες δὲ τῶν νεῶν αἱ ὕσταται πλέουσαι καταλαμβάνονται παρὰ τὸν Ἐλαιοῦντα. [3] καὶ μίαν μὲν ἐποκείλασαν κατὰ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Πρωτεσιλάου αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι λαμβάνουσι, δύο δὲ ἑτέρας ἄνευ τῶν ἀνδρῶν: τὴν δὲ μίαν πρὸς τῇ Ἴμβρῳ κενὴν κατακαίουσιν.

[102] The Athenians, who lay with eighteen ships at Sestos, knew from the beacons which their scouts kindled, and from the sudden blaze of many watch-fires which appeared in the enemy’s country, that the Peloponnesians were on the point of sailing into the strait. That very night, getting close under the Chersonese, they moved towards Elaeus, in the hope of reaching the open sea before the enemy’s ships arrived. They passed unseen the sixteen Peloponnesian ships which were at Abydos, and had been told by their now approaching friends to keep a sharp look-out if the Athenians tried to get away. At dawn of day they sighted the fleet of Mindarus, which immediately gave chase; most of them escaped in the direction of Imbros, and Lemnos, but the four which were hindermost were caught off Elaeus. One which ran ashore near the temple of Protesilaus the Peloponnesians took, together with the crew; two others without the crews; a fourth they burnt on the shore of Imbros; the crew escaped.

103. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ταῖς τε ἐξ Ἀβύδου ξυμμιγείσαις καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ξυμπάσαις ἓξ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα πολιορκήσαντες Ἐλαιοῦντα ταύτην τὴν ἡμέραν, ὡς οὐ προσεχώρει, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Ἄβυδον. [2]οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι ψευσθέντες τῶν σκοπῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενοι σφᾶς λαθεῖν τὸν παράπλουν τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ἡσυχίαν τειχομαχοῦντες, ὡς ᾔσθοντο, εὐθὺς ἀπολιπόντες τὴν Ἔρεσον κατὰ τάχος ἐβοήθουν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον: [3] καὶ δύο τε ναῦς τῶν Πελοποννησίων αἱροῦσιν, αἳ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τότε θρασύτερον ἐν τῇ διώξει ἀπάρασαι περιέπεσον αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἡμέρᾳ ὕστερον ἀφικόμενοι ὁρμίζονται ἐς τὸν Ἐλαιοῦντα καὶ

τὰς ἐκ τῆς Ἴμβρου ὅσαι κατέφυγον κομίζονται καὶ ἐς τὴν ναυμαχίαν πέντε ἡμέρας παρεσκευάζοντο.

[103] For the rest of that day they blockaded Elaeus with the ships from Abydos which had now joined them; the united fleet numbering eighty-six; but as the town would not yield they sailed away to Abydos.The Athenians, whose scouts had failed them, and who had never imagined that the enemy’s fleet could pass them undetected, were quietly besieging Eresus; but on finding out their mistake they instantly set sail and followed the enemy to the Hellespont. They fell in with and took two Peloponnesian ships, which during the pursuit had ventured too far into the open sea. On the following day they came to Elaeus, where they remained at anchor, and the ships which had taken refuge at Imbros joined them; the next five days were spent in making preparations for the impending engagement.

104. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐναυμάχουν τρόπῳ τοιῷδε. οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρέπλεον ἐπὶ κέρως ταξάμενοι παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν γῆν ἐπὶ τῆς Σηστοῦ, οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐκ τῆς Ἀβύδου ἀντανῆγον καὶ αὐτοί. [2] καὶ ὡς ἔγνωσαν ναυμαχήσοντες, παρέτειναν τὸ κέρας οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι παρὰ τὴν Χερσόνησον, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ Ἰδάκου μέχρι Ἀρριανῶν, νῆες ἓξ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα, οἱ δ᾽ αὖ Πελοποννήσιοι ἀπὸ Ἀβύδου μέχρι Δαρδάνου, νῆες ἓξ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα. [3] κέρας δὲ τοῖς μὲν Πελοποννησίοις εἶχον τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν Συρακόσιοι, τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον αὐτὸς Μίνδαρος καὶ τῶν νεῶν αἱ ἄριστα πλέουσαι, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀριστερὸν Θράσυλος, ὁ δὲ Θρασύβουλος τὸ δεξιόν: οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ ὡς ἕκαστοι διετάξαντο. [4] ἐπειγομένων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων πρότερόν τε ξυμμεῖξαι, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δεξιὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπερσχόντες αὐτοὶ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ ἀποκλῄσαι τοῦ ἔξω αὐτοὺς ἔκπλου, εἰ δύναιντο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέσον ἐξῶσαι πρὸς τὴν γῆν οὐχ ἑκὰς οὖσαν, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι γνόντες, ᾗ μὲν ἐβούλοντο ἀποφάρξασθαι αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐναντίοι, ἀντεπεξῆγον καὶ περιεγίγνοντο τῷ πλῷ, [5] τὸ δ᾽ εὐώνυμον αὐτοῖς ὑπερεβεβλήκει ἤδη τὴν ἄκραν ἣ Κυνὸς σῆμα καλεῖται. τῷ

δὲ μέσῳ, τοιούτου ξυμβαίνοντος, ἀσθενέσι καὶ διεσπασμέναις ταῖς ναυσὶ καθίσταντο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐλάσσοσι χρώμενοι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τοῦ χωρίου τοῦ περὶ τὸ Κυνὸς σῆμα ὀξεῖαν καὶ γωνιώδη τὴν περιβολὴν ἔχοντος, ὥστε τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐπέκεινα αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα μὴ κάτοπτα εἶναι.

[104] After this they fought, and the manner of the battle was as follows. The Athenians began to sail in column close along the shore towards Sestos, when the Peloponnesians, observing them, likewise put to sea from Abydos. Perceiving that a battle was imminent, the Athenians, numbering seventy-six ships, extended their line along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani, and the Peloponnesians, numbering eighty-eight ships, from Abydos to Dardanus. The Syracusans held the right wing of the Peloponnesians; the other wing, on which were the swiftest ships, was led by Mindarus himself. Thrasyllus commanded the left wing of the Athenians, and Thrasybulus the right; the other generals had their several posts. The Peloponnesians were eager to begin the engagement, intending, as their left wing extended beyond the right of the Athenians, to prevent them, if possible, from sailing out of the straits again, and also to thrust their centre back on the land which was near. The Athenians, seeing their intention, advanced from the land the wing on which the enemy wanted to cut them off, and succeeded in getting beyond them. But their left wing by this time had passed the promontory of Cynossema, and the result was that the centre of their line was thinned and weakened — all the more since their numbers were inferior and the sharp projection of the shore about Cynossema hindered those who were on one side from seeing what was taking place on the other.

105. προσπεσόντες οὖν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι κατὰ τὸ μέσον ἐξέωσάν τε ἐς τὸ ξηρὸν τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐπεξέβησαν, τῷ ἔργῳ πολὺ περισχόντες. [2] ἀμῦναι δὲ τῷ μέσῳ οὔθ᾽ οἱ περὶ τὸν Θρασύβουλον ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ ὑπὸ πλήθους τῶν ἐπικειμένων νεῶν ἐδύναντο οὔθ᾽ οἱ περὶ τὸν

Θράσυλον ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐωνύμου ἀφανές τε γὰρ ἦν διὰ τὴν ἄκραν τὸ Κυνὸς σῆμα, καὶ ἅμα οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἐπιτεταγμένοι εἶργον αὐτούς , πρὶν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι διὰ τὸ κρατήσαντες ἀδεῶς ἄλλοι ἄλλην ναῦν διώκειν ἤρξαντο μέρει τινὶ σφῶν ἀτακτότεροι γενέσθαι. [3] γνόντες δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Θρασύβουλον τὰς ἐπὶ σφίσι ναῦς ἐπεχούσας παυσάμενοι τῆς ἐπεξαγωγῆς ἤδη τοῦ κέρως καὶ ἐπαναστρέψαντες εὐθὺς ἠμύναντό τε καὶ τρέπουσι, καὶ τὰς κατὰ τὸ νικῆσαν τῶν Πελοποννησίων μέρος ὑπολαβόντες πεπλανημένας ἔκοπτόν τε καὶ ἐς φόβον τὰς πλείους ἀμαχεὶ καθίστασαν. οἵ τε Συρακόσιοι ἐτύγχανον καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤδη τοῖς περὶ τὸν Θράσυλον ἐνδεδωκότες καὶ μᾶλλον ἐς φυγὴν ὁρμήσαντες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἑώρων.

[105] So the Peloponnesians, falling upon the centre of the Athenian fleet, forced their enemies' ships back on the beach, and having gained a decisive advantage, disembarked to follow up their victory. Neither Thrasybulus on the right wing, who was pressed hard by superior numbers, nor Thrasyllus on the left, was able to assist them. The promontory of Cynossema hindered the left wing from seeing the action, and the ships of the Syracusans and others, equal in number to their own, kept them fully engaged. But at last, while the victorious Peloponnesians were incautiously pursuing, some one ship, some another; a part of their line began to fall into disorder. Thrasybulus remarked their confusion, and at once left off extending his wing; then turning upon the ships which were opposed to him, he repulsed and put them to flight; he next faced the conquering and now scattered ships of the Peloponnesian centre, struck at them, and threw them into such a panic that hardly any of them resisted. The Syracusans too had by this time given way to Thrasyllus, and were still more inclined to fly when they saw the others flying.

106. γεγενημένης δὲ τῆς τροπῆς καὶ καταφυγόντων τῶν Πελοποννησίων πρὸς τὸν Μείδιον μάλιστα ποταμὸν τὸ πρῶτον, ὕστερον δὲ ἐς Ἄβυδον, ναῦς μὲν ὀλίγας ἔλαβον οἱ

Ἀθηναῖοι στενὸς γὰρ ὢν ὁ Ἑλλήσποντος βραχείας τὰς ἀποφυγὰς τοῖς ἐναντίοις παρεῖχε, τὴν μέντοι νίκην ταύτην τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐπικαιροτάτην δὴ ἔσχον. [2] φοβούμενοι γὰρ τέως τὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναυτικὸν διά τε τὰ κατὰ βραχὺ σφάλματα καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ξυμφοράν, ἀπηλλάγησαν τοῦ σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καταμέμφεσθαι καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἔτι ἀξίους του ἐς τὰ ναυτικὰ νομίζειν. [3] ναῦς μέντοι τῶν ἐναντίων λαμβάνουσι Χίας μὲν ὀκτώ, Κορινθίας δὲ πέντε, Ἀμπρακιώτιδας δὲ δύο καὶ Βοιωτίας δύο, Λευκαδίων δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Συρακοσίων καὶ Πελληνέων μίαν ἑκάστων: αὐτοὶ δὲ πέντε καὶ δέκα ναῦς ἀπολλύασιν. [4] στήσαντες δὲ τροπαῖον ἐπὶ τῇ ἄκρᾳ οὗ τὸ Κυνὸς σῆμα καὶ τὰ ναυάγια προσαγαγόμενοι καὶ νεκροὺς τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑποσπόνδους ἀποδόντες ἀπέστειλαν καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας τριήρη ἄγγελον τῆς νίκης. [5] οἱ δὲ ἀφικομένης τῆς νεὼς καὶ ἀνέλπιστον τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἀκούσαντες ἐπί τε ταῖς περὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἄρτι ξυμφοραῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν στάσιν γεγενημέναις πολὺ ἐπερρώσθησαν καὶ ἐνόμισαν σφίσιν ἔτι δυνατὰ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ἢν προθύμως ἀντιλαμβάνωνται, περιγενέσθαι.

[106] After the rout the Peloponnesians effected their escape, most of them to the river Midius first, and then to Abydos. Not many ships were taken by the Athenians; for the Hellespont, being narrow, afforded a retreat to the enemy within a short distance. Nevertheless nothing could have been more opportune for them than this victory at sea; for some time past they had feared the Peloponnesian navy on account of their disaster in Sicily, as well as of the various smaller defeats which they had sustained. But now they ceased to depreciate themselves or to think much of their enemies’ seamanship. They had taken eight Chian vessels, five Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and of the Leucadians, Lacedaemonians, Syracusans, and Pellenians one each. Their own loss amounted to fifteen ships. They raised a trophy on the promontory of Cynossema, and then collecting the wrecks, and giving up to the enemy his dead

under a flag of truce, sent a trireme carrying intelligence of the victory to Athens. On the arrival of the ship and the news of a success so incredible after the calamities which had befallen them in Euboea and during the revolution, the Athenians were greatly encouraged. They thought that their affairs were no longer hopeless, and that if they were energetic they might still win.

107. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἡμέρᾳ τετάρτῃ ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἐπισκευάσαντες τὰς ναῦς οἱ ἐν τῇ Σηστῷ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔπλεον ἐπὶ Κύζικον ἀφεστηκυῖαν: καὶ κατιδόντες κατὰ Ἁρπάγιον καὶ Πρίαπον τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ὀκτὼ ναῦς ὁρμούσας, ἐπιπλεύσαντες καὶ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς ἐν τῇ γῇ ἔλαβον τὰς ναῦς. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν Κύζικον ἀτείχιστον οὖσαν προσηγάγοντο πάλιν καὶ χρήματα ἀνέπραξαν. [2] ἔπλευσαν δὲ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐκ τῆς Ἀβύδου ἐπὶ τὸν Ἐλαιοῦντα καὶ τῶν σφετέρων νεῶν τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ὅσαι ἦσαν ὑγιεῖς ἐκομίσαντο τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἐλαιούσιοι κατέκαυσαν, καὶ ἐς τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἀπέπεμψαν Ἱπποκράτη καὶ Ἐπικλέα κομιοῦντας τὰς ἐκεῖθεν ναῦς.

[107] The Athenians at Sestos promptly repaired their ships, and on the fourth day were proceeding against Cyzicus, which had revolted, when, seeing the eight Peloponnesian ships from Byzantium anchored at Harpagium and Priapus, they bore down upon them, and defeating the land-forces which were acting with them, took the ships. They then went and recovered Cyzicus, which was unwalled, and exacted a contribution from the inhabitants. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians sailed from Abydos to Elaeus, and recovered as many of their own captured vessels as were still seaworthy; the rest had been burnt by the Elaeusians. They then sent Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to bring up the ships which were there.

108. κατέπλευσε δὲ ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τούτους καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης ταῖς τρισὶ καὶ δέκα ναυσὶν ἀπὸ τῆς Καύνου καὶ Φασήλιδος ἐς τὴν Σάμον, ἀγγέλλων ὅτι τάς τε Φοινίσσας ναῦς ἀποστρέψειε Πελοποννησίοις ὥστε μὴ

ἐλθεῖν καὶ τὸν Τισσαφέρνην ὅτι φίλον πεποιήκοι μᾶλλον Ἀθηναίοις ἢ πρότερον. [2] καὶ πληρώσας ναῦς ἐννέα πρὸς αἷς εἶχεν Ἁλικαρνασσέας τε πολλὰ χρήματα ἐξέπραξε καὶ Κῶν ἐτείχισεν. ταῦτα δὲ πράξας καὶ ἄρχοντα ἐν τῇ Κῷ καταστήσας πρὸς τὸ μετόπωρον ἤδη ἐς τὴν Σάμον κατέπλευσεν. [3]καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσπένδου, ὡς ἐπύθετο τὰς τῶν Πελοποννησίων ναῦς ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον πεπλευκυίας, ἀναζεύξας ἤλαυνεν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰωνίας. [4] ὄντων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἐν τῷ Ἑλλησπόντῳ, Ἀντάνδριοι εἰσὶ δὲ Αἰολῆς παρακομισάμενοι ἐκ τῆς Ἀβύδου πεζῇ διὰ τῆς Ἴδης τοῦ ὄρους ὁπλίτας ἐσηγάγοντο ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ὑπὸ Ἀρσάκου τοῦ Πέρσου Τισσαφέρνους ὑπάρχου ἀδικούμενοι, ὅσπερ καὶ Δηλίους τοὺς Ἀτραμύττιον κατοικήσαντας ὅτε ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων Δήλου καθάρσεως ἕνεκα ἀνέστησαν, ἔχθραν προσποιησάμενος ἄδηλον καὶ ἐπαγγείλας στρατιὰν αὐτῶν τοῖς βελτίστοις, ἐξαγαγὼν ὡς ἐπὶ φιλίᾳ καὶ ξυμμαχίᾳ, τηρήσας ἀριστοποιουμένους καὶ περιστήσας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ κατηκόντισεν. [5] φοβούμενοι οὖν αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον μήποτε καὶ περὶ σφᾶς τι παρανομήσῃ, καὶ ἄλλα ἐπιβάλλοντος αὐτοῦ ἃ φέρειν οὐκ ἐδύναντο, ἐκβάλλουσι τοὺς φρουροὺς αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως.

[108] About the same time Alcibiades sailed back with his thirteen ships from Caunus and Phaselis to Samos, announcing that he had prevented the Phoenician fleet from coming to the assistance of the enemy, and that he had made Tissaphernes a greater friend of the Athenians than ever. He then manned nine additional ships, and exacted large sums of money from the Halicarnassians. He also fortified Cos, where he left a governor, and towards the autumn returned to Samos.When Tissaphernes heard that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he broke up his camp at Aspendus and marched away towards Ionia. Now after the arrival of the Peloponnesians at the Hellespont, the Antandrians, who are Aeolians, had procured from them at Abydos a force of

infantry, which they led through Mount Ida and introduced into their city. They were oppressed by Arsaces the Persian, a lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This Arsaces, when the Athenians, wishing to purify Delos, expelled the inhabitants and they settled in Adramyttium, professing to have a quarrel which he did not wish to declare openly, asked their best soldiers to form an army for him. He then led them out of the town as friends and allies, and, taking advantage of their midday meal, surrounded them with his own troops, and shot them down. This deed alarmed the Antandrians, who thought that they might meet with some similar violence at his hands; and as he was imposing upon them burdens which were too heavy for them, they expelled his garrison from their citadel.

109. ὁ δὲ Τισσαφέρνης αἰσθόμενος καὶ τοῦτο τῶν Πελοποννησίων τὸ ἔργον καὶ οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐν τῇ Μιλήτῳ καὶ Κνίδῳ [καὶ ἐνταῦθα γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐξεπεπτώκεσαν οἱ φρουροί], διαβεβλῆσθαί τε νομίσας αὐτοῖς σφόδρα καὶ δείσας μὴ καὶ ἄλλο τι ἔτι βλάπτωσι, καὶ ἅμα ἀχθόμενος εἰ Φαρνάβαζος ἐξ ἐλάσσονος χρόνου καὶ δαπάνης δεξάμενος αὐτοὺς κατορθώσει τι μᾶλλον τῶν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πορεύεσθαι διενοεῖτο πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, ὅπως μέμψηταί τε τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἄντανδρον γεγενημένων καὶ τὰς διαβολὰς καὶ περὶ τῶν Φοινισσῶν νεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς εὐπρεπέστατα ἀπολογήσηται. καὶ ἀφικόμενος πρῶτον ἐς Ἔφεσον θυσίαν ἐποιήσατο τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι. [2] [ὅταν ὁ μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ θέρος χειμὼν τελευτήσῃ, ἓν καὶ εἰκοστὸν ἔτος πληροῦται.]

[109] Tissaphernes, who was already offended at the expulsion of his garrison from Miletus, and from Cnidus, where the same thing had happened, perceived that this new injury was the work of the Peloponnesians. He felt that they were now his determined enemies, and was apprehensive of some further injury. He was also disgusted at discovering that Pharnabazus had induced the Peloponnesians to join him, and was likely in less time and

at less expense to be more successful in the war with the Athenians than himself. He therefore determined to go to the Hellespont, and complain of their conduct in the affair of Antandrus, offering at the same time the most plausible defence which he could concerning the non-arrival of the Phoenician fleet and their other grievances. He first went to Ephesus, and there offered sacrifice to Artemis ....*[With the end of the winter which follows this summer the twenty-first year of the Peloponnesian War is completed.]*

The Biographies

Thucydides — a cast of a renowned bust at Holkham Hall, Pushkin Museum

INTRODUCTION TO THUCYDIDES by Charles Forster Smith

Three ancient biographies of Thucydides have come down to us, but they are of little value. They are derived from ancient commentaries, and the biographical details which they contain, wherever they do not rest upon inference from the text of the history itself, are often confused and contradictory. These are supplemented by scattered statements of several ancient writers — Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who wrote two treatises on Thucydides (De *Thucydidis hisioiia indicium* and the *Second Letter to Ammaeus),* Plutarch (*Cimon* iv), and Pausanias (i. xxxii.).

The only authentic facts about the life of Thucydides are gathered from casual mention in the History. He was the son of Olorus (iv. civ. 4); commenced the compilation of materials for writing the History at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (i. i. 1); and lived through the whole war, ripe in years and judgment, following it with close attention, that he might acquire accurate information (v. xxvi. 5). He suffered from the plague of 429 B.C. (ii. xlviii. 3), of which he wrote his famous account (II. xlvii-liv). Elected one of the ten generals in 424 B.C., he was sent to the coast of Thrace (where he enjoyed the right of working certain gold mines) to operate against Brasidas. Failing to relieve Amphipolis, he was exiled in 424 B.C., and remained in banishment for twenty years, and thus was able to become acquainted with affairs on both sides (v. xxvi. 5).

For other facts we are dependent largely upon inference; some are reasonably certain, others less so. The name of his father was identical with that of the Thracian prince Olorus, whose daughter He- gesipyle was married to Miltiades, and his tomb, having the inscription Θουκυδίδης Ὁλόρου

‘Αλιμονσως, was in the suburb of Athens known as Kole Meletides, adjoining those of Cimon and Miltiades (Plut. *Cim.* iv). We may therefore assume that Olorus, the father of Thucydides, was a near kinsman of the Thracian prince Olorus. If, as Marcellinus says (§ 2), Thucydides’ mother was named Hegesipyle, like Cimon’s mother, that would be confirmation of the relationship; but Plutarch makes no mention of this. It seems likely, then, that Thucydides was of near kin to Cimon, younger perhaps by one generation. His father Olorus was probably a full citizen of Athens, as is indicated by the fact that, mentioning himself as *στρατηγός* (iv. civ. 4), he writes Θουκυδίδη *τον* Όλορου; for only as an Athenian citizen could his father be mentioned in this official style.

As to the date of Thucydides’ birth, the only ancient statement that seems worthy of credence was made by Pamphila, a woman writer who in the time of Nero made a great compilation of the results of learning. Aulus Gellius (*N.A.* xv. 23) quotes from Pamphila that, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Hellanicus was sixty-five years of age, Herodotus fifty-three, Thucydides forty. Pamphila’s dates were probably taken from the chronological handbook of Apollodorus (second century B.C.), which was generally accepted among the Greeks and Romans. The term forty years used by Pamphila doubtless meant the *ακμή* or prime of Thucydides, and may have been fixed on the basis of his own assertion that he began to collect material at the opening of the war (i. i. 1) and was then in full maturity of mind (v. xxvi. 5). At any rate his own statement, taken with Pamphila’s date, has led to the general assumption that the historian was born somewhere about 472 B.C.

It is indicated by Marcellinus (§ 46), and is probable in itself, that the decree for Thucydides’ banishment was adopted on the motion of Cleon, who was then at the height of his power; and it is probable that the charge brought against him was treachery (προδοσία), as stated by

Marcellinus (§ 55) and the anonymous biographer (§ 2), and apparently implied by Aristophanes (*Vesp*. 288). His own words, *ζννέβη μοι φςνγα,ν,* admit of this interpretation; and the statement of Pausanias (i. xxiii. 9) that he was later recalled from exile on the motion of Oenobius is best understood on this basis. If he had been banished by a simple decree of the people, the general amnesty that followed the capture of Athens by Lysander would have been sufficient for him as for other exiles; if the sentence was more severe, a special decree would be necessary. But it is possible, of course, that the motion of Oenobius antedated the amnesty of Lysander's peace by a few months.

As to Thucydides' death, there was a persistent tradition that he was assassinated, and the fact that the History breaks off suddenly in the midst of exciting events of the Decelean War seems to support the tradition. Plutarch (*Cirri*. iv. 3) says that it was commonly reported that he died a violent death at Scapte Hyle; Pausanias (i. xxiii. 9), that he was murdered on his journey home from exile; Marcellinus (§ 10), that after his return from exile he died and was buried in Athens. But whether he died in

Thrace or in Athens, it seems clear from his own words that he outlived the term of his banishment (v. XXVL 5, *ζννίβη μοί την Ιμαντον Ιτη ζίκοσί')* and that he returned to Athens, since his description of the wall of Themistocles, whose remains "may still be seen at the Peiraeus " (i. xciii. 5), shows that he was there after the destruction of the walls by Lysander. If he had lived to see the restoration of the walls by Conon in 395 B.C., it seems he would certainly have mentioned it. There is another reason, too, for supposing that he did not live to this year: in hi. cxvi. 2 he says that the eruption of Aetna, which occurred in the spring of 425 B.C., was the third on record; hence the one mentioned by Diodorus (xiv. lix. 3) for 396 B.C. could not have been known to him. It seems reasonable, then, to assume that he was not alive in 396 B.C.

There is a pretty and oft-repeated story that Thucydides, as a boy, heard Herodotus recite a portion of his History at Olympia and was moved thereby to tears, whereupon Herodotus said, “Olorus, your son’s spirit is aflame with a passion for learning.” But Lucian, when telling of the powerful effect of Herodotus’ recitation at Olympia, would surely have mentioned this circumstance had he known of it; besides, chronology is in the way, if we hold to Pamphila’s testimony. But if he did not as a boy hear Herodotus recite at Olympia, he must have known him later as a man at Athens. The period of his youth and early manhood fell in the time when Athens was most prolific in great men. It is clear that he had heard and admired Pericles, and he must have seen Aeschylus and known Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Gorgias, Antiphon, Pheidias, Polygnotus, Mnesicles, Ictinus, Callicrates, and Hippocrates. Association with such men and the atmosphere of Athens at such a time best explain the development of his genius; but the limits of his subject, as he conceived it, precluded any mention of any of these except Pericles, so that for any personal influence of theirs upon him we are left to inference. The first seven years of the war, before his banishment, were doubtless spent in large part at Athens, where he must have heard the speeches of Pericles, the discussions about Mytilene and about Pylos, as well as about other matters of which we have accounts in this History. But the twenty years of his exile he probably passed largely on his properties in Thrace, engaged in the task of compiling materials for his work about the war, as indeed we are told that he did by Plutarch *(De Exil*. xiv.) and Marcellinus (§§ 25 and 47).

From Thucydides’ opening statement, that he began the composition of his History at the outbreak of the war, expecting it to be a great one and more noteworthy than any that had gone before, we should naturally infer that he continued the compilation and composition throughout the

war, and in fact — as it is clearly unfinished — until his death. Again, as it was never completed, so it was never completely revised, and it is natural that one can find traces of the different dates at which the several portions were composed. Evidence of this kind has been brought forward in support of different hypotheses as to the composition of the work. The most famous of these was that put forth by F. W. Ullrich in his *Beitrage zur Erklarung des Thukydides,* Hamburg, 1845, in which it is maintained that Books I-V. xxvi, which contain the history of the Archidamian War (432-421 B.C.), formed a separate treatise composed between the Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition, and that the phrase “this war” in the earlier books refers to the Ten Years’ War only.

In v. xxvi Thucydides does make a fresh start with the words, “The same Thucydides recorded the events in order, reckoning by summers and winters, until the fall of Athens.” But he adds, “The war lasted for twenty-seven years, and anyone who declines to count the interval of truce as Avar is mistaken; “ which sounds very much like the opening of a second volume of a work that falls into natural divisions. It is quite likely, as Ullrich maintains, that the account of the Archidamian War (i.-v. xxvi.) was composed mainly in the interval between 421 and 416 B.C.; but that it received important additions after the fall of Athens seems certain, *e.g.* n. lxv. on the career of Pericles. So much may well be admitted for Ullrich’s hypothesis, but it is not necessary to admit more. Even the story of the Sicilian expedition, the finest part of the whole work, need not be considered to have been originally a separate treatise, but only to have received especial care. As for the rest, a paragraph from Classens introduction to Book V outlines a probable order for the growth of the history which seems reasonable: “ Though I am convinced that the whole work was written in the shape in which we have it after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, and that Thucydides was called away

from life when engaged in the last revision and combination of the portions which he had noted down and sketched in outline from the beginning of the war, yet I do not believe that all parts of the work received an equally thorough review. I think that the masterly introduction, which makes our First Book, was completed with the full knowledge of the disastrous result of the twenty-seven years' war; that then the history of the ten years' war and the Sicilian Expedition, for which it is likely that the results of laborious inquiry were already at hand more or less perfectly worked out, received their final touches; and that after this, before the thread of the narrative was taken up again with the Ionic-Decelean War, the intervening period of the *άρήνη ὕπονλος* was described."

The most interesting testimony as to the recognition of the power of Thucydides in ancient times is Lucian's statement *(adv. Indoct.* 102) that Demosthenes copied out the history eight times. Dio Cassius constantly imitated and borrowed from him, and among others of the later historians who emulated him were Philistus, Arrian, and Procopius. There is internal evidence that Tacitus was influenced by him, and Sallust often imitated him. Quintilian's oft-quoted characterization, *Densus et brevis et semper instans sibi Thucydides*, shows his appreciation. In modern times his greatest panegyrist is Macaulay: "There is no prose composition, not even the *De Corona*, which I place so high as the Seventh Book of Thucydides. It is the *ne plus ultra* of human art"; again, "The retreat from Syracuse — Is it or is it not the finest thing you ever read in your life?"; and still again, " He is the greatest historian that ever lived." John Stuart Mill said, "The most powerful and affecting piece of narrative perhaps in all literature is the account of the Sicilian catastrophe in his Seventh Book." The Earl of Chatham, on sending his son William Pitt to Cambridge, "left to professional teachers the legitimate routine in the classic authors, but made it his particular desire that Thucydides,

the eternal manual of statesmen, should be the first Greek which his son read after coming to college." And the Earl of Chatham's estimate is well supported by Sir G. Cornwall Lewis: " For close, cogent, and appropriate reasoning on political questions, the speeches of Thucydides have never been surpassed; and indeed they may be considered as having reached the highest excellence of which the human mind is capable in that department."

In the ordinary narration of events the style of Thucydides is clear, direct, graphic. In strong contrast with this generally simple and lucid form of statement is his style in describing battles and other critical events, in generalizations, and especially in the speeches; here the statement is often so concise and condensed as to become very difficult. Thucydides was not the first to use speeches as a means of vivid presentation of important crises and the actors in them; for that he had the precedent of Homer and the Attic drama. But he used this means with such impressive effect and success as to induce frequent imitation in later historical writing in ancient times. He does not pretend to give the exact words of the speakers, but says frankly in the Introduction (i. xxii. 1): "As to the speeches that were made by different men, either when they were about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said." As a natural result the language of the speeches has a uniform character, both in the structure of the sentences and in particular expressions — in other words it is that of Thucydides himself; but at the

same time the character and mode of thought of the assumed speaker are clearly manifest in each speech. In the hands of Thucydides such a means of presenting to us a critical situation is extraordinarily effective; here, as in his most striking narrations, his readers become spectators, as Plutarch expressed it. Or as Classen said, “Without our own choice we find ourselves involved in the conflict of interests, and are put in the position to form judgment for ourselves from the situation and the feeling of parties. Very seldom does the historian himself add a word of comment.”

We are accustomed to admire among Thucydides’ great qualities as historian, his impartiality, his trustworthiness, vivid description, sense of contrast, conciseness, epigrammatic sententiousness, reserve, pathos. We come to approve heartily his way of leaving facts clearly stated and skilfully grouped to carry their own judgments. He is never a partisan, and the unsophisticated reader might at times wonder what his nationality was did he not frequently subscribe himself “Thucydides the Athenian.” Historians sometimes criticise his attitude, but they all accept his statements of fact. His descriptions of battles read as if he himself had been present. He dramatises history by placing events in such juxtaposition that a world of moral is conveyed without a word of comment; for example, when the funeral oration with its splendid eulogy of Athens is followed by the description of the plague, the disgraceful Melian episode is succeeded by the Sicilian disaster, the holiday-like departure from Athens is set over against the distressful flight from Syracuse. He packs his language so full of meaning that at times a sentence does duty for a paragraph, a word for a sentence. “Of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most,” and however much we regret his reserve, since for much that he might have told us we have no other witnesses, we come more and more to regard this as great art. As for pathos, no historian ever excelled such passages as those where the utter defeat of a

hitherto invincible navy is portrayed (vii. lxxi), or the misery and dejection of the departing Athenian host is described (vii. lxxv), or where the final catastrophe in the river Assinarus seems to occur before our eyes, preparing us for the final sentence: “Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth, nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home.”

THUCYDIDES by T. W. Lumb

History, like an individual's life, is a succession of well-defined periods. Herodotus took as his subject a long cycle of events; the shorter period was first treated by Thucydides who introduced methods which entitle him to be regarded as the first modern historian. Born in Attica in 471 he was a victim of the great plague, was exiled for his failure to check Brasidas at Eion in 424 and spent the rest of his life in collecting materials for his great work. His death took place about 402.

His preface is remarkable as outlining his creed. First he states his subject, the Peloponnesian war of 431-404; he then tests by an appeal to reason the statements in old legends and in Homer, arguing from analogy or from historical survivals in his own time to prove that various important movements were caused or checked by economic influence. He uses his imagination to prove that the importance of an event cannot be decided from the extant remains of its place of origin, for if only the ruins of both Sparta and Athens were left, Sparta would be thought to be insignificant and Athens would appear twice as powerful as she really is. Poetical exaggeration is easy and misleading, and ancient history is difficult to determine by absolute proofs.

"Men accept statements about their own national past from one another without testing them."

"To most men the search for truth implies no effort; they prefer to turn to the first accounts available."

“It was difficult for me to write an exact narrative of the speeches actually made; I have therefore given the words that might have been expected of each speaker, adhering to the broad meaning of what was really uttered. The facts I have not taken from any chance person, nor have I given my own impressions, but have as accurately as possible written a detailed account of what I witnessed myself or heard from others. The discovery of these facts was laborious owing to conflicting statements and confused memories and party favour. Perhaps the unromantic nature of my record will make it uninteresting; but if any person will judge it useful because he desires to consider a clear account of actual facts and of what is likely to recur at some future time, I shall be content. As a compilation it is rather an eternal possession than a prize-essay for a moment.”

The essentially modern idea of history writing is here perfectly evident.

Having pointed out the significance of the war, not only to Greece but to the whole of the world, he gives its causes. To him the real root of the trouble was Sparta’s fear of Athenian power: the alleged pretexts were different. The rise of Athens is rapidly described, her building of the walls broken down by the Persians, her control of the island-states in a Delian league which eventually became the nucleus of her Empire, her alliance with Megara, a buffer-state between

herself and Corinth. This last saved her from fears of a land invasion; when she built for Megara long walls to the sea she incurred the intense anger of Corinth which smouldered for years and at last caused the Peloponnesian conflagration. The reduction of Aegina in 451 compensated for the loss of Boeotia and Egypt. Eventually the Thirty Years' Peace was concluded in 445; Athens gave up Megara, but retained Euboea; her definite policy for the future was concentration on a maritime empire; she controlled nearly all the islands of the Aegean and was mistress of the Saronic gulf, Aegina, "the eyesore of the Peiraeus", having fallen.

But if she was to confine her energies to the sea, it was essential that she should be mistress of all the trade-routes which in ancient history usually ran along the coast. On both east and west she found Corinth in possession; a couple of quarrels with this city ruptured the peace. In the west, Corinth had founded Corcyra (Corfu); this daughter colony quarrelled with her mother and prevailed. In itself Corcyra was of little importance in purely Greek politics, but it happened to possess a large navy and commanded the trade-route to Sicily, whence came the corn supply. When threatened with vengeance by Corinth, she appealed to Athens, where ambassadors from Corinth also appeared. Their arguments are stated in the speeches which are so characteristic of Thucydides. The Athenians after careful consideration decided to conclude a defensive alliance with Corcyra, for they dreaded the acquisition of her navy by Corinth. But circumstances turned this into an offensive alliance, for Corinth attacked and would have won a complete victory at sea but for timely Athenian succour. In the east Athens was even more vitally concerned in trade with the Hellespont, through which her own corn passed. On this route was the powerful Corinthian city Potidaea, situate on the western prong of Chalcidice. It had joined the Athenian confederacy but had secured independence by building strong walls. When the Athenians demanded their

destruction and hostages as a guarantee, the town revolted and appealed to the mother-city Corinth. A long and costly siege drained Athens of much revenue and distracted her attention; but worst of all was the final estrangement of the great trade rival whom she had thwarted in Greece itself by occupying Megara, in the west by joining Corcyra, and in the east by attacking Potidsea.

The final and open pretext for war was the exclusion of Megara from all Athenian markets; this step meant the extinction of the town as a trading-centre and was a definite set-back to the economic development of the Peloponnese, of which Corinth and Megara were the natural avenues to northern Greece. The cup was full; Athenian ambition had run its course. The aggrieved states of the Peloponnese were invited to put their case at Sparta; Corinth drew a famous picture of the Athenian character, its restlessness, energy, adaptability and inventiveness. “In the face of such a rival,” they added,

“Sparta hesitates; in comparison Spartan methods are antiquated,
but modern principles cannot help prevailing; in a stagnant state
conservative institutions are the best, but when men are faced with
various difficulties great ingenuity is essential; for that reason
Athens through her wide experience has made more innovations.”

An Athenian reply failed to convince the allies of her innocence; one of the Spartan Ephors forced the congress to declare that Athens had violated the peace. A second assembly was summoned, at which the Corinthians in an estimate of the Athenian power gave reasons for believing it would eventually be reduced. They further appealed to what

has never yet failed to decide in favour of war — race antagonism; the Athenians and her subjects were Ionians, whereas the Peloponnesians were mainly Dorians. The necessary vote for opening hostilities was secured; but first an ultimatum was presented. If Athens desired peace she must rescind the exclusion acts aimed at Megara. At the debate in the Athenian assembly Pericles, the virtual ruler, gave his reason for believing Athens would win; he urged a demand for the withdrawal of Spartan Alien Acts aimed at Athens and her allies and offered arbitration on the alleged grievances.

It is well to repeat the causes of this war: trade rivalry, naval competition, race animosity and desire for predominance. Till these are removed it is useless to expect permanent peace in spite of Leagues or Tribunals or Arbitration Courts. Further, it should be noted that Thucydides takes the utmost care to point out the excellent reasons the most enlightened statesmen had for arriving at contradictory conclusions; the event proved them all wrong without exception. The future had in store at least two events which no human foresight could discover, and these proved the deciding factors in the conflict.

The war began in 431 by a Theban attack on Plataea, the little town just over the Attic frontier which had been allied with Athens for nearly a century and protected her against invasion from the north. This city had long been hated by Thebes as a deserter from her own league; it alone of Boeotian towns had not joined the Persians. Burning with the desire to capture it, a body of Thebans entered the place by night, seizing the chief positions. But in the morning their scanty numbers were apparent; recovering from panic the Plataeans overwhelmed the invaders and massacred them. This open violation of the treaty kindled the war-spirit. Both sides armed, Sparta being more popular as pretending to free Greece from a tyrant. Their last ambassador on leaving

Athenian territory said: “This day will be the beginning of mighty woes for Greece”.

The Spartans invaded Attica, cutting down the fruit trees and forcing the country folk into the city; the Athenians replied by ravaging parts of Peloponnese and Megara. The funeral of the first Athenian victims of the war was the occasion of a remarkable speech. Pericles in delivering it expounds the Athenian ideal of life.

“We do not compete with other constitutions, we are rather a pattern for the rest. In our democracy all are equal before the law; each man is promoted to public office not by favour but by merit, according as he can do the State some service. We love beauty in its simplicity, we love knowledge without losing manliness. Our citizens can administer affairs both private and public; our working classes have an adequate knowledge of politics. To us the most fatal error is the lack of theoretical instruction before we attempt any duty. In a word, I say that Athens is an education for all Greece; individually we can prove ourselves competent to face the most varied forms of human activity with the maximum of grace and adaptability.... We have forced the whole sea and every land to open to our enterprise. Look daily at the material power of the city and love her passionately. Her glory was

won by men who did their duty and sacrificed themselves for her. The whole world is the sepulchre of famous men; their memory is not only inscribed on pillars in their own country, it lives unwritten in the hearts of men in alien lands."

At the beginning of the next year a calamity which no statesman could have foreseen overtook Athens. A mysterious plague of the greatest malignity scourged the city, the mortality being multiplied among the crowds of refugees. The city's strength was seriously impaired, public and private morality were undermined, inasmuch as none knew how long he had to live. Discouraged by it and by the invasions the Athenians sent a fruitless embassy to Sparta and tinned in fury on Pericles. He made a splendid defence of his policy and gave them heart to continue the struggle; he pointed out that it was better to lose their property and save the State than save their property and lose the State; their fleet opened to them the world of waters over which they could range as absolute masters. Soon afterwards he died, surviving the opening of the war only two years and a half; his character and abilities received due acknowledgment from Thucydides.

At this point Sparta decided to destroy Plataea, the Athenian outpost in Boeotia. A very brilliant description of the siege and counter-operations reveals very clearly the Spartan inability to attack walled towns and explains their objection to fortified friends. Leaving the town guarded they retired for a time, to complete the work later. The war began to spread beyond the Peloponnese to the north of the Corinthian gulf, the control of which was important to both sides. The Acarnanians were attacked by Sparta and appealed to the Athenian admiral Phormio. Two naval actions in the gulf revealed the astonishing superiority of

the Athenian navy on the high seas. Threatened in her corn supply in the west, Sparta began to intrigue with the outlying kingdoms on the north-east, the “Thraceward parts” on the trade-route being the objective.

A spirit of revolt against Athenian rule appeared in Lesbos, which seceded in 428. The chief town in this non-Ionic island was Mytilene, which sent ambassadors to Sparta. Their speech clearly explains how the Athenians were able to keep their hold on their policy; her policy (like that of Rome) was to divide the allies by carefully grading their privileges, playing off the weak against the stronger. The Spartans proved unable to help and the Athenians easily blockaded the city, capturing it early in 427. In their anger they at first decided to slay all the inhabitants, but a better feeling led to a reconsideration next day. In the Assembly two great speeches were delivered. Pericles had been succeeded by Cleon, to whom Thucydides seems to have been a little unjust. He opened his speech with the famous remark that a democracy cannot govern an Empire; it is liable to sudden fits of passion which make a consistent policy impossible. He himself never changed his plans, but his audience were different.

“You are all eyes for speeches, all ears for deeds; you judge of
the possibility of a project from good speeches; accomplished facts
you believe not because you see them but because you hear them from
smart critics. You are easily duped by some novel plan, but you
refuse to adhere to what has been proved sound. You are slaves to
every new oddity and have nothing but contempt for what is familiar.

Every one of you would like to be a good speaker, failing that, to rival your orators in cleverness. You are as quick to guess what is coming in a speech as you are slow at foreseeing its consequences. In a word, you live in some non-real world."

He pleaded for the rigorous application of the extreme penalty already voted.

He was opposed by Diodotus, who appealed to the same principle as Cleon did expediency.

"No penalty will deter men, not even the death penalty. Men have run through the whole catalogue of deterrents in the hope of securing themselves against outrage, yet offences still are common. Human nature is driven by some uncontrollable master passion which tempts it to danger. Hope and Desire are everywhere and are most mischievous, for they are invisible. Fortune too is as powerful a means of exciting men. At tunes she stands unexpectedly at their side and leads them to take risks with too slender resources. Most of all she tempts cities, for they are contending for the greatest prizes, liberty or domination. It is absolutely childish then to imagine that when human nature is bent on performing a thing it will

be deterred by law or any other force. If revolting cities are quite sure that no mercy will be shown, they will fight to the last, bequeathing the victors only smoking ruins. It would be more expedient to be merciful and thus save the expenses of a long siege."

This saner view prevailed. The doctrine of a "ruling passion" is a remarkable contribution to Greek political thought, the abstract personifications reading like the work of a poet or philosopher. An exciting race against time is most graphically described. After great exertions the ship bearing the reprieve arrived just in time to save Mytilene. This act of mercy stands in sinister contrast with the treatment the unhappy Plataeans received from the liberators of Greece. The citizens were captured, Athens having strangely abandoned them in spite of her promise to help. They were allowed to commemorate their services to Greece, appealing in a most moving speech to the sacred ground of their city, the scene of the immortal battle. All was in vain. The Thebans accused them of flat treachery to Boeotia, securing their condemnation. Corcyra similarly proved unprofitable; it was afflicted by fratricidal dissensions which coloured one of Thucydides' darkest pictures. As the war went on it became clearer that it was a struggle between two rival political creeds, democracy and oligarchy. To the partisans all other ties were of little value, whether of blood or race or religion; only frenzied boldness and unquestioning obedience to a party organisation were of any consequence. This wretched spirit of feud was destined in the long run to spell the doom of the Greek cities. In 427 the first mention was made of the will-of-the-wisp which in time led Athens to her ruin. In her anxiety to intercept the Peloponnesian corn she supported Leontini

against Syracuse, the leading Sicilian state. In Acarnania the capable general Demosthenes after a series of movements not quite fruitless succeeded in bringing peace to the jarring mountain tribes.

In 425 a most important event took place. As an Athenian squadron was proceeding to Sicily it was forced to put in at Pylos, where many centuries later Greece won a famous victory over the Turks. Demosthenes, though he had no official command, persuaded his comrades to fortify the place as a base from which to harry Spartan territory. It was situated in the country which had once belonged to the Messenians who for generations had been held down by the Spartan oligarchs. Deserters soon began to stream in; the gravity of the situation was recognised by the Spartan government who landed more than four hundred of their best troops on the island of Sphacteria at the entrance to the bay. These were speedily isolated by the Athenian navy; and news of the event filled all Greece with excitement. A heated discussion took place at Athens, where Cleon accused Nicias, the commander-in-chief, of slackness in not capturing the blockaded force. Spartan overtures for a peace on condition of the return of the isolated men proved vain; after a lively altercation with Nicias Cleon made a promise to capture the Spartans within thirty days, a feat which he accomplished with the aid of Demosthenes. Nearly three hundred were found to prefer surrender to death; these were conveyed to Athens and were an invaluable asset for bargaining a future peace.

A further success was the capture of Nisaea, the port of Megara, in 424, but an attempt to propagate democracy in Boeotia ended in a severe defeat at Delium; the fate of Plataea was a bad advertisement in an oligarchically governed district. Worse was to follow. Brasidas, a Spartan who had greatly distinguished himself at Pylos, passed through Thessaly with a volunteer force, reaching Thrace and capturing some important towns; the loss of one of

these, Eion, caused the exile of the historian, who was too late to save it. In 423 a truce for one year was arranged between the combatants, but Brasidas ignored it, sowing disaffection among the Athenian allies. His personal charm gave them a good impression of the Spartan character and his offer of liberty was too attractive to be resisted. His success was partly due to a deliberate misrepresentation of the Athenian power which proved greater than it seemed to be. The two real obstacles to peace were Brasidas and Cleon; at Amphipolis they met in battle; a rash movement gave the Spartan an opportunity for an attack. He fell in action, but the town was saved. Cleon was killed in the same battle and the path to peace was clear. The truce for one year developed into a regular settlement in 421, Nicias being responsible for its negotiation in Athens. The chief clause provided that Athens should recover Amphipolis in exchange for the Spartan captives.

The members of the Peloponnesian league considered themselves betrayed by this treaty, for their hated rival Athens had not been humbled. Corinth was the ringleader in raising disaffection. She determined to create a new league, including Argos, the inveterate foe of Sparta. This state had stood aloof from the war, nursing her strength and biding her time for revenge. When Sparta failed to restore Amphipolis, the war party at Athens, led by Alcibiades, formed an alliance with Argos to reduce Sparta; but this policy alienated Corinth, who refused to act with her trade rival. An Argive attack on Arcadia ended in the fierce battle of Mantinea in 418, in which Sparta won a complete victory. Argos was forced to come to terms, the new league was dissolved and Athens was once more confronted by her combined enemies, her diplomacy a failure and her trump-card, the Sphacterian prisoners, lost.

Next year she was guilty of an act of sheer outrage. Her fleet descended on the island of Melos, which had remained neutral, though its inhabitants were colonists from the

Spartan mainland close by. Nowhere does the dramatic nature of Thucydides' work stand more clearly revealed than in his account of this incident. He represents the Athenian and Melian leaders as arguing the merits of the case in a regular dialogue, essentially a dramatic device. The Athenian doctrine of Might and Expediency is unblushingly preached and acted upon, in spite of Melian protests; the island was captured, its population being slain or enslaved. Such an act is a fitting prelude to the great disaster which forms the next act of Thucydides' drama.

In 416 Athens proceeded to develop her design of subjugating Sicily. Segesta was at feud with Selinus; as the latter city applied to Syracuse for aid, the former bethought her of her ancient alliance with Athens. Next year the Sicilian ambassadors arrived with tales of unlimited wealth to finance an expedition. Nicias, the leader of the peace party, vainly counselled the Assembly to refrain; he was overborne by Alcibiades, whose ambition it was to reduce not only Sicily but Carthage also. When the expedition was about to sail most of the statues of Hermes in the city were desecrated in one night. Alcibiades, appointed to the command with Nicias and Lamachus, was suspected of the outrage, but was allowed to sail. The fleet left the city with all the pomp and ceremony of prayer and ritual, after which it showed its high spirits in racing as far as Aegina.

In Sicily itself Hermocrates, the great Syracusan patriot, repeatedly warned his countrymen of the coming storm, advising them to sink all feuds in resistance to the common enemy. He was opposed by Athenagoras, a democrat who, true to his principles, suspected the story as part of a militarist plot to overthrow the constitution. His speech is the most violent in Thucydides, but contains a passage of much value.

"The name of the whole is People, that of a part is Oligarchy;

the rich are the best guardians of wealth, the educated class can
make the wisest decisions, the majority are the best judges of
speeches. All these classes in a democracy have equal power both
individually and collectively. But oligarchy shares the dangers
with the many, while it does not merely usurp the material benefits,
rather it appropriates and keeps them all."

The Athenians received a cold welcome wherever they went. At Catana they found their state vessel waiting to convey Alcibiades home to stand his trial; he effected his escape on the homeward voyage, crossing to the Peloponnese. The great armament instead of thrusting at Syracuse wasted its time and efficiency on side-issues, mainly owing to the cold leadership of Nicias. This valuable respite was used to the full by Hermocrates, who at a congress held at Camarina was insistent on the racial character of the struggle between themselves who were Dorians and the Ionians from Athens. This national antipathy contributed greatly to the final decision of the conflict.

Passing to Sparta, Alcibiades deliberately betrayed his country. His speech is of the utmost importance.

His view of democracy is contemptuous. "Nothing new can be said of what is an admitted folly." He then outlined the Athenian ambition; it was to subdue Carthage and Sicily, bring over hosts of warlike barbarians, surround and reduce the Peloponnese and then rule the whole Greek-speaking world. He advised his hearers to aid Sicilian incapacity by sending a Spartan commander; above all, he counselled the occupation of Deceleia, a town in Attica just short of the border, through which the corn supply was conveyed to the capital; this would lead to the capture of the silver-mines at

Laureium and to the decrease of the Athenian revenues. He concluded with an attempt to justify his own treachery, remarking that when a man was exiled, he must use all means to secure a return.

The Spartans had for some time been anxious to open hostilities; an act of Athenian aggression gave them an opportunity. Meanwhile in Sicily Lamachus had perished in attacking a Syracusan cross-wall. Left in sole command, Nicias remained inactive, while Gylippus, despatched from Sparta, arrived in Syracuse just in time to prevent it from capitulating. The seventh book is the record of continued Athenian disasters. Little by little Gylippus developed the Syracusan resources. First he made it impossible for the Athenians to circumvallate the city; then he captured the naval stores of the enemy, forcing them to encamp in unhealthy ground. Nicias had begged the home government to relieve him of command owing to illness. Believing in the lucky star of the man who had taken Nissea they retained him, sending out a second great fleet under Demosthenes. The latter at once saw the key to the whole situation. The Syracusan cross-wall which Nicias had failed to render impassable must be captured at all costs. A night attack nearly succeeded, but ended in total defeat. Demosthenes immediately advised retreat; but Nicias obstinately refused to leave. In the meantime the Syracusans closed the mouth of their harbour with a strong boom, penning up the Athenian fleet. The famous story of the attempt to destroy it calls out all the author’s powers of description. He draws attention to the narrow space in which the action was fought. As long as the Athenians could operate in open water they were invincible; but the Syracusans not only forced them to fight in a confined harbour, they strengthened the prows of their vessels, enabling them to smash the thinner Athenian craft in a direct charge. The whole Athenian army went down to the edge of the water to watch the engagement which was to settle their fate. Their

excitement was pitiable, for they swayed to and fro in mental agony, calling to their friends to break the boom and save them. After a brave struggle, the invaders were routed and driven to the land by the victorious Syracusans.

Retreat by land was the only escape. A strategem planned by Hermocrates and Nicias' superstitious terrors delayed the departure long enough to enable the Syracusans to secure the passes in the interior. When the army moved away the scene was one of shame and agony; the sick vainly pleaded with their comrades to save them; the whole force contrasted the proud hopes of their coming with their humiliating end and refused to be comforted by Nicias, whose courage shone brightest in this hour of defeat. Demosthenes' force was isolated and was quickly captured; Nicias' men with great difficulty reached the River Assinarus, parched with thirst. Forgetting all about their foes, they rushed to the water and fought among themselves for it though it ran red with their own blood. At last the army capitulated and was carried back to Syracuse. Thrown into the public quarries, the poor wretches remained there for ten weeks, scorched by day, frost-bitten by night. The survivors were sold into slavery.

"This was the greatest achievement in the war and, I think, in
Greek history the most creditable to the victors, the most
lamentable to the vanquished. In every way they were utterly
defeated; their sufferings were mighty; they were destroyed
hopelessly; ships, men, everything perished, few only returning
from the great host."

So ends the most heartrending story in Greek history, told with absolute fidelity by a son of Athens and a former general of her army.

The last book is remarkable for the absence of speeches; it is a record of the continued intrigues which followed the Sicilian disaster. Upheavals in Asia Minor brought into the swirl of plots Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap, anxious to recover control of Ionia hitherto saved by Athenian power. In 412 the Athenian subjects began to revolt, seventeen defections being recorded in all. At Samos a most important movement began; the democrats rose against their nobles, being guaranteed independence by Athens. Soon they made overtures to Alcibiades who was acting with the Spartan fleet; he promised to detach Tissaphernes from Sparta if Samos eschewed democracy, a creed odious to the Persian monarchy. The Samians sent a delegation to Athens headed by Pisander, who boldly proposed Alcibiades' return, the dissolution of the democracy in Samos and alliance with Tissaphernes. These proposals were rejected, but the democracy at Athens was not destined to last much longer, power being usurped by the famous Four Hundred in 411. The Samian democracy eventually appointed Alcibiades general, while in Athens the extremists were anxious to come to terms with Sparta. This movement split the Four Hundred, the constitution being changed to that of the Five Thousand, a blend of democracy and oligarchy which won Thucydides' admiration; the history concludes with the victory of the Athenians in the naval action at Cynossema in 410.

The defects of Thucydides are evident; his style is harsh, obscure and crabbed; it is sometimes said that he seems wiser than he really is mainly because his language is difficult; that if his thoughts were translated into easier prose our impressions of his greatness would be much modified. Yet it is to be remembered that he, like Lucretius, had to create his own vocabulary. It is a remarkable fact that

prose has been far more difficult to invent than poetry, for precision is essential to it as the language of reasoning rather than of feeling. Instead of finding fault with a medium which was necessarily imperfect because it was an innovation we should be thankful for what it has actually accomplished. It is not always obscure; at times, when “the lion laughed” as an old commentator says, he is almost unmatched in pure narrative, notably in his rapid summary of the Athenian rise to power in the first book and in the immortal Syracusan tragedy of the seventh.

His merits are many and great; his conciseness, repression of personal feeling, love of accuracy, careful research, unwillingness to praise overmuch and his total absence of preconceived opinion testify to an honesty of outlook rare in classical historians. Because he feels certain of his detachment of view, he quite confidently undertakes what few would have faced, the writing of contemporary history. Nowadays historians do not trust themselves; we may expect a faithful account of our Great War some fifty years hence, if ever. Not so Thucydides; he claims that his work will be a treasure for all time; had any other written these words we should have dismissed them as an idle boast.

For he is the first man to respect history. It was not a plaything; it was worthy of being elevated to the rank of a science. As such, its events must have some deep causes behind them, worth discovering not only in themselves as keys to one particular period, but as possible explanations of similar events in distant ages. Accordingly, he deemed it necessary to study first of all our human nature, its varied motives, mostly of questionable morality, next he studied international ethics, based frankly on expediency. The results of these researches he has embodied (with one or two exceptions) in his famous speeches. He surveyed the ground on which battles were fought; he examined inscriptions, copying them with scrupulous care; he criticised ancient history and contemporary versions of

famous events, many of which he found to be untrue. Further, his anxiety to discover the real sources of certain policies made it necessary for him to write an account of seemingly purposeless action in wilder or even barbarous regions such as Arcadia, Ambracia, Macedonia; in consequence his work embraces the whole of the Greek world, as he said it would in his famous preface.

As an artist, he is not without his merits. The dramatic nature of his plan has been frequently pointed out; to him the main plot is the destruction not of Athens, but of the Periclean democracy, the overthrow thereof being due to a conflict with another like it; hence the marked change in the last book, in which the main dramatic interest has waned. This dramatic form has, however, defeated its own objects sometimes, for all the Thucydidean fishes talk like Thucydidean whales.

To us he is indispensable. We are a maritime power, ruling a maritime empire, our potential enemies being military nations. He has warned us that democracy cannot govern an empire. Perhaps our type of this creed is not so full of the lust for domination and aggrandisement as was that of Athens; it may be suspected that we are virtuous mainly because we have all we need and are not likely to be tempted overmuch. But there is the other and more subtle danger. The enemies within the state betrayed Deceleia which safeguarded the food-supply. We have many Deceleias, situate along the great trade-routes and needing protection. Once these are betrayed we shall not hold out as Athens did for nearly ten years; ten weeks at the outside ought to see our people starving and beaten, fit for nothing but the payment of indemnities to the power which relieves us of our inheritance.

No concrete evidence is known regarding Thucydides' death. According to Pausanias, an Athenian named Oenobius had a law passed allowing Thucydides to return to Athens, shortly after the city's surrender in 404 BC. Pausanias claimed that Thucydides was murdered on his way back to Athens. Many doubt this account, seeing evidence to suggest he lived as late as 397 BC. Plutarch claims that his remains were returned to Athens and placed in Cimon's family vault.

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